Manotok vs.
Heirs of Homer Barque
Facts:
- Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the
late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the
name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted
the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, sometime in 1988
- Upon being notified of the petition for administrative
reconstitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their
opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under
reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconstituted title
TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of
petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is spurious.
- Reconstituting officer denied the application of the
respondent
- Appealed to the LRA: The LRA ruled that the reconstituting
officer should not have required the submission of documents other
than the owner’s duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the
petition and should have confined himself with the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title
o Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners’ title was
fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that it is only the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed
fraudulently reconstituted.  It thus opined that respondents’ title may
only be reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners’ title
was void and should therefore be cancelled
CA: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed
Resolution of the LRA dated June 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED
Issue:
(a) the LRA has no authority to annul their title;
(b) the reconstitution of respondents’ Torrens title would be a
collateral attack on petitioners’ existing title;
(c)  they were not given the opportunity to be heard,
specifically the chance to defend the validity of their Torrens title;
(d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the
LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners’ t
title; and
(e)  the ruling in Ortigas  was misapplied.    such laws take great care to ensure that a petition
 
Held:
2009 CASE:
Facts are the same
Additional: On 7 September 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo
Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which was attached their
petition in intervention. [33]  Movants alleged that the property subject of
the petition in G.R. No. 162335 and G.R. No. 162605 was owned by
them. They claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente
Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 which covered lot 823
of the Piedad Estate. Moreover, they attached to their petition the
findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the
documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to
be
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 12 June 2005, and the
Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of the
Court’s First Division are hereby SET ASIDE, and the
Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 is
RECALLED. The Amended Decision dated 24 February
2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Amended Decision
dated 7 November 2003and the Resolution dated 12
March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, and the
Resolutions of the Land Registration Authority dated 24
June 1998  and 14 June 1998 in Admin. Recons. No. Q-
547-A[97] are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 
The instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with  this
Resolution. The Court of Appeals is directed to raffle
these remanded cases immediately upon receipt of this
Resolution.
Whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the
annulment of the Manotok title through the petitions raised before
it by the Barques and the Manotoks.
NO
- Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known
as the Property Registration Decree, provides that “[a] certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack […and] cannot be
altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.”[38] 
- Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise
incidentally from the administrative proceeding for
reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from
that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could
it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the
LRA’s administrative proceeding.
- There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have
original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise
adjudicate questions over ownership of property. 
o  Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction
over the Barques’ and the Manotoks’ petitions,
albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate
jurisdiction[40] over the ruling of the LRA, also
pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able
to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the
course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the
LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel
a Torrens title in the first place.  
- Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions
of the Land Registration Commissioner, as follows:
o Nowhere in the aforecited provision is it stated that
the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the
Barques are unable to point to any basis in law
that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such
cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which
authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles
in limited cases. In fact, as we shall see shortly
for administrative reconstitution of title will not
disturb existing Torrens titles.
The next matter of inquiry is whether the LRA had acted correctly
in ordering, conditional as it may have been, the administrative
reconstitution of the Barque title.
 Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732,
administrative reconstitution of titles is permitted where the certificates
of titles have been lost due to “flood, fire and other force majeure.” The
petitioner in such a case is required to execute an affidavit,
containing the following averments:
-
- (3) That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or
investigation, administrative or judicial, regarding its genuineness or
due execution or issuance;
Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act  No. 6732,
further provides:
Sec. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and
subsequently found or recovered, is not in the name of the same
person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate of title has been
issued, the Register of Deeds or the party concerned should bring the
matter to the attention of the proper regional trial court, which, after
due notice and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the
reconstituted certificate of title and render, with respect to the
memoranda of new liens and encumbrances, if any, made in the
reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, such judgment
as justice and equity may require: Provided, however, That if the
reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any
deed or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an order of
 the court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the procedure
prescribed above, with respect to the memorandum of new liens and
encumbrances made on the reconstituted certificate of title, after its
reconstitution, shall be followed with respect to the new certificate of
title, and to such new liens and encumbrances, if any, as may have
been on the latter, after the issuance thereof.[42]
          
 Rep. Act No. 6732 itself also states:
Section 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud,
deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party
obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof.
 
 
Section 12. Any person who by means of fraud, deceit or
other machination obtains or attempts to obtain a reconstituted title
shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be
liable for imprisonment for a period of not less than two years but not
exceeding five years or the payment of a fine of not less than Twenty
thousand pesos but not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos or
both at the discretion of the court.
Any public officer or employee who knowingly approves or
assists in securing a decision allowing reconstitution in favor of any
person not entitled thereto shall be subject to criminal prosecution and,
upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment of not less than five
years but not exceeding ten years or payment of a fine of not less than
Fifty thousand pesos but not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos
or both at the discretion of the court and perpetual disqualification from
holding public office.[43]
 
- These provisions indubitably establish that the administrative
reconstitution of Torrens titles is intended for non-controversial cases,
or especially where the subject property is not covered by an existing
title in favor of a person other than the applicant. Such an implication is
consonant with the rule that the reconstitution proceedings are not the
venue for confirmation or adjudication of title, but merely a means by
which a previously adjudicated title whose original has been lost or
destroyed may be reissued to its owner.[
 it would be best for this Court to test the premises under which the
LRA and the Court of Appeals had concluded that the
Barques had a valid claim to titles
o Discrepancies on the part of the Barques:
between the subdivision plan it relies on and the
DENR record. They also do not contradict the
finding of the National Archives that there is no
copy in its files of the deed of sale allegedly
executed between Setosta and Barque
 These discrepancies highlight the error
of the LRA and the Court of Appeals in
acknowledging the right of the Barques
to seek reconstitution of their purported
Barque title. Even assuming that the
petition for reconstitution should not
have been dismissed due to the
Manotok title, it is apparent that the
Barques’ claim of ownership is
exceedingly weak.
Can the Court declare the Manotok title void?
- The Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient
evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok
title. All that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet
refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotoks’
claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination,
the formal reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not
a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to receive
and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of
Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function.

- If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the

LRA, and it appears from the official records that the subject property
is already covered by an existing Torrenstitle in the name of another
person, there is nothing further the LRA can do but to dismiss the
petition. The dismissal of such petition is subject to judicial review, but
the only relevant inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on whether or
not there is a previously existing title covering that property. Neither the
LRA nor the Court of Appeals at that point may inquire into the validity
of the title or the competing claims over the property. The only remedy
is an action before the RTC for the cancellation of the existing title,
whether by the competing claimant or by the OSG on behalf of the
Republic.

The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas & Company

Limited Partnership v. Velasco, [

- The Court of Appeals herein could not

have equated its annulment of the Manotok title with that
undertaken by the Court in Ortigas since, unlike in Ortigas,
the Court of Appeals was not endowed with the proper
appellate jurisdiction to annul the Manotok title. As earlier
pointed out, since the LRA had no original jurisdiction to
cancel the Manotok title, it follows that the Court of Appeals
had no jurisdictional competence to extend the same relief,
even while reviewing the LRA’s ruling.
Clearly, Ortigas cannot be applied as a binding precedent to
these cases. 

The 2005 Decision accepted the findings of the LRA and the Court
of Appeals that the Manotok title was spurious and accordingly
sanctioned its cancellation, even though no direct attack on the
title had been initiated before a trial court. That the 2005 Decision
erred in that regard is a necessary consequence following our
earlier explanation of why the mere existence of the Manotok title
necessarily barred the LRA from inquiring into the validity of that
title.