osc 10 ws. 150 UNITED STATES ¥. SOCONY-VACUUM OIL CO, Ine, et al. ‘SOCONY-VACUUM OIL CO, Inc, ¢t al ve UNITED STATES. Nos, 346, 947, Argued Feb. 5, 6, 3010, Decided May 6, 1040, Rehearing Denlod June 8, 1940, See 810 U.S, 658, 00 S.Ct. 1001, 84 L.Ed. — 1, Monopolies €=17(1) Pricesxing agreements are unlawful per ‘se under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and no showing of so-called competitive abuses for evils which those agreements were de- Signed to eliminate or alleviate may be in- terposed as a defense Ina prosecution for violation of the act Sherman Anti-Trust Act$1, 15 USCA. $1, 2, Monopolies €17(1) ‘Agreements for price maintenance of articles moving In Interstate commerce are, ‘without more, unreasonable “restraints of trade” within the meaning of the Suerman Anti-Trust Act because they eliminate com petition, and ngreements which create por tential power for such price maintenance ex- Inibited by ita actual exertion for that pur- pose are in themselves unlawful restraints within the meaning of that act. Sherman Anti-Trast Act §41, 15 USCA. 1. ‘Sea Words and Phrases, Permanent Baitlon, for all other defiitions of ‘Restrainte of Trade”, 8. Criminal law €>11720) In prosecution for engaging in an unlaw- fol combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce In gasoline by rals- ing and fxing tank ear prices in spot mar- ets and thereby Increasing tank car and retall prices of gasoline sold tn the Mid- ‘Western area, charge to jury that defendants Doylug programs must have caused price rise and its continuance was more favora bie to defendants than they could have re quired, since so far as cause and effect ‘were concerned it was sufcient if the buying programs of the combination resulted in a price rise and market stability which but for them would not hare happened. Sher man AnthTrust Act § 1,15 USCA. ¢1. Proof that there was a conspiracy, that {ts purpose was to ralse prices, and that it UNITED STATES +, S0CONY-VACUUM OIL CO. sit ‘caused or contributed to a price rise, 1 proof of the actual consummation or exeeu- tion of an unlavefal conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce, Sherman Anti-Trust Act §1,15 USCA. $1 5 Monopolies €=17(1) In prosecution for engaging in an untawe fol combination and conspiraey in restraint fof trade and commerce In gasoline by ralsing fand fixing tank ear prices in spot market and thereby increasing tank ear and retalt prices of gasoline sold In the Mld-Western farea, fact that sales on the spot markets ‘were still governed by some competition was of no consequence, where it was Indis- Dutable that that competition was restricted rough the removal by defendants of part of the supply which Dut for thelr buy- {ng programs would have been a factor in de- termining the going prices on those markets. Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 USCA. § 1 6. Monopoties €17(1) ‘The elimination of so-called competitive cerila was no legal Justification for buyl programs removing distress gasoline frors ‘the market and could not be relled on as 9 defense in prosecution for engaging in an ‘unlawful combination and conspiracy in re- straint of trade and commerce in gasoline by ralsing and fixing tank car prices in spot markets and thereby Increasing tank car avd retall prices of gasoline sold In the Mid- ‘Western area, where elimination of such cot ditions was sought primarily for its effect on price stroetires. Sherman Anti-Trust Act Hw USCA EL 7. Monopoties ©=17(1) ‘Any combination which tampers with price structures 1s engaged In an unlawful activity, and even though the members of the pricexing group are in no position to ‘control the market to the extent that they ralse, lower, or stabilize prices, they would be dircetly interfering with the free play of market forces in violation of the Sherman Anti‘Trast Act. Sherman Anti-Trust Act 4 4,15 USCA. $1. 8. Constitutional law €70(9) Congress has not ett with the courte the Aetermination of whether particular prico- fixing schomes are wise or unwise, healtny for destructive, nor has it permitted ruinous ‘competition and competitive evils to be de-812 cy fenses to price-fixing conspiracies, and, if ‘Renuine or fancied competitive abuses and ‘the good Intentions of the members of the ‘combination are to be allowed as a legal Jor tleation for such schemes, the shift must ve made by Congress and not by the courts, Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 USCA. res 9. Monopoties 17(1), 31(1, 3) Whatever may be its pecullar problems ‘and characteristics, the Sherman Anti-Trast Act, 0 far as price-fixing agreements are ‘concerned, establishes one uniform rule ap- plleable to all Industries allke, and hence there was no error in refusing to charge that, to convlet defendante of engaging in fan unlawful combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce In gas0- line by increasing tank car and retall prices fof gasoline sold in the Mld-Westera area, the jury must find that the resultant prices were ralsed and maintained at high, arbi- trary, and noncompetitive levels, and the charge in the indletment to that effect was surplusage, Sherman Antl-Trust Act § 1,15 USCA. $2 10, Monopolies €=17(1) In prosecution for engaging in an untaw- ful combination and conspiracy in restraint ‘of trade and commerce In gasoline by rals- Ing and zing tank ear prices in spot mar kets and thereby Increasing tank car and retall prices of gasoline sold in the Mld- Western area, {t was not important that the prlces paid by the combination were not fixed In the sense that they were uniform fand inflexible, since price-Axing condemned by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act Includes more than the mere establishment of uniform pre es, Sherman AutITrust Act §1, 15 USCA. on 11, Monopottes €=17(1) ‘Am agrooment to pay or charge tigi, unt- form prices would be an Wlegal agreement under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and 90 Would an agreement to raise or lower prices whatever machinery for price-fixing was fused, Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. AGL 12 Monopottes €17(1) Prices are “Axed”, within the Sherman Anti-Trust Act condembing price-fixing agree: fata Af the range withln which purchases court ao Ua. REPORTER for sales will be made 1s agreed upon, If the prices pald or charged are to be at a cer faln level or on ascending or descending seales, if they are to be uniform, or if by various formule they are related to the mar- ket prices, and the fact that they are fixed at the falr golng market price is tmmater!- a Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 USCA. on See Words and Phrases, Permanent ition, for all other definitions of "Bixed Prices”, 13, Monopottes C=17(1) ‘That purchasing of distress gasoline by major oll compantes charged with Increasing tank ear and retall prices of gasoline sold {in the Mid-Western area was lightest during period of market rise In the spring of 1935, fand heaviest in the summer and early fall fof 1938 when prices declined, and that it ‘decreased later in 1986 when prices rose, did ot militate against conclusion that buying programs were a species of priceixing or manipulation, but those facts were wholly consistent with the maintenance of a oor lunder the market serving to increase the stability and firmness of market prices. ‘Sherman Anti‘Trust Act § 1,15 USCA. § 1. 14 Mo em Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, a ‘combination formed for the purpose and wit the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pes sing, of atablizing the price of @ commodity 1m interstate or foreign commerce ie illegal per se, Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 4,15 US. Crary 15, Monopottes €17(1) Proof that a combination was formed for the porpose of fixing prices, and that it ‘caused them to be fixed or contributed to that result, Is proof of the completion of a price-fixing conspiracy under the Sherman ‘Anti-Trust Act. Sherman Anti-Trust Act & 415 USCA 1 16. Conspiracy €=40 ‘A person may be gullty of conspiring al- ‘though Incapable of committing the objec tive offense, 17, Monopoties 12(1) Conspiractes under the Sherman Antt- ‘Trust Act are not dependent on any overt fact other than the act of conspiring, since ttwosce {8 the contract, combination, or conspiracy tn restralnt of trade or commerce which the ‘act strikes down, whether the concerted ac- tivity be wholly ‘nascent or abortive on the fone hand or successful on the other. Sher man Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 USCA. #1. 18, Monopoltes €12(1) ‘The provision of the Sherman Anti-Trust ‘Act doclaring Megal every contract, combl- nation, or conspiracy In restraint of trade ‘or commerce brands as llegal the character fof the restraint and not the amount of com ‘merce affected, and hence the amount of In teratate oF foreign trade involved is not ms terial, Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U. SCA. 1. 19, Monopottes €=17(1) A conspiracy to fix prices violates the Sherman Anti-Trust Aet though no overt ‘act Is shown, though it is not established ‘hat the conspirators had the means avall- sable for accomplishment of thelr objective, fand though the conspiracy embraced but & part of the interstate or foreign commerce fn the commodity. Sherman Anti-Trust Act $115 USCA $1. 20, Monopolies €=17(1) ‘The Sherman Anti-Trust Act has a broader application to pricesixing agreements ‘han the common law prohibitions oF anc tong Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U8 AEE 21, Monopolies €>17(1) All price fing agreements are banned by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act provisions ‘declaring legal every contract, “combina lon, or conspiracy in restraint of trade oF commerce, and, whatever economie justifien- tion particular price fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit fan ingulry Into thelr reasonableness. Sher- man Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 USCA. #1, 22, Monopolies €=29 "Tho erime under the section of the Sher- rman Anti-Trust Act declaring illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy in re straint of trade or commerce is legally dis ‘net from that under the section making it & Iisdemeanor to monopolize trade or com ‘merce though the two sections overlap In the sense that a monopoly under the second sec. ‘on Is a spectes of restraint of trade under UNITED STATES ¥, SOCONT-VACUUM OIL C0. S13 ‘the frst. Sherman Anti-Trust Act §§ 1, 2 15 USCA #12 23, Monopolies €31(2) In prosecution for engaging in an un lawful combination and conspiracy in re straint of trade and commerce in gasoline by ralaing and fixing tank car prices in spot markots and thereby inereasing tank car ‘and retall prices of gasoline sold in the Mid Western area, evidence supported charge that combination had the purpose and effect of fixing prices, and the existence of power on the part of members of the combination to ‘Bx prices was but a cénclusion from the fnd Ing that their buying programs eaused oF con- tributed to the rise and stability of prices. Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 USCA. §1. 24, Monopoties =17(1) ‘That Congross, through utilization of the precise methods employed by defendant charged with engaging in an unlawful com bination and conspiracy in restraint of trade ‘and commerce in gasoline by ralsing and fix ing tank ear prices In spot markets and ‘thereby increasing tank ear and retail prices fof gasoline sold In the Mid-Western area, ould sok to reach the same objectives ‘ought by defendants, does not mean that defendants or any other group may do #0 without specific Congressional authority. Sherman AntITrust Act § 1, 15 USCA, § 1. 25, Monopolies €=29 ‘Tuough employees of the government may have known of busing programs ear- led on by oll compantes for the alleged pr pose of Increasing tank car and retail prices Of gasoline sold in the Mid-Western aren and ‘winked at them or tacitly approved them, n0 Immunity from prosecution under the Sher- man Antl-Trust Act would have been ob- tained thereby, where Congress had specified ‘the precise manner of securing immunity un- der the National Industrial Recovery Act, ‘and no approval of programs was obtained ‘thereunder, since none other would suiice, Sherman Anth-Trust Act §1, 15 USCA, §1 National Industrial Recovery Act § 2(0, 48 Stat, 196, 2, Monopolies €=29 ‘Even if approval had been obtained une der the National Industrial Recovery Act for buying programs carried on by oll com panies as part of an alleged combinationau ‘and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce In gasoline, that approral would not have survived expiration of act in June 1085, and where programs continued unabat- fed during balance of 1605 and far into 1036, approval or knowledge and acquiescence of federal authorities before June 1935 could Ihave no relevancy to companies’ activities subsequent thereto, since a consplraey thus continued 1s In effect renewed during etch ‘ay of Its continuance. Sherman Anti-Trust Act $1, 15 USGA. § 1; National Indus (lal Recovery Aet § 20), 48 Stat. 196, 27. Monopolies €>17(1) ‘That busing programs, earried on by oll ‘companies in an allegedly unlawful combina: tion and conspiracy in restraint of trade land commerce In gasoline, may have been consistent with the general objectives and fnuls sought fo be obtained under the Nation= Al Industrial Recovery Act, was irrelevant to the legallty under the Sherman Anti-Trust ‘Act of companies’ activities elther before of after June 1835, whea the National Indus- (wil Recovery Act expired, since price og combinations which Iack Congressional sanction are illegal por se. Sherman Anti- ‘Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.CA, §1; National Ine dustrial Recovers Act § 2(0, 48 Stat. 190. 28, Monopoties €=31(2) In proseeution for engaging in an un lawful combination and conspiracy in re straint of trade and commerce in gasoline, defendants’ offers of proot covering back ground and operation of the National Indus- tial Recovery Act and the Petroleum Code, the condition of the oil industry, alleged ‘encouragement, co-operation and acgulescence fof the Federal Petroleum Administration in ‘thelr buying programs, and the like, were properly excluded In so far as they bore on the nature of the restraint and the purpose or end sought to be attained, since the re onableness of the restralat was not prop- erly an issue in the case, Shermas Auth ‘Trust Act §1, 15 USCA. $1, 28, Monopotios €=31(2) Jn prosecution for engaging In an un Yawful combination and conspiracy in re atralnt of trade and commerce in gasoline by raising and fxing tank ear prices in spot aarkets and thereby Inereasing tank car and retall prices of gasoline sold in the Mid- Western area, offers of proot to the extent 00 SUPREME COURT REPORTER that they were designed to show that defend ants by buying distress gasoline had not ralsod spot market prices to an artificial and noncompetitive level were properly denled ‘a5 immaterial, since reasonableness of pric: es and fact that defendants’ activities mere- ly removed from the market the depres sive effect of distress gasoline were not rel- ‘evant to the Issues, Sherman Anti-Trust Act 41,15 USCA SL 80, Monopolies €=31(2) In prosecution for engaging In an wn- lawful combination and conspiracy in re straint of trade and commerce in gasoline by ralsing and fing tank ear prices in spot markets and thereby increasing tank ear and retail prices of gasoline sold in the Mid- Western area, offers of proof to the extent ‘that they were almed at establishing and ‘evaluating contributory causes for price rise fand market stability during indletment pe- lod other than defendants’ buying programs ‘were not improperly denied where much of the refused testimony was merely eumula- tive and another offer, though not wholly 1 relevant, was clearly’ collateral, Sherman Anti-Trust Act §1, 15 USCA. $1, 31. Criminal law ©6651, 675 A trial court has wide discretion in ral ng on cumulative testimony and in the ex clusion of collateral evidence, 32, Monopolies €=31(2) In prosecution for engaging tm an um lawful combination and conspiracy in re straint of trade and commerce in gasoline by price xing, the district court properly limited Inquiry’ Into general economle con ditions antedating and during indictment pe lod of 1035 and 1986, and did not abuse Its @iscretion In refusing to admit testimony showing market conditions late in 1034, where that testimony would not have elim: nated defendants’ buying programs a2 con- ibutory causes to market rise and sta: bility in 1985 and 1090, and it would bare prolonged the inguiry and protracted the trial. Sherman Anti-Trust Aet § 1, 1 US Gap 33, Criminal law =621 ‘Where a great mass of evidence was re celved by the trial court, the range of Inquiry ‘was wide, and factual questions and defend: fants’ activities were intricate and involved, a