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CU Registration No : 011-1211-0710-17
CU Roll No : 171011-11-0056
Name of the College : Acharya Jagdish Chandra Bose College
Supervised By:
Annexure - I
Supervisor's Certificate
Signature :
Student's Declaration
I hereby declare that the Project Work with the title DEMONETISATION submitted by me
for the partial fulfillment of the degree of B.Com. Honours in Accounting & Finance under
the University of Calcutta is my original work and has not been submitted earlier to any
other University / Institution for the fulfillment of the requirement for any course of study. I
also declare that no chapter of this manuscript in whole or in part has been incorporated in
this report from any earlier work done by others or by me. However, extracts of any literature
which has been used for this report has been duly acknowledged providing details of such
literature in the references.
Signature :
Place : Kolkata Name : Ruqaiyya Parveen
Date : Address : 2/1, Bengal Shah Warsi Lane, Kol - 23
Registration No : 011-1211-0710-17
College Roll no : 153
CU Roll No : 171011-11-0056
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My heartiest thanks goes to all people whom I have contacted for their co-
operation and responsiveness, I would also like to take this opportunity for also
thanking our pricipal Dr. Purna Chandra Maity and Head of the
Department Prof. Supratim Dey
Sl No. Particulars Pg
No.
Introduction
1 1 -2
Background
2 Implementation 3
3 Objectives and Outcomes
1
1.1 Introduction
On 8 November 2016, the Government of India announced
the demonetisation of all ₹500 and ₹1,000 banknotes of the Mahatma
Gandhi Series. It also announced the issuance of
new ₹500 and ₹2,000 banknotes in exchange for the demonetised
banknotes. Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed that the action would
curtail the shadow economy and reduce the use of illicit and counterfeit
cash to fund illegal activity and terrorism.
The announcement of demonetisation was followed by prolonged cash
shortages in the weeks that followed, which created significant disruption
throughout the economy. People seeking to exchange their banknotes
had to stand in lengthy queues, and several deaths were linked to the
rush to exchange cash.
According to a 2018 report from the Reserve Bank of India,
approximately 99.3% of the demonetised banknotes, or ₹15.30 lakh
crore (15.3 trillion) of the ₹15.41 lakh crore that had been demonetised,
were deposited with the banking system. The banknotes that were not
deposited were only worth ₹10,720 crore (107.2 billion), leading analysts
to state that the effort had failed to remove black money from the
economy. The BSE SENSEX and NIFTY 50 stock indices fell over 6
percent on the day after the announcement. The move reduced the
country's industrial production and its GDP growth rate.
Initially, the move received support from several bankers as well as from
some international commentators. The move was also criticised as
poorly planned and unfair, and was met with protests, litigation, and
strikes against the government in several places across India. Debates
also took place concerning the move in both houses of Parliament.
Background
The Indian government had demonetised banknotes on two prior
occasions—once in 1946 and once in 1978—and in both cases, the goal
was to combat tax evasion via "black money" held outside the formal
economic system. In 1978, the Janata Party coalition government
demonetised banknotes of ₹1,000, ₹5,000 and ₹10,000, again in the
hopes of curbing counterfeit money and black money.
2
Demonetisation process
3
The government said that the main objective of the exercise was
curbing black money, which included income which had not been
reported and thus was untaxed; money gained through corruption, illegal
goods sales and illegal activities such as human trafficking;
and counterfeit currency. Other stated objectives included expanding the
tax base and increasing the number of taxpayers; reducing the number
of transactions carried out by cash; reducing the finances available to
terrorists and radical groups such as Maoists and Naxalites; and
integrating the formal and informal economies.
Black money
The government estimated that ₹3 lakh crore, or approximately 20%, of
the demonetised banknotes would be permanently removed from
circulation. However, according to a 2018 report from the RBI,
approximately 99.3% of the demonetised banknotes, or ₹15.30 lakh
crore of the ₹15.41 lakh crore that had been demonetised, were
deposited with the banking system. The banknotes that were not
deposited were worth ₹10,720 crore. Commentators concluded that the
government failed in its aim of purging black money from the economy.
Evasion
Counterfeit banknotes
After demonetisation, there was an increase in the number of
counterfeit ₹100 and ₹50 banknotes. The number of counterfeit
₹500 and ₹1,000 (demonetised version) banknotes saw an increase in
2016–17 and subsequently a decline in 2017–18. But in 2017–18, there
was an increase in counterfeit ₹500 and ₹2,000 (new version)
banknotes than the previous year. There has been no significant change
in the number of counterfeit banknotes detected. In 2017–18, the
number of detected counterfeit banknotes was close to the number
before demonetisation. Additionally, after demonetisation, only 0.0035%
of the ₹1,000 banknotes were found to be counterfeit.
Tax collection
Tax-to-GDP ratio (%)
The number of income tax returns filing increased from 43.3 million to
52.9 million between the financial year of 2016 and 2017, which was not
a significant increase compared to the increase between 2015 and 2016.
The tax compliance had increased with a number of income tax returns
filing increased but the majority of them were from salaried and non-
business class. The income tax collections increased in the financial
year of 2017 due to Income Disclosure Scheme 2016. If adjusted for it,
the increase in tax collection was modest. The tax-to-GDP ratio has
increased due to expanding tax base. An analysis of the economic data
shows that there has been no substantial increase in the number of new
tax payers or direct tax collection due to demonetisation.
The use of demonetised banknotes was allowed for the payment of
municipal and local civic body taxes, leading to a jump in their revenue
collections. For example, the Greater Hyderabad Municipal
Corporation reported collecting about ₹160 crore (US$22 million) in cash
payments of outstanding and advance taxes within the first four days of
demonetisation.
Digital payments
6
The push for digital payments was one of the stated intentions of
demonetisation. There was immediate and sharp jump in digital
payments in November–December 2016 owing to shortages of cash.
The debit card point of sales transactions was twice the size of value
suggested by trends before demonetisation. The value of credit cards
increased but no sharp growth was seen. The mobile wallet transactions
picked up immediately after demonetisation, followed by a dip in mid-
2017 due to easing cash shortages. There was again sharp rise
thereafter. By April 2018, the volume of the digital payments had
doubled. After return of the cash, the growth in digital payment had been
modest.
The currency-to-GDP ratio was 12.1% in 2015–16. It declined to 8.8% in
2016–17 due to demonetisation but increased again to 10.9% in 2017–
18. The currency-to-GDP ratio was only marginally lower compared to
levels before demonetisation.
Banknotes in circulation
On 28 October 2016, the total banknotes in circulation in India were
valued at ₹17.77 lakh crore (US$250 billion); what proportion of this
derived from ₹500 and ₹1,000 banknotes was unknown. In its annual
report of March 2016, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) stated that total
banknotes in circulation valued ₹16.42 lakh crore (US$230 billion) of
which nearly 86% (around ₹14.18 lakh crore (US$200 billion)) derived
from ₹500 and ₹1,000 banknotes. In terms of volume, the report stated
that 24% (around 22.03 billion) of the total 9026.6 crore (90.26 billion)
banknotes in circulation were ₹500 and ₹1,000 banknotes.
Before demonetisation (November 2016), there were banknotes
worth ₹17.97 lakh crore (US$250 billion) in the market. The
demonetised banknotes constituted 86.4% of it. The banknotes in
circulation had reached to the level before demonetisation in March
2018. By March 2018, there were banknotes worth ₹18.03 lakh
crore (US$250 billion) in the market; an increase of 9.9%. New
banknotes of ₹2,000 and ₹500 constitute 80.6% of it. So there was only
5.8% increase in small domination banknotes. The volume of banknotes
in the market increased by 2.1%.The banknotes in circulation had further
increased to ₹19.5 lakh crore (US$270 billion) in September
2018 and ₹21.41 lakh crore (US$300 billion) in March 2019, 19.14%
higher than the level before demonetisation.
Effects
Shortage of cash
the costs of transportation from their fields to the market from the
low prices offered. Some farmers dumped their produce in protest
against the government.
Demonetisation resulted in the relative erosion of agricultural wages
and weak bargaining power of farmers for their produce.
Legal issues
A public interest litigation (PIL) was filed in Madras High Court by M.
Seeni Ahamed, General Secretary of the Indian National League, to
scrap the decision of demonetisation. The High Court dismissed the PIL,
stating that it could not interfere in monetary policies of the
government. Similar PILs were also filed in the Supreme Court of
India. In November 2017, the Supreme Court of India referred all cases
related to demonetisation to constitutional bench to review the legality of
the demonetisation, implementation irregularities and violation of
people's rights by limits on cash withdrawals.
The government had initially announced that any person who is unable
to deposit the demonetised banknotes by 31 December 2016 would be
given an opportunity to do so until a later date. However, the government
allowed only Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) to deposit demonetised
banknotes after 31 December 2016. As a result, many people were left
stranded with demonetised banknotes. People petitioned the courts to
allow a deposit of the demonetised banknotes.
In November 2017, the Supreme Court dismissed 14 petitions related to
demonetisation, and asked petitioners to file pleas with a constitutional
bench which would deal with cases related to demonetisation.
Reactions
Reactions of economists
Most economists across the ideological spectrum, except some
partisan ones, were broadly critical of the demonetisation as an
economic policy.
Indian-American economist Jagdish Bhagwati praised the
demonetisation. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, severely criticised the
demonetisation move, calling it a "despotic action" among other
things. Former Senior Vice-President and Chief Economist of the
World Bank Kaushik Basu, called it a 'major mistake' and said that
the 'damage' is likely to be much greater than any possible benefits.
10
Political reactions
11
Political impact
Conclusion
For the RBI it was something that made then realize that their advice
does not carry significant weight. Many felt helpless. They knew this was
never going to be a success. For some of them it would have been a
moment to think about resigning.
Recommendations
Bibliography
https://myvoice.opindia.com/2016/12/demonetization-suggestions-
to-ease-the-cash-scarcity/
https://www.madhyam.org.in/has-demonetization-achieved-its-
stated-objectives/
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/view-
is-demonetisation-a-success-or-failure/articleshow/56468378.cms
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/after
-almost-two-years-of-counting-rbi-says-99-3-of-demonetised-
notes-returned/articleshow/65589904.cms
https://brainly.in/question/14926368
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Indian_banknote_demonetisatio
n
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/demonetization.asp
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-41100610