"Saving Lives"-Lü Kun's Manual On City Defense: Kai Filipiak

Journal of Chinese Military History 1 (2012) 139-188 brill.
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“Saving Lives”—Lü Kun’s Manual on City Defense
Kai Filipiak
University of Leipzig
fĳilipiak@rz.uni-leipzig.de
Abstract
The subject of this article is the Book on Saving Lives ( Jiuming shu) written by the late Ming
scholar-offfĳicial Lü Kun. The book enjoyed great popularity during the Ming and Qing dynasties
and offfers practical advice for those who were in charge of city defense. Lü wrote this text in
anticipation of imminent social crises. His prime motivation was to save the lives of his fellow
countrymen when “bandits” attacked the county seat. The book, which is a survival manual rather
than a handbook for magistrates, was written for military non-professionals who would lead the
civilian population to defend the county. On the other hand, the text is of a military nature and
refers to the military function of Chinese towns.
The majority of the book deals with military preparedness. Although the book also discusses
various aspects of city defense such as weapons, tactics, fortifĳication, training, and military law,
Lü himself lacked combat experience. In this respect, the book illustrates a dilemma: The defense
of small cities lay beyond the scope of the central government. This placed the responsible
offfĳicials in a difffĳicult and contradictory situation. The magistrate, for example, was not prepared
for the job. He lacked military experience but had to lead the local population into war. Despite
his power, he depended on the cooperation of the people, including the assistance of rich families
and the support of armed villagers skilled in martial arts. In this way, Lü Kun’s treatise illustrates
the consequences of earlier political decisions to concentrate the military on the northern border
and around the capital.
Keywords
Ming history, city defense, military preparedness, fortifĳication, tactics, Lü Kun, Jiuming shu
Introduction
The present study focuses on city defense, which became an increasingly
important issue during the second half of the Ming dynasty. In his quantitative
analysis, James Tong marks three climaxes of collective violence during the
periods 1516-1525, 1556-1565, and 1626-1644.1 Although Tong concluded that the
1 Tong 1991, 49.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI: 10.1163/22127453-12341240
140 K. Filipiak / Journal of Chinese Military History 1 (2012) 139-188
majority of unrest was concentrated in South China, David Robinson has

shown that, due to the growth of the capital, Beijing, crime and violence also
escalated in the north.2
There were various reasons for the emergence and growth of violence in late
Ming China. The early political decision to concentrate military force along the
northern border and around the capital left large parts of the empire unsafe. As
a consequence, local offfĳicials and commanders were forced to recruit peasant
militia to maintain local order.3 The structural disadvantages of the local
defense systems became obvious when banditry spread widely due to increas-
ing socioeconomic contradictions. Timothy Brook has noticed that short-term
tenants, wage laborers, domestic servants, woodcutters, and seasonal migrants
formed the lower end of the social scale.4 These potential outlaws together
with non-Chinese invaders from the north and pirates in the east and south
provided the pool of attackers posing a permanent risk for cities throughout
the empire.
Although war and the military have occupied a central position in Chinese
history, the existing literature has tended to neglect or downplay their role.5
As a result, studies on Chinese city defense are limited. Herbert Franke was
one of the fĳirst who explored military handbooks, diaries, and other sources
(including the Book on Saving Lives) in order to provide a substantial survey
on logistics, weapons, tactics and other aspects of siege and defense in pre-
modern China.6
Previous Western studies with a special focus on the Ming dynasty have
emphasized the defensive, administrative, and ritual signifĳicance of walled
cities,7 historical patterns in the building of city walls,8 and the relevance of
secondary cities within military defense networks and political administrative
hierarchies in late Ming China.9 In addition, Jérome Kerlouégan has presented
an interesting study of local manuals on city defense in which he examines the
intentions of the authors who wrote the manuals.10
In contrast to these works, the present study deals with the practical matters
of city defense summarized in the Book on Saving Lives ( Jiuming shu 救命書)
2 Robinson 2001, 47.

3 Swope 2008, 130.
4 Brook 1998, 154.
5 Grafff and Higham 2003, 1.
6 Franke 1974.
7 See, for example, Farmer 2000, Fang 2007, and Cheung 2009.
8 Des Forges 2009.
9 Swope 2008, 123-54.
10 See Kerlouégan 2002, 241-43.
K. Filipiak / Journal of Chinese Military History 1 (2012) 139-188 141
written by the late Ming scholar-offfĳicial Lü Kun 呂坤. The investigation aims
to explain the nature of the text, the intentions of the author, and the signifĳi-
cance and place the book has in Chinese writing on city defense. Furthermore,
it asks what kind of role the magistrate played in the maintenance of local
order and why the local defense systems declined beginning in the fĳifteenth
century. The study will provide micro-historical insight into local conditions in
Henan combined with macro-historical explanations of late Ming social devel-
opments. Analyses of diffferent passages illustrate the various economic, social,
cultural, and technical aspects of city defense in late Ming China.
Taking the county seat of Ningling as an example, the study will show how
much banditry and city defense afffected the life of the local population. I will
argue that, due to political decisions and the decline of hereditary military
service, Chinese cities in late Ming China had military functions, but the mili-
tary was largely absent from them. As a consequence, the civil population was,
from beginning to end, responsible for the defense of the county seat. The
armed villager and citizen had to replace the soldier. In the event of a siege, the
inhabitants, as well as the population of the surrounding villages, had to defend
the county seat. Although they were non-professionals, they used weapons and
were ruled by military regulations.
Even worse, the county magistrate was a civil offfĳicial who was by no means
prepared for his job as the city’s main defender, because military knowledge
was not part of the civil examinations. Nevertheless, magistrates were in charge
of city defense and therefore forced to deal with military tasks. The example of
the civil offfĳicial Lü Kun will show very plainly that he was an active participant
in discourse advocating local military preparedness (wubei 武備), the training
of local soldiers, the practice of martial arts, and the establishment of local self-
protection societies. Lü had a profound military knowledge of logistics, fortifĳi-
cation, weapons, and martial arts, including related fĳields of knowledge such as
engineering, botany, and public funding. This may also be the reason why later
military texts frequently refer to his book.
1. Author and Text

Lü Kun (1536-1618) was a native of Ningling 寧陵 county, which was one of
eight counties in Guide prefecture 歸德府 in eastern Henan.11 Having passed
the palace examination in 1574, Lü Kun began his offfĳicial career as magistrate
11 For a brief biography on Lü Kun, see Goodrich and Fang 1976, vol. 1, 1006-1010 as well as
Lü Kun’s biography in MS, ch. 226, 5937-43. Handlin 1983 gives a detailed account of Lü Kun’s life
of Xiangyuan 襄垣 in Shanxi. Because of his outstanding service, he was trans-

ferred to the strategic center for border defense in Datong 大同. Later he
became responsible for diffferent tasks in the Ministry of Revenue and Popula-
tion. After nine years of service in the ministry he was transferred to Shandong,
where he served as an administrative vice commissioner in 1587. Further
appointments included posts as surveillance commissioner of Shanxi, admin-
istration commissioner of Shaanxi, and grand coordinator of Shanxi. In 1592 he
was appointed as vice censor-in-chief. Serving in the capital of the Chinese
empire, he criticized the emperor for his failings and the court for serious flaws
in its administration several times. In the end, the central government found a
way to remove the inconvenient offfĳicial. Lü retired “on grounds of illness” and
spent more than twenty years at home.
Chinese historiography considers Lü Kun to be the ideal Confucian offfĳicial.12
As a man of high integrity, he cared for the sorrows of the common people and
paid much attention to maintaining law and order. Acting as a local govern-
ment offfĳicial, he advocated local granaries as well as support for the indigent.
Lü Kun’s writings include a variety of handbooks, didactic works, memori-
als, and other documents on statecraft, self-cultivation, and education. It is
noticeable, however, that a considerable part is related to military matters.
The Records of Practical Government (Shizheng lu 實政錄), published in
1598, is a profound compendium on statecraft.13 The work is based on offfĳicial
documents written by Lü Kun when he was an offfĳicial in Shanxi. It is rich in
information on military topics related to local defense systems, city defense,
organizing post stations, and practicing martial arts, as well as military weap-
onry. Chapter Nine of the book is of particular interest because of its many
references to city defense. Lü revisited some of these issues in his later Book on
Saving Lives, but he did not simply adapt Chapter Nine to the local conditions
of Ningling. On the contrary, comparison of the two texts demonstrates the
large diffferences between the military preparedness at the northern border
and that of small towns in the interior. While the Records of Practical Govern-
ment provides more details in terms of fortifĳication, military law, and the sys-
tem of mutual surveillance (baojia 保甲), including the training of militias, the
and thought. The study contrasts Lü with other thinkers of the Ming dynasty, indicating a
reorientation of scholar-offfĳicials in terms of an increasing preference for practical learning.
12 For example, Lü’s biography in Mingshi tells us that Sun Peiyang, Minister of Rites,
recommended Lü Kun as one of three most virtuous men in the world. See MS, ch. 226, 5943.
13 All quotations from the Shizheng lu in this essay are based on the 1598 edition.
Book on Saving Lives emphasizes the logistical aspects of city defense, combat
tactics, and the specifĳic local features of Ningling.
In his memorial Explaining the Hardship of the People Living along the Border
(Zhai chen bian ji min jian shu 摘陳邊計民艱疏), Lü brought up many mili-
tary problems. He criticized, for example, the inadequacy of military examina-
tions (wuju 武舉) to produce offfĳicers who were able to discuss military
tactics and to form a battle array. Lü suggested the training of village soldiers
(xiangbing 鄉兵) to be prepared for an emergency. He advocated strict mili-
tary laws and military orders in order to avoid the lack of discipline.14 In addi-
tion, Lü wrote a preface to the book Necessary Knowledge for Military Use
(Xingjun xuzhi 行軍須知) by an unknown author.
However, Lü’s most important military work is his Book on Saving Lives
( Jiuming shu 救命書), also entitled Book on Saving Lives in Case of City Defense
(Shoucheng jiuming shu 守城救命書), which provides practical guidelines for
city defense.15 Lü wrote the preface in 1607.16 The Shanghai Library has a Wanli
(r. 1573-1620) edition dating from 1614. The book was highly popular during
the Qing dynasty. It was reprinted more than twenty times, including three
editions during the Daoguang era (1821-1850) published in 1832, 1834, and 1848.
The versions from 1834 and 1848 include later added material and illustrations
of military equipment for city defense.
The extended version from 1848, based on copies from diffferent collections,
was republished in 1985.17 The text is divided into two chapters.18 The fĳirst chap-
ter includes the Book on Saving Lives by Lü Kun. The second chapter contains
the Record on Two Weapons (Er rong ji 二戎記) by Guo Zongchang 郭宗昌
and Supplementary Notes to City Defense on Methods of Offfensive Warfare
(Chengshou bu gongzhan fa fu 城守補攻戰法附) by Wang Chaolin 王朝麟.
Guo Zongchang came from Shaanxi and lived during the Ming-Qing transi-
tion. He was a scholar and an expert on inscriptions. His Record on Two
Weapons refers to the bow and arrow as “two weapons” for defending the
border against the Manchus. Wang Chaolin was a contemporary of Lü Kun and
14 Lü’s memorial is included in Chen et al. 1997, vol. 5, 4504-4515.

15 All quotations from the Jiuming shu in this essay are based on the 1832 edition, which was
reprinted in the Zhongguo bingshu jicheng series.
16 Joanna F. Handlin states that Lü wrote the book in 1609. See Handlin 1983, 172. However the
preface of the Jiuming shu dates from the beginning of the second month in the ding-wei year
(1607) during the Wanli reign.
17 Lü Kun, Jiuming shu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985).
18 The original version of the Jiuming shu was not divided into two parts, as Needham indicates.
See Needham 1986, 34.
came from Shanxi. His Supplementary Notes to City Defense on Methods of

Offfensive Warfare includes twenty methods of warfare for defending cities.
Considering that the original version of the Book on Saving Lives did not
include either text, all quotations from the Book on Saving Lives used in this
article are based on the original version republished in 1832.
This brings us to the question of the nature of this text. It is well known that
China has a long and rich tradition of military writings. Many encyclopedias,
manuals, and war diaries deal with the conceptual and practical aspects of city
defense. In this respect, the Book on Saving Lives certainly is a military text that
focuses on the military function of cities in China. In some respect it is a man-
ual, because the treatise gives instructions for the various aspects related to
city defense. As such, the text is in many regards diffferent from other sources.
Compared to other works, the Book on Saving Lives is a short text that is only
divided into the three parts “Necessary Arrangements of City Defense,” “Neces-
sary Arrangements in Case of Banditry,” and “Necessary Arrangements for Pro-
tection.” In contrast, Qian Zhan’s 錢旃 Strategies for City Defense (Chengshou
choulüe 城守籌略), a book of over four hundred pages, includes more than
three hundred entries on city defense.
Many military texts on city defense quote passages from other works. Fan
Jingwen‘s 笵景文 (1587-1644) Comprehensive Handbook on Defense (Zhanshou
quanshu 戰守全書), for example, presents passages from the “military clas-
sics” such as Sunzi, Weiliaozi, and Liutao, as well as Zeng Gongliang’s Song
anthology Essentials of the Military Classics (Wujing zongyao 武經縂要) and
Ming material such as Qi Jiguang’s military handbooks. Apart from a few
phrases, however, Lü Kun dispensed with all references to other works.
Another special feature of the Book on Saving Lives is its local context.
Although Lü Kun illustrated many general aspects of city defense, other infor-
mation only makes sense in the context of Lü’s hometown Ningling. This is the
case, for example, when he discussed the construction of the new dike in
Ningling. Another example referred to a rebellion in Guide prefecture led by
Shi Shangzhao in 1553.
It is true that other works of the Ming and Qing dynasties are much more
comprehensive and provide more information on city defense than Lü Kun’s
Book on Saving Lives. Therefore, one might suggest that the characteristics of
the book together with the reputation of its author were the only reasons for its
popularity. But there is another point where the book departs from other texts.
As the title indicates, Lü’s book is a survival manual. In the author’s view, the
basic question is not only how to defend the city against bandits but also
how to survive such a dangerous situation. In this respect, the book provides
practical advice for those who are in charge of defense as well as those who
would be the potential victims when the defense collapsed.19
The Book on Saving Lives enjoyed great popularity during the fĳinal stage of
the Ming dynasty. Guo Zizhang 郭子章 (1543-1618), author of the City Wall
Book (Chengshu 城書, 1599), refers to Lü Kun. Mao Qizong 冒起宗 wrote
another manual of city defense titled Defending the Fish Trap (Shouquan 守筌,
1635). Mao added the preface of Lü’s Book on Saving Lives to his own book and
praised Lü as a personal example. Song Zushun 宋祖舜, who wrote the Outline
of City Defense (Shoucheng yaolan 守城要覽, 1635), said that he was inspired
by Lü Kun’s Book on Saving Lives.20
Han Lin 翰霖 (1596?-1649), the author of the Outline of Cautious Defense
(Shenshou yaolu 慎守要錄, 1636), quotes Lü’s passages on granaries and on the
role of the magistrate during defense.21 He also refers to the Records of Practical
Government in which Lü discussed the construction of walls.22 Fan Jingwen,
another Ming writer on military afffairs, wrote his Comprehensive Handbook on
Defense during the Chongzhen era (1628-1644). Fan had passed the examina-
tions with the jinshi degree. He was a loyal Ming offfĳicial who committed sui-
cide at the end of the dynasty. Fan quoted the Book on Saving Lives many times,
referring to Lü’s dike control, deep and shallow places in the moat,23 distances
between lookouts, and so on.
Qian Zhan’s comprehensive work Strategies for City Defense, which includes
a preface from 1644, does not explicitly mention the Book on Saving Lives, but
quotes a passage in which Lü explains why offfĳicials have to lend but not donate
the grain from the granaries.24 Finally, Mao Yuanyi 茅元儀 (1594-1644), author
of the impressive Treatise on Military Preparation (Wubeizhi 武備志) from
1621, refers to the discussion of the details of wall building from Lü’s Records of
Practical Government.25
The success of Lü’s Book on Saving Lives continued throughout the Qing
dynasty. The sudden interest in the text after 1830 should be seen in the context
19 Lü, for example, recommended that the population flee after the bandits occupied the
town. According to the Book on Saving Lives, one should take food for fĳive to six days, hide in small
farms over the day and walk at night through counties and villages that had already been
plundered by the bandits. See JMS, 777-78.
20 See Kerlouégan 2002, 241-43.
21 Han Lin, Shenshou yaolu, 21, 24-25.
22 Han Lin, Shenshou yaolu, 3.
23 See, for example, Fan Jingwen, Zhanshou quanshu, 131.
24 Qian Zhan, Chengshou choulüe, 370. See also JMS, 759.
25 Mao Yuanyi, Wubeizhi, vol. 3, 311.
of an increasing Lü Kun “cult” during the Qing dynasty. As a result, famous

offfĳicials who were interested in practical problems rather than the contempla-
tion of Confucian concepts supported the republication of his works. Further-
more, because Lü’s public image conformed to the imperial standards for
orthodoxy, the Daoguang emperor accorded him, alone of all the thinkers of
the Wanli period, a place in the Confucian temple.26
In addition, military books continued to quote passages from Lü’s manual.
The Comprehensive Handbook on the Best Strategy to Bring Peace (Zhiping
shengsuan quanshu 治平勝算全書), which is perhaps wrongly attributed to
the Qing general Nian Gengyao 年羹堯 (?-1726), quoted what Lü Kun had
listed as the seven shortcomings of a bad defense that could be used by bandits
for attacking cities.27
The book One Hundred Golden Strategies for Defending the Empire (Pingpi
baijin fang 洴澼百金方) from 1788 discusses the pros and cons of defense
in Chinese history. In this context the book refers to Lü’s discussion on the
establishment of local militias skilled in martial arts.28 Liang Zhangju 梁章鉅
(1775-1849), governor-general of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangxi, who was a
respected scholar and offfĳicial, made a short reference to Lü’s Book on Saving
Lives in his Notes by Tuian (Tuian suibi 退庵隨筆, 1836).29
Another interesting reference can be found in Wang Peixun’s 王培荀 Mem-
ories of Earlier Times in the Native Garden (Xiangyuan yijiu lu 鄉園憶舊錄,
1848). Wang wrote that the magistrate of Jinxiang county 金鄉 in Shandong
province ordered that Lü Kun’s Book on Saving Lives be published and sent
“with respectful love” everywhere in order to plan the necessary arrangements
of city defense.30
Zhu Lu’s 朱璐 book Compilation on Defense (Fangshou jicheng 防守集成,
1853) focuses on the defense of small cities and walled villages by militia. He
quotes a passage that describes the role of the magistrate and his subordinates
in defending the wall without referring to the Book on Saving Lives.31 But it is
26 See Handlin 1975, 80.

27 Nian Gengyao, Zhiping shengsuan quanshu, 72. See also JMS, 764.
28 See Yuan Gonggui, Pingpi baijin fang, 68. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who
pointed out to me that the book was compiled by Ming loyalists in the very last years of the Ming
and republished in 1788 under the name of Yuan Gonggui.
29 Liang Zhangju, Tuian suibi, 164.
30 Wang Peixun, Xiangyuan yijiu lu, 268.
31 Zhu Lu, Fangshou jicheng, 733. See JMS, 763.
obvious that he knew the work, because in other places he explicitly refers
to Lü’s book.32
These examples illustrate that many writers appreciated Lü Kun as an expert
in the fĳield of city defense. The quoted passages on the granaries, the construc-
tion of walls, the role of the magistrate, and other aspects of defense indicate
that much of the advice given in the Book on Saving Lives could be applied
by someone else in another situation. The reason why the book was popular
in the fĳinal stage of the Ming and from the Daoguang era on can be attributed
to the increasing instability of the Ming and Qing empires respectively.
2. Lü Kun’s Motives and His Audience

The fact that the civil offfĳicial Lü Kun wrote a manual on city defense raises the
question of the cultural context behind his action. In other words, what moti-
vated the author to write the Book on Saving Lives and who were the intended
readers? The following paragraphs offfer an explanation based on an examina-
tion of Lü Kun’s thoughts, the situation of Ningling, and specifĳic aspects of the
administrative system at the beginning of the seventeenth century.
My investigation starts with Lü’s motives for composing a manual on city
defense. One might suppose that the historical circumstances caused him to
write a military handbook. It is well known that the Ming period is rich in
armed conflicts within and outside of China. Until the second half of the six-
teenth century, the Mongols presented the most dangerous threat to the
empire. They raided the Chinese border in the north, and sometimes their
tribes were unifĳied by strong leaders who threatened the empire. The armies of
Esen and Altan even besieged the capital of Beijing in 1449 and 1550. This long-
term conflict with the Mongols ended with peace negotiations in 1572.
Pirates who raided the eastern and southern coastline constituted another
threat to the empire. The war against the pirates culminated during the reign
of the Jiajing emperor (1522-1566). Furthermore, there was a variety of forms of
social violence, including rebellions, peasant uprisings, banditry, and mutinies,
during the second half of the Ming. According to James Tong, there were three
climaxes during the periods 1516-1525, 1556-1565, and 1626-1644.33
32 Zhu more or less correctly quotes Lü’s passage that there are no real soldiers nowadays and
the people do not know anything on military matters. See Zhu Lu, Fangshou jicheng, 138.
33 Tong 1991, 49.
The problem, however, is that the outlined external and internal threats
were neither temporally nor spatially directly related to Lü Kun and his Book
on Saving Lives. In contrast, Henan province and its county Ningling as well as
Shanxi province “were by far the least rebellious and bandit-ridden” provinces
in North China.34
It was, in fact, the absence of serious external and internal conflicts that
caused Lü Kun to write the book. In his preface, Lü expressed deep concern
about his time as a peaceful era where people considered walls and moats a
waste of money.35 No one cared for military preparation and people spoke out
against the reconstruction of wall and dike (in Ningling).36 He wrote:
Nowadays there is a lack of true military conflicts in our empire. People do not know
anything about military matters. When they recently held a debate on the training of
local soldiers everyone felt annoyed. [People] do not care about life or death in the
future. They simply hate [such discussions] and feel annoyed.37
In this connection it is worthwhile to notice that a decade before in his Records

of Practical Government Lü had mentioned the long time of peace in which
people could live comfortably.38 The passage refers to the absence of conflicts
with the Mongolian people as a result of the peace from 1572. Both statements
also indicate that Lü Kun had no practical experience of combating “bandits.”
After numerous incidents of war, rebellion, and banditry during the six-
teenth century, China passed through a short period of relaxation at the begin-
ning of the seventeenth century. Although the government averted the internal
and external threats, there was a serious lack of administrative, fĳinancial, and
social reforms that would stabilize the empire. As a former high-ranking offfĳi-
cial, Lü Kun was aware of this. He knew that the idea of a peaceful, stable, and
prosperous China was illusory, above all because there were serious anomalies
in the social realm.
In 1597 he submitted his Memorial on Impending Disasters (Youwei shu
憂危書) to the emperor, enumerating the signs of danger throughout the
empire. He also warned against the growing dissatisfaction of the population,
saying:
34 Tong 1991, 53.

35 JMS, 749.
36 JMS, 750. For the relation of the dike to defense, see below.
37 JMS, 784.
38 SZL, 202.
Those who have nothing lack food and warmth. Their families are in a difffĳicult situa-
tion. They put up with their poverty and carry out their duties, but they are not neces-
sarily able to live. In other circumstances and in times of war, one could live a careless
and dishonorable life and make plans for rebellion.39
Lü understood that the increasing social conflicts would lead to a decline in

support for the ruling dynasty. His ability to anticipate future developments
caused him to think about practical solutions. The Book on Saving Lives is no
doubt an important result of these thoughts.
But Lü did not only think about what would happen in the near future. He
also wrote his manual on city defense in light of past experiences. For example,
he points out that “bandits who plan to attack a fortifĳied city use confĳidential
persons who present themselves as laborers and servants. In this way, they
gather information and observe the ways. They prepare for opening the gates,
torching the city, and opening the prisons. One historic example [of this strat-
egy] is Shi [Shangzhao], who captured Guide with his accomplices.”40
Shi Shangzhao 師尚詔 was a native of the poor county of Zhecheng in
Guide prefecture who started a revolt in 1553. Although the rebels met strong
resistance in Ningling, they led an attack on the prefectural capital of Guide.
Later Shi robbed other counties in Guide, where he also freed prisoners.41
It seems that the rebellion left a deep impression on Lü Kun, who still was a
young man at the time. In this respect, his Book on Saving Lives was also a plan
to “save the lives” of the people in Ningling county in case of danger. According
to Qiao Ying 喬胤, who wrote an epilogue to the book, Lü Kun had specially
written the manual for his hometown Ningling, which lacked equipment and
methods related to city defense. In addition, the city walls and the dike were in
poor condition.42
Lü Kun’s motivation becomes clear by examining his preface, which starts
with the rhetorical question: “Is there something that people care about more
than their lives? Is there something more important to them than saving their
lives?”43 Life is indeed precious, and therefore it is important to be prepared. If
people do not care about defensive measures, then victory and defeat as well as
life and death are left to fate.44
39 Chen et al. 1997, vol. 5, 4494.

40 JMS, 758-59.
41 For a brief account of Shi Shangzhao’s rebellion see Des Forges 2003, 174-76.
42 See Qiao Ying’s epilogue in JMS, 753.
43 JMS, 749.
44 JMS, 750.
Finally, we must also take into account that the early retiree from offfĳicial life
was looking for new fĳields of activity and hoped that the county would make
use of his skills and knowledge. As a senior offfĳicial, he criticized the miserable
conditions and asked for money and laborers in order to reconstruct the defen-
sive structures of Ningling. In this way, he came into conflict with the local
people, who were displeased by his effforts to mobilize them for public works.
Faced with a feeling of uselessness caused by his retirement, Lü may have been
using the Book on Saving Lives as a vehicle to reengage with society.
To sum up, Lü’s motives for writing the book resulted from his long stay in
Ningling after retirement, his previous experience with rebellion, the present
situation characterized by a general decline of local defense systems, and the
insufffĳicient preparation for defense in Ningling, as well as his ability to recog-
nize social problems and to anticipate further developments.
This brings us to the second question, his intended audience. From the anal-
ysis of the text, it is not clear whom it addresses—and it seems that Lü was
himself unclear about this. Jérome Kerlouégan states that the authors of late
Ming manuals on city defense, including Lü Kun and his Book on Saving Lives,
wrote the manuals for magistrates to help them in the event their county seats
came under attack.45
There are several reasons that support this view. With respect to the book,
four passages from diffferent contexts refer to the magistrate:
1. In times of peace, the magistrate has to prepare identifĳication placards for

the population of the county.46
2. The smart and brave magistrate acts with foresight, clears the fĳields, and
asks the population to come.47
3. The magistrate is required to make a list of the borrowed utensils. He is
responsible for ensuring that the borrowed utensils are later returned to the
people.48
4. The most dangerous part of the city wall should be defended by a brave and
intelligent man, or the magistrate himself.49
45 Kerlouégan 2002, 239.

46 JMS, 757.
47 JMS, 761-62.
48 JMS, 772.
49 JMS, 773.
Apart from textual evidence, there are macro-historical explanations support-

ing Kerlouégan’s view. Due to the concentration of military force at the north-
ern border and around the capital, there was a lack of troops for defense inside
the empire. The decline of the few remaining garrisons made it necessary to
defend small cities with the assistance of the local population, which was led
and organized by the magistrate.
In terms of city types, Fei Si-yen stresses the important point that, for
example, the “urban space” of Nanjing was divided into administrative cities
(cheng 城) and commercial towns (zhen 鎮).50 Ningling can be assigned to
the fĳirst type. However, it is to be assumed that strategic considerations and
the level of the administrative hierarchy were important factors in deciding
whether the military would defend a particular city.
In the case of Ningling, there were two guards that could provide military
assistance. The Suiyang garrison (Suiyang wei 睢陽衛) was situated less than
forty kilometers west of Ningling. Guide, the prefectural capital, which had
the second garrison (Guide wei 歸德衛), was located forty kilometers east of
Ningling.51
Des Forges argues that Shi Shangzhao’s rebels met strong resistance in
Ningling and Suizhou, perhaps because these towns were well garrisoned.52
This applies in the case of Suizhou, where the Suiyang garrison was established
in 1389,53 but certainly not for Ningling. Lü Kun noted that even if soldiers were
sent in the event of an emergency it would take two or three months to arrive
in Ningling.54 Although it is certainly unrealistic that it would take that long for
the soldiers to arrive, the passage give evidence for the absence of guards and
battalions near Ningling. In other words, the people of Ningling had to rely on
their own effforts to defend the town and the magistrate had to lead them.
According to Lü Kun, the “Father-Mother-Offfĳicial” was the main defender and
coordinator of all defense measures.55
In addition, the magistrate, though a civil offfĳicial, was responsible for difffer-
ent tasks that were of a military nature. For example, the magistrate was
in charge of the annual recruitment of men from the military families ( junhu
50 Fei 2009, 76.

51 MS, ch. 90, 2200. For the location see Tan 1982, vol. 7, 57-58.
52 Des Forges 2003, 174.
53 Liew 1998, vol. 2, 121.
54 JMS, 783.
55 JMS, 763. The county magistrate, who was offfĳicially termed zhixian 知縣, was often referred
to colloquially as fumu guan 父母官 “Father-Mother-Offfĳicial,” indicating the role he played for
the people at the local administrative level.
軍戶) for service in the empire’s garrisons.56 The magistrate supervised

numerous forms of corvée labor, such as personal corvée without payment
(liyi 力役), paid corvée (guyi 雇役), and occasional corvée by substitutes
( jieqing bushi zhi yi 徣倩不時之役).57 Some of these types of labor could
include armed service as archers, postal security guards, and policemen. Fur-
thermore, the magistrate supervised the military families, members of the local
militias (minbing 民兵), and the all-important postal service. The county seat
had an Offfĳice of Military Afffairs (bingfang 兵房) to serve as support. According
to the Ming Code, the county offfĳicials were also responsible for local fortifĳica-
tion in the form of dispatching laborers or soldiers to repair collapsed city
walls.58 One of the main functions of magistrates consisted of the maintenance
of local order. For this reason they were responsible for managing small bands
of armed men59 and for the defense of the county seat. The Ming Code set out
drastic punishments for offfĳicials who failed to fulfĳil their obligations. Those
who left their posts without authorization or fled to avoid difffĳicult circum-
stances would be punished by beating and dismissal from offfĳice.60
The professional obligations and duties of magistrates contrasted sharply
with their education and training. Although, as we have seen, afffairs of a mili-
tary nature constituted an important part of the administrative duties of civil
offfĳicials, military knowledge was not a part of the civil examinations or even
classical education. Before a man was appointed as magistrate he had to pass
the civil examinations for offfĳicials. The examinations required profound
knowledge of the interpretation and annotation of the Confucian classics, but
did not prepare the candidates to solve specifĳic administrative problems. As a
non-professional the magistrate had to defend his county seat, but he was nei-
ther skilled in military tactics nor familiar with military engineering. Not sur-
prisingly, the magistrate was not well prepared for his difffĳicult job.
This contradiction results from the basic idea behind the system of civil
examinations. The civil examinations, restructured during the Song Dynasty
(960-1278), served as a tool for recruiting offfĳicials. The Chinese bureaucratic
system required offfĳicials to administer large territories. Those who had suc-
cessfully passed the civil examinations formed the political elite whose inter-
ests were in accord with those of the ruling dynasty. The offfĳicials were
56 Nimick 1993, 121.

57 MS, ch. 75, 1850.
58 Jiang 2005, 243.
59 Nimick 1993, 146.
60 Jiang 2005, 55.
subordinated to the emperor at the top level of the hierarchy, who could con-
trol the bureaucracy and channel their interests. Generations of offfĳicials were
educated on the basis that a thorough understanding of the Confucian classics
would discipline them and homogenize their attitudes and behavior. In the
end, the system produced generalists qualifĳied to mediate between the upper
and lower strata of the society who were also empowered to coordinate admin-
istrative activities and make decisions. Men with general knowledge (i.e.,
knowledge of social relations) formed the backbone of the administration.61
Olf Lehmann describes the ideal Confucian offfĳicial well: “The ideal Confu-
cian from a philosophical standpoint can only be viewed as a subject. He is the
receiver of a universal call to cultivation, encoded in its a priori system, as well
as the representative of order in relation to himself, his family, the empire, and
the world. His success fĳinds as many allies in the external world as his failure
does excuses. His practical experience is as endless as his expertise.”62
This ideal was represented by the school of Neo-Confucianism that emerged
during the Song Dynasty (960-1278). In the context of our discussion of expert
versus general knowledge, it is important to note that its main proponent
Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) made a fundamental distinction between Elementary
Learning (xiao xue 小學) and Great Learning (da xue 大學).
The term xiao xue refers to elementary schools and primary education.
According to the Yuan scholar Xu Heng 許衡 (1209-1281), in ancient times it
included basic training for children in subjects such as conversation, rituals,
music, archery, chariot driving, reading, writing, and arithmetic.63 By contrast,
da xue refers to a chapter of the same name (Da xue) in the classic book Record
of Rites (Liji 禮記). Zhu Xi held the text in great esteem and, as such, it was
promoted to the central text of the Neo-Confucian School. The core of the text
is an eight-step process to order the world. The process begins with the indi-
vidual, who must set out on a path to moral self-cultivation.64 As such, Neo-
Confucianism was “strongly oriented toward the humanities, and less so to the
natural, or pure, sciences.”65 Practical knowledge based on “pure science,” by
contrast, seems to have been of secondary importance.
However, many scholars took a diffferent view, emphasizing the value of
practical learning for offfĳicials. In her comparative study of scholar-offfĳicials,
61 Yang 1959, 137.

62 Lehmann 1998, 196 (my translation).
63 Xu Heng, Xiaoxue dayi, quoted from de Bary and Bloom 1999, vol. 1, 767.
64 See Das Große Lernen (Daxue), 75.
65 de Bary and Bloom 1999, vol. 1, 590.
Joanna F. Handlin has illustrated the reorientation of Lü Kun and other scholar
offfĳicials in late Ming China. This reorientation is characterized by an intense
interest in writing about matters of statecraft, including military defense. The
change in perspective is closely linked to late Ming trends causing economic
prosperity, the spread of education, and a precarious political environment.66
Military knowledge was by no means considered a part of the Great Learn-
ing, but it was the subject of numerous military handbooks published during
the Ming dynasty. According to a modern Chinese source, there is evidence of
the existence of 1,023 military handbooks in the Ming period. Around eight
hundred of these have survived to the present day.67 Curiously, most of these
books were written by civil offfĳicials, the so-called generalists or non-profes-
sionals. This can be attributed to the rising number of military conflicts during
the sixteenth century that resulted in an increasing number of civil offfĳicials
in charge of military afffairs. The fact that numerous civil offfĳicials engaged in
military afffairs created not only the need to acquire military expertise, but also
the desire to classify this knowledge in accordance with the principles of clas-
sical writing.
Comparable effforts to gain expert knowledge can be found in other realms
of offfĳicial activity. Thomas Nimick’s investigation of manuals for magistrates
shows that these handbooks, written on the basis of administrative experience,
were used in administration and helped train prospective offfĳicials.68
C. K. Yang stresses the point that the heads of an administrative area (county,
prefecture, or province) were generalists who coordinated tasks and made
decisions, whereas specialized tasks were left to specialists who enjoyed little
or no formal status in the bureaucratic hierarchy.69 The stafff of the county
magistrate was comprised of aides, operatives, and servants70 who carried out
duties related to the collection of taxes, corvèe services, and performance of
ceremonies. The assertion that an expertly trained stafff supported the magis-
trate in dealing with technically diffferentiated tasks implies that in the event of
a siege the magistrate could lean on experts who would assist him in dealing
with the complex matter of city defense. However, the entry about offfĳices and
offfĳicials in the History of the Ming (Mingshi 明史) does not provide any evi-
dence of the existence of such men. It is only said that the vice magistrate (xian
cheng 縣丞) was in charge of horses and forage and the assistant magistrate
66 Handlin 1983, 20.

67 See Xu 1990, 21.
68 Nimick 1993, 9.
69 See Yang 1959, 137-38.
70 For the specifĳication see Yang 1959, 161-63.
(zhubu 主簿) exercised police powers.71 The assistant magistrate, who control-
led the police forces for defense against bandits and pirates, certainly could be
helpful in the case of city defense, but he was stationed at a strategic location
outside of the county seat.72
Therefore, it is questionable whether the magistrate had private assistance
or aides who were specialists in city defense.73 This raises the question of
who assisted the magistrate in organizing the defense work. Lü Kun wrote
in his Book on Saving Lives that the four sections of the city wall formed the
core of city defense, and each was defended by one person in charge and his
two assistants. Lü characterized them as assistants (zuo’er 佐貳)74 and police
offfĳicers (chengwei 丞尉),75 as well as experienced, careful men who strictly
upheld the law.76
Although the reasons outlined above indicate that Lü Kun could have writ-
ten the Book on Saving Lives for the magistrate of his hometown of Ningling, I
would argue against this exclusive view. Lü mentions the magistrate several
times, but he does not address the text to him. On the contrary, he criticizes the
offfĳicials saying: “The representatives of public offfĳices enjoy their [time in their]
lounges playing ‘drum and flower.’ Although they should prepare, they do not
listen to advice and do not understand the heart of the problem. I am sure, they
will certainly not realize [the proposals] of this book.”77
Could it be that Lü Kun wrote the book for the population of his county?
This seems unlikely, because people of diffferent social backgrounds resisted
his suggestions to reconstruct the wall and dike of Ningling. Lü mentions in his
preface that the people grumbled about the renovation of the dike.78 Accord-
ing to Qiao Ying, nine out of ten people were against his proposal to expand
the wall.79 Qiao reports that people made fun of his plans or insulted him.80
The case of Ningling also demonstrates that Desmond Cheung’s statement
“that people saw the construction of county walls as contributing to the estab-
lishment of the central order”81 is at least questionable.
71 MS, ch. 75, 1850.

72 Nimick 1993, 28.
73 According to C. K. Yang, there were legal and fĳinancial aides. See Yang 1959, 161.
74 The term refers to executive offfĳicials and vice-offfĳicials in diffferent capacities.
75 Ming offfĳicials usually employed skilled advisers for assistance in administrative afffairs.
76 JMS, 763.
77 JMS, 751.
78 JMS, 750.
79 See the afterword by Qiao Ying in JMS, 753.
80 JMS, 754. See also Lü who notes in his preface that those who reject his plan laugh at him
and hate listen to him; JMS, 750.
81 Cheung 2009, 89.
On the other hand, Lü addressed another important writing related to Nin-

gling, the Letter on Reconstructing the Wall (Xiucheng shu 修城書), to his “fel-
low countrymen.”82 Some of the problems he posed in the letter can also be
found in the Book on Saving Lives, which suggests that the two texts are related.
The intention of the book is to save the lives of the people, and one could
believe that the people should be the broad audience of his book. However, in
his writings Lü often makes condescending remarks about the “foolish people”
( yu min 愚民) who grumble about death, but do not regret it.83 He creates the
impression that the foolish masses need to be “saved,” but these people are the
same as those who would protect the members and the property of the Lü fam-
ily. His ambivalent relationship to the people makes a clear distinction between
the “noble man” ( junzi 君子) and the “foolish people.”84 His attitude corre-
sponds with the old Confucian distinction between the man of virtue and the
man of low moral qualifĳication (xiaoren 小人).
There is also a passage in the Book on Saving Lives where Lü characterizes
the behavior of people after bandits have entered the city. The people will seek
refuge in their homes. The rich will pay the bandits with gold, silver, clothing,
and jewelry to protect themselves. Only the noble man who has his own moral
principles cares for the needs of others. He would not beg for his life.85
On this account, the intended readers of Lü’s book are those in charge of city
defense. They include the “smart and brave magistrate,”86 “experienced, care-
ful men who strictly uphold the law,”87 and “educated and noble men who care
about the needs of others.”88 In this respect, the Book on Saving Lives serves as
a manual for the moral elite who are willing to follow Lü’s advice.
3. Aspects of Ming Local Defense Systems

At the very beginning of the Ming Dynasty, the fĳirst emperor Hongwu (r. 1368-
1398) established a military system of guards, battalions, and companies (wei-
suo 衛所) at strategic places throughout the empire to confĳirm his dominion.
The profession of soldier became inherited. In addition, Hongwu assigned land
82 NLXZ, 439.
83 SZL, 202.
84 SZL, 210.
85 JMS, 779.
86 JMS, 761-62.
87 JMS, 763.
88 JMS, 779.
to the soldiers to ensure their supply, adopting the idea of the self-sustaining
soldier. This concept was not completely new. As early as the sixth century a
system emerged based on garrison militias. The fubing (府兵) system was con-
tinued during the Sui and Tang dynasties.89
During the fĳifteenth century, the system of guards and posts began to decline.
One reason for this lay in the fact that self-sufffĳiciency did not work. Many sol-
diers lived on the brink of poverty and were dependent on imperial subsidies.
They had to bear additional costs caused by specifĳic services.90 Soldiers and
their families were originally exempt from other taxes and corvée labor. The
family profĳited from this compensation and supported the soldier, who was
moved to the areas of high military presence in the north. The problem was
that the links between the original families and the soldiers were broken and
the families no longer supported the soldiers.91
Another problem concerns the land of military colonies that was originally
assigned to the soldiers of the garrisons. Sometimes this land was sold by their
offfĳicers, and sometimes the offfĳicers acted as landowners, misusing their subor-
dinates as peasant workers.92 Under these conditions, numerous soldiers
deserted and many garrisons showed serious defĳicits in force levels.
Another reason for the decline of local defense systems can be found in the
military policy. During the Yongle reign (1403-1424), a large number of troops
were concentrated on the northern border to fĳight the Mongols and around the
capital of Beijing for protection. Ma Wensheng 馬文升 (1426-1510), a high-
ranking offfĳicial who had been appointed as Supreme Commander of Liaodong
and Minister of War, claimed, somewhat hyperbolically, that due to the reloca-
tion of the capital from Nanjing to Beijing in 1421 almost half the guards and
posts had been transferred to the north. Fifty to sixty percent of the troops
from Nanjing, Huguang, and Jiangxi were used to transport grain to the north.
As a result, there was a lack of soldiers to guard walls and moats. No one prac-
ticed military exercises. Garrisons and guards did not even have beacons.93
One way to compensate for the loss of regular troops (guanbing 官兵) was
to enlist civilians to serve as mercenaries (mubing 募兵, zhaomu 招募).
Because paying mercenaries was expensive, they were recruited in times of
crisis to support the regular troops. For example, in 1551 the government
89 For details of the organization under Tang rule, see Grafff 2002, 140.
90 For example, soldiers of the cavalry supplied their horses at their own expense. See Huang
1970, 42.
91 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who drew my attention to this important fact.
92 Twitchett and Grimm, 320.
93 Chen et al. 1997, vol. 1, 515.
provided fĳive thousand liang (188 kilograms) in gold to recruit mercenaries in

order to resist Altan, who had besieged the capital.94
The decline of Hongwu’s formerly established system of self-sustaining
soldiers increased the burdens for the population, which often fulfĳilled the
demands of the mercenaries for pay and provisions as well as weapons and
horses.95
Another way to address the declining capacity of the government to main-
tain local order and security was to revive the system of mutual surveillance
(baojia 保甲) and organize local militias (minbing 民兵). The system of mutual
surveillance formed the basis of the village defense system, which originated in
the policies of the famous chancellor Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021-1086) during
the Northern Song dynasty. It served to organize, drill, and mobilize the local
population for self-protection against robbers, foreign raiders, and rebels. In
the 1440s, Fujian province had already made use of the baojia system against
illegal miners.96 Towards the end of the Ming dynasty, the system had spread
throughout half of the Chinese empire.97
The system of mutual surveillance provided a pool of able-bodied men who
could be used by local offfĳicials to form militias for local defense. At the begin-
ning, during the second year of the Zhengtong era (1437), “people’s stalwarts”
(minzhuang 民壯) were recruited and given a salary of two pieces of cloth and
a monthly ration of four pecks of grain.98 In 1494 the government integrated
service as a militiaman into the corvée service and defĳined rules for the militia
system following the memorial of the supervising secretary ( jishizhong
給事中) Sun Ru 孫孺.99
Local offfĳicials, faced with the problem of recruiting, applied their attention
to local martial arts traditions. It is a matter of fact that during the Ming dynasty
martial arts flourished. In contrast to other cultures, the practice of martial arts
was not the privilege of special groups in Chinese society. Tenants, craftsmen,
merchants, and monks, as well as soldiers, members of the nobility, and schol-
94 MS, ch. 204, 5395.

95 Chen 1994, 84.
96 Brook 2005, 199.
97 Brook 2005, 36.
98 MS, ch. 91, 2249.
99 According to Sun, subprefectures and counties of more than 700-800 villages should provide
two people’s stalwarts per village, those of more than 500 villages three, those of more than 300
villages four, and those of less than 100 villages fĳive. If more than the original number are to be
recruited, then they should come from families which have sufffĳicient food and enough adult
males. The recruited men should be young and strong in order to complete the register. Their age
and appearance are offfĳicially recorded. See Ming shilu, vol. 30, 1702.
ars practiced it. Numerous texts reflect the great signifĳicance of martial arts at
this time. Traditionally, martial arts was a feature primarily of rural society and
specialized in diffferent styles and weapons.100
Grand secretary Fei Hong 費宏 (1468-1535) suggested the integration of
martial arts experts from diffferent social backgrounds. According to Xie Qian,
tenants and servants of rich families who practiced martial arts should be
recruited as well as skilled hunters. Indeed, young rufffĳians who had changed
for the better could also be recruited to complement the troops.101
Lü Kun supported the intensive training of soldiers by martial arts experts.
In the eighth chapter, “Regulations for Governors” (dufu yue 督撫約), of his
Shizhenglu, which includes the entry “Practice of Martial Arts” ( yan wuyi
演武藝), he points out that the training of soldiers is assigned to diffferent
forms of martial arts.102 Each form is supervised by an offfĳicial who examines
the quality of the training by using reward and punishment. The soldiers are
taught by experts of martial arts and should receive generous rewards for their
services.103 Lü Kun discusses the matters of training, examination, reward, and
punishment in detail. In addition, he describes the specifĳics and use of difffer-
ent weapons, such as bow, crossbow, spear, saber, stafff, and fĳirearms.
Lü Kun’s discussion of martial arts practice demonstrates the important
matter of offfĳicial supervision. The recruited soldiers should be subject to offfĳi-
cial organization and control. However, local self-protection organizations
based on private initiatives were widespread in China. Local offfĳicials, there-
fore, tended to incorporate them. Chinese history knows many examples of the
benefĳits and danger of private self-protection organizations. During the Song
dynasty, archer societies spread throughout northern Hebei. Their members
were armed with bows and swords and were headed by experts of martial arts
or members of wealthy families. These organizations were based on strict regu-
lations including reward and punishment. The members of the archer societies
fought against local bandits and invaders from the north in order to defend
their homes and families.104
Some offfĳicials backed the general idea of people’s self-protection and advo-
cated the recruitment and examination of brave men for archer societies.105
100 For a discussion of the history and culture of Chinese martial arts, see Filipiak 2001.
101 Chen et al. 1997, vol. 1, 859.
102 SZL, 182-85.
103 SZL, 182.
104 Tuotuo et al., Songshi, ch. 190, 4726.
Other offfĳicials criticized the arming of the people and raised the question of
their loyalty.106
The ambiguous Ming strategy to leave local defense to low-ranking offfĳicials
and the local population had a negative influence on regional security. Histori-
cal examples demonstrate that leaders of local self-protection associations
turned into leaders of rebellions. During the fĳifteenth century, for example,
local offfĳicials in Fujian established self-protection organizations. Deng Maoqi
鄧茂七, the leader of one of these, initiated a large tenant rebellion in 1448.107
This is why Lü Kun said, “Those who apprehend bandits are the yamen runners
and people’s stalwarts. Those who commit banditry are also the yamen run-
ners and people’s stalwarts.”108
The strategy of using martial arts experts to lead and drill the population for
local defense was not free of risk. The Liu brothers, Liu Liu 劉六 and Liu Qi
劉七, who served as bandit catchers for the local government in the region
southwest of the capital, are a striking example. The brothers, who had a
good reputation for skill in arms, became leaders of a large rebellion spreading
from North Zhili in 1510.109 Although these rebellions did not threaten central
power and regime stability, they destabilized large parts of the empire for a
long time.
Because of the unreliability of martial arts experts, offfĳicials tended to involve
the local gentry in defense measures. Yang Yiqing 楊一清 (1454-1530), a power-
ful offfĳicial, suggested a variety of diffferent measures, including enlisting the
local elite for defense services.110 However, the involvement of the gentry in
local defense often depended on their power and the weakness of the local
administration. The power of local elites in Sichuan, for example, stemmed
from rice production and related commercial activities. There was a powerful,
armed gentry, but a relatively weak administration.111 Describing the siege of
Neijiang 内江 in 1640, Kenneth Swope shows how the alliance of local civil and
military offfĳicials and government students organized the town for defense. Local
leaders of the gentry who led militia units actively supported the defense.112
Such initiatives were not limited to the gentry. In Jiangnan, the commercial
boom region in sixteenth-century China, we fĳind a new type of self-protection

107 For the history and signifĳicance of the revolt, see Filipiak 2006.
108 SZL, 173. Cited in Robinson 2001, 199, note 125.
109 For a detailed account, see Robinson 2001.
110 Robinson 2001, 123.
111 Heijdra 1998, 530.
112 Swope 2008, 144.
association. According to an entry in the Ming shilu, irregular troops of mer-

chants defended the city of Wuhu 蕪湖, southwest of Nanjing, against pirates
in 1555:
When [the pirates] invaded the town, members of merchant militias [shangmin yiyong
商民義勇] climbed the roofs, throwing down tiles, stones, and pitchers fĳilled with ash
at them. After numerous bandits had been injured, they withdrew [from Wuhu]. Later,
the militiamen came down, captured two bandits, and beheaded ten of them.113
The passage indicates that in areas such as Jiangnan, where trade and com-
merce flourished, new elites emerged competing with the old established gen-
try. Merchants who aimed to protect their property formed one of these groups
and supported military actions by sending troops and providing funds.
In addition to the discourse on the recruitment of able-bodied men, the gov-
ernment focused on the reconstruction of local defense infrastructure. Several
imperial edicts in Ming history emphasized the reconstruction and mainte-
nance of walls and moats. Similar to the problem of recruitment, funding pre-
sented the main problem for all measures related to the construction and
reconstruction of the defense infrastructure.
Fei Si-yen, using the example of Gaochun 高淳 near Nanjing, demonstrates
how central decisions provoked discourse against wall construction. Accord-
ing to an imperial edict from 1573, the central government emphasized the
vital necessity of walled cities to protect the people against pirates. Responsi-
ble offfĳicials were required to examine the defense constructions and make sug-
gestions for funding. The new round of wall-building confronted Gaochun with
serious fĳinancial difffĳiculties. The precarious fĳiscal situation resulted, on the one
hand, from the administrative decision to make the small town of Gaochun a
county seat. On the other hand, this small town sufffered from funding a flood-
control project at its own expense. On these grounds, a group of local offfĳicials
criticized the idea of wall-building. They argued that the deeply impoverished
people of Gaochun who had to make contributions would turn into rebels.114
On some points, the situation in Ningling was diffferent. According to the
Gazetteer of Ningling County (Ningling xianzhi 寧陵縣誌, 1911), a city wall
of nine li (4.99 kilometers) surrounded Ningling at the very beginning of the
Ming dynasty. During the Chenghua reign (1465-1487), the magistrate cut offf
about fĳive li (2.77 kilometers) of the southern part of the wall. In 1539, another
113 Ming shilu, vol. 46, 7352.

114 For the whole account, see Fei 2009, 76-102.
magistrate took away the bricks of the battlements to use them in another
project. In 1552 and 1556, the offfĳicials added bricks to the battlements, but they
could not restore the old wall. As a result, the wall eroded and was rebuilt year
after year, wasting the people’s money and time.115
For this reason, Lü Kun made a plan to reconstruct the wall. His Letter on
Reconstructing the Wall (Xiucheng shu 修城書) is not part of the Book on
Saving Lives. It is included in the Gazetteer of Ningling County and provides
details on the causes of wall-building in Ningling, the calculations, and the con-
struction plan.116 It seems that the bad condition of the wall was caused by
mismanagement over several decades. Lü Kun points out:
Since the bricks on the top of the battlement were taken away, a 60-70-year period of
erosion and repair began. [The wall] collapsed every year; and every year it was rebuilt.
Laborers were hired within a distance of seven li [3.85 kilometers], at least 70 and at a
maximum 140 men. During the year [. . .] 350 laborers were hired. Those responsible for
managing the work did not care about it. They even went so far as to sell the laborers
for other work. For a long time, the workers themselves were only greedy for food.
Using sticks, they patted [the earth] but the old and new earth did not stick together.
When it suddenly began to rain for several days, we needed a year or six months to
rebuild it once more. When the food rations of the old levy vouchers ran out, the
food rations of new levy vouchers were distributed. People of the previous generation
often said: ‘The [cost] of food for more than seventy years is enough to build a wall
made of bricks.’117
Lü Kun’s plan for the reconstruction of the wall and dike was born when the
Grand Coordinator Shen Gongzu 沉公祖 visited the wall and decided that it
should be composed of bricks.118 First of all, however, a new dike should
be built to protect the wall.119
The reconstruction of the dike was closely related to the problem of the wall.
According to Lü Kun, the dike was important for several reasons. The Yellow
River flowed less than 20 li (11 kilometers) north of Ningling. Lü Kun noted that
“in the east of the prefecture, several meters of river sand had silted up. If the
water burst out of [the banks] on both sides, it would most certainly flow to
115 NLXZ, 53.
116 NLXZ, 439-43.
117 NLXZ, 440-41.
118 In contrast to the local gazetteer, the Quwei zhai wenji reports that Lü was inspired to
reconstruct the wall when an estate owner fleeing bandits promised to fĳinance the wall in return
for protection. See Handlin 1983, 173.
119 NLXZ, 442.
Ningling. If that much water soaked into the wall, it would be damaged and
would later need to be rebuilt once more by employing the people.”120
Another reason for reconstructing the dike was the short distance between
the wall and dike, which caused a serious security problem. Lü Kun noted:
Besides, the wall base is closely linked to the dike. The distance [between the wall and
the dike] is less than three zhang [10.74 meters]. The [height of the] wall compared to
that of the dike is less than six chi [2.14 meters]. [The wall is narrow so that] two men
cannot walk together on it, but the dike [is broad enough that] more than ten thousand
bandits could gather together. In that case, were ten archers to shoot into the city and
were [the bandits] to climb up a wooden pole [placed to connect the dike and the
wall], where could the people flee?121
To realize the project of wall and dike reconstruction, Lü Kun recommended

the recruitment of 1,300 river coolies. He estimated the cost at 2,000 dan (120.95
tons) of grain and 1,300 liang of silver. Compared with the huge amount of
8,000 liang of silver collected during the last twenty years for wall construction
in Ningling, the fĳinancial burden estimated by Lü Kun seems fair.122
Encouraging the people, Lü Kun emphasized that not all the workers of the
district would be needed and it would not be necessary to use the full fĳinancial
power of the district to complete the project.123 However, he could not prevent
trouble to the people. His plan to reconstruct the dike would cause many dif-
fĳiculties:
What must be done is to remove forcibly the cottages of the poor people from the pub-
lic dike. Houses obstructing the way within the suburbs must be demolished. In order
to dig in the earth around the wall, the people’s fĳields must be destroyed. In addition,
in order to repair the dike, the people’s land must be seized.124
As Lü Kun noted, his plan caused many to become indignant. Villagers as well
as city residents criticized the project. The following passage gives an impres-
sion of how Lü Kun reflected on their reactions:
Destroying the old and reconstructing the new [dike] required a great deal of energy
and money. For this reason, [the people] actually hate me. There are people who have
120 NLXZ, 442.

121 NLXZ, 441.
122 NLXZ, 442.
123 NLXZ, 442.
124 NLXZ, 440.
nothing to do with it, neither sending laborers nor expending money, but they also
hate me. It is hard to understand. The villagers criticize me for confĳiscating urban resi-
dences and repairing the wall for the city dwellers. They probably hate me. There are
people in the city who repair the walls of their own courtyards protecting their father,
mother, wife, and children. They also hate me and that is even harder to understand!125
Lü Kun’s reflections show that his proposal was discussed in public. For this
reason, he directed his Letter on Reconstructing the Wall towards his “fellow
countrymen” (xiangqin 鄉親). He advocated an ultimate solution based on
careful planning, bringing the process of wall and dike building to a conclusion
to benefĳit future generations. The construction project should not be at the
expense of the people, but it needed the assistance of the gentry. In contrast to
Fei Si-yen’s example of Gaochun, Lü Kun illustrates that in Ningling, to wall or
not to wall was not a public negotiation between administrative and commer-
cial city systems, but rather a public negotiation between the diffferent strata of
local society, including villagers and city residents as well as powerful people
and the masses.
This brings us to the question of whether Lü Kun’s plans were realized or
not. Unfortunately, the Gazetteer of Ningling County provides little information
on the exact date and time. For example, it only mentions that Lü Kun made
his proposal during the Wanli era.126 It also states that the work to reconstruct
the wall started under the leadership of the magistrate Li Tingxun 李庭訓.
After the terms of three other magistrates, the work was fĳinished several years
into the term of the magistrate Xue Dazhong 薛大中. The list of Ming magis-
trates in the gazetteer127 provides exact dates for one magistrate who was in
charge of the county in 1583 and another one in 1634. Between them were four-
teen magistrates, including Li Tingxun and Xue Dazhong. Considering the
average term of service, Li Tingxun began his service around 1600 and Xue
Dazhong fĳinished his service around 1613. These thirteen years should be the
time when the wall was reconstructed. Consequently, Lü Kun, who, after his
retirement, lived more than twenty years in Ningling, should have written his
Letter on Reconstructing the Wall between 1598 and 1600. In contrast to the
reconstructed wall, the dike project was obviously not completed.128 This may
be the reason why Lü picked up the topic again in his Book on Saving Lives,
where he discussed the matter in detail.
125 NLXZ, 440.
126 NLXZ, 53.
127 NLXZ, 131-35.
128 NLXZ, 56.
4. Principles of City Defense

Lü Kun’s military Book on Saving Lives provides insight into various aspects of
city defense. The fĳirst and largest part, “Necessary Arrangements of City
Defense,” deals with the organization and control of the population, the admin-
istration of granaries, strategies for clearing fĳields, and bandits’ strategies
against the defenders, as well as methods, experts, and equipment for city
defense. The second part, “Necessary Arrangements in Case of Banditry,” illus-
trates how to fĳight and how to survive after the bandits have entered the city.
The third and last part, “Necessary Arrangements for Protection,” describes in
detail how walls and dikes must be prepared and the militias organized.
One problem of the text is that it is not organized by categories. Because of
this, information is scattered throughout the text. For this reason, I fĳirst estab-
lished the diffferent aspects of city defense and then assigned these aspects to
three main categories. Finally, I attempted to derive general principles of city
defense from this information.
The various aspects of city defense provided by Lü Kun’s handbook include
registration of the population, gathering supplies, digging wells, clearing the
fĳields, walls, moats and barriers, gates, causes of defeat, offfensive defense,
defenders on the wall, mobile troops, patrols, supply, blocking attackers, weap-
ons, martial law, topography, watchtowers, archers, close combat, craftsmen,
utensils, intra-city combat, drill, martial arts, and psychology. For a better sur-
vey, I assigned the diffferent aspects to three main categories of city defense:
logistics, fortifĳication, and combat (see table).
Logistics Fortifĳication Combat

registration walls causes of defeat
gathering supplies moats tactics
digging wells dike psychology
clearing fĳields gates weapons
dividing troops and commanders watchtowers archers
supplies drill
craftsmen martial arts
utensils scenarios
weapons martial law
4.1. Principles of Logistics
Organization and Surveillance of the Population

The organization of the population was routine for magistrates in imperial
China. During the Ming dynasty county offfĳicials had to organize the popula-
tion for diffferent purposes such as corvée labor ( yi 役), local defense (baojia
保甲), and community compacts (xiangyue 鄉約). However, organization
became difffĳicult in wartime when refugees entered the city.
The inflow of people from the outside posed many problems for the offfĳicials.
They had to accommodate the newcomers and provide them with supplies.
According to Lü Kun, people from the outside who were older than eighteen
and younger than fĳifty were divided according to the directions of the city wall.
Their names were written on the city wall, helping them to fĳind their assigned
place in the shortest time.129 The offfĳicials were also faced with the problem of
reducing tensions between urban dwellers and village people. For these rea-
sons, Lü Kun suggested that offfĳicials reduce the number of individuals within
the city. According to him, “servants as well as old and young people who can-
not care for themselves need to be cast out.”130 This statement is a fĳine illustra-
tion of the extent to which civil offfĳicials were afffected by Legalist principles.
Another serious problem caused by the inflow of people concerns espio-
nage. Lü Kun regards the activities of a “fĳifth column” as very dangerous. There-
fore, the offfĳicials had to prevent spies from entering the city. According to Lü,
bandits who want to attack a city depend on informants who gather informa-
tion and observe events in the city. In his Records of Practical Government, Lü
described how the spies would prepare the ground for capturing the city:
Everywhere in the city there are many spies. People from the outside usually masquer-
ade as traders, Buddhist monks, or Daoist priests. They offfer services as fortune-tellers,
workers, craftsmen, or tailors. They sell vegetables and fruits, offfer foot care and hair
combing. The purpose is to explore the ways of the town, get information on the
strengths and weaknesses, waiting for a chance to have friendly intercourse with the
poor and the rich. They become familiar with the gatekeepers and jailers. They corrupt
those who work for the offfĳicials to spy for them. Even worse, they work as lictors, yamen
runners, and guards, and in this way are involved in the defense of the gates. They know
all about the periods of rest and activity and they transmit any plan and strategy. When
[the bandits] have surrounded the city, those people light fĳires and prepare to fĳit a key
129 JMS, 758.
130 JMS, 758.
for opening the gates. They spread the rumor that the bandits have already entered the
city and delude and cause disorder among the people.131
In his Book on Saving Lives he added that the spies at this time release the crim-
inals from the prison,132 which helps to destabilize the whole situation. On this
account, Lü Kun stated that bandits who lack support from inside the city will
not dare enter, even if the gates are left open.133
Lü suggests preventive measures to protect against espionage. In times of
peace, the magistrate should register the whole population of his county. For
this reason, each family receives identifĳication placards similar to modern
passports.134 The placards include information about the age, complexion,
scars, and pockmarks of each individual, as well as the number of sons and
grandsons in each family.135 When people have to take refuge within the walls
of the county seat, the guards at the gates can identify them by the placards.
Furthermore, suspect individuals need to be checked by the guards of the
gates.136 Those responsible should temporarily control proprietors, shopkeep-
ers, and other persons who are carrying out trade or business. If they get mixed
up with the spies, they should be beaten to death along with the spies.137
A proper way to control women who enter the city is to control their feet.138
The cultural background of this measure was the Chinese practice of footbind-
ing to make a woman’s feet small and her movements more feminine. Lü’s idea
is to check the feet in order to prevent male spies from entering the city dis-
guised as women.139
Conservation of Supplies
The amount of supplies was an important concern of the offfĳicials who prepared
their cities for defense. Historical evidence demonstrates that in premodern
131 SZL, 208.
132 JMS, 758-59.
133 JMS, 759.
134 According to the Mozi, offfĳicers, soldiers, and ordinary people should write their names on
placards within their offfĳices or barracks for checking. Lü Kun uses the same character for placard
as the Mozi. However, his placard was used as an extended version of bureaucratic control. The
original passage and translation can be found in The Mozi, 877.
135 JMS, 757.
136 JMS, 757.
137 SZL, 208.
138 JMS, 757.
139 Lü later cites the historical example of Taolin 桃林 county, which was conquered because
of soldiers that had entered the city disguised as women. JMS, 783.
times cities were either destroyed by some combination of bombardment and

assault or taken by starving out their population. European history provides
numerous examples for both. During the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), the
imperial generalissimo Johann Tserclaes Tilly (1559-1632) led his army against
Magdeburg in 1631. The city was stormed and pillaged by the troops of the
Catholic League and almost completely destroyed. Seven years later, the Prot-
estant general Duke Bernhard von Sachsen Weimar (1604-1639) took Breisach
am Rhein after several months of starving out the inhabitants.
Against the background of Chinese historical experience, Lü Kun set a high
value on fĳilled granaries. The maintenance of local granaries was a vital con-
cern of his administrative work in Shaanxi and Shanxi.140 Granaries had a
social function, as they served to support the people in times of famine. In his
Book on Saving Lives, Lü Kun points to the military function of granaries as “the
most important matter for city defense.”141 A well-stocked granary should con-
tain more than 20,000 piculs (dan) of grain and beans.142 Using historical exam-
ples to make his argument, Lü Kun emphasizes the important role of granaries
in times of war and warns offfĳicials against the careless distribution of grain in
times of famine. In times of need, people can ask for a loan of grain. Upon
repayment of the loan, they must pay an interest of thirty percent. But more
than half of the granary’s content should be saved.143
In addition to food, water is the other vital need for people within a besieged
city. For this reason it is important to dig thirty to fĳifty wells in empty spaces
within monasteries and temples.144 The wells would not only provide the pop-
ulation with drinking water, but also with the material needed to extinguish
fĳires caused by enemy attack.
Aside from provisions, Lü Kun lists experts and utensils as absolutely
necessary for defense. These experts include blacksmiths, carpenters, brick-
layers, paper craftsmen, tailors, painters, bamboo weavers, and experienced
militiamen.145
Furthermore, the author lists a large number of utensils that the magistrate
had to make available, such as candles made of plant oil or sheep fat, oil,
Sanyancheng-type cannons (Sanyancheng toupao 三眼乘頭砲), axes, saltpeter,
140 Goodrich and Fang 1976, vol. 1, 1007.

141 JMS, 759.
142 JMS, 759. In his Records of Practical Government Lü stated only 10,000 piculs of grain as a
standard for small counties. See SZL, 207.
143 JMS, 759.
144 JMS, 760-61.
145 JMS, 775.
ashes, Simen jiangjun-type cannons (Simen jiangjun pao 四門將軍砲), small

pieces of brick, lime, coal, wooden stakes, stockades, planks, long spears,
defenses against fĳire carts at each gate, wolf halberds at each gate, glaives, and
pieces of lead and iron.146
Other resources and utensils were provided by the people, for example
grain, iron, lanterns, sacks, reeds, hemp, bows, arrows, iron spades, fĳirewood,
wash stones, mats made of straw, feces buckets, water buckets, paper placards,
brushes, ink stones, and sticks made of Siberian elm, Japanese pagoda trees,
and mulberry.147
All of these useful items are needed in order to be able to respond to the dif-
ferent situations that arise during city defense. They should be provided by
people who are willing to lend or donate these materials. The magistrate is
required to make a list of the borrowed utensils, and is responsible for ensuring
that they are later returned to the people.148
Lü Kun emphasizes that the men who defend the city should be supplied
with sufffĳicient food and clothes to keep their vitality. Women, by contrast,
“have only a small mouth, so they should get only as much so that they do not
die of starvation.”149 The defenders on the wall have to pull up the food with a
rope. A cook below the city wall provides a group of twenty defenders with
food three times a day. Though anyone may receive rice and wheaten food,
only defenders are provided with a salty dish.150
Clearing the Fields

According to Kenneth Swope, “clearing the fĳields and strengthening the walls”
(qingye jiancheng 清野建城) was a military strategy widely used during the
Ming dynasty, “which characterized the type of response that might be expected
in a massive empire that was severely under-governed by modern standards.”151
Under these circumstances, cities obviously played an important role as a shel-
ter for the local populace in times of need.
The strategy of “clearing the fĳields and strengthening the walls” is already
described in the Mozi: “Within a radius of 30 li [16.65 kilometers], all fĳirewood
146 JMS, 775-76.
147 JMS, 776.
148 JMS, 772. The Mozi mentions contracts, which document things contributed by the people,
such as grain, cloth, gold, money, domestic animals and so on. See The Mozi, 905.
149 JMS, 770.
150 JMS, 770.
151 Swope 2008, 128.
twigs and wood generally is brought within [the wall].”152 Another passage
advises: “All the grain, domestic animals and materials from houses lying out-
side the city that can be of assistance are sent into the city.”153 The territory
outside the wall within a distance of 100 bu (153.6 meters) should be cleared of
houses, walls, and trees. Wells have to be fĳilled.154
Relocating the local populace was one aspect of “clearing the fĳields.” Another
aspect of clearing concerns the transport of food, fĳirewood, livestock, necessi-
ties, and furniture155 into a walled city. Lü Kun pays special attention to the
suburbs of the city. He gives an explanation as to why the clearing of the sub-
urbs is of great importance:
If bandits approach a city, the residences of the people living in the suburbs primarily
sufffer damages. Concerning the residences, people should destroy what they can by
themselves. What can be used to light a fĳire should be brought into the city. After the
bandits are chased out [the residences] can be rebuilt. If the people simply abandon
their residences, they will be used by the bandits. They will pull out the beams and
cross-beams and use them to fĳill up or build a bridge across the moat. They will take
away the straw [from the roofs] in order to set a fĳire at the city gates. It would not be
pleasant for those inside and outside [the city]. When the people in ancient times
defended cities, they fĳirst gathered all the things outside of the city and burnt them,
because they feared that the bandits would make use of them. This matter cannot be
treated lightly!156
4.2. Principles of Fortifĳication
Preparation and Control of Wall, Moat, Dike, and Towers

In his 1857 work Elements of Fortifĳication, Captain A. F. Lendy pointed out, “The
two component parts of all Fortifĳication are the Parapet and the Ditch; in its
more complicated state we fĳind the Rampart, Parapet, Ditch, Glacis, and Cov-
ered Way.”157 In the case of Ningling, we fĳind four important elements of forti-
fĳication: the wall, dike, moat, and towers.
152 Quoted from The Mozi, 841. The text Mozi is attributed to Mo Di, or Master Mo, who lived
between the fĳifth and fourth century BCE.
153 Quoted from The Mozi, 905.
154 The Mozi, 893.
155 JMS, 761.
156 JMS, 762-63.
157 Lendy 1857, 25.
The military function158 of the wall was to keep the attackers outside the city
and to protect the people against projectiles. Needless to say, a break in the
wall would bring about the defeat of the defenders. Given the importance of
walls for city defense, it is hardly surprising that a large part of Lü Kun’s hand-
book deals with walls, moats, and dikes in diffferent contexts. The author offfers
a description of fortifĳication features, aspects of organization, supplies around
the wall, and specifĳic tactics.
Lü Kun’s remarks on fortifĳication deliver micro-historical insight into the
design, construction, and preservation of military architecture, as well as the
associated social and cultural dimensions of the problem. Although Lü Kun did
not provide a coherent survey of the issue, the scattered information leads one
to assume that in Ningling a network of fortifĳication elements composed of
walls, moats, dikes, gates, and watchtowers existed. Among the various ele-
ments, he identifĳies walls and moats as problems of particular importance.159
Walls (cheng 城) headed the hierarchy of the fortifĳication elements.
Wolfram Eberhard states that walled cities in northern China preferred the
quadrangular, regular form. The walls of cities in the south, by contrast, were
often egg-shaped.160 Although located in North China, Ningling also had egg-
shaped city walls. Lü Kun did not provide details about the dimensions of the
wall, but he did cite an old phrase claiming that the moat should be one zhang
(3.58 meters) deep and the wall should be one zhang high.161
The author mentioned battlements on the city wall (chengduo 城垛) several
times, but did not provide detailed information. According to the Gazetteer of
Ningling County, the battlements made of unfĳired bricks were replaced by new
ones made of bricks in 1556.162 Lü Kun recommends a curtain hanging on hooks
between two merlons. The curtain should provide protection against guns and
arrows. Fixed eyelets in the middle of the curtain provide support for a wooden
stake in form of the character qi (qizimu 亓字木). The two feet of the stake
were placed on the parapet that sloped down.163 The construction is a simpli-
fĳied version of the wooden shutters used since the thirteenth century in Europe.
158 Farmer points out that city walls were not only built for defense, but also to distinguish
levels of the administrative hierarchy of the empire. See Farmer 2000, 461.
159 JMS, 781.
160 Eberhard 1952, 45.
161 JMS, 780.
162 NLXZ, 53.
163 JMS, 769.
The shutters were designed to be opened to allow defenders to sneak a peek at

the attackers and fĳire, and to be closed for reloading and protection.164
Lü Kun pays special attention to the bottom of the wall, because it could be
penetrated by the invaders. Climbing the wall was another way to enter a city.
That is why Lü Kun advises offfĳicials to plant grasses with winding roots to con-
solidate the ground outside the wall. Wall plants that hug the wall, such as the
sour jujube165 and trifoliate orange,166 should be planted in order to prevent
the invaders from climbing the wall.167 Both plants have long thorns that would
make climbing the wall difffĳicult. For preservation reasons, Lü Kun emphasizes
that it should be absolutely forbidden to take soil for the purpose of producing
bricks and mortar within a distance of fĳive zhang (17.90 meters) from outside
and thirty zhang (107.43 meters) from inside the wall.168
The moat (chi 池) is another element of fortifĳication to prevent bandit inva-
sions. Lü Kun stated that it should be as deep as ground water. If the moat is
deep enough, it will never dry up. The moat should contain both deep and shal-
low areas. The one-zhang-wide shallow areas marked by secret signs could aid
the people in leaving the city in case of need. In some parts of the moat, shafts
with a one-zhang-wide mouth were dug in the ground. Should the bandits
cross the moat, they would be drowned in the mouth of the well.169 An area
extending one hundred bu (153.6 meters) beyond the moat had to be free of
plants170 in order to ensure that the bandits were in a clear line of vision.171
In his treatise on city defense, Lü Kun describes in detail the reconstruction
of the dike (di 堤 or chengdi 城堤). According to the local history of Ningling
published in 1911, originally there was a small dike around the county seat for
flood protection. The moat was located between the city wall and the dike.172
In his Letter on Reconstructing the Wall, Lü describes the dike as closely linked
164 In his Xiangyue (Community Compact) from 1550 Yin Geng brings up the problem of open
crenels, saying that if two Mongols open fĳire on one crenel no one dares to stick out his nose.
Below he describes in detail the construction of wooden shutters designed to be opened and
closed. See Yin Geng, Xiangyue, 57-58.
165 Sour jujube, suanzao 酸棗 in Chinese and Ziziphus jujuba in Latin, is widespread in North
China.
166 The Chinese term for the trifoliate orange is gouju 枸橘; in Latin it is named Poncirus
trifoliata.
167 JMS, 780.
168 JMS, 779.
169 JMS, 782.
170 See The Mozi, 893.
171 JMS, 780.
172 NLXZ, 54.
to the wall base: “The distance [between wall and dike] is less than three zhang
[10.74 meters]. The [height of the] wall compared to that of the dike is less than
six chi [2.14 meters].”173
As we have seen above, Lü Kun’s special interest in problems of the dike was
motivated by the local situation in Ningling. In his preface to the Jiuming shu,
he mentions that the people are complaining about the reconstruction of the
dike.174 However, it is hardly surprising that his proposals for the reconstruc-
tion of wall and dike inspired dissension. As the Gazetteer of Ningling County
recorded, the people of Ningling had supported the reconstruction of the wall
for a long time, but those responsible wasted their money and energy.175
The main problem seems to have been the maintenance of the dike. Floods
eroded it and animals such as rats and badgers hollowed it out.176 Sometimes
children climbed up it to dig up dung beetles.177 At other times sheep and pigs
grazed on it.178 As a result, the dike sufffered serious damage. That is the reason
why Lü Kun worked out a plan to stabilize it and fĳixed rules for its use:
During the fourth, fĳifth, sixth, and seventh months, children older than ten years should
be sought to plant grass with winding roots,179 malan-grass and other plants to stabilize
the dike. Willow trees should be planted inside and outside of the dike. The space
between the trees should be one zhang. Every year the branches of the trees must be
cut offf in preparation for floods. [It is also possible] to fell the trees and make beams
and pillars out of them that can be used to repair public buildings. In this way we do
not disturb the people [who would otherwise have to pay for the repairs]. But robbers
who cut down trees or people who damage them will have to pay ten times the price
and should be put in the heavy cangue.180
Lü Kun does not clearly explain the military function of the dike. Considering
the fact that the dike was not located between the wall and moat, it did not
serve as an external wall.181 Consequently it could neither prevent enemy
access nor protect the foundation of the wall against artillery fĳire. On the con-
trary, the dike provided cover for the attacker. Still, the attacker had to break
173 NLXZ, 441.

174 JMS, 750.
175 NLXZ, 53.
176 JMS, 781.
177 JMS, 783.
178 JMS, 784.
179 The term jian 菅 refers to a coarse grass used for mats. The Latin term is Themeda villosa.
180 JMS, 782.
181 Large Chinese cities had external walls ( yangma cheng 羊馬城 or waicheng 外城) between
the wall and the moat.
Figure 1: Map of Ningling, showing the fortifĳications of the city
through this additional obstacle on his way to the city wall. In his Letter on
Reconstructing the Wall Lü identifĳies the dike as a military problem, saying that
it could be used by bandits for shooting arrows into the city.182 However, the
principal purpose of the dike was to protect Ningling against floods.
Lü Kun mentions two types of towers. One is the gate tower (chenglou
城樓). The gate towers were watchtowers on the city gates. In case of the need
for defense, they were also the place to quarter 300-400 auxiliary troops.183 The
city gates in Ningling were also protected by semicircular walls (wengcheng
甕城).184 The second type of tower is a watchtower (duntai 墩臺) integrated
into the wall and occupied by archers and crossbowmen. When the attackers
reached the wall, the defenders on the wall were unable to shoot them. Thus,
it was necessary for the archers and crossbowmen to fĳire on them from the
182 NLXZ, 441.
183 JMS, 767.
184 According to Corinna Hana, wengcheng were constructed to block the view at the gate. See
Hana 1970, 79.
towers. Lü Kun argues for a distance between the towers of fĳifty bu (76.8 meters)
without giving an explanation for this.185 It is very likely that fĳifty bu was con-
sidered to be the distance at which it should be possible to hit a target. For
example, in 1373 the Hongwu emperor ordered that “offfĳicers should be able to
shoot over a distance of 160 bu, soldiers should be able to shoot over a distance
of 120 bu, and a target should be hit within a distance of 50 bu.”186
In his Records of Practical Government, Lü emphasizes the mutual assistance
of two fĳighting towers (ditai 敵臺) to allow for the defense of the wall even if
there are no defenders on the wall. He suggests a distance of not more than
seventy bu (107.5 meters) between the towers. Otherwise, the impact of the
arrows and other projectiles would be too weak to harm the attackers.187
Due to the importance of fortifĳication for city defense, the wall needed to be
kept in optimal condition. For this reason Lü Kun recommends charging a
righteous man, a descendant of a wall designer, and an upcoming offfĳicial wait-
ing for an appointment with the inspection of the wall. Two other men were to
be in charge of managing the dike.188
It is interesting to note that the small county seat of Ningling had the same
types of fortifĳication as large cities. The only diffference might be the number of
walls, moats, towers, and other such features. Building upon Edward Farmer’s
argument that city walls provide evidence for the rank of the city in the admin-
istrative hierarchy of the empire,189 it is to be supposed that a city’s rank was
also related to the number of its fortifĳication elements.
4.3. Principles of Combat: Quotations from the Jiuming shu
Preparing for Fighting

Lü Kun discusses the several aspects of drilling from diffferent perspectives.
In case of an imminent need for city defense, twenty “people’s stalwarts”
(minzhuang 民壯)190 should be selected and drilled in order to instruct the
people in the methods of city defense.191 As a strategy for the interim period,
185 JMS, 773.

186 MS, ch. 92, 2258.
187 SZL, 203.
188 JMS, 780.
189 See Farmer 2000, 461.
190 People’s stalwarts were members of local militias. Due to the concentration of the military
in the north of the empire and the decline of local defense since the fĳirst half of the 15th century,
local offfĳicials organized militias to maintain local order and security.
191 JMS, 763.
the author recommends instructing the people fĳive times in the methods of
city defense during the wintertime between the tenth and the third month.
Continuous practice should prevent people from acting hastily when they
climb the wall to defend the city. In addition, the practice should prevent any
breaches of order when defending the city.192
However, the long-term strategy for local defense should be based on
the revival of the baojia system193 and take advantage of local martial arts
traditions:
Starting today, it is absolutely necessary that the people of each village form Survival
Associations [Xingming hui 性命會]194 and hold meetings for four months, between
the tenth month and the third month. Except for males older than sixty and younger
than fĳifteen as well as crippled and feeble men, each baojia unit must choose one hun-
dred strong males armed with long spears, arquebuses, axes, bone flowers, stafffs, bows
and arrows, sabers, muskets, whips, and iron clubs. Each man is responsible for his own
weapon. Every day in the morning and in the evening, when the gong sounds, the men
practice fĳighting. As a motivation, wagers are made on martial arts competitions simi-
lar to tossing and pitching arrows into a pot. In all the villages and suburbs there are
several thousand men who teach and practice military methods. Should there be an
expert of martial arts, make him the leader and recommend him to the offfĳicials. Give
him one or two exemption cards. If he committed a crime, he can escape flogging by
giving one card [. . .] [The training of martial arts] may be left to the people. However
offfĳicials should examine their martial abilities every month. Reward and punishment
can be used as motivation.195
Defending the Wall
When the bandits reach the bottom of the wall and start to climb the wall or under-
mine it, the defenders only throw stones, ashes, and excrement from the wall at the
192 JMS, 788.
193 See part 3 of this article, “Aspects of Ming Local Defense Systems.”
194 Local self-defense associations had a long tradition in Chinese history. Local offfĳicials often
made use of them, but many of these organizations were based on private initiatives. During
the Song dynasty there were Archer Associations (Gongjian she 弓箭社) in Hebei and the
territories north of the Huanghe to protect the villagers against invaders from the north. See
Tuotuo, Songshi, ch. 190, 4726-27. Local offfĳicials of the Ming dynasty made use of local martial
arts traditions to recruit men for the militia system. The Mingshi provides information about
certain local specialities of martial arts. See MS, ch. 91, 2252. The tradition of local self-defense
associations continued into the Qing dynasty. For example the famous Big Knife Association
(Dadaohui 大刀會) of Shandong was originally established to protect the landlords against
bandits.
195 JMS, 784-85.
attackers.196 Because we cannot shoot arrows, we need the support of the archers on
the watchtowers who start crossfĳire shooting. For this reason watchtowers are needed
only every fĳifty bu [76.8 meters]. The defenders of the watchtowers should be strong
men who are able to bend strong bows and shoot heavy crossbows. Otherwise they
cannot support each other due to the great distance.
If the defenders see that the bandits are shooting arrows from a distance, they can
avoid the arrows by using dummies. In this way they can collect the arrows [of the
enemy]. By no means return the fĳire. What use would it be to return fĳire? When the
bandits reach the bottom of the wall and lean scaling ladders against the wall, the
defenders should fĳirst do nothing. Only once the bandits can touch the battlements
with both hands should you seize the broadaxe. If you see their hands, chop them offf.
If you see the head, chop it offf. This is an important thing that determines victory and
defeat. Your hands and eyes must be absolutely focused. You cannot allow the smallest
movement to be too slow. Even if your surroundings are loud and chaotic, you must
take care to watch out for yourself. You cannot have compassion for the enemy.197
Offfensive Defense
Although the inner gates are closed, the outer gates [wengmen 甕門] must be opened
from time to time. Three to fĳive hundred fearless men should be trained and granted
generous rewards. At midnight, these troops disguise themselves as bandits. They have
passwords [to leave and enter the city].198 They then proceed to secretly sneak into the
bandit camp. When [the disguised troops] fĳire guns and muskets, the bandits will wake
up and kill each other. After blowing the horn [the members of the combat unit] move
away. Around four o’clock in the morning the names of the registered participants are
read aloud. Their commanders identify the participants and let them return [to the
city]. The [fearless men] are called demon soldiers [guibing 鬼兵]. After two or three
operations the bandits will be prepared. In that case, one must use lanterns and attack
them with flamethrowers, muskets, and Frankish machines.199 If something is found
that the bandits have stored up, use oil-soaked wood and burn it during a strong wind.
After two or three times, the bandits will be unable to stay any longer.200
196 The Mozi lists arrows, stones, sand and burning charcoal, burning fĳirewood and boiling
water that should be thrown down. See The Mozi, 903.
197 JMS, 773-74.
198 The Mozi emphasizes that “at night there are passwords.” See The Mozi, 871.
199 “Frankish machines” ( folang ji 佛朗機) points to European-style canons. Chinese
designated Europeans as Folang or “Franks.” With the beginning of the sixteenth century, China
was faced with well-armed Portuguese trade ships using efffective breech-loaders that became
very popular in China.
200 JMS, 765-66. This tactic is also similarly described in Lü’s Records of Practical Government.
See SZL, 211-12.
Formation of Mobile Units
Within the city there are mobile units [ youbing 遊兵]. One thousand men are consid-
ered to be more than enough. Six to seven hundred are considered to be less than
enough. There should be at least three to four hundred.201 A commander must be
appointed to lead them. Usually they are concentrated at a corner [of the city wall] to
assist in its defense. Should a critical situation suddenly arise at the east side [of the
wall], the big cannon is fĳired three times. Should a critical situation suddenly arise at
the south side, the big drum is beaten. Should a critical situation suddenly arise at the
west side, the bell is rung. Should a critical situation suddenly arise at the north side,
the gong is beaten. In this case, the mobile troops have to move fast to the place and
assist in its defense. If you have one thousand soldiers, split them up into two groups
and prepare to attack the enemy from both sides. Four to six hundred men are too few
and difffĳicult to split up. You must take the nature of the situation into consideration. If
the danger is not immediate, you could split up the group of four to six hundred men
into two parts. If the situation turns critical, move them all in order to defend one side
with full force. Should you have additional troops, you can concentrate three to four
hundred at each gate tower. If the bandits press ahead and you do not have enough
soldiers, you move them again. This might be the best way.202
Combat within the City
If news of the bandits is received, you must set pitfalls ten bu [15.36 meters] away from
the four city gates to block the roads. The pitfalls should have a width of fĳive chi [1.79
meters] and a depth of one zhang [3.58 meters]. Put a bed of long nails on the floor. The
mats should be thinly covered with soil. In preparation for combat within the city, you
should set ten muskets, ten heavy bows, and fĳive shield carriages close to the pitfalls.
Provided that the bandits enter the city and move forward, they will certainly fall into
the pitfalls. As [the rest of ] the bandits press forward, shoot the bows and muskets.
After an additional twenty bu, set the next pitfall using the same method. If the bandits
have not yet entered the city, cover the pitfalls with planks so that the people can walk
over them and do not stumble in.203
201 The passage proves that parts of the Book on Saving Lives are of general character, because
the number of troops depends on concrete conditions, such as the size of the city and the
proportion of the population. In the case of Ningling, the number of one thousand men for mobile
units seems to be too large. During the 16th century, Ningling was a small county of only four
to seven villages with an estimated population of between 440 and 770 families. See Liang 1993,
219-20.
202 JMS, 766-67.
203 JMS, 777.
Advice for the People

In the second part of his book (“Necessary Arrangements in Case of Banditry”),
Lü Kun offfers advice for the people of a city already conquered by bandits. Lü
discusses two ways to deal with the situation: flee or die. It seems that these are
not alternatives but rather diffferent scenarios depending upon the concrete
situation.
In the fĳirst case, the best time for escape is shortly after the bandits have
conquered the city because they are concerned with plundering. If one decides
to escape, he should keep in mind the following advice:
If there is a way to leave the town, one should take along dried food for fĳive to six days
and seek refuge in destroyed cottages. One should hide in the daytime and walk during
the night. Counties and subprefectures that have already been conquered by bandits
are good places to stay because there is no reason for the bandits to come back to a
place they have already pillaged.204
In the second scenario it is impossible to flee, because the bandits guard the
gates and fĳight against the inhabitants. In that case, those who are skilled in
martial arts should fĳight until death. They must be supported by the inhabit-
ants, who should erect barricades and dig moats to make the fĳight difffĳicult both
within and outside the residences. Lü encourages women to commit suicide in
order to avoid rape.205
But Lü Kun is also aware of a third way. This refers to the rich people who
would give their gold, silver, and clothing to the bandits in the hope of joining
them to survive.206 However, Lü emphasizes that a man of integrity would
rather die than live together with bandits.
Mental and Psychological Aspects

More than twenty years ago Herbert Franke pointed out that, in contrast to the
history of the military in premodern China, little is known about the mental
and psychological aspects of warfare. Why do people kill other people and risk
being killed?207 Why do they defend their town until death, or why do they sur-
render? We still know little about the psychological motivations of individuals
in extreme situations. It might be true that, due to the character of Chinese
204 JMS, 777-778.
205 JMS, 778.
206 JMS, 779.
207 Franke 1987, 58.
sources, the fĳield of social and individual psychology is difffĳicult to explore.208

However, Lü Kun’s manual on city defense provides many examples that dem-
onstrate the importance of attitudes, thoughts, emotions, and strategies of psy-
chological warfare.
Lü criticizes the laissez-faire attitude of his contemporaries who enjoyed
peace and quiet, but did not like to support measures for local defense.209 Sev-
eral times he describes the horror of invading bandits:
When bandits invade the territory, they start to plunder the villages. First, they burn
down the cottages and rape the women. Secondly, they kill old and young. Thirdly, they
plunder valuables and foodstufffs. At last, they force the male villagers to attack the
city.210
He illustrates how the bandits take advantage of the mental disposition of the
defenders caused by varying situations:
They use our tiredness after a day and night of hard work, when we are weary in spirit
and our power is exhausted.
They use our carelessness when our hearts have been satisfĳied all day. The offfĳicials do
not warn and instruct [the people], and the people have nothing to fear.
They use our disregard when the night is stormy, rainy, or snowy; the bandits [seem to
be] far away and scattered, and we do not think of them.211
The bandits also try to manipulate the mental disposition of the defenders.
According to Lü Kun, the bandits may lead the defenders to believe that the
siege has ended in order to lull them into a false sense of security. They discour-
age the defenders by announcing the arrival of reinforcements, and they con-
struct walls and barriers to demonstrate that they will lay siege to the town for
a long time.212 The psychological warfare of the bandits targeted the morale of
the defenders.
208 Franke 1987, 58.

209 JMS, 749.
210 JMS, 761.
211 JMS, 764.
212 JMS, 765.
4.4. Military Law
Lü Kun’s Book on Saving Lives includes only a few passages that are related
to legal issues. He states, for example, that cities are defended by the use
of military law.213 He also points out that those who carelessly neglect
their obligations on patrol, for example, have to be punished according to
military law.214 Those who give currency to rumor and the one who leaves
his post fĳirst will be executed.215 In his Records of Practical Government Lü
elaborates on twelve instances in which the culprit is to be beheaded and his
head shown to the masses. This is the case, for example, when someone
becomes alarmed after seeing the bandits and moves his feet in uncertainty,
someone comes too late after he was called and acts hesitantly and loafs
around, or someone is cowardly when the troops advance just before battle.216
It should be noticed that Lü’s regulations difffer from those in Qi Jiguang’s
New Book of Efffective Discipline ( Jixiao xinshu 紀效新書).217 Qi’s section on the
use of military law during city defense (shoucheng junfa 守城軍法) not only
presents other circumstances, but also diffferent forms of punishment, includ-
ing stick-beating and ear-cutting.218 Although the use of military law during
the Ming dynasty deserves deeper analysis, both texts indicate that they were
not based on a generally binding legal document.
On the other hand, the above-mentioned offfences are all related to military
law. When Lü refers to the legal aspects of city defense, he usually uses the
technical term junfa 軍法, which emphasizes the aspect of law enforcement.
There is another passage where he uses the term bingfa 兵法, which refers to
military principles or the military classics: “According to military principles,
one who leaves the zone he is entrusted with of his own free will, even if only
by one step, is to be executed.”219
It should, therefore, be asked what kind of sources Lü had in mind when he
used the term junfa. Did he refer to legal texts220 or did he use the term more
213 JMS, 763.
214 JMS, 768.
215 JMS, 771.
216 SZL, 215.
217 There are various versions of Qi Jiguang’s Jixiao xinshu. I am referring here to the version
with eighteen chapters from about 1560.
218 Qi Jiguang, Jixiao xinshu, 603-605.
219 JMS, 766. See also SZL, 213.
220 To my knowledge, there is no still existing comprehensive Ming source on military laws
and regulations. Parts of the Great Ming Code (Da Ming lüe) refer to penal law in the military. The
Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty (Da Ming huidian) includes information on administrative
vaguely? The fact is that the passage from Lü that refers to those who leave
their place does not correspond with the laws on military afffairs included in
the Ming Code (Da Ming lü 大明律) from 1397. According to Article 238 of the
Ming Code, which is related to offfĳicers or soldiers fleeing from campaigns or
defense, soldiers who defend fortifĳied cities at various places and flee for the
fĳirst time shall be punished by eighty strokes of the heavy stick. Only after the
third time shall they be punished by death, in this case strangulation.221
Mindful of the fact that Lü Kun refers to the punishment of civilians, it is
obvious that, compared to the Ming Code, his version of military law is stricter.
Another question concerns the application of military law to the civilian popu-
lation. The Book on Saving Lives makes clear that the problem of city defense
was of a military nature, but civilians were responsible for its solution. As a
result, military law served as an important tool to motivate the defenders and
keep up their morale.
Herbert Franke has criticized the depressing monotony of the death pen-
alty, which was imposed for trivial offfenses in the military during the Chinese
Middle Ages.222 Nevertheless, the application of the death penalty to offfenses
during city defense seems to have been an important tool for the magistrate to
force the population into military service when professional support failed.
The fear of death, pain, and serious consequences for family members helped
to establish the fĳighting spirit of the defenders.
I am not concerned here with the specifĳics and details of military law, but Lü
Kun’s use of the term military law indicates that he makes no distinction
between civil and military regulations. One reason for this could be that mili-
tary law was embedded in Chinese administrative law, as Robin Yates has
argued.223 The lack of a clear distinction between civil and military regulations
would explain why civil offfĳicials applied military law to civilians. Kenneth
Swope’s investigation of Neijiang’s defense in 1640 against the rebel army led
by Zhang Xianzhong 張獻忠 provides one example of its practical application,
with punishments and rewards for members of the local militia organization
following standard military regulations.224
aspects of military law. Legal handbooks for local offfĳicials could be another source for magistrates
who were faced with questions of law while defending cities.
221 Jiang 2005, 136.
222 Franke 1970, 17.
223 Yates 2009, 43.
224 Swope 2008, 144.
Robin Yates has emphasized that military law was one of the most impor-
tant ways in which the civil bureaucrats were able to control the military.225
Lü’s writings make clear that military law also enabled civil offfĳicials to control
the population in time of war. They demonstrate that offfĳicials such as Lü Kun
were to a large extent influenced by military administration and practice at the
end of the Ming Dynasty.
Conclusion
This investigation of the Book on Saving Lives has demonstrated that Lü Kun
wrote the text in anticipation of imminent social crises. As a former high-rank-
ing offfĳicial, he was aware of the decline of local defense systems in general and,
in particular, the shortcomings of military preparedness in his hometown of
Ningling. Lü’s prime motivation to write the book was to “save the lives” of his
fellow countrymen in case of bandits attacking Ningling.
He did not address the text to a specifĳic audience, but to an anonymous
group of those who would be in charge of city defense in the future. They
included the magistrate and the local elites who were willing to put Lü’s
instructions into practice.
Although the Book on Saving Lives was written for military non-professionals
who would lead the civilian population to defend the county, the text is of a
military nature and refers to the military function of towns in China. Text anal-
yses show very plainly that for Lü Kun city defense was a military matter. As a
result, he made use of a consistent military terminology. According to Lü, cities
were defended on the basis of military law ( junfa 軍法), by military weapons
(bingqi 兵器) and soldiers (bing 兵, youbing 遊兵, guibing 鬼兵).
Lü made clear that, in the absence of the military, the civil population
including the magistrate had to be militarized and formed into an army,
because defense would only be successful when it was completely based on
military principles. Lü’s instructions demonstrate that the population was
faced with various forms of social violence. This was not only caused by ban-
ditry, but also by offfĳicials who could punish according to military law, which
was applied to civilians. In this respect, the text reflects an important part of
social reality during the late Ming that helps to explain how a country the size
of China could be defended in premodern times.
225 Yates 2009, 43.

The Book on Saving Lives can be broadly considered as a manual, because it

provides general instructions concerning the question of what must be done
before and during defense, as well as after the city was conquered. On the other
hand, the text is dedicated to Ningling, and therefore includes many parts that
are only relevant to Ningling. With respect to the structure, content, and length
of the text, its local context, the mix of general and local instructions, the book
is diffferent from other manuals. It is a survival manual, rather than a handbook
for magistrates.
The contents of the book are interrelated with those of other texts of local
and general signifĳicance. These include Lü’s Records of Practical Government,
which provides details on the whole fĳield of military preparedness, as well as
his Letter on Reconstructing the Wall that includes suggestions for the recon-
struction of the dike and the extension of the city wall of Ningling.
The majority of the book deals with military preparedness. Lü obviously
gained relevant experience as an offfĳicial in Shanxi. Other sources quoting the
Book on Saving Lives often refer to Lü’s instructions on granaries, wall construc-
tion, dike control, and other fĳields related to military preparedness.
Although the book discusses various aspects of city defense such as weap-
ons, tactics, fortifĳication, training, and military law, only a few parts of the book
deal with the practical aspects of combating “bandits.” There are several indi-
cations of Lü’s lack of combat experience.
Lü served in Shanxi at the time when the Mongolian raids on China’s north-
ern territories came to an end due to the peace of 1572. Henan, including
Ningling, seems to have been relatively peaceful during the Wanli reign. Exam-
ples of banditry and rebellion that Lü quoted in the book refer to events in the
past. It can be therefore be assumed that Lü Kun gained considerable adminis-
trative experiences during his career as a civil offfĳicial but he did not have com-
bat experiences.
Indeed, the passages related to combat indicate Lü’s lack of personal experi-
ence. For example, Lü suggested the use of “demon soldiers” who would sneak
into the bandit camp at night fĳiring guns and muskets, which would lead the
bandits to kill one another. Were the bandits stupid enough to kill one another,
but not the demon soldiers? Would the bandits not place posts to prevent oth-
ers from entering the camp?
When Lü discussed the formation of mobile units, he suggested a strength of
at least three to four hundred men. One may ask how they could be gotten
from Ningling with its 440 to 770 families, because we still have to take into
account that there must be other soldiers on the wall.
The text indicates that the county seat was well armed with cannon, mus-
kets, and other fĳirearms. On the other hand, skirts and bedding replace flags
and banners for signals and commands, which indicates a shortage of military
equipment.
Sometimes Lü’s argumentation appears ridiculous and digressive, as for
example, when he compares the moment when the defenders of the wall chop
offf the limbs and heads of the climbing bandits with that of a women who has
to push at the right time to give birth to a child.
To sum up, the strengths of the book lie in its comprehensive representation
of measures related to military preparedness. The text delivers insight into the
complex framework of city defense, including the scope of the magistrate’s
duties and the involvement of the population in military matters. Lü’s lack of
combat experience, however, may cast some doubt on the efffectiveness of his
combat strategies.
Finally, the book demonstrates the limitations of the central power on the
local level at end of the Ming dynasty. Despite the power of the magistrate, he
depended on the cooperation of the people, who provided resources, materi-
als, and utensils. He needed the assistance of rich families residing in the
city, as well as the military support of armed villagers skilled in martial arts.
Even the reconstruction of the dike and wall was a public negotiation between
the diffferent strata of the local society. In this way, Lü Kun’s Book on Saving
Lives illustrates the decreasing military capacity of the state to maintain
local order and the increasing responsibility of the civil society that had to bear
the consequences.
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"Saving Lives"-Lü Kun's Manual On City Defense: Kai Filipiak

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Journal of Chinese Military History 1 (2012) 139-188 brill.

“Saving Lives”—Lü Kun’s Manual on City Defense

1 Tong 1991, 49.

majority of unrest was concentrated in South China, David Robinson has

2 Robinson 2001, 47.

1. Author and Text

of Xiangyuan 襄垣 in Shanxi. Because of his outstanding service, he was trans-

14 Lü’s memorial is included in Chen et al. 1997, vol. 5, 4504-4515.

came from Shanxi. His Supplementary Notes to City Defense on Methods of

of an increasing Lü Kun “cult” during the Qing dynasty. As a result, famous

26 See Handlin 1975, 80.

2. Lü Kun’s Motives and His Audience

In this connection it is worthwhile to notice that a decade before in his Records

34 Tong 1991, 53.

Lü understood that the increasing social conflicts would lead to a decline in

39 Chen et al. 1997, vol. 5, 4494.

1. In times of peace, the magistrate has to prepare identifĳication placards for

45 Kerlouégan 2002, 239.

Apart from textual evidence, there are macro-historical explanations support-

50 Fei 2009, 76.

軍戶) for service in the empire’s garrisons.56 The magistrate supervised

56 Nimick 1993, 121.

61 Yang 1959, 137.

66 Handlin 1983, 20.

71 MS, ch. 75, 1850.

On the other hand, Lü addressed another important writing related to Nin-

3. Aspects of Ming Local Defense Systems

provided fĳive thousand liang (188 kilograms) in gold to recruit mercenaries in

94 MS, ch. 204, 5395.

106 Tuotuo et al., Songshi, ch. 190, 4729.

association. According to an entry in the Ming shilu, irregular troops of mer-

113 Ming shilu, vol. 46, 7352.

To realize the project of wall and dike reconstruction, Lü Kun recommended

120 NLXZ, 442.

4. Principles of City Defense

Logistics Fortifĳication Combat

Organization and Surveillance of the Population

times cities were either destroyed by some combination of bombardment and

140 Goodrich and Fang 1976, vol. 1, 1007.

ashes, Simen jiangjun-type cannons (Simen jiangjun pao 四門將軍砲), small

Clearing the Fields

Preparation and Control of Wall, Moat, Dike, and Towers

The shutters were designed to be opened to allow defenders to sneak a peek at

173 NLXZ, 441.

Figure 1: Map of Ningling, showing the fortifĳications of the city

4.3. Principles of Combat: Quotations from the Jiuming shu

Preparing for Fighting

185 JMS, 773.

Defending the Wall

Formation of Mobile Units

Combat within the City

Advice for the People

Mental and Psychological Aspects

sources, the fĳield of social and individual psychology is difffĳicult to explore.208

208 Franke 1987, 58.

225 Yates 2009, 43.

The Book on Saving Lives can be broadly considered as a manual, because it

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