G.R. No. 95664 September 13, 1991 5174 on February 13, 1988. On the other hand, sec. 27 of E.O.
13, 1988. On the other hand, sec. 27 of E.O. 229
NINA M. QUISMUNDO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY,
FELICISIMO OCAMPO, CATALINO OCAMPO, PEDRO
MARQUEZ, ROMEO ENRIQUEZ and HERMINIO
YUSON, respondents.
Aladdin F. Trinidad for petitioner.
The Trial Attorney III for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the
decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 16418,1 dated November 29, 1989 and October 9, 1990,
respectively, which upheld the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, Branch 58, in AGRA. Case No. 5174.2
It appears that on February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants
of petitioner, filed a complaint with the trial court praying that their
relationship with petitioner be changed from share tenancy to a
leasehold system, pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended, their request therefor having been denied by petitioner.3
On March 2, 1988, private respondents further filed a motion for the
issuance of an order authorizing the supervision by the deputy sheriff
of the court of the harvesting and liquidation of the 1987-1988
sugarcane crops, which motion was granted by the trial court in an
order dated March 3, 1988.4
On March 16, 1988, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action since the law that should allegedly
govern the relationship of the parties is Act No. 4115, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 271, and not Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit in an
order dated June 2, 1988.5
On June 18, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
denial order, invoking as an additional ground the lack of jurisdiction
of the court over the case under the authority and by reason of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically Executive
Order No. 229 and Republic Act No. 6657.6
Pending the resolution of said motion for reconsideration, private
respondents filed another motion dated November 9, 1988, for the
supervision of harvesting. On December 6, 1988, the trial court
granted the motion of private respondents and denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.7
Petitioner then elevated the controversy to respondent court on a
petition for certiorari but, as stated at the outset, said court upheld the
jurisdiction of the court below, ruling that:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Second. The right of the private respondents to choose leasehold
tenancy is governed by RA 3844. We find nothing in Proclamation
No. 131, E.O. No. 229 and RA 6657 divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction over the case. To be sure, RA 6657 was enacted on June
10, 1988 or later than the filing of the Complaint in AGRA Case No.
approved on July 22, 1987 provides that "... the provisions of RA
3844 and other agrarian laws not inconsistent with this order shall
have suppletory effect." We see no inconsistency between RA 3844
and E.O. No. 229 with respect to the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the cause of action of the private respondent who desires to
adopt a leasehold system pursuant to RA 3844. E.O. No. 229 vests
quasi-judicial powers on the DAR to determine and adjudicate
"agrarian reform matters" subject of Proclamation No. 229.8 We hold
that the right of private respondents to adopt a leasehold system under
RA 3844 is distinct and separate and not affected by the enactment of
E.O. No. 229 and, hence, may be enforced pursuant to the judicial
mechanism provided for by RA 3844.9
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent
Court of Appeals in its resolution dated October 9, 1990.10 Not
satisfied therewith, petitioner is now before us raising the sole issue
of jurisdiction.
It is the contention of petitioner that the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City has no jurisdiction to try the case at bar considering that
the exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate agrarian cases has
already been vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) by
Executive Order No. 229, as amended by Republic Act No. 6657.
We find said contention tenable.
Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
instituted by Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests in the
Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters. The pertinent provision of
said executive order reads as follows:
SECTION 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is
hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR
and the Department of Agriculture (DA).
The DAR shall have powers to punish for contempt and to issue
subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its order or
decisions.
The decisions of the DAR may, in proper cases, be appealed to the
Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory
notwithstanding such appeal.
The above quoted provision should be deemed to have
repealed11 Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946
which invested the then courts of agrarian relations with original
exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights
granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances
promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.
Formerly, under Presidential Decree No. 946, amending Chapter IX
of Republic Act No. 3844, the courts of agrarian relations had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over "cases involving the rights
and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural
land except those cognizable by the National Labor Relations
Commission" and "questions involving rights granted and obligations
1
imposed by laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules
Page
and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the agrarian
reform program," except those matters involving the administrative
implementation of the transfer of land to the tenant-farmer under
Presidential Decree No. 27 and amendments thereto which shall be
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.12
In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian
relations were integrated into the regional trial courts and the
jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts.13
However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which
took effect on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for
publication in the Official Gazette,14 the regional trial courts were
divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.
The said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian
Reform.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and another judgment is hereby
rendered declaring NULL and VOID the orders of the lower court
dated March 3, 1988, June 2, 1988 and December 6, 1988. The
respondent judge, or whosoever now presides over the court a quo or
to which the case is assigned, is ordered to cease and desist from
further proceeding with AGRA Case No. 5176 which is hereby
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the
refiling of the same with the Department of Agrarian Reform.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, in the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, at
the time private respondents filed their complaint, was already bereft
of authority to act on the same. The allegation of private respondents
that their complaint was filed on November 3, 1987, and not on
February 13, 1988 as found by the Court of Appeals, is immaterial
since as of either date Executive Order No. 229 was already in effect.

The foregoing holding is further sustained by the passage of Republic

Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which took
effect on June 15, 1988. The said law contains provisions which
evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the
Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all
agrarian reform matters.

Section 50 of said Act substantially reiterates Section 17 of Executive

Order No. 229 vesting in the Department of Agrarian Reform
exclusive and original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, to wit:

SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is

hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).

x x x           x x x          x x x

In addition, Sections 56 and 57 thereof provide for the designation by

the Supreme Court of at least one (1) branch of the regional trial court
within each province to act as a special agrarian court. The said
special court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction only over
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners
and the prosecution of criminal offenses under said Act. Said
provisions thus delimit the jurisdiction of the regional trial court in
agrarian cases only to these two instances.

It is also worth noting at this juncture that the resolution of this case
by the Department of Agrarian Reform is to the best advantage of
private respondents since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian
disputes, being the administrative agency possessing the necessary
expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary
in nature and the department is not bound by technical rules of
procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and
other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive
2

action or proceeding.15
Page
[UDK No. 9864 :  December 3, 1990.]
RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE of the [CAR] RTC, Branch 4,
Iligan City, and SPOUSES DOMINGO and EUGENIA
MARTIL, Respondents.
 
DECISION
 
NARVASA, J.:
 
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, acting as a special
agrarian court, in the light of Executive Orders Numbered 129-A and
229 and Republic Act No. 6657, is what is at issue in the proceeding
at bar.
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in March, 1988, "an
agrarian case for damages by reason of the(ir) unlawful dispossession
. . .was tenants from the landholding" owned by the Spouses
Domingo and Eugenia Martil. 1 Several persons were also impleaded
as defendants, including the Philippine National Bank, it being
alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a mortgage
on the land involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the
acquisition of the property by the bank as the highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale, and in the sale by the latter, some time later, of
portions of the land to the other persons named as its co-defendants
(all employees of the National Steel Corporation), and it being prayed
that mortgage and the transactions thereafter made in relation thereto
be annulled and voided. 2
In an Order rendered on August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G.
Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint. 3 He opined that by virtue of
Executive Order No. 229 "providing the mechanisms for the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
approved on July 24, 1987" — Executive No. 129-A approved on
July 26, 1987, as well as the Rules of the Adjudication Board of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform.:-cralaw
The Tangub Spouses filed a petition for Certiorari with this Court,
docketed as UDK-8867, assigned to the Second Division. Discerning
however no special and important reason for taking cognizance of the
action, this Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals, that
tribunal having concurrent jurisdiction to act thereon.: nad
The Court of Appeals, by Decision promulgated on October 23, 1989,
4 dismissed the petition, finding that the jurisdictional question had
been correctly resolved by the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals,
adverted to a case earlier decided by it, on August 30, 1989,
Estanislao Casinillo v. Hon. Felipe G. Javier, Jr., et al., in which it
was "emphatically ruled that agrarian cases no longer fall under the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under the jurisdiction
of the DAR Adjudication Board." 5 The ruling was grounded on the
provisions of Executive Orders Numbered 229, approved on July 22,
1987, and 129-A, issued on July 26, 1987, in relation to Republic Act
No. 6657, effective on June 15, 1988. Said executive orders, it was
pointed out, were issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
undoubtedly in the exercise of her revolutionary powers in
accordance with Section 6, Article XVIII [Transitory Provisions] of
the 1986 Constitution providing that the "incumbent President shall
continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is
convened."
The petitioner Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once again
before this Court, contending that the Trial Court's "order of
dismissal of August 26, 1988, and the decision of the Honorable
Court of Appeals affirming it, are patently illegal and
unconstitutional" because they deprive "a poor tenant access to courts
and directly violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang 129."
The petition is without merit.
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). It states that the
program —
". . . shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produce, all public and private agricultural land as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 dated July 22, 1987, including whenever
applicable in accordance with law, other lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture."
Section 17 thereof.
1) vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with "quasi-judicial
powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters," and
2) granted it "jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation
of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture [DA], as
well as "powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena,
subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions."
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A made the Department of
Agrarian Reform "responsible for implementing the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, and, for such purpose," authorized it,
among others, to —
"(g) Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and
resolve agrarian conflicts and land tenure problems; . . (and)
x  x  x
(j) Approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses: . ."
And Section 5 of the same Executive Order No. 129-A specified the
powers and functions of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
including the following::- nad
"(b) Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for
contempt and issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, writ of
execution of its decision, and other legal processes to ensure
successful and expeditious program implementation; the decisions of
the Department may in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional
Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such
appeal;
x  x  x
(h) Provide free legal service to agrarian reform beneficiaries and
resolve agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems as may be
provided for by laws;
(i) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other
land uses as may be provided . . ."
The jurisdiction thus conferred on the Department of Agrarian
Reform, i.e.:
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform;
(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems;
and
(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or
3
readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
Page
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses,
is evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the
Regional Trial Court by Presidential Decree No. 946, which extended
to the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land, and other matters affecting tenant-farmers,
agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-cultivators, farms' cooperatives or
organizations under laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, instructions,
Rules and Regulations in relation to the agrarian reform program. 6
Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have been eliminated by its
being subsumed in the broad jurisdiction conferred on the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The intention evidently was to
transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a
proposition stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the
Department for the implementation of the executive orders just
quoted. 7 The rules included the creation of the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions
of the Department, and the allocation to it of —
". . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested
upon it by law, and all cases, disputes, controversies and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under Executive Order No. 229, Executive
Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6289, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations."
The implementing rules also declare that "(s)pecifically, such
jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to . . (that theretofore
vested in the Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights
and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws . . ."
The matter has since been further and definitively clarified by
Republic Act No. 6657, which was signed into law by President
Aquino on June 10, 1988 and became effective immediately after its
"publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation" on
June 15, 1988. The Act makes references to and explicitly recognizes
the effectivity and applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229. 8
More particularly, the Act echoes the provisions of Section 17 of
Presidential Decree No. 229, supra, investing the Department of
Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction, generally, over all cases
involving agrarian laws, although, as shall shortly be pointed out, it
restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction over two
groups of cases. Section 50 reads as follows:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources [DENR].
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but
shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in
a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity
and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform
rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take
testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of
books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs through
sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the
power to punish direct and indirect contempts in the same manner
and subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.
x  x  x
Notwithstanding an appeal to the court of appeals, the decision of the
DAR shall be immediately executory." 9
The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely
divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of
RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on
"Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts
designated by the Supreme Court — at least one (1) branch within
each province — to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts qua
Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same
law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-
owners," and
2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."
In these cases, "(t)he Rules of Court shall apply . . unless modified by
. . . (the) Act."
It is relevant to mention in this connection that —
(1) appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be
taken by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within
fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the decision, . ." 10 and
(2) appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on
any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other
pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of
Appeals by Certiorari 11 except as otherwise provided . . . within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact
of the DAR [being] final and conclusive if based on substantial
evidence." 12
The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in
dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a case concerning the
rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving
the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special
Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more
particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established
precisely to wield the adjudicatory powers of the Department, supra.
The petitioner had not bothered to substantiate her contention that she
has been denied access to the courts, which is just as well. The
contention is on its face utterly without merit. It may profit her and
her counsel to realize that apart from granting all concerned parties
access to a quasi-judicial forum (the Adjudication Board of the
Department of Agrarian Reform), the law strives to make resolution
of controversies therein more expeditious and inexpensive, by
providing not only that the Board "shall not be bound by technical
rules of procedure and evidence," supra, but also that, as explicitly
stated by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50 of the Act::-cralaw
"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves,
their fellow farmers, or their organizations in any proceedings before
the DAR: Provided, however, That when there are two or more
representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should
choose only one among themselves to represent such party or group
before any DAR proceedings."
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED, and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16725 dated
October 23, 1989, AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
4
Page

G.R. No. 112526             March 16, 2005
STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JUAN B. AMANTE, et al.
Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
By virtue of the En Banc Resolution issued on January 13, 2004, the
Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend the Rules so as
to allow it to consider and resolve the second Motion for
Reconsideration of respondents,1 after the motion was heard on oral
arguments on August 13, 2003. On July 9, 2004,2 the Court resolved
to submit for resolution the second Motion for Reconsideration
in G.R. No. 112526 together with G.R. No. 118338 in view of the
Resolution of the Court dated January 15, 2001 issued in G.R. No.
118838,3 consolidating the latter case with G.R. No. 112526, the
issues therein being interrelated.4 Hence, the herein Amended
Decision.
The factual background of the two cases is as follows:
The Canlubang Estate in Laguna is a vast landholding previously
titled in the name of the late Speaker and Chief Justice Jose Yulo, Sr.
Within this estate are two parcels of land (hereinafter referred to as
the "subject property") covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891
measuring 254.766 hectares and part of Barangay Casile,
subsequently titled in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation (SRRDC), the majority stockholder of which is C.J.
Yulo and Sons, Inc.
The subject property was involved in civil suits and administrative
proceedings that led to the filing of G.R. Nos. 112526 and 118838,
thus:
Injunction Case  Filed by Amante, et al.
On December 6, 1985, Amante, et al., who are the private
respondents in G.R. No. 112526 and petitioners in G.R. No. 118838,
instituted an action for injunction with damages in the Regional Trial
Court of Laguna (Branch 24) against Luis Yulo, SRRDC, and several
SRRDC security personnel, docketed as Civil Case No. B-2333.
Amante, et al. alleged that: they are residents of Barangay Casile,
Cabuyao, Laguna, which covers an area of around 300 hectares; in
1910, their ancestors started occupying the area, built their houses
and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon, and since then, have been
peacefully occupying the land; some time in June 3, 1985, SRRDC’s
security people illegally entered Bgy. Casile and fenced the area;
SRRDC’s men also entered the barangay on November 4, 1985, cut
down the trees, burned their huts, and barred the lone jeepney from
entering the Canlubang Sugar Estate; as a result of these acts,
Amante, et al. were deprived of possession and cultivation of their
lands. Thus, they claimed damages, sought the issuance of permanent
injunction and proposed that a right of way be declared.5
In their Answer, the defendants denied the allegations and disclaimed
any control and supervision over its security personnel. Defendant
SRRDC also alleged that as the real owner of the property, it was the
one that suffered damages due to the encroachment on the property.6
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on
August 17, 1987,7 but this was subsequently dissolved by the Court
of Appeals (CA) on April 22, 1988 in its decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
13908.8
After trial on the merits, the trial court, on January 20, 1992, rendered
a decision ordering Amante, et al. to vacate the property, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs hereby dismissing
the complaint and amended complaint.
The plaintiffs are hereby ordered to vacate the parcels of land
belonging to the defendants Luis Yulo and Sta. Rosa Realty. They are
likewise enjoined from entering the subject parcels of land.
Although attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation are recoverable in
case of a clearly unfounded civil action against the plaintiff (Enervida
vs. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 339), this Court resolves not to award
attorney’s fees etc. in favor of the defendants because the plaintiffs
appear to have acted in good faith in filing the present civil action
(Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65) and that it would not be just and
equitable to award the same in the case at bar. (Liwanag vs. Court of
Appeals, 121 SCRA 354) Accordingly, the other reliefs prayed for by
the defendants are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.9
Amante, et al. appealed the aforesaid decision to the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 38182.
On June 28, 1994, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court in the injunction case. The dispositive portion of the
appellate court’s decision10 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the defendants-appellees are
hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs-appellants
nominal damages in the amount of P5,000.00 per plaintiff. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
Nominal damages were awarded by the CA because it found that
SRRDC violated Amante, et al.’s rights as possessors of the subject
property.12
Amante, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, pointing out
the DARAB’s decision placing the property under compulsory
acquisition, and the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234, affirming
the same.13 The CA, however, denied the motion, with the
modification that only SRRDC and the defendants-security guards
should be held jointly and severally liable for the nominal damages
awarded. It also made the clarification that the decision should not
preempt any judgment or prejudice the right of any party in the
agrarian reform case pending before the Supreme Court (G.R. No.
112526).14
5
Page
Thus, Amante, et al. filed on March 2, 1995, herein petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 118838 on the following grounds:
4.1. The Court of Appeals decided the case contrary to law or
applicable Supreme Court decisions because:
4.1.1 First, petitioners may not be lawfully evicted from their
landholdings considering that:
-- (a) Petitioners are already the registered owners under the torrens
system of the properties in question since February 26, 1992 by virtue
of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law;
-- (b) The Court of Appeals has affirmed the Regional Trial Court of
Laguna’s dismissal of the ejectment cases filed by respondent
SRRDC against petitionerS; and
-- (c) Assuming for the sake of argument only that petitioners are not
yet the registered owners of the properties in question, respondents
may not raise the issue of ownership in this case for injunction with
damages, the same to be ventilated in a separate action, not in this
case brought to prevent respondents from committing further acts of
dispossession [Bacar v. del Rosario et al., 171 SCRA 451 (1989)].
4.1.2 Second, petitioners are entitled to moral, exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees, instead of mere nominal damages, considering
that the Court of Appeals found respondents to have unlawfully and
illegally disturbed petitioners’ peaceful and continuous possession.15
Ejectment Cases  Filed by SRRDC
Between October 1986 and August 1987, after the injunction case
was filed by Amante, et al., SRRDC filed with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna, several complaints for forcible
entry with preliminary injunction and damages against Amante, et al.,
docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 250, 258, 260, 262 and 266. SRRDC
alleged that some time in July 1987, they learned that Amante, et al.,
without their authority and through stealth and strategy, were
clearing, cultivating and planting on the subject property; and that
despite requests from SRRDC’s counsel, Amante, et al. refused to
vacate the property, prompting them to file the ejectment
cases.16 Amante, et al. denied that SRRDC are the absolute owners of
the property, stating that they have been in peaceful possession
thereof, through their predecessors-in-interest, since 1910.17
On May 24, 1991, the MTC-Cabuyao rendered its decision in favor
of SRRDC. Amante, et al. were ordered to surrender possession and
vacate the subject property. The decision was appealed to the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna (Assisting Court).
On February 18, 1992, the RTC dismissed the ejectment cases on the
ground that the subject property is an agricultural land being tilled by
Amante, et al., hence it is the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), which has jurisdiction over the dispute.18 The RTC’s
dismissal of the complaints was brought to the CA via a petition for
review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 33382.19 In turn, the CA
dismissed the petition per its Decision dated January 17, 1995 on the
ground that SRRDC failed to show any prior physical possession of
the subject property that would have justified the filing of the
ejectment cases.20 Also, the CA did not sustain the RTC’s finding that
the subject properties are agricultural lands and Amante, et al. are
tenant/farmers thereof, as the evidence on record does not support
such finding. The parties did not file any motion for reconsideration
from the Court of Appeals’ dismissal, hence, it became final and
executory.21
Administrative Proceedings
While the injunction and ejectment cases were still in process, it
appears that in August, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage to SRRDC, informing
petitioners that the property covered by TCT Nos. T-81949, T-84891
and T-92014 is scheduled for compulsory acquisition under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).22 SRRDC filed
its "Protest and Objection" with the MARO on the grounds that the
area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes, as it was rugged in
terrain with slopes of 18% and above, and that the occupants of the
land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as
beneficiaries.23 Thereafter, as narrated in the Decision of the Court
dated October 12, 2001 in G.R. No. 112526, the following
proceedings ensued:
On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the
BARC chairman answered the protest and objection stating that the
slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is
suitable and economically viable for agricultural purposes, as
evidenced by the Certification of the Department of Agriculture,
municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna.
On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a summary
investigation report and forwarded the Compulsory Acquisition
Folder Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (hereafter, PARO).
On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his
endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform.
On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of the
Bureau of Land Acquisition and Development, DAR forwarded two
(2) Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders covering the landholding
of SRRDC, covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891 to the
President, Land Bank of the Philippines for further review and
evaluation.
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam
Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition to petitioner,
stating that petitioner’s landholdings covered by TCT Nos. T-
81949 and T-84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800
hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively,
had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters separately
addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the Director, Bureau of
Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting
not only the amount of compensation offered by DAR for the
property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition.
On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the
DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657, Section 16.
On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders
6
previously referred for review and evaluation to the Director of
Page
BLAD mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding due
to some deficiencies.
On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez
wrote the Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to forward the
two (2) claim folders involving the property of SRRDC to the
DARAB for it to conduct summary proceedings to determine the
just compensation for the land.
On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the
Philippines stating that its property under the aforesaid land titles
were exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified
as watershed area and were the subject of a pending petition for land
conversion.
On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over
the two (2) claim folders (CACF’s) to the Executive Director of the
DAR Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation. Acting
on the CACF’s, on September 10, 1990, the Board promulgated a
resolution asking the office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) to first resolve two (2) issues before it proceeds with the
summary land valuation proceedings.
The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether
the subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory
Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for
land conversion of the parcels of land may be granted.
On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through
the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant Secretary for
Luzon Operations) and the Regional Director of Region IV,
submitted a report answering the two issues raised. According to
them, firstly, by virtue of the issuance of the notice of coverage on
August 11, 1989, and notice of acquisition on December 12, 1989,
the property is covered under compulsory acquisition. Secondly,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also
supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said property.
During the consideration of the case by the Board, there was no
pending petition for land conversion specifically concerning the
parcels of land in question.
On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the
parties interested, setting the hearing for the administrative valuation
of the subject parcels of land on March 6, 1991. However, on
February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma. Elena P. Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for
SRRDC, wrote the Board requesting for its assistance in the
reconstruction of the records of the case because the records could
not be found as her co-counsel, Atty. Ricardo Blancaflor, who
originally handled the case for SRRDC and had possession of all the
records of the case was on indefinite leave and could not be
contacted. The Board granted counsel’s request and moved the
hearing on April 4, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board
for the latter to resolve SRRDC’s petition for exemption from
CARP coverage before any administrative valuation of their
landholding could be had by the Board.
On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held
and subsequently, different dates of hearing were set without
objection from counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991
hearing, the subdivision plan of subject property at Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna was submitted and marked as Exhibit "5" for SRRDC. At the
hearing on April 23, 1991, the Land Bank asked for a period of one
month to value the land in dispute.
At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning
Administrator Generoso B. Opina was presented. The certification
issued on September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land subject of
the case were classified as "Industrial Park" per Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 45-89 dated March 29, 1989.
To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands
to the farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991, petitioner filed a
petition with DARAB to disqualify private respondents as
beneficiaries. However, DARAB refused to address the issue of
beneficiaries.24
...
On December 19, 1991, the DARAB promulgated a decision,
affirming the dismissal of the protest of SRRDC against the
compulsory coverage of the property covered by TCT Nos. 81949
and 84891. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby
orders:
1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the
compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation (Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 81949
and 84891 with an area of 254.766 hectares) in Barangay Casile,
Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby affirmed;
2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation the amount of Seven Million Eight
Hundred Forty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos
and Sixty-Four centavos (P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered
by the two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should
there be a rejection of the payment tendered, to open, if none has yet
been made, a trust account for said amount in the name of Sta. Rosa
Realty Development Corporation;
3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with
dispatch Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 and new
one be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free
from liens and encumbrances;
4. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either
through its Provincial Office in Laguna or the Regional Office,
Region IV, to conduct a final segregation survey on the lands covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 so the same
can be transferred by the Register of Deeds to the name of the
Republic of the Philippines;
5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to take
immediate possession on the said landholding after Title shall have
been transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and
distribute the same to the immediate issuance of Emancipation
Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna.25
On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a
memorandum directing the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to
open a trust account in favor of SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as
valuation for the SRRDC property.
7
The titles in the name of SRRDC were cancelled and
Page
corresponding TCTs were issued in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines on February 11, 1992, 26 after which Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) were issued in the name of the
farmers-beneficiaries on February 26, 1992.27
In the meantime, SRRDC had filed with the CA a petition for review
of the DARAB’s decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27234.
On November 5, 1993, the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated
December 19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to petitioner
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation ventilating its case with
the Special Agrarian Court on the issue of just compensation.28
Hence, SRRDC filed on November 24, 1993, herein petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 112526 on the following grounds:
I In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE SRRDC PROPERTIES,
DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT OF THEIR NON-
AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION PRIOR TO RA 6657, ARE
COVERED BY THE CARP CONTRARY TO THE NATALIA
REALTY DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
i. The SRRDC properties have been zoned and approved as ‘PARK’
since 1979.
ii. The SRRDC properties form part of a watershed area.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING ECOLOGICAL
CONSIDERATIONS AS MANDATED BY LAW.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
SRRDC PROPERTIES TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO
HAVE BEEN JUDICIALLY DECLARED AS SQUATTERS AND
THEREFORE ARE NOT QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES
PURSUANT TO THE CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY
DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
i. The acquisition of the SRRDC properties cannot be valid for future
beneficiaries.
ii. Section 22 of RA 6657 insofar as it expands the coverage of the
CARP to ‘landless residents’ is unconstitutional.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DARAB HAS
JURISDICTION TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
THE SRRDC PROPERTIES ARE SUBJECT TO CARP
COVERAGE.29
On October 12, 2001, the Court rendered its Decision in G.R. No.
112526 only, setting aside the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
27234 and ordering the remand of the case to the DARAB for re-
evaluation and determination of the nature of the land. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-
evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land
involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive
Land Reform Program.
supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the
temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which
shall remain in effect until final decision on the case.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.30
It is the opinion of the Court in G.R. No. 112526, that the property is
part of a watershed, and that during the hearing at the DARAB, "there
was proof that the land may be excluded from the coverage of the
CARP because of its high slopes."31 Thus, the Court concluded that a
remand of the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation of the issue of
coverage is appropriate in order to resolve the true nature of the
subject property.32
In their Memorandum, Amante, et al. argues that there exist
compelling reasons to grant the second motion for reconsideration of
the assailed decision of the Court, to wit:
2.1 Only QUESTIONS OF LAW are admittedly and undeniably at
issue; yet the Honorable Court reviewed the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals and the DARAB although the case does not fall into
any of the well-recognized exceptions to conduct a factual review.
Worse, the 12 October 2001 Decision assumed facts not proven
before any administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial bodies;
2.2 The DARAB and the Court of Appeals already found the land to
be CARPable; yet the Honorable Court remanded the case to
DARAB to re-evaluate if the land is CARPable;
2.3 The Decision did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based;
2.4 The Decision renewed the Temporary Restraining Order issued
on 15 December 1993, issuance of which is barred by Sec. 55 of R.A.
6657; and
2.5 This Honorable Court denied private respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration although issues raised therein were never passed
upon in the 12 October 2001 Decision or elsewhere.33
8
The DAR and the DARAB, through the Office of the Solicitor
Page
General, did not interpose any objection to the second motion for
reconsideration. It also maintained that if SRRDC’s claim that the
property is watershed is true, then it is the DENR that should exercise
control and supervision in the disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the property.34
SRRDC meanwhile insists that there are no compelling reasons to
give due course to the second motion for reconsideration.35
At the outset, the Court notes that petitioner designated its petition
in G.R. No. 112526 as one for review on certiorari of the decision of
the CA. In the same breath, it likewise averred that it was also being
filed as a special civil action for certiorari as public respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion. 36 Petitioner should not have
been allowed, in the first place, to pursue such remedies
simultaneously as these are mutually exclusive.37
It is SRRDC’s claim that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
in holding that the subject property is agricultural in nature. In
support of its contention, it argued, among others, that the subject
property had already been classified as "park" since 1979 under the
Zoning Ordinance of Cabuyao, as approved by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB); that it forms part of a watershed;
and that the CA disregarded ecological considerations. 38 SRRDC also
claimed that Amante, et al. are not qualified beneficiaries.39
Clearly, these issues are factual in nature, which the Court, as a rule,
should not have considered in this case. However, there are
recognized exceptions, e.g., when the factual inferences of the
appellate court are manifestly mistaken; the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; or the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different legal conclusion.40 The present cases fall under the
above exceptions.
Thus, in order to finally set these cases to rest, the Court shall resolve
the substantive matters raised, which in effect comes down to the
issue of the validity of the acquisition of the subject property by the
Government under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL).
As noted earlier, the DARAB made its finding regarding the nature of
the property in question, i.e., the parcels of land are agricultural and
may be the subject of compulsory acquisition for distribution to
farmer-beneficiaries, thus:
Ocular inspections conducted by the Board show that the subject
landholdings have been under the possession and tillage of the DAR
identified potential beneficiaries which they inherited from their
forebears (workers of the Yulo Estate). They are bonafide residents
and registered voters (DARAB Exhibits "C" and "J") of Barangay
Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. There is a barangay road leading toward
the barangay school and sites and the settlement has a barangay hall,
church, elementary school buildings (DARAB Exhibit "Q"), Comelec
precincts (DARAB Exhibits "J-1" and J-2"), and other structures
extant in progressive communities. The barangay progressive
development agencies, like the DECS, DA, COMELEC, DAR and
Support Services of Land Bank, DPWH, DTI and the Cooperative
Development Authority have extended support services to the
community (DARAB Exhibits "I", "K" to "K-3", "L", "M", "N", "O",
"P" to "P-6"). More importantly, subject landholdings are suitable
for agriculture. Their topography is flat to undulating 3-15%
slope. (Testimony of Rosalina Jumaquio, Agricultural Engineer,
DAR, TSN, June 21, 1991, DARAB Exhibits "F" and "H").
Though some portions are over 18% slope, nevertheless, clearly
visible thereat are fruit-bearing trees, like coconut, coffee, and
pineapple plantations, etc. (see Petitioners Exhibits "A" to
"YYY" and DARAB Exhibits "A" to "S", Records). In other
words, they are already productive and fully developed.
...
As the landholdings of SRRDC subject of the instant proceedings
are already developed not only as a community but also as an
agricultural farm capable of sustaining daily existence and
growth, We find no infirmity in placing said parcels of land
under compulsory coverage. They do not belong to the exempt
class of lands. The claim that the landholding of SRRDC is a
watershed; hence, belonging to the exempt class of lands is
literally "throwing punches at the moon" because the DENR
certified that "the only declared watershed in Laguna Province
and San Pablo City is the Caliraya-Lumot Rivers (Petitioner’s
Exhibit "A"). A sensu contrario, the landholdings subject herein
are not.41 (Emphasis supplied)
The evidence on record supports these findings, to wit:
1. Certification dated January 16, 1989 by the OIC Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office of Laguna that the only
declared watershed in the Laguna province and San Pablo City is the
Caliraya-Lumot Rivers No. 1570 dated September 1, 1976;42
2. Map prepared by Agricultural Engineer Rosalina H. Jumaquio
showing that: a) the topography of the property covered by TCT No.
T-84891 topography is flat to undulating with a 5 to 10% slope; (b) it
is suitable to agricultural crops; and (c) the land is presently planted
with diversified crops;43
3. Certification dated August 28, 1989 by APT Felicito Buban of the
Department of Agriculture of Laguna that, per his ocular inspection,
the subject property is an agricultural area, and that the inhabitants’
main occupation is farming;44
4. Pictures taken by MARO Belen La Torre of Cabuyao, Laguna,
showing that the property is cultivated and inhabited by the farmer-
beneficiaries;45
SRRDC however, insists that the property has already been classified
as a "municipal park" and beyond the scope of CARP. To prove this,
SRRDC submitted the following:
1. Certification dated March 1, 1991 by the Municipality of Cabuyao,
Laguna that the entire barangay of Casile is delineated as Municipal
Park;46
2. Certification dated March 11, 1991 by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board that the parcels of land located in Barangay Casile
are within the Municipal Park, based on the municipality’s approved
General Land Use Plan ratified by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board as per Resolution No. 38-2 dated June 25, 1980;47
3. Photocopies of pictures taken by Mr. Ernesto Garcia, Officer-in-
Charge of the Special Project Section of CJ Yulo and Sons, Inc., of
portions of Barangay Casile;48
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify
and convert lands through local ordinance, especially if said
ordinance is approved by the HLURB.49 Municipal Ordinance No.
9
110-54 dated November 3, 1979, enacted by the Municipality of
Page
Cabuyao, divided the municipality into residential, commercial,
industrial, agricultural and institutional districts, and districts and
parks for open spaces.50 It did not convert, however, existing
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, or
institutional. While it classified Barangay Casile into a municipal
park, as shown in its permitted uses of land map, the ordinance did
not provide for the retroactivity of its classification. In Co vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,51 it was held that an ordinance
converting agricultural lands into residential or light industrial should
be given prospective application only, and should not change the
nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal
relationships existing over such lands. Thus, it was stated:
A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of
1981, does not disclose any provision converting existing agricultural
lands in the covered area into residential or light industrial. While it
declared that after the passage of the measure, the subject area shall
be used only for residential or light industrial purposes, it is not
provided therein that it shall have retroactive effect so as to
discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located within
the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in
nature. This simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as we
must, the ordinance should be given prospective operation only.
The further implication is that it should not change the nature of
existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships
existing over such lands …52 (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, agricultural land is defined as
land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Section 3 (b)
meanwhile defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry
or fish, including the harvesting of such products, and other farm
activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with
such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
Before Barangay Casile was classified into a municipal park by the
local government of Cabuyao, Laguna in November 1979, it was part
of a vast property popularly known as the Canlubang Sugar Estate.
SRRDC claimed that in May 1979, "the late Miguel Yulo … allowed
the employees of the Yulo group of companies to cultivate a
maximum area of one hectare each subject to the condition that they
should not plant crops being grown by the Canlubang Sugar Estate,
like coconuts and coffee, to avoid confusion as to ownership of
crops."53 The consolidation and subdivision plan surveyed for
SRRDC on March 10-15, 198454 also show that the subject property
is sugar land. Evidently, the subject property is already agricultural at
the time the municipality of Cabuyao enacted the zoning ordinance,
and such ordinance should not affect the nature of the land. More so
since the municipality of Cabuyao did not even take any step to
utilize the property as a park.
SRRDC cites the case of Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. DAR,55 wherein it
was ruled that lands not devoted to agricultural activity and not
classified as mineral or forest by the DENR and its predecessor
agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as
approved by the HLURB and its preceding competent authorities
prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, are outside
the coverage of the CARP. Said ruling, however, finds no application
in the present case. As previously stated, Municipal Ordinance No.
110-54 of the Municipality of Cabuyao did not provide for any
retroactive application nor did it convert existing agricultural lands
into residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional.
Consequently, the subject property remains agricultural in nature and
therefore within the coverage of the CARP.
Only on March 9, 2004, SRRDC filed with the Court a Manifestation
pointing out DAR Order No. (E)4-03-507-309 dated February 17,
2004, exempting from CARP coverage two parcels of land owned by
SRRDC and covered by TCT Nos. T-85573 and T-92014.56 The DAR
found that these properties have been re-classified into Municipal
Parks by the Municipal Ordinance of Cabuyao, Laguna, and are part
of the Kabangaan-Casile watershed, as certified by the DENR.57
The Court notes however that the said DAR Order has absolutely no
bearing on these cases. The herein subject property is covered by
TCT Nos. 81949 and 34891, totally different, although adjacent, from
the property referred to in said DAR Order.
SRRDC also contends that the property has an 18% slope and over
and therefore exempt from acquisition and distribution under Section
10 of R.A. No. 6657. What SRRDC opted to ignore is that Section
10, as implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 13 dated
August 30, 1990, also provides that those with 18% slope and over
but already developed for agricultural purposes as of June 15,
1988, may be allocated to qualified occupants.58 Hence, even
assuming that the property has an 18% slope and above, since it is
already developed for agricultural purposes, then it cannot be exempt
from acquisition and distribution. Moreover, the topography maps
prepared by Agricultural Engineer Rosalina H. Jumaquio show that
the property to be acquired has a 5-10% flat to undulating
scope;59 that it is suitable to agricultural crops;60 and it is in fact
already planted with diversified crops.61
Also, the Certification dated July 1, 1991 by Geodetic Engineer
Conrado R. Rigor that the top portion of Barangay Casile has a 0 to
18% slope while the side of the hill has a 19 to 75% slope, 62 was
presented by SRRDC only during the proceedings before the CA
which had no probative value in a petition for review proceedings.
The Court notes that SRRDC had been given ample time and
opportunity by the DARAB to prove the grounds for its protest and
objection but miserably failed to take advantage of such time and
opportunity63 in the DARAB proceedings.
SRRDC also contends that the property is part of a watershed, citing
as evidence, the Certification dated June 26, 1991 by the Laguna
Lake Development Authority that Barangay Casile is part of the
watershed area of the Laguna Lake Basin,64 and the Final Report for
Watershed Area Assessment Study for the Canlubang Estate dated
July 1991 undertaken by the Engineering & Development
Corporation of the Philippines.65 It must be noted, however, that these
pieces of evidence were likewise brought to record only when
petitioner filed its petition for review with the CA. The DARAB
never had the opportunity to assess these pieces of evidence.
The DARAB stated:
Noting the absence of evidence which, in the nature of things, should
have been submitted by landowner SRRDC and to avoid any claim of
deprivation of its right to prove its claim to just compensation (Uy v.
Genato, 57 SCRA 123). We practically directed its counsel in not
only one instance, during the series of hearings conducted, to do so.
We even granted continuances to give it enough time to prepare and
be ready with the proof and documents. To Our dismay, none was
submitted and this constrained Us to take the failure/refusal of
SRRDC to present evidence as a waiver or, at least, an implied
acceptance of the valuation made by the DAR.66
The same goes with the CA, which did not have the discretion to
10
consider evidence in a petition for certiorari or petition for review
on certiorari outside than that submitted before the DARAB. The CA
Page
noted petitioner’s failure to present evidence in behalf of its
arguments, thus:
. . . It must be recalled that petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty itself had
asked the DARAB in a petition dated March 18, 1991 to allow it ‘to
adduce evidence in support of its position that the subject parcels of
land are not covered by the CARP beginning on the scheduled
hearing dated April 4, 1991.’ And DARAB obliged as in fact the
petitioner commenced to introduce evidence. If petitioner failed to
complete the presentation of evidence to support its claim of
exemption from CARP coverage, it has only itself to blame for which
DARAB cannot be accused of not being impartial.67
Consequently, there is no need to order the remand of the case to the
DARAB "for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the
parcels of land involved." It runs contrary to orderly administration of
justice and would give petitioner undue opportunity to present
evidence in support of its stance, an opportunity it already had during
the DARAB proceedings, and which opportunity it regrettably failed
to take advantage of.
More significantly however, it is the DAR Secretary that
originally declared the subject property as falling under the
coverage of the CARP.
Moreover, DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1990 (Rules
and Procedure Governing Exemption of Lands from CARP Coverage
under Section 10, R.A. No. 6657) provides:
I. LEGAL MANDATE
The general policy under CARP is to cover as much lands suitable for
agriculture as possible. However, Section 10, RA 6657 excludes and
exempts certain types of lands from the coverage of CARP, to wit:
A. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves,
national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental
farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational
purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers,
church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and
Islamic centers appurtenant thereof, communal burial grounds and
cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the
inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers; and
...
II. POLICIES
In the application of the aforecited provision of law, the following
guidelines shall be observed:
A. For an area in I.A to be exempted from CARP coverage, it must be
"actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary"
for the purpose so stated.
...
C. Lands which have been classified or proclaimed, and/or actually
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks,
wildlife, forest reserves, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, and
watersheds and mangroves shall be exempted from the coverage of
CARP until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental
and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of public domain, as provided for under Sec. 4(a) of RA 6657,
and a reclassification of the said areas or portions thereof as alienable
and disposable has been approved. (Emphasis supplied)
In order to be exempt from coverage, the land must have
been classified or proclaimed and actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for watershed purposes.68 In this case,
at the time the DAR issued the Notices of Coverage up to the time the
DARAB rendered its decision on the dispute, the subject property is
yet to be officially classified or proclaimed as a watershed and has in
fact long been used for agricultural purposes. SRRDC relies on the
case of Central Mindanao University (CMU) vs. DARAB,69 wherein
the Court ruled that CMU is in the best position to determine what
property is found necessary for its use. SRRDC claims that it is in the
best position to determine whether its properties are "necessary" for
development as park and watershed area.70
But SRRDC’s reliance on the CMU case is flawed. In the CMU case,
the subject property from the very beginning was not alienable and
disposable because Proclamation No. 476 issued by the late President
Carlos P. Garcia already reserved the property for the use of the
school. Besides, the subject property in the CMU case was actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
educational purposes.
In the present case, the property is agricultural and was not actually
and exclusively used for watershed purposes. As records show, the
subject property was first utilized for the purposes of the Canlubang
Sugar Estate.71 Later, petitioner claimed that the occupants were
allowed to cultivate the area so long as they do not plant crops being
grown by the Canlubang Sugar Estate in order to avoid confusion as
to ownership thereof.72 Thus, based on its own assertions, it appears
that it had benefited from the fruits of the land as agricultural land.
Now, in a complete turnaround, it is claiming that the property is part
of a watershed.
Furthermore, in a belated attempt to prove that the subject property is
part of a watershed that must be environmentally protected, SRRDC
submitted before the Court a Final Report dated February 1994
undertaken by the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau
(ERDB) of the DENR entitled, "Environmental Assessment of the
Casile and Kabanga-an River Watersheds."73 The study, according to
SRRDC, was made pursuant to a handwritten instruction issued by
then President Fidel V. Ramos. The study noted that, "the continuing
threat of widespread deforestation and unwise land use practices have
resulted in the deteriorating condition of the watersheds."74 But the
Court also notes the Memorandum for the President dated September
1993 by then DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala that, after a field
inspection conducted by the DENR’s Regional Executive Director
and the Provincial and Community Natural Resource Officers, it was
found that:
...
2. Many bankal trees were found growing in the watershed/CARP
areas, including some which have been coppiced, and that water
conduits for domestic and industrial uses were found installed at the
watershed area claimed by the Yulos. Records further show that in
the 1970s, a Private Land Timber Permit was issued to Canlubang
Sugar Estate thru its marketing arm, the Sta. Rosa Realty Devpt.
Corp.
11
3. Resident farmers denied that they have been cutting bankal trees
and volunteered the information that one of the Estates’ security
Page
guards was dismissed for cutting and transporting bankal trees. The
trees cut by the dismissed security guard were found stacked adjacent
to the Canlubang Security Agency’s headquarters.75
Evidently, SRRDC had a hand in the degradation of the area, and
now wants to put the entire blame on the farmer-beneficiaries. It is
reasonable to conclude that SRRDC is merely using "ecological
considerations" to avert any disposition of the property adverse to it.
SRRDC also objects to the identification of Amante, et al. as
beneficiaries of the subject property. Suffice it to say that under
Section 15 of R.A. No. 6657, the identification of beneficiaries is a
matter involving strictly the administrative implementation of the
CARP, a matter which is exclusively vested in the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, through its authorized offices. Section 15 reads:
SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. — The DAR in
coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural
lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries
of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the
BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:
(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;
(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length
of tenurial relationship;
(c) location and area of the land they work;
(d) crops planted; and
(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages
received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in
the barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or other
public buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection
by the public at all reasonable hours.
Meanwhile, Administrative Order No. 10 (Rules and Procedures
Governing the Registration of Beneficiaries), Series of 1989,
provides:
SUBJECT: I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), as organized pursuant to RA
6657, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers
who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This Administrative
Order provides the Implementing Rules and Procedures for the said
registration.
...
B. Specific
1. Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the CARP.
In Lercana vs. Jalandoni,76 the Court categorically stated that:
… the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a
matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.77
The farmer-beneficiaries have already been identified in this case.
Also, the DAR Secretary has already issued Notices of Coverage and
Notices of Acquisition pertaining to the subject property. It behooves
the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own
determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion
committed by the administrative agency,78 which in these cases the
Court finds none.
SRRDC questions the constitutionality of Section 22 of R.A. No.
6657, which reads in part:
SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the
CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of
the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the
same municipality in the following order of priority.
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
...
SRRDC argues that Section 22 "sweepingly declares landless
residents as beneficiaries of the CARP (to mean also squatters)," in
violation of Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution, which aims to
benefit only the landless farmers and regular farmworkers.79
The Court cannot entertain such constitutional challenge. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a
law are well-delineated, viz.:
(1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question;
(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and
(4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the
case.80 (Emphasis supplied)
12
Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of
the act in question should have been immediately raised in the
Page
proceedings in the court below,81 in this case, the DAR Secretary. It
must be pointed out that all controversies on the implementation of
the CARP fall under the jurisdiction of the DAR, even though they
raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in
nature.82 The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to
raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the
same, such that, "if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be
considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be
considered on appeal."83 Records show that SRRDC raised such
constitutional challenge only before this Court despite the fact that it
had the opportunity to do so before the DAR Secretary. The DARAB
correctly refused to deal on this issue as it is the DAR Secretary who,
under the law, has the authority to determine the beneficiaries of the
CARP. This Court will not entertain questions on the invalidity of a
statute where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and
adequately argued84 in the DAR.
Likewise, the constitutional question raised by SRRDC is not the
very lis mota in the present case. Basic is the rule that every law has
in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative.85 The controversy at hand is principally anchored on
the coverage of the subject property under the CARP, an issue that
can be determined without delving into the constitutionality of
Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657. While the identification of Amante, et
al. as farmer-beneficiaries is a corollary matter, yet, the same may be
resolved by the DAR.
SRRDC questions the DARAB’s jurisdiction to entertain the question
of whether the subject property is subject to CARP coverage.
According to SRRDC, such authority is vested with the DAR
Secretary who has the exclusive prerogative to resolve matters
involving the administrative implementation of the CARP and
agrarian laws and regulations.86
There is no question that the power to determine whether a property
is subject to CARP coverage lies with the DAR Secretary. Section 50
of R.A. No. 6657 provides that:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
...
The DAR’s jurisdiction under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 is two-
fold. The first is essentially executive and pertains to the enforcement
and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance, while the second is judicial and
involves the determination of rights and obligations of the parties.87
Pursuant to its judicial mandate of achieving a just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before
it,88 the DAR adopted the DARAB Revised Rules, Rule II
(Jurisdiction of the Adjudication Board) of which provides:
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. – The
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction,
both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and
129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No.
6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to
the following:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in
the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other
agrarian laws;
b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination and
payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals,
disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar
disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank;
c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or
decisions of DAR officials other than the Secretary, lease contracts or
deeds of sale or their amendments under the administration and
disposition of the DAR and LBP;
d) Cases arising from, or connected with membership or
representation in compact farms, farmers’ cooperatives and other
registered farmers’ associations or organizations, related to land
covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;
e) Cases involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-
emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of
the CARP or other agrarian laws;
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer
(CLT), Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) and
Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof;
g) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns
referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
Provided, however, that matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARP and other agrarian
laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 06-00,89 which provides
for the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI)
Cases, govern the administrative function of the DAR. Under said
Rules of Procedure, the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction
over classification and identification of landholdings for coverage
under the CARP, including protests or oppositions thereto and
petitions for lifting of coverage. Section 2 of the said Rules
specifically provides, inter alia, that:
SECTION 2. Cases Covered. - These Rules shall govern cases falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall
include the following:
(a) Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP),
13
including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting
of coverage;
Page
(b) Identification, qualification or disqualification of potential
farmer-beneficiaries;
(c) Subdivision surveys of lands under CARP;
(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside
the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the
issuance, recall or cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) or
Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet registered
with the Register of Deeds;
(e) Exercise of the right of retention by landowner; . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the power to determine whether a property is agricultural and
subject to CARP coverage together with the identification,
qualification or disqualification of farmer-beneficiaries lies with the
DAR Secretary.90
Significantly, the DAR had already determined that the
properties are subject to expropriation under the CARP and has
distributed the same to the farmer-beneficiaries.
Initially, the LBP forwarded the two Compulsory Acquisition Claim
Folders (CACF) covering the subject properties to the DARAB for
summary proceedings for the sole purpose of determining just
compensation. SRRDC then sent a letter to the LBP claiming that the
subject properties were exempt from CARP coverage and subject of a
pending petition for land conversion. As a consequence, the DARAB
asked the DAR Secretary to first resolve the issues raised by SRRDC
before it can proceed with the land valuation proceedings. In
response, the DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations and
the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted its report stating that:
(1) the property is subject to compulsory acquisition by virtue of the
Notice of Coverage issued on August 11, 1989, and Notice of
Acquisition issued on December 12, 1989, and that it was subject to
CARP coverage per Section IV D of DAR Administrative Order No.
1, Series of 1990; and (2) there was no pending petition for land
conversion involving the subject property. When SRRDC petitioned
the DARAB to resolve the issue of exemption from coverage, it was
only then that the DARAB took cognizance of said issue.91
As the DARAB succinctly pointed out, it was SRRDC that initiated
and invoked the DARAB’s jurisdiction to pass upon the question of
CARP coverage. As stated by the DARAB:
4.5.2.2. The ISSUE ON CARP COVERAGE was initiated and
incorporated in said proceeding, at the instance of petitioner itself,
by filing a petition dated March 18, 1991, … Prayed therein were that
DARAB:
1. Take cognizance and assume jurisdiction  over the question of
CARP coverage of the subject parcels of land;
2. Defer or hold in abeyance the proceedings for administrative
valuation of the subject properties pending determination of the
question of CARP coverage;
3. Allow respondent SRRDC to adduce evidence in support of its
position that the subject parcels of land are not covered by the CARP
beginning on the scheduled hearing date of April 4, 1991" (p.3;
emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Upon persistent request of petitioner SRRDC, it was accommodated
by DARAB and a counsel of SRRDC even took the witness stand. Its
lawyers were always in attendance during the scheduled hearings
until it was time for SRRDC to present its own evidence.
4.5.2.3. But, as earlier stated, despite the open session proddings by
DARAB for SRRDC to submit evidence and the rescheduling for,
allegedly, they are still collating the evidence, nay, the request that it
be allowed to adduce evidence, none was adduced and this
constrained public respondent to declare SRRDC as having waived
its right to present evidence. And, after the remaining parties were
heard, the hearing was formally terminated.
...
4.5.3. Needless to state, the jurisdictional objection (CARP
coverage), now being raised herein was not one of the original
matters in issue. Principally, DARAB was called upon under
Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 to resolve a land valuation
case. But SRRDC itself insisted that DARAB should take
cognizance thereof in the same land valuation proceeding. And,
SRRDC, through its lawyers, actively participated in the hearings
conducted.
4.5.4. It was only when an adverse decision was rendered by
DARAB that the jurisdictional issue was raised in the petition for
review it filed with the Honorable Court of Appeals. It was also
only then that petitioner presented proof/evidence.
...
4.5.6. Public respondents (DAR/DARAB) are not unmindful of the
rule that matter of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding. But for two serious considerations, the applicability
thereof in the case at bar should not be allowed.
4.5.6.1. The fact [part (municipal/industrial) and/or watershed] upon
which the jurisdictional issue interchangeably hinges were not
established during the hearing of the case. No proof was adduced.
That the matter of CARP coverage is strictly administrative
implementation of CARP and, therefore, beyond the competence of
DARAB, belonging, as it does, to the DAR Secretary, was not even
alleged, either before DARAB or the Honorable Court of Appeals,
the numerous petitions/incidents filed notwithstanding. Be it that as it
may, the records of the case show that initially DARAB refused to
take cognizance thereof and, in fact, forwarded the issue of CARP
coverage to the office of the DAR Secretary. It was only when it was
returned to DARAB by said office that proceedings thereon
commenced pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule II of the DARAB
Revised Rules of Procedure.
4.5.6.2. Petitioner is now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of DARAB. First, it expressly acknowledged the same, in fact
invoked it, when it filed its petition (Annex "4"); and, second,
during the scheduled hearings, SRRDC, through its counsel,
actively participated, one of its counsel (sic) even testifying. It
may not now be allowed to impugn the jurisdiction of public
respondent …92 (Emphasis supplied)
In CA-G.R. SP No. 27234, the CA likewise found that it was SRRDC
that called upon the DARAB to determine the issue and it, in fact,
14
actively participated in the proceedings before it.93 It was SRRDC’s
own act of summoning the DARAB’s authority that cured whatever
Page
jurisdictional defect it now raises. It is elementary that the active
participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court
or a quasi-judicial body, is tantamount to a recognition of that court’s
or body’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of
the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s or
body’s jurisdiction.94
Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction was raised by SRRDC only before
the CA. It was never presented or discussed before the DARAB for
obvious reasons, i.e., it was SRRDC itself that invoked the latter’s
jurisdiction. As a rule, when a party adopts a certain theory, and the
case is tried and decided upon that theory in the court below, he will
not be permitted to change his theory on appeal.95 Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such
late stage.96 To permit SRRDC to change its theory on appeal would
not only be unfair to Amante, et al. but would also be offensive to the
basic scales of fair play, justice and due process.97
Finally, the Court notes that then DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong
issued a Memorandum on July 11, 1991, ordering the opening of a
trust account in favor of SRRDC. In Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, this Court struck down as void DAR
Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, providing for the
opening of trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds
contemplated in Section 16 (e) of R.A. No. 6657. As a result, the
DAR issued Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1996, converting
trust accounts in the name of landowners into deposit
accounts.98 Thus, the trust account opened by the LBP per
instructions of DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong should be
converted to a deposit account, to be retroactive in application in
order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust
account and to grant the landowners the benefits concomitant to
payment in cash or LBP bonds prior to the ruling of the Court
in Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals. The account
shall earn a 12% interest per annum from the time the LBP opened a
trust account up to the time said account was actually converted into
cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts.
Given the foregoing conclusions, the petition filed in G.R. No.
118838, which primarily rests on G.R. No. 112526, should be
granted.
The judgments of the trial court in the injunction case (Civil Case No.
B-2333) and the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 38182 were premised on
SRRDC’s transfer certificates of title over the subject property. The
trial court and the CA cannot be faulted for denying the writ of
injunction prayed for by Amante, et al. since at the time the trial court
rendered its decision in the injunction case on January 20, 1992,
SRRDC was still the holder of the titles covering the subject
property. The titles in its name were cancelled and corresponding
TCTs were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines on
February 11, 1992, and CLOAs were issued to the farmer-
beneficiaries on February 26, 1992. When Amante, et al., in their
motion for reconsideration filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 38182, brought to
the CA’s attention the issuance of the CLOAs, the CA, per
Resolution dated January 19, 1995, reiterated its ruling that "whether
or not the subject property is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657) is the subject matter of a separate case,
and we cannot interfere with the same at the present time." The CA
further stated that "(O)ur present decision is, therefore, not intended
to preempt any judgment or prejudice the right of any party in the
said case."99 It must be noted that at that juncture, the DARAB
Decision and the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234, finding the
subject property covered by the CARP Law, is yet to be finally
resolved by this Court in G.R. No. 112526 and in fact, a temporary
restraining order was issued by the Court on December 15, 1993,
enjoining the DARAB from enforcing the effects of the CLOAs.
Amante, et al. was likewise restrained from further clearing the
subject property.100 Hence, the decision of the trial court and the CA
denying the writ of injunction was warranted.
Nevertheless, considering that the subject property is agricultural and
may be acquired for distribution to farmer-beneficiaries identified by
the DAR under the CARP, the transfer certificates of title issued in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines and the CLOAs issued by
the DAR in the names of Amante, et al.,101 are valid titles and
therefore must be upheld. By virtue thereof, Amante, et al. who
have been issued CLOAs are now the owners of the subject
property. Consequently, the decisions of the trial court in the
injunction case and the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 38182 must now be
set aside, insofar as it orders Amante, et al. to vacate and/or enjoins
them from entering the subject property.
The Court, however, agrees with the CA that Amante, et al. is not
entitled to actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees. SRRDC’s right of possession over the subject
property was predicated on its claim of ownership, and it cannot be
sanctioned in exercising its rights or protecting its interests thereon.
As was ruled by the CA, Amante, et al. is merely entitled to nominal
damages as a result of SRRDC’s acts.102
All is not lost in this case. In its Memorandum dated September 29,
1993, to the DAR Secretary, the DENR manifested that:
. . . the farmers themselves could be tapped to undertake watershed
management and protection. This community-based approach in
natural resource management, is in fact, being used in numerous
watershed management projects nationwide. Adopting the same
approach in the area is deemed the best possible solution to the case
since it will not prejudice the CLOAs issued to the farmer-
beneficiaries. They should, however, be required to undertake the
necessary reforestation and other watershed
management/rehabilitation measures in the area.
In view of the foregoing, we recommend that a watershed
management plan for the area espousing the community-based
approach be drawn-up jointly by the DAR and DENR. . . .103
If SRRDC sincerely wants to preserve the property for ecological
considerations, it can be done regardless of who owns it. After all, we
are all stewards of this earth, and it rests on all of us to tend to it.
WHEREFORE, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Court’s Decision dated October 12, 2001 in G.R.
No. 112526 is SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 5, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION, in that the Land Bank of the Philippines is
ordered to convert the trust account in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation to a deposit account, subject to a 12%
interest per annum from the time the LBP opened a trust account up
to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP
bonds deposit accounts. The temporary restraining order issued by
the Court on December 15, 1993, is LIFTED.
The petition filed by Amante, et al. in G.R. No.
118838 is GRANTED in that Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation is hereby ENJOINED from disturbing the peaceful
15
possession of the farmer-beneficiaries with CLOAs. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated June 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38182
Page
is AFFIRMED insofar as the award of nominal damages is
concerned.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the demise, the subject properties were subdivided, distributed, and
Department of Agrarian Reform, in coordination with the farmer- transferred – by extrajudicial settlement and/or sale – to their
beneficiaries identified by the DAR, are URGED to formulate a heirs.5 After several transfers, the subject properties were eventually
community-based watershed plan for the management and registered in the names of the following:
rehabilitation of Barangay Casile.
LOT REGISTERED TCT AREA
SO ORDERED. NO. LANDOWNERS NO. (hectares)
1 Virginia P. Llamas and 157111 1.4844
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Corona, and Josefino P. Llamas
Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur. 2 Renato P. Posadas 157976 1.5292
3 Lourdes P. Cipriano 179246 1.7086
4 Ernesto S. Bravo and Jose 180617 5.0741
Israel S. Bravo
5 Sonia P. Llamas and Roberto P. 157112 3.1510
Llamas
6 Lamberto P. Llamas (1/2), 161738 2.7021
Carlos S. Llamas, and Shirley
Leah S. Llamas
7 Carlos P. Cipriano 176249 3.2290
8 Remegio P. Cipriano 179236 1.2106
9 Ernesto S. Bravo and Jose 180618 1.0752
Israel S. Bravo
10 Blanca P. Llamas and Alfonso 157113 1.5136
P. Llamas
11 Renato P. Posadas 157978 1.91846
G.R. No. 152086               December 15, 2010 TOTA 24.5962
L
FEDERICO SORIANO, CIPRIANO BAUTISTA, JOSE
TORALBA, CILODONIO TANTAY, MARIANO BRAVO,
Of the 11 subject properties, only the ownership of Lots 4 and 9 still
ROLANDO TORALBA, FAUSTINO BRAVO, CRISTINA remains with the registered owners, respondents Ernesto S. Bravo and
TORALBA, BENJAMIN LACAYANGA, ROSALIA TANTAY,
Jose Israel S. Bravo. The rest of the subject properties had again been
GABRIEL DELA VEGA, ROGELIO BRAVO, and ROMEO sold and transferred to the other respondents, who have yet to secure
TANTAY, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, TEODORICO
certificates of title in their respective names. Thus, presently, the
GAMBA, Petitioners, subject properties are actually owned by respondents, as follows:
vs.
ANA SHARI B. BRAVO, REBECCA BENITO, JOHN MEJIA,
MILA BRAVO, BENITO BRAVO, ERNESTO BRAVO, JOSE LOT NO. LANDOWNERS/RESPONDENTS
ISRAEL BRAVO, JUANA BRAVO, DARAB CENTRAL, and AREA
the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER FIFTH (hectares)
DIVISION, Respondents. 1 Ernesto S. Bravo 1.4844
2 John B. Mejia 1.5292
DECISION 3 Rebecca B. Benito and Emmanuel 1.7086
Benito
4 Ernesto S. Bravo and Jose Israel S. 5.0741
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Bravo
5 Ana Shari B. Bravo 3.1510
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the 6 Juana Bravo and Conrado Macaraeg 2.7021
Decision1 dated September 24, 2001 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. 7 Rebecca B. Benito and Emmanuel 3.2290
SP No. 63197, affirming in toto the Decision2 dated May 6, 1998 of Benito
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in 8 Juana Bravo and Conrado Macaraeg 1.2106
DARAB Case Nos. 5195 to 5216, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the 9 Ernesto S. Bravo and Jose Israel S. 1.0752
Decision3 dated February 23, 1996 of Provincial Agrarian Reform Bravo
Adjudicator (PARAD) Domiciano L. Placido (Placido) of Pangasinan 10 Jose Israel S. Bravo 1.5136
in DARAB Case Nos. 01-689 to 710-WP-’95. PARAD Placido 11 John B. Mejia 1.9184
adjudged, among other things, that the subject properties are exempt TOTAL 24.59627
from the coverage of the operation land transfer (OLT) program of
the Government under Presidential Decree No. 27, otherwise known
as the Tenants Emancipation Decree, and Republic Act No. 6657, Respondents’ total landholdings are summarized below:
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL). LANDOWNERS/RESPONDENT TOTAL
S LANDHOLDINGS
At the center of the controversy are agricultural lands located at (hectares)
16

Nalsian Norte (formerly San Julian) and Malasiqui, Pangasinan, with Rebecca B. Benito and Emmanuel 4.9376 (Lot 3 + Lot 7)
a total land area of 24.5962 hectares (subject properties). The subject Benito
Ana Shari B. Bravo 3.1510 (Lot 5)
Page

properties were originally owned by spouses Patricio Posadas and

Josefa Quintana (spouses Posadas).4 Upon the spouses Posadas’ Ernesto S. Bravo 4.5591 (Lot 1 + ½ of Lot 4
 + ½ of Lot 9)
Jose Israel S. Bravo 4.5883 (½ of Lot 4 + ½ of
Lot 9 + Lot 10)
Juana Bravo and Conrado 3.9127 (Lot 6 + Lot 8)
Macaraeg
8
John B. Mejia 3.4476 (Lot 2 + Lot 11)
A portion of the subject properties was planted with rice while the
rest was planted with mangoes. Eventually, respondents decided to
relocate their business, the St. Martin’s Pharmaceuticals, Inc., to the
subject properties; and to construct the Bravo Agro-Industrial
Complex on the same properties, which would include a fruit
processing factory, disposable syringe factory, botanical plantation
for herbal medicines, integrated research and product development
facility, and a fishpond and inland resort.
Pursuant to respondents’ plans for the subject properties, respondent
Ernesto S. Bravo entered into a Compromise Agreement on
November 3, 1992 with the people cultivating the subject properties,
namely, Salvador Bautista, Faustino Bravo, Mariano Bravo, Gabriel
dela Vega, Juliana Gutierrez, Saturnino Idoz, Celistiano Manipon,
Mauricia Rubio, Federico Soriano, Romeo Tantay, Teofilo Tantay,
and Cristina Toralba (cultivators). The full text of the Compromise
Agreement is reproduced below:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
We, Romeo Tantay, Gabriel [de la] Vega, Teofilo Tantay, Salvador
Bautista, Celestiano Manipon, Faustino Bravo, Mariano Bravo,
Federi[co] Soriano, Cristina [Toralba], Juliana Gutierrez, Mauricia
Rubio, Saturnino Idoz, all of legal age, married, Filipinos and
residents of Barangay Nalsian Norte, Malasiqui, Pangasinan
otherwise known as the PARTY FOR THE FIRST PART and
Ernesto S. Bravo otherwise known as the PARTY FOR THE
SECOND PART, likewise a resident of Nalsian Norte have agreed
and covenanted on the following terms and conditions involving a
parcel of land/s under cultivations of the PARTY OF THE FIRST
PART being owned by the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART
hereunder stated, to wit:
1. That these parcels of land/s are located at Barangay Nalsian Norte,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan.
2. That the party for the FIRST PART have agreed freely and
voluntarily to the herein party for the Second Part, to construct
bulding/s plant on the aforenamed landholdings;
3. That the herein of the party of the First Part shall be relocated on
the same landholdings the site shall be determined on the plan and
specifications to be produced by the herein party for the Second Part;
4. That the party for the First Part shall be entitled to individual
homelot of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) Square meters more or
less, given out of liberality by the herein party for the Second Part;
5. That both parties shall render mutual respect taking into
considerations the rights and obligations of both parties;
6. That the party for the First Part shall enjoy security of tenure on
their individual landholdings not affected by the establishment of
plant or building/s, in the same manner the party for the Second Part
shall have the right to eject any or all of the herein party for the First
Part on the grounds authorized by law;
7. That the homelots given to the individual parties for the First Part
shall be considered remuneration/payment on the portion of the
subject landholding/s to be used in the establishment of
plant/building, a job generating project;
8. That the party for the Second Part bind himself and shall give
priority to the party for the First Part to hire employees from the
children of the party for the First Part;
9. That this shall be understood that these would-be employees must
possess the necessary qualifications, industry and dedication to duty;
10. That this compromise agreement is entered freely and voluntarily
and not contrary to law, public order or public policy.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we shall hereunto set our hands this 3rd
day of November 1992 at Malasiqui, Pangasinan.9
Relying on the Compromise Agreement, respondents began the
development of the subject properties. They installed a signboard on
the subject properties proclaiming that the "Bravo Agro-Industrial
Complex" would soon rise on said site, and proceeded with the
preparation for the construction of buildings thereon.
However, on July 10, 1995, respondents filed before the DARAB a
Complaint for Ejectment, Collection of Unpaid Rentals,
Recomputation of Rentals, Specific Performance and
Damages,10 which was docketed as DARAB Case Nos. 01-689 to
710-WP-’95. Named as defendants in respondents’ Complaint were
the cultivators who signed the Compromise Agreement (with the
exception of Juliana Gutierrez, Celestiano Manipon, and Mauricia
Rubio), along with Rogelio Bravo, Honorato de Guzman, Lydia de
Guzman, Rosita Gutierrez, Benjamin Lacayanga, Cecilio Mamaril,
Eduardo Manipon, Leonardo Rosario, Luis Rosario, Teodoro
Rosario, Joseph Tantay, Rosalia Tantay, and Rolando Toralba
(hereinafter collectively called the "defendants").
Respondents alleged that the defendants in DARAB Case Nos. 01-
689 to 710-WP-’95, upon the instigation of a cult leader, refused to
comply with the Compromise Agreement. Instead of transferring and
relocating their homes as stated in the Compromise Agreement, the
defendants demanded that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, put the subject properties under
the OLT program provided in the Tenants Emancipation Decree and
CARL. The MARO already ruled that the subject properties were not
covered by the OLT program because each of the respondents and
their predecessors-in-interest did not own more than five hectares of
the subject properties. Respondents further averred that since 1992,
defendants had refused to pay lease rentals on the portions of rice
lands they were tilling. Worse, defendants had also begun to till
portions of the subject properties that were previously untenanted and
already planted with mango trees. Based on these facts, respondents
prayed for the DARAB to (1) order defendants to comply with the
Compromise Agreement by transferring and relocating their homes to
the lots provided by respondents; (2) order defendants to pay lease
rentals on the portions of the ricelands they were tilling from 1992 to
present; (3) eject defendants from the subject properties for their
deliberate failure to pay lease rentals in violation of their obligations
17
under Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Code of
Agrarian Reforms; and (4) order defendants to pay respondents
Page
₱500,000.00 moral damages, ₱500,000.00 exemplary damages, and
₱500,000.00 actual damages, plus attorney’s fees.
Among the special and affirmative defenses raised by defendants in
their Answer11 are that respondents had no cause of action against
defendants; the respondents failed to prove their title to the subject
properties and registration of the same in their names; the subject
properties were mainly planted with rice and only a negligible
number of mango trees, which, at 15 to 18 years old, were already
fruit-bearing; respondents’ sign board confirmed the illegal
conversion of the subject properties given the absence of the required
application for conversion; the existence of the alleged Compromise
Agreement was not established by respondents, and assuming that
such Compromise Agreement did exist, it was illegal per se and void
ab initio; respondents falsely promised to respect defendants’ security
of tenure, and respondents’ true intention was to have defendants
ejected through the instant case; it was the fundamental right of
defendants, as tenant-farmers, to be freed from the bondage of the
soil, and according to the Tenants Emancipation Decree, the Code of
Agrarian Reforms, and the CARL, the subject properties are viable
for coverage of the agrarian reform program; respondents had no
authority to determine by themselves whether the subject properties
were covered by the agrarian reform program; the opinion of the
MARO of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, that the subject properties were not
within the coverage of the agrarian reform laws, was still subject to
review by higher DAR officials; defendants, who were tenant-farmers
of respondent Ernesto S. Bravo’s properties, had been religiously
paying their lease rentals; in the event that the other respondents
would be able to prove their ownership to the rest of the subject
properties, defendants were willing and able to pay their lease rentals
upon execution of a contract of lease between said respondents and
defendants; defendants’ non-payment of lease rentals to respondents
(other than respondent Ernesto S. Bravo) was reasonable considering
that defendants remitted said lease rentals to the true owners of the
subject properties, the Llamas and Posadas; and computation of the
lease rentals should be based on the actual harvest, and any sharing
should be subject to the mandate of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as
amended.
Thus, defendants prayed that the PARAD dismiss respondents’
Complaint for lack of cause of action/merit; and order respondents to
pay jointly and solidarily to defendants ₱1,000,000.00 as moral
damages, ₱1,000.00 as nominal damages, ₱1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and ₱500,000.00 for actual damages.12
On February 23, 1996, PARAD Placido, "[a]fter going deeply into
the roots of the controversy, making a searching examination of the
facts, conducting an ocular inspection and investigation in the
premises, carefully considering all the pleadings, weighing all [the]
respective exhibits and evidences of the parties,"13 rendered his
Decision in DARAB Case Nos. 01-689 to 710-WP-’95, with the
following decree:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring defendants Saturnino Idos, Teofilo Tantay, Faustino
Bravo, Mariano Bravo, Idelfonso Tantay, Pelagio Tantay and Cristina
[Toralba] as agricultural lessees of the ricelands of [herein
respondents] Ernesto Bravo and Jose Israel Bravo;
2. Confirming the findings of the Regional Investigator, Atty.
Benigno C. Bulatao, DAR Regional Office, San Fernando, La Union,
the parcels of land in question separately owned by the [respondents]
none of whom owned more than five (5.0) hectares agricultural lands
exempt from OLT coverage under P.D. No. 27 and R.A. No. 6657;
3. Declaring the parcels of land in question except the lands of
[respondents] Ernesto Bravo and Jose Israel Bravo as mango orchard
land;
4. Declaring the mango orchard land untenanted;
5. Ordering defendants Federico Soriano, Salvador Bautista, Eduardo
Manipon, Rolando Torralba, Rosita Gutierrez, Rosalia Tantay,
Gabriel dela Vega, Benjamin Lacayanga, Lydia de Guzman, Rogelio
Bravo, Joseph Tantay, Romeo Tantay, Honorato de Guzman, Luis
Rosario, Cecilio Mamaril, Leonardo Rosario and Teodoro
Rosario not tenants in any parcels of land in question. They are
[Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA)] members-
tenants on lands other than the parcels of land in question;
6. Dismissing all claims and counterclaims for not being supported by
evidence.14
Defendants’ appeal to the DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case Nos.
5195 to 5216, was unsuccessful. In its Decision dated May 6, 1998,
the DARAB affirmed in toto PARAD Placido’s Decision of February
23, 1996.
On the issue of whether the subject properties are within the coverage
of the OLT program under the Tenants Emancipation Decree and
CARL, the DARAB held:
Anent the first issue, it is beyond any iota of doubt that the subject
landholdings are outside the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27
and Republic Act No. 6657. Presidential Decree No. 27 is categorical
and very clear in its provision on the retention limit allowed the
landowner – the landowner can retain an area of up to seven (7)
hectares. Republic Act No. 6657 is likewise very clear that the
landowner’s retention limit is up to five (5) hectares. The Board
agrees with the MARO of the locality that the subject landholdings
cannot be placed within the coverage of either of the laws relied upon
by the defendants-appellants. The records show that as early as
March 10, 1971, the heirs of the late Josefa Quintans (who died on
July 12, 1958) subdivided the original 24.5962-hectare landholding
into parcels, none of which exceeded seven (7) hectares (Exhibit "B"
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Renunciation and Quitclaim
dated March 10, 1971). When Presidential Decree No. 27 became a
law on October 21, 1972, the subdivided parcels fell outside the
coverage of the Operation Land Transfer program pursuant to said
Decree, being each less than seven (7) hectares. These landholdings
were further subdivided and decreased in size until not one parcel
became more than five hectares. Despite changes in ownership, none
of the landholdings were ever consolidated under one proprietorship
in areas of more than seven hectares during the implementation of the
Operation Land Transfer program under Presidential Decree No. 27
nor areas of more than five (5) hectares during the implementation of
Republic Act No. 6657. Presently, each of the plaintiffs-appellees
does not own more than five (5) hectares of the subject landholdings.
This fact is not disputed by the defendants-appellants. Consequently,
neither Presidential Decree No. 27 nor Republic Act No. 6657 can be
relied upon for the expropriation of these parcels.15
The DARAB also sustained the validity and legality of the
Compromise Agreement in this wise:
As regards the issue of the validity and legality of the compromise
agreement, the same does not deserve a prolonged discussion. It is
beyond question that the defendants-appellants are bound by the said
compromise agreement. The document was entered into by and
between the parties without any vice of consent and was duly
18
notarized. The compromise agreement is clearly a waiver of their
rights over the subject landholding for it contains admissions and
Page
declarations against their interest. If the defendants-appellants
contend that it was not so, thus, reneging on their own sworn
admissions of the existence of the fact, then they must have perjured
themselves when they voluntarily and knowingly stated under oath
that they are relinquishing their right over the subject landholding.
The Board will not allow such perfidy to prevail because a party to a
litigation must always come to court with clean hands and in good
faith. Defendants-appellants are bound by their own voluntary
admissions and declarations against their own interest as appearing in
the said compromise agreement and the Board will not allow them to
turn their backs to it (Dequito v. Llamas, G.R. No. L-28090,
September 4, 1975).
Defendants-appellants’ act of entering into the said Compromise
Agreement is a valid waiver of whatever rights they may have had
over the subject landholdings. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction
that rights may be waived except: (1) when the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, and (2)
when prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
(Article 6, New Civil Code of the Philippines). There being no
showing at all that the above Compromise Agreement falls under any
of the above stated exceptions, it follows that the defendants-
appellants are bound by it and must consequently abide by the terms
and conditions thereof.16
The DARAB, in a Resolution17 dated December 14, 2000, denied for
lack of merit defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Undeterred, a Petition for Review of the DARAB judgment was filed
before the Court of Appeals by defendants Faustino Bravo, Mariano
Bravo, Rogelio Bravo, Gabriel dela Vega, Benjamin Lacayanga,
Federico Soriano, Romeo Tantay, Rosalia Tantay, Cristina Toralba,
and Rolando Toralba; who were joined by new parties Cipriano
Bautista, Cilodonio Tantay, and Jose Toralba (hereinafter collectively
called the "petitioners"), represented by their Attorney-in-Fact,
Teodorico Gamba. Said petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
63197. Petitioners insisted that (1) it was the Office of the DAR
Secretary, not the DARAB, which had jurisdiction to determine the
properties falling within the coverage of the Tenants Emancipation
Decree and CARL; (2) the Compromise Agreement, which the
DARAB relied upon, was never executed and enforced; and (3) the
DARAB failed to take cognizance of the tenancy issue upon which
petitioners’ right to be maintained in peaceful possession and
cultivation of the subject property depended.
In its Decision dated September 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals found
no merit in the petition, and affirmed in toto the DARAB Decision
dated May 6, 1998.
The Court of Appeals recognized that the distribution of land under
the Tenants Emancipation Decree, the CARL, and other special laws,
is an administrative prerogative of the DAR Secretary. However, it
should not be interpreted to preclude the PARAD, the DARAB, and
their adjudicators from preliminarily ascertaining whether the
questioned landholdings could be the subject of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Stated differently, the DAR
Secretary’s exclusive authority to distribute lands is exercised only
"upon proper and due CARP coverage." In the instant case, the
MARO, the PARAD, and the DARAB all found that the subject
properties are outside the coverage of the Tenants Emancipation
Decree and the CARL. The appellate court further held that based on
the allegations in respondents’ Complaint in DARAB Case Nos. 01-
689 to 710-WP-’95, the instant case involved agrarian disputes and
controversies, properly within the primary, original, and appellate
jurisdiction of the DARAB and delegated jurisdiction of the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) and the PARAD under
Sections 1 and 2, respectively, of Rule II of the DARAB Revised
Rules of Procedure.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the DARAB that the Compromise
Agreement is valid and binding. Petitioners’ act of entering into the
said agreement is a valid waiver of their rights to the subject
properties. The appellate court also pointed out that contrary to
petitioners’ assertion, the DARAB took cognizance of the tenancy
issue. The DARAB adopted the findings of the PARAD as to who
among the defendants in DARAB Case Nos. 01-689 to 710-WP-’95
were the agricultural lessees of the six-hectare rice lands. Besides, the
issue on tenancy was closely intertwined with the issue on placing the
subject properties within the coverage of the OLT program under the
Tenants Emancipation Decree and the CARL.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals pronounced that the PARAD and the
DARAB decisions were supported by substantial evidence, which
must be respected in the absence of any material or substantial
misapplication or misappreciation of facts.
On February 4, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution18 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration as it
found no cogent reason or justification to modify or recall the
findings and conclusions in its earlier decision.
Hence, the instant petition in which petitioners raise the following
Assignment of Errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
TOOK NO COGNIZANCE OF THE WANT OF JURISDICTION
EXERCISED BY THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR AND THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT DARAB IN THE DETERMINATION OF
THE LANDHOLDINGS COVERAGE UNDER PD NO. 27
AND/OR R.A. 6657[.]
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE TENANCY ISSUE UPON
WHICH PETITIONERS PREDICATE THEIR RIGHT TO
SECURITY OF TENURE.19
The Court finds no merit in the instant petition.
I
THE JURISDICTION ISSUE
Section 50 of the CARL bestows upon the DAR quasi-judicial
powers:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,20 the Court
pointed out that the jurisdiction of the DAR under the aforequoted
provision is two-fold. The first is essentially executive and pertains to
the enforcement and administration of the laws, carrying them into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance, while the
second is judicial and involves the determination of rights and
obligations of the parties.
19
Jurisdiction over agrarian disputes lies with the DARAB. Section
Page
3(d) of the CARL defines an agrarian dispute as follows:
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the time the present controversy arose, the conduct of proceedings
before the Board and its adjudicators were governed by the DARAB
New Rules of Procedures, which were adopted and promulgated on
May 30, 1994, and came into effect on June 21, 1994 after
publication (1994 DARAB Rules).21 The 1994 DARAB Rules
identified the cases over which the DARAB shall have jurisdiction,
viz:
RULE II
JURISDICTION OF THE ADJUDICATION BOARD
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction. – The Board shall have primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate
all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic
Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, and 129-A, Republic Act
No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree
No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be
limited to cases involving the following:
a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical,
engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural
lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;
b) The valuation of land, and the preliminary determination and
payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals,
disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar
disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP);
c) The annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or deeds of sale or
their amendments involving lands under the administration and
disposition of the DAR or LBP;
d) Those case arising from, or connected with membership or
representation in compact farms, farmers’ cooperatives and other
registered farmers’ associations or organizations, related to lands
covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;
e) Those involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-
emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of
the CARP or other agrarian laws;
f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation
Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority;
g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section
12 of Presidential No. 946, except sub-paragraph (Q) thereof and
Presidential Decree No. 815.
It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions
were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987.
Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARP) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as
enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.
h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns
referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR. (Emphasis supplied.)
SECTION 2. Jurisdiction of the Regional and Provincial Adjudicator.
– The RARAD and the PARAD shall have concurrent original
jurisdiction with the Board to hear, determine and adjudicate all
agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in connection therewith,
arising within their assigned territorial jurisdiction.
On the other hand, cases involving agrarian law implementation fall
within the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, series of 2000, otherwise known as the Rules of
Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases, were
promulgated only on August 30, 2000, and became effective on
September 15, 2000 after publication (2000 Rules for ALI
Cases).22 Rule I, Section 2 of said Rules delineates the jurisdiction of
the DAR Secretary, thus:
SEC. 2. Cases Covered – These Rules shall govern cases falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall
include the following:
(a) Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP),
including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of
coverage;
(b) Identification, qualification or disqualification of potential farmer-
beneficiaries;
(c) Subdivision surveys of lands under CARP;
(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside
the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the
issuance, recall or cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) or
Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet registered
with the Register of Deeds;
(e) Exercise of the right of retention by landowner;
(f) Application for exemption under Section 10 of RA 6657 as
implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 13 (1990);
(g) Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice
20
(DOJ) Opinion No. 44 (1990) as implemented by DAR
Administrative Order No. 6 (1994);
Page
(h) Application for exemption under DAR Administrative Order No.
9 (1993);
(i) Application for exemption under Section 1 of RA 7881, as
implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 3 (1995);
(j) Issuance of certificate of exemption for lands subject of Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) found
unsuitable for agricultural purposes pursuant to DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 34 (1997);
(k) Application for conversion of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses including
protests or oppositions thereto;
(l) Right of agrarian reform beneficiaries to homelots;
(m) Disposition of excess area of the farmer-beneficiary’s
landholdings;
(n) Transfer, surrender or abandonment by the farmer-beneficiary of
his farmholding and its disposition;
(o) Increase of awarded area by the farmer-beneficiary;
(p) Conflict of claims in landed estates and settlements; and
(q) Such other matters not mentioned above but strictly involving the
administrative implementation of RA 6657 and other agrarian laws,
rules and regulations as determined by the Secretary.
Rule I, Section 3 of the 2000 Rules for ALI Cases explicitly excludes
from the application thereof cases that fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the DARAB.
In determining whether the DARAB or the DAR Secretary had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of DARAB Case Nos. 01-689 to
710-WP-’95, the Court adverts to the following rules on jurisdiction
which it had established in Heirs of Julian dela Cruz and Leonora
Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz23:
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-
judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject
matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material
allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any
or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of
an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the
consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would
have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action.
Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of
the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction
to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the
parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent
the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB’s
lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or
petition.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the
defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his
answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but
also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the
controversy. If the issues between the parties are intertwined with the
resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the
DARAB. The proceedings before a court or tribunal without
jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence,
susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.24
Guided accordingly by the foregoing jurisprudence, the Court turns to
respondents’ Complaint before the DARAB, wherein they alleged:
2. That the [herein respondents] are the owners of less than five (5)
hectares each of the 26 hectares of land located at barangays Tomling
and Nalsian, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, x x x.
3. That of the aforesaid 26 hectares of land, only about 6 hectares are
tenanted by seven agricultural [lessees] namely defendants Gervacio
Sergote, Anacleto Torralba, Saturnino Idos, Faustino Bravo, Mariano
Bravo, Teofilo Tantay, Idelfonso Tantay and Pelagio Tantay;
4. That 20 hectares portion of the said 26 hectares is not tenanted and
although it is planted to 456 mango trees, the areas in between the
rows of mango trees have never been cultivated and planted to any
crop;
xxxx
6. That the [respondents] have decided to relocate the St. Martin’s
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and to construct a BRAVO AGRO-
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX in the untenanted portions of the land in
question x x x;
7. That in accordance with the relocation and development plans of
the St. Martin’s Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the construction of the
BRAVO AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, [respondents] and the
defendants Teofilo Tantay, Celestino Manipon, Romeo Tantay,
Gabriel dela Vega, Mariano Bravo, Cristina Torralba, Mauricio
Rubio, Salvador Bautista, Faustino Bravo, Federico Soriano, Josefina
Gutierrez, and Saturnino Idos executed their "Compromise
Agreement" dated November 3, 1992 which provides for the
relocation and transfer of their houses to a homelot of 240 square
meters each within the land in question for them and their family to
conveniently enjoy the benefits to be provided by the complex;
8. That the relocation of said defendants’ houses will not affect in any
manner the security of tenure of the tenants on the riceland portion of
the land in question;
9. That in 1993, the [respondents], relying on the compromise
agreement they have with the defendants, started the implementation
of their aforestated projects by strategically placing the "BRAVO
AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX" sign board in the land in
question and started making the needed concrete hollow blocks;
xxxx
11. Specific Performance. That the defendants in violation of their
compromise agreement and on the instigation of a cult leader refused
to comply with their compromise agreement;
21
12. That instead of transferring and relocating their respective houses,
the said defendants illegally demanded of the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, for the compulsory
Page
coverage of the land in question under the OLT program of the
government under Pres. Decree No. 27 and Rep. Act. 6657 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988;
13. That because the land in question is not coverable under the OLT
provisions of P.D. No. 27 and R.A. No. 6657 as the sellers from
whom the [respondents] acquired the lands in question did not have
five (5) hectares each and the latter likewise did not have five (5)
hectares each, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Malasiqui,
Pangasinan did not place the lands in question under the coverage of
the OLT program under P.D. No. 27 nor under R.A. No. 6657;
xxxx
16. COLLECTION OF UNPAID RENTALS. That since the year
1992, the defendants have deliberately refused and still refuse to pay
the lease rentals of their respective tillage on the riceland portions of
the land in question;
xxxx
29. That the defendants, in their illegal desire to convert the
untenanted portions of the land in question as parts of their tillage,
have unlawfully started plowing the untenanted surrounding areas
and the areas in between the rows of mango fruit bearing trees in the
mango orchard portion of the land in question.25
In sum, the material allegations in respondents’ Complaint are: (1)
that several of the defendants are the agricultural tenants/lessees of
respondents’ rice lands; (2) that the defendants entered into a
Compromise Agreement with respondents in which the former agreed
to give up portions of the subject properties they were tilling in
exchange for home lots also located on the subject properties; (3) that
the Compromise Agreement shall not affect defendants’ security of
tenure; (4) that instigated by a cult leader, defendants refused to
comply with the Compromise Agreement and, instead, demanded
from the MARO that the subject properties be compulsorily placed
under the land transfer program of the Government; (5) that the
defendants have also refused to pay rent for the portion of the rice
lands they were tilling; and (6) that the defendants have also begun
cultivating portions of the subject properties which are untenanted
and planted with mango trees. Based on these allegations,
respondents sought the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that an injunction order
be issued against the defendants restraining them from performing
farmworks on the non riceland portion of the land in question and
restraining them from harvesting mango fruits from the mango trees
in the mango orchard portion of the land in question and after due
hearing judgment issue:
1. Ejecting the defendants from the land in question;
2. Ordering the defendants jointly and solidarily liable to [herein
respondents’] attorneys to be proved hereinafter and pay
[respondents] ₱500,000.00 moral damages and ₱500,00.00
Exemplary damages and ₱500,000.00 actual damages.
3. Ordering the defendants to pay the deliberately unpaid rentals of
the lands in question since 1992 up to the present.
4. Making permanent the injunction order against the defendants;
5. Granting such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in favor
of the [respondents] under the premises.26
The material allegations and reliefs sought in respondents’ Complaint
essentially established a case involving the rights and obligations of
respondents and defendants as landlords and agricultural
tenants/lessees, respectively, taking into account their Compromise
Agreement; as well as the fixing and collection of lease rentals. The
DARAB properly took cognizance of the case as it constituted
agrarian disputes, well-within the jurisdiction of the DARAB under
Rule II, Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the 1994 DARAB Rules.
Moreover, even when respondents alleged in their Complaint that the
subject properties are not subject to the OLT program under the
Tenants Emancipation Decree and the CARL because each of the
respondents does not own more than five hectares, said allegation
was not fundamental in establishing respondents’ causes of action
against defendants. In fact, it was defendants who explicitly raised
and discussed in their Position Paper before the DARAB the issue of
whether the subject properties are covered by the Tenants
Emancipation Decree and the CARL.27 As part of their defense,
defendants claimed that all of the subject properties, with a total area
of 26 hectares,28 are actually owned by respondent Ernesto S. Bravo
alone, and are tenanted and planted with rice, corn, bananas, and root
crops. They argued that under the Tenants Emancipation Decree,
tenanted rice and corn lands in excess of the seven hectares a
landowner is allowed to retain shall be awarded to the tenant-
farmers.1avvphil
It bears to reiterate that jurisdiction over the nature of the action
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or
upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is
vested, the same is retained up to the end of the
litigation.29 Therefore, the DARAB was only exercising the
jurisdiction vested upon it over DARAB Case Nos. 01-689 to 710-
WP-’95 when it directly addressed the issue raised by defendants
themselves, and adjudged that the subject properties are not subject to
the OLT program under the Tenants Emancipation Decree and the
CARL since respondents each owned an area well-within the
retention limits allowed landowners by said agrarian laws.
Incidentally, the DARAB also took into consideration and only
stayed consistent with an earlier finding by the MARO that the
subject properties are not within the coverage of the OLT program of
the Government. And while it is true that the MARO’s ruling may
still be appealed to higher DAR officials, petitioners failed to present
any proof that such appeal had indeed been taken or that the said
ruling had already been reversed.
II
A reading of the decisions of the PARAD, the DARAB, and the
Court of Appeals easily belies petitioners’ contention that the tenancy
issue was not appreciated. Based on the pleadings and evidence
submitted by the parties, the PARAD found, and the DARAB and the
Court of Appeals affirmed, that (1) merely six hectares of the subject
properties are planted with rice, while the rest are planted with mango
trees; (2) just the six hectares of rice lands are tenanted; (3) only the
defendants Saturnino Idos, Teofilo Tantay, Faustino Bravo, Mariano
Bravo, Idelfonso Tantay, Pelagio Tantay and Cristina Toralba, are the
agricultural lessees of the rice lands; (4) the other defendants are
ARBA members and agricultural lessees/tenants of lands not part of
the subject properties; and (5) the recognized agricultural lessees of
the rice lands have validly waived their rights to their respective
22
landholdings by voluntarily executing the Compromise Agreement
with respondent Ernesto S. Bravo.
Page
As the Court had so often stressed, findings of the DARAB are
entitled to great weight, nay, finality, considering that the findings of
the Boards are unquestionably factual issues that have been discussed
and ruled upon by them and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
Court cannot depart from such findings. Findings of fact of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Such findings deserve full respect
and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified, or
reversed.30
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the present petition is
DENIED. The Decision dated September 24, 2001 of the Court
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63197, affirming in toto the Decision
dated May 6, 1998 of the DARAB in DARAB Case Nos. 5195 to
5216, which, in turn, affirmed in toto PARAD Placido’s Decision
dated February 23, 1996 in DARAB Case Nos. 01-689 to 710-
WP-’95, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109093 November 20, 1995
LOPE MACHETE, NICASIO JUMAWID, SANTIAGO
JUMAWID, JOHN JUMAWID, PEDRO GAMAYA, RENATO
DELGADO, FERNANDO OMBAHIN, MATIAS ROLEDA,
PASIANO BARO, IGNACIO BARO, MAMERTO PLARAS and
JUSTINIANO VILLALON, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO
VILLALON, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Are Regional Trial Courts' vested with jurisdiction over cases for
collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants?
On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a
complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners Lope
Machete, Nicasio Jumawid, Santiago Jumawid, John Jumawid, Pedro
Gamaya, Renato Delgado, Fernando Ombahin, Matias Roleda,
Pasiano Baro, Ignacio Baro, Mamerto Plaras and Justiniano Villalon.
The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold
agreement with respect to private respondent's landholdings at
Poblacion Norte, Carmen, Bohol, under which petitioners were to pay
private respondent a certain amount or percentage of their harvests.
However, despite repeated demands and with no valid reason,
petitioners failed to pay their respective rentals. Private respondent
thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him back rentals and
damages.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter. They contended
that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations,
hence, the subject matter of the complaint fell squarely within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers under Sec. 1, pars. (a) and (b),
Rule II of the Revised Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
On 22 August 1989 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, 1 and
on 28 September 1989 denied the motion for reconsideration.2
Private respondent sought annulment of both orders before
respondent Court of Appeals which on 21 May 1992 rendered
judgment reversing the trial court and directing it to assume
jurisdiction over the case3 on the basis of its finding that —
. . . The CARL (RA 6657) and other pertinent laws on agrarian
reform cannot be seen to encompass a case of simple collection of
back rentals by virtue of an agreement, as the one at bar, where there
is no agrarian dispute to speak of (since the allegation of failure to
pay the agreed rentals was never controverted in the motion to
dismiss) nor the issue raised on application, implementation,
enforcement or interpretation of these laws.4
On 18 January 1993 the appellate court rejected the motion for
reconsideration.5
Petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of action of private
respondent arose from an agrarian relation and that respondent
appellate court failed to consider that the agreement involved is an
agricultural leasehold contract, hence, the dispute is agrarian in
nature. The laws governing its execution and the rights and
obligations of the parties thereto are necessarily R.A. 3844,6 R.A.
66577 and other pertinent agrarian laws. Considering that the
application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of said
laws are matters which have been vested in the DAR, this case is
outside the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The petition is impressed with merit. Section 17 of E.O. 229 8 vested
the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those
falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in accordance with law.
Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and
strengthening the DAR, created the DARAB to assume the powers
and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform
cases.9 Section 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of the Revised Rules of the
DARAB explicitly provides —
Sec. 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction,
23
both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
Page
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Orders Nos. 229, 228 and
129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No.
6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction
shall extend over but not be limited to the following: (a) Cases
involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other
agrarian laws, (b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and
determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and
collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization
payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the Land
Bank . . .
In Quismundo v. Court of Appeals,10 this Court interpreted the effect
of Sec. 17 of E.O. 229 on P.D. 946, which amended R.A. 3844, the
agrarian law then in force —
The above quoted provision (Sec. 17) should be deemed to have
repealed11 Sec. 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which
invested the then courts of agrarian relations with original exclusive
jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and
obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation
to the agrarian reform program.
Formerly, under Presidential Decree No. 946, amending Chapter IX
of Republic Act No. 3844, the courts of agrarian relations had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over "cases involving the rights
and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural
land except those cognizable by the National Labor Relations
Commission" and "questions involving rights granted and obligations
imposed by laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules
and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the agrarian
reform program," except those matters involving the administrative
implementation of the transfer of land to the tenant-farmer under
Presidential Decree No. 27 and amendments thereto which shall be
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.12
In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian
relations were integrated into the regional trial courts and the
jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts.13
However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which
took effect on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for
publication in the Official Gazette,14 the regional trial courts were
divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.
The said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian
Reform.
On 15 June 1988 R.A. 6657 was passed containing provisions which
evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the DAR
exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters.15 Section 50
thereof substantially reiterates Sec. 17 of E.O. 229 thus —
Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
(DENR) . . .
Section 3, par. (d), thereof defines the term "agrarian dispute" as
referring to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers'
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements.
However it may be mentioned in passing that the Regional Trial
Courts have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over
agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "special
jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial
Courts designated by this Court — at least one (1) branch within each
province — to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as
Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law,
original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and (b) the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act.16
Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench
which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of
petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with
private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal
competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.17
Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to
assume jurisdiction over this case. At any rate, the present legal battle
is "not altogether lost" on the part of private respondent because as
this Court was quite emphatic in Quismundo v. Court of
Appeals,18 the resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage of the
parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes,
being the administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary
expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary
in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and
other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive
proceeding.19
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as well
as its resolution denying reconsideration is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City
dated 22 August and 28 September 1989 are REINSTATED.
Consequently, let the records of this case be immediately transmitted
to the appropriate Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) for proper adjudication in accordance with the
ruling in Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals 20 and reiterated
in Quismundo v. Court of Appeals,21 as well as pertinent agrarian
laws.
SO ORDERED.
24
Page
 The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, seeking to reverse the June 30, 2003 Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 65498. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated

October 18, 1999 dismissing the complaint filed by [petitioner]
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Branch 1, is
hereby AFFIRMED."3

The Facts

The facts of the case are narrated by the CA in this wise:

"On March 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint

Production Agreement for Islanders Carp-Farmer Beneficiaries
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. [petitioner] with Lapanday
Agricultural and Development Corporation [respondent].

"Almost three years after, on April 2, 1996, [petitioner], represented

by its alleged chairman, Manuel K. Asta, filed a complaint [with the
RTC] for Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus, Damages, with prayer
for Preliminary Injunction against [respondent], the alleged x x x
officers [of petitioner] who entered into the agreement, and the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Davao (hereinafter PARO),
represented by Saturnino D. Sibbaluca. [Petitioner] subsequently filed
an amended complaint with leave of court alleging that the persons,
who executed the contract were not authorized by it.

"[Respondent] then filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 18, 1996 x x

x, stating that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (hereinafter DARAB) has primary, exclusive, and original
jurisdiction; that [petitioner] failed to comply with the compulsory
mediation and conciliation proceedings at the barangay level; and for
the unauthorized institution of the complaint in behalf of [petitioner].
[Respondent] also averred that [petitioner] was engaged in forum
shopping because [it] also filed a petition before the Department of
Agrarian Reform praying for the disapproval of the Joint Production
Agreement. x x x PARO also filed a motion to dismiss on May 16,
1996.
[G.R. NO. 159089 : May 3, 2006]
"On August 21, 1996, [respondent] then filed a case at the DARAB
ISLANDERS CARP-FARMERS BENEFICIARIES MULTI- for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance, Injunction with
PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., Petitioner, v. LAPANDAY Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney's Fees. On February 25,
AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT 1997, the DARAB decided the case in favor of [respondent] declaring
CORPORATION, Respondent. the Joint Production Agreement as valid and binding and ordering
[petitioner] to account for the proceeds of the produce and to comply
with the terms of the contract.
DECISION

"The [RTC] then issued [its] decision on October 18, 1999.

PANGANIBAN, C.J.:

"[Petitioner], before [the CA], rais[ed] the following errors on appeal:

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
has jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 'I
Law (CARL). Included in the definition of agrarian disputes are those
arising from other tenurial arrangements beyond the traditional 'THE [RTC] GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AT
landowner-tenant or lessor-lessee relationship. Expressly, these BAR ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION.
arrangements are recognized by Republic Act 6657 as essential parts
25

of agrarian reform. Thus, the DARAB has jurisdiction over disputes

'II
arising from the instant Joint Production Agreement entered into by
Page

the present parties.

'THE [RTC] GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE
JOINT PRODUCTION AGREEMENT AS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO' "4
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Finding the relationship between the parties to be an agricultural
leasehold, the CA held that the issue fell squarely within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. Hence, the appellate court ruled that the
RTC had correctly dismissed the Complaint filed by petitioner.
Moreover, being in the nature of an agricultural leasehold and not a
shared tenancy, the Joint Production Agreement entered into by the
parties was deemed valid by the CA. The agreement could not be
considered contrary to public policy, simply because one of the
parties was a corporation.
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for the Court's consideration:
"I
"Whether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in
affirming the dismissal of the case at bench by RTC of Tagum City
on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and
nature of the suit.
"II
"Whether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in
finding that the 'Joint Production Agreement' is valid instead of
declaring it as null and void ab initio, its provisions, terms and
condition, cause and purposes being violative of [t]he express
mandatory provision of R.A. 6657.
"III
"Whether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in
holding that the 'Joint Production Agreement' is a leasehold contract
and therefore valid.
"IV
"Whether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in
interpreting and applying the prevailing doctrines and jurisprudence
delineating the jurisdiction between the regular court and DARAB on
the matter of agricultural land and tenancy relationship."6
Simply put, the question to be resolved by the Court is this: which of
the various government agencies has jurisdiction over the
controversy?
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Sole Issue:
Jurisdiction
Section 50 of Republic Act 66577 and Section 17 of Executive Order
2298 vests in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the primary
and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine
and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform.9 Through Executive Order 129-A,10 the President of the
Philippines created the DARAB and authorized it to assume the
powers and functions of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases.11
Moreover, Rule II of the Revised Rules of the DARAB provides as
follows:
"Section 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction. - - The Board shall have primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate
all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic
Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228 and 129-A, Republic Act
No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree
No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be
limited to cases involving the following:
a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical,
engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural
lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws[.]"12
The subject matter of the present controversy falls squarely within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. In question are the rights and obligations
of two juridical persons engaged in the management, cultivation and
use of agricultural land acquired through the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
Petitioner contends that, there being no tenancy or leasehold
relationship between the parties, this case does not constitute an
agrarian dispute that falls within the DARAB's jurisdiction.13
We clarify. To prove tenancy or an agricultural leasehold agreement,
it is normally necessary to establish the following elements: 1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the
subject matter of the relationship is a piece of agricultural land; 3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose
of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and 6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.14
In the present case, the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly
absent. Petitioner is thus correct in claiming that the relationship
between the parties is not one of tenancy or agricultural leasehold.
Nevertheless, we believe that the present controversy still falls within
the sphere of agrarian disputes.
An agrarian dispute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements - - whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise - - over lands devoted to agriculture. Such disputes include
those concerning farm workers' associations or representations of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. Also
26
included is any controversy relating to the terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants and
Page
other agrarian reform beneficiaries - - whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian
and tenant, or lessor and lessee."15 matters."21

It is clear that the above definition is broad enough to include
disputes arising from any tenurial arrangement beyond that in the
traditional landowner-tenant or lessor-lessee relationship.
Tenurial Arrangements Recognized by Law
The assailed Joint Production Agreement16 is a type of joint economic
enterprise. Joint economic enterprises are partnerships or
arrangements entered into by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) land beneficiaries and investors to implement
agribusiness enterprises in agrarian reform areas.17
Validity of the Joint Production Agreement
As already discussed above, jurisdiction over the present controversy
lies with the DARAB. As the RTC had correctly dismissed the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, it was superfluous for the trial
court - - and the CA for that matter - - to have ruled further on the
issue of the validity of the agreement.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from
resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.22

Recognizing that agrarian reform extends beyond the mere
acquisition and redistribution of land, the law acknowledges other
modes of tenurial arrangements to effect the implementation of
CARP.18
In line with its power to issue rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives of Republic Act 6657,19 the DAR issued Administrative
Order No. 2, Series of 1999, which issued "Rules and Regulations
Governing Joint Economic Enterprises in Agrarian Reform Areas."
These rules and regulations were to provide CARP beneficiaries with
alternatives to sustain operations of distributed farms and to increase
their productivity.20
Since the DARAB had already ruled in a separate case on the validity
of the Joint Venture Agreement,23 the proper remedy for petitioner
was to question the Board's judgment through a timely appeal with
the CA.24 Because of the manifest lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC, we must defer any opinion on the other issues raised by
petitioner until an appropriate review of a similar case reaches this
Court.25
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Section 10 of this administrative order states as follows:

"SEC. 10. Resolution of Disputes' As a rule, voluntary methods, such

as mediation or conciliation and arbitration, shall be preferred in
resolving disputes involving joint economic enterprises. The specific
modes of resolving disputes shall be stipulated in the contract, and
should the parties fail to do so, the procedure herein shall apply.

"The aggrieved party shall first request the other party to submit the
matter to mediation or conciliation by trained mediators or
conciliators from DAR, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or
the private sector chosen by them.

xxx

"Should the dispute remain unresolved, it may be brought to either of

the following for resolution depending on the principal cause of
action:

'(a) DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) if it involves interpretation

and enforcement of an agribusiness agreement or an agrarian dispute
as defined in Sec. 3(d) of RA 6657[.]' "

The present controversy involves the interpretation and enforcement

of the terms of the Joint Production Agreement. Thus, the case clearly
falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This Court in fact
recognized the authority of the DAR and the DARAB when it ruled
thus:

"All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the
27

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise

questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. All doubts
Page

should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it

G.R. No. 159089             May 3, 2006
ISLANDERS CARP-FARMERS BENEFICIARIES MULTI-
PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
has jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL). Included in the definition of agrarian disputes are those
arising from other tenurial arrangements beyond the traditional
landowner-tenant or lessor-lessee relationship. Expressly, these
arrangements are recognized by Republic Act 6657 as essential parts
of agrarian reform. Thus, the DARAB has jurisdiction over disputes
arising from the instant Joint Production Agreement entered into by
the present parties.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse the June 30, 2003 Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 65498. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated
October 18, 1999 dismissing the complaint filed by [petitioner]
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Branch 1, is
hereby AFFIRMED."3
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA in this wise:
"On March 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint
Production Agreement for Islanders Carp-Farmer Beneficiaries
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. [petitioner] with Lapanday
Agricultural and Development Corporation [respondent].
"Almost three years after, on April 2, 1996, [petitioner], represented
by its alleged chairman, Manuel K. Asta, filed a complaint [with the
RTC] for Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus, Damages, with prayer
for Preliminary Injunction against [respondent], the alleged x x x
officers [of petitioner] who entered into the agreement, and the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Davao (hereinafter PARO),
represented by Saturnino D. Sibbaluca. [Petitioner] subsequently filed
an amended complaint with leave of court alleging that the persons,
who executed the contract were not authorized by it.
"[Respondent] then filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 18, 1996 x x
x, stating that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (hereinafter DARAB) has primary, exclusive, and original
jurisdiction; that [petitioner] failed to comply with the compulsory
mediation and conciliation proceedings at the barangay level; and for
the unauthorized institution of the complaint in behalf of [petitioner].
[Respondent] also averred that [petitioner] was engaged in forum
shopping because [it] also filed a petition before the Department of
Agrarian Reform praying for the disapproval of the Joint Production
Agreement. x x x PARO also filed a motion to dismiss on May 16,
1996.
"On August 21, 1996, [respondent] then filed a case at the DARAB
for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance, Injunction with
Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney’s Fees. On February 25,
1997, the DARAB decided the case in favor of [respondent] declaring
the Joint Production Agreement as valid and binding and ordering
[petitioner] to account for the proceeds of the produce and to comply
with the terms of the contract.
"The [RTC] then issued [its] decision on October 18, 1999.
"[Petitioner], before [the CA], rais[ed] the following errors on appeal:
28
‘I
Page
‘THE [RTC] GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AT
BAR ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION.
‘II
‘THE [RTC] GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE
JOINT PRODUCTION AGREEMENT AS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO’"4
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Finding the relationship between the parties to be an agricultural
leasehold, the CA held that the issue fell squarely within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. Hence, the appellate court ruled that the
RTC had correctly dismissed the Complaint filed by petitioner.
Moreover, being in the nature of an agricultural leasehold and not a
shared tenancy, the Joint Production Agreement entered into by the
parties was deemed valid by the CA. The agreement could not be
considered contrary to public policy, simply because one of the
parties was a corporation.
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
"I
"Whether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in
affirming the dismissal of the case at bench by RTC of Tagum City
on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and
nature of the suit.
"II
"Whether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in
finding that the ‘Joint Production Agreement’ is valid instead of
declaring it as null and void ab initio, its provisions, terms and
condition, cause and purposes being violative of [t]he express
mandatory provision of R.A. 6657.
"III
"Whether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in
holding that the ‘Joint Production Agreement’ is a leasehold contract
and therefore valid.
"IV
"Whether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in
interpreting and applying the prevailing doctrines and jurisprudence
delineating the jurisdiction between the regular court and DARAB on
the matter of agricultural land and tenancy relationship."6
Simply put, the question to be resolved by the Court is this: which of
the various government agencies has jurisdiction over the
controversy?
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.1avvphil.net
Sole Issue:
Jurisdiction
Section 50 of Republic Act 66577 and Section 17 of Executive Order
2298 vests in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the primary
and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine
and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform.9 Through Executive Order 129-A,10 the President of the
Philippines created the DARAB and authorized it to assume the
powers and functions of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases.11
Moreover, Rule II of the Revised Rules of the DARAB provides as
follows:
"Section 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction. -- The Board shall have primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate
all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic
Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228 and 129-A, Republic Act
No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree
No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be
limited to cases involving the following:
a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical,
engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural
lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws[.]"12
The subject matter of the present controversy falls squarely within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. In question are the rights and obligations
of two juridical persons engaged in the management, cultivation and
use of agricultural land acquired through the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
Petitioner contends that, there being no tenancy or leasehold
relationship between the parties, this case does not constitute an
agrarian dispute that falls within the DARAB’s jurisdiction.13
We clarify. To prove tenancy or an agricultural leasehold agreement,
it is normally necessary to establish the following elements: 1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the
subject matter of the relationship is a piece of agricultural land; 3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose
of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and 6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.14
In the present case, the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly
absent. Petitioner is thus correct in claiming that the relationship
between the parties is not one of tenancy or agricultural leasehold.
Nevertheless, we believe that the present controversy still falls within
the sphere of agrarian disputes.
An agrarian dispute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
29
arrangements -- whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise
-- over lands devoted to agriculture. Such disputes include those
Page
concerning farm workers’ associations or representations of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. Also included is
any controversy relating to the terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries -- whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee."15
It is clear that the above definition is broad enough to include
disputes arising from any tenurial arrangement beyond that in the
traditional landowner-tenant or lessor-lessee relationship.
Tenurial Arrangements Recognized by Law
The assailed Joint Production Agreement16 is a type of joint economic
enterprise. Joint economic enterprises are partnerships or
arrangements entered into by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) land beneficiaries and investors to implement
agribusiness enterprises in agrarian reform areas.17
Recognizing that agrarian reform extends beyond the mere
acquisition and redistribution of land, the law acknowledges other
modes of tenurial arrangements to effect the implementation of
CARP.18
In line with its power to issue rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives of Republic Act 6657,19 the DAR issued Administrative
Order No. 2, Series of 1999, which issued "Rules and Regulations
Governing Joint Economic Enterprises in Agrarian Reform Areas."
These rules and regulations were to provide CARP beneficiaries with
alternatives to sustain operations of distributed farms and to increase
their productivity.20
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise
questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. All doubts
should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it
special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian
matters."21
Validity of the Joint Production Agreement
As already discussed above, jurisdiction over the present controversy
lies with the DARAB. As the RTC had correctly dismissed the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, it was superfluous for the trial
court -- and the CA for that matter -- to have ruled further on the
issue of the validity of the agreement.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from
resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.22
Since the DARAB had already ruled in a separate case on the validity
of the Joint Venture Agreement,23 the proper remedy for petitioner
was to question the Board’s judgment through a timely appeal with
the CA.24 Because of the manifest lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC, we must defer any opinion on the other issues raised by
petitioner until an appropriate review of a similar case reaches this
Court.25
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Section 10 of this administrative order states as follows:

"SEC. 10. Resolution of Disputes– As a rule, voluntary methods,

such as mediation or conciliation and arbitration, shall be preferred in
resolving disputes involving joint economic enterprises. The specific
modes of resolving disputes shall be stipulated in the contract, and
should the parties fail to do so, the procedure herein shall apply.

"The aggrieved party shall first request the other party to submit the
matter to mediation or conciliation by trained mediators or
conciliators from DAR, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or
the private sector chosen by them.

xxxxxxxxx

"Should the dispute remain unresolved, it may be brought to either of

the following for resolution depending on the principal cause of
action:

‘(a) DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) if it involves interpretation

and enforcement of an agribusiness agreement or an agrarian dispute
as defined in Sec. 3(d) of RA 6657[.]’"

The present controversy involves the interpretation and enforcement

of the terms of the Joint Production Agreement. Thus, the case clearly
falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This Court in fact
recognized the authority of the DAR and the DARAB when it ruled
30

thus:
Page

"All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the