G.R. No.

102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

Case Doctrine:

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or
property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.

Facts:

Rogelio Bayotas (accused-appelant) was charged and eventually convicted of the crime of Rape. Pending appeal of his conviction, he
died due to cardiac respiratory arrest. The SC dismissed the criminal aspect of his appeal but required the OSG to comment on the civil
liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. OSG expressed that the death of the accused didn’t extinguish the civil
liability aspect of the offense charged. Counsel for the accused-appellant however, argued that the death of the accused while
judgment of conviction is pending appeal, extinguishes both his criminal and civil liabilities.

Issue: W/N the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes both his criminal and civil liabilities.

Ruling: YES.

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

However, there are claims for civil liability which survives notwithstanding the death of accused, provided that the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. And in the instance that the civil liability survives, an action for recovery may
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. The separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court which states that “No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.”

G.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982

NICANOR NACAR, petitioner, vs.

CLAUDIO A. NISTAL as Municipal Judge of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur, ILDEFONSO
JAPITANA and ANTONIO DOLORICON, respondents

Case Doctrine:

Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of rights must be taken in accordance with procedural rules and cannot be left to
the whims or caprices of litigants. It cannot even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the courts of justice without sacrificing
uniformity and equality in the application and effectivity thereof. (as stated in the case of Maspil v Romero)

Facts:

Respondent Japitana filed a complaint entitled “Claim Against the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar with Preliminary Attachment” to
recover P2,791php debt of the decedent. The late Isabelo Nacar left, among other things, 7 heads of carabaos to the petitioner,
Nicanor Nacar. Due to such complaint, respondent Judge Nistal ordered the attachment of the 7 carabaos but only 4 were attached
since the other three were slaughtered for the burial of the decedent. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss and to dissolve the writ of
preliminary attachment, as well as ordered the return of the carabaos. Meanwhile, private respondent Doloricon filed a complaint in
intervention alleging that he was the rightful owner of the carabaos.

Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss hence, this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
before the Supreme Court.

Issue: W/N the denial of the respondent court to dismiss the case is proper.

Ruling: NO.

The respondent court's denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint and its issuance of a writ of attachment based on the allegations
of the complaint are improper. The allegations in the complaint against the petitioner are not only vague and ambiguous but downright
misleading. The second paragraph of the body of the complaint states that the petitioner, at various dates since the year 1968, incurred
debts to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent paragraphs, one clearly gathers that the debts were actually
incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar, who died several months before the filing of the complaint.

Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recover an indebtedness due him, the petitioner has no correlative
legal duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the debt or had anything
to do with the creation of the liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the petitioner had acted in
violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create a cause of action against the former.
Hence, it is not proper to file an action against the petitioner for the recovery of the outstanding debts of the decedent.

G.R. No. 147561 June 22, 2006

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. petitioner, vs.

REPUBLIC-ASAHI CORPORATION, respondent.

Case Doctrine:

As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the
heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only
obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.

Facts:

Respondent entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos Jr, the proprietor of JDS Construction for the construction of roadways and
drainage system in its compound. JDS then posted a performance bond along with the petitioner for 795,000php in order to jointly and
severally guarantee its undertakings.

Dissatisfied with the progress of work undertaken by JDS, respondent extrajudicially rescinded the contract pursuant to the provisions
of their contract. Such rescission shall not be considered as a waiver to the right to recover damages from JDS and its sureties. Despite
the repeated demands, both JDS and petitioner failed to pay the performance bond. Respondent then filed a complaint against JDS
and petitioner.

The deputy sheriff of the lower court failed to serve summons to Jose Santos due to his death in 1990 as well as to JDS Construction
but the same was duly served on the petitioner. The petitioner then filed its answer alleging that the money claims against them and
JDS have been extinguished by the death of Jose Santos.
The lower court dismissed the complaint against JDS and petitioner on the ground that the claim against JDS didn’t survive the death of
its sole proprietor. However, it reinstated the case against petitioner after the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
then filed its Memorandum for Bondsman reiterating its prayer for the dismissal of the complaint and it was granted by the court.

CA, however, reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that petitioner’s obligation under the surety agreement was not
extinguished by the death of Jose Santos. Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N the petitioner’s liability under the performance bond was automatically extinguished upon the death of Jose Santos Jr.

Ruling: NO.

As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the
heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only
obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.

Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate
of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligees action or suit filed
before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.

In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with respondent were not
intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those
obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the
obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation
under its performance bond. Respondent may still sue the petitioner alone in accordance with the solidary nature of the latter’s liability
under the performance bond.