LANDS, TITLES, AND DEEDS – MODULE 1
he was compelled to present an adverse claim pursuant
JUNIO v. DELOS SANTOS
TOPIC: REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVE RLAND
REGISTRATION CASES
ADVERSE CLAIM - An adverse claim is a
statement made under oath by someone who claims
any part or interest in a registered piece of land adverse
to the registered owner and serves as a notice to all of
such a claim.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS:
 Petitioner-appellant, Wenceslao Junio, is the
registered owner of a parcel of land situated
at Bayambang, Pangasinan, with an area of
7.65 hectares, more or less, covered by TCT
No. 1004 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan.
 By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
allegedly executed by petitioner over the said
parcel of land in favor of respondent
Feliciano de los Santos and his co-vendees,
Guillermo de la Cruz and Jose Junio, an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim was executed by
respondent, Feliciano de los Santos, claiming
a one-third undivided portion of petitioner's
property, which claim was annotated on
petitioner's title.
o Petitioner denies having sold any
portion of his property to private
respondent. hence, his Petition for
the cancellation of said adverse
claim. Petitioner disputes the
appropriateness of the annotation
alleging that under Section 110 of
the Land Registration Act (Act No.
496), such inscription may be
resorted to only when there is no
other means of registering an
interest or right; that Section 57 of
the same statute provides for the
registration of a documented sale
involving a titled property; and that
the Register of Deeds acted
negligently in registering the
document without the formal legal
requisities.
IN RESPONSE - respondent de los Santos countered
that he had tried to avail himself of Section 57 by
requesting petitioner to surrender his owner's duplicate
certificate of title but since the latter refused to do so
to Section 110 of the Land Registration Act.
The case was submitted for decision, without the
presentation of evidence, and based on the pleadings,
the lower Court denied the petition for cancellation for
lack of merit and because "petitioner has his own
remedy but not in this summary proceedings." The
provision on adverse claim reads in part:
Sec. 110. Whoever claims any right
or interest in registered land adverse
to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other
provision is made in this Act for
registering the same, make a
statement in writing setting forth
fully his alleged right or interest, and
how or under whom acquired, and a
reference to the volume and page of
the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description
of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed. The statement
shall be signed and sworn to, and
shall state the adverse claimant's
residence and designate a place at
which all notices may be served
upon him. This statement shall be
entitled to registration as an adverse
claim, and the court, upon a petition
of any party in interest, shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim
and shall enter such decree therein
as justice and equity may require. If
the claim is adjudged to be invalid
the registration shall be cancelled. If
in any case the court after notice and
hearing shall find that a claim thus
registered was frivolous or
vexatious, it may tax the adverse
claimant double or treble costs in its
discretion.
The "other provision for registering" = Section 57
Sec. 57. An owner desiring to convey in fee his
registered land or any portion thereof shall execute a
deed of conveyance, which the grantor or grantee may
present to the register of deeds in the province where
the land lies. The grantor's duplicate certificate shall
be produced and presented at the same time. The
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register of deeds shall thereupon, in accordance with
the rules and instructions of the court, make out in the
registration book a new certificate of title to the
grantee, and shall prepare and deliver to him an
owner's duplicate certificate. The register of deeds
shall note upon the original and duplicate certificates
the date of transfer, the volume and page of the
registration book where the new certificate is
registered, and a reference by number to the last prior
certificate. The grantor's duplicate certificate shall be
surrendered and the word 'canceled' stamped upon it.
The original certificate shall also be stamped
'canceled'. The deed of conveyance shall be filed and
indorsed with the number and place of registration of
the certificate of title of the land conveyed.
However, considering that petitioner had refused
to surrender the title, private respondent could not
avail of Section 57. Hence, the latter correctly resorted
to the annotation of an adverse claim. Where the
vendor fails to deliver to the vendee the duplicate
certificate of title, the vendee should file immediately.
with the Register of Deeds an adverse claim under
Section 110 of Act No. 496, as amended.
Register of Deeds of Quezon City vs. Nicandro
- held that when a claim is based on a perfected
contract of sale executed in their favor by the lawful
owner of the land, the remedy provided in Section 110
would be ineffective considering that the Land
Registration Act specifically provides the procedure
for registration in Section 57 thereof.
 The factual milieu in that case, however, is
completely different, for, therein there was no
question about the existence of a perfected
contract of sale, unlike in the case at bar,
where the sale between the parties is
contested. Moreover, as already adverted to,
private respondent could not register the
document of sale under Section 57 because of
petitioner's refusal to surrender the duplicate
certificate of title.
But petitioner additionally submits that because of
such refusal, it is Section 111 of the same Act No. 496,
which provides the proper remedy, and we quote:
Sec. 111. In every case where the clerk or any register
of deeds is requested to enter a new certificate in
pursuance of an instrument purporting to be executed
by the registered owner, or by reason of any instrument
or proceedings which divests the title of the registered
owner against his consent, if the outstanding owner's
duplicate certificate is not presented for cancellation
when such request is made, the clerk or register of
deeds shall not enter a new certificate, but the person
claiming to be entitled thereto may apply by petition
to the court. The court, after hearing, may order the
registered owner or any person withholding the
duplicate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of
a new certificate upon such surrender.
If in any case the person withholding the duplicate
certificate is not amenable to the process of the court,
or if for any reason the outstanding owner's duplicate
certificate cannot be delivered up, the court may by
decree annul the same and order a new certificate of
title to be entered. Such new certificate and all
duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
If in any case an outstanding mortgagee's or lessee's
duplicate certificate is not produced and surrendered
when the mortgage is discharged or extinguished or
the lease is terminated, like proceedings may be had to
obtain registration as in the case of the nonproduction
of an owner's duplicate.
HOWEVER, said Section 111 can be availed of only
if controversial issues are not involved. In this case,
the genuineness and due execution of the sale between
the parties is in controversy.
Although the grounds relied upon by petitioner for
cancellation of the adverse claim were unmeritorious,
it behooved the lower Court to have conducted a
speedy hearing upon the question of validity of the
adverse claim pursuant to the second paragraph of
Section 110 of the Land Registration Act, reading:
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall
state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate a
place at which all notices may be served upon him.
This statement Shall be entitled to registration as an
adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any
party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the
question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall
enter such decree therein as justice and equity may
require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration shall be cancelled. If in any case the court
after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus
registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the
adverse claimant double or treble costs in its
discretion.
In fact, the lower Court, instead of confining itself to
the propriety of the registration of the adverse claim
should already have decided the controversy between
the parties on the merits thereof.
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NOTE: Doctrinal jurisprudence holds that the Court
of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), as a
Land Registration Court, can hear cases otherwise
litigable only in ordinary civil actions, since the Courts
of First Instance are at the same time, Courts of general
jurisdiction and could entertain and dispose of the
validity or invalidity of respondent's adverse claim,
with a view to determining whether petitioner is
entitled or not to the relief that he seeks (THIS
DOCTRINE IS BASED ON EXPDIENCY)
NOTE: an adverse claim be cancelled only after it is
adjudged invalid or unmeritorious by the Court acting
either as a land registration Court or a Court of general
jurisdiction. The two other co-vendees, however,
should be impleaded as parties so that the entire
controversy as to ownership may be threshed out in a
single action to prevent multiplicity of suits.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered remanded
to the Regional Trial Court corresponding to the
former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for
hearing and for passing upon the controversy on the
merits between petitioner, as the registered owner,
and private respondent, who had filed the adverse
claim, impleading for that purpose the alleged co-
vendees, Guillermo de la Cruz and Jose Junio.
ARCEO v. CA
It appears that the spouses Abdon Arceo and
Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels
of unregistered land (six were involved but only four
were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified
as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Escolastica
died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed away
in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died on
September 2, 1941. Esteban had five children, Jose,
Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married
Virginia Franco, with whom he fathered six children,
Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and
Romeo. Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are the
private respondents herein while Jose's widow,
Virginia (Jose died on March 8, 1970), and their
children are the petitioners.
It also appears that on October (or September) 27,
1941, the Arceos executed a deed of donation inter
vivos, marked as Exhibit "J", in which the spouses
bestowed the properties in favor of Jose Since 1942,
Jose had been paying taxes thereon. In 1949, he took
personal possession thereof, worked thereon, and
claimed them as owner thereof
It furthermore appears that on August 2, 1950, the
spouses executed another deed of donation inter vivos,
marked as exhibit "T" disposing of the properties
further in favor of Jose.
On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos supposedly
signed a deed of donation mortis causa, marked as
exhibit "1" revoking exhibit "J" and giving away the
properties in question in favor of all his grandchildren
including Jose. It seems however that it was notarized
only on November 3, 1944, after Escolastica had died.
On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her
children, filed with the cadastral court 7 an
application for registration in their names of lots
Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131 on the strength of
exhibits "J" and "T". Pedro, Antonio, Lorenzo,
and Sotera opposed the application on the basis of
exhibit "1". Pedro and Lorenzo specifically
contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and
8131 on claims that each of them were entitled to
one-third thereof.
ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONERS:
 The cadastral court rejected all three
documents and distributed the properties
according to the law on intestate succession.
 The petitioners argue that the cadastral court
was bereft of the power to determine
conflicting claims of ownership, and that its
authority was solely to confirm an existing
title, and that anyway, all the lots should have
been awarded to them by virtue of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession since 1941 (1942, when Jose took
possession of the parcels) or otherwise, by
acquisitive prescription. They also assert that
exhibits "J" and "T" had validly transferred
the subject lands to them.
The parties do not quarrel over the genuineness of all
three exhibits but rather, over the dates thereof. Pedro,
et al. alleged that exhibit "J" was executed on
September 27, 1941, and not October 27, 1941, and
that exhibit "l", the instrument that revoked it, came
later, or on October 3, 1941. Virginia et al. maintain
on the other hand that exhibit "J' was actually made on
October 27, 1941, twenty-four days after the execution
of exhibit "1", and that assuming exhibit "1" came
earlier, it was notarized, and took effect, only on
November 3, 1944, after the death of Escolastica, one
of the donors.
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Although the parties wrangle over dates, the Court
observes that there is no real question of fact to be
resolved in this case. The important question, so we
find, is, based on existing facts, legal in character:
Who has the right over lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054,
and 8131?
COURT’S DISCUSSION
Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree - the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a
land registration court, is no longer as circumscribed
as it was under Act No. 496, the former land
registration law.

We said that the Decree "has eliminated the
distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in the regional trial court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the
former law when acting merely as a cadastral
court." The amendment was "aimed at
avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has
simplified registration proceedings by
conferring upon the required trial courts the
authority to act not only on applications for
'original registration' 'but also 'over all
petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising from such applications or
petitions.'"
EXCEPTIONS TO LIMITED JURISDICTION
RULE –
the limited jurisdiction rule governing land registration
courts is subject to recognized exceptions: (1)
where the parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced
in submitting controversial issues for determination;
(2) where they have been given full opportunity to
present their evidence;
(3) where the court has considered the evidence
already of record and is convinced that the same is
sufficient for rendering a decision upon such
controversial issues.
By the same token, it has been held that the rule is
not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather, of mere
procedure, which may be waived. It is not amiss to
state likewise that where the issue, say, of ownership,
is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of
registration, the cadastral court commits no error in
assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this
case, where both parties rely on their respective
exhibits to defeat one another's claims over the
parcels sought to be registered, in which case,
registration would not be possible or would be unduly
prolonged unless the court first decided it.
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
The next question refers to acquisitive prescription. In
support of their claims, Virginia, et al. cite four events:
(1) In 1941, Jose entered upon the properties and until
his death in 1970, worked thereon;
(2) Upon his death, they, Virginia, et al., divided the
same by virtue of an extrajudicial partition;
(3) Ever since, Jose had paid taxes thereon until he
died;
(4) Pedro, et al., have not lifted a finger to oust him,
Jose, in possession, or otherwise, to impugn his right.
Virginia, et al. now say that barring the above exhibits,
they have anyway acquired the parcels by prescription.
We also regret that one cannot agree with this
proposition. The petitioners suppose that the parcels '
had come under the category of a co-ownership,
following the death of their grandparents, but in that
case, it has been held that in order for prescription to
set in, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there is a clear showing that the claimant has
repudiated the co-ownership;
(2) he has made known to the rest of the co-owners
that he is assuming exclusive ownership over the
property;
(3) there is clear and convincing evidence thereof; and
(4) his possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious.
The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us that
they (through Jose) have acquired the lots by lapse of
time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested possession
thereof, so we hold, does not amount to adverse
possession because as a co-owner, he had the right of
enjoyment, and his use thereof cannot by itself
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prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. The fact
that he paid taxes thereon is not controlling either
because payment of real estate taxes does not
necessarily confer title upon a claimant. The fact
finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to extrajudicially
divide the property is nothing conclusive because there
is no showing that they, Virginia, et al. had made this
known to Pedro, et al. Under these circumstances, we
can ot validly say that the lands had devolved on
Virginia., et al., by way of prescription.
We are granting the petition nonetheless on the finding
that the lots had been conferred to Jose by a valid
donation inter vivos, that is, exhibit "J".
Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that exhibit "J"
had been revoked by exhibit "1", exhibit "J" appears to
have been executed in compliance with legal
requirements, i.e., as to form and acceptance. It is true
that the cadastral court was supposed to have attributed
fraud on the part of Jose in making Abdon sign the
exhibit, (according to Pedro, Abdon affixed his
signature thereon upon "the belief that it was a deed of
sale of the land purchased from one Marciano
Santos" ) but as found by the Court of Appeals, It is a
theory that "must be received with a 'grain of
salt', 2because, for one thing, Jose is dead, and for
another, the petitioners have adduced evidence that
exhibit "J" was genuine. We are bound by the factual
finding of the Appellate Court and as we averred, we
are disposing of this question on pure questions of law.
As to exhibit "T", the finding of the Court of Appeals
that it was defective is just as controlling on this Court,
that is, that "it was signed by Abdon Arceo after the
death of his wife on September 16, 1942 and does not
contain the acceptance ... by Jose Arceo."
We can not say that exhibit "1" had validly revoked
exhibit "J". The weight of authority is that a valid
donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, except on account of
officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with
charges imposed in the donation, or by reason of
ingratitude. There is simply no proof that Abdon when
he executed exhibit "1", was in possession of a legal
ground for annulment.
We cannot thus accept the Court of Appeals' holding
that exhibit "1" had "neutralized the force and
effect" of exhibit "J".
It is therefore this Court's ruling that the disposition
under exhibit "J" in favor of Jose (whose rights were
transmitted to Virginia, et al.) should be respected.
We find no need in settling the issue of true dates of
the parties' exhibits, because first, it is an issue of fact
and second, because whatever their true dates, there is
no obstacle to the validity of the claims of Virginia, et
al.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET
ASIDE. The court a quo is ORDERED to distribute
the properties covered by the donation inter vivos,
dated October (or September) 27, 1941, exhibit "J",
according to the terms and conditions set forth therein,
and in the proportions indicated thereby. No costs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS
ALMIROL v. REGISTER OF DEEDS
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or
intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of
Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS:
 On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol
purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of
land situated in the municipality of
Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered
by original certificate of title P-1237 in the
name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa
M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol
went to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of
sale and to secure in his name a transfer
certificate of title. Registration was refused
by the Register of Deeds upon the following
grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May
21, 1962:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-
1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio
Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by
legal presumption, is considered conjugal
property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property
acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil
Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the
document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already
died when the sale was made, the surviving
husband can not dispose of the whole
property without violating the existing law
(LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
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To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of
absolute Sale, it is necessary that the property be
first liquidated and transferred in the name of the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife
by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition
and that the consent of such other heir or heirs
must be procured by means of another document
ratifying this sale executed by their father.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of
First Instance of Agusan on a petition
for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the
Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to
issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of
title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages and
P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is
Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of
the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and
that he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower
court, declaring that "mandamus does not lie . . .
because the adequate remedy is that provided by
Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition,
with costs against the petitioner.
Issue: whether mandamus will lie to compel the
respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
NO LEGAL REASON
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent
evince a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate
the law on succession and transmission of rights over
real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds
for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a
document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds
to determine; this function belongs properly to a court
of competent jurisdiction
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or
intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of
Deeds to decide, but a court of competent
jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal,
et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953.
the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no
valid objection to their registration, because invalidity
is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for
denying their registration.
NOTE: The law on registration does not require that
only valid instruments shall be registered.
RATIONALE: How can parties affected thereby be
supposed to know their invalidity before they become
aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or
of their provisions?
If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice,
then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of
instruments are expected to be decided after, not
before, registration.
GURBAX SINGH PABLO & CO - It must follow as
a necessary consequence that registration must first be
allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards
A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4
of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal
judgment and discretion when confronted with the
problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on
the ground that it is invalid.
WHY?
For under the said section, when he is in doubt as
to the proper step to be taken with respect to any
deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration, all that he is supposed to do is to
submit and certify the question to the
Commissioner of Land Registration who shall,
after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing
the step to be taken on the doubtful question.
Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of
Land Registration. — When the Register of Deeds is
in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for
registration, or where any party in interest does not
agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any
such matter, the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the
certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the
question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the
suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and
thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of
the matter shown by the records certified to him, and
in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties
and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to
be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in
such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all
Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a
party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution
of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question
of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme
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Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the
notice thereof.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a

quo correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus.
Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party
in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds .
. . the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner
of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an
order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum
to be made," which shall be "conclusive and binding
upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative
remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he
can have recourse to the courts.

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