Case # 1
FGU Insurance Corp v. CA
G.R. No. 118889, March 23, 1998
Ablao, Ada Nadeen D.
Facts:
Two Mitsubishi Colt Lancers figured in a traffic accident in EDSA,
Mandaluyong. Upon approaching the corner of a street, the car owned by
FILCAR, then driven by Dahl-Jensen, swerved to the right hitting the left
side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did
not possess a Philippine driver's license.
Petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its insurance contract
with Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way of subrogation, ​it sued
Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune
Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for ​quasi-delict
before the RTC. Dahl-Jensen was dropped from the case for failure of
summons.
The RTC dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim
of subrogation. The CA affirmed the RTC based on the ground that only the
fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of
respondent FILCAR.
Issues:
W/N an action for damages based on quasi-delict may prosper against a car
rental company and its insurer for fault or negligence of the car-lessee
driving the rental vehicle - No.
Held:
The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code.
To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant;
and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of
the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
Petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, ​i​.​e​., fault or
negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of
Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be
noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about
by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle
that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was
solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the
other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any
participation therein.
Furthermore, the liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and
vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing
damage. Art. 2180 is inapplicable because none of the circumstances
mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent
FILCAR was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such,
there was no ​vinculum juris between them as employer and employee.
Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act
of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.
Case#2
Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom et al.
G.R. 143360, September 5, 2002
Agcopra, Ronna Mae C.
Facts:
In 1994, A Fuso Road Tractor driven by Tutor rammed into the house cum
store of Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed
and pinned to death were Tamayo’s son and Oledan’s daughter. This
incident also caused injuries to Felix Oledan, Enano and the two sons of
Suyom.
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Tutor was then convicted with reckless imprudence resulting to multiple
homicide and multiple physical injuries.
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office (LTO), it was found
that the registered owner of the tractor was the petitioner who leased the
tractor to Edwin Lim.
In the Lease Agreement between the petitioner and Lim, it was stipulated
that it is the intention of the parties to enter into a Finance Lease
Agreement. Under such scheme, the ownership of the tractor was to be
registered in the name of the petitioner, until the value of such was fully
paid by Lim. After a few months, Lim completed the payment for the full
price of the tractor so a Deed of Sale was executed by the petitioner in favor
of Lim. However, such deed was not registered with the LTO.
In 1995, the respondents filed a complaint for damages against Ecatine
Corporation, the petitioner and Tutor.
Petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and they
no longer had possession and control thereof at the time of the incident.
Moreover, Tutor was an employee of Ecatine, not of the petitioner.
The RTC held that since the Deed of Sale between the petitioner and
Ecatine had not been registered with the LTO, the legal owner was still
Equitable.
The CA sustained the decision of RTC, stating that the Certificate of
Registration on file with the LTO remained in the petitioner’s name. In
order for the transfer of ownership to be binding, it must be recorded in
LTO.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA and the trial court gravely erred when they
decided and held that the petitioner was liable for damages based on
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quasi-delict for the negligent acts of a driver who was not the employee of
the petitioner.
Ruling:
The petition is without merit.
There are two civil liabilities in this case, one arising from a delict and
another from a quasi-delict. Since these two civil liabilities are distinct and
independent of each other, the failure to recover in one will not necessarily
preclude the recovery in the other. In this case, the respondents failed to
recover anything from the criminal case, so they elected to file a separate
civil action for damages based on quasi-delict.
Since the petitioner is the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the
accident, it is the lawful operator of the tractor and is directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law,
the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, who is merely its
agent. Thus, Equitable, the registered owner of the tractor, is for purposes of
the law on quasi delict the employer of Tutor, the driver of the tractor.
Ecatine, Tutor's actual employer, is deemed as merely an agent of
Equitable.
Case #3
Virata v. Ochoa
G.R. No. L-46179, January 31, 1978
Albotra, Angela
FACTS: ​Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while
walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by
Maximo Borilla and registered in the name of Victorio Ochoa. A criminal
action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted on
September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal at Pasay City. Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a
reservation to face a separate civil action for damages against the driver on
his criminal liability. Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in said criminal
case to withdraw the reservation to file a separate civil action; that
thereafter, the private prosecutor actively participated in the trial and
presented evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976 the heirs of
Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to institute in separate civil action.
The heirs of Arsenio Virata, petitioners herein, commenced Civil No. B-134
in the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor, Branch V, for damages
based on quasi- delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the registered
owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa. The defendants, private respondents
herein, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause. RTC of Rizal at Pasay
City acquitted accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he caused an
injury by mere accident. RTC of Cavite at Bacoor granted motion to dismiss
Civil Case for damages.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the petitioners, heirs of the deceased Arsenio
Virata, can prosecute an action for damages based on quasi-delict against
Maximo Borilla and Victorio Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively of the
passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.
HELD: ​YES. In negligence cases, the aggrieved parties may choose
between an action under the Revised Penal Code or for quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by
Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the
same negligent act. Therefore, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery." Which means that provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally,
to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made
in the two cases vary
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act.
Before the Criminal Case was decided, they manifested that they were filing
a separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the
passenger jeepney ​based on quasi-delict​. This acquittal of the driver,
Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution of the
civil case for damages based on quasi-delict. The source of the obligation
sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or
omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the
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Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two
different sources of obligation.
CASE #4
EDGAR JARANTILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING
G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989
(ALVAREZ, Maria Arielle Samantha)
FACTS:
Private Respondent Jose Kuan Sing sustained physical injuries after being
side-swiped by a vehicle driven by Petitioner Edgar Jarantilla alongthe
direction of the provincial capitol in the evening of July 7, 1971. The City
Court of Iloilo charged Petitioner for serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence and was then acquitted “on reasonable doubt”. Private
Respondent did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and
he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private
prosecutor. Private Respondent subsequently filed a civil action for the
same subject matter. Petitioner herein alleged in his answer that Private
Respondent should be barred by prior judgement. The Trial Court issued an
order of denial and suggested that the matter be brought to the Supreme
Court. Petitioner filed in this Court a petition for ​certiorari​, prohibition and
mandamus which was dismissed for lack of merit. After trial, the court
below rendered judgment in favor of the herein private respondent and
ordering herein petitioner to pay the former hospitalization fees and actual
expenses, moral damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. A motion for
reconsideration was denied by respondent court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Private Respondent Jose Kuan Sing can file a
separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission
where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on
reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the
judgment of acquittal
HELD:
YES. In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and
intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against petitioner. Under
the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused
on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronouncement on the civil
liability of the accused and the complainant could file a petition for
mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the
judgment of acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code.
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Thus the Court held
that Respondent Court did not err in its order.
CASE No. 5
G.R. Nos. 114841-42 August 23, 1995
Atlantic Gulf VS CA
Basaran, Mariel F.
FACTS​: In 1982 petitioner company commenced the construction of a steel
fabrication plant in Bauan Batangas necessitating dredging operations at
the Batangas Bay in an area adjacent to the real property of private
respondents. As an offshoot of said dredging operations, an action for
damages against herein petitioner.
Private respondents alleged that during the on-going construction of its steel
and fabrication yard, petitioner’s personnel and heavy equipment trespassed
into the adjacent parcels of land belonging to private respondents without
their consent.
These heavy equipment damaged big portions of private respondent’s
property. They further alleged that as a result, the sea silt and water
overflowed and were deposited upon their land. Consequently, the said
property which used to be agricultural lands principally devoted to rice
production and each averaging an annual net harvest of 75 cavans, could no
longer be planted with palay as the soil become infertile, salty, unproductive
and unsuitable for agriculture.
Petitioner company denied all the allegations of private respondents and
contended that its personnel and equipment had neither intruded upon nor
occupied any portion of private respondents’ landholdings.
The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondents and ordered the
petitioner company to pay damages. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the appellate court affirmed the decision with modification.
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ISSUE​: Whether or not the damages awarded were unconscionable,
unreasonable and excessive, clearly not warranted under Articles 20 and
2176 of the Civil Code.
HELD​: The evidence on record indubitably supports the findings of the
trial and appellate courts that petitioner company is liable for the destruction
of the property of private respondents and consequently entitle the latter to
an award of the damages prayed for.
Such conclusions and findings of fact by the lower courts are entitled to
great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and
cogent reasons, none of which however obtain in the case at bar.
The fact that the appellate court adopted the findings of the trial court, as in
this case makes the same binding upon the Supreme Court, for the factual
findings of said appellate court are generally binding on the latter. For that
matter the findings of the Court of Appeals by itself and which are
supported by substantial evidence are almost beyond the power of review
by the Supreme Court.
However, this Court finds that respondent Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error of law in increasing the amount of damages awarded to
private respondents by the court a quo.
Respondent appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified the
judgment of the trial court by increasing the award of damages in favor of
private respondents who, in the first place, did not interpose an appeal
therefrom. This being the case, they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication made by the lower court. As to them, the judgment of the court
below may be said to have attained finality.
Case Number: 6
Case Number: 7
Case Number: 8
Citytrust Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court and
Emme Herrero G.R. No. 84281 May 27, 1994
Cantolino, Jerico Art
Facts:
Respondent Emme Herrero, a businesswoman, made regular deposits with
petitioner Citytrust Banking Corporation at its Burgos branch in Calamba,
Laguna.
On 15 May 1980, respondent Herrero deposited the amount of P31,
500 in order to amply cover 6 postdated checks she issued.
When the checks were presented for encashment, all the checks
were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. However, the last check No.
007400 was personally redeemed by private respondent in cash before it
could be redeposited.
Petitioner Citytrust Banking asserted that it was due to private
respondent’s fault that her checks were dishonored. Petitioner averred that
she inaccurately wrote 2900823 instead of her correct account number
29000823 in her deposit slip.
Issue: ​Whether or not petitioner Citytrust Banking has the duty to honor
checks issued by respondent Herrero despite the failure to accurately stating
the account number resulting to insufficiency of funds for the check.
Held:
Yes, even it is true that there was error on the account number stated
in the deposit slip, the name of “Emme Herrero” was indicated. This fact is
controlling in determining in whose account the deposit is made or should
be posted. It is not likely to commit an error in one’s name than merely
relying on numbers which are difficult to remember. Numbers are for the
convenience of the bank but was never intended to disregard the real name
of its depositors. The bank is engaged in business impressed with public
trust, and it is its duty to protect in return its clients and depositors who
transact business with it. It should not be a matter of the bank alone
receiving deposits, lending out money and collecting interests. It is also its
obligation to see to it that all funds invested with it are properly accounted
for and duly posted in its ledgers.
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Case No. 9
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88866,
[February 18, 1991], 271 PHIL 994-1006
Carrasco, John Mark C.
Facts:
In January 1979, a certain Eduardo Gomez opened an account with Golden
Savings and deposited over a period of two months 38 treasury warrants
with a total value of P1,755,228.37. They were all drawn by the Philippine
Fish Marketing Authority and purportedly signed by its General Manager
and counter-signed by its Auditor. Six of these were directly payable to
Gomez while the others appeared to have been indorsed by their respective
payees, followed by Gomez as second indorser.
On various dates between June 25 and July 16, 1979, all these warrants
were subsequently indorsedby Gloria Castillo as Cashier of Golden Savings
and deposited to its Savings Account No. 2498 in theMetrobank branch in
Calapan, Mindoro. They were then sent for clearing by the branch office to
the principal office of Metrobank, which forwarded them to the Bureau of
Treasury for special clearing.
More than two weeks after the deposits, Gloria Castillo went to the Calapan
branch several times to ask whether the warrants had been cleared. She was
told to wait.
Accordingly, Gomez was meanwhile not allowed to withdraw from his
account. Later, however, "exasperated" over Gloria's repeated inquiries and
also as an accommodation for a "valued client," the petitioner says it finally
decided to allow Golden Savings to withdraw from the proceeds of the
warrants.
In turn, Golden Savings subsequently allowed Gomez to make withdrawals
from his own account.
On July 21, 1979, Metrobank informed Golden Savings that 32 of the
warrants had been dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury on July 19, 1979,
and demanded the refund by Golden Savings of the amount it had
previously withdrawn, to make up the deficit in its account. The demand
was rejected. Metrobank then sued Golden Savings.
Issue:
Whether or not Metrobank can demand refund against Golden Savings with
regard to the amount withdraws to make up with the deficit as a result of the
dishonored treasury warrants.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
From the above undisputed facts, it would appear to the Court that
Metrobank was indeed negligent in giving Golden Savings the impression
that the treasury warrants had been cleared and that, consequently, it was
safe to allow Gomez to withdraw the proceeds thereof from his account
with it.
Without such assurance, Golden Savings would not have allowed the
withdrawals; with such assurance, there was no reason not to allow the
withdrawal.
Indeed, Golden Savings might even have incurred liability for its refusal to
return the money that to all appearances belonged to the depositor, who
could therefore withdraw it any time and for any reason he saw fit.
It was, in fact, to secure the clearance of the treasury warrants that Golden
Savings deposited them to its account with Metrobank. Golden Savings had
no clearing facilities of its own. It relied on Metrobank to determine the
validity of the warrants through its own services. The proceeds of the
warrants were withheld from Gomez until Metrobank allowed Golden
Savings itself to withdraw them from its own deposit. It was only when
Metrobank gave the go-signal that Gomez was finally allowed by Golden
Savings to withdraw them from his own account.
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The argument of Metrobank that Golden Savings should have exercised
more care in checking the personal circumstances of Gomez before
accepting his deposit does not hold water. It was Gomez who was entrusting
the warrants, not Golden Savings that was extending him a loan; and
moreover, the treasury warrants were subject to clearing, pending which the
depositor could not withdraw its proceeds. There was no question of
Gomez's identity or of the genuineness of his signature as checked by
Golden Savings. In fact, the treasury warrants were dishonored allegedly
because of the forgery of the signatures of the drawers, not of Gomez as
payee or indorser. Under the circumstances, it is clear that Golden Savings
acted with due care and diligence and cannot be faulted for the withdrawals
it allowed Gomez to make.
The negligence of Metrobank has been sufficiently established. To repeat
for emphasis, it was the clearance given by it that assured Golden Savings it
was already safe to allow Gomez to withdraw the proceeds of the treasury
warrants he had deposited. Metrobank ​misled​ Golden Savings.
Metrobank cannot contend that by indorsing the warrants in general, Golden
Savings assumed that they were "genuine and in all respects what they
purport to be," in accordance with Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law. The simple reason is that this law is not applicable to the
non-negotiable treasury warrants.
Case No. 10
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Querimit
G.R. No. 148582, January 16, 2002
Cecilia, Joyce Marie D.
FACTS: ​On November 24, 1986, respondent Estrella O. Querimit opened a
dollar savings account in petitioner's Harrison Plaza branch, for which she
was issued four (4) Certificates of Deposit with a total amount of
$60,000.00. The certificates were to mature in 60 days, on January 23,
1987, and were payable to bearer at 4.5% interest per annum. The
certificates bore the word "accrued," which meant that if they were not
presented for encashment or pre-terminated prior to maturity, the money
deposited with accrued interest would be "rolled over" by the bank and
annual interest would accumulate automatically. The petitioner bank's
manager assured respondent that her deposit would be renewed and earn
interest upon maturity even without the surrender of the certificates if these
were not indorsed and withdrawn.
In 1989, respondent accompanied her husband Dominador Querimit to the
United States for medical treatment. Her husband died then she returned to
the Philippines. She went to petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC) to withdraw her deposit but she was told that her husband had
withdrawn the money in deposit. Through a counsel, respondent requested
for an update and payment of the certificates of deposit, including interest
earned from the petitioner which was denied by the latter. Petitioner alleged
that it had given respondent's late husband an "accommodation" to allow
him to withdraw Estrella's deposit. Petitioner presented certified true copies
of documents showing that payment had been made.
The trial court rendered judgment for respondent. Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appeals court stated that
petitioner failed to prove that the certificates of deposit had been paid out of
its funds, since the evidence stands unrebutted that the subject certificates of
deposit until pnow remain unendorsed, undelivered and unwithdrawn by
her.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the subject certificates have already been paid by
the petitioner.
HELD: ​No. Petitioner bank failed to prove that it had already paid Estrella
Querimit, the bearer and lawful holder of the subject certificates of deposit.
The finding of the trial court on this point, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, is that petitioner did not pay either respondent Estrella or her
husband the amounts evidenced by the subject certificates of deposit. A
certificate of deposit is defined as a written acknowledgment by a bank or
banker of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the bank or
banker promises to pay to the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or to
some other person or his order, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor
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between the bank and the depositor is created. The principles governing
other types of bank deposits are applicable to certificates of deposit, as are
the rules governing promissory notes when they contain an unconditional
promise to pay a sum certain of money absolutely. The principle that
payment, in order to discharge a debt, must be made to someone authorized
to receive it is applicable to the payment of certificates of deposit. Thus, a
bank will be protected in making payment to the holder of a certificate
indorsed by the payee, unless it has notice of the invalidity of the
indorsement or the holder's want of title. A bank acts at its peril when it
pays deposits evidenced by a certificate of deposit, without its production
and surrender after proper indorsement. As a rule, one who pleads payment
has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege
non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to
prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove payment. The debtor
has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been
discharged by payment. In this case, the certificates of deposit were clearly
marked payable to "bearer," which means, to "the person in possession of an
instrument, document of title or security payable to bearer or indorsed in
blank." Petitioner should not have paid respondent's husband or any third
party without requiring the surrender of the certificates of deposit.
Case No. 11
Reyes vs. CA (G.R. No. 118492, August 15, 2001)
Cortez, Charisse Iva R.
Facts: ​Petitioner Gregorio H. Reyes, director of PRCI, sent Godofredo
Reyes to the respondent bank to apply for a foreign exchange demand draft
in Australian dollars to be used during the 20th Asian Racing Conference in
Sydney, Australia. Godofredo went to respondent bank to apply for a
demand draft but the application was denied for the reason that respondent
bank did not have an Australian dollar account in any bank in Sydney.
Respondent bank then informed Godofredo of a roundabout way of
effecting the requested remittance to Sydney thus: the respondent bank
would draw a demand draft against Westpac Bank in Sydney, Australia and
have the latter reimburse itself from the U.S. dollar account of the
respondent in Westpac Bank in New York. Petitioners spouses Gregorio H.
Reyes and Consuelo Puyat-Reyes left for Australia to attend the said racing
conference. At the registration desk, in the presence of other delegates,
petitioner Gregorio Reyes was advised that he could not register because the
foreign exchange demand draft for his registration fee had been dishonored.
petitioner Consuelo Puyat-Reyes was also embarrassed and humiliated at
the registration desk when she was told in the presence and within the
hearing of other delegates that she could not be registered due to the
dishonor of the subject foreign exchange demand draft. The petitioners filed
a complaint for damages against the respondent bank due to the dishonor of
the said foreign exchange demand draft issued by the respondent bank. The
petitioners claim that as a result of the dishonor of the said demand draft,
they were exposed to unnecessary shock, social humiliation, and deep
mental anguish in a foreign country, and in the presence of an international
audience.
Issue: ​WON the petitioners are entitled to damages.
Ruling: ​NO. Evidence shows that the respondent bank exercised that
degree of diligence expected of an ordinary prudent person under the
circumstances. As soon as the demand draft was dishonored, the respondent
bank, thinking that the problem was with the reimbursement and without
any idea that it was due to miscommunication, re-confirmed the authority of
Westpac-New York to debit its dollar account for the purpose of
reimbursing Westpac-Sydney. Respondent bank also sent two (2) more
cable messages to Westpac-New York inquiring why the demand draft was
not honored.
We ruled that the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of
a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship
with their depositors is concerned. But the said ruling applies only to cases
where banks act under their fiduciary capacity, that is, as depositary of the
deposits of their depositors. The respondent bank was not required to exert
more than the diligence of a good father of a family in regard to the sale and
issuance of the subject foreign exchange demand draft. The evidence shows
that the respondent bank did everything within its power to prevent the
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dishonor of the subject foreign exchange demand draft. The erroneous
reading of its cable message to Westpac-Sydney by an employee of the
latter could not have been foreseen by the respondent bank. The dishonor of
the subject foreign exchange demand draft is not attributable to any fault of
the respondent bank. It was established that the respondent bank acted in
good faith and that it did not cause the embarrassment of the petitioners in
Sydney, Australia. Hence, the respondent bank is not liable to pay damages
to petitioners.
Case No. 12
Adzuara v. CA; G.R.. No. 125134; 22 January 1999
Dawis, Bianca Denise D.
FACTS: On 17 December 1990, at 1:30 a.m., Xeres Adzuara, then a law
student, and his friends were cruising in a Galant Sedan along the stretch of
Quirino Ave. coming from the direction of EDSA towards Delta Circle at
approximately 40 kph. Upon reaching the intersection of 4th West Street,
the Galant collided with a Toyota Corona sedan owned and driven by
Gregorio Martinez, who was executing a U-turn at the speed of 5 kph at the
north-west portion of Quezon Ave. going to Manila when the accident
occured. Sahlee Martinez, who was seated on the Corona’s right front seat,
sustained physical injuries which required confinement and medical
attendance for five days. Adzuara was charged and convicted with reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with less serious physical
injuries.
ISSUE:​ Whether Adzuara was guilty of negligence.
RULING: YES. ​Negligence is the want of care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
At 1:30 in the morning along an almost deserted avenue, ordinary care and
vigilance would suffice. This may consist of keeping a watchful eye on the
road ahead and observing traffic rules on speed, right of way and traffic
light.. It is a rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of
way over the one making a U-turn. But if the person making a U-turn has
already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he
is already visible to the person on the thrustreet, the latter must give way to
the former. Azuara was on the thru-street and had already seen the Martinez
car. He should have stopped to allow Martinez to complete the U-turn
having, as it were, the last clear chance to avoid the accident which he
ignored.
Case No 13
Bayne Adjusters and Surveyors, Inc. v. CA (G.R. No. 116332. January
25, 2000)
De Jesus, Maria Cristel C.
FACTS:
In 1987, Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. imported alkyl
benzene from Japan valued at almost US$256K. The said liquid cargo was
insured with private respondent Insurance Company of North America
against all risk for its value. Petitioner Bayne Adjusters and Surveyors, Inc.
was contracted by consignee to supervise the proper handling and discharge
of the cargo from the chemical tanker to a receiving barge until the cargo is
pumped into the consignee’s shore tank.
Petitioner’s surveyor supervised the transfer of the cargo from the
chemical tanker to the receiving barge when the cargo arrived in Manila..
Due to mechanical problems with the pump, the pumping of the liquid
cargo from the barge to the consignee’s tank was interrupted several times.
When the pump broke down once again, the ​petitioner’s surveyor left the
premises. 2{> without leaving any instruction with the ​barge
foreman on what to do in the event that the pump becomes operational
again. There was no surveyor left in the premises and the assigned surveyor
did not seal the valves leading to the tank to avoid unsupervised pumping of
the cargo.
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The consignee asked petitioner to send a surveyor to conduct tank
sounding. Petitioner sent a cargo surveyor (Amado Fontillas who is not a
liquid bulk surveyor) to the premises and it was agreed that pumping
operation would resume the following day. Fontillas tried to inform the
barge men and the assigned surveyor of the scheduled resumption of
pumping operation ​but he could not find them so he left the premises​.
When the barge men arrived in the early evening, they found the valves of
the tank open and resumed pumping operation in the absence of any
instruction from the surveyor to the contrary. ​The following morning it
was found that an undetermined amount of alkyl benzene was lost due
to overflow.
The consignee filed a claim with the ​private respondent insurance
corporation for the value of the lost liquid cargo. Respondent insurance
corporation agreed to pay the consignee. Private respondent then instituted
an action for collection of sum of money as subrogee. Both the trial court
and the appellate court found the petitioner’s failure to comply with the
Standard Operating Procedure for Handling Liquid Bulk Cargo when
pumping operation is suspended ​as the proximate cause of the loss. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages for the loss incurred
by the consignee
HELD: YES​. The petitioner is negligent in the performance of its duty as a
marine superintendent surveyor under the standard operating procedure in
handling liquid cargo and thus, liable for damages for the loss of the cargo.
The negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligation
renders him liable for damages for the resulting loss suffered by the
obligee. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to exercise
due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as the nature of
the obligation so demands.
 Petitioner is bound to supervise the proper discharge of the liquid
cargo from the chemical tanker to the receiving barge and from the latter to
the consignee's shore tank. However, petitioner failed to exercise due
diligence as required by circumstances which in this case is governed by the
Surveyor's Standard Operating Procedure in Handling Liquid Bulk Survey
when pumping operation is suspended which ​requires the ​surveyor to seal
all cargo compartment manhole covers and the barge and manifold covers
to avoid unsupervised discharge of the liquid cargo and to avert loss or
contamination thereof.​
Here, when the pumping operations were suspended due to mechanical
problems with the barge pump, t​he assigned surveyor left the premises
without closing the valves and the manifold, and worse failed to
instruct the barge foreman to resume discharge of the cargo only at a
specified time when the petitioner's surveyor will again be present. Thus,
when the pump became operational again and the tank was left open by the
petitioner's surveyors the barge pump operators, without instruction to the
contrary, assumed that they may resume discharge of the cargo. It was
during the unsupervised discharge of the cargo that the spillage occurred.
The recurring pump break down ​should have warned the
petitioner's assigned surveyor of the need to exercise extreme caution and
closer supervision to safeguard the proper discharge of the cargo as the
pump break down hindered normal pumping operations. The petitioner's
failure to closely supervise the discharge of the cargo in accordance with
accepted guidelines is the proximate cause of the loss.
The Court found no reversible error committed by the appellate
court. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Case No. 14
Samson Jr. v. BPI (G.R. No. 150487. July 10, 2003)
Deyto, Maria Alyssa
Facts: Samson, Jr. filed an action for damages against the Bank of the
Philippine Islands. He deposited to his BPI account a check worth
P3,500.00; That as of said date, his account balance was P367.38. However,
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when he asked his daughter to withdraw, it said insufficient balance. He
deposited again the amount of P5,500 but when he tried to withdraw, it said
insufficient balance again and he was even charged a penalty fee. He
claimed that because of this, he was embarrassed and was not able to pay an
important creditor. He argued that the bank only conducted an investigation
when he reported the matter and the Manager even displayed arrogance and
discourtesy towards the petitioner.
RTC rendered a decision favorable to the petitioner. CA affirmed but
reduced the moral damages from P200K to P50K since the missing amounts
were already reimbursed to the petitioner.
Issues: ​1. Whether the reduction of the award of moral damages was
proper? Partly.
2. Whether petitioner is liable for contributory negligence? No​.
Held: Awarding moral damages is aimed at restoration, as much as
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. Since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper
amount.
The social standing of the aggrieved party is essential to the determination
of the proper amount of the award. Otherwise, the goal of enabling him to
obtain means, diversions, or amusements to restore him to the status quo
ante would not be achieved.
We believe that the award should be increased to P100,000, considering (1)
that petitioner was a businessman and was the highest lay person in the
United Methodist Church; (2) that he was regarded by respondent and its
officers with arrogance and a condescending manner; and (3) that
respondent successfully postponed compensating him for more than a
decade. This amount is more than the P50,000 granted by the CA, but not as
much as the P200,000 granted by the RTC.
That petitioner reported the missing check deposit to respondent only after
three weeks did not constitute contributory negligence. The injury resulted
from the denial of his withdrawal due to insufficient funds, an injury he
suffered before learning that his check deposit had been lost. Respondent,
not petitioner, immediately knew that a deposit envelop was missing, yet it
did nothing to solve the problem. His alleged delay in reporting the matter
did not at all contribute to his injury.
Though the amount of P3,500 was already credited back to his account, this
step was made only after his persistent prompting. Prior to this
development, he suffered damages that could no longer be reversed by the
belated restoration of the amount lost. It is for this suffering that moral
damages are due.
Case # 15
United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Teofilo C. Ramos,
(G.R. No. 147800 ; November 11, 2003)
Dolot, Paolo
Facts: United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) granted a loan to
Zamboanga Development Corporation (ZDC) with Venicio Ramos and the
Spouses Teofilo Ramos, Sr. and Amelita Ramos as sureties. Upon failure of
ZDC to pay, UCPB filed a collection suit against the latter to which the
RTC adjudged in favor of the petitioner. The writ of execution ordered
Deputy Sheriff Villapaa to levy properties belonging to the sureties. UCPB
assisted in identifying a property under the name of herein defendant,
Teofilo C. Ramos, ​not aware of the fact that herein defendant and
Teofilo Ramos, Sr. were two different persons​. The Sheriff prepared a
notice of levy and caused the annotation thereof by the Register of Deeds on
the said title.
Ramdustrial Corporation, owned by herein defendant, applied for a loan
with UCPB, using the aforementioned property as collateral to participate in
a bidding project of San Miguel Corporation. But the application was held
in abeyance due to the notice of levy that was annotated in the title. The
respondent, being informed of the matter for the first time, was shocked,
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causing cardio-vascular and hypertension for which he needed to go to the
hospital for treatment and medication.
The loan application was approved but they were unable to participate in the
bidding. Due to this, the company was not able to pay the loan. When the
corporation applied for another loan with Planters Development Bank
(PDB), it discovered that the annotation had yet to be cancelled. Thus the
PDB withheld the loan application until the notice of levy was cancelled.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled the notice of levy upon
motion of herein respondents.
Despite the cancellation of the notice of levy, herein respondent filed a
complaint for damages before the RTC alleging that without any legal basis,
the petitioner caused the annotation of a notice to levy on his aforesaid
property which caused the disapproval of his loan from UCPB and, thus
made him lose an opportunity to participate in the bidding of a considerable
project; causing him to suffer sleepless nights, moral shock, mental anguish
and almost a heart attack due to high blood pressure.
Petitioner, admitting its mistake, denied that it was motivated by malice and
bad faith, and that the damages sustained by the respondent, was due to its
delay in filing the motion to cancel the annotation.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of herein respondent. holding that
UCPB acted hastily when it did not carefully identify the judgement debtor
Teofilo Ramos, Sr. The trial court also held that Ramos was entitled to
damages as the property which was levied was the respondent’s only
property where he and his family resided. Thus, the thought of losing it for
reasons not of his own doing gave rise to his entitlement to moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Thus, the current suit.
Issues:
 1. Whether or not the petitioner acted negligently in causing the
annotation of levy on the title of the respondent;
2. Whether or not the respondent was the real party-in-interest as
plaintiff to file an action for damages against the petitioner considering
that the loan applicant with UCPB and PDB was RAMDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION;
3. Whether or not the respondent is entitled to moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Held:
1. Yes, the court ruled that the petitioner acted negligently in the
annotation of the notice of levy in the title of Teofilo Ramos. The court
stressed that the petitioner bank as a financial institution, is affected
with public interest, and that it should guard against loss due to
negligence or bad faith. Such businesses are expected to ascertain and
verify the identities of the persons it transacts business with.
In determining whether or not the petitioner acted negligently, ​the
constant test is: Did the defendant in doing the negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. In the present case, the court found that the
petitioner failed to act with reasonable care and caution. This is because
the petitioner had access to more facilities in confirming the identity of
their judgment debtors. Thus, it should have acted more cautiously,
especially since some uncertainty had been reported by the appraiser
whom the petitioner had tasked to make verifications. Such negligence
was ruled to be the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the
respondent.
2. Yes, the court ruled that Ramos is a real party-in-interest.
Regardless of the fact that the respondent was not the loan applicant
with the UCPB and PDB, as the registered owner of the property whose
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ownership had been unlawfully disturbed and limited by the unlawful
annotation of notice of levy on his TCT, the respondent had the legal
standing to file the said action for damages.
3. Yes, the court ruled that herein respondent is entitled to an award
for damages.
For the award of moral damages to be granted, the following must
exist:
1.) there must be an injury clearly sustained by the claimant,
whether physical, mental or psychological;
2.) there must be a culpable act or omission factually
established;
3.) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and
4.) the award for damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, all four requisites were established.
First, the respondent sustained injuries in that his physical health and
cardio-vascular ailment were aggravated; his fear that his one and only
property would be foreclosed, hounded him endlessly; and his
reputation as mortgagor had been tarnished. Second, the annotation on
the TCT was wrongful, and arose from the petitioners negligence.
Third, such wrongful levy was the proximate cause of the respondent’s
misery; and fourth, the award for damages is predicated on Article
2219 of the Civil Code.
The court did not award exemplary damages due to the absence of
evidence that showed malice and bad faith on the part of the petitioners.
It is a requisite in the grant of exemplary damages that the act of the
offender must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton,
fraudulent or malevolent manner.
 The Court awarded Attorney’s fees as the respondent was compelled to
engage the services of counsel and to incur expenses of litigation in
order to protect his interest in the subject property against the
petitioners unlawful levy.
Case Number: 16
Case#17
Libi vs IAC
G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992
Fernandez, Erika Mae D.
Facts:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts for more than two
years. They were both 18 years old. Thereafter, Julie Ann broke up her
relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and
irresponsible. Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to
resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the
house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso. Julie Ann and Wendell died, each
from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and
Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which
was recovered from the scene of the crime. Respondents, parents of Julie,
theorized that Wendell killed Julie and later on killed himself. Petitioners,
parents of Wendell, rejected the same and contend that the deaths of
Wendell and Julie is caused by an unknown third person whom was
displeased because Wendell was a narcotics informer. An action for
damages was filed by Julie’s parents against Wendell’s parents to recover
damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2180 is applicable making Wendel’s parents liable
for the act of their minor child?
Ruling:
13
Yes. The Supreme Court held that, having been grossly negligent in
preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which was
allegedly kept in a safety deposit box, Wendell’s parents are subsidiarily
liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was
living in their company. The parents are and should be held primarily liable
for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their
minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their
company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent such damages.
Case No. 18
Exconde vs Capuno
Gayed, Hadiya May, D.
Facts:
Dante Capuno, son of DelDn Capuno, was accused of double
homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperiña and
Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro
Caperiña, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages
against the accused. After trial, Dante who was then 15 years old, was found
guilty of the crime charged and on appeal the Court Appeals affirmed the
decision.
Dante was a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a
member of the Boy Scouts Organization; and in March 1949, he attended a
parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the school supervisor.
And from school, Dante and other students boarded a jeep; he took hold of
the wheel and drove which led an accident which killed Isisdoro and
Amado.
In line with her reservation, Sabina filed the present action against
Dante and Delfin asking foramages for the death of her son Isidoro. But the
defendants set up the defense that onl Dante should be held liable and not
his father Delfin; because the former was not under the control, supervision
and custody of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court and,
as a consequence, it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages
claimed in the complaint. From this decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court
of Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal
only involves questions of law
ISSUE: ​Whether Delfin should be held civilly liable, jointly and severally
with his minor son Dante for damages caused by the latter’s negligence.
HELD: ​Yes. Delfin is liable jointly and severally with his son Dante
because the latter committed the negligent act, he was a minor and living
with his father. Therefore, the civil liability of the father is evident.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them
which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them
in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their
means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and
punish them in moderation". The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage, which the
defendants failed to prove.
Case Number: 19
Case No. 20
Canlas v. Chan Lin Po
2 SCRA 973, July 31, 1961
Lagasca, Raynante Jr. P.
FACTS: ​Chan was negligently driving a truck and ran over Paras, aged
65, Chan Lin Po was the supposed operator and owner of the truck as well
as the parent of the driver.
ISSUE:
Is Chan Lin Po liable? No.
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Is the employer liable? No.
RULING: ​Chan lin po cannot be held liable as stated in Article 2180 as it
was not proven Chan was a minor living with his parents The employers of
Chan also cannot be held liable as there is no proof that Chan, the driver,
acted within the scope of his assigned tasks.
Case Number: 21
Case No. 22
Heirs of Delos Santos vs. CA
Limbo, Mary Christine M.
Facts:
M/V 'Mindoro of Compania Maritima sailed from pier 8 North
Harbor, Manila, on November 2,1967 at about 6PM (instead of the
scheduled 2PM departure) bound for New Washington, Aklan.
It appeared that said vessel met typhoon 'Welming' causing the
death of many of its passengers. The heirs of Delos Santos and others as
pauper litigants filed a complaint against the Compania Maritima, for
damages due to the death of several passengers as a result of the sinking of
the vessel of the defendant.
In alleging negligence on the part of the vessel, plaintiffs
introduced in evidence a permit to the Compania Maritima issued by the
Bureau of Customs limiting the vessel to only 193 passengers. Also, it
appeared that in a decision of the Board of Marine Inquiry, it was found that
the captain and some officers of the crew were negligent in operating the
vessel.
However, the defendant company alleged that no negligence was
ever established and, in fact, the shipowners and their officers took all the
necessary precautions in operating the vessel and that the loss of lives as a
result of the drowning of some passengers was due to force majeure because
of the said strong typhoon. The trial court sustained the position of private
respondent Compania Maritima. The appellate court affirmed the decision
on appeal. While it found that there was concurring negligence on the part
of the captain which must be imputable to Maritima, the Court of Appeals
ruled that Maritima cannot be held liable in damages.
Issue: Whether or not Compania Maritima can be held liable for the deaths
and injury of the victims.
Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the proximate causes of the
sinking of M/V Mindoro were Maritima's lack of extraordinary diligence
coupled with the negligence of the captain. Under Article 1733 of the Civil
Code, owing to the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
common carriers are tasked to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of its passengers. Further, under
Article 1755 of the Civil Code, they are bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances. Whenever death or injury to a passenger occurs, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
by Articles 1733 and 1755. (Art. 1756, CC)
In this case, Maritima presented evidence of the seaworthy
condition of the ship prior to its departure to prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence. Necessary repairs were made on the ship and life
saving equipment and navigational instruments were installed. However,
Maritima could not present evidence that it specifically installed a radar
which could have allowed the vessel to navigate safely for shelter during a
storm. Storms and typhoons are not strange occurrences. With the
impending threat of 'Welming,' an important device such as the radar could
have enabled the ship to pass through the river and to safety. This
demonstrated Maritima's lack of extraordinary diligence, hence, it is liable
for the deaths and injury of the victims.
Case Number: 23
Case No. 24
15
PSBA vs. CA
Mandocdoc, Marc Renzo D.
Facts:
Carlitos was enrolled in the third-year commerce course at the
Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA). A stabbing incident
which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor
premises of the PSBA prompted the parents of the deceased, herein private
respondents, filed a suit for damages against the said PSBA and its
corporate officers. The assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA.
The petitioners sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that
since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the
subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are
beyond the ambit of the rule in Article 2180.
The trial court and CA ruled in favor of the private respondents.
The respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law of
quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
WON the trial court and the CA erred when its decision was
anchored based on the law of quasi-delicts.
Held​:
YES. The Supreme Court held that there is a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not
govern. In the circumstances obtained in the case at bar, there is, as yet, no
finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached
thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This
would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there is a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, the negligence of the school
would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes
material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and
Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to
the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also ruled that for Article 2180 to apply, the
damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist
in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were
not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to
continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court.
Case Number: 25
Case No. 26
Francisco vs. CBCI, G.R. 193577, Sept. 07, 2011
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision and resolution of the CA
reversing the decision of the RTC. Since 1965, Antonio Francisco was the
owner and manager of a Caltex station in Rizal. In March 1993, 4 persons
including Gregoria Basca, came to the station and introduced themselves as
employees of CBCI and offered to sell Francisco a certain quantity of diesel
fuel. After checking Bacsa’s identification card Francisco agreed to
purchase the diesel fuel and imposed the following conditions: first, that
Petron Corp. should deliver the diesel fuel to Francisco at his business
address which should be properly indicated in the invoice; second,that the
delivery tank is sealed; and third, that Basca should issue a separate receipt
to Francisco. There were 17 deliveries to Francisco and all his conditions
16
were complied with. CBCI filed a complaint for a sum of money and
damages. According to CBCI, Petron, on various dates, sold diesel fuel to
CBCI but these were delivered to and received by Francisco. Francisco then
sold the diesel fuel to third persons from whom he received payment. CBCI
alleged that Francisco acquired possession of the diesel fuel without
authority from CBCI and deprived CBCI of the use of the diesel fuel it had
paid for. CBCI demanded payment from Francisco but he refused to pay.
Francisco explained that he operates the Caltex station with the help of his
family because, in February 1978, he completely lost his eyesight due to
sickness. Francisco claimed that he asked Jovito, his son, to look into and
verify the identity of Bacsa, who introduced himself as a radio operator and
confidential secretary of a certain Mr. Inawat, CBCI's manager for
operations. The trial court ruled that Francisco was not liable for damages in
favor of CBCI because the 17 deliveries were covered by original and
genuine invoices. The trial court pointed out that good faith affords
protection to a purchaser for value. Finally, since CBCI was bound by the
acts of Bacsa, the trial court ruled that CBCI is liable to pay damages to
Francisco. The Court of Appeals also ruled that CBCI was unlawfully
deprived of the diesel fuel which, as indicated in the invoices, CBCI had
already paid for. Therefore, CBCI had the right to recover the diesel fuel or
its value from Francisco. Since the diesel fuel can no longer be returned, the
Court of Appeals ordered Francisco to give back the actual amount paid by
CBCI for the diesel fuel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio Francisco exercised the required diligence of a
blind person in the conduct of his business.
HELD:
NO. ​Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of the person, time and place. The most common standard of
conduct is that of a good father of a family or that of a reasonably prudent
person. To determine the diligence which must be required of all persons,
we use as basis the abstract average standard corresponding to a normal
orderly person. ​Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct
expected of a reasonable person who is blind. First, Francisco merely relied
on the identification card of Bacsa to determine if he was authorized by
CBCI. Francisco did not do any other background check on the identity and
authority of Bacsa. Second, Francisco already expressed his misgivings
about the diesel fuel, fearing that they might be stolen property, yet he did
not verify with CBCI the authority of Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel. Third,
Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were typewritten on
a half sheet of plain bond paper. If Francisco exercised reasonable
diligence, he should have asked for an official receipt issued by CBCI.
Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as indicated in Petron's invoice, does not
show that CBCI authorized Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel to Francisco.
Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a
reasonable person who is blind.
Case No. 27
Case Digest No. SPOUSES FRANCO vs. IAC, G.R. No. 71137 October
5, 1989
FACTS:
The instant petition deals mainly with the nature of an employer's liability
for his employee's negligent act.
At about 7:30 in the evening of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved
the northbound ​Franco Bus ​with Plate No. XY320-PUB he was driving to
the left to avoid hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing north along the
cemented pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas
Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming ​Isuzu Mini Bus bearing Plate
No. YL-735 being driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision
between the two (2) vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous eventuality.
Dragged fifteen (15) meters from the point of impact (midway the length of
the parked truck with trailer), the mini bus landed right side down facing
south in the canal of the highway, a total wreck. The Franco Bus was also
17
damaged but not as severely. T​he collision resulted in the deaths of the two
(2) drivers, ​Macario Yuro and Magdaleno Lugue, and two (2) passengers of
the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay.
Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus,
Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita
Lugue, the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an ​action for
damages through reckless imprudence against Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco,
the owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company
ISSUE:
Whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private
respondents was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict.
RULING:
Yes under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer
under the Revised Penal Code and the employer's primary liability under the
Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. The first type of
liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
which provide as follows:
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers,
tavern-keepers and proprietors of establishments. — ​In
default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
tavern-keepers, and any other persons or corporations
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulations
shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also ​subsidiarily liable ​for the restitution of
goods taken by ​robbery or theft within their houses from
 guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value
thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposits of such goods within the inn; and
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons unless committed by
the innkeeper's employees.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons​. —
The subsidiary liability ​established in the next preceding
article shall ​also apply to employers​, teachers, persons,
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry ​for
felonies committed by the servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or ​employees in the discharge of their duties;
while the second kind is governed by the following provisions of the Civil
Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
18
Art. 2180. The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry,
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a
delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon
whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based.
Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is
imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's
criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are
proved.
In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the person who
should stand as the accused and the party supposed to be primarily liable for
the damages suffered by private respondents as a consequence of the
vehicular mishap died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to
stand on considering that their liability is merely secondary to their
employee's primary liability.
On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability
is based on culpa aquiliana which ​holds the employer primarily liable for
tortious acts of its employees subject, ​however, to the defense that the
former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employees.
Having thus established that Civil Case No. 2154 is a civil action to impose
the primary liability of the employer as a result of the tortious act of its
alleged reckless driver, we confront ourselves with the plausibility of
defendants-petitioners' defense that they observed due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. On
this point, the appellate court has unequivocally spoken in affirmation of the
lower court's findings, to wit:
“Anyway, a perusal of the record shows that the appellants ​were
not able to establish the defense of a good father of a family in the
supervision of their bus driver. “
Consequently, therefore, we find petitioners liable for the damages claimed
pursuant to their primary liability under the Civil Code.
Case No. 28
SOLIMAN VS. TUAZON G.R. No. 66207 May 18 1992
FACTS:
On August 1982, Soliman Jr., plaintiff, was in the campus ground and
premises of the defendant, Republic Central Colleges, as he was taking his
morning classes, the defendant, Jimmy Solomon, who was also in the
premises of the said school performing his duties and obligations as a duly
appointed security guard under the employment, supervision and control of
his employer-defendant R.L SECURITY AGENCY, INC., without any
provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner, with intent to kill, attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on
the abdomen with a revolver. This incident would have caused plaintiff’s
death were plaintiff’s death were it not for the timely medical assistance
given to him. Hence, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a complaint for damages
against private respondent “Colleges”, the R.L Security Agency Inc. and
Jimmy Solomon, as defendants.
Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the
complaint stated no cause of action against it, that it is free from any
liability for the reason that private respondent school was not the employer
19
of the security guard charged, and hence was not responsible for any
wrongful act of Solomon. It further argued that Art. 2180, 7​th paragraph, of
the CC did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a
pupil, student or apprentice of the school. Respondent Judge granted the
motion to dismiss, holding that Solomon was not an employee of the school
which according could not be held liable for his acts or omissions.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
granting the school’s motion to dismiss.
RULING:
In PSBA, it was said that when an academic institution accepts student for
enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part,
the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip with the necessary tools and skills to pursue
higher education or profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to
abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
In the PSBA case, the TC had denied the school’s motion to dismiss the
complaint against it. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to
dismiss filed by Colleges, upon the assumption that petitioner’s cause of
action was based, and could have been based, only on Art. 2180 of the CC.
As PSBA, however, states acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in
character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other
legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he
supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other that one based
on Art. 2180 if the Civil Code. Respondent Judge should not have granted
to motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice,
allowed the petitioner prove acts constituting breach of an obligation on the
part of respondent colleges.
Case No. 29
Castillex Industrial Corp vs. Vasquez ( G.R. Nos. 132266, December 21,
1999)
Obe, Lady Danica A.
Facts:
Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a motorcycle without any protective
helmet and also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon
the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex
Industrial Corporation, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking
lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a shortcut that
caused a collision between Vasquez and Abad. Vasquez was severely
injured and later on died. Parents of Vasquez filed for damages against
Abad and the petitioner.
CASTILEX filed an appeal stating that it should be the fourth paragraph
and not fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied, (2) and
Abad was not working within scope of his assigned task when the collision
happened.
Respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their son's death was caused by
the negligence of petitioner's employee who was driving a vehicle issued by
petitioner and who was on his way home from overtime work for petitioner;
and that petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent
death of their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180.
Issue:
WON Plaintiff is vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death
caused by Abad?
Ruling:
No, plaintiff is not vicariously liable with Abad, since there is paucity of
evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted
to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service
vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that the petitioner be relieved of
20
vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in
driving its vehicle.
Case No. 30
Jose vs. CA ( G.R. Nos. 118441-42, January, 18, 2000)
Pallera, Andrea Nicole C.
Facts: ​On February 22, 1985, Bus 203 driven by petitioner Armando Jose,
collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo. As a result of the
collision, the left side of the Ford Escort’s hood was severely damaged
while its driver and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel
Abraham, were seriously injured. Macarubo, despite being taken to hospital,
died after he underwent a surgery. Abraham, on the other hand, became
blind on the left eye which had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a
fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the face, which caused
him to be hospitalized for a week.
Consequently, the respondent, represented by his father, Felixberto,
instituted a civil case for damages against petitioners MCL and Armando
Jose in the RTC. Likewise, the spouses Macarubo, parents of the deceased
John Macarubo, filed their own suit for damages in the same trial court. On
the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita
Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John
Macarubo was negligent and that he was the “authorized driver” of Juanita
Macarubo. The latter, in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against
MCL for the damage to her car. The trial court rendered judgment
dismissing both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its
third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo. The Court of Appeals
rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not Armando Jose and Manila Central Bus Lines are
liable for quasi-delict.
Ruling: ​No. It is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually
formed part of the law itself, that the negligence of the employee gives rise
to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. Before the
presumption of the employer’s negligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be
established. While the allegations of negligence against the employee and
that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make
out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the failure to
prove the employee’s negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the
employer’s vicarious liability. In this case, private respondents failed to
prove their allegation of negligence against driver Armando Jose who, in
fact, was acquitted in the case for criminal negligence arising from the same
incident. MCL failed to present any evidence to prove that Juanita
Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo or that she is in any way
liable for John Macarubo’s negligence under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
For failure to discharge its burden, MCL’s third-party complaint should be
dismissed. Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the
complaints filed against MCL and Armando Jose, as well as the third-party
complaint filed against Juanita Macarubo, are dismissed.
Case Number: 31
Case No. 32
Delsan Transport Lines vs C&A Construction
G.R. No. 156034
Salliman, Jimael Salam D.
Facts: ​Respondent C&A Construction constructed a deflector wall for NHA
at the Vitas reclamation area in Tondo, Manila. Petitioner Delsan Transport
Lines owned and operated ship M/V Delsan Express which anchored at the
Navotas Fish Port for the pur pose of installing a cargo pump and clearing
its oil tank. At around midnight, Captain Jusep of said ship received a report
that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about 8 hours. The morning after,
the captain tried to seek shelter in North Harbor but could not because of
congestion. He then decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of the Vitas area.
21
To avoid collision with a nearby power barge, the captain ordered a full stop
of the vessel. He succeeded in avoiding collision, but when the engine was
re-started, the ship hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent.
Respondent filed complaint for damages with the RTC of Manila. In its
answer, petitioner raised the defense of fortuitous event. The trial court
dismissed the case on ground of doctrine of emergency rule. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed and held the captain and petitioner guilty and
solidarily liable.
Issue: ​Whether or not the captain and petitioner are solidarily liable.
Held: ​YES. In previous jurisprudence, the Court has held that in relation to
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, the test for determining the existence
of negligence in a particular case is: did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. In this case, when he ignored the weather report
notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, the captain showed an
inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person
would have observed in the same situation. Had he moved the vessel earlier,
he could have had greater chances of seeking refuge in other ports.
Moreover, Article 2180 of the New Civil Code provides that the obligation
imposed in Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Such
responsibility shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Therefore, to avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee,
an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing
proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employee. In previous jurisprudence,
the court has held that due diligence in supervision requires the formulation
of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of
proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of
compliance with such rules. In this case, petitioner was only able to raise
the defense that it exercised due diligence in the selection of the captain
because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. However,
petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated guidelines for the proper
performance of functions of its employees and that it monitored compliance
therewith.
Case Number: 33
Case Number: 34
Case No. 35.
Spouses Hernandez v. Dolor
G.R. No. 160286, July 30, 2004
Santos, Juan Carlo
FACTS:
Lorenzo Dolor was driving an owner-type jeepney towards Anilao
Batangas. On the way there, he figured in an accident with a passenger
jeepney driven by Juan Gonzales which is owned by the spouses
Hernandez. Dolor and his passenger died. The rest of the passengers for
both the owner type jeepney and the passenger jeepney suffered physical
injuries.
Spouses Dolor, the parents of Lorenzo, instituted an action for damages
against Juan Gonzales for negligence and lack of care and as well as the
spouses Hernandez for negligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
Spouses Hernandez argues that they are not liable since the proximate cause
of the death and injuries was the recklessness of the deceased Lorenzo
Boyet, alleging that he was driving under the influence. Furthermore, it was
argued that Juan Gonzales is not an employee but only a lessee to the
passenger jeepney on a daily basis. Lastly, it was argued that assuming that
an employer-employee relationship existed, the spouses Hernandez argued
22
that they are not liable since they exercised due care in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
During the trial of the case, it was established that the owner type jeepney,
the one being driven by Dolor, was travelling uphill at a moderate speed,
while the passenger jeepney was travelling downhill at an accelerated
speed. It was further established that Juan Gonzales was only able to get his
professional driver’s license 3 months prior to the accident. He only had a
student permit before.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Dolor and the passengers awarding
actual, necessary, funeral, litigation expenses and as well as moral damages.
The CA affirmed the ruling but modified the award for damages, actual, and
litigation expenses. (Actual damages decreased, moral damages increased)
ISSUE:
W/N Spouses Hernandez are solidarily liable with Juan Gonzales despite
the former not being in the passenger jeepney with the latter during the time
of the accident?
HELD
YES. The Hernandez spouses argue that since they were not inside the
jeepney at the time of the collision, the provisions of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code should be applied.
Article 2180 provides:
xx
“Employers shall be laible for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.”
xx
While the provisions of law do not expressly provide for solidary liability,
the same can be inferred from the wording of the first paragraph of Article
2180 which states that the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
Article 2180 should also be read with Article 2194 of the same code, which
categorically states that the responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for quasi-delict is solidary. In other words, the liability of joint
tortfeasors is solidary. Verily, under Article 2180, an employer may be held
solidarily liable for the negligence act of the employee.
Case 36
G.R. No. 82248 January 30, 1992
Serquiña, Mary Jashmin G.
Facts: Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate
No. NPA-930. At around 2 o'clock in the morning of May 11, 1982, while
being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on
Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole
severely damaged. Meralco subsequently demanded reparation from
Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging ​inter ​alia that he was
liable to it in the sum of P17,352.00 plus attorney's fees and litigation costs
as the employer of Nestor Martin. the defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that no evidence had been adduced to show that
Nestor Martin was his employee. The motion was dismissed and the court
ruled in favor of the MERALCO. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of
RTC. Hence, this petition or review.
Issues: WON Ernesto Martin should be held liable for damages caused by
Nestor Martin who the plaintiff alleges to be his employee
Held: NO. He should not be liable. Art 2180 of the Civil Code only applies
if there is an empoley-employee relationship. Once established, the plaintiff
must show that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the tort was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as
23
employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee as allowed in that article. In
the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to
show that the defendant was the employer of Nestor Martin at the time of
the accident. The ownership of the car and the circumstance sof the
accident, are not enough bases for the inference that the petitioner is the
employer of Nestor Martin.
Case No. 37
Filamer Christian Institute vs. CA and Kapunan
G.R. No. 75112, October 16, 1990
Suerte, Althea M.
FACTS​: Potenciano Kapunan, 82 yrs. old and a retired schoolteacher, was
struck by a jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by Funtecha.
Kapunan suffered multiple injuries and was hospitalized for 20 days.
Evidence showed that, during the accident, the jeep only had one headlight
functioning and that Funtecha only had a student driver’s permit. Kapunan
instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone and reserved his right to
file an independent civil action. Lower court and CFI found Funtecha
guilty. Kapunan then commenced a civil case for damages before the RTC
against Filamer, Funtecha, and Agustin Masa (director and president of
Filamer Christian Institute). Allan Masa, who was with Funtecha at the time
of the accident, was not impleaded. RTC found Filamer, Funtecha and Allan
guilty. CA affirmed RTC’s decision in toto. Filamer contends that it cannot
be held responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha since there is no existing
employer-employee relationship between them.
ISSUE​: W/N the term “employer” as used in Article 2180 is applicable to
Filamer with reference to Funtecha?
HELD​: NO.
Petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha’s employer since the
latter belongs to that special category of students who render service to the
school in exchange for free tuition. The wording of Section 14, Rule X of
Book III of the Labor Code explicitly provides that there is no
employer-employee relationship in such case. To dismiss the implementing
rule as one which governs only “personal relationships” between the school
and its students and not where there is a third person involved is to read into
the law something that was not legislated there in the first place. However,
even assuming arguendo that Funtecha is an employee, the primary
responsibility still cannot be imputed to Filamer for the reason that at the
time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not
acting within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep
the school passages, not drive the jeep. It should be fair, therefore, that
Funtecha bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. Article 2180 would
have been the proper remedy if the case was proceeded against Allan Masa,
the authorized driver and employee of Filamer. But the same still would not
be binding against him since he was not impleaded in the complaint for
damages.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992
FACTS: ​Respondents Kapunan and RTC Judge Enrique Suplico sought
reconsideration of the decision of the Court in Filamer Chriatina Institute v.
CA (October 16, 1990 Decision), seeking a review on employer-employee
relationship between Filamer and Funtecha. Respondents assert that the
circumstances obtaining in the present case call for the application of
Article 2180 since Funtecha was no doubt an employee of Filamer and was
performing an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the
petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a
joy ride without the knowledge of the school authorities.
ISSUE: ​W/N the term “employer” as used in Article 2180 is applicable to
Filamer with reference to Funtecha. [same issue]
24
HELD: YES. The Court has reconsidered its decision. The clause “within
the scope of their assigned tasks” for purposes of raising the presumption of
liability of an employer includes any act done by an employee in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if
somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the
act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined
by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of
the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master’s business.
It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time
janitor and scholar of Filamer. Driving the jeep to and from the house of the
school president where both Allan Masa and Funtecha reside was an act in
furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan’s job demands that
he drive the jeep home so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of
the next school day. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home
in the direction of Allan’s house, Funtecha definitely was not having a
joyride but ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended by
Filamer.
Rule X of the Labor Code is merely a guide for the enforcement of
substantive law on labor and is not the decisive law in a civil suit for
damages. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as
a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Case No. 38
Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. CA
GR. 116617, November 16, 1998
Sy, Julius Victor
Facts: ​MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro
Manila area and Musa was its driver. The spouses Rosales were parents of
Liza Rosalie, a third-year high school student at the University of the
Philippines Integrated School. At around a quarter past one in the afternoon
of August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27, which was driven by Musa, hit Liza
Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. An eye
witness said the girl was already near the center of the street when the bus,
then bound for the south, hit her. She fell to the ground upon impact, rolled
between the two front wheels of the bus, and was run over by the left rear
tires thereof. Her body was dragged several meters away from the point of
impact. Liza Rosalie was taken to the Philippine Heart Center, but efforts
to revive her proved futile. Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. However, for the civil liability, Souses
Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC,
Musa, MMTC Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). They subsequently amended
their complaint to include Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher of the MMTC,
as a defendant therein. To free themselves from liability, petitioners
attempted to prove that it exercise diligentissimi patris familias in the
selcetion and supervision of employees through oral evidence. The RTC
ruled in favor of Spouses Rosales, but made MMTC primarily liable and
Musa secondarily liable.
Issue:​ Whether or not MMTC is solidarily liable with Musa.
Ruling: Yes!Petitioner’s attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias
in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must
fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or
documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the
testimony. Although, MMTC submitted brochures and programs of
seminars for prospective employees on vehicle maintenance, traffic
regulations, and driving skills and claimed that applicants are given tests to
determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision, there is no
record that Musa attended such training programs and passed the said
examinations before he was employed. No proof was presented that Musa
did not have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of daily
inspections, allegedly conducted by supervisors, ever presented. The failure
of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other
documentary proof tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence
25
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers
and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial court and the
opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.
As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence
of its employee in view of Art. 2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover
from its employee what it may pay. This does not make the employee’s
liability subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for damages is
satisfied by the common carrier, the latter has a right to recover what it has
paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave
rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Hence, the spouses Rosales have the
option of enforcing the judgment against either MMTC or Musa.
Case No. 39
FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., vs. AGO
MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN
COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, (AMEC-BCCM) and ANGELITA F.
AGO
GR No. 141994, January 17, 2005
Tibajia, Mary Joyce A.
FACTS: "Exposé" is a radio documentary program hosted by Rima and
Alegre. Exposé is aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by
Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. ("FBNI"). In the morning of 14 and 15
December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from
students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational
Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine ("AMEC") and its
administrators. During the broadcast, Rima and Alegre’s made remarks
such as "greed for money on the part of AMEC’s administrators"; "AMEC
is a dumping ground, garbage of xxx moral and physical misfits"; and
AMEC students who graduate "will be liabilities rather than assets" of the
society.
Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Ago, as Dean of
AMEC’s College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI,
Rima and Alegre.
The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution.
With the supposed exposés, FBNI, Rima and Alegre "transmitted malicious
imputations, and as such, destroyed plaintiffs’ (AMEC and Ago)
reputation." AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for allegedly
failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly Rima and Alegre.
The trial court rendered a Decision finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel
except Rima. The trial court held that the broadcasts are libelous ​per se and
rejected the broadcasters’ claim that their utterances were the result of
straight reporting because it had no factual basis. The broadcasters did not
even verify their reports before airing them to show good faith. In holding
FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Defendants
Alegre and FBNI, are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay plaintiff
Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine
(AMEC-BCCM) the amount of ₱300,000.00 moral damages, plus
₱30,000.00 reimbursement of attorney’s fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s judgment with modification. The appellate
court made Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. The appellate
court denied Ago’s claim for damages and attorney’s fees because the
broadcasts were directed against AMEC, and not against her.
Issues: ​I. WHETHER THE BROADCASTS ARE LIBELOUS (YES) II.
WHETHER AMEC IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES (YES); III.
WHETHER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES IS PROPER (NO)
RULING:
I. Yes. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act or omission, condition, status, or
26
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
There is no question that the broadcasts were made public and imputed to
AMEC defects or circumstances tending to cause it dishonor, discredit and
contempt. Taken as a whole, the broadcasts suggest that AMEC is a
money-making institution where physically and morally unfit teachers
abound.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious. Rima and Alegre
failed to show adequately their good intention and justifiable motive in
airing the supposed gripes of the students. As hosts of a documentary or
public affairs program, Rima and Alegre should have presented the public
issues "free from ​inaccurate and misleading information." Hearing the
students’ alleged complaints a month before the exposé, they had sufficient
time to verify their sources and information. However, Rima and Alegre
hardly made a thorough investigation of the students’ alleged gripes.
Neither did they inquire about nor confirm the purported irregularities in
AMEC from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Alegre
testified that he merely went to AMEC to verify his report from an alleged
AMEC official who refused to disclose any information. Alegre simply
relied on the words of the students "because they were many and not
because there is proof that what they are saying is true." This plainly shows
Rima and Alegre’s reckless disregard of whether their report was true or
not.
Rima and Alegre cannot invoke the privilege of neutral reportage because
unfounded comments abound in the broadcasts. Moreover, there is no
existing controversy involving AMEC when the broadcasts were made. The
privilege of neutral reportage applies where the defamed person is a public
figure who is involved in an existing controversy, and a party to that
controversy makes the defamatory statement.
Had the comments been an expression of opinion based on established facts,
it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts. However, the comments of Rima and
Alegre were not backed up by facts. Therefore, the broadcasts are not
privileged and remain libelous ​per se.
The broadcasts also violate the Radio Code for failing to present public
issues free from ​personal bias, prejudice and ​inaccurate and misleading
information​. x x x
II. Yes. AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article
2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of
moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical
person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly
complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral
damages.
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous ​per se,​ the law implies damages.
In such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or
reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. Neither
in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual
damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. In this
case, the broadcasts are libelous ​per se​. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral
damages.
III.No. The award of attorney’s fees is not proper because AMEC failed to
justify satisfactorily its claim for attorney’s fees. AMEC did not adduce
evidence to warrant the award of attorney’s fees. Moreover, both the trial
and appellate courts failed to explicitly state in their respective decisions the
rationale for the award of attorney’s fees. ​The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual,
legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a
conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture​. In all events, the court must explicitly state in
the text of the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the
legal reason for the award of attorney’s fees.
27
WHEREFORE​, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Decision
of 4 January 1999 and Resolution of 26 January 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40151 with the MODIFICATION that the
award of moral damages is reduced from ₱300,000 to ₱150,000 and the
award of attorney’s fees is deleted. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 40
Estacion v. Bernardo
G.R No. 144723, Feb. 27, 2006
Tolentino, Ma. Micaela G.
FACTS:
In the afternoon of October 16, 1982, respondent Noe was going home to
Dumaguete from Cebu, via Bato and Tampi. At Tampi, he boarded a Ford
Fiera passenger jeepney with plate no. NLD 720 driven by respondent
Geminiano Quinquillera (Quinquillera), owned by respondent Cecilia
Bandoquillo (Bandoquillo), and was seated on the extension seat placed at
the center of the Fiera. From San Jose, an old woman wanted to ride, so
respondent Noe offered his seat. Since the Fiera was already full,
respondent Noe hung or stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle.
Somewhere along Barangay Sto. Niño, San Jose, Negros Oriental, between
kilometers 13 and 14, the Fiera began to slow down and then stopped by the
right shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo
truck, owned by petitioner and driven by Gerosano, which was traveling in
the same direction, hit the rear end portion of the Fiera where respondent
Noe was standing. Due to the tremendous force, the cargo truck smashed
respondent Noe against the Fiera crushing his legs and feet which made him
fall to the ground. A passing vehicle brought him to the Silliman University
Medical Center where his lower left leg was amputated. Police investigation
reports showed that respondent Noe was one of the 11 passengers of the
Fiera who suffered injuries; that when the Fiera stopped to pick up a
passenger, the cargo truck bumped the rear left portion of the Fiera; that
only one tire mark from the front right wheel of the cargo truck was seen on
the road. A sketch of the accident was drawn by investigator Mateo Rubia
showing the relative positions of the two vehicles, their distances from the
shoulder of the road and the skid marks of the right front wheel of the truck
measuring about 48 feet. Respondent Noe, through his guardian ad litem
Arlie Bernardo, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a complaint for
damages arising from quasi delict against petitioner as the registered owner
of the cargo truck and his driver Gerosano.
ISSUE:
Whether Respondent Noe was guilty of contributory negligence?
HELD:
YES. NOE IS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE BY
STANDING AT THE REAR PORTION OF THE JEEP. Contributory
Negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection. Noe’s act of
standing on the left rear portion showed his lack of ordinary care and
foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. To
hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or
signs of an impending danger to health and body. Quinquillera (The jeepney
driver) was also negligent because there was overloading which is in
violation of traffic rules and regulations. He also allowed the respondent to
stand on the left rear of his jeep.
Case No. 41
Mercury Drug v. Spouses Huang
G.R. No. 172122, June 22, 2007
Violeta, Olivia Althea E.
FACTS: ​Petitioner is the owner of a six-wheeler truck driven by dela Rosa,
which collided with a Toyota Corolla owned by herein respondents, which,
at that time, was being driven by the latter’s son, Stephen Huang. When the
28
vehicles collided along the stretch of C5, the petitioner’s truck was
allegedly on the lane immediately beside Huang’s vehicle, which was
cruising along the innermost left lane of the road. Upon the impact,
respondent Huang’s vehicle was tossed to the opposite lane following a
series of events, including its bumping into a lamp post and its consequent
crossing over the island. Petitioner’s vehicle, which is obviously much
heavier, was likewise tossed along the same direction, eventually stopping
at the opposite side of the road. It was found that the petitioner's driver was
then driving without a license, having been apprehended earlier for reckless
driving.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not petitioners are liable
HELD: ​Yes. Petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee when it allowed dela Rosa to drive petitioner’s
truck despite having been apprehended for reckless driving prior to the
incident.
Case # 42
Merritt vs Government of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916
Justine Vitorillo
FACTS:
Merritt was riding on a motorcycle towards the western part of Calle Padre
Faura at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour. Upon crossing Taft Avenue
and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets,
the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of
turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be
on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the
Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before
reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without
having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck Merritt,
who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place
there. As a result, Merritt was so severely injured. By authority of the
United States, Act 2457 was enacted, authorizing the Merritt to bring suit
against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said court.
ISSUE:
 Ruling:
Whether or not the Government is legally liable
HELD:
No, the Government is not liable. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable
when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is
an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility
performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his
office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
Government is not liable.
Case # 43
Mendoza v. De Leon
G.R. No. L-9596, February 11, 1916
Ablao, Ada Nadeen D.
Facts:
Plaintiff Mendoza filed an action for damages against the individual
members of the municipal council of the municipality of Pangasinan for the
revocation of the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to the
plaintiff. After use of a little more than one year, the plaintiff was forcibly
ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted by the herein
defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.
Issue:
29
W/N the members of the municipal council may be held liable for damages
sustained by plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry
privilege - Yes
Generally, a municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents in
the performance of its governmental functions. And the state being immune
for injuries suffered by private individuals in the administration of strictly
governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the municipality in the
performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute.
However, a municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent
performance of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the
administration of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private
corporation or individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or
in tort is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and
damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents
within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to
the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals.
In administering the patrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal
council occupies, for most purposes, the position of a board of directors of a
private corporation. In disposing of the local public utilities, if the term may
be used, such as the fishing and ferry rights, etc., they must exercise
considerable judgment
In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence that there was any
justifiable reason for forcibly evicting the plaintiff from the ferry which he
had leased.
Therefore, the defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages
sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the
ferry privilege in question.
Case #44
Palisoc v. Brillantes
G.R. No. L-29025, October 4, 1971
Agcopra, Ronna Mae C.
Facts:
The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio Daffon were
classmates in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute.
One afternoon, Dominador, Virgilio and Desiderio Cruz were together in
the laboratory room while the classes were in recess.
Desiderio and Virgilio were working on a machine while Dominador was
merely looking at them. The defendant made a remark that the deceased
was acting like a foreman which led the deceased to slap the defendant
slightly on his face.
In retaliation, the defendant gave the deceased a strong flat blow on the face
which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. This led to a fist
fight until Dominador became pale and fainted.
First aid was administered to him but he was not revived so he was
immediately taken to the hospital. Yet, he never regained consciousness
then he died.
The trial court absolved from liability the officials of the Manila Technical
Institute for the situation contemplated by Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code is where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school
establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those
of the parents. Since there was no evidence of such, the officials are not
responsible for the tort of the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in absolving the officials of the Manila
Technical Institute instead of holding them solidarily liable with the
defendant.
30
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school
officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180,
Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants who
are officials of the school."
The words “So long as the students remain in their custody” means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over their pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time.
Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of
the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the
quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon. Here, the parents of the student at
fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age
at the time of the tragic incident. Moreover, no liability attaches to the
defendant Brillantes since he was a mere member of the school's board of
directors. Furthermore, the school itself cannot be held similarly liable,
since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant.
Case #45
Amadora v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
Albotra, Angela
FACTS: ​Alfredo Amadora was a 17-year old graduating student of Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletes. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the
auditorium of the school, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun and killed
Alfredo. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. The
parents filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon
and two other students, through their respective parents. The Court of First
Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the
sum of P294,984.00. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the
decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved on
the ground that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody
of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended,
that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and that in any event
the defendants had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the
injury. The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then
under the custody of the private respondents. The private respondents
submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of
submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody
because the semester had already ended.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are
technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the
offending student is supposed to be "in its custody." YES.
2. Whether or not such responsibility is co-extensive with the period
when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school
term? NO.
3. Whether the school can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code? NO.
HELD:
1. The provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Teachers in general shall be liable for the
acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature,
in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. The
same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students
31
under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching.
2. The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he
is under the control and influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already
ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of
a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues.
3. The liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on
the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be
held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head
thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then
it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised
the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
The Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable
under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort
committed by any of the other private respondents for none of
them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the
offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties
in connection with such custody.
CASE #46
BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION vs.
IAC, et al.
G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988
(ALVAREZ, Maria Arielle Samantha)
FACTS:
● Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) has an ROTC unit under the
fifth control of the AFP with an office and armory in the main
 building basement. Jimmy Abon was a commerce student in BCF
and the duly appointed armorer in BFC ROTC Unit, and he
receives orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos.
● On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of
BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the
University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former
took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result,
Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and
convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No.
30, AFP.
● Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages,
impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC
Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the
Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF),
Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and
Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation
Inc. as party defendants.
● The Trial Court sentenced defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin
Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and
severally, to pay private respondents. Respondent Court herein
affirmed the said decision upon appeal.
● This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of
the decision of IAC which held, among others, petitioners
solidarily hable with Jimmy B. Abon, under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy
B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a
consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon
HELD: NO, the Court held that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to
have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he
shot Napoleon Castro. The rationale of the law is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in
loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the [student]”, as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. Thus, a student not "at
attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess". The mere fact of being
enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not
constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory
32
custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law. Therefore, petitioners
cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
Case no. 47
Mercado vs C.A
GR No. L- 14342, May 30, 1960
Basaran, Mariel F.
Facts: ​Manuel Quisimbing, Jr., son of private respondents was the
classmate of Augusto Mercado in the Lourdes School of Kanlaon, Q.C. A
fight ensued between Manuel and Augusto because of a “pitogo”, an empty
nutshell used by children as a coin bank. The said coin bank was lent
several times. As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel Jr. on the right cheek
with a razor. Private respondents went to court asking for moral damages on
account of a) the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado (2,000) , and b)
moral damages due to the mental anguish of seeing their son wounded
(3,000). Although originally dismissed by the CFI of Manila, on appeal,
judgment was rendered in favor of respondents, ordering the petitioner to
pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 as medical expenses. Petitioner
argues that since the infliction of the wound occurred in a Catholic School
(during recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the
teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the latter.
ISSUE: : ​To whom does responsibility over the child’s actions pass to, the
teacher or the parent?
HELD: ​Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which provides that "teachers
or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody", applies to an institution of arts and traders and not to any
academic institution and contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the
pupil supersede those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or
influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the
father and mother to the teacher, and so would the responsibility for the
torts of the pupil.
Case Number: 48
Case Number: 49
Case No. 50
Afialda v. Hisole G.R. No. L-2075 November 29, 1949
Cantolino, Jericho Art
Facts:
Deceased Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as
caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947,
while he was tending the animals, he was gored by one of them and
consequently died of his injuries. Thus, herein appellant, Loreto’s elder
sister who depended on him for support, filed the action for damages. The
complaint was dismissed by the trial court upon granting a motion to
dismiss filed by spouses Hisole. Subsequently, the plaintiff had taken the
present appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not defendants may be held liable for damages when damage is
caused to the animal’s caretaker.
Held:
Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is
answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage
caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he
had been negligent or at fault under Article 1902 of the same code. In the
case at hand, the animal was in custody and under the control of the
caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Thus, it was his business to
try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. Being injured by the animal under those circumstances,
was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed
33
and for which he must take the consequences. Deceased does not fall within
the ambit of “stranger”, which is significant for the claim for damages under
the said article.
Moreover, under the said circumstances, the action should not come under
Article 1905 of the Civil Code but under the labor laws, i.e. Workmen’s
Compensation Act. The complaint contained no allegation as to constitute
liability under the Civil Code nor the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Hence, it alleges no cause of action.
The order appealed from was affirmed.
Case No. 51
Purita Miranda Vestil and Agustin Vestil, vs. IAC, DDavid Uy and
Teresita Uy [G.R. No. 74431. November 6, 1989]
Carrasco, John Mark C.
Facts:
On July 29, 1975, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing
with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda,
the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was
rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple
lacerated wounds on the forehead" and administered an anti-rabies
vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but
was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The
following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death
was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils
were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and
eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting
that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame
animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After
trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint.
The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was
appealed. It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the
dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for
the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a
result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted
by the appellees.
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the
owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet
been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the
logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be
held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of
Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point.
Issue:
Whether or not the Vestils are liable for damages.
Ruling:
YES. What must be determined is the ​possession of the dog that
admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the
ownership of the dog or of the house. ​Article 2183 reads as follows: The
possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or
be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should
come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
While it is true that Purita Vestil is not really the owner of the house,
which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she
and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical
person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from
her own house. Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her
family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at
34
least one witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly,
her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little
girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after
the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in
question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to
assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she
knew them only casually.
The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of
the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of
death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a
symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia
broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a
complication of rabies.
On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link
between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been
satisfactorily established.
The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame
ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the
petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she
was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done
to the animal.​ LexLib
Case No. 52
Chapman v. Underwood
G.R. No. 9010, March 28, 1914
Cecilia, Joyce Marie D.
FACTS: At the time the accident occurred, which is the basis of this action,
there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran, with
occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other. One of these
switches was located at the scene of the accident.
The plaintiff had been visiting his friend, Creveling, in front of whose
house the accident happened. He desired to board a certain "San
Marcelino" car coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being told
by Creveling that the car was approaching, he immediately, and
somewhat hurriedly, passed from the gate into the street for the purpose
of signaling and boarding the car. Plaintiff attempted to board the front
platform but, seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion,
stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it
to come abreast of him in order to board. While in this position he was
struck from behind and run over by the defendant's automobile.
The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and
bound in an opposite direction to that in which defendant was going.
When the front of the "San Marcelino" car, the one the plaintiff attempted
to board, was almost in front of defendant's automobile, defendant's
driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff, as
above described. The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.
ISSUE: ​W/N defendant’s driver was guilty of negligence.
HELD: YES. A careful examination of the record leads us to the
conclusion that defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running
upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car upon the
wrong side. The plaintiff, in coming out to board the car, was not obliged
for his own protection, to observe whether a car was coming upon him
from his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the
right. He knew that, according to the law of the road, no automobile or
other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the car.
He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the
only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car.
The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his
driver, under the facts and circumstances of this case. In the case before
us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile
took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient
time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of
his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between
the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the
accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the
negligence of the driver.
35
Case No. 53
First Malayan Leasing vs. CA (GR No 91378, June 9, 1992)
Cortez, Charisse Iva R.
Facts: ​Crisostomo B. Vitug filed Civil Case against the defendant First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC), to recover damages
for physical injuries, loss of personal effects, and the wreck of his car as a
result of a three-vehicle collision involving his car, another car, and an
Isuzu cargo truck registered in the name of FMLFC and driven by one
Crispin Sicat.
The evidence shows that while Vitug's car was at a full stop in Cubao,
Quezon City, the on-coming Isuzu cargo truck bumped, a Ford Granada car
behind him with such force that the Ford car was thrown on top of Vitug's
car crushing its roof. The cargo truck thereafter struck Vitug's car in the rear
causing the gas tank to explode and setting the car ablaze. Vitug was
fortunately extricated from his car before the vehicle exploded. However,
two of his passengers were burned to death. Vitug's car, valued at P70,000,
was a total loss. When he regained consciousness in the hospital, Vitug
discovered that he had lost various personal articles valued at P48,950,
namely a necklace with a diamond pendant, a GP watch, a pair of Christian
Dior eyeglasses, a gold Cross pen and a pair of Bally shoes. Vitug also
suffered injuries producing recurring pains in his neck and back. He
received further medical treatment in the United States which cost him
US$2,373.64 for his first trip, and US$5,596.64 for the second.
At the time of the accident on December 14, 1983, the Isuzu cargo truck
was registered in the name of the First Malayan Leasing and Finance
Corporation. However, FMLFC denied any liability, alleging that it was not
the owner of the truck neither the employer of the driver Crispin Sicat,
because it had sold the truck to Vicente Trinidad on September 24. 1980.
FMLFC's filed a third-party complaint against Trinidad and admitted the
third-party complaint filed therewith.
Issue:​ WON FMLFC is liable.
Held: YES. This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who the
actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the registered owner is the
operator of the same with respect to the public and third persons, and as
such, directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its
operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the
employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered
merely as his agent. In order for a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle
to be valid against third persons. it must be recorded in the Land
Transportation Office. For, although valid between the parties, the sale
cannot affect third persons who rely on the public registration of the motor
vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. In law, FMLFC was the
owner and operator of the Izusu cargo truck, hence, fully liable to third
parties injured by its operation due to the fault or negligence of the driver
thereof.
Case No. 54
Manlangit v. Judge Urgel; A.M. No. MTJ-95-1028; 4 December 1995
Dawis, Bianca Denise D.
FACTS: Reynato Manlangit is the owner and operator of a passenger
jeepney. On 13 August 1994, the jeepney, driven by Edgardo Castillo, piled
its usual route going to Virac, Catanduanes. While approaching a blind
curve, Castillo occupied the wrong lane. At the curve, they suddenly saw a
parked dump truck. But then, it was too late to avoid the collision with the
truck. The jeepney then swerved to the right. Castillo and Manlangit
managed to jump off the jeepney before it plunged into the river. The
passengers were not so lucky and sustained some injuries. Consequently, a
criminal complaint for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed against Castillp and Manlangit. Judge Urgel then
issued a warrant of arrest for the two. Upon service of the warrant,
Manlangit filed a Motion to Drop him from the Criminal Complaint and
Quash the Warrant. Judge Urgel ruled favorably on his motion and issued
an Order dropping him from the criminal complaint. However, Manlangit
still charged that the erroneous issuance of the warrant of arrest caused him
and his family grave humiliation, undue embarrassment and anxiety. He
36
prayed that appropriate disciplinary and administrative action be taken
against Judge Urgel for gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUE: ​Whether Manlangit should have been issued a warrant of arrest.
RULING: NO. ​In cases of employer-employee relations, an employer is
not criminally liable for the criminal acts of his employee or agent unless
he, in some way, participates in, counsels or abets his employee's acts or
omissions. In such a case, the employer himself becomes a participant to the
criminal act of his employee. His liability under the circumstances is direct
and criminal. However, under Article 102, in relation to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, 9 the employer's liability for the criminal negligence
of his employee is subsidiary in nature and is limited only to civil
indemnity. Thus, an employer is party to a criminal case for the criminal
negligence of his employee only by reason of his subsidiary civil liability
under the law.
In the case at bar, nowhere does it show that Manlangit participated in,
abetted or even approved the negligent and reckless manner in which his
driver maneuvered the vehicle on that blind curve. Moreover, it does not
appear that his driver continuously pursued a reckless and thoughtless
control of the wheel throughout the journey, with nary an admonition or
reproof on the part Manlangit. It is evident that the driver's decision to go on
the wrong lane while approaching a blind curve was a split second judgment
which left neither the Manlangit nor any of the passengers time to react to
the perilous maneuver.
Case No. 55
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION v. CA (G.R. No. 118889. March
23, 1998)
FACTS:
At around 3AM of 21 April 1987, two vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt
Lancers, cruising northward along EDSA, Mandaluyong City, figured in a
traffic accident. The car owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the
outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car,
owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by
Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle.
Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR
swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time
Dahl- Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver's license.
Petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its insurance contract
with Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way of subrogation, it sued
Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune
Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict
before the RTC of Makati City.
Summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at
his given address, and upon motion of petitioner he was dropped from the
complaint. The RTC dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to
substantiate its claim of subrogation. CA affirmed the ruling but on another
ground (only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved
but not that of FILCAR.); that petitioner failed to establish its cause of
action for sum of money based on quasi-delict.
On appeal, petitioner insists that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable
for damages suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to
another based on the ruling in in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda.
de Caldo
ISSUE: Whether or not an action based on quasi-delict should prosper
against a rent-a-car company and, consequently, its insurer for fault or
negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle for damages
suffered by a third party
HELD​: The respondent court is correct in dismissing petitioner’s
complaint. Petition is denied.
37
NO. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: ​"Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict .​ . ."
To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant;
and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of
the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
Petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault
or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of
FILCAR. ​The damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about
by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle
that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was
solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the
other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any
participation therein.
Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances
mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent
FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the
car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between
them as employer and employee. ​Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way
be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not
being an employer of the latter.
The provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence
of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and
Dahl-Jensen. ​Clearly, ​petitioner has no cause of action against respondent
FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent
FORTUNE can neither prosper.
Petitioner cannot insist on MYC-Agro-Industrial case since it involved an
employer-employee relationship between the corporation and the negligent
driver, unlike in this case.
Case No. 56
Aguilar v. Commercial Savings Bank (G.R. No. 128705. June 21, 2001)
Deyto, Maria Alyssa
Facts: ​Petitioner Conrado Aguilar, Sr. is the father of Conrado Aguilar, Jr.,
the victim in a vehicular accident involving a Lancer car registered in the
name of respondent bank, but driven by co-respondent Ferdinand G. Borja.
At the trial, respondent bank admitted that the Lancer was registered in its
name at the time of the incident. Petitioner's counsel also showed that Borja
was negligent in driving the car.
RTC held defendants liable for Aguilar's death. CA reversed. It said that
before it can apply Art. 2180 on which private respondent anchored its
claim of the bank's negligence, petitioner must first establish that Borja
acted on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him by his
employer.
Issues: ​W/N respondent bank, as the Lancer's registered owner, is liable for
damages? Yes.
Held: ​"'One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is
identification of the vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident; and
another is that the knowledge that means of detection are always available
may act as a deterrent from lax observance of the law and of the rules of
conservative and safe operation. No responsible person or corporation could
be held liable for the most outrageous acts of negligence, if they should be
allowed to place a 'middleman' between them and the public, and escape
liability by the manner in which they recompense their servants."
38
It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the
public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the
interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries
caused on public highways.
If a registered owner were allowed to evade responsibility by proving who
the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion
with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same
to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to
respond financially for the damage or injury done.
The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory
were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by
disproving his ownership.
For as long as the respondent bank remained the registered owner of the car
involved in the vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability for
the death of petitioner's son.
Case # 57
Marcial T. Caedo, Juana Sangalang Caedo, and the minors, Ephraim
Caedo, Eileen Caedo, Rose Elaine Caedo, suing through their father,
Marcial T. Caedo, as guardian ad litem vs. Yu Khe Thai and Rafael
Bernardo
(G.R. No. L-20392 ; December 18, 1968)
Dolot, Paolo
Facts:
Marcial Caedo with his co-complainants, were driving along Highway 54
(now E. de los Santos Avenue) when Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael
Bernardo at the wheel, coming in from the opposite direction, collided with
their vehicle. Bernardo claimed that it was too late when he saw the
caretella in front of him. But according to Caedo, instead of slowing down
or stopping when he saw the caretella, Bernardo veered to the left in order
to pass, causing the car's right rear bumper to hit the caretella, wrenching it
off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane,
where it collided with their vehicle.
Plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of damages against the defendants with the
CFI of Rizal. The court ruled in favor of the complainants, holding
Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai, jointly and severally liable for actual, moral,
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Respondents appealed to
the CA which certified the case to the Supreme Court due to the total
amount of the plaintiff’s claim.
Issues:
(1) Who was responsible for the accident?
(2) If it was defendant Rafael Bernardo, whether or not Yu Khe Thai was
solidarily liable with him?
Held:
On the first issue, the court held that Rafael Bernardo was responsible for
the accident. It was held that Bernardo’s failure to notice the caretella until
it was too late was a clear indication of his negligence since the ​carretela
was provided with two lights which should have given him sufficient
warning to take the necessary precautions. Even if this was not the case, the
carretela should anyway have been visible to him from, as it must have
been visible because of his headlights.
On the second issue, the court ruled that the imputation of liability to Yu
Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, was an error. The court cited
Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have,
by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at
least twice within the next preceding two months.
It noted that if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of
the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have
prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. It further noted that
the basis of the master's liability in civil law is not ​respondent superior b​ ut
rather the relationship of ​paterfamilias​. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in
order to prevent injury or damage.
39
In the present case, the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had
been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed
by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years,
during which he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations.
Thus, no negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his
master.
Yu Khe Thai’s failure to see the carretela ​did not constitute negligence, for
he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that
distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass
the ​carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was
approaching from the opposite direction. There was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the
driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he
sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and
make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no
absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.
Case Number: 58
Case# 59
City of Manila vs. IAC
G.R. No. 71159. November 15, 1989
Fernandez, Erika Mae D.
Facts:
The widow and children of Late Vivencio Sto. Domingo filed an action for
damages against the City of Manila. Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and
was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto.
Domingo for 50 years. The wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart,
however from the receipt, no other document embodied such lease over the
lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years, the city certified the lot
as ready for exhumation. On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth
authorized the exhumation and removal of the remains of Vivencio and his
bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. The lot
was also leased to another lessee. During the next all souls day, the private
respondents were shocked to find out that Vivencio’s remains were
removed. Hence, this action for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by
its agents?
Ruling:
Yes. Under the doctrine of ​respondeat superior​, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra),
petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its
agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of lease.
The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City
of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not
meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases. When
subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the
lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.
Case No. 60
Bernardino Jimenez vs City of Manila
Gayed, Hadiya May, D.
Facts:
Petitioner was on his way home from the market when he stepped
on an uncovered whole on the street which could not be seen due to the
ankle deep rain water. This caused his left leg to be pierced by a 4-inch
rusty nail,despite the treatments he received he had to be rushed to the
hospital and be confined for 20 days due to high fever and a swollen leg.
After his hospital discharge, he had to walk around with crutches preventing
him from going to work, prompting him to hire a substitute.
40
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic
Integrated Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana Public
Market had been placed by virtue of a Management and Operating Contract.
The lower court decided in favor of respondents, on appeal, the
Intermediate Appellate Court held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable
for damages but absolved respondent City of Manila.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in not ruling
that respondent City of Manila should be jointly and severally liable with
Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner suffered.
RULING:
Yes, it appears evident that the City of Manila is likewise liable for
damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, respondent City having
retained control and supervision over the Sta. Ana Public Market and as
tort-feasor under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. Petitioner
had the right to assume that there were no holes in the passageways, and if
there were any, they would be adequately covered. Had the opening been
covered, the petitioner could not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of
the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered, the City is
therefore liable for the injury suffered by the petitioner. Respondent City of
Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation being joint tortfeasors, are
solidarily liable under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
Case Number: 61
Case No. 62
Torio v. Fontanilla
G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978
Lagasca, Raynante Jr. P.
FACTS: ​A fiesta led to the death of Fontanilla. The stage collapsed, killing
him in the process. The Municipality of Malasique, Pangasinan was sued as
a consequence.

ISSUE: ​Is the municipality liable? Yes.
RULING: ​The death was attributable to the negligence of the
municipality’s officers. They had the means to safely secure the stage but
did not do so. The municipality appointed a private entity in constructing
the stage. This does not absolve them.
Macaraeg was an agent.
This is a private action not a governmental action. The municipality will be
treated as a private corporation. The municipal councilors did not directly
participate in the construction, meaning they are not criminally liable.
Case Number: 63
Case No. 64
De Roy vs. CA
Limbo, Mary Christine M.
FACTS:
Firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal,
a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate
their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former
failed to do so. The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision
of RTC.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not petitioners should be held liable for the injuries
suffered and death of Marissa Bernal under Article 2190 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
41
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals was
correct in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under
Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a
building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs."
Petitioners’ argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring
shop and, therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded was
without merit, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been
applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable in the instant case.
Case Number: 65
Case #66
Nakpil & Sons vs. CA
Mandocdoc, Marc Renzo D.
Facts​:
Private respondents – Philippine Bar Association (PBA) – a
non-profit organization formed under the corporation law decided to put up
a building in Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the specifications of the
building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while United Construction was hired to
construct it. The proposal was approved by the Board of Directors and
signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building was completed in
1966.
In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which caused
the building heavy damage, which led the building to tilt forward, leading
the tenants to vacate the premises. United Construction took remedial
measures to sustain the building.
PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but
United Construction subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil and Sons,
alleging defects in the plans and specifications.

Issue:
WON an Act of God exempts from liability the parties who would
otherwise be due to negligence.
Held:
NO. The petitioner made significant deviations from the plans and
specifications, thereby failing to observe requisite workmanship standards
in the construction of the building while their architect drew plans that
contain defects and other inadequacies. Both the contractor and the architect
cannot escape liability for damages when the building collapsed due to an
earthquake when other buildings in the area withstood the earthquake.
Further, the lower court also found that the spirals in one of the columns on
the ground floor have been cut. One who creates a dangerous condition is
still liable even if an act of God may have intervened. As such, the liability
of the contractor and the architect for the collapse of the building is
solidary.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires
that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature
and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the
cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be
considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man,
whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God.
Case Number: 67
Case No. 68
Callanta vs. Carnation Ph. Inc.and NLRC G.R. No. 70615, October 28,
1986
FACTS:
42
Petitioner Virgilio Callanta was employed by private respondent Carnation
Philippines Inc.as a salesman in January 1974. Five years later or on June 1,
1979 respondent filed with the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor and
Employment an application for clearance to terminate the employment of
Callanta on the alleged ground of serious misconduct and misappropriation
of company funds. MOLE Regional Director Baterbonia approved the
clearance application and petitioner’s employment with Carnation was
terminated effective June 1, 1979. On July 5, 1982, Virgilio Callanta filed
with the MOLE, a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for
reinstatement, backwages, and damages against respondent Carnation. In its
position paper, respondent Carnation put in issue the timeliness of
petitioner's complaint alleging that the same is barred by prescription for
having been filed more than 3 years after the date of Callanta's dismissal.
Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos rendered a decision finding the termination
of Callanta's employment to be without valid cause. Respondent Carnation
appealed to respondent NLRC which set side the decision of the LA. It
declared the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Callanta to have already
prescribed.
ISSUE: ​whether or not an action for illegal dismissal prescribes in three
years pursuant to Articles 291 and 292 of the Labor Code.
HELD:
NO. ​Indeed there is merit in the contention of petitioner that the
four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code,
applies by way of supplement, in the instant case. Verily, the dismissal
without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a
violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations.
Such violation, however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood
under Article 291 of the Labor Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an
illegal act which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law, but
which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for
the punishment of a crime. When one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of
his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of
one's dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action
predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff", as contemplated
under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four
[4] years.
Case No. 69
Allied Bank vs. CA G.R. No. 85868. October 13, 1989
FACTS ​Private respondent Joselito Z. Yujuico obtained a loan from the
General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) in the amount of Five
Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00), payable on or before April 1,
1977. As evidence thereof, private respondent issued a corresponding
promissory note in favor of GENBANK. At the time private respondent
incurred the obligation, he was then a ranking officer of GENBANK and a
member of the family owning the controlling interest in the said bank. On
March 25,1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution
No. 675 forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Philippines.
This was followed by Resolution No. 677 issued by the Monetary Board on
March 29, 1977 ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. It appears that in a
Memorandum of Agreement dated May 9, 1977 executed by and between
Allied Banking Corporation (ALLIED) and Arnulfo Aurellano as
Liquidator of GENBANK, ALLIED acquired all the assets and assumed the
liabilities of GENBANK, which includes the receivable due from private
respondent under the promissory note. Upon failing to comply with the
obligation under the promissory note, petitioner ALLIED, on February 7,
1979, filed a complaint against private respondent for the collection of a
sum of money. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 121474 before the
then Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court).
Sometime in 1987 and in the course of the proceedings in the court below,
private respondent, then defendant in the court below, filed a Motion to
Admit Amended/Supplemental Answer and Third-Party Complaint. Private
respondent sought to implead the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano as
third-party defendants. It was alleged in the third-party complaint that by
reason of the tortious interference by the Central Bank with the affairs of
GENBANK, private respondent was prevented from performing his
obligation under the loan such that he should not now be held liable thereon.
43
ISSUE: ​WON Arnulfo Arellano and Central Bank are liable for tortious
interference
HELD: They are liable for tortious interference but the action has already
prescribed​.
As early as Capayas vs. Court of First Instance of Albay, 11 this Court had
already outlined the tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a
third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff's claim." They are: (a) whether it
arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, or
whether the third-party's claim, although arising out of another or different
contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim; (b) whether
the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant
for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although
the third party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction; or (c)
whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense which the
third-party plaintiff has, or may have against plaintiff s claim. 1 While the
claim of third-party plaintiff, private respondent herein, does not fall under
test (c), there is no doubt that such claim can be accommodated under tests
(a) and (b) above-mentioned. Whether or not this Court agrees with the
petitioner's assertion that the claim does not "arise out of the same
transaction on which the plaintiff s claim is based," it cannot be denied that
the third-party's claim (although arising out of another or different contract
or transaction) is connected with plaintiffs claim. Put differently, there is
merit in private respondent's position that if held liable on the promissory
note, they are seeking, by means of the third-party complaint, to transfer
unto the third-party defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal
liquidation of GENBANK which, in the first place, was the basis for the
assignment of the promissory note. If there was any confusion at all on the
ground/s alleged in the third-party complaint, it was the claim of third-party
plaintiff for other damages in addition to any amount which he may be
called upon to pay under the original complaint. While these allegations in
the proposed third-party complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the
main suit, it cannot, however, be outrightly asserted that it would not serve
any purpose. As to the issue of prescription, it is the position of petitioner
that the cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint has already
prescribed. Being founded on what was termed as tortious interference,"
petitioner asserts that under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code on
quasi-delict the action against third-party defendants should have been filed
within four (4) years from the date the cause of action accrued
Case No. 70
ARSENIO DELOS REYES ET AL. VS. CA G.R. NO. 121468 January
27, 1998
FACTS:
Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land measuring 13, 405 sqms
originally owned by the spouses Genaro and Evarista delos Reyes. On July
7, 1942, Evaristsa Delos Reyes sold to spouses Catalina Mercado and
Eulalio Pena 10,000 sqms of the property situated at Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. On June 4, 1943 the vendees were able to secure the TCT covering
not only the 10k sqms of land bought by them but also the remaining 3,405
sqms left unsold. Pena spouses then sold the whole property to Isaias de
Guzman and Emiliana de Onon who later conveyed the same whole area to
some other persons. Eventually, the land was acquired by private
respondents herein, Rodolfo Caina, and Zenaid Caina, on July 9, 1963
through a “Deed of Exchange”. Eight days later, or on July 17, 1963, was
issued in the name of Caina spouses who since then exercised full
ownership and possession over the property.
On October 3, 1978 petitioners, all heirs of Evarista delos Reyes, filed an
action against respondents for reconveyance of 3,405 sqms of the property
claiming that this portion was invalidly included by the Pena spouses in the
titling of their 10l sqms they had bought from Evarista delos Reyes.
However, the case was dismissed by the TC on the ground of laches. Which
the CA affirmed.
Petitioners argue that their cause of action still subsists because it accrued
either on Sept. 17, 1962 when Evarista delos Reyes died, or on July 17,
1963 when issued to Rodolfo and Zenaida Caina.
ISSUE:
44
W/N the contention of the petitioners is right.
RULING:
No this is incorrect. A cause of action being an act or omission of one party
in violation of the right of another arises at the moment such right violated.
In the instant case, petitioner’s cause of action accrued on June 4, 1943
when the Pena spouses caused the registration in their name of the entire
13,405 sqms instead of ownership of Evarista over the remaining 3,405
sqms was transferred and from that very moment sprung the right of the
owner, and hence all her successors in interest, to file a suit for
reconveyance of the property wrongfully taken from them.
Case No. 71
Ferrer vs. Ericta ( G.R. Nos. L-41767, August 23, 1978)
Obe, Lady Danica A.
Facts:
-Defendants Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider, owners of pick-up car. In Dec.
21 1970, their son, Dennis Pfleider, 16 years of age, without proper official
authority, drove the pick-up car, without due regard to traffic rules and
regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent injury to
persons or damage to property.
-Plaintiff filed a case on January 6, 1975, Due to this pickup car was
overturned, causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who was
then a passenger, she was paralyzed and required medical treatment for
more than two (2) years. She also said to suffered unimaginable physical
pain, mental anguish, and her parents also suffered mental anguish, moral
shock and spent a considerable sum of money for her treatment.
-Defendants filed their answer, stating that they exercised due care and
utmost diligence in driving the vehicle aforementioned and alleging that
Annette Ferrer was not a passengers but merely joy riders and that the
defendants had no obligation whatsoever to plaintiffs.
-Respondent Judge rendered judgment against private respondents, private
respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration 1 on the following grounds:
(1) the complaint states no cause of action insofar as Mr. and Mrs. Pfleider
are concerned because it does not allege that at the time of the mishap,
defendant Dennis Pfleider was living with them, the fact being that at such
time he was living apart from them, hence, there can be no application of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which parents' liability is premised;
and (2) that tile complaint shows on its face "that it was filed only on
January 6, 1975, or after the lapse of MORE THAN FOUR YEARS from
the date of the accident on December 31, 1970", likewise appearing from
the complaint and, therefore, the action has already prescribed under Article
1146 of the Civil Code.On September 23, 1975, respondent judge, without
setting aside the order of default, issued an order absolving defendants from
any liability on the said grounds.
Issue:
WON the complaint for damages prescribed?
Held:
Yes, it is already prescribed. The complaint alleges that the accident which
caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff Annette Ferrer occured on
December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action for damages was only
filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising from physical injuries
because of a tort must be filed within four years. 8 The four-year period
begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the
accident.
Case No. 72
Kramer, Jr. vs. CA ( G.R. No. L-83524, October 13, 1989)
Pallera, Andrea Nicole C.
Facts: ​In the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing
boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer
figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines
owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a
consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish
catch. Both parties filed their respective marine protests with the Board of
45
Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an
investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the
maritime collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a
subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard
dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines
was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages
against the private respondent before the RTC. The private respondent filed
a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of
prescription. On the other hand, the petitioners contended that the running
of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and
that their cause of action accrued only from the time the decision
ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had
become final. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and stated that
the four-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code
should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence
of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained as
there is an absolute need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to
such collisions. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision.
Issue:​Whether or not the complaint for damages instituted by petitioners
against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by
statute of limitations.
Ruling: ​Yes. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a
quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period
begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. It is therefore clear that
in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the
four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the
collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an
administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was
caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an
action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case.
Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the
courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or
personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly found
that the action of petitioner already prescribed. The collision occurred on
April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed iii court only on May
30, 1 985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.
Case Number: 73
Case No. 74
NAPOCOR v. CA
G.R. No. L-47379
Salliman, Jimael Salam D
Facts: ​Private Respondent Engineering Construction Inc (ECI) executed a
contract with NAWASA whereby the former undertook to construct the
Ipo-Bicti Tunnel and its outworks at Norzagaray, Bulacan. When some of
the outworks were still under construction, typhoon Welming hit the region.
Due to heavy downpour, the water in the Angat Dam reservoir was rising.
To prevent overflow of water, Petitioner NAPOCOR caused the opening of
the spillway gates, which resulted in the extraordinary large volume of
water hitting the installations and construction works of private respondent
as a result of which its supplies and structures were lost or destroyed.
Private respondent filed complaint for damages, alleging negligence against
petitioner. Petitioner raised the defense of fortuitous event. The lower courts
both ruled in favor of private respondent.
Issue: ​Whether or not NAPOCOR is liable for damages.
Held: ​YES. In Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that if
upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or contravention in any manner of
the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code,
which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability. Thus, to
be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free
46
from any previous negligence or misconduct by which the loss or damage
may have been occasioned. In this case, petitioner was undoubtedly
negligent because it opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the
height of the typhoon when it knew very well that it was safer to have
opened the same gradually and earlier, as petitioner knew of the coming
typhoon at least four days before it actually struck. Even though the
typhoon was an act of God, petitioner cannot escape liability because its
negligence was the proximate cause of loss and damage.
Case Number: 75
Case Number: 76
Case No. 77
Yobido v. CA
G.R. No. 113003, October 17, 1997
Santos, Juan Carlo
FACTS
Spouses Tumboy and their children boarded the Yobido liner bus bound for
Davao city. On the way there, the left front tire of the bus exploded. The bus
fell into a ravine which caused the death of Tito Tumboy (the father). Leny
(the mother) and the surviving spouse instituted an action for breach of
contract of carriage, damages, and attorney’s fees against Alberta Yobido,
the owner of the bus and Cresencio Yobido, the driver.
In their defense, the Yobido’s argued that the case is a fortuitous event to
which they are not liable. The tire which exploded was changed 5 days prior
to the happening of the accident. All drivers are screened and checked prior
to deployment and that the bus was not even in full seating capacity when
the accident happened. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint
stating that the tire blowout was a fortuitous event which is completely an
extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the Yobido. The CA
overturned the ruling and found that the cause of the blow-out if due to a
factory defect, improper mounting, excessive tire pressure, is not an
unavoidable event.

ISSUE: ​W/N the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event which will make
Yobido Bus line not liable for the accident?
HELD:
No. A fortuitous event is possess of the following characteristics:
1. The cause of the unforeseen occurrence must be independent of human
will;
2. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, if it is foreseeable it must be unavoidable;
3.it must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation; and
4. The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
injury resulting to the creditor.
Under the circumstances of the case, the explosion of the new tire may not
be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in this
situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely
free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the
vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is
of a brand name noted for quality, result in the conclusion that it could not
explode within five days use.
Case 78
G.R. No. 118664 August 7, 1998
Serquiña, Mary Jashmin G.
Facts: private respondents boarded JAL flight bound to Manila. As an
incentive for travelling on the said airline, the flight was to make an
overnight stopover at Narita Japan, at the airline’s expense. However, due to
the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed NAIA, rendering it
inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private repondents’ trip to Manila was
cancelled indefinitely. To accomodate the needs of its stranded passengers,
JAL reooked all the Manila-bound passengers to depart on June 16, 1991
and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay
starting June 14, 1991. On June 16, 1991, the flight was again cancelled due
47
to NAIA’s closure. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that
it would no longer pay for their hotel accommodation expenses. The
respondents then were forced to pay their expenses from June 16, 1991 to
June 21, 1991. On July 25, 1991 the respondents commenced action for
damages against JAL asserting that the latter failed to live up to its duty to
provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay
for its hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991. On the
other hand, JAL denied its allegations on the ground of force majeure. RTC
ruled in favor of the private respondents. on appeal, CA affirmed the
decision of RTC with modifications on the damages. Hence, this petition for
review.
Issues: WON JAL as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the
hotel and meal expenses of the stranded passengers until they have reached
their final destination even if the delay was caused by force majeure
Held: NO. Common carriers are not absolutely responsible for all injuries or
damages if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise
would render the defense of “force majeure” as an exception from any
liability, illusory and ineffective. When JAL was prevented from resuming
its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever
losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded
passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. The respondents’
predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure
of NAIA to international flights. However, JAL is not completely absolved
from any liability. It had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to
transport private respondents on the first available connecting flight to
Manila. JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and
convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from
transit passengers to new passengers as a result of which the private
respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves
for the next flight.
Case No. 79
Gotesco Investment Corporation vs. Chatto
G.R. No. 87584, June 16, 1992
Suerte, Althea M.
FACTS​: Gloria Chatto and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Chatto went to
see a movie at Superama I theatre, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment
Corporation. 10 minutes after entering the theatre, the balcony ceiling of the
theatre collapsed. As soon as they were able to get out to the street, they
walked to the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated
for one day before they moved to the UST Hospital where Gloria was
treated from June 5 to 19 and Lina was treated from June 5 to 11. Plaintiff
went to Illinois for further treatment and stayed there for about 3 months.
Defendant Gotesco claim that the collapse of the ceiling was due to force
majeure and that its theatre did not suffer from any structural or
construction defect. The trial court awarded damages. CA affirmed the
lower court’s decision and ruled that there was no error in the trial court’s
finding that the collapse of the ceiling was due to construction defects and
not force majeur and that, considering that the collapse of the ceiling
happened barely 4 years after its construction, it behoves defendant to
conduct an exhaustive study of the reason for the tragic incident.
ISSUES​: W/N Gotesco is liable for the injuries sustained by Gloria and
Lina Chatto
HELD​:
YES. It is settled that the owner or proprietor of a place of public
amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement
devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed. Even assuming
arguendo that the cause was indeed force majeure, Gotesco would still be
liable because it was guilty of gross negligence for failing to exercise due
diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises (it was found
that there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the
accident)
Case No. 80
48
WALTER A. SMITH & CO., INC., vs. CADWALLADER GIBSON
LUMBER COMPANY
GR. No. L-32640, December 29, 1930
Sy, Julius Victor
FACTS​:
On August 30, 1926, the steamer Helen C, belonging to the defendant, the
Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., under the command of Captain Miguel
Lasal, in the course of its maneuvers to moor at the plaintiff's wharf in the
port of Olutanga, Zamboanga, struck said wharf, partially demolishing it
and throwing the timber piled thereon into the water. Whereupon the
plaintiff brought the instant action to recover of the defendant the sum of
P9,705.83 as damages for the partial demolition of the wharf and for the
loss of the timber piled thereon.
The defendant denied the plaintiff's causes of action, and in defense alleged
that the demolition of the wharf was due to the excessive weight of
thousands of board feet of timber piled upon it by the plaintiff to be loaded
and shipped on the steamer Helen C and to the bad condition of the piles
supporting said wharf.
The evidence shows that said wharf was built in 1921 and repaired in 1925.
The repairs, according to the deposition of Wilson C. Smith, a witness for
the plaintiff, consisted in replacing 6 bents of piles leaving more than 9 old
bents of piles without being replaced.
ISSUE​:
Whether the impact of the ship was due to the excessive force with which
the captain, ordered the winches to work
Held​:
No, the evidence shows that Captain Lisa at the time the plaintiff’s wharf
collapse was a duly licensed captain this being so, we are of opinion that the
presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the
exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family. (Art. 1902
and Art. 1903 of the Civil Code)

Case No. 81
Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District
GR No. L-7664 (104 Phil 398), August 29, 1958
Tibajia, Mary Joyce A.
Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral
expenses and attorney’s fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong.
After trial, the lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable
and dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs
took the case on appeal directly to this Court because the amount involved
exceeds the sum of P50,000.
Dominador Ong, 14-year old son of plaintiffs, in company with two of his
brothers went to swim at the defendant’s swimming pool. After paying the
admission fee they went to one of the small pools where the water was
shallow. Later Dominador told his brothers that he was going to the locker
room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this,
his two brothers went to the bigger pool. Later another boy in the swimming
pool informed a lifeguard employed by the defendant that somebody was
swimming underwater for quite a long time. The lifeguard immediately
jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved te apparently lifeless body
of Dominador Ong from the bottom. Artificial respiration and a resuscitator
were applied by employees of the defendant upon Dominador for the
purpose of reviving him. A doctor was summoned by employees of the
defendant to revive the boy but all to no avail. This action was instituted by
the parents of the boy to recover damages from the defendant for the death
of their son.
Issue: (1) Whether or not plaintiffs have clearly established the
fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it liable for the damages
sought? (2) Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the
case at bench.
Ruling: The record shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved
from the bottom of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything
49
possible to bring him back to life. Thus, after he was placed at the edge of
the pool, lifeguard Abaño immediately gave him manual artificial
respiration. Soon thereafter, nurse Armando Rule arrived, followed by
sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who brought with him an oxygen
resuscitator. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the
inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil. When the manual
artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator
until its contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being
made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who
however came late because upon examining the body he found him to be
already dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is
humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and
for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.
With regard to the application of doctrine of last clear chance, since it is not
known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being
apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of
the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing
that lifeguard Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his attention
was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the
disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to
life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now
invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee..
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot
be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is
or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any
previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have
contributed to the injury. ​O'Mally vs. Eagan​, 77 ALR 582, 43
Wyo. 233, 350, 2, P2d 1063. (A.L.R. Digest, Vol. 8, pp. 955-956)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from being in accordance with law and
the evidence, is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Case No. 82
Reyes vs. CA
G.R. No. 118492, August 15, 2001
Tolentino, Ma. Micaela G.
FACTS:
In view of the 20th Asian Racing Conference in Sydney, Australia, the
Philippine Racing Club, Inc. sent four delegates to the said conference.
Petitioner Reyes, as vice-president for finance, racing manager, treasurer,
and director of PRCI, sent Godofredo Reyes, the club’s chief cashier, to the
respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company to apply for a foreign
exchange demand draft in Australian dollars. Godofredo went to
respondent’s Buendia Branch to apply for a demand draft, which was
initially denied because FEBTC did not have an Australian dollar account in
any bank in Sydney. The bank’s assistant cashier informed Godofredo of a
roundabout way of effecting the requested remittance to Sydney by having
FEBTC draw a demand draft against Westpac Bank in Sydney and have the
latter reimburse itself from the US dollar account of FEBTC in Westpac
Bank in New York. Reyes, acting through Godofredo, agreed to this
arrangement, which was approved by FEBTC. However, upon due
presentment of the foreign exchange demand draft, the same was
dishonored, with the notice of dishonor stating the following: No account
held with Westpac. Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against
respondent FEBTC, claiming that they were exposed to unnecessary shock,
social humiliation, and deep mental anguish in a foreign country, and in the
presence of an international audience.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent FEBTC should have exercised a higher degree of
diligence than that expected of an ordinary prudent person in the handling
of its affairs?
HELD:
NO. THAT HIGHER DEGREE OF DILIGENCE IS NOT EXPECTED TO
BE EXERTED BY BANKS IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS THAT
DO NOT INVOLVE THEIR FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP WITH
50
THEIR DEPOSITORS. The degree of diligence required of banks is more
than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their
relationship with their depositors is concerned. But this only applies to cases
where the banks act under their fiduciary capacity, as depositary of the
deposits of their depositors. The case at bar does not involve the handling of
petitioners’ deposit with the respondent bank. The relationship involved was
that of a buyer and seller, that is, between the respondent bank as the seller
of the subject foreign exchange demand draft, and PRCI as the buyer of the
same, with the 20th Asian Racing Conference Secretariat as the payee
thereof.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT FEBTC DID EVERYTHING WITHIN
ITS POWER TO PREVENT THE DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT
FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEMAND DRAFT. FEBTC did not cause an
erroneous transmittal of its SWIFT cable message to Westpac-Sydney. It
was the erroneous decoding of the cable message on the part of
Westpac-Sydney that caused the dishonor of the subject foreign exchange
demand draft. As a result, Westpac-Sydney construed the said cable
message as a format for a letter credit and not for a demand draft. The
erroneous reading of its cable message to Westpac-Sydney by an employee
of the latter could have been foreseen by the respondent bank. Prior to the
first dishonor, FEBTC advised Westpac-New York to honor the
reimbursement claim of Westpac-Sydney. After the dishonor, FEBTC
reconfirmed the authority of Westpac-New York to debit its dollar account
and also sent two more cable messages inquiring why the demand draft was
dishonored.
Case No. 83
PBCom v. CA
G.R. No. 97626, March 14, 1997
Violeta, Olivia Althea E.
FACTS: ​From May 1975 to July 1976, petitioner entrusted funds in the
form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to its employee Irene Yabut, to be
deposited in the company’s current accounts with the respondent bank. It
was later found, however, that Yabut fraudulently deposited said funds to
her husband’s account instead, by leaving blank the name of the account
holder in the duplicate form of the bank’s deposit slip, which were
nevertheless validated by the bank’s teller, despite irregularity on its face.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the bank’s negligence was the proximate cause of
the petitioner’s loss
HELD: ​Yes. Due to the fiduciary nature of the bank’s relationship with its
clients, as well as the fact that its operations are imbued with public interest,
it is the bank’s duty to exercise utmost diligence in dealing with its clients’
accounts. By allowing the validation of irregular deposit slips, it failed to
exercise such diligence. Had it exercised utmost diligence in dealing with
RMC’s accounts, the resulting loss could have been prevented. The latter’s
contributory negligence could not have prevented the same.
Case # 84
Crisostomo vs CA
G.R. No. 138334; August 25, 2003
Justine Vitorillo
FACTS:
Petitioner contracted the services of respondent Caravan Travel and Tours
International, Inc. to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and
accommodation in a tour dubbed Jewels of Europe. Pursuant to said
contract, the travel documents and plane tickets were delivered to the
petitioner who in turn gave the full payment for the package tour on June
12, 1991. Without checking her travel documents, petitioner went to NAIA
on Saturday, June 15, 1991, to take the flight for the first leg of her journey
from Manila to Hongkong. To petitioner’s dismay, she discovered that the
flight she was supposed to take had already departed the previous day. She
learned that her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled on June 14, 1991.
She thus called up Menor to complain. Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon
petitioner to take another tour- the British Pageant. Upon petitioner’s return
51
from Europe, she demanded from respondent the reimbursement of the
difference between the sum she paid for Jewels of Europe and the amount
she owed respondent for the British Pageant tour.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for breach of contract of
carriage and damages alleging that her failure to join Jewels of Europe was
due to respondent’s fault since it did not clearly indicate the departure date
on the plane, failing to observe the standard of care required of a common
carrier when it informed her wrongly of the flight schedule. For its part,
respondent company, denied responsibility for petitioner’s failure to join the
first tour, insisting that petitioner was informed of the correct departure
date, which was clearly and legibly printed on the plane ticket. The travel
documents were given to petitioner two days ahead of the scheduled trip.
Respondent further contend that petitioner had only herself to blame for
missing the flight, as she did not bother to read or confirm her flight
schedule as printed on the ticket.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent is negligent and liable for damages.
HELD:
No. Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services,
the standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of a
family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. In the case at bar, Caravan
Travel and Tours exercised due diligence in performing its obligations
under the contract and followed standard procedure in rendering its services
to Estela. The plane ticket issued to petitioner clearly reflected the departure
date and time, contrary to Estela’s contention. The travel documents,
consisting of the tour itinerary, vouchers and instructions, were likewise
delivered to her two days prior to the trip. The Caravan Travel and Tours
also properly booked Estela for the tour, prepared the necessary documents
and procured the plane tickets. It arranged Estela’s hotel accommodation as
well as food, land transfers and sightseeing excursions, in accordance with
its avowed undertaking.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Caravan Travel and Tours performed
its prestation under the contract as well as everything else that was essential
to book Estela for the tour.
Hence, Estela cannot recover and must bear her own damage.

52