PALLERA, Andrea Nicole C.

2018400076
Legal Technique 3F

PART 1: CASE BRIEF

Charles Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

469 F. 2d 466
1972
Facts
Petitioner Charles E. Moritz was a resident of Denver and was a single man who
had never been married. He was a full time employee of a publishing firm in
Philadelphia, maintaining his office in his home. His duties involved extensive
travel, visiting authors, and attending conventions and gatherings of life science
professionals throughout the continental United States.

Commencing in 1958 and through the tax year in question, Mr. Moritz's mother
resided with him. The home was owned by Moritz and all household expenses
during 1968 were paid by him. He provided over half of the total support afforded
his mother during that year who was physically and mentally incapable of caring
for herself. Mrs. Moritz refused to enter a nursing home.

To provide for her care, thereby leaving Moritz free to do his work, he engaged the
services of Miss Cleeta L. Stewart to assist him in the care of his mother. Petitioner
paid Miss Stewart $1,250 in 1968. Of the aggregate compensation paid her, a sum
in excess of $600 is properly allocable to the assurance of Mrs. Moritz's well-
being. On his 1968 return petitioner deducted $600 for ‘household help for invalid
mother.’ The Commissioner disallowed the deduction.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner is entitled under Section 214 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, for expenses incurred in the care of his invalid mother.

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court is entitled for the deduction claimed under Section 14 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which provides that:

“Sec. 214. Expenses for care of certain dependents

 (a) General rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction expenses paid
during the taxable year by a taxpayer who is a woman or widower,
or is a husband whose wife is incapacitated or is institutionalized,
for the care of one or more dependents (as defined in subsection (d)
(1)), but only if such care is for the purpose of enabling the taxpayer
to be gainfully employed.

(d) Definitions.-For purposes of this section-

(2) Widower.-The term 'widower' includes an unmarried individual who

is legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of
separate maintenance.”

Analysis
The Court emphasized that classifications do not per se violate due process or
equal protection principles. However, as noted, Sec. 214 gave the deduction to a
woman or widower, a divorce and a husband whose wife is incapacitated or
institutionalized, but denied it to a man who has not married. The Court stated that
the classification is premised primarily on sex and must be subject to scrutiny
under equal protection principles.

It is true that deductions are a matter of legislative grace and that they must be
authorized by a clear provision under which the taxpayer must qualify. However, if
the Congress determines to grant deductions of a general type, a denial of them to a
particular class may not be based on an invidious discrimination. In the case at bar,
the Court finds that the classification is an invidious discrimination and invalid
under due process principles. It is not one having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation dealing with the amelioration of burdens on the
taxpayer.

The Court concluded that the challenged provision in Sec. 214 is invalid and
should be denied application, and that the benefit of the deduction generally
provided by the statute should be extended to the taxpayer. For these reasons, Mr.
Moritz was entitled to the deduction claimed and the decision of the Tax Court is
accordingly reversed.
Conclusion
This case was a clear depiction that a tax deduction on the basis of sex constitutes a
violation of the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution. The main
objective of the provision in question, specifically Section 14 of the I.R.C, is to
provide caregivers the opportunity to work outside the comforts of their home. It is
not intended to protect women and discriminate against men. In that regard, the
law should be fixed to reflect its intent, by extending the tax deduction to
unmarried men.

Olmstead v. L.C.
527 U.S. 581
1999

Facts
Respondents L. C. and E. W. are mentally retarded women; L. C. has also been
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and E. W., with a personality disorder. Both women
were voluntarily admitted to Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta (GRH), where
they were confined for treatment in a psychiatric unit. Although their treatment
professionals eventually concluded that each of the women could be cared for
appropriately in a community-based program, the women remained
institutionalized at GRH. Seeking placement in community care, L. C. filed this
suit against petitioner state officials (collectively, the State). She alleged that the
State violated Title II of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) which
provides that, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of, a public
entity's services, programs, or activities,” in failing to place her in a community-
based program once her treating professionals determined that such placement was
appropriate. E. W. intervened, stating an identical claim.

Jonathan Zimring, on the consolidated behalf of two female patients with mental
disabilities, challenged Tommy Olmstead, the Commissioner of Georgia's
Department of Human Resources, for the Georgia Regional Hospital's (GRH)
decision to keep the two women in psychiatric isolation. Zimring argued that under
Title II of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the women had to be
moved to the most communally integrated setting possible. Defending GRH's
decision, Olmstead argued that although the women were medically cleared for a
more integrated treatment setting, financial constraints and the need to
fundamentally alter treatment programs prevented this from happening.
Issue
Whether or not the unjustified placement or retention of persons in institutions
severely limits their exposure to the outside community, constituting a form of
discrimination based on disability prohibited by Title II of the ADA.

Ruling
Yes. The ADA both requires all public entities to refrain from discrimination and
specifically identifies unjustified “segregation” of persons with disabilities as a
form of discrimination. The recognition that unjustified institutional isolation of
persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination reflects two evident judgments.
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from
community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated
are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life. Second, confinement
in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals,
including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence,
educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.

Analysis
The Court found that the ADA required the placement of patients with mental
disabilities in "integrated settings" when they are medically cleared for such
settings, they themselves express a desire for such settings, and the resources for
such a transfer are available. This Court emphasizes that nothing in the ADA or its
implementing regulations condones termination of institutional settings for persons
unable to handle or benefit from community settings. Nor is there any federal
requirement that community-based treatment be imposed on patients who do not
desire it. In this case, however, it is not genuinely disputed that L. C. and E. W. are
individuals “qualified” for non institutional care: The State’s own professionals
determined that community-based treatment would be appropriate for L. C. and E.
W., and neither woman opposed such treatment.

The Court ruled that, under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide
community based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when the State's
treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, the affected
persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably
accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State and the
needs of others with mental disabilities. The Court added that financial constraints
might be significant if the state can show that allocation of resources to one patient
will cause harm to others. The case was remanded for a better analysis of GRH
spending priorities.
Conclusion
States are required to place persons with mental disabilities in community settings
rather than in institutions when the State’s treatment professionals have determined
that community placement is appropriate, the transfer from institutional care to a
less restrictive setting is not opposed by the affected individual, and the placement
can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to
the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.

United States v. Virginia

518 U.S. 515
1996
Facts
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is a sole single-sexed school among Virginia’s 15
public institutions of higher learning. VMI’s mission is to produce “citizen
soldiers”, men prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service. VMI
achieves its mission through its “adversative method”, which is characterized by
physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy,
etc. The United States sued Virginia and VMI, alleging that VMI's exclusively
male admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.

The District Court ruled in VMI's favor. The Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered
Virginia to remedy the constitutional violation. In response, Virginia proposed a
parallel program for women: Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL),
located at Mary Baldwin College, a private liberal arts school for women. The
District Court found that Virginia's proposal satisfied the Constitution's equal
protection requirement, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The appeals court
deferentially reviewed Virginia's plan and determined that provision of single-
gender educational options was a legitimate objective. Maintenance of single-sex
programs, the court concluded, was essential to that objective. The court
recognized, however, that its analysis risked bypassing equal protection scrutiny, so
it fashioned an additional test, asking whether VMI and VWIL students would
receive "substantively comparable" benefits. Although the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that the VWIL degree lacked the historical benefit and prestige of a
VMI degree, the court nevertheless found the educational opportunities at the two
schools sufficiently comparable.

Issue
Whether or not the exclusion of Virginia Military Institute (VMI) of qualified
women violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
Ruling
Yes. The Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional.
VMI has shown no “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding all women.
In this case, it has been regarded that, “benign” justifications offered in defense of
absolute exclusions will not be accepted automatically. The notion that admitting
women would downgrade VMI’s stature and destroy the school’s adversity system
was hardly proved. Generalizations about the way women are or what is
appropriate for them will no longer serve to justify denying opportunity to those
whose talents and capabilities make them exceptions to the average description.

Analysis
The Court opined that in cases of official classification based on gender, the
proffered justification must be exceedingly persuasive; that the burden of
justification was demanding and rested entirely on the state; that the state must
show at least that the challenged classification served important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed were substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives; that the justification was genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation; and that it did not rely
on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences
of males and females. The Court held that VMI failed to satisfy its burden of
providing an exceedingly persuasive justification for its sex-based admissions
policy or that the policy was substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.

Moreover, VWIL does not qualify as VMI’s substitute. VWI’s student body,
faculty, course offerings and facilities do not match VMI’s. The program could not
offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. The VWIL would not provide
women with the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities,
financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its
male cadets. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI
and VWIL was misplaced. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive
comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard,
requiring that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with
"heightened scrutiny." When evaluated with such "heightened scrutiny," Virginia's
plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as
VMI provides its men and so it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection
clause.
This case calls into question what differences between men and women are real,
i.e., legitimate basis upon which to draw distinctions, for constitutional purposes.
Military training facilities that segregate men from women without a compelling
reason violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if
the women’s facility is roughly comparable to the men’s facility.

Conclusion
Gender-based classifications of the government can be defended only by
exceedingly persuasive justifications. The State must show that its classification
serves important governmental objectives and that the means employed are
substantially related to those objectives. The justification must be genuine, not
hypothesized. And it must not rely on over-broad generalizations about the
differences between males and females.

Importance of these cases to me and to the legal profession in general

The aforementioned cases are among the many Supreme Court cases that highlight
the legacy of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg, the woman ever to be
appointed to the Supreme Court, paved the way for women’s rights, equality and
anti-discrimination. Indeed, she is woman of grace, passion and substance, a
fighter who tirelessly strived to battle inequality and discrimination not just for
herself but for the entirety of American history. Justice Ginsburg has triumphed the
Supreme Court leading to landmark anti-discrimination rulings. In her words, she
wrote that any law that “denies to women, simply because they are women, full
citizenship stature - equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and
contribute to society” violated the equal protection Clause. During her career, she
never stood behind her commitment in achieving and providing for a more just and
equal America.

In the case of United States v. Virginia, Justice Ginsberg exemplary provided that,
“Neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with equal protection when
a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full
citizenship stature-equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and
contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities.” It is very
notable that in the course of her career, Justice Ginsburg remained strong of her
principles and morals despite the numerous setbacks and hindrances she
encountered. These cases are emolument of her passion to serve the people and to
fight against any form of discrimination, inequality and injustices. Justice Ginsburg
is an inspiration to many including me for her principles set a great standard that
aspiring lawyers and practicing lawyers must uphold in the pursuit of justice.
PART 2: RESEARCH
It is a well-founded principle that a competent, independent and impartial judiciary
is essential for the courts to fulfill their role in upholding the Constitution and the
rule of law. The judiciary is imbued with public interest and confidence which
presupposes that judges must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust
and service to enhance and maintain confidence with the judicial system. In the
words of Holmes, “If a man goes into law it pays to be a master of it, and to be a
master of it means to look straight through all the dramatic incidents and to discern
the true basis for prophecy. Therefore, it is well to have an accurate notion of what
you mean by law, by a right, by a duty, by malice, intent, and negligence, by
ownership, by possession, and so forth.” In this regard, Holmes is expressing that
in the process of judicial decision-making, a judge must endeavor diligently to
ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan or personal
interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. One must render a just and impartial
decision, in a manner that is free from any suspicion as to its fairness and
impartiality, as well as the judge’s integrity.

Judicial decision-making in the society is of prime importance as it is an

embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. The public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary must be promoted at upheld at all
times. The confidence of the people in the judicial system is founded not only on
the wide magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the
bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are
expected to possess. In the performance of judicial decision-making, it is
incumbent upon the judges to carry out their judicial duties without favor, bias, or
prejudice. Any form of impropriety or partiality in all judicial activities must be
prohibited. It applies not only to the decision in itself but also as to the process by
which the decision is made.

In the Philippine legal system, judicial decision-making is paramount for the

reason that it is a cornerstone of the entire justice system. The duty of the judges
involve ascertaining the law in the case before the bench and to apply the law
which is applicable in the facts and circumstances of the said case. Judicial
decision-making necessitates the comprehensive and extensive legal knowledge of
both the common and statutory law, as well as the ability of the judge to determine
the applicable rule of law in rendering a judgement to a case before it. Moreover, it
is important to note that in a legal system that regards precedents as part of
substantive law, the judicial decisions must be just, fair and based on the rule of
law. Judicial decisions are significant as it is one that establishes a legal rule or
principle that is employed to resolve future cases.