1) San Juan v. CSC
COMELEC
San Juan is the Governor of Rizal. When the position of Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal was
vacant, San Juan appointed Santos in an acting capacity. He then suggested 3 nominees,
including Santos, to DBM for the position. Despite the 3 nominees, DBM Usec Cabuquit
appointed Almajose who was not one of the nominees. The reason was because she was
deemed most qualified. San Juan questions this.
SC: While DBM is correct in disallowing people not qualified from holding the position, it may
not appoint a person not nominated by the Governor since this goes against the spirit of local
autonomy as protected in the Constitution. The Governor must be involved in the
appointment process.
2) Province of Negros Occidental v. COA
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental issues a resolution retaining earnings for
hospital and healthcare benefits of the province’s officials and employees. COA disallowed
this claiming AO 103 requires prior Presidential approval before LGUs can grant benefits to
their employees.
SC: The LGUs do not need prior Presidential approval because they have fiscal autonomy.
Although AO 103 is valid, it does not mention LGUs but is only limited to Departments,
Bureaus, and GOCCs over which the President exercises control. The President does not
exercise control over LGUs but only supervision since LGUs have local autonomy. The
President only has the power to ensure that these LGUs faithfully execute the law.
3) Alternative Center v. Zamora
ERAP proposed the allotment of 121B as internal revenue allotment for LGUs. When the law
was passed, Congress set aside 10B as unprogrammed funds that could only be released
upon meeting conditions set in the GAA. Petitioners, NGOs, question the provisions on
unprogrammed funds.
SC: The conditions are inconsistent with fiscal autonomy. Since the constitution provides that
the allotment for LGUs will be automatically released, Congress cannot subject the allotment
of money to LGUs to conditions which may or may not even take place.
4) Borja v. COMELEC
Pateros Mayor Borja died and Capco, his vice, took over for the unexpired portion.
Subsequently, Capco ran and was re-elected in 1992 and 1995. When he tried to run in 1998,
Borja Jr., who is also a candidate, questions Capco’s candidacy due to the 3-term rule.
SC: For the 3-term limit rule to apply, 2 elements must concur: (1) official was elected to
same position 3 consecutive times, and (2) he must have served 3 full terms. Since he was
not elected for the unexpired term, and since he could not have fully served that term since
it was really the deceased Capco’s term, the unexpired portion should not be considered for
purposes of the 3-term limit rule.
5) Adormeo v.
Adormeo and Talaga filed their COCs for Lucena Mayor. Adormeo questioned Talaga’s COC
because he served in 92, 95, and 2000. The service in 2000 was due to a recall election where
Talaga served the unexpired portion of Tagarao.
SC: The 3 term rule means consecutive terms and for this to apply, you must be elected for 3
straight terms and serve the same. When Talaga lost in 1998, the consecutiveness was
interrupted.
6) Socrates v. COMELEC
The barangay officials of Puerto Princesa convened to recall Mayor Socrates. COMELEC
allowed for the recall to take place and scheduled a recall election in 2002. Hagedorn, who
was mayor in 92, 95, and 98, filed his COC. Socrates questions whether Hagedorn can run.
SC: The recall election in 2002 is beyond the 3-term limit rule. By not being elected in 2001,
the consecutiveness was interrupted thus he can run in the recall.
7) Latasa v. COMELEC
Latasa seeks to challenge a COMELEC Resolution which DQ-ed him from running for Mayor of
Digos City, Davao del Sur in 2001. Latasa was the Mayor of Digos in 92, 95, and 98. During his
third term, the municipality of Digos was converted into the City of Digos. Despite the
conversion, Latasa was mandated by the Charter of Digos to serve in a hold-over capacity as
Mayor of Digos. In 2001, Latasa filed his COC for Mayor on the premise that he was running
for the first time as Mayor of the City of Digos. Sunga, another candidate, questioned this
using the 3-term rule. COMELEC DQ-ed Latasa but Latasa filed an MR. Before COMELEC
resolved the MR against him, Latasa won and assumed office.
First, since Latasa already assumed office, COMELEC has no jurisdiction. However, certain
peculiarities in the present case reveal the fact that its very heart is something which this
Court considers of paramount interest hence it will decide the case.
Second, based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the framers of the
Constitution wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of
power as a result of consecutive terms. Thus, an elective local official is not barred from
running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct
personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and must be accorded different
treatment consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not
deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor.
However, he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained
a different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post.
Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one, there is a material
change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit when it is converted
from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well. It is
precisely for this reason why Section 10, Article X of the Constitution mandates that no
province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, without the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional
provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local
government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the
same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and
authority as their chief executive for nine years.
In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May
1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by
reason of the conversion of Digos from municipality to city? This Court believes that he did
involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed
abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal
mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein,
for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never
ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from
discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the
framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive
terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen
consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not
abhorred by it.
Third, Sunga cannot be Mayor because he lost and making him Mayor would frustrate the
will of the electorate.
8) Ong v. Alegre
Ong and Alegre are rivals for the position of Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte. In 1998,
Ong won as Mayor and served the full term. In 2001, COMELEC declared that the real winner
of the 1998 election was Alegre. Ong ran again in 2001 and won. Notably, Ong won in 95,
served in 98, and won in 2001. In 2004, Ong ran again but Alegre filed a case to DQ him
under the 3-term rule. COMELEC DQ-ed Ong and when Ong’s brother tried to substitute him,
COMELEC disallowed the same because he filed his COC late. Hence this case.
SC: Although it was later proclaimed that Alegre won the 1998 elections, Ong actually served
the entire term. There was no interruption to speak of, he was never unseated, and he never
ceased discharging his responsibilities as Mayor. Thus, the service of the 98 term is
considered when contemplating the 3-term rule. Having served in 95, 98, and 2001, Ong
cannot run in 2004.
9) Dizon v. COMELEC
Dizon is a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Morales, the mayor, was elected
and served in 95, 98, 01, and 04. Now, Morales wants to run again in 07. Dizon files a case to
DQ him because he is effectively running for his 5th term. COMELEC ruled that Dizon was DQ-
ed. However, Morales asserted that there was an RTC decision that declared the true winner
of the 98 elections was Dee thus the 3-term rule should be counted from 2001 and not 1995.
The COMELEC 2nd Division took notice of the RTC case but claimed Morales was able to
exercise the full term in 98 despite being alter declared to have lost. However, since the 98
term was considered, having also served in 95 and 01, the COMELEC 2nd Division held that
Morales was not qualified to run in 04 and it is due to this lack of qualification that he can
again run in 07 since the consecutiveness of the terms was broken.
COMELEC en banc upheld the ruling but also added that Morales relinquished his position on
May 16 2007 and the vice-mayor took his oath and served the unexpired portion from May
17-June 30. The COMELEC en banc considered this a gap which renders the 3-term limit
inapplicable. Hence this case.
First, because the SC ruled on the Rivera case regarding his 1998 term in May 2007 – the
immediate consequence being that Morales was not qualified during 2004, which was
effectively his fourth term – this effectively unseated him. It was because of this vacancy that
the vice-mayor took over for the unexpired term. The assumption by the vice mayor of the
office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’
continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30
June 2007.
Second, although the SC concedes that Morales was in fact Mayor in 95, 98, 91, and 04 until
May 16 2007, the fact is that Morales was not the duly elected Mayor in 04 and he did not
serve the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Indeed, the
period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term
limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term
for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Third, Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through
lengthy litigations. However, such delay which is not here shown to have been intentionally
sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to
be elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election.
10) Bolos v. COMELEC

Bolos was Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in 94, 97, and 2002. In 04, he
ran as Municipal Councilor and won, leaving his position of Punong Barangay. After serving
the full term of Municipal Councilor, he ran in Oct. 07 as Punong Barangay. Cinconiegue, the
incumbent Punong Barangay and a candidate for the position, asks COMELEC to DQ Bolos
based on the 3-term limit. His claim is that the relinquishment of the position of Punong
Barangay by Bolos was voluntary. COMELEC ruled that the relinquishment was voluntary thus
Bolos could not run for Punong Barangay in 07 hence this petition.

SC: First, the Constitution intentionally left the determination of term of office of barangay
officials to the discretion of Congress. However, under the LGC, they are covered by the 3-
term limit. Also, they serve a 5 year term.

Second, Bolos voluntarily renounced his term when he ran for Municipal Councilor. This is
because he knew that after being elected and proclaimed, his election as municipal councilor
would entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it.
Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for
Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan
member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems
as a voluntary renunciation of said office.

Third, Bolos argues he left his position by operation of law. This is untenable. In this case,
petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished
his office during his third term when he won and assumed a new office.

11) Aldovino v. COMELEC

Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena for 3 terms (98-01; 01-04; 04-07). During his third term,
he was suspended by Sandiganbayan for 90 days. Eventually, the SC lifted the suspension
order.

In the 2007 elections, Asilo filed his COC for councilor. Aldovino sought to have Asilo’s COC
denied because it violated the 3 term limit rule. COMELEC ruled that a preventive suspension
is an effective interruption because it incapacitates the public official from serving his term
thus it should not be counted as part of the 3-term limit rule.

SC: A suspension cannot interrupt a term. Suspension is a preventive measure when an

official is facing charges but this does not strip him of his position even if he does not receive
any salary during that time. Thus, COMELEC acted with GADALEJ.