Word Count: 5083

Hegel on Recognition: Challenging Dehumanisation and Denial of

Personhood
Introduction:

This paper aims to address the issue of dehumanisation and the attribution of personhood through a
logical reconstruction of Hegel’s master-and-bondsman relationship; this is achieved through tracing
the developmental stages of the master-and-bondsman process and highlighting the key aspects that
have the ability to play a fundamental role in addressing dehumanisation and the attribution of
personhood. The paper is structured as follows; firstly, a summary of dehumanisation as proposed by
Smith (2014)1 and secondly, usage of Hegel’s master-and-bondsman relationship that aims to address
this issue through highlighting the logical inconsistencies within a dehumanist position or belief. As a
result, the issues and paradoxical nature of holding dehumanisation beliefs entails that they can be
addressed via the logical moves within Hegel’s master-and-bondsman relationship, as will be shown.
My responses to these arguments will take the form of an analysis of the “Independence and
Dependence of Self-Consciousness”2 section of the Phenomenology of Spirit (or Hegel’s master-and-
bondsman relationship or master-and-slave dialectic as it is sometimes referred to in the literature3) and
how this challenges the viewpoints put forward by dehumanist’s. As a result, I propose that mutual
Recognition is a necessary postulate (a theoretical posit by a given agent that due to its pragmatic usage
is binding on normative agents) for addressing the issue and that it can be argued to be widely adoptable
by scholars working within the area of dehumanisation, including non-philosophers. This paper will
proceed as follows: addressing what dehumanisation is considered to be and responding to viewpoints
that hold dehumanisation acceptable or hold belief in dehumanisation acceptable. This will be achieved
through the usage of Hegel and its application to these discourses, showing that these argumentative
moves that may be performed by potential interlocutors are not allowable within the sphere of reason-
giving.

Usage of Hegel’s master-and-bondsman in this paper is meant to be ‘dialogical’4 insofar as we can use
the relevant sections of the Phenomenology in order to account for both how positions of
dehumanisation (and the positions of possible interlocutors who hold dehumanisation views) are arrived
at, and how they can be logically shown to be cases of bad reasoning. This is the purpose of

1
Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014):
814-824.
2
Pinkard’s translation: “Self-sufficiency and Non-Self-Sufficiency of Self-Consciousness; Master and Servitude”;
Terry Pinkard; G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019),
108. Miller’s translation: “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage”; A.V.
Miller, G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 111.
3
Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), 208.
4
To clarify; dialectic in the section of Hegel’s text refers to the particular methodology by which Hegel’s enquiry
proceeds. By Dialogical, I mean the methodology I put to use in the paper and the way in which my enquiry
proceeds.

1
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incorporating the master-and-bondsman relationship into this issue. Furthermore, by this is meant that
any interlocutor who holds dehumanising views can be challenged on their dehumanist views through
usage of Hegel’s master-and-bondsman relationship. From this, we can ascertain the general schema of
the master-and-bondsman relationship as contributing to the aim of attempting to challenge dehumanist
positions. The criteria for success involved in the discussion of this paper will be based around whether
the master-and-bondsman relation proposed by Hegel is adequate for confronting interlocutors who
utilise a belief in dehumanisation; therefore, we can claim it as successful if we can utilise Hegel’s
master-and-bondsman relation in a manner that is able to ‘shutdown’ or ‘negate’ viewpoints utilising
dehumanisation that may be held by potential interlocutors. Firstly, the issue of dehumanisation will be
discussed, then, Hegel’s analysis of Recognition will be discussed, and its application assessed.5

Dehumanisation:

Dehumanisation must first be considered in its historical context. In the Politics, Aristotle puts forward
a view that argues for the racial distinction that sets in stone the allowance of personhood to members
of a given societal class.6 Aristotle’s Polis is one that is willing to deny personhood and allow for a
slave-class that is ultimately accepted as normative and justifiable within Aristotle’s reason-giving;
because society is by definition unequal, we can justify the existence of a slave-class.7 Examples of
dehumanisation also include beliefs about Africans that were entertained by English colonists in the
Americas during the late 17th century – Smith (2014) draws attention to the writings of Morgan
Godwyn, an Anglican clergyman and civil rights activist of the period, making it clear that many (or
most) colonists in both the Caribbean and North America regarded African slaves as subhuman
creatures.8 On the other hand, Locke’s defence of liberal political philosophy, natural rights (in the
Second Treatise) did not apply to the slave-trade in North America.9 We can categorise these as
instances of dehumanisation towards a given set of individuals and a belief in dehumanisation, although
we distinguish them in how they view the given individuals subject to the dehumanisation – for
Aristotle, it is a rational consequence of a given society that a slave-class is allowable, while for Locke

5
Shane O’Neill and Nicholas Smith, Recognition Theory as Social Research: Investigating the Dynamics of Social
Conflict (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); O’Neill and Smith (2012) consider Recognition to have
potential as a research programme in the social sciences. Regarding this, it may be added that this research
programme would only make sense when associated or working in coordination with research into
dehumanisation. This is due to dehumanisation being an area of research largely focused on the theoretical
categorisation of dehumanisation as a position, while recognition, in juxtaposition, is an attempted practical
solution to the problem of addressing dehumanisation viewpoints. As a result, the study of dehumanisation
(historical and contemporary) is coordinated with the study of Recognition and mutual Recognition in a way that
is mutually beneficial.
6
Aristotle, Politics: 1254b16–21.
7
Tony Burns, “Aristotle,” in Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Present, ed. David Boucher & Paul Kelly
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 85.
8
Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014):
815-817.
9
Susan Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti”, Critical Inquiry 26, No. 4 (2000): 821-865; John Locke, Two Treatises
of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

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the dehumanisation of the given individuals is demarcated as outside the realm of the implications of
his political theory. Likewise, take for example the 19th century emergence of justification for racist
argumentation through ‘scientific’, biological reasoning; as shown in the eugenics movement or
phrenology10, in which dehumanist rhetoric involved the attempt at arguing that there were legitimate
scientific reasons as to why members of a given group were inferior or non-human, based around a
biological dichotomy between ‘low-hygiene’ and ‘purity’ of the genes of the dehumanisers.11
Furthermore, we see that over the thirty years before the end of Apartheid in South Africa, that control
over language and discourse was central to dehumanisation, through the enforcement of alternative
languages different from a given groups own chosen or preferred mode of discourse or language-
usage.12

Dehumanisation and Recognition as a historical phenomenon feeds into this discussion, but ultimately
it will be viewed as a contemporary problem. Essential to this paper is the premise that dehumanist
views deny recognition of personhood.13 ). Firstly, Smith (2014) provides a general outline of the issue
of dehumanisation, specifically the psychological phenomena of a belief in dehumanisation. Smith
(2014) proposes a systematic understanding of dehumanisation following the psychological literature
on this problem, opting for a depiction of dehumanisation that is based on the psychological essentialism
of a dehumanist perspective, i.e. that the dehumaniser would hold a belief in there being an essentialist
account of human-beings that having this essentialist feature allows for a demarcation between human-
being and supposed inferior or lower lifeforms. It must be explicitly stated that Smiths views only
account for the psychological disposition in which dehumanisation is held as a belief, but Smith believes
this to be deeply philosophical due to the involvement of essentialism in these beliefs and understanding
essentialism therefore is involved in understanding dehumanisation. Dehumanisation is an issue that is
cross-discipline; it is engaged with multiple fields of study. Likewise, by challenging dehumanist views
we also make a larger social claim in that we assert the positive statement of not remaining under a
conception of tutelage (the term used by Kant in ‘What is Enlightenment?’). This applies to a larger
social project; especially in areas of society or societal domains in which dehumanist views are the
‘norm’.14 Smith’s views are only discussed in so much as they account for an understanding of

10
Alasdair Macintyre, “Hegel on Faces and Skulls,” in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Alasdair
Macintyre (Notre-Dame: University of Notre-Dame Press, 1976), 219-237.
11
Rowan savage, ““Disease Incarnate”: Biopolitical Discourse and Genocidal Dehumanisation in the Age of
Modernity,” Journal of Historical Sociology 20, no. 3 (2007): 404-405.
12
Anne-Marie Beukes, “‘The greasy pole of dehumanisation’: Language and violence in South Africa,” Language
Matters 43, no. 2 (2012): 128-130.
13
Brian J. Buckley, “Racism and the Denial of Personhood,” Quaestiones Disputatae 9, Issue 2 (2019): 196.
14
Immanuel Kant, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54-61.

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dehumanisation and my discussion of Hegel’s master-and-bondsman relation as a suggested solution to

the issue itself.15

The usage of the term dehumanisation denotes the “psychological stance of conceiving other humans
as subhuman creatures”.16 This can be expanded upon and categorised as the following:

1) “actions that subject others to indignities or involve treating others merely as means”17;
2) “rhetorical practices that metaphorically liken human-beings to non-human animals or
inanimate objects”18,one important aspect regarding dehumanisation and engaging with
interlocuters who may hold these views, is to consider “discursive and rhetorical properties”19;
3) “denial of the subjectivity, individuality, agency or distinctively human attributes of others [i.e.
personhood, whether this means having some sort of ineffable property unique to persons, or
something like consciousness20]”21;
4) “treating others in such a way as to erode, obstruct, or extinguish some of their distinctively
human attributes”22.

15
Smith (2014) points out that dehumanisation has been paid very little attention to by philosophers, and mostly
designated to the realm of psychologists and social-scientists; Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and
Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014): 814-815.
16
Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014):
814-815.
17
Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014):
814-815.
18
Idem.
19
Martha Augoustinos and Danielle Every, “Accusations and denials of racism: Managing moral accountability
in public discourse,” Discourse & Society 21, Issue 3 (2010): 251.
20
Dehumanisation may have strong links with the problem of other minds and the possibility of ‘p-zombies’.
Given the prevalence of Chalmers’ philosophical-zombie argument, there may be an instance in which it is used
as an argument for dehumanisation. This would likely proceed as follows: it follows from Chalmers p-zombie
argument that:

1) Consciousness is necessary for personhood

2) P-zombies lack consciousness
3) Therefore, p-zombies lack personhood

And that:

4) If p-zombies lack personhood, they cannot have the rights and liberties allocated to those with
personhood
5) P-zombies lack personhood
6) Therefore, p-zombies cannot be allocated the rights and liberties of those with personhood.

However, this is all we may say about this aspect of the zombie argument, dehumanisation and consciousness –
but it may be useful to bring awareness to the possibility of this type of scenario or any possible interlocuter who
holds these views or utilises this type of argumentation. Furthermore, the purpose of mentioning this possible line
of argumentation is only meant as a detour into the possible argumentation of a potential dehumanist interlocuter,
and not a prima facie attack on Chalmers line of argumentation in his work within consciousness-studies.
21
Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014):
814-815.
22
Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014):
814-815.

4
Word Count: 5083

Characterisation as any of the following (1-4) is an example of dehumanisation, and any instance that
is at the boundary-point between (1), (2), (3), (4) or a mix of one or more of them, is also an example
of dehumanisation. Dehumanist views also follow the general tendency of justification of negative acts
and views towards minority out-groups while positioning themselves as decent, moral, rational
citizens.23 The terminological idiom of ‘dehumanisation’ is also broad enough that we can apply it to
all given ‘discursive strategies’ that attempt to deny a given agents personhood.24 However, the views
presented are open to being altered given the requirements of a potential scenario or interlocuter, i.e. in
the context of empirical psychological studies on dehumanisation and its naturalistic data, assumptions
around the nature of dehumanisation as a psychological phenomenon are open to revision.25 For the
subject matter of this paper, the identification of dehumanisation is only relevant in so much as we can
apply Hegel’s master-and-bondsman relationship to its core tenants and see if this is an effective
strategy for dealing with interlocuters who may hold the observed, empirically study-able, phenomenon
of psychological dehumanisation. Furthermore, we need to consider whether there are any requirements
we can identify as archetypal to a dehumanist position.

The issue of ‘what is a dehumanist viewpoint’ requires an analysis of its component parts. The three
core components of a dehumanising position are as follows, and necessarily absolve themselves into
(1-4)26:

A) A given explanation of the appearance/reality distinction within the members of a given group
that are being dehumanised – i.e. how does the dehumanist account for the fact that although
the given group looks as though they should have personhood, they in fact do not, under the
dehumanist’s beliefs, this is seen most notably with the example of the European colonists and
Africans;
B) An essentialist belief – there is something ‘extra’ beyond reach or visibility that makes up for
the fact that personhood should not be attributed to the given group or individuals27;
C) Hierarchal order – the placement of the dehumanist is ordered above that of the individuals who
are being dehumanised on a given hierarchy – i.e. this is seen with the 19th century eugenics
movement and phrenology belief system.28

23
Martha Augoustinos and Danielle Every, “Accusations and denials of racism: Managing moral accountability
in public discourse,” Discourse & Society 21, Issue 3 (2010): 252
24
Gilbert Ramsay, . “Dehumanisation in religious and sectarian violence: the case of Islamic State,” Global
Discourse 6, Issue 4 (2016): 563.
25
Gilbert Ramsay, . “Dehumanisation in religious and sectarian violence: the case of Islamic State,” Global
Discourse 6, Issue 4 (2016): 564
26
Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014):
815-817
27
See Footnote (21.)
28
Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014):
815-817

5
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Dehumanisation for Smith consists in two stages; denying that others have a human essence, and when
this occurs, they are thought of as non-human, from this follows that a subhuman essence is attributed
to them.29 However, other instances of dehumanisation may occur in which an essence or lack of essence
is not attributed to the given group, and instead is given a set of different observable qualities that differs
from those the dehumanist attributes to themselves.30 As such, we can say that the usage of Hegel in
this paper is meant to address or attack any interlocutor who holds views that can be defined by these
three characteristics. To attribute these three characteristics to a viewpoint or interlocutor, is to attribute
a dehumanist thesis. It follows that dehumanisation is a phenomenon or view that may be held by a
given agent. This agent may hold the view that some individuals or groups of individuals cannot or
should not be attributed personhood. Thus, dehumanisation is a phenomenon concerned with the
attribution of personhood. It follows from this that the discussion or usage of Hegel and the master-and-
bondman relation is brought in to challenge the argumentative moves by a given agent who holds
dehumanising views, such that we can say that any potential dehumanising interlocuter can be
challenged on their beliefs in a dehumanist viewpoint. From this, we can ascertain a gradual progression
utilising the Master-and-bondsman relation in which we go from agents conceptualised as objects to
agents conceptualised as subjects, and thenceforth to a stage of mutual recognition between two agents
recognised by each other as subjects. The dichotomy between dehumanisation and Recognition is
central to this paper.

Recognition:

Hegel’s conception of the master-and-bondsman relation is a descriptive occurrence of an act of

Recognition.31 Recognition – in the context of this paper – being the polar-opposite to occurrences of
dehumanisation. To briefly state the central point of Hegel’s description of the master-and-bondsman
relation and how it arises; a conscious being can make value judgments about objects external to it, but
this becomes more complicated once those objects want to identify themselves as subjects, and a host
of difficulties ensues over the right to be recognised as subject rather than object.32 The master and
bondsman relationship that Hegel describes is linked intrinsically with the concept of ‘Recognition’,
Recognition acts as a necessary practical postulate by which agents can be given complex rights and

29
Idem.
30
Gilbert Ramsay, . “Dehumanisation in religious and sectarian violence: the case of Islamic State,” Global
Discourse 6, Issue 4 (2016): 566-567.
31
Terry Pinkard; G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2019), 108; Allen W. Wood. Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 85-86.
32
John Russon, “The Project of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,” in A Companion to Hegel, ed. Michael Baur &
Stephen Houlgate (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 58; In the context of the original text of the
Phenomenology, the starting-point offered by Hegel is one in which two agents are presented as engaged in a
‘tooth-and-claw’ fight to potential death, the scope of this paper does not cover this aspect of the master-and-
bondsman relationship and the surrounding themes regarding state of nature literature.

6
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liberties or basic recognition of personhood.33 The process of Recognition is only completable through
the utilisation of another agent that I encounter in experience and interact with in this conscious
experience, the desired goal for the mature self-conscious agent and any liberal society is mutual
Recognition where all agents are avowed their rights and liberties.34 The Recognition that Hegel is
concerned with is the German ‘Anerkennung’; the acknowledgment of another agents’ liberties and
rights and the acknowledgement that they have these things in their personhood.35 Hegel believes that
recognition in the modern state will be mutual,36 but this presents a Europe-centred view of world states
that seems inadequate for the 21st century; rather, applying the concept of Recognition in today’s
globalised world requires awareness of societies outside of Europe where minority or oppressed groups
are not achieving Recognition. As a result, we can establish that Recognition remains the necessary and
sufficient conditions for personhood.37 ). As with the historical examples mentioned prior, we see this
need for Recognition in beliefs about Africans that were entertained by English colonists in the
Americas during the late 17th century, as many (or most) colonists in both the Caribbean and North
America regarded African slaves as subhuman creatures.38

Let us take as our starting point that there is a desire for Recognition by a self-conscious agent.39 By
self-conscious agent is meant an agent whose object is itself, at its lowest form, it seeks Recognition
only for itself and at its most advanced form it desires mutual Recognition.40 This desire in theory
manifests itself as mutual (the best possible outcome) but in practice can turn out inaccurate, i.e. that
one agent receives Recognition while the other does not, becoming a binary relationship in which one
is the ‘master’ and the other is the ‘servant’.41 This is an example of the “psychological stance of
conceiving other humans as subhuman creatures”.42 This ‘inadequate’ relationship in which
dehumanisation occurs is the one we are concerned with due to its historical and real-world parallels,
while the instance of mutual Recognition is the desired goal. In Hegel’s description, a self-conscious
agent begins as existing in-and-for-itself (independent, not relying on any other agent).43 ). From this, a

33
Terry Pinkard; G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2019), 109.
34
H. S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason (Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 343; Terry
Pinkard; G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 110.
Such a scenario is exemplified by the modern European state and contemporary democracy, in which agents are
allowed to participate in the construction of the ruling body of a state as well as being allowed to have a set of
basic rights by which their potential actions are demarcated from forbidden actions.
35
Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), 245.
36
Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), 245.
37
Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), 246.
38
Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014):
815-817.
39
Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), 85-86.
40
Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009),
68.
41
Allen W. Wood. Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 89.
42
Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014):
814-815.
43
H. S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason (Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 343.

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scenario occurs in which this self-conscious agent (or more phenomenologically, let us take ourselves
as undergoing this experience) comes into contact with another agent, an agent which will differ from
other objects that can be encountered in experience.44 This agent – as Pinkard notes – will always be
conditioned, meaning being situated within a specific historical time and zone, within a social-space
and specific individual existence, i.e. we can take this agent as e.g. existing in ancient Greece for
instance, or an English colonists’ belief about Africans during the late 17th century. 45 From this, the
scenario involving the concept of Recognition emerges between two agents; being a relational concept
due to intersubjective involvement.46

Recognition thus becomes external. This leads to an impasse between the two agents; both are
underdeveloped so want Recognition only for themselves (they are not yet at the stage of wanting
mutual Recognition which the mature self-conscious seeks), in scenarios in which both want
Recognition only for themselves, a life or death struggle ensues.47 Hegel is clear that the dominance of
one agent over another will not establish the conditions for mutual Recognition – the historical parallels
being serfdom and slavery48 – with one agent being subjected under the other agent and the personhood
of the subjected agent being lost so that the other gains Recognition, this compromise should be seen
as a failure to establish mutual Recognition.49 Hegel is engaged in a form of externalism in the usage of
the concept of Recognition here. Hegel’s externalism is seen through the necessary requirement of
another self in the process of recognition, this form of externalism via multiple agents is reminiscent of
Clarke and Chalmers externalist thesis about the minds content.50 Thus, the active role of the
environment plays a part in cognitive processes as well as the involvement of assets and tools in the
mind’s cognition, the “manipulation of external media” and its assistance to the purely mental content.51
Recognition requires an external agent that allows for the process to take place, it cannot be achieved
with a single isolated individual. The mental is no longer considered in isolation, i.e. being a
determinate, single subject in isolation from other subjects. Externality and its considerations via Clarke

44
H. S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason (Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 52-53.
45
Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:
2008), 48.
46
H. S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason (Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 344;
Terry Pinkard; G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019),
109-110.
47
Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009),
69.
48
Hegel alludes to these when, in discussion of the development of a one-sided relationship between a master-
agent and servant-agent, he discusses the idea of the servant-agent developing talents through work. Although this
is the one-sided relationship in which mutual Recognition is not achieved, it is still an instance in which the
paradoxical nature of dehumanisation allows for there to be a move towards recognition, as the agent adopting
the master position must at the same time be in a position of power and also stagnant (i.e. not developing talents,
abilities and ‘works’) while the slave is doing just this, and as such, is really in a position in which the master has
some kind of co-dependence on the slave’s powers and abilities; Terry Pinkard; G. W. F. Hegel, The
Phenomenology of Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 114-116.
49
H. S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason (Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 344.
50
Andy Clarke and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998): 7.
51
Ibid, 8-11.

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and Chalmers thesis thus lead us on to the ideas of intersubjectivity; from considering the role of
external tools and assets in cognition to the placement of other subjects in the cognitive experience of
a self-conscious subject. As a result, if an agent wants Recognition, there is a reason why it is achieved
via another agent, and not an object like a rock, book or tree; this is the externalism an agent is not
looking for when it wants Recognition to occur.

However, regardless of the move towards an intersubjective approach, the arbiter of what will be
considered a valid instance of Recognition will always be the agent experiencing the process, or the
other agent who is also experiencing the process.52 The relationship required for recognition is a
necessary one, such that the viewpoint of the agent or the conscious experience of the agent is such that
she can only attain validation through being recognised by another (who claims) to also be an agent or
thinking, conscious subject ( ‘I’s’ who claim to be I’s – when the criterion we believe for this to be
established is necessarily subjective experience (or the best possible criterion of validation for this), i.e.
the ‘having’ of subjective experience. From this we can see that this underdeveloped self-conscious is
at an impasse and unable to achieve mutual Recognition because its mode of thinking is egoistical. The
solution to this is the introduction of a self-consciousness seeing itself in another; i.e. a projection of
selfhood onto another.53 However, this becomes more complex once there is an acknowledgement that
the agent to which the first agent wants to emulate is not simply an object, this agent has to make herself
into an object for the other agents sake or for her recognition of the other agent, this is a predominately
egotistical usage of the other agent and highlights how the issue at stake here centres around egotistical
assumptions in methodological approach; there is always the insistence that my perspective is the
correct way in which to engage with the other agent who is also seeking recognition – the validation of
my conscious experience is almost valid but requires approval from this other agent. From this, we can
assess that the process of Recognition requires the involvement of both agents, and that ultimately
mutual Recognition dispels dehumanisation problems through phenomenological awareness and the
preceding developments had by both agents. Likewise, potential interlocutors who hold a dehumanist
position will necessarily subscribe to the core components of a dehumanising position.54 From this, we

52
H. S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason (Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 344.
53
H. S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason (Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 345; The nature
of the move towards Recognition is normative in that one of the two agents, due to the nature of the proceeding
events and demands made by the other agent, that there is a paradoxical aspect of the categorisation offered by
one agent to another; ‘if X claims to demand personhood, exhibits signs of personhood, self-refers to themselves
as ‘I’ just as I do, then surely they are justifiable in demanding personhood, and from this, surely I am justified in
attributing them personhood?’ – the dilemma is such that the two competing agents are both going to be
undergoing the same or similar thought-processes regarding whether or not attributing personhood to the other
agent is acceptable. In one-sided instances in which one agent has a superiority over the other, this would not
occur, and the balance of power between the two agents would need to be reassessed before a move towards
mutual Recognition is achieved.
54
Smith, D. L. “Dehumanisation, Essentialism and Moral Psychology”. Philosophy Compass 9, Issue 11 (2014):
815-817

9
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must now consider how adequately the process of mutual Recognition deals with the dehumanisation
issue:

1) “actions that subject others to indignities or involve treating others merely as means”55. If these
actions are performed, the process of mutual Recognition will fail.
2) “rhetorical practices that metaphorically liken human-beings to non-human animals or
inanimate objects”56. The process of mutual Recognition allows challenges potential
interlocutors on this aspect of dehumanisation in that the agent seeking Recognition needs to
accommodate for a position in which the external agent is also able to receive Recognition,
otherwise neither receives Recognition. Given a potential interlocutor is making claims that fall
into the category of (2), they can thus be challenged on the basis that any potential
argumentative moves such as (2) are also open to the external agent who also seeks
Recognition, and thus if either or both agents were to make these claims, then the process of
Recognition would fail and thus be detrimental to the prospects of either agent.
3) “denial of the subjectivity, individuality, agency or distinctively human attributes of others”.57
The process of mutual Recognition absolves this issue in that the logical development,
beginning with is a desire for Recognition by a self-conscious agent and ending with mutual
approval between the two agents accommodates for a rejection of (3).
4) “treating others in such a way as to erode, obstruct, or extinguish some of their distinctively
human attributes”58. Recognition cannot be achieved with external objects lacking in qualities
of personhood, if an agent wants Recognition, there is a reason why it is achieved via another
agent, and not an object like a rock, book or tree; this is the externalism an agent is not looking
for when it wants Recognition to occur. the dominance of one agent over another will not
establish the conditions for mutual Recognition – the historical parallels being serfdom and
slavery – with one agent being subjected under the other agent and the personhood of the
subjected agent being lost so that the other gains Recognition, this compromise should be seen
as a failure to establish mutual Recognition.59

One way of interpreting the process put forward is to consider it as beginning with the issue of
dehumanisation, and then following a steady path through Hegel’s scenario, we arrive at a new
understanding of dehumanisation that takes account of the master-and-bondsman relation. From this,
we can ascertain that the master-and-bondsman relation is a necessary logical process by which we can
establish the grounds for Recognition as a juxtaposed and challenging view to dehumanist views and

55
Idem.
56
Idem.
57
Idem.
58
Idem.
59
H. S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder Volume 1: The Pilgrimage of Reason (Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 344

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Word Count: 5083

dehumanist views held by potential interlocutors. One objection we may have to confront may come
from Hegelians who may object that due to the nature of Hegelian thinking and Hegel’s conception of
aufheben (following Pinkard (2019), translated as ‘sublation’, the idea that in a move from rival
interlocuters conceptions we arrive at a new conception that takes account of both and adds and
subtracts some of the given elements of the prior conceptions) the dehumanist positions are not rejected,
but incorporated into a new position that takes account of whatever it is that the dehumanist has gotten
correctly. This is problematic. To what extent may we be willing to say that the dehumaniser has gotten
something or other right within their position? The easiest response to this would be to say that the
baseline aspect of any dehumanist position, i.e. a hierarchical order of natural kinds, was correct but
that, as a result of defective reasoning, the dehumaniser held a belief in inferior humans or attributed to
individuals that they are non-humans. Furthermore, the contentious nature of this objection may require
us to consider the issue at length another time.

Conclusion:

Overall, the paper has covered and addresses the issue of dehumanisation as it relates to the attribution
of personhood via a significant usage of Hegel, and that mutual Recognition is a necessary postulate for
addressing the issue of dehumanisation. We have seen that dehumanist positions have occupied an
important historical back-drop to relevant contemporary discussions, dehumanist views deny
recognition of personhood, dehumanist (following (Smith (2014)) is primarily a psychological belief or
phenomenon in which a demarcation between oneself and a given group or group of individuals is
attributed. From this, discussion or usage of Hegel and the master-and-bondman relation is brought in
to challenge the argumentative moves by a given agent who holds dehumanising views, such that we
can say that any potential dehumanising interlocuter can be challenged on their beliefs in a dehumanist
viewpoint, the process of Recognition requires the involvement of both agents, and that ultimately
mutual Recognition dispels dehumanisation problems through phenomenological awareness and the
preceding developments had by both agents. As a result, mutual Recognition is beneficial to any account
of agency and rights-attribution that wants to dispel dehumanisation and the views of potential
interlocutors who may hold dehumanist positions.

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