HISTORY

OF
PAKISTAN
ARMY FROM
1965 TO 1971

Major Agha Humayun Amin (Retired)

Stray Reflections on
Commencement of Writing
'Pakistan Army Since 1965'
A.H Amin

The first part of this book 'The Pakistan Army till 1965' was distributed
free of cost to a vast cross section of people including retired and
serving Pakistani army officers of ranks varying from captain to four
star general. Some copies were sent to libraries both Pakistani as well
as foreign and some copies sent to research oriented organisations. No
feedback was received from Pakistani readers, a happening, which
may be termed as a rule rather than an exception. I have been writing
for various Pakistani military journals since 1989. The various articles,
which I thus wrote, dealt with doctrine, military training, leadership etc.
With the exception of four cases out of which three were letters written
praising my articles in two lines by officers who retired as colonels or
brigadiers and one in which a factual error inadvertently committed by
me was pointed out by the late General Attiq-ur-Rahman. No letter was
written by any officer critically analysing my articles. The same is true
for the vast majority of articles published in various army journals and
magazines.

The trend in Pakistan since independence has been towards anti-

intellectualism. There are historical reasons for this anti-
intellectualism. The irony is that the situation was not remedied after
independence. Education in British India was aimed at acquiring
degrees so that Indians could become lawyers doctors or government
officials. That they surely did, in the process of which some acquired
great wealth and also became political leaders, senior civil servants
and prosperous middle class professionals. The intellectual basis of
modern Europe's success was the renaissance, the French Revolution
and the Industrial revolution. During this period great progress was
made in Europe in political thought, philosophy and scientific
advancement. The Indo-Pak sub-continent was introduced to modern
thought by the British by virtue of being colonial subjects of the English
East India Company.
Thus research intellectual activity etc were never important or of any
consequence for the people of the Indo-Pak. On the other hand a mad
rush towards acquiring rank and status, government jobs or political
power by claiming to be champions of Hindu and Muslim rights plagued
the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent! Once this mad rush for government
patronage and jobs got an impetus from 1858, communalism became
a major factor in Indo-Pak politics. This was since at this time the other
parts of the world were talking about nationalism, socialism and
political liberties. All the intellectual thrust of Indians was towards
interpreting laws in communal terms! This was a Godsend blessing for
the British colonial rulers! They encouraged communalism since it
divided the Indians and ensured that they stayed away from dangerous
ideas like war of liberation against the colonial state or from socialism
or communism. The British very cleverly introduced parliamentary
institutions, which enabled the leading Indians to divert their energy
into harmless constitutional debates!

The fathers of communalism as an idea in Indian politics were Syed

Ahmad Khan, Lala Lajpat Rai, Gandhi and the Jauhar brothers! The
British on the other hand right from 1858 followed a subtle but brilliant
policy, introducing parliamentary democracy as bait to divert the
energies of the more prominent Indians! A bait, which aroused
ambition, whether based on ego, lust for glory, social recognition or
material rewards! Peaceful yet heroic! Safe yet glorious! The double
advantage of pursuing a prosperous law practice or business career or
wielding feudal power while at the same time also being leaders of the
subject Indians and the possible successors of the British Viceroys!
Parliamentary democracy or its prospects once the British finally left
India produced two distinct kinds of reactions, both of which helped the
British and went against the people of the Indo-Pak Sub-continent! The
leaders of the Hindu majority saw themselves as successors of the
British Viceroys while the principal leaders of the Indian Muslims
hypothesised that parliamentary democracy in independent India
would mean Hindu ascendancy and Muslim subservience or more
correctly all power in the hands of the Hindu politicians! The Hindu-
Muslim question in reality was a 'Hindu-Muslim leaders clash of ego'
question! It all started once the British introduced local self-
government based on elections from the 1860s and aggravated more
and more as leaders who were Hindu by accident of birth tried to
sideline other leaders who were Muslim by accident of birth! Initially
leaders from both the communities talked in terms of high sounding
slogans like 'Nationalism' 'Liberty' 'Democracy' etc but became more
narrow in approach once their religion became a psychological
disqualification in being leaders of all Indians!
The fact that the vast majority of Indians whether Muslim or Hindu
would remain poor as they were before 1947 and are in the year 2000
was not important for these men. The Congress and League were
essentially bourgeois parties with a larger feudal presence in the
league and a larger urban business presence in the Congress. Both
these parties employed religion as a tool to further their party
agendas, middle class business class or feudal on the whole and
egoistic at the higher level! Nehru was an atheist and a socialist, Mr
Jinnah was a highly Westernised man, and yet both were great Hindu
and Muslim leaders. Both the parties were instruments of business
professional and feudal classes to achieve maximum power and both
increasingly divided Indian society on communal lines simply because
their leaders were essentially highly egotistical men! The irony of Indo-
Pak history is the fact that modern Indo-Pak history is a story of clash
of great men like Nehru and Jinnah who employed religion as a tool
simply because they correctly albeit ironically realised that the people
of the Indo-Pak were too naive to understand vague slogans like liberty
or democracy and could only be galvanised or mobilised by raising
religious slogans! In a more advanced Indian society Nehru and Jinnah
may have been leaders of all Indians rather than only Hindu Indians or
Muslim Indians! India, however, was like Europe around the time of the
30 years war and thus both these great men were forced by historical
circumstances to be only communal leaders! Both wanted to be
leaders of all Indians regardless of race or religion, but both were
forced, thanks to the fire of religious communalism lit by glorified
agitators or complex and outwardly impressive hypocrites like Gandhi
to be communal leaders! Nehru was too sophisticated a man to be a
Hindu and Jinnah was too enlightened a man to be only a leader of
Indian Muslims. It was a twist of fate that both are today remembered
albeit rightly as leaders of Hindu or Muslim India. Thus while the other
parts of the world intellectually as well as materially made great
progress during the period 1850-1950 all the energies of the Indians at
all levels were increasingly diverted into communalism; thereby
ensuring that intellectually as well as materially the Indo-Pak Sub-
Continent remained backward! History was written as Muslim or Hindu
history, politics was practised as Hindu or Muslim politics and while
Europe was experimenting with radical social legislation, all the
energies of Indian constitutionalist were absorbed in debating
representation on basis of religion! College or University education was
important because it was a pre-requisite for government jobs or to
practise in the law courts! Research teaching and writing were
unproductive jobs since they did not enable a man to be a deputy
collector or barrister or doctor! It was a mad race made further mad by
frequent outbursts of communal frenzy, which increased as population
increased during the period 1890-1940.
All this helped the Britishers who had been traumatically shaken by the
Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 when a largely Hindu majority army had
rebelled under Muslim leaders! The British were thus happier playing
the role of judges resolving Hindu Muslim disputes rather than
performing the more unpleasant task of facing a combined political
movement of all Indians regardless of race or religion as in 1857, 1919
or 1922 ! This is the basis of anti-intellectualism in the Indo-Pak Sub-
continent. It is more true for Pakistan since the Muslims were
educationally more backward and relatively less true, yet still true and
applicable to India too! Pakistan and India have produced very few
serious military writers. In Pakistan the situation is worse since an
unofficial ban was imposed on military writing by various military
usurpers who ruled the country for the greater part of its history.
Unfortunately the larger number of men who joined the officer corps of
both the Indian and Pakistan Army were from the relatively less
educated or superficially educated classes of Indo-Pak society. There
were some military writers in Pakistan like Attiq-ur-Rahman, Fazal
Muqeem, Shaukat Riza and A.I Akram. Attiq-ur-Rahman wrote well but
was more obsessed with more outward forms of military discipline and
was more of a martinet and proper soldier than a military writer of
depth. A man of impeccable integrity, a man of Honour and a most
cultured and proper soul, Attique did not have any of the dynamism or
subtlety of a Liddell Hart or Fuller. He was never remembered as an
inspiring field commander but as a 100 percent proper soldier who was
obsessed with military drill and haircut.As a retired officer he was
obsessed with Golf Courses which he rightly regarded as a waste of
time and effort. However, this was where his concern ended. He
stopped writing after 1990 and thus retired from the army's intellectual
life at a time when the army needed a serious military writer.

General A.I Akram wrote well but his books dealt with seventh and
eighth century Arab Wars and had little relevance as far as practical
utility in terms of modern warfare unit level tactics or operational
strategy was concerned. General Shaukat Riza dabbled more with
military writing but his writing lacked depth, broad outlook and
dynamism. He was employed by Zia's military regime to write a heavily
doctored trilogy on the history of the Pakistan Army at a time when the
man was semi-senile and sick. The resultant three books thus lacked
depth of analysis, their only significance being, a collection of three
rudimentary handbooks which provide basic facts about order of
battle, broad outline plans and other basic details which untouchable
low caste retired majors like this scribe cannot ever obtain access to
through normal official channels available to any researcher in any
civilised country! Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan stands out as the
relatively most competent clearheaded and coherent out of all the
above mentioned gentlemen. His books lacked strategic vision and a
broad outlook but nevertheless were precise and forthright without
confusing layouts which are hallmarks of all Shaukat Riza's books. The
unfortunate part about Muqeem's writings was the fact that Muqeem
wrote first as a sycophant serving general hopeful of getting the next
rank and later as a retired general to please or at least cover up an all
powerful serving prime minister.

The positive aspect about Muqeem's works was the fact that Muqeem
was generally precise, correct and exact in analysing a fallen gladiator,
a typical quality of all successful men, at least in the Indo-Pak Sub-
continent, where a primitive historical state of civilisation and political
system do not allow dispassionate, blunt critical and forthright
analysis. This is relatively more true for Pakistan which has witnessed
military rule or dictatorship in guise of democracy for the greater part
of its history; I would say, for its entire history from 1947. Lack of
critical analysis due to dangers of being labelled blasphemous is the
greatest tragedy of history writing in all countries where Muslims live!
Perhaps the reasons can be found in the fact that Christianity is 500
years older than Islam and may be in the year 2500 we in this part of
the world will be writing history the way Europeans are doing in 2000!
The problem with history writing in Islamic countries is lack of
tolerance. Those in power are sacred figures by virtue of authority and
totalitarian powers. Analysis or forthright analysis is dangerous in most
cases and injudicious in many! Muqeem may have been an excellent
historian in West Europe! But the question is that Muqeem was not
willing to be sidelined or isolated or persecuted in a society, which
does not tolerate criticism of those in the higher echelons of power!
Thus each of Muqeem's work although relatively better than others
was a condemnation of the previous regime's military efforts! Thus in
his first book he criticised Liaquat the first Prime Minister for
incompetence in the Kashmir War while raising Ayub to the level of a
modern Napoleon. In his second major book Fazal rightly criticised
Ayub for structurally weakening the army by encouraging sycophants
and retiring relatively better officers who were perceived as likely
political threats. Similarly Muqeem's analysis of the 1971 war is
reasonably balanced, but exonerates Mr Bhutto of all blame and also
exonerates the Pakistan Army of the terrible genocide that it carried
out in East Bengal in 1971. Shaukat criticises Bhutto since he was Zia's
principal political opponent but exonerates Ayub of all the blunders
and the follies committed in the period 1950-1969! A very learned
gentleman who I hold in very high esteem by virtue of being a close
friend of one of my dearest friends rightly told me to reduce what he
called 'polemics' in the first volume of this history.

A conceptual difference arises about the use of the word 'Polemics'.

The term has different meaning for different people and is
unfortunately used in a sweeping manner to dismiss valid historical
criticism! There is no denying of fact in stating that 'Polemic' may be
an unpleasant figure of speech for a professor of English literature or a
criminal error of conduct for a sycophant or a man of this world. The
fact that polemics i.e. 'practice of controversial discussion' is
something, which is the essence of all historical writing, is absolutely
undeniable and incontrovertible. The historian cannot be a diplomat in
order to escape being branded as one who indulges in polemics. The
historian has to indulge in controversy because there are no archives
or source material in any library or records office in this world, which
enable a research scholar to understand the innermost depths of
human personality. Every historian who wants to be loyal to posterity
has to be polemical. History is but another name of a never-ending
controversy! At some point in time or text all historians enter the realm
of polemics! It's a part of their craft or calling! I wrote an article for the
Command and Staff College Quetta about two years ago. It contained
some criticism about the higher organisation of the Pakistan Army.

The article was surprisingly published since the Staff College was
headed at that time by one of the most upright and intellectually
honest generals of Pakistan Army; a rare commodity in a sub-
continental army and I would say in any army of the world. In addition
the staff college's principal magazine's editor at that time was one of
the most dynamic and boldest colonels, (at least in my humble
opinion), of the army! The colonel editor who twice risked his career by
attacking the Quetta Police over an entirely honourable issue in 1979,
and by refusing to supervise Degchas in a general officers daughter's
wedding in early 1987 was being posted out to command a tank
regiment. Somehow he managed, or I should say was instrumental in
ensuring that my article criticising the higher command organisation
be published in the 'Citadel' magazine. The Editorial Introduction was,
however, written by another colonel who succeeded him as the editor
and belonged to the majority 'go safe' calculate a decade ahead 'take
no risk' breed of career officers! The clever editor exonerated himself
of all that I had said in the article by stating that 'the article lacks
documentation for certain controversial assertions'. The gentleman's
point was valid but this is what historical analysis is all about; i.e.
dealing with controversy in face of fog and obscurity and lack of
documentation! Who in this world can find documentary evidence for
saying that many wars that this world fought were to satisfy egos of
Kings, Presidents or Prime Ministers! That revolutions killed millions or
that countries were divided simply because one politician did not want
the other to be the country's next Prime Minister or Governor General!
So much for 'Polemics', bad word for professors, careful men, career
officers, successful men! But one of the most essential tools in
historians craft.
THE PAKISTAN ARMY From 1965 to
1971
Selected Excerpts from “Pakistan Army Since 1965” re-drafted
as an article exclusively for the “Defence Journal”. “The
Pakistan Army Since 1965” is the second volume of the Two
Volume history of Pakistan Army and covers Pakistan Army
from 1965 till 2000.

Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON

DC makes an interesting foray down memory lane.

The finest summarising of the incalculable qualitative harm inflicted

on the Pakistan Army, by the self-promoted Field Marshal of peace,
by a contemporary, was done by Major General Fazal I Muqeem, when
he described the state of affairs of the Pakistan Army during the
period 1958-71; in the following words: "We had been declining
according to the degree of our involvement in making and unmaking of
regimes. Gradually the officer corps, intensely proud of its
professionalism was eroded at its apex into third class politicians and
administrators. Due to the absence of a properly constituted political
government, the selection and promotion of officers to the higher rank
depended on one man’s will. Gradually, the welfare of institutions was
sacrificed to the welfare of personalities. To take the example of the
army, the higher command had been slowly weakened by retiring
experienced officers at a disturbingly fine rate. Between 1955 and
November 1971, in about 17 years 40 Generals had been retired, of
whom only four had reached their superannuating age. Similar was the
case with other senior ranks. Those in the higher ranks who showed
some independence of outlook were invariably removed from service.
Some left in sheer disgust in this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of
the right of criticism, the two most important privileges of an Armed
Forces officer. The extraordinary wastage of senior officers particularly
of the army denied the services, of the experience and training vital to
their efficiency and welfare. Some officers were placed in positions that
they did not deserve or had no training for" 1.
The advent of Yahya Khan and Yahya’s Personality

Immediately after the 1965 war Major General Yahya Khan who had
commanded the 7 Division in the Grand Slam Operation was promoted
to the rank of Lieutenant General, appointed Deputy Army C in C and
C in C designate in March 1966 2. Yahya was a Qizilbash3
commissioned from Indian Military Academy Dehra Dun on 15 July
1939. An infantry officer from the 4/10 Baluch Regiment, Yahya saw
action during WW II in North Africa where he was captured by the Axis
Forces in June 1942 and interned in a prisoner of war camp in Italy
from where he escaped in the third attempt4. In 1947 he was
instrumental in not letting the Indian officers shift books 5 from the
famous library of the British Indian Staff College at Quetta,where Yahya
was posted as the only Muslim instructor at the time of partition of
India.Yahya was from a reasonably well to do family, had a much
better schooling than Musa Khan and was directly commissioned as
an officer. Yahya unlike Musa was respected in the officer corps for
professional competence. Yahya became a brigadier at the age of 34
and commanded the 106 Infantry Brigade, which was deployed on the
ceasefire line in Kashmir in 1951-52. Later Yahya as Deputy Chief of
General Staff was selected to head the army’s planning board set up
by Ayub to modernise the Pakistan Army in 1954-57. Yahya also
performed the duties of Chief of General Staff from 1958 to 1962 from
where he went on to command an infantry division from 1962 to 1965.

Yahya was a hard drinking soldier approaching the scale of Mustafa

Kemal of Turkey and had a reputation of not liking teetotallers. Yahya
liked courtesans but his passion had more to do with listening to them
sing or watching them dance. Thus he did not have anything of
Ataturk’s practical womanising traits. Historically speaking many great
military commanders like Khalid Bin Waleed, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,
Eftikhar Khan and Grant were accused of debauchery and womanising.
These personal habits still did not reduce their personal efficiency and
all of them are remembered in military history as great military
commanders! The yardstick is that as long as a military commander
performs his job as a military leader well, debauchery drink etc is not
important. Abraham Lincoln a man of great integrity and character
when told by the typical military gossip type commanders, found in all
armies of the world and in particular plenty in the Indo-Pak armies,
about Grants addiction to alcohol dismissed their criticism by stating "I
cannot spare this man. He fights"! Indeed while the US Civil War was
being fought a remark about Grant was attributed to Lincoln and
frequently repeated as a joke in army messes. The story thus went
that Lincoln was told about Grant’s drinking habits, and was asked to
remove Grant from command. Lincoln dismissed this suggestion
replying "send every general in the field a barrel of it"! Once Lincoln
heard this joke he said that he wished very much that he had said it! 6
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, praised by his enemies, i.e. the British, in the
British Official History of WW One, as one of the greatest military
commanders in world’s history was a great consumer of alcohol and
chronic womaniser! It has been alleged that Kemal was a homosexual
(a typically Turkish pastime) too and frequently suffered the ravages of
venereal disease! The same was true for Petain one of the greatest
military commanders of the French Army in WW One!

Gul Hassan Khan who served with Yahya in the General Headquarters
in the early 1960s described Yahya as "professionally competent" and
as a man of few words whom always approached the point at issue
without ceremony.7 Muqeem described Yahya as "authoritarian by
nature" and "reserved by temperament".8 Major General Sher Ali
under whom Yahya served assessed Yahya as an officer of the "highest
calibre". Shaukat Riza writing as recently as 1986 described Yahya as a
good soldier, as a commander distinguished for his decision making
and generous nature and one who gave his total trust to a man whom
he accepted as part of his team or a colleague.9

Contrary to Gauhar’s judgement Yahya, at least in 1966-69, was

definitely viewed as a professional in the army. His shortcomings in
functioning as the Supreme Commander that became evident in the
1971 war were not known to anyone in 1966. No evidence exists, but
it appears that Yahya’s sect and ethnicity may have played a part in
Ayub’s decision to select Yahya as C in C. Musa writes in his memoirs
that Yahya was not his first choice as Army C in C but was selected by
Ayub overruling Musa’s reservations about Yahya’s character 10. This
further proves that Ayub selected Yahya as the army chief for reasons
other than merit. I am not implying that Yahya was incompetent, but
merely the fact that Ayub was motivated by ulterior reasons to select
Yahya. These reasons had something to do with Yahya’s political
reliability by virtue of belonging to a minority! Yahya was not a Punjabi
or a Pathan but belonged to a minority ethnic group as well as a
minority ethnic group, just like Musa.This was no mere coincidence but
a deliberately planned manoeuvre to have as army chief a man who
was not from the two ethnic groups which dominated the officer corps,
the Punjabis being more than 60 % of the officer corps and the Pathans
being the second largest group after the Punjabis!11 Altaf Gauhar
Ayub’s close confidant inadvertently proves this fact once he quite
uncharitably, and for reasons, other than dispassionate objective
historical considerations, described Yahya as one " selected…in
preference to some other generals, because Yahya, who had come to
hit the bottle hard, had no time for politics and was considered a
harmless and loyal person".12

Selection of Army C in C

Foreign readers may note that almost all army chiefs of Pakistan
Army were selected primarily because they were perceived as reliable
as well as pliable! In Addition ethnic factors Vis a Vis prevalent political
considerations played a part in their selection. Thus Liaquat the first
premier selected a non Punjabi as the army’s first C in C since in 1950
Liaquat was involved in a political confrontation with Punjabi politicians
of the Muslim League and had established a Hindustani-Pathan-Bengali
alliance to sideline the Punjabi Muslims. Thus the most obvious
nominee for the appointment of C in C i.e. Major General Raza, a
Punjabi Muslim was not selected. Instead Ayub an ethnic Pathan, and
one who already had been superseded and sidelined, and with a poor
war record was selected as the first Pakistani Muslim army C in C.
Similarly Ayub selected Musa simply because Musa was perceived as
loyal despite not being competent! Yahya as Gauhar Ayub’s closest
adviser and confidant admits, as earlier mentioned, was selected
because he had hit the bottle hard; i.e. was harmless, and was loyal,
and thus no danger to Ayub! In other words Gauhar advances a theory
that Ayub selected Yahya (Gauhar’s subjective judgement) simply
because it was politically expedient for Ayub to have this particular
type of man as army chief! Gauhar judgement of Yahya has little value
since it was highly subjective but Ayub’s reasons for selecting his
army chief, as Gauhar describes it speaks volumes for the character of
Ayub and I would say the orientation of all Pakistani politicians, both
civilian and military! In third world countries every army chief is a
military politician! The process was carried on and continues to date
but this chapter deals with only 1965-1971, so more of this later!

The same was true for extensions given to the army chiefs. Ayub got
three extensions since Iskandar Mirza perceived him as a reliable tool.
He booted out Mirza, his benefactor, after the last extension in 1958!
Ayub gave Musa an extension of four years in 1962 since he perceived
Musa as reliable and politically docile, and thus no threat to Ayub’s
authoritarian government. Since 1962 when Musa got his extension of
service by one additional term of four years, which prolonged his
service from 1962 to 196613, no Pakistani army chief was given an
extension beyond his three or four year term. The situation however
was still worse since Yahya took over power in 1969 and thus
automatically extended his term as C in C till December 1971. Zia
usurped power in 1977 and thus gave himself a nine year extension as
Army Chief till he was removed to the army and the country’s great
relief in August 1988 by Divine Design! Beg attempted to get an
extension by floating the idea of being appointed as Supreme
Commander of Armed Forces14 but was outmanoeuvred by his own
army corps commanders, who gave a lukewarm response to the idea
and by Ghulam Ishaq who was a powerful president and had a deep
understanding of the military mind by virtue of having loyally and
successfully served three military dictators.

Yahya Khan as Army Chief-1966-1971

Yahya energetically started reorganising the Pakistan Army in 1965.

Today this has been forgotten while Yahya is repeatedly condemned
for only his negative qualities (a subjective word which has little
relevance to generalship as proved in military history)! The post 1965
situation saw major organisational as well as technical changes in the
Pakistan Army. Till 1965 it was thought that divisions could function
effectively while getting orders directly from the army’s GHQ. This idea
failed miserably in the 1965 war and the need to have intermediate
corps headquarters in between the GHQ and the fighting combat
divisions was recognised as a foremost operational necessity after the
1965 war. In 1965 war the Pakistan Army had only one corps
headquarter i.e the 1 Corps Headquarters. Soon after the war had
started the US had imposed an embargo on military aid on both India
and Pakistan. This embargo did not affect the Indian Army but
produced major changes in the Pakistan Army’s technical
composition. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk well summed it up when
he said, "Well if you are going to fight, go ahead and fight, but we’re
not going to pay for it"!15 Pakistan now turned to China and for
military aid and Chinese tank T-59 started replacing the US M-47/48
tanks as the Pakistan Army’s MBT (Main Battle Tank) from 1966. 80
tanks, the first batch of T-59s, a low-grade version of the Russian T-
54/55 series were delivered to Pakistan in 1965-66. The first batch
was displayed in the Joint Services Day Parade on 23 March 196616.
The 1965 War had proved that Pakistan Army’s tank infantry ratio
was lopsided and more infantry was required. Three more infantry
divisions (9, 16 and 17 Divisions) largely equipped with Chinese
equipment and popularly referred to by the rank and file as "The China
Divisions" were raised by the beginning of 196817. Two more corps
headquarters i.e. 2 Corps Headquarters (Jhelum-Ravi Corridor) and 4
Corps Headquarters (Ravi-Sutlej Corridor) were raised.

In the 1965 War India had not attacked East Pakistan which was
defended by a weak two-infantry brigade division (14 Division) without
any tank support. Yahya correctly appreciated that geographical, as
well as operational situation demanded an entirely independent
command set up in East Pakistan. 14 Division’s infantry strength was
increased and a new tank regiment was raised and stationed in East
Pakistan. A new Corps Headquarters was raised in East Pakistan and
was designated as Headquarters Eastern Command.18 It was realised
by the Pakistani GHQ that the next war would be different and East
Pakistan badly required a new command set up.

Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan took over as the army’s Chief of
General Staff and thus Principal Staff Officer to the C in C soon after
the 1965 war. Yaqub was an aristocrat from a Hindustani Pathan
background and was altogether different from the typical north of
Chenab breed in depth of intellect, general outlook and strategic
perception! In words of Fazal Muqeem a sharp observer and one who
was not lavish in praising anyone "planning had taken a turn for the
better when Major General Yaqub Khan became the Chief of General
Staff”.19 In other words Muqeem was implying that planning level in
the army was relatively poor before Yaqub became the Chief of
General Staff. But Muqeem went further and stated that the army’s
war plans in the post 1965 era were still vague about "what action
should be taken in West Pakistan if an attack was mounted against
East Pakistan".20 We will discuss more of this later.

Promotions and Appointments

Selection and assessment of officers for higher ranks had depended on

one man’s will and his personal likes and dislikes since 1950. Initially it
was Ayub from 1950 to 1969 and Yahya from 1969 to 1971. Dictators
fear all around them and this was the principal tragedy of the
Pakistan Army. Selection and assessment of men was not a plus
point in Yahya’s personality. It appears that either Yahya was not a
good judge of men. In this regard Yahya continued Ayub’s policy of
sidelining talented officers who had the potential of becoming a rival at
a later stage! We will first deal with selection for higher ranks vis-a-vis
war performance. Almost no one, who had blundered, except Brigadier
Sardar Ismail the acting divisional commander of 15 Division, was
really taken to task for having failed in the discharge of his military
duties!21 Lord Bashir of Valtoha fame was promoted, and commanded
the 6th Armoured Division after the war! On the other hand Major
General Abrar, who had proved himself as the finest military
commander, at the divisional level, at least by sub continental
standards, was sidelined and ultimately retired in the same rank!22
Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry who had saved Pakistan’s
territorial integrity from being seriously compromised at a strategic
level at Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965 was sidelined. This may
be gauged from the fact that at the time of outbreak of the 1971 War
Nisar although promoted to brigadier rank, was only commanding the
Armoured corps recruit training centre, a poor appointment for a man
who had distinguished himself as a tank regiment commander in
stopping the main Indian attack. A man whose unit’s performance was
described by the enemy opposing him as one "which was certainly
creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured
Division and its objective"23 was considered by the Pakistani General
Headquarters pedantic officers as fit only to command a recruit
training centre while one who was instrumental in failure of the main
Pakistani armour effort at Khem Karan was promoted to Major General
rank and trusted with the command of Pakistan’s Armoured division!
Brigadier Qayyum Sher who had distinguished himself as a brigade
commander in 10 Division area in Lahore was also not promoted!
Qayyum Sher was one of the few brigade commanders of the army
who had led from the front. Major General Shaukat Riza who rarely
praised anyone had the following to say about Sher’s conduct while
leading the Pakistan army’s most important infantry brigade counter
attack on Lahore Front as a result of which the Indian 15 Division
despite considerable numerical superiority was completely thrown off
balance. Shaukat stated that "Brigadier Qayyum Sher, in his command
jeep, moved from unit to unit and then personally led the advance, star
plate and pennant visible. This was something no troops worth their
salt could ignore".24 but the Army’s Selection Boards ignored Qayyum
Sher once his turn for promotion came! Qayyum Sher did well in war
and was awarded the Pakistani D.S.O i.e. the HJ! But war performance
or even performance in peacetime training manoeuvres was, and still
is, no criteria for promotion in the Pakistan Army! Qayyum retired as
a brigadier, remembered by those who fought under him as a brave
and resolute commander, who was not given an opportunity to rise to
a higher rank, which Qayyum had deserved, more than any brigadier
of the Pakistan Army did.

Analysis and reappraisal after the 1965 War

The 1965 War was rich in lessons and many lessons were learned;
however the army’s reorganisation was badly affected by the political
events of 1968-71. The two major areas of improvement after the war
were in the realm of military organisation and military plans. It was
realised finally that infantry and armoured divisions could not be
effectively employed till they were organised as corps with areas of
responsibility based on terrain realities.

The post 1965 army saw major changes in terms of creation of corps
headquarters. On the other side no major doctrinal reappraisal was
done after the 1965 War except raising new divisions and corps no
major reform was undertaken to produce a major qualitative change in
the army’s tactical and operational orientation. Today this is a much
criticised subject. The events of 1965-71 however must be taken as a
whole. When one does so a slightly different picture emerges. A major
start was taken soon after 1965 after Yahya had been nominated as
the deputy army chief, towards improving higher organisation and
corps were created, but this process was retarded by the much more
ominous political developments which increasingly diverted the army
chiefs energies into political decision making from 1969 onwards.

The 1965 War was a failure in higher leadership. This was true for both
sides. However, qualitative superiority by virtue of superior doctrine
strategic orientation and operational preparedness became relatively
far more important for the Pakistan Army than the Indians.

The Indians had already embarked on a programme of rapid expansion

since the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. The material and numerical gap
between the Indian and Pakistan armies started widening from 1962
and after 1965 it reached dangerous proportions! Further because of
the 1965 War the Indians got an opportunity to improve their
command and control procedures. The Indians the reader must note
were already one step ahead of the Pakistanis in higher organisation
since their army was organised to fight as corps since 1947-48 while
the Pakistan Army had fought the 1965 War organised in divisions.

The Indians had failed to make good use of their considerable

numerical superiority in infantry in 1965 but, they had learned many
lessons which. This meant that in the next war the Indians could
employ their numerically superior forces in a relatively better manner
than in 1965. Further Pakistan had lost its major arms supplier the
USA which had imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan. Thus the
technical superiority in equipment which Pakistan had enjoyed in
1965 was nullified after 1965. On the other hand India had a much
larger economy and thus far greater potential to buy from the open
market than Pakistan. All these factors demanded a major qualitative
change. One that would ensure that Pakistan could survive another
war with India.It was an entirely new situation.

The year 1965 was a watershed in Pakistani military history. Till 1965
Pakistani planners thought in terms of liberating the Pakistani Alsace
Lorraine i.e. Kashmir! The issue in the next war was no longer adding
more territory but merely preserving the country’s territorial integrity!
The country was in the grip of serious internal and external crisis. The
Internal crisis stemmed out of 11 years of military rule which had
sharply polarised the country into two wings i.e the Eastern and the
Western Wing and even within the Western Wing the bulk of the
populace was alienated with the Ayub regime. It appears that this
major change in the overall geostrategic position was not grasped by
those at the highest level. It appears that till December 1971 no one in
the Pakistani GHQ seriously thought that the Indians would overrun
East Pakistan. Too much hope was based on US or Chinese
intervention. The Chinese could not possibly have intervened since all
Himalayan passes were snowbound in Nov-Dec 1971. The United
States on the other hand made no serious effort to pressurise India into
not attacking East Pakistan. To make things further complicated the
country’s internal cohesion was seriously weakened by the political
conflict between the East and West Pakistan Provinces and the
countrywide anti Ayub agitation which finally led to the exit of the self
promoted Field Marshal Ayub from power in March 1969. The situation
was extremely delicate, complicated and only a truly great leader at
both civil and military level could have remedied the situation.
Unfortunately for the Pakistan Army and the country there was no
such man to steer the country’s ship out of troubled waters.

It appears that 1965 war was not rationally analysed in Pakistan at

all. In this regard the Pakistani military decision-makers were swept
away in the emotional stream of their own propaganda! The fact that
the Pakistan Army was in a position to inflict a decisive defeat on the
Indians in the war, but failed due to primarily poor leadership at and
beyond brigade level, and due to doctrinal and organisational
deficiencies at the higher level was not accepted! It was a natural
result of the fact that Pakistan functioned as a pseudo democracy
under one man! This in turn had led to a ban on frank and open
analysis of the army’s performance and role! On the other hand the
Indian Army’s poor performance was openly and frankly analysed and
the Indian critics did not spare the Indian C in C General Chaudri.25 It
would not be wrong to say that the Indians thanks to a democratic
system in which the army was not a sacred cow, unlike Pakistan,
analysed their failings in 1965 in a more positive and concrete
manner. Shaukat Riza the officially sponsored historian of the
Pakistan Army admitted this fact. Shaukat thus observed, while
briefly analysing the Commander in Chief’s General Training Directive
of 1968, that "We admitted that the enemy would have better
resources in number of troops, quality of equipment, research,
development and indigenous production. In face of superiority we
were relying solely on quality of our troops to win a war against India.
But there was nothing in our satchel of organisation, tactical doctrine
or even quality of professional leadership, which could substantiate
this confidence. This was self-hypnosis where we were not really
hypnotised”.26 It may be noted that the General Training Directive
identified the enemy threat relatively realistically only in an extremely
vague and rudimentary sense but gave no solution or tangible doctrine
to combat it except, operations on broad front for all formations except
those in Kashmir, Mountain Warfare for formations in Kashmir and
Baluchistan, Snow Warfare for troops in the Northern Areas, Desert
Warfare for formations located in Sind Baluchistan and Bahawalpur,
Jungle and Riverine Warfare for formations in East Pakistan and
Frontier Warfare for all formations in NWFP and Baluchistan!27 It was a
piece of extreme naivety and was probably drafted by a staff officer
after reading the recommendations of the last two years training
directives and was merely signed by the army chief 28. The 1969
training directive dealt with attack by infiltration and anti infiltration
measures29, something, which was just a whimsical fancy in a staff
officer’s mind! Infiltration was buried soon and in 1971!

Strategic and Operational Dilemmas

Fazal Muqeem quite correctly described the adverse strategic situation

in the post 1965 period in the following words, "with the almost daily
expansion of the Indian Armed Forces since the 1965 war, it had
become economically impossible for Pakistan to keep pace with her.
The policy of matching Indian strength with even 1/3 or _ in numbers
had gradually gone overboard. Under these circumstances all that
Pakistan could do was to avoid war with India and to strive to resolve
her disputes through political and diplomatic means”.30 The only
problem with this quote is the fact that, at that time i.e. the period
1965-71 no one at the helm of affairs was ready to think so
realistically and rationally! Fazal’s wisdom is the wisdom of hindsight,
expressed some two years after Pakistan Army had fought the
disaster and humiliating war in its history and Pakistan was
dismembered into two countries. The Pakistani nation had been fed on
propaganda about martial superiority of their army! Brigadier A.R
Siddiqi who served in the army’s propaganda/media management wing
known as the ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations Directorate) states
that "the 1965 war had exalted the military image to mythical
heights”. 31 The common man drew false conclusions and to
compound things further, the 1965 war was viewed differently in West
and East Pakistan. The West Pakistani populace and particularly the
majority West Pakistani ethnic groups i.e. the Punjabis saw the war as
a triumph of a preponderantly Punjabi Muslim army over a numerically
larger Hindu army! The East Pakistanis viewed the war as a war fought
by a West Pakistani dominated army to protect West Pakistan, where
some 90 % of the army was stationed! The Indians had not attacked
Pakistan deliberately since their strategy was based on the fact that
in case the bulk of Pakistan Army in the West Pakistan provinces
northern half i.e. Punjab was destroyed Pakistan would automatically
sue for peace or collapse! Thus they had concentrated the bulk of their
army against West Pakistan in the 1965 War. On the Eastern Front
the Indians outnumbered the Pakistani troops defending East Pakistan
by more than three to one but did not attack East Pakistan out of fear
of Chinese Army the bulk of which was concentrated opposite India’s
Assam Province and the North East Frontier Agency. Later after the
1965 war the Indians with the benefit of hindsight painted this timid
action in not attacking East Pakistan as an act of grand strategic
dimensions. In any case the harm was done as far as East Pakistani
perceptions about the war were concerned. The East Pakistanis
increasingly started viewing the army as a west Pakistani entity
created to defend only West Pakistan. The seeds of secession were
firmly sown as a result of the 1965 War.

The strategic and operational dilemmas faced by the Pakistan Army

can only be understood in terms of the complicated political situation
in the period 1969-1971. Yahya Khan attempted to solve two highly
complicated political problems that he had inherited from his
predecessor and who were also the father and architect of both the
problems. These were restoration of democracy and resolving the
acute sense of deprivation which had been created in the East
Pakistan province as a result of various perceived or real injustices
during the period 1958-1969. Secessionist tendencies had emerged in
the East Pakistan province where the people viewed Pakistan’s
federal government with its capital in the West Pakistan as a West
Pakistani elite dominated affair. A government which was Muslim in
name but West Pakistani (Punjabi, Pathan and Hindustani in order of
merit)32 dominated in essence and which had been exploiting the East
Pakistan province like a colony since 1947! We will not examine the
details of this perception since it is beyond the scope of this book. We
are only concerned with the fact that this perception made things very
complicated for the Pakistan Army. The bulk of the army was
concentrated in the West Pakistan province in line with the strategic
doctrine that defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. The
likely political danger now lay in the fact that the East Pakistanis were
increasingly viewing the army as a foreign and hostile entity. This
perception could make things difficult for the lone infantry division of
the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. The Indian Army had been
rapidly expanded since 1965 and the Indians now possessed a military
capability to overrun East Pakistan while part of its army kept the
bulk of the Pakistan Army stationed in the West wing in check. The
situation was made yet more complex by fears in West Pakistan
about the East Pakistani majority leader Mujeeb’s intention to reduce
the army in case he won the 1970 elections that Yahya had promised.
Further Mujeeb’s "Six Point Formula" if enforced would have led to
virtual disintegration of Pakistan since it envisaged a confedral
system with a very high level of provincial autonomy. What would
happen in case a civil war started in the East wing after the 1970
elections and India decided to take advantage of the adverse internal
political situation by invading East Pakistan. The military planners in
the GHQ knew clearly that in case an armed insurrection broke out in
the East Pakistan province one infantry division would not be control
it. In case troops were sent from the West wing to reinforce the East
Pakistan garrison, the war plans in the West Wing would be
compromised. These were serious questions, which no one in the GHQ
could answer in 1969. No one exactly knew what would happen in the
first general elections of Pakistan. How could anyone know? This basic
right had been denied to the common man in both the wings since
1946!

Yahya Khan and the Political Situation- 1969-1971

Now a word on Pakistan’s internal political situation in 1969 and its

negative effects on the Pakistan Army. It appears that, had not Ayub
Khan alienated the East Wing by his pro West Pakistani elite policies
and also had not alienated the West Pakistani and East Pakistani
populace by his self-serving policies, there would have been no East
Pakistan problem which resulted in Pakistan’s break-up in 1971 or
any anti-Ayub agitation in both the country’s provinces of East and
West Pakistan that finally led to the fall of the Ayubian system of
government in March 1969. The foreign readers may note that the East
wing versus West wing rivalry had been constitutionally resolved
through the passing of the 1956 Constitution, once the representatives
of the East wing had most large heartedly accepted the principal of 50
% parity in the country’s legislature despite the fact that their actual
ratio in the country’s population entitled them to 54 % seats in the
assembly! Both the wings now started coming closer since issues were
settled inside the parliament rather than by subversion or agitation.
However Ayub in league with the president Iskandar Mirza repeatedly
conspired to derail democracy and in league with Iskandar Mirza finally
usurped power in the country by imposing the first Martial Law in
October 1958. He sidelined Mirza in less than a month and imposed a
one-man rule on the country. Ayub despised the East Pakistanis and as
Army C in C had stopped more raisings of infantry battalions of East
Pakistanis. The East Pakistanis on the other hand were anti-Ayub and
resented Ayub’s policies of allocating a predominantly large part the
resources of the country on the development of the West Wing. Further
during the Ayub era, the strategic doctrine that defence of East
Pakistan lay in concentrating the bulk of the Pakistan Army in the
West wing was developed. This further alienated the East wingers
since there was an unofficial ban on recruitment of Bengalis in the
fighting arms of the army and the expanded army increasingly
became a West Pakistani army, instead of being a national army.33

Once Ayub handed over power to Yahya Khan on 25 March 1969 Yahya
inherited a two-decade constitutional problem of inter provincial ethnic
rivalry between the Punjabi-Pathan-Mohajir dominated West Pakistan
province and the ethnically Bengali Muslim East Pakistan province. In
addition Yahya also inherited an eleven-year-old problem of
transforming an essentially one-man ruled country to a democratic
country, which was the ideological basis of the anti Ayub movement of
1968-69. Herein lies the key to Yahya’s dilemma. As an Army Chief
Yahya had all the capabilities, qualifications and potential. But Yahya
inherited an extremely complex problem and was forced to perform
the multiple roles of caretaker head of the country, drafter of a
provisional constitution, resolving the One Unit question 34, satisfying
the frustrations and the sense of exploitation and discrimination
successively created in the East Wing by a series of government
policies since 1948. All these were complex problems and the seeds of
Pakistan Army’s defeat and humiliation in December 1971 lay in the
fact that Yahya Khan blundered unwittingly into the thankless task of
cleaning dirt in Pakistan’s political and administrative system which
had been accumulating for twenty years and had its actual origins in
the pre 1947 British policies towards the Bengali Muslims. The
American author Ziring well summed it up when he observed that,
"Yahya Khan has been widely portrayed as a ruthless uncompromising
insensitive and grossly inept leader…While Yahya cannot escape
responsibility for these tragic events, it is also on record that he did not
act alone…All the major actors of the period were creatures of a
historic legacy and a psycho-political milieu which did not lend itself to
accommodation and compromise, to bargaining and a reasonable
settlement. Nurtured on conspiracy theories, they were all conditioned
to act in a manner that neglected agreeable solutions and promoted
violent judgements”. 35

The irrefutable conclusion is that Yahya failed as an Army Chief not

because he lacked the inherent capabilities but because he tried to do
too many things at the same time. This as we earlier discussed was the
prime reason for failure of the Pakistan Army to develop and function
as a dynamic entity beyond unit level in the 1965 war and in the pre
1965 era.

In all fairness one cannot but admit that, Yahya Khan, sincerely
attempted to solve Pakistan’s constitutional and inter
provincial/regional rivalry problems once he took over power from
Ayub in March 1969. The tragedy of the whole affair was the fact that
all actions that Yahya took, although correct in principle, were too late
in timing, and served only to further intensify the political polarisation
between the East and West wings. He dissolved the one unit restoring
the pre 1955 provinces of West Pakistan, promised free direct, one
man one vote, fair elections on adult franchise, a basic human right
which had been denied to the Pakistani people since the pre
independence 1946 elections by political inefficiency, double play and
intrigue, by civilian governments, from 1947 to 1958 and by Ayub’s
one man rule from 1958 to 1969. However dissolution of one unit did
not lead to the positive results that it might have lead to in case "One
Unit" was dissolved earlier. Yahya also made an attempt to
accommodate the East Pakistanis by abolishing the principle of parity,
thereby hoping that greater share in the assembly would redress their
wounded ethnic regional pride and ensure the integrity of Pakistan.
Instead of satisfying the Bengalis it intensified their separatism, since
they felt that the west wing had politically suppressed them since
1958. Thus the rise of anti West Wing sentiment in the East Wing,
thanks to Ayub Khan’s anti East Wing policies, had however reached
such tremendous proportions that each of Yahya’s concessions did not
reduce the East West tension. Yahya announced in his broadcast to the
nation on 28 July 1969, his firm intention to redress Bengali
grievances, the first major step in this direction being, the doubling of
Bengali quota in the defence services 36. It may be noted that at this
time there were just seven infantry battalions of the East Pakistanis.
Yahya’s announcement although made with the noblest and most
generous intentions in mind was late by about twenty years!

Yahya cannot be blamed for the muck that had been accumulating for
more than two decades. Yahya’s intention to raise more pure Bengali
battalions was opposed by Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, the
General Officer Commanding 14 Division in East Pakistan, since the
General felt that instead of raising new purely Bengali battalions,
Bengali troops should be mixed with existing infantry battalions
comprising of Punjabi and Pathan troops.37 Such was the strength of
conviction of General Khadim about not raising more pure Bengali
battalions that once he came to know about Yahya’s orders to raise
more East Pakistani regiments, he flew to the General Headquarters in
Rawalpindi to remonstrate against the sagacity of raising more pure
Bengali units. Khadim’s advice that Bengali troops could not be relied
upon in crisis situations should have been an eye opener for all in the
GHQ. No one at least at that time took his advice seriously. It appears
that the generals were convinced that the Bengali was too meek to
ever challenge the martial Punjabi or Pathan Muslim

The Bengalis were despised as non martial by all West Pakistanis.

However much later an interesting controversy developed in which the
Punjabis and Hindustanis blamed each other for doing so! The
Hindustanis blaming Aziz Ahmad etc and the Punjabis blaming many
Hindustani ICS old foxes of the 1950s! There is no doubt that this
exercise in Bengali degrading was neither totally or exclusively Punjabi
led but a a true for all West Pakistanis business!

The foreign reader may note that Bengalis were despised as a non
martial race from the British times. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan a Hindustani
Muslim and an eminent Muslim leader of the North Indian Muslims in
late 19th century made open fun of Bengalis in his various speeches,
notably the one delivered at Lucknow in 1887. I.H Qureshi another
prominent Hindustani Muslim and a post 1947 cabinet minister
declared in a roundabout manner that the Bengalis were an inferior
race. Ayub made various remarks implying that the Bengalis were an
inferior race in his memoirs written in 1967.38

Inflated Perceptions about Pakistani military

effectiveness

The essence of the whole business was the fact that the Pakistani GHQ
placed entire reliance on the “Superior Valour and Martial Qualities of
the Pakistani (Punjabi and Pathan Muslim soldier) vis a vis the Hindu
Indian soldier, as proved in 1965 war” and felt that somehow, in the
next war to miracles would occur and the Pakistan Army would do well!
The tangible military facts of the Indo Pak politico-military scenario
were not analysed in their true dimension! It was a classic case of
perceptual distortion and losing sight of reality. Eric Berne an eminent
psychologist defined "adjustment" as "ability to change one’s images
to correspond to a new reality”. Berne rephrases "adjustment" as
"flexibility" which he defines as " ability to change your images as they
should be changed according to reality". This in Berne’s view is more
important than intelligence. Berne thus concluded that ‘the successful
man is the one whose images correspond most closely to reality,
because then his actions will lead to the results, which he imagines".39
This as a matter of fact are one of the prime functions of a military and
political leader. The success of the western democracies lay in the fact
that one man was never totally in command but civil and military
functions were divided and shared between various appointment
holders aided by a host of staff officers and research Organisations.
This sadly was not Pakistan’s case where one man from 1958 wielded
all power, both civil and military onwards. The situation was not so
complicated till 1965 since Pakistan enjoyed material and technical
superiority till 1965 and because the troop ratio between Pakistan and
India was relatively manageable40. Unfortunately in Pakistan after
1971 all blame was heaped on Yahya’s shoulders. The fact that the
psychosis that had afflicted the Pakistani decision makers in the period
1966-1971 and finally led to the great humiliation of 1971, had a close
connection with the nature of Pakistan’s experiences as a nation in the
period 1947-1971 was not accepted and instead Yahya was made a
scapegoat for all that had gone wrong. We will analyse more of this in
the next chapter. I will quote Berne once again to define greatness or
the lack of it in Pakistan during the period 1947-1971. But before we
do it we must understand that man is not fully autonomous but is a
prisoner of historical environmental and physiological circumstances.
There are very few truly great men who act more autonomously than
the multitude. Berne thus defined individual human greatness as " A
great man is the one who either helps to find out what the world is
really like or else tries to change the world to match his image. In both
cases he is trying to bring images and reality closer together by
changing one or the other”. In the period 1966-1971 Pakistan did not
have the resources to change the world to match its images nor great
men who had the depth of character and intellect to find out what the
world is really like and changing their images!

Many Pakistani intellectuals with the naivety of a provincial farm

maiden try to heap the whole blame on liquor and Yahya or on liquor
alone! This unfortunately is too simplistic a view! The Pakistanis as a
nation were forming wrong and unrealistic images right from 1947!
Too much faith was based on ideology (Islam) to unite two entirely
diverse regions of East and West Pakistan! Even Shauakat Riza a pro
establishment historian, commenting on religion as a common factor
between the East and West wings caustically noted that “Twenty four
years is too long to gamble on one card”41 History was distorted to
show that the Muslims were ruling the timid Hindu when the British
snatched power from the brave Muslims by treachery! This was sadly
not the case! In reality the Muslims were saved from total defeat by
the British advent in India! A false image was formed by official
propaganda right from 1947 that the Muslims were more martial than
the timid Hindus were! It was a poor modification of the "Martial Races
Theory" of the British, which was a purely imperialist theory to "Divide
and Rule" India! But once Pakistan was defeated in 1971, all blame
was heaped on Yahya and liquor, disregarding the fact that Yahya was
merely the tip of the iceberg, and the irrefutable fact that many great
commanders in history were absolutely incorrigible and compulsive
womanisers and drinkers!

This fact was noted by some officers soon after 1965 but the majority
were victims of the psychosis of Islamic Martial Military superiority that
overwhelmed the West Pakistani psyche during the period 1966-1971!
Brigadier A.R Siddiqi in his book on the Pakistan Army’s press image
thus narrated a thought-provoking incident soon after the war. Siddiqi
met Brigadier Qayyum Sher who as just discussed had distinguished
himself as an infantry brigade commander in the battle opposite
Lahore. Qayyum Sher was unhappy about the unrealistic expectations
and myths that were being created as a result of the official
propaganda. Qayyum Sher told Siddiqi, "Miracles he mused, ‘may
indeed have happened, but they happen only once. Let me tell you
that your press chaps are doing a lot of harm to the soldier
psychologically by publishing all those foolish stories. I wonder what
they are really trying to tell the world. That the Pakistani soldier can
fight his war only with the help of his celestial allies. That he is facing
an enemy inferior to him in all respects. I admit God’s help is of the
utmost importance but it’s no substitute for one’s own performance. It
would be quite stupid to forget that the Indian soldier is as much of a
professional as his Pakistani counterpart. He has been trained in
similar military systems and institutions and fights like hell when he
has to. The only reason why the Pakistani soldier put up a
comparatively better performance in this war was that he fought
largely on his own home ground as a defender”. Siddiqi further noted
that "The Pakistani image makers, however, had little use for such
sterile talk. They had their own mental picture of the war and regarded
it as the only correct one. Anybody who dared to speak of the war
more realistically simply betrayed a ‘diffident and defeatist mentality’
…The merest suggestion of the criticism of the military performance
became a taboo”.42 Sher was not alone in entertaining these views.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL TAJAMMUL HUSSAIN MALIK

Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik who very ably commanded the
3rd Baluch opposite Lahore on the BRB states in his memoirs that the
Indian superiority opposite Lahore was not as overwhelming as later
portrayed in the Pakistani official propaganda. Tajammul thus
stated, "We had Patton Tanks whereas Indians had mostly
Sherman Tanks which were comparatively much inferior.
Similarly our artillery guns out ranged the Indian artillery
guns. They had an overall superiority of infantry, perhaps of
about 1 to 2 but most of their divisions were comparatively ill
equipped and untrained and they had to guard a much bigger
frontier”. 43
Many years earlier one of the greatest thinkers of this world Sigmund
Freud rightly noted that "the irrational forces in man’s nature are so
strong that the rational forces have little chance of success against
them”. Freud thus concluded that "a small minority might be able to
live a life of reason but most men are comfortable living with their
delusions and superstitions rather than with the truth". As a matter of
fact whole nations can be victims of delusions. This has happened
many times in history. The same was true for the Pakistani nation, or
the predominantly West Pakistani elite!

Sultan Khan who served as Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary with Yahya

during the fateful year of 1971 noted at many places in his memoirs
that most Pakistani generals thought that the Pakistani soldier was
more martial and would somehow emerge successfully through the
East Pakistan War. Gul Hassan, Sultan thus noted, was one of them
and firmly believed in the power of bayonet to solve all problems! The
tragedy is that after the war all the blame was heaped on Yahya and
the fact that the whole elite and all those who mattered were under
influence of highly irrational ideas was deliberately suppressed. Till this
day in presentations and studies carried out in Pakistan Army’s schools
and colleges of instruction, Yahya is made the scapegoat for the entire
1971 fiasco and the fact that the whole of West Pakistani was under
influence of a psychotic state is ignored.

Historical Background of Superiority Complex in the

Pakistan Army

It is necessary to examine the historical reasons for this false feeling of

superiority in the Pakistan Army in 1969-71. It may be noted that the
vast bulk of Muslims, just like the vast bulk of Hindus of the Indo Pak
Sub Continent were caught in a vicious square of "ethnicity” "ideology"
"exploitation by feudal and capitalist classes" and above all "British
Colonial rule" during the period 1858-1947. In 1857 the common
soldiers (sepoys), both Hindu (some three fourth) and Muslims (around
one fourth) from modern UP province attempted a rebellion against the
British. This rebellion was crushed by the Britishers using European as
well as Punjabi (largely Muslim and relatively less Sikh and Hindu)
Pathan (less in number than Punjabis) Gurkha and Madrasi troops. The
rebellion’s end in 1858 marked a major turn in British policy in India.
Till 1857 British policy as executed by various Viceroys of the private
English East India Company was markedly egalitarian and anti feudal.
A major policy change was introduced from 1858 onwards once the
British crown took over the governance of India. Feudals who were
viewed as unnecessary anachronisms by Dalhousie were now viewed
as allies against future rebels while ethnic/religious factors which were
not important in army recruitment before 1857, now became a matter
of careful policy, since the pre 1857 was largely one in which soldiers
were mixed down to platoon level regardless of race or religion. The
British policy now changed since the Hindustani44 Hindus and Muslims
regardless of race or religion had jointly rebelled. Thus from 1858
onwards the British introduced the concept of One class companies
with soldiers from one religious as well as ethnic class in any single
infantry company or cavalry troop. Due to various reasons discussed in
detail in the previous volume of this history the British actively
followed a policy of Punjabising from 1858 to 1911. As a result by
1911 the Indian Army was largely a Punjabi although not a Punjabi
Muslim dominated army45.

The reader may note that during the period 1885—1911 when
the ethnic composition of the British Indian Army changed
from a Hindustani majority/Hindu/Non Muslim dominated army
to a Punjabi Majority/Punjabi Muslim heavy army in 1911; no
major war took place; that could prove that Punjabi troops or
Punjabi Muslim troops were better than Hindu troops or the
Hindustani troops, and the concept that the British changed
the ethnic composition based on proven fighting ability in
actual combat; has no connection with any reality of military
history. Thus the “Martial Races Theory” was based more on
political considerations than on any tangible or concrete
military effectiveness or relative combat effectiveness in any
war! In any case the pre 1947 Indian Army was never a Muslim
majority army at any stage of its history. Many Britishers were
crystal clear about the situational or historical relativity of the
so called martial effectiveness even in the first half of the
nineteenth century. Henry Lawrence a Civil Servant of the
English East India Company thus summed up the whole
business about martial effectiveness once he said “Courage
goes much by opinion; and many a man behaves as a hero or a
coward, according as he considers he is expected to behave.
Once two Roman Legions held Britain; now as many Britons might
hold Italy". On the other hand , the reasons why the British preferred
the Punjabis in the army in preference to other races were rationalised
by many Britishers by stating that the British preferred the Indian Army
to be composed of “Martial Races”46.

The "Martial Races Theory" in reality was an Imperial gimmick to boost

the ego of the cannon fodder. Various British writers like Philip Mason
frankly admitted that the real reason for selective recruitment was
political reliability in crisis situations which the Punjabis had exhibited
during the 1857-58 Bengal Army rebellion.47 Another British officer
thought that "Martial Races Theory" had a more sentimental and
administrative basis rather than anything to do with real martial
superiority. C.C Trench thus wrote, “Reasons for preferring
northerners were largely racial. To Kiplings contemporaries,
the taller and fairer a native, the better man he was likely to
be…There was a general preference for the wild over the half
educated native as being less addicted to unwholesome
political thinking…Brahmins had been prominent in the mutiny,
and their diet and prejudices made difficulties on active
service48. The “Special Commission appointed by the Viceroy” to
enquire into the organisation of Indian Army was more blunt in
outlining the political reliability factor once it stated that "lower
stratum of the Mohammadan urban population, the dispossessed
landholders (many of them, off course, Muslims), the predatory
classes, and perhaps the cadets of the old Muhammadan families (as)
… the only people who really dislike British rule” 49 . The reason why
the Punjabis whether Sikh Hindu or Muslim were more loyal to the
British at least till 1919 lay in complex socio-political background of the
province and the complex relationship between the Sikhs Hindus and
Muslims of the province. Its discussion is beyond the scope of this
work. The fact remains that in the first world war the Punjabi case for
priority race for recruitment to the army was once again reinforced
when the Punjabi soldiers, Sikh Muslim and Hindu loyally served the
British in France Mesopotamia Egypt Palestine and Gallipoli. Philip
Mason thus wrote that the "Punjabi Muslims were steady as a rock”
while “a faint question mark hung over the Pathans” 50. Such was the
difference in reliability within the units that when two Pathan
squadrons of 15 Lancers passively refused to fight against the Turks in
Mesopotamia, the Punjabi Squadrons remained staunch and the Pathan
squadrons were disbanded and replaced by Hindustani Hindu Jat
Squadrons from 14th Murray Jat Lancers! The Hindustani/Ranghar
Muslims were also further discredited once the 5th Light Infantry a
pure Hindustani/Ranghar Muslim unit composed of Delhi region
Hindustani Pathans, and Ranghar Muslims rebelled and seized
Singapore for about a day in 1915.51 It was more a question of
political reliability than being more martial that led to further
Punjabisation of the army after the first world war. Thus in 1929 as per
the “Report of the Statutory Commission on Indian Constitutional
Advancement”, military ability was not evenly distributed in the entire
population and, the capacity to fight was confined to the martial races!
The commission ignored the fact that recruitment was done to fill
ethnic quotas as decided by the Indian government and was not open
to all classes! As per this commission’s report some 86,000 or some
54.36% Indian Army combatants out of a total of 158,200 were from
Punjab province. These did include some Ranghar Muslims who were
administratively Punjabi although Hindustani ethnically/culturally, but
there is no doubt that the vast bulk of these men were ethnically
Punjabi. The important part of the whole business was the fact that
once 19,000 Nepali Gurkhas, who were in reality foreigners, included in
the above mentioned total of 158,200 men are excluded the Punjabi
share in Indian Army rose to 61.8%. The Pathans thanks to their
political record in the First World War had been reduced to just 5,600
men 52 or just 4.02% out of which at least a thousand were non
Pathans!

The same state of affairs continued till the outbreak of the Second
World War with the major change being the Punjabi Sikhs who became
relatively less reliable politically because of being under communist
influences 53. However the reader may note, so as not to be led astray
by any false claims that in 1939 the Indian Army was only 37% Muslim,
the rest being non Muslim including about 12.8 % Sikhs 10.9% Hindu
Gurkhas and 37.6% other Hindus54. Immense demands of WW Two
forced the British to diversify the recruitment pattern of the Indian
Army and although Punjab remained the top contributor of recruits, it
provided about 754,551 out of a total of 24,61,446, or 30.65% recruits
to the Indian Army between 3rd September 1939 and 31 August 1945.
55 The reader may note that some 314,356 or a total of 41.66% from
the Punjab contribution and 12.77% recruits were Punjabi Muslims56.
Thus although Punjab led positionwise as a province in recruitment,
there never was any Punjabi Muslim majority or even Punjabi Muslim
majority or even near majority in recruitment to the Indian Army in WW
Two. However a myth was widely propagated in Pakistan that the
Punjabi Muslims were the most martial race and the Pathan Muslims
were the second most martial race57. I may add that I heard this
ridiculous and irrational myth thousands of times in the course of my
13 years service in Pakistan Army. On the other hand the knowledge of
historical knowledge may be gauged from the fact that as late as 1992
in a book written and published in the staff college a brigadier made
the Mughal Emperor Humayun fight the second battle of Panipat, at a
time when Humayun was already dead!

In August 1947 the British Indian Army was divided into the Pakistan
and Indian armies. Two divergent recruitment policies were followed in
both the armies. The Indians broadened their army’s recruitment base,
officially declaring that recruitment was open to all Indian nationals.58
Thus the post 1947 Indian Army drifted away from being the pre 1939
Punjabised army. In Pakistan, Mr Jinnah the politician-statesmen who
created Pakistan almost single-handedly, as the country’s first Head of
State, adopted a sensible policy, to make the army a national army.
Jinnah ordered immediate raising of two infantry battalions of Bengali
Muslims in 1948 reversing the anti Bengali policy of the pre 1947
British colonial government.59 Jinnah’s far sighted as well as just policy
of bringing Bengalis in the fighting arms of the Pakistan Army was
discontinued by General Ayub Khan who was the first Pakistani Muslim
C in C of the Pakistan Army and became the Army Chief in January
1951. Ayub although allegedly guilty of tactical timidity in the WW Two
in Burma60 had a low opinion61 about the Bengalis and discontinued
the expansion of the East Bengal Infantry Regiment from 1951 to
1966. Thus by 1966 the Pakistan Army was a predominantly West
Pakistani (Punjabi dominated) army. In addition the vast bulk of it
except one infantry division was stationed in West Pakistan in line with
the strategic concept evolved in Ayub’s time that the defence of East
Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. Thus the “Martial Races Theory” was
carried on till 1971 and in 1971 the vast bulk of West Pakistanis really
felt that they were a martial race. This superiority complex played a
major part in the wishful thinking in the Pakistani High Command that
somehow the Indians would not invade East Pakistan in strength or
even if they did so, the troops of this martial race (which was subdued
by an 8 % Sikh minority from 1799 to 1849, till it was liberated by the
English East India Company!) would frustrate the Indian Army, despite
all the tangible numerical and material Pakistani inferiority. Foreign
Secretary Sultan Khan’s memoirs are full of the existence of this
irrational belief in the Pakistani High Command. Whatever the case at
least the 1971 War proved that the real reason for the Indian Army’s
martial fervour or relatively better performance was the British factor,
keeping in mind the net total available resources of British Empire or
its allies in the two world wars.

New Raisings – 1966-1971 and the army’s operational

plans

New raisings as discussed earlier were done right from 1965-66

onwards. The Pakistani high command correctly assessed that lack of
infantry played a major role in the failure of Pakistani armour to
translate its convincing material and technical superiority into a major
operational or strategic success. New raisings became more essential
since US military aid, which had enabled Pakistan Army to function
relatively more effectively as compared to the Indians, was no longer
available because of the US ban on arms exports to both India and
Pakistan.

EXISTING DIVISIONS AND NEW RAISINGS FROM 1965 TO

DECEMBER 197162

SER 1965 REMARKS 1966 REMARKS 1968 REMARKS

 - -
NO
1968 1971
Reserve Division to
Peshawar Part of 2 Support 1 Armd Div
1 7 DIV
Corps. Operations in
Bahawalnagar area.
Defence of
Sialkot. 1 Part of 1 Shakargarh Bulge.
2 8 DIV
Corps Corps Under 1
Corps
10
Defence of Ravi-Sutlej
DIV Lahore 1 Part of 4
3 Corridor. Part of 4
Corps Corps.
Corps
4
11 Part of 4
Ditto
DIV Corps.
Headquarter
s
12 Defence of Azad
5 In
DIV Kashmir
Murree

14 East Pakistan Defence of East

6
DIV Pakistan
Defence of Sialkot
15 Part of 1
7 Sialkot Sector.Under 1 Corps
DIV Corps.
Strategic
1
Multan 1 Part of 2 Reserve.Stationed at
8 ARM
Corps Corps. Multan. Under 2
D DIV
Corps.
Strategic
6 Part of 1
Kharian 1 Reserve.Stationed at
9 ARM Corps.
Corps Kharian. Under 1
D DIV
Corps.
Reserve
Div. Raising
10 9 Airlifted to E.Pak in
completed
DIV March 1971
at Kharian
by 1968.
11 16 Reserve Ditto
DIV Div. Quetta.
Raising
 complete by
1968.
Kharian.
Raising
To support 6
17 complete by
12 Armoured Division
DIV 1968.
operations
Reserve
Division
Raised at Hyderabad
in June-July 1971 for
13 18 defence of 560 miles
DIV area from Rahimyar
Khan to Rann of
Katch.
Raised at Jhelum in
June-July 1971 for
14 23
Chhamb-Dewa Sector
DIV
previously in area of
12 Div.
Raised in December
33 1971.Reserve Division
15 DIV of 2 Corps later split
between Shakargarh
Bulge and Sindh in
the war.
16 37 Raised in Dec- 71 Jan-
DIV 72.

The table of raisings above is self-explanatory. The most important

organisational changes which occurred in the army till the 1971 war
were as following. Firstly the army was organised into three corps i.e
the 1 Corps, 2 Corps and 4 Corps and 12 18 and 23 Divisions. The 1
corps headquarter was designated to command four divisions i.e 8, 15,
17 InfantryDivisions and 6 Armoured Division63. 15 and 8 Infantry
Divisions were responsible for defence of Sialkot Sector and the
Shakargarh Bulge respectively while 17 Infantry Division and 6
Armoured Division were the strike force of the corps and also part of
Pakistan Army’s strategic reserves. In addition the 1 Corps also had an
independent armoured brigade (8Armoured Brigade). 4 Corps
consisting of 10 and 11 Infantry Divisions, 105 Independent Infantry
Brigade and 3rd Independent Armoured Brigade was responsible for
the area between Ravi River and Bahawalpur. The 2 Corps with its
headquarters at Multan was a strategic reserve corps. This corps
consisted of the 1st Armoured Division (Multan), 7 Infantry Division and
later 33 Infantry Division. Three infantry divisions i.e the 12, 23 and 18
Infantry Divisions were directly under GHQ and responsible for defence
of Azad Kashmir, Chhamb-Dewa Sector and Sind-Rahimyar Khan
respectively.

Tangibles and Intangibles - The Pakistan and Indian

Army’s military worth by January 1971

By January 1971 the Pakistan Army was a reasonable military machine.

Its main battle tank was the Chinese T-59 which was almost as good as
any Indian tank.Its strategic reserves had the potential to deter any
Indian aggressive military move. It was on its way to becoming a really
national army since Yahya’s announcement of 1969 to allow
recruitment of Bengalis in the fighting arms. Organisationally the
command was coherently and logically distributed in corps and
divisions and the organisational imbalances of 1965 had been totally
removed. Yahya Khan had not failed as the C in C.

The Indian Army was numerically larger but the advantage was not
overwhelming since the Indian Army was divided between the Chinese
Border West Pakistan and East Pakistan. Technically the Indians had
relatively better Soviet tanks but numerically the Pakistani armour
was larger than Indian armour and possessed more higher
organisational flexibility by virtue of having two full fledged armoured
divisions as against one Indian armoured division.

Later events of 1971 clouded our perception and we in Pakistan tend

to view things as entirely simple for the Indian military planners. The
Indian military dilemma was a possible three front war with the Indian
Army divided between West Pakistan East Pakistan and the Indo
Chinese border. The Pakistani defence problem was a two front war
with its army divided into two parts i.e one defending the East Pakistan
and the major part defending West Pakistan. The Pakistani planners
had evolved a clear-cut strategy to overcome this dilemma. The Indian
strategy as it was later applied in 1971 war was based on a choice of
time which reduced the likely threats that it faced from three to two
since the December snow effectively nullified chances of Chinese
intervention and enabled release of Indian Mountain Divisions
earmarked for the Chinese Border to participate in a war against
Pakistan. Even then the final Indian plan was a gamble and would have
failed if Pakistan had launched a pre-emptive attack in October 1971.
The C in C Indian Western Command admitted this fact. General
Candeth who was C in C Western Command states in his book that
“the most critical period was between 8 and 26 October when 1 Corps
and 1 Armoured Division were still outside Western Command. Had
Pakistan put in a pre-emptive attack during that period the
consequences would have been too dreadful to contemplate and all
our efforts would have been trying to correct the adverse situation
forced on us”.64

There were however major shortcomings in both the armies at the

higher leadership level. These pertained to the "Intangible aspects of
military leadership". The mercenary origins of the pre 1947 Indian
Army had resulted in the creation of an orders oriented machine! This
was true for both Indian and Pakistani Armies. These shortcomings had
their origin in the pre 1947 British era and were common with the post
1947 Indian Army. The Indian Army’s military worth was retarded and
downgraded because of a civilian leadership which viewed the army as
a reactionary entity consisting of mercenaries who had collaborated
with the British rulers. This attitude was revised once India suffered
serious loss of prestige in the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962. However
changes in military spirit of an army occur very slowly and by 1971
Indian Army was still trying to recover from many teething problems.
The Pakistan Army in 1947 had consisted of relatively talented as well
as spirited officers. The Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951 had however
started a witch-hunt and many dynamic officers were removed or
sidelined. This conspiracy against originality and boldness had
intensified when Ayub Khan started manipulating extensions from
politicians and the army was reduced to a personal fiefdom of Ayub
during the period 1951-1969! In the process the Pakistan Army lost the
services of many more experienced officers simply because they were
sidelined through political supersession or were retired. The gap
between the two Indo Pak armies in quality of experience may be
gauged from the fact that the first Indian C in C was eight years senior
to Ayub in service and the course mate of Musa, the second Muslim C
in C of the Pakistan Army i.e Manekshaw became the Indian C in C
eleven years after Musa! This may have worked positively for the
Pakistan Army had Musa been a man with an independent outlook!
Musa on the other hand as Gul Hassan’s memoirs revealed lacked
independent judgement dynamism or talent! The Pakistan army during
the period 1951-71 became a highly orders oriented machine! Smart
on the drill square, tactically sound but strategically barren and lacking
in operational vision! One whose first Pakistani C in C was more
interested in political intrigue and industrial ventures than in the basics
of higher military organisation or operational strategy!

The reader must bear in mind that the only major difference despite all
other differences between the Indian and Pakistan Armies was that the
Indian Army was numerically larger than the Pakistan Army was. In
quality of higher military leadership both the armies by virtue of being
chips of one pre 1947 block were little different from each other! Both
the Indian and Pakistan Armies of 1971 were like the Austro-Hungarian
armies of 1809. They consisted of perhaps equally brave junior leaders
but were severely handicapped since rapid expansion since the Sino-
Indian war of 1962 and since the 1965 war. Having more corps and
division despite being impressive on paper had not made the Indian or
Pakistani military machine really effective because of poor training at
divisional and brigade level. Both numerically larger than they were in
1965, but were organisationally ineffective beyond battalion level,
having dashing young leaders but tactically and operationally inept
brigade divisional and corps commanders from the older pre 1947
commissioned generation whom were initially supposed not to go
beyond company level, had the transfer of power not taken place in
1947. The strike corps was a new concept and the Indian 1 Corps
which was shortly created before the 1965 war was a newly raised
formation whose corps commander and armoured divisional
commanders were about to retire in 1965 when war broke out. The
Indian commanders beyond unit level, as was the case with Pakistan
Army, consisted of men who had experience of infantry biased
operations in WW Two and did not understand the real essence of
armoured warfare. It was this lack of understanding that led to the
failures in achieving a decisive armour breakthrough in both sides. It
was a failure of command as well as staff system where even the staff
officers on both sides were too slow for armoured warfare and worked
on yards and furlongs rather than miles. Their orientation was position
oriented rather than mobility oriented and their idea of a battlefield
was a typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or North African
experience where the Japanese and Germans frequently appeared in
their rear had made them extra sensitive about their flanks. These
were men who thought in terms of security rather than speed.
Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in
the slavish colonial orders oriented British Indian Army was the
cardinal script of their life. It was this British system in which every
senior commander was more interested in doing the job of those one
step junior to him that led to the lack of dash and initiative at brigade
and battalion level. They were trained that way and there behaviour as
far as the timidity at brigade and divisional level has to be taken in this
context. Yahya was not a superman who could clean up the Pakistani
political system and reform Pakistan Army within an year or two! He
started the job of reorganising and reforming the Pakistan Army but
had to leave it half way once he was forced to clean up the political
mess in 1969. He made an admirable attempt to clean the political
garbage which had accumulated since 1948 but was over taken by the
tide of history which in 1971 was too powerful to be manipulated by
any single man!

The Indian Army of 1971 was much larger than the Indian Army of
1965! It was many times superior strategically and operationally to the
1965 Indian Army in terms of material strength, technological strength
and numerical strength. The Pakistani defence problem was far more
complex in 1971 than in 1965. Even in terms of foreign policy Pakistan
had just been ditched by one superpower in 1965. The situation in
1971 was far more worse since India had been adopted by another
superpower which, unlike the Naive half hearted, American Village
maiden, was resolutely poised to go with India through thick and thin!
Yahya made unique and brilliant moves to bring the USA and China
together and vainly hoped that the Americans would help him!
Unfortunately the US betrayed a country which had been loyally served
US interests since 1954! Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan’s memoirs
recognise Yahya’s contributions and dismiss many myths about Yahya
having gone out of his way to annoy the Soviets. This aspect is
however beyond the scope of this article.

CONCLUSION

The Pakistan Army and Yahya inherited a complex historical problem,

which had many fathers, at least half of whom were civilians and
politicians! The Bengali alienation started from 1948 over the language
question, was increased through Liaquat’s political intrigues to sideline
Suharwardy and delay constitution making and thus holding elections
which held a threat of a Bengali prime minister challenging the
Hindustani-Punjabi dominance of Muslim politics! The first sin was
committed once Suharwardy was sidelined! This was followed by
coercion and intrigue to force parity on the Bengalis! They even
accepted this unjust formula in 1956! Ask the Punjabis today to agree
to a 50% parity as against all three provinces and then evaluate the
generosity and magnanimity of the Bengalis! The death verdict of
Pakistan’s unity came in 1958 when Ayub took over and allied with the
West Pakistan civil-military-feudal-industrialist clique to sideline the
Bengalis for eternity from the corridors of power! Familiar names , and
a familiar combination constituted the ruling clique! A Punjabi financial
wizard, one Dawood, some generals, some civil servants, some
Hindustani specialists, one old fox who knew how to twist the law, then
young, and some younger whiz kids constituted the ruling clique! They
took Pakistan back to 1864 or even 1804! Local bodies, two huge
provinces like the Bengal and Bombay Presidency etc! The seeds of the
division were laid between 1958 and 1969! Yahya Khan whatever his
faults was a greater man than Liaquat or Ayub! He held the first ever
general elections based on adult franchise! Something that the so
called Quaid e Millat had failed to hold for four long years, not
withstanding all hollow rhetoric by his admirers that he was going to
make a great announcement on 16 October 1951, the original D-Day in
1999 too! Yahya restored provincial autonomy, brought the Bengalis in
the army, and reorganised the army! He did everything that was right
but it was too late! He was fighting against the tide of history! The
Pakistan Army was tossed into a volcano whose architect enjoyed total
power for eleven years and retired peacefully to enjoy his hard earned
wealth. Ayub’s son has remained in the corridors of power in one form
or another and is still a running horse! Yahya Khan is much criticised
for problems with which he had nothing to do! For having done a job
which Liaquat should have done in 1950! The Pakistan Army was a
relatively good fighting machine in 1971! Great reforms were made in
organisation, education and training! It was recovering from the curse
of one-man rule! The cyclone of 1970 in words of an Indian general
destroyed everything! Yes there was a far more dangerous intangible
and invisible cyclone that had been building up since 1948! This
cyclone had four great fathers! Yahya Khan was not one of these four
great men! The "Martial Races Theory" that played a major role in
Pakistani overconfidence in 1971 before actual operations had many
fathers and dated from British times.These British officers had in 1930s
described Jews as non martial! Compare the four Arab-Israeli wars with
this attitude! The military action in 1971 was widely hailed in West
Pakistan! Yet in December 1971 only Yahya was blamed! Yahya was
not the architect of the problems that destroyed the united Pakistan of
1971! He paid for the sins of all that ruled Pakistan from 1947 to 1969!
He could do little more than what a midwife can do in birth of a child as
far as the child’s genetic codes are concerned! The failure of 1971 was
not an individuals failure but failure of a system with flawed
constitutional geographic philosophic and military organisational and
conceptual foundations! I find nothing better to repeat once again the
saying that “Success surely has many fathers and failure is an orphan!
We must however not forget that the failure of 1971 had roots that go
back to 150 years of history!

References and Explanatory Notes

1Page-258 & 259- Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan
(Retired)-National Book Foundation-Ferozsons-Rawalpindi-1973--Fazal I Muqeem was
a sycophant, but a clever one in the sense that once he wrote his first book "The
Story of the Pakistan Army", he was in the run for promotion and naturally had to
play the sycophant which most men who rise to higher positions do! In 1973 Fazal
was a retired man and under no external motivation to please Ayub! Any
dispassionate reader can gauge Fazal’s calibre as a writer from reading both his
books. It was certainly much higher than Shaukat Riza whose three books on the
Pakistan Army in some ways are harder to decipher than the Dead Sea Scrolls!

2Page-125- The Military in Pakistan-Image and Reality –Brigadier A.R Siddiqi

(Retired)-Vanguard-Lahore-1996.

3 Qizilbash is a Persian speaking tribe of Turkish origin employed as mercenary

soldiers by Safavid kings of Iran and by Nadir Shah who himself was a Turk but not a
Shia unlike the Qizilbashes. Once Ahmad Shah Abdali became the first king of
Afghanistan after its independence many Qizilbashes entered his service and were
based in Kandahr and later Kabul. Many Qizilbash nobles were posted in Peshawar as
Nadir Shah’s officials once Nadir Shah invaded India in 1739. In addition many
Qizilbashes were granted estates by Ahmad Shah Abdali and some came and settled
in Lahore after the First Afghan War. The Qizilbash were Shia by sect and Persian
speaking. Yahya Khan was from the Peshawar branch of Qizilbashes. Those living in
Peshawar identified themselves as Pathans and spoke Pashto as a second language
but were distinct from Pathans as an ethnic group. Yahya’s father was from the
Indian Police Service and served in various appointments as a police officer during
the British Raj. Yahya’s brother was also in the Police Service of Pakistan and later
served as Director Intelligence Bureau.

4 Page-122- The Pakistan Army-War 1965 –Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired)-
Army Education Press-Rawalpindi-1984.

5 The Indians deny this assertion but this is something which is accepted in Pakistan
as an irrevocable fact of history. It is of little military bearing since few officers make
use of libraries anyway! This career profile may not be very accurate since I do not
have access to official records. These details are based on various references to
Yahya’s military career. Refers—Page-111- Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan-
Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan -Oxford University Press-Karachi-1993. Pages-
131 & 144- The Story of the Pakistan Army- Major General Fazal I Muqeem Khan-
Oxford University Press-Lahore-1963. Pages-47 & 122- Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. Page-37
Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit.

6Pages-192 & 194- Partners in Command- – Joseph.T.Glatthaar- The Free Press-New

York-1994.

7Page-238-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit.

8 Page-28-Fazal Muqeem-Crisis in Leadership--Op Cit.

9Page-154-The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan-Major General

Sher Ali (Retired)-First Printed-1976-Third Edition-Syed Mobin Mahmud and Company-
Lahore-1988. Page-122-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit.

10 Page-187-Jawan to General—General Mohammad Musa- East and West Publishing

Company-Karachi-1984.

11The Punjabis as an ethnic community were the largest community in the officer
corps of the pre 1947 Indian Army. No exact statistics exist but by and large the
Sikh/Hindus of Punjab were the largest group in the officer community followed by
Punjabi Muslims survey of Indian officer cadets done in 1954-56 showed that majority
of the officer cadets were from Indian Punjab or from Delhi which was a Punjabi
majority city (Indian Parliament Estimates Committee-1956-57-Sixty Third Report-
Ministry of Defence Training Institutes-New Delhi-Lok Sabha Secretariat-Appendix-
Seven--Quoted by Stephen Cohen-Page-183-The Indian Army-Stephen.P.Cohen-
Oxford University Press-New Delhi-1991) after 1947 The Punjabi Muslims were
however denied the top slots in the army during the period 1947-72, Ayub being a
Hindko speaking Pathan, Musa being a Persian speaking Mongol-Hazara and Yahya
being a Persian speaking Qizilbash. Tikka was the first Punjabi chief of the army.In
my course of stay in the army I had various discussions with old officers and almost
all agreed that there were groupings in most units on parochial lines which were
mostly Punjabi and Pathan groups. The Punjabis of areas north of Chenab river
tended to be more clannish with stress on district or sub regional groupings like
Sargodha, Chakwal, Pindi, Attock Khushab etc. The Punjabis of areas south of Chenab
river which were more economically prosperous and more educationally advanced
were by and large not parochial having acquired the big city or urban mentality.
These tended to look down upon groupings based on caste and district lines and
operated more on relations based on personal rapport than kinship on village and
district basis. There was definitely a strong feeling in Punjabi officers (something
which was most natural) of the pre 1971 era that the army was Pathan
dominated.Both Ayub and Yahya although not Pashto speaking were viewed as
Pathans by Punjabi officers. Musa was viewed as a rubber stamp and as a mere
shadow of Ayub. The Hindustani Muslims the third largest but relatively better
educated group (although not distinguished for any unique operational talent) were
not united because they were mostly from urban backgrounds and had like the
Punjabis from big cities south of Chenab the selfish or self centred big city mentality.
Thus as individuals the Hindustani Muslims like the urban Punjabis did well but were
not parochial like the Pathans or the Punjabis from north of Chenab river. They were
viewed as politically more reliable by virtue of being an ethnic minority but were
sidelined from higher ranks in most cases. The most glaring of all was the case of
Major General Abrar Hussain who was not promoted despite outstanding war
performance at Chawinda.Sahibzada Yaqub who later refused to agree to military
action in East Pakistan was also a Hindustani Muslim. Yahya’s circle was not based on
ethnicity on the principles of companionship. Thus Peerzada was from Bombay, while
Umar and Hameed were Punjabis. Bilgrami another close associate was Hindustani.
Lieutenant General Chishti described Yahya’s attitude towards selecting officers for
higher command ranks the following words; “Do you see this. I told you, we do not
need educated people in the Army” (Quoted by Lieut. Gen. F.A Chishti- Betrayals of
Another Kind-Lieutenant General Faiz Ali Chishti-Asia Publishing House-London-1989).
It is not possible to cross check Chishti’s statement and it may be an
exaggeration.Yahya however did promote some ex rankers and known Yes Men with
extremely limited intellect like Tikka and Niazi. Chishti was not an ex ranker. His book
on the Zia era is thought provoking and is compulsory reading for anyone who wishes
to understand the post 1971 Pakistan Army. Chishti is one of the few generals from
the Zia era who did not establish huge business empires like sons of the ex ISI Chief
Akhtar Abdul Rahman etc. Chishti’s book contains valuable insights into the
sycophantic nature of Zia!

12Page-407 & 408- Ayub Khan-Pakistan’s First Military Ruler –Altaf Gauhar-Sang –I-
Meel Publications-Lahore-1993.Altaf Gauhar had the reputation of a “Sycophant Par
Excellence" while serving with Ayub as “Information Secretary”. Gauhar a civil
servant who had joined the coveted "Civil Service of Pakistan" without sitting in the
Indian Civil Service Competitive Examination, having initially been inducted as a
Finance Officer, was the man principally responsible as Ayub’s information man for
destroying Pakistan’s free press. He was Yahya’s rival and harboured political
ambitions. His biography of Ayub is a defence of his benefactor and an attempt to
portray Ayub in a favourable light and one who was led astray by evil minded
advisors like Bhutto who was again Gauhar’s rival in sycophancy with Ayub, and was
far more talented than Guahar. Gauhar was instrumental in the personality
assassination campaign of Ayub against Bhutto when Bhutto fell out with Ayub. Later
when Bhutto became Prime Minister, Gauhar was booked under law and prosecuted
for having the copy of an old "Play Boy" Magazine and half a bottle of Whiskey!

13Page-115-Brigadier A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit.

14This was in 1991 while this scribe was serving in the army and a letter from GHQ
was circulated to all headquarters for comments on the proposal of having the
appointment of supreme commander of the armed forces.

15Page-239-India and the United States-Estranged Democracies – Dennis Kux-

National Defense University Press-Washington D.C-June 1993.

16Arms Trade Register-Arms Trade with Third World-Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute- (SIPRI)-1975 and Page-120-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit.

17Page-148-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit. It may be noted that during the 1965 war and
immediately after cease fire two infantry battalions were raised and added to each
existing infantry division. In addition soon after the war one infantry division and two
independent infantry brigades wee raised. (Refers-Page-147-Ibid). A new corps
headquarter i.e. 4 Corps Headquarters at Lahore was also raised

18Till 1965 East Pakistan was defended by a two brigade infantry division known as
14 Infantry Division. This division had no tank regiment.

19Page-106-Fazal Muqeem-Ibid. Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan was born

in 1920 and commissioned in 1940 he served in the Middle East Theatre in WW Two
where he saw action in North Africa and became a German/Italian prisoner of war like
Sahibzada Yaqub Tikka and Yahya (who later successfully escaped) and later
commanded 6 Lancers and 11 Cavalry. He graduated from Command and Staff
College Quetta in 1949 and Ecole Superieure de Guerre, Paris and Imperial Defence
College London later. Appointed the Vice-Chief of General Staff in 1958, Yaqub was at
Staff College Quetta when the 1965 War started. He was sent to Headquarter 1 Corps
in order to supply the Headquarters with badly needed Grey matter and was
appointed the Deputy Corps Commander of 1 Corps. He later commanded the 1st
Armoured Division and later appointed Corps Commander and Commander Eastern
Command, from where he was sacked by Yahya in March 1971 following Yaqub’s
refusal to carry out a military action against the population of East Bengal. Yaqub
was later appointed as an ambassador of Pakistan to France was in February 1972
and to the USA in December 1973. He later served as Ambassador to the USSR in
1979-1980 and later as Foreign ministers during the Zia regime from 1980 to 1985.
Yaqub was a Hindustani Pathan from Rohailkhand. His ancestors were Yusufzai
Pathans, from the Kabul river valley of present NWF Province of Pakistan and had
settled in Rohailkhand in modern UP in the 18th century. Yaqub was a fourth
generation aristocrat from a family with considerable landed wealth. He was serving
in Viceroy’s Bodyguard at the time of partition and later served with Mr. Jinnah as the
first Pakistani Muslim Commandant of the Governor General’s Body guard. The unit is
now known as President’s bodyguard and is now commanded by a lieutenant colonel.

20Ibid.

21Ismail was not as guilty as his corps commander i.e. Lieutenant General Bakhtiar
Rana, but was penalised, and sacked. Ismail was sacked because of the Jassar Bridge
crisis and replaced by Major General Tikka Khan as General Officer Commanding 15
Division on the afternoon of 8th September 1965. (Refers-Page-153-Shaukat Riza-
1965-Op Cit). Brigadier Sardar Ismail Khan was an Army Service Corps Officer and
should not have been placed as an infantry division commander in the first place .It is
a tribute to General Musa’s intellect that a non fighting arm officer from the services
was acting divisional commander of one of the most crucial divisions of the Pakistan
Army!
22Many were promoted despite known military incompetence in the 1965 war at
brigade level. These included one Brigadier Bashir. Bashir was commanding the 5
Armoured Brigade of the 1st Armoured Division in Khem Karan area in the 1965 War,
and was responsible for its poor handling on 7th 8th and 9th September. Gul a
seasoned armour officer squarely condemned Bashir for inefficiency and inaction as
commander 5 Armoured Brigade. Gul described Bashir’s conduct as that of one who
had "drifted into stupour", one who was not in command of his faculties, and one who
did not prod his staff into action! (Refers-Page-214-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit). Gul
highlighted the deficiencies in Bashir and expressed wonder as to why a career
officer who had served as an instructor at the command and Staff College performed
so poorly! (See Page-210-Ibid). Bashir was a Kaimkhani Rajput from Rajhastan and
had attended the Army War Course in 1964. (Page-35-- National Defence College-
Rawalpindi-Alumni Directory—Research Cell-National Defence College-Rawalpindi-
May 1992) It appeared that Bashir had a good rapport with Yahya and Hamid and
survived the Khem Karan fiasco. He became a major general and commanded the 6th
Armoured Division, the newly raised 23 Division and the newly raised 37 Division.
Bashir was retired in 1972 by Tikka since he was perceived as one close to Yahya. He
became a Minister in the Zia era. Lieutenant General Yusuf presently serving in the
GHQ is a relation of Bashir.

23Page-395- The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1941-1971–

Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1994.

24Page-203-Shaukat Riza-1965 War –Op Cit.

25Pages-116 & 117-Brig A .R Siddiqi-Op Cit.

26Page-67-The Pakistan Army-1966-1971–Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired)–

Wajid Ali’s Private Limited-Lahore-Services Book Club-1990. This was the last book in
Shaukat Riza’s trilogy. The book is poorly written but extremely valuable in terms of
basic facts about organisation, order of battle, and names of commander’s etc. It has
occasional flashes of insight, which came to Shaukat Riza, and which escaped the
simpleton and pedantic although extremely narrow scrutiny of the pedants in the
Military Intelligence Directorate, though relatively infrequently. The readers may
note that all articles published in the army journals are vetted in some manner by the
Military Intelligence Directorate. The book is not reliable in terms of battle accounts,
has extremely poor battle maps and does not even give the total casualties of the
army. However, due allowance must be given to the author who was not in the prime
of his health and was forced to write the book according to the GHQ’s myopic and
petty requirements.

27 Page-66-Ibid.

28 This is the standard practice in units, headquarter and schools of instruction. The
clerical staffs are such experts that they bring a Solomon’s Solution based on an old
letter written in a similar situation, as DFA (Draft for Approval) and the concerned
officer signs it with minor alterations! I am sure that the Indians must be operating
similarly!

29Page-67-Shaukat Riza-1966-1971-Op Cit.

30Page-111-Fazal Muqeem Khan-Op Cit.

31Page-121-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit.

32The East wingers viewed everyone from the West Wing as a Punjabi. Punjabi was
more of a term to describe all non-East Pakistanis or to be more precise all non-
Bengalis. It may be noted that Ayub who ruled the country from 1958-1969 was not a
Punjabi, nor was Yahya, nor Bhutto, who was later accused by many to be the
principal culprit in 1971 of creating the political crisis which finally led to the March
1971 military crackdown in East Pakistan and finally the 1971 war.

33See Page-136- Sher Ali –Op Cit, for the development of the strategy "defence of
East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan". In 1963 the Bengali representation in the army
was just 7.4% in the rank and file and 5.0% in the officer corps. (Refers-Government
of Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan,Debates,March 8, 1963 as reported on
pages-30 & 31- Pakistan Observer- Dacca-Issue dated 27 June 1964.

34The “One Unit” was an absurd administrative arrangement legalised in the 1956
constitution and resented by the smaller provinces of West Pakistan. “One Unit”
meant the concentration of the previously four provinces, states and territories into
one huge monster of a province known as West Pakistan disregarded the huge
differences between the old provinces/territories/states in terms of ethnicity
language social and cultural differences and distribution of resources. The “One Unit”
was viewed as an instrument of imposing Punjabi domination on the population wise
old smaller provinces/states/regions/commissionerates of Sind Baluchistan NWFP
Bahawlpur etc.

35Page-104-Pakistan-The Enigma of Political Development – Lawrence Ziring—

William Dawson and Sons –Kent –England—1980.

36Page-9- Witness to Surrender – Siddiq Salik—First Published—1977—Third

Impression-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1998.

37Siddiq Salik has dealt with the issue in considerable detail and has described
Yahya’s final compromise decision of, mixing Bengalis with West Pakistani troops in
existing infantry battalions and also raising more purely Bengali battalions of the East
Bengal Regiment, as the decision of an indecisive commander. Salik says that Yahya
ordered raising of two more battalions (Refers Pages-9 & 10-Siddiq Salik-Op Cit) but
Shaukat Riza states that Yahya ordered raising of three more battalions (Refers Page-
79-Shaukat Riza-1966-1971-Op Cit). This as per Shaukat Riza happened "some time
in 1970" (all praise to staff officers who assisted Shaukat in terms of preciseness of
simple facts like dates!!!!!). (Refers-Ibid.).

38The reader must note that Shaukat and Siddiq Salik criticised Yahya’s decision to
raise more pure Bengali units with the benefit of hindsight; i.e. Salik doing it eight
years after the war and Shaukat leisurely doing so some twenty years later. I
remember as a school student in the period 1969-70 in Quetta where my father was
a grade two staff officer of operations in the 16 Division in Quetta, that even
schoolchildren (most of them being sons of army officers, Quetta being a very large
garrison town) used to joke about Bengalis, bragging that one Punjabi/Pathan was
equal to ten Bengalis! This was common thinking at that time and what was later
branded as Yahya’s blunder, much later after the 1971 fiasco, was an indisputable
assertion believed as a common fact in 1970 ! The foreign reader may note that
Bengalis were despised as a non martial race from the British times . For Sir Syed
Ahmad Khan’s anti Bengali views see Page-308-Aligarh’s First Generation – David
Lelyveld- Oxford University Press-New Delhi-1978 . For I.H Qureshi’s views see Page-
28-Ethnicity and politics in Pakistan-Dr Feroz Ahmad-Oxford University Press-Karachi-
1999. For Ayub’s remarks see Page-187-Friends not Masters- Ayub Khan-Oxford
University Press-Karachi-1967.

39See Chapter One-Pages-31 to 62- A Layman’s Guide to Psychiatry and

Psychoanalysis—Eric Berne-Penguin Books-England-Reprinted-1984.

40 Page-Story of My Struggle- Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik (Retired) – Jang

Publishers-Lahore-1990.

41Page-80-Shaukat Riza-1966-1971-Op Cit.

42Pages-108 & 109-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit.

43Footnote on page-78-General Tajammul-Op Cit.

44The inhabitants of areas south of Ambala in Indian Punjab and till Indian Bihar
inclusive in the east and till the southern boundaries of modern UP Province of India
were referred to as Hindustanis. The bulk of these were Hindus but Muslim Ranghars
(also in Hindustani category) and Hindustani Muslims of mostly Pathan descent were
predominant in the pre 1857 Bengal Army’s cavalry, which as an arm was far smaller
than the much larger infantry. It was this Bengal Army (it had no Bengali soldiers,
Bengal only being an administrative classification since the entire area from Burma
till the Afghan border till 1858 was known as the Bengal Presidency) which had
rebelled in 1857. In addition there were two smaller armies of the Bombay and
Madras Presidencies known as the Madras and Bombay armies. These armies had
stayed loyal. In 1895 all three armies were merged into one British Indian army.

45See chapter Five, “Pakistan Army Till 1965”–Major Agha Humayun Amin (Retired) –
Strategicus and Tacticus –Lahore-17 August 1999. Also, page-7, “Recruiting in India
Before and during the War of 1914-1918 "-Army Headquarters, India, 1919. Also see
page-Pages-51 & 58- India and World War One-S.D Pradhan –Columbia University
Press-1978. There are no exact figure about the ethnicity of fighting arms in 1914.
Pradhan places the figure of ethnically Punjabi soldiers at about 50%. These were
roughly assessed from the approximate statistics of 1096 infantry companies out of
which 431 were wholly Punjabi and 221 were partly Punjabi, and 155 total squadrons
of cavalry out of which 95.5 were wholly Punjabi and 47.5 were partly Punjabi.

46Lord Roberts a Bengal Artillery officer who served as C in C of the Madras Army
from 1881 to 1885 and the Bengal Army (which meant that he was also C in C India)
from 1885 to 1893 was one of the principal exponents of this theory. Roberts was in
favour of recruiting the Punjabis and Pathans over Hindustanis who were the vast
bulk of the Bengal Army at least as late as 1885 when Roberts became C in C of the
Bengal Army. Roberts rationalised his anti Hindustani bias by theorising that the
Hindustanis had degenerated as a result of the benefits of the British rule and : not
enough adversity. Pages-441 & 442-Forty One Years in India-Volume Two –Lord
Roberts- William Bentley and Son-1897. Roberts policy of Punjabising the Indian Army
was followed by his successors i.e Creagh Kitchener etc till WW One.

47Page–314, A Matter of Honour–Philip Mason, Jonathan Cape–London-1974.

48Page-11-The Indian Army and the King’s Enemies-1900-1947–Charles Chenevix

Trench-Printed in German-1988.
49Page-10-Report of the Special Commission appointed by His Excellency the
Governor General in Council to enquire into the Organisation and Expenditure of the
Army in India – Simla – Government of India Printing Press-1879.

50Page-442-Philip Mason-Op Cit. The layman reader may note that the Pathans had
wavered in terms of loyalty to the British once fighting against the Muslim Turks and
Germans; with many Tribal area Pathan soldiers defecting to the German lines in
France (Page-418 & 425-Ibid), the Turkish lines in Mesopotamia and Egypt/Palestine
and some units which even attacked British officers like the 130 Baluchis (Refers-
Page- 427-Ibid)

51Page- 426-Ibid.

52Map on page-96–Report of Indian Statutory Commission-Volume One-Calcutta–

Government of India–Publication Branch– 1930.

53Page- 349- Fidelity and Honour – Lieut Gen S.L Menezes – Viking- Penguin Books
India-New Delhi – 1983. Pages – 514 & 515 – Philip Mason – Op Cit. Page-

54Page-210- Making of Pakistan: The Military Perspective – Noor ul Haq – National

Institute of Historical and Cultural Research–Islamabad-Pakistan–1993. Major part of
this book is based on the book mentioned in the next footnote, however relatively
speaking the author has made a commendable effort in doing some very interesting
research about the recruitment policies of the British. The book however suffers from
the harm inflicted by Fazal Muqeem once he most fallaciously declared that there
were no all-Muslim units in the British Indian Army. A statement which was
erroneously accepted first by Cohen the American writer, and later by many more
like Noor ul Haq (See page-8-Ibid) as the gospel truth.

55Appendix –16- Expansion of Armed Forces and Defence Organisation-1939-1945–

S.N Prasad and Dharm Pal-Combined Inter Services Historical Section-India and
Pakistan-1956.

56Appendix-13-Ibid.

57This myth has the status of being the gospel truth in Pakistan till to date, although
the 1971 War and the relatively poor performance in 1965 war did slightly deflate
this myth. After 1971 the army’s stature was slightly reduced but soon Mr Bhutto
gave the army a chance to improve its self-image by employment against the Baloch
Muslims in the 1974-77 insurgency. The army’s inflated image got a further boost
when US aid started flowing inside Pakistan after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan.
The Kargill Operation launched in 1999 was a manifestation of this myth. A major
general, a certain Jamshed writing in Dawn Daily in May 2000 asserted that the
Pakistani Muslims were more martial than the Indians were. Reference is made to
Muslims being more martial than all infidels, but the ulterior meaning always is that
the Punjabi or Pathan Muslims are more martial!

58Footnote-25-Page-187– Cohen/Indian Army Op Cit.

59Page-7, Brigadier A.R Siddiqi, Op Cit. Jinnah made a historic speech on the
occasion of the raising of the 1st Battalion of the East Bengal Regiment. Jinnah thus
said “During the foreign regime you were classed as non martial. It is your own
country, your own state now and it is up to you to prove your worth”. (Refers-Ibid).
Ayub Khan who took over as C in C in 1951 reversed the policy of Mr Jinnah and no
further battalion of the East Bengal Regiment was raised till 1966. Thus the Pakistan
Army remained a Punjabi dominated army . The infantry’s regiments i.e the largest
Punjab regiment was more than 65% Punjabi, the remaining being Pathans or
Ranghars (Rajput Muslims from East Punjab/Hariana and previously a sub category of
Hindustani Muslims of the pre 1947 British Indian Army). The "Baluch" and "Frontier
Force" Regiment also being West Pakistani with a 60% Punjabi majority in the
"Baluch" regiment and a "Pathan-Punjabi " parity in the "Frontier Force" Regiment.
The Azad Kashmir regiment of the post 1971 war, which was known before 1971 as
the "Azad Kashmir Regimental Force" or the "AKRF" was also almost hundred percent
Punjabi with the bulk of troops being from the Punjabi speaking districts of Pakistan
Occupied Kashmir known as "Azad Kashmir" in Pakistan. The other arms like artillery
engineers services etc were also Punjabi dominated. The armoured corps (tank corps)
was roughly divided into one-third Ranghar Muslims and about 40% Punjabi Muslims
and about 30% Pathans. However, some Bengalis were introduced as a small
percentage in the 1960s. The recruitment to all infantry and tank regiments was
governed by fixed class quotas of “Muslim Sindhi and Baluchi or MS & B” under which
all Ranghars were enrolled, “Punjabi Muslim or PM” and “Pathan Muslims or Ptn”.
Even promotion of the “Other Ranks” i.e all rank and file other than officers was
governed by class quotas. Much later in 1980-81 the “Sindh Regiment" of infantry
was raised. The Sindh regiment was largely Punjabi but from 1989 the Sindhi Muslim
proportion was increased and brought to figures varying battalion wise from 15 to
50%. The junior most infantry unit i.e the "NLI or Northern Light Infantry" was
recruited from men of the Gilgit and Skardu Regions of the Federally Administered
Northern Areas. The NLI’s origins dates from the 1971 war and it became a regular
battalion of infantry in 1998-99. It is almost wholly recruited from the "Northern
Areas" which are inhabited by a racial/ethnic group totally different from the Punjabis
or Pathans.

60 The reader may note that Ayub ordered destruction of all documents pertaining to
his war performance in Burma after he became the Pakistan Army C in C in January
1951. Ayub was C in C till 1958 and President of Pakistan and supreme commander
of the armed forces from 1958 till 1969 and thus it was no problem for him to remove
all documents that proved his tactical timidity in Burma. However there are other
sources that prove that Ayub’s war record was not very illustrious in Burma. Joginder
Singh who was his unit officer in the 1930s says that Ayub used to visit his house in
1944 and was not considered fit enough to command a battalion of his parent
"Punjab Regiment". (Refers-Page-30-Behind the Scene-An Analysis of India’s Military
Operations-1941-1971-Major General Joginder Singh (Retired)-Lancer International –
Delhi-1993). As per Sardar Shaukat Hayat who was an officer in WW One having been
commissioned from Indian Military Academy Dera Dun in August 1936.Shaukat states
that he met Major General Reese who at that time was commanding the Punjab
Boundary Force in 1947. Reese had been Ayub’s General Officer Commanding in
Burma and in 1947 was assisting Reese again as Pakistan Army representative.
Reese thus told Shaukat; “Shaukat, whatever has come over your people, that
against the fine soldier that India has selected to represent their country on the
Boundary force, you have selected a man whom I had sent back from Burma when he
showed tactical timidity, after the death of his commanding officer? He was therefore
posted to the training command in India. How do you expect him to be of any
assistance to you, and how could I learn to depend on his wisdom after what he had
done in the past? “(Refers- page-182-The Nation that lost its Soul”-Sardar Shaukat
Hayat Khan-Jang Publishers-Lahore-1995. Sher Ali cited Messervy the first
The 1971 War

An examination of the strategic

concept of the 1971 war
The strategic concept of Pakistan’s defence i.e. ‘Defence of East
Pakistan lies in the West’ was formulated by Ayub Khan in late fifties
and became the foundation of Pakistan’s defence policy. The concept
envisaged having bulk of the army in the northern half of the West
Wing and was based on the assumption that this arrangement would
force India to keep bulk of its army/strategic reserves on its western
front. We will analyse the various aspects of this concept as following:-
ALPHA :--The interconnection between the internal and external fronts.
The basis of defence and stability of a country is absolute harmony and
in consonance with the internal and external fronts. The internal front
means ‘morale of the civilian population’ ‘their belief in the legitimacy
and moral credibility of the political government’ ‘belief in national
aims and ideology of the country’ ‘identification with the Armed Forces
of the country as defenders of the country’s integrity’ etc etc. External
front includes the country’s Armed Forces, and its foreign policy. A
country’s defence is based on both and any weakness in one will
weaken the other. This inter-relationship was ignored by Pakistan’s
civilian and military leadership during the period 1947-71. The Muslim
League was initially dominated by a partnership of refugees from
Muslim minority provinces and later by a combination of Punjabi
Muslims and civil-military bureaucrats. The Bengalis were alienated
first because of the National language issue and later because of the
constitutional representation issue. The Bengalis were initially patriotic
and only demanded linguistic equality and had even agreed to political
parity in 1956. This arrangement was seriously disturbed once Ayub
usurped political power in 1958. Immediately after independence the
founder of the nation Mr Jinnah made an attempt to broaden the
army’s recruitment base by ordering the raising of the East Bengal
Regiment in 1948. This was a purely political decision taken by Mr
Jinnah and implemented by a British C in C. By December 1948 two
battalions of this unit composed of Bengali Muslims had been raised.
This process was, however, discontinued once Ayub Khan an
intellectually naive and tactically timid man became the Pakistan
Army’s C in C in 1951. Ayub was biased against having Bengalis in the
army. During his tenure an unwritten policy of not raising any more
Bengali infantry battalions was followed. Ayub also retired the most
promising Bengali officer Major General Majeed soon after taking over.
The East Bengal Regiment was limited to two units and the expanded
Pakistan Army remained a largely Punjabi dominated army. The irony
of the whole affair was the fact that during this entire period all the
army chiefs were non-Punjabi! In any case this was the first serious
negation of the concept of having a national army. The Army was on
the other hand firstly viewed as a Punjabi Army in the East Wing.
Secondly and far more worse; it was viewed as an organisation
designed primarily for the defence of the West Wing. The 1965 war
further convinced the Bengalis that the army was not a national army
but one designed to defend the West Wing. Thus from 1965 the rift
between the internal and external fronts became much wider and the
army was increasingly viewed as a foreign entity in the East Wing. The
seeds of the events of 1971 were laid during the Ayub era. The Bengali
populace viewed the federal government as a neo colonial government
with its political base in the West Wing. The Army was increasingly
viewed as a coercive instrument which was aimed at perpetuating the
West Wing’s political and economic exploitation of the East Wing. By
1971 Pakistan’s ‘Internal Front’ was seriously eroded and this in turn
greatly weakened its external front. BRAVO:--The Military Capability to
implement the strategic concept. Till 1962 the military balance
between Pakistan and India was equal. The Sino-Indian conflict led to a
major change in Indian defence policy and the Indians initiated a major
programme of military expansion. In 1965 when the second Indo-Pak
War took place; the relative Indo-Pak military capabilities were not as
significant; and Pakistan was better placed at least in terms of
strategic reserves. Stoppage of US military aid in 1965 brought a major
change in the military sphere. Pakistan concluded an alternate defence
arrangement with China but this was not sufficient to redress the
imbalance. India on the other hand more rapidly expanded her Armed
Forces and the gap between India and Pakistan in terms of infantry
formations became far more wider than in 1965. Thus India’s overall
military superiority over Pakistan increased from 1965 when it was
about 20 to 35 in Infantry1 to 15 to 32 in 1971. The situation became
far more worse in terms of strategic reserves since Pakistan’s armour
potential was severely reduced because of stoppage of US aid. The
Indians on the other hand almost completely replaced their ancient
tank fleet of 1965 with brand new Vijayanta-Vickers or Russian
supplied T-54/55 Tanks. In brief Pakistan did not possess the military
capability to implement the strategic concept. CHARLIE:--Pakistan’s
Internal Situation. The military regime of Yahya made an honest
attempt to bring democracy in Pakistan and successfully held
Pakistan’s first ever general elections based on Universal Suffrage
since 1946. The country was already polarised because of the political
legacy of the Ayub era and the East Wing was on the verge of
secession. This situation was not of Yahya’s making but inherited by
him. The situation demanded extraordinary political vision which was
sadly missing in the country’s political as well as military leadership.
Yahya although sincere at heart believed in the power of bayonet and
thought that the East Wing could be kept within the federation through
military action. The consequences of the surgical and brief military
action were not fully grasped by Yahya and most of the West Wing’s
politicians. In 1971 the country was divided and in no position to
simultaneously deal with a civil war as well as an external war. This
adverse internal situation nullified the whole concept. DELTA:--Lack of
clarity in the Pakistani Military Higher Command about the ‘Modus
Operandi’ of executing the Strategic Concept. It may be noted that at
least till 1968-69 the Pakistani GHQ was not clear about ‘what action
should be taken in West Pakistan if an Indian attack was mounted
against East Pakistan’2. In brief the Pakistani military leadership was
confused and vague about the method of execution of the strategic
concept; i.e. ‘Defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan’ as late as
1968-69 at the time when defence plans were revised under General
Yaqub Khan’s tenure as CGS. The concept was based on the
assumption that Indian pressure/threat against East Pakistan could be
dealt with by launching a major counter offensive taking the war inside
Indian territory on the Western Front. This was a very generalized
assumption and was interpreted by different officers in a different
manner. General Gul Hasan who took over as CGS had more clear
ideas about the implementation of this concept; but Gul’s views were
not shared by the higher military leadership. One school of thought led
by the CGS General Gul Hassan felt that this could be best done by
‘simultaneous launching of preliminary operations and the counter
offensive’ or ‘that the reaction to any Indian invasion of East Pakistan
should be an all out offensive by Pakistan’s Strike Corps i.e. the I
Corps’3. Yahya and his Chief of Staff General Hameed felt otherwise.
They were of the view that ‘preliminary (local level tactical attacks)
operations by the holding formations should be launched first and
when the preliminary objectives had been secured and the enemy’s
attention had been diverted, the main counter offensive should be set
in motion.4 Yahya and Hameed failed to realise that the only chance of
salvation in 1971 when Pakistan was facing serious odds was in
resorting to the boldest measures. Gul’s views were not accepted and
Yahya and Hameed decided on a vague plan of ‘first launch
preliminary operations followed by counter offensive’. The final
strategic plan was vague and confusing on two counts; i.e. firstly it did
not take into account the fact that the Indians enjoyed overwhelming
superiority in the Eastern Theatre and possessed the potential of
overrunning East Pakistan; secondly no time frame was fixed for
launching the counter offensive of 1 Corps. It may be noted that
Pakistan possessed relatively superior strategic reserves on in the
Western Theatre and its 1 Corps two strike divisions i.e. 6 Armoured
Division and 17 Division had no offensive role. In brief once Pakistan
embarked on war its strategic plans were confused and vague and its
strike formation was not clear about when it was to be launched. This
conceptual confusion doomed Pakistan’s strategic plans from the
onset. The Validity of the Chinese Card The Chinese card on which so
much hope was based had limited and seasonal validity! The
Himalayan snow fall blocked the passes through which China could
militarily influence the war! This seasonal factor was never
incorporated as an important factor in the Pakistani strategic plan. If
China was to be involved or Chinese friendship tested the ideal time to
launch a pre-emptive attack on India was mid-June or mid-July or even
September. Manekshaw the Indian Chief realised this and forced Indira
to wait till December when the Himalayan snowfall had completely
nullified chances of Chinese overland intervention and had freed
India’s Mountain Divisions facing China for the attack on East Pakistan.
The Fate of Pakistan Army’s Strategic Plan in Actual Execution Foch
defined two broad essentials of strategy i.e. ‘Economy of Force’ and
‘Preservation of Freedom of Manoeuvre’. The Pakistani GHQ did well in
case of the first and created a strong strategic reserve by new raisings
and by economising sectors which were relatively less vulnerable. Its
response to the East Pakistan insurgency in the first phase in March
1971 was praised even by Indian military writers as ‘a remarkable
performance on Pakistan’s part’5. China aided Pakistan immensely and
two new infantry divisions were raised to replace the 9 and 16
Divisions which were Pakistan’s strategic reserve till March 1971. In
addition Pakistan raised 18 and 23 Division in June July 1971 and the
33 and 37 Division on the eve of the war. It may be noted that apart
from this Pakistan had also raised two independent armoured brigades
in 1970 by withdrawing the integral armoured regiments of some of its
existing infantry divisions.6 All these measures gave the Pakistani
commanders a significant strategic reserve to implement the official
strategy of launching a counter offensive on the Western Front aimed
at ensuring that the Indians could not concentrate their entire strength
and over run East Pakistan. However, the Pakistani GHQ failed in the
actual execution of this strategic plan. It was in preservation of
‘Freedom of action’ that the Pakistani GHQ failed. This freedom of
action could be preserved and denied on the other hand to the Indians
only if Pakistan launched its counter offensive immediately after the
war started. If this had been done it was possible that the Indians could
have been forced to pull out some of their formations from the Eastern
Theatre; thereby reducing the pressure on Pakistan’s Eastern
Command. Since no such counter offensive was launched; India was
allowed to invade and conquer East Pakistan at leisure. In the
meantime two Pakistani armoured divisions; one independent
armoured brigade (3 Armoured Brigade-Lahore) and three infantry
divisions (17, 7 and 37) remained uncommitted during the entire war.
Once the war started the Indians were extremely cautious. Once they
realised that Pakistan was irresolute; they became more audacious and
stepped up their offensive operation. In Shakargarh for example the
Indian 1 Corps Commander had initially earmarked five of his nine
infantry brigades for a holding role. Once he realised by 7th September
that Pakistan was not launching any major attack in his area of
operations he switched three of his holding infantry brigades into an
offensive role. This increased pressure, forced the Pakistani GHQ to
pull out one armoured regiment from its 23 Division attack in Chamb
and to commit half of its 33 Division (a part of the strategic reserve) to
defence of Shakargarh. In addition the other half of 33 Division was
committed to the defence of the Southern Sector once the 18 Division
attack towards Loganewala failed. As a result of this increased
pressure the Indians were unable to impose their will on the Pakistani
GHQ in strategic terms. This was despite the fact that Pakistan had a
relatively better offensive potential in the Western Theatre. Yahya
Khan based the entire Pakistani plan on the wishful thought that the
Indians would never invade East Pakistan. Once the Indians did so he
became indecisive and kept on delaying the decision of launching
Pakistan’s strategic reserve in order to reduce Indian pressure on the
Eastern Command. He only decided to launch the counter offensive on
16 December when the Eastern Command had surrendered. Thus the
strategic concept i.e. defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan;
whatever it was worth in words of General K.M Arif was never tried or
implemented. Chances of Success of Pakistani I Corps Offensive We
will examine in brief the chances of success of the Pakistani 2 Corps
offensive; in case it had been launched in brief. The Strike Force
consisted of one armoured division (T-59/T-54/55 Tanks) and two
infantry divisions (7 and 37 Division) which were based in area
Arifwala-Pirowal-Burewala-Bahawalnagar. This strike corps was to
launch the main attack inside Indian territory from general area Sadiq
Ganj-Amruka-Minchinabad and thrust towards Bhatinda; thereafter,
swinging north towards Ludhiana. The Indians were relatively well
placed in this area and had their 1st Armoured Division in Muktsar area
consisting of four armoured regiments (Vijayantas) and three
mechanised infantry battalions. Apart from this they had two covering
troop forces i.e. the ‘Mike Force’ (T-54 and T-55) comprising one tank
regiment and one tank regiment minus, one squadron in area in
Ganganagar area. This force was tasked to threaten the flanks of
Pakistani 1st Armoured Division in case it attacked India while the 1st
Indian Armoured Division manouvred into action. In addition the
‘Foxtrot Force’ (T-54/55) consisting of one tank regiment and another
tank regiment less one squadron was already under command 67
Independent Brigade tasked with defence of Fazilka. The above
mentioned dispositions meant that force wise the Indians were well
poised to defend the area where Pakistan’s main counteroffensive was
to be launched. The result would surely have been a fierce clash of
armour which may have led to a draw or one side inflicting relatively
greater losses on the other without making much headway in the final
reckoning. This means that the 1 Corps attack even if launched held no
guarantee of success in terms of relieving the pressure on East
Pakistan or in terms of capturing a strategic objective. There was,
however, one guarantee of success for Pakistan’s 2 Corps too! This was
in case Pakistan launched a pre-emptive attack on India in early
October. This would have been a good option. Pakistan in any case had
been condemned for human right violations and genocide and this
allegation is levelled even today. Unfortunately its leadership remained
obsessed with diplomatic niceties and hairsplitting and tried to play an
all correct conduct game. Thus this golden chance was lost. Other
Offensive Options Pakistan had other offensive options to relieve
pressure on East Pakistan. These included employment of its northern
strike corps i.e. the 1 Corps (6 Armoured Division and 17 Division) to
launch a thrust in the far more vulnerable Indian belly between
Pathankot and Chamb; thereby threatening the lifeline of four Indian
divisions in Kashmir; forcing the Indians to switch their 1st Armoured
Division north of Beas River. This was a far better option since an
advance of 15 to 20 miles would have enabled Pakistan to sever the
Indian line of communication. In the case of 2 Corps counter offensive
the operation involved an advance of more than 60 miles in face of an
Indian armoured division. In 1 Corps area the Indians had two
armoured brigades as against one Pakistani Armoured Division and one
independent armoured brigades. The Pakistani GHQ, however, made
no plans for any offensive employment of 1 Corps, offensive
employment and this formation was left unutilised throughout the war.
Initially two of its armoured regiments were employed in the 23
Division attack in Chamb and after 10 December once, one of its
armoured regiments reverted back to it; it was given no other task
except to be prepared to launch a counterattack in Zafarwal. Pakistani
Military Leadership’s Dilemma. It became fashionable after the war to
heap all the blame on Yahya and his cronies. Yahya, as a matter of fact
was a far more capable chief than Musa. He inherited a situation which
was of Ayub’s making. Yahya did his best to remedy the serious
military imbalances; raised new formations; improved plans where
none as a matter of fact had existed. He was faced with a hostile
neighbour having full support of USSR; while at the same time facing a
civil war created because of ambition of two crafty politicians. The
odds with which Yahya was faced were high and demanded the
strategic vision of Moltke and the operational talent of a Rommel or
Manstein. There were some Rommels like General Eftikhar but no
Moltke’s to give higher strategic direction. Yahya was initially dynamic
but successively became more timid and cautious at a time when the
only salvation was in resorting to the boldest measures. Even the
Indians praised Yahya’s initial conduct. One author thus wrote:
‘Nevertheless Yahya showed a good sense in taking decisions and his
command decisions were generally well deliberated upon and sound.
He had been thrown into a rotten situation, which had come into being
the day Pakistan came into being with its two wings. His only hope lay
in somehow getting round Mujeeb and getting him to see reason, he
tried that... he had perhaps achieved a measure of success too... but
the cyclone of 12/13 November destroyed everything... the elections
gave the Bengalis an overwhelming majority. The Six Points would
have meant a virtual dismemberment of Pakistan. This could not be
permitted. So the only course open was to hold military rule and
restore the law and order if necessary by force’7. Kissinger in his White
House Years has asserted that it was USA’s intervention which saved
West Pakistan from being overrun by India. This is a vague statement.
It is doubtful whether India was willing to invade West Pakistan in force
after the fall of East Pakistan. The answer to Pakistan’s dilemma was a
bold attack and only a bold all out attack could have forced India to
drop the idea of invading East Pakistan. Long ago Clausewitz well
summed up the solution for states like Pakistan in 1971 when he said
‘Offensive war, that is the taking advantage of the present moment, is
always commanded when the future holds out a better prospect not to
ourselves but to our adversary’. In this case the future had better
prospects for India and Pakistan’s only hope was an all out offensive
posture. Clausewitz defined the solution in yet more detail in the
following words ‘Let us suppose a small state is involved in a contest
with a very superior power, and foresees that with each year its
position will become worse: should it not; if war is inevitable, make use
of the time when its situation is furthest from worst? Then it must
attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages Ñ it will
rather increase the disparity of forces-but because this state is under
the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue
before the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime
some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account’8. Indian
General Candeth who commanded the Indian Western Command made
a very thought-provoking remark in his memoir of 1971 war which
proves that Pakistan’s only chance lay in offensive action. Candeth
thus wrote:- ‘The most critical period was between 8 and 26 October
when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division were still outside Western
Command. Had Pakistan put in a pre-emptive attack, during that
period, the consequences would have been too dreadful to
contemplate and all our efforts during the war would have been spent
in trying to correct the adverse situation forced on us’.9 Conclusion
Only a Napoleon or a Frederick could have saved Pakistan in 1971 from
being divided and humiliated and cut to size! There were potential
Napoleons and Fredericks in the Pakistan Army in 1947-48 but these
were systematically sidelined or weeded out from 1950 to 1958. A
conspiracy against originality and boldness! Ironically the political
situation that the Pakistan Army inherited was created once the West
Pakistan Civil servants and the then army C in C had ganged up in the
period 1951-58 to keep the much despised Bengali in his place! The
civilians did well in creating the 1956 Constitution which solved all
major political problems of Pakistan. The politicians were, however,
never allowed to implement this constitution since its implementation
through holding of a general elections in 1959 may have led to a East
Bengali victory, thus seriously reducing the civil-military dominance of
Pakistani politics. Thus martial law was imposed in 1958 to avoid a
general election! Ironically the army finally saw the light of the day a
bit too late once a martial law was imposed in 1969 to hold a general
election ! The tide of history in these 11 years had become
irreversible! Strategic insight could at best have averted total
humiliation! But there was no strategic insight since Ayub Khan had
ensured from 1950 to 1969 that no strategic insight should be
groomed and cultivated!

Tank Ambush at Kushtia

Squadron and Company
Commander Dislocate a
Corps Commander!
The tank battle of Kushtia is Greek to most in Pakistan. Ironically it was
one of the most classic tank actions of 1971 war in which a vastly
outnumbered tank infantry force of squadron company level inflicted
such a punishment on the Indians that their corps commander lost his
mental equilibrium and earmarked a whole division to deal with a
Pakistani delaying force of squadron battalion strength. Civil War
followed by a mixed Civil War and Conventional War further
compounded by atrocities, confused real military competence with
abnormal psychology and even genuine heroism or resolution in face
of tremendous adversity was forgotten while atrocities were
remembered! It is ironic that many purely military writers like Shaukat
Riza and Fazal Muqeem Khan ignored this inspiring battle! Of all the
people it was Siddiq Salik, more a journalist than a soldier who most
precisely described the battle of Kushtia as "the first and last battle
that Brigadier Manzoor's brigade fought in the entire war1"! Siddiq,
however, never knew the degree to which this battle influenced the
higher commander's perceptions and actions! But then Siddiq was
more of a civilian and cannot be blamed for this lapse once we see so-
called military historians making the same error! I came to know of the
significance of this thought-provoking battle only after I read some
Indian military accounts! No tribute to the cause of military history in
Pakistan, which likes the politicians, has hit the rock bottom! The
Hamood Ur Rahman Commission found villains but ignored existence
of heroes! It is again ironic that Hamood found villains not merely
because they existed but because those who had ordered the inquiry
wanted some villains to keep the men in Khaki in their place! Hamood
thus unwittingly became the tool of politicians despite the fact that he
was an illustrious judge! Pakistan's legal or political history with the
exception of one decision of the Sindh High Court and one single
resolute Sindhi Muslim Chief Justice is after all little more than the
confinement of all who matter in petticoats, in terms of resolution and
heroic defiance since 1954! Robes or any other dress in the symbolic
form are an illusion! Petticoats, are the essence! Chief Justice Hamood
ur Rahman like all his predecessors or followers was a rubber stamp,
as far as the big flies were concerned, since laws as the truest saying
in English language states are like cobwebs through which the greater
flies brake through! Hamood's findings had no de facto value! Ironically
on the other hand the men who were identified as villains and cowards
by the Hamood Commission were promoted while many real heroes
were sidelined or superseded! Thus while Tajammul, Saadullah and
Sher ur Rahman were sidelined Jehanzeb Arbab, Rahim Khan,
Rahimuddin Khan, Admiral Sharif and many more did extremely well
after the 1971 War and are doing well to date!
ESSENTIAL FACTS

Opposing Strengths

2 Indian Corps (a newly raised corps headquarters) was tasked with

the reduction of the SouthWest Sector of East Pakistan. The Indian 2
Corps was vastly superior to Pakistan's 9 Division defending the Sector.
It had two over sized infantry divisions (4 Mountain and 9 Infantry
Division) and one independent infantry brigade (50 Independent Para
Brigade). 4 Indian Mountain Division had three infantry brigades (7, 41
and 62) one of which (7 Brigade) was initially held back as corps
reserve. In addition this division also had under command a tank
squadron (45 Cavalry/PT-76), a Mechanised Infantry Company and an
additional medium artillery battery apart from its integral divisional
artillery. 9 Indian Infantry Division had three infantry brigades (33, 35
and 42) and one tank regiment less one squadron (45 Cavalry/PT-76)
and one tank squadron (63 Cavalry/T-55). Lieutenant General Raina
the Indian Corps Commander had seen action in WW II in North Africa
and Burma. Pakistan's 9 Infantry Division comprised two infantry
brigades, 57 Brigade (Brigadier Manzoor) holding the northern half and
107 Brigade (Brigadier Hayat) holding the Central Approach i.e Jessore.
An ad hoc brigade consisting of Para military forces of dubious military
value was holding the southern approach (Khulna Sub-Sector). In
addition there was the "Divisional Reserve" consisting of half battalion
Recce and Support, one infantry battalion and a tank squadron of M-24
Chafee Light Tanks. The Pakistani 9 Division was commanded by Major
General Ansari an artillery officer who proved in the war that he was an
honest man and a devout Muslim, but did little in the realm of
commanding his division or anything in terms of leading from the front!
Opposing Plans The operational task assigned to the 2 Indian Corps
was to capture Khulna, Jessore, Magura, secure ferry sites over
Madhumati and finally either capture the Golaundu Ghat or to secure
Paksay Bridge (Hardinge Bridge) over the Ganga, whatever ordered. 4
Mountain Division was tasked with the capture of Magura and securing
of Ferry Sites over the Madhumati and subsequently secure Goalundu
Ghat or Paksey Bridge. 9 Division was tasked to capture Jessore in the
first phase and Khulna in the second phase. Pakistan's 9 Division had
employed five regular infantry battalions to hold the five main
approaches running from West to East in between the Ganges River
with 57 Brigade in the north and 107 Brigade in the centre. We will not
discuss the details of these dispositions since these are beyond the
scope of this article. Summary of Operational Situation till Battle of
Kushtia The Indians had been actively conducting military operations
against the Pakistani 9 Division since mid-November 1971. The pace of
these operations was, however, extremely conservative unimaginative
and timid! Indian victory in terms of tangible superiority in quantum of
forces was a forgone conclusion in this sector as in any other sector of
East Pakistan! The reader may note that the ad hoc force at Khulna
bolted towards Dacca around 4th/5th December without having been
attacked! The Indian tactics were based on establishing roadblocks in
the Pakistani brigades rear with forces of battalion, tank
squadron/troops strength while vastly superior tank and infantry forces
attacked frontally and contained and pinned down the Pakistani
infantry brigades. Brigadier Manzoor the 57 Brigade Commander made
the Indian task easier by assuming that they would attack Chuadanga
and denuded all other approaches while concentrating most of his
troops to defend Chuadanga! Manzoor in the process, wittingly or
unwittingly offered the Indian commander a golden opportunity to
compromise the operational integrity of the 9 Pakistani Infantry
Division. The Indians had logically assumed that the Pakistani brigades
would withdraw eastwards and fight as a division. They did not know
that both the Pakistani brigade commanders had decided to fight their
private wars and had already decided to withdraw northeastwards and
southeastwards! The next Indian move against Jhenida commencing
from 4 December when the Indians established a tank infantry
roadblock at a point halfway between road Chuadanga-Jhenida, thus
came as a surprise to 57 Brigade which was effectively cut off from its
parent formation i.e 9 Division. The 1971 war was over the 9 Division
as a division from 4th December 1971! Its brigades continued fighting
but they fought as brigades since the division commander had failed to
goad and spur them into fighting as a division! The division
commander who preferred sitting on his prayer mat2 rather than leave
his headquarters and goad men like Brigadier Manzoor, remained
plagued with inertia and inaction! There is not much to write about 9
Division's operational role after 4th December! 41 Brigade after its
brilliant success advanced to Jhenida supported by tanks. Jhenida,
thanks to Manzoor's Chuadanga blunder was almost defenceless and
the Indians captured it after some limited fighting on 7th December
1971. Meanwhile, 62 Indian Brigade advanced towards Kaliganj which
was defended by a very small ad hoc force under colonel staff 9
Division. Kaliganj was captured by morning of 7th December. 9
Division's story ends here. Its divisional headquarter withdrew to
Faridpur while K.K Afridi's ad hoc force delayed the Indians over the
Madhumati! The 2 Indian Corps which was commanded by as much of
a windbag as the Pakistani divisional commander now finally released
7 Brigade less battalion to 4 Mountain Division on 8th December. The
Indian Corps Commander, the readers may note, thought that 57
Brigade had withdrawn towards Faridpur along with Headquarter 9
Division.3 The 7th Brigade reached Jhenida during night 8th/9th
December 1971 and was ordered to advance towards Kushtia on 9th
December. For this purpose 7 Brigade was also assigned two tank
troops of the 45th Cavalry. Tangibly everything was now excellent for
the Indians . Battle of Kushtia 9 Division was assigned with a squadron
of 29 Cavalry for the defence of Hardinge Bridge.4 This squadron was
commanded by one Major Sher ur Rahman.5 At this stage 57 Brigade
was in the process of withdrawing across the Hardinge Bridge to Nator
in 16 Division area. Manzoor tasked Sher ur Rahman along with an
infantry company commanded by Major Zahid (18 Punjab) to delay the
Indian force which was reported by the para-miltary Razakars to be on
the way to Kushtia. Sher ur Rahman, as I many years later heard first
hand from many soldiers of 29 Cavalry who had fought with him at
Kushtia was no Manzoor! He selected an ambush site along with Major
Zahid the infantry company commander inside Kushtia. The main road
passed across a high embankment at this site and there was some
open face on both flanks while some trees and buildings provided
concealment and firing positions to Sher ur Rahman's two tank troops6
and Major Zahid's infantry company. The ground on both sides of the
road was boggy limited manoeuvre options of Indian tanks leading the
7 Brigade advance. The Indian tanks (two troops) leading the advance
reached the outskirts of Kushtia at 2 p.m. and deployed outside the
towns built up area. As per the Indian armoured corps historian
precisely at this point in time the Indian 2 Corps Commander Raina
along with GOC 4 Mountain Division arrived in a helicopter and "chided
the commanders on the spot for their unnecessary caution when there
was no enemy who was, in any case, on the run. He told them not to
waste time on battle procedure but press on with tanks because there
was no requirement to lead with infantry through the town".7 The
Indians commenced advance tanks leading and infantry very close
behind. The first shot as per one 29 Cavalry veteran was fired once the
sixth and the last Indian tank was in range and the infantry company
(of 22 Rajput) was also within small arms range. The scene after this
was one of total chaos. Most of the infantry company was gunned
down within no time and as per Major General Gurcharan Singh
Sandhu "within a few minutes the battalion (22 Rajput) ceased to exist
as a fighting force" and "stragglers kept trickling away until the next
day".8 The Indian tank corps historian states that "The first shot from a
Chafee (29 Cavalry) split open the fifth tank down the line". Only one
out of six tanks escaped the ambush. The battle was over! All that the
Indian 7 Brigade Commander now did was to organise a defensive
position with his second battalion behind a canal close to Kushtia.
Gurcharan admitted and this was stated by many 29 Cavalry veterans
that "Pakistani tanks made contact with the canal and engaged the
defenders. At last light they blew up the canal bridge and withdrew to
Paksay".9 57 Brigade was given the breather it needed to withdraw
across the Ganges. Many years later I had the opportunity of hearing a
first hand account of this withdrawal while under intense air attack
from another direct participant Colonel Rathore from Engineers.
Rathore was a very fine officer and a gentleman and when I heard him
that he was staff officer with my father in 491 Brigade Group at Jaglot
Farm. This was 8 years after the war i.e July 1979. Reaction of Indian
Corps Commander The reactions of Indian 2 Corps Commander may be
termed as typical reactions of any Indo-Pak subcontinental Corps
commander! I will simply quote Indian military historians in describing
this part of the battle! Gurcharan Singh gives the following picture.
"The Corps Commander received the news of the mishap on return to
his headquarter. He over-reacted and ordered 4 Mountain Division to
halt its advance along the Faridpur axis and contain the enemy along
Madhumati with one battalion. The rest of the division ( i.e some two
infantry brigades) was to back track to Kushtia, capture and clear the
Hardinge Bridge. Two tank troops of 45 Cavalry were ordered to move
from 9 Division to make up its "A" Squadron in Kushtia. Kushtia was
bombed and strafed by the IAF on 10 and 11 December. Pakistanis had
evacuated it during night 9-10 December. 4 Division concentrated
outside the town by morning of 10 December. Elaborate plans were
made for a divisional attack on 11 December, when the town was
found clear".10 I am quoting Praval a more balanced historian since
some Indians may find Gurcharan's more forthright criticism
unpalatable! Praval states "Unfortunately Barar and Raina over reacted
to the reverse. During the evening the former ordered 41 Brigade top
move from Jhenida to Kushtia. Later during the night Raina told Barar
to move the third brigade too also, leaving a battalion on the
Madhumati.
Authors Father who served as GSO 2 Operations 16 Division
East Pakistan from Mrch 1971 to October 1971 and as CI of 6
Engineer Battalion tasked to bridge Indian Gong Canal for the
planned counteroffensive
Thus by evening of 10 December the whole division assembled in front
of Kushtia"!11 Now compare the Indians with what Shaukat Riza!
Shaukat merely states without naming Sher or Zahid that "Enemy 7
Mountain Brigade attacked the position and suffered serious
casualties".12 Fazal Muqeem merely brushes the affair aside by stating
that "the attack was repulsed and three tanks captured".13 Is this the
way military history is written? Its not difficult to figure that Gurcharan
Singh and Praval were fairer with Majors Zahid and Sher ur Rahman
than Shaukat Riza and Fazal Muqeem Khan. This is the sub-continental
psyche! Talent must never be recognised! A conspiracy against
originality and boldness! Heroism died in 1858! At least as far as
higher level leadership was concerned! ANALYSIS Technical and
Numerical Inferiority Nullified by Superior Tactics and Resolute
Leadership The battle of Kushtia proves that technical and numerical
inferiority can be nullified by superior tactics and resolute leadership.
Unfortunately while there were many Shers and Zahids there were no
Lettow Vorbecks or Rommels commanding the Pakistani divisions or
corps. There was one Rommel but he was on the western Front! Ask
the troops who fought under him, not irresolute people who he kicked
and abused in Chamb and you can find out . Lack of Higher Planning at
Divisional Level which led to independent withdrawal by brigade
commanders and failure of 9 Division to function as a credible
operational entity The readers may note that the state of
demoralisation and apathy in the 9 Division at higher level was such
that no credible or concrete plan had been prepared for withdrawal of
the division's two regular brigades in case of an Indian breakthrough
which was most likely, keeping in view the immense disparity between
the Indian and Pakistani forces! It appears that both the regular
brigade commanders i.e the 57 and 107 Brigade Commanders had
made up their mind to withdraw northeast and Southwest to the safety
of Rajshahi north of Ganges in 16 Division area and Khulna in the
south! Whatever the motives of the brigade commanders this action
resulted in rendering the 9 Division into an operational non-entity soon
after the commencement of actual war on 5th December 1971! One of
the brigade commanders was thus later condemned in the Hamood
Report for this unauthorised withdrawal! Even Fazal Muqeem 14
admitted this fact once he said "Headquarters 9 Division (Major
General M.H Ansari) which had lost control earlier ...". Dislocation of
Enemy Higher Commander's Military Equilibrium Two majors dislocated
the enemy higher commanders mental equilibrium. What would have
happened had there been some Sher ur Rahmans and Zahids in 9
Division Headquarter too. What would have happened had the
Pakistani GHQ allocated a few more tanks for the Eastern Command
earlier in 1971 or 1970! If the Indians could employ T-55/T-54 tanks
why could not Pakistani T-59s have been employed there? And what
did most of Pakistan's T-59s in 1971 war do in the 1971 War apart from
hiding in reserve forests or moving in trains! Quality of Higher Military
Leadership The Pakistani 9 Division was commanded by Major General
Ansari an artillery officer who proved in the war that he was a devout
Muslim, but did little in the realm of commanding his division or
anything in terms of leading from the front! Ansari sat on the prayer
mat but did little else during the war! He was as good as any unit Pesh
Imam of his division. His operational role was zero multiplied by zero in
the war! Defenders of Ansari assert that he was a decent man, but
there are so many decent men in this world, who don't command
divisions in battle but perform other minor roles more commensurate
with their temperament or genius! There was no military leadership at
divisional level in the Pakistani 9 Division. This over ensured that the
battle was relegated to the two infantry brigade commanders, one bold
but not interested in fighting a divisional battle, while another who was
most keen to hit the Paksey Bridge and become a part of the 16
Division! Brigadier Hayat took his own decisions, mission oriented but
ones which compromised his divisions integrity withdrawing his
brigade to Khulna, fighting an excellent brigade battle while also
ensuring that the Indians were given an excellent gap to race forward
towards Dacca in the middle! Brigadier Manzoor's performance was
"hopeless" in words of a participant and his role in the flight of his
brigade cannot be over exaggerated! A Battle of Offensive Defence or
Clausewitzian Shield of Blows The battle was a classic application of
Clausewitz's concept of offensive defence in which he described
defence as a shield of arrows! A Case Study of Divisional Battle The
battle of 9 Division in 1971 illustrates the barrenness at divisional
level. The absence of the GOC as a decisive operational division makes
at divisional level.
CONCLUSION
The South Western Sector of Eastern Command was not a really very
decisive sector of the 1971 War. The significance of the "Tank Ambush
at Kushtia" lies in the heavy odds involved and how certain military
commanders at squadron company level through resolution ingenuity
and sheer tenacity emerged at least tactically victorious against vastly
superior forces.

The true significance of the "Battle of Kushtia" lies in the fact that
"ingenuity, resolution and a positive mental attitude could have
enabled the Eastern Command to fight longer than it did"! That the
seeds of the dramatic collapse of 16 December lay not in numerical
inferiority alone but in phenomenal lack of military competence in the
Eastern Command and those in the Military Operations Directorate in
the Pakistani GHQ who insisted that the Eastern Command must
conduct a rigid defensive strategy of holding every inch!

This article does not aim at proving that East Pakistan could have been
a Pakistani victory but only that a more imaginative higher strategy
could have resulted in a less humiliating defeat than what actually
happened! The failure in East Pakistan was not a political failure alone
but a military failure at the highest level! Sher ur Rahman lives in the
hearts of 29 Cavalry veterans as the ultimate war hero! This I
discovered in the Rakhs of Qila Sobha Singh! In Pakistani military
history he figures nowhere, since he was not from the trade union of
generals! Wrong forever on the throne! Truth forever on the Scaffold!

References

1Page-145-Witness to Surrender-Siddiq Salik-Oxford University Press-

Pakistan-First Published in 1977-Third Impression-Oxford University
Press-Pakistan -1998.

2Page-145-Siddiq Salik-Op Cit.

3Page-439-The Indian Armour-History of Indian Armoured Corps-1941-

1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi-
1993.

4Page-141-The Pakistan Army-1966-71-Major General Shaukat Riza

(Retired)-Services Book Club-1990.

5 I first heard his name while talking with my squadron commander

Captain Azam Niazi in October 1984 while serving in 29 Cavalry. I had
been attached with this unit since around 25th September (following
another attachment period with 15 SP from 09 August 1984 to 25th
September 1984) due to some disciplinary problem with my
commanding officer in 11 Cavalry. Azam said that he joined the unit
because he had been deeply impressed by Sher ur Rahman's exploits
in 1971 War. The time spent with Azam was memorable and we made
good use of it by hunting around the Degh Nala and the marshes
around Qila Sobha Singh and Dhamtal. At that time, thanks to Durga
Devi and Terry Tyrant seemed imminent and 8 Armoured Brigade was
deployed close to the border.

6 Page-439-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Op Cit. I have relied on the Indian

general's description in stating that the ambush force consisted of two
tank troops!

7 Page-439-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

8 Page-439-Gurcharan Singh -Op Cit.

9 Page-441-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

10 Page-441-Ibid.

11Page-331-The Indian Army Since Independence-Major K.C Praval-

Lancer Books-New Delhi-1992.

12 Page-142-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. 13Page-179-Pakistan's Crisis in

Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan-National Book
Foundation-Lahore-1973. 14 Page-179- Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.
THE BATTLE OF CHAMB

THESE MAPS ARE CONCEIVED AND DRAWN BY A.H AMIN

ENTIRELY ORIGINALLY AND ANY ONE WHO
REPRODEUCES THEM MUST SEEK PRIOR
PERMISSION.HOWEVER NOTHING GOOD IS EXPECTED
FROM HOPELESS OFFICERS OF INDO PAK ARMIES
WHOSE HALLMARKS ARE SYCOPHANCY BALL LIFTING
HYPOCRISY AND INTRIGUE.

The Battle of Chamb

1971

The Battle of Chamb of 1971 stands out as the finest display of an

offensive battle in the Indo-Pak operational scenario. Symbolically
speaking it was this battle which sustained the morale of the army in
West Pakistan and provided much needed credibility to sustain and
preserve the armyÕs image in the wake of the traumatic events of
December 1971. The Indians justly described it as Òthe most serious
reverse suffered in the 1971 warÓ. (refers page.488-the Indian armour
history of the Indian Armoured Corps -1941-1971-Major General
Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi). It is ironic that Third
World countries study Napoleon and Slim when they have great
military commanders like Eftikhar, Akhtar and Abrar. The Battle of
Chamb of 1971 was an epic feat of arms. Even today it stands out as
one of the most instructive battles of all three Indo-Pak wars in terms
of operational strategy, small unit actions, handling of armour and
above all as a supreme example of the power of personality and
leadership in war.Any student of the art of war who wishes to
understand the Indo-Pak way of war will find the battle complete in
terms of valuable insights and thought-provoking lessons connected
with leadership, strategy and tactics. Above all the Battle of Chamb
convincingly proves that the major part of pitfalls and drawbacks which
inhibit many Third World armies are more connected with leadership
morale and conceptual hangovers and have little connection with
material factors like equipment or simple numerical inferiority or
superiority.
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS

THE BATTLE GROUND

Chamb had become a household name in Pakistan in 1965, thanks to

the famous Operation Grand Slam and General Akhtar Hussain MalikÕs
lightning advance towards Akhnur. In 1965, however, it was a much
easier place to enter since its importance had been realised by the
Indians only shortly before the war started.

Thus in 1965 Chamb was held only by an independent Infantry Brigade

while in 1971 it was held by an Infantry Division which had been
heavily fortifying and improving its defences since 1965, keeping in
view the lightning Pakistani advance in this sector in 1965.The sector is
bounded by the ceasefire line/international border in the west and
south while a range of hills constitutes its northern portion running
roughly in an east west line.

Some ridges, however, jut downwards from this range of hills and run
along a north south alignment, most prominent of these being the
Phagla Sakrana Bridge which perpendicularly cuts the main
road/approach to Chamb from west and provides good defensive
positions like Point 994 etc. Average relative height of Phagla Sakrana
Ridge was 60 to 70 feet and it ran south till a place called Jhanda. The
most prominent and tactically most important ground in the entire
sector were two ridges known as Mandiala North and South.

These two ridges dominated Chamb and the bridge over River Tawi 2
miles north of Chamb. No attacker advancing towards Chamb or
planning to attack the bridge or to bypass Chamb from the north and
cross River Tawi could be successful unless these two ridges were
captured. Both the ridges ran in a roughly north west-south west
direction and were parallel to each other. Both were 60 to 70 feet high.
Mandiala North ran along southern bank of Sukh Tao Nullah from its
bend near village Kahni till a round hill near 200 R. The southern ridge
dominated the town of Chamb and the Tawi bridge. River Tawi and
Sukhtao Nullah were the two main water courses running from north to
south.

Sukhtao Nullah was a tributary of Tawi and joined it a little north of the
Tawi bridge. In the summers River Tawi was a partial tank obstacle
with a wide bed steep banks with crossing places at Chhanni Chamb
and Mandiala. In the winters, however, tanks could cross the river after
recce. There were, however, boggy patches on both sides of the river
south of Chamb. (Refers-page. 498-Indian Army after Independence-
Major K.C. Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1987 and the Indian
Armour-Maj Gen. Gurcharan Singh-earlier quoted-page 488).The Tawi
was spanned by a bridge built after the 1965 war about 2 km north of
Chamb. Average width of Tawi was 150-300 yards (Refers-discussion of
the author with various participants of the 1971 operation from 11
Cavalry, 28 Cavalry and 19 Baluch) and was roughly 7 to 8 kilometers
east of the ceasefire line/international border.

The area from the border in the west till Akhnur may be described as a
funnel which is wide at its western entrance and gets progressively
narrower by virtue of closer successive proximity of lines of hill on the
north and the River Chenab to the south. Thus the defendersÕ task
became easier as an attacker advanced eastwards from Koil to Jaurian
and to Akhnur making any outflanking operation more and more
impracticable by virtue of high hills on the north and the unfordable
River Chenab to the south. All the ridges in the area followed a north
south alignment with a ridge and a nullah (dry water course)
alternating each other approximately every 1000 to 2000 metres all
the way from the international border till River Tawi making the
defenders task easier and the attackers task extremely arduous and
time consuming. Most of the area was covered by 8 to 10 feet high
grass and wild shrubs and was sparsely populated. The continuous line
of hills on the north, however, made the gunners task very easy and
this was true specially for area around Chamb Mandiala and Kamali
Chappar. Thus a large proportion of casualties were caused by artillery
fire.

The most dominating and high features in the sector were however in
the north i.e. the red hill lalaea etc. These were however away from
Chamb and were of local significance. Their loss or possession had no
connection with the advance towards Chamb or Palanwala in direct
terms. The main metaleed roads in the area were road Koil-Chamb
running from Koil on the border till Chamb and two metalled roads east
of Tawi i.e., Akhnur-Jaurian) Chamb and Akhnur-Kalit Mandiala which
were parallel the former being south of the latter.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING FORCES

In 1965 Pakistan enjoyed technical superiority over the Indian armour

by virtue of having technically superior US Patton tanks. In 1971 this
was no longer the case since the Indian army possessed the Russian T-
54/55 tanks and the Patton was no longer the best tank in the
subcontinent. In 1965 the Indians had a squadron of French AMX-13
tanks in Chamb as compared to two Pakistani armoured regiments in
the initial phase. Thus the situation in 1971 was radically different from
1965.

The Indian 10 Infantry Division had been deployed in Chamb since

1965. The Indian units in Chamb knew the area like the palm of their
hand and had made extremely thorough preparations for its defence.
In 1965 the newly raised headquarters 10 Indian Infantry Division had
arrived in Akhnur from the south on 28 August 1965. It is ironic that
today the common man is not aware that the odds in Chamb in 1971
were much more tough against a successful attack than in 1965. It is
ironic that today the common man is not aware that the odds in
Chamb in 1971 were much more tough against a successful attack
than in 1965. The Indian Military Historian exhibited great intellectual
honesty when he rightly said ÒIn 1965 the Pakistanis had succeeded in
capturing Chamb with a surprise attack.

There should have been no surprise in 1971 but they succeeded

again). (Refers-page 494 the Indian Army after independence -Major K.
C. Praval-earlier quoted).The Indian 10 Infantry Division had four
Infantry Brigades (14 battalions, two regiments of armour i.e. 9 Deccan
Horse (T54) 72 Armoured Regiment (T-55), 2 independent armoured
squadron ex-Central India Horse (AMX-13), two engineer battalions, six
regiments of artillery (two medium, three field, one light).

The division also had a para-company and a company of ATGM of

entac ATGMs. Two BSF battalions manning the border were also under
command 10 Division. The Pakistani 23 Division was a five Infantry
Brigade Division, however, its fifth Infantry Brigade i.e. 7 AK Brigade
(three battalions) was facing largely the 25 Indian Infantry Division
deployed north of 10 Indian Division. Thus against 10 Indian Division
the Pakistan 23 Division could field four infantry brigades (13
battalions).

The Pakistani artillery consisted of four field regiments, one field

battery, two mountain batteries, one medium battery, a section of
heavy guns. The most formidable force multiplier for the Pakistan
Artillery, however, was Brigadier Naseerullah Khan Babar who
compensated for lack of sophisticated Russian guns on part of the
Pakistani artillery.

The 23 Division had two armoured regiments i.e. 26 Cavalry which was
its integral armoured regiment (Sherman 11) 11 Cavalry which was
placed under command in October 1971 (T-59) was also placed under
command. In addition Headquarters 2 Armoured Brigade was also
placed under command in end October 1971.Outwardly it appears from
the above mentioned information that 23 Division was superior only in
terms of armour vis-a-vis the 10 Indian Division. However in actual fact
it was vice versa.

All Indian tanks in both the armoured regiments were T-54/55 which
were slightly superior to T-59; whereas only 11 Cavalry and 28 Cavalry
possessed T-59 while the 26 Cavalry and 12 independent squadron
were equipped with the obsolete Sherman 11/M-36/B-2 tanks of world
war vintage. Further 28 Cavalry had just 31 tanks. In total 23 division
had 129 tanks out of which 55 Sherman 11/M-36/B2 were largely
ineffective in operational terms; leaving some 74 T-59 against some 90
T-54/T-55 tanks. Thus though slightly numerically inferior in numbers
i.e. 129 versus 104; the Indians were qualitatively superior as far as
armour was concerned. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb- Lt. Col Saeed-
(GSO-I 23 Div in 1971- P.13 Army Education Press-1979).

In addition the Indian T-54/55 tanks possessed pads ammunition firing

capability which was not available as far as the Pakistani T-59 tanks
were concerned. The T-54/55 gun had a far superior stabilisation
system.In artillery there was relative parity; Pakistan having 130 guns
of all calibres while the Indians possessed 126 guns which could have
possibly been increased to 144 guns if 19 Brigade Artillery of the
neighbouring Indian 26 Division also extended fire support to the 10
Infantry Division.

Three Pakistani battalions i.e. 42 Punjab, 47 Punjab and 33 FF were

only 8 to 9 months old. The AK regiments were also not as well trained
as the regular infantry. (Refers-the Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-
page.2). On the Indian side the 72 Armoured Regiment was a newly
raised regiment having been raised in Ahmad Nagar in July 1971.
(Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page.
412)It is significant to note that even General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu
has acknowledged the fact that T-59 and M-36 Shermans were far
inferior to Indian tanks technically in his history of Indian Armoured
Corps.

Thus General Gurcharan stated ÒA major weakness in the Pakistan

army at the time was the state of its armour ... The Americans had
stopped military aid after 1965 war to both India and Pakistan. The
step did not materially affect IndiaÕs capability but Pak armour was
seriously handicapped ... she had to resort to alternative sources and
imported 225 T-59 tanks from China but the number was not large
enough to replace her aging fleet ... Sherman tank destroyers etc.
were by 1971 becoming obsolescent. Even Chinese T-59, the latest in
the Pak inventory were a Chinese version of the Russian T-54 which
the Soviets had discarded and replaced by a much improved T-55
version. (Refers-page 425-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier
quoted).

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHAMB SECTOR

The area of Chamb was regarded as territory of crucial significance by

both India and Pakistan. For the Indians its defence was of paramount
significance since it was the direct approach to the Indian jugular vein
of Akhnur Bridge which lay on the main Indian line of communication to
the Indian 25 Division holding Poonch and all area west of Pir Punjal
Range in Kashmir. Capture of Akhnur by Pakistan could lead to an easy
advance towards the Jammu Srinagar Road at least theoretically,
although in 1971 the Pakistan army was in no position to carry out
such an ambitious offensive.

The Indians based on their harsh experience in 1965 i.e. the lightning
Pakistani offensive towards Akhnur were firmly resolved to pre-empt
any Pakistani move towards Chamb by resorting to an offensive
operation into Pakistan territory from Chamb.The Pakistani military
planners on the other hand perceived the Indian position of Chamb as
a springboard from which the Indians could launch a swift
counterstroke into the soft underbelly of Pakistan and sever the main
Pakistani line of communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road; which was
just 35 to 40 miles from the Indian held territory of Chamb. The
Pakistani fears about Indian designs were further compounded by the
fact that unlike the area south of River Chenab there was no water
obstacle in between Chamb and the main Pakistani line of
communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road running north to south
though the towns of Kharian, Lalamusa and Gujrat; all three of which
were within striking range of Chamb.

THE BATTLE PLANS

THE INDIAN PLAN

There was some difference of opinion among the various Indian

commanders at various levels regarding the proposed Indian design of
battle in Chamb. The GOC Western Command General Candeth wanted
to initially fight a governing troops withdrawal battle from the border
till River Tawi to wear down and exhaust the expected Pakistani attack
on Chamb; followed by a change of posture and a deliberate Indian
counter attack which would push the attacking Pakistani troops
backwards.
The Indian counter attack was based on employment of a complete
Independent Armoured Brigade with three armoured regiments (8th
Light Cavalry, Central India Horse, 72 Armoured Regiment) one
mechanised infantry regiment (7th Grenadiers) and a fourth Integral
Armoured Regiment of 10 Division i.e. the Deccan Horse.

The plan visualised having just one infantry battalion west of Tawi
assisted by a tank squadron. The plan was based on the assumption
that complete surprise would be achieved by rafting all three armoured
regiments of the 3rd Armoured Brigade across the Chenab. (Refers-the
western front- Lt. Gen. K. P Candeth-Allied Publishers Delhi 1984-page-
75). (refers-history of the Indian armoured corps earlier quoted page-
483). It appears that by November 1971 the Indian General
Headquarters lost the nerve to launch this formidable plan which
keeping in view the great Indian numerical superiority in tanks; had the
potential to seriously jeopardise 23 DivisionÕs operational position at
worst and at best ensure that Chamb stayed in Indian hands. However
by November 1971 the Indian GHQ prevailed upon Candeth to not to
resort to the initial unorthodox and bold plan and instead follow a
typical Indo-Pak compromise plan of holding territory west of Tawi in
strength.
It appears that both the GOC Western Command Candeth and the
Corps Commander 15 Corps General Sirtaj Singh were obsessed with
launching an attack and did not take the Indian GHQÕs orders to stand
on defensive till ordered otherwise. According to Major K. C. Praval this
information reached the HQ 10 Indian Division only on the evening of
01 December; primarily because of lethargy in passing down
information (refers-the Indian Army after Independence earlier quoted-
page. 495). There is an apparent divergence in the accounts of
Candeth and Praval and it is obvious that it was not lethargy in passing
down orders but overconfidence in the impregnability of their position
on account of superior numbers which led the Indian command to
underestimate the offensive potential of the 23rd Division.

THE INDIAN PLAN WAS AS FOLLOWING:--

1. Area west of Tawi to be initially held by two brigades i.e. the 28

Brigade holding the hill sub-sector i.e. area Dewa Red Hill Laleal etc.
The 191 Brigade to hold area west of Tawi and to the south of 28
Brigade in strength with three battalions holding area west of Tawi and
one battalion east of Tawi supported by a tank squadron ex-Deccan
Horse and ATGM company with the following dispositions:-

a. 5 Sikh holding area south of Laleali-Dewa and Mandiala.

b. 4/I Gurkha Rifle in the middle holding area Mole and Phagla.

c. 5 Assam defending area Barsala-Jhanda-Munawar and the Darh

crossings over Tawi.

d. 10 Garhwal east of Tawi in area Chhati-Tahli Hamirpur.(Refers: The

Western Front:- Page 76 and History of the Indian Armoured Corps-
Page. 483)

2. 52 Infantry Brigade east of Tawi in area Kalit Troti with be prepared

orders to occupy defences on East Bank of Tawi in case of a Pakistani
attack and defend the southern approach i.e. Line Hamir Pur-Chati-Tali
which was at the moment thinly held on extended frontage by 10
Garhwal. This brigade was also designated to advance into Pakistan
territory along with 68 Indian Brigade in case of an Indian offensive
mounted inside Pakistan territory from Chamb.

3. 68 Brigade was not deployed fully/partially unlike the other infantry

brigades and was held in reserve along with 72 Armoured Regiment to
either defend Chamb or Akhnur area as a reserve force or to be
prepared to launch the projected Indian offensive inside Pakistan
territory.

4. According to K.C Praval the 15 Corps plan was to use 10 Infantry

Division to advance along the north bank of Chenab river towards
Tanda-Gujrat while 26 Infantry Division was to advance south of River
Chenab towards Sialkot. (Refers the Indian Army after Independence-
earlier quoted-page. 493).

It appears that Candeth did have grandiose plans of advancing inside

Pakistan as amply seen from PravalÕs previously quoted account of 15
Corps plans. However, since Candeth wrote his book more than a
decade later he wisely disassociated with his earlier plan and we donÕt
find any of what Praval stated in his book about 15 Corps plans in
CandethÕs book.5. The RHQ of Deccan Horse was located east of Tawi
at Kachreal.

Its A squadron was tasked to cover the approaches to Chamb from the
south and west and was located west of Tawi River under command
191 Brigade.

B squadron was located at Kachreal along with the RHQ, C Squadron

was tasked to cover the southern approach and was located in the 10
Garhwal area east of Tawi river.

The regimentÕs CO was wounded in an accident and the regiment was

commanded by its 2/IC during the entire operation. (Refers-The History
of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page.483)6.

The Indians had full intentions of launching an offensive and

for this reason had left a gap in between the area Barsala-
Jhanda which was only covered by a dummy minefield. They had
also left a similar gap in the area south west of the southern crossing
places near the 20 Pakistan Brigade area. Later on this gap in between
Barsala and Jhanda greatly facilitated the advance of the armoured
brigade towards Chak Pandit. (Refers - the History of the Indian
Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page-483).

THE PAKISTANI PLAN

The Pakistani GHQ had given GOC 23 Division the primary task of
clearing the enemy held territory up to River Tawi. (Refers-PakistanÕs
Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal -i- Muqueem Khan, National
Book Foundation - Islamabad-1973-page-197.)We have seen that
terrain in the northern part of the sector was more hilly and broken
than in the south. Before the war started there was a school of thought
that the ideal line of advance into Chamb was from the south i.e. from
north of Tanda.

However, according to General Fazal-i-Muqeem, General Eftikhar had

rejected this idea. The GeneralÕs rationale for doing so was that
although in the north terrain was bad; this fact was balanced by the
fact that in the south the enemy was much stronger and there was a
greater chance to surprise the enemy. (Refers-PakistanÕs Crisis in
Leadership-earlier quoted-page.197).

The key idea of General Eftikhars plan was that once Mandiala bridge
was captured; the Indians would be forced to abandon Chamb and all
area west of Tawi; since the loss of the bridge would outflank their
entire position west of Tawi and render it untenable.
In brief 23 Division plan was as following:-1. 66 Brigade and 111
Brigade to secure lodgement in the area between Mungawali-Khalabat
Jhil in the north and Ghogi in the south. This lodgement would result in
the breakup of the main line of Indian forward defended localities and
provide own armour with a firm base for breakout at first light.

This operation was to commence at 2100 hours 03 Dec and the

lodgement established by first light on 04 December 1971.2. 11
Cavalry Group comprised 11 Cavalry, a squadron of 26 Cavalry, 4
Punjab, one company 19 Baluch (Recce & Support), 24 field company
engineers were to breakout from area Manawanwali in the northern
part of the lodgement and advance towards Mandiala cutting road
Dewa Mandiala at Kamali Chappar and to secure the home bank of
Tawi in Mandiala area on night 4/5 December 1971. (Refers-Battle of
Chamb-earlier quoted-page-15).

11 Cavalry (old P.A.V.O) Group was theoretically under Command 66

Brigade but practically speaking as we shall see later 66 Brigade HQ
had little control if any on the battle fought at Mandiala.3. 111 Brigade
to carry out offensive probe towards Chamb and Chak Pandit and draw
enemy reserves. On 05 December 111 Brigade was to advance and
capture Chamb.4.

Following the capture of Chamb; the 66 Brigade and the 111Brigade

were to clear the entire salient up to west bank of Tawi.5. Operations
across Tawi were planned but no fixed plan was made and the future
plan to do so was to be in relation to the operational situation later.
(Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quotedÑ page-15).6.

20 Brigade in the south was to hold ground in the south, to make

attack demonstrations in area Burjeal-Manawar and Nadala enclave.
According to the divisionÕs GSO-I the primary task of the 20 Brigade
was to hold ground against a possible counter offensive of the enemy
in the southern half of the salient. (Refers-Ibid-Page-15).

Later on once the main attack of 66 and 111Brigade in the north had
succeeded; the Brigade was to advance northward as far as possible
capturing Jhanda Manawar etc.7. In the north opposite what the
Indians called hill sub-sector there were two Pakistani brigades i.e. 4
AK Brigade and 7 AK Brigade.
The GOC correctly appreciated that no major fighting would take place
in this area.8. The HQ 2 Armoured Brigade was assigned 12
Independent Armoured Squadron, 13 AK Battalion, 28 Cavalry (A
surprise arrival which joined the division after last light 04 Dec), and a
company R & S. It may be noted that 13 AK was Reserve Battalion of 7
AK Brigade but had been ordered to march south on 02 December to
be part of the main attack in the south as part of 2 Armoured Brigade.
CONDUCT OF BATTLE
THE INITIAL ATTACK AND THE BATTLE OF MANDIALA
The initial two days of the Battle of Chamb proved Moltkes famous
saying that no plan survives on contact with the enemy. 66 Brigade
started its attack after the preparatory bombardment which had
commenced at 2020 hours 03 December and by 0200 accomplished its
task of capturing an area of 3000 yards depth. Thus a lodgement area
wide enough for 11 Cavalry Group to break out was secured. 111
Brigade, however, failed to accomplish its assigned task to capture a
similar 3000 yards deep objective south of 66 Brigade.
It was held up by an enemy company in Moel area.Meanwhile the
Indians who had been alerted by the preparatory bombardment took
the following counter measures:-
a. Deployed three tank troops of ÒAÓ Squadron Deccan Horse in areas
Barsala, Jhanda and Munawar respectively in order to cover the
southern approach to Darh crossings on the Tawi.
b. The fourth troop of the A/M Squadron was kept as reserve in depth.
c. The RHQ of Deccan Horse moved to Chamb close to 191 Brigade
Headquarters from Kachreal. Two troops from ÒBÓ Squadron Deccan
Horse previously east of Tawi were sent to border posts at Moel Add
Paur where Pakistani tanks had been reported on the evening and
night of 03 December. Squadron Headquarters of ÒBÓ Squadron was
deployed along with two troops in depth at Barsala.
d. One troop of ÒCÓ Squadron which was supporting 52 Brigade was
detached and sent to defend the Mandiala crossing. (Refers-History of
Indian Armour-Page-484)These counter measures taken on night 03
December illustrated that the Indians expected the attack in the south,
since no armour was sent to cover the Dewa Mandiala approach.
Meanwhile 11 Cavalry Group had commenced its advance towards
Mandiala and by mid-day was reported by Indians in area Gurha on
track Mandiala-Dewa. HQ Indian 191 Brigade correctly sensed the
threat posed by 11 Cavalry tanks to Mandiala and at 0900 hours
ordered Deccan Horse to reinforce the northern axis.
Thus two tank troops of Deccan HorseÕs ÒBÓ Squadron were sent to
Phagla and Mandiala ridge respectively. The remaining two RHQ
Deccan Horse were sent to take position at Gurha north west of
Mandiala.
The sheer Indian desperation may be gauged from the fact that the
two RHQ tanks were sent to engage the main enemy attack. At mid-
day 11 Cavalry appeared in area Gurha and was immediately engaged
by the RHQ Tanks Deccan Horse and B Squadron Deccan Horse tanks
at Mandiala.
The Indian tanks were deployed in extremely dominating positions and
within few minutes 11 Cavalry lost 7 tanks. It is best in a battle account
to quote the enemy and this is how the Indian historian of the Indian
armoured corps described the traumatic but epic battle of Mandiala:-
"About mid-day 11 Cavalry made its appearance in area Gurha ... RHQ
tanks had selected their position well and within a few minutes
knocked out 7 T-59 tanks and two recoilless guns ... 11 Cavalry less a
squadron had, however, followed a route further north along the bed of
Sukhtao Nullah. 191 Brigade must have been unaware of this thrust.
Enemy tanks appeared behind Mandiala north and Gujha ridge along
the Nala bed and destroyed a ÒBÓ Squadron tank in Mandiala. They
also shot up the squadronsÕ echelons dispersed in the foothills. By
three P.M. 11 Cavalry had captured Mandiala north but could not
secure the crossing held by a troop of tanks from ÒCÓ Squadron,
Deccan HorseÓ. (Refers: History of Indian Armoured Corps-Page-485)
11 Cavalry had suffered heavy casualties on 04 December i.e. 5 tanks
destroyed and 9 men killed and 7 wounded. In total 11 tanks were hit.4
Punjab occupied Mandiala north.Meanwhile 28 Cavalry had been
assigned to 23 Division and had reached area Assar on the evening of
03 December. 66 Brigade which was supposed to overall control 11
Cavalry operations was stuck up at Phagla and was in no position to
provide any infantry support to 11 Cavalry or to control its
operations.The 111 Brigade which was supposed to have captured
Chamb by 05 December was still near the border many miles from
Chamb.
A situation entirely unexpected had thus developed. General Eftikhar,
however, remained unruffled and resolute and adopted the following
modified plan:-a. 11 Cavalry to go into Leaguer behind Gura and to
rest, replenish and recuperate. Resume attack on Mandiala after
replenishment.b. HQ 4 AK Brigade along with 6 AK and 13 AK to
establish a bridgehead east of Tawi after last light 04 December
capturing high ground east of Sahamwan.c. 28 Cavalry to breakout
from the Bridgehead secured by 4 AK Brigade at first light 05
December to capture Pallanwala and advance as eastwards as
possible.d.
11 Cavalry to stay in reserve on 05 December 1971.e. 66 Brigade to
move forward, and follow 11 Cavalry groups advance and close up to
River Tawi.f. 111 Brigade and 20 Brigade to continue as per initial
battle plan.Meanwhile by mid-day 04 December the Indian commander
was clear about the main direction of Pakistani attack.
Thus the Deccan Horse was reinforced by one squadron of 72
Armoured Regiment which joined Deccan Horse by the evening of 04
December. In addition one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment and 7
Kumaon (68 Brigade) were despatched from Akhnur to launch a
counter attack to recapture Mandiala north.
The regiment along with C Squadron 72 Armoured Regiment, however,
reached the east bank of Tawi after last light 04 December and
immediately lost its Commanding Officer due to Pakistani artillery
shelling along with 4 other officers of 7 KumaonÕs O Group.
Thus the battalion being rendered leaderless could not be immediately
deployed. Since it had reached Tawi after last light its mission was
changed to take up positions on the east bank overlooking Mandiala
crossing. On 04 December only the para company of 9 Commando was
guarding Mandiala crossing and Mandiala crossing was only saved,
thanks to the tenacious courage of the 5 Sikh and the tank troops of
Deccan Horse which were holding Mandiala south.It may be noted that
by the evening of 04 December the B Squadron of 72 Armoured
Regiment which had been placed under Command Deccan Horse was
deployed west of Tawi; two troops on the Phagla ridge facing west and
north west and the Squadron Headquarters and two troops in reserve
at Chak Pandit.
THE 4 AK BRIGADE ATTACK ACROSS TAWI 04/05 DECEMBER
1971
4 AK Brigade was assigned 13 AK and 47 Punjab minus a company for
the attack across Tawi. One squadron of 26 Cavalry and 12
Independent Squadron which had only 4 tanks available was also
under command 4 AK Brigade.
The 4 AK BrigadeÕs attack plan was as following:-a. 6 AK and 13 AK to
launch night attack across Tawi; 6 AK on the left and 13 AK on the
right. Both the battalions were to capture Spur Feature.b. Two
companies of 47 Punjab and one squadron 26 Cavalry under command
RHQ 26 Cavalry and one company 47 Punjab were to be held in
reserve.
It may be noted that there was literally no enemy in front of 4 AK
Brigade, 7 Kumaon still lost due to loss of its CO and O Group and just
one Indian para company holding the Chamb Mandiala bridge. At night
it appeared that only a miracle could save the Indians.4 AK Brigade
had been alerted to launch the attack from 1000 hours 04 December.
Later the subject attack was postponed from 1800 hours 04 December
to 05 December 0400 hours. Both the 6 AK and 13 AK were well aware
about their tasks in the planned attack. However, somehow at the
appointed time the CO of 6 AK failed to join the unit to lead it into the
approach march to the forming up place since he had lost his battalion.
(Refers-the Battle of Chamb Col Saeed-pages 42 and 43).
13 AK, however, launched the planned attack at 0300 hours 05
December. 13 AK ran into the Indian unit 9 Jat and dispersed it and
advanced forward to capture its objective i.e. Spur Feature. However,
no unit was supporting it and the Indians in its rear reorganised
themselves and surrounded the brave battalion in the morning.
Elements of 5 Sikh, 9 Jat now surrounded 13 AK organised a breakout
back to own lines but lost heavily losing 26 men killed and 50 wounded
including its brave CO Col.
Basharat Raja who was taken prisoner.During this whole confusion 4
AK Brigade HQ passed back the information that both its battalions had
captured the Spur Feature and ordered its reserve i.e. elements of 26
Cavalry and companies of 47 Punjab to move forward and consolidate
the bridgehead.
When these moved forward the Indians who had by now reoccupied
their defensive positions.Candeth the Indian GOC western command
acknowledged 13 AKÕs performance in the following words:-
PakistanÕs 13 AK Battalion had by then succeeded in capturing the
bridge (Mandiala) but their attempts to get their tanks across was
thwarted by 9 Horse ... Taking advantage of the gap caused by
absence of 7 Kumaon 13 AK Battalion got through to the gun positions
of 39 medium and 216 medium regimentsÓ.Refers-The Western Front-
Candeth-Page-79
As per the Indian account the situation of utter panic caused by 13 AK
attack was only checked by personal intervention of Commander
Indian 68 Brigade who in words of Praval Òreached the scene on the
morning of December 5 with a company of 9 Jat mounted on two
troops of tanks from 72 Regiment 5 (Refers-Indian Army after
Independence-page-497). Absence or presence of commanders can be
decisive in crisis situations.
The previously mentioned Indian accounts prove that 4 AK Brigade
attack across Chamb had the potential to cause a major crisis in the
Indian position, provided 4 AK Brigade Headquarters had exercised
control on the battle like fighting from the front like Commander 68
Brigade who joined the battle all the way from Akhnur. Once compared
with General Shaukat RazaÕs account of the 4 AK Brigade the Indians
sound very different; Shaukat Raza had the following to say about 4 AK
Brigade:-ÒBy first light 5 December Brigade Major 4 AK Brigade
confirmed capture of Bridgehead over River Tawi.
The information was premature. Enemy positions had been reinforced.
As our troops neared Tawi the Indians counter attacked with tanks, our
troops hurriedly withdrewÓ. (Refers-the History of the Pakistan Army-
Shaukat Raza Services Book Club-1990-page-182).
Once the actual situation was discovered by 4 AK Brigade early in the
morning of 05 December; a feeble attempt was made to retrieve the
situation by sending forward a squadron of 26 Cavalry and parts of 47
Punjab; but by now the Indians had firmly regained their composure
and 26 Cavalry Squadron failed to advance suffering three tank
casualties in the process. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-45) in the
meantime Headquarters 23 Division discovered that 66 Brigade was
still in the lodgement area and had not closed on to River Tawi as
earlier ordered. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-42).
Had 66 Brigade been at TawiÕs west bank near Mandiala 4 AK
BrigadeÕs position could have been saved. It may be noted that HQ 66
Brigade had been ordered on 04 December 1971 to move forward and
relieve 11 Cavalry Group i.e. 4 Punjab which was holding Mandiala
north. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-Page-46). These orders had been
passed at 0900 hours 04 December 1971.
MODIFIED PLAN TO CAPTURE CHAMB-05/06 DECEMBER AND ITS
EXECUTION The operational situation on the morning of 05 December
was as following:a. 13 AK was back on west bank of Tawi having failed
to hold the Bridgehead due to absence of 6 AK.b. 66 Brigade was still
in lodgement area west of Phagla.c. 111 Brigade had failed to capture
Point 994 the crucial feature dominating the approach to Chamb. The
Point was captured once by 10 Baluch but lost soon as a result of a
resolute Indian counter attack.d. 20 Brigade had made no worthwhile
progress.e. 11 Cavalry had failed to succeed in its probing efforts in
Sukh Tao and Tawi river area due to heavy fire from east of Tawi and
Mandiala south which dominated the approach to Tawi bridge.It was
something like failure of 4 Armoured Brigade attack in 1965 in Khem
Karan. The whole atmosphere was grim and gloomy. General Eftikhar,
however, retained his mental equilibrium and was not unnerved by the
reverses of 04/05 December. He immediately adopted the following
modified plan to carry on the battle:-a. Bulk of the armour to be pulled
out from area north of Chamb and regrouped in area east of Jaimal Kot
for launching a fresh attack on Chamb Salient from the south aimed at
Area Chak Pandit south of Chamb with HQ 2 Armoured Brigade
comprising 28 Cavalry, one Squadron 11 Cavalry, one Squadron 26
Cavalry, 23 Baluch, one Company R & S.b. Pressure to be kept on the
Indian position north of Chamb by continuing the attack on Mandiala
south using 11 Cavalry minus one squadron, and 4 AK Brigade.c.
111Brigade to continue its attack on Chamb. One squadron 26 Cavalry
also assigned to 111Brigade for this attack.d. 66 Brigade to continue
its attack towards Mandiala south.2 Armoured Brigade units started
moving towards the forward assembly area east of Jaimal Kot starting
from evening of 05 December and the movement continued
throughout the night 05/06 December 1971. By 0445 hours the
infantry units arrived in the forward assembly area. 23 Baluch
commenced the attack at 0530 hours and soon captured Bakan and
Paur its objectives. There was hardly any opposition since no attack
was expected by the Indians in this area. At 0800 hours 2 Armoured
Brigade commenced its advance towards Chak Pandit. Opposition was
nil since by 05 December the Indians were convinced that the main
Pakistani attack was coming from the north. The intentionally left
Indian gap in their minefield between Barsala and Jhanda proved a
blessing in disguise for the 2 Armoured Brigade. A few tanks were,
however, damaged on the outer fringes of the dummy minefield. The
tanks of 2 Armoured Brigade captured Chak Pandit at 1730 hours, in
the evening 2 Armoured Brigade captured Pallanwala.It may be noted
that once 2 Armoured Brigade had first encountered the dummy
minefield between Barsala and Jhanda on its way to Chak Pandit; the
progress of their advance had become very slow since they had
started probing to find a gap in the minefield. It was at this juncture
that the GOC flew in his helicopter to Chanir where he met Commander
2 Armoured Brigade and exhorted him to make a frontal rush and cross
the minefield. Once this was done the Brigade made an almost clean
sweep with the exception of three tanks damaged. (Refers-The Battle
of Chamb-page-58 and page.59) Colonel Saeed in his book surprisingly
noted about this incident that surprisingly very few tanks ran over
minesÓ (Refers-Battle of Chamb-page-59). It was so because the
minefield was dummy and left to enable the Indians to launch their
planned offence inside Pakistan!Meanwhile Mandiala South was
captured by 4 AK Brigade by the evening of 06 December 1971. What
the Indians had refused to abandon in three days hard fighting was lost
in one evening by means of a brilliant indirect approach as a result of
the modified plan of 23 Division i.e. the advance to Chak Pandit. At
1930 hours in the evening of 06 December GOC 10 Indian Division
Major General Jaswant Singh decided to give up the western bank of
Tawi. (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted
-page. 487). Orders were given to Headquarters 191 Indian Brigade to
withdraw to the eastern bank of Tawi at 1930 hours 06 December
1971. The Indian withdrawal was completed by midnight 06/07
December and the hotly contested bridge at Mandiala was blown up at
midnight.It is significant here to describe that it was 5 Sikh which was
the real obstacle holding 66 Brigade and 4 AK Brigade from capturing
Mandiala south. This fact was well acknowledged by GSO-I of 23
Division Lt Col. Saeed in the following words once he described 5 Sikhs
crucial role on the two days i.e. 04 and 05 December in the following
words:-ÒIf the Indian Commander now knows full details of what was
coming for him on the morning of 05 December he can rightly
congratulate the Commanding Officer of 5 Sikh and the Squadron
Commander who held Mandiala south that day with so much grit and
determination. They both saved a sad day for himÓ. (Refers-The Battle
of Chamb-Page.51) THE FINAL BID FOR PALLANWALA While 2
Armoured Brigade was moving towards Chak Pandit the indomitable
General Eftikhar had made up his mind to use 2 Armoured Brigade to
attack Pallanwala across Tawi from Chak Pandit. Whatever historians
may think the Indians have acknowledged the fact that it was well
within 23 DivisonÕs capability to capture Pallanwala. (Refers the Indian
Army after Independence K.C. Praval-earlier quoted-page 498).Chamb
was captured by 2 Armoured Brigade by the morning of 07 December.
This was a foregone conclusion since the Indians had already
abandoned it on night 06/07 December 1971.General Eftikhar gave his
orders for capture of Pallanwala at 1430 hours on 07 December. 2
Armoured Brigade was to cross Tawi east of Nageal. General Eftikhar
correctly appreciated that Pallanwala could be captured if an
immediate attack was made. A fact which has been acknowledged
much later with the benefit of hindsight by Indian historians (Refers-KC
Praval Indian Army after Independence page. 498). Thus General
Eftikhar wanted that the attack across Tawi on Pallanwala should
commence by late evening. When the GOC told Commander 2
Armoured Brigade about his plan. Commander 2 Armoured Brigade felt
that the timings were too tight but was firmly ordered by the GOC to
carry out these orders. The order to establish the bridgehead could not
be implemented since the two battalions who were supposed to
establish the bridgehead could not be located by Commander 2
Armoured Brigade as per General Shaukat Raza. (Refers-History of
Pakistan Army-1966-71 page.185). Col Saeed the GSO-I of the Division,
however, categorically states in his book that 23 Baluch which was
supposed to launch the attack and knew about Commander 2
Armoured Brigades O Group for the subject attack did not send any
officer to attend the O Group. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-page 67).
Whatever the actual reason the fact is indisputable that 23 Division
lost a golden opportunity to capture Pallanwala while the Indians were
disorganised and no battalion was holding the area opposite Tawi
across Chak Pandit. Commander 2 Armoured Brigade had to cancel the
crucial attack till 0100 hours 08 December. Till six the next morning
HQ 2 Armoured Brigade failed to locate 4 Punjab or 23 Baluch and no
attack was launched! (Refers-Battle of Chamb-page-68 and 69). Finally
at six in the morning of 08 December Commander 2 Armoured Brigade
informed the GOC that it had not been possible to launch the attack.
(Refers-IBID Page.69)Finally the proposed task of attack was given to
111Brigade. The subject attack was to be launched on the night of
08/09 December by 4 Punjab of Mandiala fame and 10 Baluch. By now,
however, the Indians were well established. Failure to make use of the
critical time span on 07/08 December had doomed the likelihood of
success of 23 DivisionÕs bid for Pallanwala. The Indians in the two
precious days had brought their complete 68 Brigade forward and had
organised their defences as following.a. 68 Brigade to hold northern
half of the east bank of Tawi; while 52 Brigade was to hold the
southern half of the east bank of Tawi.b. 72 Armoured Regiment under
Command 68 Infantry Brigade was to cover the Mandiala and Chamb
crossings.c. Deccan Horse under Command 52 Brigade was to cover all
crossing places south of Chamb in the 52 Brigade area of
responsibility. Squadron Deccan Horse was in reserve in area Khaur
near Pallanwala.Meanwhile on 09 and 10 December GHQ placed
restriction on use of 11 Cavalry east of Tawi since they wanted to
move 11 Cavalry to Sialkot. Thus practically the only Armoured
Regiment left for the Divison was 28 Cavalry which had just 28 tanks
left. On the evening of 09 December, General EftikharÕs helicopter
crashed and the general who was mortally wounded was evacuated to
Kharian. Officiating command of the division was assumed by Brig
Kamal Matin. The planned attack on Palanwala was launched by 111
Brigade and 28 Cavalry. The infantry attack commenced at 0100 hours
on night 09/10 December opposite Darh and Raipur ferries. By the
afternoon of 1.0 December a Bridgehead which was 4,000 yards wide
and 1,000 yards deep (Refers-The Western Front Candeth-page 82).
The Indians speedily launched a counter attack employing elements of
7 Kumaon, 5/8 Kurkha, 10 Garhwal and 3/4 Gurkha supported by a
squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment under the direct supervision of
General Sartaj Singh the Commander 15 Indian Corps. The Bridgehead
was contained. As per Lt Colonel Saeed there was misreporting on part
of BM 111 Brigade Major Nazar Hussain also; thus the BM gave an
incorrect report that 28 Cavalry was down to 4 tanks. (Refers-The
Battle of Chamb-page 80). Meanwhile the new GOC General Umar had
arrived. At 1400 hours on 10 December HQ 23 Division ordered
withdrawal of 111Brigade. The Battle of Chamb was a battle of lost
opportunities. But these opportunities came because the indomitable
spirit of General Eftikhar who had the burning desire to beat the enemy
and commanded his division from the front. Even today he lives in the
hearts of many ex-servicemen who saw him from close quarters,
always rushing towards the sound of gun fire; in search for the leading
tank troop or the first wave of infantry. Alas, had he lived, many
cowards may not have prospered.ANALYSISHANDLING OF ARMOURThe
Battle of Chamb 1971 stands out as the most significant battle in the
history of Pakistan armoured corps as a battle in which armour was
used in a successful manner in an offensive role. Later on with the
benefit of hindsight General EftikharÕs handling of armour was
criticised. The criticism that armour was distributed on too wide a front
is often made about 23 Division employment of armour. As a matter of
fact armour was used in a concentrated manner and all the reverses
suffered by the division were because of lack of infantry at the correct
place. Like 11 Cavalry successfully captured Mandiala north and
following this complete 4 Punjab was absorbed in holding Mandiala
north. The Squadrons of 26 Cavalry were allotted to the 66 and
111Brigade because there was Indian armour supporting 5 Sikh, 4/I
Gurkha and 5 Assam. In any case there was hardly any room for
manoeuvre in the Mandiala area where the first main attack was
launched.Later on once 28 Cavalry arrived on 04 December armour
was used in a concentrated manner. The decision to leave regiment
minus of 11 Cavalry in the north of Chamb when 2 Armoured Brigade
was a brilliant case of deception rather than dispersal of armour;
because presence of tanks opposite Mandiala on 05/06 December
convinced the Indians that main effort of 23 Division was still in the
north. This led to the successful grand surprise at Chak Pandit which
forced the Indian commander to abandon what three brigades of
infantry had failed to achieve in three days of fighting.On the Indian
side, however, tanks were under employed. Initially only one squadron
was deployed west of Tawi and this squadron was further sub-divided
into parts; one troop each in Jhanda Barsala and Munawar and one in
reserve. When the artillery shelling started on evening of 03 December
two more tank troops of B Squadron Deccan Horse were sent towards
Moel but the Mewa Mandiala approach was totally ignored providing 11
Cavalry a clean sweep to Mandiala. This was an entirely avoidable and
inexcusable blunder since firstly the Indians had seven tank Squadrons
and secondly the Dewa Mandiala approach had already been used by
Pakistani armour in 1965. Four tank troops on this approach in well
sited positions were enough to stop 11 Cavalry Group well short of
Mandiala. However, when 11 Cavalry was approaching Mandiala there
was no Indian armour on this approach and only at 9 OÕclock in the
morning was the Indian commander 191 Brigade sufficiently alerted to
hastily despatch two tank troops of B Squadron Deccan Horse. One of
these tank troops was already deployed opposite Koel Moel while the
second was in reserve east of Barsala. In additon in sheer desperation
the two RHQ tanks of Deccan Horse were also deployed on Mandiala
south to defend the ridge. However, three tank troops were no
consolation and 11 Cavalry was easily able to outflank the Indian
position by outflanking it by approaching through the bed of Sukhtao
Nullah.By evening of 04 December B Squadron 7 Armoured Regiment
was also placed under Command Deccan Horse but Mandiala north had
been lost and a dangerous imbalance in the Indian 10 Division position
which was entirely avoidable had been created by virtue of 23
Divisions successful capture of Mandiala north.The Indian commander
employed armour in penny packets and to act as a stationary retaining
wall rather than a dynamic element which could be swiftly made to
change its role as per particular dynamics of a tactical situation. Thus
C Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which was given to 191 Brigade
was relegated to stationary observation duties on the east bank of
Tawi opposite Mandiala and the Sukhtao Nala-Tawi junction. Similarly
ÒAÓ Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which crossed the Tawi at
1100 hours on 06 December when 2 Armoured Brigade was in the
process of launching its fateful and decisive attack on Chak Pandit was
aimlessly divided into two parts; two troops being sent to Jhanda in the
south opposite the Pakistani 20 Brigade and two troops being sent to
reinforce Point 994 opposite the 111Brigade front, the three reserve
tank troops at Chak Pandit were moved to Chamb to act as a reserve.
The third squadron of Deccan Horse never crossed the Tawi and stayed
to guard the Darh crossings and the area in south. The independent
squadron was never moved and guarded the Akhnur Bridge on the
Chenab till end of the war.The Indians can be accused of under
employing the armour justly but nothing in 23 DivisionÕs employment
of armour warrants the unjust criticism levelled by writers writing
books 20 years after the war. It was the balanced distribution of
armour by 23 Division which confused the Indians and forced them to
divide their armour. The Indians broke the integrity of tank squadrons
and grouped tank troops of one regiment with another. This was not
done by 23 Division at any stage. The opinion of Indian Armoured
Corps historian about employment of armour is worth quoting:-
ÒArmour available to 10 Division was not properly employed. The
inherent flexibility and mobility of armour enables it to switch roles at
short notice. Neither the Divisional Commander nor his Armour Advisor
appreciated this characteristic of armour. On the first day only two
Squadrons out of seven available were employed. One Squadron was
left unemployed throughout the war because it was earmarked for the
defence of Akhnur Bridge/town which the remotest threat disappeared
after our attack on ÔchickensÕ neckÕ. The second armoured regiment
was not inducted even after the enemyÕs intention became quite
clear. When employed its Squadrons were brought in one by one
merely to make up losses suffered by the Deccan Horse. The 10
DivisionÕs appreciation of the armour threat from Pakistan and the
consequent employment of the Deccan Horse was faulty. Pakistan had
used the northern approach in 1965. What justification could be there
six years later to ignore this approach and to allot no armour for its
defence? It is said that the commanders concerned did not want to
employ armour earmarked for the offensive for defensive purposes.
But this is not a valid justification because the flexibility of armour
enables it to switch roles at short notice; in any case it would appear
that there were adequate resources available centainly in armour after
10 December to regain lost territory but no attempt was made:
(Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page 489)
AREA TANK TROOPS INDIAN PAKISTANI MANDIALA AND EAST OF TAWI
NEAR MANDIALA 12 8 PHAGLA GURHA 4 4 CHAK PANDIT 1 17 JHANDA-
MUNAWAR 4 4 DARH-EAST TAWI 3 - AKHNUR-EAST OF TAWI 4 - 28 33*
* Troops does not mean all three tanks since many tanks were
distributed/inoperational MODIFICATION OF PLANS IN CRISIS SITUATION
KEY TO THE ISSUE It is regarded as an impossibility in our tactical
exercises that plans can fail at divisional and corps level; whereas in
actual fact it is at divisional and corps level that plans succeed or fail.
Moltke correctly stated that: ÒIt is a delusion, when one believes that
one can plan an entire campaign and carry out its planned end ... the
first battle will determine a new situation through which much of the
original plan will become inapplicableÓ. (Refers-Military Works-Berlin-E.
S. Mitter Und Sohn-1892-1912- Volume Four-pages 70 to 117). Moltke
went further and said: ÒEverything comes to this; To be able to
recognise the changed situation and order the foreseeable course and
prepare it energeticallyÓ. (Refers- Military Works-Moltke-earlier
quoted-Volume Four-pages 1, 71-73). The position of 23 Division after
the failure in the north on 04 and 05 December was similar to that
confronted by the Indian Armour GOC opposite Chawinda in 1965 and
the Pakistani Armour GOC opposite Valtoha after failure of 4 Armoured
Brigade attack. GOC 23 Divison had much less resources than both of
the commanders just mentioned. Yet he remained calm, resolute and
optimistic and brilliantly modified his plan to once again attack in the
south at Chak Pandit.Thus General Eftikhar was able to pierce the veil
of darkness with his rapier like operational vision; overcoming all the
stumbling blocks in his way; facing the barrage of conflicting
information passed on through the subjective process of distortion of
informaiton; as it is passed from the lower to the higher echelons in
crisis situation. In Clausewitzian terms General Eftikhar whose
generalship and personality comes closest to the Clausewitzian frame
of the ideal military commander as far as Indo-Pak sub-continent is
concerned Òstood like a rock against which the sea breaks. Its fury in
vainÓ. (Refers-On War-Clausewitz-Anatol Rapoport-National Book
Foundation-page-163).John Keegan describes the German definition of
operational strategy in the following words:-ÒEven higher in the
German armyÕs scale of values than the nature of the warrior spirit in
its conscripts stood the cultivation of operational talent in their leaders.
Operative is an adjective which does not translate exactly into English
military vocabulary. Lying somewhere between ÒStrategicÓ and
ÒTacticalÓ, it describes the process of transforming paper plans into
battlefield practice, against the tactical pressures of time which the
strategist does not know, and has been regarded by the German army
as the most difficult of the commanders art since it was isolated by the
great Moltke in the 1860s. Taught in so far as it can be taught, in his
famous staff college courses, its traits were eagerly looked for in the
performance of general staff candidates and its manifestation in
practice. In war time it was rewarded by swift promotionÓ. (Refers-Six
Armies in Normandy-John Keegan-Fontana Books-Reprint-1985-
Page.238) LEADING FROM THE FRONT It was leading from the front for
which General Eftikhar is remembered even today by the troops who
served in 23 Division during the Battle of Chamb. It was this quality
which enabled him to arrive at a realisttic appraisal of the actual
situation without undue reliance on exaggerated reports from lower
echelons.Absence of this doctrine or system of command due to the
British heritage at brigade and divisional level, however, led to certain
command failures at the Brigade level. The Pakistan and Indian armies
are basically the continuation of the old British Indian army steeped in
a system of command in which the GOC and Brigade Commanders
rarely left their headquarters; placing full trust in the fighting ability of
the battalion commanders fighting the main battle. EftikharÕs
approach was more close to the German way of war. Thus while he
himself was leading from the front; others like the brigade
commanders were not doing so. On the other hand the staff officer in
the British/Indo-Pak system had a lesser mission oriented and
independent role than the German General Staff which led to
breakdown in command. Staff officers trained in the British way of war
were not trained to think independently; thus there were no Westphals
or Mellenthin to keep the things rolling while the Pakistani Rommel was
moving with the leading tank troop. Similarly there were no Neumann,
Silkows and Suemermann among the Brigade Commanders who fought
from the front. Thus 4 AK Brigade and 66 Brigade Commanders were
not accustomed to the system of exercising command from the front
and in turn the Headquarters of 23 Division was unable on 05 and 06
December to make a correct assessment of the situation. Similarly this
was the reason why 2 Armoured Brigade Headquarters could not find
its infantry units on night 06/07 December to launch the planned
attack across Tawi. The flaw was both doctrinal as well as
organisational. The executive weakness of the staffs and subordinate
headquarters was the principal obstacle and reason for 23 Division
failure to capture Pallanwala. The troops fought magnificently, the GOC
was a great military commander. But somewhere in the middle there
was a gap; created as a result of the colonial legacy of an army which
followed an operational philosophy which was orders oriented rather
than mission oriented.It may noted that according to the German
doctrine: ÒA Divisional CommanderÕs place is with his troops ... During
encounters with the enemy seeing for oneself is best ... Commanders
are to live with the troops and share with them danger deprivation,
happiness and sufferingÓ. (Refers-Truppenfuhrung- Commnd of
Troops-Berlin-E.S Mittler und Sohn 1936-page-2-4, 33-34). The
spectacular German successes of World War 11 were the direct result
of the fact that the German General Officer multiplied the combat
effectiveness of his Division by leading from the front. Thus on the
average during Second World War one German Corps Commander was
killed per three months and one Divisional Commander was killed
every three weeks. This calculation is based on the facts that 3 Army
Commanders, 23 Corps Commanders and 110 Divisional Commanders
were killed in the German army fighting World War 11. (Refers-Die
Generale Des Heeres-Friedburg-Frg-Podzun-Pallas Verlag-1983 Ñ This
work contains bio notes on all German General Officers of WW 11 and
has been translated by US army into English). THE POWER OF
DEFENCE IS A RELATIVE AND COMPLEX FACTOR The Battle of Chamb
was a convincing proof that keeping in view comparative equipment
resources etc tanks in defence were a much more formidable weapon
than in offence. A tank advance even with artillery support was near
suicidal when the enemy in front was well entrenched and had sited its
defence well. Thus while 11 Cavalry swiftly advanced till Mandiala
because no tanks were covering this approach; armour failed to
achieve a breakthrough on 04 and 05 December. Some critics
condemned this employment of armour; however it was unavoidable.
In the first phase wherever tanks were launched there were bound to
be casualties and in Chamb due to the dominating ridges the defender
was ideally placed. To cause dislocation some attrition in terms of tank
casualties was thus inevitable. The Indian commander on the other
hand underestimated the power of defence. Thus in the initial
discussions before the war General Candeth in his own words
advanced the mistaken viewpoint that ÒPositions west of Tawi were
not tactically sound (Refers-Candeth-The Western Front-earlier quoted-
page-75). Tactically there was nothing wrong with the Indian positions
as amply demonstrated by the performance of Indian 191 Brigade in
blocking the advance of four infantry brigades in the first four days of
the war. The Indian failure in losing Chamb was entirely a command
failure at divisional level and Chamb was not lost by I91 Indian brigade
but by 10 Indian Divisional Commander. The tank casualties of 1971
merely hint at a trend in favour of Defence as the stronger form of
warfare as witnessed in the limited success of armour attacks even in
the 1973 war and in the Iran-Iraq war. The Kuwait war cannot be cited
as an example of success of tanks in attack since the contest was one
sided.The dilemma which faced General Eftikhar was that casualties
were unavoidable. Someone with some tank squadrons had to move
forward and create a dislocation in the Indian defensive posture so as
to fix the enemy commanders attention and create conditions which
would lead to commitment of reserves finally leading to a situation
which offered a vulnerable area through which own armour could
breakthrough and paralyse the will of the enemy. The frontal attack on
Mandiala and the high tank casualties around Phagla Gurha and
Sukhtao Nullah were a pre-requisite for the success later on achieved
at Chak Pandit. The relentless attacks of 23 Division in Mandiala area
on 04 and 05 December convinced the Indians that the Pakistanis
would continue banging their heads against Mandiala. Just like the
Indian Armoured Division had done at Chawinda. Thus the sudden
appearance of armour at Chak Pandit caused a mental paralysis and
the Indians lost the will to fight. General Eftikhar in words of Clausewitz
ÒBy strategem made the Indians commit the errors of understanding
which at last, flowing into one result, suddenly change the nature of
things in his eyesÓ (Refers-On War earlier quoted-page.274).Defence is
the stronger form of war and it is extremely difficult to dislodge well
entrenched soldiers with similar equipment and weapon systems. The
only remedy in such a case is dislocating the enemy commanders
mental equilibrium by surprise in terms of force ratio and time and
space.The defender lays down the first laws of war, in words of an
author he forces the attacker to establish his plan ... But defence is the
weaker form of warfare in short conflicts like Indo-Pak wars where
resources are few and it is a nearly impossible task to change posture
from defence to offence as was the Indian plan/thus after 10 December
though 23 Division was greatly exhausted the Indians could not regain
what they had lost. Had they taken their main defence on Tawi rather
than west of Tawi as Candeth wanted; they may even have lost
Pallanwala. Much more strength of will, intellect and courage is
required to fight a successful offensive battle. 10 Indian DivisionÕs
initial defensive battle was a masterpiece effort in terms of 191 Indian
Brigades conduct in facing four advancing Brigades. Where the Indians
failed was in terms of the conduct of battle at the divisional level;
placing of reserves; launching of timely counterattacks etc etc. THE
TERM FLANK A great deal of emphasis is placed on the term flank. In
the Indo-Pak way of warfare the term ÒVulnerable PointÓ is better than
the term ÒFlankÓ. Flanks may not necessarily be the best place to
attack. In any case ÔFlanksÕ are created only after breakthroughs are
made. The 11 Cavalry advance to Mandiala was, however, a peculiar
operation because it was made in a situation in which no real
breakthrough had been achieved; but a penetration had captured the
Mandiala north ridge 191 Indian Brigade was outflanked. If this
advantage had been immediately exploited a serious defeat would
have been inflicted on the Indians. However, since the Indians got one
day the gap north of Mandiala and the vulnerable flank created as a
result of capture of Mandiala north was undone and a continuous line
was once again established once Indians brought 68 Brigade units
opposite Mandiala crossing on 05 December. The Indian Commanders
mental fixation with Mandiala led to weakening of Indian defences in
the middle. This was well exploited by General Eftikhar vide his Chak
Pandit thrust of 06 December, which created another exposed flank for
the Indians. There are thus no flanks initially but flanks are created as
a result of own offensive action or as a result of enemyÕs attention
being fixed on one part of the front. There is a great deal of truth in
General Wetzell who was General LudendorfÕs Chief of Operations
saying that :-The enemy is not necessarily the weakest on his flanks,
nor will he make most of his mistakes on the wings, his weakness and
his efforts may occur at other places. The main condition of success is
to discover weaknesses and errors wherever they are and to attack the
enemy wherever he is weak and wherever he has committed an error.
Ò(Refers-Surprise-General Waldemar Erfurth-First Translation-1943-
Military Service Publishing Company-Stackpole Books-1974 Ñ page.2
and 3)It may be noted that the above mentioned quotation exactly
describes the Indian position at Chamb. Initially they were strong in the
centre south; while in the later part they became the strongest on the
northern flank and the weakest in the centre opposite Barsala; it was
General EftikharÕs greatness as a General that he correctly perceived
this Indian vulnerability and exploited it by launching the 2 Armoured
Brigade opposite Chak Pandit.Another flank was created on 06/07
December opposite Nageal but since 23 Division could not exploit it;
the same vulnerable point was strengthened by 08/09 December when
finally the 111Brigade attack was launched. THE SUSPENSION OF
ACTION FACTOR Suspension of Action which means a state of action in
which an army or any military entit Battle of Chamb offers some very
fine instances of application of this concept.According to Clausewitz;
there were three reasons for ÒSuspension of ActionÓ in a war or a
battle. Firstly, ÒNaturally timidity and want of resolution in the human
mind, a kind of inertia in the moral world produced by dread of danger
and responsibilityÓ (Refers-On War-Clausewitz-edited by Rapport-
National Book Foundation-page.292); Secondly, ÒThe imperfection of
human perception and judgment, because a person hardly knows his
own position from one moment to another, and can conjecture only on
slight grounds that of the enemyÓ (Refers-ibid-page 292); Thirdly, the
ÒGreater strength of the defensive formÓ (Refers-ibid-page.292).Like
all other armies in the world 23 Division also at various times went into
a state of suspension of action. The foremost reason for this was the
third reason, ie, ÒGreater strength of the defenceÓ and this was true
for the various battles at Mandiala, Phagla and Point 994. The other
two reasons certainly played a role on 05 and 06 December and golden
opportunities were lost to inflict a crushing defeat on the Indians. In an
article published in Citadel issue I/91 titled ÒDo we lack
aggressivenessÓ The Battle of Chamb was cited as an instance; where
ÒThe momentum of attack dissipated after the General Officer
Commanding embraced ShahadatÓ (Refers-Citadel-issue I/91-
page.56). The question raised by this learned author was answered by
Clausewitz long ago when he identified suspension of action as an
important reality of war. The problem was common to all armies in the
world including the great Prussian army to which Clausewitz belonged.
But Clausewitz suggested an antidote to ÒNatural timidity and want of
resolutionÓ; it was ÒThe will of the commander ... by the spark in his
breast, by the light of his spirit, the spark of purpose, the light of hope,
must be kindled afresh in others ... whenever that influence ceases,
and his own spirit is no longer strong enough to revive the spirit of all
others ... the spirit of all others sink into the lower region of animal
nature, which shrink from danger and knows not shameÓ. (Refers
Clausewitz-On War-page.I45). There is no doubt that General Eftikhar
possessed tremendous personal courage both physical courage which
enabled himself to expose him-self to fire and thereby act as an
example for all under command; and moral courage which enabled him
to take sound operational decisions. His appearance at Mandiala while
11 Cavalry was engaged in a life and death struggle with the Indians
played a significant role in reducing the suspension of action or
inactivity period at Mandiala; similarly his landing at Chanair and
spurring of 2 Armoured Brigade to quickly cross the minefield (which
later on was proved to be a dummy minefield) played significant role
on the fateful 06 December when 2 Armoured Brigade was advancing
towards Chak Pandit. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb-Lt Colonel Saeed-
page 59).As regards the factor of imperfect human perception; here
too the 23 Division enjoyed tremendous advantage by virtue of having
the GeneralÕs penetrating perception; his penetrating coup de oeil
which enabled him to finally switch to the south on 06 December.In
short all armies suffer from the suspension of action paradox; however,
it can be countered by resolute leadership. The conclusion is simple; to
firstly recognise suspension of action as an important reality in military
training and secondly to select resolute commanders who can spur and
goad their formations in actual battle by leading from the front.
PERFORMANCE OF 23 DIVISION The 23 Division was the only formation
whose performance was appreciated even by the enemy. Thus the
following was the opinion of various Indians about the war performance
of 23 Division and General Eftikhar:-ÒMajor General Iftikhar Khan, the
Divisional Commander, showed skill and determination in carrying out
his misison.Ó(K.C Praval- Ò Indian Army after IndependenceÓ -
Page.496)ÒThe enemy commander showed commendable flexibility.
Having achieved surprise by using the northern approach, he switched
to the south when he found himself firmly checked at Mandiala
crossingsÓ(Ibid. page.499)ÒThe permanent loss of tactically and
economically valuable territory on the west bank of Munawar Tawi was
the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 warÓThe History of the
Indian Armoure Corps-1941-1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh
Sandhu-Page.488)In the Second World War one percent of the pilots of
the US Air Force were responsible for shooting down in air fights some
40% of enemy war planes. (Refers-The Professional Soldier-Moris
Janowitz-The Free Press of Glencoe-USA-1960-page-41). During the
decisive battle of Assaye the British Infantry Regiment 74th Foot did
bulk of the fighting and its casualties amounted to 501 whereas the
other European casualties of all other units were just 143. (Refers-
WellingtonÕs Campaigns in India Intelligence Branch Indian Army-
page-176). In 1857 the British casualties at the siege of Delhi
exceeded British casualties at all other battles in 1857 totalled by
some 200 additional casualties. (Refers-The Indian Mutiny-G.W. Forest-
Volume One-page-150 and 151) it is a fact of history that very often
bulk of the fighting is done by a qualitatively superior force; as we
have seen in the above mentioned instances. For 1971 war also strictly
keeping the facts in mind almost half of casualties sustained by the
army on the western front were borne by the valiant 23 Division. Thus
while the total army casualties on the western front were 4958 (Refers-
PakistanÕs Crisis in Leadership-earlier quoted-page.280) those of 23
Division alone were 2216 (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page-
87).On the other hand at times it has been stated that 23 Division
could not have captured Palllanwala since the Indians were too strong
east of Tawi. These are writers about whom Clausewitz warned us long
go when he said:- ÒNot to be led astray and intimidated by the danger
of which thirty years later people still wrote and spokeÓ. (On War-
earlier quoted-page.245). There is simply no doubt that 23 Division
could have captured Pallanwala on 07 or even 08 December had the 2
Armoured Brigade and 111Brigade been handled with resolution. The
Indian writer K.C. Praval admitted this fact when he said:-ÒIftikhar
Khan did not pursue 191 Brigade across the Munawwar Tawi straight
away. This gave Indian troops the time to strengthen their defences
and the enemy lost the chance of establishing itself east of Tawi.Ó
(Refers-Indian Army after Independence-page-498).It was not General
Eftikhar who paused but the Brigade Headquarters who were not led
by individuals like General Eftikhar who fought from the front.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENCE VERSUS OFFENSIVE PLANS The Indian
plan lacked integrity and this compromised their dispositions. Their
commanders were so obsessed with launching the offensive that they
disregarded their prime task of defence of Chamb till an attack was
launched. Glaring among these planning errors was disregard for the
security of the Mandiala Dewa approach, leaving of the large minefield
gap in Barsala Jhanda area.The Indian commanders assumption that
commencement of offensive in Chamb would by itself ensure the
defence of Akhnur Chamb sector was a highly erroneous assumption.
Thus the bulk of 10 Indian Division troops were not in their defences
when the Pakistani attack was launched since they were in
concentration areas preparing for the offensive. (Refers KC Praval-
page-495) PSYCHOLOGICAL DISLOCATION OF HIGHER COMMANDER It
was psychological dislocation of the Indian Commander which was the
crucial factor in the final analysis. In this regard an interview of a
senior Indian Staff Officer is highly thought-provoking:-ÒFascinating
indeed! you had almost done it. It was a matter of just touch and go.
We really did not know what happened to you after you took the spur
and did not pursue. We did not have much to stop you at all (Reference
to 13 AK attack). God alone knows where you would have stopped that
evening if only you had got going. Our situation was really badÓ.
(Refers: Opinion of Indian Col General Staff Colonel Rege immediately
after the war-quoted by Colonel Saeed-Battle of Chamb-page-85)The
Indians were simply psychologically dislocated. With no superiority in
troops, on the whole it was superior leadership of General Eftikhar
which was 23 DivisionÕs principal asset. It is absence or presence of
great leaders which is decisive in the final reckoning.When General
Eftikhar switched south following failure in the north the Indian
Commander was simply overwhelmed by complete surprise. The
brilliant manner in which Eftikhar shifted the entire Schwerpunkt of the
battle from north to south within one night has no parallel at least in
the history of Indo-Pak wars. Thus by 5th December once the Indians
were finally feeling secure; convinced that the situation had been
stabilised; the shocking report received on 6th December that a large
tank force was advancing at Barsala on 6th December was traumatic
at least for the Indian commander! A counterstroke which in the Indo-
Pak scenario may be compared to achievement of a Manstein or
Sharon.Later on elements started destroying talent in our army;
EftikharÕs achievements were down played and Shaukat Raza who
was hardly an independent historian writing what the officials in GHQ
wanted downplayed Chamb. It is shocking that he did not even
mention 13 AK attack or the criminal delay by 2 Armoured Brigade or
111 Brigade on 07 and 08 December. Today the civilians hardly know
Eftikhar and all the glory that Chamb was. Instead we are being
repeatedly told about soldiers who were warriors more known for
dexterity in handling CIA dollars of Afghan wars than guns. Logically
these men should not even have been mentioned after they met an
accidental end which ended their unsoldierly pursuits in August 1988
by divine design.The men who led us in 1971 were not as outwardly
wise with NDCs and AFWCs as todayÕs officiers; but they were a finer
lot. Inshallah the next war will prove to be the final audit of mediocrity
instilled in our army in the period 1977-88.

PAKISTANS CHARGE OF VERY HEAVY TANK BRIGADE

A.H AMIN

OCTOBER 1999

It is because of failures in pointing out such criminal

military blunders,one cannot forgive Shuja
Nawaz,author of Crossed Swords.

Agha
Second Lieutenant Yaqub Malik ,Troop Leader 13 Lancers , brother of
Brigadier Faruq Yaqub (11 Pavo Cavalry) and son of Lieut Colonel
Yaqub Malik (Pavo Cavalry) killed in action at Bara Pind
A very juniour troop leader of 13 Lancers Killed in action at Bara Pind

Captain Ejaz Alam of 13 Lancers (brother of Brig Z.A Khan,Vice

Admiral Shamoon Alam,General Shamim Alam,Lieutenant
Genera Javed Alam,Lt Col Feroz Alam,Group Captain Mushtaq
Alam,Group Captain Shuaib Alam ) killed in action at Bara Pind
A very juniour troop leader of 13 Lancers Killed in action at
Bara Pind

Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal a Punjabi Hindu from Sargodha

District who played a key role in saving Indian position at Bara
Pind.Killed in action and awarded PVC the highest military
Award of India

Major Alley Ahmad ,Tank Squadron of 31 Cavalry Killed in

action at Bara Pind

Lieutenant Zaheed Rashid Mirza of 31 Cavalry, tank troop

leader,killed in action at Bara Pind
Into the Valley of Death,

Rode the 600,

Theirs not to question why

Theirs but to do and Die

The Stench of burnt human flesh many

miles around

In those dark Rakhs (Forests ) of Shakar

Garh Bulge
A Story of the miserable Command Failure
of Pakistans 1 Corps led by Lieutenant
General Irshaad,8 Infantry Division led by
Major General Abdul Ali Malik and 8
Independent Armoured Brigade at Bara
Pind in 1971 War
Valuable human lives sent into certain
and pointless slaughter simply because of
poor leadership and planning

In the Memory of all who participated in

that bloody tank battle

Major Agha H Amin (Tank Corps-Pavo Cavalry)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

INDIAN SOLDIERS STANDING ONE OF PATTON TANKS OF 13

LANCERS IN THE BATTLE
THIS IS NOT SOMETHING COPY AND
PASTE BUT BASED ON ENTIRELY ORIGINAL
RESEARCH OF MAJOR A.H AMIN FROM
1983 TO 1999 AND ONE OF THE
CHAPTERS OF :--

"INDO PAK WARS-A STRATEGIC AND

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS-1947-71" BY
MAJOR A.H AMIN"

WHICH CAN BE FOUND IN MANY LEADING

MILITARY LIBRARIES OF THE WORLD.I
HAD CONSIDERED A WASTE OF TIME AND
VALUABLE EFFORT TO SEND IT TO ANY
PEDANTIC PAKISTANI LIBRARY OR
PAKISTANI MILITARY INSTITUTION,WHICH
ARE BASTIONS OF PEDANTRY AND
MYOPIC LEARNING

Battle of Barapind-Jarpal

16 Dec 1971

A.H Amin

September 1999
The Battle of Barapind or Jarpal, fought on the northern border of the
ShakarGarh Bulge, as the Pakistanis and Indians respectively call it,
was one of the most bloody and pointless battles of the 1971 war as
far as the Western Front was concerned. The battle has remained
shrouded in a number of myths and controversies with one unit
accusing another of cowardice and misreporting, further compounded
by the artillery accusing armour as an arm and armour in turn blaming
the infantry for all its tactical blunders!

Around the 1980s some gentlemen particularly in the armoured corps

rationalised the battle and the immense losses in men and material by
claiming that had the counterattack not been launched, the Indians
would have broken through and may have perhaps captured Zafarwal
or Pasrur. Another school of thought in the armoured corps heaped the
entire blame on the armoured brigade commander, while totally
denying that the Barapind-Jarpal fiasco had any connection with faulty
doctrine, organisational imbalances/deficiencies, battle procedure or
with the command echelons higher than brigade level! Many
rationalised the failure by insisting that the Indians enjoyed numerical
superiority and the losses suffered by the armoured brigade were
inevitable. Yet another school of thought, particularly in the armoured
corps alleged that the fiasco occurred because of misreporting of
enemy situation by an infantry battalion!We will briefly analyse the
battle and endeavour to arrive at conclusions which are realistic and
free from negative biases like inter arm rivalry, personal likes and
dislikes and a mistaken feeling of espirit de corps which propels many
to regard forthright analysis as against regimental loyalty or as
unpatriotic etc.

COMPARISON OF FORCES

Pakistan's I Corps (Lieutenant General Irshad Ahmad Khan) consisted

of three infantry divisions, an armoured division and an armoured
brigade. Two of its infantry divisions were deployed to defend the
entire area from Marala Headworks in the north till the Narowal area
where the Ravi river finally enters Pakistan.

8 Infantry Division (Major Abdul Ali Malik)1 comprising four infantry

brigades2 being responsible for defence of Shakargarh Bulge and 15
Division (Major General Abid Ali Zahid) for the defence of Sialkot.
8 Independent Armoured Brigade (Brigadier Syed Mohammad Ahmad)
comprising three tank regiments (13 Lancers, 27 Cavalry and 31
Cavalry), one self-propelled artillery regiment (15 Self- Propelled
Regiment or simply 15 SP)3 and a mechanised infantry battalion (29
Frontier Force or simply 29 FF) was to assist both 8 and 15 Division in
the defence of the Ravi-Chenab corridor by launching counterattacks
or occupying counter penetration positions.

6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division although theoretically

under command 1 Corps were essentially the Pakistan Army's strategic
reserve and were in concentration areas in general area Pasrur-Daska-
Gujranwala. These were to be employed only as a last resort and as a
matter of fact were not employed at all by the GHQ because of lack of
resolution!

India's I Corps comprised three infantry divisions (36, 39 and 54

Divisions), two armoured brigades (2 and 16 Independent Armoured
Brigades), two independent artillery brigades (31 and 41) less a
medium regiment and approximately two engineer brigades. The
Indian infantry divisions did not have any integral tank regiments.

The independent artillery brigades were equivalent to what the

Pakistanis called corps artillery, subdivided into two brigades for
greater flexibility, keeping in view the large frontage of the area of
operations. The infantry divisions however had their own respective
divisional artillery brigades. The Indians enjoyed a significant, although
not overwhelming superiority in infantry, having approximately 27
infantry battalions as against 8 Divisions 12 infantry battalions. I have
used the word significant because the 17 Division although never
employed by Pakistan was also available, at least potentially for use.

In armour the Indians enjoyed qualitative but not quantitative

superiority as was later fallaciously claimed by some in order to
rationalise the blunders committed by Pakistan's I Corps. They had six
tank regiments and two independent recce squadrons as against five
tank regiments and one independent squadron of 8 Division and 8
Independent Armoured Brigade and four tank regiments of 6 Armoured
Division4.

It may be noted that 6 Armoured Division was reinforced by 11 Cavalry

by the time the Barapind battle was fought and thus the total Pakistani
potential tank strength which could be employed against the Indian I
Corps (minus 15 Division, which was opposite Indian 15 Corps 26
Division) was nine tank regiments as against six Indian.

The Indian qualitative superiority in tanks was also not applicable as

far as Barapind-Jarpal battle was concerned.This was so because all the
T-54/T-55 Indian tanks were concentrated in its 2 Armoured Brigade
whose all three units were equipped with T series tanks, while the 16
Independent Armoured Brigade, which fought the Barapind Battle was
equipped with the same Centurions which the Indians had in 1965 as
against the same Pattons of Pakistan's 8 Armoured Brigade, which
Pakistan had in 1965 war.

The 6 Armoured Division was equipped with T-59 tanks which were at
par with the Indian T-54/T-55 tanks and far superior to Centurions.

AREA OF OPERATIONS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

The Shakargarh Bulge by virtue of its location parallel to the only

Indian road link to Kashmir for more than 54 miles was an area which
the Indians could not ignore. Any Pakistani thrust launched from the
bulge into Kashmir at any point along the entire 54 miles stretch from
Kathua to Jammu could enable the Pakistan Army to sever the road link
between India and Kashmir by advancing just five to fifteen miles
inside Indian territory!

This would have meant isolation of five infantry divisions; something

which could have affected the whole outcome of war! It was for this
reason that the Indians had selected the northwestern part of
Shakargarh Bulge to launch their main attack in 1965.Shakargarh was
not as vital for Pakistan as for India, being one of the few areas north
of Sutlej river where Pakistan could afford to trade space for time, at
worst and launch a major thrust inside Indian territory to force the
Indians to commit their reserves and even ease the pressure on the
East wing, at best. It was a potential springboard for launching a
significant thrust inside India, which had the ability to seriously limit
Indian Army's freedom of manoeuvre, provided there was a Moltke or
Manstein in the Pakistani GHQ! While having all the advantages of a
springboard for offensive operations, Shakargarh was a defender's
nightmare.
There were no serious water obstacles, unlike the areas south of Ravi
River, to restrict the freedom of manoeuvre of a force commanded by
an imaginative and resolute commander. The area was flat, firm and
free of the boggy patches found in plenty in the areas west of Pasrur or
south of the MRL canal and Ravi River.

The area was bisected by a large number of water courses and their
tributaries (see map) running in a general north east- south west
direction from Indian held Kashmir into Pakistan.These were non-
perennial and fordable with minor recce in winters. Fields of fire were
limited between 600 to 1200 yards due to clumps villages and sugar
cane crops and artificial plantations called 'Rakhs' or 'Reserve Forest'.
The Pakistanis had constructed a number of embankments (bunds) and
anti- tank ditches to restrict an attacker's freedom of manoeuvre.

These obstacles were further strengthened by construction of concrete

bunkers. In addition three lines of mines, each approximately 600 to
800 metres were laid before the commencement of the war.

OPPOSING PLANS

PAKISTANI PLAN: -

The Pakistani plan for employment of I Corps and defence of

Shakargarh was an essentially reactive rather than proactive plan. As
per Fazal Muqeem the Pakistani I Corps was tasked to eliminate the
Indian enclave (Dharm Enclave) on the Pakistani side of the River Ravi
in area Narowal on the south western border of the Shakargarh Bulge
and simulate offensive actions in order to draw enemy forces into the
Shakargarh area5.

The defence was based on two strong points organised around the
small towns of Shakargarh, Narowal and Zafarwal which were to be
held by 14 Para Brigade and 24 Brigade respectively6. It was
appreciated that the main Indian thrust would be launched in the area
between Degh Nala and Bein Nala. An ad hoc covering troops force
known as the 'Changez Force' under Brigadier Nisar (of Gadgor fame in
1965 war) consisting of two tank regiments (20 Lancers, the I Corps
Recce Regiment and 33 Cavalry ex 8 Division) and 13 Punjab were to
fight a delaying battle at each minefield belt between the two strong
points i.e. Zafarwal on the east bank of Degh Nala and Shakargarh on
the west bank of Bein Nala, 'with a view to causing maximum attrition
on enemy armour and infantry, thereby creating an opportunity for
effective counterattack by corps/division resources'7.

One tank regiment (20 Lancers having 35 Sherman, M-36-B-2 Tanks) of

this force was to delay the advancing enemy along the first minefield
while the second tank regiment (33 Cavalry having 41 Patton M-47/M-
48 Tanks)8 was to impose delay along the second minefield. 13 Punjab
the foot infantry unit with Changez Force was to provide infantry
support to the Changez Force. The road between Zafarwal and
Shakargarh was designated as line of no penetration and any enemy
thrust south of this line was to be eliminated by launching the corps
armoured reserve i.e. 8 Independent Armoured Brigade. The 8
Armoured Brigade was not tasked to do anything to wrest initiative
from the enemy and the 6 Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division
were also assigned no offensive roles and were in MODC role (Ministry
of Defence Constabulary)10.

INDIAN PLAN:-

The essence of Indian I Corps plan was to take offensive action and
advance into Shakargarh Bulge from the north and east with an
infantry division each spearheaded by an independent armoured
brigade, with a view to ensure, the security of the Pathankot Base and
also the corridor leading to Kashmir on which the 15 Indian Corps in
Kashmir depended11 while also ensuring that Pakistani reserves were
also committed in defence of Shakargarh Bulge and could not be used
in an offensive role.

The original Indian plan, keeping in view their comparative strength,

was extremely ambitious and envisaged the capture of Pasrur followed
by an advance to the MRL Canal12. This was revised following the
Pakistani build up against Poonch. 197113.The modified Indian plan
involved a two prong advance by 54 and 39 Infantry Divisions
supported by 16 and 2 Independent Armoured Brigades respectively
with 54 Division with 16 Independent Armoured Brigade under
command was to advance southwards in the area between Degh and
Karir Nala and capture Zafarwal-Dhamtal complex.

The 39 Division (with 72 Infantry Brigade consisting of four battalions

and 2 Independent Armoured Brigade) was to advance from the north
and capture Shakargarh.The 36 Infantry Division tasked to defend the
most critical Pathankot-Kathua-Gurdaspur area was to initially stay on
the defensive and to attack westwards towards Shakargarh in case the
operational situation warranted (ie after ensuring that no Pakistani
threat was imminent against Pathankot-Kathua-Gurdaspur complex).

The Indian plan was extremely conservative. There were nine infantry
brigades available to Lieutenant General K.K Singh (commander of 1
Armoured Brigade at Chawinda in 1965). He earmarked four of these
(168, 323, 87 and 18) along with six tank squadrons ( complete 14
Scinde Horse and 16 Light Cavalry) for guarding the critical areas of
the Indian border on both flanks against a likely Pakistani attack. These
troops were deployed west of Degh Nala (two infantry brigades and a
tank regiment less one squadron), opposite Nainakot (one infantry
brigade and one tank squadron) and in area Dinanagar-Pathankot (one
infantry brigade and one tank regiment). This left the Indian I Corps
with four infantry brigades and two armoured brigades less one tank
regiment each to advance inside Pakistani territory!

OPERATIONAL SITUATION FROM 4TH TO 16TH DECEMBER 1971

The Indians were as concerned about their security as the Pakistanis

but superiority in infantry enabled them to assume an offensive
role.Their relatively limited armoured resources vis-a-vis the total
available Pakistani armour in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor however
ensured that although Pakistani territory all along the eastern and
northern boundary of Shakargarh Bulge was captured, no major
strategic gain was made.

The Indian because of the minefields and because of the skill with
which Brigadier Nisar handled Changez Force was slow. Soon after the
commencement of operations once they realised that no Pakistani
threat was likely against Pathankot-Kathua or Samba the 36 Division
was also given an offensive task on 8th December, to advance against
Shakargarh from the east with an infantry brigade and a tank
regiment. 39 Infantry Divisions rate of advance was extremely slow
and on 12 December its only two advancing brigades i.e. 72 Brigade
and the 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (less one tank regiment)
were placed under command 54 Division (72 Brigade and one tank
regiment) and 36 Division (2 Armoured Brigade and less two tank
regiments). In addition 87 Brigade and one tank squadron of 39
Division which were in defensive role opposite Nainakot were also
placed under command 36 Division and assigned an offensive role of
advancing against Shakargarh along with 36 Divisions other brigades.
39 Infantry Division Headquarters was shifted to Samba area and
made responsible for commanding the three infantry brigades and one
tank regiment less one squadron in holding role in 'X Sector' on the
right flank of the 1 Corps between Degh and Aik Nala.The 54 Infantry
Division and 16 Armoured Brigade with whom we are primarily
concerned as far as the analysis of the 'Battle of Barapind-Jarpal' is
concerned advanced cautiously and slowly but enough to unnerve the
Pakistan Army's Chief of Staff General Hameed who despatched one of
the infantry brigades (124 Brigade) of the reserve division 33 Division
to I Corps on 9th December 1971 and alerting 11 Cavalry till then in
Chamb for move to Shakargarh on 10th December14.

The Pakistani defences opposite 54 Division followed an inverted 'L

Shaped' alignment with a horizontal alignment along 'Sakror Bund', an
anti-tank ditch and embankment which ran all the way between Degh
and Basantar Nala and a vertical alignment along the west bank of
Basantar Nala from a point a little north of Lalial village where the
Sakror Bund joined the Basantar Nala, running in a north-south
direction from this point.
54 Indian Division advanced two brigades up both supported by tanks
from 16 Armoured Brigade with 47 Brigade on the right and 91 Brigade
on the left while the third brigade ie 74 Brigade in reserve. 47 Brigade
was assigned the mission of contacting Basantar Nala opposite general
area Lagwal-Jarpal and establishing a bridgehead on the west bank of
Basantar Nala through which 74 Brigade was to breakout towards
Zafarwal.

91 Brigade was to move on the east flank of 54 Division. By 15th

December the 47 Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) closed
with Basantar Nala opposite Lagwal and made a successful assault
across the minefield laid in the bed of Basantar Nala on night 15/16
December15. A tough infantry fight took place and one of Indian
infantry battalion commanders was killed during this operation16.

FORMATION OF BRIDGE HEAD BY INDIAN INFANTRY ACROSS

BASANTAR

CLICK ON TOP TO ENLARGE

The 47 Indian Infantry Brigade was tasked to establish a bridgehead in
general area Sikandarpur-Lalial-Barapind17. It captured Siraj Chak and
Laleal Forest at 8.30 p.m and Jarpal at 11.30 p.m18. Stiff fighting took
place at Jarpal; and Major Hoshiar Singh a hardy Sikh Jat from Sisana in
Hissar district was awarded a Param Vir Chakra; India's highest
gallantry award18a.

The Indian infantry reported at 2.00 p.m. that they were being
attacked by Pakistani tanks and sent an SOS for tank support.This
forced Indian 47 Brigade Commander to ask 17 Poona Horse to move
into the bridgehead at once. As per the Indian armoured corps
historian, the situation was so desperate that one squadron of Poona
Horse was rushed across part of the minefield even though a lane had
not been cleared18b.

A firefight followed and Indians claim that they destroyed a Pakistani

Sherman despite having no night firing capability!The forward extent
of the bridgehead was east of the Lalial Reserve Forest and this forced
the Poona Horse tanks to cross the forest at night and establish
themselves on its western edge, so as to be able to effectively engage
any counter attack force the next morning.

The Lalial Reserve Forest was thus cleared by a night assault launched
by 'C' Squadron 17 Poona Horse immediately followed by an APC
mounted company of 18 Rajput. The CO of 17 Horse also joined C
Squadron along with RHQ Troop. The rest of the regiment followed and
by first light the whole 17 Poona Horse was deployed; 'C' Squadron
opposite Lalial village and to the south of it on the forward edge of the
forest, 'B' Squadron less two troops south of 'C' Squadron opposite
Ghazipur and 'A' Squadron in reserve in area Siraj Chak a village east
of Ghazipur on the eastern side of the reserve forest.

Two tank troops of 'B' Squadron were deployed in Jarpal area in the
defences of 3 Grenadiers. 16 Madras which was the right forward
battalion in the assault was deployed in line with the tanks in the
north, in area Lalial-Ghazipur, 6 Madras which was in reserve in the
assault phase was also brought forward and deployed in the middle
and 3 Grenadiers which had played a major role in the initial assault as
the right forward battalion in Jarpal and east of Barapind. It is
significant to note that the Indians were all praise for the Pakistani
infantry defending Jarpal; unlike the Pakistani infantry on the north i.e.
opposite 6 and 16 Madras18c.

THE 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE COUNTER ATTACK ON BARAPIND

JARPAL -16 DECEMBER 1971

It appears that Headquarters 1 Corps did not seriously appreciate the

gravity of 54 Indian Division's advance towards Zafarwal. 8 Armoured
Brigade was concentrated in general area Qila Sobha Singh-Pasrur
from 11th December onwards. On 15th December the brigade was told
to be prepared for ' a brigade attack east of Bein Nala to recapture lost
territory up to River Ravi'!19 It may be noted that no effort was made
to impose caution on the advancing enemy who leisurely breached all
three minefields from 5 to 15 December maintaining a rate of mile on
an average one and a quarter mile per day.

This was not because of paucity of reserves, but paucity of resolution

and decisiveness in the 1 Corps Headquarters or in the GHQ to spur 1
Corps! General Fazal Muqeem very accurately described 1 Corps
conduct of the defensive battle as 'passive defence of 1 Corps' 20.8
Armoured Brigade was preparing for the grand counter attack that it
was supposed to launch east of Bein Nala to recover all lost territory up
to River Ravi which it was supposed to launch in Nainakot area when it
was suddenly informed at 0430 hours 16th December by the infantry
formation in defence that the enemy had breached the minefield on
Basantar Nala at Lagwal21.

At 0515 hours the armoured brigade headquarters issued a warning

order assessing an enemy tank squadron and an infantry battalion
which had crossed the Basantar Nala and was established in area Lalial
Forest and was being 'contained by own infantry and an independent
squadron'22. On the other hand the infantry brigade commander of the
area i.e. Brigadier Sher Ali Baz (24 Brigade) assessed the enemy in
Jarpal as one tank troop and one infantry company!23

Lieutenant General Irshad the 1 Corps Commander ordered 8

Independent Brigade Commander to 'Restore the situation with
minimum force'24.8 Armoured Brigade Commander earmarked 13
Lancers one of its three tank regiments to deal with the situation and
gave the following instructions/orders:-'Approximately squadron of
tanks and infantry battalion in village Siraj Chak area on the west bank
of Basantar.

This penetration has been contained by own infantry/tanks...and

directed 13 Lancers to establish a counter penetration position25 in
area Pindi Channian west of village Jarpal immediately 26'13 Lancers
along with other 8 Brigade units was located a little south of Zafarwal.
It concentrated in Jabal-Mehla area by 0745 hours along with its
affiliated armoured infantry company. 'A' Squadron which was
earmarked for the 'Counter Penetration' task was briefed by the CO 13
Lancers and crossed road Zafarwal-Shakargarh at 0800 hours. While
on the move it was ordered on wireless by the CO to move towards
area Sikandarpur and destroy a few enemy tanks which were breaking
out from area Lalial. (It may be noted, that this must have been a false
alarm, since no Indian account mentions any such offensive movement
at eightish in the morning).

This modification in plan resulted based on new orders from 8

Armoured Brigade Commander who had received these from 24
Infantry Brigade Commander. The brigade commander had asked CO
13 Lancers to 'send a squadron to contain enemy penetration' but the
CO decided to 'attack north and destroy enemy tanks'27. 'A' Squadron
moved to Sikandarpur and was fired at by enemy tanks/anti-tank guns
from Ghazipur village.

The squadron formed up and attacked losing in the process 8 tanks

and two officers killed and wounded. The remaining six tanks withdrew
and deployed along with Pakistani infantry holding defences at Sakror
Bund. Meanwhile at 0830 hours while 'A' Squadron was moving
towards Ghazipur CO 13 Lancers, entirely on his own judgement, also
ordered 'C' Squadron to take a 'Counter Penetration Position' in Pindi
Chanian area and while 'C' Squadron was preparing to do so changed
his orders, ordering both 'B' and 'C' Squadrons to 'proceed to Barapind
and attack six to seven enemy tanks and infantry company in Jarpal
area'28.All that followed was disastrous and both the squadrons were
engaged by heavy enemy anti-tank and artillery fire, losing twenty
tanks and in the process, three officers killed and two officers
wounded.

MAJOR HOSHIAR SINGH CHEEMA A JAT FROM SISSANA IN

HISSAR DISTRICT OF HARIANA FIRED WITH AN ANTI TANK GUN
HITTING SOME TANKS AND LIVED TO WIN A PVC , A UNIQUE
HONOUR,NORMALLY AWARDED POSTHOMOUSLY

ATTACK BY A SQUADRON 13 LANCERS-CLICK ON TOP TO

ENLARGE

CONCEIVED AND DRAWN BY A.H AMIN

It was during this action that Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal a
Punjabi Hindu from Sargodha exhibited extreme valour and saved the
Indian position as per the Indian Armoured Corps historian; an action
which was acknowledged by grant of a posthumous Param Vir Chakra;
India's highest gallantry award. 13 Lancers claims that the enemy fell
back from Barapind29
MAJOR HOSHIAR SINGH CHEEMA

(which was of no consequence to both Indians and Pakistanis in any

case) while the Indians claim that they had never occupied Barapind30
(again of no consequence even if they had done so).We will briefly
discuss the Indian position during this whole affair.
ATTACK BY B AND C SQUADRONS OF 13 LANCERS-CLICK TO ENLARGE-
ORIGINAL A.H AMIN CREATION

The Indians were holding the bridgehead as we earlier discussed with

two tank squadrons with a third in reserve (it has been erroneously
claimed that there were two or three Indian tank regiments defending
the bridgehead); 'C' Squadron Poona Horse on the right holding area
Lalial and south , 'B' Squadron less two troops holding area Ghazipur
and south and two troops of 'B' Squadron beefing up the defences of 3
Grenadier Battalion in village Jarpal. It was essentially 'C' Squadron
Poona Horse which faced 'A' Squadron 13 Lancers and 'B' Squadron
Poona Horse which faced 'B' and 'C' Squadrons of 13 Lancers.

Once 13 Lancers brought in its two remaining squadrons the Indians

reinforced Jarpal with half squadron of its 'A' Squadron which was in
reserve in Siraj Chak area. Once 31 Cavalry attacked the Indians
brought the remaining tanks of 'A' Squadron in Jarpal area.By 1200
hours 13 Lancers which was praised by the Indians for its tremendous
valour, keeping aside all the foolhardiness of their modus operandi,31
was written off from the order of battle of the 8 Armoured Brigade!

The issue now was no longer containment since the Indians were also
considerably shaken, having suffered a large number of tank and
infantry casualties in the process. Such was the elan and dash of this
attack that the Indian armoured corps historian admitted that 'the only
occasion that a breakthrough could have occurred was when two
squadrons of 13 Lancers (following Major Nasir's exhortation described
in the previous sentence) attacked together in the afternoon, but a
gallant last-ditch stand by three tanks of the Poona Horse averted the
danger' But the Indian historian went further and instead of making
ridiculous claims that the Indians were more martial frankly admitted
that the Pakistani failure had a direct connection with incompetent
leadership. Gurcharan Singh thus said: 'Pakistani armour suffered
casualties because of bad use of ground and tactical ineptness'31a.

8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters now ordered its second tank

regiment 31 Cavalry to attack the Indian bridgehead from the direction
of Marara Wazirpur in the gap between the place where 'C' and 'B'
Squadrons 13 Lancers had attacked. The Indians admitted that the
attack of 31 Cavalry was more methodical and deliberate32 than 13
Lancers, with the regiment attacking as an entity; two squadrons
providing static fire support and one assaulting.

The deliberate manner in which the attack was launched could not
compensate for the nominal artillery support and the frontal approach
and the attacking squadron of 31 Cavalry was beaten back with a loss
of ten out of fourteen tanks destroyed and a squadron commander and
another officer killed. 31 Cavalry now did what 8 Armoured Brigade
may have done at 8 O' Clock in the morning; ie it went into a counter
penetration position around Marara Wazirpur at about 1400 hours.33
AFTER 13 LANCERS FAILED , 31 CAVALRY REGIMENT WAS
LAUNCHED TO ATTACK THE INDIAN BRIDGE HEAD-CLICK TO
ENLARGE

It was after this second attack of 31 Cavalry that the Indians reinforced
the bridgehead with approximately 12 tanks from Brigade
headquarters, and half squadron 4 Hodsons Horse. The situation now
was well in control with 27 Cavalry and 35 FF of 124 Brigade in reserve
and the Indian threat (that is if there was any despite Pakistani
numerical tank superiority of three to one or three to two in Barapind-
Jarpal area) was removed.
Remnants of 'A' Squadron 13 Lancers remaining tanks were in counter
penetration position opposite Ghazipur, 'B' and 'C' Squadrons in
counter penetration position opposite Barapind and Jarpal and 31
Cavalry in the middle.On night 16/17 December the 8 Brigade and 24
Brigade commander decided to attack the bridgehead which had been
most disastrously contained with the third tank regiment 27 Cavalry
and 35 FF, both of which were to attack and capture Jarpal (another
mud village of no tactical consequence).

The infantry battalion was delayed and the armoured brigade

commander called off the planned attack34 which was originally
scheduled to be launched at 0430 hours 17 December35. The infantry
brigade commander who according to many officers of the 24 Brigade
rarely left his headquarters however insisted that 35 FF, a newly raised
but highly integrated and motivated foot infantry unit to launch a
daylight attack without tank support on a bridgehead which two tank
regiments had failed to dent !

Due to some phenomenal command blunder artillery fire support was

not coordinated and 35 FF attacked without artillery fire support36 at
0530 hours. The commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja
led the senseless attack and it is best to quote the Indians who were all
praise for the gallantry of this indomitable battalion and were shocked
at the senselessness of the whole affair; 'At dawn 39th FF launched its
attack for the recapture of Jarpal. The attack was doomed to failure

Launched in broad daylight as it was over open ground in full view of

one tank squadron plus and one infantry battalion and covered by their
combined weapons. Tanks and artillery opened fire when the
Pakistanis emerged from cover from their forming up place.It was a
foolhardy venture,the attackers were literally massacred but they
persisted in their attempt to close until the few remnants fell only
about 50 metres from tanks of 4 Hodsons Horse. At about that time the
news of Pakistani acceptance of ceasefire was received. The whole of
this gallant battalion was sacrificed to no purpose...ceasefire became
effective at 8.00 p.m. and guns fell silent on both sides.The next day
80 dead bodies of the 39th Frontier Force including their commanding
officer, second in commands and adjutants were handed over to the
Pakistanis'37'Hail Indomitable Heroes Hail! Despite of all your Generals
and Brigadiers ye prevailed! The Indians rightly awarded two of their
highest gallantry awards to their soldiers, but nothing beyond an SJ
was granted to the brave men who died at Barapind-Jarpal! The Indians
even awarded their highest award to Major Hoshiar Singh Cheema who
survived the battle but many equally brave soldiers of 13 Lancers, 31
Cavalry or 35 FF were not considered worthy of being awarded a
Nishan-i-Haidar. Perhaps there is something seriously wrong with the
whole system of the award of gallantry in our army?

What is the basis;is it that an officer has won the Sword of Honour or is
from an old regiment, or that his citation was written well, or that he
was liked by his brigade or divisional commander before the war?Fazal-
i-Muqeem well summed up at least 8 Division's performance when he
said: 'The few counter attacks, which 8 Division tried during the war
were most noticeable by their lack of planning. The units were hurled
into battle without having been given enough time for planning and
preparations'.38

ANALYSIS

Impact of Experiences of 1965 War on the Principal Decision Makers'

Minds.

Most analysis of Barapind-Jarpal are unfortunately superficial because

they concentrate on the superficial aspects of the whole affair. The
principal reason for the failure at Barapind was neither the artillery
factor, nor the assessment of situation, nor incompetence of the
armoured brigade commander but something much deeper. This was
the deep impact of experiences of 1965 war on the principal decision
makers' mind.

First of all we will discuss Brigadier Ahmad the commander of 8

Armoured Brigade. Brigadier Ahmad, had distinguished himself as a
squadron commander at Gadgor in 1965 war a few miles west of Degh
Nala and had played a major role in the failure of the Indian 1st
Armoured Division's failure to achieve a major breakthrough on 8th
September. It appears that this experience at Gadgor shaped many of
his actions in 1971.

The Battle of Gadgor was a peculiar battle in which Pakistan's 25

Cavalry had clashed with two tank regiments of the Indian Army, with
both units on the march and with both deploying in a line formation in
a most impromptu manner without knowing the strength or
composition of the enemy in front. The Indians had the potential to
outflank 25 Cavalry by virtue of having nine tank squadrons against
three of 25 Cavalry but failed because their armoured brigade
commander (who ironically commanded 1 Indian Corps in 1971) was
unnerved due to reports of a false alarm on his flank.

The action at Gadgor was a glorious feat as far as 25 Cavalry and then
Major Ahmad were concerned. But it was one of those unique incidents
which rarely occur in military history!Both sides did not know, who was
opposing them; 25 Cavalry having no clue that they were opposing the
whole Indian armoured division and the Indian 1st Armoured Division
thinking that they were opposed by an armoured brigade!

Artillery was of no consequence in this action since both sides clashed

by accident and artillery fire made a limited impact on the battle! At
this time there were no armoured brigades in Pakistan 6 Armoured
Division and the Battle of Chawinda was fought as a largely ad hoc
battle with divisional headquarters directly telling units what to do. It
appears that Gadgor experience influenced both Brigadier Ahmad and
GOC 8 Division who at that time was commanding 24 Infantry Brigade
at Gadgor. Later on artillery played a pivotal role in defeating
deliberate Indian assaults opposite Chawinda from 12th to 21
September 1965.
However these were downplayed because of the inter arm rivalry and
Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Choudhry the architect of artillery plan at
Chawinda was sidelined and retired as a brigadier despite having had a
brilliant career.

Post 1965 propaganda in Pakistan painted the Battle of Chawinda as a

triumph of armour and infantry; hardly ever admitting that artillery
played any role in it! This was due to the British inherited legacy in
which artillery was despised as an arm by infantry and armour officers!
Now we will discuss 13 Lancers.

The experiences of this unit in 1965 war played a major role in

conditioning its attitude in 1971. In 1971 this unit was launched in
Chamb against an Indian Squadron equipped with AMX-13 tanks which
had no potential to oppose the six to one tank superiority concentrated
against them by Pakistan in Chamb during Operation Grand Slam.

Even technically AMX-13 was a matchbox with extremely thin armour

as compared to the Patton/Sherman tanks employed by Pakistan
against it. 13 Lancers was conditioned by the Grand Slam experience
when it was opposed by an enemy which was outnumbered, as well as
surprised. This experience conditioned their behaviour in 1971 and
they had faith in the tank charge which had succeeded in Grand Slam
in front of AMX-13 but had no chance of success in front of Centurions
of a tank regiment as illustrious as 13 Lancers!

DOCTRINAL AND OTHER TACTICAL FAILURES

The conduct of the two tank regiments clearly point towards doctrinal
procedural and tactical failures particular to the armoured
corps.Brigadier Jahangir Karamat (later General) who was from 13
Lancers categorically said that the armoured briagde commander
asked both 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry to attack as soon as possible
implying that there was no need to cut short the batle procedure and
there was no need to panic;but both the units and specially 13 Lancers
cut through various parts of the battle procedure like liaision with
infantry,preliminary recce etc leading to the phenomenal tank losses
that it later suffered.Even the method of attack of both units was
different;which proved that even at brigade level;tactical thinking was
whimsical and differed from unit to unit;even in important things like
basic drills of operations

CRUX OF THE WHOLE ISSUE

There is one fact which is missed in most analysis’s of the Battle of

Barapind and most other tank battles of Indo-Pak war.This refers to
handling of units above regiment level.There is one striking parallel
between Battle of Gadgor fought in 1965 where 25 Cavalry checked
the 1st Indian Armoured Briagde(ie 1st Indian Armoured Div) and in
Barapind where 16 Light Cavalry stopped the whole 8 Armoured
Brigade.

The fact that stands out is that handling of unit till regiment level was
good in defence while handling of units beyond brigade level was
extremely poor and especially in offensive operations! Even the
Pakistani 6 Armoured Division which did well in Chawinda fought an
essentially defensive battle.

In Gadgor, 25 Cavalry did extremely well as a unit but the Indians

failed miserably as a brigade at Gadgor;despite a four to one
superiority; and the same happened at Barapind.The conclusion is that
both the armies failed to function as dynamic entities beyond
regimental level!The troops and the young leaders till squadron were
equally brave and leaders beyond unit level almost equally weak in
handling more than one unit!

Even in Khem Karan Pakistani armour succeded till unit level but failed
misearbly beyond in attack; which is a far more difficult operation to
coordinate, execute and synchronise than attack. Thus Khem Karan
was triumph of 6 Lancers and failure of 4 and 5 Armoured Brigades in
attack!The same tendency was present at the Corps level, althoughn
the Indians improved over it since they had the system of corps in
vogue earlier than Pakistan Army.
They learnt it from 1965 when their 1 Corps had miserably failed to
function as a Corps. Even in Shakargarh the Indians failed to
concentrate more than one armoured regiment at any one place at a
particular time. The Battle of Barapind was the triumph of one unit
over a brigade in defence but proved that the Gadgor experience;ie
inability of both armour commanders to handle more than one tank
regiment was valid even in 1971!

The only man in the subcontinent who came close to succesful

handling of more than one tank regiment in offence was an
infantry general (like Rommel) ie General Eftikhar who despite
near parity successfully handled an armoured force of more
than two tank regiments. A small feat in western military
terms but a big one in the Indo-Pak military scenario. Praval
the Indian writer hit the nail on the head when he observed
that in Shakargarh bulge the Indians failed to concentrate at
any one time more than one tank regiment and that at no time
was more than one tank regiment in action, or in contact with
the enemy.

EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES

Clausewitz clearly and repeatedly stated many times in his book 'On
War' that a strategic reserve that had no bearing on the decisive battle
was a negation of the whole idea of having a strategic reserve. Thus
what was the use of 6 Armoured Division or 17 Division when they did
nothing and had no bearing on the whole battle of Shakargarh!

There is some truth in Iqbal's verse 'Man never suffers defeat, without
perishing he goes into retreat

ROLE OF HEADQUARTER 1 CORPS

The only role of 1 Corps Headquarters was handling of Corps reserves

but commander 1 Corps abdicated from this responsibility taking no
interest in what 8 Armoured Brigade did or what it was supposed to do.
1 Corps Headquarters was as a matter of fact overtaken by the friction
of war. The gears of whole higher command mechanism of 1 Corps
were jammed and Commander 1 Corps did not have the powerful iron
will to overcome this friction, nor did he have the coup d oeil or
operational vision to supply the much needed oil to lubricate the gears
of 1 Corps operational ability.
1 Corps possessed numerical superiority over the Indians in armour,
the arm of decision and had the potential to make the Indians react to
its moves rather than reacting to their moves. As Fazal Muqeem rightly
described 1 Corps assumed a passive role and merely kept reacting
instead of seizing the initiative; which was well within its capability;
keeping in view the relative superiority in tanks. So disgusted were the
officers with the army high command, that the revolt which finally
resulted in the exit of Yahya Khan started from 6 Armoured Division,
which was not utilised at all throughout the war.

1 Corps Headquarters was vacillating and indecisive, unable to even

assess as to which was the most dangerous enemy threat, and till 15
December was thinking of employing 8 Armoured Brigade for a raid at
Nainakot, more than 20 miles east of Barapind!1 Corps Headquarters
was also directly responsible for keeping the artillery out of the
planning of operations.

Shaukat Riza the official historian of Pakistan Army noted this anti-
artillery bias of Headquarters 1 Corps in the following words: 'When
Headquarters 1 Corps was established in Gujranwala, its artillery
component was driven out nine miles away to Nadipur.

Even for the capture of Dharam Enclave Headquarters Artillery I Corps

was kept out of picture'39. Instead of ensuring that artillery, armour
and all arms worked as a team, Commander 1 Corps established a
precedence which aimed at increasing the inter arm rivalry which both
Pakistan and Indian Armies had inherited from the British (but which
had been reduced in Indian Army, by virtue of having an artillery C in C
etc).

Thus when commander 8 Armoured Brigade made his counterattack

plans he did not consult the corps artillery Commander or any other
infantry divisional artillery commander at all.40

ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION

Barapind-Jarpal was essentially a failure in assessing a situation

correctly. There was no doubt from 5 December onwards that the
principal threat to Pakistani 1 Corps was from the 54 Division which
although very slowly was surely advancing towards Zafarwal-Pasrur
complex, possession of which was vital for anyone who wanted to hold
the initiative in Shakargarh Bulge. 1 Corps Headquarters failed to
assess this simple fact and did not function at all as an operational
headquarters except as a post office processing requests for
reinforcements.

The crossing of Basantar should not have come as a surprise at all on

the morning of 16 December, but it appeared that the corps
headquarters was not prepared for this eventuality. Instead the
situations assessment was relegated to the holding infantry battalion
and the infantry brigade commander made no serious attempt to keep
a close liaison with either the armoured brigade headquarters.

Even as late as the morning of 16 December he insisted that enemy

strength across Basantar was no more than a tank troop and an
infantry company. The armoured brigade commander also made no
independent effort to confirm or disregard the assessment of the
infantry commander and assumed that a tank regiment could deal with
the situation without utilising divisional or corps artillery's fire support.

The CO of 13 Lancers who should have been the most concerned

person made no effort to assess the situation and was confident that
one tank squadron could deal with the enemy! The engagement that
followed was impromptu and 13 Lancers, was committed as a unit of
sheer reflex action while conducting fire fights with individual Indian
tanks.

ROLE OF 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE HEADQUARTER VIS-A-VIS ITS UNITS

8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters' failed in three counts; i.e. was the

assessment of the situation, ability to employ the tank resources
correctly and in incorporating artillery to support its offensive
operations. The headquarters was formed in 1970 and the concept of
an independent brigade fighting in the environment of a corps was new
at least as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned.

The operational situation in 1971, was far more complex than the one
in 1965 when the 6 Armoured Division was fighting a battle on a
twelve mile frontage with an enemy which was only attacking it
frontally. In 1971 1 Corps was dealing with an operational situation in
which Shakargarh Bulge was being attacked from three distinct
directions over a frontage which was more than 60 miles wide with no
clear cut operational plan to counter it. 8 Armoured Brigade had
worked on about 25 contingencies and operated in an environment in
which its corps headquarters was already paralysed by indecision and
vacillation.Later on it became fashionable to criticise Brigadier Ahmad
and to state that it was a failure of one man. Brigadier Ahmad was one
of the finest officers of the armoured corps and was therefore placed in
an independent command. The failure of 8 Armoured Brigade was not
failure of one individual but that of the whole Pakistan Armoured
Corps! The blunders were committed at all levels and 13 Lancers lost
most of its tanks, not because of Brigadier Ahmad but because of the
erratic attitude of its CO who on his own decided to reap some glory by
ordering an attack when he had been ordered by his brigade
commander to go into counter penetration position. 8 Armoured
Brigade Headquarter's major failure was in failure to utilise artillery;
but we must remember that at that time and to some extent till even
now at least in armoured corps, artillery was despised as an arm, and
any other man in Ahmad's place would have acted no differently41.

It appears that 8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters was unnerved once

13 Lancers was decimated and ordered 31 Cavalry to attack at once
without realising that the one tank regiment attacking at the same
place where another had just failed was against all tactical principles!
It is possible that Brigadier Ahmad was forced to bring in 31 Cavalry
since the high losses of 13 Lancers had created a grave situation which
could be remedied only by bringing in another tank regiment, to deter
the Indians from exploiting their tremendous success against 13
Lancers. Even the contrast between 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry's
conduct was glaring. 31 Cavalry despite being a new unit conducted its
attack in a far more deliberate manner than 13 Lancers; something
which was noticed; as we have already discussed even by the Indian
armoured corps historian.

The unnecessary losses that 13 Lancers suffered were entirely

avoidable had its CO followed the instructions he had received and
went for a counter penetration position. The Indians fought well, but
they did so out of sheer desperation!It is ironic that while armour was
singled out as an arm for the Barapind failure,the disease which had
led to it was not diagnosed.It was a disease born in the Ayub-Musa era
and had a deep connection with the British military legacy afflicting the
whole army.

Brigadier Ahmad was not promoted after the war, but this had less to
do with Barapind and more with personal likes and dislikes! GOC 8
Division whose conduct as we have discussed was complimented by
Fazal Muqeem was promoted! Another Brigadier who did not have the
moral courage to join his brigade in Chamb and evaded active service
on the pretext of martial law duty, was promoted and became a full
general!

GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION

The failure at Barapind was later rationalised by saying that the Indian
threat was grave and that the blunders committed were a natural
result of the confusion caused because of the gravity of the threat! We
will examine this extremely fallacious assertion in brief. The principal
decision makers as we have seen assessed that the enemy in front was
a troop of tanks or a squadron and thought in a most cavalier manner
that it could be swept aside by just sending a tank regiment without
any deliberate corps artillery support!

The corps commander specifically used the words restore the situation
by use of minimum force, thus implying that the threat was not as
grave as to merit the employment of maximum force!Even keeping in
view the relative strength the Indians were not capable of achieving
much. What did they have; a tank regiment and two Madras and one
Grenadier battalions against three Pakistani tank regiments and one
infantry brigade immediately available and one tank division and
infantry division within 20 miles of the bridgehead! And if the threat
was so grave, how was it that 1 Corps realised its gravity only at 0430
hours on 16 December.Two factors stand out in the whole affair. One
was a vacillating and highly indecisive corps headquarters which had
no clear grasp of the operational situation and viewed things in view of
straight geometrical lines like a drill sergeant major!

There was no cause for concern and 8 Armoured Brigade was leisurely
being told to raid Nainakot till 15 December and suddenly the situation
became grave when the enemy crossed the line of no penetration.
What was the rationale in not accepting the gravity of threat from 5
December onwards and resorting to countermeasures to wrest the
initiative from the enemy, when it was evident that the intention of this
particular enemy division was to capture Zafarwal and to cross the so
called line of no penetration!

The second factor which stands out is that 8 Division Commander, 24

Brigade Commander and perhaps the armoured brigade commander
wanted to achieve a local victory which they suddenly realised was
much required keeping in view the drain on the morale of own troops
due to the constant withdrawal through the various layers of minefields
since 05 December.

If this was the motivation then the modus operandi in which it was
aimed at was extremely costly! The thirst for glory and honour are
perfectly reasonable and honourable aspirations provided they are
matched by equal willingness to share risks of battle and are
accompanied by strength of intellect and ability and the resolution to
execute a viable plan.

These were sadly missing in all headquarters from brigade and

onwards!It appears that the prime motivation in all the principal
decision makers mind at both brigade and regimental level in 8
Armoured Brigade was ''thirst for glory'' which they thought was
cheaply purchasable by launching a squadron or two at a force
estimated at six or seven tanks or a squadron at the most; not a grave
threat, and something that could be dealt with by utilising, just one
third of 8 Armoured Brigade's tank strength!

It was only after 16 December when the outcome turned out to be

disastrous; was a myth created that 8 Armoured Brigade despite
suffering colossal losses had saved Shakargarh Bulge or Zafarwal! That
the enemy in front was a tank brigade or two tank regiments; and
certainly not a single tank regiment; which unfortunately was the
actual case! Injustice to the brigade commander it must be admitted
that he had asked 13 Lancers to contain the enemy by fire; but CO 13
Lancers on his own overzealous attitude decided to attack! Had he
died like Akram Raja of 35 FF the trauma may have been much less!

At Chawinda just six years earlier the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division

with a lesser strength in infantry but parity in tanks had stopped the
whole Indian 1st Armoured Division aided by two infantry divisions
from breaking out!

Here at Chawinda; the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division had stopped the

Indians not by charging without artillery support; but by making
optimum use of tanks containing the Indians by fire and defeating
Indian infantry attacks by artillery fire. At Barapind what was the
gravity in containing an Indian infantry brigade with one tank regiment
with three tank regiments and one foot infantry and one mechanised
infantry battalion by fire as was done six years earlier with exactly the
same Patton tanks in defence and the same Indian Centurion tanks
seeking to breakthrough!!!!

Since I joined the armoured corps in 1981 I heard thousands of time

that despite losses 8 Armoured Brigade had done a wonderful job! The
fact remains that the only people who did a wonderful job despite all
the tactical ineptness at regiment and above were the officers and
men of 13 Lancers; men like Major Nasir41a who were praised by the
Indians, or 35 FF who assaulted in face of certain destruction!
EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARMOUR

The battle of Bara Pind was not only a failure of Brigade and Corps
level but also a failure at tactical level. It is unfortunate that while the
armoured brigade commander was criticised, the fact that execution at
regimental level played as much a part in failure as the higher
headquarters was ignored.The battle even without sufficient artillery
support was not as potentially disastrous as made by the piecemeal
and cavalier manner in which 13 Lancers was handled in particular by
its CO.

Instead of utilising the whole regiment to attack in depth he employed

a squadron; ordering it into certain depth. The second attack involving
two squadrons, however, came close to achieving a breakthrough;
something which was admitted by the Indians and proves that a more
deliberate attack by I Lancers could have led to a breakthrough.

Gurcharan Singh thus said, 'Firstly it made no sense to attack with only
one squadron at a time. The armour counter attack neither had the
numerical advantage nor the depth to have a chance to succeed; the
only occasion when a breakthrough could have occurred was when two
squadrons of 13 Lancers attacked together in the afternoon, but a
gallant last ditch stand by three tanks of Poona Horse averted the
danger.'

This proves that a regiment attack with all threquadrons could

have succeeded and Bara Pind which has gone down in history
as a childish blunder could have been a great battle if
Commander 8 Brigade had insisted that 13 Lancers must
attack as a regiment ... but then there were serious doctrinal
and battle procedures in armoured corps as an arm and the
fact that Bara Pind was a fiasco despite the fact that the best
officer of the armoured corps was commanding the brigade;
does not paint a bright picture about the armoured corps of
that time!

Later on the whole blame was heaped on the brigade commander and
the fact that the failure had a lot to do with doctrine, poor tactics as
taught and practised was ignored. This does not mean that the
armoured corps did not have good brigadiers.

Gurcharan Singh saw in Brigadier Nisar the commander of Changez

Force a much better commander. He actually praised Changez Force
saying; 'Pakistan armour functioned well in the role of covering troops.
It managed to delay a superior armour force for a longer period than it
could have planned for', a tribute from an enemy to a brigadier who
was not promoted for having done well!

It is instructive to note that the Indians have admitted that the

day was saved by a 'last ditch stand by just one tank troop
leader', which means that Bara Pind like Gadgor in 1965 was a
fluke where the Indians were able to hang on by the sheer skin
of their teeth, while in 1965 it was one tank squadron in
particular and ironically Brigadier Ahmad's squadron with
Brigadier Ahmed in lead which saved the day!

Perhaps there is a greater power which decides the fate of armies in

which doctrine and tactics are taught in the manner of a novice and
concentration is on polo; push and pull etc.

EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY

There was nothing new in employing or not employing artillery at

Barapind! The fact that no use was made of the six field, eight medium
and two heavy artillery batteries42 which could have been potentially
utilised by 8 Brigade or 24 Brigade or 8 Division proves the presence of
a disease which was not presently merely in 8 Armoured Brigade but in
the whole army! Poor employment of artillery had led to a serious
British reverse at Chillianwala in January 1849.

The British learnt their lesson and made full use of artillery at the final
battle of Gujrat if the 2nd Sikh War as a result of which they won this
battle with minimum casualties. One British writer was frank enough to
admit that Gujrat was won because of 'the power of superior artillery
and disciplined cooperation against a more numerous, equally brave,
but less coherent enemy compelled to fight on open ground'43.

In Pakistan at least at the army level the role of artillery in all our
successes was not fully appreciated as well as incorporated in doctrine
training and in operational methodology. Thus the concentration was
on the macho image of the tankman or infantry man whereas in reality
artillery had played a decisive role in many Indian failures opposite
Lahore, in Chamb and at Chawinda!

Those from infantry and armour who dominated the scene were not
honest enough to admit it; and thus at Barapind despite all the martial
and Islamic fervour and a clear cut three to one majority in tanks, but
minus artillery support of something like 4 Corps Artillery Brigade; 8
Armoured Brigade; an elite fighting outfit ,was brought to grief; failing
to dislodge one regiment of Centurions supported by three infantry
units, out of which one was that of a mixed composition and two of
those Madrasis despised as non-martial in Pakistan!

Our soldiers were second to none in valour; but valour alone minus
military talent, coup d oeil and artillery support is no guarantee of
success. It was for this reason that G.G.O Number. 1277 of 1861 had
laid down specifically:-'Resolved henceforward, with such few
exceptions as may be rendered necessary by local considerations,
there shall be no native artillery'.44

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN CASUALTIES

I came across the assertion many times while in service that 1 Corps
caused enormous casualties on the Indians in Shakargarh. This
assertion is not proved by facts. The toughest battles of the 1971 war
were fought opposite 54 Division and the following facts do not prove
that 54 Division suffered high casualties45:-

Kill Wound Prisone Tota

Formation Missing
ed ed r l
Included
10 Division
440 190 723 in 1353
-Chhamb
Missing
54 Division-
76 - 272 298
Shakargarh
67 Brigade-
190 196 425 - 811
Sulaimanke
4 Para-Jalwala 21 - 60 - 81
Shyok -Kargil 55 28 195 - 278
This cannot be Reconciled
Rest of the
since many missing were
Formations on No
846 subsequently found 2456 3703
the Western Figures
PW/wounded/killed
Front
categories
162 6,52
TOTAL 253 4131 512
8 4
Now compare the Pakistani losses of 35 FF at Jarpal ie 64 killed,75
wounded and 12 missing46 or that of 13 Lancers which exceeded the
figure of 50 casualties. Were these necessary or justified and for what
purpose? Just because one feather in someone's cap was wanted. Had
there been an Eftikhar leading from the front these losses may have
made some sense!

AN ALTERNATIVE OPERATIONAL REMEDY

It has frequently been asserted that 1 Corps had no other alternative

but to resort to a passive defence. This is a totally false assertion, if we
take into account the resources available to 1 Corps vis-a-vis the
Indians. 1 Corps had nine tank regiments in all as against six Indian
tank regiments in Shakargarh Bulge.

Further 17 Division was not utilised at all to do anything throughout

the war. In Chamb with just a slight numerical superiority and
qualitative inferiority in tanks and parity in infantry General Eftikhar
wrested the initiative from Indians in such a manner that by 10th
December the Indians had withdrawn one battalion from 168 Brigade
in the 'X Force Sector' opposite Charwa in 1 Corps area, and had
placed the same brigade at few hours notice to move to Chamb in view
of 23 Divisions attack at Pallanwala.

The Pakistani GHQ's strategy in Shakargarh was reactive rather than

proactive, and all initiative despite numerical superiority in armour was
surrendered to the Indians. A strategy involving a more offensive
posture would have definitely forced the overcautious Indians to resort
to the defensive. It was here that we enter the realm of military talent.
There was no general officer in 1 Corps with the operational talent or
resolution of an Eftikhar; and this in the final analysis was the singular
misfortune of Pakistan's 1 Corps.

Till ceasefire five armoured regiments were kept on sentry duty in

Pasrur area and were not utilised. The saying that a pessimist sees a
calamity in every opportunity, can be exactly applied to 1 Corps
conduct of battle in Shakargarh Bulge.

LEVEL OF STRATEGIC SUCCESS

The Indian 1 Corps Commander was able to impose his will in strategic
terms on Pakistan's 1 Corps. With a slight relative superiority in
infantry (if 17 Division is included) the Indian 1 Corps commander
succeeded on two counts; firstly in ensuring that Pakistan's 6
Armoured Division and 17 Infantry Division remained fixed in
Shakargarh and secondly by exerting such a pressure; despite his
numerical inferiority in tanks that the Pakistani GHQ was enough
unnerved to pull out 11 Cavalry from Chamb on 10 December; and
bring it to Pasrur (also destroying Satrah Road on the way with their
steel tracks!!!!); thereby reducing the pressure that Pakistan's 23
Division was exerting on the Indians and ultimately leading to 23
Divisions withdrawal to the west bank of Tawi.

The Indian Corps Commander was not brilliant but definitely more
decisive and bold; at least as compared to 1 Corps Commander
opposing him. So apprehensive was this man of Pakistani offensive
capability that he initially assigned four out of his nine infantry
brigades and two tank regiments out of six for a defensive role. Once
he realised that the Pakistani commander opposite him was not like
Abrar Akhtar or Eftikhar; he mustered greater resolution and used his
troops more offensively.

FRONTAL ATTACK IN MILITARY HISTORY VERSUS IMAGINATIVE USE OF

TANKS IN DEFENCE

A frontal attack against an enemy who has not been neutralised by

artillery fire or surprised by following a stratagem has rarely succeed.

In 1815 at New Orleans when the British Army was one of the
finest armies of the world; a similar frontal attack had led to
one of the most disastrous repulses in British military annals!
Thus the British suffered 2037 casualties including their
commanding general killed while the US defenders suffered
just 61 casualties47!

It is interesting that to note that tank is such a versatile weapon

system; that the worst possible tank in defence can play havoc with
the best tank when it comes to firing at an advancing tank from a
stationery defensive position.

The Italians in North Africa had the technically speaking most pathetic
tanks of WW Two. During the battle of 'Crusader' in November 1941
the British 22nd Armoured Brigade equipped with the technically
overwhemingly superior 'Crusader' Tanks with 2 Pounder gun and
49mm frontal armour lost 40 out of 160 tanks when it gallantly but
frontally charged the far inferior Italian Ariete Division equipped with
M-13 tanks!

Most of the tanks were destroyed by anti-tank guns which were closely
integrated with Italian tanks! In July 1944 SS Obersturmfuehrer Michael
Wittman was able to stop the British 7th Armoured Division with just
four Tiger Tanks, annihilating their complete advance guard, knocking
out 25 tanks, 14 carriers and 14 half tracks! Wittman did so without
charging, but by conducting a highly imaginative defensive battle!

Notes

1 Page-199-Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem

Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Lahore-1973.

2 Page-188-The Pakistan Army-1966-1971-Major General Shaukat Riza

(Retired)-Wajid Alis Limited-Lahore-1990.

3 I had the privilege of serving in 15 SP in its 'R' Battery which was one of
the units of 8 Independent Armoured Brigade, under Major Zohrab,one of
the most upright officers that I came across in the army, from 9 August
1984 to 10th October 1984 in Kharian as well as Dhamtal-Qila Sobha Singh
area,at a time when war was imminent, and thus was able to interview
many gunners who had taken part in the Barapind Battle.15 SP in 1984 was
still equipped with Priest Self Propelled Guns of WW Two vintage,which it
had at the time of Battle of Barapind.In 1984 these guns although
extremely efficiently handled were at the last leg of their life,and this in
itself was a direct tribute to 15 SPs excellence as a unit.

4 Most Pakistani authors while discussing 1 Corps operations conveniently

omit mentioning 6 Armoured Division.This includes General Shaukat Riza
who wrote the officially sponsored history of the 1971 war.Shaukat did not
mention at all in his book that the 6 Armoured Division was also in I Corps
area of operations around a place called Pasrur and gave no reason why
this division was condemned to stationary guard duty throughout the war!
Unfortunately instead of dispassionately analysing our previous wars,there
has been a marked tendency in our country,that motivates military
historians to rationalise all our failures by citing the excuse that we were
outnumbered and all the battles where our military commanders blundered
were ones in which defeat or failure was inevitable.

5 Page-199-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.

6 Page-190-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

7 Page-191-Ibid.

8 Page-190-Ibid.
10 A lazy second line para military force which performs sentry duty at
various ordnance factories. Thus in planning terms Pakistan's numerical
superiority and technical parity in armour by virtue of 6 Armoured Division
and the considerable infantry resources of 17 Division although available
were assigned no role in the area of operations.Why this was done has not
been touched at all by Shaukat Riza and Gul Hassan in their otherwise
lengthy accounts?

11 Page-29-The Western Front-Lt Gen K.P Candeth (Retired)-Allied

Publishers-New Delhi-1984.

12 Page-495-The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1941-

1971-Maj Gen Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi-1993.

13 Page-65-Candeth-Op Cit and page-495-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. This led

to despatch of 33 Infantry Brigade of 39 Division to Poonch on 21
November,since the Pakistani build up opposite Poonch had started from
November.

14 Page-213-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit and page-195-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit and

Page-72-The Battle of Chamb-Lt Col Saeed-Army Education Press-GHQ-
Rawalpindi-1979.

15 The assertion by many eminent personalities in Pakistan Armoured

Corps in particular that the Indians got two nights to consolidate their
position before 8 Armoured Brigade attacked it on the morning of 16
December 1971 has no conection with facts,and is merely a figment of
these honourable gentlemen's cavalier imagination! General Jahangir
Karamat who was one of the squadron commanders in 13 Lancers at
Barapind admitted that 'At 0430 hours on 16th December the infantry
formation in defence informed the armoured brigade headquarters that the
enemy had breached the minefield at Basantar Nala at Lagwal' (Page-3-
'The Tank Attack that Failed'- Brigadier Jahangir Karamat- Sabre and Lance
Magazine-1982 Issue-School of Armour Nowshera-1983.

16 Page-511-Indian Army after Independence-Major K.C Praval-Lancer

International-New Delhi-1987.This was Lieutenant Colonel V.Ghai of 16
Madras.The three infantry battalions of this brigade were 3 Grenadiers,6
Madras and 16 Madras).

17 Page-510-Ibid.

18 Page-504-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

18a Ibid and Page-513-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.Authors Note;-The Jat Sikhs
of Hissar were an extremely tough lot famous for rowdiness and riotous
habits.This was noted by an ICS officer Badruddin Tayyabji who served in
Hissar before partition.The Jat Sikhs of Sisana and surrounding villages
were famous before partition for distilling 'illicit home made liqour also
known as Desi'.This created a close bond between them and many Ranghar
Muslims of the same district!After partition many Ranghar Muslims of
Sisana settled in Multan,Khanewal and Vihari districts and continue to brew
excellent Desi with a far superior impact than any western brand, as per
the 'Sisana' recipee!I have been always curious to know whether Sisana is
still famous for the Desi which many old Ranghar armoured corps soldiers
of Hissar used to nostalgically remember long after partition!

18bIbid.

18c Ibid.

19 Page-2-'Sabre and Lance' Issue-1982-Op Cit .

20 Page-215-Fazal Muqeem Khan.Late Major General Abdullah Saeed

described 1 Corps Headquarters in 1971 as a headquarter struck by inertia
and a paralysis.It is impossible to substantiate this assertion,but a
dispassionate analysis of the 1 Corps battle proves that
decisiveness,resolution or energy in conduct of operations were certainly
not the hallmarks of 1 Corps Commander's personality.

21 Page-3-'Sabre and Lance'-Op Cit.

22 Ibid.

23 Page-194-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

24 Ibid.

25 A Role in which tanks occupy hides covering the most likely enemy tank
approaches.from these the tanks move to pre arranged and possibly pre
prepared fire positions with the aim of halting the enemy attack which has
penetrated in between localities or overrun them' (Refers-GSP-1518-
Armoured Regiment in Battle-1972).The Glossary of Military Terms GSP-
1538 of 1973 defined counter penetration as 'The action taken by a
defender to halt penetration of his defences by the enemy and to destroy
by fire enemy forces which have penetrated between his defended
localities'.

26 Page-194 & 195-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit and Page-3-'Sabre and Lance'-Op

Cit.General Jahangir Karamat specifically stated that the CO of 13 Lancers
stated the number of enemy tanks to be not more than 'six or seven'.Thus
there is a discrepancy here in between Shaukat Riza and Jahangir's
account.

27 Page-3-Sabre and Lance-Op Cit.

28 Page-4-Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Page-507-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.It may be noted that 13 Lancers was

never ordered to capture the 'Carthage or Rome' that Barapind was but to
go into counter penetration opposite Jarpal.This undue emphasis on the
glory of capturing villages with mud houses or stating that they were never
driven out is a good indicator of the extreme myopicness of the Indo-Pak
military mind!The Kargil episode with both sides making claims of retaining
or capturing Tiger Hill etc proves that despite all the NDCs and AFWCs the
emphasis still is on tactical gains rather than at anything more significant.

31 Page-506-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.The Indian Armoured Corps historian

praised 13 Lancers gallantry mentioning in particular Major Nisar (actually
Major Nasir later Brigadier Khwaja Mohammad Nasir or Pervez Nasir).The
13 Lancers did extremely well what they were told to do as far as their
squadron commanders and all lower echelons were concerned.Posterity will
remember the services of all who participated in that grim battle from
major and downwards.

31a Page-514-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

32 Page-507-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

33 Page-4-Sabre and Lance-Op Cit.

34 Page-4-Ibid.

35 Page-196-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

36 Page-196-Ibid.

37 Page-508 and 509-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

38 Page-215 and 216-Fazal Muqeem-Op Cit.

39 Page-188-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

40 Page-194-Ibid.

41 Brigadier Ahmad was described by most armoured corps officers as one

of the finest and most competent officers of the armoured corps.

41a Nasir was conspicuous in being praised by both Gurcharan Singh and
K.C Praval (refers-page513-K.C Praval-op cit and page-506-Gurcharan
Singh-Op Cit).I think the only Major at least from armoured corps,so openly
and frankly praised by the Indians for leading his squadron from the front
.It's a pity that he never became a major general!

42 Page-194-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

43 Page-148-The Punjab in Peace and War-S.S Thorburn-1904-London

44 Page-20-The History of the Indian Mountain Artillery-Brig Gen C.A.L

Graham-Aldershot-Gale and Polden-1957.

45 Based on K.C Praval and Candeths books-Op Cit.

46 Page-197-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

47 Page-3-The Birth of the Modern World Society-1815-1830-Paul Johnson-
Harper Collins-New York-1991.The exact casualties were:-British:-291 killed
and remaining missing/wounded;US:-13 Killed,29 Wounded and 19 Missing.

48 Page-135 and 136-Tank Commanders-George Forty-Firebird Books-UK-

1993.

ALL MAPS ARE CONCEIVED AND DRAWN BY A.H AMIN IN

JANUARY 2000 AND PUBLISHED IN JANUARY 2002 IN DEFENCE
JOURNAL , KARACHI.

CLICK ON MAPS TO ENLARGE

The Western Theatre in 1971

A Strategic and Operational Analysis

A.H AMIN

January 2002

The Western Front in 1971 War has not received the due attention that
it deserved from the point of view of lessons learnt and generalship in
action. The obvious reasons for this reason lie in the fact that the East
Pakistan crisis was the focus of attention and the surrender a Dacca
was too large an historical event!

The war on the Western Front is an invaluable study in terms of

strategy, operational leadership and battle tactics. The future
reorganisation of Pakistan and Indian Army was done based on the
experiences of 1971.Historical BackgroundThe 1965 War produced a
major change in both Indo-Pak armies.

In Pakistan Army the two key lessons derived from 1965 War were to
have more infantry and to have intermediate higher commands
between units and brigades based on the corps rather than the division
command concept.

Till 1965 Pakistani GHQ had naively hoped that division headquarter
was a suitable level of operation command. Thus in 1965 Pakistan
Army had just one corps headquarter and all other formations were
divisional headquarters which functioned under higher command of the
GHQ.This concept of organisation had broken down in Khem Karn
where the main Pakistani attack of the war was launched. Further
there had been lack of cooperation between the armoured and infantry
division in this battle since no higher corps headquarter was controlling
both the divisions and the infantry and armoured division commander
had a personality clash.

The Pakistani GHQ now firmly decided to iron out these contradictions
and created three more corps headquarters i.e Headquarter 2 Corps to
control/coordinate Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division and its sister
infantry formation, Headquarter 4 Corps to control operations of the 10
and 11 Division in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and Eastern Command to
command the troops stationed in East Pakistan.

Organisationally the Pakistan Army was now on a sound footing, but

this process was soon derailed since political developments, threw the
entire post-1965 reorganisation to winds. Developments in East
Pakistan in 1971 forced the Pakistani GHQ to move its strategic
reserves i.e 9 and 16 Divisions to East Pakistan.These divisions had
been raised in 1966-68 soon after 1965 War.

This necessitated the raising of two more divisions to take the place of
the reserve divisions sent to East Pakistan i.e the 33 and 37 Divisions.

The 23 Division was raised at Jhelum in June-July 1971 to look after the
Chamb-Dewa area thus reducing the 12 Division of the burden of
looking after a 200 mile plus area of responsibility.18 Division was
raised at Hyderabad to look after the 560 mile stretch between
Rahimyar Khan and Rann of Katch.

The Indians also drew significant lessons from 1965 War and increased
the number of formations protecting their line of communication
between Pathankot and Jammu and in giving greater importance to the
hitherto neglected area south of Sutlej starting from Sulaimanke. In
addition the Indian High Command keeping the political developments
in East Pakistan changed its 1965 Strategy of attacking West Pakistan
in strength and decided to launch their major attack on East Pakistan
from early 1971.

To do this Indians had to use three corps i.e 2,4 and 33 Corps.
Pakistani Forces and Plans-Western TheatreTill 1965 Pakistan Army
keeping in view its equipment and training was relatively superior to
the Indian Army. India under Nehru was a peaceful country but the
Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 transformed the whole scenario.

Thus while Indian Army had by and large registered no major

expansion since 1947 after 1962 the Indians embarked on a highly
ambitious expansion programme.It was Pakistan’s good luck that in
1965 this process was at a very rudimentary stage, however by 1971
the whole strategic scenario had changed from 1965.Indian Army as it
stood in 1971 was much stronger vis-a-vis Pakistan Army as compared
with the situation of 1965.

Fazal Muqeem was thus not wrong when he stated that “with the
almost daily expansion of the Indian Armed Forces since the 1965 war,
it had become economically impossible for Pakistan to keep pace with
her. The policy of matching Indian strength with even 1/3 or 1/4 in
numbers had gradually gone overboard. Under these circumstances all
that Pakistan could do was to avoid war with India and to strive to
resolve her disputes through political and diplomatic means”.1 The
only problem with this quote is the fact that, at that time i.e. the period
1965-71 no one at the helm of affairs was ready to think so realistically
and rationally! Fazal’s wisdom is the wisdom of hindsight, expressed
some two years after Pakistan Army had fought the disaster and
humiliating war in its history and Pakistan was dismembered into two
countries.

Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan took over as the army’s Chief of
General Staff and thus Principal Staff Officer to the C in C soon after
the 1965 war. In words of Fazal Muqeem a sharp observer and one who
was not lavish in praising anyone “planning had taken a turn for the
better when Major General Yaqub Khan became the Chief of General
Staff”.2 However, Muqeem adds that the army’s war plans in the post-
1965 era were still vague about “what action should be taken in West
Pakistan if an attack was mounted against East Pakistan”.3

The two statements somewhat contradictory prove that although

planning improved Yaqub did not give a concrete answer or plan to
solve Pakistan’s strategic dilemma.Although no archives have been
declassified Fazal Muqeem who had access to various highly classified
documents by virtue of being secretary defence armed with semi-
official mandate from the then prime minister to write a book on 1971
war states that the plan of mounting a counter-offensive from the
Western Theatre centred around “a corps with an armoured division
and two infantry divisions” ......while “remainder of the army was to
perform mainly a holding role”.

The most significant aspect of the army’s main plan of attack i.e when
to launch the attack as per the then Chief of General Staff of the
Pakistan Army,General Gul Hassan Khan was left undecided.5 Muqeem
states that “There appears to have been a heated discussion on the
timing of launching a counter-offensive”.
There were two schools of thought here i.e one who favoured an
immediate counter-offensive in relation to any Indian invasion of East
Pakistan while the second a procrastinating one maintained that
counter offensive should commence only after completion of
preliminary operations to fix and divert the attention of the enemy.6

PAKISTANI WAR PLAN IN THE WESTERN THEATRE

Pakistani plan in the Western Front was as following:—

Preliminary/Fixing Operations:—

a. 12 Infantry Division at Opposite Poonch.

The aim was to force the Indians to reinforce Poonch thus weakening
their other formations in 15 Corps and 1 Corps areas of
responsibility,thus improving chances of success of 23 Division in
Chamb and a possible counter attack by 6 Armoured Division in
Shakargarh-Sialkot area.

b. 23 Infantry Division in Chamb Sector.

Not allowing the Indians to exploit a jumping area opposite Pakistan’s

soft underbelly and crucial North-South line of communications passing
via Gujrat. This division was allotted two additional infantry brigades
(111 and 66) an independent armoured brigade(2 Armoured Brigade)
for the task.111 Brigade was a reserve brigade while 66 Brigade
originally belonged to 17 Division.

c. 18 Division Opposite Jaisalmer-Longanewala.

It was hypothesised that this attack would attack Indian armour

southwards thus making Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Divisions task in
Ganganagar area easier. Another aim of this attack was to protect the
vulnerable Pakistani North-South road link which was just about 65
kilometres from the border in this area.

d. 105 Independent Infantry Brigade Group opposite Fazilka.

This was essential to ensure the safety of the most crucial Sulaimanke
Headworks which was just about 1500 metres from the international
boundary.
Main Attack-Counter Offensivea.

a. Attack with 1st Armoured Division and two infantry divisions (7 and
33) opposite Ganganagar-Anupnagar.

b. This force after crossing the Bikaner Canal (Gong Canal) opposite
Bahawalnagar was to capture Bhatinda and then swing north to
possibly threaten Ludhiana. Candeth the Indian C in C Western
Command was of the opinion that the main objective of this Pakistani
attack was to cut the road Ferozpur-Ludhiana and then
isolate/eliminate Indian garrison at Ferozpur.7 The Pakistani official
historian Shaukat Riza in line with the pedantic sub continental
tradition of hiding what is no longer relevant even two decades after
an event states nothing about aims/objectives of this grand counter
offensive in his monumental “The Pakistan Army-1966-71”. Formations
in Holding Rolea. 12 Division in Kashmir except in Poonch Sector.b. 23
Division in Hill Sector North of Dewa.c. 8 and 15 Division in Sialkot and
Shakargarh Bulge.d. 10 and 11 Division in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.e. 18
Division in all sectors except Reti-Ubauro.f. Northern Area Scouts in
Northern Areas.

Formations tasked for Counter Penetration or Counter attack Role:---

a. 6 Armoured Division less two armoured regiments detached to

command 2 Independent Armoured Brigade Group under command 23
Division in Chamb and 17 Infantry Division less one infantry brigade
detached under command 23 Division in Chamb to counter attack in
Ravi-Chenab Corridor when ordered. Both formations were under
command Headquarter 1 Corps and were also army reserves. 2
Independent Armoured Brigade Headquarter was given two units of the
6 Armoured Division i.e 11 Cavalry and the newly raised 28 Cavalry.2
Independent Armoured Brigade Headquarter had been raised following
a wargame held in August 1970 which had concluded that “Pakistan
had insufficient reserves for a reasonable counter offensive”.8

b. 8 Independent Armoured Brigade stationed in general area Pasrur

and tasked to carry out various contingency counter-attack or counter
penetration tasks when ordered by Headquarter 1 Corps.8 Armoured
Brigade had been raised based on findings of a wargame held in
August 1970 by withdrawing integral armoured regiments from some
infantry divisions.
c. 3rd Independent Armoured Brigade stationed in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor
under command Headquarter 4 Corps was tasked with various
contingency counter attack plans of counter attack/counter
penetration.15 Lancers one of the units of this brigade was assigned
the responsibility of looking after the line of Sutlej River from Kasur till
north of Sulaimanke.

CLICK ON MAPS TO ENLARGE

Recently in a book published in 1998 Brigadier Z.A Khan stated that

this brigade was also to perform duties of flank protection with the 2
Corps counter offensive force.9

Indian Forces and Plans-Western Theatre

Indian strategy in the Western Theatre was basically to stay on the
defensive while its Eastern Command conducted an all out offensive
campaign aimed at reducing East Pakistan.

The prime aim in words of Gurcharan Singh Sandhu being “to prevent
Pakistan from being any sizeable inroads into Indian territory”10 while
the Eastern Command was busy in the creation of Bangladesh Indian
Forces

a. Western Command:—

Commanded by Lieutenant General K.P Candeth consisting of 15 Corps

(Lieut General Sartaj Singh) deployed in Kashmir,1 Corps (Lieut Gen
K.K Singh) was tasked with the defence of the area from Aik Nala in
Kashmir till and excluding Dera Baba Nanak Enclave on the Ravi River
north of Amritsar and 11 Corps (Lieut Gen N.C Rawlley) holding area
from Dera Baba Nanak Enclave in the North till a point on the
Rajhastan border south of Anupgarh.

b. Southern Command:—

Commanded by Lieut General G.G Bewoor this command was

responsible for the defence of area starting from Bikanir Sector in the
North till the Arabian Sea in the south.This area of responsibility of this
command was divided in four sectors i.e Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Barmer
and Katch. This command had two divisons i.e 12 Division in the north
and 11 Division holding Barmer and Katch Sectors.In addition it was
supported by an armoured regiment, two independent armoured
squadrons and one missile squadron.

c. Army Reserves:—

1st Armoured Division was stationed in Muktsar area against the

expected Pakistani 2 Corps Counteroffensive in Ganganagar area.14
Infantry Division was stationed with Headquarters in Faridkot area.This
division was also given some defensive responsibilities by Headquarter
11 Corps in Ferozpur and Fazilka Sectors.
CLICK ON MAPS TO ENLARGE
Indian plan/dispositionsWestern Command:—

a. 15 Corps :—

This corps consisted of five infantry divisions (3,19,25,10 and 26) and
one independent armoured brigade.3rd Infantry Division was tasked to
hold Ladakh Sector bordering Chinese Held Tibet and till Fortu La Pass.
Since no threat was expected in this sector one of the infantry brigades
of this division was stationed at Suratgarh area. The other two brigades
of the 3rd Mountain Division were in their divisional area while the
independent brigade holding Kargil Sector (Fortu La Pass to Zoji La
Pass) was also placed under command 3rd Division. The Partapur
Sector opposite Shyok River Gorge was held by Ladakh Scouts.19
Division was looking after the Kashmir Valley Sector from Zojila Pass till
Hajipir Bulge in the Pir Panjal Range.25 Division was in charge of the
Rajauri Sector comprising Rajauri,Poonch and Nowshera areas. 10
Division was looking after the Hill Sub Sector and Chamb.15 Corps was
given the defensive tasks in all areas except 10 Division in Chamb
Sector. 10 Division was tasked to attack towards Gujrat-Tanda area
based on the assumption that an offensive posture in this area was the
best guarantee for the defence of Chamb. The Corps Headquarter of
this corps was at Udhampur.

b. 1 Corps:—

This corps consisted of three infantry divisions (36,39 and 54) and two
independent armoured brigades (2 and 16). This corps was assigned
an offensive task of attacking Pakistan’s Shakargarh Bulge with a view
to commit Pakistan’s 1 Corps into defensive tasks thus ensuring that
Pakistan could not launch any offensive adventure in Indian territory
specially against the Indian line of communication from Punjab to
Kashmir i.e the Gurdaspur-Pathankot-Samba-Jammu Road. This corps
move to the area was carried out as a direct reaction to the movement
of the strike elements of Pakistan’s 1 Corps i.e 6 Armoured Division
and 17 Infantry Divisions into the Ravi-Chenab Corridor. The reader
may note that the Shakargarh Bulge by virtue of its close proximity to
Pathankot-Samba-Jammu Road, was a great source of mental tension
to the Indian High Command.11 The Indians saw the bulge as a great
natural threat and 1 Corps prime task was to ensure that Pakistan’s 1
Corps could not use this bulge as a diving board to launch a lightning
thrust against the Indian line of communication from Indian Punjab into
Kashmir. Thus 1 Corps was given various offensive tasks in Shakargarh
like capture of Shakargarh and Zafarwal. 1 Corps was tasked to first
contain any Pakistani advance in Indian territory frontally and to then
deliver a riposte against Pakistani line of communications so as to
force them back.12c. 11 Corps:—11 Corps consisted of three infantry
divisions i.e 15 Division, 7 Division and Foxtrot Sector (ad hoc) and an
independent armoured brigade (14 Armoured Brigade). 14 Armoured
Brigade theoretically consisted of five armoured regiments (18 Cavalry,
62 Cavalry, 64 Cavalry, 70 Armoured Regiment, 71st Armoured
Regiment,) one independent recce tank squadron and one mechanised
infantry battalion. Practically most of its units were dished out to 86
Brigade in Dera Baba Nanak Enclave ,F Sector and Mike Force and it
only retained one tank regiment i.e 64 Cavalry (T-54). The area of
responsibility of the corps was from Dera Baba Nanak Enclave in the
north till a point near Anupgarh in Bikaner area. No major fighting took
place in this corps area, however, the vast bulk of Indian armour units
were stationed in this corps area of responsibility during the war.15
Division (Four infantry brigades and two armoured regiments)was
responsible for defence of area from Dera Baba Nanak Enclave till and
including Lahore-Amritsar Road.
In addition 11 Corps had a reserve brigade taken from 14 Infantry
Division in Ajnala area.7 Infantry Division (Three brigades and an
armoured regiment)was responsible for axis Khalra-Lahore,Khem
Karan-Kasur and Ferozpur-Kasur till and including Jalalabad South of
Ferozpur.“

F Sector” (three infantry brigades and approx seven tank squadrons)

was responsible for area from excluding Jalalabad till a point south of
Anupgarh.

Mike Force was a reserve held by Western Command.This force

consisted of 62nd Cavalry (T-55),18TH Cavalry less B Squadron (T-54),
one Mechanised Infantry Company and a medium artillery regiment.Its
headquarter was at Abohar and the units were located east of
Ganganagar.
In addition 11 Corps had a reserve brigade taken from 14 Infantry
Division in Ajnala area. Before 1965 both sides had hardly any troops
in the area south of Sutlej less Fazilka which was held by a brigade
each. After 1965 both sides constructed extensive obstacles in the
entire area from Chamb till Sutlej making the area literally extremely
expensive to trespass !

Thus the emphasis after 1965 shifted to area south of Sutlej River and
both sides knew that any major attack would come in the area south of
Sutlej. Thus the area south of Sutlej in 11 Corps area of responsibility
was accorded great importance.Thus the Foxtrot Sector backed by an
armoured division to its immediate rear.

Army Reserves:—

a. 1st Armoured Division:— (Four Tank Regiments) .

b. 14 Division:— Three infantry brigades.

c. These Indian Army Reserves stationed in 11 Corps area of

responsibility.

The 11 Corps and Western Command in consonance with the tradition

of bullying lower headquarters wrested two brigades (one placed at
Ajnala and one to Hussainiwala) from 14 Infantry Division. However 1st
Armoured Division commander successfully resisted these attempts
from both higher headquarters.13 Both these divisions were tasked to
counter any attack by Pakistan’s 2 Corps in the area south of Sutlej.
The Indian GHQ had positioned 1st Armoured Division at Muktsar North
of Fazilka and East of Bikanir Canal thus in case the Pakistani 1 Corps
attack had been launched the Pakistanis would have had a free run till
the Bikanir Canal. However it appears that the Indian plan in this area
was to subject any Pakistani thrust to stiff resistance on the line of
Bikanir Canal.Candeth the Indian Army Commander Western Command
states that the reason for placing 1st Armoured Division North of
Fazilka was to deny Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division the opportunity
to threaten Ferozpur or Ferozpur-Ludhiana Road.14

Southern Command:—

The Southern Command had two divisions deployed along Pakistan’s

southern border i.e the 11th and 12th Infantry Divisions. There were
four sectors in this command i.e Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Barmer and Kutch.
Fighting took place only in the Jaisalmer and Barmer Sectors while the
other two sectors saw negligible activity because of absence of
communications. Indian deployment/plans were as following:—
a. 12 Division:—

This division was deployed in the Jaisalmer sector and was commanded
by Major General Khambata with headquarters at Tanot 120 Kilometres
north of Jaisalmer. This division had three infantry brigades,a tank
regiment consisting of AMX-13 tanks, an independent tank squadron
(T-55) and an engineer battalion. The division was tasked to advance
on Axis Kishengarh-Rahimyarkhan towards the Pakistani
communication centre Rahimyarkhan located on the main Pakistani
north-south Lahore-Karachi Highway with a strength of one infantry
battalion, light artillery regiment, one tank regiment (20 Lancers) and
an independent tank squadron consisting of T-55 Tanks.Another
holding brigade of the same division was to launch a diversionary
attack by attacking and capturing Islamgarh. The third brigade was to
hold a firm base.

b. 11 Division:— This division was deployed in Barmer Sector and was

commanded by an armoured corps officer Major General R.D.R Anand.
It was concentrated in Barmer area by October 1971. The division had
two brigades and a tank squadron(T-55). It was tasked to capture Naya
Chor by advancing along axis Gadra Road-Munabao.Subsidiary attacks
were to be made on Khinsar and Chacchro.

1971 War Western Theatre

12 Division Operations

The Pakistani plan to capture Poonch was a bold gamble undertaken

with insufficient resources. The essential idea being to outflank main
Indian defences at Poonch by an attack by infiltration capturing
dominating features of Thanpir and Chandak to the east and rear of
Poonch garrison thus threatening Indian line of communication going
north to south over Poonch River thus forcing them to abandon
Poonch. The Indian garrison at Poonch consisted of an infantry brigade
(93 Brigade) while 12 Division had planned to infiltrate with two
infantry brigades.

The plan was sound in conception but failed because of irresolution at

divisional level,loss of surprise, poor logistic arrangements and refusal
of Indian brigade commander at Poonch to panic.Surprise was lost
before the operation was launched since Indian intelligence gave their
higher headquarters about the impending operation. Thus the Indians
reinforced the area before war had begun (on 25 November )15 with
another brigade i.e the 33 Infantry Brigade from the 39 Division of 1
Corps tasked to attack Shakargarh Bulge.
This move certainly caused imbalance to the Indian 1 Corps plans
against Shakargarh but saved Poonch. Pakistan’s 2 AK Brigade and 26
Brigade were to execute the plan. The attack initially went very
smoothly and the Thanpir and Chandak Ridges were captured by
Pakistan Army. However, Danna on the deep right flank of the
Pakistani infiltrating brigade was strongly defended and resisted
capture. The troops who had captured the Thanpir and Chandak Ridges
were not adequately supplied, as per Fazal Muqeem the divisional
commander Major General Akbar Khan (later a candidate for post of
chief in 1976) did not lead from the front “to give the required push”
and “there was a lack of a necessary push and drive at brigade and
battalion level”.16

Finally the infiltrating force had to withdraw. There was no General

Wolfe here to lead the infiltrating Pakistan Brigade onto the narrow
path to victory.But then Wolfe died and Quebec was captured by his
troops. At Poonch no Pakistani officer beyond colonel rank was killed
and Poonch stayed in Indian hands! It may be added that the Northern
Areas were given very low priority by the Pakistani GHQ. This enabled
the Indians to capture important posts overlooking Kargil-Leh Road and
in Paratpur Sector. Later these posts became the stepping ground for
Indian infiltration into Siachen.

23 Division Operations

Pakistan’s 23 Division was facing a larger division in Chamb yet it

captured Chamb despite determined Indian opposition. After this the
division established a bridgehead opposite Pallanwala across the Tawi
to conduct further operations against Jaurian.The whole process came
to a full stop on 10th December when Major General Eftikhar the
indomitable GOC of the division was killed from injuries suffered in a
helicopter crash. At this stage the Indian 10 Division had strong
reserves which were uncommitted i.e an infantry brigade which was
free after capturing the Phulkean Salient and the 3rd Armoured
Brigade comprising 8th Light Cavalry (Vijayanta) and Central India
Horse (T-55).However in case Pakistan’s 23 Division had captured a
foothold across Tawi.These Indian reserves would have become
committed.

1 Corps Operations
Pakistan’s 1 Corps was responsible for defence of Shakargarh Bulge
and Sialkot.The Shakargarh Bulge offered many jumping areas for
Pakistan’s 6th Armoured Division to sever the Indian line of
communication from Pathankot to Jammu.The Pakistanis had three
excellent minefields protecting the bulge apart from the Ravi River on
the south and adequate reserves to launch an attack into Indian held
Kashmir while the attacking Indians were caught in the three
minefields.The Pakistani GHQ was, however, already dominated by a
defensive mindset and the 1 Corps Commander was one known for
procrastination,indecision and vacillation. A man of few words whose
professionalism ended at checking arcs of fire of all infantry trenches
of all infantry battalions holding the forward defended
localities.Lieutenant General Irshad viewed his task as that of a sentry
who had to react only when threatened and would do nothing else !
Thus the 6th Armoured Division remained on rear sentry duty around
Pasrur and Daska while the 17 Division was deployed to defend the
Marala-Ravi Link many miles in the rear and at no stage under any
Indian threat.

The Indian Corps Commander K.K Singh was another PHENOMENALLY

HOPELESS similarly typical sub continental corps commander,mediocre
in operational outlook,immensely concerned about security,timid in
offensive operations.He was the same man because of whose
irresolution and poor handling of armour the Indians failed to win the
1965 War within few hours at Gadgor on 8th September! K.K Singh had
two armoured brigades and a comfortable superiority in infantry.
However he was more concerned about security just like his Pakistani
counter part and had deployed half of his corps in holding roles,divided
his armour, dishing it out to holding infantry formations leaving two
weak armoured brigades to lead infantry division advances at infantry
pace at many points.

The result in words of an Indian analyst was “pathetic”......”there was

total lack of offensive spirit at any level”!17 However, by 15th
December one Indian Division whose advance was spearheaded by a
tank regiment had breached all three minefields! Now comes the
reaction of Pakistan’s 1 Corps Commander like an NCO drilling a
platoon of recruits! 8 Armoured Brigade is told to launch a counter
attack to restore the situation with minimum force. No artillery beyond
the obsolete 105 MM Priest Self-Propelled Guns was used to support
the attack and the result was an Indian tank regiment contained with
three Pakistani Tank Regiments two of which lost almost half of their
tanks! One of the most unfortunate incidents of 1971 War was the 35
FF attack on Barapind-Jarpal. The Indian Armoured Corps historian
called it “an attack doomed to failure” and one in which “a heroic
battalion was sacrificed to no purpose”!18 Even Pakistani historian
Fazal Muqeem found nothing correct in this attack and thus concluded
“The few counter attacks which 8 Division (Major General Abdul Ali
Malik) tried during the war were noticeable by their lack of
planning...The worst example of this attack was on December 17”.19
The hallmark of higher commanders in both Pakistani and Indian 1
Corps was phenomenal incompetence. The Indians captured some
large size mud villages of no strategic consequence which were
returned at Simla Talks. Pakistan’s 6th Armoured Division and 17th
Division remained unemployed and no effort was made by Pakistan’s 1
Corp Commander to wrest the initiative from the Indians or to make
the Indian Corps Commander to his offensive moves! Mediocrity was
the common factor on both sides in 1 Corps battle.

The Indian 1 Corps Commander advanced because he was told to do

so and the Pakistani 1 Corps Commander did not advance because no
one told him to do so!Hopeless windbag generals on both sides.I think
th situation has worsened since then and not improved.Good for both
the countries.

4 Corps Battle Operations

4 Corps of Pakistan was in holding role in the Ravi Sutlej Corridor and
facing about two Indian divisions with two of its own.Certain minor
actions like capture of Indian Enclave opposite Hussainiwala
Headworks took place in 4 Corps operational area. Hussainiwala was
an enclave west of Sutlej and difficult to hold. The Indian battalion 15
Punjab fought well and this was acknowledged by Fazl Muqeem20 but
was betrayed by its commanding officer who had pitched his
headquarter in the safety of Sutlej River on the East bank.Most notable
here was the conduct of Pakistan’s Lt Col Ghulam Hussain Chaudhry of
3rd Punjab who led his battalion from the front and was killed in action.
One of the very few commanding officers to get killed in action on the
Western Front. No road in any major cantonment is named after this
brave man in Pakistan! Hussainiwala was a small affair in terms of
casualties. The Indians who were well entrenched suffered a total of 19
Killed 21 casualties.105 Independent BrigadePakistan’s 105 Brigade
carried out a small scale but highly aggressive operation in Sulaimanke
area opposite Indian town of Fazilka. The strength here was in Indian
favour but Indian brigade commander S.S Chowdry was highly
incompetent in placing his forward battalion 10 kilometre ahead of his
other two battalions. This enabled Pakistan’s 105 Brigade to capture
the Bund ahead of Sabuna Distributary thus ensuring the safety of
Pakistan’s most crucial Sulaimanke Canal Headworks which was just
1,500 metres from the border. 105 Brigade’s determined counter
attack severely depressed Indian Higher Commanders and 11 Corps
Commander expressed a desire to abandon the area and withdraw to
Fazilka Fortress and to replace 67 Brigade which was defending the
area.22 Such was the state of Indian demoralisation that Western
Command Army Commander finally sacked 67 Brigade Commander on
11th December.23 S.S Chowdhry was replaced by Brigadier Piara
Singh. At this stage the Indian brigade commander was so demoralised
that he overestimated the Pakistani strength opposite him to be two
infantry brigades supported by an armoured regiment24 while in
reality the Pakistani strength on east bank of Sabuna was only an
infantry battalion (6 FF) supported by a depleted tank squadron of WW
Two vintage tanks. The Indians suffered heavy casualties at
Sulaimanke.Some 190 Killed, 196 Missing most of whom were killed or
prisoners and 425 wounded.25 These casualties were far heavier than
those suffered by 54 Division which fought battles like those around
Bara Pind Jarpal which suffered a total of some 76 Killed and 272
wounded.26

Desert Sector-Rahimyarkhan-Sindh

18 Division plan to capture Longanewala was brilliant in conception. It

failed because of poor logistic planning and lack of air cover. There was
hardly anything in front of the 18 Division attacking force heading for
Longanewala and Jaisalmer, however, since there was no air support
just two Indian Hunters neutralised Pakistani armour! This attack has
been much criticised by arm chair strategists in Pakistan. However, the
situation was saved by the fact that Indians opposing 18 Division were
equally incompetent and hesitated from attacking the withdrawing
Pakistani troops from Longanewala. One positive aspect of the whole
affair despite all Pakistani imperial blunders was the fact that the
attack even in its failure caused such mental discomfort to Indian
Higher commanders that the Indian plans to attack Rahimyar Khan
were dropped.27 Thus Indian Southern Command Army Commander
Lieutenant General Bewoor requested Manekshaw for a change in task
with the plea that resources placed at his disposal were insufficient for
capture of Rahimyarkhan.28 The Indians decided to call off all
offensive operations of 12 Division against Rahimyar Khan and
transferred one of the three brigades of 12 Division to Kutch Sector on
the 12th December for the planned attack on New Chhor.29
This reinforcement was a sugar coated bullet for 11 Indian Division
since it only further compounded the logistic nightmare of 11 Indian
Division.30 Indian Armoured Corps historian was intellectually honest
enough to admit that “main toll was taken by the terrain,the IAF
destroyed a sizeable number of tanks and vehicles” while the 12
Division itself did little.31The Pakistani GHQ was perturbed by the
failure of 18 Division and was forced to break up their strategic reserve
infantry division sending one brigade to Chhor and another to
Shakargarh on 7th December.32 While the move of a brigade to Chhor
was most necessary that of sending one to Shakargarh was
avoidable.Indian 11 Division was assigned the task of capturing New
Chhor held by a Pakistani brigade supported by a tank squadron. A
force comprising 85 Infantry Brigade and an independent tank
squadron(T-55) was earmarked. This force contaced the outer
defences of New Chhor at Parbat Ali on 8th December. The Indians
wanted to mount a divisional attack on New Chhor but were delayed
due to administrative reasons. By 11th December the second Indian
brigade also reached the area. On 13th December the Indians
launched a brigade plus attack capturing Parbat Ali. However, their
time and space was by now totally off balance. The area had been
reinforced by another brigade of 33 Division and on 15th December as
per their own admission a probing force of the Indians opposite New
Chhor was severely mauled.33 This was done by 60 Brigade consisting
of three fine infantry units i.e 44 Punjab, 45 Punjab and 46 Baluch. 44
Punjab in particular distinguished itself at 199 and 200 r! The Brigade
in actual fact was commanded in the field by Lt Col (later Brig)
Muhammad Taj SJ & Bar, who was CO 44 Punjab (now 4 Sindh). 44
Punjab was the hub for the defence of Naya Chhor, the Indians actually
withdrew in the face of aggressive patrolling. This fact was
acknowledged by Indian GOC 11 Division in his flag meeting with Major
General Iqbal (later CJCSC) after the war.34

There is a Nicholson Memorial at Taxila but no memorial in Chhor for

Pakistan Army soldiers who saved Sindh in 1971! It is an irony of
Pakistani military history that Major General Shaukat Riza has not
mentioned this incident at all while it was Major K.C Praval an Indian
military historian who acknowledged this fact.

On the other hand Fazal Muqeem criticises the decision of sending 60

Brigade to Sindh. Had 60 Brigade not come to New Chhor the Indians
may not have stopped before reaching Mirpur Khas! Fazal Muqeem
thus did not mention 60 Brigade at all in his book. Perhaps doing so
would have contradicted his brilliant criticism of dividing 33 Division!
The Indian brigade operating in Umerkot-Nagarparkar area captured
many thousand square miles but all these consisted of empty desert.

Another aspect of military history writing in Pakistan is regimental bias

and personal likes and dislikes. It is significant that all the three units
of 60 Brigade were new units and thus not worthy of being mentioned
by stalwarts from old units. The same was the case with Bara Pind
where 31 Cavalry and 27 Cavalry were praised by Indians for better
planning and good battle procedures but were not praised by any
Pakistani military historian!At one stage during the war the Indian GHQ
wanted Southern Command to capture Badin with a brigade group
from Kutch side but this idea was dropped because of
administrative/logistic problems.35

ANALYSIS

Quality of Strategic Orientation

Both sides were equally barren in terms of strategic insight. Thus one
Indian army officer who occuped a senior position in 1971 noted “At
the time of the Bangladesh War no institution of Indian Army taught or
studied strategy”. Thus as per Jacob “no realistic ,overall estimate of
war situations by the Army Headquarters was made”.

There was in fact no strategic or political definition of policy,nor an

appropriate higher command organisation to plan or direct the war”.36
Jacob states that Manekshaws handling of senior officers was not
conducive to creating confidence.37Intellectually speaking the
Pakistani higher command was an equal negation of two nation theory
at least in terms of mediocrity in higher ranks.

Starting from what East Pakistan the Pakistani GHQ had a naively
simplistic attitude towards Bengali separatism. They did not realise
that political problems could seriously compromise the strategic
equilibrium of the army. This dawned upon them only once the army’s
reserve 9 and 16 Divisions were airlifted to East Pakistan in March-April
1971. If two divisions were raised to replace 9 and 17 Divisions in 1971
two divisions could have been raised to serve in East Pakistan in the
period 1965-66!
The much trumpeted phrase defence of East Pakistan lies in West
Pakistan was an oversimplified and highly vague statement.Thus the
admission of Fazal Muqeem that as earlier discussed no one knew what
action would be taken in West Pakistan if an attack was mounted
against East Pakistan. This was not because Yahya or his junta was
intellectually inferior in any manner than the Ayub-Musa duo but
simply because by 1971 the strategic balance had overwhelmingly
tilted in favour of India! As a matter of fact Pakistan Army improved in
the positive direction after 1965 and Yahya relatively speaking was a
far better professional than Musa. He was, however, only an individual
and could not alter the movement of historical forces which were far
stronger than any individual actor. He was the product of an age and a
military system which wanted to produce Indian officers who could
command companies but not brigades or divisions what to talk of a
corps or an army.

The only answer to Pakistan’s strategic dilemma was to mount a pre-

emptive attack on India in Monsoon season before the Indian Army had
fully mobilised and the Himalayan Passes had not become snow bound.
This did not happen because Indira Gandhi conducted skilful diplomacy
and also because Pakistan’s military junta lacked strategic insight.

Indian Western Command C in C Candeth admitted the fact that all

Indian plans to attack Pakistan would have gone to winds had Pakistan
attacked in October 1971.38 Thus Candeth’s remark that “Yahya Khan
had tarried too long and had missed the boat”. Degree of Success of
Diversionary attacksThe Pakistani GHQ had a difficult task as far as
balancing means availabale and ends sought were concerned. Despite
inept execution diversionary attacks did overthrow Indian plans off
balance. Thus the Poonch operation affected Indian 1 Corps plans in
Sialkot-Shakargarh because of despatch of 33 Brigade from 1 Corps to
15 Corps area opposite Poonch. Similarly the ill-fated Longanewala-
Jaisalmer operation made the Indians abandon their plans to conduct
offensive operations against Rahimyarkhan. The 105 Brigade operation
against Sulaimanke came very close to strategic success and both the
local brigade commander and the corps commander wanted to
withdraw to Fazilka 15 Kilometres to the rear. This was only stopped
once Candeth stepped in. Timidity at Operational LevelWhile the lower
levels of command were in relatively high spirits timidity at operational
level severely retarded conduct of operations.Glaring among all was
conduct of 1 Corps Commander in Ravi-Chenab Corridor who was
overcome by inertia and indecision from day one.
Throughout the war he reacted to Indian moves rather than making
any attempt to make the opposing Indian commander react to his
moves despite the fact that he had sufficient reserves to do
so.Compare his conduct with that of GOC 23 Division General Eftikhar
who achieved a breakthrough despite having no superiority at all. On
the other hand 1 Corps Headquarter functioned like a glorified post
office simply processing reinforcement requests and waiting for the
enemy to breach the last Pakistani minefield.Indian 1 Corps
Commander also proceeded with equal caution but was forced to
attack since he had been ordered to attack. Even then he did so in a
fairly bureaucratic manner, neatly dividing his armour so that all
divisional attacks made progress but no major breakthrough was
achieved. The average sub continental corps commander’s first priority
was security and safety rather than speed and dynamism in the
conduct of operations.

In words of an Indian observer 1 Corps advance in Shakargarh

was “pathetic”... “the plan was not designed for a quick
advance but was merely to play safe”!39

This was despite the fact that this illustrious career officer had fought
the 1965 War in the same sector (pathetically at Gadgor), had served
as Director Military Operations and then risen to three star rank to
command India’s elite strike corps on the Western Front!

Praval described this illustrious three stars corps battle as one

“smitten with indecision”, a corps whose offensive failed “without
the capture of its initial objectives” ...one which advanced just 13
kilometres in 12 days.40

I would say that this man was no different from any of the top
brass I saw in my 13 years service ! Ones who have an
immense sense of timing , not in matters operational or
strategic but in personal career planning and getting the right
ACR from the right man at the right time ! It is consoling to
hear from General Jacob that the same state of affairs plagues
the Indian High Command to date! 41

Missed Opportunities

There were certain missed opportunities in the war in the sense that
the wrong men were at the right places.Thus Major General Eftikhar a
highly operationally gifted commander was given a limited offensive
role and limited resources.Had this man been given one more infantry
brigade and an armoured brigade he could conveniently have forced
the Indians to shift brigades from 1 Corps area into Chamb. As a
matter of fact at one stage in battle one of the brigades in 1 Corps
area was alerted to move to Chamb. Similarly had this man been the
Pakistani Corps Commander in 1 Corps the whole story of conduct of
operations may have been different.

Similarly in 105 Brigade area with just another armoured regiment

Amir Hamza could have achieved a breakthrough and gone right till
Bikanir Canal. It is a credit to this indomitable leader of men that
despite no superiority in resources he almost made the Indians
abandon Sabuna Line and advocate withdrawal to Fazilka and Gong
Canal.

But then Hamza was packed off as a major general and Pakistan Army
was gifted with four stars who had not been seen by the FOOs of their
divisional artillery throughout the war!

Chances of Success of the Counter Offensive

There has been too much rhetoric about the Pakistani Counter
Offensive that was never launched.In the first place once the war
started the counter offensive was already late by one month as
Candeth stated.

Secondly the objectives of the counter offensive i.e Bhatinda or some

say even Ludhiana were unrealistic if we keep in mind the pathetic
performance of Pakistani armour in 1965 despite having achieved total
strategic surprise and having relatively better equipment.
THE AUTHORS FATHER WHO SERVED AS CO OF THE ENGINEER
BATTALION TASKED FOR BRIDGING THE CANAL FOR 2 CORPS
COUNTER OFFENSIVE STATED THAT THE 1ST ARMOURED
DIVISION OFFICERS WERE LEAST INTERESTED IN THE PLANNED
ATTACK .THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS WAS THE CO 12
CAVALRY SHAH RAFI ALAM.

Thirdly while in 1965 Pakistan’s armoured division was only opposed

by a weak infantry division and later by a weak tank brigade, here was
a situation where the Indian armoured division was already well poised
and waiting for the attack. The result would have been a clash of
armour in almost equal strength with both sides getting bloody noses
and achieving nothing on the strategic plane.

True that the Pakistanis may have had a free run till Gong Canal or
even a little to its east but East Pakistan was already lost and by the
time Pakistan Army was across the Gong Canal it would have been
facing the first additional Indian corps arriving from East Pakistan. That
is if the counter attack was to be launched on 16 December as
planned.

There was a chance of achieving some success in case the counter

offensive had been launched on 4th or 5th December, but then
Pakistani Higher Command was against it.No tribute to their strategic
acumen!

Analysis of Casualties

An analysis of casualties prove that the bulk of the fighting was done
firstly by 23 Division at Chamb which suffered almost half of the
casualties sustained in the Western Theatre. Similarly this division
inflicted the heaviest number of casualties on the Indians.

Second as per this scale was 105 Brigade at Sulaimanke which

suffered second highest casualties on Indians despite having no
superiority in numbers. Third position may be assigned to the forces
opposite Poonch.

The Indians opposite 105 Brigade lost more men than opposite 8
Division at Sialkot. The magnitude may be imagined from the fact that
while the Indians lost some 67 Killed and 90 wounded at Hilli from 23rd
November to 11 December, 39 at Sulaimanke they lost something like
190 Killed and 196 Missing most of whom were killed or prisoners and
425 wounded.42

Formation Killed Missing Wounded Prisoner Total Remarks

10 Division 440 190 723 1353 Chamb

54 Division 76 272 298 Shakargarh

67 Brigade 190 196 425 811 Sulaimanke

4 Para 21 60 81 Jalwala

Shyok-Kargil 55 28 195 278

Rest of 846 Cannot be 2546 No Exact 3703 Formations on reconciled

figures Western Front with missing and prisoners Total 6,524 The
following table showing Indian casualties on the entire Western Front in
1971 is self explanatory:—43

Almost half of the casualties sustained by the Pakistan Army in the

Western Theatre were sustained by the valiant 23 Division.Thus while
total army casualties in the western Theatre were 4,958 those of 23
Division alone were 2,216.44

Defence as the stronger form of war

The lessons of 1971 War were not digested by Asian countries.Indian
Army on the Western Front had failed throughout the war to achieve
any breakthrough on the Western Theatre.Similarly the Indian efforts
to attack positions in East Pakistan mostly failed. This lesson was
convincingly once again proved in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 when
both sides failed to achieve any breakthrough.East Pakistan where the
Indian Army did achieve a breakthrough was an exceptional case
where conditions were highly unnatural and where superiority was
overwhelming.

Thus the validity of Indian analyst Brigadier Sodhi’s conclusion that

“the success of the army in Bangladesh was mainly due to peculiar
conditions prevailing there,which are difficult to imagine obtaining in
any future war” and that “the true performance of the army was in the
Western Theatre”45 whereas per Sodhi the Indian Army failed to
overcome any main enemy position.

I am not implying that things would have remained the same if all
three corps committed in East Pakistan had arrived. However, even
then the cost would have been high. One which Indira Gandhi was not
willing to pay. Thus the unilateral Indian ceasefire of 17th December
1971!

No attack succeeded anywhere except in Chamb where the general

officer commanding was of an exceptionally high calibre. The defender
was stronger and the Chawinda experience of smaller forces defeating
larger forces when smaller forces was convincingly proved when three
Pakistani tank regiments miserably failed to make a dent against one
Indian tank regiment. All battles where any side did well were battles
in which the side which performed better was in defence. This was
because of the immense lethality of modern weapons and increased
ground friction.

Thus 6 FF inflicted maximum casualties on Indians while it was

defending Sabuna Drain rather than when it attacked it. Shakargarh
again was triumph of defence.Use of ReservesThe decision to divide 33
Division after failure of the 18 Division Operation opposite
Longanewala was subjected to much criticism by Fazal Muqeem. While
sending one brigade might sound unnecessary there is no doubt that
the decision to send 60 Brigade and a tank regiment (Guides Cavalry)
to 18 Division area was a sound operational decision.

The situation after the Longanewala fiasco was serious, had the Indians
exploited it. Even the Indian historian noted that 12 Division missed a
rare opportunity.46 In this case Yahya and his team reacted
correctly.At the strategic level both sides showed a remarkable
hesitation in use of reserves which illustrates that generalship at
higher level was barren.

What is the use of a strategic reserve that is never used. Thus both
sides armoured divisions were not committed and both sides at the
highest level were happy that these were not committed.Yahya stated
unofficially in private conversations that the armour commanders
particularly Gul Hassan and some other generals had lost the will to
fight. Gul claims in his memoirs that it was Yahya who was delaying
the counter offensive.47 An engineer battalion commander who this
scribe interviewed stated that 1st Armoured Division staff and
commanders less than lieutenant colonel Shah Rafi Alam showed no
interest in bridging plans across Gong Canal ! Perhaps by December
1971 some had lost the will to fight.

There was perhaps a deeper philosophical explanation. Long ago Carl

Von Clausewitz beautifully summed up Yahya Khan’s dilemma once he
said ‘There are two considerations which as motives may practically
take the place of inability to continue the contest. The first is the
improbable, the second is the excessive price of success’!48 Perhaps
Yahya was more concerned about saving West Pakistan which would
have come under heavy attack once three Indian corps free from the
Eastern Theatre were to be shifted to the Western Theatre! The
decision which Yahya took was based on a rationale and was not an act
of a drunkard as was later claimed in cheap polemics!

Use of ad hoc forces and minefields

If desert delayed Indians in 11 and 12 Division areas, minefields and

Changez Force played a major role in delaying the Indians in 8 Division
area. Changez Force was an ad hoc force raised under Brigadier Nisar
of Gadgor fame who had by a rare exercise of coup d oeil blocked the
Indian 1st Armoured Division in 1965. Changez Force operated in
between the three layers of minefields in Shakargarh Bulge.

Even the Indian Armoured Corps historian acknowledged its role when
he stated “Pak armour functioned well in the role of covering troops.It
managed to delay a superior armour force for a longer period than it
could have been planned for”.49 Praval acknowledged the effect of
minefields when he said “1 Corps commenced operations in an area
which was very heavily defended by minefields”.50
Influence of Generalship on Operations in the Field

In most of the formations on both sides general officers preferred

conducting the battle by wireless and telephone. Moltke the Elder
correctly stated “It is a delusion, when one believes that one can plan
an entire campaign and carry out its planned end ... the first battle will
determine a new situation through which much of the original plan will
become inapplicable”.51 Moltke went further and said “Everything
comes to this; To be able to recognise the changed situation and order
the foreseeable course and prepare it energetically”.52 John Keegan
described the German definition of operational strategy in the
following words:- “Even higher in the German army’s scale of values
than the nature of the warrior spirit in its conscripts stood the
cultivation of operational talent in their leaders. Operative is an
adjective which does not translate exactly into English military
vocabulary. Lying somewhere between “Strategic” and “tactical”, it
describes the process of transforming paper plans into battlefield
practice, against the tactical pressures of time which the strategist
does not know, and has been regarded by the German army as the
most difficult of the commanders art since it was isolated by the great
Moltke in the 1860s. Taught in so far as it can be taught, in his famous
staff college courses, its traits were eagerly looked for in the
performance of general staff candidates and its manifestation in
practice. In war time it was rewarded by swift promotion”.53 In 1 Corps
area on both Indian and Pakistani side general officers fought the
battle from their headquarters. A young officer then serving as a
liaison officer described the siting of the headquarter of one infantry
brigade commander near Zafarwal with immense care to ensure that
nothing in the Indian armoury could have even a dent on this great
field commanders headquarter.54 The battles in this area were fought
by troops who fought well but were not led by dynamic
commanders.What was Bara Pind? A battle in which Indian position
was saved by the skin of its teeth55 because of the last ditch stand by
a troop leader who was a subaltern ! No tribute to Vaidya the brigade
commander or the 54 Division Commander! What was glorious about
Jarpal and Barapind apart from the stoical bravery of 13 Lancers,31
Cavalry and 35 FF ! It was only in Chamb in Pakistan’s 23 Division that
operational leadership in its true dimension was exhibited ! General
Eftikhar was a dynamic leader of men praised by Indian military
historian Praval as one who exhibited “commendable flexibility” .....
“one who showed skill and determination in carrying out his
mission”.56 In the true Clausewitzian definition of a military genius he
spread light around with the spark of his breast, exhorting men to drive
on, exposing himself countless times to fire ! If he expected too much
then there is no doubt that he gave too much and to this day his name
is remembered with great respect by old veterans of 11 Cavalry
(Frontier Force) who was lucky to serve under his command!57 His
photograph hangs in the officers mess and every second lieutenant
from the military academy is told about his exploits. The tragedy is
that Eftikhar was a piece of rock in empty space,a lone lighthouse in a
sea of mediocrity! The Eftikhar way of command was never
institutionalised! Thus General Eftikhar was able to pierce the veil of
darkness with his rapier like operational vision; overcoming all the
stumbling blocks in his way; facing the barrage of conflicting
information passed on through the subjective process of distortion of
informaiton; as it is passed from the lower to the higher echelons in
crisis situation. In Clausewitzian terms General Eftikhar whose
generalship and personality comes closest to the Clausewitzian frame
of the ideal military commander as far as Indo-Pak sub-continent is
concerned he “stood like a rock against which the sea breaks its fury in
vain”.58 A battle was fought by a general officer at the true
operational level in 1971 only by Pakistan’s Major General Eftikhar. It is
an irony of Pakistani military history that many of our so-called military
heroes at the general level had nothing to do with any operational
strategy in any war! It is a strange fact that this man’s generalship in
1971 was not given the space of a line by Pakistan Army’s last C in C in
his voluminous memoirs despite the fact that Gul claimed that Eftikhar
was his friend!59

Artillery as a factor in success or failure

Artillery had played a major role in many Pakistani successes. On the

other hand where artillery factor was missing invariably failures
occurred. The Bara Pind Counter attack apart from other factors was a
glaring example of failure in absence of artillery. Absence of sufficient
artillery played a major role in many of Pakistani failures in East
Pakistan. Even the Indian bypassing of Pakistani defences had a link
with absence of sufficient artillery with Pakistani forces.

Conclusion

Strategic ineptness and phenomenal operational incompetence

triumphed on both sides of the Radcliffe Line in 1971. Bravery at junior
level compensated things to some extent. What did India achieve apart
from simplifying Pakistan’s strategic problems is for Indians to ponder.
They did inflict a severe psychological defeat on Pakistan which in turn
has given birth to a dangerous kind of extremism in the post-1971
politics.

When the student attending the armed forces war course at the
prestigious National Defence College writing a paper on 1971 War
claims with pride that all major Pakistani garrisons had survived
surrender in 1971 till the fall of Dacca,he is stating a truism which even
a student at infantry school knows.

What is the glory in holding individual garrisons when higher

headquarters lost the will to fight and an army of brave men was
condemned to incarceration in prisoner of war camps for two years! On
the other hand there is little comfort in the fact that we were
strategically inept and saved from total elimination simply because our
enemy is equally inept at the strategic level. Vajpayee is too late in
trying to solve the Pakistan problem in the post-Pokhran stage. What
could have been achieved by dishing out a few ministries to Indian
Muslims by Nehru in 1937 cannot be today accomplished by an Indian
with a fine nuclear arsenal!

The finest compliment to Indian political leadership was paid by

General Jacob when he stated “At the negotiating table at Simla we
were unable to obtain a permanent settlement of outstanding issues
with Pakistan. The advantages gained on the battlefield were frittered
away at the Simla Conference”!60

In 1971 the Pakistan Army army fought a war albeit half heartedly and
had many heroes who did well and are remembered. An uncertain
future faces us. This century has seen great armies,once considered
impregnable collapsing without fighting a battle simply because their
highest political leadership betrayed them!

Thus the suicide note of Marshal Akhromyev of USSR, “Everything I

have devoted my whole life to building is collapsing”. Armies are
defeated but survive defeats. They are only destroyed once their
leaders betray them like Tejh Singh and Lal Singh betrayed the Khalsa
in 1845-46!

The Anatomy of Indo-Pak Wars

A Strategic and Operational Analysis

India and Pakistan have fought three declared wars and many
undeclared wars of proxy or low intensity wars. This article is a brief
analysis of the essence of these wars at the strategic and operational
level.1947-48 Kashmir WarThe 1947-48 War was an improvised war
fought on an ad hoc basis. It began with some tangible operational
strategy and little definite strategy on the Pakistan side and a definite
operational strategy on the Indian side. At the onset Mr Jinnah the
Governor General of Pakistan ordered the British Acting C in C Pakistan
Army to order two brigades into Kashmir, one on the Sialkot-Jammu
Axis and the other on Murree-Muzaffarabad-Srinagar-Axis. This was a
tangible plan based on a precise strategy of severing Indian landward
and aerial lines of communication to Kashmir. The plan was rendered
null and void since the Britisher refused to obey Jinnah’s order.This was
followed by a hastily scrambled series of actions with regular Pakistan
Army officers leading irregulars, irregulars besieging Indian/Dogra
garrisons and conducting mini-wars against Chamb, Naushera,
Srinagar, Skardu, Leh etc. In April 1948 the regular Pakistan Army
entered the scene. At this stage the Indians were in a strategically
disadvantageous position. Leh being cut off, Poonch besieged, Skardu
besieged, Naushera threatened etc. At this stage the Pakistani strategy
was to contain Indian Army advance towards Muzaffarabad, capture
Poonch and safeguard Pakistan’s soft underbelly opposite Gujrat. No
one at this stage thought of a ceasefire, which would have been of
great strategic advantage to Pakistan. The Indians conceived a fine
plan to outflank Muzaffarabad and executed a brilliant brigade level
march across against the 3,000 metres plus high Nastachun Pass, thus
unexpectedly forcing their way with great ease to Tithwal. The
Pakistani official history noted “Brigadier Harbux Singh, commander of
the 163 Brigade waited at Tithwal for two days to let the rest of his
brigade join him there . He lingered a little longer to prepare for his
next move and perhaps also to coordinate his moves with that of the
Indian offensive in the Jhelum Valley for a two pronged push towards
Muzaffarabad. This delay changed the subsequent course of history in
Kishanganga Valley, as it enabled the first two companies of 4/16
Punjab under Major Mohammad Akbar Khan to reach by a forced march
in the vicinity of Tithwal and take up positions there”1. The Pakistanis
saved their position by reinforcing it with a brigade.On the operational
level the Pakistanis did well by capturing Pandu a position of tactical
importance in the Jhelum Valley by a brilliant infiltration plan conceived
by Commander 101 Brigade Brigadier Akbar Khan DSO with the
indomitable Major Ishaq MC as his Brigade Major. Akbar deputed Lt Col
Harvey Kelly, commanding 4/10 Baluch to plan the attack in detail.2
Pandu, however, was an operational episode of great tactical
significance but limited strategic value.From April 1948 to December
1948 the Pakistani GHQ merely reacted tactically moving companies
and battalions while the Indians moved strategically. In Phase One,
they recaptured Rajauri the gateway to Poonch with a single tank
squadron! In Phase Two, they achieved two strategic triumphs! They
forced their way through Zojila Pass driving on to relieve Leh and
capture Kargil Dras and they relieved Poonch which was a mini-Indian
East Pakistan surrounded from all sides by Pakistani troops.At this
stage the Pakistani GHQ had conceived the Operation Venus. Venus
was a thrust against the Indian line of communication leading to
Poonch Valley with an infantry and a heavy tank brigade in Naushera-
Beri Patan area. At this stage the Indians were involved in the relief of
Poonch and Leh and strategically off balance. The official account of
1970, however, maintains that the aim of Venus was not to sever the
Indian line of communication to Poonch but merely to force the Indians
for ceasefire which they did and which came into effect on night 31
Dec 1948/01 January 1949. If ceasefire was the aim then the Pakistani
strategy was barren since a ceasefire in July 1948 would have been far
more strategically desirable! This was so since in April 1948 Zojila
(captured by Gilgit Scouts under Lieut Shah Khan on 7th July 1948) the
gateway to Srinagar as well as Ladakh in Pakistani hands, the frontline
near Rajauri and Poonch surrounded by Pakistani troops/irregulars. It is
not clear what the Pakistani GHQ advised the civilians at this stage but
no records have been made public which prove that they gave any
advice!In the 1960s General Fazal-i- Muqeem asserted that the
ceasefire of 1948 took place to the army’s horror since the army was
close to a great victory. However, this point is refuted by the Pakistan
Army’s Official account of 1970. Much later in 1976 General Sher Ali
who was commanding a brigade of the Venus Force asserted that had
the operation been launched Pakistani tanks would have been in
Jammu within no time! This has to be taken with a pinch of salt once
we compare it to the performance of armour in an offensive role in
1965 and 1971!The Kashmir War ended with the Indians as masters of
Poonch Valley, Srinagar Valley and Leh Valley but with a
communication to all three valleys running precariously close to the
Pakistani border! Thus strategically the Indian position despite all their
strategic triumphs was not secure since their line of communications
offered multiple objectives to any single Pakistani thrust. One tank
brigade with a twenty mile thrust could threaten the existence of a
whole Indian army corps. The Indians took no care to remedy this state
of affairs despite many war games held in their Kashmir Corps to show
that the Pakistanis could threaten the Indian line of communication in
Poonch Valley.31965 WarThe 1965 War was a comical affair! Civilians
at the foreign ministry assessed that the Indians could be knocked out
at the strategic level while soldiers at the highest military level and
political level, the president being a soldier were not interested in any
military adventure. The civilian hawks led by Bhutto, however, were in
league with a group of generals and brigadiers within the army and
finally succeeded in persuading the president(famous for tactical
timidity in Burma) into embarking on a military adventure. Musa the
army chief had little strategic insight and was against any military
adventure in which he may be forced to exercise his qualities of
leadership! Musa had rudimentary understanding of strategy and tank
warfare since he was a political choice appointed more because he was
seen as politically no threat rather than for any military strategic or
operational talent!The Pakistani offensive plan i.e. a thrust against
Indian line of communication at Akhnur in case of a limited war in
Kashmir or/and against Indian line of communication between Indian
Corps holding Ravi-Sutlej Corridor at Jandiala Guru on Amritsar-
Jullundhur road in case of an all out war was brilliant in conception.
This was so because if successful any of the two plans would have
forced the Indians to sue for peace at best and to surrender at worst.
No less an authority than the Indian Western Command C in C
Harbaksh Singh thus confessed“A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory
towards the Grand Trunk Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us
in the helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for
want of readily available reserves while the enemy was inexorably
pushing deep into our vitals. It is a nightmarish feeling even when
considered in retrospect at this stage”.To the Pakistan Army’s
misfortune a plan which was brilliant at the strategic and operational
level failed simply because those who were leading the military
machine at the highest level lacked the strategic insight as well as
resolution! The first opportunity was thus missed in Chamb-Jaurian
Sector, when even a foreigner i.e. Chinese Foreign Minister visiting
Pakistani thought that Akhnur5 was the key!The second and most
serious operational failure occurred in Khem Karan.This had more to do
with poor execution at the divisional and brigade level and poor initial
higher organization and composition of troops at the divisional level.
The first being an operational failure and the second being an
organizational failure at the higher command level.At the operational
and tactical level three events stand out in the war i.e. the Grand Slam
Operation in Chamb-Jaurian, blunting of Indian offensive at Chawinda
at Gadgor on 8th September when one lone tank regiment gave a
severe mauling to two tank regiments out of a total available Indian
force of an armoured division, and a brigade level counter attack in
Lahore Sector.Grand Slam failed because of change of command! Not
because Akhtar Malik was better than Yahya but because one man
either Akhtar or Yahya should have conducted the whole operation!
The Indians admitted that their position was saved because of the
pause of 48 hours, which occurred at Tawi after the Pakistani Chief
Musa ordered change of horses in the mid stream!Now the battle of
Gadgor. Technically Gadgor was 24 Infantry Brigade Group versus 1st
Indian Armoured Division. In reality the contest was 25 Cavalry versus
Poona and Hodsons Horse since 24 Brigade Commander told Colonel
Nisar to “do something”6 the vaguest order of 1965 War! Nisar had no
idea of what was in front but by a miraculous coup d oeil deployed his
tank regiment 25 Cavalry in a manner which would produce an instant
nervous breakdown in an instructor who taught tank tactics at the
armour school! 25 Cavalry was deployed by Nisar like a thin line of
steel! Like a thin net to catch a whale! The manoeuvre if it can be
called one succeeded because the Indian brigade commander was
paralysed by the fog of war! Thus Commander Indian 1st Armoured
Brigade saw a finger as a mountain! He saw a threat to his flanks
which in reality was a half squadron of Indian 62 Cavalry which had lost
its way and fired at Indian Artillery opposite Rangre! What Nisar
deployed after the “Do Something” order was seen by the Indian
brigade commander as a tank brigade! Thus he lost the will to use two
uncommitted tank regiments to outflank the Pakistani position! Gadgor
was a psychological defeat inflicted on K.K Singh by Nisar with Nisar
not knowing what was in front of him and K.K Singh over estimating
three times what was really in front of him. Thus in cognitive terms, at
Gadgor was a tank regiment commander who did not know what was
in front of him against a tank brigade commander who was overawed
by what he assessed was in front of him and was reduced into a state
of total inertia and indecision. The important factor in this decisive
battle was the fact that tangibly K.K Singh had the third tank regiment
as well as three uncommitted squadrons within his two committed tank
regiments with which he could have easily outflanked Nisar and got to
his rear! Nisar had tangibly no reserves with which he could have
countered K.K’s outflanking manoeuvre.The counter attack of Brigadier
Qayyum Sher in Lahore Sector was a successful divisional battle
ordered by Major General Sarfaraz MC and executed by Brigadier
Qayyum Sher most resolutely! It produced a crisis on the Indian side
and threw the Indians off balance! Both retired in the same rank
sometimes after the war!1971 WarThe 1971 War was a strange war!
The Indians won great glory but failed to strategically solve their
military problems! They overran East Pakistan creating a new state of
Bangladesh but merely reduced Pakistan’s defence problems and
increased their own problems by creating a new state which became
more hostile to India and is far more difficult to militarily to deal with
than the old East Pakistan!The Indians, and an authority no less
eminent than their 1971 GOC Western Command General Candeth
have admitted that had the Pakistanis started a pre-emptive war in
October 1971 all their plans to attack East Pakistan would have been
thrown to the winds!7 But strategic insight had not been inculcated yet
in the Pakistan Army! The Pakistanis waited and allowed the Indians to
attack them in December 1971.Much has been said about a Pakistani
counter offensive in December 1971 to save East Pakistan. At this
stage the Indian 1 Corps was in position and the Pakistani Higher
Command like K.K Singh on 8th September to gamble their last card!
There was a reason for this inaction. One that the cost was too heavy
and the second that armour higher commanders (the CGS Gul Hassan
and GOC 1st Armoured Division) as Yahya Khan asserts had lost the
will to launch an attack.Two cases of operational brilliance and one
case of a Gadgor type tactical heroic stand out in 1971. These are the
cases of the Pakistani 23 Division offensive in Chamb, the Indian
defence of Poonch and the Barapind-Jarpal Battle. In Chamb Pakistan’s
General Eftikhar successfully fought a divisional battle in which he
deliberately manoeuvred a force of two plus tank regiments inflicting a
severe mauling on the Indians forcing them to abandon Chamb.
Eftikhar was firmly in control at all stages. When his initial tank thrust
was checked at Maandiala he did not sink into inertia or indecision like
K.K Singh at Gadgor or Pakistan’s Naseer at Khem Karan! Nor did
Eftikhar tell his armoured brigade commander to “Do Something”!
Eftikhar did not abdicate the conduct of operational strategy to any
tank regiment of tank brigade commander! He resolutely regrouped
his command and launched another attack from the south emerging
victorious! The second case was the Indian stand at Poonch. The
Pakistanis conceived a fine plan to capture Poonch but the Indian
brigade commander at Poonch was too resolute while the Pakistani
divisional and brigade commanders at Poonch lost their nerve!The
third case of a Gadgor type battle occurred at Barapind! Here the
Pakistani tank brigade commander gave a simple order to resort to
counter penetration to his tank regiment commander who on his own
converted it into an attack! Unfortunately he carried out a piece meal
attack, first sending in a squadron and then two more! The Indians
admit that had 13 Lancers attacked with all three squadrons8 they
would have broken through despite nominal artillery support. The hero
of this battle was not the Indian brigade or regiment commander but
the Indian squadron who blunted the attack and the Indian troop
leader Arun Khetarpal who stopped the attack by skin of his teeth
losing his life in the process! In words of Indian Armoured Corps
historian the Indian success was attributable to a ‘last ditch stand by
just one tank troop leader’.1984 CrisisThe 1984 Crisis was a calculated
Indian response against alleged Pakistani involvement in the Sikh
Insurgency in Punjab. Tangibly the Indian position was far superior to
Pakistan since Pakistan Army was still equipped with the old T-59s. The
situation was saved by two Individuals who polished off the Indian
‘Durga Devi’ thus leading to a swift de-escalation of the crisis.Siachen
Crisis 1984-To Date A case of zero strategic insight on the Indian side
and of personal ambition on part of two and three star Indian generals
to start private wars to gain promotion. Both sides gained nothing and
one Indian Division and one Pakistani brigade is committed to a mad
sentry duty role since 1984!1987 CrisisThe 1987 Crisis was a case of
over enthusiasm at the military level with little outward enthusiasm at
the highest political level. The Indian Chief Sundarji was living in
visions of Glory and visualized that a military manoeuvre would
escalate into a war which would lead to a successful Indian military
thrust severing the Pakistani line of communication in Rahimyar Khan
Sector thus leading to the emergence of a new state in Pakistani Sindh
and the creation of a second Indian Field Marshal after Manekshaw i.e
Sundarji!Comically Sundarji’s visions of glory were not matched by
strategic insight! Thus he was overawed into inaction and inertia like
K.K Singh at Gadgor, once the Pakistani High Command relocated the
Pakistani reserves northwards in a purely defensive move!1987 was a
watershed and marked the Indian Army at its lowest position in the
eyes of the highest Indian political leadershipvis-a-vis the high position
of 1971. Sundarji destroyed all that the Indian Army had gained in 25
years with one night of irresolution and inertia!1999 CrisisThe 1999
Crisis in Kargil were the result of an audacious Pakistani plan to inflict a
sharp but highly subtle psychological defeat on the Indians by
threatening the Indian line of communication to Leh and Siachen by
placing a small Pakistani force on the heights overlooking the Dras-
Kargil-Leh Road. The execution at tactical level was brilliant albeit
marked by poor logistic arrangements at divisional level! The Pakistani
political leadership lost the resolution to press home the move to its
final conclusion. Full facts are not available about what the Pakistan
Army’s highest leadership wanted at this point in time.The Indians
payed a heavy price in terms of casualties for an intelligence failure.
What Pakistan gained or lost is not clear although a debate continues
about who was Kargils winner. Kargil stands out as merely one stage in
a long series of actions in Pakistani military history. If Kargil was a
political failure then logically the army should have packed off the
political leadership in June 1999! Yet it chose to blame Nawaz only
later on like it blamed Liaquat for calling off Operation Venus in 1948!
Have things changed or we changed!ConclusionIndo-Pak Military
history is a continuous story of strategic failures and a mix of
operational successes and failures. At the tactical level both the armies
fought well.The reasons for the strategic failures are historical. Both
states are successor states of the British Colonial Indian Empire.
Indians were not groomed or trained for making strategic decisions.
Strategic insight is the result of a process spread over many
generations. The German General Staff was not created by a sudden
flight. Even the British Empire was not created by the strategic genius
of one man! Militarily the failure of both armies at the higher level is
more easy to understand. Both were the continuation of a colonial
army designed for internal security and brigade level actions. The
Indian Army in WW Two either fought as part of a larger British Army or
in circumstances of immense material superiority with massive US
military aid as in Burma! The political failure in Pakistan is equally
simple to explain since in words of Mr Jinnah most of the Muslim
politicians would not do anything without consulting the DC (Deputy
Commissioner)! That may be a reason why Nawaz Sharif went to DC!

Indo-Pak Wars
A Strategic Summing Up
Clausewitz states that it is far more difficult to understand strategy
than tactics since things move very slowly in strategy and the principal
actors are far away from the heat and friction of the battlefield. Thus
strategy is a hundred more times difficult to comprehend and conduct
than tactics. In this final chapter which sums up all that happened we
will endeavour to arrive at a strategic summing up. The first fact that
stands out is that the men who dominated the Indo-Pak scene, in the
period that we have studied, both soldiers and politicians, were all
tacticians, none being a strategist! They, some of whom were great
men, were caught in historical currents, which were too strong to be
manipulated! On one side was a Jungian situation with deep hatred of
communalism firmly ingrained in the unfathomed and mysterious
subconscious of the vast bulk of the populace! An irrational albeit
substantial hatred that increased with leaps and bounds as ambitious
middle and higher classes fought for jobs and legislative council seats!
These men were clever in a tactical way, having been to some British
University or a Legal Inn and were driven by burning egos to be the
successors of the British Viceroys! Initially they borrowed some leafs
from Europe’s Nationalism and talked about India and India’s
independence as a country! Politics, however, remained in the drawing
rooms of rich businessmen and feudals and chambers of barristers and
lawyers till the First World War. The First World War constitutes a
watershed in world history! It destroyed five Empires, four i.e the
Romanoff, Hapsburg, Hohenzollern and Ottoman totally and one i.e the
British who won the war but theirs was a Pyhric victory! They lost the
will to retain their empire since the flower of its youth was destroyed
on the battlefields of France! This fact was indirectly acknowledged by
Alan Brooke the British Warlord once he admitted in writing that Britain
lost its best men in the First World War. The First World War aroused
great expectations in India and the mild lawyers who dominated the
Indian political scene before the war saw far greater opportunities in
the near future! If Lenin could mobilize the masses in the name of
revolution and Kemal could do it in the name of Turkish Nationalism,
why not mobilize the Indian masses too over some slogan! Alas India
was only a geographical expression! A mosaic of complicated ethnic
groups, castes, religions, sects! Who could be the Indian Lenin or
Mustafa Kemal! How to bring a revolution! A Hindu called Gandhi
discovered one cheap tactical response! A melodramatic employment
of ancient Indian/Hindu slogans and names! This wily man tactically
outwitted the outwardly more clever nationalists who dominated the
pre-war congress! Two Muslims also arrived at similar conclusions like
Gandhi! These were the Jauhar Brothers who mobilized the Indian
Muslims in the name of Islam by unsolicitedly taking up the already
doomed c!ause of the Turkish Caliphate! Religion was injected in the
blood of Indian politics! It started from Punjab, which had been bled,
white on the bloody fields of Flanders, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli and
Egypt! Martial Law was imposed in the Punjab in 1919! The sword arm
of India, at least the areas south of Chenab, was now suddenly
transformed into a bastion of revolutionary activity! The Britishers
were saved simply because while Punjab burnt, Bengal was relatively
tranquil and UP was still not mobilized by Gandhi and Jauhar! Just like
1857 when UP was in rebellion and Punjab and Bengal were staunchly
loyal! Politicians in a vague political environment in which no one was
clear about India’s political future employed religion as a tactical
weapon! This was the period 1919-1923! What was the Khilafat Slogan
in the strategic sense, except as a short-term ploy to mobilize the
Indians! What was Gandhi’s Non- Co-operation without violence! A
river raised into a massive flood, which ended in a destination less
desert! Tactical behaviour does not lead to strategic results and this is
what happened! The Congress remained the largest organized party
but was perceived as a Hindu dominated entity by the more provincial
as well as Muslim dominated parties! The Khilafat exhausted the
Muslims without any long-term aims! The British came up with a
strategy of provincial autonomy with the carrot appointment of
provincial premiers that effectively checked chances of success of any
all India rebellion against the British! Mr Jinnah left the Congress but
was confined to the Muslim minority provinces! And had no concrete
programme, at least in the period 1923-39. So much for the politicians!
Now the soldiers! The Indians finally achieved their target of having
commissioned ranks in the army! Here too the victory was tactical!
Indians a term then used for all who lived in the Indo-Pak before 1947
were supposed to be platoon commanders or company commanders
and not battalion, brigade, divisional or corps commanders! Needless
to add some even today are platoon or company commanders despite
outwardly wearing ranks of brigade, divisional or corps commanders!
Pakistan was more unfortunate in having one who was the army chief
but functioned like a platoon commander during the period 1958-66!
Another such platoon cum corps commander doomed the Pakistani
cause in 1971 in the East Pakistan! True that he was an MC, but then
many JCOs were MCs and retired as MCs! If gallantry awards alone are
a criteria for higher ranks then at least five of Indian or Pakistan Army
chiefs should have been rankers who won the VC in WW Two! A fifty
percent ranker quota in the officer ranks deliberately imposed by the
British ensured that the Indian officer corps remained naive in essence!
The other fifty percent were also taken care of simply by ensuring that
watchful deputy commissioners weeded out the potentially brighter
and independent ones in the initial screening for officer ranks! The
Second World War changed everything! The British even then ensured
that no Indian should command anything beyond a battalion in actual
combat barring Thimaya who commanded a brigade in action in an
acting capacity! Instead the British promoted many Britons with five or
six years service to command brigades! Indians were kept at mostly
administrative jobs or did not cross the battalion commander line! This
was an imperial strategic response! The Britishers were clear that
more Indians in higher ranks after the war could be potentially
dangerous! Thus the response not to have Indians in higher ranks! The
Second World War, however, destroyed the British resolve to stay in
India! Even then what we call the Independence and what they call the
transfer of power in 1947 was their parting kick! One state too big to
be effective as an advanced and developed state and one state with a
geographical incoherence was their parting gift! The irrefutable lesson
of post-1919 Indian history is the fact that the British response at every
stage was strategic, while the Indian response at every stage was
tactical! The reason was simple! India was too diverse and disunited to
respond strategically! The Congress move not to have Muslim
ministers in UP in 1937 was a cheap tactical reaction which
strategically doomed the Congress aim to rule over an undivided India!
Mr Jinnah’s agreement on the clause that each princely state’s ruler
could opt to join India or Pakistan regardless of the states religious
composition was again a tactical response! The imposition of Boundary
Commissions to partition Punjab and Bengal were again strategic
responses of the British to ensure that Indo-Pak remains a hostage to a
vicious cycle of never ending disputes! The Second World War strategy
not to have Indians in higher ranks paid immense dividends in the First
1947-48 Indo-Pak War in Kashmir! Both the armies had British C in Cs
who were in constant communication with each other many times in a
day and conducted the strategy while Indian brigade and divisional
commanders took care of the tactical part! Mr Jinnah did make one
meaningful attempt to be the strategist once he ordered the Pakistan
Army into Kashmir but this move was blocked because Jinnah had no
capable lieutenant and institutionally the Pakistan Army was British
dominated! Mr Nehru remained a tactician even as prime minister of
India! He saw the army as a threat and attempted to reduce its
stature! He learnt his lesson in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and,
thereafter, did make an attempt to introduce strategic reforms in the
Indian Army. Pakistan on the other hand remained in the hands of
second rate tactician politicians who delayed constitution making
simply because the ruling elite which was from the west wing knew
that elections would mean sitting in the opposition ranks with a Bengal
Muslim Aborigine ruling them! The Pakistan Army was doomed to be
led by an indigenous chief who had no strategic understanding and did
not want to have anything to do with higher strategy! He did have
grandiose ideas like Napoleon the Third but lacked operational insight
or strategic depth. We will examine the strategic scenario with the
above-mentioned background in mind. The First 1947-48 Indo-Pak War
The British started with a strategic plan having Britishers dominating
the key posts in both the newly created countries! The war was fought
largely by individuals on the Pakistani side and by the British Governor
General and senior army commanders on the Indian side! Gilgit was
won by Pakistan simply because the British officers of Gilgit scouts and
the Gilgit Scouts VCOs acted with remarkable unison! No credit to the
Pakistani Government, which had no clue about what was happening in
Gilgit in September-October 1947. The Indians were doomed in this
case since their Dogra Governor made plain his intentions to do away
with the Gilgit Scouts! The VCOs of the Gilgit Scouts acted tactically
but while doing so achieved a great strategic victory for Pakistan! It
was a fairly even contest. There were two non- Muslim Companies in
the 6 J and K at Bunji against two non-Muslim Companies! There was
an airfield at Gilgit just like there was one at Sringar! The Indians lost
the Northern Areas because of outright strategic incompetence! The
Pakistanis have proved equally strategically barren! No statue at
Islamabad commemorates what the VCOs of the Gilgit Scouts led by
the indomitable Scott Major W.A Brown achieved for Pakistan in
October November 1947! Without Gilgit or Baltistan what would have
been Pakistan’s China policy! There was a Dogra Governor in Gilgit in
1947! Today the Northern Area still does not have a Gilgiti Muslim
Governor! The situation in the Jhelum Valley was saved by tribals who
possessed Èlan and great fervour but had no strategic insight!
Something for which they cannot be blamed! Bhimbhar was won by
local militia while Poonch was besieged by local militias only to be lost
once Pakistan Army had entered the scene in 1948. On the Indian side
the crowning feat of strategic insight was capture of Zojila, the
brainchild of Thimaya. Something, which vindicates this scribe’s
humble assertion in the previous paragraphs, i.e Thimaya was the only
Indian who had commanded a brigade in actual action in the Second
World War! In the final summing up, the Kashmir war of 1948 was a
partial Indian victory and a strategic Pakistani failure since the Indians
delayed ceasefire till the relief of Poonch and recapture of Kargil-
Ladakh, while the Pakistani leadership delayed ceasefire while Poonch
was surrounded by West Pakistan like East Pakistan was surrounded by
India and Zojila the gateway to Baltistan was in Pakistani hands! The
Indian acceptance of ceasefire on 31 December 1948 had a strategic
design while the Pakistani non acceptance of ceasefire earlier was a
matter of lack of strategic insight! The important fact here is that the
Britishers who led India both politically (Mountbatten) and militarily
Russell and Bucher had greater strategic insight than Messervy or
Gracey! 1965 War Strategically the Indians were ascendant at the time
of ceasefire in 1948. Their superiority suffered once Nehru downsized
the Indian Army viewing it as a colonial relic. The Indian Armoured
Corps historian is stating nothing but the simple truth once he states
‘The first fifteen years after independence saw a steady decline in the
efficiency, state of equipment and importance of India’s Armed
Forces... the belief in ahimsa and the consequent pacifist strain in our
people’. Gurcharan further adds, ‘The Government’s attitude became
plain to all ranks soon enough when their pay and allowances were
drastically reduced’. From 1954-58 the strategic balance started tilting
in favour of Pakistan. US military aid enabled the Pakistan Army to
acquire greater organizational flexibility and operational efficiency. The
balance swung in favour of Pakistan particularly in terms of armour
and artillery. Technical superiority is, however, meaningless unless it is
matched and accompanied by corresponding organizational superiority
and strategic insight. On both, strategic as well as organizational plain
the Pakistan Army remained as barren as in 1947. Till the divisional
level the Pakistani organisation was qualitatively superior to the
Indians. The trouble started at corps and army level. The ruling
Pakistani clique had no understanding of higher military organisation!
They viewed war as a clash of battalions, brigades and divisions which
could be conducted by a General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. At the
army level there was equal barrenness and ineptitude! They saw any
future war in Kashmir as a ‘Limited War’ something like the 1947-48
Kashmir War! If Nehru had not attacked across the international border
in 1948 why should Shastri who was smaller should do so! These
pedants forgot the fact that Nehru did not attack in 1948 because
Liaquat decided at the last moment to call off Operation Venus aimed
at cutting Indian communications to the Poonch Valley! On the
strategic plain the Pakistani cause was doomed from the beginning not
because of any tangible inferiority but simply because Pakistan’s
military leaders had no clue about their capability to inflict a strategic
defeat on India! These men who dominated the corridors of the army’s
higher command had rudimentary ideas about operational strategy or
higher strategy. They did not have confidence in themselves! On the
other hand the civilians in the cabinet were far more resolute than the
army C in C and the president! The conduct of 1965 War and its
subsequent analysis, however, later became a highly politicized issue.
Thus the resultant analysis was highly subjective. It became a battle of
Bhutto haters and Ayub haters! Largely Bhutto haters wrote the history
of that war in the period 1977-90 and a highly distorted picture
emerged as a result of these exercises in personal hatred. The 1965
war could have been a Pakistani strategic victory if the Pakistani 1st
Armoured Division had achieved a breakthrough in Khem Karan! Had
the Pakistani Blitzkrieg succeeded, and there was a great chance of it
succeeding at one stage, three Indian divisions would have been rolled
like Hitler rolled up the bulk of the French Army and the BEF in France
in 1940. 1965 would have gone down in history as a Pakistani victory.
This fact has been openly admitted by no less a man than the Indian C
in C Western Command Harbaksh Singh when he stated ‘’A Blitzkrieg
deep into our territory towards the Grand Trunk Road or the Beas
Bridge would have found us in the helpless position of a commander
paralysed into inaction for want of readily available reserves while the
enemy was inexorably pushing deep into our vitals. It is a nightmarish
feeling even when considered in retrospect at this stage’. Harbaksh
was not a member of Bhutto’s party but an illustrious officer of the
Indian Army who held the highest operational appointment in the
Indian Army.1965 was not a foreign policy failure as Shaukat Riza the
mouthpiece of the military establishment asserted but a military
failure. A military failure that was avoidable, had the military
establishment been led by more dynamic people! A military failure
which occurred because of poor higher command structure and
absence of a corps headquarter and an infantry division, both of which
could have been raised with ease only if someone in the higher
quarters in the GHQ knew their operational significance! Now the
strategic rationale why Pakistan had to resolve the issue through a
resort to arms in 1965. The Indians had started reorganizing their army
after the Sino Indian War of 1962 and the balance of forces was fast
tilting in Indian favour. What was the solution to this problem! Long
ago, Clausewitz gave an answer to this when he said ‘Let us suppose a
small state is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and
foresees that with each year its position will become worse: should it
not; if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is
furthest from worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in
itself ensures any advantages — it will rather increase the disparity of
forces —but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing
the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives or of
gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may
hereafter turn to account.’ There is no evidence which indicates that
Ayub or Musa read Clausewitz! It appears that Bhutto had read
Clausewitz! Bhutto and Aziz did have a strong rationale for being the
hawks that they were in 1965. Strategically, 1965 was the last
Pakistani chance to impose a military solution on India. The events of
1971 prove that the balance was fast tilting in favour of India. The US
had decided to revise its policies keeping in view Pakistan’s China
policy. A war had to be fought in 1965! The failure did not lay in the
fact that 1965 War was fought but in the fact that the Pakistani higher
command was conceptually intangibly qualitatively and intellectually
incompetent to win a war which tangibly speaking it had the potential
to win! 1971 War Pakistan Army did learn some strategic lessons from
the 1965 War. The army was organized on rational lines. Many corps
headquarters were created. However, the whole situation had now
drastically changed. While 1965 was the best chance for Pakistan to go
at war, 1971 was the worst moment to start war with India! Again as in
1947 the Pakistani leadership was caught in an irrevocable vicious
whirlpool of history! Since Ayub lacked both political as well as military
strategic insight he had irrevocably alienated the country’s East Wing!
Pakistan in 1971 was a house divided against itself and East Pakistan
had to fall! Sometimes history assumes an air of inevitability. Beyond
one point the flow of events becomes irreversible and even a Napoleon
or Alexander cannot change the current.This is what happened to
Pakistan in 1971. Interestingly, 1971 was an Indian strategic failure too
. They achieved a short-term aim but failed to strike at the centre of
gravity i.e West Pakistan.In the final reckoning they created another
hostile anti-Indian state which is far more difficult to subdue than the
former East Pakistan as it was in 1971! On the other side the ‘Pakistan
problem’ as the Indians call it has not been resolved! Kashmir is a huge
blotting paper that keeps at least half a million Indian troops occupied
while militancy goes on and no solution is in sight! Religious extremism
which had witnessed a decline in the period 1947-77 on both sides of
the Radcliffe line after 1947 is now ascendant! Post-1971 situation to
date The Indians have failed to arrive at a strategic solution to their
military problems. The initiative has been in the Indian hands since
1971 but they have proved equally inept ! In 1971 they did not have
the will to launch a second phase i.e the reduction of West Pakistan! In
1984 they came close to a conflict which was avoided only because
Durga’s Sikh guards polished her off! In the post-1979 period both the
Soviets and Indians failed strategically. The Soviet response to the
Afghan problem should have been increased aid to India so that
Pakistan was made to react to a strategy of indirect approach. This did
not happen. In 1987 the Sundarji was playing the part that Bhutto was
playing in 1965 i.e manipulating an indecisive political chief executive
into a war! Rajiv Gandhi checked Sundarjis ambitions and decided to
make peace. The Pakistani military establishment had realized after
1971 that India could not be defeated in any future conventional war.
Thus the switch over to Low Intensity Wars like in Indian Punjab in
1984 and in Kashmir from 1987 onwards. The future of Indo-Pak will be
decided by a series of Low Intensity Wars. The Low Intensity War in
Kashmir is likely to be followed by one in Sindh or Balochistan. The
possibility that the US encourages Low Intensity Wars in Chinese
Sinkiang through India cannot be ruled out. The principal danger lies in
escalation of a low intensity war into a nuclear conflict. This is a serious
possibility unless major political changes occur on both sides of the
Radcliffe Line. The rise of religious extremism on both sides of the
Radcliffe Line is the most serious threat to future regional stability. On
the Indian side this threat is more political while on the Pakistani side
this threat has a deeper connection with militants who are a smaller
group but enjoy greater support in the country’s Armed Forces. No one
can predict whether the militants will succeed in Pakistan or not. The
distant rumbling of a revolution or a coup can be felt but can never be
accurately predicted. Religious militancy’s success or failure in
Pakistan has a deep connection with the success or failure of the
Taliban Government in Afghanistan. Religious militancy will receive a
boost in both cases. If, the Taliban fail it will be seen as a conspiracy of
the West against Islam. If they succeed their success will be seen as a
model which must be repeated in the entire Islamic World!

Why Indo-Pak Armies

Failed in War

The failures of the two

armies in the various
conflicts.
Around the time of partition there were great expectations from the
successor armies of the old British Indian Army i.e the Pakistan and the
Indian Army! Thus while discussing the boundaries of the to be
partitioned province of Punjab an Indian giving evidence before the
Punjab Boundary Commission stated “If Pakistan manages in a
counterattack to make a 40 miles advance then the defence of India
would be affected. True they would lose Bhatinda and Dhuri and
Pakistan forces were within measur-able distance of Ambala, but they
(The future Indian Army) do not lose all. Their communications are not
upset; they lose so much of the railway line up to the extent of 40
miles, but they still have the main line bringing their supplies at right
angle to their forces”. The same person in this discussion gave the
Indians a capability of advancing 500 miles inside Pakistan”!Compare
this remark with the later performance of both Indian and Pakistan
Armies in actual war which was pathetic in terms of speed of advance
or area captured in all three Indo-Pak wars! On a personal level I may
add that this subject of phenomenal mediocrity at strategic as well as
operational level motivated me to write “The Pakistan Army till
1965”.The reasons for the dismal performance of both the armies are
to be seen in their historical background, the classes which were
inducted in both the armies and in the impact of British military as well
as colonial legacy on both the armies!The reader may note that since it
was the failure of success of armour that decided the issue in all Indo-
Pak Wars at least as far as any decisive breakthrough was concerned
the discussion centres around employment of armour and leadership
with special reference to armour.Before proceeding into the analytical
phase a glance at two comparative decisive battles is necessary so
that necessary lessons can be linked to the analysis. The four test
studies are Pakistani armours failure to achieve a breakthrough on the
first day of Operation Grand Slam in 1965, both Pakistani and Indian
1st Armoured Division's major offensives opposite Khem Karan and
Chawinda Pakistani 8 Armoured Brigade's failure opposite Bara Pind.
Following is a summary of the four battles.Pakistani failure to achieve a
decisive breakthrough on first day of Grand SlamThe Chamb Sector in
1965 was a very weakly held sector held by three dispersed Indian
infantry battalions supported by a tank squadron of AMX-13 tanks
which were like matchboxes as compared to the Pattons held by the
two opposing Pakistani tank regiments i.e a superiority of 6 to 1 in
tanks. Further Pakistan had immense artillery superiority both
numerical and material of 6 to 1. Pakistani 8 Inch Guns were
phenomenally superior to anything that the Indians had. Unfortunately,
the Pakistani armour was distributed in penny packets to the two
infantry brigades. Thus instead of using armour as a punch it was
employed as a thin net as a result of which its hitting power was vastly
reduced. Thus many tanks were lost on the first day and Indian brigade
holding the sector withdrew during the night in an organized manner.
This initial setback on the first day reduced Pakistani chances of victory
which was later on compromised due to other political reasons.Indian
1st Armoured Division's failure at ChawindaThe major Indian attack of
1965 War was launched by the Indian 1st Armoured Division opposite
Chawinda on 8th September 1965. The Indian formation had four tank
regiments as opposed to 1 tank regiment of Pakistan Army! There was
no infantry on both flanks of the Pakistani unit and only one battalion
in its rear yet the Indians miserably failed to outflank this unit and
reach Sialkot-Pasrur Road opposite Badiana or to the South of Pasrur!
While two Indian tank regiments advancing on a narrow front
unimaginatively battered frontally with a single Pakistani tank
regiment, two Indian tank regiments in the rear were not employed by
an Indian GOC and his brigade commander paralysed by intertia
vacillation and procrastination ! This was not a case of a more martial
morally superior Muslim soldier blunting a less martial Hindu soldier at
Panipat but a failure on part of two Indian commanders sitting many
miles in the rear! Thus the truth in Clausewitz's pronouncement on
higher leadership “marches to turn a flank, right or left are easily
combined …but let a general try to do these things like Frederick the
Great …it required the King's boldness, determination and strength of
will to see the things in this light and not to be led astray and
intimidated by the danger of which 30 years after people still wrote
and spoke”.The most interesting aspect of the first engagement
opposite Gadgor being discussed is that Pakistan's 25 Cavalry which
faced the Indian Armoured Division was not aware that it was facing an
Indian Armoured Division while the Indian Armoured Division
commander was also not aware that there was only one tank regiment
opposing his tank division! If both knew what was the actual case then
25 Cavalry's commanding officer may have been paralysed by
irresolution and inertia and history may have been different and the
Indian commander may have gathered greater resolution and
bypassed the unit! However, this is the realm of speculation! More
important is what actually happened! The Indian commander decided
not to outflank the Pakistani's in front because of three reasons i.e (1)
that his four tank regiments were opposed by two tank regiments (2)
no news of his left flank protection force (3) that his rear was under
attack. At the end of the day the Indian divisional commander
withdrew his division back and stayed inactive till 10th September
1965, during which Pakistan reinforced the area with its 6th Armoured
Division! The battles that followed from 11th September till ceasefire
could not be decisive since initial Indian superiority at the decisive
point had been compromised! The reason why the Indian commander
thought that he was faced with two tank regiments was Pakistan's 25
Cavalry's unusually extended line of defence, his flank protection force
had lost his way because of poor map reading and strayed out of
wireless contact and the attack on his rear which unnerved him was an
exchange of fire between his left flank protection force and his own
artillery guns! These three reasons were considered enough by the
Indian GOC to withdraw eight miles to the rear and do nothing for the
next two days! After 11th September when the Indians resumed
advance the Pakistanis had brought reinforcements and there was no
room for a battle of manoeuvre! Pakistani 1st Armoured Division's
failure at Khem KaranPakistan's 1st Armoured Division with five tank
regiments and additional two supporting tank regiments on the flanks
failed to breakthrough the Khem Karan area on 7th and 8th September
at a time when only one Indian tank regiment with ancient Sherman
tanks was opposing the Pakistani five tank regiments having most
modern Patton Tanks. The reason of the dismal performance was not
Indian resistance but poor initial planning and staff work in not taking
adequate measures to ensure crossing of one water course and one
canal both in Pakistani territory! This delayed the induction of the
armoured division in the battle area enabling the Indians to reinforce
their lone Sherman tank regiment with two more tank regiments! It is
ironic to note that the Pakistani plan to attack in this sector was not
new but formulated many years before the war. Here was a case like
Chawinda earlier discussed where there was failure in achieving a
breakthrough despite a five to one superiority simply because the
superiority could not be put into practice due to poor initial planning
and staff work.Pakistani 8 Armoured Brigade's Failure at Bara
PindPakistan's 8 Independent Armoured Brigade was launched at Bara
Pind on 16th December 1971! The situation here was ironically similar
to Indian situation at Gadgor on 8th September 1965! Three Pakistani
Patton Regiments were available as against one Indian Centurion tank
regiment holding a bridgehead at Bara Pind-Jarpal! Ironically as
happened with the Indians at Gadgor here too the Pakistani tank
brigade commander failed to achieve a breakthrough despite a three
to one superiority. The first Pakistani tank regiment was initially
launched with the initiative of the detailed planning of the attack,
decentralized to the tank regiment commander! This was a fatal
decision! The tank regiment commander known as Masood Chhakrra
initially launched one tank squadron in attack. Once this squadron was
badly beaten being in a frontal role against Indian tanks in static
positions, he launched his remaining two squadrons a little to the north
and again with disastrous consequences! Once the first tank regiment
had failed the Pakistani tank brigade commander launched his second
regiment again with disastrous results. In short three tank regiments
failed to dislodge a single Indian tank regiment in a counter attack
which was a planned contingency before the war and carried out in
Pakistani territory. Prominent in this case was failure to coordinate
artillery support which was available in abundance but not utilized in
the attack plan. The Indian armoured corps historian held the view that
the Pakistanis could have broken through even without artillery
support if all three squadrons of 13 Lancers had attacked the Indian
position in concentration!3Analysis Failure occurred not because of
material or numerical but other reasonsIt has been a common practice
to cite insufficient numerical superiority at the decisive point as a
reason for failure. In all four cases, all decisive battles, this was not the
case. The Pakistanis failed at Grand Slam despite 6 to 1 superiority on
the first day. This was a case of not concentrating tanks and using
them as infantry support vehicles. The Indian failed at Gadgor despite
a 4 to 1 superiority. This was a case of the Indian brigade commander
losing his nerve because of timidity and irresolution and the Indian
GOC not spurring his brigade commander and instead withdrawing to
the rear for the next two days while only one tank regiment opposed
his division. The Pakistanis failed at Khem Karan despite a five to one
superiority because of poor initial planning and incorrect armour
tactics in withdrawing to the leaguer at night. Again Bara Pind was a
failure in not integrating artillery in attack and in not concentrating the
armoured brigade in attack.British Colonial LegacyOnce the British
initially came to India they allowed Indians entry in officer rank. The
real danger in history has always been posed not by weapons but by
men of resolute description! Thus Mustafa Kemal defied superpowers
of his day not by any nuclear warhead but by generalship in the field!
Once the British came to India initially they were not aware of the
dangers that Indians in higher rank could pose to their rule! Thus once
a cavalry unit Moghal Horse was raised at Patna in July 1760 it was an
All Muslim unit with Sardars Mirza Shahbaz Khan and Mirza Tar Beg.
More notable was the case of Yusuf Khan!Back in 1752 a Muslim of
Pathan descent enlisted under Colonel Clive and distinguished himself
in battle (not by verbosity on courses or in model discussions) on many
occasions. As a reward for excellence in battle Yusuf Khan was made
commandant of all Indian sepoys in the service of the English East
India Company in 1754, three years before Plassey, presented with a
medal in 1755 and further rewarded by renting of two districts in
Carnatic for 20 Lakh Rupees in 1759 ! From 1760 onwards Yusuf Khan
became more powerful and started defying the English East India
Company. The Englishman were forced to start a war against Yusuf
Khan which lasted for more than an year! All the British Troops of
Madras Army were committed and peace only came after Madura
Yusuf Khan's stronghold was finally captured on 13th October 1764!
4No more Yusuf Khans! This was the Englishmen's conclusion and this
they enforced religiously right till 1947! Have no native leadership in
the Indian Army! This was ensured as a policy right till 1947 even
though Indo-Pak natives were admitted synthetically in the officer rank
in 1919! While Indians were recruited as officers from 1919 it was
ensured that these must be the most slavish and meek ones!
Outwardly smart and impressive in bearing, but loyal to the core,
lacking initiative in higher decision making and good till only company
and platoon level! Thus the basic aim of Indian Military Academy Dera
Dun was to produce Indian officers who at best could be good company
commanders and nothing more! This system was enforced as a
Machiavellian policy! Sir Sivaswamy Ayer in 1921 demanded in the
Indian legislative assembly that all seats to commissioned officer rank
in Indian Army should be filled by open competitive exam held on all
India basis.The British sabotaged this scheme! Thus when Indian
Military Academy Dera Dun was established the Britisher ensured a
slavish Indo-Pak officer corps by insisting that 30 out of 60 officer
vacancies be given to rankers from Indian Army who had spent many
years in ranks under British officers and considered more loyal than
educated Indo-Pak candidates selected on the open merit!As a result
the Indian Army and its successors Indian and Pakistan Army remained
pro West and conservative in outlook! In 1950s Ayub Khan was ready
to defend Anglo Iranian Oil fields in Iran for US interests! A relationship
with USA was cemented with the rationale that it would enable
Pakistan to regain Kashmir! Yet when the time came in 1965 Pakistan's
self-promoted field marshal had cold feet! The military advantage over
India in 1965 in terms of superior equipment was lost in Khem Karan
not because of material inferiority, where Pakistan had tank superiority
of 6 to 1 on 7th and 8th September, but qualitative inferiority on part
of Pakistani higher military leadership! India's leading military thinker
Ravi Rikhye admitted in an article on www.orbat.com that Khem Karan
had the potential to be India's Fourth Battle of Panipat had the
Pakistan Army broken through! Deliberate measures were taken to
instil an inferiority complex in the Indian officers! Major General
Jahanzeb who was commissioned in 1942 states “In their regiments
they were treated with undignified and unconcealed contempt. Once a
British regiment invited the Indian C in C to dinner. On enquiry about
the segregated table he was told unabashedly that it was for the
attached Indian officers”. The general further stated that till mid-
thirties Indians commissioned from Sandhurst were not allowed to
enter the precincts of the Peshawar Club and there were cases when
an Indian officer asked for a chair being told by the quartermaster that
Indian officers were not authorized chairs.5 Indian Army experience in
WW TwoThe British Indian Army was basically an internal security
army designed to ensure continuity of British rule in India. It had no
dynamic operational role. Tanks were inducted only in 1938 and
Indians were discriminated against in tank units. Major General
Jahanzeb states “The Indian cavalry was the domain of the British
aristocracy. The odd Maharaja's sons were admitted on sufferance. In
1932 three cavalry regiments were Indianised, the 3rd 7th and 16th.
They accepted rich and titled Indian officers. The other regiments
admitted Indian officers almost two years after declaration of World
War Two, a fact which was to cost Pakistan dearly when it came into
being”.6To compound the fact further, the British had a phenomenally
incompetent record in handling of armour and were beaten decisively
by the Germans repeatedly from 1940 till 1942 when overwhelming
material superiority enabled them to turn the tide.In addition Indian
war record was nominal since most of the Indian units in North Africa
comprised of armoured cars while in Burma where the Indian tank
regiments had Shermans there was no worthwhile enemy in front since
the Japanese had very inferior tanks.The Indian experience in WW Two
was also significant. In North Africa they encountered Rommel who was
a master of armoured warfare who could appear from any direction.
Thus a strange fear of enemy on the flanks or in the rear imported
from North Africa. Similarly, the Japanese who confronted the Indians
in Burma were again masters of infiltration and the emphasis that the
Indian officers saw was on security and defence rather than any bold
offensive tactics.The resultant failures in 1965 and 1971 had deep
historical reasons.The Indian commanders who failed beyond unit level
consisted of men who had operated in a tactical and operational
environment in WW Two where operations were infantry biased. Even
at Al Alamein the major tank attack was carried out by pure British
army units while Indian units and formations were in a static or holding
role or assisting British units in the initial breakthrough as infantry
units. Thus, the post 1947 commanders of Indian and Pakistani army
did not understand the real essence of armoured warfare. It was this
lack of understanding because of which both sides failed to achieve
any decisive breakthrough in all three wars.It was a failure of the
command as well as the staff system where even the staff officers on
both sides were too slow for armoured warfare and thought in terms of
yards and furlongs rather than miles.Their orientation was position
oriented rather than mobility oriented and their typical idea of a
battlefield was a linear one rather than a multi-linear one. Their Burma
and North Africa experience where the Japanese or Germans frequently
appeared in their rear made them extra sensitive about their flanks.
These were men who thought in terms of security rather than speed.
Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in
the slavish colonial “orders oriented” British Indian Army. These men
had joined the army for social and personal advancement reasons and
warfare to them was a job like WAPDA rather than a supreme test of
nationalism or ideology.Further, in the British way of war a higher
commander was more interested in doing the job of those one step
junior to him that led to lack of initiative and dynamism.The same
legacy was imported in the post-1947 Pakistan and Indian Armies.
ConclusionToday the serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army
console themselves with the fact that today's officer is far more
educated than his predecessors. The matter is not as simple as it
appears. Both the armies have crossed the stage where a decisive
defeat could be inflicted on each other. In the post-Nuclear Age
conventional superiority or conventional weapons are no longer
decisive. Warfare has been privatized with ideological organizations
conducting a war that is spread all over the globe with multiple cells in
nominal communication with each other. Today when an army
marches into operation in one region its enemies react by bomb blasts
in areas previously considered unassailable! The mainland of USA once
considered impregnable has been rendered vulnerable since 9/11.The
other country's army is no longer the decisive target to be eli-minated
as the Iraq war has proved.Iraqi resistance continues despite the
demise of Iraqi Army! Airpower alone cannot win wars as is proved in
Afghanistan and Iraq!The Indian thrust is today no longer to defeat
Pakistan in Siachen or Kargil! The thrust is on cultural wars,
psychologically disarming moves and on strengthening the
economy.Seen in this context Pakistan Army is still preparing for the
previous war. No effort is being made to organize the populace for a
conflict which would continue even after the conventional army has
collapsed.The future wars will have no beginning and no end, fought
with soft power and by modifying educational syllabi and trade
regulations! Conducted by proxy through minority ethnic groups and
by minority sects who are threatened by majority sects.Conversely, the
Indian leadership has realized that it would be cheaper to win the race
by unconventional means and projecting India as a moderate state
with its western borders with a state full of fanatics and lunatics who
deserve to be bombed without remorse. Whatever policies that
President Musharraf is following are seen in the West as the efforts of
one man, while the Pakistani nation is being increasingly perceived as
an unstable state which must not be trusted with nuclear weapons. If
the military regime fails to find a viable solution to the political
problems of Pakistan and design a suitable exit strategy Pakistan's
future may not be brighter than Serbia or Somalia!The fact that today's
Pakistan is far more vulnerable than 1947 or 1965 or 1971's Pakistan is
not being understood. Nuclear weapons may not prove to be a
guarantee of Pakistan's survival unless the political and military forces
decide in the best interest of the nation to respect each other! The
important point to be noted is that Pakistan was the result of a political
process and the armed forces were meant to be a subordinate organ of
the political leadership!The next threat would not be the Indian 1st
Armoured Division with its many mechanically unfit tanks but
combined forces of many hostile neighbours attacking Pakistan's
Nuclear facilities by stealth! The next conflict will be multi-national and
very fast moving! This time there would be no KK Singhs worrying
about their flanks since Pakistan may be facing not India alone but a
combined Indian-Israeli-US onslaught!The lesson of today's Pakistan
remains that Pakistan is ill-equipped for the future challenges that it
may face! Rather Balkanisation at best and Somalisation at worst
cannot be ruled out! With a crisis of legitimacy paralyzing this
country's natural growth since 1954 the future does not appear to be
bright!All depends on which country has a superior Grand Strategy and
can handle its total national resources in a better manner!

EMPLOYMENT IN 1971
BATTLE OF CHAMB

Battle of Chamb fought in 1971 was the only battle in Indo Pak where
a force of armoured brigade level was successfully employed by an
infantry general in an offensive manner to achieve a successful
breakthrough. This battle was covered in great detail by this scribe in
DJ's September 1999 issue. First the 23 Division tried to make a
breakthrough from the north but once this failed General Eftikhar Khan
in the classic German manner made a swift re-assessment and
regrouped his forces to launch an attack from the south towards Chak
Pandit as a result of which the Indians abandoned Chamb Salient. It
was a classic case of dislocating the enemy commander's mental
equilibrium. Eftikhar by redeploying and changing direction of armour
attack did something which three of his division's infantry brigades had
failed to do while attacking frontally! Eftikhar later planned another
outflanking thrust at Pallanwalla but his efforts were frustrated due to
two irresolute as well as incompetent brigade commanders which
included his armoured brigade commander who was unable to
concentrate his tank and infantry units and was many times publicly
abused by him for incompetence and irresolution!79

BATTLE OF SHAKARGARH BULGE/BARAPIND

The Battles fought in Shakargarh Bulge and at Bara Pind-Jarpal were

the second major battles of the 1971 war as far as armour was
concerned.

Two major tank operations were conducted here. I will only quote few
lines from the Indian Armoured Corps History to describe the first i.e
delaying battle of Changez Force, which was conducted by the
indomitable Brigadier Nisar of 25 Cavalry of Chawinda fame. The Indian
historian thus noted Nisar's brilliance, something that the Pakistani
selection boards later failed to note, as following; "Pak armour
functioned well in the role of covering troops. It managed to delay a
superior armour force for a longer period than it could have planned
for".80

The other major tank battle i.e the Pakistani armoured brigade counter
attack at Bara Pind was one of the most heroic, but tragic affairs in the
history of Indo Pak wars. The initial rot started at Corps level where
the commander who had served in staff jobs, despised artillery81 and
had vague ideas about tank warfare. He viewed the armoured brigade
as a hammer meant to crush an enemy by a direct assault rather than
a dynamic operational entity used for dislocation or disruption of
enemy plans. The armoured brigade thus initially did nothing in the
first twelve days of the war as happens in all successful model
discussions at the staff college and the defence college, but was finally
ordered to eliminate an enemy force which had achieved a limited
breakthrough. Two major failures occurred here. One was at brigade
level in failure to incorporate artillery in the brigade plans82. The major
failure here occurred at armoured regiment level when one tank
regiment ordered to contain the enemy penetration instead attacked
the enemy frontally like the Light Brigade with nominal artillery
support and suffered very heavy tank casualties. A second tank
regiment was then launched which contained the bridgehead
established by an Indian tank regiment, suffering heavy but relatively
less losses once compared with the first regiment! On the Indian side
the situation was equally dismal, as far as higher leadership at brigade
level was concerned, and the day was saved only by "a very gallant
last-ditch stand by three tanks of Poona Horse"83 commanded by a
Punjabi Hindu subaltern from Sargodha district!

DESERT SECTOR

The Pakistani attack in the desert sector with two tank regiments was
another Quixotic effort which failed because of poor inter arm
cooperation between the army and the airforce and was a battle in
which two Indian Hunter aircraft84 engaged a tank regiment caught in
the open desert without anti-aircraft cover or aerial support and was
forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses.

THE 2 CORPS COUNTER OFFENSIVE

The Pakistani 2 Corps offensive involving attack by an armour and

infantry division which was never executed has remained a subject of
much speculation and controversy . Indian Western Command C in C
Lieutenant General Candeth has acknowledged that had this operation
been launched between 8 and 26 October, it could have caused
serious disruption in Indian plans to attack East Pakistan.85 Once the
war started the Indians had brought their armoured division opposite
the Pakistani division and the resultant clash would have been "a futile
frontal bloody clash of armour".86 One observer who was Tikka's
contemporary has opined that the 2 Corps Commander i.e Lieutenant
General Tikka Khan "had neither the ability to handle such a large
force, nor the experience of such a war".87 The observer in this case
may be dismissed as one saying so out of professional rivalry, but a
dispassionate glance at handling of armour in all three Indo Pak
wars beyond tank regiment level, by both armour and non-armour
officers gives great substance to this criticism. Major General Eftikhar
the lone exception is an altogether different case. Such men are born
once in many centuries. In any case Eftikhar took immense pains in
learning about armour by attending a short but effective basic course
at the School of Armour Nowshera where his photograph as a general
officer student was hanging in the Communication Group as I last saw
it in January 1984. In addition Eftikhar had very effectively commanded
the 6 Armoured Division before the 1971 war.
POST-1971 DEVELOPMENTS LESSONS OF 1971 WAR

There is no doubt that the armoured corps learnt a great deal from
1971 war, specially as far as integration of artillery in armour attack
and brigade level attacks were concerned. It was, however, a case of
preparing for a war which had already been fought. The Indo Pak
difference in conventional forces continued to increase after the 1971
war and the whole strategic scenario was transformed after India's
nuclear blast in 1974.

No major lesson was, however, learnt in higher organisation and the

armoured corps continued as it had before 1971 as far as higher
organisation was concerned. The armour had not been tested at
divisional level and no major reappraisal at divisional level was
undertaken.

More armoured regiments were raised by milking the existing units

and eliminating the fourth tank troop in each tank squadron.
THE 1984 AND 1987 WAR SCARES

Pakistan concluded a major arms deal with the US in 1981 but the
urgent need to modernise/upgrade the armour was not realised since
the military junta was enjoying siphoning the fruits of massive US aid
into private bank accounts. Thus once Indira Gandhi mobilised her
forces in the wake of the Sikh Insurgency and concentrated them close
to the border in mid-September Pakistani armour was in bad shape
both technically as well as maintenance wise having the same old
1966-71 T-59 tanks. War looked imminent but the tension de-escalated
after Indira Gandhi's assassination.

THE AUTHOR IN 1984 SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER WAR SCARE

MOBILISATION

In 1987 again Pakistani armour was qualitatively inferior having the

same 1971 T-59's albeit new or reconditioned vis-a-vis Indian T-72s.
War looked imminent in January 1987 but did not break out due to
sheer irresolution on Rajiv Gandhi's part. Later much propaganda was
done in Pakistan about some visionary soldiers but as this scribe wrote
in a letter published in one of the most prestigious journals of the
Pakistan Army "As far as BRASS TACKS is concerned, I beg to submit
that there was no countermove with the deliberate intention to frighten
the Indians.The move of the Strategic Reserve (Pakistan's 2 Corps)
from Cholistan to Ravi-Sutlej Corridor was a purely defensive move. If
Sunderji lost his nerve then it was a matter of pure chance otherwise
the Pakistani intention was never to unnerve Sunderji but to get its
strategic reserve to a more central location which it occupied in both
1965 and 1971 wars. Later on with benefit of hindsight some people
here did attempt to make the effort appear as a visionary soldier's
piece of military genius".88 The readers may note that this assertion
was not challenged by anyone which either means that the staff
college magazine is either distributed in graveyards or no one has the
time or energy to read or contest anything!

The situation in 1987 was most grave for Pakistani armour at least
technically and numerically and the Indians due to sheer irresolution
lost a golden chance to impose a military solution which in the post-
Chaghi scenario is no longer possible. One explanation of the Pakistani
armoured division's withdrawal north of Sutlej lies in Pakistani
governments desire not to provoke the Indians. Technically, however,
Pakistan Armour was not in a reasonable shape to fight a war in
January 1987.

THE AUTHOR TRAINING HIS DELTA SQUADRON IN 1986-87

MOBILISATION IN THE DESERT
NEW RAISINGS
1971-1994 AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

New raisings were done after the 1971 war but every new raising was
based on milking of existing units and was matched by new raisings on
the other side. Thus these new raisings did not produce any qualitative
or quantitative situation in the overall comparative military balance.
Some units were raised soon after the 1971 war while six units were
raised as a result of the return of personnel of Tabuk Brigade in 1985
and 1988 respectively. Three more units were raised on the return of
the armoured brigade despatched to the Gulf in 1991, while two more
units were raised from the existing independent squadrons one of
which was raised in 1971 and was commanded by this scribe till
November 1993. Both these two units were raised in infantry divisions
and thus deprived of the relatively far superior training environment
that should have been available to them by virtue of being raised in an
armoured division. This was done at a time when there were many
senior armour officers in the General Headquarters and this simple
truism could have been conveyed to the concerned authority. The
sending of two batches of officers and men to Saudi Arabia in 1982 and
1985 seriously undermined armoured corps efficiency. Two classes
were created in both within the officers and the rank and file. The
incentive to somehow go to Saudi Arabia created unpleasant situation
in many units in terms of class rivalry, favouritism and even further
dilution of uprightness and soldierly forthrightness and simple
approach towards regimental soldiering. Only individuals gained while
the military spirit of the army described by Clausewitz as the most
important foundation of an army was eroded. This was followed by
other carrots that made people more money minded and calculating
like secondments to Somalia, Bosnia etc. The net goodwill they
brought can be gauged from the fact that Pakistan is on the borderline
in the US State Department's list of terrorist nations and is on the brink
of financial default which will force its government, military or civil to
finally bend to superpower dictation regardless of all rhetoric!

During the period 1977-88 the armoured corps got the best
opportunity to benefit from the fact that an armour officer was the
master of everything! Paradoxically professionally things deteriorated!
Two messes were built in Nowshera and Rawalpindi which are not for
armour officers, at least those below brigadier! The one in Rawalpindi
is a personal fiefdom and is an excellent means of exercising
patronage and enhancing contacts! The armour school during this
period went on the same lines as in 1960s. No new building was built.
It retained its unique distinction of being the final resting place of near
superseded or superseded brigadiers at a time when from 1983-84 the
infantry school was upgraded to a general rank headed institution, and
some very fine officers (barring few exceptions!!!!) were posted to
head that institution! The armoured corps suffered in terms of
promotion since promotions became a far more personalised affair
since those on top knew officers intimately and lavishly exercised their
powers to promote or demote in a typical third world whimsical
style.Thus many fine officers like Sher Azam Malik and Javed Hussain
were sidelined while many officers reached the general rank despite
the fact that at least one was not recommended for next rank by his
infantry division commander and corps commander. It is true that
some individuals gained four star rank without commanding a division
or a corps or in other ways but the armoured corps as an arm suffered.
It became a personal fiefdom from 1976 to 1988. It will take many
years to recover from the negative effects of that "Darbari Era".
Perhaps the next war towards which the sub-continent is invariably
being pushed into due to myopic vision and lack of statesmanship will
be the final audit of the armoured corps of both sides since 1971! Our
only hope is that our Indian friends I hear are almost as incompetent as
we are beyond tank regiment or brigade level. At least their
performance beyond unit level in both 1965 and 1971, provides a lot of
solace and indicates that their commanders beyond unit level are as
illustrious as ours!

There is nothing much to write about Zarb-i-Momin as far as armour

was concerned. This by all definitions, is ironic since it was supposed to
be an armour dominated show supposedly designed to derive lessons
which were special to armour. What happened in reality was a farce.
The enemy armoured divisions reconnaissance teams were in the
enemy territory some four months before the war broke out,
conducting Recce and familiarising themselves with the area. Engineer
units arrived months before to improve tracks to enhance mobility
inside enemy territory! This scribe was then serving in 3rd Armoured
Brigade Headquarters. The only redeeming feature of the exercise was
the 3rd Armoured Brigade counter-attack, which succeeded by divine
design since bad weather rendered the enemy air inoperational. Huge
exercises in which millions are spent, however, cannot be justified
simply because of attacks, which succeed, by divine design! There was
no element of the fog of war for the advancing side, while the
defenders final attack succeeded by Divine Design! The military
objectives of the exercise, at least meaningful ones pertaining to
higher direction of war, or inter corps co-ordination i.e holding and
striking corps operating in the same area, were not achieved. If anyone
claims that these were achieved then the fact that no co-ordinating
headquarter was created to regulate the holding and striking corps
between 1989 and 1998 proved that the lessons, that is if any, apart
from those in the realm of propaganda and public relations, were
learnt, were either not implemented (a serious command failing if true)
or disregarded by the successors of the then chief. The second
conclusion is also highly improbable since the then chief was in chair
for more than one and half year after the exercise, and had ample time
to incorporate the lessons, that is if any meaningful ones were learnt.
Since this scribe does not have the power of ESP it is not possible to
gauge whether the ulterior motives of that exercise, if any were
achieved or not!

The problem with the army of 1984-90, at the top was that it was
dominated by men who had not commanded armoured formations
beyond unit level or brigade (and that too for few months) in case of
armour and even had not commanded infantry formations in major
general rank which held even a tank squadron on their order of battle!
Zia who had commanded an armoured division in peace and a corps
for an year had utilised bulk of his time in sycophancy with the PPP
stalwarts in Multan and had nothing to do with any armoured battle in
both the wars! The best product of this galaxy of talents was the
bifurcation of the older corps into striking and holding formations as
stated earlier, without earmarking any co-ordinating headquarter and
would have been a recipe to diasaster in case a war had broken out!
This Quixotic bifurcation as earlier stated was not tested in Zarb-e-
Momin.

ANALYSIS

ARMOUR IN TRAINING MANOEUVRES

Various divisional level training manoeuvres were held after 1971 and
many lessons were learnt. However, there is no organisational or
institutional framework to scientifically evaluate the command abilities
of officers beyond tank regiment level. This assertion is based on
conviction and was pointed out in writing by this scribe in various army
journals and is on record :—

"Evaluation of exercises which is one of the major peactime methods

of judging resolution in a commander is an extremely rigorous and
scientific affair. It is felt that this should be done by a select corps of
officers who will be less biased in judging a man's professional calibre.
The present system, it is felt is less objective, less scientific and less
profession oriented. Probably it is so because those who evaluate each
other spend more time together in cantonments than in the field and
thus go into the field with preconceived ideas further biased by
personal likes and dislikes ............the present system of exercises are
not aimed at testing the command qualities which are really decisive
like resolution. Even if this is being done in certain cases then it is
confined to lower command levels, which a study of military history
illustrates is just not enough ........." We have got to train our
commanders for adverse situations which demand unconventional
audacious and imaginative planning. Presently we are afraid this is not
being done. Rather exercises are demonstrations on a massive
scale".89

THE AUTHOR AS MECHANICAL TRANSPORT OFFICER OF 3RD

ARMOURED BRIGADE WITH STAFF CAPTAIN ABID HAMZA
WHERE HE WITNESSED THE GRAND DEMO ZARB I MOMIN AND
BILLED HIS BRIGADE COMMANDER 35 THOUSAND RUPEES FOR
MISUSING HIS STAFF CAR IN 1989.I CONVINCED ABID HAMZA
TO JOIN HIS FATHERS BATTALION 10 PUNJAB BY CHANGE OF
ARM.THE UNIT HAD ALL SHORT SERVICE COURSE OFFICERS IN
1990 AND HAMZA RESIGNED IN DISGUST SEEING THEIR OR
TYPE BEHAVIOUR.HE JOINED THE PIA AS A PILOT LATER.
"There are institutions (referring to one particular institution) which
deliver a verdict on command qualities of an individual without a single
exercise in the field"!90 ......... " Commanders above unit level are
rarely properly exercised" ........ " The system is producing many whose
tour of regimental soldiering is with the primary aim of getting a hole
punched in the service record card".91

"Many military systems that this world saw were a conspiracy against
originality and boldness"......"Create an 'Evaluation Corps' which will be
a full time corps primarily designed/dedicated to test the professional
competence of commanders at all levels (till divisional level)".92

THE AUTHOR AT EXERCISE ZARB I MOMIN 1989 AT SERAI KRISHNA

"Establishment of training command, responsible for planning and

monitoring Army's training is an inescapable necessity".93

The rationale behind quoting all these observations which are on

record is to prove that training manoeuvres as this scribe saw them
while serving for four continuous years, without going on a single
course or even a month's leave in an armoured divison or later in
other infantry formations, were not being held on a scientific basis.
There were exceptions like Generals Hameed Gul, Sajjad or Brigadier
Inayatullah Niazi (his other qualities/peculiarities apart) who took
training manoeuvres religiously and conducted them brilliantly, but
these men and particularly Hameed Gul (his so called fundamentalist
political views aside) was an exception and the next two years after
his departure from the armoured division as this scribe saw were the
most barren years of training. The reason is simple, i.e procedural and
institutional arrangements are longer lasting and more consistent and
to a considerable extent compensate for individual human qualitative
differences resulting from change of command from person "X" to
person "Z".

The problem is that lack of a neutral organisation which could give a

second opinion on the command abilities of a commander beyond
squadron unit or brigade level was missing. It was common to hear
many brigade and unit commanders brag that it was their pen and not
the performance of an officer on training manoeuvres which would
decide the issue. This was true since it was common to see many
excellent brigade commanders and unit commanders who handled
their command outfits superbly in field training manoeuvres being
sidelined to oblivion and obscurity while many relatively incompetent,
as far performance in field was concerned, but "on paper good
officers", getting the best appointments and rising to general rank.This
is as far as the armoured corps was concerned. The secondment to
Saudi Arabia propelled another breed who had a good time in three
years in Tabuk where exercises were a "hoax" and reached high ranks
without commanding an armoured brigade (the Lahore armoured
brigade being an exception since it hardly does any meaningful
training at brigade level and performs other more important non
training duties) or armoured division. There emerged during the
period 1977-1994 a breed of essentially paper tiger commanders who
had all the holes punched and had also mastered the techniques of
conducting perfect armoured attacks (in reality, carefully rehearsed
demonstrations) under conditions in which all the friction of war which
that poor Prussian Clausewitz had written about had been eliminated
through whiz kid techniques mastered in the process of hole punching
and keeping the OEI high !

HANDLING OF ARMOUR IN SCHOOLS OF INSTRUCTION

Handling of armour in schools of instruction also requires serious re-

evaluation. During my stay in the School of Armour I observed that
there were no fixed parameters or training guidelines at army level
which regulated that institution. All depended on the commandant's
personality. If there was a hard taskmaster like Sher Azam Malik
everything went well but everything would suddenly transform once
person "Y" or "Z" came. As far as I know the school with few exceptions
was a dumping ground for superseded or about to be superseded
brigadiers, at least after 1971 with perhaps one or two odd exceptions.
Naturally these commandants were on their way out and with few
exceptions took more interest in preparing themselves for their future
retired life!

THE AUTHOR AS AN INSTRUCTOR OF TACTICS AT THE TANK

SCHOOL TACTICAL WING NOWSHERA NOVEMBER 1991

The same was true for instructors at Lieutenant Colonel level out of
whom very few went beyond brigadier. Further the school's location
being far away from both the armoured divisions did not allow
integration of students doing courses in major armour training
manoeuvres as is done in the Infantry School in Quetta. This school
should be re-located somewhere in the desert in Cholistan or perhaps
its outer fringes or in the Potohar plateau! This scribe in May-June 1993
had made a similar recommendation for the independent armoured
squadron that he was commanding and was then stationed in Okara
(through an official written letter held on record) to be shifted to the
desert in Tamewali or Bahawalnagar. The recommendation made as
part of unit points for the divisional conference was approved by Major
General Zia ul Haq the General Officer Commanding the infantry
division and implemented much to the chagrin of officers who later
joined the new tank regiment raised from the Phoenix ashes of that
squadron! Coming back to the main line of discussion there was no
system of grading in the school and the powers of the officers in
charge course, the chief instructor and the higher

THE AITHOR WITH GENERAL M.A BEG IN 1990

appointment holders to alter a tactical grading done by an instructor of

major or colonel rank were not limited by any margin of plus one or
two as was the practice in Infantry School. I don't know whether it has
changed now from 1992.

The instructors posted after staff college to armour school were those
majors who were not fit to be brigade majors or were there simply
because no unit or other vacancy was available for them! This did not
mean that these majors were not good since the system of assessment
of staff college needs considerable revamping. The bad part was that
these majors did not put up maximum hard work since they knew that
the seal of relatively mediocre majors had been stamped on them and,
however, hard they worked their chances for promotion beyond colonel
rank were remote! Two buildings were completed in 1988-89 but
these were hardly sufficient to meet the existing demands! The
transparency of the system of grading could be gauged from the fact
that the only two officers who got an alpha grade in tactical leg of the
young officer's basic course were sons of serving generals! This scribe
had the opportunity to see one of them during the basic course and
was perplexed and surprised as to how he was graded alpha. On the
other hand a retired three star general's son who had already
managed a Bee Plus in the junior Staff Course (a far more tough affair
than the mid career course) while his father was a serving three star
general, was initially graded as Bee Minus in the Mid-Career Course
whereas he certainly deserved a Bee! Later on I believe he was given a
Bee, after much haggling as happened at Valtoha between 1 FF and 6
Lancers.

HIGHER ARMOUR OPERATIONAL COMMAND ORGANISATION

No major change in Pakistani higher armour command as earlier

discussed in brief was made till 1987. In 1986-87 the older corps which
contained both holding and striking formations were sub-divided into
holding and striking corps. This arrangement although outwardly neat
and superficially sound was essentially confusing and fallacious. It was
regarding this change that this scribe pointed out in an article "It is felt
that during conduct of operations two formation commanders of equal
rank commanding a holding and strike formation respectively in the
same area of operations, cannot function effectively. Even during
Exercise Zarb-e-Momin this aspect was not put to trial. Training of
holding and strike formations needs to be integrated thus meriting a
unified operational command vested in the person of one officer of the
rank of lieutenant general. The change may require creation of Army
Headquarters in certain operational areas".94

The arrangement of holding and striking corps without any higher co-
ordinating headquarter was a recipe for confusion and disaster as I
witnessed while serving in a holding corps, once I personally saw the
lack of communication and co-ordination in training and cooperation
between the concerned strike and holding corps. Thus, I was motivated
to write another article in which this scribe's recommendations for
establishing a co-ordinating headquarters for the holding and striking
corps were seconded by the worthy editor of the Citadel Magazine as
ones which "certainly merits consideration".95 The rationale on
which these recommendations were based were: "The concept of
holding and striking formation also needs reappraisal....the bifurcation
in terms of offensive and defensive role, while outwardly neat and
theoretically sound is historically without a successful precedent. The
issue could have been resolved in exercise Zarb-e-Momin in 1989 by
subjecting it to the friction of a rigorous training manoeuvre".96 "The
shield and the spear or the hammer and the anvil can function
effectively only if one head synchronises and co-ordinates their
operational functions. As they say that too many cooks spoil the broth,
the two formations fighting the same battle in the same operational
area cannot fully realise their combat potential unless a headquarter
regulates their operations.How can one main headquarters 200 or 400
miles in the rear, with loads of other matters to take care of,
effectively co-ordinate the operations of a hammer and anvil".97 "The
need for an army headquarters to co-ordinate and effectively
command the holding and strike corps is an indispensable
necessity".98 I believe that there has been some progress since these
recommendations which are on record were made in 1998. All credit,
however, goes to then commandant Major General Amjad and his team
who published these two above quoted articles. Had these been
written in 1987 or 1988 no editor would have dared to publish them.
99

POOR INTER-ARM/INTER- UNIT COOPERATION AND LACK OF

DIVISIONAL SPIRIT

Poor inter-arm cooperation seriously retarded the combat potential of

the Pakistan Armoured Corps right from 1947. This was the worst
British legacy that both the Indo-Pak armies inherited. A British
observer in WW Two noted that "in the training of the armoured
division, I stressed the need for co-operation of all arms in battle. One
had to check a pernicious doctrine which had grown up in recent years,
aided by certain civilian writers, that tank units were capable of
winning an action without the assistance of other arms. The Chief
agent in debunking this and many other fallacies of our pre-war
pundits were the German".100 The secret of the German Blitzkrieg
tactics which revolutionised warfare lay in intimate inter-arm
cooperation. The US concept of Combined Arms Teams is actually the
old German inter-arm cooperation within the Panzer Division concept
'wine in new bottles'. The British tanks in WW II on the other hand
repeatedly failed to function effectively because of poor inter-arm
cooperation based on inter-unit rivalry and excess of regimentation.
The Pakistan Army inherited this disease and this disease instead of
getting reduced became more pronounced after 1947. The army
remained infantry dominated since all the chiefs from 1948 to 1972
were from infantry. From 1977 to 1988 the army remained armour
dominated and preference in promotion was given to those close to
Zia. Poor inter-arm cooperation led to serious operational failures in
Khem Karan and in Grand Slam in 1965 and at Bara Pind in 1971. The
similarity between the lack of infantry tank cooperation in Grand Slam
and in Khem Karan and those of similar incidents in the case of British
infantry and tanks at Gazala etc is remarkable. Even when I was
commissioned in 11 Cavalry in March 1983, 29 Cavalry (in which this
scribe later served for some time) being a new unit was regarded as
second among equals, 7 FF the mechanised infantry unit of our brigade
was viewed as an enemy and 15 SP the artillery unit was despised and
considered too insignificant even to be considered an enemy. The
Supply and Transport unit was regarded as a bunch of untouchables!
The EME was not liked but feared, for their nuisance value in
inspections, though secretly despised. It was out of question to visit
the messes of these units and my friendship with an officer of 7 FF
was viewed by many seniors as disloyalty to the regiment! Officers
from armoured regiments were mostly friendly with officers from other
armoured regiments. It was rare that any officer of the infantry division
met any officer of the armoured division in Kharian.

Even within the very small armoured corps of the 1950s and 1960s
there were glaring differences from regiment to regiment. There were
regiments with a much higher representation in the top hierarchy
dating from 1947 and there were fatherless regiments who had done
well in war but had no patrons beyond the brigadier rank. The negative
factor here for the armoured corps was the fact that while the
regiment in infantry had a much larger number of units like the Punjab
and FF group, each armoured regiment was as different from each
other as France from Germany and an officer from any tank regiment
only believed in patronising his very own regiment!

Parallels can be found in battle of Bir El Gubi in 1941 where the 22

Armoured Brigade frontally charged the Italians with the support of just
one battery of 25 Pounders 101 and failed to capture it suffering in
the process huge losses and in the Battle of Bara Pind where Pakistan's
8 Armoured Brigade did a similar thing. The German tank general and
illustrious staff officer Von Mellenthin noted this failing when he said,
"their commanders would not concentrate tanks and guns for a co-
ordinated battle".102

On the other hand notorious examples of non-cooperation in 1965 and

1971 wars can be compared with the conduct of the British armour at
Gazala in 1942 when the 2nd Highland infantry was destroyed by
German tanks while a superior British tank force merely looked on, or
in the case of the 1/6th Rajputana Rifles who were abandoned to
German Panzers simply because the British armour had to go into
leaguer!103

One of the most notorious examples of lack of inter-arm co-operation

took place in Chawinda when first the Indian tanks withdrew from
Jassoran-Buttur Dograndi-Sodreke area on their own104, and later
when Indian tanks ordered to re-attack the same area later were not
informed about the failure of the last night's infantry attack!105 An
Indian general frankly admitted this lack of inter arm cooperation when
he said, "There were misunderstandings galore between the infantry
and armour commanders in the second battle of Chawinda. A lack of
rapport seems to be the only explanation..".106 This lack of
cooperation was something like 13th century inter-arm and individual
rivalry which led to the failure of the Crusaders or the Mongols against
the Mamelukes.Toynbee the great historian thus wrote, "the individual
Mongol champion was promptly overcome by the disciplined heavy
cavalry of the Egyptian Mamlukes (mostly kidnapped slaves of
Slav/European origin converted to Islam after being bought by the
Kurds etc). These had given warning of the supremacy of their
technique at the Battle of Mansurah in AD 1250, when Frankish army
of Saint Louis had paid a disastrous penalty for the thoughtless
individualism of its knights, each anxious for personal honour at the
expense of the disciplined formation".107 I can state with confidence
that as late as 1993 that almost each tank regiment (having seen five
tank regiments and one tank squadron) or infantry regiment behaved
at least symbolically like these thirteenth century knights described by
Toynbee, at least in garrisons and on field manoeuvres! I am sure that
the Indian army being the chip of the same block and led by as
mediocre and orders oriented men is no different! At least in strength
of reservoirs of mediocrity the subcontinent consists of men belonging
to one nation!

THE CAVALRY CHARGE TRADITION

The Armoured Corps inherited a typically British cavalry charge

tradition, an irrational urge of being "brave to the point of
foolhardiness".108 The Indians suffered from a similar malady and lost
many tanks in attacks delivered in a cavalry charge manner at Gadgor,
Phillora, Buttur, Dograndi, Sodreke, etc. Brigadier Riaz ul Karim who
was sent as Deputy GOC of 6 Armoured Division described these
encounters as "Kabbadi Matches". Riaz thus observed "The normal
practice on both sides was to despatch one armoured regiment at a
time to probe and infiltrate (with infantry following) and the other side
reacted with launching one of their own armoured regiments to stop
and destroy that force. With this type of battle, there were heavy tank
casualties on both sides".109 Riaz states that "The first thing that I
did was to stop the 'Kabbadi Game' i.e for one regiment sailing into the
blues and coming back with a bloody nose".110

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT IN WW TWO AND INFLUENCE OF

CONSERVATIVE BRITISH DOCTRINE
In all fairness the nature of Indian Army's employment as far as the
armoured corps was concerned did not make things any easier for the
armoured corps of both the countries. The Indian Armoured Corps was
either employed in a screen/scout role or in conditions where their
opponent as in Burma was vastly inferior both numerically and
quantitatively in number of tanks. Indians were not groomed for higher
ranks and even the British despite better education superior literacy
level and technically and qualitatively superior position did not produce
a single good tank commander at any level higher than tank regiment.
No wonder that they failed the Germans in France and North Africa
from 1940 till 1942 when finally the scales were turned, not because of
better generalship but by virtue of overwhelming numerical
superiority. Further the conservative British tank doctrine which both
the armies inherited and made no effort to change that armour
commanders beyond unit level remained as mediocre as they were on
the British side in WW II. It is no credit to the quality of British
armoured corps that General Mellenthin who saw the British Army as
its direct opponent for some two years noted that " The British Artillery
was the best trained and best commanded element in the British
Army".111

MISCELLANEOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL HANGUPS

The armoured corps of 1947 inherited many psychological hang-ups.

The subconscious emphasis inherited from the British was on being an
"arm of fashion and wealth" "affected carelessness" and worst of all
"an arrogant non-chalance towards the duller aspects of their
work".112 During a winter collective which this scribes unit had to
conduct for another armoured brigade, the other brigades units
insisted that their tank commanders cannot advance unless there is a
visible track going through the desert. In this case there was none!
Finally the problem was resolved by asking for engineer support and a
track was made with the help of earthmoving equipment! During my
service I frequently heard many officers saying that a fourth tank troop
in a squadron was good and added flexibility while many said that it
was difficult to manage. These officers probably never understood that
the Germans performed miracles with armoured divisions, which had
just one Panzer Regiment (tank brigade).

LACK OF OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AT BRIGADE/BEYOND AND

DOCTRINAL AMBIGUITY AND CONFUSION AT SPECIAL TO ARM
TACTICAL LEVEL

Firstly we shall discuss the leaguer concept which seriously jeopardised

the success of Pakistani armour operations in Khem Karan. The British
mostly withdrew from the final battle positions in North Africa because
they feared the German 88 Anti-Tank Guns and wanted to have a
peaceful next morning. In any case the operational situation in North
Africa was not area oriented, as in Punjab but mobility oriented since
any outflanked force could easily move in any direction and regain its
equilibrium. In Punjab where defence was a relatively far more superior
type of warfare than in the desert and holding every inch of captured
territory was important, the operational situation was totally different
from North Africa. Here every locality once captured had to be held
since manoeuvre was far more difficult due to heavy terrain, friction
and large number of artificial and natural obstacles and bottlenecks.
This was a serious doctrinal failing which should have been resolved in
the School of Armour. No one gave it a serious thought since it was
thought that the Pattons were invincible. These pedants failed to
realise that the British repeatedly failed to defeat Rommel despite
possessing numerical and qualitative superiority as was admitted by
Captain B.H Liddell Hart.

There was an inclination in some strike formations to use French terms

in operational orders! On one occasion shortly before retirement while
this scribe was an umpire with a strike infantry division, I read the term
"Coup de Main" describing the division's main attack. My knowledge of
French was limited but as far as I then knew "Coup de Main" in the
British military sense was a term used for a surprise attack launched in
a manner which was not very deliberate or conventional. Once I
pointed this out the majority was outraged and two colonels who had
done the French Staff Course insisted that "Coup de Main" was the
right word for describing "Main Attack or Effort".

Then we come to brigade level. The Khem Karan failure was essentially
the failure of 5 Armoured brigade. On the first day the brigade was
dispersed without any coherent plan one tank regiment going for Assal
Uttar from the centre and left, one tank regiment (some 19 tanks)
going for Valtoha without any sizeable infantry support and the
brigade headquarters sitting in Khem Karan as if it was the
headquarters of Mountbatten's South East Asia Command rather than
a brigade tactical headquarter. It appears that there was no
operational philosophy of handling armour at brigade level. The
brigade was thus doing what a German Panzer Division could not do i.e
attacking on some three axis instead of developing the operations on
what the Germans called the "Schwerpunkt".113 The concept of all
arms cooperation was not understood and 6 Lancers was despatched
to Valtoha on its own . Its Commanding Officer did make a request for
infantry114 but this was brushed aside and mechanised infantry which
was available that day did little, regardless of whatever they may claim
now in their regimental histories.
Major failures in both Indian and Pakistan Armies in handling of
armour occurred at brigade and division level. It appears that no
lessons were derived from these failures. In my thirteen years service I
witnessed changes in concept of employment of armoured brigade and
division with change of brigade and divisional commanders. Thus what
was executed by Brigadier Inayatullah Niazi for two years was
disregarded in near totality once Inayat departed and was endorsed by
the same commanding officers who had served earlier under Inayat as
the Gospel truth! One i.e my second commanding officer, who had
dissented under both the commanders albeit tactfully retired as a
colonel! This is just one example out of innumerable examples. The
School of Armour as far as I know till 1992 had no concrete or tangible
set of recommendations about concept of employment or doctrine of
employment of an armoured brigade or division in the various types of
terrain/scenarios where employment was likely. I was in charge of all
the scripts held in the Tactical Wing from December 1991 to December
1992 and did not find any such thing! Even in the School, concepts of
employment changed with change of commandant or change of chief
instructor! The Divisional Battle Schools of Armoured Divisions were
dumping grounds of superseded or near superseded majors and
colonels and their cardinal attribute was "silence of a graveyard" as I
pointed out to a letter to editor of Citadel magazine in mid-1998. There
was no specific to corps area of operations doctrine of operations of
armour at least till 1994, at a time when the existence of a multiple
number of formations like mechanised brigade, corps reserve, army
reserve operating in the same area made a clarity of
role/mission/doctrine of employment all the more necessary! Infantry
lieutenant colonels who had done foreign staff college had rudimentary
ideas about the non-linear armoured battle and the behaviour of
enemy armour in the post-breakout stage! Armour after all in all
three wars has failed to breakout successfully as far as both sides are
concerned!

TRADITION OF LEADING FROM THE REAR AT BRIGADE AND

BEYOND

One of the main reasons of slowness of British armour operations was

the fact that brigade commanders with few exception like the great
Jock Campbell, VC who was an artillery man, there was a tradition of
leading from the rear and this certainly contributed to many failures in
Grand Slam and in Khem Karan. Decision making was thus done at a
snail's pace. All sorts of false and exaggerated reports were accepted
as the Gospel truth etc. The British tradition of leading from the rear
had a deep connection with the level of esteem in which their staff
officers were held by their field commanders. The layman reader may
note that unlike the German General Staff the British never had a
permanent cadre of general staff officers. In their army as in both the
Indo-Pak armies attending the staff course was just a hole punching
business and general staff was not a highly specialised corps in the
British Army unlike the German Army where the staff officer with a
crimson stripe on his uniform was a highly qualified man belonging to a
corps d elite. Thus while German commanders of the rank of brigade,
divisional and corps level could lead from the front staying close to the
leading tank regiment, the British commanders could not do so, since
they looked down on their staff officers as men who were incapable of
manning their main headquarters. Thus the profound truth in
Mellenthin's observation that "the officers of the German General Staff
were not mere clerks or mouthpieces of their higher commanders
(Mellenthin hints without saying so that the British ones were!!!!), but
were trained to accept responsibility to give grave decisions and were
respected accordingly. In contrast the British fighting commanders
tended to look down on the staff, and the British show a curious
reluctance to appoint capable staff officers to operational
commands".115

LACK OF OFFENSIVE SPIRIT

There was a serious lack of offensive spirit at all levels beyond unit
level. Thus Ayub did not leave Rawalpindi throughout the war. As late
as 1991 a Directing Staff of Command and Staff College observed this
glaring lack of aggressiveness in the army in an article published in
1991.116 The writer then an instructor at the command and Staff
College and now probably commanding a division somewhere thus
noted, "The Battle of Chamb was cited as an instance; where the
momentum of attack dissipated after the General Officer Commanding
embraced Shahadat". The readers may note that this man was one of
the few generals who led from the front. Some of the many who saw
him in that role, who this scribe knows/met are Majors Suleman Butt
(11C), Iftikhar Chaudhry (11 C), Shujaat Ali Janjua (the indomitable
Panther Janjua from (11C) and Lieutenant Colonel Zil ur Rehman who
was commanding an R & S Company.

POOR GENERAL STAFF PROCEDURES AND PLANNING ABILITY

AT HIGHER LEVELS

This factor played a serious role in the Pakistani armoured division's

failure at Khem Karan in 1965. At the GHQ level the failure to
appreciate that the armoured division must get out of the bottleneck
between Rohi and Nikasu Nala was not appreciated. Nothing in the
orders given to the 1st Armoured Division indicates that the planners
understood this problem. Nikasu Nala was a pre-1947 landmark while
Rohi Nala was no common pin to have missed the eyes of the planners.
Poor general staff procedures at brigade and division level led to
failure to concentrate all three armoured brigades across the Rohi Nala
and thus was the principal reason for failure of the armoured division's
effort. The GHQ vacillation and indecision on 6th, 7th and 8th
September when it issued contradictory orders to the 1st Armoured
Division, sometimes to send one of its brigades to Lahore and
sometimes to Sialkot117 also played a major role in adding to the
imperial confusion in the armoured division.

Correlli Barnett's observations on the British Staffs of WW II fit well on

the Pakistani Staff officers role in failure to handle armour. Barnett
thus noted "The pace (referring to that of armoured operations) was
too fast for the slow working staffs of lower formations (referringto
corps/divisional/brigade staffs) ......(German staff work, because of
greater experience and better training, was always faster and more
lucid than British).....and detailed organisation for the offensive was
poor and confused".118 This observation fits well with the Military
Operations Directorate of both sides and all staff officers down to
armoured brigade level responsible for planning/executing the
operations of both the Pakistani and the Indian 1st Armoured Divisions.
The British perhaps were unlucky that their opponents were Germans
and the Indians and Pakistanis were perhaps very lucky that their
opponents were Pakistanis and Indians!

CONCLUSION

The Gul theory of failure because infantry officers were commanding

the armoured division is not vindicated by actual facts of the 1965 war.
Was the Indian 1st Armoured Division or its 1st Armoured Brigade
commanded by an infantry officer and yet they proved as incompetent
as Naseer. After all Rommel was from infantry, Macarthur, Mead and
Lee were from Engineers and Napoleon was from artillery. The fault lay
in the military clique of that time who made promotions on whims and
on basis of personal likes and dislikes rather than on merit. After all the
finest armoured commander that the sub- continent produced was
Eftikhar who was an infantry man!

The Pakistan armoured corps with the exception of one unit of

armoured cars was not employed in 1947-48 war. In 1965 Pakistan
Armoured Corps failed to achieve a major breakthrough despite
relative qualitative superiority in tanks as well as overwhelming
numerical superiority in total available number of tanks in Khem Karan
due to doctrinal leadership and essentially staff incompetence centred
reasons. A breakthrough was possible and one Indian general was
frank enough to recall as late as 1993 General Harbaksh Singh's
remarks that "A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the Grand
Trunk Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in the helpless
position of a commander paralysed into inaction for want of readily
available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing deep into
our vitals.It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered in
retrospect at this stage"119. Long before 1965 and 1971 civilians on
the board of the boundary commission had very high hopes from both
the Indian and Pakistan Armies and thus one had said "If Pakistan
manages in a counterattack to make a 40 miles advance, then the
defence of India would be affected. True they would lose Bhatinda and
Dhuri and Pakistan forces were within measurable distance of
Ambala,but they (referring to the Indian Army) do not lose all. Their
communications are not upset; they lose so much of the railway line up
to the extent of forty miles, but they still have the main line bringing
their supplies at right angles to their forces..."120. The same member
went further and gave the Indians a capability of advancing 500 miles
inside Pakistan!121 Compare these remarks with two Indian three star
generals remarks:— "We penetrated only 11 miles (despite a five to
one superiority in tanks on 8th September and a much larger one in
infantry-this scribe's remarks) into enemy territory beyond the
bridgehead at our deepest stretch, when, but for the mishandling of
our forces, especially armour, the completion of our mission appeared
well within our grasp".122 Another sadly noted "it ground to a halt just
four miles ahead of the bridgehead"!123 This happened not as
propagandists assert in Pakistan because of some superior martial race
or ideological reasons but simply because the Indian brigade and
division commander lost their nerve. The Indians, the lower ranks till
battalion/regiment level fought as bravely at Chawinda as their
Pakistani counterparts, tankman and infantry man alike, at Khem
Karan where Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division also failed to achieve a
breakthrough despite a seven to one superiority in tanks in total
number. Leave aside west or east of Rohi Nala which was entirely a
command as well as staff planning failure. The Nikasu Nala was even
clearly marked as a large water obstacle even on the maps of the
Punjab Boundary Commission!124 So where do we go. The common
man, the tax payer has been bled white on both sides with a very large
percentage being spent on armoured corps which failed to advance
pathetically beyond 4 miles on the first day of the war in face of
nominal opposition or eleven miles in all 17 days or got stuck between
a Nala and a canal in own territory! The generals on both sides should
explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against them for
strategic and operational incompetence despite being provided with
superiority at the decisive point and why their command outfits which
are too large for their intellectual/resolution capabilities to handle in
war should not be cut to one fourth their present size! But who will bell
the cat! Why not employ a good team of psychiatrists at one-fiftieth
the cost spent on armour and other expensive hardware and cure the
pathetic minds of the sick Indo Pak psyche! Alas! we forget what long
ago Freud said, "The irrational forces in man's nature are so strong
that the rational forces have little chance of success against them. A
small minority might be able to live a life of reason, but most men are
comfortable living with their delusions and superstitions than with
truth". Freud thus sadly concluded "Society which has been fashioned
by man reflects to a great extent man's irrationality. As a
consequence each new generation is corrupted by being born in an
irrational society. The influence of man on society and of society on
man is a vicious circle and only a few hardy souls can free
themselves". That was in the interwar years with Fascism rising and
hatred gripping all Europe. Europe paid its price in million of lives in
WW II. The Indo-Pak subcontinent has yet to learn. We saw one
holocaust in 1947 but have learnt very little from it. The 1971
holocaust did not affect many in the West Wing.Brahmaputra and the
tidal rivers had the capacity to take a huge load and disposal of
anything was a simple operation! Had our higher leaders both civil and
military or the armoured commanders been more competent, perhaps
things may have been settled a bit less amicably albeit more swiftly
in the 1947-48, 1965 or 1971 wars! In the post-nuclear scenario both
sides sure do need psychiatric help! n

REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES

79 Interviews with a large number of participants including Major later

Lieutenant Colonel Zil ur Rahman from 19 Baluch (R & S) residing in
Lahore Cantt and one who I first met at the Lahore Cantt Polo Ground
jogging track, Major Iftikhar a dear friend and senior from 11 Cavalry
who commanded a tank troop in Chamb in 1971, Lieutenant Colonel
Suleman Butt from 11 Cavalry who is a unit officer and a relative by
family inter-marriages, who was a troop leader and was seriously
wounded in Chamb and more than 100 other ranks of 11 Cavalry, 28
Cavalry and 26 Cavalry with whom I served in 11 Cavalry, 58 Cavalry
and 5 Independent Armoured Squadron.

80Page-513 & 514-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

81Page-188-The Pakistan Army-1966-1971- Major General Shaukat

Riza (Retired)-Printed for Services Book Club by Wajid Alis (Private
Limited) -Lahore-1990. Shaukat Riza the official historian of Pakistan
Army noted this anti-artillery bias of Headquarter 1 Corps in the
following words; "When Headquarter 1 Corps was established in
Gujranwala, its artillery component was driven out nine miles away to
Nadipur. Even for the capture of Dharam Enclave Headquarter Artillery
I Corps was kept out of picture."
82Page-194-Shaukat Riza-Pakistan Army-1966-71-Op Cit. Riza writes
that "Brigadier Ahmad (armoured brigade commander) made approx
25 counter-attack plans. However, the artillery commander from 1
Corps and neighbouring divisions were neither consulted nor advised
about these plans.This was to have unfortunate consequences as the
battle unfolded."

83Page-514-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

84 Pages-531 & 532-Ibid.

85 Page-28-The Western Front-Indo Pakistan War 1971- Lt Gen P.

Candeth -Allied Publishers-Madras-1984. General Candeth who was C
in C Western Command states in his book that "the most critical period
was between 8 and 26 October when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division
were still outside Western Command. Had Pakistan put in a pre-
emptive attack during that period the consequences would have been
too dreadful to contemplate and all our efforts would have been trying
to correct the adverse situation forced on us "

86 Page-25-Article- The Armoured Thrust-An Operational Analysis-

Major A.H Amin (Retired)- The Citadel -Issue Number - 1/98- Command
and Staff College- Quetta-April 1998.

87Page-25-Article- Why I Lay down Arms-Lieutenant General Amir

Abdullah Khan Niazi (Retired) - Defence Journal-Issue Number -3-4-
1979- Volume Number Five-Karachi-1979.

88 Page-8-Letter to the Editor from Major A.H Amin - Readers Forum-

"The Citadel-No. 3/93"- Command and Staff College Quetta-November
1993.

89Pages-39 & 40-Article - Resolution -the Cardinal Command Virtue-

Captain A.H Amin-Pakistan Army Journal-June 1992 Issue-Inspector
General Training and Evaluations Branch-Training publication and
Information Directorate-General Branch -Rawalpindi.

90 Page-14- Article- The Intangible Forces Behind a Military

Manoeuvre- Major A.H Amin -Pakistan Army Journal-June 1993 Issue-
Inspector General Training and Evaluations Branch-Training Publication
and Information Directorate-General Headquarters -Rawalpindi.

91 Ibid.

92 Pages-32 & 35-Article-Plain as well as Subtle aspects of Military

Decision Making- Major A.H Amin (Retired)-The Citadel-Issue Number
1/94- Command and Staff College -Quetta-April 1994. This article was
submitted for publication while the author was in service commanding
an independent tank squadron in September 1993 but published after
retirement in April 1994.

93 Page-32-Citadel Issue 1/98-Op Cit.

94 Page-31-Ibid.

95Page-3- Editors Note-The Citadel-Issue Number 2/98- Command and

Staff College Quetta-December 1998.

96Page-50-Article-The Relationship of Organisation to Doctrine and

Conduct of War- Major A.H Amin (Retired)-Citadel Issue number 2/98-
Op Cit.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 The reader may note that the Glasnost/Perestroika of the Pakistan

Army as far as military writing is concerned began from 1988-89
onwards once General Baig became the COAS and Major General
Riazullah became the Director General of Inter Services Public
Relations Directorate (ISPR). Riazullah essentially a fighting soldier and
a career officer with a fine written expression was one of the most
capable and brilliant heads of the ISPR. In addition Lieutenant Colonel
I.D Hassan was particularly instrumental and decisive in improving the
quality of the "Pakistan Army Journal". Colonel I.D Hassan was
succeeded in turn by two almost as brilliant editors i.e Lieutenant
Colonel Syed Ishfaq and Lieutenant Colonel Syed Jawaid Ahmad both
of whom raised the standard of the Pakistan Army Journal to a very
high level. Unfortunately after Colonel Jawaid Ahmad's departure in
1994 the magazine's standard deteriorated and by 1997 its circulation
despite the massive financial resources at its backing had been
reduced from quarterly to six monthly.

100 Page-28-Eight Years Overseas-Field Marshal Henry.M. Wilson of

Libya-Hutchinson Boks-London-1950.

101 Page-138-J.A.I Agar Hamilton-Op Cit and Page-40-The

Mediterranean and Middle East-Volume Three-Major General I.S.O
Playfair-Her Majesty's Stationery Office-London-1960

102Page-79-Panzer Battles-General Von Mellenthin-Corgi/Ballantine

Books-New York-1977.
103 Page-243-The Crucible of War-Auchinleck's Command- Barrie Pitt-
Macmillan-London-1986.

104 Page-156-War Despatches-Op Cit. Page-404-Gurcharan Singh-Op

Cit. The reader may note that Indian armour withdrew north of the
railway line at Chawinda on its own, but some units in Pakistan claim
that it was they who attacked the Indians and drove them out !

105 Page-405-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.This incident illustrates poor

staff procedures too since the headquarter of 1st Armoured Division
was also responsible for this lapse.

106 Page-496 - Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit

107 Page-197-A Study of History-The One Volume Edition- Arnold

Toynbee-Thames and Hudson-Published with arrangement with Oxford
University Press, London-1988.

108 Page-243-Correlli Barnett-Op Cit.

109 Pages-12 & 13-Brigadier Riazul Karim Khan, MC, LOM -Op Cit.

110 Page-13-Ibid.

111 Page-79-Von Mellenthin-Op Cit.

112 Page-243-Correlli Barnett-Op Cit.

113 Page-39-Tank Warfare-Richard Simpkin-Brasey's Publishers

Limited London-1979.

114 Page-232-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cited.Shaukat writes that

although an infantry company was to go (which means that it was
ordered to go) with 6 Lancers....after some haggling (as if 5 Armoured
Brigade was a fish market!!!!) only one platoon was made available.
Shaukat writes that later Sahibzada Gul (6 Lancers) asked for more
infantry and an air strike on Valtoha but neither came. It appears that
the gears of the 5 Armoured Brigade were completely jammed due to
the friction of war and despite all this its commander was promoted
after the war while Nisar the real hero of tank battles in both 1965 and
1971 did not go beyond a brigadier. The finest infantry brigade
commander of the 1965 Brigadier Qayyum Sher who was praised by
Shaukat Riza (Page-203-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit) was also retired as a
brigadier while one who was on the sidelines in Chawinda (i.e Niazi)
became a lieutenant general. The same happened in India to Harbaksh
Singh since he was a Punjabi and a Sikh while Manekshaw who had
played no role in 1948 and 1965 wars became a

C-in-C. The lesson is that in Indo-Pak armies as perhaps in all armies;

actual on ground war performance is less important than PR! Thus a
brigadier who absented himself from his headquarters in 1971 on
pretext of martial law duty later became a four star general while
another who was accused of many atrocities/plunder in East Pakistan
became a lieutenant general ! On the other hand the brigade
commander who was most openly praised by the Indians in East
Pakistan i.e Tajammul Hussain Malik was superseded as a major
general. The German General Staff identified talent and groomed and
polished it.The Indo Pak armies identify mediocrity and take it to the
highest limits !

115 Pages-89 & 90-Von Mellenthin-Op Cit.

116 Page-56- Article- Do we Lack Aggressiveness-Lieutenant Colonel

Javed Alam Khan- Citadel -Issue Number 1/91-Command and Staff
College-Quetta-June 1991. The worthy writer who was one of the few
genuinely professional officers who I served with while he was a major
and I was a lieutenant in the adjacent unit/same division for four long
years during the period 1985-89. His sense of humour at that time
was a bit unconventional (as second in command he kept a special
box in his drawer, with a scandalous creature, a kind of a puppet, that
was enough to ensure that all JCOs, especially the Tabuk returned
Hajis, asking for leave bolted out of room instantaneously and it was a
folly to greet him by hugging him in the traditional manner on Eid. I
have not met him since 1994 and I wonder whether he has succumbed
to the genetic transformation that occurs once most officers reach
general rank or has managed to retain his forthright resolute and
intellectually honest approach which he possessed in abundance till at
least brigadier rank in 1995.

117 Pages-236 , 237 & 238-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit.

118 Page-90-The Desert Generals -Correlli Barnett-London-1984.

119 Page-496 & 497-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit recalling General
Harbaksh Singh's remarks on page-161-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.

120 Page-318-Remarks of Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan-The

Partition of the Punjab-A Compilation of Official Documents-Volume
Two- National Documentation Centre-Lahore -1983-Printed at
Ferozsons.
121 Page-319-Ibid

122Page-496-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

123Page-160-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.

124 Map on page 6 Volume Four-The Partition of Punjab-Official

Documents-Op Cit.

THOUGHTS ON
THE 1971 EAST
PAKISTAN
DEBACLE
By
A.H AMIN
Analysis of Book Review by
Ahmad Faruqui
THE PAKISTAN ARMY CONSISTING IN
LARGE PART OF RANKERS OR
RANKERS SONS HAD NO TRADITION
OF MISSION ORIENTED MODIFICATION
OF ORDERS KNOWN AS
AUFTRAGSTAKTIKS.ITS OFFICERS
MAY BE BRAVE OR SPIRITED LACKED
INITIATIVE,AND MADE THEIR WAY UP
THE LADDER BY SYCOPHANCY AND
YES MAN SHIP.THIS WAS THE FACTOR
IN EAST PAKISTAN AND THE SAME
MEDIOCRITY SIGNIFIES THE
PAKISTAN ARMY TILL TO DATE.AN
ARMY LED BY OFFICERS WHO ARE
CLERKS AND EMPTY WINDBAGS IN
SPIRIT.
A.H AMIN ,2000

BOOK REVIEW
The Betrayal of East Pakistan

BY A.A.K NIAZI

AHMAD FARUQUI reviews the book of the former Commander Eastern

Command in 1971. PUBLISHED IN DEFENCE JOURNAL 2000

On December 16, 1971, under clear skies, and in front of a restless

crowd of nearly a million Bengalis, Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi,
Commander, Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army, surrendered
“first his pistol, then his sword, and then half his country” to Lieutenant
General Jagjit Singh Aurora of the Indian Army.2 In West Pakistan, the
President of Pakistan, its Chief of Army Staff, and its Chief Martial Law
Administrator, General Yahya came on the radio to reassure his
shocked nation that even though fighting had ceased on the eastern
front “due to an arrangement between the local commanders,” the war
with India would continue. However, on the very next day, realizing
that his chances of surviving a fullscale war with India on the western
front without US or Chinese support were nil, he agreed to a ceasefire.
An exultant Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and daughter of
India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, declared that “we have
avenged the Muslim capture of Somnath and our history of a thousand
years.”3 General Yahya had boasted earlier in the year that if India
choose to declare war on Pakistan “I will shoot my way out of it.” He
had also boasted about how he had escaped from a prisoner of war
camp in Italy during the Second World War, while Sam Manekshaw,
now the Indian Chief of Staff, was one of many fellow prisoners who
had been unable to escape. Now, in vastly different circumstances, a
chastened General Yahya sought to justify the ceasefire by stating that
“I have always maintained that war solves no problem.” However, as
Oxford historian Robert Jackson noted in South Asian Crisis, “the
victors in Dacca knew otherwise.” East Pakistan had passed into the
history books, and with it some argued the “two nation theory” that
had led to Pakistan’s independence. How did things come to such a
sorry pass for Pakistan? A nation as proud of its martial traditions as
Pakistan has still not to come with this sad legacy. Heir to the glorious
traditions of the Arab, Turkish and Moghul armies of Muslim history,
the Pakistani army was expected to fight to the “last man, last round”
in East Pakistan, and to do anything but surrender itself to the Indian
Army. Several years later, a Pakistani general officer summed up the
nation’s feelings when he said that “Never before had a Muslim sword
been turned over to a Hindu. In Islam, surrender is taboo; you either
return with the land, or you bathe it in your blood4.”
What went wrong? Pakistanis may well find an answer to this troubling
question in General Niazi’s book, even though it is not the
disingenuous answer that presented by the author. Soon after the war
ended, Indian authors, gloating over their victory, produced a plethora
of books with jingoistic titles such as The Lightning Campaign, Indian
Sword Strikes in East Pakistan and The Liberation of Bangladesh. A few
month’s prior to the surrender, the Chairman of the Pakistan People’s
Party, and soon to be the new president and first civilian martial law
administrator of truncated Pakistan, penned his version of events. It
blamed the inept Army leadership and the intransigent Awami League
for The Great Tragedy. There was no mention of Bhutto’s own
intransigence in accepting the right of the Awami League to form the
government, which was its constitutional right given its absolute
majority in parliament. Nor was there any mention of his collusion with
the ruling junta in launching Operation SEARCHLIGHT on March 25.
Unable to hide his relief at the military crackdown, he had ranted
prematurely on the following day that “Thank God Pakistan has been
saved.”
When he took over the presidency in Islamabad, he asked Major
General Fazal Muqueem Khan who had earlier written ‘A Story of the
Pakistani Army’ during the presidency of Ayub Khan to write a “military
history” of last year’s events. Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership
conveniently placed the blame squarely on Pakistan’s erstwhile
military junta. To deal with any potential public outcry for justice, Mr.
Bhutto appointed a judicial commission of inquiry headed by then Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Hamood-ur-Rehman. The Commission
laboured over several months to interview serving and retired
generals, air marshals, admirals, civil servants and politicians.
However, there was one surprising exception: Lieutenant General Tikka
Khan, who had launched the ill-fated Operation SEARCHLIGHT, and
who would later become Chief of Army Staff. The Commission’s report
was completed but never saw the light of the day. It remains “Top
Secret” to this day, because its release may compromise “national
security.” As the years went by, Major Siddiq Salik, Public Relations
Officer to General Niazi in Eastern Command, produced a lucid and
compelling first-hand narrative called ‘Witness To Surrender’. This
placed the blame largely on General Niazi’s shoulders.

More recently, Lieutenant General Gul Hasan, then Chief of General

Staff, produced his Memoirs. Accepting responsibility for his portion of
the blame, he stated that “we lost half of the country due to our
mistakes.” He also stated that General Niazi should never have been
appointed to this command because he had an undistinguished
military record and that his “professional ceiling was that of a company
commander.” However, he does not explain how then Brigadier Niazi
was one of only eight officers to be awarded the Hilal-e-Jurat in the
1965 war. General Niazi’s Version In his book, Niazi reproduces a letter
of recommendation from Lieutenant General Tikka Khan where the
latter expresses complete confidence in Niazi and says that “I will have
him on my side in war.” As the war began, Niazi notes that “I had vast
experience of commanding troops. The troops under my command
were probably the best in the world.” And five months later, General
Abdul Hamid Khan, de facto C-in-C during the 1971 war, called him
“the highest decorated officer of our Army, and one of our best field
commanders.” General Niazi says that 24 medals “adorned” his chest,
including — for some unexplained reason — the Hilal-e-Jurat and
Sitara-e-Pakistan for his performance in the 1971 war. After being
released as a prisoner of war, he states that he “volunteered for Court
Martial” because the truth would come out and the real culprits would
be exposed. However, no one took him up on the offer. Niazi puts the
blame for the military debacle on the GHQ and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He
alleges they conspired to surrender the Eastern wing of the country to
India, so that they could hang on to power in the Western wing. He
simply dismisses all other books that critique his role in the debacle,
such as those by Salik and Gul Hassan, as a “pack of lies”. Nowhere
does he find any fault with himself. If anything, he states that he never
abandoned his soldiers, and proudly states that both Hannibal and
Napoleon had done so at

least once.

Niazi comes across as a general officer eager to follow orders. Three

such orders led to disaster. The first order was to command the
Eastern Garrison. Several generals senior to him had declined the
opportunity. He knew the mission assigned to him was not achievable
with the resources given to him, but he accepted that order even
though “I had been given a rudderless ship with a broken mast to take
across the stormy seas, with no lighthouse to me in any direction.” The
second order was to not take the war into India, even though he had
planned to “capture Agartala and a big chunk of Assam, and develop
multiple thrusts into Indian Bengal. We would cripple the economy of
Calcutta by blowing up bridges and sinking boats and ships in the
Hoogly River and create panic amongst the civilians.” But this proposal
was rejected by General Hamid who said that the Pakistan government
“was not prepared to fight an open war with India...You will neither
enter Indian territory nor send raiding parties into India, and you will
not fire into Indian territory either.”
And the third order was to surrender the Eastern garrison to India, “to
save West Pakistan, our base, from disintegration and Western
Garrison from further repulses.” Thus, the defence of West Pakistan
had now become contingent on the surrender of East Pakistan, in an
ironic reversal of Pakistan’s strategic doctrine that “the defence of the
East lay in the West.” He states that he had 32,000 men and the
wherewithal to continue the war and “were nowhere near defeat.” The
number of men cited seems implausible since he had started the war
with 45,000 troops. It is highly unlikely, given his deployment of forces,
that he could have concentrated 32,000 for the Battle of Dacca. In fact,
others have argued that he only had 5,000 men available for the
defence of Dacca, since the troops had been deployed in penny
packets around the entire border with India, and were instructed to fall
back only when they had experienced 75% casualties.5 Regardless of
the number of troops available to him, it is not clear how long he could
have survived, since there was no hope for reinforcements of any kind
from any source. Notes Brian Cloughley, “the concept of operations
was faulty: all brigades were forward, with nothing in reserve...The
outcome of the Indian advance was inevitable.6” General Niazi
requires an unusual amount of gullibility from his readers when he
states that he was forced to surrender by his Commander-in-Chief.

It is the very opposite of what typically happens in such situations.

Informed that Paulus had surrendered the Sixth Army to the Soviet
Union, an infuriated Hitler said: “This hurts me so much because the
heroism of so many soldiers is nullified by one single characterless
weakling...What is Life? Life is the Nation. The individual must die
anyway...What hurts me most, personally, is that I still promoted him
to Field Marshal. I wanted to give him this final satisfaction. He could
have freed himself from all sorrow and ascended into eternity and
national immortality, but he prefers to go to Moscow.7” Valid Insights
He contends correctly that General Yahya disappeared from East
Pakistan after March 25, 1971. This was inexcusable behaviour on the
part of the Supreme Commander and President. To make matters
worse, when asked about East Pakistan, Yahya would say that “all I can
do about East Pakistan is pray.” General Abdul Hamid Khan, the acting
C-in-C, visited the troops in the East just twice. General Gul Hassan,
the Chief of General Staff, would not answer Niazi’s phone calls. The
top brass of the Pakistan Army had abandoned their “most decorated
officer” to his own devices. General Niazi excoriates General Yahya and
the GHQ for waging a lack lustre campaign on the Western front,
where they had a near parity of forces with India and could choose the
time and place of attack. He states that the Western Garrison lost
5,500 square miles of territory in ten days, and failed to launch their
much awaited counter offensive into India. He calls this “a setback
militarily unbelievable, unacceptable and unforgivable.”
 Lieutenant General Attiqur Rahman states that the counter offensive
was not launched for reasons that remain a mystery, but lack of
morale was not one of them. Without any success being achieved in
the West, the fate of the garrison in East Pakistan was sealed. As noted
by Sisson-Rose, “the war was planned and pursued with a lack of
coordination and foresight not dissimilar to that of 1965.”8 Niazi boldly
and correctly calls for “a computer model of the conduct of operations
by the Armed Forces in the whole of Pakistan, as well as separately for
East and West Pakistan, keeping in view the political and military
environment at that time. This is the modern method for assessing
performance... If this were done, I and my generals would be shown to
be among the most successful generals of this century.” By prejudging
the outcome of such a computer simulation, he erodes the credibility
of this useful suggestion. The Engima of Surrender General Niazi is not
inclined to accept any blame for himself. Having prided himself on his
superiority to Hannibal and Napoleon, he states elsewhere that he
“did more for the good of the country and its armed forces than
anyone else.” As mentioned earlier, he says he challenged the Pakistan
Army to Court Martial him, but they refused. It is likely that much
would have come out of such proceedings that would have implicated
not only the top Army brass but also General Niazi himself. It is very
likely that he would have been subjected to intense cross examination
on his conduct of war.

Perhaps the following questions would have been put to him. (1) Did
you think that East Pakistan could be defended with the troops that
were likely to be made available to you? I.e., three divisions without
much supporting armour or artillery, and only one squadron of
subsonic Sabre fighter bombers. War with India was coming on the
heels of a gruelling civil war, and your “troops were not only tired and
exhausted but had swollen feet, ravaged chests, and bare legs,
because clothing and footwear were not available in the required
quantity.” (2) Did you not anticipate that you would be required to
simultaneously fight a conventional war and a guerilla war? The Mukti
Bahini was fighting a war of liberation, supported by a local population
of 75 million up in arms against the Pakistan Army which it viewed as
an occupation force. (3) What stroke of generalship led you to believe
that India would merely conduct a minor incursion into East Pakistan to
set up a puppet regime? Is that why you deployed your troops in penny
packets? Niazi told his captors that they “always seemed to come
round behind us.” Pran Chopra argues that the credit for this goes very
largely to the Mukti Bahini. “Jointly, the IAF and the Mukti Bahini
destroyed the logic of Niazi’s strategy.”9 (4) Why did you expect
Pakistan would succeed in pulling off its well-known but untested
strategy that the “Defence of the East lies in the West.” Was this not a
case of putting “all your eggs in one basket?” (5) What caused you to
expect the Chinese would intervene through the Himalayan passes
which the winter snows had rendered impassable in December? Were
you not aware of India’s treaty with the Soviet Union, and the decision
of the Soviet Union to deploy scores of additional divisions along the
Manchurian border with China. Did you not recall that China had issued
an ultimatum to India during the September 1965 war, but then never
delivered on it? (6) Given his poor track record, what caused you to
think that General Hamid would indeed send your beleaguered
garrison supplies from the West through the “hump back” trade route
that traverses Tibet, thereby circumventing the Indian blockade of the
sea routes? He states that when he asked General Hamid to send him
supplies through this route, Hamid dismissed the request politely by
simply saying that it was infeasible. (7) Did you honestly think the US
government was in a position to intervene on Pakistan’s side, in the
face of significant domestic opposition to the wellpublicized brutalities
of Tikka Khan’s military crack-down? You surely had seen first hand
how the US had abandoned its military ally, Pakistan, during the 1965
War with non-aligned India. That “equal” embargo on both India and
Pakistan had significantly affected importdependent Pakistan without
making any dent in India war-making capabilities. (8) When hostilities
broke out, why did you succumb to a “bunker mentality” and did not
dare to venture out of Dacca.

On reaching Calcutta after the surrender, he stated to reporters that

the IAF bombing “had kept him awake for 12 nights, and he just could
not continue any more.10” There were times when he would break
down during military briefings. Once he did that in the presence of
Bengali servants, who were immediately ordered outside where they
gleefully reported that the “Sahibs are crying inside.”

Post Script

This book is a failed attempt by General Niazi to clear his name, and
its tone is entirely self-serving. Ironically, the book provides unique
insights into the workings of his mind. Such insights could not have
been obtained through other means. That alone makes it essential
reading for students of military history.Sums up Brian Cloughley:
“Yahya bore overall responsibility for what befell his country; but
General Niazi was the commander who lost the war in the East.”
Perhaps the book should have been entitled General Niazi’s Betrayal of
Pakistan. The book makes it very clear why the Pakistan Army
surrendered in 13 days with more than 45,000 soldiers still in fighting
condition. As General Gul Hasan notes, “with Niazi at the helm, they
had no chance.” Of course that begs the question of who put Niazi
there. The most strategic command in the Army was turned over to a
“hastily promoted Major General.”11 The list of culprits begins with
Generals Yahya and Hamid, but it cannot exclude General Gul Hasan
either, who was then Chief of the General Staff.

There is then the bigger question of why did Pakistan get involved in a
war with India under such adverse circumstances. Can India be blamed
for assisting the Mukti Bahini guerillas in seeking the liberation of
Bangladesh? In one year, India implemented successfully what
Pakistan had been trying unsuccessfully for two decades to implement
in Kashmir. And then of course there is the role of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
unwilling to take a back seat to Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman. He insidiously
ingratiated himself with leading personalities of the military junta,
including Generals Peerzada, Mitha, and Umar, and blocked the
National Assembly from meeting in Dacca. That essentially sealed the
fate of United Pakistan. Later on, he tore up the Polish resolution which
would have preserved the honour of the Pakistan Army from being
considered by the United Nations Security Council.12 Writes Robert
Jackson, now a British Member of Parliament, “Looking back on it all,
the sad story of the demise of East Pakistan does seem to have been a
miasma of personal ambition.”1314

REFERENCES
1 The author is an economist in Palo Alto, California. He lived in
Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars. He has written on Pakistan’s
Strategic Myopia in the RUSI Journal, and reviewed Mazari’s book,
Journey to Disillusionment for International Affairs.
2James P. Sterba, Wall Street Journal, November 6, 1984.
3Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan: Leadership Challenges, OUP, 1999.
4Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, Pakistan, India, and the Creation of
Bangladesh, University of California Press, 1990.
5Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army, OUP, 1999.
6Brian Cloughley, op. cit.
7Antony Beevor, Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943, Penguin
Books, 1998.
8 Sisson-Rose, op. cit.
9Pran Chopra, India’s Second Liberation, MIT Press, 1974.
10Pran Chopra, op. cit.
11Brigadier A. A. K. Chaudhry, September 1965, Ferozesons, 1977.
12 Sisson-Rose, op. cit.
13 Personal correspondence, January 20, 2000.
ANALYSIS OF
AHMAD
FAUQUIS BOOK
REVIEW
BY
A.H AMIN
The book review on General Niazi’s book was a very fine effort. There
are some observations which I wish to share with the readers. Firstly
the writers quoting another author saying that creation of Bangladesh
was the end of the two nation theory. We in Pakistan have twisted
“Two Nation Theory” very subjectively . We have forgotten that Mr
Jinnah the founder of Pakistan favoured creation of an Independent
Bengal in 1946. H.V Hodson perfectly reliable authority states that Mr
Jinnah said that he would be delighted if Bengal stayed united and
independent and added, “What is the use of Bengal without Calcutta?
They had much better remained united and independent: I am sure
they would be on friendly terms with Pakistan”. (Refers-Page-246- The
Great Divide- H.V Hodson- Oxford University Karachi-1985). Bengal did
not become independent because of Bengali Hindu fears about being
in a Muslim majority independent Bengal.
THE ABJECT SURRENDER OF A TIGER.A MAN WHOSE
ANCESTORS WERE BETRAYED BY THE MUSLIMS OF
RAWALPINDI IN 1857 CAN UNDERSTAND THE FACT THAT THERE
WERE NO MARTIAL RACES REFERRED TO IN PAKISTAN !
Thus the connection with “Two Nation Theory” was not the reason why
Bengal was divided in 1947. Mr Jinnah saw in 1946 i.e the inadvisability
of having Bengal in Pakistan without Calcutta. Something that the
Pakistani policy makers failed to grasp till 1971! It is to Jinnah’s credit
that he brought Bengalis in the army by raising the first two battalions
of the East Bengal regiment. A process, which was stopped by Ayub
from 1950 to 1966, as a result of which Pakistan Army instead of
becoming a broad based national army like the post 1947 Indian Army,
remained, a Punjabi dominated army. A factor which contributed a
great deal to the separation of East Pakistan.

The Two Nation Theory was created due to certain reasons which at
that time were valid albeit relatively. It did not exist in 711 AD or in
1857 but was enunciated in the period 1860-1940. In 1971 it was no
longer valid at least for the Bengali Muslims and they rejected it. My
second contention pertains to the author’s quoting a Pakistani General
stating that “Never before had a Muslim army surrendered before a
Hindu army or the assertion that the Pakistan Army was a bearer of
traditions of the early Muslim conquerors of India! This assertion is
absolutely false ! The problem is that we have to get out of this
“Martial Races Syndrome”. The vast bulk of Pakistan army consists of
men with Hindu or Buddhist ancestry! As a matter of fact the Hindu
Rajputs of the north of Chenab area from where the vast bulk of
Pakistan army is recruited were far more difficult to govern before they
were converted to Islam! The only positive connection that these races
had with the Muslim Turks was the fact that one of their members
killed Sultan Ghauri!

Even the Pathans, the second largest group of Pakistani soldiers, had
little connection with Turkish invasions of India! Babar did not like the
Pathans and the Pathans generally remained in conflict with the
Muslim governments in Delhi! Many Muslim forts surrendered to the
Hindu Marathas during the Maratha war in the south. The Marathas
captured Delhi long before 1971 in mid -18th century and held it with
uneven gaps till 1803 once the British captured it. As a matter of fact
the problem is that most of our worthy generals have not read military
history of the sub-continent. The Pakistan Army is not the descendant
of the Turk armies that invaded India! Of course with the exceptions of
some genuinely Mughal villages like Lehr Sultanpur etc! The Pakistan
Army is a chip from the block of the old mercenary British army with its
origins in the “Mutiny Loyalty of Punjabi Muslim Pathan and Sikh
soldiers” who attacked Delhi for the first time in September 1857 and
in phenomenal staunchness of Punjabi soldiers while facing the Muslim
Turks in WW One!
The Punjabis once totalled as Muslim Hindu and Sikh, as an ethnic
group became the largest single group and the vast bulk of the British
Indian Army in the period 1883-1911. In 1883 there were about 34.09
% or 120 Punjabi companies (25 Punjabi Muslims, 18 Punjabi Dogra
Hindus and 77 Punjabi Sikhs) and 15 Pathan companies out of the total
352 infantry companies of the Regular Bengal Army. By 1911 the
Indian Army was a more than 50 % Punjabi army although never a
Muslim majority army. In 1929 thanks to Pathan and Ranghar defiance
of the British in WW One the Punjabi percentage (divided into roughly
one third Muslim Sikh and Hindu) of the Indian Army rose to 54.36% if
the Gurkhas were included and to 61.8 % if Gurkhas were excluded.
The Pathan share at this time stood at 4.02 % out of which all were not
ethnic or linguistic Pathans. (Refers- Map on page-96 - Report of Indian
Statutory Commission-Volume One- Calcutta - Government of India -
Publication Branch 1930). The low caste Hindu Marathas militarily
defeated the Mughals long before 1971 and their hold on India was
finally successfully challenged not by any Punjabi or Pathan Muslim
army but by the Bengal and Madras armies of the English East India
Companies at Laswari and Assaye respectively in 1803! Punjab later
dubbed as a martial province with a Muslim majority was firmly under
Sikh domination despite the fact that the Sikhs were a 8 or 9 %
minority! During Sikh rule mosques were often used as military
magazines, including the famous Badshahi mosque and some times
plastered with cow dung (Pages -347 to 360— “Lahore -Past and
Present” - M.Baqir, Punjabi Adabi Academy, Lahore—1984)as
happened with the Golden Mosque of Kashmiri Bazaar Lahore !

So much for the martial traditions, just 122 years ago, of the largely
Punjabi Muslim army that surrendered in East Pakistan! The problem
ironically was the fact that the same West Pakistanis, who despised
Bengalis as non-Martial race in March 1971, at least were not as
martial in 1849, as they became in 1914, because of British
recruitment policies and situational reasons! The problem is that we
have forgotten that all territory west of Aligarh district (including
Aligarh), including Delhi Agra Punjab and Frontier was under Hindu
Maratha or non-Muslim Sikh rule till 1803 or as late as 1849! There
were no martial races in Muslim majority Punjab, at least to rule Punjab
till 1849! So much for the martial traditions of Muslims of Indo-Pak! It
was all situational, there being no martial races! But somehow in
Pakistan by 1950s myth became mixed with reality and myth finally
gained the upper hand ! The winter of our discontent finally came in
the killing fields of Bengal in December 1971! General Niazi, the much
maligned man, was the tip of the iceberg only! But we realise this only
if he is assessed in the light of the other factors. He was a product of
the Ayubian system when officers with ranker background or those
who lacked independent judgements were preferred for higher ranks!
The class conscious British who were extremely snobbish in selection
of regular officers for the British Army very cleverly kept a 50% quota
for Indian Army rankers (24 on internal merit and 6 on nomination) in
each intake ( 30 out of 60 cadets) of the Indian Military Academy Dera
Dun.

The ulterior motive was to ensure that relatively more pliable ,

politically inert, and orders oriented material entered the Indian officer
corps. In India the ranker breed did not do as well as Pakistan because
their first Indian C-in-C Cariappa was from the 1919 commissioned
Indian course. On theother hand in Pakistan the civilian leadership in
its zeal to have a non-Punjabi C-in-C at a time when the Punjabi-
Hindustani conflict was at its peak selected Ayub who was a 1927
commissioned officer. This led to the exit of many Sandhurst/Daly
College commissioned Muslim officers who were senior to Ayub. The
leftover of Sandhurst commissioned officers were eliminated by Ayub
through forced retirement or by promotion of Musa to C-in-C’s
appointment in 1958. Thus the Pakistan Army lost the services of many
more experienced officers simply because they were sidelined through
political supersession or were retired. The gap between the two Indo
Pak armies in quality of experience may be gauged from the fact that
the first Indian C-in-C was eight years senior to Ayub in service and the
course mate of Musa, the second Muslim C-in-C of the Pakistan Army
i.e Manekshaw became the Indian C-in-C eleven years after Musa! This
may have worked positively for the Pakistan Army had Musa been a
man with an independent outlook! Musa on the other hand as Gul
Hassan’s memoirs revealed lacked independent judgement dynamism
or talent! The Pakistan army during the period 1951-71 became a
highly orders oriented machine! Smart on the drill square, tactically
sound but strategically barren and lacking in operational vision! One
whose first Pakistani C-in-C was more interested in political intrigue
and industrial ventures than in the basics of higher military
organisation or operational strategy! Modern warfare on the other
hand demanded mission-oriented approach, which was sadly lacking in
both the Indo Pak armies! This was thanks to the British inherited
orders oriented approach which in words of General Mellenthin of the
Wehrmacht, reduced British officers to the status of clerks and
mouthpieces of their commanders!

The British with all the resources of the British Empire and thanks to US
aid in both world wars managed to survive despite phenomenal
military incompetence. Thus Alanbrooke the British Chief lamented
during WW Two once he said “It is lamentable, how poor we are in
army and corps commanders; we ought to remove several , but
heaven knows where we shall find anything much better...the flower of
our manhood was wiped out some twenty years ago and it is just some
of those that we lost then that we require now” (Refers-Page-239- The
Turn of the Tide-Arthur Bryant -Collins Saint James Place-London-April
1957). But this incompetence was no longer affordable in the resource
starved Pakistan Army of 1971! The Indian problem was less serious
since many of their drawbacks were overcome by the fact that they
were numerically superior, and possessed larger material resources.
This was applicable relatively less in 1965 and convincingly more in
1971! Secondly the Indians had lesser number of ranker officers in
their higher ranks and had benefited from the experience of a larger
number of service chiefs with more experience in terms of length of
service as well as war record than Pakistan Army, whose first chief was
famous for tactical timidity in Burma, while the second chief was a non
entity, whose only quality was humility, albeit, commensurate with his
actual potential (!) and political reliability! Some readers may find the
approach biased. Nevertheless it is based on lessons of military
history. Leadership is a situational process. The finest leadership seen
in an institutionalised form was developed in the German Army.

The German officer corps was dominated by two classes of men. One,
scions from aristocratic families of Prussia or the impoverished nobility
weak in land holding but bearers of a long tradition in officer rank. Men
with the title/prefix Von. Second were men of learning who made their
way upwards in the officer corps through sheer merit and on total
intellectual grounds. Like Moltke Gneisenau and Scharnhorst (of
humble origins but educated under a noble’s patronage who saw great
talent in him). Take Moltke the Elder, the writer of a large number of
military history works and a profound thinker. He cannot be compared
with Niazi Tikka or Musa, all of whom entered the army on the ranker
quota and the last were not famous for any qualities of higher military
leadership apart from eminence in conducting ruthless counter
insurgency operations in Baluchistan or East Pakistan! Men who had
not written even a single article or composition on any military subject,
with any trace of depth of intellect! When I was commissioned in the
army in March 1983 we had two officers in 11 Cavalry who specialised
in narrating anecdotes of General Tikka Khan’s utterances of
Solomon’s wisdom on various occasions while he was the chief!

Take Ayub Khan. Guilty of tactical timidity in Burma! No comparison

with Thimaya the only Indian to command an infantry brigade in actual
action in WW Two or Rajendarsinhji the first Indian to get a DSO! Those
who did have the talent of higher command or grasp of strategy like
Yaqub were sidelined! Those who did have a record of accomplished
generalship as divisional commanders like Abrar or Sarfaraz or brigade
commanders like Qayyum Sher were not promoted! The reviewer’s
observation about gallantry awards may be compared with Tajammul’s
observation about the round about manner in which gallantry awards
were awarded in 1965, e.g Aziz Bhatti’s case who as per Tajammul
died on the home bank of BRB (by fluke) but was awarded a Nishan e
Haidar on the basis of the citation (which was rewritten three times)
written by his Commanding Officer Colonel Ibrahim Qureshi (a man the
readers may or may not know of considerable literary merit).
(RefersPage-74-The Story of My Struggle- Major General Tajammul
Hussain Malik-Jang Publishers- Lahore -1991) . In any case Hilal I Jurrat
was awarded even to Niazi again and to General Rahim (accused of
fleeing in a unsoldierly manner later), Ansari, Sharif (God knows why)
during the period when the army was engaged in minor operations
against the so-called Mukti Bahini insurgents from March to December
1971 (Page -126-Ibid). Tajammul a Punjabi Muslim from Chakwal
forthrightly admitted that these above-mentioned awards were given
to these gentlemen for killing their own countrymen! (Ibid).

The problem of the Pakistan Army was not lack of talent but of
operating in an environment, which I have always referred to in a self-
coined phrase as “ conspiracy against originality and boldness”,
something which I at least witnessed in my 13 years service from 1981
to 1994. Why this conspiracy against talent? We enter the political
realm once again! The German Kaisers had nothing to fear from a
Moltke or Blucher but military or civilian usurpers of Pakistan had a lot
to fear from a more talented general! Thus the necessity for (another
self-coined phrase) “Goof Selection Syndrome”, a process initiated by
Liaquat the first prime minister under able advice of Iskandar Mirza
and perfected by Ayub and Bhutto. “Select a man from an ethnic or
sectarian minority or at least a politically docile man or one who is
mediocre or at least perceived/assessed as such”. Thus in the Ayubian
era officers with ranker background, were not preferred on merit, but
on the basis of lack of talent and thus lack of ambition in being
politically docile, or being from ethnic and sectarian minorities as was
the case with Musa and Yahya.
The German Army which we were discussing as late as 1930’s the
German army was a “Von” dominated army. As a matter of fact most
of the German generals who opposed Hitler’s rule and many of his
unsound strategic decisions were men like Fritsch Manstein etc, all of
them with an aristocratic background. In India unfortunately the British
with an ulterior motive had encouraged men from the ranks to be
officers with the thinking that these would be more reliable. There
never was any 50 % quota for rankers in Sandhurst! Why the British
were so generous with the despised Indians! Even the Punjabi
dominated army which was so much criticised by the British press for
atrocities in East Pakistan was a British creation whose origins dated
back to the period 1883-1911! The army did have potential Moltke’s
Mansteins and some Grey Wolf’s but the vast bulk of these, perhaps
with the exception of men like Eftikhar Khan were sidelined! Even
Eftikhar, thanks to his unorthodox personal life, was a sidelined man,
once the war broke out, and it was Pakistan Army’s good luck that this
great leader of men, our finest commander commanded the 23
Division! I remember a session with General Attiq ur Rahman whenI
presented him with a book that I had written on Clausewitz’s military
thoughts .The book was dedicated to Eftikhar Khan. Attiq was horror
struck and remembered Eftikhar as a horrible man , as Attiq saw him in
the light of Attiq’s strict standards of morality as Eftikhar’s Directing
Staff in Staff College Quetta. I dismissed General Attique’s objections
since I viewed Eftikhar as all the officers and men of my unit 11
Cavalry saw him in Chamb in 1971. Moving towards the sound of guns,
racing ahead of the leading tank ! Goading cursing and prodding with
his stick irresolute lower commanders ahead !

Our problem has been failure to identify and groom talent! A natural
result in a country where the Prime Minister or the President wants to
have the most pathetic man in the highest ranks, just because he feels
safer with them! There were some charismatic and resolute men in
East Pakistan at brigade level like Tajammul or Saadullah but
Tajammul was described as a nut to this scribe by his brigade major!
Nut because he wished to fight till the bitter end and was abandoned
by most officers of his headquarter while doing so ! But these men
Tajammul, Saadullah etc were the exception rather than the rule! An
officer who served in 16 Division Headquarters and stayed as a
prisoner stated in a conversation in 1983 that the choice in December
1971 was between getting massacred by the Bengalis or safety of an
Indian camp and many, specially those involved in atrocities against
non combatants/civilians were positively relieved on hearing the
announcement of surrender.
On the other hand surrender was a traumatic experience for many
upright officers like some who I saw even as late as 1985 as brigadiers
were bitter about the terrible psychological experience of the whole
affair. There were fighting soldiers who had no part in any atrocities
against non-combatants! Many fine souls like Ijaz Mustafa, Sultan
Mahmood and many more died in the fighting, but today they are not
remembered since they had no one to write a good citation or no
patron in the higher headquarters to send their names ahead. The
Eastern Command on the other hand required a mission-oriented
commander with independent judgement! Niazi’s intellectual level as
stated by Gul and many others was not beyond that of a company
commander! The GOCs that he had were equally illustrious! On the
other hand the strategic situation in 1971 required a Moltke or
Manstein in the Pakistani GHQ! Thus the basic reasons for surrender do
not lie in Niazi’s personality alone, but in other factors! The surrender
in 1971 was the combined result of absence of a Von Lettow Vorbeck
(German commander in East Africa in WW One) in East Pakistan and an
absence of a Moltke the Elder or Manstein in the Pakistani GHQ! The
surrender had two angles, one strategic, which was in the realm of the
Pakistani GHQ and the other operational i.e the realm of the Eastern
Command. I will quote an Indian to prove that East Pakistan could have
been saved despite all the horrible things done by another ranker
Tikka, had the Pakistani GHQ acted with a greater sense of timing!
General Candeth who was C in C Western Command states in his book
that “ the most critical period was between 8 and 26 October when 1
Corps and 1 Armoured Division were still outside Western Command.
Had Pakistan put in a pre-emptive attack during that period the
consequences would have been too dreadful to contemplate and all
our efforts would have been trying to correct the adverse situation
forced on us “ (Refers-Page-28The Western Front-Indo Pakistan War
1971- Lt Gen P. Candeth -Allied PublishersMadras-1984). The fact that
Niazi became a three star general proves that incompetent men can
reach relatively high ranks in an army.

SURRENDER DAY 16 DECEMBER 1971 BELOW ,SEEN IN THE

PICTURE IS SHAH BEG SINGH MAJOR GENERAL INDIAN ARMY
WHO TRAINED THE MUKTI BAHINI AND DIED FOGHTING THE
INDIAN ARMY AT THE GOLDEN TEMPLE IN 1984

Who can say that Niazi was different from the bulk of other generals of
the Pakistan Army in 1971! An army in which between 1955 and
November 1971, in about 17 years 40 Generals had been retired, of
whom only four had reached their superannuating age. (Refers- Page-
258 & 259Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem
Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Ferozsons-Rawalpindi-1973).

An army in which in the words of a major general who served in the

same period, anyone “in the higher ranks who showed some
independence of outlook were invariably removed from service” or one
in which “Some officers were placed in positions that they did not
deserve or had no training for”! (Ibid). An army where “gradually the
officer corps, intensely proud of its professionalism was eroded at its
apex into third class politicians and administrators”! (Refers-Ibid). An
army in which security of commission and constitutional safeguards
against arbitrary dismissal thanks to laws amended from early 1950s
were so lacking that “some left in sheer disgust in this atmosphere of
insecurity and lack of the right of criticism, the two most important
privileges of an armed force officer”. (Refers-Ibid). As a matter of fact
Clausewitz recognised mediocrity in higher ranks. As per Gul
obsequiousness helped Niazi in his rise. Then being from Ayub’s unit
also played a part in his promotion to higher ranks. As far as gallantry
is concerned Niazi did win an MC in WW Two and an HJ in 1965! But
then, the resolution required at higher level, as Clausewitz the great
philosopher of war says, is far different from that required at a lower
level, thus “higher the rank the more necessary it is that boldness be
accompanied by a reflective mind”, compare this with General Niazi.
“Much more strength of will is required to make an important decision
in strategy than in tactics”; judge Yahya in the light of this statement
and the situation is easier to comprehend! Yahya’s war record,
successful escape from a Prisoner camp, or combat action as a
company officer or company commander or command of a division,
was no guarantee that Yahya possessed the strategic vision or talent
to function successfully as Pakistan’s Supreme War Lord in a conflict
with an enemy with a marked numerical superiority! He simply did not
have the “strength of will or the strategic insight to execute a sound
military strategy “ in a situation which required a man with a Moltke
the Elder’s calibre! It was not a question of valour or more being more
martial but a conflict of David and an over cautious Goliath (as
Candeth’s statement proves) in which the David lost or lost too badly;
not because of weak muscles or fists but because of lack of resolution
and strategic talent at the operational as well as strategic level! Lastly
the military conduct of war in East Pakistan. The failure to withdraw to
the Dacca bowl, the failure to foresee the pattern of Indian operations
in case of war! Niazi alone cannot be blamed for it! In foreseeing this
the GHQ, Niazi’s staff, all five of his GOCs and above all Yahya’s
strategic failure in exercising the offensive strategy to remedy the
operational crisis resulting from an Indian attack on East Pakistan were
the ultimate reason for surrender. The only two areas where Niazi and
his team of staff officers and divisional commanders, can be blamed is
not for fighting longer than they did, and setting an example in
resolution and heroism and for not being mission oriented and in
blindly following orders to defend every inch of territory against his
better judgement, if there is a grain of truth in what he asserts, was his
better judgement in that particular situation at that point in time! But
surrender even then was a foregone conclusion! In the past when
armies fought till the end, even when it was militarily pointless, was
not due to their being more martial, but simply because of sheer
desperation, since at that time prisoners were not taken, all found alive
were liquidated! This was no longer the case in civilised warfare!
The only exceptions to this rule being the Japanese! Surrender took
place, not because Pakistan army was less martial but because it was
without air cover blockaded and encircled and surrender was the only
option as many other armies had done in Singapore, France, Poland
etc. In any case Hara Kiri or fighting till death was not a part of the
historical traditions of the areas from which the bulk of Pakistan Army
was recruited! Had that been the case the Punjab and an 8 % Sikh
minority could not have ruled Frontier! An admirer addressed Moltke
the Elder after his military triumphs against Austria and France as a
great military commander. Moltke said that he was not a great military
commander since he had never carried out a withdrawal operation.
The operational problem in East Pakistan involved withdrawal to the
Dacca bowl and was not as simple as it seemed. The fact thus remains
that even the operational problems in East Pakistan were too
complicated for Niazi and his staff officers and even for the Military
Operations Directorate of the Pakistani GHQ! Gul the Pakistani CGS
being a man in words of Sultan Khan who firmly believed in the power
of bayonet to settle all issues!

Now coming down to actual on ground odds. Manekshaw admitted that

“The Pakistanis (in East Pakistan) fought well... and that they could not
have fought any better and ...their defeat keeping in view the
overwhelming Indian superiority was a foregone conclusion. Surrender
was a natural result of higher military incompetence and political
bankruptcy. Niazi the product of the Ayubian system was relatively as
good or as bad as most of the general officers of that era. Ironically
since no other three star general was tried in 1971 like Niazi, Niazi
stands out as a scapegoat! To conclude there were many intangible
factors that counted.

It takes me 32 years back as a school going lad to Quetta where my

father was a grade two operations staff officer with the 16 Division
(which was airlifted from Quetta to East Pakistan in 1971) from 1969
till October 1971! How the school children mostly army officers sons,
or even common West Pakistani soldiers referred contemptuously to
Bengalis as one West Pakistani (Punjabi or Pathan) is equal to ten
Bengalis! A perception based on the myth of the Martial Races Theory
as I discovered much later! What about the immense psychological the
burden of having carried out a genocide on the Muslim population of
Bengal from March to October 1971.
CANTT PUBLIC SCHOOL QUETTA WHERE THE AUTHOR WAS
STUDYING IN 1971 WHEN THE 16 DIVISION MOVED FROM
QUETTA TO EAST PAKISTAN IN MARCH 1971

An officer, one Major Bhatti, brother of another officer who became a

three star general, who was there in that gory period, and admitted
that atrocities were carried out by both sides on a lavish scale, once
told me that there was ferocity in the Bengalis as if they had a 50 year
old debt to repay ! True that all officers were not guilty of atrocities,
nor were all the divisions, brigades or units! But there were Hodsons
and Calleys and the actions of these men weighed heavily on the
whole army! These are the intangible factors that many of us now
discount. But these were there! Somehow everyone in 1971 had been
under estimating the Bengalis! A race, which led India at least as far as
the Bengali Hindus, was concerned in defiance of imperialism! The
indomitable man who threw a bomb on the British viceroy at Delhi in
1913 was not from the so-called martial races but a thoroughbred
Bengali! Clausewitzian solution to Pakistan’s strategic dilemma visa-vis
India Long ago Clausewitz gave a strategic solution to Pakistan’s
military dilemma visa-vis India when he said, “Offensive war, that is
the taking advantage of the present moment, is always commanded
when the future holds out a better prospect not to us but to our
adversary”. In this case the future had better prospects for India and
Pakistan’s only hope was an all out offensive posture.

Clausewitz defined the solution in yet more detail in the following

words; “Let us suppose a small state is involved in a contest with a
very superior power, and foresees that with each year its position will
become worse: should it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the time
when its situation is furthest from worst? Then it must attack, not
because the attack in itself ensures any advantages - it will rather
increase the disparity of forces - but because this state is under the
necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before
the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime some
advantages which it may hereafter turn to account.”

VON FRANCOIS WHO CARRIED THE DAY BY DISOBEDIENCE AT

TANNENBERG IN 1914.THE HALL MARK OF PAKISTAN ARMY
OFFICERS WHO LED IT AS GENERALS WAS SYCOPHANCY AND
DOCILITY

THE PAKISTAN ARMY CONSISTING OF RANKERS OR RANKERS

SONS HAD NO TRADITION OF MISSION ORIENTED
MODIFICATION OF ORDERS KNOWN AS AUFTRAGSTAKTIKS.ITS
OFFICERS MAY BE BRAVE OR SPIRITED LACKED INITIATIVE,AND
MADE THEIR WAY UP THE LADDER BY SYCOPHANCY AND YES
MAN SHIP.THIS WAS THE FACTOR IN EAST PAKISTAN AND THE
SAME MEDIOCRITY SIGNIFIES THE PAKISTAN ARMY TILL TO
DATE.AN ARMY LED BY OFFICERS WHO ARE CLERKS AND
EMPTY WINDBAGS IN SPIRIT
 The problem is that the men at the helm of affairs did not read
Clausewitz in the period 1947-1971! Even debauchery was not the
problem for there was no greater womanizer and drinker than Mustafa
Kemal; often contracting Syphilis and Gonorrhea in the course of
satisfying his heavy appetite, and yet at the same time he was such a
great military commander that his exploits were acknowledged even
by his opponents, the British, in their official history of the WW One!
Our problem in 1971 and to date was not debauchery but lack of
resolution and strategic talent at the higher level!

The present generation of our senior officers has not been tested in
any war since none of them commanded anything beyond a company
in any war! Only the audit of war will prove their actual worth. We must
remember that fighting the Indians is not as simple as removing Feroz
Khan Noon, Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif’s government . Or even as
simple as dealing with other pillars of state! Even Kargil about which
there has been so much sabre rattling was a junior leader’s triumph! It
is hard to believe that we were so close to a strategic triumph and our
noble leaders gave up the triumph! If that was so then Mr Nawaz Sharif
should not have been allowed to land after negotiating the Blair House
sell off!

The actions of 12th October although necessary were late by some

four months!

POSTSCRIPT

AS I SEE BOLD AND DYNAMIC OFFICERS ARE ON THE AVERAGE

NOT REACHING HIGHER RANKS.THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS LIKE
MAJOR GENERAL TARIQ KHAN BUT OUTSTANDING OFFICERS
LIKE TARIQ ASLAM ARE BEING DUMPED WHILE MANY VERY
SHALLOW OFFICERS ARE REACHING THE NATIONAL DEFENCE
COLLEGE TO ATTEND WAR COURSE WHICH MAKES THEM
FUTURE GENERALS WHO WILL BE REMEMBERED AS CAREER
OFFICERS WHO FAILED MISERABLY IN WAR LIKE A.A.K NIAZI
AND NASEER OF FISRT ARMOURED DIVISION.
LIEUTNANT COLONEL TARIQ ASLAM AN OFFICER WHO I THOUGHT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN A FUTURE GENERAL .WITH THE AUTHOR IN 2008
AS A RULE CAREFUL WINDBAGS ARE BEING PROMOTED WHILE
OFFICERS WITH GUTS AND PRIDE ARE BEING SIDELINED.

THIS REMAINS THE TRAGEDY OF PAKISTAN ARMY.