LAW ON SALES

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON CASES:

“ANALYN DE LOS SANTOS AND SPOUSES RAPHAEL LOPEZ AND
ANALYN DE LOS SANTOS-LOPEZ vs.
JOEL LUCENIO AND ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS AND
AUTHORITY UNDER HIM”
“GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC. vs.
EVELYN M. ANGELES”

And
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP. (NOW PRYCE CORPORATION) vs.
NARCISO R. NOLASCO, JR.

Submitted by:
Sam Christian T. Barro
Rodavallo Gallogo Jr.
Judy Ann Arellano
Angel Diane Alpuerto
Lizeal Jean C. Baguio
Cristine Joy Enopia
Psyche Opanis

Submitted to:
ATTY. CRISJESA LAO FLORES-GOMEZ
Instructor
DIGESTED CASES

ANALYN DE LOS SANTOS AND SPOUSES RAPHAEL LOPEZ AND ANALYN DE

LOS SANTOS-LOPEZ, PETITIONERS,
vs.
JOEL LUCENIO AND ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS AND
AUTHORITY UNDER HIM, RESPONDENTS.
(G.R. No. 215659, March 19, 2018)

FACTS:

December 2009, petitioner Teresita lent her name and credit standing in favor of her daughter
and son-in-law namely Analyn De Los Santos and Rafael Lopez (petitioner spouses) as an
accommodation party thru a Deed of Assignment dated August 31, 2010 to enable them to purchase a
property from the list of assets for sale by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), that on
January 19, 2010, the GSIS issued a Notice of Approval granting petitioner Teresita's application to
purchase the property located, at Block 8, Lot 14, Juana I Complex, Biñan, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-129136 issued under the name of the GSIS.

On March 5, 2010, petitioner spouses paid the required deposit in the amount of P87,255.00
and a front-end service fee in the amount of P7,852.97;12 that on May 12, 2010, a Deed of
Conditional Sale was executed by the GSIS over the subject property in favor of petitioner Teresita,
that despite demand by petitioners, respondent Joel refused to vacate the subject property.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Court of Appeal is correct in applying Maceda Law?

RULING:

The Court found that petitioners had a better right over the subject property as they acquired
an inchoate right of ownership by virtue of the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by GSIS.
Affirming the findings of the MTC that petitioners, as successors-in-interest of GSIS, were legally
entitled to the full control and possession of the subject property. It pointed out that from the time the
Deed of Transfer of Rights was executed on January 20, 2005, respondent Joel never made any
payment on the delinquencies.
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC, which the CA dismissed the complaint
for unlawful detainer for failure of the GSIS to issue a notarized notice of cancellation and to refund
the cash surrender value of the payments made on the subject property.
According to section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 15. Questions that
may be raised an appeal. – Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court
below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in
the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.
In Peña v. Spouses Tolentino, the Court explained that A party cannot change his theory of
the case or his cause of action on appeal. This rule affirms that 'courts of justice have no jurisdiction
or power to decide a question not in issue.' Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports
to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties is not only irregular but also
extrajudicial and invalid. The legal theory under which the controversy was heard and decided in the
dial, court should be the same theory under which the review on appeal is conducted. Otherwise,
prejudice will result to the adverse party. We stress that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments
not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a
reviewing court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
Records show that it was only before the Court of Appeals that respondent Joel alleged that
the GSIS failed to send a notarized notice of cancellation and a refund of the cash surrender value to
his sister. The CA, therefore, should not have considered these belated allegations, as these are factual
matters, which would require the presentation of additional evidence on the part of petitioners.
Furthermore, these belated allegations likewise changed the theory of his case, which is not allowed
under the Rules as it goes against the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
Respondents, therefore, must vacate the premises and pay petitioners the amount of P5,000.00
per month as reasonable compensation for the continued use and occupation of the subject property
from May 16, 2010, the date of the demand to vacate, until respondents actually vacate the subject
property and the amount of P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC., PETITIONER,

vs.
EVELYN M. ANGELES, RESPONDENT.
(G.R. No. 202358, November 27, 2013)

FACTS:

Evelyn M. Angeles (Angeles for brevity) purchased a house (under Contract to Sell No. 2272)
and lot (under Contract to Sell No. 2271) from Gatchalian Realty, Inc. (GRI for brevity) priced at
₱750K and ₱450K respectively with 24% interest per annum to be paid by installments within the
period of ten years.

The house and lot were delivered to Angeles. However, under the contracts to sell executed
between the parties, GRI retained ownership of the property until fulfillment of the purchase price.

After 35 installments for Contract to Sell No. 2271 and 48 installments for Contract to Sell
No. 2272 payments, Angeles failed to failed to satisfy her monthly installments with GRI.

After giving a total of 51 months grace period with several demands but the same were
continually disregarded by Angeles. Finally, GRI served Angeles with a Notice of Notarial Recission
thru registered mail.

Consequently, Angeles was furnished by GRI a demand letter demanding her to pay the
outstanding reasonable rentals for her use and occupation of the house and lot to date and to vacate
the same. She was informed in said letter that the 50% refundable amount that she is entitled to has
already been deducted with the reasonable value for the use of the properties.

Allegedly, Angeles has been sending several postal money orders through registered email to
GRI, stating that it was supposed to be payments of her outstanding monthly amortizations.
 These payments were not accepted by GRI as monthly amortizations. GRI reiterated that
payments will only be accepted if it will serve as her outstanding payment of rent not monthly
amortizations.

Because of Angeles failure to settle her accounts and refusal to vacate the house and lot, GRI
filed a complaint unlawful detainer against Angeles.

MeTC held that the facts indicate that GRI was able to establish the validity of recission. It
ruled that GRI is entitled to ₱1,030,896.39 by way of reasonable rental fees less ₱574,148.40 as of
May 2005. Angeles filed a notice with the MeTC. Angeles filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction, but it was denied. Angeles filed a petition for Certiorari with Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction, but they were dismissed to. A Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal was issued in favor of GRI and the properties were returned over to GRI.

Angeles appeal before Branch 197 of the Las Piñas RTC initially produced a result favorable
to her. RTC ruled, there being no valid cancellation of the Contract to Sell, this court finds merit in
the appeal filed by Angeles and reverses the decision of the court a quo. This court recognized
Angeles right to continue occupying the property subject to Contract to Sell.

GRI filed a motion for Reconsideration. The RTC issued an Order on June 17, 2008 which
ruled that GRI had compiled with the Provision of R.A. 6552, and had refunded the cash surrender
value to Angeles upon its cancellation of the contract to sell when it deducted the amount of the cash
surrender value from rentals due on the subject properties. Later on, Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED.

The CA dismissed GRI’s complaint for unlawful detainer, and reverse and set aside the
RTC’s decision. Although the CA ruled that Angeles received the Notice of Notarial Recission, it
ruled that the actual cancellation of the contract between the parties did not take place, because GRI
failed to refund to Angeles the cash surrender value. The CA denied GRI’s motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

 Whether there is a valid cancellation of the Contract to Sell

 Whether Angeles is entitled to the benefit of Maceda Law or R.A. 6552

RULING:

 There was no actual cancellation of the contracts because of GRI's failure to actually refund the
cash surrender value to Angeles.

Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 6552 requires refund of the cash surrender value of the payments on
the property to the buyer before cancellation of the contract. The provision does not provide a
different requirement for contracts to sell which allow possession of the property by the buyer upon
execution of the contract like the instant case. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on compliance with the
requirement by assuming that the cash surrender value payable to the buyer had been applied to
rentals of the property after respondent failed to pay the installments due.

 In view of the absence of a valid cancellation, the Contract to Sell between GRI and Angeles
remains valid and subsisting, because of GRI’s failure to send a notarized notice of cancellation
and to refund the cash surrender value. Angeles thus had the right to offer to pay the balance of
the purchase price, and GRI had no choice but to accept payment.
 However, the Angeles was unable to exercise this right because the GRI sold the subject lot.
The Court ordered GRI to refund to Angeles the actual value of the lot with 12% interest per annum
computed from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid, or to deliver a substitute lot at
the option of Angeles.

PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP. (NOW PRYCE CORPORATION), PETITIONER,

vs.
NARCISO R. NOLASCO, JR. RESPONDENT.
(G.R. No. 203990, August 24, 2020)

FACTS:

On Jan. 22, 1999, Narciso R. Nolasco, Jr. (Respondent) filed a complaint for recovery of a
sum of money against Pryce Corporation, formerly Pryce Properties Corporation (Pryce)

According to Nolasco, he purchased three lots in 1995 for a total amount of Php 393, 435
through a check in favor of Pryce.

But the latter did not deliver to Nolasco the copies of the lots’ certificate of title and their
sales agreement.
 He was surprised, frustrated and dismayed when he finally received the sales agreement, as it
contained unacceptable conditions to which he conveyed his objections to Pryce.

He averred that since he had not yet signed the sales agreement, there was still no meeting of
the minds between him and Pryce; and despite demands for refund of his deposit payments, Pryce
failed to comply.

Respondent Nolasco impliedly agreed to the unsigned Contract to Sell and harks on the
applicability of RA 6552 or the Maceda Law Pryce countered that Nolasco could not yet be issued
certificate of title since their transaction was not a contract of sale but a contract to sell.

That Nolasco was furnished a copy of the Contract to Sell as early as Nov. 8, 1995, which he
signed and even requested for an amended Contract to Sell to reflect a new Amortization schedule.

Nolasco, under RA No. 6552 or the Maceda Law, was not entitled to a refund of his deposits
since he failed to complete the payments within the grace period provided by Pryce, resulting in their
forfeiture and the rescission of the contract to sell.

It also ruled that under RA 6552 or the Maceda Law, Pryce can rescind the contract of sale for
failure of Nolasco to pay at least 2 years of installments to Pryce.

Furthermore, it ruled that Nolasco was entitled to the refund of payments he made to Pryce
citing Article 1191 of the Civil Code.

CA: Affirmed the RTC in Part. Found that the contract entered into by Pryce and Nolasco was
a contract to sell. It also ruled that Nolasco is entitled to a refund, as Price did not exercise the remedy
of cancellation under RA 6552 and under equity considerations. It also updated the interest on the
monetary award granted to Nolasco pursuant to the pronouncement in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs
CA.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the contract between Pryce and Nolasco was rescinded in accordance with
RA 6552.

 Whether or not petitioner Pryce should refund Nolasco.

RULING:

 NO. The Contract to Sell between Pryce and Nolasco, not validly cancelled.

The Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act, otherwise known as RA 6552 or the Maceda
Law, protects “buyers of real estate on installment payments against onerous and oppressive
conditions.” One of the legal features of it is Sec. 4 thereof, which provides for the remedies
of a defaulting buyer that has paid less than 2 years of installment amortizations for a
purchase of real property.

 YES. The deposit payments made by Nolasco to Pryce must be refunded. It has been held
that in absence of a lawful rescission of a contract governed by RA 6552, the same
remains valid and subsisting. The Court affirms the court below in directing the refund of
the deposit payments made by Nolasco to Pryce.
This buyer’s option to claim refund is not explicitly mentioned in RA 6552, equity
considerations have already filled up this legal vacuum as declared in Orbe, wherein, the
buyer failed to make at least two years of installment payments in consideration of a purchase
of a lot, the seller however failed to cancel their contract through a valid notarial act and sold
the lot in issue to a third person, the Court order the refund of the amounts actually paid by
the buyer, justifying the same with equitable reasons.