PO LITICS: 2005 VO L 25(2), 80–88

Social Inclusion: A Philosophical

Anthropology1
Dermot O’Reilly
University of Bristol

In this article the theoretical conflations associated with the concept of social exclusion are disag-
gregated into a number of competing versions in terms of their social scientific and normative
bases. The types of policy, analysis and critique that are engendered by these conceptions of exclu-
sion are examined for their underlying social scientific methodology. The disjunction between posi-
tive, interpretative and critical approaches to social exclusion can only satisfactorily be broached
by a methodology utilising a critical realist framework. This framework requires the integration of
a theorised dialectical linkage between inclusion and exclusion. The necessary conceptual pre-
requisites are outlined for modelling inclusion and exclusion in a substantive, contextually sensi-
tive manner that enables critical assessment.

Social exclusion has become one of the dominant terms in discussing social prob-
lems, but a large part of its dominance comes from its having a variety of differ-
ent analytical and moral connotations. The contested nature of social exclusion as
a concept is frequently acknowledged but seldom constructively addressed. The
purpose of this article is to analyse the current impasse in the use of the concept
of social exclusion that results from the conflicting meanings attributed to it, and
to outline how this impasse may be overcome. This is enabled by analysing the dif-
fering analytical and moral discourses that refer to and make use of the concept of
social exclusion. The fundamental problem is that the analytically coherent para-
digms of social exclusion are predicated on moral paradigms of inclusion, which
results in a disjunction between implicit positive conceptions of inclusion, the
boundary prefigured by the concept of exclusion, the interpretative contexts that
mediate between the positive and the corresponding boundaries, and the critical
orientations to these interpretative contexts.
These differential epistemological and ontological orientations are clarified by
analysing the different orientations in terms of social science methodology. The
potential use of the concept of exclusion as a meaningful descriptive, analytical and
critical term requires a critical realist approach to interpreting particular cases of,
or concerns with, exclusion. This development of an analytical paradigm needs to
be based on the dialectical relationship between inclusion and exclusion. In turn,
the specification of this dialectical relationship needs to draw on a phenomeno-
logical interpretation of social interactions and value orientations. This interpreta-
tion utilises the approaches to social exclusion previously discussed and broader
social theory to identify the three primary axes of inclusion and exclusion.

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SOCI A L I NCLUS I O N : A P H I L OS OP H I C AL AN T HRO PO LO G Y 81

Paradigms and discourses

There are at least six broad traditions of discussing social exclusion, which can be
compared firstly in terms of their theoretical paradigms and secondly in terms of
the moral discourses associated with them.

The multidimensional concept of exclusion (Geddes and Benington, 2001) broad-

ens out from the notion of material poverty to include various conditions such as
health and educational deprivations, geographical disadvantage and particular dis-
advantages such as ethnic discrimination and physical or mental disabilities. These
concerns could still be labelled as material bases of exclusion, but sometimes the
multidimensional concept is used to include different aspects of exclusion such as
from financial services or from political participation (see Room, 1995; Whelan and
Whelan, 1995; Burchardt et al., 1999; Percy-Smith, 2000). This theoretical para-
digm neatly echoes the government’s definition of social exclusion as ‘a shorthand
term for what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of
linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing,
high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown’ (Social Exclusion
Unit, 2001, p. 10). The multidimensional approach to exclusion is naïvely heuris-
tic and tautological in that it identifies social problems and then labels them as
aspects of exclusion. It is not guided by any particular social science paradigm or
theorisation of what either exclusion or inclusion is. Its lack of theoretical rigour,
however, means that the absence of a strong ideological orientation allows a rela-
tively open approach to identifying exclusion, even if its symptoms and conditions
are not systematically understood.

Hilary Silver (1994) identifies four traditions of understanding exclusion – a

naturalistic organic approach and three social science paradigms. Ruth Levitas
(1998), in comparison, concentrates on the moral discourses surrounding the three
social science paradigms, so these two perspectives will be discussed together.

The organic tradition is based on a naturalistic conception of the organic integra-

tion of subsidiary units or communities (such as families or regions) that make up
society. Exclusion then occurs as a result of not fitting into ‘the natural order of
things’. The moral understanding underpinning such an approach is identity-laden
and dualistic, where the definition of self-identity is first formulated in opposition
to those considered as outsiders or as profane (Cohen, 1989). In such cases an
identity of inclusion is dependent on there being an excluded other. The moral
discourses associated with this approach emphasise the natural ‘rightness’ of the
established community, examples being traditional conservatism or the Catholic
Church.

The first of Silver’s social scientific paradigms is that of specialisation, which sees
exclusion as associated with barriers to individual freedom. According to its neolib-
eral economic analysis, joblessness is a ‘rational, self-interested reaction to the work
disincentives in welfare politics’ (Silver, 1994, pp. 554–555). According to this dis-
course, therefore, the only forms of exclusion with which the state should be con-
cerned are those caused by discrimination. The moral discourse aligned with the
specialisation paradigm is that of the underclass and dependency theories. These

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82 DERMOT O’REILLY

neoconservative ideas are not a necessary logical corollary of neoliberal economic

ideas, but in practice they are symbiotic. The moral underclass discourse stresses
the moral and cultural character of the poor themselves (Levitas, 1998).

The monopoly paradigm focuses its analysis on the structure of the economy.
Groups that are able to assert a monopoly on the means of production receive ‘rents’
that perpetuate their unequal economic position. The economic inequality that
results is the cause of exclusion. This paradigm has two versions, one that stresses
the hierarchical nature of production, which is associated with Fordism, and a later
version that stresses the relations between the economic centre and its peripheries,
associated with post-Fordism. The second of these versions stresses the resultant de-
skilling and proletarianisation of previously secure workers, which David Byrne
(1999) sees as the creation of a new reserve army of labour in insecure, part-time
and lowly paid jobs. The redistributionist moral discourse that accompanies the
monopoly paradigm prefigures inclusion in terms of citizenship rights which would
promote equality (Levitas, 1998). The utilisation of a discourse of rights as a tool for
social change has been challenged by the responsibilities discourse of neoconserva-
tive parties and commentators, while the monopoly paradigm implies that a restruc-
turing of the economy is necessary to change the unequal distributions within
society to which current social rights are only a palliative.

The third social scientific paradigm of exclusion, and its original source, is that of
solidarity from the tradition of French republicanism. This tradition values a cohe-
sive society based on the fundamental equality of citizens in an external, moral
and normative social order, so that exclusion is understood as a rupture of this
social bond and a failure of the republican state (Silver, 1994). In contrast to the
monopoly and specialisation paradigms, the moral discourse of social integration
that is associated with French republicanism is internal to its analysis of exclusion,
whereas the neoconservative and citizenship discourses are external to their
analytical counterparts. Levitas argues that the social integration discourse focuses
narrowly upon integration as participation in paid work. There is evidence for this
interpretation from both the EU’s emphasis on ‘workers’ rather than people in
European law, and in Labour’s various New Deals to increase employment. As Paul
Spicker (cited in Atkinson and Davoudi, 2000) points out, however, there are two
variants of the social integrationist discourse: the one Levitas identifies as a ‘new
Durkheimian hegemony’ that justifies differences between groups, and a more
republican version that identifies solidarity as transcending individual, class, ethnic
and regional interests, which Levitas fails to take account of.

Post-modernist accounts of exclusion are a further school of thought, that, as one

would expect, eschews an overarching moral position. Whereas the previous
traditions have a common tendency to be reduced to a concern with paid work
as the primary means of inclusion (Yepez Del Castillo, 1994), a post-modern per-
spective would argue that not only is work reduced in terms of time, but, with the
erosion of the work ethic, also as a means of providing identity. The current defin-
ing aspect of exclusion is as much exclusion from commodity consumption as from
production. The result is ‘a growth of segmented identities and social divisions on
ethnic, sexual or local lines’ (Geddes and Benington, 2001, p. 23).

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SOCI A L I NCLUS I O N : A P H I L OS OP H I C AL AN T HRO PO LO G Y 83

Methodology and exclusion

These models of exclusion and how they are related to their corollary moral dis-
courses can be viewed from the perspective of approaches to the methodology of
social science. As has been commonly discussed, there are essentially three types
of social science approach: a positivist approach that focuses on objectively observ-
able phenomena, an interpretivist approach that focuses on the subjective or inter-
subjective meanings attached and attributed to social phenomena, and a critical
approach that interprets the processes and features of society in terms of an overall
structure of domination or oppression (whether ideological or material).

The multidimensional model of exclusion is constructed through the use of posi-

tive indicators, which explains its use in the operationalisation of numerous
academic (see Burchardt et al., 1999; Richardson and Le Grand, 2002) and policy
models (see Social Exclusion Unit, 2001) that utilise various measurable indicators
of exclusion. These indicators are operationalised by comparing the positive levels
of activity of, or possession by, people, according to certain categories against a
defined level of activity or possession that is considered inclusive or socially accept-
able. Those that are found to have insufficient levels of activity or possession to
meet the defined level in a particular category are classed as excluded in that
regard.

The problems with a solely positive model of exclusion are twofold. Firstly, on an
operational level, these indicators are necessarily confined to those aspects of social
life for which accurate data are available. Secondly, on a methodological level, such
indicators are always likely to be too generic to account for individual experiences
of social exclusion and are unlikely to be able to factor in contextual and relational
factors that add to or detract from exclusion. In other words, some types of exclu-
sion are likely to be excluded from view by such models.

The organic model is a simple interpretative model, that is, it regards the inter-
pretative models that are used by people in identifying exclusion as unproblematic.
This results in contextually bound models of exclusion, and implicit models of
inclusion. The problem with the organic approach is that it tends to cast localities
or groups in monolithic forms, such that differences within societies are neglected
or brushed over. Such models can only be rescued from individualised models of
exclusion by the argument that, despite differences within a society or group, the
subsidiary units or lifestyles are bound up in and support a dominant cultural-
symbolic order that marks inclusion and that functions as the boundary of exclu-
sion. This disallows critical reflections on the constitution of such societies, and, as
such, has declining relevance to modern societies.

The three social scientific paradigms are both interpretative, in having analytical
models for identifying and classifying exclusion, and critical, in having a norma-
tive basis for criticising the failure of social mechanisms to provide for inclusion.
The specialisation paradigm is too narrowly individualist to account for the group
dynamics of exclusion, while the monopoly paradigm is too rigidly focused on eco-
nomic causes of exclusion to recognise fully other means of social differentiation
such as gender or ethnicity. The republican/social integrationist model incorporates

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an analytical link between inclusion and exclusion, but leaves undefined the spe-
cific linkages that could be used in analytical and critical case studies of inclusion
and exclusion.
In comparison to the lack of a satisfactory analytical stance applicable to field
research from these interpretative paradigms, the critical perspective most com-
monly associated with the concept of social exclusion takes its lead from work
influenced by Levitas (1998). This work critiques the concept of social exclusion
as being essentially hegemonic. This body of work has included interesting and
telling discourse analyses of various policy documents and programmes (see Colley
and Hodkinson, 2001). Levitas herself recommends the development of a discourse
that draws on what she calls the redistributionist discourse, which is concerned
with building on such features as social rights. This body of critical work, however,
tends to focus on criticism of the ideologies enmeshed within policy documents
and programmes and stops short of making constructive recommendations for
developing or promoting social inclusion.
The concerns with the limitations of each of these social science methodologies are
commonly familiar to academics. The major innovation in social science method-
ology in the last three decades has been the development of the critical realist
approach (see Keat and Urry, 1982; Bhaskar, 1986). Critical realism combines ele-
ments of these three methodologies in an epistemological and methodological par-
adigm. This paradigm allows for the empirical testing of interpretative theories as
well as critical reflection on the underlying features of the empirical and the the-
oretical issues present in any particular case with a view to human emancipation.
Rather than repeat these debates and developments, the overall thrust of the crit-
ical realist position will be taken as correct. Applying this approach to a concept
such as social exclusion, however, quickly leads to a concern with the highly rela-
tional, and therefore interpretative, nature of the concept. In classical sociology,
the relationship that constitutes social exclusion is necessarily one of boundaries
between those within a group and those without (see Merton, 1968; Parkin, 1979).
Logically, meanwhile, the conceptualisation of exclusion must be related to the
central features of a conceptualisation of inclusion. Both of these considerations
point to the need to examine the binary logic, or the dialectic, between inclusion
and exclusion.

Which comes first: inclusion or exclusion?

The common and shared focus of the above models on exclusion, on those outside
the boundary, results in their conceptions of inclusion being implicit and unprob-
lematised. Only if the question of what constitutes inclusion is addressed can the
question of what constitutes exclusion be posed. Each question is mutually de-
pendent on the other. A critical realist approach to exclusion, therefore, must firstly
factor in the dialectical relationship between inclusion and exclusion. Secondly, it
must draw upon an abstract philosophical anthropology.
The language of inclusion and exclusion implies a binary logic, that one is either
included or excluded. The use of the concept of exclusion, however, commonly
recognises that people are included or excluded in relation to some variable. The
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SOCI A L I NCLUS I O N : A P H I L OS OP H I C AL AN T HRO PO LO G Y 85

question of inclusion, therefore, is best conceptualised as a sort of sliding scale

rather than as a binary function, so that inclusion and exclusion are the extreme
poles of a continuum of relations of inclusion/exclusion. There are, however,
numerous variables that can be considered of importance in terms of inclusion and
exclusion, and as all of these are potentially complex continua, a fully compre-
hensive model of inclusion and exclusion would need to be incredibly detailed.
This does not imply that inclusion and exclusion cannot be modelled; rather, it is
a recognition that an all-encompassing analytical model of inclusion and exclusion
would be too cumbersome to be useful. The use of any model of inclusion and
exclusion is primarily critical in nature, that is, it can be used to analyse what the
case actually is, make judgements as to what the case should be, and outline how
the ideal case can be developed constructively. For this reason the modelling of
relations of inclusion and exclusion needs to address the contextual features in any
particular case to be investigated. The modelling of these relations in a critical realist
manner would entail being interpretatively attuned to the most salient features
relevant to inclusion and exclusion in the case at hand, but would also enable com-
parison between different cases through the identification of pertinent categories.
This would thereby enable both the critique of existing relations of exclusion, and
the specification of means by which inclusion could be developed.

Acknowledging that there is no satisfactory encompassing model of inclusion

and exclusion that would enable the comparison and analysis of every social
fraction or situation, there are, however, three features to be drawn from a
philosophical anthropology that are constitutively related to social inclusion and
exclusion.

The first of these features is that of material social interactions. This feature is vari-
ously treated by work on poverty, deprivation and aspects of the multidimensional
concept of exclusion, and is related to the material resources that enable human
relationships. Much of the work on this feature of social interaction is historically
and temporally specific; however, Len Doyal and Ian Gough (1991) construct an
abstract model of human need that allows for critical comparisons of the particu-
lar ‘need satisfiers’ accessible by, and conditions available to, people. Such a model
articulates the material social conditions that can be used to substantiate how this
feature of social inclusion and exclusion could be modelled in a critical realist
approach.

The second feature that is constitutively related to social inclusion and exclusion
is the question of individual value orientations as compared to the society in which
they are resident. One aspect of this feature is whether individuals are enabled,
through the material resources available to them, to be interpersonally
autonomous (see Doyal and Gough, 1991; Held, 1994); in other words, that they
are not adversely included in relationships of domination or dependence (see
Wood, 1999). A second and more far-reaching aspect of this is whether individ-
uals are free to pursue their own ethical ends within society. This necessarily entails
comparing such ethical ends to those sanctioned or tolerated in their society in
terms of inclusion, or comparing them to the ethical values prohibited in their
society in terms of exclusion. This feature of inclusion and exclusion is thus con-
cerned with the integration or accommodation of different ethical ends into the
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cultural framework of the society in question, particularly its legal and institutional
frameworks.
The third constitutive feature of social inclusion and exclusion is the question of
group value relations in society. The groups in question can either be identified by
some inherent characteristic, be that racial, biological or national (leaving aside the
question of how inherent these characteristics are), or they can be identified in
terms of their own moral or behavioural ascription. This question of inter-group
dynamics, sometimes described as identity politics, or as the struggle for recogni-
tion (see Honneth, 1995), marks the third fundamental dimension of social inclu-
sion and exclusion. This third feature of inclusion, of the group, is clearly related
to the second feature, of individual value orientations. The relation of the indi-
vidual to the group is a question beyond the scope of this article. It is, however,
clear from the history of social movements that group claims have been the vehicle
for increased individual autonomy and social change. Hartley Dean (2003 and
2004) argues that rights, if utilised as individual claims, are of limited critical use,
but that they can be conceptualised and utilised as claims made in a process of
negotiation of co-responsibility. The differentiated presence or non-existence of this
involvement by groups in the negotiation of co-responsibility in society is the
marker of the third feature of inclusion and exclusion.

What does a philosophical anthropology of inclusion and

exclusion add?
We have seen the limitations of the various analytical paradigms and moral dis-
courses variously associated with the concept of social exclusion. They variously
involve incomplete descriptions of the causes or features of exclusion and either
imply prescriptive notions of inclusion, or remain focused on the ideological decon-
struction of policies without proffering substantive recommendations. By analysing
the failings of these paradigms in terms of social science methodology I have
claimed that a critical realist approach to social inclusion and exclusion can be
developed retaining empirical, interpretative and critical relevance. I have also out-
lined the three constitutive elements of social inclusion and exclusion that I argue
are most relevant in either actual empirical investigations of exclusion, or in
analysing and developing policies or programmes of inclusion.
The question of what this philosophical anthropology of social inclusion and exclu-
sion adds to the debate on exclusion is best answered through an example. Finn
Bowring (2000), while agreeing with much of Levitas’s analysis, criticises the redis-
tributionist discourse for regarding social deprivation as shame-inducing exclusion
from social norms, and concludes that it is precisely the development of norms and
ideals outside of economic and cultural capitalism that should be utilised to develop
a more inclusive, sustainable and equal society. It is not my intention to analyse
Bowring’s conclusion, but to indicate how the philosophical anthropology outlined
above could be used to decide whether the argument that leads to his conclusion
is substantiated or refuted by evidence. Firstly, this would involve comparing how
well the two alternative models (in this case capitalism and socialist-ecologism)
would facilitate the material resources and processes for producing and distribut-
ing need-satisfiers to people. Secondly, it would involve exploring to what degree
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SOCI A L I NCLUS I O N : A P H I L OS OP H I C AL AN T HRO PO LO G Y 87

the two models enable or restrict personal autonomy and foster various compatible
ethical orientations, and, thirdly, to what extent differing groups are involved in
negotiating co-responsibility within these alternative models of society.
The model of inclusion and exclusion proffered does not prejudge such an inves-
tigation. Moreover, the model enables the ethical and group orientations involved
to be used to substantiate the interpretation, and possible critical appraisal, of the
situation. These reflections and analyses are therefore intended to clarify thinking
about social exclusion, particularly in terms of the relation between inclusion and
exclusion. Furthermore, they are intended as an argument for a more contextu-
ally sensitive and appropriate use of empirical data related to the three axes of
inclusion and exclusion; for analysing exclusion, critiquing policy, and, hopefully,
developing programmes of inclusion.

Note
1 The author would like to thank Hartley Dean, Katie Germer and two anonymous referees for their
comments and feedback on earlier versions of the article.

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