SILVALA, Maricris Johanna C.

May 29, 2020

Labor Law II Atty. Leilanie Cabras

LABOR RELATIONS
CASE DIGESTS
 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

G.R. No. 80774 31 MAY 1988

FACTS:

SMC employed Vega as mechanic in Bottling Dept of SMC Plant Brewery in Mandaue City. SMC
then sponsored an Innovation Program which grant cash awards to all SMC employees, except ED-HO
staff, Division Managers and high-ranked personnel, who will submit ideas. This is where Vega submitted
an innovation program that includes reducing the speed of beer pasteurizer, yet upon demanding his cash
award, he was refused. He filed a complaint before Ministry of Labor and Employment alleging that his
proposal had been accepted and implemented by the Corporation yet he was not given the reward he
deserves. Corporation countered that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, and dismissed the
complaint because the money claim is not considered incidental to his employment.

ISSUE:

WON NLRC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

No, the case should fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor arbiter and NLRC, even though a claim
for damages is incidental. The Labor Code expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters
and NLRC are those “cases arising from employer-employee relations.” The money claims of workers
which do not arise or in connection with their employer-employee relationship falls within the general
jurisdiction of regular courts, and cannot be simply assumed to fall relative to issue of employment. Vega’s
money claim out of the program does not directly coincide with his employment relationship with SMC –
hence must fall under regular court.
 PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTORS OF THE PHILIPPINES INC., vs. LOLITAA O. GAL-LANG

G.R. No. 89621 24 SEPTEMBER 1991

FACTS:

Respondents were alleged to be illegally dismissed by Pepsi Cola, and a complaint was filed against
the company. The company, however, alleged that since the case involves an issue about employee-
employer relationship, the trial court had no jurisdiction. They invoked under the Labor Code that
employment-related civil complaint for damages must fall under the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter, hence
this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the Labor Arbiter has the jurisdiction

RULING:

No, since not all cases or issues must be falling under labor arbiters or labor courts. It is important
to impute the “reasonable causal connection” between the claim asserted and employee-employer
relations to link it to a labor case, otherwise, will fall under regular courts. In the current case, the
complaint did not arise from such established linked or relations, and can be seen not dependent to their
employment. The case must be referred to regular courts.
 ERNESTO MEDINA and JOSE ONG vs. FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME

G.R. No. L-59825 11 SEPTEMBER 1982

FACTS:

Aboitiz went to their plant and maliciously humiliated Medina and Ong through shouting and
saying “fuck you” and “you are both shit to me” in front of other employees. This also prompted the two
to not go to work anymore after treating such rage as an expression of dismissal due to an alleged delay
in the use of promotional crowns. They filed a complaint for oral defamation, but was dismissed, then was
elevated to grave slander against Aboitiz. It was raised that the case must involve unfair labor practices
and must be brought under NLRC jurisdiction given that such rage occurred in the course of their
employment under Pepsi.

ISSUE:

WON the Labor Arbiter shall have the jurisdiction

RULING:

No, aside from the complaints not alleging unfair labor practice, the damages done to the plaintiffs
are governed by the civil code, where regular courts should take cognizance on.
 PLACIDO O. URBANES, JR. vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

G.R. No. 122791 19 FEBRUARY 2003

FACTS:

Catalina Security Agency agreed to provide security services to SSS. Placido then requested SSS
for adjustment of their rate in view of Wage Order but the request was declined. His agency pulled him
out and another agency replaced him in servicing SSS – Jaguar. He then filed a complaint to implement
said wage order. The Regional Director ordered payment of wage differentials and the Labor Secretary set
aside such order for recomputation.

ISSUE:

WON Labor Secretary has jurisdiction to review or set aside the said appeal

RULING:

No, the Labor Secretary has no jurisdiction since it does not fall under an employee-employer
relationship case as there is no employer-employee relationship existing to be establishing within the
parties. RTC must have the jurisdiction although for the issue is to enforce the contract between him and
SSS – not his employer.
 YUSEN AIR SEA SERVICE PHILIPPINES vs. ISAGANI A. VILLAMOR

G.R. No. 154060 16 AUGUST 2005

FACTS:

Respondent Villamor was hired as a branch manager and upon his resignation, he started to work
for Aspac International. Relative to his previous employer’s contract, a complaint was filed since he
violated his undertaking in not joining his current company after 2 years once he separated from the
previous, for the businesses are in conflict with each other. RTC first tried the case but was argued that it
should fall under the Labor Arbiter for there exists an issue regarding the employer-employee relationship
or the parties.

ISSUE:

WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction

RULING:

No, for the damage claims falling under the Labor Arbiter must establish the link of having the
reasonable causal connection with any claims with his or her employment – thereby falling under
employee-employer relationship issue. In the current case, the claims referred to are just incidental to
such relationship, where the reasonable causal connection was not established on. Hence, such breach
claimed must fall within normal courts.
 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEE UNION-PTGWO vs. JESUS BERSAMIRA

G.R. No. 87700 13 JUNE 1990

FACTS:

SMC entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite, independent
contractors duly licensed by DOLE, to maintain its competitive position and in keeping with the
imperatives of efficiency, business expansion and diversity of its operation. In said contracts, it was
expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the
latter and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents. There was to be no employer-
employee relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SMC on the other.
The Union advised SMC that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and
sought the regularization of their employment with SMC because some employees have been
continuously working for SMC for a period ranging from 6 months to 15 years and that their work is neither
casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or activities necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of SMC. Thus, it was contended that there exists a "labor-only" contracting situation and wanted
to be regularized. The Union filed a notices of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union
busting.

ISSUE:

WON the present case involves or is in connection, or relates to labor dispute

RULING:

Yes, while it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself,
on the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can
nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer
and employee” provided the controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of
employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof. The existence of a labor dispute is not negative by
the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee.
 REGINA BIBOSO, et al. vs. VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY

G.R. No. L-44360 31 MARCH 1977

FACTS:

Complainants were employed as teachers in St. Mary Mazzarello School. The School Directress
informed the complainants afterwards that they will not be rehired for the next school year, prompting
an action filed with Department of Labor. It was held that the Labor Code does not set the maximum
probationary period at 6 months, and recognizes Bureau of Private Schools policy in setting the maximum
probationary period for teachers at 3 years.

ISSUE:

WON there is an issue on security of tenure

RULING:

The petition, as noted at the outset, cannot prosper. What is decisive is that petitioners were
well aware all the time that their tenure was for a limited duration. Upon its termination, both
parties to the employment relationship were free to renew it or to let it lapse. It was the decision of
private respondent that it should cease. Thus there was the safeguard as to the duration of their
employment being respected. To that extent, their tenure was secure.
 INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 72222 30 JANUARY 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), a non-profit organization

dedicated to refugee service at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Morong, Bataan engaged the
services of private respondent Bernadette Galang on January 24, 1983 as a probationary cultural
orientation teacher with a monthly salary of P2,000.00. Three (3) months thereafter, private respondent
was informed, orally and in writing, that her services were being terminated for her failure to meet the
prescribed standards of petitioner as reflected in the 10 performance evaluation of her supervisors during
the teacher evaluation program she underwent along with other newly-hired personnel. On August 1983,
private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and unpaid wages against
petitioner with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, praying for reinstatement with backwages,
exemplary and moral damages. On October 1983, after the parties submitted their respective position
papers and other pleadings, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision dismissing the complaint for illegal
dismissal as well as the complaint for moral and exemplary damages but ordering the petitioner to pay
private respondent the sum of P6,000.00 as payment for the last three (3) months of the agreed
employment period pursuant to her verbal contract of employment. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the
instant petition. Petitioner maintains that private respondent is not entitled to the award of salary for the
unexpired three-month portion of the probationary period since her services were terminated during such
period when she failed to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards
prescribed by petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON private respondent is a probationary employee

RULING:

There is no dispute that private respondent was terminated during her probationary period of
employment for failure to qualify as a regular member of petitioner's teaching staff in accordance with its
reasonable standards. Records show that private respondent was found by petitioner to be deficient in
classroom management, teacher-student relationship and teaching techniques. Failure to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards of the employer is a just cause for
terminating a probationary employee specifically recognized under Article 282 (now Article 281) of the
Labor Code. A probationary employee, as understood under Article 282 (now Article 281) of the Labor
Code, is one who is on trial by an employer during which the employer determines whether or not he is
qualified for permanent employment. A probationary appointment is made to afford the employer an
opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at work, and to ascertain whether he will
become a proper and efficient employee. The word "probationary", as used to describe the period of
employment, implies the purpose of the term or period, but not its length.
 MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC. vs. HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR.

G.R. No. 74246 26 JANUARY 1989

FACTS:

Dequilla was hired on probation by petitioner Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. as a general utility
worker on January 1979. Upon the expiration of the probationary period of six months, Dequila was
informed by his employer that his work had proved unsatisfactory and had failed to meet the required
standards. To give him a chance to improve his performance and qualify for regular employment, instead
of dispensing with his service then and there, with his written consent Mariwasa extended his probation
period for another three months from July to October 1979. His performance, however, did not improve
and on that account Mariwasa terminated his employment at the end of the extended period. Dequila
thereupon filed with the Ministry of Labor against Mariwasa a complaint for illegal dismissal and violation
of Presidential Decrees Nos. 928 and 1389 but was dismissed by Ministry of Labor NCR and ruled that the
termination of Dequila's employment was in the circumstances justified and rejected his money claims
for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal to the Office of the Minister, however, said disposition was
reversed and held that Dequila was already a regular employee at the time of his dismissal, therefore,
could not have been lawfully dismissed for failure to meet company standards as a probationary worker.

ISSUE:

WON he is a probationary employee and such period may be extended beyond the prescribed
period agreed

HELD:

Yes. The extension of Dequila's probation was ex gratia, an act of liberality on the part of his
employer affording him a second chance to make good after having initially failed to prove his worth as
an employee. Such an act cannot now unjustly be turned against said employer's account to compel it to
keep on its payroll one who could not perform according to its work standards. The law, surely, was never
meant to produce such an inequitable result. By voluntarily agreeing to an extension of the probationary
period, Dequila in effect waived any benefit attaching to the completion of said period if he still failed to
make the grade during the period of extension. The Court finds nothing in the law which by any fair
interpretation prohibits such a waiver. And no public policy protecting the employee and the security of
his tenure is served by prescribing voluntary agreements which, by reasonably extending the period of
probation, actually improve and further a probationary employee's prospects of demonstrating his fitness
for regular employment.
 HOLIDAY INN MANILA vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 109114 14 SEPTEMBER 1993

FACTS:

Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was on April 15, 1991, accepted
for "on-the-job training" as a telephone operator for a period of three weeks. On May 13, 1992, after
completing her training, she was employed on a "probationary basis" for a period of six months ending
November 12, 1991. On November 8, 1991, four days before the expiration of the stipulated deadline,
Holiday Inn notified her of her dismissal, on the ground that her performance had not come up to the
standards of the Hotel. Through counsel, Honasan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that she
was already a regular employee at the time of her separation and so was entitled to full security of
tenure.[5] The complaint was dismissed on April 22, 1992 by the Labor Arbiter. Probationary employment
shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. In its own decision dated November 27, 1992, the
NLRC ordered the petitioners to reinstate Honasan "to her former position without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges with backwages without deduction and qualification." Reconsideration was denied in
a resolution dated January 26, 1993

ISSUE:

WON Elena was already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal, which was made 4 days
before the expiration of the probation period.

RULING:

Yes, probation clearly exceeded the period of 6 months prescribed by Article 281. The hotel's
system of double probation a transparent scheme to circumvent the plain mandate of the law and make
it easier for it to dismiss its employees even after they shall have already passed probation.
 SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 132564 20 OCTOBER 1999

FACTS:

Endozo was deployed to Taiwan as a domestic helper and was required to pay. She was employed
as a housemaid of Sung Kui Mei for 1 year but after 11 days, her employer terminated her services and
sent her home for alleged incompetence. She filed against Sameer for illegal dismissal, payment of salary
corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract, illegal exaction, violation of labor code,
falsification of contract of employment.

ISSUE:

WON the employer in Taiwan could lawfully terminate Endozo’s employment during the
probationary period of her employment

HELD:

No, for it is established that even a probationary employee is entitled to security of tenure. A
probationary employee may be terminated on such grounds: just cause or failure to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at
the time of his engagement.
 CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 106246 1 SEPTEMBER 1994

FACTS:

CENECO entered into a collective bargaining agreement with CURE, a labor union representing its
rank-and-file employees, providing for a term of three years retroactive to April 1, 1987 and extending up
to March 31, 1990. On December 28, 1989, CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiations be
conducted for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA). On January 18, 1990, CENECO denied CURE’s
request on the ground that, under applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, employees who at the same
time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a union. Prior to the
submission of the proposal for CBA renegotiation, CURE members, in a general assembly held on
December 9, 1989, approved Resolution No. 35 whereby it was agreed that ‘tall union members shall
withdraw, retract, or recall the union members’ membership from Central Negros Electric Cooperative,
Inc. in order to avail (of) the full benefits under the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into
by and between CENECO and CURE, and the supposed benefits that our union may avail of under the
renewed CBA. However, the withdrawal from membership was denied by CENECO on February 27, 1990
under Resolution No. 90.

ISSUE:

WON the employees of CENECO who withdrew their membership from the cooperative are
entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement
proposed by the latter.

RULING:

Yes. The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal
from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the resignation of the member-
employees is an expression of their preference for union membership over that of membership in the
cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to afford fall protection to labor and to promote the primacy
of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees’ right to form and join unions for purposes of
collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.
Thus, member employees of a cooperative may withdraw as members of the cooperative in order to join
labor union. Membership in a cooperative is voluntary; inherent in it is the right not to join.
 MOISES DE LEON vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 70705 21 AUGUST 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner was employed by private respondent La Tondeñ;a Inc. on December 11, 1981, at the
Maintenance Section of its Engineering Department in Tondo, Manila. His work consisted mainly of
painting company building and equipment, and other odd jobs relating to maintenance. He was paid on a
daily basis through petty cash vouchers. In the early part of January, 1983, after a service of more than
one (1) year, petitioner requested from respondent company that he be included in the payroll of regular
workers, instead of being paid through petty cash vouchers. Private respondent's response to this request
was to dismiss petitioner from his employment on January 16, 1983. Having been refused reinstatement
despite repeated demands, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, reinstatement and payment
of backwages before the Office of the Labor Arbiter of the then Ministry now Department of Labor and
Employment. Petitioner alleged that he was dismissed following his request to be treated as a regular
employee; that his work consisted of painting company buildings and maintenance chores like cleaning
and operating company equipment, assisting Emiliano Tanque Jr., a regular maintenance man; and that
weeks after his dismissal, he was re-hired by the respondent company indirectly through the Vitas-
Magsaysay Village Livelihood Council, a labor agency of respondent company, and was made to perform
the tasks which he used to do. Emiliano Tanque Jr. corroborated these averments of petitioner in his
affidavit. On the other hand, private respondent claimed that petitioner was not a regular employee but
only a casual worker hired allegedly only to paint a certain building in the company premises, and that his
work as a painter terminated upon the completion of the painting job.

ISSUE:

WON Moises is a regular employee

RULING:

Yes. The primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business
or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the
work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if
the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous
or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is
also considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. In the case at
bar, the respondent company, which is engaged in the business of manufacture and distillery of wines and
liquors, claims that petitioner was contracted on a casual basis specifically to paint a certain company
building and that its completion rendered petitioner's employment terminated. This may have been true
at the beginning, and had it been shown that petitioner's activity was exclusively limited to painting that
certain building, respondent company's theory of casual employment would have been worthy of
consideration. However, during petitioner's period of employment, the records reveal that the tasks
assigned to him included not only painting of company buildings, equipment and tools but also cleaning
and oiling machines, even operating a drilling machine, and other odd jobs assigned to him when he had
no painting job. A regular employee of respondent company, Emiliano Tanque Jr., attested in his affidavit
that petitioner worked with him as a maintenance man when there was no painting job. Therefore, all
things considered, the petitioner’s status of employment became regular hence private respondent is
ordered to reinstate petitioner as a regular maintenance man and to pay petitioner backwages, ECOLA,
and 13th Month Pay.
 SAMSON VS. NRLC

G.R. NO. 113166 FEBRUARY 1, 1996

FACTS:

16 Petitioner had been working for respondent Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. Manila for
approximately 28 years and his project-to-project employment was renewed several times. His successive
contracts of employment required him to perform virtually the same kind of work throughout his period
of employment. Petitioner would be re-hired immediately, some for a gap of one day to one week from
the last project to the succeeding one.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner is a regular employee

RULING:

Article 281 of the Labor Code pertinently prescribes that the provisions of written agreement to
the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall
be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Where from the circumstances it
appeared that periods have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the
employee, they should be struck down as contrary to public policy, morals, good customs, or public order.
There can be no escape from the conclusion that the employee is a regular employee of the respondent.
 CIELO VS. NLRC

G.R. NO. 78693 JANUARY 28, 1991

FACTS:

The petitioner is a truck driver who claims he was illegally dismissed by the private respondent,
the Henry Lei Trucking Company. Petitioner were made to sign an agreement with the private respondent
that they don’t have an employer-employee relationship but in an affidavit that petitioner is being forced
to sign states that he received his salary and allowanced from the private respondent. Upon refusal to
sign, private respondent dismissed petitioner on the basis of disrespect and insubordination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not WON petitioner was legally dismissed?

Held: RULING:

The private respondent's argument that the petitioner could at least be considered on probation
basis only and therefore separable at will is self-defeating. The Labor Code clearly provides as follows: Art.
281. Probationary employment. — Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the
date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a
longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee
who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. There is no
question that the petitioner was not engaged as an apprentice, being already an experienced truck driver
when he began working for the private respondent. Neither has it been shown that he was informed at
the time of his employment of the reasonable standards under which he could qualify as a regular
employee. It is plain that the petitioner was hired at the outset as a regular employee. At any rate, even
assuming that the original employment was probationary, the Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner had
completed more than six month's service with the trucking company and so had acquired the status of a
regular employee at the time of his dismissal.