NOTES FOR TORTS (Lucas v. Tuano – St. Martin v.

LWW]
Ocean Builders v. Spouses Cubacub
 Bladimir Cubacub, a worker for petitioner Ocean Builders, caught chickenpox and was
advised by general manager Dennis Hao to rest at the company’s barracks.
- After three days he went about his usual chores.
- Later, he asked his co-worker to accompany him to his house so he could rest. His co-
worker told Hao of Bladimir’s intention and ordered the co-worker to bring Bladimir
to the hospital.
- He was later on placed in the ICU and died the following day. The cause of death was
cardio-respiratory arrest, multiple organ system failure, and chicken pox.
 Bladimir’s parents filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, claiming Hao was
guilty of negligence that resulted to the deterioration of Bladimir’s health that led to his
ultimate demise.
 RTC ruled that Hao was not negligent, as he was not under any obligation to bring
Bladimir to better hospitals.
 CA reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Hao’s failure to bring Bladimir to a
better hospital is a violation of Article 161 of the Labor Code.
- The CA claimed that Hao should have foreseen that Bladimir could suffer from
complications from chicken pox.
 In the present petition, they maintain that Hao exercised the diligence more than what the
law requires, thus, not liable for damages.
 SC ruled in favor of petitioners.
 To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be
present
a. Duty
 Art. 161 of Labor Code – employers should provide adequate and immediate
medical assistance and treatment to any sick employee in case of emergency
 Art. 157 – depending on number of employees, must have a full-time registered
nurse
 No allegation of either the company premises are hazardous or its number of
employees. They only have 7 regular and 20 contractual employees—short of the
minimum 50 to require a full-time nurse.
 Hao advised Bladimir to rest and had him brought to the nearest hospital.
b. Breach.
c. Injury and proximate causation.
 Proximate cause – in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have
occurred.
- An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it
appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the
 injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission.
- Hao’s alleged negligence cannot be the proximate cause.
 Dissent, J. Bersamin: Death was wrongful by reason of the employers’ failure.
- To isolate the co-worker to prevent the spread of chicken pox.
- To provide to him the legally mandated first aid treatment.
- To extend adequate medical and other assistance for his affliction with chicken pox
and the expected complications of the affliction (like letting him off from work in
order to have complete rest).
 Negligence is a relative term, not an absolute one, because its application depends
upon the situation of the parties and the reasonable degree of care and vigilance
that the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose.
- When the danger is great, a high degree of care is required, and the failure to
observe such degree of care amounts to want of ordinary care
a. Ocean Builders did not have first aider or clinic in the workplace
b. Hao insisted that Bladimir continue on the job, despite Bladimir’s request
to stay at parents’ home in Capas
c. Company barracks unsuitable for any employee afflicted with chicken pox
to have the requisite complete rest
 Small, cramped, wooden
d. Testimonies – instead of resting, Bladimir was still working
e. Hao confirmed that Bladimir contracted chickenpox from a co-worker
who was also residing in the barracks
f. Hao did not isolate Bladimir, and his assistance was too little too late
 Too late – by the time of rushing him to the community hospital
Bladimir had already collapsed due to the irreversible effects of the
deadly complications
Barredo v. Garcia
 A head-on collision between a taxi driven by Fontanilla and a carretela guided by
Dimapilis occurred. The carretela overturned, and Faustino Garcia, a passenger suffered
injuries that led to his death.
 A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla where he was convicted. Court granted to
reserve the right to bring a separate civil action.
 Parents of the deceased brough an action in the CFI against Barredo, employer of
Fontanilla.
- CFI awarded damages. CA modified by reducing the damages. CA found Barredo
liable as he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had numerous violations
already.
 Barredo’s defense is that his liability is only subsidiary and there is no civil action against
Fontanilla, hence, Barredo cannot be held responsible.
- CA disagrees, as the action against him is one of quasi-delict, not a civil obligation
arising from a felony.
 Issue: Whether the respondents may bring a separate civil action against petitioner, thus
making him primarily and directly responsible under 1903 as an employer of Fontanilla.
 Distinguishing delict and quasi-delicts.
- QD: A separate legal institution under CC, with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict.
- Upon this principle, primary and direct responsibility of employers is anchored.
- It is seen that 1903 limits QD to acts or omissions “not punishable by law”.
- However, 365 of RPC punishes not only reckless but also simple imprudence or
negligence.
- Concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for QD.
- Same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under Article 100 or create an action for QD.
- Crimes: Public interest, punishes or corrects criminal act, not broad, not all produce
civil responsibility.
- QD: Private concern, merely repairs damage, includes all acts in which “any kid of
fault or negligence intervenes.”
 HISTORY:
- Of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law
(hence, culpa aquiliana)
- Siete Partidas contributes – anyone who unintentionally injures another through his
fault.
- Spanish Civil Code keeps it. Art. 1089 – source of obligation; Arts. 1902-1910
exclusively devoted to it.
- French Civil Code - action can be brought directly against the person responsible and
is in itself a principal action
- Spanish Supreme Court decisions:
a. An act which does not constitute felony does not necessarily preclude existence of
unqualified fault or negligence, which is in itself a source of obligation
b. Same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code.
c. An employer, under 1903, is primarily and directly responsible for the negligent
acts of his employee.
- Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf: Article 1903 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from
faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of
Title XVI (Arts. 1902-1910)
- Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes
a. 1903 not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when
liability shall cease: when persons mentioned prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
b. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both
 c. Presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be
rebutted
d. If the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision, he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family,
the presumption is overcome
- Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co.
a. Basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater
familial
b. Liability on master’s negligence, not of the servant
- Arambulo v. Manila Electric Co: Exemption from civil liability established in article
1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family, is not applicable to the subsidíary civil liability provided in article 20 of the
Penal Code.
- The counsel for defendant/petitioner failed to recognize the distinction between civil
liability arising from crime and the responsibility of quasi-delict.
- Since Article 365, RPC punishes simple negligence, and 1902-1910 refers only to
fault or negligence not punishable by law, culpa aquiliana will have little scope and
application in real life.
- Sometimes, criminal negligence cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but it can
be proved by preponderance of evidence.
- To hold that there is only one way to make defendant’s liability effective, and that is
to exhaust the negligent employee’s property first, would be devious. 1903 can be
used, as it is being used in this case, to make the employer primary and directly
responsible.
RULING: PETITION DENIED. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
• Nature: 1157: Obligations arise from: (5) Quasi-delicts.
ARTICLE 1089. Obligations are created by law, by contract, by quasi-contract, and by unlawful
acts or omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
• Governing Provision: 1162: Shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
XVII, and by special laws.
• Definition, Elements: 2176: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there are no preexisting contractual relations between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
1902: Any person who by act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence
shall be liable for the damage so done.
• Scope, Intentional Acts: 2176:
Cangco v. Manila Railroad
 As petitioner was about to alight the train going to a full stop, his feet came in contact
with a sack of watermelons, resulting on his feet getting slipped from under him and he
fell violently on the platform.
- His body rolled from the platform and was under the moving car, where his right arm
was badly crushed and lacerated. It resulted to its amputation.
 According to the employees, the sacks of melons were on the platform because it was the
customary season for harvesting.
 Petitioner filed an action upon the negligence of the employees of the defendant in
placing the sacks near the platform and leaving them causing his mishap.
 CFI: Even though there is negligence to respondent, petitioner himself had failed to use
due caution from the train, therefore precluding him from recovering.
 Petitioner appealed.
 The legal liability of respondent is the breach of the contract of carriage. Article 1903
is not applicable, since it only applies to culpa aquiliana. Articles 1101-1104 are
applicable.
- Manresa: Culpa aquliana is substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes
the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by a legal tie.
Culpa contractual is an accident in the performance of an obligation already
existing.
- The liability arising from extra-contractual is always based upon a voluntary act or
omission, which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has
caused damage to another.
- Under 1903, the law creates a presumption that the master/employer has been
negligent in the selection of his employee but can be rebutted if there is proof of due
care and diligence.
- In cases of breach of contract, the liability of employers for the negligent acts of their
employees is not based upon a mere presumption of negligence of the former, and
proof of exercise of utmost diligence and care does not relieve the master of his
liability for the breach of his contract.
- In non-contractual, the negligent act creates the vinculum juris, but in contractual the
vinculum exists independently of the breach.
- In non-contractual, burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence of
defendant. In contractual, the plaintiff needs only to show proof of contract and its
nonperformance to warrant a recovery, not necessary to prove negligence.
 For employers, proof on their part that it was the negligence of his employees that caused
the breach of contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If this would be
allowed, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages
arising from contract breaches.
 In this case, the contract to transport petitioner, by implication, the duty to carry him in
safety, as stated by Article 1258.
 Respondents argues that granted they are negligent, but the direct and proximate cause of
the injury was the petitioner’s own contributory negligence in failing to wait for the train
to come to a full stop.
 - In the doctrine of contributory negligence, if accident was caused by plaintiff’s own
negligence, then no liability upon defendant. If accident was caused by defendant’s
negligence and plaintiff’s negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages
should be apportioned.
 The Court ruled that petitioner was not guilty of contributory negligence.
- Train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted. A lot of people have done the same
but sustained no injury where the company has kept its platform free from
obstructions.
- Used the doctrine expressed in Thompson’s work on Negligence: The test by which
to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to
alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be
considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex, and condition of the
passenger would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed
by the evidence.
- The only fact that can say that petitioner was guilty of contributory negligence is that
he stepped off without clearly discerning the condition of the platform. However, he
is ignorant of the fact that there’s an obstruction, and the place was dimly lighted.
- The petitioner was a young man; therefore agile. Applying the test, he is not guilty.
RULING: RULING REVERSED. RESPONDENTS ORDERED TO PAY PETITIONER
FOR DAMAGES.
Elcano v. Hill
 Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of damages from respondent Reginald Hill
(married, minor) and his father (counsel).
 Reginald killed the son of the petitioners but was acquitted on the ground that his act was
not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.
 Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
a. Action is against Rule 107, Section 1, now Rule 111 of the ROC.
b. Action is barred by a prior judgement which is now final.
c. No cause of action against father/counsel, as he was already relieved as guardian of
the other through emancipation by marriage.
 RTC denied but granted the motion for reconsideration.
 Petitioners appeal.
 Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed?
- Citing Barredo: the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
- In criminal cases: proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required.
- In civil cases: Preponderance of evidence is sufficient.
- Deeper reflection of Barredo would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault, not just acts of
negligence and unintentional voluntary acts.
 - The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in
violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.
- Therefore, under Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not
for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict. The said article forestalls double recovery.
- The preliminary chapter on human relations establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixe by Article 100, RPC, and in a sense, the ROC
under Rule 111 Section 1 and 3c contemplate also the same separability.
- Rakes v. Atlantic: 2176 where it refers to “fault or negligence”, covers not only acts
“not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended part is not allowed to recover damages on both
scores.
 May Article 2180 be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that
at the time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a minor, living with and
getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married?
Andamo v. IAC
 Whether a corporation which has built through its agents, waterpaths and contrivances
within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adject land, can be held
civilly liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that
the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
 The private respondent constructed waterpaths and contrivances, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners’ land, caused a young man to drown, damaged crops,
washed away fences, endangered the lives of petitioners during the rain reasons, etc.
 Petitioners instituted a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation (Article
324, RPC).
- 7 months after petitioners filed a civil action for damages.
 Trial court issued an order suspending the hearing of the civil case until after the
judgement of the criminal case, citing Rule 111, Section 3 (a) of the Rule of Court that
provides “criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgement has been rendered in the criminal court.”
 On appeal, the Appellate Court denied the petitioner, affirming the Trial Court.
 The issue is the propriety of the dismissal of the Civil Case in accordance with Section 3
(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
- Petitioner contend that the civil case is predicated on a quasi-delict.
 SC agrees with petitioner.
- Nature of an action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action.
 - The complaint shows that it is a civil action under Article 2176, 2177 as the elements
of a quasi-delict are present:
a. Damage: Those mentioned in the second bullet point.
b. Fault or negligence: The construction of waterpaths.
c. Connection of cause and effect between negligence and damage: Inundation of
land.
- Cited Samson v. Dionisio.
- The respondents violated Article 431 of the Civil Code: Owner of a thing cannot
make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.
 2176 covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
 A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.
- In Castillo v. CA: A quasi-delict is a separate legal institution with a substantivity all
its own, and individuality that is entirely apparat and independent from a delict or
crime—a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual.
- In Azucena v. Potenciano: The civil action is entirely independent of the criminal
case according to Article 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
RULING: REVERSED. REINSTATE CIVIL ACTION.
Intentional acts fall under RPC.
Article 21: WITH INTENT: TORT EME
QUASI-DELICT: NO INTENT
Cinco v. Canonoy
 Recovery of damages from a vehicular accident between an automobile and a jeepney
(driven by Romeo Hilot, operated by spouses Pepito [respondents]).
 A criminal case is filed against Hilot, and a civil case against the three respondents.
 Respondents moved to suspend civil action pending the determination of the criminal
action (Rule 111, Section 3b, ROC).
- “(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;”
- Granted by the City Court.
 Filed a certiorari, claims City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending
civil action.
 - Certiorari dismissed: Damage to property is not one of the instances when an
independent civil action is proper.
- There is another available remedy: to submit his claim for damages in the criminal
case.
 Issues presented are synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an
independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal
action.
 Complaint filed by petitioner is evidently taking the nature and character of a quasi-
delict. (Article 2176, 2180)
- Plaintiff averred that it was the fault or negligence of Hilot which caused the
collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the damages and the
fault and negligence.
- Respondents contended that Valeriana Pepito observed due diligence in selection and
supervision of her employees.
 Distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict has been expounded in Barredo
v. Garcia.
 Separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict also recognized in Section 2, Rule
111, ROC).
- “Sec. 2. Independent civil action.—In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.’’
- The provision categorically lists cases provided for in Art. 2177 as allowing of an
independent civil action.
 In this regard, City Court erred in suspending the civil action,
- Wrong reliance on Section 3(b) of Rule 111 (refers to other civil actions arising
from cases in the section cited, including rule 111, section 2).
- The civil action referred to in 3a and 3b is that arising from the criminal offense,
not the civil action based on quasi-delict.
 Article 31: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
- Quasi-delict is an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony.
 Petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Quasi-delict in 2176 is so broad that
it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property (there was no
distinction between the two).
- The word “damage” is used in two concepts: harm done and reparation for the harm
done. Harm is not limited to personal, also applies to property injuries.
 - 2191 (2) is an instance where quasi-delict includes damage to property. The provision
holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke that may be
harmful for persons or property.
RULING: THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSPENDING THE
CIVIL ACTION.
St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. v. LWV Construction Corporation
 Respondent engaged in business of recruiting Filipinos for deployment in Saudi.
 Petitioner is authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants for
overseas employment.
 Respondent referred an applicant to petitioner for a medical examination.
- Petitioner cleared the applicant and found him fit for employment.
- The deployment of said applicant amounted to 84.4k.
- When Raguindin (applicant) underwent another medical exam in Saudi, he tested
positive for HCV or Hepatitis C virus. Tested again, same result.
- This caused Raguindin’s repatriation to the PH.
 Respondent filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioner for being
reckless in issuing the Medical Report of Raguindin.
- They averred that they relied on petitioner’s declaration and incurred expenses as a
result.
 METC Ruling: Favored respondent. They ruled that respondent was a real party-in-
interest as it would not have incurred expenses if the petitioner did not issue the said
Medical Report.
- Rejected defense that Raguindin may have contracted the disease after said medical
examination (no evidence offered).
- Respondent was entitled to be informed accurately of the condition of Raguindin.
 RTC Ruling: Dismissed petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner cannot raise new issues on appeal
(argued on the authentication of documentary evidence).
 CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC ruling with modification: deleted award for actual damages,
instead awarded temperate damages.
- Remarked that petitioner’s medical report does not enjoy presumption of regularity as
they are merely an accredited clinic.
- It is contrary to human experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker would
immediately contact a serious virus at the very beginning of a deployment.
 Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent in issuing the Medical Report declaring
Raguindin “fit for employment” and hence, should be held liable for damages.
 SC Ruling: Petition granted.
 Reexamination of facts is allowed when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; or when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based.
 Citing Alano v. Magud-Logmao: Article 2176 is not an all-encompassing enumeration of
all actionable wrongs which can give rise to the liability for damages. Under the Civil
Code, acts done in violation of Arts. 19-21 will also give rise to damages.
 Article 19: When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results damage to another, a legal wrong is committed.
- However, Article 19 does not provide a remedy for its violation.
- Generally, Article 20 or 21 would then be proper.
- Article 20 applies to both willful and negligent acts that are done contrary to law.
- Article 21 applies only to willful acts done contra bonos mores.
 Citing Alano, Leonen provided distinctive applications of Arts. 19-21 vis-à-vis 2176.
- Article 19: General rule on human relations conduct. By itself, not a basis for
actionable tort.
- Article 20: Concerns violations of existing law as basis for an injury. Allows
recovery if the act is willful or negligent.
- Article 21: Concerns injuries caused by acts which are not necessarily proscribed by
law. Requires act to be willful.
- Article 2176: Covers situation where injury happens through an act or omission. The
act itself must not be a breach of an existing law or a preexisting obligation.
 The lower courts anchored their rulings on Articles 19-21 because neither respondent nor
the courts themselves mentioned any law or preexisting contractual relation as basis for
which damages may be recovered due to petitioner’s alleged negligent act. Thus, Article
2176 shall govern.
 Negligence defined: The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
 Picart v. Smith: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used the same situation?
If not, he is guilty of negligence.
- Furthermore, this must be evaluated in light of human experience and facts involved.
Abstract speculation cannot be of much value.
- Negligence cannot be presumed, and thus, must be proven by him who alleges it.
- If the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent
acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even
presumed that a person takes ordinary case of his concerns.
 The examination conducted by the Saudi General Care Dispensary was conducted at least
two months after petitioner issued its Medical Report.
- Therefore, it is upon the respondent to show that there was negligence already at the
time of the issuance of the Medical Report.
- The respondent only presented evidence of both issuances.
- There is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin became exposed of the disease only
after his medical examination with petitioner.
 According to WHO, the HCV infection is usually asymptomatic. The incubation period
for CV is 2 weeks to 6 months.
 - Raguindin was not deployed to Saudi immediately after the medical examination.
 Although the expiration of the Medical Report was not until 3 months after its issuance,
there is no guarantee that Raguindin’s medical status would remain the same. The
expiration only refers to the validity.
RULING: PETITION GRANTED.
LG Foods v. Philadelfa
 The private respondents’ son was hit by a van owned by the petitioners and driven by
their employee. This resulted to the son’s death.
- An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the
driver. However, before the conclusion of the trial, the driver committed suicide.
 Private respondents instituted an action for damages against the petitioner arising from a
vehicular accident.
- They allege that the petitioners, as employers, failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees.
- The petitioners in their counterclaim prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of cause of action.
 Instead of a memorandum of authorities, as required by the trial court, the petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss.
- They argue that the complaint is a “claim for subsidiary liability against an employer”
under Article 103, RPC.
- Under this provision, there must first be a judgement of conviction against the driver
as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable.
- Since the criminal action ceased because of the driver’s death, the sine qua non
condition for the liability was not fulfilled.
- They also argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a
separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in
question, deemed instituted with the criminal action, is also dismissed.
 RTC Ruling: Denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
 CA Ruling: Also denying the petition and upheld the trial court’s decision.
- The complaint does not imply that the responsibility charged was that of Article 103
of the RPC. They aver that the responsibility falls under Article 2176 on quasi-delicts.
 SC denies the petition. The sole issue is whether the private respondents’ cause of action
is founded on Article 103, RPC or Article 2180, CC.
 Nothing in the allegations suggests that petitioners are being made to account for their
subsidiary liability under Article 103. The respondents did not even aver the basic
elements for the subsidiary liability (including the prior conviction).
 The complaint did not also explicitly state that they were suing for damages based on
quasi-delict. But it is evident from the allegations of the complaint.
- Respondents allege gross fault and negligence on the part of driver and employers (to
exercise due diligence). Also allege that petitioners are civilly liable for the
 negligence of driver since they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
 Cause of action: Act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.
- Gives rise to an obligation.
- May also give rise to two separate civil liabilities:
a. Civil liability ex delicto
b. Independent civil liabilities
1. Not arising from an act complained as felony; or
2. Where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal actions.
 Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce civil
liability arising from culpa criminal and an action for quasi-delict.
- If the latter is chosen, plaintiff may hold employer liable for the negligent act of
employee.
- If the former, plaintiff can hold employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior
conviction.
 Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case
the obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict or quasi-delict. The
choice is with the plaintiff, not the defendant.
 Under Article 2180, liability of employer is direct/immediate.
 The repeated mention of Article 2180 and putting on their defense that they had exercised
due diligence in the selection, supervision of the employees by the petitioners in their
Compulsory Counter-Claim serves as an admission that the petitioners acknowledged the
respondents’ cause of action as one for quasi-delict.
 In the issue of petitioner’s argument that respondents failed to make a reservation to
institute a separate civil action when the criminal action is filed (citing Maniago).
- Maniago reliance is misplaced. In this case, criminal action was prematurely
terminated due to death.
RULING: COMPLAINT IS A CASE OF QUASI-DELICT, NOT SUBSIDIARY
LIABILITY.
FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation
 Respondent undertook to delivery appliances when it collided with another truck and fell
into a canal, resulting damages.
 Petitioner, insurer of shipment paid Concepcion Industries the value of the cargoes.
- In turn, being the subrogee of rights and interests of said company, sought
reimbursement from respondent.
 Respondent failed to pay, prompting petitioner to file a complaint for damages and
breach of contract of carriage against respondent and its driver.
 Respondent claimed that they are not engaged in business as a common carrier, and was
only the exclusive hauler of Concepcion.
- Further claimed that the cause of damage was purely accidental.
 - Instead of submitting evidence, they filed a motion to dismiss by demurrer to
evidence on the ground that petitioner failed to prove that they were a common
carrier.
 RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
- Under Rule 131, Section 1 of ROC: Each party must prove his own affirmative
allegation.
- Hence, the application of law on common carriers is not warranted, and the
presumption of fault or negligence of a common carrier is not availing.
- What must be govern are the laws on obligation and contract and on quasi delicts.
- Under obligations and contract, negligence/fault is not presumed.
- Under quasi-delict, presumption may only be applied upon attendance of some
circumstances. As stated in Article 2185: Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic violation.
- Since no evidence has been provided that respondent was violating any traffic
regulation, presumption is not obtaining.
 Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. Contending that the lower court erred in not
holding that respondent was not a common carrier and for dismissing the complaint on a
demurrer to evidence.
 CA rejected petitioner’s appeal.
- Same as RTC: upon petitioner to prove that respondent was a common carrier.
 SC rules that respondent cannot be considered a common carrier. As common carriers
offer their services to the public, whether in general or to a limited clientele but never on
an exclusive basis.
 However, SC rules that respondent cannot escape from liability.
- This is a case of culpa contractual. Mere proof of the existence of a contract and the
failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a right to relief.
- Law will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of
misperformance of the contractual undertaking. A breach upon a contract confers to
petitioner a valid cause for recovery of what was lost.
- This remedy serves to preserve the interests of respondent that may include:
a. Expectation interest: his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put
in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed;
or
b. Reliance interest: his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party.
- Every infraction/breach creates a new duty: to recompensate the one injured, unless
he presents a proof of exercise of due diligence or fortuitous event.
- In this situation, a failure of compliance with an obligation gives rise to a
presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual
obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. In this case, respondent failed
to do so.
 - Driver, without proof of negligence, may not be ordered to pay petitioner since he is
not a party to the contract of carriage. Petitioner’s civil action against the driver can
only be based on culpa aquiliana which would require the claimant for damages to
prove negligence/fault on the defendant.
 On res ipsa loquitur: Holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the latter’s management and the accident is such that,
in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care.
- This maxim places on defendant the burden of proof.
- This may only be allowed only when:
a. The event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence;
b. Other responsible causes, including conduct of plaintiff and others, are
sufficiently eliminated by evidence; and
c. The indicated negligence is within the scope of defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.
- This maxim finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists between
the plaintiff and defendant.
- This maxim is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to
one of the several causes, when some could not be the defendant’s fault. This should
be understood to being confined only to cases of pure tort (non-contractual) since the
presumption of negligence in culpa contractual immediately attaches by a failure of
its tenor.
- In the driver’s case, whose liability is predicated on culpa aquiliana, it is not shown
that the accident could have been exclusively due to his negligence. Thus, res ipsa
loquitur cannot work against him.
RULING: Ruling reversed. Respondent is liable. Driver is not.
Calalas v. Court of Appeals
 Private respondent took a jeep operated by petitioner. She was given an extension seat.
 When she gave way for an exiting passenger, a truck bumped the rear of the jeepney
injuring private respondent. She fractured her leg.
 Private respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, alleges violation of
the contract of carriage in failing to exercise diligence required as a common carrier. She
also filed a third-party complaint against the owner of the truck that injured her.
 RTC ruled third-party liable and not petitioner as they held that the third-party who was
responsible for the accident.
 RTC also ruled in favor of petitioner in his civil action against the third-parties for the
damage to his jeepney.
 CA reversed the lower court’s ruling on the ground that private respondent’s cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and the carrier failed to
exercise the required diligence. Also dismissed third-party complaint.
 In this petition, petitioner contends that the ruling in his civil case against the third-party
that the negligence of the driver of the truck was the proximate cause of the accident and
negates his liability. Otherwise, it would make the common carrier an insurer of the
safety of its passengers.
- He also contends that the bumping was a fortuitous case.
- Also contended on the basis of the award of moral damages.
 SC rejects petitioner’s claims.
 On his first argument: the ruling of his case against the third-party for quasi-delict ignores
the fact that private respondent was never a party in that case, thus, res judicata does not
apply.
- The issues there and in this case are different. The issue of the former was whether
the third-parties were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused. The latter’s issue
is if the petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. One is quasi-delict (negligence
of tortfeasor), the other is a breach of contract (negligence in the performance of
obligation).
- In quasi-delict, negligence or fault should be clearly established. In breach of
contract, action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of contract and the
obligor failed to do his obligation.
- In Article 1756, when there is an injury, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or acted negligently unless proven to observe extraordinary diligence.
- The collision being the proximate cause is immaterial. Proximate cause is only
applicable in actions for quasi-delict, not breach of contract. It only matters if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation.
 1755 requires common carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances.
- Court ruled that petitioner did not meet this criterion.
- Jeep was not properly parked; the rear portion was exposed. A violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code.
- Petitioner took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity. Violation of the
same Code.
- Placing the private respondent in an “extension seat” placed her in a more dangerous
position that the other passengers.
- This shows that he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
 Petitioner’s contention that the private respondent’s action of taking the extension seat
amounted to an implied assumption of risk is brushed off by the court.
 Court also rejected the fortuitous event claim since the petitioner should have foreseen
the danger of parking his jeepney with its rear exposed into the highway.
 Court accepts petitioner’s contention on the award of moral damages.
- Private respondent was a Physical Education major and was not able to enroll the
following semester and eventually lost intention to pursue her degree because her leg
“has a defect already”.
 - Moral damages are not recoverable for damages predicated on a breach. However,
there are exceptions:
a. In cases which mishaps result in the death of passenger.
b. In cases in which carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith.
- In this case, there is no legal basis as there was no factual finding that petitioner acted
in bad faith.
RULING: Petitioner still liable, minus the award for moral damages.