Lecture Notes in Criminal Law Review by Judge Leonido

Page 1 (492700526.docxW by JUDGE EDGARDO C. LEONIDO – MTCC MAASIN CITY) 1st Sem.
SY 2010-2011
LECTURE NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
By: Judge EDGARDO C. LEONIDO

MTCC-Maasin City
There are basically four (4) kinds of questions asked in the BAR:
(1) Is there a crime?
(2) Is the accused liable?
(3) What is the crime committed?
(4) Is the charge correct?
My advice: Always form your opening statements in a direct and concise manner; then
follow up with your legal arguments. If the question is answerable by “yes” or “no”, immediately
say so, as the case may be, then your legal basis.
CRIMINAL LAW- is that branch of Municipal law which defines crimes, treats of their
nature and provides for their punishment. It is termed as municipal law from the view point of
international law.
Characteristics of Criminal Law:
(1) GENERALITY – which means that our criminal law, particularly the RPC, covers all
persons, regardless of sex, age, religion or creed. This means all persons who reside or sojourn
in the Philippines.
Exceptions:
(1) Article 14 of the New Civil Code which provides: “Penal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory,
subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations”.
1. 1 By principles of international law, the following are exempt from criminal prosecution:
sovereigns or heads of states, ambassadors, ambassadors plenipotentiary and ministers-
resident, charges d’affairs and attaches.
1.2 By treaty stipulations : P.I. – U.S.Military BasesAgreement, which expired on Sept.
16, 1991. In said agreement, the US have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the ff. offenses:
(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base, except where the offender and the
offended party are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the US on active
duty) or the offense is against the security of the Philippines; )b) Any offense committed outside
the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States in which the offended party is
also a member of the armed forces of the US; and (c) Any offense committed outside the bases
by any member of the armed forces of the US against the security of the US.
1.3 RP-US Visiting Forces Accord, the Philippines agreed that: (a) US military authorities
shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction
conferred on them by the military law of the US personnel in RP; (b) US authorities exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over US personnel with respect to offenses, including the offenses relating
to the security of the US punishable under the law of the US, but not under the laws of RP; and
(C) Us military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over US personnel
subject to the military law of the US in relation to: (1) offenses solely against the property or
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security of the US or offenses solely against the property or person of US personnel; and (2)
offenses arising of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
(2) Article IV, Section 11, 1987 Philippine Constitution granting immunity to members of
congress from libel or slander suits in connection with any speech delivered on the floor of the
house during a regular or special session.
(3) Voluntary act of government: Republic Act 75 (Law of preferential application) , which
extends immunity to the domestics or domestics servants of duly accredited ambassadors, if
registered in the Department of Foreign Affairs. This is applicable only in cases where the country
of the diplomatic representative adversely affected has provided for similar protection to duly
accredited representatives of the Republic of the Philippines.
Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Over Offenses Committed by Person Subject to Military

Law.
1. The Civil Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the military court or general court
martial as the jurisdiction of civil tribunals is unaffected by the military character of the person
brought before them for trial. (U.S. vs. Sweet, 1 Phil 18).
2. The jurisdiction of a military court over a soldier is not exclusive of the civil courts even
in time of war, if the soldier is stationed in a place where the civil courts are functioning and where
no actual hostilities are in progress. ( Valdez vs. Lucero, 76 Phil. 356).
Persons subject to military law:
a) All officers, members of the nurse corps and soldiers belonging to the regular forces of
the Philippine army, all reserves from the date of their call to active duty and while on such active
duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called;
b) Cadets, flying cadets and probationary third lieutenants; all trainers of the camp and all
persons accompanying or serving with the army of the Philippines in the field of war or when
martial law is declared through not otherwise wise subject to these articles;
c) All persons under sentence adjudged by court martial.
(2) TERRITORIALITY – which means that our penal law is applicable to all crimes
committed within the limits of the Philippine territory, which includes the atmosphere, interior
waters and maritime zone.
NOTE: a. If crime is committed within the Philippine Territory – INTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION.
b. If committed outside our territory – EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION. These
acts are subject to the RPC only when they are committed not within the territory of another
sovereign. The general rule is that when the act is committed in the jurisdiction of another
country, the laws of that country shall apply in view of the territoriality of its laws.
Exception: The Revised Penal Code may be applied outside Philippine territory against
those:
(a) Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship.
1.1 Provided the Philippine ship or airship must be duly registered under the
Philippine laws.
1.2 The reason for the exception is that when such vessel is beyond the maritime
zone it is considered an extension of Philippine national territory.
1.3 But if the said vessel or aircraft is within the territory of a foreign country when
the crime is committed, the laws of that country will apply as a rule.
1.4 But if the accused in a registered Philippine vessel committed homicide on
board said vessel while in the territorial waters of a foreign country, like
Vietnam, was not prosecuted before a Vietnam court, he could be tried in our
court. (People vs. Togoto, CA, 68 Off. Gaz. 8317).
(b) Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note or any obligation or security of
the Philippine government;
(c) Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into the country of the
obligations and securities afore-stated.
Reason (b&c): To preserve and maintain the financial credit and stability of the state.
A sweepstake ticket is an obligation of the Philippine government.
(d) While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of
their functions, like the disbursing official of a Philippine embassy and it must refer to
the discharge of his function.
1.1 The General Rule: RPC applies only to public officers and employees if the
offense committed pertains to the exercise of official duties. Example:
Malversation, Illegal Exaction, and Bribery.
There are even offenses which are not connected with their function and yet, the
general will apply: Ex. Acts of Lasciviousness (where he attempts his secretary while in
office).
If crime is committed outside, determine first if it was connected with the discharge of
his public duties. If connected, RPC will apply. If not, foreign law will apply.
Exception: If it is committed within the Philippine embassy, regardless of the nature,
the RPC will govern, because the embassy grounds are considered to be an extension of
Philippine jurisdiction in a foreign country.
Problem (For Assignment): A deposition was supposed to be taken in Singapore and
the consul assigned there did it. The deponent requested the daughter of said consul to
prevail over her father to alter the deposition in consideration of certain sum of money. The
daughter agreed and succeeded in convincing her father.
What crime is committed and who shall be liable?
Answer: The crimes committed are falsification and bribery for accepting the
consideration. The daughter shall be guilty for corruption for corrupting her father under Sec.
3A of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
(e) Should commit any crime against national security and the law of nations as defined
in Title I, Book II of the Code (Article 2)
Reason: To safeguard the existence of the state. Example: ESPIONAGE.

Example of crimes against law of nations: PIRACY and MUTINY. Piracy is triable
anywhere.
Jurisdiction over crimes committed on board foreign vessels while in Philippine
waters.
1. If the foreign vessel is a warship – our courts have no jurisdiction. REASON: The
vessel is an extension of the territory of the country to which it belongs and is not
subject to the laws of another state. (U.S. vs Fowler, 1Phil.614).
Rules on Merchant Vessels:
FRENCH RULE: The law to be applied is that of the nationality of the vessel. (Law of the
Flag State). The foreign country where the crime is committed shall consider the vessel as an
extension of the territory of the country whose flag it flies. The foreign country will not apply its
criminal law, unless the crimes affects the national security or public order of such foreign
country.
ENGLISH RULE/ANGLO-AMERICA RULE: The emphasis is on the territory where the
crime is committed. (The Coastal State).The foreign country where the crime is committed shall
apply its own laws for as long as the vessel was in the territorial waters when the offense was
committed, unless the crime pertains only to the internal management of the vessel in which
case the laws of the flag state shall govern.
The Anglo-American rule is followed in our jurisdiction. (U.S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil. 7).
Comments: In (U.S. vs. Look Chow, 18 Phil. 573), and in the commentaries of Antonio
Gregorio, it would seem that the French Rule was applied in this case, thus: “The legal
application of the rule is that the crime committed on board a foreign vessel in transit in Philippine
waters must affect a breach of public order to be triable by our courts. Hence, the rule does not
apply to a case involving mere possession of opium on board a foreign vessel in transit in
Philippines waters as such does not involve a breach of public order unless the opium is landed
on Philippines soil”. In the case of (U.S. vs. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729): “ The rule, however,
applies to a case regarding smoking of opium on board said vessel as such already involves a
breach of public order because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our
country”.
Clearly it is the French Rule that is applied in these two cases.
But look at in the case of (U.S. vs. Ah Singh, 36 Phil. 978), it says: “ But of the foreign
vessel is not in transit and a Philippine port is its destination, any crime committed on board said
vessel, like possession of opium is triable by our courts, except if the crimes involves the internal
management of the vessel”. ( underlining supplied).
Theories of Criminal Law and their Characteristics:
A. CLASSICAL THEORY/PHILOSOPHY
(1) The penalty is imposed for retribution; to make the wrongdoer pay for the wrong he
has done. Make his suffer what the victim suffered.
(2) The penalty is applied on a mechanical manner. What you do to other will be done
unto you. Ex. “an eye for an eye”.
(3) Emphasis on the crime, not on the criminal. There is a scant regard for human
element. It does not consider the reasons of the offender for doing it.
(4) the man is considered a moral creature who understands what is right and what is
wrong such that of he does something wrong he must be prepared the suffer the
consequences of such act.
B. POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHY
(1) The purpose of the penalty is reformation. To correct.
(2) Before the penalty prescribed is applied, the offender is first examined by a panel of
social scientists who determines why the offender committed the crime. (psychologists,
psychiatrists, priests, even lawyers).
(3) Emphasis is on the criminal, not the crime. There is a high regard to the human
element. The offender is regarded as socially seek who needs treatment in an asylum. (just like
hospital, the offenders are kept there because they are psychologically and emotionally sick) . To
correct not to punish.
(4) Man is regarded as inherently good but crimes are social phenomenon which
constrained man to do wrong, although not of his own liking. Crimes are regarded as inevitable
and brought about by the environment.
C. THE ECLECTIC PHILOSOPHY

(1) It does away with the extreme features of the first 2 philosophy. Only the constructive
characteristics are combined.
(2) More modern countries are unwittingly moving towards this philosophy. They classify
commonly committed crimes using statistics. Penalty is applied depending on the frequency of
the commission of a particular offense; light penalty is applied if theft of food is committed by poor
people.
Philosophy adopted in the Philippines
Although originally our criminal law is classical because our RPC was merely adapted
from the Spanish Codigo Penal, which in turn was copied from the French Penal Code, which
was the forerunner of the classical philosophy, our RPC contains provision based on the positivist
philosophy, that is, Article 13, par. 7 on the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
plea of guilty.
Reclusion Perpetua is predominantly classical.
(3) IRRETROSPECTIVITY OR PROSPECTIVITY – That the law does not have any
retroactive effect, except if it favors the offender unless he is a habitual delinquent (Art. 22) or the
law otherwise provides.
1. Three rules are to be observed: First, a penal law does not have retroactive effect;
second, if favorable to the accused, a penal law may be given retroactive effect; and third, even
of favorable to the accused, a penal law cannot be given retroactive effect if the accused is a
habitual delinquent or the law so expressly provides. (Art. 22, RPC; Tavera vs. Valdez, I Phil
468).
The effect of express or implied repeal of penal laws on the principles of
irretrospectivity:
1. If the repeal is express:
(a) All pending prosecutions under the repealed shall be dismissed regardless of
whether the accused is a habitual criminal or not under a previous conviction or otherwise.
(b) Those already convicted and serving sentence under the repealed law may apply
for their discharge because the penalty imposed shall be remitted, provided that the convict is not
a habitual delinquent or provided there is nothing in the repealing law which provides against its
retroactive application.
2. If the repeal is implied:
(a) Pending prosecution shall continue and if the accused would be convicted, the
repealing law will be applied to him if it more lenient than the repealed law. Otherwise it will still
be the repealed law that will be applied.
(b) Those already convicted shall continue serving the sentence but the repealing law
may be applied to those convicts who are not habitual delinquent if the repealing law provides for
a lighter penalty than the repealed law. Provided the repealing law does not provide against the
retroactivity thereof.
Distinction between acts punished under the RPC and those punished under the special
laws:
REVISED PENAL CODE SPECIAL LAWS

Criminal liability is based on the criminal intent Liability arises only bec. The act done is
of the offender unless the crime results from prohibited bylaw; and so criminal negligence is
criminal negligence. not covered. There is no culpa.
Good faith or lack of criminal intent is a defense Good faith or lack of criminal intent is not a
unless the crime is the result of criminal defense. It is enough that the act was
negligence. voluntarily done.
Degree of participation in the commission of No classification of offenders – only those who

the offense is considered in imposing the perpetrated the act incurs the liability.
penalty. Principal, accomplice, accessory.
Degree of accomplishment is considered. Punished only when consummated unless the
Attempted, frustrated and consummated law specifically punish for an attempt.
crimes.
Modifying circumstances are considered – Modifying circumstances are not considered.

mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Crimes punished under the RPC are generally referred to as MALA IN SE; but it does not
follow that all crimes punished under special laws are all MALA PROHIBITA.
-A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are punished under the Revised
Penal Code while malum prohibitum crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality,
however, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as Plunder under R.A. 7080,
as amended. Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined under the Revised Penal
Code such as technical malversation. The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and
mala prohibita is the determination if the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If
the punishable act is immoral itself, then, is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not
immoral in itself, but there is statute prohibiting its commission by reason of public policy, then it
is mala prohibita. (Dungo, et al., vs. Pp, GR No. 209464, July 2015.)
-The non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is malum prohibitum.
(MAtalam vs. Pp, GR No. 221849-5-, April 4, 2016).
R.A. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law) is malum prohibitum.
- The study of the provision of RA 8049 shows that, on paper, it is complete and robust in
penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and
disallow the defense of good faith. (Dungo, et al., vs. Sibal, supra.)
MALA IN SE – literally means the act is inherently evil or bad, i.e., wrongful per se.
MALA PROHIBITA – the wrong arises only because it is prohibited by law, but the act is
not inherently evil.
Question: Is the act of omitting the name of a voter from the voter’s list, which is punished by
Election Code, (a special law) mala prohibita or mala in se?
Answer: Mala in se. The SC held that the act of omitting a name from the voter’s list cannot be
considered a wrong simply because it is punished by a special law. The act being inherently
wrong is therefore a mala in se and not malum prohibitum. Being a mala in se, there must be
evidence of malice or criminal intent on the part of the accused. (Pp. vs Sunico).
Mere carrying of firearm within a polling place is punishable by the RPC irrespective of
whether or not the offender had the intention to violate the law. (Pp. vs. Bayona, 61 Phil. 181).
But it is essential that the act must be committed consciously, freely and voluntarily. (U.S. vs
Chico, 14 Phil. 128). Good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. ( Pp. vs.
Neri, 140 SCRA 750).
Anti-graft Law partakes of an act malum prohibitum. ( Pp. vs. Court of Appeals, 135
SCRA 372, 1985).
Article 3, RPC (definition of felony)
Felony – any act or omission punishable by law (referring to the Revised Penal Code).
The elements are: (a) act or omission; (b) punishable by the Revised Penal Code; and (c)
committed either by culpa or dolo.
Elements of Dolo (Intentional Felonies)

(1) Freedom of action
When a person acts without freedom, he is not a human being but a tool. Thus,
irresistible force and uncontrollable fear is a defense. (Article 12, pars. 5& 6,RPC).
(2) Intelligence
Intelligence is the moral capacity to determine what is right and wrong and to realize the
consequences of his act. Thus, minority, insanity and imbecility are valid defenses.
(3) Intent (dolo)
Intent is presumed from the commission of the act. Mistake of facts is a valid defense
Elements of Culpa (Culpable Felonies)

(1) Freedom of Action
(2) Intelligence and
(3) Negligence or Imprudence or Lack of Foresight or Lack of skill
Negligence is deficiency of perception; while imprudence deficiency of action.
The foregoing elements must concur depending on the kind of felony committed. Note
that in both cases there is the element of VOLUNTARINESS, be it culpable or intentional.
Otherwise there will be no dolus or culpas and therefore no felony.
Problem:
A and B while hunting passed by the house of C who pointed them where boars roam
around. A shot at the bushes where C pointed but the bullet pivoted and hit C. Is A liable?
Answer:
No he is not liable because it is purely accidental. A was performing a lawful act. He shall
incur no liability whether civil or criminal. Neither the element of intent or negligence is present in
the case.
Problem:
Eduardo contracted a second marriage with Tina believing in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek nullification of his first
marriage before marrying Tina. Is Eduardo liable?
Ruling:
Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as
intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words with malice do not appear in Article
3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word “voluntary”.
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal
excuse and justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission defined by
law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to
be intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or
probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary and such
presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exist from a consideration of the whole
evidence. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant. As a general rule mistake of fact and good faith is a valid defense on a
prosecution for felony by dolo; such defense negates malice and criminal intent. However,
ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. (Eduardo
Manuel vs. Pp. G.R. No. 165842, Nov. 29, 2005).
Distinction between dolo and culpa:
1) In intentional crime (dolo) the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence

(culpa) what is penalized is the mental attitude and condition behind the acts, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care and foresight. ( Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 103501-03, Feb. 17,
1997).
2. In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language
of Art. 3 RPC, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in
performing the act or in incurring the omission has the intention to cause the injury to another. In
culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the
offender to another is unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act preformed without
malice. ( Roliie Calimutan vs. People, et al., G.R. No. 152133.
Distinction between motive and intent:
1) Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a definite result; while
intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.
Ex. “A” wanted to kill “B” because the latter killed his brother.
Motive – revenge for the death of his brother.
Intent – to kill
2) Intent is an element of the crime; motive is not.
3) Motive may become necessary to be proved only in case there is doubt whether the
accused has committed the crime or not (U.S. vs. McMan, 4 Phil. 161, People vs. Rogales, L-
17531, Nov. 30, 1962); intent is necessary to prove the crime.
But the absence of apparent motive to commit the crime charged would upon the
principles of logic create a presumption of innocence of the accused, since, in terms of logic, an
action without a motive would in effect without cause (Pp. vs. Aguilar, L-32041, Jan. 20, 1982,
111SCRA 222).
Defense in intentional felony: MISTAKE OF FACTS
Mistake of facts- it is an act or omission which is the result of a misapprehension of facts

that is voluntary but not intentional. The actor performed an act which would have been lawful
had it been true as he believed it to be.
Ex. “A’ stabbed “B” whom he believed as an intruder but turned out to be his room mate
“C”- mistake of facts due to good faith and exempted him from criminal liability (see U.S. vs. Ah
Chong, 15 Phil. 488).
Note: For mistake of facts to be exempting the act must not be attended with negligence;
otherwise criminal responsibility results. See Pp. vs. Fernando, 49 Phil. 75 and compare the
same with Ah Chong.
MISTAKE OF IDENTITY – not a defense
Mistake of identity is not a defense because intent is present.

Ex.: If A shot B believing him to be C, there is mistake of identity and not of fact. The act
of shooting B is unlawful. Mistake of identity is merely the consequence of the intentional act of
shooting the intended victim. (See Pp. vs Oanis, 74 Phil. 257). Is it the crime reckless
imprudence? No. Where an unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended
victim cannot be considered reckless imprudence. (Pp. vs. Oanis, supra).
Article 4, RPC (How criminal liability is incurred).
This provision stemmed from the principle that “one is liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of his unlawful act, even if the ultimate result had not been intended. ( Pp. vs.
Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 13532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964), and from the latin maxim: “he who is the cause
of the cause is the cause of the evil caused”.
Our penal law looks particularly to the material result following the unlawful act and holds
the aggressor responsible for the consequence thereof. (Pp. vs. Buyco, 45 O.G. 2893). Thus,
one may be liable for homicide or murder even if there is no intention to kill as long as it is the
result of a felonious act.
For the article to apply two elements are needed: (a) a felony is committed; (b) the wrong
done must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed (resulting
felonious act) even though different from that intended.
Thus, if the act is lawful, even though an injury results, there is no criminal liability. (Pp.
vs. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 151), except if the act is committed with negligence.
Ex: A fired his gun in self defense at his aggressors but instead hit a bystander. Is A
liable? No! because when A fired his gun was not committing a felony. Therefore he can’t be
liable for the resulting act. (there is no negligence).
But if the gun was not aimed at the aggressor but indiscriminately fired the same hitting
innocent persons whom the one firing knew were around, he is liable for the resulting act because
in defending himself he acted with negligence. (Pp. vs Galacgac, 54 O.G. 1027).
Examples of the second element – the wrong done is the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felonious act even though different from that intended:
(1) Where the offenders after robbing the victim, tied her hands and feet and stabbed
her and stuffed her mouth with a piece of pandesal to prevent her from screaming
and the victim died of asphyxiation as the pandesal slid into her neckline caused by
the movements of the victim. It was held that the death of the victim is the direct
consequence of felonious acts committed by the offenders – praeter intentionem.
(Pp. vs Opero, 105 SCRA 40 (1981).
(2) A victim who jumped into the river and was drowned because he was threatened or
chased by the accused with a knife. (U.S. vs Valdez, 42 Phil. 497).
(3) A victim who died because he removed the bandage from a wound inflicted by the
accused as it produced extreme pain. (Pp. vs. Quaizon, 62 Phil. 162).
(4) If death results as long as the wound inflicted is mortal even there was an erroneous,
unskillful medical or surgical treatment. ( Pp. vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 3) because he who inflicts the
injury is not relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to
destroy or endanger life, even though the immediate cause of death was erroneous and unskillful
medical or surgical treatment. (Pp. vs Abejuela, 92 SCRA 903 [1979]). Even if the victim refused
or there was no medical treatment. (U.S. vs. Marasigan, 27 Phil. 614).
For research: ; Pp. vs. Reloi, 43 SCRA 526, 532; Pp. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil. 22; and
Pp. vs. red, C.A., 43 O.G. 5072; .
Second element not applicable – if there is an intervening cause.
Ex: (1) A victim who received slight physical injuries in his arm which became serious
because he deliberately immersed his wounded arm in a poll of stagnant water. (U.S. vs. delos
Santos, G.R. No. 13309).
(2) If the blow is not the direct cause of death as in the case of a boy who was
struck in the mouth by the accused and who died 2 days thereafter because of fever prevalent in
the community, (Pp. vs. Palalon, 49 Phil. 177).
Reason:
The felony is not the direct and proximate cause of the injury, which is defined as “that
cause, which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. ( Villanueva vs.
Medina, 102 Phil. 186). If an active force intervened between the felony and the injury which is a
distinct act foreign to the crime, there is no liability for such injury. (Pp. vs. Cardenas, 56 SCRA
631).
In the foregoing examples, does that mean that the offender has no criminal liability? No.
In all cases wherein the injury is not the direct an logical consequence of the felony committed,
the offender is not liable for the said injury, but only for the felony committed. In the above
example the offender is liable only for physical injuries.
Where the accused wounded the victim at the back of the hand and three weeks later the
victim died due to tetanus infection of the wound as he returned to work in his farm with bare
hands exposing the wound to tetanus germs, it was held that the remote cause of death was the
wound inflicted and the proximate cause was the infected wound for which the accused had
nothing to do and hence was not criminally liable. (Urbana vs. IAC, L-43964, Jan. 7, 1988).
Instances where the wrongful act different from what is intended:
(1) Aberratio Ictus – mistake in the blow. It arises when where the offender delivers the
blow but it landed on a 3rd party. This will result in a complex crime.
Ex: A saw his enemy B and thereupon fired at him. It was C who was hit and fatally
wounded. What are the crimes committed?
Insofar as B is concerned, attempted murder; insofar as C is concerned Serious Physical

Injuries. Both were results of a single act; both were less grave. With respect to C only physical
injuries because there is no intent to kill.
(2) Error in Personae – there is mistake in identity. This may mitigate the criminal
liability if the crime is different from what intended.
Note: Art. 49- whichever of the two crimes carry a lesser penalty, the lesser penalty shall
be imposed but in its maximum period. But if the crime intended and committed are the same,
then error en personae shall not be mitigating circumstance and shall not affect the liability of the
offender.
(3) Praeter Intentionem- where the consequence went beyond that intended.
Art. 13, par. 3, this is a mitigating circumstance as he did not intend to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed. This applies only where the resulting felony cannot be generally
anticipated or from the means employed by the offender in the commission of the crime. It means
committing it can generally be expected to produce the felony which resulted, the offender cannot
validly claim the he did not intend t to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
Example:
(a) If the offender stabbed the victim in the neck with the handle of a pointed comb, it
cannot be said that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. When uses
a pointed instrument on a vital part of a body, he can and should be expected a fatal
consequence.
(b) A son in the heat of anger because his mother was not able to prepare food, got hold
of his mother’s neck which resulted her death. The son is liable because death is expected in
strangling – no mitigating circumstance.
Impossible crime (Art. 4, RPC, par. 2)
Elements: (a) acts are performed which would be a crime against person or property;
(b) there is criminal intent; (c) it is not accomplished because inherent impossibility or the means
employed is inadequate or ineffectual.
Reason for punishing impossible crime: The commission of an impossible crime is
indicative of criminal propensity or criminal tendency on the part of the actor. Such person is a
potential criminal. According to positive thinking, the community must be protected from anti-
social activities, whether actual or potential, of the morbid type of man called “socially dangerous
person.” (RPC by Luis B. Reyes, 2008 edition)
Rules:
(1) If the acts performed constitute another distinct felony, an impossible crime is not
committed because objectively a crime is committed.
Ex: Accused administered abortive drugs upon his girlfriend whom he believed it to be
pregnant, which turned out not true, but the woman became ill for more than 30 days, the
accused will be liable for serious physical injuries under Art. 264 of the Code and not for
impossible crime of abortion.
(2) Inherent impossibility- Ex 1: stabbing a person already dead. Ex 2: A with intent to
gain, took a watch from the pocket of B, which turned out to be his own watch which
he had lost days ago. The act performed would have been theft if the watch had
been the property of B. There is legal impossibility in accomplishing the crime
because in theft the personal property taken must belong to another.
Ineffectual means – Ex: giving a drink to another which was mixed wth salt believing it
to be poison.
Inadequate means – Ex: if it were poison, the quantity was not sufficient.
(3) For impossible crime to apply, the offender believed that the person he stabbed was
not dead or the mixture was really poison or the means employed was sufficient,
otherwise, there would be no criminal liability for impossible crime as evil intent
would be absent.
(4) If there is adequate or effectual means although the crime is not produced, it cannot
be impossible crime but a frustrated felony. Ex: If sufficient quantity of poison was
administered to the victim to kill him but he did not die, the felony was not produced
due to his impossible immunity to the poison, which is an act independent of the will
of the offender.
(5) When the rule speaks of “crimes against persons”, it does not mean that the victim
must be a person, the crime must be within Title 8, Book II of RPC. Ex: A, while
driving his car in Luneta, met B when the latter tried to hitch a ride. Somewhere in
Baclaran, A turned the car to a secluded area and started kissing B who turned out
to be also a male. Is there impossible crime? Answer: NO! there is none because
had the crime been consummated, it would have been a crime against chastity, not
against persons. The crime here is acts of lasciviousness if committed with
violence against “B” (Art. 336 RPC). If there is none, the crime is unjust vexation if
B was annoyed of the kissing.
(6) The offender is made liable for an impossible crime only as a last resort when he
cannot be punished under any provision of law. The purpose is to teach the offender
a lesson for being criminally pervert although objectively no crime is committed.
Ex.: A & B are constantly quarrelling neighbors and it is only a matter of time that one
would kill the other. A thought of killing B before the latter could kill him. One evening while B was
already asleep, A climbed into the room of B, entering it trough an open window. Upon seeing B,
A stabbed B on the chest not knowing that B had died earlier of cardiac arrest. Therafter, A fled
through the same window.
(a) Is an impossible crime committed? Yes. B was already dead when A stabbed
him with the intent of killing him, not knowing that he was already dead. It
would have been murder, which is a crime against person, were it not for B’s
being a corpse at the time of the stabbing.
(b) Is A criminally liable for impossible crime? No, although an impossible crime
was committed, A should be prosecuted for qualified trespass to dwelling, as
he entered through a window which is not for that purpose.
The principle here is that the wrongdoer shall be punished for impossible crime only
when his acts cannot be punished any other provisions of RPC.
Duty of Courts (Art. 5)
(1) This article has no application to the violation of another piece of legislation like illegal
possession of forearms, as it refers to penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code. (Pp. vs.
Salazar, L-7490, (1958). Hence, nor applicable to crimes mala prohibita provided for in special
legislation. (Pp. vs. Quebral, CA-G.R. No. 22120-R, February 28, 1961).
See also the case of Pp. vs. Manlapas, 88 SCRA 104 and Pp. vs. Valera, 90 SCRA
400.
Stages of Execution of a Felony (Art. 6).
The stages of execution of a felony – attempted, frustrated and consummated – are
punishable under Art. 6 of RPC.
(1) ATTEMPTED – when the offender commences the commission of the felony
DIRECTLY BY OVERT ACTS and does not perform all the acts of execution which should have
produced the felony by reason of some cause or causes or accident other by his own
spontaneous desistance.
1.1 “Spontaneous desistance” cannot be used in frustrated crimes because it is no longer

possible in the frustrated stage as the offender has already lost control his acts
because he has already performed all the acts of execution. Hence, there can be no
spontaneous desistance.
Case: With intent to kill A fired at B who was not mortally wounded. A aimed again and
said: “Now I will kill you”. B begged so hard so much so that A changed his mind and walked
away. Is there a desistance? Will A be liable?
Answer: On the first shooting, A shall be liable for attempted homicide. The act of
shooting completed the first attempt – there is no desistance made. However, on the second
aiming of the gun, there is desistance. But this desistance will not exempt him from his liability
under the first act. The desistance refers to the crime he intended to commit and not to the crime
actually committed before the desistance. ( Pp. vs. Palomares, 75 O.G. 5739).
1.2. If on the attempted stage, the offender desisted- there is no attempted felony.
Reason: it is a sort of reward granted by law to one having one foot on the verge of
crime, heed the call of his conscience and return to the path of righteousness.
(viada). However, even if the offender desisted from performing the act he intended
to commit if the act so far has already constituted another offense, the offender shall
be liable for such other crime.
Ex: A wanted to kill B by entering the latter’s house through an open window into B’s
room who was sleeping, but he noticed on the latter’s face to be that of a miserable man and so
left the room through the same window. Is there an attempted crime? What is the felony
committed?
Answer: There is no attempted crime of murder because of the desistance. He already

began the acts of execution and could have performed all the acts but he desisted. The crime
already committed is qualified trespass to dwelling.
Meaning of OVERT ACTS:

Overt act- is some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. (RPC, Luis B. Reyes, 2008 Ed.).
Rules:
(1) A felony is committed directly by overt acts if the following requisites are present: a)
That there be an internal acts; b) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime
intended to be committed.
(2) Preparatory acts do not have direct connection with the crime which the offender
intends to commit.
Ex. 1: If A bought poison from a drug store in preparing for the killing of B by means of a
poison – preparatory acts – not an overt act because it has no direct connection with the crime of
murder which A intended to commit. The poison purchased may, after all, be used by A to kill
insects. Hence, the act of buying poison did not disclose necessarily an intention to kill a person
with it.
But if A mixed the poison with the food intended for B, and the latter without knowing that
it contained a poison took it, the act of A is more than planning or preparation for the commission
of a murder. The buying of poison and mixing it with it with the food of B who later put into his
mouth part of it, taken together, constituted an overt acts of murder. If for some reason B threw
away the poison from his mouth, A is liable for attempted murder.
Ex. 2: Drawing or trying to draw a pistol is not an overt act of homicide. ( Pp. vs. Tabago,
et al., 48 O.G. 3419).
Ex. 3: Raising a bolo as if to strike the offended party is not an overt at of homicide. (U.S.
vs. Simeon, 3 Phil. 688).
Definition of subjective phase:

It is that portion of the acts constituting the crime, starting from the point where the
offender begins the commission of the crime to the point where he has still control over his acts,
including their natural cause.
If between these two points the offender is stopped by any cause other that his own
voluntary desistance, the subjective has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not stopped
but continues until her performs the last act, it is frustrated, if the crime is not produced by
cause/s independent of the will of the offender. The acts then of the offender reached the
objective phase of the offense.
CASES HELD TO BE ATTEMPTED.

Homicide/Murder/Physical Injuries
(a) U.S. vs. Bien, 20 Phil. 354.
Where the accused threw a Chinaman into the deep water and as the Chinaman did not
know how to swim, he made efforts to keep himself afloat and seized the gunwale of the boat, but
the accused tried to loosen the hold of the victim with the oar. The accused was prevented from
striking the latter by other persons. Intent to kill is apparent, attempted homicide was committed.
(b) Pp. vs Kalalo, et al., 59 Phil.75.
Where the accused fired four successive shots at the offended party, while the latter was
fleeing to escape from his assailants and saved his own life. Not having hit the offended party,
either because of his poor aim or because his intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots,
the accused failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of cause other than his own
spontaneous desistance. (see also Pp. vs. Aban, C-G.R. No. 10344-R, Nov. 30, 1954).
(c) Pp. vs. Fernando Costales, G.R. No. 141154, Jan. 15, 2002.
Where the injuries, though no doubt serious, were not proved fatal, such that without
timely medical intervention, they would have caused death, the crime committed was attempted
murder. Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not
medically attended, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the accused and the crime committed may be declared as attempted.
(d) Pp. vs Marcos Asuela, et al., G.R. No. 140393-94, Feb. 4, 2002.
Where there is no intent to kill and the wounds are not fatal, say the wounds would last
for less than nine (9) days Slight Physical Injuries is committed.
(f) Pp. vs. Sy Pio, G.R. No. L-5848, April 30, 1954).
Even if the victim was hit when the accused fired at him but the victim was able to run
away which fact must have produced the mind of the accused that he had not actually performed
all the acts of execution necessary to kill the victim, the crime is attempted.
(g) Pp. vs. Umaguing, 107 SCRA 166, 1981.

Where the accused, a janitor in a hospital, removed the endo-tracheal tube which was
inserted in the mouth of a patient suffering from a cerebral hemorrhage, and as a result, the
patient bled in the mouth and had convulsions, but the tube was restored by the resident
physician who was notified of what happened, it was held that the overt act committed by the
accused was malicious and felonious and constituted attempted murder since he was not able to
perform all the acts of execution necessary to consummate the crime because the tube was
reinserted into the victim’s mouth.
RAPE
(h) Pp. vs. Nopia, 113 SCRA 599, April 28, 1982.
Rape is attempted if the organ of the accused could hardly enter the sexual organ of a 12
year old girl although the girl felt it touched her organ.
(i) Pp. vs. Briton, 364 Phil. 731, 748 (1999).

Consumated rape to be established what is essential is that there must be penetration of the
female organ no matter how slight.
( j) Pp. vs. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000.

Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mone pubis of the
pudendum is not sufficient to constitute rape absent any showing of any slightest penetration of
the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape, at most it can only be attempted, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted
“touching of the female organ” has also progressed into being described as the introduction of the
male organ into the labia of the pudendum; or the bombardment of the drawbridge. But to our
mind, the case at bar merely constitutes shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency, or as earlier
stated, a straffing of the citadel of passion. See Pp. vs. Alfredo Bon, G.R. No. 166401, Oct. 30,
2006.
(k) Pp. vs. Alibuyog Bulala, G.R. No. 144976, March 11, 2004.
While the appellant was doing the push and pull movement, his pants was still on and his
organ did not penetrate her vagina but only touched it, he is liable only for Attempted Rape.
For conviction of consummated rape to prosper, complete and full penetration is not
necessary because mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the victim’s
genitalia consummates the crime. What is fundamental, moreover, is that the entry or at least the
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum must be convincingly proved.
Of critical importance is that there must be sufficient proof that the penis indeed traveled
even just the labia or slid into the victim’s organ, and not merely strike the external surface
thereof.
(k-1) Norberto Cruz vs. People, GR No. 166441, Oct. 8, 2014.

The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinctions between
attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent;
the acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct over acts of the offender establish the intent
to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute
attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis in a position to penetrate the female’s vagina.
(Read also Tibong vs. People, GR No. 191000,Sept. 15, 2010; Pp vs. Banzuela, GR NO.
202060).).
ARSON
(l) U.S vs. Valdez, 39 Phil. 240.

Although all the acts necessary to burn the building have already been performed as
setting on fire some rags soaked in gasoline to burn the building but no portion of the building
was burned, the arson is frustrated. But see the subsequent case. Note: Even if only a portion of
the building is burned, arson is consummated. The total burning of the building is not necessary
to consummate the crime. (Pp. vs Hernandez, 54 Phil. 122)
(m) Pp. vs. Garcia, 49 O.G. 558.

But of the overt acts directly connected with the burning of the building have not been
performed, as burning all the office supplies and hospital equipment inside the office building,
without burning the building the crime is attempted arson. The reason is that if no part of the
building is burned, none could truthfully or successfully maintain that the offender had performed
all the acts of execution which would produce the felony of arson as a consequence because the
element of burning is still missing and the result was no more than an attempt to commit the
offense. (this ruling eliminates frustrated arson).
(n) Pp. vs. Baisa, G.R. No. 20304-R, June 18, 1959.
Where the defendant threw a flaming torch at the roof of the complainant’s house, which
did not however burn, because the torch rolled and fell to the ground, the crime committed is
attempted arson.
(o) Pp. vs. Go Kay, CA, 54 O.G. 2225

Even of there is no blaze, attempted arson may committed when the offender poured
gasoline under the house of another and was about to strike the match to set the fire when he
was apprehended, attempted arson is committed.
THEFT, ROBBERY & ESTAFA
(p) Pp. vs. De la Cruz, 43 O.G. 3202.

If the offender commenced by overt acts directly connected with the felony intended to be
committed but did not perform all the acts of execution due to an external cause, as when the
lock of a jeep was already broken but he was caught before he succeeded in driving away the
jeep, the theft is attempted.
(q) Pp. vs. Dio, 130 SCRA 151.

Where the killing of the victim was merely incidental to and an offshoot of the plan to
carry out the robbery, which however, was not consummated, because of resistance by the
deceased, the crime is only attempted robbery with homicide.
(q-1) Valenzuela vs. People, et al., GR No. 160188, June 27, 2001.
Unlawful taking, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of
the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose the same. “In so far as we consider the
present question, ‘unlawful taking’ is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the
deprivation of one’s property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated
stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be
attempted theft as well, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Art. 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or
consummated”. Note: A clear departure from Pp vs. Dino, CA 45 OG 3446.(Only C.A. decision).
(r) U.S. vs Villanueva, `1 Phil. 370.

If the offender has performed all the acts of deceits as by trying to collect a fee from the
offended party but the fraudulent scheme was not realized because of the inability of the offended
party to pay the said fee, estafa is attempted.
(r-1) Lateo vs. Pp, GR No. 161651.June 1, 2011.
Undoubtedly, petitioners commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but they
failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of their
spontaneous desistance but because of their apprehension before they could obtain the amount.
Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself had been shown, the RTC and
CA correctly convicted petitioners of attempted estafa.
(r-2) Koh Tieck Heng, GR Nos. L-48535-36, Dec. 21, 1990.
Although one of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended
party, in the absence of proof thereof the offender would at least be guilty of attempted estafa.
Appellant commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but he failed to perform all the acts
of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of his own spontaneous desistance
but because of his apprehension by the authorities before he could obtain the amount. Since only
the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has been shown, respondent court
correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa.
(2) FRUSTRATED – the offender performed all the acts of execution to produce the
crime but the crime was not produced due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
2.1 All the acts of execution performed by the offender could have produced the felony
as a consequence.
Ex. 1 When A approached B stealthily from behind and made a movement with his right
hand to strike B with a deadly knife, but the blow, instead of reaching the spot intended, landed
on the frame of the back of the chair on which B was sitting at the time and did not cause the
slightest physical injury on B. (Pp. vs. Borinaga, 55 Phil. 433).
Comment: Highly criticized ruling. It should have only been attempted murder because
without inflicting a deadly wound upon a vital spot of which B should have died, the crime of
murder would not have been produced as a consequence. What was prevented by the back of
the chair was the wounding and not the victim’s death. (Justice Villareal’s dissenting opinion).
The ruling in Borinaga was later on superseded by Pp. vs Kalalo, 59 Phil. 715 which rules: In
crimes against persons, such as murder, which require that the victim should die to consummate
the felony, it is necessary for the frustration of the same that a mortal wound is inflicted.
2.3 Belief of the accused that he had performed all the acts of execution n some cases
was considered by the Supreme Court.
Ex. 1: Deadly weapons were used, blows were directed at the vitalal parts of the body,
the aggressors stated their purpose to kill and though they had killed. The subjective phase of the
crime was entirely passed, and subjectively speaking, the crime was complete. The felony is not
produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators; in this instance, the
playing possum by the victim, that is, he escaped from the aggressors by the ruse of feigning
death. ( Pp. vs. Dagman, 47 Phil. 770). See also U.S. vs. Lim San, cited in Dagman and U.S.
vs. Eduave, 36 Phil. 210.
2.4 The belief of the accused need not be considered. What should be considered is
whether all the acts of execution performed by the offender “would produce the felony as a
consequence”. See Pp. vs Kalalo, supra and Pp. vs. Guihama, et al., 13 CA. Rep. 557.
2.5 If the crime is not produced because the offender himself prevented its
consummation, there is no frustrated felony, for the fourth element is absent.
Ex. A doctor conceived the killing of his wife, and to carry out his plan, he mixed arsenic
with the soup of his victim. Immediately after the victim took the poisonous food, the offender
suddenly felt such a twinge of conscience and he himself washed out the stomach of the victim
and administer to her the adequate antidote. Would this be a frustrated parricide? Certainly not,
for even though the subjective phase of the crime had already been passed, the most important
requisite of a frustrated crime i.e., that the cause which prevented the consummation of the
offense be independent of the will of the perpetrator, was lacking. (Guevara). He committed
Physical Injuries.
CASES HELD TO BE FRUSTRATED
Homicide, Murder and Physical Injuries
(a) Pp. vs. Hondrada, 51 Phil. 112.

Where the accused stabbed the offended party in the abdomen, penetrating the liver, and
in the chest. It was only the prompt and skillful medical treatment which the offended party
received that saved his life.
(b) Pp. vs Mercado, 51 Phil. 99.

Where the accused wounded the victim in the left abdomen with a sharp-edged weapon,
causing a wound in the peritoneal cavity, serious enough to have produced death.
(c) Pp. vs. David, 60 Phil. 93.

Where the accused in firing his revolver at the offended party hit him in the upper side of
the body, piercing it from side to side and perforating the lungs, The victim was saved due to
adequate and timely intervention of medical science.
Theft, Estafa & Robbery
(d) Pp. vs. Dino, C.A. 45 O.G. 3446.

A truck loaded with stolen boxes of rifles was on the way out of the check point in South
Harbor surrounded by a tall fence when an MP guard discovered the boxes on the truck. It was
held that the crime committed was frustrated theft, because the timely discovery of the boxes on
the truck before it could pass the check point. Compare this case with Pp. vs Espiritu, et al.,
CA-G.R. No. 2107, May 31, 1949: In the Supply Depot at Quezon City, the accused removed
from the pile nine pieces of hospital linen and took them to their truck where they were found by a
corporal of the MP guards when they tried to pass the check point. It was held that the crime
committed was consummated theft.
Distinguish the two cases: In Espiritu case, it was consummated theft because the
thieves were able to take or get hold of the hospital linen and that they only thing that was
frustrated, which does not constitute the element of theft, is the use or benefit that the thieves
expected to derive from the commission of the offense. In Dino case, it was frustrated theft
because the fact determinative of consummation in the crime of theft is the ability of the offender
to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it were more or less momentarily.
The Dino ruling was reaffirmed in the subsequent CA ruling:

(e) Pp. vs. Flores, 6 CAR 834.
The theft of bulky goods is frustrated when the intervening act which literally frustrated
the theft was the inspection of the truck by a third person and not any spontaneous desistance on
the part of the accused and it was not consummated since the truck was not able to leave the
compound wherefrom the goods were taken, so that the accused was never placed in a situation
where they could dispose the goods at once.
(f) Empelis, et al., vs IAC, L-68138, Spt. 28, 1984.

Where the accused was seen carrying away fifty coconuts while they were still in the
premises of the plantation, the crime is Frustrated Qualified Theft because the accused were not
able to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony as a
consequence. They were not able to carry the coconut away from the plantation due to the timely
arrival of the owner. Note: The reason is inaccurate because a felony is frustrated if all the acts of
execution to produce the felony have been performed.
NOTE: Except Pp. vs. Esperitu, Dino, Flores, and Empelis have already been
abandoned in the case of Valenzuela vs. People, et al., supra.
(g) U.S vs. Dominguez, 41 Phil. 409.

Where a defendant, a salesman, pocketed part of the sales amount instead of giving it to
the cashier, but who discovered it on time, the estafa committed is frustrated.
The rule thus, in THEFT: While the offender may not take the personal property away, if
he already took hold of it, and the taking is already complete, theft is already consummated. It is not
necessary that the offender be able to carry away the personal property, It is a matter of whether
the offender has GAINED COMPLETE CONTROL such that he could simply dispose the property
at will. There is complete control where he is in a position to subject the property to his own will
instead of the will of the owner or possessor thereof. When the possessor gained control of the
personal property with a certain degree of permanence, even though he may later change his mind
and return it, the return is not desistance anymore. In criminal law, desistance is not available in
frustrated stage.
COMPLET CONTROL means the thing is totally removed from the enclosure, container,
or receptacle where the owner keeps the thing.
(7) CONSUMATED
` 1) A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are proved. Every crime has its own elements which must all be present to
constitute culpable violation of a precept law.
1.2 In arson, it is not necessary that the property is totally destroyed by fire It is
consummated even if only a portion of the wall or any part of the house is burned.
The consummation of the crime of arson does not depend upon the extent of the
damaged caused. (Pp. vs Hernandez, 54 Phil. 22).
1.3 In theft, the crime is consummated when the thief is able to take or get hold of the
thing belonging to another, even if he is not able to carry it away. Ex: A customs
inspector abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a Japanese and secreted it
in the drawer of his desk in the Customs house, where it was found by other
customs employees. Consummated because all the elements for its commission
and accomplishment are present. (U.S. vs Adiao,, 38 Phil. 754). Distinguish this
case with Domiguez case, supra. The difference lies on the elements of the two
crimes. In estafa, the offended party must be actually prejudiced or damaged. This
element is lacking in Domiguez. In theft, the mere removal of the personal property
belonging to another with intent to gain is sufficient.
1.4 In rape, entry of the labia or lips of the female organ without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is generally sufficient to warrant conviction of consummated
rape. (Pp. vs Hernandez, 49 Phil 980, 982).
Light Felonies (Art. 7, RPC)
1) General rule: Light felonies are punishable only when they are consummated.
Exception: Light felonies committed against person or property. Reason: Light
felonies produce such light, such insignificant moral and material injuries that public
conscience is satisfied with providing a light penalty for their consummation. If they
are not consummated, the wrong done is so light that here is no need of providing a
penalty at all. (Albert).
2. The light felonies under the Revised Penal Code: a) Slight Physical Injuries (Art.
266); b) Theft, (Art. 309, par. 7&8); c) Alteration of boundary marks. (Art. 313);d)
Malicious mischief; and e) Intriguing against honor ( Art. 364)
Conspiracy ( Art. 8 RPC)

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decided to commit it.
1) Conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony are not punishable, except as provided for
bylaw.
2) There are only three (3) conspiracies to commit a crime that are punished in the RPC,
to wit: a) Conspiracy to commit treason (Art. 115); b) conspiracy to commit rebellion (Art. 136);
and c) conspiracy to commit sedition ( Art. 141).
3) In P.D 1613, conspiracy to commit arson; and P.D. 1728, conspiracy to maliciously
damage any building or personal property by explosives or incendiary device.
4) Conspiracies punished in special laws: a) Comm. Act. No. 616, (An act to Punish
Espionage of other Offenses Against National Security); b) Conspiracy to commit offenses under
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
5) Conspiracy cannot exist in case of negligence. In conspiracy it involves meeting of the

minds to commit a crime while negligence denotes absence of intent. (Pp. vs. Narvasa, et al., ca
16013-CR 75 OG No. 42200).
6) To establish conspiracy it is not necessary to prove previous agreement to commit a

crime if there be proof that the malefactors have acted in concert and in pursuance of the same
objective. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point
to a joint purpose and design. Their actions must be judged not by what they say, for what men
do is the best index of their intention. (Pp. Mada-ISantalani, et al., Sept. 28, 1979).
7) It is not enough that the person supposedly engaged or connected with the criminal
plan be present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be logical relation between the
commission of the crime and the acts of the supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and
intimate connection between and among the latter, such that their overt acts appear to have been
done in pursuance of a common criminal design. ( Pp. vs. Aniel, et al., 96 SCRA 199 [1980]);
Pp. vs. Realon, et al., 99 SCRA 422 (1980).
8) Overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy consist in actively participating in the actual

commission of the crime, in lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators, by being present at
the scene of the crime, in exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move
them to executing the conspiracy. (Pp. vs Peralta, 25 SCRA 759).
9) Conspiracy may be inferred from close association among the accused and their
concerted efforts to liquidate the victim, an indication of community of design. (Pp. vs. Medrano,
114 SCRA 335, May 31, 1982).
10) Conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence. Mere suspicion,
relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy. (Pp. vs. Sosing, 111
SCRA 368, Jan. 30, 1982). Ex. 1: An accused who was present when the other accused met in is
house to plan a bank robbery and who told them that he cannot join because of a foot injury
which would make him only a liability, such did not make him a conspirator as he did not take an
active part in the talk among the malefactors in his house. ( Pp. vs. Doble, 114 SCRA 631, May
31, 1982). Ex. 2: Where only one of the persons who raped the victim killed her, he alone should
be guilty of the crime of rape with homicide as there is no plan to do away with the victim after
raping her. (Pp. vs. Viscara, 115 SCRA743, July 30, 1982). The passive presence of the
accused at the moment the accused suddenly strangled the victim does not make him liable for
the act of their co-accused. (Ibid.)
CASES
a) Pp. vs Cantuba, 183 SCRA 289, 298

Where the accused knew of the plot to assassinate the victim as he too had been
ordered to scout for a man who could do the job; he also knew exactly the place where the killing
was to take place and also the date and approximate time of the assault. There is conspiracy
there is unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful act.
b) Pp. vs. Pugay, 167 SCRA 439.

Where one of the accused poured a gasoline to the victim after they made fun of him,
and the other accused set the victim on fire, each of them shall be liable only for the act
committed by him as there is no showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose between the accused immediately before the commission of the crime.
c) Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, et aal., GR NO. 148965, Feb. 26,
2002.
There is no denying the fact that the “plunder of an entire nation resulting in material
damage to the national economy” is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the
crime of plunder therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. IN the case at
bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality – to help the
former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealthx-x-x. The gravamen of the
conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from
illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused
ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase the Belle Corp. and receive commission from such sale,
nor that they unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, and kickback; rather, it is that
each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
WHEEL CONSPIRACY/ CHAIN CONSPIRACY
The presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves teo

structures: (1) the so-called “wheel” or “circle” conspiracy, in which there is a single person or
group (the “hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the “spokes); and
(2) the “chain” conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contranband, in
which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with
legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra).
d) GMA vs. Pp. & Sandiganbayan/Benigno B. Aguas vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR

No. 220598/GR No. 220953.
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one
who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is
committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least P50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt criminal as described in Section
1(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals
that there must be a main plunderer and he co-conspirators, who may be members of her family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other
words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course,
implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged
and duly proven by the Prosecution.
x-x-x
For sure, even the Sandiganbayan was at a loss in this respect. Despite the silence of
the information on who the main plundered or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbaya readily
condemned GMA in its resolution dated Sept. 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of
the specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that
substantiated that sweeping allegation.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES (Art. 11)

Par 1. (self-defense)
1. Where the accused invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. He
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution. For even if the prosecutions evidence is weak, it could not be
disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. (Pp. vs. Sazon,
189 SCRA 700, 704, Sept. 18, 1990).
2. Requisites of self-defense: a) unlawful aggression; b) reasonable necessity of

the means employed to prevent or repel it; and c) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself. ( Pp. vs Uribe, 182 scra 624,
630-631).
3. The aggression must be unlawful. Ex. 1: The act of a chief of police who used
violence by throwing stones at the accused when the latter was running away
from him to elude arrest for a crime committed in his presence, is not unlawful
aggression, it appearing that the purpose of the police officer was to capture
the accused and place him under arrest. (Valcorza vs. People, 30 SCRA
143, 149, Oct. 31, 1969).
4. Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of

an immediate and imminent kind. (Pp. vs. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366). There is
unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s limb or right is either actual or
imminent. There must be actual force or actual use of weapon. ( Pp. vs
Crisostomo, 108 SCRA 288, 298, Oct. 31, 1981). See Pp. vs. Jose Laurel,
22 Phil. 252.
5. Imminent – that the danger is on the point of happening. It is not required that
the attack already begins, for it may too late. Ex.: While inside the boat with
some women and children, including the family of the accused, the deceased
who was also a passenger, upon reaching a place of great depth, rocked the
boat which started it to take water, and the accused fearing that the boat might
capsize asked the accused not to do it, but the deceased paid no attention and
continued rocking the boat, so the accused struck him on his forehead with an
oar and the deceased fell into the water. But a little while the deceased re
appeared and held the side of the boat, saying that he was going to capsize
the boat and moved, seeing which the women began to cry, whereupon the
accused struck him on the neck with the same oar that resulted the death of
the deceased. Held: Due to the condition of the river at the point when the
deceased started to rock the boat, if it had capsized, the passengers would
have run the risk of losing their lives. The conduct of the deceased gave rise to
the belief on the part of the accused that it would capsize if he had not
separated the deceased from the boat to give him no time to accomplish his
purpose. For this purpose, the blow given him by the accused on the forehead
with an oar was the least that he could reasonably have been done. And this
consideration militates with greater weight with respect to the second blow
given in his neck with the same oar because the danger was greater than the
boat might upset, especially as the deceased had expressed his intention to
upset it. ( Pp. vs. Cabungcal, 51 Phil. 803)
6. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack,

or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude, or imaginary. ( Pp. vs. Pasco Jr., 137 SCRA 137, June 24, 1985),
Ex. Aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and
making a motion as if to attack. (Pp. vs. Resurreccion, G.R. No. 0048-R,
Feb. 4, 1962), or brandishing a knife with which to stab or pointing a gun to
the accused. (Pp. vs Lacheca, L-38175, Sept. 28, 1984). But a mere
threatening attitude of the victim such as pressing his right hand to his hip
where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance or
like aiming to throw a pot is not unlawful aggression. (Pp. vs. Lavinia, 115
SCRA 223).
7. Slap on the face constitutes unlawful aggression. Reason: The face
represents a person and his dignity, slapping it is a serious personal attack. It
is physical assault coupled with a willful disregard, nay, a defiance, of an
individual’s personality. It may therefore, be frequently regarded as placing in
real danger a person’s dignity, rights and safety. (Pp. vs. Sabio, G.R. No. L-
23734, April 27, 1967).
8. A public officer exceeding his authority may become an unlawful aggressor.
Ex. A provincial sheriff who, in carrying out a writ of execution, exceeded his
authority by taking against the will of the judgment debtor personal property
with sentimental value to the latter, although other personal property sufficient
to satisfy the claim of the plaintiff was made available to the sheriff, was an
unlawful aggressor and the debtor had the right to repel the unalwful
aggression. (Pp. vs Hernandez).
9. The Rule now is “ stand ground when in right”. The ancient common law rule
in homicide denominated “retreat to the wall, has now given way to the new
rule “stand ground when in the right” (Reyes). So, where the accused is where
he has the right to be, the law does not require him to retreat when his
assailant is rapidly advancing upon him with a deadly weapon. ( U.S. vs.
Domen, 37 Phil 57). Reason: If one flees from an aggressor, he runs the risk
of being attacked in the back by the aggressor. (Reyes).
10. The rule is more liberal if the person attacked is a peace officer in the
performance of a duty, who must stand his ground and who cannot, like a
private person, take refuse in flight. (U.S. vs. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784). His duty
requires him to overcome his opponent and the force which he may exert may
differ that which ordinarily may be offered in self-defense. (Pp. vs. Papileta,
G.R. No. 03948-CR, July 16, 1968).
11. The belief of the accused may be considered in determining the existence of
unlawful aggression. Ex. 1: A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B
rushing rapidly towards him, with an outstretched arm and a pistol in his hand,
and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having
approached him near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his
hand strikes B over the head which caused his death. It turns out that the
pistol was loaded with powder only, and the real design of B was only to terrify
A. The killing is justified, otherwise, the man so attacked must, before he
strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded? (Reyes). Ex.
2: Crispin’s gun which turned out to be a toy pistol is inconsequential,
considering its strikingly similar resemblance to a real one and defendantCA
Rep. 914).
3. Facts: Earlier Cristina and Gerry had a quarrel when the former did not
cook their food having no money to buy food. They had an altercation for ten
(10) minutes until they were pacified. Gerry left but after 30 minutes, he
returned and pointed a knife at Cristina’s neck. The latter begged Gerry not to
hurt her, but Gerry continued pointing the knife and threatened to put a hole in
her neck and he slapped her twice. While Gerry was still holding the knife
Cristina pushed him and he fell. She took the knife which Gerry was holding
and begged him not to come near her. Suddenly Gerry grabbed her and for
fear that her life was in danger Cristina stabbed Gerry and the latter died.
Issue: Whether or not accused acted in self-defense.
Ruling: Contrary to the conclusion of the CA that Gerry’s aggression had
already ceased when he was disarmed, it is the Court’s view that the
aggression still continued. Her perceived to her life continued and persisted
until she out an end to it. It must be noted that after she was able to take hold
of the knife from her husband, he did not stand down but, instead, continued
to move towards her despite her plea that he should not come nearer. He
grabbed her by the arm which could have precipitated her well-grounded
belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able to wrest the weapon
from her. (Pp vs. Samson, GR No. 214883, Sept. 2, 2015).
Reasonableness of the means employed (second requisite).
1. Whether or not the means employed is reasonable, will depend upon the nature
and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor, his physical condition,
character, size and other circumstances, and those of the person defending
himself, and also the place and occasion of the assault. (Reyes).
2. Perfect equality between the weapon used by one defending himself and that of
the aggressor is not required, because the person defending himself does not
have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, to calculate and to choose which
weapon to use. ( Pp. vs. Padua, C.A. 40 O.G. 998).
3. Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material

commensurability between the means of the attack and defense. What the law
requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as
principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person
attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than reason, that moves or impels the
defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm
done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. (Pp. vs Encomienda,
46 SCRA 522, 534, Aug. 18, 1972). Ex. 1: An unarmed man was being mauled
with fistic blows by the deceased and his companions for refusing to their offer to
drink wine, picked up a lead pipe within his reach and struck the deceased with it
on the forehead resulting the death of the deceased. The use of the lead pipe
under the circumstances is reasonable. That accused did not select a lesser vital
portion of the body of the deceased to hit is reasonably to be expected, for in
such a situation, the accused has to move fast, or in split seconds, otherwise, the
aggression on his person would have continued and his life endangered. ( Pp. vs
Ocana, C.A. 67 O.G. 3313).
No necessity of the course of action taken.
1. When the deceased who had attacked Alconga ran away, there was no
necessity for Alconga to pursue and kill the deceased. ( Pp. vs. Alconga, 78
Phil. 366).
2. The theory of self-defense is based on the necessity on the part of the

person attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression, and when the
danger or risk on his part disappeared, his stabbing the aggressor while
defending himself should have stopped. ( Pp. Calavagan, C.A. G.R. No.
12952-R. Aug. 10, 1955).
3. When the accused succeeded in disarming the victim of the piece of wood
which the latter was allegedly carrying, the stabbing of such frequency, frenzy
and force can no longer be considered as reasonably necessary. (Pp. vs
Masangcay, 155 SCRA 113, 122, Oct. 27, 1987).
Necessity of the means used.
1. The means employed by the person must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel
an unlawful aggression. Thus, in the following cases, there was no rational necessity to employ
the means used: Ex. 1. A sleeping woman, who was awakened by her brother-in-law grasping
her arm, was not justified in using a knife to kill him as the latter did not perform any other act
which could be construed as an attempt against her honor. ( U.S. vs. Apego, 23 Phil. 391). Ex.
2, When a person was attacked with fists blows only, there was no reasonable necessity to inflict
upon the assailant a mortal wound with a dagger. (Pp. vs. Montalbo, 56 Phil. 443).
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (third
requisite in self-defense).
1. To be entitled to the benefit of justifying circumstance of self-defense, the one

defending himself must not have given cause for the aggression by his unjust
conduct or by inciting or provoking the assailant. (Reyes).
2. Even if there is provocation but not sufficient, the third requisite is applicable. Ex.
A having discovered that B built a part of his fence on A’ land, asked why he had
done so. This question angered B who immediately attack A. If A would kill B to
defend himself, the third requisite is present because even if it is true that the
question of A angered B, thereby making B attack A, such provocation is not
sufficient. ( Pp. vs. Pascua, 28 Phil. 222). See Pp. vs. Genosa, G.R. No.
135981, Jan. 15, 2004)
Par. 2 (Defense of Relatives)
1.Relatives that can be defended:

1.spouse, 2) Ascendants, 3) Desxcendants, 4) Legitimate, natural or adopted brothers
and sisters, or relative by affinity in the same degree; and 5) Relatives by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree.
2. Requisites of Defense of Relastives:
1. unlawful aggression
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3. In case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense
had no part therein. (See PP. vs. Eduarte, GR No. 72976, July 9, 1990, 187 SCRA 291, 296;
Pp. vs. Agapinay, 186 scra 812, 823)
- Take note that among the three requisites, the unlawful aggression is the most essential
and primary, without which defense of relatives is not possible or justified (See Pp. vs. Agapinay).
- When two persons are getting ready to strike each other, there can be no unlawful
aggression, and hence, a relative of either who butts in and administer a deadly blow on the other
to prevent him from doing harm is not acting in defense of relative, but is guilty of homicide. (Pp.
vs. Moro Munabe, CA, 46 OG 4392).
- Unlawful aggression can be made to depend upon the honest belief of the n e making the
defense. (U.S. vs. Esmedia, 17 Phil. 260, 264).
Ex.: A attacked and wounded B with a dagger, causing the latter to fall down, but B
immediately stood up and defended himself by striking A with a bolo and as a result, A was
seriously wounded and fell in the mud with B standing in front of A in a position as if to strike
again in case A would stand up, there is no doubt that A was the unlawful aggressor, But when
the sons of A came, what they saw was that their father was lying in the mud wounded. They
believed in good faith that their father was the victim of an unlawful aggression. If they killed B
under such circumstances, they are justified.
`-Example of the third requisite:
A slapped the face of B. B immediately commenced to retaliate by drawing a knife and
trying to stab A, and C, the father of A killed B in defense of his son. C is completely justified,
notwithstanding the fact that the provocation was given by his son A.
But if C had induced his son A to injure B, thereby taking part in the provocation made by
A, C would not be completely justified in killing B while the latter was about to stab A, because the
third requisite of defense of relative is lacking.
Note:
- Even of the person defending a relative was also induced by revenge or hatred, there
would still be a legitimate defense of relatives so long as all the three requisites are present.
-
Par. 3 Defense of stranger.
Requisites:
1. Unlawful aggression.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3. The person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.
- If the person defending a stranger has a grudge against the victim, the third requisite is
absent because the alleged defense of stranger would only be a pretext.
Ex. If in defending his wife’s brother-in-law, the accused acted also from an impulse of
resentment against the deceased, the third requisite of defense of stranger is not present.
(Pp. vs.Cabellon and Gaviola, 51 Phil. 851).
Cases:
1. A was able to deprive B, a constabulary lieutenant, of his pistol during the fray. B
ordered C, a constabulary soldier under his command, to search A for the pistol. When C was
about to approach A to search him, the latter stepped back and shot C who was able to avoid the
shot. When A was about to fire again at C, D, another constabulary soldier, fired at A with his rifle
which killed him.
Held: D was justified in killing A, having acted in defense of stranger. (Pp. vs. Ancheta, et
al., 66 Phil. 638).
2. A heard screams and cries for help. When A responded, he saw B attacking his
(B’s) wife with a dagger. A approached B and struggled for the possession of the weapon, in the
course of which A inflicted wounds on B.
Held: A acted in defense of a stranger. (Pp. vs. Valdez, 58 Phil. 31).
Note: Furnishing a weapon to one in serious danger of being throttled is defense of stranger.
Case: A Japanese hit an old man 78 years of age on the face, shoved him to the ground
and attempted to choke him. The accused furnished the old man with a small gaff, used by game
cocks, with which the old man killed his assailant. Held: The accused was justified in furnishing
the old man with the gaff, it being a defense of stranger. (U.S. vs. Subingsubing, 31 Phil. 376).
Par. 4. Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury.
Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which caused
damaged to another, provided that the following requisites are present:
1) That THE evil sought to be avoided actually exists.
2) That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it. And
3) That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
- The term DAMAGE TO ANOTHER, includes injury to persons and damage to property or
even injury to one’s honor.
Example of injury to one’s honor:
The accused who was about to be married to the offended party eloped with another
man, after the offended party had made preparations for the wedding, the Court held that there
was necessity on the part of the accused of avoiding a loveless marriage with the offended party,
and her refusal to marry him and her eloping with another man whom she loved were justified and
did not amount of a crime of slander by deed. (Pp. vs. Norma Hernandez, CA, 55 OG 8465).
Example of “that the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it:
A person was driving his car on a narrow road with due diligence and care when
suddenly he saw a six by six truck in front of his car. If he would swerve his car to the left he
would fall intoa precipe, or if he would swerve it to the right he would kill a passer-by. He was
forced to choose between his life or sacrificing the life of an innocent by-stander. He chose the
latter and swerved to the right, ran over and killed a passer-by.
Held: The killing is justified because the instinct of self-preservation always make one feel
that his own safety is of greater importance than that of another.
Note: The rule will not apply of the greater evil was brought about by the negligence or
imprudence of the actor.
Case: Victims, Arnulfo Andal and Antonio Duclayan, were with fellow navy officers who had a
drinking spree in Aquarius Videoko bar on August 10, 2002 in the evening. Their group had an
altercation with the appellant due to misunderstanding. To avoid trouble, the group of the victims
went home and while on their way towards the NETC camp, the appellant on a van sped away
towards the camp and suddenly swerved towards the right hitting the group of the walking navy
personnel, killing Andal and Duclayan. Appellant invoked the defense that he acted in avoidance
of greater evil or injury under par. 4, Art. 11 of RPC. His act of increasing the vehicle’s speed
was reasonable and justified as he was being attacked by two men whose companions were also
approaching. He asserted that the attack against him by the two nave personnel constituted
actual and imminent danger to his life and limb. The sight of the four approaching companions of
his attackers “created his mind a fear lof greater evil”, prompting him to speed up his vehicle to
avoid a greater evil or injury to himself.
HELD: Under Art. 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, infliction of damage or injury to
another so that greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self may be justified only if it is taken as
a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid injury
without causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no such other way but the damage to
another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to one’s self, then such course should
be taken. In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 6 to 7 meters in
width, and the place was well lighted. Both sides of the road were unobstructed by trees, plants or
structures. Appellant was drive by occupation. However, appellant himself testified that when he
shifted to the second gear and immediately stepped on the accelerator upon seeing the four navy
personnel approaching in front of him, he did not make any attempt to avoid hitting the
approaching navy personnel even though he had enough space to do so. He simply sped away
straight ahead, meeting the approaching navy personnel head on, totally unmindful if he might
run over them. He therefore miserably failed to resort to other practical and less harmful available
means of preventing the evil or injury.(Pp. vs. Punzalal, Jr, GR No. 199892, Dec. 10, 2012).
Par. 5. –Fulfillment of Duty or Lawful Exercise of Right of Office.
Requisites:
1. That accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office.
2. That the injury caused or the offense committed by the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. (Pp. vs.
Oanis, 74 Phil. 257).
Case:
Lorenzo escaped from the jail where he was serving his sentence. Policeman Felipe
Delima, who was looking for him found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed
piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and Delima demanded his surrender, however, the
fugitive answered with a stroke of a lance. The policeman dodged it, and to impose his authority
fired his revolver, but the bullet did not him. The criminal ran away, without parting his weapon.
The peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him.
HELD: The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under obligation to
surrender, and had no right, evading the service of sentence, to commit assault and disobedience
with a weapon in his hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to an extreme means, ehich,
although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances. (Pp. ve. Felipe Delima, 46
Phil. 738).
- The above case was applied in Pp. vs. Bisa, C.A., 51 O.G. 4091, where a detained
prisoner under the custody of the accused, by means of force and violence, was able to
leave the cell and actually attempted to escape, notwithstanding the warnings given by
the accused not to do so, and was shot by the accused, the latter is entitled to an
acquittal.
- Also in the case of Valcorza vs. Peeople, 30 SCRA 148-150 where four members of the
police force went after an escaping detainee who was escaping. When the escaoing
detainee saw one of the policemen, he lunged at the latter, hitting him with a stone onth
right cheek ,as a consequence of which he fell down, and while in that position he was
again struck with a stoned by the detainee; thereafter, the latter ran away but was
pursued by the policemen and his companions; in the course of the pursuit, the
policeman fired several shots into the air, but the detainee paid no heed to it; and as the
latter was apparently widening the distance between them, and fearing that he might
finally be able to elude arrest, the policeman fired directly at him hitting him on the back.
- But the above case was not applied in Pp. vs. Lagata, 83 Phil. 159, where a guard shot
two of the prisoners who attempted to escape and his reason was to prevent the
prisoners from escaping. But it was found out that Abria, one of the prisoners was only
three meters away from the guard, while Tepace was only four or five meters. The
Supreme Cpurt said there was absolutely no reason for the guard to fire at the prisoners.
- Also, a thief who refused to be arrested and he would not stop even if he would die and
the security guard fired at him directed at the leg but the bullet hit him in the lumbar
region killing the thief, it was HELD: The security guard acted in the performance of his
duty, but he exceeded the fulfillment of his duty by shooting the deceased. He was found
guilty of homicide.(Pp. vs. Bentres, C.A. 40 O.G. 4919).
- The above rule is in keeping with the doctrine restated in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
that “No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall be subject to any greater restrain than is necessary for his detention.
Case: In the morning of 5 August 1992, four policemen alighted from the car and halted
the collector who was riding a motorcycle from Laoayan. The police asked the collector to show
his identification card. The collector took the ID out of his left pocket and when it reached the front
man, one of the policemen (petitioner), opened fire at the collector whose right hand then was
raised. The four other policemen meanwhile had their firearms pointed at the collector. The
defenses of the petitioner: a) Defense of stranger alleging that victim shot another policeman
Regencia, b) self-defense as he was the next target; and c) fulfillment of a lawful duty.
HELD: Defense of Stranger or self-defense. In order that the defense of relative may
be appreciated, the following requisite must concur: (1 unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; 2) reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; 3) the person defending be not
induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.
Unlawful aggression is the first and primordial element of self-defense (or defense of
stranger). Without it, the justifying circumstance cannot be invoked. If there is no unlawful
aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel.
Unlawful aggression refers to an attack or a threat to attack, positively showing the intent
of the aggressor to cause injury. It presupposes not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude,
but an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which imperils one’s
life or limb. Thus, when there is no peril, there is no unlawful aggression.
Granting that there was unlawful aggression, we find the petitioner’s contention that he
employed reasonable means to repel the aggression must fail. It is settled that reasonable
necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means
of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence. The Court notes that the
victim sustained 8 gunshot wounds which were all fatal as they affected vital organs. It bears
repeating that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly abd
unremittingly considered as important indicia which disprove a plea for self-defense or defense of
stranger because they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend
himself.
Case: Responding to a call that a robbery hold-up was in progress, petitioner, together other
police officers responded to the scene. Thereat, they asked permission to go to the roof top of the
house where the suspect was allegedly taking refuge. The three policemen, petitioner, Diaz and
Cruz, each armed with a handgun, searched the rooftop. There, they saw the man who they
thought was the robbery suspect. At that instance, petitioner Mamangun. Who was walking ahead
of the group, fired his gun, hitting the man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras who was
not the robbery suspect. The petitioner invoked the defense of fulfillment of duty under par. 5,
Article 11.
HELD: The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under par. 5, Art. 11 of RPC may be
invoked only after the defense successfully proves that: 1) the accused acted in the performance
of a duty; and 2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the
due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. Concededly, the first requisite is present as his
presence at the crime scene was in accordance with the performance of his duty. However, proof
that the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras because he latter Cntreras was a necessary
consequence of the due performance of his duty as a police man is essential to exempt him from
criminal liability. Petitioner’s posturing that he shot Contreras because the latter tried to strike him
with a steel pipe was a mere afterthought to exempt from criminal liability. The location of the
entry of the bullet fired by the accused Mamangun which is the outer left arm at about the bicep of
the victim and its trajectory as it penetrated his body hitting his vital organs along the way belies
the claim of the accused that the victim was facing him and just missed his head with an iron
pipe, as instead the victim must have instinctively shielded his body with his left arm.(Mamangun
vs. Pp., GR No. 149152, Feb. 2, 2007).
Lawful performance of duty.
The justifying circumstance may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves
that the accused acted in the performance of a duty, and the injury or offense committed is the
necessary consequence of the due performance of lawful exercise of such duty. These two
requisites are wanting in this case. The victim was not committing any offense at that time.
Petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the victim had indeed fired at Regencia. Killing the
victim under the circumstances of this case cannot in any wise be considered a valid performance
of a lawful duty by a man who had sworn to maintain peace and order and to protect the lives of
the people. As aptly held in Pp vs. Cruz, “Performance of duties does not include murder…
murder is never justified, regardless of the victim.(Cabuslay vs. Pp, et al., GR No. 129875,
Sept. 30, 2005).
Lawful exercise of a right or office.

“Of a right”
- Under the Civil Code, Art. 429 (Doctrine of self-help), the owner or lawful possessor of a
thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For
this purpose he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
- Under this paragraph, unlawful aggression is not necessary against the person charged
with the protection of the property.
Oar. 6. Obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose.
Requisites:
1. That an order has been issued by a superior.
2. That such order must be for some lawful purpose.
3. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.
Note: For the article to apply, both the person who gives the order and the person who executes
it, must be acting within the limitation prescribed by law. ( Pp. Wilson and Dolores, 52 Phil.
919).
Ex.
The Court ordered that the convict should be executed on a certain date. The executioner
put him to death on a day earlier than the date fixed by the Court. Held: The execution of the
convict, although by virtue of a lawful order of the court, was carried out against the provision of
Article 82. The executioner is guilty of murder.
- When the order is not for a lawful purpose, the subordinate who obeyed it is criminally
liable.
Ex. One who prepared a falsified document with the full knowledge of its falsity is not excused
even if her merely acted in obedience to the instruction of his superior, because the
instruction was not for a lawful purpose. (Pp. vs. Barroga, 54 Phil. 247).
Ex. A soldier who, in obedience to the order of his sergeant ,tortured the deceased for
bringing a kind of fish different from that he had been asked to furnish a constabulary
detachment, is criminally liable. Obedience to an order of a superior is justified only when the
order is for some lawful purpose.
- The subordinate is not liable for carrying out an illegal order of his superior, if he is not
aware of the illegality of the order and he is not negligent.
Ex. When the accused acted upon the orders of superior officers, which he, as a military
could not question, and obeyed the orders in good faith, without being aware of their illegality,
without any fault or negligence on his part, he is not liable because he had no criminal intent
and he was not negligent. (Pp. vs. Beronilla, 96 Phil. 566).
1. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE
The reason for the exemption in exempting circumstance is absence of voluntariness or
some of its ingredients, namely: criminal intent, intelligence, or freedom of action on the part of
the offender, or absence of negligence, imprudence or lack of foresight or lack of skill, in case of
Culpable felony.
Imbecility or insanity.(Par. 1)
In imbecility, there is complete absence of intelligence. An imbecile is a person whose

mental development is like that of a child between 2 to 7 years of age. It has an IQ of only 7. The
deficiency is permanent. Thus, there is no lucid interval.
In insanity that is exempting is limited only to mental aberration or disease of the mind
and must completely impair the intelligence of the accused. Emotional or spiritual insanity are not
exempting in our jurisdiction, unlike in other common law countries.
The test of insanity as held in Pp. vs. Rafana, Nov. 21, 1991 to be exempting:
1. The test of cognition, or whether the accused acted with complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the said crime;
2. The test of volition, or whether the accused acted in total deprivation will.
Case: On March 12, 2009, Maynard Plata with his father Romeo and Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie)
were at Bagao Police Station to report that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation
pump. After the confrontation, they went home but stopped at a drug store. Romeo proceeded
towards the drug store while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw
Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie. Romeo died upon
arrival at the CVMC. Verdadero invoked insanity as a defense as he was suffering from
schizophrenia.
HELD: Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is exempt from criminal
liability, unless the latter acted during lucid interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be
clearly proved for there is a presumption that the acts penalized by law are voluntary.
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the
Psychiatric Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001;
(3) he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) He was confined in the psychiatric
ward sometime in 2009 due to relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of
his confinement in 1999 until the stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a
relapse on March 20, 2009.
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between

fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. A showing that
accused is suffering from a mental disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him from
the consequences of his act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputablity.
In Pp vs. Florendo, 459 Phil. 470, 477 (2003) the Court explained in upholding insanity
as an exempting circumstance, to wit:
Insanity under Art. 12, par 1, of the RPC exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of
reason; he acts without the least discernment because of complete absence of
the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The
onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
In Pp vs. Isla (GR NO. 199875, Nov. 21, 2012) elucidated that insanity must relate to the time
immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the
accused is charged. Otherwise, he must be adjudged guilty for the said offense. In short, in order
for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must
categorically demonstrate that: 1) he was completely deprived of intelligence because of his
mental condition or illness; and 2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at
the time or immediately before the commission of the offense.
x-x-x
Proving insanity is a tedious task for it requires an examination of the mental state of the
accused. In PP vs. Opuran (469 Phil. 698 (2004) the Court explained how one’s insanity may be
established, to wit:
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is nor susceptible of the usual means
of proof. As no man can know what is going on the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person’s mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by which we
read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine
whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties

which is manifested in language and conduct.xxx
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which

may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has
rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based in his own
perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as psychiatrist.
Xxx
Guided by the precepts laid out by the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the Court finds that
Verdadero sufficiently proved that he was insane at the time f the stabbing. (Verdadero vs. Pp,
gr No. 216021, March 2, 2016)
Age under nine years of age. (Par. 2).
1. Age of absolute irresponsibility raised to fifteen years of age.

Republic Act No. 9344 otherwise known as Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raised the
age of absolute irresponsibility from nine (9) to fifteen (15) years of age.
Under Sec. 6 of the said law, a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the crime shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subject to an intervention program as provided under Section 20 of the same law.
2. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program unless he/she has
acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subject to appropriate proceedings in
accordance with said act.
3. Discernment, meaning.
It’s the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong; and such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the
very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the
act, but also after and even during the trial. (Guevarra vs. Almodovar, 169 SCRA 476, 481).
CASE: In Aug., 2001,13-year old AAA was playing with friend BBB in the 2 nd floor of her family’s
house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to
play with them. The petitioner then undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her.
Afterwards, he turned to AAA undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse with her by
inserting her male organ into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they
did. The petitioner was charged of the crime of RAPE but invoked par. 1, Sec. 6 of RA 9344
(Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act 2006) to exempt him from criminal liability considering that he
was only 15 years old at the time the crime was consummated. The CA convicted the petitioner.
First, it was not established and proved he was 15 years old or below at the time of the
commission of the crime. It was incumbent for the defense to present Robert’s birth certificate it
was to avail RA 9344.
HELD: The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing the petitioner was
only 15 yrs. old at the time of the commission of the crime. Section 7 of RA 9344 expressly states
how the age of a child in conflict with the law may be determined:
SEC 7. Determination of Age.-xxx The age of a child may be
determined from the child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information of the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.
Incase of doubt as to the age of the age of the child, it shall be resolved in
his/her favor.
Xxx
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the petitioner and CCC both testified
regarding his minority and the age when the rape was committed. Second, the records
before us show that this pieces of testimonial evidence were never objected to by the
prosecution. And lastly, the prosecution did not present any contrary evidence to prove
that the petitioner was above 15 years old when the crime was committed.
That the petitioner committed the rape before RA 9344 took effect and that he is
no longer a minor(he was already 20 years old when he took the stand) will not bar him
from enjoying the benefit of total exemption that Section 6 of RA No. 9344 grants. As we
explained in discussing Sec. 64 and 68 of RA 9344 in the case of Ortega v People ( GR
No. 151085, Aug. 20, 2008):
Sec. 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children of 15 years old
and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare
and development officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with resoect
to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL’s age at the
time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL’s age at the time of the
commission of the offense.xxx
The retroactive application of RA No. 9344 is also justified under Art. 22 of the RPC, as
amended, which provides that penal laws are to be given retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the accused who is not found to be a habitual criminal.(SIERA vs. Pp., GR
No. 182941, July 13, 2009).
Any person who, performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it. (Par. 4)
Elements: a) A person is performing a lawful act; b) with due care; c) he causes an injury
by mere accident; and d) without fault or intention of causing it.
Case: While defending himself against the unjustified assault upon his person made by
the assailant, appellant Galacgac fired his revolver at random, wounding two innocent persons.
Held: The discharge of firearm in a thickly populated place in the City of Manila being prohibited
and penalized by Art. 155 of RPC, the appellant was not performing a lawful act, hence, the
exempting circumstance in Art. 12, par. 4 is not applicable. (Pp. vs. Galacgac, 54 OG 1027).
Illustration: A person driving his car within the speed limit, while considering the
condition of the traffic and the pedestrians at that time, tripped on a stone with on his car tires.
The stone hit a pedestrian on the head and suffered profused bleeding. Answer: The driver has
no criminal and civil liability, while generally in exempting circumstance, the offender while
exempted from criminal responsibility is civilly liable.
How about if he abandoned his victim, is there a liability of the driver? Ans.: The driver
would be liable under Article 275, par. 2 RPC. How about if at the start the driver was driving
beyond the speed limit and did not take into consideration the condition of the traffic and the
pedestrian? Ans: The driver is liable under Art. 365 of RPC, and the penalty is qualified to a
higher degree.
Accident and Negligence distinguished.
In Jarco Marketing Corp. vs. CA, 321 SCRA 375, the Supreme Court held that an
accident is a fortuitive circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human
agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an even which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. Negligence, on the
other hand, is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand without which
such other person suffers injury. (Pp. vs. Fallorina, GR No. 137347, March 4, 2004).
CASE: At around 11’o clock in the evening of May 2, 1994, accused appellant was drunk, arrived
and went into the bedroom where his wife (Grace) and son were sleeping. Not long thereafter,
Grace shouted:” Sige patayin mo ako, patayin mo na kami ng anak ko”, then a gunshot was
heard. Grace was brought by the accused-appellant to the hospital. Grace died. The accused
invoked par. 4, Article 12 of the RPC because according to him, the incident occurred when he
tried to prevent his wife from killing herself, and he and his wife grappled for the possession of
the gun.
HELD: Accused appellant cannot invoke the benevolent provision of Par. 4, Art. 12 of the RPC in
order to be exempt from criminal liability arising from the death of his wife, Grace Nepomuceno.
Said provision pertinently states:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
Xxx
a. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
At all events, accident to be exempting, presupposes that the act done is lawful. Here, however,
the act of accused-appellant of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same not being
in self-defense is unlawful – it at least constitutes light threats. There is thus no room for the
invocation of accident as a ground for exemption. (Pp vs. Nepomuceno, Jr. GR No. 127818,
Nov. 11, 1998). See also PP vs. Kempis, GR No. 97169, May 10, 1993.
Any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force. (Par. 5).
1. Force considered irresistible.
For a force to be considered irresistible, it must be such that, in spite of the resistance of
the person on whom it operates, it compels his members to act and his minds to obey. Such a
force can never consist in anything which springs from primarily from the man himself; it must be
a force which acts upon him from the outside and by a third person. (U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil.
209).
In other words the offender must be totally deprived of freedom. If the offender still has
freedom of choice, whether to act or not, even if the force was employed on him, or even if he is
suffering from an uncontrollable fear, he is not exempt from criminal liability. Because he is still
possessed with voluntariness. In exempting circumstance, the offender must act without
voluntariness or freedom.
Case: Where the accused was threatened with a gum by his friend, the mastermind, to
perform the crime is not exempting when he himself has a rifle. Meaning there is no total
deprivation of freedom. (Pp. vs. Sarip, 88 SCRA 666, Feb. 28, 1979).
Case: Where the accused in his testimony said that he was intimidated into committing
the crime, but it is was established that he had the opportunity to leave the gang, par. 5 is not
available to him. (Pp. vs. Parulan, 88 Phil. 615).
Case: Where the accused allegedly under compulsion of an irresistible force when he
committed the crime is incredible when he had the opportunity to run or resist the possible
aggression because he was also armed. (Pp. vs. Abanes, 73 SCRA 44,47).
2. A Threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character
as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
(Pp. vs. Loreno, 130 SCRA 311, 321-322, July 9, 1984).
CASE: On March 2, 1990 in Pasayanon, Matungao, Lanao Del Norte, appellant armed with a
garand rifle like his four (4) companions, fired the fatal shots which caused the death of Abubakar
Alamat, a.k.a Abubakar Pangalamatan. Appellant claims exemption from criminal liability under
Art. 12, par. 5 of the RPC because he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible
force. He allegedly joined the armed Dorados against his will because of fear for his own safety.
He claims in his brief that the Dorados were guarding him so closely that “escape was risky and
protection by lawfully constituted authorities was, at the moment, out of reach.”
HELD: A person who invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to
irresistible force must prove his defense by clear and convincing evidence. He must show that the
irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against
his will. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave accused no opportunity to defend
himself or to escape.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it
must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. A speculative, fanciful or
remote fear, even fear of future injury is insufficient.
In this case, appellant failed to show such compulsion. In his testimony, he did not
mention that the Dorados physically or morally threatened to kill or hurt him. He did not even
make any attempt to resist. He simply took for granted that they would kill or hurt him if he did not
follow them. No evidence was presented to establish how, if at all, he was compelled to join
Dorados in killing the victim. In other words, appellant failed to prove that the Dorados made a
real and imminent threat on his life or limb sufficient to overcome his will.( Pp vs. Dansal, GR
No. 105002, July 17, 1997).
Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury. (Par. 6).
1. Requisites:
For an uncontrollable fear to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must
concur: (a) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the
fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. (Pp. vs. Petenia, 143 SCRA
361, 369).
Case: Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco were compelled to under fear of
death to swear allegiance to the Katipunan whose purpose was to overthrow the government by
the force of arms. Held: The accused cannot be criminally liable for rebellion, because they joined
the rebels under the imoulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. (U.S. vs.
Exaltacion, 3 Phil. 339). The penalty for rebellion is prision mayor or imprisonment from 6 yrs.
And 1 day to 12 years and fine against death if they do not join the rebellion.
Example: If A had threatened to burn the house of B should the latter not kill his B’s
father, and killed his father for fear that A might burn his (B’s) house, B is not exempt from
criminal liability for the reason that the evil with which he was threatened was much less than that
killing his father.
2. Nature of duress as a valid defense.
Duress as a valid defense should be based on real, imminent, or reasonable fear for
one’s life or limb and should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote fear. (Pp. vs. Borja, 91 SCRA
340, 355, July 12, 1979).
Case: A person who was ordered to kill the victims executed the order because the one
who made the order ( a Japanese officer) made a threat that he would come along with them if he
will not comply. Held: The threat is not of such serious character and imminence as to create in
the mind of the defendant an uncontrollable fear that an equal or greater evil or injury would be
inflicted upon him if he did not comply with the alleged order to kill the deceased. (Pp. vs.
Moreno, 77 Phil. 549).
Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some
lawful or insuperable cause. (Par. 7)
1. Elements: a) That an act is required by law to be done; b) That a person fails

to perform such act; and c) That his failure perform such act was due to some lawful or
insuperable cause.
2. When prevented by some lawful cause, meaning. Ex. A person who confessed
before a priest being in conspiracy wit other persons against the government. The priest
has no criminal liability for failing to report of such conspiracy to the governor or the fiscal
of the province where he resides under Art. 116 because under the law, the priest cannot
be compelled to reveal any information which he came to know by reason of the
confession made to him in his professional capacity.
3. When prevented by some insuperable cause, meaning.
Case: The Municipal president who detained the offended party for three days
because to take him to the nearest justice of the peace required a journey of three days
by boat as there was no other means of transportation. There is no violation of Art. 125 of
RPC requiring the delivery of a person arrested to the nearest judicial authority within 36
hours, otherwise the officer will be liable for arbitrary detention. The distance requiring
three (3) days journey is insuperable cause. (U.S. vs. Vicentillo, 19 Phil. 118, 119).
Case: A mother who at the time of childbirth was overcame by sever dizziness
and extreme debility, and left the child in thicket where the child died, is not liable for
infanticide because it was physically impossible for her to take her home the child. The
dizziness and extreme debility of the woman constitute insuperable cause. (Pp. vs.
Bandian, 63 Phil. 530-535).
4. Absolutory causes defined. Absolutory causes are those where the act committed is
a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.
Other absolutory causes:
Art. 6 – The spontaneous desistance of the person who commenced the commission of a
felony before he could perform all the acts of execution.
Art. 20 – Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. The penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling with the
provisions of par. 1 of the next preceding article.
The provision of par. 1 of Art. 19 read as follows:

“By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.”
Art. 124, last paragraph. – The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other
ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered
legal grounds for the detention of any person.
Art. 247, pars. 1 and 2. – Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances. - Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injuries, shall suffer a
penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempted from
criminal punishment.
Art. 280, par. 3. – The provision of this article (on trespass to dwelling) shall not be
applicable to any person who shall enter another’s dwelling for the purpose of preventing some
serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be applicable
to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some services to humanity
or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses, while the
same are open.
Art. 332. – Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil, liability
shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed
or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased
spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
Art. 344, par 4. - In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the
marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already impose upon him. The provision of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the
co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
4. Instigation an absolutory cause.

Reason: A sound public policy requires that the courts shall condemn this practice
(instigation) by directing the acquittal of the accused.
Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a crime. Without
inducement, the crime would not have been committed. Hence, it is exempting by reason of
public policy. Otherwise, the peace officer would be a co-principal.
4.1 If the person who instigated is a private person he will be liable as a principal by
inducement. (Art. 17, par. 2).
Ex. A policeman induced a person to import opium which he made him believe he would
buy and when the opium imported was delivered he made the arrest. Held: There is an
instigation. Without the inducement the opium would not have been imported. (Pp. vs. Lua Chu,
et al., 56 Phil. 52).
5. Entrapment not an absolutory cause.

Entrapment –signifies the ways and means devised by a peace officer to entrap or
apprehend a person who has committed a crime. With or without the entrapment, the crime has
been committed already. Hence, entrapment is not mitigating.
Case: So, if the offender was suspected of selling medicine at a price higher than the
fixed by law, and a policeman pretended to be a buyer, bought some of the medicine and paid the
offender with the marked money, since the offender sold the medicine to the policeman at price
higher than the selling price, there is no instigation but entrapment, as the price was fixed and
collected by the offender. (Pp. vs. Tia, 51 O.G. 1863)
Case: The accused wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to send to him a shipment of
opium. The opium had been in Hongkong for sometime, awaiting for a ship that would go direct to
Cebu. The Collector of Customs of Cebu received information that the accused was intending to
land opium in the port. The Collector of custom promised the accused that he would remove all
the difficulties in the way, and for this purpose agreed to receive P 2,000.00. Juan Samson, a
secret serviceman, pretended to smooth the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug. The
accused started landing the opium and had the accused prosecuted. Held: It is true that Juan
Samson smoothed the way of the introduction of the prohibited drug, but after the accused had
already planned the importation and ordered for the said drug. (Pp. vs. Valmorfes, et al. 122
SCRA 922, June 26, 1983).
Distinction between Entrapment and Instigation
In entrapment, a criminal design is already in the mind of the person entrapped. It did not
emanate from the mind of the law enforcer entrapping him. Entrapment involves only ways and
means which are laid down or resorted to facilitate the apprehension of the culprit.
In instigation, on the other hand, the criminal plan or design exists in the mind of the law
enforcer with whom the person instigated cooperated so it is said that the person instigated is
acting only as a mere instrument or toll of the law enforcer in the performance of his duties.
If the instigator is the law enforcer, the person instigated is not criminally liable, because
it is the law enforcer who planted that criminal mind in him to commit the crime, without which he
would not have been a criminal. If the instigator is not a law enforcer, then both will be criminally
liable. It would be contrary to public policy to prosecute a citizen who only cooperated with the law
enforcer because he believes that it is his civil duty to cooperate.
So that, if the person instigated does not know that the person instigating him is a law
enforcer or he known him not to be a law enforcer, it is not a case of instigation. This is a case of
inducement, both will be criminally liable.
5.1 As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a
valid means of arresting violators of RA 9165. It is an effective way of apprehending
law offenders in the act of committing a crime. IN a buy-bust operation, the idea to
commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding
him to commit the offense. (Pp. vs. Bartolome, GR No. 191726, Feb. 6, 2013).
5.2 A prior surveillance is not a pre-requisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust
operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of
good police work. However, the police carry out its entrapment operation, for as long
as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not
pass on the wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide the time is of the
essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance. The flexibility is even more
important incases involving trafficking of persons. The urgency of rescuing the victims
may at times require immediate but deliberate action on the part of the law
enforcers(PP vs. Shirley A. Casio, GR No. 211465, Dec. 3, 2014).
6. Distinctions between justifying circumstances and exempting circumstances.
In justifying circumstance-
1. The circumstance affects the act, not the actor;
2. The act complained of is considered to have been done within the bounds of the law;
hence, it is legitimate and lawful in the eyes of the law;
3. Since the act is considered lawful, there is no crime, and because there is no crime
there is no criminal;
4. Since there is no crime or criminal, there is no criminal liability as well as civil liability.
In exempting circumstance-
1. The circumstance affects the actor, not the act;
2. The act complained of is actually wrongful but the actor acted without voluntariness.
He is a mere tool or instrument of the crime;
3. Since the act complained of is actually wrongful, there is a crime. But, because the
actor acted without voluntariness, there is absence of dolo or culpa. There is no
criminal;
4. Since there is a crime committed but there is no criminal, there is civil liability for the
wrong done. But there is no criminal liability. However, in pars. 4 & 7 of Article 12,
there is no criminal or civil liability (Accident and insuperable cause)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES (Art. 13 of RPC)
1. Mitigating circumstance are those which, it present in the commission of the

crime, do not entirely free the actor from criminal liability, but serve only to reduce the
penalty.
2. Basis: Mitigating circumstances are based on the diminution of either freedom of
action, intelligence, or intent, or on the lesser perversity of the offender.
3. Classes of mitigating circumstances.
a) Ordinary mitigating circumstances: Those enumerated in subsections 1 to 10 of
Article 13.
b) Privileged mitigating circumstances: a) Art. 68. (Penalty to be imposed upon a
person under eighteen years (as amended by R.A 9344); b) Art. 69. (Penalty to be imposed when
the crime committed is not wholly excusable; and c) Art. 64. (Rules for the application of penalties
which contain three periods).
4. Distinctions:
a) Ordinary mitigating circumstances is susceptible of being offset by any aggravating
circumstances; while privileged mitigating circumstances cannot be offset by aggravating
circumstance.
b) Ordinary mitigating, if not offset by an aggravating circumstance, produces only the
effect of applying the penalty provided by law for the crime in its minimum period, in case of
divisible penalty; whereas, privileged mitigating produces the effect of imposing upon the offender
the penalty by one or two degrees than that provided by law for the crime.
The privileged mitigating circumstances of incomplete justifying or exempting

circumstance (Par. 1, Art. 13, RPC)
1. In self-defense, defense of relative or defense of stranger, it is essential that

unlawful aggression be present; otherwise there can be no such defense, whether
complete or complete. (Pp. vs Rosal, G.R. No. L-5355).
Case: The deceased was about to set on fire the house of the accused. They grappled
and then the accused boloed to death the deceased. Held: There was unlawful aggression on the
part of the deceased, but there is absence of reasonable necessity of killing the aggressor as he
was already driven out of the house and was prostrate on the ground. Accused is entitled to
privilege mitigating circumstance.
2. Incomplete justifying circumstance of performance of duty.
Case: The deceased was killed was asleep, the crime committed was murder qualified by
alevosia. The duty of the accused was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance
is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over anxiety or their
desire to take no chance, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person
whom they believed as Balagtas. (Pp. vs. Oanis, supra).
Paragraph 2, Art. 13 RPC impliedly repealed by RA 9344.
1. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall be exempt
from criminal liability unless he/she acted with discernment. (Sec. 6, RA 9344). If he acted with
discernment, such child in conflict with the law shall undergo diversion program under Chapter 2
of RA 9344.
2. The offender who is over 70 years of age is only a generic mitigating circumstance as
Article 68, providing for privileged mitigating circumstances does not include the case of
offenders over 70 years old.
That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
(Par. 3).
1. This circumstance is taken into account only when the facts proven show that there is
a notable and evident disproportion between the means employed to execute the criminal acts
and its consequences. (U.S. vs. Reyes, 36 Phil. 904, 907).See also Pp. vs. Amit, 32 SCRA 95.
2. The intention, as an internal act, is judged not only by the proportion of the means
employed by him to the evil produced by his act, but also b the fact that the blow was or was not
aimed at a vital part of the body.
Case: It may be deduced from the proven facts that the accused had no intention to kill
the victim, his design being only to maltreat him, such that when he realized the fearful
consequence of his felonious act, he allowed the victim to secure medical treatment at the
municipal dispensary. (Pp. vs Ural, No. L-30801, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 146).
3. Intention may also be judged by considering the weapon used, the injury
inflicted, and his attitude of mind when the accused attack the deceased. Case: The
accused a heavy club in attacking the deceased whom he followed some distance, without giving
him the opportunity to defend himself, is to be believed that he intended to do exactly what he did
and must be held responsible for the result, without the benefit of the mitigating circumstance.
(Pp. vs. Flores, 50 Phil. 548, 551).
4. Art. 13, par. 3 is not applicable when the offender employed brute force. Case:
Accused who is a man, knew that the victim was a girl of tender age (6 years old), weak in body,
helpless and defenseless, should have known the natural and inevitable result of his act of
strangulation the victim. He cannot claim that he had no intention to kill the victim. ( Pp. vs. Yu, 1
SCRA 199, 204).
5. Is Art. 13, par. 3 applicable to felonies where the intention of the offender is
immaterial?
Case: In unintentional abortion, where the abortion that resulted is not intended by the
offender, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed is not applicable. (Pp. vs. Cristobal, C.A., G.R. No. 8739, Oct. 31,
1942. But, Case: Where the accused pulled the hair of the complainant who was three months
pregnant causing her to fall on her buttocks on the cement floor causing her foetus to fall from her
womb, the mitigating circumstance is applicable, her intention was merely to maltreat. (Pp, vs,.
Flameno, C.A. 58 O.G. 4060).
Case: The brute force employed by the petitioner contradicts the claim that he had no
intention to kill the victim. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the
accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim.
(Oriente vs. Pp, GR No. 155094, Jan. 30, 2007).
Sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately

precede the act. (Par. 4).
1. By provocation is understood any unjust or improper conduct or act of the

offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone.
2. Provocation in order to be mitigating must be sufficient and immediately
preceding the act. (Pp. vs. Pagal. 77 SCRA 570, 575-576).
3. The word “sufficient” means adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong
and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. (Pp. vs. Nabora, 73 Phil. 434, 435).
Case: The deceased one of the laborers in the line to receive their wages, left his place
and forced his way into the file. The accused, who was the foreman ordered him out, but he
persisted, and the accused gave him a blow on the right of the head. Held: When the aggression
is in retaliation for an insult or injury or threat, the offender cannot claim self-defense, but can
avail of the mitigating circumstance. There is provocation. (U.S. vs. Carrero, 9Phil544,545-546).
Case: When in his house, the accused saw an unknown person jumped out of the
window and his wife begged for his pardon on her knees, he killed her. Held” The conduct on the
part of the wife constitutes sufficient provocation to the accused. (Pp. vs. Marquez, 53 Phil. 133,
135).
Case: The victim challenged the family of the petitioner while armed with a bolo and an
“Indian pana”, then chased Felipe. But the petitioner attacked the victim shortly after the latter’s
provocation. HELD: Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended
party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone. In order to be mitigating, provocation must
be sufficient and immediately precede the act. Provocation is sufficient if it is adequate to excite a
person to commit the wrong, which accordingly be proportionate in gravity. That the provocation
must immediately preced the act means that there not be any interval of time between the
provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the personprovoked.
In the present case, the act of the victim of challenging the family of the petitioner while
armed with a bolo and an “Indian pana” and chasing Felipe clearly constitute sufficient
provocation on his part. (Pepito, et al., vs. CA,et al., GR No. 119942, July 8, 1999).
Case: The fact that a heated argument preceded the incident is not by itself the sufficient
provocation on the part of the offended party as contemplated by law. Moreover, petitioner failed
to establish by competent evidence that the victim had a gun and used it to threaten him.(Oriente
vs. People. Supra.)
4. Provocation must originate from the offended party. Hence, when the alleged
provocation did not come from the deceased but form the latter’s mother, the same may
not be appreciated in favor of the accused. (Pp. vs. Reyes, 69 SCRA 474, 481).
Ex.: A and B were together. A hit C on the head with a piece of stone from his sling-shot
and ran away. As he could not overtake A, C faced B and assaulted the latter. In this case, C is
not entitled to this mitigating circumstance, because B never gave provocation or took part in it.
5.. As to whether or not provocation is sufficient depends upon the act
constituting the provocation, the social standing of the person provoked, the place and
time when the provocation is made. (Reyes).
6. Provocation must be immediate to the commission of the crime. Between the
provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the person
provoked, there should not be any interval of time. Reason: When there is an interval of time
between the provocation and the commission of the crime, the conduct of the offended party
could not have excited the accused to the commission of the crime, he having had time to regain
his reason and to exercise self-control. (Reyes).
Case: Where the accused shot the victim one day after the former was provoked by the
latter. Held: The accused was not sufficiently provoked at the time the alleged provocation was
made. It was a deliberate act of vengeance and not a natural reaction of a human being to
immediately retaliate when provoked. (Pp. vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357, Feb. 13, 1975).
Case: The accused after being provoked by the deceased when he was accused of
having stolen two (2) jackfruits from the latter’s tree, went home and later returned fully armed
and killed the deceased. Held: Provocation should be considered mitigating in favor of the
accused.
Comments: The accusation of the victim should be considered as a grave offense under
par. 5 instead of provocation, because an interval of time between the grave offense and time is
allowed.
7. Threat immediately preceded the act.
Thus, if A was threatened by B with bodily harm and because of the threat, A immediately
attacked and injured B, there was a mitigating circumstance of threat immediately preceding the
act.
8. The threat should not be offensive and positively strong, because, if it is, the threat to
inflict injury is an unlawful aggression which gave rise to self-defense. (U.S. vs. Guysayco, 13
Phil. 292, 295-296)
The act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or
adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree. (Par. 5)
1. Requisites: a) That there be a grave offense done to the one committing the felony,
his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers r sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degree; b) That the felony is committed in vindication of such
grave offense. A lapse of time is allowed between the vindication and the doing of the grave
offense.
Case: Stabbing to death the son of the accused which most naturally and logically must
have enraged and obfuscated him that, seized by that feeling of hatred and rancor, he stabbed
indiscriminately the people around. (Pp. vs. Doniego, 9 SCRA 541, 546, 547).
Case: The remarks made by the victim in the presence of the guests during a celebration
that the accused lived at the expense of his wife, under the circumstances were highly offensive
to the accused or to any other person in his place. (Pp. vs. Rosal, 68 Phil. 323).
2. A lapse of time is allowed between the grave offense and the vindication.
Case: The fact that the accused was slapped by the deceased in the presence of many
persons a few hours before the former killed the latter, was considered mitigating circumstance. It
was held that the influence of the slapping by reason of its gravity and the circumstances under
which it was inflicted, lasted until the moment the crime was committed. (Pp. vs. Parana, 64 Phil.
331, 337).
Case: The killing of the paramour by the offended husband one day after the adultery
was considered still proximate. (Pp. vs. Palaan, G.R. No. 34976). Ex. 3: The lapse of time
between the grave offense (Abduction of the daughter of the accused) and the vindication (Killing
of the deceased) was two or three days. It was held that although the elopement took place on
Jan. 4, 1935, and the aggression on the 7 th of said month and year, the offense did not cease
while the daughter’s whereabouts remained unknown and her marriage to the deceased
unlegalized – there was no interruption.
3. Cases when interval of time negates vindication:
Case: Approximately 9 months before the killing, the deceased boxed the accused
several times in the face resulting in the conviction of the deceased, there was no immediate or a
proximate vindication of the first incident. (Pp. vs. Lumayag, 13 SCRA 502, 507-508).
Case: The deceased uttered the following remarks at 11 o’ clock in the morning in the
presence of the accused and his officemates: “Nag iistambay pala dito ang magnanakaw” and at
5:00 o’ clock in the afternoon the accused killed the victim. Held: no mitigating circumstance. (Pp.
vs. Benito, 74 SCRA 271). Ex. 3: The accused heard the deceased say that the daughter of the
former is a flirt and stabbed the victim two months later, no mitigating circumstance because he
had sufficient time to recover his serenity. (Pp. vs. Lopez, G.R. No. 136861, Nov. 15, 2000).
Case: Four days after learning that Felipe and Timboy Lager attempted on the virtue of
his wife, accused carried the attack that led to the death of Felipe and Ranil.
HELD: Art. 13, par. 5 of the RPC requires that the act be “committed in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (dolo), his spouse, ascendants,
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relative by affinity within the same degrees.”
The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a greave offense when the
accused had sufficient time to recover his equanimity. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant
point to the alleged attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave
offense for which he sought immediate vindication. He testified that he learned of the same from
hi step-son, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on November 6, 2002, the
accused appellant carried out the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a
period of four days was sufficient enough a time within which the accused-appellant could have
regained his composure and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot be
credited in favor of the accused-appellant.(PP vs. Rebucan, GR No. 182551, July 27, 2011).
4. The basis to determine the gravity of the offense in vindication depends on the
social standing of the person, the place, and the time when the insult was made. (See Pp.
vs. Ruiz, 93 SCRA 739 where the rule was applied).
Case: During a fiesta, an old man 70 years of age asked the deceased for some roast
pig. In the presence of many guests, the deceased insulted the accused, saying: “There is no
more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you”. A little later, while the deceased was squatting
down, the old man came up behind him and struck him on the head with an ax. Held: While it may
trifle to an average person, it evidently was a serious matter to an old man, to be made the butt of
a joke in the presence of so many guests. (U.S. vs. Ampar, 37 Phil. 201).
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced

passion or obfuscation. (Par. 6)
1. Requisites: a) That there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind; and b) That the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity. (Pp. vs Gravino, 122 SCRA 123, 134, May 16, 1983)
.
Case: The act of a common-law wife, who left the common home, refused to go home
with the accused, was acting within her rights, and the accused (common law husband) had no
legitimate right to compel her to go with him. The act of the deceased, although provocative,
nevertheless was insufficient to produce the passion and obfuscation that the law contemplates. (
Pp. vs. Quijano, 50 O.G. 5819)
. Case: But where the accused killed his wife on the occasion when she visited her aunt’s
husband, this mitigating circumstance is applicable, having in mind the jealousy of the accused
and her refusal to return to his house until after the arrival of her uncle. (U.S. vs Ortencio, 38
Phil. 341, 344-345).
3. Passion or obfuscation is mitigating only when it arose from a lawful sentiments or

legitimate feelings. (Pp. vs. Echaluce, 66 SCRA 221) and not from vicious, unworthy
or immoral passion. (U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217).
Case: Killing the deceased with whom the offender lived for several years because she
left him to live with another man, is not the passion that is mitigating because it did not originate
from a legitimate feeling. (U.S. vs. Hicks, supra).
Case: If the accused injured the offended party who made indecent propositions to a
woman with whom the accused had illicit relations, the obfuscation of the accused is not
mitigating because his relationship with the woman is illegitimate. (Pp. vs. Olgado, G.R. No. L-
4406, March 31, 1952).
4. There could be no mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation when more than
24 hours elapsed between the alleged insult and the commission of the felony. (Pp.
vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486, 490), or if several hours passed between the cause of the
passion or obfuscation and the commission of the crime. (Pp. vs. Aguinaldo, 92
Phil, 583, 588), or when at least half an hour intervened between the previous fight
and the subsequent killing of the deceased by the accused. (Pp. vs. Matbagon, 60
Phil. 887, 890).
Case: Passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance need not be felt only in the
seconds before the commission of the crime. It may be build up and strengthen over time
until it can no longer be repressed and will ultimately motivate the commission of the
crime.
Xxx
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals narrowed its understanding of
passion and obfuscation to refer only to the emotions accused-appellant felt in the
seconds before a crime is committed. It failed to understand that passion may linger and
build up overtime as repressed anger enough to obfuscate reason and self-control.(Pp
vs Oloverio, GR No. 211159, March 18, 2015).
5. Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest
belief of the offender.
Case: The belief of the defendant that the deceased had caused his dismissal from his
employment is sufficient to confuse his reason and impel him to commit the crime. (u.S. vs.
Ferrer, 1Phil. 56, 62).
Case: The belief entertained in good faith by the defendant that the deceased cast upon
their mother a spell of witchcraft which was the cause of her serious illness, is so powerful a
motive as to naturally produce passion or obfuscation. (U.S. vs Macalintal, 2 Phil. 448, 451; Pp.
vs. Zapata, 107 Phil. 103, 109).
That the offender had voluntarily surrender himself to a person in authority or his
agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. (Par. 7).
1. Voluntary surrender must be made to a person in authority or his agent. It may be

present if made after the issuance of a warrant of arrest but before the actual arrest
is made. (Pp. vs Turalba, L-29118, Feb. 28, 1974; Pp. vs. de la Cruz, L-45485,
Sept. 19, 1978).
2. But if the accused surrendered after the issuance of warrant of arrest as he had
found it futile to continue being a fugitive from justice, such surrender is not
mitigating. (Pp. vs. Rodriguez, 119 SCRA 254, Dec. 15, 1982).
3. A surrender is not voluntary when forced by the circumstances. To be voluntary, a

surrender must be spontaneous, i.e., there must be an intent to submit oneself to the authorities,
either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them from the trouble
and expense to be necessarily incurred in his search and capture. (Pp. vs. Reyes, L-30668,
July 29, 1979).
4. The surrender is not voluntary if the offender was merely forced by circumstances
because he could not live any longer in hostility as the agents of the law did not give him peace
for a moment. (Pp. vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27, Pp. vs. Sabater, et al., 74 O.G. 4560, Feb. 28,
1978).
5. To benefit the accused, the following requisites (of voluntary surrender) must be
proven, namely: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary
must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save the trouble and
expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes
repentance. (Pp vs. Tabarnero,et al., GR No. 168169, Feb. 24, 2010).
Voluntary plea of guilty
1. To be mitigating, the plea of guilty must be: a) made in open court; b) spontaneous; c)
prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. An extra-judicial confession is not
mitigating. (Pp. vs. Undong, 66 SCRA 386).
2. A plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the
accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance. (Pp. vs. Lungbos, 162
SCRA 383,388-389, June 21, 1988; Pp. vs. Verano, Jr., L-45589, July 28, 1988, 163 SCRA
614, 621).
3. Death penalty changed to life imprisonment because of plea of guilty, even if done
during the presentation of evidence.
31. While the accused entered a plea of guilty only during the trial so that under this
circumstances may not, under the law, be considered mitigating, however, such admission of guilt
indicates his submission to the law and a moral disposition on his part to reform, hence, the death
penalty is changed to life imprisonment. (Pp. vs. Coronel, 17 SCRA 509, 513).
4. Plea of guilty to amended information mitigating.
Case: Trial had already begun on the original information for murder and frustrated
murder. However, in view of the willingness of the accused to plead guilty for a lesser offense, the
prosecution, with leave of court, amended said information to make it for homicide and frustrated
homicide, and the accused pleaded guilty thereto. That was an entirely new information and no
evidence was presented in connection with the charges made therein before the accused entered
his plea of guilty. The accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. (Pp. vs.
Ortis, 15 SCRA352, 354, Nov. 29, 1965).See Pp. vs. Intal, 101 Phil. 306, 307-308.
5. Plea of guilty to lesser offense not mitigating circumstance because to be voluntary,

the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged. (Pp. vs. Noble, 77 Phil. 93). Or if the voluntary
confession is conditional or qualified, it is not mitigating. (Pp. vs. Gano, G.R. No. 134373, Feb.
28, 2001).
6. A case where qualified plea of guilty considered mitigating.
Case: The defendant pleaded guilty, however, manifesting that evident premeditation
alleged in the information did not attend the commission of the crime. The Court required the
presentation of evidence to prove evident premeditation and the prosecution failed. Held: The
plea of guilty is mitigating, because although the confession was qualified and the introduction of
evidence became necessary, the qualification did not deny the defendant’s guilt and, what is
more, was subsequently justified. It was not the defendant’s fault that aggravating circumstances
were erroneously alleged in the information. (Pp. vs. Yturriaga, 68 Phil. 534, 539; Pp. vs. Ong,
62 SCRA 174, 216, Jan. 30, 1975).
7. A late plea of guilty cannot be considered mitigating.
Case: The late plea of guilty entered by the herein appellant cannot be considered
mitigating because the plea made is not “of similar nature and analogous” to the plea of guilty
contemplated in par. 7 of Art. 13. A plea of guilty is considered mitigating on the rationale that an
accused spontaneously and willingly admits his guilt at the first opportunity as an act of
repentance. An accused should not be allowed to speculate on the outcome of the proceedings
by pleading not guilty on arraignment, only to later substitute the same with a plea of guilty after
discovering that the people has a strong case against him.(Pp. vs. Derilo, et al., GR No,
117818, April 18, 1997).
The offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering from some physical
defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow
beings. (Par. 8)
1. In a criminal case charging robbery in an inhabited house, the accused is deaf and
dumb. Whether the accused is educated or not is immaterial as the law does not distinguish. (Pp.
vs. Nazario, 97 Phil. 990).
2. Physical defects referred to in this paragraph is such as being armless, cripple, or a
stutterer, whereby his means of act, defend himself or communication with his fellow being are
limited. (Albert).
3. In the crime of treason, the physical infirmities of the accused were not considered
mitigating as he had shown such fire of purpose, zeal and vigor in the execution of his
treasonous activities. (Pp. vs. Garillo, L-30281, Aug. 2, 1978).
Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the
offender without however depriving him consciousness of his acts. (par. 9)
1. Disease of the mind, body, the nerves or moral faculty and the accused who
committed the crime while suffering from any of these illnesses is entitled to mitigation of his
penalty. (Pp. vs. Francisco, 78 Phil 694).
2. Illness of the offender considered as mitigating:
Case 1: The mistaken belief of the accused that the killing of witch was for public good
may be considered a mitigating circumstance for the reason that those who have obsession that
witches are to be eliminated are in the same condition as one who, attacked with a morbid
infirmity but still retaining consciousness of his act, does not have real control over his will. (Pp.
vs. Balneg, et al., 79 Phil. 805).
Case 2: An offender who is mentally sane is entitled to mitigating circumstance because
of his misfortunes and weak character brought about by a mild behaviour disorder as a
consequence of an illness she had in early life. (Pp. vs Amit, 82 Phil 820).
Case 3: One who is suffering from acute neurosis which made him ill-tempered and
easily angered is entitled to this mitigating circumstance, because such illness diminished his
exercise of will power. (Pp. vs. Carpenter, C.A. G.R. No. 4168, April 22, 1940). A feeblemind is
entitled to the mitigating circumstance under this paragraph. (Pp. vs Formigones, 87 Phil. 658).
And finally, any other circumstance of a similar nature or analogous to those
abovementioned. (Par. 10).
1. Over 60 years old with failing sight, similar to over 70 years of age mentioned in par. 2.
(Pp. vs. Reantillo and Ruiz, C.A., G.R. No. 301, July 27, 1938).
2. Outraged feeling of owner of animal taken for ransom analogous to vindication of a
grave offense. (Pp. vs. Monaga, No. L-38528, Nov. 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 466, 476).
3. A person who killed his debtor who tried to escape and refused to pay his debt is
entitled to mitigating circumstance similar to passion and obfuscation. (Pp. vs. Merenillo, CA, 36
OG 2283). Impulse of jealous feeling, similar to passion and obfuscation. (Pp. vs. Ubengen, CA,
36OG 763).
4. Manifestation of Battered Wife Syndrome, analogous to an illness that diminishes the
exercise of will power. (Pp. vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, Jan. 14, 2004).
5. Voluntary restitution of the property stolen by the accused or immediately reimbursing
the amount malversed is mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. (Pp. vs.
Luntao, CA, 50OG1182).
6. Extreme poverty and necessity, similar to incomplete justification based on state of
necessity.
Case: The accused, on account of extreme poverty and of the economic difficulty then
prevailing, was found to pilfer two sacks of paper valued at P 10.00 from the customhouse. He
sold the two sacks of paper for P 2.50. Held: The right to life is more sacred than a mere right to
property. This is not to encourage or even countenance theft, but merely to dull somewhat the
keen and pain-producing edges of the stark realities of life. (Pp. vs. Macbul, 74 Phil. 436, 438-
439).
7. Testifying for the prosecution, analogous to plea of guilty. (Pp. vs. Narvasa, 76 SCRA
70, 81, March 15, 1977).
Extenuating circumstances.
The effect of this circumstance is to mitigate the criminal liability of the offender. In other
words, this has the effect as mitigating circumstance, only you don’t call it mitigating because this
is not found in Article 13.
Illustrations:
An unwed mother killed her child in order to conceal a dishonor. The concealment of
dishonor is an extenuating circumstance insofar as the unwed mother or the maternal
grandparents are concerned, but not as far as the father is concerned. The penalty is lowered by
two degrees
The concealment of honor by mother in the crime of infanticide is extenuating

circumstance but not in the case of parricide when the age of the victim three days old and
above.
IN the crime of adultery on the part of a married woman abandoned by her husband. At
the time she was abandoned by her husband she needs the company of another man.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES (Art. 14 RPC).

1. Definition.
Aggravating circumstance are those which, if attendant in the commission of the crime,
serve to increase the penalty without, however, exceeding the maximum of the penalty provided
by law for the offense.
2. BASIS.
They are based on the greater perversity of the offender manifested in the commission
of the felony as shown by: (1) the motivating power itself; (2) the place of commission; (3) the
ways and means employed; (4) the time; or (5) the personal circumstances of the offender, or of
the offended party. (reyes).
3. Kinds of aggravating circumstances.
a) Generic – Those that can generally apply to all crimes. In Art. 14, the circumstances in
paragraphs no. 1,2,3 (dwelling),4,5,6,9,10,14,18,19, and 20, except “by means of motor vehicle”
are generic aggravating circumstances.
b) Specific – Those that applies only to particular crimes. The circumstances in par. 3
(except dwelling), 15, 16, 17 and 21 are specific aggravating circumstances.
c) Qualifying – Those that change the nature of the crime. Art. 248 enumerates the
qualifying circumstances which qualify the killing to murder.
d) Inherent – Those that must of necessity accompany the commission of the crime. (Art.
62, par. 2). Ex. Evident premeditation is inherent in the crime of robbery, theft, estafa, adultery
and concubinage.
4. Qualifying aggravating circumstance distinguished from generic aggravating
circumstance.
a) The effect of a generic circumstance, not offset by mitigating circumstance, is to
increase the penalty which should be imposed upon the accused to the maximum period, but
without exceeding the limit prescribed by law; while that of a qualifying circumstance is not only to
give the crime its proper and exclusive name but also to place the author thereof in such a
situation as to deserve no other penalty than that specifically prescribed by law for said crime.
(Pp. vs. Bayot, 64 Phil. 269, 273).
b) A qualifying circumstance cannot be offset by a mitigating circumstance; a generic
aggravating circumstance may be compensated by a mitigating circumstance.
c) A qualifying circumstance to be such must be alleged in the information. If it is not
alleged, it is a generic aggravating circumstance only.
5. Effect of aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information.
An aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information, may be proved over
the objection of the defense (Pp. vs. Gabitanan, CA, 43 OG 3209; Pp. vs martinez Godinez,
106 Phil 606-807), and such evidence may be appreciated in imposing the sentence. Such
evidence merely forms part of the proof of the actual commission of the offense and does not
violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the cause of
accusation against him. (Pp. vs. Ang, 139 SCRA 115, 121, Oct. 8, 1985); while a qualifying
aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information because it is an integral part of the
offense; otherwise it will only be a generic aggravating circumstance. (Pp. vs. Abella, CA 45
OG1802).
6. Treachery is generic aggravating circumstance if not alleged in the information. (Pp.
vs. Jovellano, 56 SCRA 156, 163, March 27, 1974; Pp. vs. Estillore, 141 SCRA 456, 461,
March 4, 1986; Pp. vs, Cantre, 186 SCRA 76, 79, June 4, 1990).
That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position. (par. 1).
1. Meaning of “advantage be taken by the offender of his public office”.
The public officer must use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which his office gives
him as a means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the
inquiry, “Did the accused abuse his office in order to commit the crime?” (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19
Phil. 150, 156-157).
Case 1: The accused, who is a policeman, the guard on duty and had access to the cell
where the victim was confined and under his custody took advantage of his position when he
maltreated the victim. (Pp. vs. Ural, 56 SCRA 138, 145, March 27, 1974).
Case 2: Where the accused, a police officer in the course of the investigation of a charge
against him for grave threats shot the complainant in a treacherous manner. (Pp. vs. Reyes, 69
SCRA 474, 480-481, March 27, 1974).
Case 3: Where the accused used their authority as members of the police and
constabulary to disarm the victim before shooting him. (Pp. vs. Asuncion, 179 SCRA 396, 402,
Nov. 14, 1989).
Case 4: The three accused who are all police officers ordered the Montecillos to board
the mobile patrol car and forced them to hand over their money took advantage of their public
positions. It was on account of their authority that the Montecillos believed that Mario committed a
crime and would be brought to the police station for investigation unless they gave them what
they demanded. (Fortuna vs. People, G.R. No. 135784, Dec. 4, 2000).
That the crime be committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.
(Par.2).
1. Basis.
This is based on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by his lack of respect for
the public authorities.
2. The crime should not be committed against the public authority while he is in the
performance of his duty; otherwise the offender commits direct assault (Art. 148).
3. The above rule was not followed in the case of Pp. vs. Santok, G.R. No. L-18226,
May 30, 1963 where it was held that the crime committed was homicide with the aggravating
circumstance of the commission of the offense in contempt of the public authority, since the
deceased was shot while in the performance of his duty as barrio lieutenant.
4. Knowledge that a public authority is present is essential. Thus, if A killed B in the
presence of the town mayor, but A did not know that of the presence of the town mayor, this
aggravating circumstance is not applicable.
That the act committed (1) with insult or in disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of his (a) rank, (b) age, or (c) sex, or (2 that it be committed in
the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation. (par. 3).
1. If the four aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime
should be considered as one. (Gregorio; Albert).
But in Pp vs. Santos, 91 Phil. 320, 327-328, the Supreme Court of Spain held that its
former decision did not declare an absolute and general rule which would exclude the possibility
of their being considered separately when their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist
independently, revealing greater degree of perversity. Note: the same Supreme Court earlier
ruled that the four circumstances constitute only one aggravating circumstance.
Thus, in Pp. Cunanan, 110 Phil. 313, 318, night time and band were considered
separately. Also in the case of Pp. vs. Taga, 53 Phil. 273 it was held that the aggravating
circumstances of sex and age of the injured party as well as those of dwelling place and nighttime
must also be taken into account.
2. Disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex may
be taken into account only in crimes against person or honor.
It is not proper to consider this aggravating circumstance in crimes against property.
Robbery with Homicide is primarily a crime against property and not against person. Homicide is
mere incident of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal. (Pp.
vs. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570, 576-577, Oct. 25, 1977). See also Pp. vs. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446,
458, July 7, 1986.
3. Cases in disregard of the rank of the offended party:
Case 1: A pupil who attacked or injured his teacher. (U.S. vs Cabiling, 7 Phil. 469, 474).
Case 2: Killing a judge because he was strict or because of resentment which the
accused harbored against him as a judge. (Pp. vs. Valeriano, 90 Phil. 15, 34-35).
Case 3: An attempt against the life of a General of the Philippine army. (Pp. vs. Torres,
G.R. No. L-4642, May 29, 1953).
4.In disregard of the rank there must be a difference in the social condition of the
offender and the offended party. (reyes).
Dwelling
7. “Dwelling” includes dependencies, staircase, and enclosures under the house. (Pp.
vs. Alcala, 40 Phil. 739).
8. For dwelling to be aggravating, the offended party must not give provocation.
When it is the offended party who has provoked the incident, he loses his right to the
respect and consideration due him in his own house. (Pp. vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635, 637). See
Pp. vs. Atienza, 116 SCRA 379, 385).
9. The above rule shall apply if there is a close relation between provocation and
commission of crime in the dwelling of the person from whom the provocation came. (Pp. vs
Dequina, 60 Phil. 279, 288).
10. For aggravating to be inapplicable, provocation must be immediate to the crime
committed in the dwelling.
Case: The defendant learned that the deceased and the former’s wife were maintaining
illicit relations. One night, he went to the house of the deceased and killed him then and there.
During the trial of the case, the defense contended that the deceased provoked the crime by his
illicit relations with the defendant’s wife. Held: The provocation (the illicit relations) was not given
immediately prior to the commission of the crime. Dwelling is still aggravating. (Pp. vs. Dequina,
60 Phil. 279, 288-289). If the defendant surprised the deceased and the wife of the defendant in
the act of adultery in the house of the deceased, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling would
not exist. (Pp. vs. Dequina, supra).
Case: Where the victim was killed inside his house when he gave provocative and
insulting words against the accused before the commission of the crime, dwelling is not
aggravating because the deceased lost his right to the respect and consideration due him in his
house. (Pp. vs. Atienza, supra.
Case: It should be emphasized that for dwelling to be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance, there must have been no provocation on the part of the victim. The provocation
contemplated here is one that is sufficient and immediate to the commission of the crime. In other
words, the invasion of the privacy of the offended party’s house must have been the direct and
immediate consequence of the provocation given by the latter as where, for example, the
accused and the victim quarreled in front of the latter’s house and the accused, in a fit of rage
entered the victim’s house and proceeded to stab him. Such is not the situation at bar because
the killing in the victim’s house occurred at least six hours after the accused’s mauling. (Pp. vs
Molina, GR No. 129051, July 28, 1999).
11. Dwelling was found aggravating in the following cases although the crimes were
committed not in the dwelling of the victim:
Case: The victim was raped in the boarding house where she was a bedspacer. Her
room constituted a dwelling. (Pp. vs. Daniel, 86 SCRA 511, 531).
Case : The victim was killed in the house of her aunt where she was living with her niece.
Dwelling was considered aggravating because dwelling may mean temporary dwelling. (Pp. vs.
Badilla, 185 SCRA 554, 570, May 21, 1990).
Case : The victims were sleeping as guests in the house of another person, were shot to
death in the house. Dwelling was held aggravating. The code speaks of dwelling, not domicile.
(Pp. vs. Basa, 83 Phil. 622, 624).
The act committed with (1) abuse of confidence or (2) obvious ungratefulness.
(Par. 4)
Abuse of confidence.
1. This circumstance exists only when the offended party has trusted the offender who
later abuses such trust by committing the crime.
The abuse of confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the
culprit taking advantage of the offended party’s belief that the former would not abuse said
confidence. (Reyes).
Case: A jealous lover, who had already determined to kill his sweetheart, invited her to a
ride in the country. The girl unsuspecting of his plans, went with him. While they were in the car,
the jealous lover stabbed her. It was held that this aggravating circumstance was present. (Pp.
vs Marasigan, 70 Phil. 583, 594).
2. Betrayal of confidence not aggravating.
Case: The offender was living in the house of the accused, her parents having entrusted
to the care of said accused. One day the accused took the offender by the arm and forcibly led
her to an isolated place where she was raped by the accused. Held: There is no showing that
the accused was able to commit the crime by abusing the confidence reposed upon him by the
offended party. The accused betrayed the confidence reposed in him by the parents of the girl.
But this is not an aggravating circumstance. It must be an abuse of confidence that facilitated
the commission of the crime which is aggravating. (Pp. vs. Arthur Crumb, C.A. 46 OG 6163).
Case: The killer of the child, nine-month old, is the domestic servant of the family and is
sometimes the deceased child’s amah, the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of
confidence is present. (Pp. vs. Caliso, 58 Phil. 283, 294).
Compare the Crumb and Caliso case. In Crumb case, the confidence reposed by the
parents of the girl in the offender could not have facilitated the commission of the crime, because
the offended girl could resist, although unsuccessfully, the commission of the crime. In Caliso
case, the victim, being a nine-month old child, could not resist the commission of the crime. The
confidence reposed by the parents of the child in the offender facilitated the commission of the
crime. (reyes).
3. The confidence between the offender and the offended party must be immediate and
personal.
Case: The mere fact that the voters had reposed confidence in the defendant by electing
him to the public office does not mean that he abused their confidence when he committed estafa
against them. (U.S. vs. Torrida, 23 Phil. 189, 192).
Obvious ungratefulness.
1. Ungratefulness must be obvious, i.e., manifest and clear.

Case: Where the accused killed his father-in-law in whose house he lived and who
partially supported him. (Pp. vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 244, May 31, 1956).
Case: Where the victim was suddenly attacked while in the act of giving their assailant
bread and coffee for their breakfast. Instead of being grateful to the victim, they took advantage of
his helplessness when his two arms were used in carrying their food, thus, preventing him from
defending himself from the sudden attack. (Pp. vs. Bautista, 65 SCRA 460, 470).
That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive, or in his
presence, or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a
place dedicated to religious worship. (Par. 5).
1. If the place of the commission of the felony is in Malacanang palace or a church, is

aggravating, regardless of whether State or official or religious functions are being held.
The Chief Executive need not be in Malacanang palace. His presence alone in any place
where the crime is committed is enough to constitute the aggravating circumstance. This
aggravating circumstance is present even if he is not engaged in the discharge of his duties in the
place where the crime is committed. (reyes).
2. Other public authorities must be actually engaged in the performance of duty. (reyes)
Case: Where the accused and the decease who were respectively plaintiff and defendant
in a civil case in the court of justice of the peace, having gotten into some trouble, left the
courtroom and went into an adjoining room, where the accused, without any warning, attacked
the deceased with a knife and killed him on the spot, it has been held that it was error to consider
the aggravating circumstance of having committed the offense in the place where the public
authority was exercising his function, because the court had already adjourned and the attack
was made in the adjoining room. (U.S. vs. Punsalan, Phil. 260, 261).
Case: A murder committed in an electoral precinct or polling place on election day, this
aggravating circumstance will apply. (Pp. vs. Canoy,L-6037, Sept. 30, 1954).
3. Offender must have the intention to commit a crime when he entered the place.
Case: At the time of the commission of the crime, both the deceased and the defendant
were inside the chapel. The deceased placed his hand on the right thigh of the defendant girl,
who pulled out a knife and stabbed him. Held: The aggravating circumstance that the killing was
done in a place dedicated to religious worship cannot be legally considered, where there is no
evidence to show that the defendant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel on the
fatal night. (Pp. Jaurigue, 76 Phil. 174, 182).
That the crime be committed (1) in the nighttime, or (2) in an unihabited place, or
(3) by a band, whenever such circumstance may facilitate the commission of the offense.
( Par. 6).
1. If the three aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime
should be considered as one. (Gregorio; Albert).
In Pp vs. Santos, 91 Phil. 320, 327-328, the Supreme Court of Spain held that its
former decision did not declare an absolute and general rule which would exclude the possibility
of their being considered separately when their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist
independently, revealing greater degree of perversity. Note: the same Supreme Court earlier
ruled that the four circumstances constitute only one aggravating circumstance.
Thus, in Pp. Cunanan, 110 Phil. 313, 318, night time and band were considered
separately.
2. When nighttime, uninhabited place and band aggravating.
Nighttime, uninhabited place or band is aggravating: (1) when it facilitated the
commission of the crime; or (2) when especially sought for by the offender to insure the
commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity. (Pp. vs Pardo, 79 Phil. 568, 578); ©
when the offender took advantage thereof for the purpose of impunity. (U.S. vs. Billedo, 32 Phil.
574, 579; Pp. vs. Matbagon, 60 Phil. 887, 893).
Ex. A, with intent to kill B, had hidden behind a tree and availed himself of the darkness
to prevent his being recognized, or to escape more readily. As soon as b came, A stabbed him to
death.
Nighttime may facilitate the commission of the crime, when because of the darkness of
the night the crime can be perpetrated unmolested, or interference can be avoided, or there
would be greater certainty in attaining the ends of the offender. (Pp. vs. Matbagon, supra.)
Case: Where the accused waited for the night before committing the robbery with
homicide, nighttime is especially sought for. (Pp. vs. BArredo, 87 Phil. 800).
Case: Where the accused who was living only 150 meters away from the victim’s house
and evidently waited for nightfall to hide his identity and facilitate his escape, knowing that most
barrio folks are already asleep, or getting ready to sleep at 9:00 p.m. (Pp. vs. Baring, 187 SCRA
629, 636, July 20, 1990).
Case: Where the accused lingered for almost three hours in the evening at the restaurant
before carrying out their plan to rob it. (Pp. vs. Lungbos, 162 SCRA 383, 388).
Nighttime.
3. By the word nighttime, should be understood, according to Viada, that period of

darkness beginning at end of dusk and ending at dawn. Nights are from m sunset to sunrise.
4. If nighttime is merely incidental to the commission of the crime, not aggravating.
Case: At nighttime, the collision of the two vehicles occurred which caused the heated
argument and the eventual stabbing of the victim, nighttime is not aggravating. To be
aggravating, the prosecution must show that the accused purposely sought to commit the crime
at nighttime in order to facilitate the achievement of his objective, prevent discovery or evade
capture. (Pp. vs. Velaga, Jr., 199 SCRA 518, 523-524, July 23, 1991).
Uninhabited place
1. uninhabited place defined.

uninhabited place is one where there are no house at all, a place at a considerable
distance from town, or where the houses are scattered at a great distance from each other.
(reyes).
Case: Where the place where the crime was committed could be seen and the voice of
the deceased could be heard from a nearby house, this aggravating circumstance should not be
considered. (Pp. vs. Laoto, 52 Phil. 401, 408).
2. Whether or not the place is uninhabited is determined, not by the distance of the
nearest house to the scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place of its commission, there
was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help.
Case: This aggravating circumstance is applicable where the crime was committed
during nighttime, in a sugarcane plantation about a hundred meters from the nearest house, and
the sugarcane in the field was tall enough to obstruct the view of the neighbors and passersby.
(Pp. vs Damaso, 75 OG 4979, No. 25, June 18, 1979).
Case: Where the crime was committed in the open sea, where no help could be
expected by the victim from other persons and the offenders could easily escape punishment.
(Pp. vs. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1037, 1044, Aug. 31, 1987).
3. Solitude must be sought to better attain the criminal purpose. (Pp. vs. Aguinaldo,
55Phil. 610, 616).
Case : For uninhabited place to apply the offenders must choose the place as an aid
either (1) to an easy and uninterrupted accomplishment of their criminal designs, or (2) to insure
concealment of the offense, that he might thereby be better secured against detection and
punishment. (Pp. vs Andaya, 152 SCRA 570, 578). See Pp. vs. Deguia, 88 Phil. 520, 526).
By a Band.
1. Band defined.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the
commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. (reyes). Hence,
even of there 20 persons, but only three are armed, the aggravating circumstance by a band
cannot be considered. (Pp. vs. Ga, 186 SCRA 790, 797, June 27, 1990).
2. “Stone” is included in the term “arms”. (Pp. vs. Manlolo, GR No. 40778, Jan. 26, 1989).
3. If one of the four armed persons is a principal by inducement, they do not form a
band. At least four in number must take direct part in the execution of the criminal act. (Gamara
vs. Valero, 51 SCRA 322, 326, June 25, 1973).See. Pp. vs. Robiego, Nov. 1993.
4. “By a band’ is not applicable to crimes against chastity. (Pp. vs. Corpus).
5. Abuse of superior strength and use of firearms, absorbed in aggravating circumstance
of “by a band”.(Pp. vs. Escabarte, G.R. No. 42964, March 14, 1988).
That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune. (Par. 7)
1. “Chaotic condition” after liberation is not included under this paragraph. Pp. vs.
Corpus, CA, 43 OG 2249). But in Pp. vs Penjan, CA, 44 OG 3349, the chaotic condition
resulting for the liberation of San Pablo was considered a calamity.
2. A banca which developed engine trouble at sea is a misfortune but is not within the
terms “other calamity or misfortune” as used in Par. 7, Art. 14 of RPC. (Pp. vs. Arpa, 27 SCRA
1037, 1045, April 25, 1969).
That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men, or (2) persons who insure
or afford impunity. (par. 8).
1. Example of “with the aid of armed men”

Case:” A, in order to get rid of her husband, secured the services of other moros with a
promise of a reward and had them killed her husband. A even supplied the rope with which to tie
her husband. Held: This aggravating circumstance is present. (Pp. vs. Elane. G.R. No. L-45902).
See also the case of Pp. vs. Ortiz, 103 Phil. 944, 949).
2. Exceptions:
a) This aggravating circumstance shall not be considered when both the attacking party
and the party attacked were equally armed. (Albert).
b) When the accused as well as those who cooperated with him in the commission of
the crime acted under the same plan and for the same purpose. (Pp. vs. Piring, 63 Phil. 546,
553, Pp. vs. Candado, 84 SCRA 508, 524).
That the accused is a rescidivist. (Par. 9).
1. Who is a recidivist?
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have previously been
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal
Code. (Pp. vs. Lagarto, 196 SCRA 611, 619, May 6, 1991).
2. No recidivism if the subsequent conviction is for an offense committed before the
offense involved in the prior conviction.
Case: The accused was convicted if robbery with homicide committed on December 23,
1947. He was previously convicted of theft committed on December 30, 1947. Held: The accused
was not a recidivist. (Pp. vs. Baldera, 86 Phil. 189).
Ex. The accused was prosecuted and tried for theft, estafa and robbery. Judgment for the
tree offenses were read on the same day. The accused is not a recidivist because the judgment
in any of the first two offenses was not yet final when he was tried for the third offense.
2. Pardon does not obliterate the fact that the accused was a recidivist; but amnesty
extinguishes the penalty and its effect
As held in U.S vs Sotelo, 28 Phil. 147, 160, Article 89 extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects. There is no such provision with respect to pardon. Thus, pardon does not prevent a
former conviction from being considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Case: The accused-appellant admitted during the trial that the was once convicted of the
crime of homicide but he was pardon. Recidivism is applicable since pardon for a preceding
offense does not obliterate the fact that the accused is a recidivist upon his conviction of a second
offense embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. (Pp. vs. Lacao, 201 SCRA 317,
330, Sept. 4, 1991).
That the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a
lighter penalty. (Par. 10).
1. Requisites: a) That the accused is on trial for an offense; b) that he previously served
sentence for another offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty, or for two or
more crimes to which it attaches lighter penalty than for the new offense; and c) That he is
convicted for the new offense.
2. “Punished for an offense to which the law an equal x-x-x penalty” , meaning.
Ex.: A served sentence for Forcible Abduction (Art. 342) punishable by reclusion
temporal, that is, from 12 yrs., 1 day to 20 years. Later after was A released from prison, he
committed homicide (Art. 249) punishable also by reclusion temporal. The Court should consider
habituality.
3. “Punished for an offense to which the law attaches x-x-x greater penalty”, meaning.
Ex: The accused once served sentence for homicide punishable by a penalty ranging
from 12 yrs., 1 day to 20 yrs. Now he is convicted of falsification punishable by a penalty ranging
from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. Reiteracion or habituality is present because the penalty for
homicide for which he served sentence is greater than that for the new offense (Falsification).
4. “Punished x-x-xfor two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty”, meaning.
Ex.: A served 30 days imprisonment for theft; later 2 months for estafa; now he is tried for
homicide which is punishable by reclusion temporal, that is from 12 yrs. And 1 day to 20 years.
5. In reiteracion or habituality, it is the penalty attached to the offense that is considered

and not the penalty actually imposed. (reyes).
That the crime committed in consideration of a price, reward or promise. (Par. 11).
1. When this aggravating circumstance is present it affects not only the person
who received the price or the reward, but also the person who gave it.(U.S. vs. Paro, 36
Phil. 923, 924; U.S. vs. Maharaja Alim, 38 Phil. 1, 7).
2. But in the case of Pp. vs. Talledo andTimbreza, 85 Phil. 539, it was held that the
aggravating circumstance of price or reward cannot be considered against the other accused for
the reason that it was not she who committed the crime in consideration of price or reward. (I
agree).
3. Price or reward must be for the purpose of inducing another to perform the deed. (Pp.
vs. Gamao, 23 Phil. 81).
Case: If without previous promise it was given voluntarily after the crime had been
committed as an expression of his appreciation for the sympathy and aid shown by the other
accused, it should not be taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the penalty. (U.S.
vs. Flores, 28 Phil. 29, 34).
That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,

stranding of a vessel or intentional damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the
use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin. (Par. 12).
1. To be aggravating, either generic or qualifying, any of the circumstances in paragraph

12 must be used by the offender to accomplish a criminal purpose.
Case: When the crime intended to be committed is arson and somebody dies as a result
thereof, the crime is simply arson and the act resulting in the death of that person is not even an
independent crime of homicide, it being absorbed. (Pp. vs. Paterno, et al., 85 Phil. 722).
On the other hand, if the offender had the intent to kill the victim, burned the house where
the latter was, and the victim died as a consequence, the crime is murder, qualified by the
circumstance that the crime was committed by means of fire. (Art. 248, Par. 3).
Case: If the house was set on fire after the killing of the victim, there would be two
separate crimes of arson and murder or homicide. (Pp. vs. Bersabal, 48 Phil. 439, 441; Pp. vs.
Piring, 63 Phil. 546, 552).
That the act be committed with evident premeditation. (Par. 13).
1. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during
the space of time sufficient to arrive a calm judgment. (Pp. vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363, 369). See
also Pp. vs. Escabarte, No. L-42964, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 602, 612).
2. Evident premeditation may not be appreciated absent any proof as to how and when
the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out. Pp. vs. Panones, 200
SCRA 624, 635, Aug. 16, 1991). See also Pp. vs. Samonte, 64 SCRA 319, 326, June 11,
1975.
3. Requisites of evident premeditation: The prosecution must prove a) The time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; b) An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung
to his determination; and c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome
the resolution of his will. (Pp. vs. Lagarto, 196 SCRA 611, 619-620, May 6, 1991).
Case: Accused confessed that after the death of his wife he was directed by Datto
Mupuck to go huramentado and to kill the two persons he would meet in the town, and if he would
be successful, he would be given a pretty woman. In order to carry out his intention to kill two
persons he provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in the banana leaves; that he
traveled for a day and a night from his home; that upon reaching the town, he attacked a
Spaniard, and then attacked a chinaman. Held: The facts established evident premeditation. U.S.
Manalinde, 14 Phil. 77). In this case the three requisites are present: First requisite- When
Manalinde accepted the proposition on a certain date, he is said to have determined to commit
the crime; Second requisite – His journey for a day and night to comply therewith and provided
himself with a weapon indicate that the offender clung to his determination to commit the crime;
and Third requisite – After the journey for a day and night, he killed the victims. One and night
constitute a sufficient lapse of time for the offender to realize the consequences of his
contemplated act. See also Pp. vs. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275, 290, May 31, 1974.
Case: Where on the night when the deceased slapped the accused and asked him to
kneel down, the latter made it clear that he would avenge his humiliation; when two days later
accused looked inside a bus for the deceased and not finding him there said that if the deceased
were there, he had something for him. Accused found the deceased seated in a jeep and stabbed
him. Held: There is evident premeditation. (Pp. vs. Mojica, 70 SCRA 502, 508-509, April 30,
1976).
4. The premeditation must be based upon an external acts and not presumed from the
mere lapse of time. (Pp. vs. Ricafort, 1 Phil. 173, 176)
Case: Although in the offender’s confession there is a statement that, on the morning of
June 29, when he heard Calma was at large, he proposed to kill him, there is an entire absence
of evidence showing that he meditated and reflected on his intention between the time it was
conceived and the time the crime was actually perpetrated. No evident premeditation (Pp. v.
Carillo, 77 Phil.
572).
Illustration: A and B fought on Monday but because A suffered so many blows, he told B,
“this week shall not pass, I will kill you”. On Friday, A killed B. Is there evident premeditation?
None. What condition is missing? Evidence to show that between Monday and Friday, the
offender clung to his determination to kill the victim, acts in indicative of his having clung to his
determination to kill B.
5. Mere threat without the second element does not show evident premeditation.
Case: A threat to kill, unsupported by other evidence which would disclose the true
criminal state of mind of the accused, will only be construed as a casual remark naturally
emanating from a feeling of rancor and not a resolution of the character involved in evident
premeditation. (Pp. vs Fuentesuela, GR No. L-48273, April 22, 1942).
Case: The fact that the accused in is extra-judicial confession stated that as soon as he
heard that the deceased had escaped from the army stockade he prepared to kill him, is not
sufficient to establish evident premeditation. It is necessary to establish that the accused
meditated on his intention between the time it was conceived and the time the crime was actually
perpetrated. Defendant’s proposition was nothing but an expression of his own determination to
commit the crime which is entirely different from premeditation. (Pp. vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572).
6. Nursing a grudge or resentment against the deceased is not conclusive proof evident
premeditation. (Pp. vs. Lacao, L-32078, Sept. 30, 1974).
7. What is sufficient lapse of time?
There is no exact time fixed by law and jurisprudence constituting “sufficient lapse of
time”.
In Pp. vs. Lazafin, 92 Phil. 668, 670, 3 days was held sufficient; Pp. vs. Mojica, 70 Phil.
502, 508-509, 1 month is sufficient; Pp. vs. Diaz, 55 SCRA 178, 188, Jan. 21, 1974, one-day is
sufficient; U.S vs Blanco, 18 Phil. 206, 208, quarter of an hour was sufficient; Pp. vs. Pantoja,
25 SCRA 468, 471, half an hour is sufficient; But in the case of Pp. vs. Crisostomo, 108 SCRA
288, 297, Oct. 23, 1981, 2 hours is not sufficient.
8. When victim is different from that intended, premeditation is not aggravating.
Case: Evident premeditation may not be properly taken into account when the person
whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the actual victim. (Pp. vs. Hilario,et al.,
GR No. 128083, March 16, 2001).
Case: Evident premeditation is present even if a person other than the intended victim
was killed, if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not only the intended victim
but also any one who may help him put a violent resistance. (Pp. vs. Timbol, et. Al., GR No. L-
47471-47473, Aug. 4, 1944).
9. It is not necessary that there is a plan to kill a particular person.
Case: when the criminal intent was to be carried out the first two (2) persons whom the
accused will meet, evident premeditation is present. (Pp. Manalinde, supra).
Case: A general attack upon a village having been premeditated and planned, the killing
of any individual during the attack is attended by evident premeditation. (U.S. vs. Butag, 38 Phil.
746, 747).
10. Evident premeditation is inherent in robbery, but may be aggravating in Robbery with
Homicide if the killing of the victim was included in the premeditation.(Pp. vs. Nabual, 28 SCRA
747, 752). Thus, if the killing of the victim was only incidental, evident premeditation is not
present. (Pp. vs. Pagal, 97 SCRA 570, 576, Oct. 25, 1977).
11.Plea of guilty to the charge does not include the attending aggravating circumstances.
Case: The trial court should not have concluded that evident premeditation attended the
commission of the crime of murder on the bases of its findings regarding the admission of guilt by
the appellant and the existence of conspiracy with his co-accused. As earlier stated, appellant
entered his plea of guilty after the prosecution had presented its evidence whatsoever was
adduced by it to prove the supposed evident premeditation. The records and the transcripts of
stenographic notes are barren of any proof tending to show any prior refection on, followed after
sometimes by persistence in, the criminal resolution of the of the five accused.
It is elementary that to establish evident premeditation, there must be proof of (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit
has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and
execution to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will and he desired to hearken
to its warnings.
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is that the execution
of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out
the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. When it is not
shown as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was
carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. Evident premeditation must be stressed
on external acts and must be evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning.
Otherwise stated, there must be a demonstration by outward acts of a criminal intent that is
notorious and manifest.
As there is no proof, direct or circumstantial, offered by the prosecution t show when
appellant and his co-accused meditated and reflected upon their decision to kill the victim and the
intervening time that elapsed before this plan was carried out, the circumstance of evidence
premeditation cannot be presumed against the appellant.xxx
A plea of guilty is improvidently made accepted where no effort was even made to explain
to the accused that a plea of guilty to an information for a capital offense, attended by an
aggravating circumstance, may result in the imposition of the death penalty. We cannot declare
with reasonable certainty that when appellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the
information he knew that he was at the same time admitting the presence and serious effects of
the aggravating circumstances alleged therein. We are more inclined to believe, as a matter of
judicial experience, that when he admitted his role in the killing of the deceased, he only intended
to limit such admission to the crime charged and not the aggravating circumstances.
The trial judge did not himself inform or advise appellant regarding the consequences of
pleading guilty to having killed the victim with both circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery. More particularly, the trial judge did not himself try to convey to appellant, in ordinary
language that appellant would be assumed to understand, the meaning of evident premeditation
and treachery as circumstances that would qualify the killing ot murder and to aggravate the
penalty as to call for maximum penalty of death.
Xxx
In view of the present requirement of Section 3, Rule 116 for the presentation of evidence
but with due explanation to appellant of the significance of the aggravating circumstances alleged
in an information, and considering the insufficiency of the People’s evidence showing evident
premeditation in this case, we cannot consider appellant’s plea of guilty as an admission of the
existence of that aggravating circumstance. (PP vs. Derilo, et al., GR No. 117818, April 18,
1997).
12.Evident premeditation cannot be inferred from conspiracy.

Case: There is no doubt that conspiracy was shown in the instant case from the
concerted actions of the accused. The existence of this mode of the commission of a felony can
be inferred from the sudden shooting of the victim by Derilo and the successive stabbing of her
person by appellant and his unidentified companion.
However, to claim that evident premeditation can be inferred from conspiracy violates the
fundamental principle that aggravating circumstances should also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt as the crime alleged to have been committed. While the court below did not equate
conspiracy with evident premeditation, the latter cannot be deduced from the former as the
elements of conspiracy and evident premeditation are completely different. (Pp. vs Derilo, et al.,
supra.)
That (1) craft, (2) fraud, (3) disguise be employed.

1. CRAFT- involves use of intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the accused.
(Pp. vs. Juliano, 95 SCRA 511, 526). It is a chicanery resorted to by the accused to aid in the
execution of his criminal design. It is employed as a scheme in the execution of the crime.
Case: Where the regular driver of the victim feigned illness to enable another driver to
drive for the victim who drove the vehicle first to the house of the regular driver who said he was
already well and so he boarded with his co-accused, took over the driver’s seat, and during the
trip shot the victim who was also on board the vehicle. Held: Craft is not attendant. (Pp. vs. Zea,
130 SCRA 77, 81, 90, June 29, 1984).
Case: Where four (4) men, having determined to kill a man in an uninhabited place so
that the crime might be less easily discovered, invited him to go with them on a journey to a
distant mountain on the pretense that they would find there a molave tree from which a liquid
supposed to have a particular virtue, and murdered him in a remote and uninhabited place,
aggravating circumstance of craft is present. (U.S. vs Gampona, 36 Phil. 817).
Case: The act of the accused in pretending to be bonafide passengers in the taxi cab
driven by the deceased, when they were not so in fact, in order not to arouse his suspicion, and
then killing him, constitute craft. (Pp. vs. Daos, 60 Phil. 143, 154).
Case: Where the defendants pretended to be constabulary soldiers to gain entry into the
place of the victims, craft is properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. (Pp. vs.
Saquing, 30 SCRA 834, 844, Dec. 26, 1969).
Case: Where all the accused intending to kill the victim pretended to accompany the
latter in a friendly manner in going home and in order to lure him into a false sense of security
and making him unmindful of the tragedy that would befall him, one of them even placed his
hands on the shoulder of the victim while walking. Craft was attendant. (Pp. vs. Molleda, 86
SCRA 667, 705, Nov. 21, 1978).
2. Craft is not attendant where the unlawful scheme could have been carried out just the
same even without the pretense.(Pp. vs. Aspili, 191 SCRA 530, 543, Nov. 21, 1990).
3. FRAUD – insidious words or machinations used to induce the victim to act in a manner
which would enable the offender to carry out his design.
Case: Where the defendants induced their victims to give up their arms upon a promise
that no harm should be done to them, and when the latter gave up their arms, the former attacked
and killed them. Held: Fraud was present. (U.S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568, 574).
Case: Where the defendants, upon the pretext of wanting to buy a bottle of wine, induced
the victim to go down to the lower story of his dwelling where the wine was stored, entered it
when the door was opened to him, and there commenced the assault which ended in his death.
Held: Fraud was present. (U.S. vs. Bundal, 3 Phil. 89, 90, 98).
Case: The accused, stepfather of the offended party, taking advantage of the absence of
the girl’s mother, went to the house and took the young girl away, telling the latter that she was to
be taken to her godmother’s house. The accused, however, took the girl to another house were
he ravished her. Held: The accused committed rape, employing fraud. (Pp. vs. De Leon, 50 Phil.
539, 545).
2. CRAFT distinguished FRAUD.
When there is a direct inducement by insidious words or machinations, fraud is present;
otherwise, the act of the accused done in order not to arouse suspicion of the victim constitutes
craft.
3. DISGUISE – resorting to any device to conceal identity.
Case: The use of an assumed name in the publication of libel constitutes disguise. (Pp.
vs. Adamos, CA, GR No. 43808, Aug. 20, 1936).
Case: Where the defendant used a handkerchief in covering his face before committing
the crime, disguise is present. (Pp. vs. Piring, 63 Phil. 546, 553).
Case: If is inspite of the use of handkerchief to cover their faces, the culprits were
recognized by the victim, the disguise was not considered aggravating. (Pp. vs. Sonsona, GR
No. L-8966, May 25, 1956).
But in the later case: Where the masks worn by the accused subsequently fell down,
thus, paving the way for this one’s identification does not render the aggravating circumstance of
disguise inapplicable. (Pp. vs. Cabato, 160 SCRA 98, 110, April 15, 1988).
Case: Where the accused was wearing masks and wore sunglasses to conceal identity,
but he was readily recognizable because his face could easily be seen together with the
identifying feature of his mustache. (Pp. vs. Reyes, GR No. 118649, March 9, 1998).
That (1) advantage be taken of superior strength, or (2) means be employed to

weaken the defense. (Par. 15)
1. To take advantage of superior strength means to use purposely excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.(Pp. vs. Moka, 196 SCRA
378, 387, April 26, 1991).
Case: The deceased Tomas Martir was unarmed, under the influence of liquor. He was
much smaller than Navarra. Navarra’s attack came after he (Martir) was pushed to the wall by
Antonio Santiago. Not content with this and after Martir tried to escape, Virgilio fired at him. Not
only that, this was followed by two other shots from Navarra. Held: Since the aggressors were
police officers fully armed, and the deceased was defenseless and under the influence of liquor ,
a clear case of abuse superior strength is present. The two took advantage of these
circumstances to consummate the offense. (Pp. vs. Navarra, 25 SCRA 491, 497, Oct. 14, 1968).
2. To be aggravating, there must be evidence that the accused were physically superior
and that they abused such superiority.(Pp. vs. Diokno, 63 Phil. 601, 607).
Case: The fact that there were two (2) male persons who attacked the victim does not
per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength there being no
proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. (Pp. vs. Carpio, 191SCRA 108,
119, Oct. 31, 1990).
Case: Where three persons armed with bolos attacked another who was armed with a
revolver, it was held that there was no abuse of superior strength, as their strength was almost
balanced, a revolver being as effective, if not more so, than the three bolos. (Pp. vs. Antonio, 73
Phil. 421, 424-425).
Case: Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality
of force between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of in the commission of the
crime. When four armed assailants, two of whom are accused-appellants in this case, gang up on
one armed victim, it can only be said that excessive force was purposely sought and employed.
(Pp vs. Tabarnero, GR No. 168169, Feb. 24, 2010).
That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia) – Par. 16.
2. Meaning of treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. (Pp. vs. Lacao, 201 SCRA 317, 330, Sept. 4, 1991),or that the offended party was not
given the opportunity to make a defense. (Pp. vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368, 387, July 23, 1991).
Question: Is it necessary that the mode of attack insures the accomplishment of the
crime?
Answer: No. It is not necessary that the means, methods or forms employed in the
execution of the crime insure its accomplishment, as the law says, “To insure its execution” only.
In other words, it is the means, methods and forms employed that it considered and not the
result. Thus, treachery is considered in attempted or frustrated stage, or even if the offense was
not consummated.
2. The means of the attack must be consciously adopted.
The suddenness of attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even
if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim’s
helpless position was only accidental. Pp. vs. Narit, 197 SCRA 334, May 23, 1991).
The accused must make some preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to
insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to
defend himself or retaliate. (Pp. vs. Iligan, 191 SCRA 643, 653, Nov. 26, 1990).
3. Treachery cannot be presumed.
Even if the wound of the victim is at the back where it is not known as the manner in
which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted the death of the deceased began
and developed. The wound at the back might have been the last one inflicted or might have been
inflicted by accident in the course of the fight. (U.S. vs. Panagilion, 34 Phil. 786, 792-793).
4. Exceptions, or cases, in which treachery may be presumed:
Case: When the victim was tied elbow to elbow, his body with many wounds and his
head cut off, treachery may be considered, though no witnesses saw the killing. (U.S. vs.
Santos, 1 Phil. 222, 224-225).
Case: The killing of a child is murder qualified by treachery, even if the manner of the
attack was not shown. (Pp. vs. Laggui, CA 34 OG 1708). See also Pp. vs. Valerio, Jr., 112
SCRA 231, Feb. 25, 1982), because the weakness of the child due to his tender age results in
the absence of any danger to the accused. (U.S. vs Oro, 19 Phil. 548, 554).See also Pp v.
Rebucan, GR No. 182551, Jan. 27, 2011.
5. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Treachery is not to be presumed or taken for granted from the mere statement of a
witness that the attack was so sudden. There must be a clear showing from the narration of facts
why the attack or assault is said to be sudden. The reason is that treachery, like any element of
the crime, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. (Pp vs. Santos, 85 SCRA 630,
639, Oct. 23, 1978).
6. Treachery may exist even if the attack is face to face.
Treachery should be taken into account even if the deceased was face to face with his
assailant as at the time the blow was delivered, where it appears that the attack was not
preceded by a dispute and the offended party was unable to prepare himself for his defense.
(U.S. vs Cornejo, 28 Phil. 457, 461).
Case: the victim approached the driver of a pick up and, as he approached the pick up,
the victim was met with gun fire which was followed by two more successive shots. Held:
Treachery is present although the shooting was frontal, as the attack was so sudden and
unexpected that the victim was not in a position to offer an effective defense. (Pp. vs. Cuadra, 85
SCRA 576, 595). See also Pp vs. Listo, 179 SCRA 415, 421.
7. Mere sudden and unexpected attack does not necessarily give rise to treachery.
It does not always follow that because the attack is sudden and unexpected it is tainted
with treachery. Indeed, it could have been done on impulse, as a reaction to an actual or
imagined provocation offered by the victim. (Pp. vs. Sabanal, 172 SCRA 430, 434).
Case: The assailant called out “Fiscal” and when the latter turned his head to find who
was calling him, the assailant fired immediately, rendering no opportunity for the victim to defend
himself. Held: The fact tat the assailant called “fiscal” before shooting the victim does not negate
the presence of treachery. The assailant being a hired killer, he wanted to insure that he was
shooting the correct person. (Pp. vs. Magdueno, 144 SCRA 210, 217-218).
8. Treachery may be taken into account even if the victim of the attack was not the
person whom the accused intended to kill. (Pp. vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714, 725, April 16,
1968).
Reason: When there is treachery, it is impossible for either the intended victim or the actual victim
to defend himself against the aggression. (Pp. vs. Andaya, CA 40 OG Sup. 12, 141).
9.Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide-a crime
against property.
Case: Going by the letter of the law, treachery is applicable only to crimes against
persons as enumerated in Title Eight, Chapters One and Two, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code. However, the Supreme Court of Spain has consistently applied treachery to robbery with
homicide, classified as crime against property.
Xxx
Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although
said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery
is not a qualifying circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision
Sept. 11, 1878, the word homicide is used in its broadest and generic sense.(Pp. vs. Gonzales
Escote, GR No. 140756, April 4, 2003).
10. Abuse of superior strength absorbed by treachery.
Case: When the circumstance of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is
absorbed in the latter. (Pp v. Rebucan, supra).
That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to
the natural effects of the act. (par. 17).
1. Ignominy, defined.
Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and
obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. (Pp. vs. Acaya, 163 SCRA 768, 774).
2. Ignominy is applicable to crimes against chastity, less serious physical injuries, light or
grave coercion, and murder.
Case: Where the accused raped a woman after winding cogon grass around his genital
organ, he thereby augmented the wrong done by increasing pain and adding ignominy thereto.
(Pp. vs. Torrefiel, et al., CA 45 OG 803).
Case: Where the accused raped one of the victims in the presence of her husband, and
the others successively raped by five men. (Pp. vs. Detuya, 154 SCRA 410, 426, Sept. 30,
1987).
Case: Where the accused used not only the missionary position, i.e., male superior,
female inferior, but also dog style of sexual intercourse, i.e., entry from behind. (Pp. vs. Saylan,
28 SCRA 159, 167, June 29, 1984).
Case: Where the accused used a flashlight and examined the genital of the victim before
he ravished her, and committed the bestial deed in the presence of the victim’s old father. (Pp.
vs. Bumidag, GR No. 130630, Dec. 4, 2000).
3. Cases where ignominy is not present:
Case: The accused sliced and took the flesh form the thighs, legs and shoulders of the
victim after killing her by the use of a knife does not add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
(Pp. vs. Ferrera, 151 SCRA 113. 140, June 18, 1987).
It is necessary that the offense be committed in a manner that tends to make its effect
more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to his moral suffering. (Pp. vs. Carmina, 193 SCRA
429, 436, Jan. 28, 1991).
Case: Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and
obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. The mere fact that accused-appellant burned
the body of the deceased is not sufficient to show that the means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act. Nor we may cinsider the circumstance of cruelty as
found by the trial court because there is no showing that the victim was burned while he was still
alive. For cruelty to exist, there must b proof showing that the accused delighted in making the
victim suffered slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and moral pain in the
consummation of the criminal act. No proof was presented that would show that accused-
appellants deliberately and wantonly augment the suffering of their victim.(Pp vs.Catian, et al.,
GR No. 139693, Jan 24, 2002).
That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry. (Par. 18).
1. Unlawful entry is inherent in Robbery with force upon things under Art. 299, par. (a),
and Art. 302 of the Code, but not in Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons,
because unlawful entry in not inherent inthis kind of robbery.
If the crime charged is theft, unlawful entry is aggravating if it is proved during trial. (Pp.
vs. Sunga, 43 Phil. 205).
2. Dwelling and unlawful entry taken separately in murders committed in a dwelling.
Case: When the accused gained access to the dwelling by climbing through the window
and once inside, murdered certain persons in the dwelling, there are two aggravating
circumstances which attended the commission of the crimes-dwelling and unlawful entry. (Pp. vs.
Barruga, 61 Phil. 318, 331).
That as a means to the commission of a crime, a wall, roof, floor, door, or window
be broken. (Par. 19).
Case: It was considered aggravating in murder where the accused cut the ropes at the
rear filed tent sand killed two soldiers inside the tent. (U.S. Matanug, 11 Phi. 188, 189, 192).
Case: Breaking of the shutters and the framing of the door to insure elements of surprise
does not aggravate the commission of the crime. (Pp. vs. Capillas, 108 SCRA 173, 187, Oct.
23, 1981).
That the crime be committed (1) with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age,
or (2) by means of motor vehicles, airships, or other similar means. (Par. 20).
1. Motor vehicle to be considered must be used to facilitate the commission of the

offense.
This circumstance will be considered when there is a showing that the motor vehicle was
purposely used to facilitate the commission of the offense or when it is shown that without it the
offense charged could not have been committed or was intentionally sought to insure the success
of the nefarious enterprise. (Pp. vs. Jaranilla, 55 SCRA 563).
Thus, it is not present where the motor vehicle was used to facilitate the escape of the
accused. (Pp. vs. Veloso, 112 SCRA 173), or its use is merely incidental and not purposely
sought to facilitate the commission of the crime. (Pp. vs. Garcia, 80 OG 115, April 9, 1984).
That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by
causing other wrong not necessary for its commission. (par. 21).
1. There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly
and gradually, causing unnecessary moral and physical pain in the consummation of the criminal
act which he intended to commit. (Pp. s. Dayug, 49 Phil. 423; Pp. vs. Gatcho, L-27251, Feb.
28, 1981).
Case: Gagging of the mouth of a three years old child with stockings, dumping him with
head downward into a box, and covering the box with sacks and other boxes, causing slow
suffocation, and as a result the child died, constitutes cruelty. (Pp. vs. Lora, 113 SCRA 316,
March 30, 1982).
Case: After hog-tying the victim, the accused extracted the victim’s eyes from its socket
with the pointed end of his cane and also stuffed the victim’s mouth with mud. Held: there is
cruelty. (Pp. vs. Mariquina, 84 Phil. 39, 40-41, 43, 33).
2. Cruelty refers to the suffering of the victim purposely intended by the offender. (Pp. vs.
Gatcho, supra).
Cruelty cannot be inferred from the fact that the body of the victim was dismembered and
placed inside a sack in the absence of proof that this was done while the deceased was still alive.
(Pp. vs. Pascual, -SCRA 722 [1980]).
3. Cruelty requires deliberate prolongation of the suffering of the victim (Pp. vs. Dayug,
supra). It cannot be presumed. (Pp. vs. Pp. vs. Atieda, 90 SCRA 144).
So, throwing the body of the baby outside the window after it was hacked, cruelty cannot
be inferred. (Pp. vs Gacho, supra).
Also inflicting various successive wounds in order to cause the death of the victim, no
appreciable time intervening between the infliction of one and that of another, is not necessarily
cruelty. The number of wounds does not by itself indicate cruelty as it is essential to show that the
wounds were inflicted unnecessarily while the victim was still alive to prolong his physical
suffering. (Pp. vs Magistrado L-62833, Oct. 8, 1985).
Case- We cannot sustain the ruling of the trial court that cruelty aggravated the killing
simply because according to the autopsy report the victim’s body bore sixteen (16) wounds all in
all, four (4) of which were severe, deep and fatal. The number of wounds is not the test for
determining cruelty; it is whether appellant deliberately and sadistically augmented the victim’s
sufferings. Thus, there must be proof that the victim was made to agonize before appellant
rendered the blow which snuffed out her life.(Pp. vs. Florendo, GR No. 136845, Oct. 8, 2003).
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES (Art. 15).
1. Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as

aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions
attending its commission.
2. There are three alternative circumstances to wit: (a) relationship; (b) intoxication; (c)
degree of instruction and education of the offender.
Relationship –is taken into consideration when the offended party is the spouse,
ascendant, descendant legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister or relative by affinity in the
same degree.
1. Relationship is mitigating in rimes against property by analogy to the provision of Art.
332. But in theft, estafa and malicious mischief, relationship is exempting.
Thus, relationship is mitigating in the crimes of robbery (Art. 294-302), usurpation (Art.
312), fraudulent insolvency ( Art. 314), and Arson (Arts. 312-322, 325-326).
2. Relationship is aggravating in crimes against person if the offended party is a relative
of a higher degree or when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the same level, as
killing a brother-in law. (Pp. vs. Mercado, 51 Phil. 99), a brother (Pp. vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362,
364).
3. But when the crime against person is any of the serious physical injuries (Art. 263),
even if the offended party is descendant of the offender, relationship is an aggravating
circumstance
4. When the crime committed is less serious physical injuries (Art. 265); or slight
physical injuries (Art. 266), relationship is a mitigating circumstance, if the offended party is a
relative of a lower degree of the offender, and an aggravating circumstance if the offended party
is a relative of a higher degree of the offender.
5. But if the crime against persons is homicide or murder, relationship is aggravating
even if the victim of the crime is a relative of lower degree.
Thus, the killing of a stepfather by her stepmother is attended by the aggravating

circumstance of relationship which is considered as aggravating. (Pp. vs. Portento,CA 38 OG
467).
6. In crimes against chastity, relationship is always aggravating, regardless of whether
the offended party is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party. (See Pp. vs.
Lucas, 181 SCRA 316, 327, Jan. 22, 1990).
Intoxication
1. Intoxication is mitigating if it is not habitual or it is not subsequent to the plan of the

commission of the felony. It is aggravating if it is habitual or intentional.
2. By intoxication is meant that the offender’s mental faculties must be affected by
drunkenness. The state of intoxication must be proved. (Pp. vs. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798). Mere
drinking of liquor prior to the commission of the crime does not necessarily produce a state of
intoxication.
3. If one had plotted to kill the victim, had drunk wine in order to embolden him in carrying
the out his evil plan, drunkenness is not mitigating.(Pp. vs. Hernandez, No.L-3391, May 23,
1952). But if one is somewhat drunk at the time of the incident for having drunk tuba,
drunkenness is mitigating. (Pp. Calinawan, CA-GR No. 21413, July 21, 1958).
4. a habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks.
The habit should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a matter of daily
occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to evil thought and undermines will power, making the
victim a potential evil doer. (Pp. vs. Fuentes, 121 SCRA 252).
Degree of Instruction and Education/Lack of Education.
1. In the degree of instruction and education of the offender, the court considers not only
illiteracy but the lack of intelligence of the offender. If one is unable to write but is highly and
exceptionally intelligent or mentally alert that he easily realizes the significance of his act, there is
no mitigating circumstance.(Pp. vs. Gorospe, 105 Phil. 184; Pp. vs. Geronimo, 55 SCRA 246,
Oct. 23, 1973). But where the accused studied up to sixth grade, lack of instruction cannot be
considered in his favor. (Pp. Pujinio, 27 SCRA 1185, April 29, 1969).
2. Lack of instruction or a low degree of intelligence is, generally mitigating in all crimes.
Exception: Pp. vs Mutya, L-11255-56, Sept. 30, 1959, the SC Held: Such is not mitigating in
murder because to kill is forbidden by natural law which every natural being is endowed to know
and feel; Pp. vs. Dejaresco, L-32701, June 19, 1984, not mitigating in crimes against property
like robbery or theft; Pp. vs. Lopez. L-14347, April 29, 1960, not mitigating in crimes against
chastity like rape. Reason: No one, however, unschooled he may be ignorant as to know that
theft or robbery or assault upon a person in authority in inherently wrong and violation of the law.
(Pp. vs. Magistrado, L-62833, Oct. 8, 1985).
But in Pp. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97, 101, lack of instruction was mitigating in theft of large
cattle committed by member of an uncivilized tribe of Igorots or in Igorot land.
But in Pp. vs. Macatanda, 109 SCRA 35, 38, 39, where the accused claimed to be a
Moslem belonging to cultural minority, the SC held: Membership in cultural minority does not per
se imply being an uncivilized or semi-uncivilized state of the offender (the basis in applying lack of
instruction as mitigating in Maqui case). Reason of the Maqui case, which is the only ruling of the
SC is that the case was decided in 1914 when the state of civilization of the Igorots has not
advanced as it had in its present state, when certainly it can no longer be said that any member
of a cultural minority in the country is uncivilized or semi-uncivilized.
IN Robbery with Homicide, where the accused was illiterate, lack of instruction was held
to be mitigating. (Pp. vs. Mantawar, 80 Phil. 817, 823).
3. Lack of instruction must be proved positively and directly and cannot be based on
mere deduction or inference. (Pp. vs. Bernardo, CA 40 OG 1707)
4. High degree of instruction is aggravating.
Example: A lawyer, who, with abuse of his education and learning, commits estafa –
aggravating. But mitigating where a lawyer commits physical injuries, as he did not take
advantage of his high degree of education. (Pp. vs. Sulit, CA-G.R. No. 21102-R, Sept. 29,
1959).
PERSON CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES (Title Two)
1. Who are persons criminally liable?

For Grave or less grave felonies: a) Principals, b) Accomplices, and c) Accessories.
For Light Felonies: a) Principals and b) Accomplices.
2. Who are principals? They are: a) Those who take part in the execution of the act
(Principal by direct participation); b) Those who directly force or induce another to commit it
(Principal by inducement); and c) Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another without which it would have been accomplished (Principal by indispensable cooperation).
Principal by direct participation
1. Two or more persons who may take direct part in the execution of the act, in which
case they may be principals by direct participation, when the following requisites are present:.
(Pp. vs Castillo, et al., 17 SCRA 721).
a) That they participated in the criminal resolution; b) That they carried out their plan and
personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. (Pp. vs. Ong
Lay, 60 Phil. 788, 790).
Principal by inducement
1. there is only principal by inducement or by induction if it is shown that the crime was
actually committed by another who was induced. (Pp. vs. Ong Lay, supra).
2. Regarding induction, it is essential that (a) it be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime; and (b) that such inducement be the determining cause of
the said commission by the induced. (Pp. vs. De la Cruz, 97 SCRA 385).
Thus, an induced or ill-conceived advice without any intention that such would be
followed or that it would produce any result is not inducement because such is not made with the
intention of making the one advised to commit a crime. (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203);
Ex.: A person who advised a married woman whose husband was so stringy and treated
her badly that the only thing for her to do is was to rob him, was not guilty of the crime of robbery
by inducement, for the reason that an imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not sufficient. (cited in
the case of U.S. vs Indiana, supra). Reason: The person who gave the advice did not have the
intention to procure the commission of the crime.
2. or if the one induced has a personal reason to commit the crime so that he would
commit it just the same whether or not there is inducement x-x-
3. For an act to be considered an inducement, it is necessary that such advise or such
words have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary
that they be a direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence
itself. (Pp. vs. Ulip, et al., 89 Phil. 629).
4.. If the principal by inducement did not include the means to be employed in the
commission o the crime like treachery, such will not affect him. (U.S. vs. Gamaco, 23 Phil. 81).
Principals by indispensable participation
1.There must be immediate participation in the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation by an act without which the crime would not have been committed. The cooperation
of this principal is by an act indispensable to the commission of the felony. To cooperate means
to desire or wish in common a thing. The common purpose does not necessarily mean previous
understanding, for it can be inferred from the circumstances of each case. (Pp. vs. Aplegido, et
al., 76 Phil. 571).
Case: Where one who knowingly contributes money for the purpose of buying weapon to
be used by another in killing a third person is principal for having cooperated with an act without
which the crime could not have been committed. (Pp. vs Ulip, supra).
Case: Where one of the accused removed the panties of the offended party and held her
feet while the sexual act was performed by the other accused, the first accused is a principal by
indispensable cooperation since considering the extent of the cooperation, without his aid, the
crime of rape could not have been committed. (Pp. vs. Tigalo, et al., L-34334, Nov. 7, 1979).
2. But any cooperation, even done with knowledge of criminal intent of an accused, if not
indispensable to the commission of the crime, will make one liable as accomplice. So if the
accused knowingly aided the killers by casting stones at the victim (Pp. vs Tatlonghari, 27
SCRA 728) or the act of giving the victim fist blow after he was stabbed by the other accused, the
liability will be that of an accomplice. (Pp. vs. Vistido, 70 SCRA 719).
ACCOMPLICES
Who are accomplices? (Art. 18)
1. The are those, who not being principals, cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous act. (Art. 18)
2. In the case of accomplices, there is no conspiracy. An accomplice has knowledge of
the criminal design of the principal and all that he does is to concur with the latter in his purpose,
by cooperating in the execution of the crime by previous or simultaneous acts, for the purpose of
supplying material or moral aide to the principal in an efficacious way. (Pp. vs. Halili, et al., GR
No. 14044, Aug. 5, 1966).
3. A relation must exist between the act of the principal and that committed by the
accomplice. (Pp. vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38). It is essential that the accomplice must know of the
criminal design of the principal and thereby cooperates knowingly or intentionally by an act which
even though not rendered, the crime would be committed just the same.
Case: The driver of the taxicab knowing that hi co-accused were going to commit robbery
permitted them to use the taxicab in going to the place where the robbery was committed ins an
accomplice. (Pp. vs. Lingadd, 51 OG 6191).
Case: A while choking B, C suddenly appears and stab B mortally. If A continues choking
B after the mortal wound is inflicted, A will be an accomplice. His act is concurrence in the
criminal design of C to kill B.
Case: Where the victim was mortally wounded and was prostrate on the ground and
while in that condition the third accused threw stones on the victim, he should be guilty as an
accomplice, for it is apparent that he shared the criminal act, although the means employed may
have been distinct and separate. PP. vs Sarmiento, CA Gr No. 00170-Cr, Feb. 27, 1964).
4. In case of doubt whether the participation of the offender will be considered that of an
accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Case: While Carlos and Pascual joined their borhter in the pursuit of the fleeing Matnog,
and in the attack on him as he fell, yet the prosecution witness was unable to assert positively
that the two managed to hit the fallen man. There being no showing of conspiracy, and the extent
of their participation in the homicide being uncertain, they should be given the benefit of doubt
and declared as mere accomplices. (Pp vs Clemente, 21 SCRA 261, 270-271).
4. Distinction between accomplice and conspirator.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the
criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves
have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices came to know about it after the principals
have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution.
Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; conspirators merely concur in it.
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the
plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are authors of the crime; accomplices
are merely instrument who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense. (Pp. vs.
de Vera, GR No. 128966, 18 Aug. 1999).
5. Co-conspirator may be held liable.
Pp. vs. Anin, 64 SCRA 729, 736, it was held that if the overt acts of the accused,
although done with the knowledge of the criminal intent of his co-accused was not indispensable
to the homicidal assault, the accused should be held liable as an accomplice in the killing of the
victim.
Pp. vs. Niera, 76 OG 6600, No. 37, Sept. 15, 1980, it was held that in some exceptional
situations, having community of design with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from
being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was,
relatively speaking, of a minor character.
But in Pp. vs. Manzano, 58 SCRA 250, it was held that appellants alternative contention
tha he should be regarded only as an accomplice is untenable once it is postulated that he
conspired with Bernardo and Delfin to kill Jose Santos.
Pp. vs. Mendoza, it was held that the role of a malefactor in the perpetration of the
homicide or murder was of a minor character is of no consequence, since having been in
conspiracy with the others, the act of one is the act of all.
7. The following requisites must concur for a person to be considered an accomplice: a)
There must be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; b) That he cooperates in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid
in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and c) That there be a relation between the
acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. (Pp. vs.
Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38).
8. The cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance which is knowingly or
intentionally given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose.
(Pp. vs. Cruz, 191 SCRA 377, Nov. 14, 1990).
Case: The sentry improperly permitted certain convicts to go out of jail, accompanied by
the corporal of the guards. The convicts committed robbery. Held: When the sentry permitted the
convicts to go at large, the sentry had no knowledge of their intention to commit any crime. (U.S.
vs. Bello, 11Phil. 526).
Case: A taxi cab driver who, knowing that his co-accused were going to make a hold-up,
permitted them to use the taxi cab driven by him in going to a store where his said co-accused
staged the hold up, and waited for them until after the hold up, is an accomplice of the crime of
robbery.(PP. vs. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12).
9. An accomplice may be liable for a crime different from that which the principal
committed.
Case: A attacked B with treachery, the attack being sudden and unexpected. When B
was mortally wounded, C, father of A appeared, placed himself on top of B’s abdomen, and held
his hands, Later D also appeared and held both knees of B. C and D made it possible for A to
search the body of B for the latter’s revolver. It was not shown that that C and D knew of the
manner A attacked B. What they knew was that A had unlawfully attacked B. Held: A was guilty of
murder qualified by treachery. C and D were guilty as accomplice in the crime of homicide. (Pp.
vs. Babiera, 52 Phil. 98).
ACCESSORIES (Art. 19)
An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the
commission of the felony, but, with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he subsequently
takes part in three ways: (a) by profiting from the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing the body,
effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discovery; and (c) by assisting in the
escape or concealment of the principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public
functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. (Pp. vs. Versola, No. L-
35022, Dec. 21, 1977, 80 SCRA 600, 608).
1. If the principal author of the robbery has already been convicted and there is no proof
that the alleged accessory knew of the commission of the crime and that he profited himself by
its proceeds does not make an accessory by his mere possession of the stolen property. (Pp. vs.
Racimo, CA 40 OG 279). Note: If there has been no one convicted as a thief, the possessor
should be prosecuted as principal in the crime of theft.
2. Knowledge of the commission of the crime may be acquired subsequent to the
acquisition of the stolen property.
Case: The robbers took and carried away carabaos belonging to another. These animals
were found in the possession of A who acquired them without knowing that they had been
illegally taken. When the owners of the carabaos informed A that they were illegally deprived of
their animals, A demanded the payment of one-half of what he had for them. The owners
promised to comeback with the money. When the owners came back, A informed them that he
had returned the animals to the person from whom he had bought them. Held: A is an accessory
even if he acquired knowledge that the carabaos were stolen after he acquired the same. It is
sufficient that he concealed or disposed the same, depriving the owner thereof. ( U.S. vs.
Montano, 3 Phil. 110).
SPECIFIC ACTS OF ACCESSORIES:

By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
Case: A person who received any property from another, and used it, knowing that the
same had been stolen, is guilty of the crime of theft as an accessory. (Pp. vs. Tanchoco, 76
Phil. 436, 437).
Case: In murder, one who shared in the reward given for the commission of the crime is
an accessory. U.S. vs. Empainado, 9 Phil. 613)
But one who received P 200 from the owner of a stolen jeep, as a reward for locating it in
possession of someone who had bought it, is not an accessory, because the amount of P 200
was in the nature of a reward and not fruits or effects of the crime. (Pp. vs. Yatco, CA 51 OG
260).
Question: If A took the stolen property form the principal B without the latter’s consent, is
A an accessory? Answer: No, he is a principal in the crime of theft.
Case: IN kidnapping for ransom, those who acted as runners or couriers in obtaining the
ransom money is an accessory as he assisted the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.
( Pp. vs. Magsin, GR No. L-3649, Jan. 29, 1954).
Case: those who assisted in the burial of the victim of homicide to prevent the discovery
of the crime incur the responsibilities of accessories because they conceal or destroy the body of
the crime to prevent its discovery. (U.S. vs. Leal, 1 Phil. 118).
3. One who kept silent with regard to the crime he witnessed is not an accessory.
Case: A person who knew the commission of a murder, by another whom he knew, kept
silent with regard to it, and did not report it to any of the authorities is not liable even as an
accessory. (U.S. vs. Callapag, 21 Phil. 262). Reason: Such omission is not harboring, or
concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal.
But if the person went to the authorities and volunteered false information which tend
affirmatively to deceive the prosecuting authorities and thus to prevent the detection of the guilty
parties and to aid them in escaping discovery and arrest, he is liable as an accessory. (U.s vs.
Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 415).
3. Accessories’ liability is subordinate and subsequent.
Case: If the principal was acquitted, it is neither proper nor possible to convict the
defendant as accessory. The responsibility of the accessory is subordinate to that of the principal
in a crime, because the accessory’s participation therein is subsequent to its commission, and his
guilt is directly related to that of the principal delinquent in the punishable act. If then the facts
alleged are not proven in the prosecution instituted, or do not constitute a crime, no legal grounds
exist for convincing the defendant as an accessory after the fact for a crime not perpetrated.
(U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194, 196).
In Mendoza case supra, it was held that the acquittal of the principal in an arson case
must likewise result in acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that no crime was
committed in as much as the fire was the result of an accident.
But if the crime was in fact committed, but the principal was not held criminally liable,
because of an exempting circumstance such as insanity or minority, an accessory may be held as
such because in exempting circumstance, there is a crime committed. Hence, there is a basis for
convicting the accessory. See U.S. vs. Villaluz, 32 Phil. 376).
Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability (Art. 20)

An accessory is exempt from criminal liability, when the principal is his-
(1) spouse, or (2) ascendant, or (3) descendant, or (4) legitimate, natural or adopted
brother, sister or relative by affinity within the same degree.
Exception: If the accessory took part subsequent to the commission of the crime by (a)
profiting by the effects of the crime, and (b) assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime.
Question: Suppose a husband conceals the property stolen by his wife in order to profit it
later, is he liable as accessory?
Answer: Yes, because he said act is prompted not by affection but by a detestable greed.
The purpose of concealing the property is not to prevent the discovery of the crime.
Question: A who committed parricide by killing his wife, went to his adopted brother to
hide in the latter’s house and his adopted brother harbored and concealed A because he gave his
adopted brother P1,000.00. Is the adopted brother an accessory?
Answer: Yes having harbored and concealed A. But he is not criminally liable because he
did not profit by the effects of the crime. The P 1,000.00 he received by him from A was not the
effect of the crime of parricide.
PENALTIES
Penalties in general
Constitutional restriction on penalties.
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.
The punishment is “cruel and unusual” when it is so disproportionate to the offense
committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under
the circumstances.
Justification of death penalty.

When a person proved himself to be a dangerous enemy of society, the latter must
protect itself from such enemy by taking his life in retribution for his offense and as an example
and warning to others. (Pp. vs. Carillo, 85 Phil. 611, 635).
No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission (Art. 21).
This article is a declaration that no person shall be subject to criminal prosecution for any
act of his until after the State defined the crime and has fixed a penalty therefore. (U.S. vs
Parrone, 24 Phil. 29, 35).
Reason for the provision.

An act or omission cannot be punished by the State if at the time it was committed there
was no law prohibiting it, because a law cannot be raionally obeyed unless it is first shown, and a
man cannot be expected to obey an order that has not been given.
Thus, subsidiary imprisonment for a crime cannot be imposed, it it was not prescribed by
law prior to its commission. (U.S. vs Macasaet).
Retroactive effect of penal laws (Art. 22).
Penal shall have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of felony;
provided that the person is not a habitual criminal.
(already discussed in the early chapters)

Effect of pardon by the offended party (Article 23)
1. Generally, a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal liability.
Even if the injured party already pardoned the offender, the prosecutor can still prosecute
the offender. Such pardon by the offended party is not even a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint or information.
Reason: A crime committed is an offense against the state. IN criminal cases, the
intervention of the aggrieved parties is limited to being witnesses for the prosecution. ( Pp. vs.
Despavellador, 53 OG 21797). Only the Chief Executive can pardon the offenders. (Art. 36).
2. Compromise does not extinguish criminal liability.
It is well settled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise, for it is a
public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on its own motion
even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the
offended party. (Pp. vs. Benitez, 59 OG 1407).
There may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising from an offense; but such
compromise shall not extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty. (Art.
2034, Civil Code).
A contract stipulating for the renunciation of the right to prosecute an offense or waiving
criminal liability is void. The consideration of the subject matter is illegal. (See Articles 1306, 1352
and 1409 of the New Civil Code).
3. Except as provided in Art. 344 of this code.
The offended party in the crimes of adultery and concubinage cannot institute criminal
prosecution, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. (Art. 344, par. 2). The pardon
here may be implied, as continued inaction of the offended party after learning the offense.
IN the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, there shall be no
criminal prosecution if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian as the case may be. The pardon here must be expressed.
4. Pardon under Art. 344 must be made before the institution of criminal prosecution.
But the pardon afforded the offenders must come before the institution of the criminal
prosecution. (Pp. vs. Infante, 57 Phil. 138-adultery.
The only act that extinguishes the penal action after the institution of the criminal action,
is the marriage between the offender and the offended party. (Art. 344).
But civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his
express waiver.
Art. 24 – measures of prevention or safety which are not considered penalties. (just
read the provision. Nothing much to discuss)
Art. 25. Penalties which may be imposed.
SCALE
PRINCIPAL PENALTIES
Capital punishment:
Death
Afflictive penalties:
Reclusion perpetua
Reclusion temporal
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
Prision mayor
Correctional penalties:
Prision correctional
Arresto mayor
Suspension
Destiero
Light Penalties
Arresto menor
Public censure
Penalties common to the three preceding clauses:
Fine, and bond to keep the peace
ACCESSORY PENALTIES
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification

Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the
Profession or calling
Civil interdiction
Indemnification
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense
Payment of cost
1. The penalties which may be imposed, according to this codex-x-x are those included
in Art. 25 only.
Thus, a sentence of five years in Bilibid prison is defective, because it does not specify
the exact penalty described in RPC .(U.S. vs. Avillar, 28 Phil. 131, 134-135).
The penalty of hard labor in addition to imprisonment cannot be imposed because it is not
authorized by the RPC. (Pp. vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35, 43-44).
The penalty of “life imprisonment” or “cadena perpetua” imposed is erroneous
designation. The correct term is “reclusion perpetua”. (Pp. vs. Abletes, 58 SCRA 241, 248).
3. Classification of Penalties
1. Principal Penalties –those expressly imposed by the court in the judgment of

conviction.
2. Accessory penalties – those that are deemed included in the imposition of the principal
penalties.
Principal penalties may be classified:
According to their divisibility.
1. Divisible – are those that have fixed duration and are divisible into three periods.
2. Indivisible – penalties which have no fixed duration. The are: Death, Reclusion
Perpetua, Perpetual absolute or special disqualification, and public censure.
Classification according to subject matter:
1. Corporal (death)
2. Deprivation of freedom (reclusion, prision, arresto)
3. Restriction of freedom (destiero)
4. Deprivation of rights (disqualification and suspension)
5. Pecuniary (fine)
Classification of penalties according to their gravity.

1. Capital
2. Afflictive
3. Correctional
4. Light
“Censure”, being a penalty, is not proper in acquittal (Pp. vs. Abellera, 69 Phil. 623,
625). Thus, if person is found not guilty, not court has the power to mete punishment . (Gomes
vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717, 723).
But a competent court, while acquitting the accused, may permit itself nevertheless to
criticize or reprehend his acts and conduct in connection with the transaction out of which the
accusation arose by expressing its approval or reprehension of those acts to avoid the impression
that by acquitting the accused it approves or admires his conduct.
Art. 26. Fine- when afflictive, correctional, or light penalty.

1. Afflictive – over P 6,000
2. Correctional – 200 to P 6,000
3. Light penalty – less than P200
Fine may be imposed as a single penalty or as an alternative penalty.
Duration of each of different penalties (Art. 27).

1. Reclusion perpetua – 20 yrs. And 1 day to 40 yrs. (RA 7659)
2. Reclusion temporal – 12 yrs. And 1 day to 20 yrs.
3. Prision mayor and temporary disqualification - 6yrs and 1 day to 12 yrs., except when
disqualification is an accessory penalty, in which case its duration is that pf the principal penalty.
4. Prision correccional, suspension and destiero – 6 mos. And 1 day to 6 yrs., except when
suspension is an accessory penalty, in which case its duration is that of the principal penalty.
5. Arresto mayor – 1 mp. And 1 day to 6 mos.
6. Arresto menor – 1 day to 30 days.
7. Bond to keep the peace – the period is discretionary upon the court.
1. The accessory penalties follow the principal penalty and need not be stated in the
sentence.
Thus, the court will specify only the principal penalty, accessory penalties to the prescribed
penalties are deemed imposed although they are not stated in the judgment.
3. Penalties in which other accessory penalties are inherent:
Death – perpetual absolute disqualification, and civil interdiction during 30 yrs. Following date
of sentence. (Art. 40).
Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – civil interdiction for life or during the period of
the sentence, as the case may be, and perpetual absolute disqualification. (Art. 41).
Prision mayor – temporary absolute disqualification from the right of suffrage. (Art. 42).
Prision correccional – suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage if the duration of the
imprisonment shall exceed 18 months. (Art. 43).
Arresto – suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the
sentence.
4. Distinction between bond to keep the peace from bond for good behavior.
1. Failure to post a bond to keep the peace is imprisonment either for 30 days or 6
months, depending on whether the felony committed is grave or less grave on the one hand,
or it is light only on the other hand.
2. Failure to post bond for good behavior is destierro under Art. 284.
Bond for good behavior is imposed in the crimes of grave threats and light threat in Art. 25,
but you can’t find this penalty in Art. 25. What is provided in Art. 25 is bond to keep the peace
but there is offense in the revised penal code which imposes this penalty.
Art. 28. Computation of penalties.
1. Rules for the computation of penalties.

1. When the offender is in prison – the duration of temporary penalties is from the day on
which the judgment becomes final.
2. When the offender is not imprison – the duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of
liberty, is from the day the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the
enforcement of the penalty.
3. The duration of other penalties – the duration is from the day on which the offender
commences to serve his sentence.
If the accused, who was in custody, appealed, his service of sentence should commence
from the date of the promulgation of the decision of the appellate court, not from the date the
judgment of the trial court was promulgated. (Ocampo vs. CA, 97 Phil. 949).
The service of sentence of one in prison begins only on the day the judgment becomes final.
(Baking vs. Director of prison, 28 CRA 851, 856).
If the offender is under preventive imprisonment, rule no. 3 applies, that is the duration of the
penalty shall be computed from the day on which the defendant commences to serve his
sentence.
Art. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment.

1. The rule: shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the full time during which they
have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners; otherwise, entitled only to
four-fifths (4/5). Exception: When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or
more times of any crime; when upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they
have failed to surrender voluntarily.
Whenever, the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or
more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and the case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice
to the continuation of trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In
case the maximum penalty to which the may be sentenced is destiero, he shall be released after
30 days of preventive imprisonment.
Effects of penalties according to their respective nature. (Art. 30-35).
1. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office: (a) deprivation of

public offices and employments, even if by election; (b) deprivation of right to vote or be elected;
(c) disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any rights
mentioned; and (d) loss of right to retirement pay or pension for any office formerly held. (Art. 30).
2. Perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or
calling: (a) deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected; and (b)
disqualification for holding similar offices or employment perpetually or during the service of
sentence. (Art. 31).
3. Perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage: (a) deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected to any public office; and (b) cannot
hold any public office during the period of disqualification. (Art. 32).
4. Suspension from public office, profession or calling or the right of suffrage: (a)
disqualification from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of
suffrage during the term of the sentence; and (b) if suspended from public office, the offender
cannot hold another office having similar functions during the period of suspension. (Art. 33).
5. Civil interdiction: (a) deprivation of the rights of parental authority or guardianship of any
ward; (b) deprivation of marital authority; and (c) deprivation of the right to manage his property
by any act or conveyance inter vivos. (Art. 34). Note: but he can dispose the property by will or
donation mortis causa.
6. Bonds to keep the peace: (a) the offender must present two sufficient sureties who shall
undertake that the offender will not commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that incase
such offense is committed they will pay the amount determined by the court; or (b) the offender
must deposit such amount with the clerk of court to guarantee said undertaking; or (c) the
offender may be detained, if he cannot give the bond, for a period not to exceed 6 months if
prosecuted for grave or less grave felony, or for a period not to exceed 30 days, if for light felony.
(Art. 35).
Art. 36 (pardon; its effects)
1. Effects of pardon by the President.

a) A pardon shall not restore the right to hold public office or the right of suffrage. Exception:
When any or both such rights is or are expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
b) It shall not exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity. The pardon cannot
make an exception to this rule.
2. Limitations upon the exercise of the pardoning power:
1. That the power can be exercised only after conviction;
2. That such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. (Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71
Phil. 34, 38).
If the accused appealed his conviction, the appeal must be withdrawn. (Pp. vs. Salle, Jr.,
250 SCRA 592).
2. Pardon granted in general terms does not include accessory penalty.
When the principal penalty is remitted by pardon, only the effect of that principal penalty is
extinguished but not the accessory penalty, unless such right be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon.
Exception: When an absolute pardon is granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, it
removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. (Cristobal vs. Labrador, supra).
3.A public officer who has been granted absolute pardon by the Chief Executive is not
entitled to reinstatement to his/her former position without a new appointment and is not relieved
of his/her civil liability.
Case: In a decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan on March 25, 1983, convicted
petitioner Salvacion A Monsanto (then Asst. Treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other
accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and meted the
penalty of imprisonment and further ordered to pay P 4,892.50 representing the balance of the
amount defrauded and to pay the cost proportionately. Monsanto appealed the conviction which
was affirmed by the SC, then subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration but while said
motion was pending, she was extended absolute pardon by Pres. Marcos on Dec. 17, 1984 which
she accepted on Dec. 21, 1984. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog
treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant treasurer since the same
was still vacant. Petitioner’s request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution and the
latter granted the request but she was required to pay the sum of P 4,892.50 which was required
by the Sandiganbayan. Seeking reconsideration, petitioner wrote the Ministry of Finance that the
full pardoned bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of he preventive suspension which is august 1, 1982; that she is entitled to
back pay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P 4,892.50. The Ministry of Finance referred the request to
the Office of the President which denied the same and ruled that petitioner is not entitled to
automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon and that she is liable for the civil
liability concomitant to her previous conviction. Hence the present petition. Petitione theorized
that the general rule on pardon cannot apply to her by reason of the fact that she was extended
executive clemency while her case still pending appeal. There having no final judgment of
conviction, he employment therefore as asst. treasurer cannot be said to have been terminated or
forfeited. In other words without the final judgment o conviction, the accessory penalty of
forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her employment remained “suspended”. More
importantly, when pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because
there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President of the Philippines declared her not guilty
of the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same.
Held: The 1981 amendments (of the 1973 constitution) had deleted the earlier rule that
clemency could be extended only upon final conviction implying that clemency could be given
even before conviction. Thus, petitioner’s unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal
pending in the high court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former
limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present
case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the
result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have
abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the
character of finality.
Xxx
The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least not one based on the offender’s
innocence) as relieving the party from the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the
disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more.
To say however, that the offender is a “new man”, and as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense, is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged
guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving punishment
though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one
never found guilty of a crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his conviction.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in
force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can
be required. This would explain why petitioner, thug pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earning s and benefit.
Xxx
Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are “historical” facts which,
despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, “ordinary, prudent
men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restore him all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person’s
innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose
of the privilege.
Xxx
The rationale is plainly evidence. Public offices are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private
interest. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted on e from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full
and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed
to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
conviction.
Xxx. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is
governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any
reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s
civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, GR No, 78239, Feb. 9, 1989).
4.Pardon, either conditional or absolute must not be granted , or its application should not
be acted upon unless the appeal is withdrawn. Acceptance of pardon does not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal.
Case: We now declare that the “conviction by final judgment” limitation under section 19,
Art. VII of the present constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an
accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application
therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process towards its grant should not
begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the
government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his
conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification
issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon
shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by
virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of appeal shall
render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the
accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from
confinement. (Pp vs. Salle, Jr., et al., GR No. 103 567, Dec. 4, 1995).
5. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action and
the preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.
Case: On Sept. 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former Pres. Estrada, a former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Crim. Case No. 26558. On
Oct, 2007, however, former Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way
of pardon, to former President Estrada. The full text of said pardon states:
Xxxx
XXXX
WHEREAS, Joseph Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office.
IN VIEW HEREOF, and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution,
I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored
tom his civil and political rights.
Xxx
On Nov. 30, 2009, former Pres. Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
the President, but a disqualification case was filed against Pres. Estrada. Pres. Estrada lost in the
presidential election and hence the petition was dismissed on the ground of mootness.
On Oct. 2, 2012, former Pres. Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and
filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of
Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal, filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada invoking Sec. 40
of the Local Govt. Code, which disqualifies persons running for any elective position convicted
by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two(2) years after serving sentence and Sec.
40 of the Omnibus Election Code which disqualifies a person to be a candidate and to hold any
public office if convicted for any offense, for which he been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months of for a crime involving moral turpitude, unless he has been given
pleanary pardon or granted amnesty. The COMELEC dismissed the petition. Hence this case.
Held: Former Pres. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his
civil and political rights which, naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. Xxx
Recall that the petition for disqualification file by Risos-Vidal against former President
Estrada,xxx, was anchored on Sec. 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is,
having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving
moral turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective
office notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a statement
expressing “[he] is hereby restored to his civil and political rights”.
Risos-Vidal theorizes that former Pres, Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of
Manila Cityxxx for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of his
right to vote and be voted upon for public office. She invokes Art. 36 and 41 of the RPC as the
foundation of her theory.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
In Cristobal vs. Labrador and Pelobillo vs. Palatino, which were decided under the 1935
constitution, wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the President shared similar
phraseology with what was found in the present 1987 constitution, the Court then unequivocally
declared that “subject to the limitations imposed by the constitutions, the pardoning power cannot
be restricted or controlled by legislative action. The Court reiterated this pronouncement in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. thereby establishing that, under the present constitution, “ a pardon,
being s presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by a legislative action.” Thus, it is
unmistakably the long-standing positions of this court that the exercise of the pardoning power is
discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except
only when it exceeds the limits provided by the constitution.
Xxx
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to Former Pres. Estrada shows that
both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the
pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former Pres. Estrada
who was convicted by the Sandignabayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The
sentence that followed which states that “(he) is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,”
expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC, it is indubitable from the text of
the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification
were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
“[w]hereas, Joseph Eejrcito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office,” neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that
the former President Estrada’s right to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been
restored. This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term “civil and political rights” being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reason for the enactment, usually introduced
by the word “whereas”. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking,
they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at
issue is not an integral part of the decree of pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone
operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfillment of
the afore-mentioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon. ( Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal,
Petitioner, and Alfredo s. Lim-Intervenor vs. COMELEC and Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GR
No. 206666, Jan. 21, 2015).
Art. 37 (cost).
The following are included in the costs:
1. Fees, and
2. Indemnities, in the course of judicial proceedings.
Payment of cost is discretionary upon the court. Appeal will hardly lie to interfere with the
discretion. (Bacolod Murcia Planters’ Assn., Inc. vs. Chua, 84 Phil. 596, 599).
Art. 39. Subsidiary imprisonment.
1. What is a subsidiary penalty?

It is a subsidiary personal liability to be suffered by the convict who has no property with
which to meet the fine, at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the rules provided
for in Art. 39.
2. No subsidiary imprisonment if not imposed in the judgment of conviction.
An accused cannot be made to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to
pay the fine imposed upon him when the subsidiary imprisonment is not imposed in the judgment
of conviction. (Ramos vs. Gonong, 72 SCRA 559, 565).
3. Rules as to subsidiary imprisonment:
1. If the penalty imposed is prision correccional or arresto and fine – the subsidiary
imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the term of the sentence, and in no case to continue for more
than one year. Fraction or part of a day, not included.
2. When the penalty imposed is fine only – subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 6
months, if the culprit is prosecuted for grave or less grave felony, and not to exceed 15 days, if
prosecuted for light felony.
3. When the penalty imposed is higher than prission correccional – no subsidiary
imprisonment.
4. If the penalty is not to be executed by confinement, but of fixed duration – subsidiary
penalty shall consist in the same deprivation as those of the principal penalty, under the same
rules as in Nos. 1,2 and 3 above.
5. In case the financial circumstances of the convict should improve, he shall pay the fine,
notwithstanding the fact that the convict suffered subsidiary personal liability therefor.
4. Subsidiary imprisonment is not an accessory penalty.
Therefore, the culprit cannot be made to undergo subsidiary imprisonment unless the
judgment expressly so provides. (Pp. Fajarado, 65 Phil. 539, 542).
Art. 40-44 ( Penalties in which accessory penalties are inherent).
1. Outline of accessory penalties inherent in principal penalties:

DEATH, when not executed by reason of commutation or pardon – (1) perpetual
absolute disqualification; and (2) civil interdiction for 30 years, if not expressly remitted in the
pardon.
RECLUSION PERPETUA AND RECLUSION TEMPORAL – (1) civil interdiction for life or
during the sentence; and (2) perpetual absolute disqualification, unless expressly remitted in the
pardon of the principal penalty.
PRISION MAYOR – (1) temporary absolute disqualification; and (2) perpetual special
disqualification from suffrage, unless expressly remitted in the pardon of the principal penalty.
PRISION CORRECCIONAL – (1) suspension from public office, profession or calling;
and (2) perpetual special disqualification from suffrage, if the duration of the imprisonment
exceeds 18 months, unless expressly remitted in the pardon of the principal penalty.
Note; There is perpetual special disqualification from suffrage, only when the duration of
the imprisonment exceeds 18 months.
ARRESTO – suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the
term of the sentence.
Art. 45 – Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime.
Outline of the provision of this article.

1. Every penalty imposed carries with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instrument or tools used in the commission of the crime.
2. The proceeds and the instruments or tolls of the crime are confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the government.
3. Property of a third person not liable for the offense, is not subject to confiscation and
forfeiture.
4. Property not subject of lawful commerce (whether it belongs to the accused or to third
person) shall be destroyed.
1. Confiscation and forfeiture are additional penalties.
If the accused has already pleaded guilty to the charge and paid the fine, but the court
did not order the confiscation of the money used in illegal gambling, the Court can no longer order
their confiscation as the same would be an additional penalty, and as the sentence has become
final, the same can no longer be modified, alter or change the sentence. (U.S vs. Hart, 24 Phil.
578, 581-582).
Where the penalty imposed did not include the confiscation of the dollars involved, the
confiscation or forfeiture of the said dollars as is sought in the government appeal, would be an
additional penalty and would amount to an increase in the penalty already imposed, thereby
placing the accused in double jeopardy. (Pp. vs. Alejandro Paet y Velasco, 100 Phil. 357, Pp.
vs. Sanchez, 101 Phil. 745-748).
But in the case of Pp. vs. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125, the Supreme Court ruled that when the
accused has appealed, confiscation and forfeiture not ordered by the trial court, may be imposed
by the appellate court.
How to reconcile the Paet and Exconde case?
In Pp. vs. Paet, and Sanchez, the Supreme Court did not entertain the appeal of the
government from the refusal of the court to decree such a forfeiture because in a criminal case
wherein the accused did not appeal, no appeal can be taken by the government with a view to
increasing the penalty imposed by the court below; and the confiscation being an additional
penalty, the accused would be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
should the government appeal be entertained. But in the case of Exconde, the accused’s own
appeal has removed all bars to the review and correction of the penalty imposed by the court
below, even if an increase thereof should be the result.
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crime.
1. In complex crime at least two crimes must be committed.

Art. 48 requires the commission of at least two crimes, that is, two or more grave or less
grave felonies which resulted from a single act, or an offense must be necessary means for
committing the other.
2. A complex crime is only one crime.
Although there two or more crimes actually committed, they constitute only one crime in
the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one
criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the evil intent of the offender is only one. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the
commission of a complex crime. (Pp. vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515).
3. Two kids of complex crime:
1. When a single act constitute two or more grave or less grave felonies (compound
crime).
2. When an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (complex crime
proper).
Case: Single act of throwing a highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas
resulting in the death of another person, committed several grave felonies. (Pp. vs. Guillen, 85
Phil. 307, 318).
Case: Placing a time bomb in a plane, which caused it to explode in mid-air, killing 13
other persons therein, constitute a complex crime of multiple murder and destruction of property.
(Pp. vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061 -1062).
Case: Although several independent acts were performed by the accused in firing
separate shots from their individual firearms, it was not possible to determine who among them
actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi. Moreover, there is no evidence that accused appellants
intended to fire at each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On
the contrary the evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugad’s group as
a whole. Thus, one of accused-appellants exclaimed in frustration after the ambush: “My gosh,
we were not able to kill all of them.” Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single
purpose, their individual act in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act
of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense. (Pp. vs. Sanidad, GR No. 146099, April
30, 2003).
Case: appellant’s single act of detonating an explosive device may quantitatively
constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses should be considered only as a
single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the offenders were impelled by
a single criminal impulse which shows their lesser degree of perversity. (Dominador Malana, et
al., vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173612, March 26, 2008).
Case: the single act of throwing into the bedroom of the victims causing the death of
three persons and injuries to one person constituted the complex crime of multiple murder and
attempted murder. (Pp. vs. Carpo, et al., 356 SCRA 248 [2001]).
4. Several shots from Thompson sub-machine gun causing several deaths,
although caused by a single act of pressing the trigger, are considered several acts.
Case: The accused fired his Thompson sub-machine gun at several persons. The first
burst of shots hit three persons. The accused let loose a second burst of shots wounding two
others.
Held: For each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victim corresponds a
distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as
many offenses as those resulting from every single act that produced the same. (Pp. vs.
Desierto, CA, 45 OG 4542).
4. Cases not held to be complex offenses.
Case: When the acts are wholly different, not only in themselves, but also because they
are directed against two different persons, as when one fires his revolver in succession, killing
one person and wounding another. (U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56).
Case: When two persons are killed one after the other, by different acts, although these
two killings were the result of a single criminal impulse. (Pp. vs. Alfindo, 47 Phil. 1).
Case: The appellant alone killed all the six victims, one after another, with one shot each.
(Pp. vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, 612).
Compare Remollino, supra with Lawas case:, where the Supreme Court held: “If the act
or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single”. The
Supreme Court continued by stating, “it may also be added that there is absolutely no evidence
as to the number of persons killed by each and everyone of the appellants, so even if we were
induced to hold each appellant responsible for each and every death caused by him, it is
impossible to carry that desire into effect as it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths
caused by each and everyone. We are, therefore, forced to find the appellants guilty of only one
offense of multiple homicide for which the penalty to be imposed should be in the maximum
period. (Pp. vs. Lawas, GR L-7618, June 30, 1955).
Note: The ruling of Lawas is applicable only when there is no evidence at all to show the
number of persons killed by each of several defendants.
5. Several light felonies resulting from one single act – not complex.
Case: A collision between two automobiles driven in a careless and negligent manner,
resulting in the physical injuries of the passengers and light felony of damage to property, there is
no complex crime, because the crime of slight physical injuries, as well as damage to property is
light felony. (Pp. vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001, 1002).
6. Applicable to crimes through negligence.
Case: A Municipal Mayor who accidentally discharge his re3volver during a school
program killing a girl and injuring a boy requiring medical attendance for more than 30 days, was
found guilty of complex crime of homicide with less serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. (Pp. vs. Castro, 40 OG Supp. 12, 83).
Case: A man while pouring a gasoline in the tank of his passenger bus in a garage used
a candle to light the place. The gasoline caught fire and the house was burned. His mother-in-
law, who jumped from a window during the fire, died due to burns and injuries and another person
suffered serious physical injuries. Held: The crimes of arson, homicide, serious physical injuries,
and damage to property constitute a complex crime within the meaning of Art. 48. (Pp. vs.
Pacson, CA, 46 OG 2165).
“When an offense is a necessary means for committing the other”

Requisites:
1. That at least two offenses are committed.
2. That one or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the other.
3. That both or all the offenses must be punished under the same statute.
Abduction as a necessary means for committing rape.
Case: A girl, 19 years of age, who had worked in the rice fields in Calamba Laguna, was on her
way home in the afternoon. When in an uninhabited place, the two accused forcibly abducted her
against her strong protest and resistance, took her to the woods in Silang, Cavite, and other
places where she was raped by one of the accused while her hands were being held by the other.
Held: the crime of forcible abduction was a necessary means for committing the crime of rape.
(See Pp. vs. Manguiat, 51 Phil. 406).
7. In complex crime, when the offender executes various acts, he must have a
single purpose.
Case: The accused received 17 money orders with a letter, all in one envelope,
addressed to the offended party. The accused presented them to the post office for cashing on
one occasion, after having falsified the signature of the remitter on each and every one of the 17
money orders. Held: In all the acts performed, there was only one criminal intent. To commit
estafa, the accused had to commit 17 falsifications. These falsifications were necessary means to
commit estafa. (Pp. vs. Gallardo, CA 52 OG 3103).
Case: But if a person falsified 27 vouchers, not to commit estafa or malversation, he is
liable for 27 falsifications, because the various acts of falsifications were not executed for the
attainment of a single purpose. (See Gonzales vs. City Fiscal, CA-GR. No. 19075-R, March 20,
1957).
8. Subsequent acts of intercourse, after forcible abduction with rape, are separate
acts of rape.
Case: The complaining witness was forcibly abducted by the four accused and violated
on board a truck by one of them with the assistance of three others, and after reaching a house in
the evening, the four of them alternatively ravished her inside the house three times each and
one each the following morning. Held: There was only one forcible abduction with rape which was
the one committed in the truck, and the subsequent acts of intercourse in the house against her
will are separate acts of rape. Reason for the ruling: When the first act of rape was committed in
the truck, the crime of forcible abduction was already consummated so that each of the
succeeding rapes committed in the house cannot legally be considered as still connected with the
abduction. The crimes committed are one (1) forcible abduction with rape and sixteen (16)
separate rapes. (Pp. vs. Bohos, No. L-40995, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 353, 364).
9. No complex crime, when one offense is committed to conceal the other.

Case: After committing homicide, the accused, in order to conceal the crime, set fire to
the house where it had been perpetrated. (Pp. vs. Bersabal, 48 Phil. 439, 442). Note: Homicide
nor arson was neither necessary to commit the other.
Case: A postmaster received from the offended party P 1, 250 to be transmitted as a
telegraph money order to a third person. He failed to send the money and when the complainant
demanded its return, he returned only P 417, having already misappropriated the difference of P
833. He then forged the signature of the complainant to a receipt made by him, reciting therein
that said complainant had already received from him the entire amount. Held: The amount
appropriated for himself was in the possession and at the disposal of the accused and he could
have appropriated it to himself without the necessity of the falsified document. Two crimes were
committed. The falsification was a means to conceal, not to commit, the malversation. (U.S. vs.
Geta, 43 Phil. 1009, 1013).
9. When a complex crime is charged and one offense is not proven, the accused
can be convicted of the other.
Case: When a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as
to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the other. ( Pp. vs.
Maribung, NO. L-47500, April 29, 1987, 149 SCRA 292, 300-310, 304).
10. Complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public
Documents which involves an amount exceeding P 22,000.00 is not a capital offense and
therefore the accused can post bail as a matter of right. Note: Malversation of Public
Funds involving an amount exceeding P 22,000.00 carries a penalty of reclusion temporal
in its maximum to reclusion perpetua.
Case: It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant her the
same only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime committed. Likewise, it is unjust
for us to give a stamp of approval in depriving the accused person’s constitutional right to bail for
allegedly committing a complex crime that is not even considered as inherently grievous, odious
and hateful. To note article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature of the
constituent offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum penalty prescribed by law.
When committed through falsification of public/official documents, the RPC does not intend to
classify malversation as a capital offense. Otherwise the complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of official/public documents involving an amount that exceeds P
22,000 should have been expressly included in Republic Act No. 7659. If truly a non-bailable
offense, the law should have already considered it as a special complex crime like robbery with
rape, robbery with homicide, rape with homicide and kidnapping with murder and homicide, which
have prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Case: AAA was kidnapped by the accused on Dec. 2, 2000 from a dancing hall in Brgy.
San Francisco, Legazpi City. She was brought different places where she was repeatedly raped
by the accused. The RTC convicted the accused of kidnapping, four counts of rape and one
count of rape through sexual assault. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification. It found
accused guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, four counts of rape, and one
count of rape by sexual assault.
Held: We find the accused guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal
detention with rape.
Xxxx
Emphatically, the last par. Of Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659, states
that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This rovision
gives rise to a special complex crime.
Xxx
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is
because the composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact RA 7659
punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, RA 7659 depreciated the seriousness
of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped , like in the present case, there
is only one crime committed- the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. ( Pp vs.
Merandilla, Jr. GR No. 186417, July 27, 2011).
CONTINUING CRIME.
A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is a single crime, consisting of a series of
acts but all arising from a criminal resolution.
A continuing offense is a continuous , unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single
impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.
Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime committed.
Case: A thief who takes from the yard of a house two game roosters belonging to two
different persons commits only one crime, for there is a unity of thought in the criminal purpose of
the offender. There is no series of acts here for the accomplishment of different purposes, but
only of one (purpose) which is consummated. (Pp. vs. de Leon, 49 Phil. 437, 439-441). In
getting hold of the two roosters, it is not done by a single act of taking, but by two separate acts.
There is, however, a unity of thought and action in taking the two roosters.
Case: The taking of six roosters from coop is a single offense of theft. The assumption is
that accused were animated by single criminal impulse. (Pp. vs. Jaranilla, No. L-28547, Feb. 22,
1974 55 SCRA 563, 575).
Compare these two cases with Pp. vs. Enguero.
Facts: Appellants were charged with the crime of robbery in band in three separate
informations, committed by robbing one house, then proceeded to another house where the
second robbery was committed and then to another house where the third robbery was
committed. Held: Appellants argued that they are guilty of one crime only, citing in support of their
contention the case of Pp. vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437. The contention is without merit. In the case
cited, defendant entered the yard of a house where he found two fighting cocks belonging to
different persons and took them. In the present case, appellants, after committing the first crime,
went to another house where they committed the second and proceeded to another house where
they committed the third. Obviously, the rule in the case cited cannot be invoked and applied to
the present case. (Pp vs. Enguero, 100 Phil. 101).
Compare Enguero with Pp. vs. Dela Cruz.
Facts: While the in habitants of a barrio were working in a sugar mill, seven armed
persons, who had a general plan to commit robbery against all those in the place, entered into the
mill and while two of the bandits guarded the people with guns leveled at them, five of them
ransacked the houses for their personal properties. Held: The several acts of ransacking the
different houses were not unconnected and entirely distinct from one another. They formed
component parts of the general plan to despoil all those within the vicinity. There is only one
crime of robbery in this case. (Pp. vs. Dela Cruz, GR No. L-1745, May 23, 1950.)
10. The series of acts born of a single criminal impulse may be perpetrated during
a long period of time.
Case: A sent anonymous letter to B, demanding P 5,000.00 under threats of death and
burning the latter’s house. B sent P 1,000 to A. Two months later, A sent again another letter to
B, demanding the balance of P 4,000 and making the same threats. B sent P 2,000 to A. Four
months later, A sent again another letter to B demanding the amount of P 2,000 and making the
same threats. B sent P 1,000. Six months thereafter, A sent another letter to B, demanding the
remaining of P 1,000 and making the same threats. This time a was arrested for grave threats.
Held: The different acts of sending letters of demand for money with threats to kill and burn the
house of the offended party constitute only one and the same crime of grave threats born of a
single criminal impulse to attain a definite objective. ( Pp. vs. Moreno, CA, 34 OG 1767).
TRANSITORY CRIME (Moving crime)
Ex: Kidnapping for the purpose of ransom, by forcibly taking the victim from Manila to
Bulacan where ransom was demanded. The offenders can be prosecuted and tried either in
Manila or in Bulacan.
When a transitory crime is committed, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality, city or province wherein any of the essential ingredients thereof took
place. The singleness of the crime, by committing two or more acts, is not considered.
Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different
from that intended.
The rules:
1. If the penalty for the felony committed be higher than the penalty for the offense which
the accused intended to commit, the lower penalty shall be imposed.
2. If the penalty for the felony committed be lower than the penalty for the offense which
the accused intended to commit, the lower penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. If the act committed also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, and the
law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter, the penalty for the attempted or frustrated
crime shall be imposed in the maximum period.
1. Art. 49 applies only when there is a mistake in the identity of the victim of the
crime, and the penalty for the crime committed is different from that for the crime intended
to be committed.
(1) Aberration ictus-
Ex.: A fired his gun at his father, with intent to kill him, but he missed and hit C, killing the
latter.
In this case, two crimes were actually committed: (1) homicide, of which C was the victim;
and (2) attempted parricide, of which A’s father was the offended party. Thus, A committed a
complex crime of homicide with attempted parricide. Art. 48 and not 49 is applicable.
(2) Error in personae-

Ex.: A, thinking that the person walking in a dark alley was B, a stranger, fired at that
person, who was killed as a result. It turned out that person was C, the father of A. In this case,
the crime actually committed is parricide, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The crime
which A intended to commit is homicide, punishable by reclusion temporal. The penalty for
homicide shall be imposed in its maximum. (Art. 49, par. 1).
But if A wanted to kill his father and waited for the latter to arrive in a dark alley; when a
saw a person coming and thinking that he was his father, A shot him; and it turned out that the
person is a stranger. A should be punished with the penalty for homicide in the maximum period.
(8) Prater intentionem-
Ex.: A, without intent to kill, boxed B from behind on the back part of the latter’s head. B
fell to the cement pavement with his head striking it. B died due to the fracture of the skull. In this
case, the death of B was not intended by A.
RULES REGARDING SUCCESSIVE SERVICE OF TWO OR MORE PENALTIES

(Art. 70, as amended by C.A. No. 251).
1. To be served by the culprit simultaneously if the nature of the penalties permit.

Ex.: Destiero and Fine.
2. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual or temporary special
disqualification, public censure, suspension from public office and other accessory
penalties can be served simultaneously with other penalties. (Rodriduez vs.
Director of Prison, 47 SCRA 353).
3. Otherwise, the following rule shall apply (successive service of sentence).
a. The penalties are to be served in the following order of severity.
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision Mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto Mayor
7. Destiero
8. Perpetual absolute disqualification
9. Temporary absolute disqualification
10. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right
to follow profession or calling
11. Public censure.
b. The maximum duration of the sentence should not be more rthan three times
the most sever penalty. (Three fold rule)
c. The maximum period cannot exceed 40 years
d. The duration of perpetual penalties is 30 years.
- The three-fold rule applies although the penalties were imposed for different crimes art
different times and under separate informations. (Torres vs. Superintnedent, 58 Phil.
847).
- The phrase ‘most severe penalty” includes equal penalties. (Aspra vs. Direcrtor, 85
Phil. 737). If in six estafas, accused was sentenced to 3 minths and 11 days in each case
and he should serve 3 times 3 months and 11 days or 9 months and 33 days.
- The 3-fold maximum penalty does not preclude subsidiary imprisonment. This means to
say that after prisoner has served the highest penalty under the three-fold rule, he still
has to serve the payment of all indemnities (now fine only) with ir without subsidiary
imprisonment provided the principal penalty does not exceed 6 years. So, if the prisoner
after serving the three-fold maximum penalty cannot pay the fine, he still has to serve the
subsidiary imprisonment as long as the principal penalty does not exceed 6 years.
(Bagtas vs. Director of Prison, 47 OG 1743).
Book Two
CRIMES AND PENALTIES
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY

Section One- Treason and Espionage
Art. 114 - Treason.
Elements of Treason:
1. That the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines.
2. That there is a war in which the Philippines is involved;
3. That the offender either-
a. levies war against the government, or
b. adheres to the enemies, giving them aid or comfort.
Treason – is breach of allegiance to a government, committed by a person who owes
allegiance to it.
Allegiance- is the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individuals owe to the
government under which the individuals under which they live or to their sovereign, in return for
the protection they receive.
The offender in treason is either a Filipino citizen or a resident alien.

Thus, the offender is treason must be a Filipino citizen, as he should not be a foreigner.
Now as amended by Executive Order No. 44, Revised Penal Code now punishes a resident alien
who commits treason. (Pp. vs. Marcaida, 79 Phil. 283).
Allegiance may either be temporary (resident alien) or permanent.

Temporary allegiance- is the obligation of fidelity and obedience which a resident alien
owes to our government. (Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 956).
Treason can be committed in times of war only.
Treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense

and self-preservation. The law of treason is an emergency .measure. It remains dormant until the
emergency arises. But as war starts, it relentlessly put into effect. (Concurring opinion of
Justice Perfecto in Laurel vs. Misa, supra).
Two modes of committing treason

1. By levying war against the government.
2. By adhering to the enemies of the Philippines, giving them aid or comfort.

Levying war – is the actual assembling of men for the purpose of executing a
treasonable design by force.
It is not necessary that there be a formal declaration of the existence of a state of
war.
It is not necessary that there be any formal declaration of the existence of a state of war.
Actual hostilities may determine the commencement of war, (Justice Johneson, dissenting;
U.S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil. 495).
The levying of war must be in collaboration with a foreign enemy.
If the levying of war is merely a civil uprising, without the intention of helping an external
enemy, the crime is not treason. The offender may be held liable for rebellion.
Adherence to the enemy – means to betray. When a citizen intellectually or emotionally
favors the enemy and harbors sympathies or conviction disloyal to his country’s policy or interest.
(Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Supt. Ct 918, April 23, 1945).
Aid or comfort – means an act which strengthens or tends to strengthen the enemy in
the conduct of war against the traitor’s country and an act which tends to weaken the power of
the traitor’s country to resist or to attack the enemy. (Cramer vs. U.S., supra).
Adherence alone without giving the enemy aid or comfort, does not constitute
treason.
Friendly relations with the Japanese during the war, openly revealing himself sympathetic
to the cause of the enemy and also believing in the invincibility of the Japanese Armed Forces
does not in itself constitute a treasonable act. The crime of treason must consist of two (2)
elements: 1) adherence to the enemy; and 2) rendering him aid and comfort. (Pp. vs Tan, P.C.,
42 OG 12 63, see also Pp. vs. Roble, 83 Phil. 1).
Where treason can be committed.
If the offender is a Filipino, treason can be committed outside of the Philippines, in the
Philippines or elsewhere.
If the offender is a alien residing in the Philippines, treason must be committed in the
Philippines (E.O. No. 44).
Treason is a continuous offense.

Treason is of such nature that it may be committed by a single act, by a series of acts, or
by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous
crime. (Pp. vs. Victoria, 78 Phil. 129).
Two-witness rule.
The testimony of two witnesses is required to prove the overt act of giving aid or comfort.
It is not necessary to prove adherence.
The defendant should be acquitted if only one of the two witnesses is believed by the
Court. (See. People vs. Adriano, 78 Phil. 563-567).
Reason for the two-witness rule.

The special nature of the crime of treason that the accused be afforded a special
protection not required in other cases so as to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The extreme
seriousness of the crime, for which death is one of the penalties provided by law, and the fact that
the crime is committed on abnormal times, when small differences may in mortal enmity wipe out
all scruples in sacrificing the truth, require that, at least, two witnesses must testify to overt acts of
treason, if the same should be accepted by the tribunals as legal basis to condemn a person as a
traitor. (Pp. vs Marcaida, 79 Phil. 295, conurring opinion of Justice Perfecto).
Reason why two-witness rule not applicable in adherence to the enemy.

It seems obvious that adherence, in the sense of a disloyal state of mind, cannot be, and
is not required to be, proved by deposition of two witnesses, because what is designed in the
mind of an accused never is susceptible of proof by direct testimony. ( Reyes).
Art. 115 – Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason.
How are the crimes of conspiracy and proposal to commit treason committed?
Conspiracy to commit treason is committed when in time of war, two or more persons
come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to
give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it.
Two witness rule is not applicable in this offense as this is a separate and distinct offense
from that of treason. (U.S. vs. Bautista, et al., 6 Phil. 581).
Art. 116. Misprision of treason.

Elements:
1. That the offender must be owing allegiance to the Government, and not foreigner.
2. That he has knowledge of any conspiracy (to commit treason) against the
government.
3. That he conceals or does not disclose and make known the same as soon as
possible to the governor or fiscal of the province or the mayor or fiscal of the city in
which he resides.
Art. 116 does not apply when the crime of treason has already been committed.
This is because Art. 116 speaks of “knowledge of any conspiracy against” the
government of the Philippines, not knowledge of treason actually committed by another.
Note: the offender in Art. 116 is a principal, not an accessory, but he is punished
as an accessory of the crime of treason
Art. 117 – Espionage.

Two ways of committing espionage.
1. By entering, without authority therefore, a warship, fort, or naval or military
establishment or reservation to obtain any information, plans, photographs or other data of a
confidential nature relative to the defense of the Philippines.
Elements:
a) That the offender enters any of the places mentioned therein;
b) That he has no authority therefore;
c) That his purpose is to obtain information, plans, photographs or other data of
a confidential nature relative to the defense of the Philippines. (Guevara).
2. By disclosing to the representative of a foreign nature the contents of the articles, data
or information referred to in paragraph No. 1 of Art. 117, by reason of the public office he holds;
Elements:
a) That the offender is a public officer;
b) That he has in possession of the articles, data or information to in paragraph No. 1 of
Art. 117, by reason of the public office he holds;
c) That he discloses their contents to a representative of a foreign nation.
It is not necessary that information, etc. is obtained.
Under the first way of committing espionage, it is not necessary that the offender should
have obtained any information, plan, etc. It is sufficient that he has the purpose to obtain any of
them when he entered a warship, fort, naval or military establishment.
Other acts of espionage are punished by Com. Act No. 616.

Art. 118. Inciting to war or giving motive for reprisal.
Elements:
1. That the offender performs unlawful or unauthorized acts.
2. that such acts provoke or give occasion for a war involving or liable to involve the
Philippines, or expose Filipino citizens to reprisals on their personal property.
Examples:
The raising, without sufficient authorization, of troops within the Philippines for the service
of a foreign nation against another nation.
The public destruction of the flag or seal of a foreign state or the public manifestation of
hostility to the head or ambassador of another state.
Reason for the law: Such acts might disturb the friendly relation that we have with a
foreign country, and they are penalized even if they constitute a mere imprudence. (Albert).
The intention of the offender is immaterial.

If the unlawful or unauthorized acts of the accused provoke or give occasion for a war or
expose Filipino citizens to reprisals, the crime is committed regardless of his intention. The law
considers the effects produced by the acts of the accused.
Art. 119. Violation of neutrality.

Elements:
1. That there is a war in which the Philippines is not involved;
2. That there is a regulation issued by competent authority for the purpose of enforcing
neutrality;
6. That the offender violates such regulations.
Art. 120. Correspondence with hostile country.

Elements:
1. That it is time of war in which the Philippines is involved;
2. That the offender makes correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied
by any troops.
3. That the correspondence is either-
(a) prohibited by the Government, or
(b) carried on in ciphers or conventional signs, or
© containing notice or information which might be useful to the enemy.

Even if correspondence contains innocent maters, if the correspondence has been
prohibited by the Government, it is punishable.
If the correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by enemy troops has
been prohibited by the Government, the crime is committed even if the correspondence or letter
contains innocent matters, because of the possibility that some information useful to the enemy
might be revealed unwittingly. (Reyes).
Prohibition by the Government is not essential in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Art. 120.
(Reyes).
Art. 121. Flight to enemy’s country.
Elements:
1.That there is a war in which the Philippines is involved;
2. That the offender must be owing allegiance to the Government;
1. That the offender attempts to flee or go to enemy country;
2. That going to enemy country is prohibited by competent authority.
An alien resident may be guilty of flight to enemy country.
An alien resident in the country can be held liable under this article. The law does not say
“not being a foreigner.” Hence, the allegiance contemplated in this article is either permanent or
temporary allegiance. (Reyes).
Mere attempt to flee or go to enemy country consummates the crime.
It should be noted that mere attempt to flee or go to enemy country when prohibited by
competent authority consummate the felony. (Reyes).
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas or in Philippine water.
Two ways or modes of committing piracy:
1. By attacking or seizing a vessel on the high seas or in Philippine waters;
2. By seizing in the vessel while on the high seas or in Philippine waters the whole or part
of its cargo, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
Elements of piracy:
1. That a vessel is on the high seas or in Philippine waters;
2. That the offenders are not members of its complement or passengers of the vessels;
3. That the offenders (a) attack or seize that vessel, or (b) seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
Meaning of “high seas”
It does not mean that the crime be committed beyond the three-mile limit (now 12 miles)
of any state. It means waters on the sea coast which are without the boundaries of low water
mark, although such waters may be in the jurisdictional limit of a foreign government. (Pp. vs.
Lo-lo, et al., 43 Phil. 19).
Where piracy may be filed?
Piracy may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may
be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. (Pp. vs. Lo-lo, supra).
Note: Piracy does not apply to an enemy vessel in time of war as such will be considered
an act of war. This rule does not apply to an enemy vessel which is non-belligerent.
Case: The act of compelling complainants to go elsewhere other than their place of
destination is part of the act of seizing complainant’s boat. (Pp. vs. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075,
September 5, 1997).
Mutiny – is the unlawful resistance to a superior officer, or the raising of commotions and
disturbance on board a ship against the authority of its commander. (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary,
Vol. 2, p. 2283).
When Piracy and Mutiny considered as Terrorism under RA 9372?
Under RA 9372, otherwise known as Human Security Act of 2007, approved on March 6,
2007, a person who commits an act punishable as piracy and mutiny under Art. 122, thereby
sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of
the crime of terrorism, and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the
benefit of parole.
Art. 123. Qualified Piracy.
Piracy or mutiny is, therefore, qualified of if any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) Whenever the offenders have seized the vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;
(b) Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without the means of saving
themselves, or
© Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries, or rape.
Note: Qualified mutiny applies only to pars. 2 & 3 of Art. 123.
P.D. No. 532 (1974) covers on piracy “any person”

P.D. 532, issued in 1974, amended Art. 122 of RPC by embracing in its coverage “all
persons”, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters.
RA 7659 widened the coverage of Art. 122 to include offenses committed in

Philippine waters.
Before the amendment of Art. 122 by RA 7659, only piracy and mutiny on high seas was
covered by RPC. Now, it includes offenses committed on Philippine waters.
R.A. No. 62 35 (1971) Aircraft Piracy or Hijacking

- It is committed by any person who compels a change in the course or destination of an
aircraft of Philippine registry, or seizes or usurps the control thereof, while it is in flight. Aircraft is
in flight from the moment all its external doors are closed following embarkation until any of such
doors are opened for disembarkation.
- It is also committed by any person who compels an aircraft of foreign registry to land in
Philippine territory or seizes or usurps the control thereof while it is within the said territory.
Penalty:1. not less than 12 yrs. But not more than 20 yrs., or fine of not less than P
20,000, but not more than P 40,000.00.
2. 15 yrs. to death, or fine of not less than P 25,000.00 but not more than P 50,000.00, if
committed under the following circumstances:
1. Whenever he has fired upon the pilot, member of the crew or passenger of the aircraft;
2. Whenever he has exploded or attempted to explode any bomb or explosive to destroy

the aircraft; or
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, serious physical injuries or
rape.
Title Two
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE
Chapter One
Art. 124. Arbitrary Detention.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
When is there a detention?

Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in any
manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty. (Pp. vs. Flores, GR No. 116488, May 31,
2001).
Even if the person detained could move freely in and out of their prison cell and could
take their meals outside the prison, nevertheless, if they were under surveillance of the guards
and they could not escape for fear of being apprehended again, there would still be an arbitrary
detention. (Pp. vs. Camerino, CA-GR No. 14207-R, Dec. 14, 1956).
Arbitrary detention may be committed thru imprudence.

Where the Chief of Police rearrested a woman who had been released by means of
verbal order of the justice of the peace. The accused acted without malice, but he should have
verified the order of release before proceeding to make the re-arrest. The crime is arbitrary
detention through simple imprudence punished under Art. 365 of RPC. (Pp. vs. Misa, CA 36 OG
3496).
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial authorities.
Elements:
2. That he has detained a person for some legal ground.
3. That he fails to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within:
(a) 12 hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their
equivalent; or
(b) 18 hrs, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties; or
(c) 36 hrs., for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive penalty.
If the offender is a private person, the crime is illegal detention.

A private individual who makes a lawful arrest must also comply with the requirements
prescribed in Art. 125. If he fails to do so, he is liable for illegal detention (Art. 267 or 268), not
arbitrary detention. (see Pp. vs. Sali, et al., CA 50 OG 5676).
Art. 125 does not apply if the arrest is by virtue of a warrant of arrest.
Art. 125 applies only when the arrest is made without a warrant of arrest. But the arrest
must be lawful.
“Delivery of arrested person to judicial authority”; construed.

The delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested without a warrant by a peace
officer, does not consist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation or charge or filing of
an information against the person arrested with the corresponding court or judge, whereby the
latter acquires jurisdiction to issue an order of release or of commitment of the prisoner, because
the arresting officer cannot transfer to the judge and the latter does not assume the physical
custody of the person arrested. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 859).
“Proper Judicial Authorities.”
“Proper Judicial Authorities”, as used in Art. 125 means the court of justice or judges of
said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person
charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the “Supreme Court and such inferior
courts as may be established by law”. Fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city are not
included because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment for temporary
confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of the person arrest without
warrant. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, supra.)
Fiscal not liable unless he ordered detention.
If the City Fiscal does not file the information within the period prescribed by the law and
the arresting officer continues holding the prisoner beyond the prescribed period, the fiscal will
not be responsible for violation of Art. 125, because he is not the one who arrested and illegally
detained the person arrested, unless he has ordered or induced the arresting officer to hold and
not release the prisoner after the expiration of said period. ( Sayo, vs. Chief of Police of Manila,
supra.)
Thus, if no charge is filed by the fiscal in court within the period fixed in Art. 125, the
arresting officer must release the detainee; otherwise, he will be guilty under Art. 125.
Art. 126. Delaying release.
Three acts are punishable under Art. 126.

1. By delaying the performance of a judicial or executive order for the release of a
prisoner.
2. By unduly delaying the service of the notice of such order to said prisoner.
3. By unduly delaying the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person.
Elements:
a. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
b. That there is a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner or a detention
prisoner, or that there is a proceeding upon a petition for the liberation of such person.
c. That the offender without good reason delays (1) the service of the notice of such order
to the prisoner, or (2) the performance of such judicial or executive order for the release of the
prisoner, or (3) the proceedings upon a petition for the release of such person.
Art. 127. Expulsion.

Two acts are punishable under Art. 127:
1. By expelling a person from the Philippines.
2. By compelling a person to change is residence.
Elements:
b. That he expels any person from the Philippines, or compels a person to change his
residence.
c. That the offender is not authorized to do so by law.
Who are authorized by law?
1. The President can expel undesirable alien pursuant to the procedure in Revised
Administrative Code.
2. Courts by final judgment can order a person to change his residence. This is illustrated
in ejectment proceedings, expropriation proceedings and in the penalty of destierro.
Hence, the Mayor and the Chief of Police of Manila cannot force the prostitutes residing
in that City to go and live in Davao against their will, there being no law that authorizes them to do
so. These women, their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattels, but
Philippine citizens, protected by the same constitutional guarantees as are other citizens.
( Villavicencio, et al., vs. Lukban, et al., 39 Phil. 778).
Section Two – Violation of Domicile
Art 128. Violation of Domicile.

Acts punishable under Art. 128.
1. By entering any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof; or
2. By searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of
such owner; or
3. By refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously entered said dwelling
and after having been required to leave the same.
Elements common to the three acts:

b. That he is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or to
make a search therein for papers or other effects.
The offender must be a public officer.

If the offender who enters the dwelling against the will of the owner thereof is a
private individual, the crime committees is trespass to dwelling. (Art. 280).
Search with previous consent of such owner, legal.

When the detectives secured the previous consent of the owner of the house to
the search without a warrant, they are not liable. (Pp. vs. Sane, CA, 40 OG Supp. 5,
113).
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made upon his
person or premises he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be
secured from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly. (Pp. vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221).
Silence of the owner of the dwelling before and during the search, without
warrant, by public officer, may show implied waiver. (Reyes).
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained, and abuse in the service of
those legally obtained.
Acts punishable in this article.

1. By procuring a search warrant without just cause.
2. By exceeding his authority or by using unnecessary severity in executing a
search warrant legally produced.
Elements of procuring a search warrant without just cause:

b. That he procures a search warrant
c. That there is no just cause.
Test of lack of just cause.
The true test of lack of just cause is whether the affidavit filed in support of the application
for search warrant has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and
affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the applicant for search warrant or his witnesses, not of the
facts “reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable. (Alvarez. vs. Court, et al., 64
Phil. 33).
Effects of the evidence seized by virtue of search warrant illegally procured.
When papers or effects obtained during unreasonable search and seizure, or under a
search warrant issued without probable cause and not in accordance with the procedure
prescribed, or in violation of the privacy of communication and correspondence, the papers or
effects thus obtained are not admissible if presented as evidence. (See, Alih vs. Castro, 151
SCRA 279 & Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383).
Elements of exceeding authority or using unnecessary severity in executing a
search warrant legally procured:
a. The offender is a public officer or employee.
b. That he has legally procured a search warrant.
c. That he exceeds his authority or uses unnecessary severity in executing the same.
Example of exceeding authority in executing search warrant.
If the public officer, in executing a search warrant for opium, seized books, personal
letters, and other property having a remote or no connection with opium, even if he believed or
suspected that they had some relation with opium, such public officer may be held liable under
Art. 129. (Uy vs. Kheytin, et al., vs. Villareal, et al., 42 Phil. 886).
But the possession of contraband articles, like firearms without license, is a flagrant
violation of the law and the contraband can be seized without a writ. (Mangoncia vs. Palacio, 80
Phil. 770).
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses.

Elements:
1. That the officer is a public employee.
2. That he is armed with search warrant legally procured.
3. The he searches the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person.
4. That the owner, or any member of his family, or two witnesses residing in the same
locality are not present.
Note: Art. 130 does not apply to searches of vehicles or other means of transportation,
because the searches are not made in the dwelling.
Section Three. – Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings.
Art. 131. Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings.

Acts punishable in this article:
1. By prohibiting or by interrupting, without legal ground, the holding of a peaceful
meeting, or by dissolving the same.
2. By hindering any person from joining any lawful association or from attending any of its
meetings.
3. By prohibiting or hindering any person from addressing, either alone or together .
Elements common to the three acts:
2. That he performs any of the acts mentioned above.
A private individual cannot commit this offense.
Only public officer or employee can commit this crime. If the offender is a private
individual, the crime is disturbance of public order under Art. 153.
Right to peaceful meeting not absolute.
Right to peacefully assemble is not absolute for it may be regulated in order that it may
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of
the community or society, under the police power of the state.
Thus, action taken by the respondent not to allow the use of the kiosk, part of the public
plaza, by the members of the Watch Tower Bible and tract Society, whose tenets and principles
are derogatory to those professed by the Catholics, is not unconstitutional as an abridgment of
the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship, considering that in view of the proximity to the
kiosk to the Catholic church, such meeting, if allowed, might result in the happening of untoward
incidents and disturbance of peace and order. (Ignacio, et al., Ela, 99 Phil. 347).
The offender must be a stranger, not participant, in the peaceful meeting.
Thus, where during the meeting of municipal officials called by the mayor, the chief of
police kept on talking although he had been asked by the mayor to sit down, and there was a
heated exchange pf words among the mayor, a councilor and the chief of police, and in the
ensuing confusion, the crowd watching the proceeding dispersed and the meeting was eventually
dissolved, the chief of police is not guilty under Art. 131, but under Art. 287, for unjust vexation.
(Pp. vs. Calera and Cantela, CA 45 OG 2576).
Interrupting and dissolving the meeting of municipal council by a public officer is a

crime against a legislative body, not punished under Art. 131.
The disturbance or interruption and the consequent dissolution of the meeting of the
municipal council is violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1755, which is similar to Arts. 143 and 144 of
the Revised Penal Code. (Pp. vs. Alipit, et al., 44 Phil. 910).
Read: Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil. 225, Navarro vs. Villegas, 31 SCRA 371,
Gallego vs. People, 8 SCRA 813, Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, Pp. vs. Yalung, CA 40 OG
Supp, 11, 83.
Section four. – Crimes against religious worship.
Art. 132. Interruption of Religious worship.
Elements:
2. That religious ceremonies or manifestations of any religion are about to take place or
are going on.
3. That the offender prevents or disturbs the same.
Circumstances qualifying the offense.

If the crime is committed with violence or threats.
Preventing a religious ceremony that is to take place.
In a barrio chapel, a priest was ready to say mass and a number of barrio folks were to
hear the mass. The barrio lieutenant made an actual threat on the life of the priest should the
latter persist in his intention to say the mass. As a result the mass was not celebrated. Held: The
barrio lieutenant was guilty of violation of Art. 132. (See Pp. vs. Mejica, CA Gr No. 12980-R,
Dec. 29, 1955). See also Pp. vs. Reyes, et al., CA-GR No. 13633-R, supra and US vs.
Balcorta, 25 Phil. 279.
Art. 133. Offending the religious feelings.

Elements:
1. That the acts complained of were performed (1) in a place devoted to religious
worship, or (2) during the celebration of any religious ceremony.
2. That the acts must be notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
- In a “place devoted to religious worship” it is not necessary that there is a religious
ceremony going on when the offender performs the acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of
the faithful; while “Celebration of any religious ceremony” need not be in a place devoted to
religious worship. Ex. Of religious ceremony: Procession and special prayers for burying dead
persons. (Albert).
Not religious ceremony.

A religious rally in the public plaza is not a religious ceremony, even if the minister was
then preaching (“that Jesus Christ was not God but only a man”). The rally was attended by
persons who are not members of the sect. (Pp. vs. Mandoriao, Jr., CA 51 OG 4619).
“Acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.”
The acts must be directed against religious practice or dogma or ritual for the purpose of
ridicule, as mocking or scoffing at or attempting to damage an object of religious veneration.
( Viada; Pp. vs. Baes, 68 Phil. 203).
Examples:
1. Throwing of stones at the minister of the Iglesia ni Cristo who was preaching his beliefs
before a crowd notoriously offended the feelings of the minister and the members who witnessed
the incident. (Pp. vs. Migallos, CA GR No. 13619, Aug. 5, 1955).
2. Remarks that those who believed that Christ is God are anti-Christ, that all the
members of the Catholic Church are marked by the demon, and the Pope is the commander of
Satan are notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. (Pp. vs. Mandorio).
To be liable there must be deliberate intent to hurt the feelings of the faithful.
While the Catholic elements were having their procession and passing near the meeting
place, the accused placed a picture of the pope on the wall of the house of one Vivencia Balaquit
and shouted words offensive to the religious feelings of the catholic faithful. Held: In order to
render defendant-appellant liable for the particular crime charged, it is indispensable that the said
utterances were made when the defendant-appellant was actually in the place devoted to worship
or in a place where the religious ceremony was being celebrated. In this case, it was the
procession that approached the place where he was preaching or delivering a sermon on matters
offensive to the feelings of the faithful Catholics. There is no evidence that defendant-appellant
had purposely deviated from the topic of his preaching or sermon or that of the procession had
not approached his meeting place, he would not have uttered the words herein complained of, to
evidence his intention deliberately to hurt the feelings of those actually engaged in the celebration
of a religious procession or ceremony. (Pp. vs. Gesulga, CA 57 OG 8494-8496).
Not offensive to Religious feeling.
The construction of a fence in front of the chapel, even though irritating and vexatious to
those present in the “pabasa”, is not notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The crime
committed is only unjust vexation defined and penalized in art. 287. (Pp. vs. Reyes).
While the congregation of the Assembly of God was having its afternoon services in its
chapel, the accused who was allegedly drunk entered with uplifted hands and attempted to grab
the song leader who ran away from him. The other members of the sect also ran out of the
church and the religious services were discontinued. Held: the accused is guilty of unjust vexation
under Art. 287 RPC. (Pp. vs. Nanoy, CA 69 OG 8043).
Chapter One
REBELLION, COUP D’ ETAT, SEDITION
AND DISLOYALTY
Rebellion or insurrection (Art. 134).
Elements:
1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking arms against the Government.
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either-
a. to remove from the allegiance to said government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval or other armed forces; or
(3) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Rebellion and insurrection distinguished.
Rebellion is used where the object of the movement is completely to overthrow and
supersede the existing government; while insurrection is employed in reference to a movement
which seek merely to effect some change of minor importance, or to prevent the exercise of
governmental authority with respect to particular matters or subject.
Nature of the crime of rebellion.

The crime of rebellion or of inciting it is by nature a crime of masses, of a multitude. It is a

vast movement of men and complete net of intrigues and plots. (Pp. vs. Almazan, CA, 37 OG
1932).
The word rebellion evokes, not only a challenge to the constituted authorities, but also
civil war on a bigger or lesser scale.(Pp. vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515).
Actual clash of arms with the forces of the Government, not necessary to convict
the accused who is in conspiracy with others actually taking arms against the
government.
Thus, the mere fact that that the accused knowingly identified himself with Huk
organization that was openly fighting to overthrow the government was enough to make him guilty
of the crime of rebellion. (Pp. vs. Cube, CA, 46 OG 4412).
It is not necessary that the purpose of the rebellion be accomplished.
The crime of rebellion is complete the very moment a group of rebels rise publicly and
take arms against the Government, for the purpose of overthrowing the same by force. It is not
necessary, to consummate rebellion, that the rebels succeed in overthrowing the Government.
Rising publicly and taking arms against the Government is the normative element of the offense,
while the intent or purpose to overthrow the government is the subjective element. (Guevara).
Giving aid and comfort is not criminal in rebellion.
Unlike the crime of treason, the act of giving comfort or moral aid is not criminal incase of
rebellion or insurrection, where the RPC expressly declares that there must be a public uprising
and the taking up of arms. Note: The accused was not a member of the Huk movement. He did
not take up arms against the government. The only acts he was shown to perform were the
sending or furnishing of cigarettes and food supplies to the Huk leader; the changing of dollars
into pesos for a top-level communist and helping of huks in opening accounts with the bank of
which he was an official. (Carino vs. People., 7 SCRA 900, supra.)
Rebellion or insurrection is considered Terrorism under Republic Act No. 9372

(Human Security Act of 2007, approved on March 6, 2007).
Rebellion or insurrection is considered terrorism if it sows or creates a condition of

widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand. The penalty is forty (40) years of imprisonment,
without the benefit of parole.
Penalties in terrorism:
1. Those who conspired to commit crime of terrorism – 40 yrs.
2. Accomplice – 17 yrs, 4 months and 1 day – 20 yrs.
3. Accessories – 10 yrs. and 1 day – 12 yrs.
Terrorist Organization or Association of Persons.

Any organization, association, or group or person organized for the purpose of engaging
in terrorism, or which although not organized for that purpose, actually uses acts
mentioned in RA 9372.
Rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes.
Case: Amado Hernandez was charged and convicted of Rebellion, complexed with
murders, arsons and robberies, for which capital punishment must be imposed, although the
lower court sentenced him to merely life imprisonment. Upon the other hand, the defense
contends, among other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson or robbery.
Held: One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said
Article 135 is by “engaging in war against the forces of the government” and “committing serious
violence” in the prosecution of said “war”. These expressions imply everything that war connotes,
namely: resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions,
restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness
and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake – except that, very often, it is worse than war in the
international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with bitterness and
passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest between strangers. Being within the purview of
“engaging war” and “committing serious violence” said resort to arms, with the resulting
impairment or destruction of life property, constitutes not two or more offense, but only one crime-
that of rebellion, plain and simple. Xxx
IN as much as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we repeat, one single
crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which
requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, this court has never in the past,
convicted any person of the “complex crime of rebellion with murder.xxx
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against-
defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons, and robberies described therein
are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means
“necessary” (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
afore-mentioned information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons, and robberies.xxx (Pp vs. Hernandez, et al., GR No. L-6025-26, July
18, 1956).
Case: In the afternoon of Feb. 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader, Juan Ponce
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Dir. Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the strength
of a warrant arrest issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC, Quezon City Br. 103, in Crim. Case
No. 90-10941 for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from Nov. 29 to Dec. 10, 1990. Sen. Enrile
was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Ave., Manila, without bail.
On the same date of Feb. 28, 1990, Enrile, through counsel filed the petition for habeas
corpus alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being or having been: (a) held
to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books; (b)xxxxx
The SOLGEN argued that petitioner’s case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because – and this is putting it very simply- the information in Hernandez charged murders and
other common crimes committed as necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas,
the information against Enrile, et al., charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion
The parties oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) Abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view xxx that rebellion cannot absorb
more serious crimes, and that under Art. 48 of the RPC rebellion may properly be
complexed with common offense;
(b) Hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as

necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
course of the rebellion which also constitutes common crimes of grave or less grave
character; and
(c) Maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
thereof.
(The Court rejected the first two options)
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.(In the matter of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus, Juan Ponce Enrile, Petitioner vs. Judge Jaime Salazar, GR
No. 92163, June 05, 1990).
Crimes punished under special law are absorbed by the crime of Rebellion.
Case: Together with the filing of an information charging Sen. Enrile as having committed
rebellion complexed with murder with the RTC of Quezon City, govt. prosecutors filed another
information charging him for violation of Pres. Decree No. 1829 with the RTC, for having
“unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct impede, frustrate or delay the
apprehension of said Ex Lt. Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his
house”.
On Certiorari, petitioner argued that the “alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of
Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component
element of, the ‘complexed’ rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-
conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on Dec. 1989.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive

is punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code;
hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other.
Held: This argument is specious in rebellion cases. IN the light of the Hernandez doctrine
the prosecution’s theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes whether punishable
under special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in
furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and
charged as separate crimes themselves. (Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Hon. Omar U. Amin, et. Al.,
GR No. 93335, Sept. 13, 1990).
But for common crimes to be absorbed by rebellion, it is imperative for the

accused to allege and prove that the act was done in furtherance of a political end.
Case: Off-duty, SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga,
Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked behind him, pulled a -45 caliber gun from his
waist, aimed the gun at the policeman’s right ear and fired. After taking the latter’s gun, a man
and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled. Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood
loss from multiple gunshot wounds. The accused was charged and convicted of the crime of
murder. On appeal, the accused contends that because the killing was a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends, said killing should have been absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
The SOLGEN, however, avers that he crime committed by the appellant may be considered as
rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that he motive or intent for the killing of
the policeman was for “pplitical and subversive ends”
Held: We agree with the SOLGEN that the crime committed was murder and not
rebellion.
Xxx
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the
government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving
crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. One aspect
noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by
law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political character.
Xxx
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes
a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than
the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes
imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political
end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, being a
state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows.(Pp vs. Lovederio, GR No.
112235, Nov. 29, 1995)
Art. 143-A. Coup d’etat.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a person or persons belonging to the military or police or holding
any public office or employment.
2. That it is committed by means of a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation,

threat, strategy or stealth.
3. That the attack is directed against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communication networks, public utilities or other
facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power.
Coup d’ etat may be committed with or without civilian participation.
Art. 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees.
Acts punished:
1. By failing to resist a rebellion by all means in their power; or
2. By continuing to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of the rebel; or
3. By accepting appointment to office under them.
To be liable under this article, there must be rebellion to be resisted or, at least, the place
is under the control of the rebels. (U.S. vs Ravidas, 4 Phil. 273).
Art. 138. Inciting to rebellion or insurrection.
Elements:
1. That the offender does not take arms or is not in open hostility against the government.
2. That he incites others to the execution of any acts of rebellion;
3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems,

banners or other representation tending to the same end.
Inciting to rebellion distinguished from proposal to commit rebellion.
1. In both crimes, the offender induces another to commit rebellion.
2. In proposal, the person who proposes has decided to commit rebellion; in inciting to
rebellion, it is not required that the offender has decided to commit rebellion.
3. In proposal, the person who proposes the execution of the crime uses secret means;
in inciting to rebellion, the act of inciting is done publicly.
Art. 139. Sedition – How committed.
Elements:
1. That the offenders rise (1) publicly, and (2) tumultuously;

2. That they employ force, intimidation, or other means outside of legal methods;
3. That the offenders employ any of those means to attain any of the following
objectives:
(a) To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any
popular election;
(b) To prevent the National Government, or any provincial or municipal

government, or any public officer thereof from freely exercising its or his
functions, or prevent the execution of any administrative order;
(c) To inflict any act or hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public
officer or employee;
(d) To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate o revenge against
private persons or any social class; and
(e) To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or
province, or the National Government of all its property or any part thereof.
Sedition is distinguished from rebellion by the purpose or object of the uprising.
Case: Accused contended that the crime committed by him was only sedition, because
the uprising took place only in a municipality, which was a small territory.
Held: What distinguished sedition from rebellion is not the extent of the territory covered
by the uprising but rather the object at which the uprising aims. The purpose of the Sakdal
uprising was to obtain the independence of certain portions of the territory from the government
and withdrawing it from the authority of the central government. It is not one of the object of
sedition enumerated in Art. 139. (See League vs. People, 73 Phil. 155).
Distinctions between sedition and rebellion.
In both rebellion and sedition, there must be a public uprising. While in rebellion there
must be taking up of arms against the government; in sedition, it is sufficient that the uprising is
tumultuous.
While in sedition, the purpose of the offender may be political or social, in rebellion, it is
always political.
If the purpose of the uprising is not exactly against the Government and not for the
purpose of doing things defined in Art. 134 of the revised Penal Code, but merely to attain by
force, intimidation, or by other means outside the legal methods, one object, to wit, to inflict an act
of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, like the town mayor, it is
sedition.
Facts: ON the eve of election, Congressman Umali instructed Pasumbat to contact

Abeng, the Huk commander so that incumbent Mayor Punzalan will be killed feeling that the latter
will win in the election and his death is the only way to win the election. Pasumbat reported to
Umali that he contacted Abeng and agreed and even outlined the manner of attack.
After sometimes, Abeng and his troops numbering about 50, armed with garands and
carbines arrived. Congressman Umali, holding a revolver, was seen with the group of Torio and
about 30 armed men. Then shots were heard. Afterwards Umali and his companions left.
Held: The crime committed was sedition and not rebellion. The purpose of the uprising
was not against the government. The object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc., on
object to wit, to inflict the act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official,
Punzalan who was then the town mayor of Tiaong. (Pp. vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185).
Preventing public officers from freely exercising their functions.
Facts: A warrant of arrest was to be executed against Datu Tahil by a group of soldier.
The commander did not receive any reply upon his intimation, and instead a group of armed
moros appeared at the left flank of the soldiers in the act of attacking, but were repelled. It was
again intimated that Datu Tahil surrender, but again no answer was received, and then a large
group of Moros appeared in an aggressive manner, but likewise repelled. Held: Having resisted
the judicial warrant of arrest by means of force and thereby prevented the officers, charged with
the duty of arresting them, from performing it, Datu Tahil and his men committed the crime of
sedition. (Pp. vs. Tahil and Tarson, 52 Phil. 318).
Inflicting an act of hate or revenge upon public officers (par. 3 of Art. 139).
Facts: The group of constabulary soldier escaped from the barracks with their guns and
made an attack upon the police force who had an earlier encounter with the constabulary soldiers
resulting in the death of a private soldier. They fired in the direction of Calles Real and Cabildo,
killing a policeman and a civilian. Held: the crime committed is sedition. The object of the uprising
was to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the persons of the policemen who were public
officers or employees. (Pp. vs, Cabrera, et al., 53 Phil. 64).
Public uprising and an object of sedition must concur.
1. No public uprising – no sedition.
Facts: While the Municipal council was in session, some 500 residents of the towns
assembled near the municipal building, some of them crowded into the council chamber and
demanded the dismissal from the office the municipal treasurer, the secretary and the chief of
police, and the substitution on their places new officials. The persons who took part were wholly
unarmed, except that a few carried canes. The crowd was fairly orderly and well behaved. The
council acceded to their wishes and drew up a formal document, which was signed by the
councilors and by several leaders of the crowd. Held: There was no sedition, because there was
no public and tumultuous uprising.
Are common crimes absorbed in sedition?
In Pp. vs. Umali, the crimes committed were sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated
murder and physical injuries.
In Pp. vs. Cabrera, the constabulary men who murdered six policemen and two private
citizens and seriously wounded three civilians were found guilty of the separate crimes of sedition
in one case, and multiple murder with grave injuries in the other case.
Art. 140. Penalty for sedition.-just read
Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition.-just read
Art. 142. Inciting to sedition.
Different acts of inciting to sedition.
1. Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitutes sedition by
means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, etc.
2. Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb the public peace.
3. Writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous libels against the Government or any of the
duly constituted authorities thereof, which tend to disturb public peace.
Elements:
1. That the offender does not take part in the crime of sedition.
2. that he incites others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute
sedition.
3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems,
cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end.
Uttering seditious words or speeches.
Facts: The accused, municipal secretary and another person, happened to meet in the
municipal building of the town of Pilar, Sorsogon, and there they became engaged in a discussion
regarding the administration of Governor General Wood, which resulted in the accused shouting
number of times: “The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood’s head for having
recommended a bad thing to the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence.”
Held: The accused uttered seditious words. His conviction must be sustained. (Pp. vs.
Perez, 45 Phil. 599). See also Pp. vs. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455).
Uttering seditious words or speeches and writing, publishing or circulating
scurrilous libels are punishable, when –
1. They tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his
office; or
2. They tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes; or
3. They suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; or
4. They lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government.
Thus, a theatrical play or drama where the words uttered or speeches delivered are
seditious may be punished under Art. 142. (See U.S. vs. Tolention, 5 Phil. 682).
- Disturbance or disorder, not necessary in inciting to sedition. (See Pp. vs Nabong,
supra.).
- Proposal to throw hand grenades in a public place, intended to cause commotion and
disturbance, as an act of revenge against the police force, where no harm could be done to any
person, which was accomplished as planned is inciting to sedition and illegal possession of hand
grenades. (Pp. vs. Quimpo, CA 46 OG 3784).
Chapter Two
CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION
Section One – Crimes against legislative bodies and similar bodies.
Art. 143. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of the Assembly and similar bodies.
Elements:
1. That there be a projected or actual meeting of the National Assembly or any of its
committees or subcommittees, constitutional committees or division thereof, or any provincial
board or city or municipal council or board.
2. That the offender who may be any person prevents such meeting by force or fraud.
Any person, even the chief of police or the Municipal President may be guilty
Under Art. 143, if he prevents a meeting when the defect of the meeting is not manifest and
requires an investigation before its existence can be determined.
Facts: The election of the Municipal President was contested on the ground of minority.
He yielded the chair to the vice-president. The meeting of the municipal council presided over by
the vice president was stopped by the chief of police and the municipal president by arresting the
vice president and threatening the councilors with arrest if they would continue holding the
meeting. The councilor then dispersed, leaving the premises.
Held: any stranger, even if he be the municipal president himself or chief of police, must
respect the meeting of the municipal council presided over by the vice-president and he has no
right to dissolve it through violence under the pretext of lack of notice to some members of the
council, which was not apparent, but required an investigation before it could be determined. (Pp.
vs. Alipit, et al., 44 Phil. 910).
Art. 144. Disturbance of proceedings.

Elements:
1. That there be a meeting of the National Assembly or any of its committees,
constitutional commissions or committees or division thereof, or of any provincial board or city or
municipal council or board.
2. That the offender does any of the following acts:
(a) He disturbs any of such meetings.
(b) He behaves while in the presence of any such bodies in such a manner as to interrupt
its proceedings or to impair the respect due it.
- It must be a meeting of a legislative body or of provincial board or city or municipal
council or board which is disturbed. (See Pp. vs. Calera, CA 45 OG 2576).
Art. 145. Violation of Parliamentary immunity.

Acts punished under Art. 145.
1) By using force, intimidation, threats, or frauds to prevent any member of the National
Assembly from (1) attending the meetings of the assembly or any of its committees or
subcommittees, constitutional commission or committees or division thereof, or from (2)
expressing his opinions, or (3) casting his votes.
Elements:
1. The offender uses force, intimidation, threats or fraud.

2. That the purpose of the offender is to prevent any member of the National Assembly
from-
(a) attending the meeting of the Assembly or of any of its committees or
constitutional commission, etc.
(b) expressing his opinions; or
© casting his vote.
Note: The offender here is any person.
2) By arresting or searching any member thereof while the National Assembly is in
regular or special session, except in case such member has committed a crime
punishable under the Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee;
2. That he arrests or searches any member of the National Assembly;
3. That the assembly, at the time of the arrest or search, is in regular or special session;
4. That the member arrested or searched has not committed a crime punishable under
the Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
Chapter Three
ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATIONS
Art. 146. Illegal Assemblies.

Illegal assemblies are:
1. Any meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the
crimes punishable under the Code.
Requisites:
a) That there is a meeting, a gathering or group of persons, whether in a fixed
place or moving;
b) That the meeting is attended by armed persons;
© That the purpose of the meeting is to commit any of the crimes punishable
under the Code.
3. Any meeting in which the audience, whether armed or not, is incited to the
commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or assault
upon a person in authority or his agents.
Requisites:
a) That there is a meeting, a gathering or group of persons, whether in a fixed
place or moving.
b) That the audience, whether armed or not, is incited to the commission of the
crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or direct assault.
Art. 147. Illegal associations.
What are illegal associations?
1. Associations totally or partially organized for the purpose of committing any of the
crime punishable under the Code.
2. Associations totally or partially organized for some purpose contrary to public morals.
Persons liable?
1. Founders, directors and president of the association.

2. Mere members of the association.
Distinctions between illegal association and illegal assembly.
a) In illegal assembly, it is necessary that there is an actual meeting or assembly of
armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punished under the Code, or of
individuals who, although not armed, are incited to the commission of treason, rebellion, sedition,
or assault upon a person in authority or his agent; in illegal association, it is not necessary that
there be an actual meeting.
b) In illegal assembly, it is the meeting and attendance at such meeting that are
punished; in illegal association, it is the act of forming or organizing and membership in the
association that are punished.
c) In illegal assembly, the persons liable are: (1) organizers or leaders of the meeting,
and (2) persons present at the meeting. In illegal association, the persons liable are: (1) the
founders, directors and president, and (2) members.
Chapter Four. Assaults, etc.
Art. 148. Direct assaults.

Two ways of committing the crime of direct assaults:
1. Without public uprising, by employing force or intimidation for the attainment of any of
the purposes enumerated in defining the crime of rebellion and sedition.
2. Without public uprising, by attacking, by employing force, or by seriously intimidating or
seriously resisting any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance
of official duties, or on the occasion of such performance.
Elements of the first form of assault:
1. That the offender employs force or intimidation.
2. That the aim of the offender is to attain any of the purposes of the crime of rebellion
or any of the objects of the crime of sedition.
3. That there is no public uprising.
Examples of first form:
Facts: The chief of police together with other policemen compelled the Municipal
president by force to go to the municipal building and detained him there for hours because their
salaries had been in arrears for sometimes. He was released when the relatives of the president
sent him money to pay for the salaries. Held: That these facts constitute the commission of the
crime charged in the complaint. There is force in this case. But there is no public uprising. When
the accused, compelled by force the municipal president to go with them to the municipal building
and detained him there, they inflicted an act of hate or revenge upon a public officer. This is one
of the objects of sedition which the accused aimed to attain. (U.S. vs. Dirain, 4 Phil. 541).
Direct assault to prevent a popular election.

The act of the accused in preventing by force the holding of a popular election in certain
precincts, without public uprising, is direct assault of the first form. (See Clarin vs. Justice of the
Peace, GR No. L-7661, April 5, 1955).
Elements of the second form of direct assault.
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the
actual performance of official duties, or that he is assaulted, (b) by reason of the past
performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or agent
in the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.
Degree of force necessary in direct assault.
If the offended party is only an agent of a person in authority, the force employed must be
of serious character as to indicate determination to defy the law and its representative at all
hazards. (Reyes)
If the offended party is a person in authority the force employed need not be serious.
(See U.S. vs. Gumban, 39 Phil. 76).
Facts: The accused, while being placed under arrest by three policemen, hit one of them
in the breast with his fist. Held: The words in Art 148 relating to the employment of force appear
to have reference to something more dangerous to civil society than a simple blow with the hands
at the moment a party is taken into custody. No direct assault. ( U.S. vs. Tabiana).
Where a police officer tried to arrest the accused for violation of the chicken dung
ordinance, and the accused punched the police officer on his face, particularly on his lip, and then
grappled with a police officer, there was direct assault. (Rivera vs. People, G.R. No. 138553,
June 30, 2005).
Slapping the face of the municipal president while in the performance of his duty is direct
assault, although the force employed is not serious. (U.S. vs. Gumban, supra).
Intimidation or resistance must be serious whether the offended party is an agent
only or he is a person in authority.
The law, with regard to intimidation or resistance as other constitutive element of assault,
expressly requires that they be serious in character. (U.S. vs. Gumban).
Example of serious resistance.
In the course of the quarrel between A and B, the latter called, “Police! Police!, and the
policeman who went to the scene saw B getting up. When the policeman was about to arrest A,
the latter said: “Don’t come near, because I will take your life.” As the policeman was approaching
him, A struck him with a knife but was not hit. (U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516).
Example of serious intimidation.
Pointing a gun at a military police captain who is in the performance of his duty
constitutes assault upon an agent of person in authority, because there is a serious intimidation.
(Pp. vs. Diama, CA, 45 OG 838).
It would seem threatening to give a fist blow, made to a policeman who was arresting the
accused would not constitute direct assault by intimidation, because the intimidation is not
serious.
Intimidation must produce its effect immediately, for if threats be of some future evil, the
act would not be direct assault. (Albert).
- Knowledge of the accused that the victim is a person in authority or his agent is
essential. (Pp. vs. Villasenor, 35 SCRA 460).
- “On occasion of such performance” of official duty signifies “by reason” or “because” of
the past performance of official duty, even if at the time of the assault no official duty was being
discharged. (Justo vs. CA, 99 Phil. 453).
-U.S. vs Garcia, 20 Phil. 358, where a judge was attacked by a person who earlier was
order by the judge to step out of the court for uttering contemptuous remarks against the court
although the judge was not in the actual performance of his duty, but he was assaulted by reason
of the performance of official duty.
The victim is still in the performance of official duty even if she descended to the
level of and fought back with the accused.
Case: Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos, were public school teachers
at the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydia’s son, Rosseller, was a student of
Gemma at the time material to the issue.
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o’ clock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma aftr
learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a sissy while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the
cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit the wall divider. As a result of Lydia’s
violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion inher “maxillary area”. As a result Gemma suffered
incomplete abortion. Lydia was charged and convicted of complex crime of Direct Assault with
unintentional abortion But the CA found her guilty only of the crime of slight physical injuries. It
ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since Gemma descended from being a
person in authority to a private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the
principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia. Likewise Lydia’s purpose was not to
defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of her son.
HELD: Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently
overruled in setting aside the trial court’s verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held
guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault
because she allegedly descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact
remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official
functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk
properly, but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia
continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly
situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her
against a wall divider while she was going to the principal’s office. No fault could therefore be
attributed to Gemma. (Gelig vs. Pp, GR No. 173150, July 28, 2010).
Art. 149. Indirect Assault.
Elements:
1. That a person in authority or his agent is the victim of any of the forms of direct assault
defined in Art. 148.
2. That a person comes to the aid of such authority or his agent.
3. That the offender makes use of force or intimidation upon such a person coming to the
aid of the authority or his agent.
- Indirect assault is committed only when a direct assault is also committed. (reyes).
- The offended party in indirect assault may be a private individual.
- If a private individual was assaulted while aiding a policeman in arresting the accused is
not indirect assault as the policeman is not a victim of direct assault.
Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, etc.

Art.151, Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of
such person.
Elements of resistance and serious disobedience:

1. That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or
gives lawful order to the offender.
2. That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person in authority or his agent.
3. That the act of the offender is included in the provisions of Arts. 148, 149 and 150).
Examples:
- U.S. vs. Tabiana, 37 Phil. 515 –where the accused struck a policeman on the breast
with a fist when the latter was arresting the said accused.
- Pp. vs. Baesa, CA 55 OG 10295, where the accused in the heat of the argument and
under the impulse of obfuscation pulled the hand of a barrio lieutenant, causing him to fall to the
ground, is guilty of resistance and serious disobedience under Art. 151, not direct assault
because the employment of force is not deliberate.
-Pp. vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 182, where the accused bit a policeman on the right forearm
and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which severely injured the policeman, and it
required two policemen to subdue him, it was held that the was guilty of resistance and serious
disobedience because the employment of force is not deliberate.
Simple disobedience. (par. 2).
Pp. vs Bacani, CA 40 OG 981, where the court issued a writ of injunction against the
accused not to enter the land in dispute, but he disobeyed despite being told by the sheriff not to
enter the land claiming that he was the owner of the land, and advance towards the sheriff, but
was intercepted by the policeman, is guilty of simple disobedience.
Art. 157. Evasion in the service of sentence.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a convict by final judgment.
2. That he is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty.
3. That he evades the service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence.
The sentence must be by reason of final judgment.
Thus, if the accused while the sentence of conviction was under appeal, he is not liable
under this article because the judgment has not yet become final even if his appeal was later
dismissed. (Curiano vs. CFI, GR L-8104, April 15, 1955).
The term “escape”
Mere loitering in the premises of the court house, without a guard or escort is not
“escape” in contemplation of the law as the circumstances belie escape, or intention of the
accused to escape as they certainly would not have loitered in the premises of the courthouse,
just near the city jail, where they could easily be spotted. (Pp. vs. Lauron, et al., CA 60 OG
4983).
Art. 158. Evasion of the service of sentence on the occasion of disorders,
conflagrations, earthquakes , or other calamitites.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a convict by final judgment, who is confined in a penal institution.
2. That there is disorder, resulting from:
a. conflagration,
b. earthquake,
c. explosion,
d. similar catastrophe, or
e. mutiny in which he has not participated.
3. That the offender evades the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution
where he is confined, on occasion of such disorder or during the mutiny.
4. That the offender fails to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of a proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of such
calamity.
The rules.
- What is punished by this article is not the leaving of the penal institution, but the failure
of the convict to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours after the proclamation
announcing the passing away of the calamity.
- The penalty is that the accused shall suffer an increase of 1/5 of the time still remaining
to be served under the original sentence, not to exceed six (6) months.
- If the accused gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours, he is entitled to a
deduction of 1/5 of his sentence.
Mutiny, meaning.
Mutiny implies an organized unlawful resistance to a superior officer; a sedition; a revolt.
( Pp. vs. Padilla, CA 46 OG 2151).
Art. 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. (Violation of conditional
pardon)
Elements of violation of conditional pardon.
1. That the offender was a convict.
2. That he was granted a conditional pardon by the Chief Executive.
3. That he violated any of the conditions of such pardon.
Nature of conditional pardon – it is a contract.
A conditional pardon is a contract between the Chief Executive, who grants the pardon,
and the convict, who accepts it. Since it is a contract, the pardoned convict is bound to fulfill its
condition and accept all its consequences, not as he chooses, but according to its term. (Pp. vs.
Pontillas, 65 Phil. 659).
Penalties:
a. Prision correccional in its minimum period – if the penalty remitted does not
exceed 6 years.
b. The unexpired portion of his original sentence – if the penalty remitted is
higher than 6 years.
Illustration:
The accused was sentenced to a penalty of 6 years and 1day of prision mayor.
He served 2 years, 5 months and 22 days of the sentence and was granted conditional
pardon. The term remitted by the pardon is 3 years, 6 months and 8 days. The penalty is
prision correccional in its minimum period. ( Pp. vs. Sanares, 62 Phil. 825).
- Offender must be found guilty of the subsequent offense before he can be
prosecuted under Art. 159. (Torres vs. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272).
- Violation of conditional pardon is a distinct offense. (Pp. vs. Martin, 68 Phil.
122). Thus, violation of conditional pardon is committed in the place where the
subsequent offense is perpetrated.
- The time during which the convict was out of prison cannot be deducted from
the unexecuted portion of his sentence. (Pp. vs. Tapel, 64 Phil. 112).
Art. 160. Commission of another crime during the service of penalty
imposed for another previous offense. (Quasi-recidivism).
Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance where a person, after
having been convicted by final judgment, shall commit a new felony before beginning to
serve such sentence, or while serving the same. He shall be punished by the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law for the same felony.
Elements:
1. That the offender was already convicted by final judgment of one offense.
2. That he committed a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence or
while serving the same.
- The second crime committed must be a felony, not punished by special law because the
article speaks of “the maximum period” of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony”.
Penalty prescribed by special law has no three periods like the three periods of a divisible penalty
prescribed in RPC.
- But the first crime for which the offender is serving need not be a felony. (Pp. vs. Alicia,
95 SCRA 227).
- The new offense need not be of different character from that of the former offense.
Hence, even if the new offense is murder and he is serving sentence for homicide, this article
applies. (Pp. vs. Yabut, 58 Ohil. 499).
- Quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances because Art.
160 specifically provides that the offender “shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. (See Pp. vs. Parete, 58 OG 8628).
- A quasi-recidivist may be pardoned at the age of 70 years and has already served out
his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching such age, unless by reason of
his conduct or other circumstances, he shall not be worthy of such clemency.
Title Four
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST.
(Art. 161-174)
Art. 171. Falsification by pubic officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical

minister.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.
2. That he takes advantage of his official position.
3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the following acts:
a. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.
b. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact do so participate.
c. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them.
d. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
e. Altering true dates.
f. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which

changes its meaning.
g. Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an
original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original.
h. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in
a protocol, registry or official book
4. In case the offender is an ecclesiastical minister, the act of falsification is committed
with respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil
status of persons.
Definition of a document.
A document is any written statement by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished. (Pp vs. Moreno, CA 38 OG 119.
A document is a writing or instrument by which a fact may be proven and affirmed.
Thus, a draft of a payroll because it has not been signed by the proper authority, can
prove and affirmed nothing. (Pp. vs. Camacho, 44 Phil. 488).
Pamphlets cannot be said to evidence a fact, agreement or disposition. They are rather
merchandise as any other article. (Pp. vs. Agnis, 47 Phil. 945).
- In falsification by (1) making alteration or intercalation, or (2) including in a copy a
different statement, there must be a genuine document that is falsified.
- In another paragraphs of Art. 117, falsification may be committed by simulating or
fabricating a document.
Illustration: To cause the arrest of his common-law wife, the accused simulated a warrant
of arrest by making it appear that the same was signed and issued by the authority when in truth
and in fact it was not. Held: It is not necessary that it be a real document, it is enough that it be
given the appearance of a genuine document.
Case: It is a settled rule that in falsification of public or official document, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intention to injure a third person for the
reason that that in falsification of public or official document, the principal thing punished is the
violation of public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. Thus, the
purpose for which the falsification was made and whether the offender profited or hoped to profit
from such falsification are no longer material. (Pacasum vs. Pp, GR No. 180314, April 16,
2009).
Counterfeiting or imitating (feigning) any handwriting, signature or rubric. (Par. No.
1).
-There are two ways of committing falsification under paragraph 1 of Art. 171. They are:
(1) counterfeiting, which is imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; and (2) feigning, which is
simulating a signature, handwriting or rubric out of one which does not in fact exist.
-In counterfeiting imitation of another’s signature need not be perfect. It is necessary only
(1) that there be an intent to imitate, and (2) that the two signatures or handwritings, the genuine
and forged, bear some semblance to each other. (U.S. vs. Rampas, 26 Phil. 189).
- If there is no attempt whatsoever by the accused to imitate the signature of other
persons so that they are entirely unlike the genuine signatures, the accused may be found guilty
under par. 2, Art. 171, in causing it to appear that those persons have participated in the act when
they did not in fact so participate. (U.S. vs. Freimuth, 3 Phil. 318, U.S. vs. Cinco, et al., 42
Phil. 839).
- In feigning there is no original signature, handwriting or rubric, but a forgery of a

signature, handwriting or rubric that does not exist. (See US vs. De los Angeles, et al., 4 Phil.
597).
- Drawing up a will purporting to be that of a person who is already dead long before the
date of the will is falsification by feigning. (U.S. vs. De los Angeles).
Causing it to appear that persons have participated in an act or a proceeding. (Par.
2).
Requisites:
1. That the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person or persons
participated in an act or a proceeding; and
2. That such person did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding.
- That act of the defendant postmaster in forging the signatures of Irene Sanchez and
Feliciano Isidro on the money orders to make it appear that said persons received the amounts
corresponding to the money order is falsification under par. 2 by making it appear that the said
persons intervened in the execution thereof by receiving the amount corresponding to the amount
thereof, even if he did not imitate the signatures of the persons. (Pp. vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil.
671).
- The placing by the accused of their thumb marks in the list of voters opposite the name
of the electors who have not actually voted, thereby making it appear that those electors cast
their votes when they did not in fact vote, is falsification under paragraph 2 of Art. 171, and the
offenders who are private individuals are liable under Art. 172. (Pp. vs. Asa, et al., )
Attributing to persons who have participated in any act or proceeding statements

other than those in fact made by them. (Par. 3).
Requisites:
1. That a person or persons participated in an act or proceedings;
2. That such person or persons have made statements in that act or proceeding; and
3. That the offender in making a document, attributed to such person or persons
statements other than those in fact made by such person or persons.
- The accused, for the purpose of appropriating to himself a tract of land, drew a
document setting forth the sale in his favor of the said land and let the owners signed thereon.
However, it appears that the owner of the land did not sell, or that they executed in favor of the
accused a Deed of Sale; that what they really did was to confer upon him (accused) a special
power of attorney to represent them in a suit they had with another person. The crime committed
is falsification under par. 3 of Art. 171. (U.S. vs. Capule, 24 Phil. 13).
Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. (Par. 4).

Requisites:
1. That the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts;
2. That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;
3. That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
4. That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent
of injuring a third person.
- The falsehood must involve statements of facts and not of law. Thus when the accused
certified that she was eligible for the position, which turned out to be inexact or erroneous, she
practically wrote a conclusion of law and not of fact, she may not be guilty of falsification. (Pp. vs.
Yanza, GR No. L-12089, april 29, 1960).
- There must be a legal obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated. (Pp. vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333).
- The accused, in compliance with the requirements of the Manila Police Dept. filled a
Persona Data Sheet. On the blank space, where a question is asked whether the applicant had
previously been convicted of a criminal offense, he placed there “none”. Investigation disclosed
that he had a previous conviction of the crime of theft. Held: The prosecution has failed to point to
any law or ordinance imposing upon the defendant the obligation to reveal his previous conviction
in filling in the personal data sheet which the members of the Manila Police Dept. are required to
file. The accused was acquitted. (Pp. vs. Poserio, CA 53 OG 6159).
- The narration of facts, to be liable for falsification under this paragraph must be
absolutely false. Thus, where the accused, who was a janitor, marked with vertical lines in payroll
opposite the names of some persons under his charge, to show that said person had performed
their work during the days stated in the payroll and then certified that the payroll was correct,
when as a matter of fact one of the men did his work before 8:00 o’ clock in the morning but
absented himself during the whole day, is not guilty of falsification for the reason that the person
really worked but not for the whole day. (U.S. vs. Bayot, 10 Phi. 518).
- The rule is that if the statements are not altogether false, there being some colorable
truth in such statements, the crime of falsification is not committed. (Pp. vs. Villena, et al., CA 51
OG 5691).
- Legal obligation to disclose the truth in is inherent in residence certificate. (Pp. vs. Po
Giok, 96 Phil. 913).
Altering true dates. (Par. 5).
- To violate this paragraph the date must be essential so that the alteration thereof must
affect its veracity or the effects thereof. ( Pp. vs. Rodeca and Cordero, 62 Phil. 567).
- The acts of the chief of police, in conspiracy with the justice of the peace, in altering the
dates in the police blotter, book of records of arrest, bail bond, and the return of the warrant of
arrest, in order to make it appear that the preliminary investigation of the case was disposed
within ten days by the judge, is falsification under this paragraph. Date being essential here. (Pp.
vs. Montano and Cabagsang, 57 Phil. 599).
- Altering dates in official receipts, although does not affect the integrity of the document,
is falsification if the purpose is to prevent the discovery of malversation. (Pp. vs. Belgica, CA,
40 OG, Supp. 4, 17).
Making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its

meaning. (Par. 6).
- When accused altered the copy of the Traffic Violation Report issued to him for traffic
violation, as his temporary license, by erasing the originally written “III” and the word “three” after
the words “pending cases” and by writing and superimposing thereon number “I” and the word
“one” to hide his previous traffic violations, is falsification under this paragraph. (Pp. vs. Mansala,
105 Phil. 1253).
- Alteration which speaks the truth is not falsification. Thus, a priest who altered his
“cedula’ as to his age from 23 to 25, but it appeared that the accused’ real age is 25 is not
falsification. (Arriola vs. Republic, 103 Phil. 730).
- The alteration must affect the integrity or change the effects of the document; for unless
that happens, there could not exist the essential elements of the intention to commit the crime.
(Pp. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48).
Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original

document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary
to, or different from, that of the original document. (Par. 7).
- This kind of falsification can only be committed by pubic officer or notary public who
takes advantage of his official position, since the authentication of a document can be made only
by the custodian or the one who prepared and retained a copy of the original document.
- Example of “purporting to be a copy of an original when no such original exists”: The
notary public who made a supposed copy of a deed of sale which was never executed and of
which he had no copy.
- Example of “Including in a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original.”: A Civil Registrar who stated in a certified copy of a record of birth that the
person mentioned therein was legitimate when there was no such statement in the original.
Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document. Art. 172).

Acts punished under this article:
1. Falsification of public, official or commercial document by private individual. (par. 1)
2. Falsification of private document by any person. (par. 2)
3. Use of falsified document. (last par.)
Any one of the modes of falsification in paragraphs 1 to 6 of Art. 171 must be employed
by the offender in committing the crimes defined in par. Nos. 1 and 2 of Art. 172. Par. 7 of Art.
171 cannot be committed by a private individual. It can only be committed by a public officer or a
notary public who takes advantage of his official position.
- The possessor of a certificate of title is presumed to be the author of the falsification that
made possible the transfer of title. (Pp. vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28). See also Pp. vs. Manansala,
105 Phil. 1253.
- In par. 1, Art. 172, as in Art. 171, damage or intent to cause damage is not necessary.
The subject of falsification here are public documents and the basis of the punishment is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly declared. (See Pp. vs.
Pacana, 47 Phil. 56).
- Falsification under par. 2, Art. 172 is committed even if the act did not result in prejudice
to a third party, if it has been done with the intention of causing such prejudice. (U.S. vs.
Paraiso, 1 Phil. 127).
- Damage to another need not be material. The law does not make any distinction.
Damage to one’s honor is included. (U.S. vs. Infante, et al., 36 Phil. 146).
- It is not necessary that the offender profited or hope to profit by the falsification, as all
that the law is required is a intent to prejudice another person. (U.S. vs. Infante, et al., 36 Phil.
146).
Gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third person is not
essential in falsification of public document.
Case: The element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third
party as a result of the falsification, or tarnishing of a document’s integrity, is not essential to
maintain a charge for falsification of public documents. What is punished in falsification of public
document is principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly
proclaimed therein. In this particular crime, therefore, the controlling consideration lies in the
public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at
least the intent cause such damage becomes immaterial. (Goma, et al., vs. Pp, et al., GR NO.
168437, Jan. 8, 2009).
- When the offender commits on a document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Art. 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the
two crime form a complex crime under art. 148. However, the document falsified must be public,
official or commercial.
There is no crime of estafa through falsification of private document.
Case: As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it
is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charge with falsification of a private
document or with etafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to
commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed
without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa.
(Batulanon vs. Pp. GR No. 139857, Sept. 15, 2006).
Rule if there is no direct evidence against the accused as the forger.
Case: The absence of direct proof that Chua was the author of the falsification is of no
moment for the rule remains that whenever someone has in his possession falsified documents
and uttered or used the same for his advantage and benefit, the presumption that he authored the
same arises. (Chua vs. Pp, GR No. 183132, Feb. 8, 2012).
Rule if in a complex crime of Estafa through falsification of public document,
estafa was not established.
Case: The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve
petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of public document under
the same information charging the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document. (Gonzaludo vs. Pp., 517 Phil. 110[(2006], as cited in Chua vs. Pp. supra.)
Use of falsified document. (last par.of Art. 172).
-The falsified document may be introduced in a judicial proceedings, in which case,
damage is not necessary. Or in another transaction, which requires at least intention to cause
damage to another.
Chapter Two
OTHER FALSITIES
Section Two.- False testimony.
False testimony is committed by a person who, being under oath and required to testify
to the truth of a certain matter at a hearing before a competent authority, shall deny the truth or
say something contrary to it.
False testimony against a defendant. (Art. 180).

Elements:
1. That there be a criminal proceeding.
2. That the offender testifies falsely under oath against the defendant therein.
3. That the offender who gives false testimony knows that it is false.
4. That the defendant against whom the false testimony is given is either acquitted or
convicted by final judgment.
False testimony favorable to the defendant. (Art. 181).

-False testimony which either favor or against the accused is equally repugnant to the
orderly administration of justice, and deserve to be rigorously repressed. (Pp. vs. Reyes, CA, 48
OG 1837).
- The false testimony in favor of the defendant need not directly influence the decision of
acquittal. Thus, when the accused falsely testified in another case in favor of an accused by not
remembering anymore the face of the latter as robber and failed to elicit other data, and for which
reason the accused in the robbery was acquitted, is guilty of false testimony, even if the reason
for the dismissal of the case was the failure of the fiscal to call other witnesses. (Pp. vs. Reyes,
CA, 48 OG 1837).
- The false testimony need not benefit the defendant, say if the accused, notwithstanding
the favorable testimony of the accused (in false testimony) was convicted, so long as the
testimony was intended to favor the accused. (U.S. vs. Adolfo, 12 Phil. 296).
- The defendant who falsely testified in is own behalf in a criminal case is guilty of false
testimony favorable to the defendant. (U.S. vs. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5).
- Rectification made spontaneously after realizing the mistake is not false testimony,
there being no malice or criminal intention to testify falsely. (Pp. vs.Ambal. 69 Phil. 710).
False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. (Art. 183).
Elements:
1. That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter.
2. That the statement or affidavit was made before competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath;
3. That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion
of a falsehood; and
4. That the sworn statement or affidavit containing falsity is required by law.
- If the false testimony given by the witness is not important, essential or material to the
principal matter under investigation, it cannot properly be held that perjury is committed. (U.S. vs.
Jurado, 31 Phil. 491).
- Good faith or lack of malice is a defense in perjury. (See Pp. vs. abaya, 74 Phil. 59).
- Examples of cases where affidavits are required by law: (1) affidavit attached to the
petition for receivership; (2) affidavit attached to the complaint for ejectment; (3) affidavit for
application for marriage license.
- Two contradictory statements are not sufficient to convict perjury. The prosecution must
prove which of the two statements is false, and must show that statement to be false by other
evidence than the contradictory statements. (U.S. vs. Capistrano, 40 Phil. 902).
Subornation of perjury.
Subornation of perjury is committed by a person who knowingly and willfully procures
another to swear falsely and the witness suborned does testify under circumstances rendering
him guilty of perjury. (U.S. vs. Ballena, 18 Phil. 382).
Note: This offense is omitted from the penal code. The one inducing another is principal
by inducement and the latter as principal by direct participation.
Chapter Two
MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE INOFFICE
Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. (Art. 204).

Elements:
1. That the offender is a judge;
2. That he renders judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
3. That the judgment is unjust;
4. That the judge knows that his judgment is unjust.
Judgment- is the final consideration and determination of a court of competent jurisdiction
upon the matters submitted to it, in an action or proceeding.
Unjust judgment- is one which is contrary to law, or is not supported by evidence, or both.
Unjust judgment is rendered knowingly when it is made deliberately and maliciously.
“Knowingly” means consciously, intelligently, willfully, or intentionally. (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 5th ed., 784).
- Unjust judgment cannot be presumed-it must be supported with evidence. Thus, the
mere fact that the judge promise to the other party that he would decide the case against the
other party does not prove that judgment is unjust. The judgment may be supported with
evidence.
- Before a judge can be held liable under this article, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that the judgment is contrary to law, or is not supported with evidence, and the
same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. (Sta. Maria vs. Ubay, 87
SCRA 179).
- It is not the prosecutor who would pass the unjustness of the judgment but the proper
appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the court of appeals or the supreme
court, and it also does not apply to collegiate court. (In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, AM, No. 93-
7-6960, February 21, 1995).
-Mere error of judgment cannot serve as a basis for a charge under this article when
there is no proof or even allegation of bad faith, or ill motive, or improper consideration.
( Yaranon vs. Judge Rubio, 66 SCRA 67).
Judgment rendered through negligence. (Art. 205)
Elements:
2. That he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
3. That the judgment is manifestly unjust;
4. That it is due to his inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
-Abuse of discretion or mere error of judgment is not punishable as it does not
necessarily mean ulterior motive, arbitrary conduct or willful disregard of litigant’s right.
(Evangelista vs. Hon. Baes, 61 SCRA 475).
Unjust interlocutory order. (Art. 206).

Elements:
2. That he performs any of the following acts:
a) knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree; or
b) renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through
inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
- An interlocutory order is an order which is issued by the court between the

commencement and the end of suit or action and which decides some point or matter, but which,
however, is not a final decision of the matter in issue. (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary).
Malicious delay in the administration of justice. (Art. 2017)

Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. (Art. 208).
Acts punishable:
1. By maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution against violators of the law.
2. By maliciously tolerating the commission of the offense.
-“negligence” as used in this article should not be understood merely as lack of foresight
or skill but means “neglect of the duties of his office by maliciously failing to move the prosecution
and punishment of the delinquent”. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194).
Elements of dereliction of duty in the prosecution of offenses.

1. That the offender is a public officer or officer of the law who has a duty to cause the
prosecution of, or to prosecute, offenses.
2. That there is dereliction of the duties of his office; that is, knowing the commission of
the crime, he does not cause the prosecution of the criminal (Pp. vs. Rosales, GR No. 42648) or
knowing that a crime is about to be committed, he tolerated its commission.
3. That the offender acts with malice and deliberate intent to favor the violator of the law.
Officers liable:
- A chief of police, who, in breach of official duty, failed to prosecute a jueteng collector, in
that he failed to file the corresponding criminal action against the latter who was caught
possessing jeuteng lists, was held liable under Art. 208. ( Pp. vs. Mina, 65 Phil. 621).
- A barrio lieutenant (now brgy. captain) who, in neglect of his duty, fails to move the
prosecution of, and punishment for, a crime of arson, of which he is informed, would, in case the
alleged crime was afterwards duly proven, be guilty of prevaricacion. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23
Phil. 194).
- A fiscal who, knowing that the evidence against the accused is more than sufficient to
secure his conviction in court, drops the case, is liable and may punished under Art. 208.
- Malice is an important element of this article. Thus, the municipal president (now mayor)
who held cockfights on the days not authorized by the law, to raise funds for the construction of a
ward in the provincial hospital, was not liable under Art. 208 for the word “maliciously” means that
the action complained of must be the result of a deliberate evil intent and does not cover a mere
voluntary act. The accused was convicted of illegal cockfighting. (Pp. vs. Malabanan, 62 Phil.
786).
- The crime committed by the law-violator must be proved first. If the guilt of the law-
violator is not proved, the person charged with dereliction of duty under this article is not liable.
(U.S. vs. Mendoza, supra).
Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor-revelation of secrets. (Art. 209).

Acts punished as betrayal of trust by attorney.
1. By causing damage to his client, either (1) by any malicious breach of professional
duty, (2) by inexcusable negligence or ignorance. Note: When the attorney acts (1) with malicious
abuse of his employment or (2) inexcusable negligence or ignorance, there must be damage to
his clients.
2. By revealing any of the secrets of his client learned by him in his professional capacity.
Note: Damage is not necessary.
3. By undertaking the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the
consent of his client, after having undertaken the defense of said first client or having received
confidential information from said client. Note: If the client consents to the attorney’s taking the
defense of the other party, there is no crime.
Section Two-Bribery
Direct Bribery. (Art. 210).
Acts punished punishable in direct bribery:
1. By agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present – an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties.
2. By accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute
a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duty.
3. By agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which it is his official duty
to do, in consideration of a gift or promise.
Elements of direct bribery:

1. That the offender be a public officer within the scope of Art. 203.
2. That the offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a gift or present by
himself or through another.
3. That such offer or promise be accepted, or gift or present be received by the public
officer –
(1) with a view to committing some crime; or
(2) in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime,
but the act must be unjust; or
(3) to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do.
4. That the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes be
connected with the performance of his official duties.
- “public officer” as used in this title means every public servant from the highest to the
lowest. For this purpose of the penal code, it obliterates the standard distinction in the law of public
officers between “officer” and “employee”.
-Thus, a laborer in the Bureau of Posts appointed by the acting director as sorter and filer
of money orders and the sorting and filing of money orders are obviously a public function or duty.
(Maniego vs. People, 88 Phil. 494).
- A mere emergency helper of the Bureau of Treasury on a daily wage basis, without any
appointment as a janitor or messenger, is a public officer having been entrusted wit the custody of
official document. (Pp. vs. Ireneo, CA 53 OG 2827).
-Gift may not only be offered by a private person, but it may be solicited by the public
officer himself.
- The gift or promise must be accepted by the public officer; otherwise the one making
the offer or gift is liable for attempted corruption of public officer.
- A mere promise to give gift to, and a promise to commit an unlawful act, by a public
officer is sufficient in direct bribery. Thus, a stenographer who accepted a promise of P100 from an
individual and he promised to alter the notes taken by him during the trial is sufficient to hold him
liable in direct bribery. Alteration of TSN is falsification of public document.
- In other words, a promise from the circumstances of the case, may be implied. (U.S. vs.
Richard, 6 Phil. 545).
- The act which the public officer agrees to perform must be connected with the
performance of his official duties. ( U.S. vs. Valdeheza, 4 Phil. 470).
Direct bribery under 2nd paragraph of art. 210
- Direct bribery under the first and the second paragraph have the same elements, but
the act intended by the public officer in the second paragraph does not amount to a crime but is
unjust.
Examples:
The treasurer who, in consideration of money or present, awards certain stalls in the
public to a china man, inspite of the fact that there are Filipinos who have better rights. The act of
the treasurer is not a crime but is unjust.
-In Pp. vs. Gacutan, the act of a judge in rendering an unjust decision, knowing it to be
unjust, in favor of a party who gave him a female carabao falls under this paragraph. Because when
he decided the case in favor of the party is not criminal but is unjust, being in disregard of the
evidence.
-In Marifosque vs. People, GR No. 156685, July 27, 2004, the Police officer is guilty of
direct bribery under the second paragraph when he received a bribe money for the recovery of
stolen cylinder tanks, which was an act not constituting a crime, and his act of receiving money was
in connection with his duty as a police officer.
Where the act is entirely outside of the official functions of the officer to whom the
money is offered, the offense is not bribery.
Case: Official duties include any action authorized. It is sufficient if the officer has the
official power, ability or apparent ability to bring about or contribute to the desired end. The acts
referred to in the law, which the offender agrees to perform or execute, must be ultimately related to
or linked with the performance of his official duties. It is sufficient of his actions, affected by the
payment of the bribe, are parts of any established procedure consistent with the authority of the
government agency. However, where the act is entirely outside of the official functions of the officer
to whom the money is offered, the offense is not bribery.(TAD-Y vs. Pp. GR No. 148862, Aug. 11,
2005).
Direct bribery under the 3rd paragraph.
Examples:
A sanitary inspector who accepts a gift from the tenant of an unsanitary building and in
consideration thereof refrain from performing his official his duty to report its condition to his
superiors. (U.S. vs. Navarro, 3 Phil. 633).
- If by refraining from doing an act the officer is committing a crime, he is punished not
under par. 3 but under par. 1.
Thus, if a public officer, for a gift or promise, abstain from instituting an action for the
punishment of an offense, which is punished under Art. 208, he should be punished under par. 1,
not under par. 3.
Indirect bribery (Art. 211).

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That he accepts gifts.

3. That the said gifts are offered to him by reason of his office.
- There must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so
offered and considered the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift
for safe keeping or pocketing them.
Thus, mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstances or act to
show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude the crime of indirect bribery
has been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up
public officers by simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or other property.
(Formileza vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 1).
Art. 211-A Qualified bribery(as amended by RA 7659) .

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer entrusted with law enforcement;
2. That the offender refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death;
3. That the offender refrains from arresting or prosecuting the offender in consideration
of any promise, gift or present.
Penalty:
1. Shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.
2. If it’s the public officer who asks or demands such gift, the penalty is death.
Corruption of public officials. (Art. 212).

Elements:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises or gives gift or presents to a public officer.
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents given to a public offer,
under the circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
-Entrapment is usually a means of catching the briber.
Thus, an NBI agent who, posing as interested in expediting the approval of license for
firearm, gave P 50.00 to a public officer who had hinted that he was not averse to receiving some
money for expediting the approval of licenses, merely resorted to ways and means to catch the
public officer, it appearing that there was a ground of suspicion or belief of the existence of official
graft in that office. (Pp. vs. Vinzol, CA 47 OG 294).
P.D. No. 46 – Prohibits the giving and acceptance of gifts by a public officer or to a public
officer, even during anniversary, or when there is an occasion like Christmas, New Year, or any
gift-giving anniversary.
The decree punishes both the giver and the receiver.
- The giving and receiving of gifts must be by reason of official position, regardless of
whether or not the same is for past or future favors.
- The giving of parties by reason of the promotion of a public official is considered a crime
even though it may call for a celebration. The giving of the party is not limited to the pubic officer
only but also to any member of his family.
P.D. 749. Granting immunity from prosecution to a private person or public officer who
shall voluntarily give information and testify in a case involving a violation of the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The giving of immunity to the bribe-giver requires the following:

1. He voluntarily discloses the transaction he had with the public officer constituting
direct or indirect bribery, or any other corrupt transaction;
2. He must willing testify against the public officer involved in the case to be filed against
the latter.
- Before the bribe giver may be dropped from the information, he has to be charged first
with the receiver. Before trial, the prosecutor may move for the dropping of the bribe-giver from
the information and be granted immunity. But first the five condition must be met:
1) The information must refer to consummated bribery;
2) The information is necessary for the proper conviction of the public officer involved;
3) That the information to be given is not yet in the possession of the government or
known to the government;
4) That the information can be corroborated in its material points;
5) That the informant has not been convicted previously for any crime involving moral
turpitude.
The immunity attached only if the information given turned out to be true and correct. If
the same is false, the public officer may even file criminal and civil complaint against the
informant for perjury.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

(R.A. No. 3019 as amended by R.A. No. 3047, P.D. No. 77 and B.P. Blg. 195)
Sec. 3 – Corrupt Practices Act. Of Public Officers.
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act

constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be
persuaded, induced, or influence to commit such violation or offense.
- The persons liable are (1) the public officer who persuades, etc., and (2) the public
officer who allows himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced.
- Requesting or receiving any gift, present, or benefit is not required in this provision.
- In the absence of any allegation or proof that the accused so acted for a consideration,
payment or remuneration and that he intended to obtain personal gain, enrichment or advantage,
the accused may not be convicted of violation of par. (a), Sec. 3 of RA 3019. ( PP. vs Bernales,
13 CA. Rep. 972; 67 O.G. 8316).
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,

percentage, or benefit, for himself of for any other person, in connection with any contract
or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein the public officer in
his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
-The person liable under this provision is the public officer, who in his official capacity,
has to intervene under the law in any contract or transaction between the government and any
other party and he directly or indirectly request, receive any gift, present, share percentage, or
benefit, for himself of for any other person, in connection with that contract or transaction.
- A preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by the fiscal is not a
“contract or transaction” so as to bring it within the ambit of section 3 (b) of RA 3019. (Soriano
vs. Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 184).See also Pp vs. Sandiganbayan et al., GR NO. 188165,
Dec. 11, 2013).
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other

pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, for any person for whom the
public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain,
any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given,
without prejudice to Section 13 of this Act.
- The person liable under this provision is the public officer who, in any manner or
capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtained, any Government permit or license
for another person and he directly or indirectly request or receive any gift, present or other
pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another in consideration for the help given or to be
given.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private
enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or
within one year after his termination.
-The person liable under this provision is a public officer who had or has pending official
business with a private enterprise and he accepts or has any member of his family accept
employment in that enterprise (1) during the pendency of the official business with him or (2)
within one year after its termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross excusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of license or permits or other
concessions.
-To be liable under this provision, the public officer must act thru manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross excusable negligence.
- The act constituting the crime is causing undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of the official administrative or judicial functions of the offending public officer.
The prosecution must prove unwarranted benefit or undue injury.
Case: Section 3(e) requires the prosecution to prove that the appointments of Dr.
Posadas caused “undue injury” to the government or gave him “unwarranted benefits.
The Court always interpreted “undue injury” as “actual damage”. What is more, such
“actual damage” must not only be capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. A finding of “undue injury” cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial
evidence or upon speculation, conjecture, or guesswork. The Court held in Llorente vs.
Sandiganbaya, (G.R. NO. 122166, March 11,1998) that the element of undue injury cannot be
presumed even after the supposed wrong has been established. It must be proved as one of the
elements of the crime.(Posadas,et al., vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., GR No. 168951&169000,
Nov. 27, 2013).
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the
purpose of obtaining directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some
pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest
or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the government, into any contract or transaction

manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer
profited or will profit thereby.
- The person liable under this provision is any public officer who has the duty under the
law to enter, in behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction with any person, and he
enters into such contract or transaction manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government.
- It is not necessary that the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
-To sustain conviction under Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019, it must be clearly proven that 1) the
accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of
the government; and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government.(Morales vs. Pp, 385 SCRA 259,July 26, 2002).
Lack of public bidding and the violation of an administrative order may not violate
Act No. 3019, Sec.3 (g)
Case: We must emphasize however, that the lack of public bidding and the violation of
an administrative order do not by themselves satisfy the third element of RA No. 3019, Sec. (g);
namely: that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government, as seems to be stated in the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying the
motion for reconsideration. Lack of public bidding alone does not result in manifest and gross
disadvantage. Indeed, the absence of public bidding may mean that the government was not able
to secure the lowest bargain in his favor and may open the door to graft and corruption.
Nevertheless, the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Penal laws are
strictly construed against the government.(Nava vs. Palatao, et al;, GR No. 160211, Aug. 28,
2006).
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interest.
- The officer liable under this provision is any public officer who intervenes of takes part in
his official capacity in any business, contract or transaction, or any public officer who is prohibited
by the Constitution or by any law having any interest and he has financial interest directly or
indirectly in that business, contract or transaction.
- Actual intervention is what is required in the transaction in which one has financial or
pecuniary interest in that business in order that the liability may attach. (Opinion No. 306, Series
of 1961 and Opinion No. 94, series of 1972 of the Secretary of Justice).
-The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not DO
anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent the dominant use of
influence, authority and power. (Trieste, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 145 SCRA 508).
Actual intervention in the transaction necessary to violate Sec. 3(h) lf RA 3019.
Case: Worth citing is the case of Triste, Sr., vs. Sandiganbayan (145 SCRA 508, Nov.
13, 1996) where the court clarified the kind of intervention that would constitute a violation of
Section 3(h) of RA 3019:
What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is the actual intervention in
the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that the liability
may attach. For the law aims to prevent dominant use of influence, authority and
power. (caballero, et al., vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., GR No. 137355-58, Sept. 25,
2007).
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested in any transaction or act requiring the
approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises
discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in
the action of the board, panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers
responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transactions
or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.
-The person liable under this provision is any public officer who is a member of the board,
panel or group which exercises discretion in the approval of any transaction, and he is directly or
indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having any material interest in any
transaction or act requiring the approval of such board, panel or group. He is liable even if he did
not participate in the action of the board, group or panel, or even if he votes against it
The public officer responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable or
irregular transactions or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong are presumed to
have acquired interest for personal gain.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in
favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit,
privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not qualified
or entitled.
- The person liable under this provision is the public officer who has the duty of approving
or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit, and he knowingly approve or grant any
license, permit or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such
license, permit or privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not
qualified or entitled.
- Requesting or receiving any gift, present or benefit is not required in this provision.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his
office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing
such information in advance of its authorized release date.
- The person liable under this provision is any public officer who, on account of his official
position, or whose office, acquired valuable information of a confidential character, and he (1)
divulged such valuable information to unauthorized persons, or (2) released such information in
advance of its authorized released date.
Sec. 4. Prohibition on private individual
- It shall be unlawful for any person who has family or close relation with any public
official who has to intervene in some business, transaction, application, request of contract of the
government with any other person to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or
close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, or
material or pecuniary advantage from the person having the business, transaction, application,
request or contract with the government.
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives – just read.

Sec. 6. Prohibition on Members of congress – just read.

Sec. 7. Statements of Assets and liabilities – just read.
Sec. 8. Prima facie evidence of and dismissal due to unexplained wealth- just read.
Read up to Sec. 16.
Preventive suspension is not violative of the constitution and mandatory under
Section 13 of RA 3019.
Case: All told, preventive suspension is not violative of the constitution as it is not a
penalty. IN fact, suspension particularly under Sec. 19 of RA 3019 is mandatory once the validity
of the information is determined. What the constitution abhors is an indefinite preventive
suspension as it violates the due process and equal protection clauses, and the right of public
officers and employees to security of tenure.
Xxx
1. Preventive suspension under Sec. 13, RA 3019 as amended shall be limited
to a maximum of period of ninety (90) days, from issuance thereof, and this
applies to all public officers, (as defined in Sec. 2(b) of RA 3019) who are
validly charged under said act.
Suspension of a public officer charged under RA 3019 is not automatic as a
hearing on the validity of the information must first be had.
Case: xxx suspension of a public officer is mandatory. However, suspension cannot be
automatic, the reason being that “a hearing on the validity of the information appears conformable
to the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a
suspension of n elective official even before his conviction and that public interest demand a
speedy determination of the issues involved in the case.” Thus, before a suspension order can be
issued, a hearing on the issue of the validity of the information must first be had. This pre-
suspension hearing is conducted to determine the validity of the information, xxx(PP vs. Albano,
GR No. L-45376-77, July 26, 1998).
Chapter Four
MALVERZATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.

Acts punishable:
1. By appropriating public funds or property.
2. By taking or misappropriating the same.
3. By consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person
to take such public funds or property.
4. By being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property.
- The penalty for malversation is the same whether committed with malice or through
negligence
Elements common to all acts of malversation under Art. 217.

1. That the offender be a public officer.
2. He had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office.
3. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable.
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented to or, through

abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
- It is the nature of the duties, not the relatively important name given to the office, which
is the controlling factor in determining whether or not the accused is an accountable public officer.
The vital fact is that he is an employee of, or in some way connected with, the government and
that, in the course of his employment, he receives money or property belonging to the
government for which he is bound to account. ( U.S. vs. Vlelasquez, 32 Phil. 157).
- An emergency employee entrusted with the collection and/or custody of public funds
may be held liable for malversation, if misappropriates such funds.
Illustrations:
1. An unlicensed firearm confiscated by a police officer, but instead of turning over the
same to the property custodian for the prosecution of the offender, sold the firearm is guilty of
malversation.
2. A government cashier did not bother to put the public fund in the public safe/vault but
left it in the drawer of the table which has no lock and then somebody took the funds is guilty of
malversation. Note: Malversation can be committed by negligence.
3. The Municipal President who spent for himself P 60.00 which he had received as rent
for the house owned by the Municipality is guilty of malversation, said amount having received by
him by reason of his office. (U.S. vs. Togonon, 12 Phil. 516).
- If the officer is not accountable to the funds misappropriated the crime committed is
theft. If there is abuse of confidence, it will be qualified theft.
- To be liable for malversation funds or property must be received in official capacity.
Thus, a municipal councilor who had no duty to collect or receive the slaughter fee received it
from another person with a promise to secure a receipt therefore and misappropriated it is guilty
of ESTAFA, not malversation. (U.S. vs. Radaza, 17 Phil. 286). See U.S. vs. Webster, 6Phil.
394 and U.S. vs. Wickersham, 20 Phil. 440.
-Non-accountable officer of private individual may be liable for malversation if they
conspired with a public officer guilty of malversation.
Thus, a janitor and five policemen who aided the municipal treasurer in the commission
of malversation by taking the safe containing the money from the municipal treasury and carrying
it to another place and took the contents thereof are guilty of malversation although they are not
accountable officer. (U.S. vs. Ponte, et al., 20 Phil. 379). See also Pp. vs Sendaydiego, 81
SCRA 120).
-Lack of criminal intent or good faith is a defense in malversation not committed trough
negligence.
Thus, a municipal officer who in good faith paid out of public funds, persons who in
accordance with the resolution of the municipal council, but the payments were made in violation
of the law, because of insufficient vouchers or improper evidence, is only civilly liable there being
no criminal intent. (See Pp. vs. Elvina, 2 Phil. 230; U.S. vs. Catolica, 18 Phil. 504).
- Private property may be involved in malversation. It applies to administrator or
depository of funds or property attached, seized, or deposited by public authority even if such
property belongs to private individual. (see Pp. vs. De la Serna, CA, 40 OG Suppp.12 159).
- Failure to account public funds or property upon demand by duly authorized officer is
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal uses.
Thus, the failure or inability of the accused who was in custody of public funds or property
to refund the shortage upon demand by the duly authorized office constitute prima facie evidence
of malversation, notwithstanding the fact that such demand was made verbally. (U.S. vs.
Kalingo, 46 Phil. 651).
An accountable public officer is liable for malversation even if there is no direct evidence
of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his account which he has
not been able to explain satisfactorily.
- The presumption, however, may be rebutted. (see Magdarang vs. People GR No.
112314, March 28, 2001).
- The return of the funds malversed is only mitigating, not exempting circumstance.
Thus, when the books were examined by the auditor, the assistant cashier was not able
to produce the amount, and later the assistant cashier offered and did actually return the money,
it was held that the return of the money was merely mitigating circumstance. (Pp. vs. Velasquez,
72 Phil. 98).
- But in another case where the officer who made the examination testified that at the
very moment when the shortage was discovered and the treasurer was notified he at once paid
the shortage out of the money from his pocket, it was held that no presumption of
misappropriation can be established. (U.S. vs. Feleciano, 15 Phil. 147).
-Where, a treasurer covered his shortage out of the money borrowed from his clerk did
not relieved him of his liability as he failed to explain satisfactorily why the amount which should
be in his hands was in is clerk’s possession. (Pp. vs. Divino, CA-GR No. 428, Oct. 13, 1938).
-But when the accountable officer is obliged to go out of his office to borrow the sum
allege to be the shortage and later the missing amount was found in some unaccustomed place
in his office, is not liable for malversation. ( U.S. vs Pascual, 26 Phil. 234).
-Demand is not necessary in malversation. It is not an element of the crime. It merely
raises the presumption that missing funds have been put to personal use. (Morong Water
District vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 116754, March 7, 2000).
Art. 218-222 – just read.
Loans granted to employees taken from the cash account of the municipality not
covered by supporting vouchers signed by the Municipal Mayor nor officially entered in
the cash book as official cash advances is malversation.
Case: xxx. Gosudan also admitted that these loans were neither covered by supporting vouchers
signed by the Municipal Mayor nor officially entered in the cash book as official cash advances.
Xxxx
Clearly, the subject loans that Gosudan extended to the said municipal officials and
employees including herself were unofficial and unauthorized loans and, therefore, anomalous un
nature. The sandignabyan was correct in ruling that said loans were nothing but personal loans
taken from the cash account of the Municipality of INfanta, Pangasinan. Gosudan unlawfully
disbursed funds from the coffers of the municipality and, therefore, guilty of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds. (Manuel, et al., vs. Pp, et al., GR No. 158413, Feb. 8, 2012).
An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no
direct evidence of malversation.
Case: In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his
possession public funds; that it could not account for them and did not have them in his
possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An
accountable officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts which has not been able to
explain satisfactorily. (Zenon Perez vs. Pp. et al., GR No. 164763, Feb. 12, 2008).
Accused charged of intentional malversation can still be convicted of malversation
by negligence even if the latter is not alleged.
Case: Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolr of the
culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode
charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and
conviction thereof is proper. All that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when
demand thereof was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct
evidence or personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the
accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts.(Zolita vs. Sandiganbayan,
GR No. 185224, July 29, 2015).See PP vs Consigna,et al., 122 Phil. 293, 296 (1965)Pp vs.
Ochoa, 511 Phil. 682 (2005).
Chapter Five
INFIDELITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Art. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion.
Elements:
2. That he had in his custody or charge, a prisoner, either detention prisoner of prisoner
by final judgment.
3. That such prisoner escaped from his custody.
4. That he was in connivance with the prisoner in the latter’s escape. (U.S. vs Badino,
29 Phil.459).
- A policeman who allowed a prisoner to go out and buy a cigarette at a nearby store,
thereby making possible the escape of the prisoner, is not in connivance with the latter, the
policeman not knowing that he would escape.
- A detention prisoner is a person in legal custody, arrested for, and charged with, some
crime or public offenses.
Thus, a driver of a truck, driving without a license, met an accident and was taken to the
hospital and, while being guarded by a policeman escaped, the policeman is not liable because
the driver who was not actually arrested, was not a detention prisoner. An information for driving
without license was filed against the driver two days after his escape. (Pp. vs. Liong, CA 47 OG
1321).
- Release of a detention prisoner who could not be delivered to the judicial authority
within the prescribed period is not infidelity in the custody of prisoner. (Pp. vs. Lancanan, 95
Phil. 375).
- Laxity or leniency is not infidelity where the prisoner was allowed to eat in a restaurant
near the municipal building or at his house during the town fiesta and was duly guarded all the
time. (Pp. vs. Evangelista, CA 38 OG 158).
- A guard who allowed a prisoner to sleep and eat at his house there being no provision
for food of prisoner is infidelity. (See Pp. vs. Revilla, CA 37 OG 1896).
- A municipal mayor who utilized a prisoner to do house chores at his house and served
as a cook is infidelity. (See Pp. vs. Evanglista, supra.)
Art. 224. Evasion through negligence.

Elements:
2. That he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention
prisoner or prisoner by final judgment.
3. That such prisoner escaped through negligence.
Illustration of absence of 2nd element:
-If the custody of the prisoner was not yet transferred to the succeeding guard B
who was still sleeping when his time take over came and during that time a prisoner
escaped while guard A continued manning the post want for B to wake up, guard B
cannot by liable for negligence as the custody of the prisoner has not yet been
transferred to him when the evasion took place. (Pp. vs. Silvosa, CA GR No. 12736-
R,April 30, 1955).
Illustration of absence of the 3rd element:
- A policeman was guard on duty. He unlocked the door of the jail to let a detention
prisoner go out to clean the premises of the police headquarters. The prisoner went to a nearby
faucet to wash the rags. Upon his third trip to the faucet, he walked behind the police
headquarters, climber over the wall and escaped. Held: The policeman is not liable as he was not
negligent. Not every little mistake or destraction of a guard leading to prisoner’s escape is
negligent under Art. 224. (Pp. vs. Flosa, CA, 47 OG 2452).
- Not every negligence or distraction of a guard is penalized; it is only that positive
carelessness that is short of deliberate non-performance of his duties as a guard that is the
gravamen of the crime of infidelity under Art. 224. (Pp. vs. Reyes, et al., CA 59 OG 6664).See.
Pp. vs Nava, CA 36 OG 316.
Examples of Infidelity trough negligence:

1. A policeman who, assigned to guard a prisoner, falls asleep, which resulted in the
escape of a prisoner is guilty of negligence. (Pp. vs. Guiab, GR No. 39631, May 6, 1934).
2. The guard who permitted a prisoner , who escaped, to gather gabi considering that the
place was grassy and talahibs was growing therein is guilty of negligence. (Pp. vs. Lagata, 83
Phil. 159).
-The recapture of the prisoner does not afford complete exculpation. (Pp. vs. Qiesel, CA
52 OG 6975).
Art. 225. Escape of prisoner under the custody of a person not a public officer. –
just read.
Art. 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents.
Elements:
2. That he abstracts, destroys or conceals documents or papers.
3. That the said documents or papers should have been entrusted to such public officer
by reason of his office.
4. That damage, whether serious or not, to a third party or to the public interest should
have been caused.
- The document must be complete and one by which a right could be established or an
obligation could be extinguished.
Thus, the municipal mayor who, in the fit of anger, mutilated the payroll of the town, is
not guilty of infidelity as the payroll was not yet complete not having been signed yet by the
mayor. (Pp. vs. Camacho, 44 Phil. 484).
- This provision applies to private document entrusted to a public officer.
Thus, a postmaster to whom a letter containing paper money was delivered to be
forwarded by registered mail, opened said letter and abstracted money orders, or the money bills
enclosed therein in guilty under this provision. (U.S. vs. Gorospe, 31 Phil. 285; U.S. vs. Filoteo,
14 Phil. 73).
- The simple act of retaining the mail without forwarding the letters to their destination,
even if he did not open and take the money they contained is guilty under this provision. (U.S. vs.
Marino, 10 Phil. 652; U.S. vs. Pena, 12 Phil. 362).
Art. 226-245- just read them.
Title Eight
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
Art. 246. Parricide.

Elements:
1. That a person is killed.
2. That the deceased is killed by the accused.
3. That the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused.
- With respect to grand parents or grandchildren, to be liable for parricide, they must be
legitimate. (other descendants or ascendants). But with respect to father, mother or child of the
accused, proof of legitimacy is not required. (Pp. vs. Embalido, 58 Phil. 154).
- Relationship must be alleged in the information. If the accused is charged only with
murder instead of parricide, he cannot be convicted for parricide, but relationship will be an
aggravating circumstance of relationship. (Pp. vs. Jumawan, 116 SCRA 739).
- If a person wanted to kill a stranger but by mistake killed his own father, the crime
committed is parricide, but Art. 49 is the penalty.
Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances.

Requisites:
1. That a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his daughter, the
latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person.
2. that he or she kills any or both, of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any
physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter;
3. That he has nor promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that
he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
- It is not required in this article that the parent-accused must be legitimate. It is merely
required that the daughter must be under 18 years of age, and living with her parents.
- This does not apply to married daughter, although does not state “unmarried daughter”.
This applies only to single daughter, she is under parental authority. If she is married, only her
husband can claim the benefit.
- The accused must have surprised his spouse or daughter (under 18 yrs of age and
living with him ) in the act of sexual intercourse with another person.
Thus, where a husband who, upon arriving home one night and seeing a man jump out
of the window, killed his wife who was begging forgiveness is guilty of parricide. (Pp. vs.
Marquez, 53 Phil. 260).
- Merely sleeping on the same bed is not “in the act of sexual intercourse. (Pp. vs.
Bituanan, 56 Phil. 23).
-Also not included in the phrase where he surprised his wife after the act, as when he
saw already rising up and the man buttoning hid drawer. (Pp. vs. Gonzales, 69 Phil. 66).
- But it is enough that the circumstances show reasonably that the carnal act is being
committed or has just been committed. (Pp. vs. Gonzales, supra).
In the above case, the paramour and the accused wife entered the room alone,
undressed themselves, performs mutual acts of the character of lasciviousness all in the prelude
to the carnal act when they were surprised by the offended husband and killed them. Majority of
the justices held that there must be an act of sexual intercourse. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Laurel said: “Must the offended husband look on in the meantime and wait until the very physical
act of coition take place. This interpretation is far from being rational and certainly does violence
to the reason and purpose of the law.
Meaning of the phrase “immediately thereafter”

Case: While looking for his wife who did not return home, and on his way home, he
surprised his wife and his paramour in the act of sexual intercourse, but they hurriedly stood up
and the man started to run. The husband pursued the man but did not catch him and he then
returned home where he found his wife in the act of climbing the stairs and killed her. Held:
Although the wife was not killed in the very where she was caught, the assault upon the wife must
be understood to be a continuation of the act of the wronged husband’s pursuit of her paramour.
Art. 247 applies. ((U.S. vs. Alano, 32 Phil. 383-384).
-The discovery, the escape, the pursuit and the killing must all form part of one
continuous act. ( 79 Phil. 194).
- Though a quite length of time, had passed between the accused surprised his wife the
act of sexual intercourse and the time when the paramour was actually shot, the shooting must
be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused. (Pp. vs. Abarca,
153 SCRA 735).
- The killing must be the by-product of the accused rage after surprising his wife and
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse and mut not be influenced by external factors. (Pp. vs.
abarca, supra).
- Where physical injuries where committed as a result of the cross-fire, the accused will
not be liable because the accused was not committing felony when he discharged his firearm.
(Pp. vs. abarca, supra.) Unless he is guilty of negligence.
-Destierro is not really intended to punish the killer of the spouse but merely to protect
him form reprisal specially coming from the relatives of the deceased spouse. ( Pp. vs. Lauron,
57 OG 7367).
Art. 248. Murder.
- killing a person by means of fire is murder, only when there is actual design to kill on the
part of the offender. (U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418).This ruling is applicable to all other
circumstances enumerated in paragraph No. 3 of Art. 248.
- If the defendant had assaulted the victim in a treacherous manner, he is guilty of murder
in view of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, even if he did not intend to kill the victim. (Pp.
vs. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 530). This ruling may be applicable to all the circumstances in pars. Nos.
1,2,4,5 and 6 of Art. 248. The ruling is based on Art. 4, par. 1 of the RPC.
- Murder will exist with only one of the circumstances described in Art. 248 (U.S. vs
Labai, 17 Phil. 240).
- When more than one of said circumstances are present, the others must be considered
as generic aggravating. Thus, when the killing of the victim, the commission of the crime is
attended by evident premeditation, treachery, and price, reward or promise, only one of them
shall qualify the killing to murder and the other shall be considered as generic aggravating
circumstances. (See pp. vs. Dueno, 90 SCRA 23).
- Killing of a child is murder even if the manner of attack was not shown. Treachery or
alevosia exists when an adult person attacks a child of tender years and causes his death. (Pp.
vs. Valerio, 112 SCRA 231).
Art. 249. Homicide.
-When death resulted, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide. (U.S. vs
Gloria, 3 Phil. 333). Because intent to kill is conclusively presumed when death resulted.
- It is only in attempted or frustrated homicide that intent to kill is important. In attempted
or frustrated homicide there must be intent to kill; otherwise he is liable for physical injuries only.
- Usually intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the parts
of the body of the victim at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. But
in the of Pp vs. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 is the exception where the accused went to his wife, who
was living separately from him, to entreat to live with him again, but a cousin of his wife provoked
him that caused him to assault him (wife’s cousin) and the son of his wife by first marriage, with a
bolo, inflicting physical injuries, caused indiscriminately and not deliberately, the purpose of the
accused ingoing to the house, and not the kind of weapon he carried nor the parts of the body of
the victims that were wounded, is indicative and determinative of his intention.
- The wounds that caused the death were inflicted by two different persons, even they
were not in conspiracy, each one of them is guilty of homicide. The burden of proof is on the
accused to show that the wound inflicted by him did not cause the death of the victim. (Pp. vs.
Abiog, 37 Phil. 137).
Case: A shot B with a revolver in the latter’s abdomen, inflicting mortal wound. B fell to
the ground, stunned for an instant, but soon got up and went to his house, procured a knife, and
knowing that he would die anyway, cut his throat, and he died in five minutes. Held: The
contention of the defense the B killed himself is untenable. When the death of B occurred, the
wound inflicted by A did contribute to the event. B was actually dying when he cut his throat, B
continued t languish from both wounds until his death. ( Pp. vs. Lewis, 124 Cal., 551, cited in
US vs. Abiog).
Art. 255. Infanticide.
Elements:
1. That a child was killed.
2. That the deceased child was less than three days (72 hours) of age.
3. That the accused killed said child.
- A stranger who cooperates in the perpetration of infanticide committed by the mother or
grandparent on the mother side, is liable for infanticide, but he must suffer the penalty prescribed
for murder. (U.S. vs Aquino,34 Phil. 813).
- In Infanticide, the prosecution must prove that the mother gave birth to a living creature.
(U.S. vs. Aquino, supra.), which means that the child must be borne alive and fully developed,
that is it must sustain an independent life. (U.S. vs. Vedra, 12 Phil. 96).
A foetus about six months old cannot subsist by itself, outside the maternal womb. (Pp.
vs. Detablan, CA 40 Og Supp. 5, 30). See Pp vs. Jesus Pacayanan. G.R. No.179035, April
16, 2008.
Even if the child who was expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive at birth, the
offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable.
(Pp vs. Pacayanan supra).
Art. 256. Intentional abortion.
Abortion is defined as the willful killing of the foetus in the uterus, or the violent expulsion
of the foetus from the maternal womb which results in the death of the foetus.
- Foetus must die to consummate abortion. Thus, if the foetus survives in spite of the
attempt to kill it or the use of violence, abortion is not consummated. If abortion is intended and
the foetus did not die, it is frustrated intentional abortion when all the acts of execution have been
performed by the offender.
- If abortion is not intended and the foetus does not die, in spite of the violence
intentionally exerted, the crime may only be physical injuries.
- As long as the foetus dies as a result of the violence used or drugs administered, the
crime of abortion exists, even if the foetus is full term. (Viada).
Ways of committing intentional abortion:

1. By using any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman.
2. By acting, but without using violence, without the consent of the woman. ( By
administering beverages or drugs upon such pregnant woman without her consent.
3. By acting (by administering drugs or beverages), with the consent of the pregnant
woman.
Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman;
2. That violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the accused

otherwise acts upon such pregnant woman;
3. That as a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, or any other
act of the accused, the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled
therefrom;
4. That the abortion is intended.
Abortion distinguished from infanticide.

- Even if the foetus already acquired human form and about six months old when it was
expelled from the womb but did not have its own life independent of its mother, or even if
alive but could not subsist by itself outside the maternal womb, the crime committed is
abortion. But if it could sustain an independent life, after its separation from the maternal
womb, and it is killed, the crime committed is infanticide.
Art. 257. Unintentional abortion.

Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman,
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having
been expelled therefrom.
- Unintentional abortion is committed only by means of violence, thus, where a man
points a gun at a pregnant woman, at the same time telling her that eh will kill her, and
because of the fright she absorbs, she suffers an abortion, the offender is guilty only of
threats. (Dec. Supreme Court of Spain of Nov. 30, 1887).
- The violence must be intentionally exerted. Thus, a man who struck a woman three
months pregnant on her hip with a bottle, causing hemorrhage and miscarriage was held guilty of
unintentional abortion. (U.S. vs. Jeffrey, 15 Phil/ 391).
- The accused is still liable even if he did not know that the woman was pregnant. (U.S.
vs Jeffrey, supra). Also incase of Pp. vs. Carnaso, CA, 61 OG 3623.
- There can be complex crime of homicide with unintentional abortion. Thus, when a man
struck the woman with his fist, causing her to fall to the ground, and when she got up, he gave
another blow which caused her to fall again, causing the woman’s hemorrhage culminating the
premature delivery of her twin babies, the other not having been born because the woman die, is
guilty of complex crime of homicide with unintentional abortion. (Pp. vs. Genoves, 33 OG 2201).
See Pp. vs. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401).
- A husband who, with violence kills his pregnant wife, thus occasioning the death of the
foetus, is guilty of parricide with unintentional abortion. (Pp. vs. Villanueva, 242 SCRA 47).
- Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim
in a fight is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have
merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause abortion. (Pp vs. Salufrania, GR
No. 50884, March 30, 1988).
Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself or by her parents.

Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives.
Chapter Two
PHYSICAL INJURIES
Art. 262. Mutilation.
“Mutilation” means the lopping or the clipping off of some part of the body.
Two kinds of mutilation:
1. By intentionally mutilating another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some
essential organ for reproduction.
2. By intentionally making other mutilation, that is, by lopping or clipping off any part of
the body of the offended party, other than the essential organ for reproduction, to deprive him of
that part of his body.
Elements of mutilation of the first kind:
1. That there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation, such
as penis or ovarium.
2. That the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the
offended party of some essential organ for reproduction.
- The firs kind of mutilation is castration which must be made purposely. Thus, if by
reason of the injury or attack, the person is deprived of organs of generation, the act, although
voluntary, not being intentional to that end, would not come under the provision of this article.
(U.S. vs. ESparcia, 36 Phil. 840).
- If a mutilation is not caused purposely and deliberately so as to deprive the offended
party of a particular part of his body, the crime could be physical injuries.
Art. 263. Serious physical injuries.
What are serious physical injuries?

1. When the injured person as a consequence of the injury inflicted becomes insane,
imbecile, impotent or blind (two eyes).
2. When the injured person (a) losses the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell,
or losses an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg, or (b) loses the use of any such member, or (c)
becomes incapacitated for the work in which he was theretofore habitually engaged,
inconsequence of the physical injuries inflicted.
3. When the person injured (a) becomes deformed, or (b) loses other member of his
body, or (c) loses the use thereof, or (d) becomes ill or incapacitated for the performance of the
work in which he was habitually engaged for more than 90 days, in consequence of the physical
injuries inflicted.
4. When the injured person becomes ill or incapacitated for labor for more than 30 days
(but not be more than 90 days) as a result of the physical injuries inflicted.
-In serious physical injuries there must be no intention to kill, otherwise, it will either be
frustrated or attempted homicide, as the case may be.
- The penalty for Article 262, paragraph I shall be reclusion perpetua if the victim is under
12 years of age. (Sec. 10, RA 7610).
- It must be loss of power to hear of both hear to apply par. 2, otherwise if only one ear,
par. 3 shall apply.
- In order to sustain conviction under par. 2 of Art. 262, the prosecution must prove that
the offended party cannot make use of his hands permanently; otherwise, accused is guilty under
par. 3 thereof. (Pp. vs. Reli, CA, 53 OG 5695).
- Par. 2 refers to principal members of the body. The arm is principal member of the
body. (U.S. vs. Camacho, 8 Phil. 142). If the left arm becomes permanently maimed, the crime
is serious physical injuries. (Pp. vs. Sto. Tomas, 138 SCRA 206).
- Par. 3 covers any member which is not principal member of the body. Meaning, any
member of the body which is not principal is covered by par. 3. (Pp. vs. Balubar, 23 Phil. 375).
- Loss of “power to hear” must involve two ears; otherwise he has not lost poser to hear,
but “lost the use of any part of his body”. (Pp. vs. Hernandez, 9 Phil. 49).
-Medical attendance is not required in serious physical injuries, only illness or incapacity
for labor. (Pp. vs. Obia, CA, 45 OG 2568).
- Loss of one tooth which impaired appearance is deformity covered by par. 3, Art. 263.
And front tooth is a member of the body other than the principal member of the body. (Pp. vs.
Balubar, 60 Phil. 707).
In absence of animus iniuriandi (malicious intent), the act of kicking, paddling, and
other modes of inflicting physical injuries, will not amount to intentional felony as physical
injuries.
Fact: Lenny died during Aquila’s fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would
be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit
anytime. On the first night, they were subjected to “traditional” initiation rites, including the ‘indian
run”, “bicol express”, rounds and the “auxies privilege round”. The beating were predominantly
directed at the neophytes’ arms and legs.
Xxxx
These rituals were performed with Lenny’s consent. A few days before the rites, he asked
both his parent’s permission to join the Aquila Fraternity. His father knew that Lenny would go
through an initiation process and would be gone for three days.
Even after the going through Aquila’s grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the second day of the initiation.
Held: Based on the contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear
malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in
this case. Even if the specific act of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting
physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements
of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of
criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.xxx Other than the paddle, no other
weapon was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the
legs and the arms;xxxthere was no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a
different treatment.
Xxx
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to
recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny culpable felony. Note; The accused were
found guilty of slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. (Villareal vs.
Pp. GR No. 151258, Feb. 1, 2012).
For other physical injuries, just read them.
Republic Act. 9262

Anti-Violence Act Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004

March 8, 2004.
“Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against his child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within nor without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts: a) Physical violence; b)
Sexual violence; c) Psychological violence; and economic abuse. (Read further the law).
Even of the physical injuries inflicted upon the offended woman is not related to
their dating relationship, RA 9262 is committed.
Case: Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that
the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation
be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable act refers to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
(Dabalos vs. RTC, et al. GR No. 193960, Jan. 7, 2013).
Chapter Three
RAPE
Art. 266-A. RAPE
Elements of Rape under Par. 1
1) That the offender is a man;
2) That the offender has carnal knowledge of a woman.
3) That such act is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
(a) By using force or intimidation; or
(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented.
Elements of rape under par. 2
1) That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;
2) That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:
(a) By inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or
(b) By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person;
3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following
circumstances:
(a) By using force or intimidation;
(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age.
- Labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the
penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, the grazing of the surface of the female
organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated
rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either
labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape if not acts of lasciviousness. (Pp. vs. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30,
2000).
- Finger is within the expanded definition of rape under RA No. 8353 (par. 2 of Art. 266-
B). Obana vs. Hon. Soriano, CA-GR SP No. 60353, Aug. 29, 2001 and Pp. vs. Soriano, GR
No. 142779-95, Aug. 29, 2002, 388 SCRA 140.
Rules on force and intimidation:
- A verbal refusal alone will not do. There must be physical struggle, taxing her power to
the utmost. Thus, the mere initial resistance of the offended party in a rape case is not manifest
and tenacious resistance that the law requires. (Pp. vs. Lago, CA, 45 OG 1356).
- When the girl defended herself against the accused as long as she could, but he
overpowered her and held her till her strength gave out, and then accomplished his purpose,
there is evidence of sufficient force. (Pp. vs. Momo. 56 Phil. 86). The force need not be
irresistible. It need not be present and so long as it brings the desired result, all consideration of
whether it was more or less resistible is beside the point. (supra).
- The force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the
age, size and the strength of the parties and their relation to each other. (Pp. vs. Savellano, 57
SCRA 320).
- Where resistance would be futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent to
sexual assault. It is not necessary that the victim could have resisted to death or sustained
physical injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is enough if sexual intercourse takes place against
her will or if she yielded because of the genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so.
(Pp. vs. Las Penas, Jr. GR No. 133444, Feb. 20,2002). Indeed, the law does not impose upon a
rape victim the burden of proving resistance. (Pp. vs. Sending, GR No. 141773-76, Jan. 20,
2003).
- Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the
time of rape and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that it produces fear – fear that if the
victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at
the moment or thereafter, as she when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident.
( Pp. vs. Tabugoca, 285 SCRA 312, 332 [199]).
- Moral ascendance or influence is held to substitute for the element of physical force or
intimidation. This rule was applied by the Supreme Court in the following cases:
a) fathers against daughters (Pp. vs. Bazona, GR No. 133343-44, March 2, 2000; Pp.
vs. Maglente, 306 SCRA 546, [1991]; Pp. vs. Panique, 316 SCRA 757 [1999]);
b) step fathers against stepdaughters (Pp. vs. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392, [1995]; Pp. vs.
Robles, 170 SCRA 557 [1989])
c) Godfathers against Goddaughters ( Pp. vs Casil, 241 SCRA 285 [1995] ).
d) uncles against their nieces (Pp. vs. Betonio, 279 SCRA 532 [1997]); and
e) the first cousin of the victim’s mother. (Pp. vs. Perez, 307 SCRA 276 [1999], Pp. vs.
Dichoson, GR No. 11896-89, Feb. 19, 2001).
Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.
Case: A woman is no longer that chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A

husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a
marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he accords himself. He
cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her
full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and
accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities that have lost their
relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the family code, obligates the spouses to love on another but this rule
sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expression of love, that are both spontaneous and
mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.(Pp vs. Jumawan, GR
No. 187495, April 21, 2014).
Rape can be committed against a male.
Case: On Jan. 2, 2002. XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at MacDonald’s
Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m. Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a distant relative and textmate
of XXX, then 10 years old.
After dinner, XXX mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late. He
slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room.
It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as “he felt pain in his anus and stomach and
something inserted in hi anus.” He saw that Ricalde “fondled his penis.” When Ricalde returned to
the sofa, XXX ran towards his mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother
that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.
Ricalde denied the charge but was convicted of rape by sexual assault by the RTC, and
affirmed by the C.A.
In his defense, petitioner argued, among others, that XXX did categorically say that a
penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his
anal orifice. XXX was able to immediately to immediately push him away. Thus, no push and pull
movement happened that would explain XXX’s alleged stomach ache.
Held: We affirm the conviction with modification on the penalty imposed.
Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed-
Xxx
2) By any person who, any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, knot the genital or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as “instrument or object
rape,” “gender-free rape,” or homosexual rape. The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is
the “insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into another’s genital or anal orifice.
Xxx
In long line of cases, this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child
victims. Their “youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.” XXX, then only
10 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner.
(Second), petitioner’s reliance on the medic-legal’ s findings of no recent trauma in XXX’s
anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal
orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not
contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found probable credible, natural and
consistent with human nature.
People v. Bonaagua considers a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing
jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by
analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victim’s anal orifice
consummates the crime of rape.(Ricalde vs Pp, GR No. 211002, Jan. 21, 2015).
Chapter One
CRIMES AGAINST LIBERTY
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Elements:
1. The offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his
liberty.
3. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;
b) That it is committed simulating authority;
c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made; or
d) That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
- The offender under this article must be a private individual. If the offender is a public
officer, the crime committed is arbitrary detention.
- But if the public officer has no duty under the law to detain a person, such as a
policemen, and he detains another, he is liable under this article.
- Intention to deprive the victim of his liberty is essential in the crime of kidnapping.
Case: The accused approached, took hold of, and dragged M, striking the latter with the
butt of his rifle. The companions of M were told to continue on their way. Hardly had they walked
one kilometer when they heard a gun report. M was found dead the following day with gun shot
wound. Held: There was no evidence sufficient to prove to kidnap. The interval of time was so
short tic include the presence of intention to detain. Her short detention was part of the
perpetration of the crime of murder. (Pp. vs. Remalante, 92 Phil. 48; Pp. vs. Sacayanan, GR
Nos. L-15024-25, Dec. 31, 1960).
- Lack of motive to resort to kidnapping, no liability under this article.
Case: Where the agents of the constabulary took the supposed victim from his house to
make him answer for the murder of those persons who had disappeared, there was lack of motive
to resort to kidnapping. Such agents are not liable for kidnapping. (Pp. vs. Soriano, et al., 51 OG
4513).
-It is essential in the crime of illegal detention that there be actual confinement or
restriction of the person of the offended party. (U.S. vs. Cabanag, 8 Phil. 64). Thus, if the alleged
victim had freedom to leave the premises where she was allegedly confined, the crime of illegal
detention cannot rise because she was not deprived of her liberty. (See U.S. vs. Quevenco, 2
Phil. 412, U.S. vs. Herrera, et al., 3 Phil. 515).
Case: Where the offended party, although ordered not to go out of the agency or peeped
out of the window. But there is no evidence that the door of the agency was closed to prevent her
from going out had she wanted to. There is no evidenced that the accused conspired to instill fear
in her mind to compel or force her to remain in the agency. Held: There is no illegal detention,
because the element of detention or locking up is lacking. (Pp. vs. Ching Suy Siong, et al., GR
No. L-6174, Feb. 28, 1955).
-Leaving a child in a house of another, where he had freedom of locomotion but not the
freedom to leave at will, deprive him of liberty. Because of the tender age and the fact that he did
not know the way back home, he was then and there in a way deprived of his liberty. (Pp. vs.
Acosta, et al., 60 OG 6999).
- But the fact that the owners of a sugarcane plantation locked up in the lobby of their
house a boy who had stolen some sugar canes from the plantation from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m,
without giving him anything to eat does not constitute the crime of illegal detention. (Pp. vs.
Tamorro, GR No. 25373, June 11, 1925). She was found guilty of light coercion.
-When the kidnapping is for the purpose of extorting ransom, it is not necessary that any
of the circumstances enumerated in the first paragraph enumerated in the first paragraph of Art.
267 be present.
-Restraint by robbers to delay or prevent assistance being rendered by the authorities is
not illegal detention. (U.S. vs. Sol, 9 Phil. 265).
-Where the victim is taken from one place to another solely for the purpose of killing him,
the crime committed is murder. (Pp. vs. Camo, et al., 91 Phil. 240).
- If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental
deprivation of the victim’ s liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a
preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim.
The crime committed would either be homicide or murder. (Pp. vs. Delim, GR No. 142773,
January 28, 2003).
- The maximum penalty is imposed which is death-
1) The purpose of kidnapping or detention is to extort ransom;
2) When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention;
3) When the victim is raped;
4) When the victim is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.
(Note: RA 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty).
Kidnapping and serious illegal detention can either be made forcibly or
fraudulently.
Case: The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect the same, The crime of
serious illegal detention consist not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining
or depriving him in any manner of his liberty.
Xxx
The fact that AAA voluntarily went with appellant to Antipolo, upon appellant’s pretension
that he had to open the vault of his house, is immaterial. What is controlling is the act of the
accused in detaining the victim against his or her will after the offender is able to take the victim in
his custody. In short, the carrying away of the victim in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention can either be made forcibly or, as in the instant case, fraudulently. (PP vs. De
Guzman, et al;, GR No. 214502, Nov. 25, 2015).
The taking of a five (5) month old baby from her parents is kidnapping.
Case: In a prosecution for kidnapping , the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of
the latter’s liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof. And in this case,
the actual taking of the baby without the consent of her parents is a clear proof of appellant’s
intent to deprive AAA (baby) of her liberty. (Pp. vs. Magno, GR No. 206072, Dec. 2, 2015).
Art. 268. Slight illegal detention.

Elements:
1) That the offender is a private individual.
2) That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him of his liberty.
3) The act of kidnapping or detention is illegal.
4) That the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in Art. 267.
- If the offender (a) voluntarily releases the person so kidnapped or detained within three
days from the commencement of the detention, (b) without having attained the purpose intended,
and (c) before the institution of criminal proceedings against him, his liability is mitigated. In effect,
it is a privileged mitigating circumstance because the penalty is lower by one degree. But to
impose the lesser penalty, it must be shown by the offender that he was in a position to prolong
the detention for more than three days and yet he released the person within that time.
Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling.

Elements:
a. That the offender is a private person.
b. That he enters the dwelling of another
c. That such entrance is against the latter’s will.
-The offense is qualified if committed by means of violence or intimidation.
-Dwelling place, as used in this article, means any building or structure exclusively
devoted for rest and comfort, as distinguished from places devoted to business, offices, etc.
- A store of cheap goods, which was also the dwelling place of the owner thereof, was
considered a dwelling . (Pp. vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil. 703).
- Where the accused is living in the same house with the victim whose room the accused
entered is part, the room is dwelling under this article. (U.S. vs. Silvano, 31 Phil. 510).
-“Against the will” should be distinguished from “lack of consent from the dweller”. A mere
absence of dweller’s consent is not enough to constitute the crime of trespass to dwelling. To
commit trespass, the entrance of the accused should be against the presumed or express
prohibition of the occupant, and lack of permission should not be confused with prohibition. (Pp.
De Peralta, 42 Phil. 69)
- Lack of permission does not amount to prohibition.(supra).
- But it is well settled that whoever enters the dwelling of another at the late hour of the
night after the inmates have retired and close their doors does so against their will. Under this
circumstances an express prohibition is not necessary, as it is presumed. (U.S. vs. Mesina, 21
Phil. 615; U.S. vs. Panes, 25 Phil, 292).
Passing through the window, even if the same is open, there is implied prohibition when
entrance is made through means not intended for ingress. (Pp. vs. Marcial, CA 50 O.G. 3122).
Cases of trespass by means of violence (qualifying)
1. Pushing the door violently and maltreating the occupants after entering. (Pp. vs.
Paray, 17 Phil. 378).
2. Cutting of a ribbon or string with which the door latch of a closed room was fastened.
The cutting of the fastenings of the door was an act of violence. (U.S. vs. Lindio, 10 Phil. 192).
3. Wounding by means of a bolo, the owner of the house immediately after entrance.
(U.S. vs Arceo, et al., 3 Phil. 381).
By means of intimidation:
1. Firing a revolver in the air by persons attempting to force their way into a house. (U.S.
vs. Ostrea, 10 Phil. 93).
2. The flourishing of a bolo against the inmates of the house upon gaining entrance.
(U.S. vs. Lindio, 10 Phil. 192).
- Trespass to dwelling may be committed by the owner of the dwelling against the actual
occupant of the house. (Pp. vs. Almeda, et al., 75 Phil. 476).
Case: The accused entered the dwelling of a captain by forcing his way through the
window. When found inside by the occupants who tried to arrest him, the accused resisted arrest
and stabbed the son of the captain, inflicting a mortal wound. In his effort to escape, he also
assaulted the captain, his wife and daughter. Held: the crime committed by the accused are
trespass to dwelling, through violence, frustrated homicide and less serious physical injuries. (Pp.
vs. Medina, 59 Phil. 134).
Note: If the purpose of the accused was to kill the person injured, it would be frustrated
homicide only, the dwelling would be an aggravating circumstance.
Art. 282. Grave Threats.

Acts punished as grave threats:
1. By threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or property or that of
his family of any wrong amounting to a crime and demanding money or imposing any other
condition, even though not unlawful, and the offender attained his purpose.
2. By making such threat without the offender attaining his purpose.
3. By threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or property or that of
his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, the threat not being subject to a condition.
-The crime of grave threats is consummated as soon as threats come to the knowledge
of the person threatened. (Pp. vs. Villanueva, et al., 48 OG 1376).
- Threats made in connection with the commission of other crimes, are absorbed by the
latter. Thus, where the defendants struck the offended party, saying at the same time that he
would kill them if they would not return to him the jewelry which they had lost, it was held that the
threat is part of the assault. The defendant was convicted of maltreatment. (U.S. vs. Sevilla, 1
Phil. 143).
Case: Accused after kissing, embracing and touching the private parts of the woman who
was resisting, threatened that if she would not accede, her husband would be killed by his
companion who was guarding him. The crime committed is acts of lasciviousness. (Pp. vs.
Timbol, CA, 47 OG 1868).
Threats made to different persons at a different place and at different times is not
a continuing crime.
Facts: After constituents complained of water interruption, petitioner discovered a tap
from the main line which he promptly disconnected. It was at this point that Indalecio
(complainant) arrived. Without any warning. Petitioner picked up his bolo and charged towards
Indalecio shouting “Patyon tikaw” (I will kill you). Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way
his wife, Diosetea (complainant). Diosetea inquired what was the matter, petitioner instead
shouted “I don’t spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you”. Diosetea similarly
scampered. He again chased Indalecion but chanced upon Vicente (complainant) and repeatedly
thrust his bolo towards him, shouting “Even if you are old I will crack open your skull”.
Issue: Whether the three threats constitute only one crime being a result of only criminal
resolution.
Held: Petitioner’s theory fusing his liability to one counbt of Grave Threats because he
had only “single mental resolution, a single impulse, and a single intent. Xxx. The records,
however, belie this assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio, petitioner was as much surprised
to see Indalecio as the latter was in seeing petitioner when they chanced upon each other near
the water tank. Similalry, petitioner came across Diosetea as he was chasing Indalecio who had
scampered for safety. Lastly, petitioner crossed paths with Vicente while running after
Indalecioxxx. Not having known in advance of the Darong’s presence near the water tank at the
time in question, petitioner could not have formed any intent to threaten any of them until shortly
before he inadvertently came across each of them. Xxx petitoner’s intent to threaten Indalecio,
Diosotea and Vincent with bodily harm arose only when he chanced upon each of his victims.
Indeed, petitioner’s theory holds water only if the facts are altered-that is, he threatened
Indelalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same time. Had this been true,
the petitioner’s liability for one count of Grave Threats would have rested on the basis grounding
our rulings that the taking of six roosters or 13 crows found in the same place andtaken at the
same time results in the commission of only one count of theft xxx(Paera vs. People, GR NO.
181626, May 30, 2011).
Art. 286. Grave Coercion
Two ways of committing grave coercions.
1. By preventing another, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, from doing
something not prohibited by law.
2. By compelling another, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, to do something
against his will, whether it be right or wrong.
Elements:
1. That a person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that
he compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2. That the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and
3. That the person that restrained the will and liberty of another had not the authority of
the law or the right to do so, in other words that the restraint shall not be made under the authority
of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. (Timoner vs. People, 125 SCRA 830).
- In grave coercion, the act of preventing by force must be made at the time the offended
party was doing or about to do the act to be prevented. If the act was already done when violence
is exerted the crime is unjust vexation, as when the offender who was told earlier by the accused
not to go to work, but the former proceeded to work on the next day, and in the afternoon of that
day the accused exerted violence on him, the crime committed is only unjust vexation. (Pp. vs.
Madrid, CA OG 711).
-There are acts of prevention or compelling which violate another crime:
A public officer who shall prevent by means of violence or threats the ceremonies or
manifestation of any
religion is guilty of interruption of religious worship. (Art. 132)
Any person who, by force, prevents the meeting of a legislative body is liable under Art.
143.
Any person who shall use force or intimidation to prevent any member of Congress from
attending the meetings thereof, expressing his opinions, or casting his votes is liable under Art.
145.
A public officer, who not being authorized bylaw, compels a person to change his
residence is liable for expulsion under Art. 127, not for coercion.
Kidnapping the debtor to compel him to pay his debt is not only coercion, but kidnapping
for ransom, because in effect, there is a demand for payment that release from captivity. (Art.
267).
- Compelling another to do something includes the offender’s act of doing it himself while
subjecting another to his will, as when the accused who tried to cross a private bridge which was
closed, and was prevented by the caretaker, and the accused open the bridge, grabbed and
pushed the care taker who fell to the ground, and one of the accused pulled a revolver ready to
shoot, the crime committed is grave coercion. (Pp. vs. Juan, et al., CA 36 OG 3277).
- Compelling another by means of violence, who is in actual possession of a thing, even if
he has no right to such possession, and even by the owner himself, is grave coercion. (U.S. vs.
Mena, 11 Phil. 543).
- The taxi driver who threatened to bump his car to kill himself and his female passenger
if she would not go with him to the night club is guilty of grave coercion, even if he did not
succeed as the female passenger jumped out of the taxi. The intimidation that he would bumped
the car is equivalent to violence because it was intended to control the will of the offended party.
(Pp. vs. Rimando, CA, 56 OG, 1687).
Unjust vexation – other light coercion (Art. 287, par. 2)

Unjust vexation includes any human conduct which, although not productive of some
physical or material harm would, however, unjustly annoy or vex an innocent person. The
paramount consideration whether the offender’s act caused annoyance, irritation, vexation,
torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. (Pp. vs. Gozum,
CA, 54 OG 7409).
- A man who kissed a girl and held her tightly to his breast is guilty of unjust vexation.
(Pp. vs. Climaco, CA 46 OG 3186).
- But if the conduct of the accused is lascivious, then he will be guilty of acts of
lasciviousness. (Pp. vs. Anunuevo, CA 36 OG 2018).
Chapter One
ROBBERY IN GENERAL
Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery.

Robbery is the taking of property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence against, or intimidation of any person, or using force upon thing.
Classification of robbery.
1. Robbery with violence against, or intimidation of person (Art. 294, 297 and 298)
2. Robbery by the use of force upon things. (Art. 299 and 302).
Elements of robbery in general:
1. That there be (a) a personal property; (2) belonging to another;
2. That there is (3) unlawful taking of that property;
3. That the taking must be (4) with intent to gain; and
4. That there is violence or against or intimidation of any person, or force upon thing.
- prohibitive articles may be the subject matter of robbery, such as opium. (U.S. vs. Sana
Lim, 28 Phil. 404).
Case: While the information alleged that the property taken belonged to Roman Estriba,
the proof showed that the person robbed was Juan Seran. For lack of conformity between the
allegation and proof respecting the ownership of the property, it was held that it is hard to convict
the accused of robbery. The accused are convicted of four separate homicides. (U.S. vs
Lahoylahoy, 38 Phil. 330).
- It would seem then, that if the crime charged is robbery with homicide, in view of the
capital punishment attached to it, the name of the owner of the thing is a matter of essential
description of the crime. Thus, if the intimidation or violence resulted only in physical injuries, or
for robbery by the use of force upon things, the name of the real owner is not essential so long as
the property does not belong to the accused.
- Robbery with force upon things, is consummated if the thing is taken out of the building.
Thus, when the accused who had already broken the floor of the bodega, had entered it and
removed one sack of sugar from the pile, but was caught in the act of taking out the sack of sugar
through the opening of the floor, it was frustrated robbery only. (Pp. vs. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG
4332).
Intent to gain- is presumed from the unlawful taking of personal property. (See Pp. vs.
Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52).
- The taking of personal property belonging to another should not be under claim of
ownership. One who takes property openly and avowedly under claim of title proffered in good
faith is not guilty of robbery even though the claim of ownership is untenable. (U.S. vs. Manluco,
et al., 28 Phil. 360).
- The violence or intimidation need not be present from the very beginning. It is enough
that the same is present before the taking is complete. Thus, when the accused was about to
take the money of the offended party, one of them struck the latter in the mouth when they were
discovered. Held: the crime committed is robbery with violence. (Pp. vs Campa, CA 37 OG
1482; US vs. Nueca, 7 Phil. 511).
- The taking of the property need not be immediately after the intimidation. Thus, when
the accused intimidated the offended party that he will be deported out of the country for trying to
send a letter outside the country, which the offended party thought was wrong; but if he will gave
an amount of P2,000, the case will be dropped, which prompted the offended party to secure
money from someone and gave it to the accused, robbery by means of intimidation was
committed. (Pp. vs Chiong, CA 69 OG 8671).
Note: If the property taken is a motor vehicle, RA 6539 is committed, known as
carnapping.
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons- penalties.
-The crime defined in this article is a special complex crime.
- Where the original design comprehends robbery, and homicide is perpetrated by reason
or on occasion of the consummation of the former, the crime committed is robbery with homicide.
(Pp. vs. Salazar, 277 SCRA 67 [1997]).
- If the original design is not to commit robbery, but the robbery was committed as an
afterthought and a minor incident in the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as two
distinct offenses. (Pp. vs. Toleng, 91 SCRA 382).
- Where injuries were committed apart from robbery and homicide, the crime is only
robbery with homicide, physical injuries being absorbed by the former. (Pp. vs. Veloso, 112
SCRA 173).
- Homicide may precede the robbery or may occur after the robeery, the crime is robbery
with homicide, so long as the intention to take personal property preceded the killing. (U.S. vs.
Ibanez, 19 Phil. 463).
- There is Robbery with homicide if the latter was committed to defend possession of the
stolen goods. Thus, where the accused were coming out of the store and were carrying away the
stolen goods, the deceased stopped and attacked them, then, two or three of the offenders
returned the attack and killed the deceased. (Pp. vs. Salamuden, 52 Phil. 670).
- Robbery with homicide is committed even if the person killed is a robber himself. The
law does not require that the person killed is the owner of the property.
- There is robbery with homicide even if the person killed is an innocent bystander and
not the person robbed. (Pp. vs. Disimban, 88 Phil. 120).
- the law does not require that the victim of the robbery be also the victim of homicide.
Pp. vs. Barut, 89 SCRA 16).
-there is robbery with homicide even if the killing of a person is by mere accident. (Pp.
vs. Mangulabnan, et al.,99 Phil. 992)
-Robbery with homicide is committed even if the killing is not the place of the robbery if
there is intention to rob the victim and his shooting was to eliminate the obstacle to consummate
the criminal design. (Pp. vs. Libre, 93 Phil. 5).
- There is no crime of robbery with murder. Thus, the qualifying circumstance of murder,
such as treachery cannot qualify the killing to murder, but merely a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide. (Pp. vs. Abang, GR No. L-14623, Dec. 29, 1960).
Robbery with rape.
- Even if the rape was committed in another place, it is still robbery with rape. Thus, after
the robbery, the accused compelled the women to go with them and while on their way to where
their bancas were hidden, and by force and intimidation raped them. Robbery with rape was
committed. (U.S. vs. Tiongco, et al., 37 Phil. 951).
-If the primary intention of the accused was to take personal property, even if the rape
took place before the taking of the property, the crime committed is robbery with rape. (Pp. vs.
Canastre, 82 Phil. 482).
- There is no such crime as robbery with attempted rape. (See. Pp. vs. Cariaga, 54 OG
4307).
Robbery with serious physical injuries under Art. 263, par. 2 ( Art. 294, par. 3)
Case: the accused assaulted the victim and robbed him of P 17.00. The victim lost the
hearing of one ear, as a result of the blows he received from the accused. Held: the accused is
guilty of robbery under Art. 294, par. 3, the physical injuries inflicted being covered by Art. 263,
par. 2. (Pp. vs. Luncay, 49 Phil. 4640.
Robbery with unnecessary violence and intimidation (Art. 294, par. 4)
Case: Tying a victim after wounding him and leaving him tied to the trunk of a tree on the
craggy ground after taking his money constitutes unnecessary violence and intimidation referred
to in par. 4, of Art. 294. (Pp. vs. Manzanilla, et al., 43 Phil. 167).
Robbery with the use of violence against or intimiation of any person under par. 5
of Art. 294.
-The robbery under this paragraph is known as simple robbery, because the use of
violence against any person does not result in homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or any of the
serious physical injuries defined under Art. 263, which may five rise to special complex crime.
- If the injury inflicted upon the offended party on the occasion of robbery can be qualified
only as less serious physical injuries (U.S. vs. Barroga, 21 Phil.161), or slight physical injuries,
(Pp, vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372), the crime is that defined and penalized in par. 5 of Art. 294.
- Snatching money from the hands of the victim and pushing her to prevent her from
recovering the seized property covered by par. 5. (U.S. vs. Santos, 8 Phil. 286).
- Grabbing pawn ticket from the hands of another an intimidating him. (U.S. vs. Blanco,
10 Phil. 298)
Art. 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and by
a band, or with the use of firearms on a street, road or alley.
-This article applies if any of the offenses defined in subsection 3,4 and 5 of Art. 294 is
committed –
1) in an uninhabited place, or
2) by a band, or
3) by attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle or airship, or
4) be entering the passengers’ compartments in a train, or in any manner taking the
passengers’ thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or
5) on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of
firearms, the offender shall be punished by the maximum periods of the proper penalties
prescribed under Art. 294.
-Meaning, this article does not apply to robbery with homicide, or robbery with rape, or
robbery with serious physical injuries under par. 1 of Art. 294. Thus, if robbery with homicide was
committed by attacking a motor vehicle or moving train, or on a street, etc., the penalty under
subdivision 1 of Art. 294 shall not apply (moving train, etc, not being qualifying circumstance). But
if there is no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the maximum penalty shall be applied
as they will be treated as generic aggravating circumstances under Art. 14. (See Pp. vs. Salip
Manla, 30 SCRA 389; Pp. vs. Damaso, 86 SCRA 370).
Art. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof.
Art. 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain
circumstances.
-The term “homicide” in this article is used in its generic sense (Pp. vs. Manuel, 44 Phil.
333).Hence, it include, multiple homicides, murder, parricide, or even infanticide. The penalty is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
Art. 299. Robbery in an inhabited place or public building or edifice devoted to
worship.
-“Inhabited house” is any shelter, ship or vessel constituting dwelling of one or more
persons even though the inhabitants thereof are temporarily absent therefrom when the robbery
was committed. (Art. 301).
- “Public building” is every building owned by the government or belonging to a private
person but used or rented by the government, although temporarily unoccupied by the same. (Art.
301). Thus, it the building has already been delivered by the contractor to the government, the
same is public building as the state has already title over it. (Pp. vs. Cosntantino, 46 Phil. 745).
Art. 301. What is an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to

religious worship and their dependencies.
Art. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building.
Art. 308. Theft.
- What distinguishes theft from robbery is that in theft, the offender does not use violence
or intimidation or does not enter any house or building through any of the means specified in Art.
299 or Art. 302 in taking the personal property of another with intent to gain.
-“intent to gain” is presumed in any unlawful taking of personal property belonging to
another.
- But if a person takes personal property from another believing it to be his own, the
presumption of intent to gain is rebutted and, therefore, he is not guilty of theft. (U.S. vs. Viera, 1
Phil. 584).
- One who takes personal property openly and avowedly under claim of title made in
good faith is not guilty of theft even though the claim of ownership ia later found to be untenable.
(Pp. vs. Lozada, CA-Gr No. 3147-R,, Dec. 21, 1949).
-Joy ride or using a car of another to learn how to drive is “sufficient gain”. Satisfaction,
enjoyment and pleasure are real gain. (Pp. vs. Fernandez, CA, 38 OG 985).
-Theft is committed even if the accused did not take the property for his own use but gave
it to another person. (Pp. vs. Santos, CA, 38 OG 985).
Art. 310. Qualified theft.
- Theft by a domestic helper is always qualified. It is not necessary to show that he
committed the crime with abuse of confidence. (Pp. vs. Evangelista, 70 Phil. 122).
- Use of safe combination learned by confidential clerk is a grave abuse of confidence.
Hence, qualified theft. (Pp. vs. Valdellon, 46 Phil. 245).
Art. 3115 SWINDLING (estafa).
Elements of Estafa in general:
1)That the accused defrauded another a) by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit;

and b) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party
or third person.
-Estafa is classified into three different forms according to the means by the fraud is
committed-
1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;
2) by means of false pretense or fraudulent acts; or
3) through fraudulent means.
Elements:
a) Deceit or abuse of confidence’ and b) Damage or prejudice to the offended party.
(Pp. vs. Abana, 76 Phil. 1).
Meaning Damage:
1. Actual or real damage is not necessary. Mere disturbance of the property rights of the
offended is enough as long as it is capable of pecuniary estimation or even in
temporary prejudice. The reason why the damage must be capable of pecuniary
estimation is because the penalty in estafa generally depends on the value of the
defraudation. (Pp. vs. Nisperas, 56 O.G. 7317).
Thus,
- Even if the chattel constituting the object of the deception is recovered, there is
damage. (U.S. vs. Gonochea, 9 Phil. 117).
- If the check delivered to the accused because of false pretense that he was an agent of
the company was not encashed, damage is present, as this constitutes temporary prejudice. (Pp.
vs. Santiago, 54 Phil. 814).
-An accused who has the power to deposit and withdraw funds in the name of the
company but deposited certain sums of money paid by the customer of the company in his own
name and failed to account the same is liable for estafa. (Lu Huyco vs. CA, L49607-13, Aug.
26, 1985).
-In all cases of estafa, mere intent to cause damage is sufficient which even include the
estafa committed by other deceits in Art. 316 (Pp. vs. Velasco, CA-GR No. 2392-R, Jan. 9.
1950), except that one punished in Art. 6 of Art. 316 wherein damage must be actual because the
property involved here belongs to the accused.(Castillo vs. People, 73 Phil. 480).
-Where there is no damage, the estafa may either be attempted or frustrated. If deceit is
present but no damage or prejudice is caused because the offended party is aware of the
deception and because the giving of money is merely for entrapment, attempted estafa is
committed as the act of the accused in receiving the marked money is an intent to defraud. (Pp.
vs. Tan, GR No. L000164-CR, Aug. 31, 1963).
Meaning of Abuse of Confidence:
- Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa with abuse of confidence. (U.S. vs.
Pascual, 10 Phil. 621). Abuse of confidence takes the place of deceit.
-Even if deceit is present, the abuse of confidence will characterize the estafa as deceit
will be merely incidental or is absorbed by the abuse of confidence. (Court of Span, in
Sentencia, 12 Ju7nio 1947).
-As long as there is a relation of trust and confidence between the complainant and the
accused and even though such relationship has been induced by the accused through false
representation and pretenses and which is continued by the active deceit without truthfully
disclosing the facts to the complainant, the estafa committed is by abuse of confidence although,
deceit co-existed in its commission. (U.S. vs. Lim. 36 Phil. 382).
Meaning of Deceit:
-Deceit assumes so many different hues and forms that it is not possible to lay down a
rule to determine its presence in any given case. Deceit may consist in a misrepresentation. It
may also consist of any trick, artifice, machination or device. As a general rule, in order to
constitute deceit there must be a false representation as a matter of fact, a positive assertion of
falsehood. (Pp. vs. Manahan, CA-GR No. 19602-R, May 20, 1958).
-It may also consist in a fraudulent misrepresentation or contrivance by which one man
deceives another, who has no means of detecting the fraud to the injury of another. (Pp. vs.
Babel, 10 CAR 133).
-If the offended party is aware of the deceit or the false misrepresentation of the offender,
there can be no deceit. (Pp. vs. Concepcion, 44 Phil. 544).
There is no deceit on the following cases:
-Non-compliance of a promise to perform a thing does not constitute deceit (Pp. vs.
Villarin, 50 OG 262) because it is hard to determine and infer a priori the criminal intent to the
person promising. (Pp. vs. Yee, CA-GR NO. 21602-R, Oct. 2, 1958).
-Deceit should be proved and established by acts distinct from and independent of, n on
compliance of the promise. (Pp. vs. Villarin, supra). Thus, if aside from unfulfilled promise, there
are representations made by the accused which establish deceit, the case is one for estafa under
Art. 315, par. 2(a). (Pp. vs. Gatmaitan, 3 CAR 205).
-Where the accused offered to sell some palay to the complainant, who gave him P
1,440.00 as advance payment and the accused failed to deliver either the palay or the money, the
liability is only civil and not criminal because a mere promise to perform a thing is not a
representation which constitutes deceit and a failure to such promise does not change its
character. The intention to defraud must be coetaneous with alleged deceitful act. (Pp. vs.
Dizon, CA-GR No. L-17447-R, March 11, 1957).
-To constitute an element of estafa, deceit must be prior to or simultaneous with the
damage and must the cause thereof.
- Money misappropriated must have been received by the defendant transferring juridical
possession to him. If he takes it from another it will be theft.
-juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up against the owner.
Ex: Renting the truck of another for a consideration for the use of the borrower within a
certain period as agreed, the possession id juridical. (Pp. vs. Noveno, et al. 46 OG 1637).
-There is estafa if the offender misappropriates the thing received by him in trust, on
commission or for administration. (Pp. Carulasdulasan, et al., 95 Phil. 8).
Effect of Different Misappropriations.
-If the different misappropriations occur on the same occasions or on the same date as
the misappropriation of various amounts which are to be accounted for in one single occasion,
one case of estafa is committed. (Ricafort vs. Ferraro, 54 OG 2534.
- If the period are far apart, the different misappropriations cannot be committed within
one continuous period. (Pp. vs. Dichupa, 3 SCRA 327; Pp. vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77).
-If the employer failed to pay the wages of his laborers, there are as many cases of
estafa as there are offended parties because the non-payment of the wages due them separately
are independent acts of deception.Pp. vs. Magampo, 52 O.G. 6225).
Is there a complex crime of estafa through theft?

Our SC held that there may be as where the accused snatched a pawnshop ticket and
later redeemed the jewelry by representing himself to be the owner.Pp. vs. Yusay, 50 Phil. 598).
But the SC of Spain held that only theft is committed because the redemption of the jewels is a
mere continuation of the purpose of stealing the pawnshop ticket which has no value to the thief
unless redeemed. The doctrine of SC pf Spain is a better rule since the two acts indeed arise only
from a single criminal intent.
-if the false pretense or misappropriation is made in the public document itself, the crime
committed is not estafa through falsification but falsification through false pretense.
Ex1. If the accused merely wrote the name of the payee for endorsement without
imitating the signature, and for the purpose of impersonating him only.(Pp. vs. Lapidez, CA-GR
No.21987, Jan. 19, 1960).
Ex2. If the check is in the name of XY as unmarried widow of deceased but accused
being the widow has hten remarried and hence disqualified to receive the proceeds of the check
under a specific law, and in order to collect the check, wrote at the back “XY as unmarried widow
of the deceased”, estafa is committed thru false misrepresentation that she was still unmarried.
(pp. vs.De Guia, 105 Phil. 1288).
DEMAND is not an element-Excpetion.

1.When money is received by means of fraud or false pretense, that is by means of

deceit, a demand for the return of the same is not necessary in order to constitute estafa.(US vs.
Asensi, 34 Phil.750).
2. But if the estafa is committed under Article 315, par. 1(b), previous demand is an
indispensable requisite. (pp. vs. Scott, 62 Phil. 553); Pp. vs. Evangelista,
69Phil.582). However, an actual personal demand is not necessary to be made if the
parties have agreed upon a specific time for the delivery or return of the
misappropriated property (pp. vs. Librea, 48 OG 5305). Or is it required that the
demand be in writing and even an idirect or implied demand is sufficient. (Pp. vs.
Cabacungan, GR No. 21909-10, July 21, 1959 or where there is sufficient evidence
of misappropriation.(Pp. vs. Morales, L-21896-CR, July 19, 1982).
EFFECTS LOF NOVATION.
Novation or compromise does not affect the criminal liability of the accused (Pp. vs.
Leachon, 56 Phil. 739). Thus, partial payment nor extension of time to pay the amount
misappropriated nor acceptance of a promissory note for the payment of the amount converted
does not extinguish criminal liability because a criminal offense is committed against the state
and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes fpr
the commission of the offense. (Pp. vs. Gervacio, GR No. L-7705, Dece. 24, 1957).
Exception:
If the compromise is executed before the criminal action is instituted ((PP. vs. Teruel,
CA-GR 15304-CR, May 31, 1966) as where the amount was converted into a contract of loan
and the accused was made to acknowledge the debt, there is novation of contract so as to
extinguish any incipient criminal liability of the accused. (Pp. vs. Clemente, CA 65 OG 6892). But
the nbovation must be expressed and must refer only to the incipient criminal liability.(PP. vs.
Francisco, CA-GR No. 25738, Sept., 15, 1959).
-Before the filing of the criminal action, where the accused received jewelries to be sold in
cash basis and later the agreement was novated to allow the accused to sell on credit and the
accused obligation of a guarantor if the buyer could not pay the pricve, the novation extinguish
the criminal liability of the accused, (Pp vs Amer 75 OG 143, November 2, 1977).
Estafa with Unfaithfulness or Abuse of Confidence (Par. 1). Altering sibstances, Quantity
or Qualsity of Things (1-a)
-In this particular type of estafa, the offender does not receive but delivers the thing under
an onerous obligation which is not in accordance with the substance, quantity or quality agreed
upon. If the consideration is gratuitous, there can be no defraudation.
Ex.1 Twenty thousand bales of hemp were pledged to complainant which accused
declared in an instrument were actually in existence although there were only 12,000 bales which
the accused knew. (US vs. Mendezona, 2 Phil. 353).
( Ex.2. Accused by false representations sold to complainant 1,000 tins of opium but only
16 tins contained opium when infact the others were filled with sand and mollases (Pp. vs.
Manansala, 58 Phil. 796.
By Misappropriation or Converting Money of Goods Received in Trust or Commission or
for Administration, or Under any Obligation involving the Duty to Deliver or Retur (1-b).
Illustration of Estafa where the offender received the thing in trust, on commission, or for
administration (Par. 1 (b).
a) The thing received in trust (Pp. vs. Carulasdulasan, et al., 95 Phil.8).

The accused were tenants of the complaining witness. They received from the sale of
the abaca harvested by them a sum of money, including the one-half which belong to
the landlord under the tenancy agreement. This half of the money the accused were
under obligation to deliver to the landlord. They therefore, held intrust for him. But
instead of turning it over to him, they appropriated it to their own use and refused to
give it to him, notwithstanding repeated demands.
HELD: It is not correct to say that the abaca in question was not received by the
accused from anybody but had been harvested by them. What the accused are
charged with having misappropriated is the landlord’s share of the purchase price
which they received in trust for him.
PNB VS. vda. De Hijos de Angel Jose, 63 Phil. 814-15.

A person who executed trust receipts and, despite demands by the bank, failed either
to turn over to the bank the proceeds of the sale of the goods or to return said goods, if
they were not sold, is guilty of having violated the provision of Article 315, 1(b) of the
RPC. The ownership of the merchandise continues to be vested in the person who has
advanced the payment, until he has been paid in full, or If the merchandise has already
been sold, the proceeds of the sale should be turned over to him by the importer or by his
representative or successor-in-interest.
b) The thing was received on commission ( See U.S. vs. Figueroa, 22 Phil. 270):
A received P .25 from B with the obligation to pay as a slaughter fee to the municipal
treasurer. A received some pork from C, promising to pay .P.25, representing the
cost of the pork, to the municipal treasurer as a slaughter fee in the name of C. A
failed to make the payment for C and B, and spent the money of B.
HELD: 1) As to the P.25 in cash received from B, there is estafa. 2) As to his promise
to pay P .25 to the municipal treasurer in consideration of some pork received from
C, there is no estafa. REASONS: 1) The title under which A received the P .25 from
B was that of a commission consisting in the instruction to deliver the same to the
municipal treasurer. 2) As regards the failure of A to pay the treasurer the P .25
representing the cost of the pork received from C, there is no estafa, because the law
says “money, goods, or any other personal property received”, under obligation “to
deliver the same.” This means the thing received must be the same thing to be
delivered, and to another. In this case A did not receive money from C to be delivered
to the treasurer. What A received was a kilo of pork.
c) The thing received for administration:
1.If the administrator, appointed by the Court to administer the estate of a deceased
person, received money or other personal property in such capacity, and
misappropriated the same for his personal benefit is guilty of estafa.
2) When the accused collected a sum of money as rentals from the different tenants
of his employer, failed to account for and turned over said amount to his employer,
upon demand therefor, is guilty of estafa. (Pp. vs. Benitez, 108 Phil. 920).
Meaning of “Conversion”.
Conversion- an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over
goods or personal chattels that belong to another; the alteration of their condition or the exclusion
of the owner’s right and it takes place when a person actually appropriates the property of
another to his own benefit, use and enjoyment. (Pp. vs. Trinidad, 53 OG 731). It presupposes that
that the thing has been devoted to a purpose that is different from that agreed upon. (Pp. vs.
Nepomuceno, 46 OG 6128, 6132).
EX. When an agent entrusted to a sub-agent pieces of jewelry for the same purpose, that
is, “for cash sale or on commission basis” and the sub-agent misappropriated the proceeds for his
own benefit, estafa by conversion is not committed. By the agent; that act of the agent in
appointing the sub-agent was done in accordance with human practice and the law; Art. 1892 of
th Civil Code provides in part that “the agent msy appoint s substitute if the principal has not
prohibited him from doing so” (Pp. vs. Aldeguer, GR No. 0054-CR, May 21, 1961).
-But delivery to a sub-agent in violation of the agreement constitutes conversion and
breach of trust (Pp. vs.Ponce, GR No. 01355-CR, May 6, 1963).
- However, the fact that the agent violated the instruction of the principal did not by the
act alone make him liable for estafa. The important thing is intention. If there is intent to benefit
himself or the sub-agent, then there is estafa. Otherwise no estafa is committed. ( Pp. vs. 08415-
CR, June 2, 1971).
Note: The phrase “or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same”, includes quasi-contracts and certain contracts of bailment>
Illustration:
Meaning of “misappropriation” – The misappropriation of money, goods, or any other personal
property belonging to another for his personal benefit.
Case: Accused received P 753.54 from complainant for purchase of materials and wages
for laborer. Held: Not guilty of estafa because there is no proof that accused actually
misappropriated or converted the amount involved. (Concepcion vs. Pp., 74 Phil. 63)
-The mere failure to return or deliver the value of the things received under such
circumstances, or the mere delay in the fulfillment of the trust or mere negligence on the part of
the agent which enable another to benefit from the transaction to the prejudice of the owner, only
involve civil liability, unless the commission agent has misappropriated or appropriated to his own
use and benefit the goods, or conspired with the party who actually committed the
misappropriation.(Pp. vs. Papagayo, 71 Phil.337).
Case: A sweepstakes agent who got the possession of s winning sweepstake ticket,
whether by snatching or receiving it from the owner, assumed the obligation of holding it intrust,
and collecting the prize and of turning over the money to the owner. Even of the prize is not
collected if she disowns the owner’s ownership of the ticket, she is liable for estafa because there
is temporary prejudice.(pp. vs. Espiritu, April 20, 1922).
Case: The lessee who dismantles a house on the leased premises without the knowledge
and consent of the lessor or owner thereof, sells the materials and pockets the proceeds thereof
is liable is liable for estafa under Art. 315 1(b). (Pp. vs. Reyes, June 30, 1971).
-If the accused has the choice or option of returning or of retaining the money advanced,
the necessary inference is that he no duty to return. The money was not therefore received in
trust or for commission or for administration implying an obligation to return.(Pp. vs. Alikpala,
October 28, 1965)
-If the accused received a radio on trial for a certain period under the condition that he
was either to return the radio after that period or to pay its price on installment basis, and the
accused having chosen to retain the radio but without paying the installment, no estafa is
committed as the retention by the accused of said radio became automatically a sale. (Sizon vs.
People, GR No. L-48198, 1943).
`-Even if the property misappropriated was received by the offender, the misappropriation
will constitute theft and not estafa where the custody of the property by the accused was only
precarious and for temporary purpose, or for a short period and was merely the effect of such
relationship as master and servant, employer and employee or master and domestic involving
personal property, the juridical or constructive possession remaining in the owner until the
conversion.Pp. vs. Nicoals, GR No. L-00398-CR, July 8, 1961).
EStafa by False Pretense or Fraudulent Acts Prior to or Simulataneously with Commission

of Fraud (Par. 2)
Use of Fictitious name. (2-a)
- The use of fictitious name with intent to defraud and damaged caused thereby, are
essential elements of estafa under this paragraph.
-Thus, when a person uses a fictitious name publicly, not with the intention to defraud,
but for the purpose concealing a crime, evading the execution of a judgment, or causing damage,
does not commit estafa, but the crime of using a fictitious name penalized by Art. 178 of RPC.
(Pp. vs. Pelea, 40 O.G. 563).
-Signing a check with fictitious name and then falsely pretending that said check could be
cashed at the drawee bank, defendant knowing that it could not be so cashed and then, on the
strength of such false pretense, obtaining from the offended party the amount of P 1,7000.00 in
exchange for the worthless check in question. (pp. vs. Bisquera, CA, 51 OG 248).
False representation as to power, influence, property, business, etc.(2-a)
-Power and influence refer to those false representations of the accused to convince the
victim the he possesses certain authority, prestige or capacity to realize certain things he does
not have but promising to obtain the same by means of these personal circumstances.
Note: It is essential that the pretense be actually false (Pp. vs. Lingst, et sl., CA 68 OG
5538).
Ex1. Accused who obtained from the offended party a carabao valued at P 77.00
delivered to complainant as payment a piece of paper which accused induced him to accept upon
their representations and guaranty that it was an instrument which would make a coin paper and
silver money after the lapse of 7 Fridays, provided that complainant on each of said Fridays
would offer appropriate prayers for the success of the enterprise. (U.S. vs Delos Reyes, et al.,
34 Phil. 693).
Ex 2. Accused pretending to be a magician with power to discover hidden treasure led

the offended party to believe that under his house was a jar containing articles of great value but
to obtain said jar ir was necessary for the offended party to give him P 150.00 for the purchase pf
certain substance and old gold coins for the purpose of extracting the said hidden treasure.
Offended party believing the accused gave him P 150.00 who after receiving it did not return back
to the house of the offended party.(Pp. vs. Scott, 62 Phil. 533).
Qualifications
Ex. Falsifying a loan application by showing that the applicant is the lessee of the
landholder and submitting the required affidavit allegedly signed by the landholder on the basis of
which misrepresentation an agricultural loan a tenant was granted constitutes estafa by falsely
pretending to possess the necessary qualification.(Pp. vs. Benoza, CA 70 OG 2278).
Credit or money
EX. Accused ordered certain materials on the pretense that he was building a house and
that he has sufficient funds to pay incash the value of said materials on completion of their
delivery; that these pretenses are false; and that he, therefore, converted to hs personal use the
materials ordered by him. (Pp. vs. Santos, 71 Phil. 490).
- But, where a person who received merchandise from another on credit, and which credit
was afterwards discontinued but was subsequently, renewed because of his apparently
conducting his business in a manner which appeared to justify it, did not pay for what he owed on
account of such credit, he did not thereby commit the crime of estafa, which it is evident he would
not have committed by availing himself of the credit at the beginning. (US vs. Tan Tokj, 15 Phil.
538).
By Altering the Quality, Fineness, or Weight of Anything pertaining to his Art or Business
(2-b).
-This kind of estafa is usually committed by jewelers and silversmiths who defraud rtheir
customers b y altering the quality, fineness, or weight of anything pertaining to their art or
business.
Issuing or Postdating Checks Without Funds. (2-d as amended).
Elements as amended: a) The offender has postdated a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time of postdating or issuance of such check ; b) That at the time of the
postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the banks
deposited were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; c) The payee has been
defrauded.
-It is then essential that the check must be issued in payment of a simultaneous
obligation. So, if it was issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, there is no estafa, because
the accused obtained nothing for the said check, his debt for the payment thereof of said check
when issued, had been contracted prior to the issuance. The check is not utilized to defraud the
creditor, the latter not having been deprived of his property at the time and by reason of the
issuance of the check.(pp. vs. Villarama, 75 OG 1392, Oct. 24, 1977).
Ex. If the accused issued a check in payment of a promissory note which had matured
and the check was dishonored, there is no estafa since the accused did not obtain anything by
menbas of the said check. (Pp. vs. Canlas, 38 OG 1092).
-If the postdated checks were intended merely as promissory notes, there is also no
estafa, although those postdated checks were issued in payment of an obligation to be redeemed
with cash by the drawer at the payee’s establishment. (Pp. vs. Obieta, 53 OG 5224).
-Good faith os a defgense regarding the issuance of such checks.
Ex. The payee was informed by the drawer that at the time of the issuance of the check,
his funds in the bank were not sufficient to cover the facevalue of the check (Pp. vs. Valino, CA-
GR No. 00469-R, 1961).
EX. The payee was notified by the drawer not to deposit the check for a week which was
not followed. (Pp. vs. Fernandez, 59Phil. 615).
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22
-Under this statute what is punished is the mere issuance of a check without sufficient
funds. Damage is not an element.
Case: A person who in bad faith negotiates a check issued by another knowing it was not
covered by sufficient funds in payment of an obligation is also liable for estafa. (Pp. vs. Isleta, et
al., 61 Phil. 332). He is not liable under BP 22. As he did not issue, make or draw such checks.
He is not liable if he has no knowledge that the drawer issued the check without sufficient funds.
(PP vs. Malig, CA 76 OG 163).
-The act to be prevented by the law is the act of making and u=issuing a check with the
knowledge that, at the time of issue, the drawer issuing the check does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the bank for the payment of the check and the check was subsequently
dishonored upon presentment.
-Even if the bad check is issued as a guarantee, BP 22 is violated. BP 22 does not make
any distinction as to whether the bad check is issued in payment of an obligation or to guarantee
an obligation.(Que vs. Pp, GR No. 73217-18, Sept. 21, 1987).
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds- The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within 90 days from the
date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangement for the payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such has not been paid by the drawee
bank.
Notice of dishonor of the check to the maker must be in writing. A mere oral notice to the
drawer or maker of dishonor of his check is not enough.
-Unless and until the drawer or maker of the check receives a written notice of dishonor
of the check, or where there is no proof as to when such notice of dishonor was received by the
drawer or maker, the five-day period within which the drawer or maker has to pay the amount due
or made arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment of the check, cannot be
determined. In such case the prima facie presumption cannot arise. (Sia vs. Pp. GR No. 149695,
April 28, 2004).
- The 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of the offense; It is simply one
of the conditions to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds. (Wong vs
CA, 403 Phil. 830 [2001]).
In BP 22 cases, the civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case and the
death of accused, does not extinguish his civil liability arising from the issuance of
worthless check.
Case: In BP 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil actions. Instead of instituting two separate cases, only a single suit is filed and tried. This rule
was enacted to help the court declog court dockets, which have been packed with BP 22 because
creditors used the courts as collectors.
As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil liabilities arising from the
issuance of worthless check are deemed instituted in a case for violation of BP 22; the death of
Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the action. The independent civil liability based on a
contract, which was deemed instituted in the criminal action for BP 22 may still be enforced
against her estate in the present case.(Bernardo vs. People, GR No. 182210, Oct. 5, 2015).
Proof that issuer had received notice of dishonor essential in conviction of BP 22
cases.
Case: Section 2 of BP 22 creates the presumption that the issuer of the check was aware
of the insufficiency of funds when he issued a check and the bank dishonored it. The
presumption, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice
of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt hereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check
or to make arrangements for its payment.
Xxx
It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that the receipts for registered letters
including return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to
serve proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. To be sure, the
presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused received such notice. It is not enough for the
prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the accused. The prosecution must
also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is
reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused.(San Mateo V. PP, GR No.
200090, March 6, 2013).
BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crime.
Case: It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another, In such cases,
the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with continuing or transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. (Morillo vs. PP, et
al., GR No. 198270, Dec. 9, 2015).
Obtaining Food, Refreshment or Accomodation , Etc. (2-e)
-The above provision refers only to hotels, motels, inns and lodging houses for transient
guests and not to leased premises like a house. (Mayer vs. Judge Herrera, 78 OG 6325, Oct. 4,
1982).
Case: A defendant who is ordered by final judgment to vacate house and in obedience
thereof leaves the house and moves to another house a few meters away is not liable under this
provision although he leaves at nighttime and does not pay the accrued rentals. (Pp vs. Ramon,
CA 75 OG 954).
Estafa through any of thru any of the following Fraudulen Means (Par 3). Inducing another
By means of Deceit to sign any document (3-a)
Case. When the accused induced the illiterate owners of 3 parcels of land to sign a deed
of sale of theit property instead of a power of attorney which he has been asked to prepare,
estafa was held committed under this paragraph. (US vs. Malong, 36 Phil. 821).
Resort to fraudulent practice to insure success in gambling game (3-b)
Case. A defendant who changed the position of the gaff of a fighting cock pretending to
have been authorized by the owner in such a manner that said cock cannot inflict any serious
injury to another, si guilty of estafa under this paragraph. (US vs. Ner, 18 Phil. 534).
Removing, concealing or destroying Court records, office files, documents or any other
papers. (3-c)
Case. Defendant who destroyed a note pf P 2,5000 after he succeeded in obtaining it

from the offended party on the pretext that he would renew it, was held guilty of estafa under this
paragraph. (US vs. Kilayco, 31 Phil. 371).
Case, A book keeper who destroyed the chits evidencing his purchase of merchandise
was held guilty of estafa thru falsification. (Ppp vs. Dizon 457 Phil. 350).
P.D. 1869 SYNDICATED ESTAFA.

PD 1869 increases the penalty of swindling under Article 315 and 316 to life
imprisonment to death if swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons fromed
with intent of carrying unlawful or illegal act, transaction or scheme and defraudation results in
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stock holders or members or rural banks,
cooperatives, Samahang Nayon or farmers associations or funds contributed by corporations or
associations fro general welfare. If not committed by a syndicate, the penalty is reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount defrauded exceeds P 100,000.00).
1.The thing was received under a quasi-contract (US vs. Yap Tian Jong, 34 Phil.
10).
An interisland steamer received at Manila a shipment of 18 boxes of goods consigned to
the accused. The boxes bore the marks “Y.J.”, letters presumably representing the initials of the
accused. In delivering the 18 boxes to the accused at Ibajay, Capiz, a box of sinamay valued at P
625, consigned to another Chinese bearing also marks “Y.J”, was also delivered to the accused
by mistake, that accused denied that he had received the box of sinamay and declared that knew
nothing about it. HELD: The accused is guilty of estafa. H propertye recived the box of sinamay
under such circumstances as to give rise to an obligation to return ormake delivery of the same to
the owner upon demand.
Simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely different crimes.
Case: Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely
different crimes. Simple estafa is a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is
necessarily included in another offense when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form a part of those constituting the latter.
Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the
petitioners should not be nullified since probable cause exists for simple estafa. (Hao, et al., vs.
Pp, GR No. 183345, Sept. 17, 2014).
Art. 316 OTHER FROM OF SWINDLING
Act punished:
1. Any person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall convey,
sell, encumber or mortgage the same.
- The thing must be immovable property. If it were movable, it would amount to
theft, or any other but not estafa.
- If he believes in truth that he is the owner, the fact, constitute an error, an
ignorance but not estafa due to absence of deceit or fraud.
- The act should be made to prejudice the owner or third person, or at least
with the intention of causing it.
- Deceit must be employed and this consists in the false pretense that the
offender is the owner of the real property sold when the contrary is not true. If
such deceit is not present, estafa is not committed. (Pp, vs. Abasalud, [CA],
GR No.11679, Feb. 21, 1955).
- This deceit may be practiced upon the second purchaser although the
damage is suffered by the first purchaser.
- The subject real property really exists but it does not belong to the seller who
pretends to be the owner thereof. But if the property fraudulently sold does
not exist, Art. 315, par. 2 is committed.
2. Any person who, knowing that the real property is encumbered, shall dispose
the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded.
- The offender knows that the real property is encumbered, irrespective of
whether such encumbrance be recorded or not, and the act disposing the
real property is made to the damage of another or with the intention of
causing the same. (Pp. vs. Alicante, 60 OG 225; Pp. vs. De los Santos,
[CA] 70 OG 1067)
- The mere fact that the encumbered real property is disposed of again by the
owner does not in itself constitute swindling under Art. 316. It is necessary to
prove that there was fraud or deceit in the second disposition.
- It cannot be presumed that there was dolo, fraud or deceit by the mere fact of
selling the property for the second time.(Pp. vs. Gurangco, No. 08924-CR,
April 24, 1970, 67 OG 2930).
- It is not necessary to investigate or inquire in the Register of Deeds to
determine the actual status of the property. (Pp. vs. Mirasol, 70 OG 660,
Aug. 24, 1981).
3. The owner of any personal property who shall wrongfully take it from its lawful
possessor, to the prejudice of the latter or any third person.
Examples:
a. Pledgor of a watch asked the pledge to give him the watch under the
pretense of redeeming it. Once in possession he refused to return it or pay
the redemption money, Estafa is committed. (Pp. vs. Fajardo, 49 Phi. 206).
b. Pledgor wrongfully took his vehicle which was in the lawful possession of
complainant by virtue of a verbal contract of pledge.(Pp. vs. Ramos, et al.,
[CA] 76 OG 7439).
c. Where accused who delivered two diamond rings and a pair of diamond
earrings to complainant as collateral for a loan through fraudulent
representation that he had buyers for said jewelry, succeeded in having
possession of the same promising to return to complainant said jewelry if the
sale was realized, was found guilty of swindling under par. 3, Art. 316. (Pp.
vs. Villacorta CAR 425).
4. Any person who, to the prejudice of another shall execute any fictitious
contract.
- If the purpose of the offender is to prejudice creditors, the act is punished by
Art. 314 Fraudulent Insolvencey.
5. Any person who shall accept any compensation given him under the belief that
it was in payment of services rendered or labor performed by him when in fact
he did not actually perform such labor or service.
- Practice by some foremen employing fictitious persons and collecting their
wages through dummies constitutes estafa under this paragraph.
6. Any person who, while being a surety in a bond given in a criminal or civil action,
without express authority from the court or before the cancellation of his bond or
before relieved from the obligation shall sell, mortgage or in any manner encumber
the real property with which he guaranteed the fulfillment of such obligation.
Art. 317 Swindling a minor
Art. 318, Other Deceits
Art. 319, Chattel Mortgage,
Art. 320 Destructive Arsons
Art. 321 Other Form of Arsons
Art. 322-326-B
(Just read all of them)
Chapter Nine
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
Art. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief.
- Just read the elements.
- The act damaging another’s property is committed merely for the sake of
damaging it. (Pp. vs. Orpiano, [CA], 74 OG 11267)
- The crime of causing injury to another is not determined solely by the mere
act of inflicting injury upon the property of another, but it must be shown that
the act had for its object the injury of the property for the sake merely of
damaging it; without this circumstance the essential element of the crime is
lacking and the criminal intention of the culprit cannot be established. (US vs.
Gerale, 4 Phil. 218).
- One who shoots a pig walking in the middle of the road for the pleasure of
testing the potency of his newly acquired rifle is guilty of malicious mischief.
(Pp. vs. Conde [CA] 69 OG 97, 1972).
Art. 328. Special Cases of Malicious Mischief, Art. 329. Other Mischief,
Art. 331 Destroying or damaging statutes, public monuments, or
paintings, Art. 322, Persons exempt from criminal liability.
Title Eleven
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Art. 333. Who are guilty of Adultery.
Elements: a) That she is a married woman; b) That she unites insexual
intercourse with a man not her husband; and c) The act of intercourse is
voluntary.
- For adultery to exist, there must be a marriage although it be subsequently
annulled. (US vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490. There is no adultery if the marriage is
void from the very beginning.
- Although the wife was not abandoned by her husband as in fact the latter left
her in response to a duty which he could not be avoided, yet she was left
helpless and in such a great need that she found herself in the predicament
of committing the wrong of which she had been guilty for the sake of her
three children and other dependents. And added to this condition is her belief
in good faith that her husband died according to reliable information , her
responsibility arising from her act of giving herself up to the man, who had
lent her a helping hand during such time of want and need, should be
considered mitigated twofold by sheer necessity.(Pp. vs. Alberto, 47 OG
2438).
- The acquittal of a woman does not necessarily result in the acquittal of the
co-defendant.
- If one of the parties was, at the time of committing the physical act, insane,
certainly such party has committed no crime, but certainly it cannot be
contended that the other party who was sane has committed no crime.
- If the man had no knowledge that the woman was married, he would be
innocent insofar as the crime of adultery is concerned and the woman guilty.
The one would have to be acquitted, and the other found guilty, although
they were tried together.
- The death of the woman during the pendency of the action cannot defeat the
trial and conviction of the man.
- Strong circumstantial and corroborative evidence such as will lead the
guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the conclusion that the
alleged act has been committed, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for
adultery.(US vs. Feliciano, 36 Phil. 753).
- Proof of sexual intercourse is not essential for conviction when the
circumstances proven in the case lead to no other conclusion. (Pp. vs.
Fernandez, [CA], GR No. L-7148R, Feb. 15, 1952).
ART. 334 CONCUBINAGE
Three ways of committing concubinage: a) By keeping a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling; b) By having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman, who is
not his wife; and c) By cohabiting with her in any other place. (Pp. vs. Santos, 45 OG No. 5,
2116).
- Scandalous circumstances are not necessary in concubinage by keeping a
mistress in the conjugal dwelling. It is only when the mistress is kept
elsewhere that “scandalous circumstances” become an element of the crime.
(US vs. Macabahag, 31 Phil. 257).
- The mere fact that it was necessary to employ spies for the purpose of
watching the conduct of the appellant, in relation with the fact that none of
the people living in the vicinity had observed any suspicious conduct on is
part in relation with his co-defendant, gives rise to a serious doubt the act
were committed con escandalo (US vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 51).
- Scandal has been defined as any reprehensible word or deed that offends
public conscience, redounds to the detriment of the feelings of honest
citizens and gives occasions to the neighbor’s spiritual damage or ruins. (Pp.
vs. Caniza, et al., CA-GR 04048-CR, March 18, 1965).
- The offender must be so imprudent and wanton as to offend modesty and
that innate sense of morality and decency of the people in the neighborhood.
So the people in the vicinity are the best witnesses of the intercourse under
scandalous circumstances. (Pp. vs. Benlot, et al., 16 CAR EP 539).
- Cohabit means to dwell or live together as husband and wife although they
are not legally married; to live together in the same house, claiming to be
married.
- Proof of sexual intercourse is not necessary.
- Concubinage involves moral turpitude ( In re: Isada, 60 Phil. 915).
Chapter two
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
ART. 336 . Acts of Lasciviousness
Elements:
a) Offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; under any of the following
circumstances; 1) Using force or intimidation; 2) offended party is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; or 3) offended party is under 12 years of age.
- In order to sustain a conviction for acts of lasciviousness, it is essential that
the act complained be prompted by lust or lewd designs and that the victim
did not consent or encourage such acts. Merely embracing and kissing the
offended girl are not sufficient. (Pp. vs. Masa, 5 CAR 457.
- If the accused embraced and kissed the offended party and he breast was
touch as an incidental consequence of the mebrace, light coercion under Art.
286, par. 2 is committed.
- But stealthily kissing, embracing and fondling the breast of complainant are
acts of lasciviousness. (Pp. vs. Mayoral, GR No. L-96094-95, N0v. 13,
1991).
- There is no frustrated acts of lasciviousness, because from the moment the
offender perform all the elements necessary for the existence of the felony,
he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment, all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. From the standpoint point
of the law, there can be no frustration of acts of lasciviousness because no
matter jhow far the offender may have gone towards the realization of his
purpose, if his participation amounts to performing all the acts of execution,
the felony is necessarily produced as a consequence thereof. (Pp. vs.
Famularcano, 43 OG 1721).
- If the acts of lasciviousness were committed upon the offended party while
under a hypnotic spell, the crime is committed upon the offended party was
deprived of reason or freedom of will. (Pp. vs. Esguerra, CA 75 OG 4058).
ART 337-QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
Elements:
a) That the offended party was a virgin at the time of the commission of
the offense; b) That she was over 12 but under 18 years of age; that
the offender had carnal knowledge of her; that the offender is one of
those persons enumerated in the first paragraph of Art. 337.
- Virginity is not to be understood in the physical sense. It refers to a woman of
chaste character. It does include a virtuous woman of good reputation. (Pp.
vs. Lanot, [CA], GR No. L-04557-CR, January 18, 1964).
- Neither virginity nor age is essential in the seduction of a sister by a brother

or of a descendant by an ascendant.
- Deceit is not necessary in qualified seduction. (US vs Santiago,41 Phil.
793).Qualified seduction is committed even though no deceit intervenes or
even when such carnal knowledge was voluntary on the part of the virgin.
(Pp vs. Fontanilla, 23 SCRA 1227).
- The accused need not be a teacher of the offended party. It is sufficient if he
is a teacher in the same school where the offended party was studying
because of his moral influence as member of the faculty over students.
(Santos vs. People, 40 OG 6 th Supp. 10). The term “teacher” incudes not
only teachers who give academic instructions but also those who teach in
trade schools. (Pp. vs. Cariasco, 50 Phil. 884).
Art 338-Simple Seduction
Elements:
a) The offended woman must be single or a widow; b) she must be of
good reputation; c) she is over 12 and under 18 years of age; d) the
offender had carnal knowledge of her; and e) The act committed by
deceit.
- Unlike in qualified seduction, virginity is not essential. What is required is the
woman be unmarried and of good reputation. Simple seduction is
synonymous with loss of virginity.(Pp. vs. Yap, JR. GR No.L-25176, Feb.
27, 1968).
- The failure to comply with the promise of marriage constitutes deceit
mentioned in the law. The promise of marriage is sufficient if made in a
manner as to make a woman believe it and therefore, it need not be formal.
(Spanish jurisprudence, citation omitted.)
- It has been declared that the act of fraudulently leading a woman to enter
into an invalid marriage relation by an assertion that a former marriage of the
defendant is void, and that he will have it set aside and publicily marry the
woman, then subsequently obtained a divorce and married another woman,
is regarded by statute as a form of criminal seduction.
- The essential feature of seduction in law is more than sexual intercourse or a
breach of promise of marriage, it connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power to abuse confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman yielded. (Tanjanco vs. CA, 19 SCRA 994, Dec. 17, 1966).
- To constitute seduction there must be in all cases be sufficient promise or
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and intercourse from
mutual desire or if she knew the accused was a married man, there is no
seduction. (US vs. Sarmiento, 27 Phil. 121).
Art. 339 Acts of Lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party;
Art. 340, Corruption of Minors; and Art. 341- White Slave Trade (Just
read)
Art. 342- Forcible Abduction
Elements:
a) The person who is kidnapped must be a woman. It is immaterial whether she is a
widow, a married woman, or virgin, for all these three classes are comprised within
the generic terms “woman”; b) the crime must be committed against her; c) it must be
committed with unchaste designs, that is, with the intention of lying with the woman.
- When the female abducted is under 12 years of age, it is not necessary that
she be taken against her will. The crime is committed even if there is
consent.
- The taking away of the woman may be accomplished by means of deceit art
at the beginning and then by means of violence and intimidation later.
(US vs. De Vevar, 29 Phil. 251).
- The intention to contract marriage may, on certain occasions, constitute lewd
designs as in the case of the abduction of a minor with her consent, when the
offender knows that she cannot give consent legally to the marriage. (Pp. vs.
Tala, et al, [CA] 44 OG 117).
- For the convictions of various defendants for the crime of abduction, it is
enough that there was lewd design by one of them, and the same was known
to the others who cooperated in the commission of the felony. Each and
every one of the defendants executed acts which constituted direct and
necessary cooperation for the commission of the felony, hence, each one of
them should be necessarily considered as principal. (Pp. vs. Deliguiado, 33
OG 3687).
- If the purpose of the abduction is to rape the victim, the forcible abduction will
be absorbed. (Pp. vs. Toledo, 83 Phil. 777).
- When a woman was kidnapped with lewd or unchaste designs, the crime
committed is forcible abduction. But when the kidnapping is without lewd
designs, the crime committed is illegal detention. (Pp. vs. Crisostomo, 46
Phil. 775).
- But where the offended party was forcibly taken to the house of the
defendant to coerce her to marry him, it was held that only Grave Coercion
was committed and not illegal detention.(Pp. vs. Deaton, GR No. 44293,
Aug. 5, 1936).
ART 343-Consented Abduction
Elements: a) That the offended party be a virgin; b) That she be over 12 but under 18
years of age; c) That she was abducted with her consent; and d) That the abduction was
committed with lewd design.
- The purpose of the law in punishing the offense is not punish the wrong done
to the girl, provided that she consents thereto, but to prescribe punishment
for the disgrace to the family and the alarm caused therein by the
disappearance of one who is, by her age and sex, susceptible to cajolery and
deceit. (US vs. Reyes, 20 Phil. 510).
- The accused can be convicted only when the girl is chaste and pure, since
the case is not within the article if she had already lost her virginity.
However, the virginity to which said article refers is not to be understood in
so material a sense as to exclude the idea of abduction of virtuous woman of
good reputation.(US vs. Casten, 34 Phil. 808).
- For the article to apply, the female must be removed from the custody of his
parents by means of promises made to or cajolery or enticement exerted
upon her by her abductor. (Pp. vs. Palisco, [CA]. GR No. 01994-CR, July
17, 1964). So that, where the female voluntary leaves her home and is
subsequently taken by the accused to a particular place for a prohibited
purpose, or where the female on her own volition goes to the home of the
accused, who may be under moral duty to send her away, he does not come
within the prescription of the law by permitting her to stay.
- The admission by the accused that he and the offended woman treated each
other as husband and wife after their elopement demonstrates the presence
of lewd designs. (Pp. vs. Valdez, [CA], 74 OG 10904).
- Illicit intercourse is not necessary to prove lewd design; intent to seduce is
sufficient and this can be inferred from the appellant’s act or conduct. (US vs.
Ramirez, 39 Phil. 738).
- It is not necessary that the offended party be taken from her house; it is
sufficient that the accused was instrumental in her removal or departure from
her house.(Pp. vs. Valdez, supra).
Art. 344-Prosecution of the crimes adultery, concubinage, rape and acts
lasciviousness
Prosecution of private offenses:
1. Adultery and Concubinage. – a) Upon complaint by the offended
spouse; b) Both the guilty parties must be included if both are alive;
c) Action cannot be instituted if there is consent or pardon of both the
offenders.(Vera-Neri vs. People, GR No. 96715, Nov. 19, 1991).
- The pardon must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution and
both offenders must be pardoned by the offended party if soad pardon is to
be effective. (pp. vs Infante, 57 Phil. 413).
- Having sexual intercourse with the offending spouse subsequent to the
adulterous conduct is implied pardon. Express pardon must not be
accompanied by intercourse between the spouse thereafter. (Pp. vs.
Muguerzam, et al., 13 CAR 1079).
- Condonation means that the offended party forgives the offense with full
knowledge of the delictum, but only upon the condition that the offense be
not repeated. As condonation is forgiveness, based upon the presumption
and belief that the guilty party has repented, any subsequent act of the
offender showing that there was no repentance will not bar the prosecution of
the offense even though condonation has been exrended.(Pp. vs. Engle, 43
OG 3733).
2. Seduction, abduction, rape, acts of lasciviousness – a) Upon
complaint by the offended party, her parents, grandparents, or
guardian; b) Action cannot be instituted if offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may
be.
3. Defamatory utterances imputing upon the offended party the crime of
prostitution can be prosecuted de oficio. (Pp. vs. Din Chu, 33 SCRA
199, May 29, 1970). But imputation of “illicit relationship” between a
man and woman connotes carnal intercourse with each other, the
criminal action cannot be prosecuted de oficio, (Fernandez vs.
Lantin, 74 SCRA 338 [1976]).
- If the offended girl is a minor, pardon must be accompanied by the express

pardon of her parents. Pp. vs. Arguilles, GR No. 612, March 31, 1937),
except when she has no more parents who could concur in the pardon, the
father being the offender himself under whose parental authority she lives,
her mother having died long ago.(Pp. vs. Inciong, [CA] 1 OG 904, Oct, 26,
1942).
- Affidavit of Desistance under Art. 344 by the complainant in a crime against
chastity is considered as pardon of the accused which must be made prior to
the institution of the criminal action. If made while the case has been filed
already, such cannot justify the dismissal of the complaint. It cannot also be
considered as a mitigating circumstance because the same does not
constitute an admission of guilt by the accused which should manifest a
disposition to submit himself to the law.(Pp. vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162
[1988]).
Art. 345-Civil Liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity.
Civil Liabilities:
a) To indemnify the offended woman; b) To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law
should prevent him from doing so; and c) IN every case to support the offspring.
- The adulteres and the concubine may also be sentenced in the same
proceeding or in a separate civil proceeding, to indemnify for the damage
caused to the offended spouse. But in concubinage, the imposition of civil
liability for indemnity is against the concubine only.(Pp. vs, Ramirez, CA-GR
No. 015171-CR, May 21, 1966).
- In rape, the rapist is duty bound to support the offspring not only because he
is the father, but because he is civilly responsible for all the civil
consequences of the offense. IN multiple rape where paternity cannot be
identified, does not change the fact, as any one of them could be the father
of the child. In rape the fact of paternity is not the legal ground for the support
of the offspring but the moral, social and legal responsibility for the crime that
cause the conception and birth of the offspring.(Pp. vs. Velo, 45 OG No. 9,
page 65-66).
- Where the victim is a married woman, the law prohibits the acknowledgment
of the offspring in such a case, on account of the parental authority which
thus be conferred upon the party committing the rape and because of the
inherent parental right in favor of the father constanti matrimonio.
- If the offended party in rape has not yet reached the age of puberty, there is
no need to require acknowledgment of the offspring if any because she is not
in a position to be impregnated. (Pp. vs. Period, [CA] 44 OG 2764).
Art. 346- Liabilities of ascendants, etc.- just read
Art. 347- simulation of birth, etc.
- Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another, and concealment
or abandonment of a legitimate child with intent to cause such child to lose its
civil status are ounished under Art. 347.
- In case of simulation of birth, the woman who simulates births and the
woman who furnishes the child are both guilty as principals. (SC of Spain,
March 20, 1880).
- The elements of simulation of birth asre: a) the child is baptized or

Registered in the Registry of Births as hers; b) that the child loses its real
status and acquires a new one; 3) the actor’s purpose was to cause the loss
of any trace as to the child’s true filiation.
- Be merely presenting a child as having been born to the accused from
feigned pregnancy or pretended delivery, the crime is not committed if the
legal formalities of investing such child with a civil status other than her own
are not present. (Pp. vs. Sangalang, et la., [CA] 74 OG 5977).
Art. 348- Usurpation of Civil Status (just read)
Art. 349-BIGAMY
Elerments of Bigamy:
a) The Offender has been legally married; b) the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead; c) he contracts a subsequent marriage; d) the
subsequent marriage would have been legal had it not been for the existence pf the
first. (Marbella-Bobis vs Bobis, GR No. L-138509, July 31, 2000).
-In case is bigamy, it is immaterial whether it is the first or the second wife who initiates
the action, for it is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person
affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same.
- The term “innocent spouse” is applicable not only to the wife of the first marriage but
also to the wife of the second marriage, because bigamy affects the civil status of the
wives, and more particularly the second. (pp. vs. mojica, 40 og 4953).
-In prosecution of bigamy, the fact the woman with whom accused contracted a second
marriage was aware of the accused’s previous marriage when the second marriage was
solemnized, is not a defense because is not an offense against the second wife but
against the state. (Pp vs. Concepcion, 40 OG 2878).
-One convicted of bigamy may be prosecuted for concubinage as both are distinct
offenses. The first is an offense against civil status which may be prosecuted at the
instance of the estate; the second, an offense against chastity, and may be prosecuted
only at the instance of the offended party. On the matter of double jeopardy, the test isnot
whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act but whther he has been
put in jeopardy for the same offense. (Pp vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82).
-One, not yet married before, who knowingly consents to be married to one who is
already married, is guilty of bigamy knowing that the latter’s marriage is still valid and
subsisting. (Pp. vs. Archilla, GR No.L-15632, Feb. 28, 1961).
Art. 350- Marriage contracted against the provision of the law; Art. 351-Premature
marriages; Art. 352 – Performance of illegal marriage ceremony. (Just read)
LIBEL
Art. 353. Definition of libel.

Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or imaginary or an
imputation of any act, omission, condition or status, or circumstances tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.
- Imputation of a criminal intention is not libelous because intent to commit a crime is not libelous.
This is more so, when it is a mere assertion or expression of opinion as to what will be the future
conduct of another. (Pp. vs. Baja, CA 40 OG, Supp. 5, 2006).
- An expression of opinion by one affected by the act of another and based on actual fact
is not libelous. Thus, an expression of opinion that a person is unfair or partial in the distribution
of her property, where it appears that the defendant has been deprived of her share is not
libelous. (Pp. vs. Baja, supra).
- IN matters of libel, the question is not of an alleged libel means, but what is the meaning of the
words he has used. The alleged defamatory statements should be construed not only as to the
expression used but also with respect to the whole scope and apparent object of the writer. (Pp
vs. Encarnacion, 48 OG 1817).
-Where the comments are insincere and intended to ridicule rather than praise the
plaintiff, the publication is libelous. Praise underserved is slander is disguise. (Jimenez vs.
Reyes, 27 Phil. 52).
Malice defined –“Malice” has been defined as a term to indicate the fact that the
defamer is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to
injure the reputation of the person defamed. The term “malice” implies an intention to do ulterior
and unjustifiable harm (US vs. Catiete, 38 Phil. 253).
-where the accused is motivated by vengeance, personal resentment or aversion.(PP.
vs. Quemel, CA 02853-CR, March 18, 1964).
Malice- connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure
the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm. (Borjal, et al., vs. CA, et al., GR No. 126466, Jan. 14, 1999).
Kinds of Malice: a) Malice in law; b) Malice in fact
-“Malice in law”- is presumed from a defamatory imputation. Proof of malice is no longer
required because it is presumed to exist from the defamatory imputation. But this principle does
not apply where the communication is privileged under Art. 354. Hence, malice as a fact must be
proved. (U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731). In order to establish malice as a fact, it is obviously
becomes necessary to prove that justifiable motives existed for the publication. The proposition
cannot be inverted. (US vs. Prautch, 10 Phil. 562).
-But privilege, destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice is then on the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive
of his conduct.(US vs. Bustos, supra.0
- Constructive criticism of a matter of public interest is not malice. (Pp. vs. Andrada, 37
OG 1783).
-Matters of public interest and concern are accorded the mantle of qualified privilege
immunity (Zafra vs. Manzi, et al., 14 CAR 313). It must be personal to constitute malice so that if
the will is engendered by one’s sense of justice or by a legitimate or a plausible motive, such
feelings negative actual malice.x-x-x, what constitute the crime is not only the defamatory matter
b the attitude of the accused. Esteban vs. Veneracion, et al., 16 CAR 313).
Publication defined. Publication is the communication of the defamatory matters to
same third person or persons. To publish is to make public, to make known to the persons in
general. (Ocampo vs. Evangelista, et al., 37 OG 2196), (Pp. vs. Atencion, CA-Gr Nos. 11351-
R to 11353-R, Dec. 14, 1954).
- Defamatory statements on two or more persons contained in one writing and published
by a single act constitutes but one offense so as to warrant single indictment therefore. (Pp. vs.
Aquino, 35 OG 8844).
-The publication of s libel should not be presumed from the mere fact that the immediate
control thereof has been parted with, unless it appears that there was a reasonable probability
that it was thereby exposed to be read or seen by third persons. It cannot be fairly said when the
defendant enclosed the alleged libelous matter in a sealed envelope, addressed to the plaintiff,
and sent it by messenger, that he parted with its custody under circumstances which suggest a
reasonable probability that it was thereby exposed to be read or seen by other persons. (Lopez
vs. Delgado, 8 Phil. 26).
- But where a defamatory letter contained in a close envelope, was delivered through
another, the offender having parted with its possession in such a way that it could have been read
by persons other than the defamed party, it was held that there was sufficient publication.(Pp. vs.
Adamos, 35 OG 496).
-Sending a letter not shown to have been sealed to the offended party charging the latter
with having illicit relationship with her husband is publication. (Pp. vs. Silvela, 103 Phil. 773).
-If the defamatory matter is not seen or heard by anyone except the defamer and the
defamed, damages to character reputation cannot result since man’s reputation is the estimate
on whether held him, and not what he himself thinks. (Pp. vs. Silvela, supra).
-Delivery of the article to the typesetter is sufficient publication. (U.S. vs. Crame, 10 Phil.
135).
-Although in law the husband and the wife are one, sending of a letter to the wife
defamatory to her husband is sufficient publication. (US vs. Urbina, 1 Phil. 741; Magno vs.
People, GR No. L-133896, Jan. 27, 2006).
- Person libeled must be identified.
-Libel cannot be committed except against somebody, and that somebody must be
properly identified. (Pp. vs. Andrada, 37 OG 1783).
-Where no one was named or accurately described, it must be shown that the description
of the person referred to in the defamatory publication was sufficiently clear so that at least a third
person would have identified the plaintiff. It is not sufficient that plaintiff recognized himself as the
person attacked. (kunkle vs. Cablenews-American & Lyons, 42 Phil. 727).
- A libel may be published in parts, neither part being complete libel in itself but all the
parts taken together constituting a libelous publication. Thus, the first publication mentions no
name. The second publication consists of a cartoon in which the persons referred to in the first
publication are caricatured by name and to each of them is attached one of the words or phrases
just mentioned, thereby identifying as one of the persons meant in the first publication. The
evident purpose and the result of the publication of the cartoon, called the second publication,
was to make clear to the public that the tree men named in the cartoon were the labor leaders
referred to in the first publication. (US vs. Sotto, 36 Phil. 839).
-Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all embarrassing as to apply to every individual in the
group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that
the defamatory statements specifically pointed to him so that he can bring an action separately, if
need be. (Newsweek vs IAC, GR No. L-63559, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 171). This is in
reiteration of the doctrine in the case of Uy Tioco, et al., vs. Yang Shu Wan, et al., 32 Phil.
624, which held that defamatory imputations directed at a glass or group in general language are
not actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping.
-There are as many offenses of libel as there are persons libeled, and the computation of
the number is not the publication but the writing or composing of the libel. Hence, if in a single
publication there are persons defamed, each has a right to file separate charges of libel to
vindicate his honor and reputation.(Pp. vs. Del Rosario, GR No. L-2254, April 20, 1950).
- But if the utterances is made but once and refers to a family of lawyers designated by
their common surname, there is only one offense of libel. (Pp vs Aquino, 53 OG 844).
- Where the alleged slanderous utterances were committed on the same date and the
same place, but against two different persons, the situation has given rise to two separate and
individual causes for prosecution. (Pp vs. Juan Gil, et al., 25 SCRA 888, October 31, 1968).
- Well settled is the rule that parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in
libel or slander cases for words otherwise defamatory, uttered or published in the course of
judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent and relevant to the case. (Malit vs.
People, 114 SCRA 348, May 31, 1982).
Kinds of privileged communications:
1).Absolutely privileged is not actionable, even of the actor has acted in bad faith. This
includes statements made by members of congress in the discharge of their functions as such,
official; communications by public officers in the performance of their duties, and allegations
made by the parties or their counsels in the pleadings or motions during the hearing of judicial
proceedings, as well as answers given by witnesses in response to questions propounded to said
witness, provided that said allegations or said statements are relevant to the issues and the
answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said witness.
2) Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications, are those which, although
containing defamatory imputations, could not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith,
and malice exists when the defamer has been prompted by ill-will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty but to injure the reputation of the person defamed. (Orfanel vs. People, GR L-
26877, Dec. 26, 1969).
- The doctrine of privileged rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and
unfettered administration of justice, though as an incidental result it may in some instances afford
an immunity of evil-disposed and malignant slandered. But the statements must be made under
an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive.(US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731).
-Libel in answer to another libel is not justified. (Pelicena vs. Gozales, 6 Phil. 50). But if
published in self-defense in good faith, without malice, and is not necessarily defamatory of his
assailant, it is privileged. (Pp. vs. Baja, 40 OG 2016).
- A person libeled may hit back with another libel, which of adequate will be justified. (Pp
vs. Chua Hiong, [CA], 51 OG 1932).
- Complainant called the accused “hypocritical, a dishonorable client, xx insincere and
dishonest and the accused struck back with same disparaging and intemperate language, and
insults were hurled back and forth and each one bent his spleen on the other, the Court held: “In
this factual background to convict does not square with our sense of justice. The act of one
should be considered as nullifying the other. Being similarly situated neither one should be
allowed to complain against the other. (Pp vs. Ignacio, CA 74 OG 3680).
-Statements made in self-defense or in mutual controversy are often privileged. (Pp vs.
Borja, CA 74 OG Supp. 5, page 206).
-To be privileged, the communication must be pertinent and material to the subject matter
in which the author claims an interest to uphold. The protection of the privilege may be lost by
manner of execution. It does not protect any unnecessary defamation. (PP. vs Fernandez, CA
64 OG 348).
Fair and True Report.
-The publication by a news paper of an incorrect statement of the contents of the
complaint filed in court is not privileged. (Macleod vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 12 Phil. 427).
Because the news paper is to keep the public informed of what takes place.
-Even if the report or article is true, the use therein of unfair and uncalled for comments
and epithets precludes good faith and the accused who made them cannot shield himself with the
armor of justifiable motives.(People vs. Rico, 60 OG 43).
- A fair and true report of a complaint filed in court without remarks nor comments even
before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated should be covered by the rule on privilege.
(Cuenco vs. Cuenco, 70 SCRA 212).
-So long as it acts in good faith, a news paper of general circulation has the legal right to
have and express its own opinion of legal questions in cases pending on court. The denial of
such right would infringe upon the freedom of the press. (El Hogar Filipino vs. Prautch, 37 Phil.
731).
- Defamatory remarks against govt. employees with respect to facts related tp the
discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth of the
imputation but any attack upon the private character of the officer on matters which are not
related to the discharge of his official functions may constitute libel, for under our laws the right of
the press to criticize public officers does not authorize defamation. (U vs. BUstos, 37 Phil. 731).
Art. 355 Libel by means of writing or similar means, Art. 356- Threatening to publish and
offer to prevent such publication for compensation, Art. 357- Prohibited publication of
actsreferred to in the course of official proceedings. (Just read them)
In RA 10175 (CYBERCRIME LAW), Sec. 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID
and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it.;
and Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of the
cybercrimes is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Section 4© (4) on online
libel.
Except for the original author, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and Share)
are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their
response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And, considering the
inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands of responding “friends” or “followers” in
the criminal charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as to who should go to jail for the
outbreak of the challenged posting?
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a square peg in a
round hole when applied to cyberspace libel, Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that
takes into account its unique circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a chilling
effect on the millions that use this new medium of communication in violation of their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
Xxx
Libel in cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the mouse.
Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover,
cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and
friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to
regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation
and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
area of protected freedoms.
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments
await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be
threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law
enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The
terms “aiding” or “abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who
express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section
5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “adding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
(Disini, Jr, et al. vs. Sec. of Justice, etc. GR No. 203335, Feb. 18, 2014).
Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualified privilege communication since fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged.
Fact is Issue: Whether or not the disputed article constitute privilege communications as
to exempt the author from liability. The trial court ruled that petitioner Borjal cannot hide behind
the proposition that his articles are privileged in character under the provisions of Art. 354 of the
Revised Penal Codexxx.
Respondent court explained that the writings in question did not fall under any of the
exceptions described in above-quoted article since these were neither “private communications”
nor “fair and true report xxx without any comments or remarks.”
HELD: Indisputably, petitioner Borjal’s questioned writings are not within the exceptions
of Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are
neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks.
However, this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the
enumeration under art. 354 is not exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair
commentaries on matter of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privilege
communications had its genesis not in the nation’s penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the
constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in the United
State vs. Canete,( 38 Phil. 253, 265 [1918]) this Court ruled that publication which are privileged
for reasons of public policy are protected are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom
of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to
give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels.
Xxxx
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute
a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public officer in
his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a
public official may be actionable, it may either be a false allegations of fact or a comment based
on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts.(Borjal, et al., vs. CA, et al., GR No. 126466, Jan. 14, 1999).
Note: See Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. vs. AMEC-BCM, et al, GR # 141994,
Jan. 17, 2005. In this case, the subject comments made by Rima and Alegre, although an
expression of opinion, but since the same were no based on established facts, they were not
privileged and remain libelous per se.
Art. 358 – SLANDER (Oral Defamation)

SLANDER DEFINED.
Case: Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term
oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and
defamatory words which to tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office trade, business or
means of livelihood. (Villanueva vs. PP, et al., GR No. 160351, April 10, 2006).
GRAVE SLANDER.
Case: There is grave slander when it is of serious and insulting in nature. The gravity of
oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expression used, but also (2) on the personal
relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the case.
Xxx
In our previous rulings, we held that the social standing and position of the offended party
are also taken into account and thus, it was held that the slander was grave, because the
offended party had held previously the office of the Congressman, Governor, and Senator and
was then a candidate for Vice-President, for which no amount of sophistry would take the
statement out of the compass of grave oral defamation. However, we have likewise, ruled in the
past that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the
offended party constitutes only a light felony. (Villanueva vs. Pp, et a., supra).
-Words uttered in the heat of anger constitutes light oral defamation.(Pp vs. Doronilla,
40 OG 231).
- The absence of any prior enmity or misunderstanding between the accused and the
complainant serves to minimize the serious and insulting motive of the defamation or if the
defamation was uttered by the accused while in extreme excitement or in the midst of passion
and obfuscation, the gravity is lesser than if it was made with cold and calculating deliberation.
(Pp vs. Andrion, [CA], 75 OG 1226).
-Defamation in a political meeting on the eve of the election when feeling s were running
high and people could no think clearly normally constitutes light slander. (Pp. vs. Laroga, 40 OG
123).
-As long as other persons or even any person and not the offended party heard the
slanderous words, slander is committed. (Pp vs. Clarin, [CA] 37 OG 1106).
-The person slandered may hit back with another slander only if his reply is made in good
faith without malice and it is not necessarily defamatory of his assailant. (Pp vs. Mendoza, CA 74
OG 5607).
-To repel an attack on his reputation, defendant may make an explanation of the
imputation, and it is only where, if by explaining, he must of necessity have to use scurrilous and
slanderous remarks, that he may legally be allowed to do so without placing himself under
criminal prosecution. (Pp. vs. Mendoza, supra).
The doctrine that a “public officer should not be too onion-skinned and should be
tolerant to criticism” applies only to defamatory statements uttered in connection with the
public officer’s duty.
Case: Finally, the Court finds that even though SPO3 Leonardo was a police officer by
profession, his complaint against De Leo for oral defamation must still prosper. It has been held
that a public officer should not be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticism. The
doctrine, nevertheless, would only apply if the defamatory statement was uttered in connection
with the public officer’s duty.
Here, however, the malicious imputations were directed towards the public officer with
respect to their past strained personal relationship. To note, the De Leon’s displeasure towards
SPO3 Leonardo could be traced to a gun-pointing incident where the latter was angered when
the former failed to grant him a private loan transaction in the amount of P 150,000.00.
Xxx.
To reiterate, their altercation and De Leon’s subsequent defamation were not in
connection with SPO3’s public duties. Taking onto account the circumstances of the incident,
calling him “walanghiya” and “mangongotong na pulis” was evidently geared towards his
reputation as aprovate individual of the community. Thus, the defamation committed by De Leon,
while only slight is character, must not go unpunished. (De Leon vs. Pp, et al., GR No. 212623,
Jan. 11, 2016).
Art. 359-Slander by Deed
-Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature or not,
depends on diverse factor, such as the social standing of the offended party, the circumstances
under which the act was committed, the accession, etc. For instance the slapping of the face of a
priest while he saying a mass undoubtedly constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature. In the
other hand slapping the face of a prostitute inside the house of prostitution, only the other
prostitutes being present, may not constitute slander of a serious nature.
-Placing a mirror between the legs of complainant in a public place is slander by deed
because it was committed to create contempt or ridicule upon the offended party. ((Pp vs.
Mantilla, [CA1] GR No. L-01713-CR, Sept. 11, 1962).
-The acts of slapping and boxing the offended woman in the presence of so many people
constitute slander by deed because as a result thereof the complainant, a school teacher, was
put to dishonor, contempt and ridicule. (Pp vs. Delfin, et al., 112 Phil. 807).
Pointing a “dirty finger” at complainant constitutes simple slander by deed.
Case: xxx pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase “Fuck You,” which is
similar to the expression “Puta” or “Putang Ina mo,” in local parlance. Such expression was not
held to be libelous in Reyes vs. People, where the court said that: “This is a common enough
expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger
or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection
on the virtues of a mother.” Following Reyes, and in the light of the fact that there was perceived
provocation coming fro the complainant, petitioner’s act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant
constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the case that the act
complained of was employed by petitioner “to express anger or displeasure” at complainant for
procrastinating the approval of is leave monetization. (Villanueva vs. People, et. Al., supra).
Art. 360, Persons liable for libel or slander, Art. 361, Proof of Truth, Art. 362, Libelous
remarks, Art. 363, Incriminating Innocent Persons,, Art. 364, Intriguing against honor (Just
read them)
Art. 365-Imprudence and Negligence
Doctrine of “last clear chance” means the contributory negligence of the party injured
will not defeat the action if it be shown that the accused might, by exercise of reasonable care
and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. At most,
such contributory negligence would merely be considered as a mitigating circumstance.
Moreover, the defense of contributory negligence does not apply to criminal cases through
reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of
his own negligence.(Pp vs. Quinones, 44 OG 1520).
-The fact that another truck was parked on the wrong side of the road bears no influence
to relieve the accuse from criminal liability, because despite that admitted fact, the accused had
time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he has been sufficiently careful and cautious.(pp vs.
Sy, [CA] 75 OG 6582).
-The “last clear chance” doctrine is applicable only incases where both drivers of the two
vehicles are negligent, and the party involved is not able to prevent the injury despite the
opportunity to avoid it,(Sy Kiao vs. Onofre, [CA] 73 OG 5565).
Doctrine of “right of pre-emption” is the privilege accorded to drivers along thru-street
to have the preference to pass through first, if both drivers have not yet reached the crucial cross-
section of the two streets. Thus, even of the driver of a motor vehicle crossing a thru-street was
supposed to have waited (along the intersection) for the driver of a motor vehicle running along
the thru-street, if the driver crossing the street have already reached the middle thereof, the other
driver travelling along the thru-street although with the right of pre-emption, has the duty to stop
his motor vehicle in order to avoid a collision. (Pp vs. Panuyas, 17 CAR 1251 349).
-A professional driver who permits any unlicensed person to drive the car placed under
his responsibility violates the provision of Section 48 (B) of 3992, It has been held in this
connection that the violation of a statute which imposes a specific requirement to omit to do a
definite act is negligence per se.
-An automobile driver cannot put himself in a position where, in order to save himself, he
must injure someone else (Emergency rule). (Pp vs. Santos, 44 OG 1289). Thus, the act of a
motorist in attempting to pass a car in front of him at a moment when another vehicle is
approaching constitutes gross negligence and renders him liable for any damage resulting from
said act. (5 Am Jur. 61).
- Where the property is only partially destroyed, the measure of damages as the basis of
the fine described in 3rtd par. Art. 365, should be difference between its value immediately before
the injury and immediately thereafter, together with reasonable expenses incurred to preserve
and restore the property to its form and condition. (Pp vs. Janilla, 14CA Rep. 6880).
-In case a patient died after his operation, to hold the surgeon liable, there must be proof
of breach of duty on his part and the causal connection between such breach and the resulting
death of the patient. The presumption of negligence of the surgeon cannot arise or is not
available simply because the operation was not successful. (Abaya et al., vs. Flavis, 3 CAR
450).
- Accused was a manger of an electric plant. His employees installed electric wires in the
house of a customer. The son of the customer happened to hold an uninsulated portion of electric
wire. He was electrocuted. Accused was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence. Held:
As a general rule, a director or other officer of the corporation is criminally liable for his acts in his
official capacity if he participates in the unlawful act directly or as an aider, abettor or accessory
but is not criminally liable for the corporate acts performed by other officers or agents thereof. (Pp
vs. Montilla, CA 52 OG 4327).
-“Kabit system” is one where a person is granted a certificate of public convenience
allows other persons to own motor vehicle to operate them under such license for a fee or
percentage of the earning. (Dizon vs. Octavio, et al., CA 51 OG 4059). Where such vehicles
figures in an accident, the ostensible operator and the and the actual operator are both solidarily
liable for damages. (Francisco vs. Malibay Transit, et al., CA 51 OG 1456).
Thank you!

Lecture Notes in Criminal Law Review by Judge Leonido

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Page 1 (492700526.docxW by JUDGE EDGARDO C. LEONIDO – MTCC MAASIN CITY) 1st Sem.

LECTURE NOTES IN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

By: Judge EDGARDO C. LEONIDO

Characteristics of Criminal Law:

Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Over Offenses Committed by Person Subject to Military

Persons subject to military law:

Reason: To safeguard the existence of the state. Example: ESPIONAGE.

Rules on Merchant Vessels:

Theories of Criminal Law and their Characteristics:

C. THE ECLECTIC PHILOSOPHY

REVISED PENAL CODE SPECIAL LAWS

Degree of participation in the commission of No classification of offenders – only those who

Modifying circumstances are considered – Modifying circumstances are not considered.

Article 3, RPC (definition of felony)

Elements of Dolo (Intentional Felonies)

Elements of Culpa (Culpable Felonies)

Distinction between dolo and culpa:

1) In intentional crime (dolo) the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence

Distinction between motive and intent:

Defense in intentional felony: MISTAKE OF FACTS

Mistake of facts- it is an act or omission which is the result of a misapprehension of facts

MISTAKE OF IDENTITY – not a defense

Mistake of identity is not a defense because intent is present.

Article 4, RPC (How criminal liability is incurred).

Second element not applicable – if there is an intervening cause.

Instances where the wrongful act different from what is intended:

Insofar as B is concerned, attempted murder; insofar as C is concerned Serious Physical

Impossible crime (Art. 4, RPC, par. 2)

Duty of Courts (Art. 5)

1.1 “Spontaneous desistance” cannot be used in frustrated crimes because it is no longer

Answer: There is no attempted crime of murder because of the desistance. He already

Meaning of OVERT ACTS:

Definition of subjective phase:

CASES HELD TO BE ATTEMPTED.

(g) Pp. vs. Umaguing, 107 SCRA 166, 1981.

(i) Pp. vs. Briton, 364 Phil. 731, 748 (1999).

( j) Pp. vs. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000.

(k-1) Norberto Cruz vs. People, GR No. 166441, Oct. 8, 2014.

(l) U.S vs. Valdez, 39 Phil. 240.

(m) Pp. vs. Garcia, 49 O.G. 558.

(o) Pp. vs. Go Kay, CA, 54 O.G. 2225

THEFT, ROBBERY & ESTAFA

(p) Pp. vs. De la Cruz, 43 O.G. 3202.

(q) Pp. vs. Dio, 130 SCRA 151.

(r) U.S. vs Villanueva, `1 Phil. 370.

CASES HELD TO BE FRUSTRATED

Homicide, Murder and Physical Injuries

(a) Pp. vs. Hondrada, 51 Phil. 112.

(b) Pp. vs Mercado, 51 Phil. 99.

(c) Pp. vs. David, 60 Phil. 93.

Theft, Estafa & Robbery

(d) Pp. vs. Dino, C.A. 45 O.G. 3446.

The Dino ruling was reaffirmed in the subsequent CA ruling:

(f) Empelis, et al., vs IAC, L-68138, Spt. 28, 1984.

(g) U.S vs. Dominguez, 41 Phil. 409.

Light Felonies (Art. 7, RPC)

Conspiracy ( Art. 8 RPC)

5) Conspiracy cannot exist in case of negligence. In conspiracy it involves meeting of the

6) To establish conspiracy it is not necessary to prove previous agreement to commit a

8) Overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy consist in actively participating in the actual

a) Pp. vs Cantuba, 183 SCRA 289, 298

b) Pp. vs. Pugay, 167 SCRA 439.