Rule 89  Petitioner also contends that to sanction the sale at this stage would bring a partial distribution
of the estate, which is significant as there was a finding in the probate court that the legitimes
1. Opulencia v. CA, G.R. No. 125835, July 30, 1998 - Dolar
Doctrine: Properties of the estate may be subject to a valid sale without prior court approval if made by
the seller in the capacity of an heir and not as an administrator or executor.
Facts:
 (Facts were stipulated at the pre-trial conference)
 Private Respondents Simundac and Oliven filed a complaint for specific performance against
Petitioner Opulencia.
 It was alleged in the complaint that Petitioner had executed a Contract to Sell in favour of the
Respondents.
 The object was a parcel of land in Sta. Rosa, Laguna with an area of 23, 766 sq. meters, sold at
Php 150 per sq. meter.
 Respondents had paid a downpayment of Php 300,000.00, but despite demands, Respondent
failed to comply with her obligations.
 Petitioner admitted the execution of the contract as well as the receipt of the downpayment.
 However, Petitioner put forward the affirmative defences: (1) the property formed part of
Demetrio Carpena’s estate (Petitioner’s father); (2) that at the time of the execution of the
contract, the parties were aware that there were pending probate proceedings; (3) that the
probate court did not approve the contract to sell; (4) that Petitioner offered to return the
downpayment but Respondents refused.
 After the Respondents submitted their evidence, Petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence
instead of submitting evidence.
 The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that when the contract was consummated, no
petition was filed in the Court to show that the sale was necessary and beneficial. It also ruled
that where the estate is already subject of a testate or intestate proceedings, the administrator
cannot enter into any transaction involving the estate without prior approval of the probate
court.
 The CA reversed the lower court, ruling that the contract in question is not covered by Rule 89,
ROC since it was made by the Petitioner in her capacity as an heir. This was because the
property that was the object of the contract was devised to the Petitioner under the will.
 The CA also pointed to the preliminary portion of the document which stated the “that the
SELLER describes the property as among those given to her by her late father…” Said
stipulation made it evident that the property was sold by Petitioner in her capacity as an heir
and owner.
 Petitioner now appeals to the SC, contending that the contract is void for failure to comply with
Sec. 7, Rule 89, ROC.
Issue: W/N the Contract to Sell executed by Opulencia in favour of Simundac and Oliven was valid? -
YES.
Ruling:
 As correctly ruled by the CA, Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the ROC is not applicable, because Petitioner
entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or
administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the lawful owner and
seller of the subject parcel of land. She also explained the reason for the sale to be difficulties
in her living conditions and consequent need of cash. These representations clearly evince that
she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to
Sell.
 We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the
decedent’s death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment
her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell,
because the Petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the
estate of her late father.
of one of the heirs had been impaired. Petitioner essentially contends that allowing the sale
would prejudice the administration of the estate. The SC is not convinced. The contract
stipulates that Petitioner is offering to sell her contingent rights. Therefore, there is no basis for
petitioners apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and
distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that the sale made by an heir of
his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way
of such administration.
 Petitioner is also estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to Sell
with Respondents, from whom she had already received Php300,000 as initial payment of the
purchase price. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice
of the Respondents who have relied on them. The law nor the courts will extricate a party from
an unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered into with all the required formalities and
with full awareness of its consequences. Petition Denied.
2. Acebedo v Abesamis 217 S 186 - Loyola
Doctrine:
1. It is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased
person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication.
2. Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property
belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval
of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.
3. There is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest or participation he may have in
the property under administration. The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s property,
even if the same is under administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating that the
possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and
from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there
are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned
in common by such heirs.
Facts:
 The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties located in
Quezon City and Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated value of about P30 million.
Said estate allegedly has only the following unsettled claims:
o P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon City;
o P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City;
o The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator Miguel Acebedo, and the
incumbent Administrator Herodotus Acebedo; and
o Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate.
 The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein, and the
others are the private respondents.
 The case pended for 16 years with the court. Miguel Acebedo et al (respondents) then filed a
Motion for Approval of Sale for them to sell their shares from the estate. The court approved
the motion. Respondents were able to find a buyer in the person of Yu Hwa Ping who agreed to
buy the properties for P12 Million. He paid P6 million as earnest money.
 Acebedo assailed the approval of the sale claiming that the price is quite low. The court
ordered Miguel et al to find a higher bidder within a specified time frame which was later
extended to 7 months but still no other buyer could provide better terms.
 Finally, it was agreed by the parties that respondents sell their share to the price already agreed
upon with Ping and that Acebedo can negotiate his price with Ping. But Acebedo still filed a
Supplemental Opposition against the approval of the conditional sale.
 The court affirmed the approval of the sale and ordered Acebedo to sell his share at the same
rate that the other heirs sold their share to Ping.
Issue:
 1. W/N it is  within the jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order
approving the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior court? -
YES. 1st sale: only ½ pro-indiviso share of the two lots to Escanlar and Holgado (Petitioners)
2. W/N the other heirs can sell their shares of the estate prior to adjudication? - YES. Vendors: Heirs of Gregorio Cari-an (private respondents)

Ruling:
 In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a pronouncement that it is within 2nd sale: entire estate (including the two lots) to Ney Sarrosa Chua and Paquito Chua
the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by Vendors: Heirs of Nombre + Heirs of Cari-an (private respondents)
his prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should
be threshed out in a separate action. 3rd sale: only ½ pro-indiviso share of the two lots to Sps. Edwin Jayme
 The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the Vendors: Escanlar and Holgado (Petitioners)
sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding,
should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its
capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted Cari-an  →> Escanlar & Holgado  →> Jayme
within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale. Cari-an and Nombre  →> Chua
 An heir can sell his share without final adjudication. An heir is a co-owner of the property
(estate) before adjudication.
 Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property
belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval
of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore,  Gregorio Cari-an was declared as Victoriana’s heir in the estate proceedings for the spouses.
it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the After Gregorio died in 1971, his wife and children were also adjudged as heirs by
Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale. representation to Victoriana’s estate. Two parcels of land, Lot No. 1616 and 1617 of the
 The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s property, even if the same is under Kabankalan Cadastre formed part of the estate of Nombre and Cari-an.
administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary  On September 15, 1978, Gregorio Cari-an’s heirs executed the Deed of Sale of Rights,
property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the Interests and Participation. For P275,000.00, “sell, cede, transfer and convey by way of
death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or ABSOLUTE SALE, all the RIGHTS, INTERESTS and PARTICIPATION of the Vendors as to
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such the one-half (1/2) portion pro-indiviso of Lots Nos. 1616 and 1617 (Fishpond), of the
heirs. Kabankalan Cadastre, pertaining to the one-half (1/2) portion pro-indiviso of the late
Victoriana Cari-an unto and in favor of the Vendees, their heirs, successors and assigns. . .
3. Heirs of Pedro Escanlar vs. CA and Heirs of Cari-an, October 23, 1997- Magsanay That this Contract of Sale of rights, interests and participations shall become effective only
upon the approval by the Honorable Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental”.
Doctrine: *in BOLD within the ruling part*  Escanlar and Holgado, the vendees, were concurrently the lessees of the lots. They paid P50k
but the balance (P225,000) shall be paid on or before May 1979 in a Deed of Agreement.
Facts: Vendees shall not assign, sell, lease, nor mortgage the rights, interests and participation thereof
until fully paid. If they fail to pay the balance, vendors will cancel the Contract of Sale and the
ESTATE IN HEIRS HEIRS/ Vendors HEIRS P50k shall be deemed as damages.
QUESTION  Petitioners were unable to pay the Cari-an heirs individual shares (P55k each). However, said
heirs received at least 12 installments from petitioners after May 1979.
GUILLERMO Nephews and grandnephews  Being former lessees, Petitioners continued in possession of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617. They
NOMBRE continued to pay rent based on their lease contract. Petitioners moved to intervene in the
(died 1924) probate proceedings of Nombre and Cari-an as the buyers of Cari-ans’ share in Lot Nos. 1616
and 1617. Petitioners’ motion for approval of the “September 15, 1978 sale” was opposed by
VICTORIANA Gregorio Cari-an (+) Generosa Martinez private respondents Cari-an. (Note: this is only on the share of Victoriana)
CARI-AN (nephew) (wife)  The probate court approved a motion by the heirs of both Sps. Cari-an and Nombre to sell their
(died 1938) shares in 8 parcels of land including Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 to the Sps. Chua and Chua for
(children) P1.8M. Then they filed for approval of the hereditary rights.
Carmen Cari-an  Private respondents Cari-an instituted this case for cancellation of sale against Petitioners
(Escanlar and Holgado) for their failure to pay the balance of the purchase price by May 31,
Fredisminda Cari-an 1979 and alleged that they only received a total of P132,551.00 in cash and goods. Petitioners
replied that the Cari-ans, having been paid, had no right to resell the subject lots; and that the
court approval of the sale to the Chuas was subject to their existing claim over said properties.
Rodolfo Cari-an  On April 20, 1983, Petitioners also sold their rights and interests in the two lots (Lot Nos. 1616
and 1617) and turned over its possession to Edwin Jayme for P735k.
 1984: the probate court approved the September 1982 sale (2 nd sale) without prejudice to
Leonardo Cari-an (+) Nelly Chua (wife) whatever rights, claims and interests over any of those properties of the estate which cannot be
Leonell Cari-an properly and legally ventilated and resolved by the court in the same intestate proceedings. The
(minor child) certificates of title for the 8 lots sold were issued in the name of Sps. Chua.
  The trial court allowed a third-party complaint by Petitioners against the Chuas for conspiring
with the Cari-ans during the 2nd sale which should be declared illegal and of no effect. It also
approved a fourth-party complaint by the Chuas against the Sps. Jayme for refusing to vacate
despite demands, and they also claim for uncollected rentals as damages.
 Meanwhile, the PROBATE COURT which took cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 7-7279
(Intestate Estate of Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an) concluded that since all the
properties of the estate were disposed of or sold by the declared heirs of both spouses, the case
is considered terminated and the intestate estate of Nombre and Cari-an is closed.
 Since the nature of the proceedings in this case is summary, this Court, being a Probate Court,
has no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity or invalidity of the sale of rights of the declared
heirs of Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an to third parties. This issue must be raised
in another action where it can be properly ventilated and resolved. x x x there are no more
properties left to be partitioned as that had long ago been disposed of by the declared heirs x x
the sale to Petitioners Escanlar was nullified because it was not approved by the probate court
as required in the agreement and it was not fully paid. Hence, the sale to Sps. Jayme was also
nullified. The sale to the Chuas was approved.
 CA: On appeal by Petitioners, it affirmed RTC decision and held that the questioned deed of
sale of rights, interests and participation is a contract to sell because it shall become effective
only upon approval by the probate court and upon full payment of the purchase price. MR
denied, hence these petitions.
Issue/s:
1. W/N the Deed of Sale of Rights in favor of Petitioners Escanlar is valid? - YES.
2. W/N the approval of the probate court is necessary for the validity of the contract of sale in
favor of Petitioners? - NO.
Ruling:
The September 15, 1978 Deed of Sale of Rights, Interests and Participation is a CONTRACT OF
SALE and not contract to sell
 In contracts to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full payment
of the price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a
breach of contract but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey
title from acquiring binding force. There should be express reservation of ownership.
 The September 15, 1978 sale of rights, interests and participation as to 1/2 portion pro indiviso
of the two subject lots is a contract of sale for the following reasons:
1. Private respondents as sellers did not reserve unto t full payment of the unpaid
balance of P225,000.00.
2. There is no stipulation giving the sellers the right to unilaterally rescind the contract
the moment the buyer fails to pay within the fixed period.
3. Prior to the sale, petitioners were in possession of the subject property as lessees.
Upon sale to them of the rights, interests and participation as to the 1/2 portion pro
indiviso, they remained in possession, not in concept of lessees anymore but as
owners.
 In a contract of sale, the non-payment of the price is a resolutory condition which extinguishes
the transaction that, for a time, existed and discharges the obligations created. The remedy of
an unpaid seller is to seek either specific performance or rescission.
Lack of probate court’s approval only affected the EFFECTIVITY of the contract and not the
validity of the contract of sale
 The stipulation in question: “(t)his Contract of Sale of rights, interests and participations shall
become effective only upon the approval by the CFI Himamaylan (probate court).”
 Under Art. 1318 of the NCC, the essential requisites of a contract are: consent, object and
cause of the obligation. Absent one, no contract. Where all are present, it is a valid contract.
The absence of the various kinds of restrictions or modalities stipulated by the parties will not
affect the validity of the contract.
 In the instant case, the Deed of Sale, complying as with the essential requisites, is a valid one.
Amidst the lack of approval by the probate court, as stipulated in the agreement, only the
effectivity and not the validity of the contract is affected. The need for approval by the
probate court exists only where specific properties of the estate are sold and not when
only ideal and indivisible shares of an heir are disposed of.
 “It is settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedent’s estate. However, reference to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the
substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-
ownership among the heirs. It must be recalled that during the period of indivision of a
decedent’s estate, each heir, being a co-owner, has full ownership of his part and may
therefore alienate it. But the effect of the alienation with respect to the co-owners shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership.” It is clear that hereditary rights in an estate can be validly sold
without need of court approval and that when private respondents Cari-an sold their rights,
interests and participation in Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617, they could legally sell the same without
the approval of the probate court.
 Whoever crafted the document of conveyance, must have been of the belief that the
controversial stipulation was a legal requirement for the validity of the sale. But the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties reveal that the original objective of the
parties was to give effect to the deed of sale even without court approval. The acceptance of the
late payment of installments and the possession of the petitioners of the property as lessees
showed their intention to effect mutual transmission of rights and obligations. It was only after
private respondents Cari-an sold their shares again to Sps. Chua that these same heirs filed for
the cancellation of the September 1978 conveyance. They accepted late payments even beyond
May 1979 and did not seek judicial relief until late 1982 or 3 yrs later.
 In addition, the requisite court approval was deemed impossible to obtain due to the pending
case for the rescission of that same contract instituted by the vendors against Petitioners. It
attacked the very source of whatever rights or interests Holgado and Escanlar may have
acquired over one-half (1/2) portions of Lots Nos. 1616 and 1617. If probate court meddles on
these issues raised in that ordinary civil action seeking for the rescission of an existing contract,
any act of this court would be totally ineffective, as the same would be in excess of its
jurisdiction.
There is thus no ground to rescind the contract of sale because of non-payment and lack of court
approval
 The September 15, 1978 deed of sale of rights, interests and participations is valid and that the
sellers-private respondents Cari-an were fully paid the contract price. However, it must be
emphasized that what was sold was only the Cari-ans hereditary shares in Lot Nos. 1616 and
1617 being held pro indiviso by them and is thus a valid conveyance only of said ideal shares.
Specific or designated portions of land were not involved.
 Consequently, the subsequent sale of 8 parcels of land, including Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617, to
the Sps. Chua is valid except to the extent of what was sold to petitioners Escanlar and
Holgado. Private respondents Cari-an as the sole heirs by representation of Victoriana Cari-an
was indisputably entitled to half of the estate of the Sps. Nombre and Cari-an, hence, entitled to
half of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617. Petitioners, as their successors-in-interest, own said half of the
subject lots; and ought to deliver the possession of the other half, as well as pay rents thereon,
to Sps. Chua but only if the petitioners remained in possession thereof.
 Petitions are GRANTED. The case is REMANDED to RTC of Negros Occidental to determine
exactly which 1/2 portion of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 will be owned by each party, at the
option of petitioners. The proceedings surrounding the estate of Nombre and Cari-an having
attained finality for nearly a decade now, the same cannot be re-opened.
 It must be noted however, that the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 7-7279 desisted
from awarding the individual shares of each heir because all the properties belonging to the
estate had already been sold.
 Rule 90
4. Heirs of the late Fran v Salas 210 S 303 - Payad
Doctrine: The non-distribution of the estate is not a ground for the re-opening of the testate proceedings.
A seasonable motion for execution should have been filed. In De Jesus vs. Daza, the Court ruled that if the
executor or administrator has possession of the share to be delivered, the probate court would have
jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to transfer that possession to the person
entitled thereto. This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However, if no motion
for execution is filed within the reglementary period, a separate action for the recovery of the shares would
be in order.
Facts:
 Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo died with no descendants nor ascendants. She left real and
personal properties which she bequeathed through a will to her collateral relatives (brothers,
sisters, nephews and nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's
death, Jesus Fran, as executor to serve without bond.
 Jesus Fran filed a petition with the CFI Cebu for the probate of Remedios' last will and
testament. The petition alleged that Rosario Tan is not physically well. Fran was appointed as
special administrator.
 The private respondents filed a manifestation alleging that they needed time to study the
petition. However, they weren’t able to file an opposition. Instead, they filed a "Withdrawal of
Opposition to the Allowance of Probate of the Will".
 After the probate court rendered its decision, and there having been no claim presented despite
publication of notice to creditors, Fran submitted a Project of Partition which private
respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to which private respondent
Espina expressed her conformity through a certification filed with the probate court.
 Court approved partition after hearing declaring the parties therein as the only heirs entitled to
the estate of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, directing the administrator to deliver to the said
parties their respective shares and decreeing the proceedings closed.
 Six years later, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
probate judgment and the Order of Partition, in said motion, they ask the court to declare the
proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the allowance of the will. Their grounds,
among others are:
o (a) they were not furnished with a copy of the will;
o (b) the will is a forgery;
o (c) they were not notified of any resolution or order on their manifestation
requesting time within which to file their opposition, or of the order closing the
proceedings
o (d) the project of partition contains no notice of hearing and they were not notified
thereof and
o (e) the petitioner never distributed the estate to the devisees and legatees.
 Instant petition was filed challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court in taking cognizance of
the Omnibus MR considering that the probate judgment and the order approving the Project of
Partition and terminating the proceedings had long become final and had in fact been executed.
 Respondent Judge proceeded with the hearing of the Omnibus MR and then issued the
impugned order declaring the testamentary dispositions of the will void, finding the signature
of the late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo to be a forgery, decreeing the reopening of the testate
proceeding and converting the same into an intestate proceeding.
Issue: W/N the said orders of the Respondent Judge in the lower court should be annulled? - YES.
Ruling:
 Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
he granted the Omnibus OR and thereafter set aside the probate judgment. It is not disputed
that private respondents filed on the day of the initial hearing of the petition their "Withdrawal
of Opposition To Allowance of Probate Will" wherein they unequivocally state that they have
no objection to the allowance of the will.
 After the probate court rendered its decision, petitioner Fran submitted a Project of Partition
which private respondent Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to which private respondent
Espina expressed her conformity through a certification filed with the probate court. Assuming
for the sake of argument that private respondents did not receive a formal notice of the decision
as they claim in their OMR, these acts nevertheless constitute indubitable proof of their prior
actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice would have been an idle ceremony.
 In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of partition, which is normally
an implementation of the will and is among the last operative acts to terminate the proceedings.
If private respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision, they should have desisted
from performing the above acts and instead demanded from petitioner Fran the fulfillment of
his alleged promise to show them the will.
 Private respondents claim that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the petition
because only the English translation of the will and not a copy of the same was attached to the
petition; the will was not even submitted to the court for their examination and that there was
fraud principally because they were not given any chance to examine the signature of the
testatrix and were misled into signing the withdrawal of their opposition on the assurance of
petitioner Fran that the will would be shown to them during the trial. These contentions do not
impress this Court.
The original of the will was submitted in evidence and marked as Exhibit "F". It forms part of
the records of the special proceedings — a fact which private respondents admit in their
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration when they alleged that upon examination of the will it
was revealed that a different person signed the will.
 The availability of the will for their examination renders completely baseless the private
respondents' claim of fraud on petitioner Fran's part in securing the withdrawal of their
opposition to the probate of the will. If indeed such withdrawal was conditioned upon Fran's
promise that the private respondents would be shown the will during the trial, why weren't the
appropriate steps taken by the latter to confront Fran about this promise before certifications of
conformity to the project of partition were filed?
 As to the forgery: The probate judgment, long final and undisturbed by any attempt to unsettle
it, had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set the same aside, by
mere motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery. Settled is the rule that the decree of
probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and it cannot be impugned
on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
action or proceeding. We wish also to advert to the related doctrine which holds that final
judgments are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed; otherwise, there would be a
wavering of trust in the courts.
 As to the non-distribution of estate, [SEE DOCTRINE]
 As the Court see it, the attack on the Order was just a clever ploy to give a semblance of
strength and substance to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration by depicting therein a
probate court committing a series of fatal, substantive and procedural blunders, which they find
to be imaginary, if not deliberately fabricated.
5. Kilayko v Tengco 207 S 600 - Santos
Doctrine: Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the
validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
Facts:
 Late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a “Testamento”.
 Probate court issued an order declaring the will probated and appointing Eustaquia as the
executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares.
 Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some properties
of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. Court granted.
 Project of partition was granted and became final and executor.
  Petitioners and respondent even partitioned the property in accordance to the said Project of  Four months later, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the
partition. court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of
 Later on, Kilayko et al.  filed an action for reconveyance alleging that in the “testatemento” the the deceased. It was denied for tardiness.
testator instituted the a fideicommissary substitution.  Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed (one year and two months later) with RTC for
partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. It was GRANTED.
 Celedonia appealed. Affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N the project partition can still be annulled? - NO.
Issue: W/N the ordinary court has jurisdiction? - NO.
Ruling:
 Kilayko et al are now barred in questioning the project of partition based on the alleged Ruling:
invalidity of the contents of the will.  In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings, Concordia’s motion to set aside the order
 The SC applied sec. 1 of Rule 90. declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as coheir
 Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly. Her remedy when the
demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate succession court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on
may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a certiorari.
separate action.  We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has
 The question of private respondents’ title over the lots in question has been concluded by the exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
partition and became a closed matter.  It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the
administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties
6. Solivio v CA 182 S 119 - Sta. Ana  In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal
Doctrine: It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons court.
entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus
far relieves the administrator from his duties Other Issue: Share of Concordia
 Concordia is entitled to her share.
Facts:  However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the
 This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr. He died a bachelor, foundation in honor of his mother, an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her
without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl.
o His only surviving relatives are: (1) half-sister of his mother (petitioner Celedonia Proceeding No. 2540
Solivio); and  (2) sister of his deceased father (the private respondent, Concordia  Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is
Javellana-Villanueva) conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement
 During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and
some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help
poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack
on without having set up the foundation.
 Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation
to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping
indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.
This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order
dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540
 Pursuant to their agreement, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed
for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Later, she
filed an amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be
declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of
inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her.
 After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was
declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
o She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the
estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's
nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition
of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated
 Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the
deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in SEC.
 Rule 91
7. Tan v. City of Davao, G.R. No. L-44347, September 26, 1988 - Tolentino
Doctrine: Since the petition was filed on 12 September 1962, the applicable rule was the 1940 Rules of
Court wherein Rule 92 provides that the municipality or City may file a petition for escheat.
Facts:
 Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia were residents of Davao City. They were childless so
they decided to adopt Dominga Garcia.
 Dominga Garcia married a Chinaman named Tan Seng alias Seng Yap, and had 3 children:
Vicenta, Mariano, and Luis. Eventually, Dominga emigrated to China along with her husband
and children.
 According to the petitioner, Dominga Garcia died intestate in 1955. She left a 1,966-square-
meter lot in Davao.
 Since Dominga’s departure for China with her family, they never returned to the Philippines to
claim the lot.
 When Cornelia (Dominga’s adoptive mother) died, her nephew, Ramon Pizarro occupied a part
of the aforesaid lot and collected rentals from the other occupants.
 Another nephew of Cornelia, Segundo Reyes, in a burst of civic spirit, informed the Solicitor
General about the property.
 The City Fiscal and NBI agents, Antonio Gonzaga and Felix Valencia, investigated Segundo
Reyes, Ramon Pizarro and Aurello Pizarro regarding the whereabouts of Dominga Garcia, Tan
Seng, and their children.
 During the investigation, Ramon and Aurelia tried to prove that Vicenta (Dominga’s daughter)
was married and living in the Philippines but did not know her exact address.
 On September 12, 1962, the City of Davao filed a petition in the CFI Davao Branch 1 to
declare Dominga Garcia’s land escheated in its favor. It alleged that Dominga Garcia and
her children are presumed to be dead and since Dominga Garcia left no heir or person by law
entitled to inherit her estate, the same should be escheated pursuant to Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court.
 The court set the petition for hearing and directed the City to cause (as it did) the publication of
its petition in the “Mindanao Times,” a newspaper of general circulation in the city and
province of Davao, and in the Official Gazette, once a week for six (6) consecutive weeks.
 Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition on the ground that courts are not authorized to
declare that a person is presumed to be dead and that Dominga Garcia’s being in Red China is
not a sufficient ground to deprive her of her property by escheat proceedings.
 Pizarro filed a motion to dismiss the escheat petition, but he withdrew his motion three days
later. Numerous incidents delayed the trial of the case but the controversy centered on whether
Vicenta was alive.
 However, the trial court found that Pizarro’s testimonies regarding Vicenta’s whereabouts ring
with untruthfulness; that they are replete with inconsistencies and the witnesses who
corroborated him were unworthy of belief.
 The trial court held that the Dominga Garcia’s property shall escheat to the City of
Davao for the benefit of public schools and charitable institutions.
 Pizarro appealed to the CA. Then, a certain Luis Tan (claiming to be Dominga’s son) filed a
motion to intervene in the CA to oppose the escheat proceedings. The City of Davao opposed
the said motion.
 The CA disallowed the motion because the trial had long been terminated and to allow it would
unduly delay the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. The CA affirmed the trial
court.
 Vicenta Tan and/or her attorney-in-fact, Ramon Pizarro, appealed by petition for certiorari to
this Court, alleging that [for the purposes of SPECPRO] only the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the SolGen may file the escheat petition under Sec. 1, Rule 91 of the Revised
(1964) Rules of Court.
Issue: W/N only the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for escheat proceedings?
Ruling: No [Refer to doctrine]
 The case did not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on September 12, 1962,
when the applicable rule was still Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court which provided:
“Sec. 1. When and by whom petition filed. When a person dies intestate, seized of real or
personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heirs or person by law entitled to the same, the
municipality or city where the deceased last resided, if he resided in the Philippines, or
the municipality or city in which he had estate if he resided out of the Philippines, may
file a petition in the court of first instance of the province setting forth the facts, and praying
that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated.”
 Rule 91 of the Revised rules of Court, which provides that only the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, may commence escheat proceedings, did not take effect until
January 1, 1964. Although the escheat proceedings were still pending then, the Revised Rules
of Court could not be applied to the petition because to do so would work injustice to the City
of Davao.
 The CA should have dismissed the appeal of Vicenta Tan and Ramon Pizarro earlier because
the records show that Vicenta was never a party in the escheat proceedings. Vicenta Tan, if
she still exists, was never served with summons extraterritorially under Section 17, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. She never appeared in the trial court by herself, or counsel and never filed a
pleading therein, hence, she never submitted to the court’s jurisdiction.
 Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Ramon
Pizarro, the alleged administrator of Dominga Garcia’s property, was not a real party-in-
interest. He had no personality to oppose the escheat petition.
8. Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, 65 Phil. 318 - Villadolid
DOCTRINE:
Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person become the property
of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action but a special
proceeding which should be commenced by petition and not by complaint
In a special proceeding for escheat under section 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive
interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be
escheated is likewise and interest and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.
In the present case the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material
interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa; and the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner
of the hacienda, and the latter because he claim to be the lessee thereof under a contract legality entered
with the former. In view of these allegations it is erroneous to hold that the said parties are without right
either to appear in case or to substantiate their respective alleged right. This unfavorably resolves the
petitioners' first assignment of error.
FACTS:
·       The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a petition claiming the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasan by the right of Escheat.
·       Colegio de San Jose, claiming to be the exclusive owner of the said hacienda, assailed the petition upon the
grounds that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the remedy prayed for.
Carlos Young, claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda under a contract legally entered with Coelegio de
San Jose, also intervened in the case.
·       Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to the appearance and intervention of Colegio de San
Jose and Carlos Young but such objection was overruled. Furthermore the lower court dismissed the
petition filed for by Municipal Council of San Pedro.
ISSUE:
WON the petition for escheats should be dismissed? (YES)
HELD:
According to Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Sec 1 of Rule 91), the essential facts which
should be alleged in the petition, which are jurisdictional because they confer jurisdiction upon the CFI
are:
1. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will,
2. That he has left real or personal property and he was the owner thereof,
3. That he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the property, and
4. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where deceased has his last
residence or in case he should have no residence in the country, the municipality where the
property is situated.
Sec. 751 (now Sec 3 of Rule 91) provides that after the publications and trial, if the court finds that the
deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal property situated in the country and has not left any heir
or other person entitled there to, it may order, after payment of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat
and in such case, it shall adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his
last residence and the real property to the municipality/ies where they are situated.
Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person become the property
of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action but a special
proceeding. The proceeding should be commenced by a petition and not by a complaint.
In a special proceeding for Escheat under section 750to 752 (now sec 1 to 3 of Rule 91), the petitioner is
not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or Interest in the
property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and necessary party and may appear and oppose
the petition for escheat.
When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed for and
even admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground for the court to proceed to the
Inquisition provided by law, an interested party should not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss
the petition which is untenable from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon
this ground the petition may be dismissed unconditionally.
In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to intervene as an alleged exclusive owner
and a lessee of the property respectively.
The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, temporal
property of the Father of the Society of Jesus, were confiscated by the order of the King of Spain. From
the moment it was confiscated, it became the property of the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this
fact, it is evident that the Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them, because it is no
longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any person which may
legally claim it (2nd requirement lacking).
9. Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Haw, G.R. No. L-1411, September 29, 1953, 93 Phil. 827 - Yap
Topic: Rule 91: Escheat
Doctrine: In the present, there are two ways by which this situation may be remedied, to wit: (1) action for
reversion, and (2) escheat to the state. An action for reversion is slightly different from escheat
proceeding, but in its effects they are the same. They only differ in procedure. Escheat proceedings may be
instituted as a consequence of a violation of Art. 13, Sec. 5 of our Constitution, which prohibits transfers
of private agricultural lands to aliens, whereas an action for reversion is expressly authorized by the Public
Land Act (CA 141, Sec. 122, 123, and 124)
Facts:
1. Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land, together with the house erected
thereon, situated in Manila, for P25,000. The parties also entered into a contract of lease on the
same date, under which Rellosa remained in possession of the property.
2. Rellosa then instituted an action to annul the sale and lease covering the land and house as
aforementioned:
 Alleging that the sale was executed subject to the condition that Gaw, being a
Chinese citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese Military Administration
in accordance with Seirei No. 6 issued by Japanese authorities. Since the approval
has not been obtained, even if said requirement were met, the sale would at all
events be void under Art. 13, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
 Praying that that once the sale and lease are declared null and void, Gaw be ordered
to return to him the duplicate of the title covering the property and be restrained in
any way from dispossessing him of the property.
3. Gaw answered:
 The sale referred to in the complaint was absolute and unconditional, and was in
every respect valid and binding between the parties, it not being contrary to law,
morals, and public order;  
 Rellosa is guilty of estoppel by having executed a deed of lease over the property,
he thereby recognized the title of Gaw to that property.
4. RTC: Dismissed. Both sale and lease are valid and binding. CA Affirmed.
4. Rellosa filed a petition for review, alleging that the sale in question cannot have any validity
under Seirei No. 6 in view of failure of Gaw to obtain the requisite approval.
Issues: Can Rellosa have the sale declared null and void and recover the property considering the effect of
the law regarding contracts. (NO) -- PS. Main issue is regarding nullity of sale, but Court discussed
escheat and reversion in its ruling.
Held:
1. The sale was entered into in violation of the Constitution.
 It is not necessary to consider the question relative to the validity of Seirei no. 6
because the law that should govern the particular transaction is not such, but the
Constitution. The transaction was executed in 1944. Hence, the Constitution,
adopted by the Republic in 1943, applies.
 As such, the sale in question is void for having been entered into in violation of the
Constitution. Art 13, Sec. 5 of the Constitution: No private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
 “Private Agricultural Land” includes residential lands, as the one involved herein.
 Krivenko v RD: Under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands.
2. Despite the nullity of the sale, Rellosa is prevented from having it declared null and void,
if their purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily parted with, because of their
guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution.
  No action arises, in equity or law, from an illegal contract. (Doctrine of In Pari
Delicto) Exception to In Pari Delicto: Whenever public policy is considered as
advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against the transaction.
 Case herein: The contract in question does not fall under the exception because it is
not intrinsically contrary to public policy. It is illegal because it is against the
Constitution.
3. Discussion on Escheat and Action for Reversion
The Court emphasized that the best policy would be for Congress to approve a law laying down the
policy and procedure to be followed in transactions affected by the Consti prohibition against
acquisition of public agricultural lands by aliens. A more militant policy in conserving our natural
resources is necessary to protect public interest. (See doctrine)
Notes on Escheat:
 The original source of private titles is the sovereign or government.
 If escheat lies against holding. lands in those states of the Union where common law prevails
or where similar Consti prohibition exists, there is no cogent reason why similar proceedings
may be instituted in this jurisdiction.
 Escheat is an incident or attribute of sovereignty and rests on the principle of the ultimate
ownership by the state of all property within its jurisdiction.
 In America, escheats belong universally to the state or some corporation thereof as the ultimate
proprietor of land within its jurisdiction.
 An escheat is nothing more or less than the reversion of property to the state, which takes place
when the title fails. As applied to the right of the state to lands purchased by an alien, it would
more properly be termed a forfeiture.
 In modern law, escheat denotes a falling of the estate into general property of the state
because the tenant is an alien, or because he has died intestate without lawful heirs to
take his estate by succession, or because of some other disability to take or hold property
imposed by law.
Notes on Action for Reversion:
 Pertinent portion of CA No. 141, Sec 121 and 122: “No land originally acquired in any
manner…shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons…who may acquire
lands of the public domain under this Act...”
 Meanwhile, Sec. 124 provides that any prohibited conveyance is not only unlawful but null
and void ab initio. It will produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title,
patent, or permit, originally issued, recognized, or confirmed, actually or presumptively,
and of causing the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State.
o The reversion would seem to be a consequence of the annulment and cancellation of
the original grant or title and this is so for in the event of such annulment or
cancellation, no one else could legitimately claim the property except its original
owner or grantor—the State.
Fallo: Sale is null and void. BUT Rellosa is barred from taking the present action under the principle of
pari delicto.
10. Republic v. Court of First Instance of Manila and Pres.. Roxas Rural Bank, Inc., G.R. No. L-
30381, August 30, 1988 - Acabado
Doctrine: Escheat proceedings are actions in rem which must be brought in the province or city where the
rem in this case the dormant deposits, is located.
Facts:
 By virtue of Section 2 of Act No. 3936,  “Unclaimed Balance Law”, 31 banks including private
respondent Pres. Roxas Rural Bank forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines separate
statements under oath by their respective managing officers of all deposits and credits held by
them that were inactive for the preceding ten years or more.
 In the sworn statement submitted by Rural Bank, only two (2) names appeared: Jesus Ydirin
with a balance of P126.54 and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of P62.91.
 The Treasurer of the Philippines published the statements in three different issues of two
different newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
 The Republic instituted before the CFI-Manila a complaint for escheat against the aforesaid 31
banks and the individual depositors and/or creditors reported in the sworn statements.
 Summons were issued to the banks and the creditors/depositors requiring them to file severally
their answers to the complaint within 60 days after the first publication of the summons with
notice that should they fail to file their answers, plaintiff would take judgment against them by
default.
 Rural Bank filed an MTD for improper venue, which was granted.
Issue/s:
1. W/N Rural Bank was a real party in interest and could file an MTD? - YES.
2. W/N venue was properly laid?  - NO.
Ruling:
(1)
 A "real party in interest" is the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment of the
suit or the party entitled to avail of the suit. Rural bank undoubtedly falls under this definition.
The escheat of the dormant deposits in favor of the government would necessarily deprive said
bank of the use of such deposits.
 It stands to be "injured by the judgment of the suit;" and it is for this reason that Section 3 of
Act No. 3936 specifically provides that the bank shall be joined as a party in the action for
escheat. If the bank were not a real party in interest, the legislature would not have provided for
its joining as a party in the escheat proceedings.
 Besides, under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the bank is a real party in interest as its
presence in the action is necessary for a complete determination and settlement of the questions
involved therein. Being a real party in interest, it may and can file a motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue.
(2)
 The law directs the Solicitor General to commence an escheat action or actions in the CFI of
the province where the bank is located.
 The phrase "or actions" in this section is very significant. It manifests awareness on the part of
the legislators that a single action to cover all banks wherever located in the Philippines would
not be legally feasible in view of the venue prescribed for such action under the same section,
i.e., the province where the bank is located.
 The law further provides that where all banks are located in the same province where the CFI
concerned is located, they may be made defendants "in one action". This was clearly intended
to save on litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not as authority for the lumping
together of all banks wherever found in the Philippines in one single escheat proceedings.
 Escheat proceedings are actions in rem which must be brought in the province or city
where the rem in this case the dormant deposits, is located.
11. In Re Anne Fallon Murphy, G.R. No. L-14187, Oct. 26, 1960 - Banguis
Doctrine: The court acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for escheat by virtue of the publication of the
petition for escheat. The jurisdiction acquired cannot be converted into one for the distribution of the
properties of the said decedents. For such proceedings (for the distribution of the estate of the decedents)
to be instituted, the proper parties must be presented and the proceedings should comply with the
requirements of the Rule.
Facts:
 Municipalities of Magallon, La Castellana and Isabela, instituted escheat proceedings with CFI
Negros Occidental, praying that the estates of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas
 Fallon, the latter married to Julia Fallon, consisting of agricultural lands and residential lots, as
well as accrued rentals deposited with the Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd., be escheated in favor
of the above-named municipalities, respectively, wherever the real estates are situated.
o Finding that the petition was in order, the judge of the court ordered the publication
of the petition and set the same for hearing before itself on October 9, 1957.
 The evidence shows that the properties sought to be escheated originally to Charles J. Fallon
(Fallon), an American citizen, married to Rosario Santaromana.
 Fallon died in Manila on March 25, 1935, so his wife acquired by inheritance one-half of the
said properties as owner, and the other half as usufructuary.
o The value of the properties of Charles J. Fallon in 1936 is estimated at P461,
105.41. His wife Rosario Santaromana died in 1943, and thereupon the properties
which she held in usufruct were transmitted to the brother and sister of her deceased
husband, namely, Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy.
 The value of the estate belonging to both Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy were
residents of the United States and as nothing was known about them from their relatives in the
United States, the petitioning municipalities believed that they had died without heirs. Hence
the petition for escheat.
o At the hearing of the petition, evidence was submitted that Anne Fallon Murphy
died on March 12, 1936 in San Francisco, California (ROA p. 21), while Thomas
Fallon, died on May 26, 1936, also in San Francisco, California (ROA p. 25). Julia
Fallon, on the other hand, died in San Francisco, California on December 2, 1944
(ROA p. 26).
 Opposition to the petition for escheat was filed by Ignatius Bezore. Elwood Knickerbocker and
Mary Irene Fallon.
o McCormick Henry Bezore claims that he is the nephew of the decedents because
his mother was their sister. Elwood Knickerbocker also claims to be the sole legatee
of his wife Loreta Knickerbocker, who in turn, was the residuary legatee of Anne
Fallon Murphy. Mary Irene Murphy McCormick likewise claims that she is the
niece of the decedents as her father was a brother of said decedents. Conformably to
their petitions, all the oppositors pray that the petition for escheat be dismissed and
that the properties of the decedents be disturbed among them.
 The court, after hearing, found that Anne Fallon Murphy died in San Francisco on March 12,
1936 and Thomas Fallon, also in the same city on May 26, 1936; that Thomas Fallon was
survived by his wife Julia Fallon, who in turn, died in San Francisco on December 22, 1944;
that Ane Fallon Murphy executed a will on February 7, 1935, which was admitted to probate
on May 7, 1937.
 Lower Court= Denied petition for escheat. For the reason that Thomas Fallon died with an heir
his wife Julia Fallon, and Anne Fallon Murphy, for her part, died leaving a will, in which she
disposed of all her properties. However, as to prayers contained in the opposition asking that
the oppositors be declared heirs of the deceased Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy, the
court declared that the evidence submitted was not competent or sufficient to sustain the claim
of the oppositors and, therefore denied said prayers.
 Hence, this appeal by the alleged heirs in not declaring them as heirs of the decedents Anne
Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in not rendering judgment in their favor and in not declaring them heirs
of the decedents Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon. (NO.)
Held:
 This appeal cannot be entertained. While it is possible for the estates of the deceased Anne
Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon, who at the time of their death were residents of San
Francisco, California, to be settled here, or more especially in Negros Occidental where they
had properties, these proceedings were instituted as escheat proceedings and not for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
 The court acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for escheat by virtue of the publication of
the petition for escheat. The jurisdiction acquired cannot be converted into one for the
distribution of the properties of the said decedents. For such proceedings (for the distribution of
the estate of the decedents) to be instituted, the proper parties must be presented and the
proceedings should comply with the requirements of the Rule.
 Hence, the court of First Instance did not have the power to order, or to proceed with, the
distribution of the estates of the decedents in these escheat proceedings, and adjudicate
the properties to the oppositors.
SC= Lower Court AFFIRMED.
12. Republic v. CA and Solano, G.R. No. 143843, Jan. 31, 2002 - Bries
Doctrine:
·       A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those
who are not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown, "a judgment of
escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons
interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the
appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper
notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private
respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the
deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has
long attained finality.
Facts:
·       For more than three (3) decades private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around
personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During
Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent
Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close relative was
available to tend to her needs.
·      In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two
(2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of land covered by a TCT. Private respondent
alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be found.
·       While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the
estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the RTC. During the proceedings, a motion for intervention
was filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa, but the
motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid
claim or right to the properties in question.". The lower court escheated the estate of the
decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
·       Private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation she had been
looking for for a long time. In view of this development, respondent Amada Solano filed a
petition before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the lower court's decision alleging
that the deceased Elizabeth Hankins having donated the subject properties to the petitioner in
1983 and 1984, these properties did not and could not form part of her estate when she died on
1985. Consequently, they could not validly be escheated to the Pasay City Government.
·     The Office of the Solicitor General representing public respondents RTC and the Register of
Deeds filed an answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a) lack of jurisdiction
over the nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by the statute of
limitations.
·       The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for annulment of judgment and setting the
date for trial on the merits.
Issue:Whether or not private respondent has a claim over the escheated property? No.
Held:
·       Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of
its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate
leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall
an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers.” Since escheat is one of the incidents of
sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within
which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property
may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which
such action must be brought.

·       In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years
from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if
sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the
estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever.” The 5-year period is not a device
capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly
prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims,
otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment.

·    In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and
exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property
sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition
for escheat.

·       In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27
June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private
respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her
right over the escheated properties militates against recovery.

·       A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is

conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are
not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown, "a judgment of escheat was held
conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on
the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way
injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been observed." With the lapse
of the 5-year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and
the supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the
escheat judgment which has long attained finality.

·       In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time
that the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the lower court was not divested of its
jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had
been previously donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the
escheat court for failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in question."  Where a
person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to
establish his title to the property and his right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title
covering the subject properties were in the name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of
ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by the deceased during her
lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing proof showing that the subject
lands had been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at
least before the escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not to
assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorily presuppose that the
subject properties were no longer part of the decedent's estate at the time the lower court
handed down its decision on the strength of a belated allegation that the same had previously
been disposed of by the owner. It is settled that courts decide only after a close scrutiny of
every piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision and unadulterated
thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations, conjectures and unsubstantiated
assertions.