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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,   G.R. No. 152577

     P e t i t i o n e r ,   
  Present: their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child.  In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her
   
       PUNO, American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.  Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not
            Chairman,
          - versus-      AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
       CALLEJO, SR., be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him.  Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of
       TINGA, and
       CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons.   Fely continued to
   
CRASUS L. IYOY, Promulgated:
     R e s p o n d e n t.   live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A.  She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in
September 21, 2005
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
  the U.S.A.  For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as “Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus.”  At the time the

DECISION Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation
 
  between them.  Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 
  demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.  Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the

Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, Philippines.

[1]
 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,  

[2]
 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997.  She asserted therein that she was already an American

of the Philippines.
citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus.  While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five

 
children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint.   She explained that she was no more hot-
[3]
          The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint  for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on
tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s
25 March 1997.  According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones

drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household.   She could not
Avenue, Cebu City.  As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal

ages.  After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.”  In 1984, have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs.  Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as

Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. 

the care of respondent Crasus.  Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign
Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. 

the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request.  Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to
Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons.   While she
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take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.    Taking into account
did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed

that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress,
divorce papers.  After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship.  She

the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998, [14] considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence.  The case was thus
argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of
deemed submitted for decision.

her present nationality.  Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child.  
 

She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their           Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and

son, Calvert.  On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings –

 
respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration.   As
observed, plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly credible.  The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity,
fees, and litigation expenses.
mutual love, respect, help and support.  From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him.  She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man
and has establish [sic] another family of her own.  Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife
 
who is already married to another man in another country.
 
          After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, [5] the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY
CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the
wedding.  It appears to be the case in this instance.
evidence.  Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. [6]     
Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred
  and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world.   It is quite
evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to
          Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, plaintiff.
 
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply with the
in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; [7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. 
The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking  
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations.  These are her
place on 16 December 1961; [8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital stability.  That such incapacity was already there at
the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.   And for these
husband’s surname, Micklus.[9]  reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null
and void ab initio.[15]
 
   
 
          Fely’s counsel filed a Notice, [10] and, later on, a Motion, [11] to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr.
          Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court
and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said
of Appeals.  The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible
witnesses reside.  Despite the Orders[12] and Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to
error therein.  It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –
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  and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen.  He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing
in the United States.  Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity
of their marriage…
by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
…
 
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for
 
“Art. 26.  All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
 
“WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS
VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD  
BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO
SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.”
            After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust
situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad.  In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly meritorious.
acquired her American husband’s citizenship and thus has become an alien as well.  This Court cannot see why the  
benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another  
citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien. I
   
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former.  To condemn plaintiff to  
remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is  
incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this  
Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.  Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court’s
declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. [16]
  Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads –
 
 
 
ART. 36.  A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, [17] denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
 
the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds –  
 

  Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity.  In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining
I.    Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute psychological
incapacity.
  its existence. 
II.   The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence
considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
 
Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]
 
            In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –
   
            “. . . [P]sychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
          In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full- the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.  There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.   This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated… [21]

 
 
 
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
 
(a)              Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
a marriage;
(b)             Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c)              Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
[22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down
by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below –
 
   (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in
the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.”   It decrees marriage
as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof.  Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
 
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.  The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do's.” The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
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(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts”
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.  The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[24]
 
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity.  Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial. 
 
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by
respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring
their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
 
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into
question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence.  He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
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Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations;

celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified.  If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily

husband’s surname.  Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of

the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential the marriage; nor that it is incurable.  While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the

obligations of marriage.  declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in  Marcos v. Marcos,

  [29]
 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[30] that the root cause of

          It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant  

spouse.[26]  Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism,           In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. [31]  No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to

sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[32] 

[27]
   

  II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
 
          As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond  
 

at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves.  It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –
 
marriage.  It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
one is about to assume.”[28]

 
 

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and
          The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family.   Her hot-

the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated.  By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her

case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen .  Although the exact
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date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime services of lawyers.  The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties

after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.  In the same Answer, she alleged that she had requiring the services of lawyers.[34]        

been an American citizen since 1988.  At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle  

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,           The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in

and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.  Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of

between Filipino spouses.  Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such
 
 
proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it. 
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration
 
of nullity of marriages.
 
 
          Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
 

Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. [35]  While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal

actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the
assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of

Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court.  Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the
the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.  Article 48 provides –

case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being
 
ART. 48.  In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
 
 
  or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

          That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for  

annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the           In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of

Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government. [33]  His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36] –

Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the  
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            In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals  [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.  No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.  The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. 
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
 
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals  [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the State…[37]
 
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the
decision personally or by registered mail.  If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the
dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.  Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
…
 
 
Sec. 20.  Appeal. –
 
…
 
(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a
Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial.  The appellant
shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

          Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
          Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and
[38]
 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to
existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely.  At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent

file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.  The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the
Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage

proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts.  The pertinent provisions of the
under Article 36 of the same Code.  While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a

said Rule are reproduced below –

hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual

 
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.  – problem.[39] 
 
…
   
(4) It shall be filed in six copies.  The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the
court proof of such service within the same period.           WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,
…
 
Sec. 18.  Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No.  CEB-20077,  dated  30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET
Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the
date the trial is terminated.  It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State.  No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court.  After the lapse of ASIDE. 
the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
 
  The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
Sec. 19.  Decision. –
 
…  
 
SO ORDERED.
 Page 8 of 16

Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)

Posted: August 8, 2011 in Civil Law

Tags: Divorce, Marriage 0

Facts:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of
the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and
void based on Article 36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year
she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went
back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husband’s last
name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought “danger and dishonor” to the family and were
manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and
the invitation where Fely used her newhusband’s last name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was already an American
citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

Issue:

Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.”

Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs.  COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur,
Branch 35, Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as “Alicia”), as co-owners of whatever property she and the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as “Lorenzo”) may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together
as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. [3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as “Paula”) were married before a parish priest,
Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo,
Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his
favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo  was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit
his wife and he visited the Philippines. [7]He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship
with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as “Crisologo Llorente,” with the
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank. [9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her.  In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1)
all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and
support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate
agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act
since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.   The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula
and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother.  The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce  with  the  Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the County of San Diego.  Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings.  On November 27,
1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory
judgment of divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. [13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they
resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. [14]
Page 9 of 16
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. [15] Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children,
Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament.  The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly
signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.  In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property
to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
“(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
“(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in
equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio
Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
“(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my
lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the
province of Rizal, Philippines;
“(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and
conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
“(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the
latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
“(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
“(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
“(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any
manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed
respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.” [17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his
last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. [18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. [19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. [20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition [22] for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor.  Paula
contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will
disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. [23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. [24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-
888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper “Bicol Star”.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

“Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void.  This being so the petition
of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the
will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
“On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as
primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul,
Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
“Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente.  As such let the corresponding letters
of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court
within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her
possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the
same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the court
within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
“On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
“SO ORDERED.”[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. [28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz
Llorente are not children “legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. [29] Amending its decision of May 18,
1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third
(1/3) of the free portion of the estate. [30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever
properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
“SO ORDERED.”[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. [33]
[34]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,  denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, [36] the issue is simple.  Who are entitled to inherit
from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals.  We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the
will of the deceased.
Page 10 of 16
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2)
marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
“Art. 15.  Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
“Art. 16.  Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
“However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration ,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.” ( emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.  Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law.   The Court of Appeals and the trial
court called to the fore the renvoidoctrine, where the case was “referred back” to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical,
albeit equally unproven statement that “American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo’s will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law.  The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to
general American law.  There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States.  Each State of the union has
its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State.  It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the
decedent was a resident.[39] Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi  doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a
mere paramour.  The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will.  It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired
during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the
formalities of Philippine law, is fatal,especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.  In
the same case, the Court ruled that aliens  may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals ,[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen
when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could “very well lose her right to
inherit” from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany.  There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
 Page 11 of 16

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. [43] We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.   Now, the effects of this divorce
(as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
“Art. 17.  The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.
LLORENTE v. CA
FACTS:Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United
States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home
and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and
filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The RTC ruled in
favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition
to the Supreme Court.

“When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.” (underscoring ours)
HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed.  We
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad
do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity.”[44] provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
proved.  Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law.  In fact, the will was The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s will and determine the
duly probated.
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on  “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, capacity”since he was a foreigner.
Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.  Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to
the decedent's national law.[45]

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995
is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted
in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on
December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and
determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate
dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

 345 scra 592

Nationality Principle

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and
August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they
were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born
on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has
re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay
City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner
be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the
remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed,
or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory
authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.  1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given
it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through
conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and
its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after
their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during
the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
Page 12 of 16
understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed
in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things
necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,  5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.  6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage . As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton , 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his
Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR,
in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the
latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional
question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage
started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was
born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that
they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground
of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized
by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before
the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982
and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.  5 However, upon review, the respondent city
fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were
accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia",  docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge;
while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua" , docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of
Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside
and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate
the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a
consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset
Page 13 of 16
the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of
the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then
pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,  12 which motion
was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the
petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until
she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking
the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted  de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing
the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of
September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey
A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance
with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which
starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive
and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action
for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse,
and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in
fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not
apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State,
through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes"
or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the
scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the  raison
d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
 Page 14 of 16

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and,
as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to
bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed
prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the
anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant
as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of
such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has
been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders  where the statute provides that the
innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of
no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery,  26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal
Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even
though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures
a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the
declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no
marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover,
what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was
filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply
where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932,
Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be
such when the prosecution was begun ; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the
complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining
the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the
prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta,  hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory
reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar
or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one enteredDISMISSING the complaint in
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made
permanent.

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy
SO ORDERED.
on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the
time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint. Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur .

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said  
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned  23 in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
 

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al.,  24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja
Separate Opinions
Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions,
this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:  

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree
is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence
the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
PARAS, J.,  concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that
the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended
party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to
have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman
of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and
his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their  National law, namely,
American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is
married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
 Page 15 of 16

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers
the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what
he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however,
of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the  national law of the husband the absolute divorce will
be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work
an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the
husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under
our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the
American husband and the Filipino wife.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in
one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city
fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil
and Chia” was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.  (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution
Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue. of the criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce
 
decree?

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J.,  concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that
the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended
party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to
have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman
of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and
his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their  National law, namely,
American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is
married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers
the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what
he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however,
of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the  national law of the husband the absolute divorce will
be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work
an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the
husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under
our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the
American husband and the Filipino wife.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint … for
lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case … is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It
has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre
of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.  (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a
Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

ILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERA Leave a comment

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al
G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After
about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
 Page 16 of 16

G.R. No. L-18176            October 26, 1966 Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then noticed that, on February 16, 1958, defendant was already married, according to
said Exhibit B; that as he confronted the defendant with the contents of this document, her reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to
marry twice in Korea; that when he inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she had lived with about two (2)
LAZARO B. RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant, 
Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there was no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later on, they were
vs.
separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to him.
CHAE KYUNG LEE, defendant-appellee.

The lower court considered plaintiffs evidence insufficient to establish that defendant was married to another person prior to March 15, 1953, and
Jaime R. Nuevas for plaintiff and appellee. 
we agree with this conclusion. To begin with, Exhibit A is not signed. It merely purports to bear the seal of the Chief of Pusan National Police.
Rafael Jose for defendant and appellant.
Secondly, the record does not show who prepared it, much less that he had personal knowledge of the truth of the entry therein concerning
defendant's status on February 15, 1953. It should be noted, that defendant was a native, not  of Pusan but of Seoul, Korea. Hence, Exhibit A
CONCEPCION, C.J.: could, at best, be no more than hearsay evidence. Again, when plaintiff allegedly confronted the defendant with the contents of Exhibit B,
defendant did not  say that she had been married before. Plaintiff declared that she admitted having previously lived  with several other men,
adding, however, that she had no impediment, thus, in effect, negating the alleged previous marriage.
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.

Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown,
and she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea, summons was served by publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff
moved that defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an answer, and that a date be set for the reception of his evidence. Before
acting on this motion, the lower court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, for the purpose of determining whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. Said officer having found no such collusion, the
case was heard on the merits. In due course, thereafter, decision was rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, without costs, upon the ground:
(1) that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed for. A
reconsideration of this decision having been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court, the
jurisdiction of the lower court being in issue in the appeal.
Thirdly, if Exhibit A was obtained on February 16, 1953, in order to establish defendant's qualification to contract marriage, why is it that the
wedding took place, despite the entry in said document to the effect that defendant was married already? There is no competent evidence to the
effect that Korean laws permit bigamy or polygamy. Moreover, the presumption is that the foreign law is identical to the  lex fori, or, in the case at
bar, the Philippine Law. 9 In fact, the statement, imputed by plaintiff to the defendant, to the effect that, although she had cohabited before with
other men, there was no impediment to her marrying him, clearly suggests that a previous marriage on her part would have been, in her opinion,
a legal obstacle to her marriage with the plaintiffs. Then too, the marriage certificate Exhibit D contains spaces for the entry of data on whether
any of the contracting parties had been previously married; whether the prior marriage had been dissolved by a decree of divorce; and, if there
had been such decree, the date thereof. Surely, these data would be absolutely irrelevant if polygamy were sanctioned in Korea. And, again, why
is it that Exhibit D states that defendant had had no  previous marriage?

Last, but not least, plaintiff cannot possibly secure the relief prayed for unless full faith and credence are given to his testimony, but we cannot
In relation thereto, the court a quo  found that it had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it having been believe him for the records show that he would not hesitate to lie when it suits his purpose. Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted marriage
solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said conclusion is erroneous. In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must have with the defendant, he said that he was single, although, he admitted, this was a lie, because, sometime in 1940, he married in Baguio, one
jurisdiction over (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.1 Adelaida Melecio or Valdez.10 But, then he would, also, have us believe that his marriage with the latter was illegal or fictitious, because Adelaida
and he did no more than sign, on a small window in the City Hall of Baguio, certain documents the contents of which he did not read.
The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of first
instance,2 and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations. 3 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the costs of this instance against plaintiff-appellant. It is so
ordered.
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the complaint herein. 4 Defendant was
placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by publication. 5 Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,  concur.
Barrera, J, is on leave.
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole word. The  res  in the present case is
the relation between said parties, or their marriage tie. 6 Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the
place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.7 Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore,
subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and — under plaintiff's — theory still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does
not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.

Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status therein involves and affects two persons. One is married, never in
abstract or a vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on the marriage status of a person necessarily reflects upon the
status of another and the relation between them. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the  res, in an action for
annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum. 8 Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in
the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties. In
other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties herein.

As regards the substantial validity of said marriage, plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in Pusan Korea, sometime in 1952, where she was
operating a nightclub; that they lived together from November 1952 to April 1955; that they were married in Pusan Korea, on March 15, 1953, as
attested to by their marriage certificate Exhibit D; that before the wedding she obtained the "police clearance" Exhibit A, written in Korean
language, and dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order that she could contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to
India and left the defendant, then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her said