Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DECISION
LEONEN , J : p
Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard of legal pro ciency,
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values
and norms embodied in the Code [of Professional Responsibility]." 54
Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the
best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all good delity as well to the courts as to
[their] clients[,]" 55 and to "delay no man for money or malice[.]" 56
These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly duciary nature of their relationship. 57 Clients entrust their
causes — life, liberty, and property — to their lawyers, certain that this con dence would
not be abused.
Complainant Luna entrusted respondent Atty. Galarrita with handling the civil
case involving a mortgaged land in Quezon Province. However, without complainant
Luna's consent, respondent Atty. Galarrita settled this case with the other party.
Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that "[s]pecial powers of attorney are
necessary in the following cases: . . . (3) To compromise , to submit questions to
arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the
venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired[.]"
The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special authority from their
clients when entering into a compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation:
SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to
bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure.
But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's
litigation , or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full
amount in cash. 58 (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Galarrita contends that he holds a Special Power of Attorney to enter into
compromise agreements, but as found by the Investigating Commissioner:
There seems to be a compelling reason to believe that
Complainant had not given any authority for the Complainant [sic] to
enter into Compromise Agreement at that precise stage of the trial.
Firstly, the Complainant was not made a party to the Compromise Agreement
despite the fact that he was not abroad when the agreement was executed.
Secondly, there was no indication that he had agreed to the amount of
P100,000.00 in exchange for his withdrawal of the complaint. Thirdly, he was
not seasonably informed of the execution of the Compromise
Agreement/payment of the P100,000.00 and came to know of the same only
much later.
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Respondent argued that Complainant had previously executed a Special
Power of Attorney wherein he authorized the former to "enter into possible
amicable settlement or submit any matter to arbitration and alternative modes
of dispute resolution, simpli cation of the issues, the necessity of amendment
to the pleadings, the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts
and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof, the limitation of the number of
witnesses, the advisability of preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner,
the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or
of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist, the
advisability of suspending the proceedings, offer matters that may properly be
considered under Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure." It would seem,
however, that despite the authority given to Respondent, the same SPA cannot
justify Respondent's representation in the Compromise Agreement on February
14, 2006. To dissect, the SPA was executed on September 16, 2002 or a
month before the ling of the Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage.
Thus, the conclusion seems to be that the authority given therein to
Respondent to enter into a possible settlement referred only to a
possible settlement that could be secured or rmed up during the
preliminary conference or pre-trial of the case . In fact, the tenor of the
SPA indicates that the SPA was precisely executed in order to constitute
Respondent as Complainant's representative during the preliminary conference
or pre-trial.
Assuming it can be inferred that the SPA and the authority given to
Respondent can be liberally interpreted and allowed to extend up to the time the
Compromise had been executed, still the Respondent may not have faithfully
performed his sworn duty to his client. During the mandatory conference, it was
established that at the time the compromise was executed the Complainant was
not abroad and, therefore, given the current information technology it would
have been easy or convenient for Respondent to have informed his client about
it. Admittedly, his failure in this regard had only given Complainant the reason to
cast doubt on his real intention in agreeing to the compromise agreement for
and in his behalf.
It would seem, however, that by Complainant's act of demanding the
amount from Respondent, the former may have already ignored the issue on the
lack of authority on his part thus curing the defect on the latter's authority to
enter into the same. 59 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." 60 Members of the bar
must always conduct themselves in a way that promotes "public con dence in the
integrity of the legal profession." 61 HESIcT
On another point, there seems no cogent proof, too, that Respondent had
been advised of Complainant's supposed agreement to Mr. Calvario's payment
of P100,000.00. Despite R[es]pondent's allegations that he had informed
Complainant about his so-called counsel's report, it remains undisputed that the
Complainant did not give him any express approval of the same.
There is to the undersigned enough indicia to conclude that Respondent
had committed bad faith in entering into the Compromise Agreement. From
February 2006 to November 2010, or a period of four (4) years, Respondent
failed to turn-over the P100,000.00 he had collected from Mr. Calvario to
Complainant. Worse, he failed to seasonably inform Complainant about the
same. He kept the money and claimed he had the right to retain the same
invoking the counsel's right to a retaining line [sic]. He pointed out that
Complainant had incurred accrued attorney's fees which he is bound to pay
under the general retainer agreement. Thus, it is not amiss to state that he
entered into the said agreement with the odious motivation to hold on to it and
pave the way for the payment of his attorney's fees. In so doing, he violated the
trust reposed in him by his client and violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of
[P]rofessional Responsibility.
As to Respondent's invocation of the lawyer's retaining lien and his
retention of the money, the undersigned deems the same unlawful. True, the
Code of Professional Responsibility allows the lawyer to apply so much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client." But this provision assumes that the client
agrees with the lawyer as to the amount of attorney's fees and as to the
application of the client's fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursements, in
which case he may deduct what is due him and remit the balance to his client,
with full disclosure on every detail. Without the client's consent, the lawyer
has no authority to apply the client's money for his fees, but he
should instead return the money to his client, without prejudice to his
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filing a case to recover his unsatisfied fees.
xxx xxx xxx
On Respondent's argument that prescription has already set in against
Complainant, su ce it to state that the rules have already been supplanted by a
new set of rules which do not anymore carry the same. 88 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence. 89 This court
accepts and adopts the ndings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors, but with modi cation increasing the period of suspension from the practice
of law to two (2) years considering that respondent Atty. Galarrita not only
compromised litigation without complainant Luna's consent, but also refused to turn
over the settlement proceeds to date.
III
This court sustains the order for respondent Atty. Galarrita to return the amount
of P100,000.00 to complainant Luna.
In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar , 90 the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after
which respondent received P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the
townhouse and lot. 91 However, respondent did not turn over this amount to developer
Crown Asia, and no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to complainant. 92 This court
suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of law for three (3) years, but did not grant
complainant's prayer for the return of the P937,500.00. 93
Ronquillo held that "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a
trial of an action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its
officers." 94 Thus, disciplinary proceedings are limited to a determination of "whether or
not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar." 95
Later jurisprudence clari ed that this rule excluding civil liability determination
from disciplinary proceedings "remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are
purely civil in nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the
lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically
linked to his professional engagement." 96 This court has thus ordered in administrative
proceedings the return of amounts representing legal fees.
This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative
proceedings when respondent's civil liability was already established:
Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding
primarily to exact the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar,
the Court's silence about the respondent lawyer's legal obligation to restitute the
complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical
misconduct concerning the client's funds or property should be
required to still litigate in another proceeding what the administrative
proceeding has already established as the respondent's liability . That
has been the reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount
involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan,
supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Lan git, supra, Small v. Banares, supra . 97 (Emphasis
supplied) ICHDca
Respondent Atty. Galarrita does not deny his receipt of the P100,000.00 but
justi es his refusal to turn over the amount by invoking jurisprudence on retaining lien.
98 The Rules of Court provides for attorney's retaining lien as follows:
**** On leave.
***** On leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 2-6.
2. Id. at 7-10.
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 11-12.
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id. at 8-9.
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 15.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 3 and 15.
12. Id. at 3 and 17.
54. Jinon v. Jiz , A.C. No. 9615, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 348, 354 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En
Banc], citing Molina v. Magat , A.C. No. 1900, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 1, 6 [Per J.
Mendoza, Third Division].
60. See Malecdan v. Atty. Pekas, 465 Phil. 703, 716 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
61. Cerdan v. Atty. Gomez, 684 Phil. 418, 428 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
62. Villanueva v. Atty. Ishiwata , 486 Phil. 1, 6 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third
Division], citing Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr. , 386 Phil. 221, 233 (2000) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division].
63. Cerdan v. Atty. Gomez, 684 Phil. 418, 428 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
66. Id.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id.
79. A.C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011, 660 SCRA 490 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
86. Id.
87. Id. at 358.
95. Id.
96. Agot v. Atty. Rivera , A.C. No. 8000, August 5, 2014
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
le=/jurisprudence/2014/august2014/8000.pdf> 6 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc],
citing Pitcher v. Gagate , A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013, 707 SCRA 13, 26 [Per J.
Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
97. Bayonla v. Reyes, A.C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011, 660 SCRA 490, 506 [Per J. Bersamin,
En Banc].
102. Miranda v. Atty. Carpio , 673 Phil. 665, 672 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], citing
Ampil v. Hon. Agrava, et al., 145 Phil. 297, 303 (1970) [Per J. Teehankee, En Banc].
103. Rollo, pp. 47 and 243.
104. Id. at 22.