Week 11 Topics

Registered-owner Rule Art. 2184

1. GAUDIOSO EREZO, ET AL. vs. AGUEDO JEPTE, G.R. No. L-9605 September 30, 1957

Jepte registered owner of the truck which collided a taxicab and went off the streeat and hit
Ernesto Erezo who died due to the accident. The CFI convicted the driver of the truck. The heirs
of Ernesto demand damages against Jepte. Jepte denied ownership of the truck.

The Government and all persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on his
declaration of ownership and registration. It, therefore, held that the defendant-appellant is
liable because he cannot be permitted to repudiate his own declaration.

Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public
service, should primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the
latter while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets.

In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is primarily
responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but he (defendant-
appellant) has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may
be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellant

2. DIWATA VARGAS, vs. SALVADOR LANGCAY, G.R. No. L-17459 September 29, 1962

F: Helen Langcay, sisters, were hit and injured by a jeepney then driven by Ramon B. Aguas.
Since the records of the Public Service Commission and the Motor Vehicles Office showed that
Diwata Vargas was, at the time of the accident, the owner and operator of the jeepney in
question, Helen sued Diwata Vargas and the driver for damages.

Diwata Vargas that prior to the accident, precisely on August 17, 1953, she had sold the vehicle
to Jose B. Aguas (father of the driver), so that at the time of the accident she was no longer the
owner of the jeepney.

Further, the Public Service Commission, cancelled the certificate of public convenience issued in
her name, the defendants Diwata Vargas and Ramon B. Aguas were jointly and severally
sentenced to pay damages and attorney’s fees by the Court of First Instance of Manila. Diwata
Vargas appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed.

R: Corazon and Helen Langcay were not passengers of the jeepney, the reckless operation of
which resulted in the injuries. Therefore, the direct and immediate liability of a common carrier
as provided for by the Civil Code cannot be ascribed to appellant.

The Court hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering appellant-petitioner Diwata
Vargas only subsidiarily liable under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This Court, in
 previous decisions, has always considered the registered owner/operator of a passenger vehicle,
jointly and severally liable with the driver, for damages incurred by passengers or third persons
as a consequence of injuries (or death) sustained in the operation of said vehicles.

"In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendant appellant herein, is primarily
responsible for the damage caused"

"Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed
transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape
said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done."

3. GILBERTO M. DUAVIT vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989
Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep owned by plaintiff, Ruperto Catuar
was driving the said jeep on Ortigas Avenue, San Juan, Rizal. The plaintiff’s jeep, at the time, was
running moderately at 20 to 35 kph.

Another jeep driven by defendant Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff’s jeep on the portion
near the left rear wheel, and as a result of the impact plaintiff’s jeep fell on its right and skidded by
about 30 yards; that as a result plaintiff’s jeep was damaged, particularly the windshield, the
differential, the part near the left rear wheel and the top cover the jeep.

Virgilio Catuar was shown to the middle of the road; his wrist was broken and he sustained
contusions on the head; that likewise plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. was trapped inside the fallen
jeep, and one of his legs was fractured. Each of the injured passsenger had time spent in the
hospital and incurred expenses.

As to the injured driver of the bumped jeep, PAntonio Sarmiento, Sr. has some sidelines as well and
due to the accident had not reported to those sidelines.

Plaintiffs have filed this case both against Oscar Sabiniano as driver, and against Gualberto Duavit as
owner of the jeep.

Defendant Gualberto Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other jeep. denied that the other
defendant (Oscar Sabiniano) was his employee. Duavit claimed that he has not been an employer of
defendant Oscar Sabiniano at anytime up to the present.

The trial court found Oscar Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but found no employer-
employee relationship between him and the petitioner because the latter was then a government
employee and he took the vehicle without the authority and consent of the owner. The petitioner
was, thus, absolved from liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Court of Appeals rendered the questioned decision holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable
with Sabiniano. Hence, this appeal.
 The respondent court’s misplaced reliance on the cases of Erezo v. Jepte and Vargas v. Langcay
cannot be sustained.

As can be seen, the circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those in the
present case. Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in the mishap but
completely denies having employed the driver Sabiniano or even having authorized the latter to
drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner’s garage. To hold, therefore, the
petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver
nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an
accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle.

4. BA FINANCE CORPORATION vs. CA, G.R. No. 98275 Nov. 13, 1992

CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICTS; LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYERS FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR
EMPLOYEES ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ASSIGNED TASKS; DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN DUAVIT
VS. COURT OF APPEALS (173 SCRA 490 [1989]) And DUQUILLO VS. BAYOT (67 PHIL. 131 [1939] NOT
APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR.

Petitioner’s reliance on the rulings of this Court in Duavit v. Court of Appeals and in Duquillo v.
Bayot (supra) is legally unpalatable for the purpose of the present discourse. The vehicles adverted
to in the two cases shared a common thread, so to speak, in that the jeep and the truck were driven
in reckless fashion without the consent or knowledge of the respective owners. Cognizant of the
inculpatory testimony spewed by defendant Sabiniano when he admitted that he took the jeep
from the garage of defendant Duavit without the consent or authority of the latter, Justice
Gutierrez, Jr. in Duavit remarked: ". . . Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle
involved in the mishap but completely denies having employed the driver Sabiniano or even having
authorized the latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner’s garage. To
hold, therefore, the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who
was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of
a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. In this regard, we
cannot ignore the many cases of vehicles forcibly taken from their owners at gunpoint or stolen
from garages and parking areas and the instances of service station attendants or mechanics of
auto repair shops using, without the owner’s consent, vehicles entrusted to them for servicing or
repair." In the Duquillo case, the defendant therein cannot, according to Justice Diaz, be held liable
for anything because of circumstances which indicated that the truck was driven without the
consent or knowledge of the owner thereof.

Rogelio Villar y Amare, the driver of the Isuzu truck, was at fault when the mishap occurred in as
much as he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in triple
homicide with multiple physical injuries with damage to property.

Petitioner was adjudged liable far damages in as much as the truck was registered in its name
during the incident in question, as laid down in Erezo Case.
 Rock Component Philippines, Inc. was ordered to reimburse petitioner for any amount that the
latter may be adjudged liable to pay herein private respondents as expressly stipulated in the
contract of lease between petitioner and Rock Component Philippines, Inc. Moreover, the trial
court applied Article 2194 of the new Civil Code on solidary accountability of joint tortfeasors
insofar as the liability of the driver, herein petitioner and Rock Component Philippines.

whether petitioner can be held responsible to the victims albeit the truck was leased to Rock
Component Philippines when the incident occurred, the appellate court answered in the
affirmative.

The recourse instituted from the rebuffs it encountered may not constitute a sufficient foundation
for reversal of the impugned judgment of respondent court. Petitioner is of the impression that the
Perez and Erezo cases are inapplicable due to the variance of the generative facts in said cases as
against those obtaining in the controversy at bar.

If the ratio of Erezo Case were applied in solving the circumstance whereof the vehicle had been
alienated or sold to another, there certainly can be no serious exception against utilizing the same
rationale to the antecedents of this case where the subject vehicle was merely leased by petitioner
to Rock Component Philippines, Inc., with petitioner retaining ownership over the vehicle.

Consequently, there is no need for Us to discuss the matter of imputed negligence because
petitioner merely presumed, erroneously, however, that judgment was rendered against it on the
basis of such doctrine embodied under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code.

5. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. CA, G.R. No. 118889 March 23, 1998

The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on
the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due
care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage.[7 Yet, as
correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the
circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR
being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As
such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR
cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an
employer of the latter.

We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: "In motor
vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune x x x x If the owner was not in the
motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is
neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent
FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on
the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.
6. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC. vs. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO G.R. No. 162267 July 4, 2008
A Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by United Coconut Planters Bank was traversing the Laurel
Highway, Barangay Balintawak, Lipa City. The car was insured with plantiff-appellee [UCPB General
Insurance Inc.], then driven by Flaviano Isaac with Conrado Geronimo, the Asst. Manager of said
bank, was hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck owned by defendants-appellants
PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. allegedly leased to and operated by defendant-appellant Superior Gas &
Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its employee, defendant appellant Renato Gonzaga.

The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in an explosion of the rear
part of the car. The driver and passenger suffered physical injuries. However, the driver defendant-
appellant Gonzaga continued on its [sic] way to its [sic] destination and did not bother to bring his
victims to the hospital.

Plaintiff-appellee paid the assured UCPB the insurance coverage of the damaged car. As the 18-
wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI Leasing, repeated demands were made by
plaintiff-appellee for the payment of the aforesaid amounts. However, no payment was made.
Thus, plaintiff-appellee filed the instant case.

PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., (petitioner) interposed the defense that it could not be held liable for
the collision, since the driver of the truck, Gonzaga, was not its employee, but that of its co-
defendant Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc.

SUGECO, and not petitioner, that was the actual operator of the truck, pursuant to a Contract of
Lease signed by petitioner and SUGECO. Petitioner, however, admitted that it was the owner of the
truck in question.

The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff UCPB General Insurance [respondent], ordering the
defendants PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., [petitioner] and Renato Gonzaga, to pay jointly and
severally the former.

Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, petitioner appealed to the CA. But, the CA affirmed the
RTC's decision, with certain modifications. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the
CA denied. Hence, this petition,

The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasi-delicts resulting from its
use is well-established in jurisprudence.

In Erezo Case, The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are
numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or
other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that
 the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons
responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.

The case is still good law and has been consistently cited in subsequent cases. Thus, there is no
good reason to depart from its tenets.

Thus, the rule remains the same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter, that is not
registered with the Land Transportation Office, still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved
in tortious incidents, for the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as
conclusive evidence of ownership.

The burden of registration of the lease contract is minuscule compared to the chaos that may result
if registered owners or operators of vehicles are freed from such responsibility. Petitioner pays the
price for its failure to obey the law on compulsory registration of motor vehicles for registration is a
pre-requisite for any person to even enjoy the privilege of putting a vehicle on public roads.

7. CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR., G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999

Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was
traveling counter-clockwise, but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only
carrying a Student’s Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a]
manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up.

On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of
going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic.

Later, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe
injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands
Hospital.

Sadly, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor’s Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an
acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills,
professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.

The present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez,
parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial
Corporation.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose
Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX)
to pay jointly and solidarily.

CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.

Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held
that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. It reduced the
award of damages representing loss of earning capacity. Upon CASTILEX’s motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals modified its decision which reduced the moral damages,
deleted the attorney's fee and decreased of the interest agaisnt the hosptial bill.

Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition.

Petitioner’s interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his
assigned task.

This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business
or industry such as truck operators banks. The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in
applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case.

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove
the same. It was enough for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of
his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).

The Court does not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or
scope of his employment.

Based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in
ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American
law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part
of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer’s
business or within the scope of his assigned task.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner’s office,
which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie’s Restaurant in
Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from petitioner’s place of
business.

To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal
purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about
2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD’s working day had
ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put
 it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection
to petitioner’s business.

Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.

8. CONRADO AGUILAR, SR., vs. COMMERCIAL SAVINGS BANK G.R. No. 128705 June 29, 2001
Petitioner Conrado Aguilar, Sr. is the father of Conrado Aguilar, Jr., the victim in a vehicular accident
involving a Lancer car registered in the name of respondent bank, but driven by co-respondent
Ferdinand G. Borja.

Aguilar, Jr. and his companions, among them Nestor Semella, had just finished their snack at the
Uncle Watt’s Bakery along Zapote-Alabang Road. As they crossed the road, a Lancer and driven by
Ferdinand Borja, overtook a passenger jeepney. In so doing, the Lancer hit Aguilar and Semella.
Aguilar was thrown upwards and smashed against the windshield of the Lancer, which did not stop.
Aguilar and Semella were then brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital at Pamplona, Las Piñas,
where Aguilar was pronounced dead on arrival.

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondents. Borja did not file his answer within
the reglementary period, hence, he was declared in default by the trial court.

Respondent bank admitted that the Lancer was registered in its name at the time of the incident.
Petitioner’s counsel also showed that Borja was negligent in driving the car.

The trial court declared that Borja’s negligence, carelessness and imprudence caused the victim’s
death. It also found that Borja was an assistant vice president of respondent bank at the time of the
incident. It held that under Art. 21803 of the Civil Code, the negligence of the employee is
presumed to be that of the employer, whose liability is primary and direct; and that respondent
bank failed to exercise due diligence in the selection of its employees.

Respondent bank appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals said that before it can apply Art. 2180 on which private respondent anchored its
claim of the bank’s negligence, petitioner must first establish that Borja acted on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him by his employer. The appellate court found no evidence
that Borja had acted as respondent bank’s assistant vice-president at the time of the mishap. The
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

As defense according to respondent bank, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the negligent
employee commits the act outside the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties, the
employer has no vicarious liability. Further, the bank insists that it is not liable since at the time of
the accident, Borja was driving the Lancer in his private capacity and was not performing functions
 in furtherance of the interest of Comsavings Bank. Additionally, according to the bank, Borja
already bought the car on installment basis. Hence, at the time of the incident, the bank concluded
it was no longer the owner of the car.

The Court was, however, unimpressed by respondent bank’s disquisition. It goes against
established jurisprudence.

The rationale well postulated in Erezo applies in the present case. Thus far no change in
jurisprudence has been brought to our attention. In our view, respondent bank, as the registered
owner of the vehicle, is primarily liable for Aguilar, Jr.’s death. The Court of Appeals erred when it
concluded that the bank was not liable simply because (a) petitioner did not prove that Borja was
acting as the bank’s vice president at the time of the accident; and (b) Borja had, according to
respondent bank, already bought the car at the time of the mishap. For as long as the respondent
bank remained the registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular accident, it could not
escape primary liability for the death of petitioner’s son.

9. FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES, vs. JOSE A. ESPINAS G.R. No. 174156 June 20, 2012

Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila. Upon reaching
the intersection of Leon Guinto and President Quirino Streets, Espinas stopped his car. When the
signal light turned green, he proceeded to cross the intersection. He was already in the middle of
the intersection when another car, traversing President Quirino Street and going to Roxas
Boulevard, suddenly hit and bumped his car. As a result of the impact, Espinas’ car turned
clockwise. The other car escaped from the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its
plate number.

After verifying with the Land Transportation Office, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car,
with plate number UCF-545, is Filcar. Espinas sent several letters to Filcar and to its President and
General Manager Carmen Flor, demanding payment for the damages sustained by his car.

Espinas filed a complaint for damages against Filcar and Carmen Flor.

Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car that hit and bumped Espinas’ car, the
car was assigned to its Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor, the husband of Carmen Flor. Filcar
further stated that when the incident happened, the car was being driven by Atty. Flor’s personal
driver, Timoteo Floresca.

On seeing the dent and the crack, Atty. Flor allegedly asked Floresca what happened, and the
driver replied that it was a result of a "hit and run" while the car was parked.

Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due to its fault or
negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen Flor both
said that they always exercised the due diligence required of a good father of a family in leasing or
assigning their vehicles to third parties.
METC ruled in favor of Espinas, and ordered Filcar and Carmen Flor, jointly and severally, to pay
Espinas.

RTC affirmed the MeTC decision. The RTC ruled that Filcar failed to prove that Floresca was not its
employee as no proof was adduced that Floresca was personally hired by Atty. Flor. The RTC agreed
with the MeTC that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily liable for the damages
sustained by third persons as a consequence of the negligent or careless operation of a vehicle
registered in its name.

CA partly granted the petition. CA modified the RTC decision by ruling that Carmen Flor, President
and General Manager of Filcar, is not personally liable to Espinas. The appellate court pointed out
that, subject to recognized exceptions, the liability of a corporation is not the liability of its
corporate officers because a corporate entity – subject to well-recognized exceptions – has a
separate and distinct personality from its officers and shareholders.

The CA, however, affirmed the liability of Filcar to pay Espinas damages. According to the CA, even
assuming that there had been no employer-employee relationship between Filcar and the driver of
the vehicle, Floresca, the former can be held liable under the registered owner rule.

Filcar filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, the present petition.

Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus vicariously
liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code

It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle which hit and caused
damage to Espinas’ car; and it is on the basis of this fact that we hold Filcar primarily and directly
liable to Espinas for damages.

As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a person will generally
be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by another.

Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis
of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts
of one’s subordinates to prevent damage to another.

As its core defense, Filcar contends that Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code
is inapplicable because it presupposes the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
According to Filcar, it cannot be held liable under the subject provisions because the driver of its
vehicle at the time of the accident, Floresca, is not its employee but that of its Corporate Secretary,
Atty. Flor.

SC cannot agree. It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the
motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable
 for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil
Code.

Thus, whether the driver of the motor vehicle, Floresca, is an employee of Filcar is irrelevant in
arriving at the conclusion that Filcar is primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by
Espinas. While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code does not contain
any provision on the liability of registered owners in case of motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in
relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as registered owner,
to answer for the damages caused to Espinas’ car. This interpretation is consistent with the strong
public policy of maintaining road safety, thereby reinforcing the aim of the State to promote the
responsible operation of motor vehicles by its citizens.

This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any recourse against the actual employer of
the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the registered
owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the
amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to another.

10. CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC., v. ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR, G.R. No. 170631,
February 10, 2016
Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita Street, United
Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number PKM 19512
was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van
swerved to its left and hit Reyes.

Espinosa told the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital.
Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with
Reyes still in the van. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes
to the hospital.

Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan.19 Caravan is
a corporation engaged in the business of organizing travels and tours. Bautista was Caravan's
employee assigned to drive the van as its service driver.

Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes. Despite medical attendance, Reyes
died two (2) days after the accident.

Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt filed before the Regional Trial
Court. or damages against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged that Bautista was
an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.

Thus, Abejar moved to drop Bautista as a defendant. The Regional Trial Court granted her
Motion. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found that Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the
vehicle
 Caravan's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the Regional Trial Court.

Caravan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this Petition was filed.

Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because she is not a real party in
interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute parental authority. She
is also not the judicially appointed guardian or the only living relative of the deceased.

There is also no record that Reyes has brothers or sisters. It was under these circumstances that
respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a child, assumed the role of Reyes' parents, and
thus, exercised substitute parental authority over her.As Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised
the full extent of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent.

1st: respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes, it stands to reason
that when Reyes died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural parent would have felt
upon the loss of one's child.

2nd: respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes' actual parents would have been capacitated
to do.

SC note that Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having reached the age of majority,
she was already emancipated upon her death. While parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation,68 respondent continued to support and care for Reyes even after she turned 18.

Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's liability for quasi-delict provided in Article

2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Contrary to petitioner's position, it was not fatal to respondent's cause that she herself did not
adduce proof that Bautista acted within the scope of his authority. It was sufficient that Abejar
proved that petitioner was the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.

These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is also the
registered owner of a vehicle.

Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that harmonizes it with
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Rules must be construed in a manner that will harmonize
them with other rules so as to form a uniform and consistent system of jurisprudence. In light of
this, the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable. There, this court stated that Article
2180 "should defer to"104 the registered-owner rule. It never stated that Article 2180 should be
totally abandoned.

Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule and
Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner of the
 vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable
presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.

This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the
actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former that
should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence. The victim is, in many cases, a hapless
pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to uncover the employment relationship of the
owner and the driver, or any act that the owner may have done in relation to that employment.

The Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership of the van. Petitioner itself did not dispute its
ownership of the van. Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption that the
requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises. It is now up to petitioner to establish that it
incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following:
first, that it had no employment relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista acted outside the
scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of Bautista.

Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when it selected Bautista as
service driver; it also committed an actual violation of law.

For failing to overturn the presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been
satisfied, petitioner must be held liable.

11. GREENSTAR EXPRESS, INC. AND FRUTO L. SAYSON, JR., v. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, G.R.
No. 205090, October 17, 2016

Petitioner Greenstar Express, Inc. (Grepistar) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
public transportation, while petitioner Fruto L. Sayson, Jr. (Sayson) is one of its bus drivers,

Respondents Universal Robina Corporation (URC) and Nissin Universal Robina Corporation (NURC)
are domestic corporations engaged in the food business. NURC is a subsidiary of URC.

URC is the registered owner of a Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number WRN 403 (URC van).

On February 25, 2003, which was then a declared national holiday,7 petitioner's bus, which was
then being driven toward the direction of Manila by Sayson, collided head-on with the URC van
which was then being driven by NURC's Operations Manager, Renante Bicomong (Bicomong). The
incident occurred along Km. 76, Maharlika Highway, Brgy. San Agustin, Alaminos, Laguna. Bicomong
died on the spot.

Petitioners filed a Complaint against NURC to recover damages sustained during the collision,
premised on negligence. An Amended Complaint9 was later filed, wherein URC was impleaded as
additional defendant.
In this case, it is beyond cavil that the deceased Renante Bicong [sic] was not in the performance of
his duty on that fateful day of February 25, 2003. In the first place that day was a holiday; there was
no work and it was not shown that he was working as indeed his work assignment is operations
manager of the company's plant.

The accident having occurred outside Remnte Bicomong's assigned tasks, defendant employers
cannot be held liable to the plaintiffs, even assuming that it is the fault of defendants' employee
that was the direct and proximate cause of their damages.

The foregoing however is a mere interpretation or speculation and not supported by any account,
either by an eyewitness [or by] a explanation tracing the relative positions of the two vehicles in
relation to the road at the time of impact and the movements of the two vehicles after the impact.
For this reason, it will be unfair to make an interpretation of the events based alone on the point of
impact [on] the vehicles. The points of impact by themselves cannot explain the positions of the
vehicles on the road.

The trial court ruled in dismissing the complaint.

Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA, they argued that Bicomong's negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision, as the van he was swerved to the opposite lane and hit the bus
which was then traveling along its proper lane; that Bicomong's act of occupying the bus's lane was
illegal and thus constituted a traffic violation.

Bicomong, Respondents, countered that the bus driven by Sayson was running at high speed when
the, collision occurred, thus indicating that Sayson was in violation of traffic rules; and that Say-son
had the last clear chance to avert collision but he failed to take the necessary precaution under the
circumstances, by reducing his speed and applying the brakes on time to avoid collision.

But, the CA affirmed the trial court's Decision dated April 4, 2011.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its subsequent December 28,
2012 Resolution. Hence, the present Petition.

The Court denies the Petition.

In the present case, it has been established that on the day of the collision -or on February 25, 2003
- URC was the registered owner of the URC van, although it appears that it was designated for use
by NURC, as it was officially assigned to the latter's Logistics Manager, Florante Soro-Soro (Soro-
Soro); that Bicomong was the Operations Manager of NURC and assigned to the First Cavite
Industrial Estate; that there was no work as the day was declared a national holiday; that Bicomong
was on his way home to his family in Quezon province; that the URC van was not assigned to
Bicompng as well, but solely for Soro-Soro's official use; that the company service vehicle officially
assigned to Bicomong was a Toyota Corolla, which he left at the Cavite plant and instead, he used
the URC van; and that other than the Cavite plant, there is no other NURC plant in the provinces of
Quezon, Laguna or Bicol.

Applying the above pronouncement in the Caravan Travel and Tours case, it must be said that when
by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong's employment were proved, the presumption
of negligence on respondents' part attached, as the registered owner of the van. and as Bicomong's
employer. His burden of proof then shifted to respondents to show that no liability under Article
2180 arose.

Respondents succeeded in overcoming the presumption of negligence, having shown that when the
collision took place, Bicomong was not in the performance of his work; that he was in possession of
a service vehicle that did not belong to his employer NURC, but to URC, and which vehicle was not
officially assigned to him, but to another employee; that his use of the URC van was unauthorized -
even if he had used the same vehicle in furtherance of a personal undertaking in the past, this does
not amount to implied permission; that the accident occurred on a holiday and while Bicomong was
on his way home to his family in Quezon province; and that Bicomong had no official business
whatsoever in his hometown in Quezon, or in Laguna where the collision occurred, his area of
operations being limited to the Cavite area.

Sayson did not take the necessary precautions, as by reducing speed and adopting a defensive
stance to avert any untoward incident that may occur from Bicomong's manner of driving. This is
precisely his testimony during trial. When the van began to swerve toward his bus, he did not
reduce speed nor swerve his bus to avoid collision. Instead, he maintained his current speed and
course, and for this reason., the inevitable took place: An experienced driver who is. presented with
the same facts would have adopted an attitude consistent with a desire to preserve life and
property; for common carriers, the diligence demanded is of the highest degree.

CA is affirmed.