Professional Documents
Culture Documents
administration and the administrator may bring and defend action for the
1. Caro v CA 113 S 10 - Tolentino recovery or protection of the property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2,
Rule 88), such right of possession and administration do not include the
Topic: What constitutes administration right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger
Doctrine: An administrator has no power to exercise the right of redemption. by one of the co-owners after the death of another, because in such
case, the right of legal redemption only came into existence when the
Facts: sale to the stranger was perfected and formed no part of the estate of the
Alfredo, Mario, and Benjamin, all surnamed Benito were the original co-owners of 2 parcels of deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted to the heir of
land. the deceased co-owner.(Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc.)
When Mario died, Basilia (Mario’s wife) and Saturnino (Mario’s father) were appointed as
joint administrators of his estate. 2. Mananquil v Villegas 189 S 335 - Villadolid
Benjamin, one of the co-owners, executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Luz Caro
(petitioner) of his one-third undivided portion over the said parcels of land. Subsequently, Topic: What constitutes administration
with the consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito (shown in their affidavits dated Doctrine: Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or
1960) a subdivision title was issued to petitioner Caro. administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of
Basilia found out about the sale around May 1966 and sent Caro a letter dated August 25, 1966 the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He
offering to redeem the said one-third undivided share. Caro ignored this offer. may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having
Basilia, in an independent action sought to prove that she haad not been notified of the sale as jurisdiction of the estate.
required by Art. 1620 and 1623 of the NCC.
Caro refuted this by presenting the affidavit of Benjamin Benito, executed ante litem motam, Facts:
attesting to the fact that the possible redemptioners were formally notified in writing of his This is actually a disbarment case against VILLEGAS.
intention to sell his undivided share. It turns out that VILLEGAS was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator for
The trial judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds that: (a) private respondent, as the testate estate of one Felomina Zerna.
administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not have the power to exercise the In 1963, LEONG, as administrator of Zerna’s estate, entered into a lease contract with the
right of legal redemption, and (b) Benjamin Benito substantially complied with his obligation partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over several lots included in Zerna’s estate.
of furnishing written notice of the sale of his one-third undivided portion to possible The said lease contract was renewed several times henceforth.
redemptioners.
It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was both counsel of LEONG and a partner
On appeal, the CA found for Basilia. in the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS.
When LEONG died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed
Issue:
administrator for LEONG’s estate. MANANQUIL alleged that the lease contracts were made
W/N Basilia, as administratix of the estate of Mario Benito, can exercise legal redemption with respect to
under iniquitous terms and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that VILLEGAS should
the lots in question? - NO.
have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate before
the contracts were renewed, VILLEGAS being counsel of that estate’s administrator.
Ruling:
Petitioner Caro contends that the right sought to be exercised by Basilia in the case assumes
that the land in question is under co-ownership. Issue/s:
However, the fact is that as early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land was terminated 1. W/N VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate court’s approval regarding the lease? -
when Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by NO.
administrators Saturnino Benito, as trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario Benito, 2. W/N VILLEGAS should be disbarred? - NO.
agreed to subdivide the property.
A petition for subdivision was then filed for the purpose. This was accompanied by the
affidavits of Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito, to the effect that they agree to the
Ruling:
segregation of the land formerly owned in common by Mario Benito, Alfredo Benito and
Benjamin Benito. A subdivision plan was made and by common agreement with an area of 163
(1)
hectares, more or less, was ceded to petitioner Caro. A subdivision title was subsequently
Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or
issued on the lot assigned to petitioner Caro.
administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal
In Caram, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. the Court held that once the property is
estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses
subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and
of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority
there is no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.
from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an
Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that therefore, the right of administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate
legal redemption exists, Basilia, as administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right for even without prior judicial authority and approval.
and in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co-
Thus, considering that administrator Leong was not required under the law and prevailing
administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino’s consent to the sale of the one-third
jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real
portion to petitioner Caro cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the ground that
properties of the estate, VILLEGAS, as counsel of Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to
the right of redemption was not within the powers of administration, in the same manner,
notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial
Basilia, as co-administrator has no power to exercise the right of redemption, the very
approval thereto.
power which the Court of Appeals ruled to be not within the powers of administration:
“While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has
the right to the possession of the real and personal estate of the (2)
There is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although VILLEGAS should be suspended from administration proceedings in the CFI for the settlement of the estate of Olave, and the claim must be
practice of law because he participated in the renewals of the lease contracts involving filed within the period prescribed lest it be barred forever.
properties of Zerna’s estate in favor of the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS. Under Art. o Purpose of presentation of claims against decedents in the probate court:
1646 of the Civil Code, “lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the 1. To protect the estate of the deceased, that way, the executor or
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession” are prohibited administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether
for leasing, either in person or through the mediation of another, the properties or things it is a proper one which should be allowed;
mentioned. Such act constituted gross misconduct, hence, suspension for four months. 2. To apprise the administrator and probate court of the existence of the
claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its
payment in full and by pro-rata portion in the due course of
3. Estate of Olave v Reyes 123 S 767 - Yap administration, inasmuch as upon decedent’s death, his entire estate is
burdened with payment of debts and no creditor shall enjoy any
Topic: What constitutes administration preference or priority.
Doctrine: Where the estate of a deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding,
It is clear that the main purpose of SAMCO in filing the civil case is to secure a money judgment
the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
against the Estate of Olave, which eventually resulted in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than 29
hec. of land belonging to the estate, in payment of its claim, without prior authority of the probate
Facts: court which has exclusive jurisdiction over the case of the estate of Olave.
Herein private res. Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO) filed a civil case It was a mistake for CFI-Davao to have given due course to the case, much less issue the questioned
against Carlos and Matias Matute, in their capacities as co-administrators of the Estate of Olave, for Order approving the Amicable Settlement.
the collection of an alleged indebtedness of P28k (P19k for principal amount; P8k for other fees). o Section 1, Rule 73 provides that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
Carlos and Matias filed an answer claiming their lack of knowledge and questioning the legality of estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
the claim of SAMCO. o Where the estate of a deceased is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding,
CFI-Manila issued an order directing Carlos and Matias to secure the probate court’s approval before the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of
entering into any transaction involving the 17 titles of the estate—one of which is a parcel of land in the probate court.
Davao covered by OCT-27 (subject property). Fallo: GRANTED.
Against the court’s orders, the parties submitted an Amicable Settlement to CFI-Davao. The Rule 85
Settlement alleged: (1) Acknowledged the estate’s debt to SAMCO amounting to P28k; (2) Rhat at
present, the estate does not have any funds with which to pay or settle the obligation; (3) Rhat the 4. Pascual v CA 300 S 214 - Acabado
estate, through its administrators, decided to pay SAMCO by way of conveying and ceding unto it
the ownership of certain real property under their administration; (4) That SAMCO accepts the offer Topic: Attorney’s fees, when chargeable to estate, exec/adm
as full and complete payment and satisfaction of the debt; (5) That the parties waive all other claims Doctrine: A money claim against the person administering an estate, in relation to his/her acts of
which they might have against each other. administration can be filed in the intestate proceedings in the same court. The intestate court may resolve
Said Settlement was not submitted to and approved by CFI-Manila, nor was notice thereof given to the nature of the claim as a necessary expense in the care, management and settlement of the estate.
the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings.
Despite the opposition of other parties who sought to intervene and the lack of approval by the Facts:
probate court, CFI-Davao still approved the Amicable Settlement and enforced it thru a court Don Pascual died interstate and was survived by his widow, his nephews and nieces (from his
decision ceding the subject property, with an assessed value of P31k, to SAMCO, in satisfaction of full and half blood brothers), his brother’s estate. Dr. Olivia Pascual (petitioner) is the
its claim amounting to only P19k. illegitimate child of his brother.
Thus, the Estate of Olave, represented by Jose Matute (judicial administrator in the special His widow filed a petition for letters of administration, and was appointed as special
proceeding), filed a petition for certiorari, praying for the Amicable Settlement submitted by the administratrix. She hired private resp. Atty. Santos. As her counsel for the proceedings, for a
parties to be set aside, as it will operate as a judgment that conveys illegally and unfairly the property fee equal to 15% of her share of the estate.
of the estate without the requisite approval of the probate court, which has the sole jurisdiction to Pascual’s heirs entered into a compromise agreement - 3/4th of the estate would go to the
convey this property in custodia legis of the estate. widow, and 1/4th would go to the other heirs.
SAMCO answered: The widow died during the pendency of the proceedings, leaving a will naming petitioner
1. NCC 2032 applies only to extrajudicial compromise entered into by the Olivia the sole universal heir.
administrators of the estate; the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the The rendered judgement in accordance with the compromise agreement, awarding Atty. Santos
probate court, as it was entered into in another independent action and in another his 15% of the widow’s share, and a writ of execution in his favor was released, ordering the
court of equal rank. garnishment of certain deposits and shares belonging to the widow’s estate.
2. Even so, the lack of probate court’s approval does not render the Settlement void, Petitioner Olivia sought Reconsideration and Quashal of the Writ, and later petitioned for
but only voidable, which must be attacked directly in the CFI. annulment of the award before the CA.
CA dismissed - intestate court had jurisdiction to make the award, and that petitioner Olivia
had been accorded due process. An attorney’s lien had already been placed by the RTC on the
Issue:
estate in the early stages of the proceedings. Though not incurred by Don Pascual, the claim
W/N the compromise agreement herein entered into by administrators of the estate requires the approval
was related to ordinary acts of administration of the estate.
of the probate court? - YES.
Issue:
Ruling: W/N the intestate court has jurisdiction to determine the nature of the expenses in the administration and
Section 1, Rule 87 of the ROC provides that “no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or settlement of the estate? - YES. Petition denied.
debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator.” The claim of
SAMCO, being one arising from contract, may be pursued only by filing the same in the Ruling:
Petitioner argues that the intestate court lost jurisdiction over the person of the widow, who
was the administrator, after her death. Hence it could not consider the lien as a necessary
expense of the estate allowed to the administrator in Rule 85.
The death of the widow did not extinguish Atty. Santos’ claim, nor require him to refile his
claim. This is because he had filed his claim against the estate and was granted an atty.’s
lien on it, rather than against the estate of the widow.
The estate of Don Pascual is distinct and separate from that of the widow, who merely
served as the administratrix of the former. The widow was merely a representative, and
the atty.’s claim was an item of the administrative expense of the estate.
A money claim against the person administering an estate, in relation to his/her acts of
administration can be filed in the intestate proceedings in the same court. It was the duty
of the intestate court to determine whether the money claim was allowable as
administrative expense if it was obtained in reference to the management of the estate -
the performance of legal services the administratrix could not perform, prosecution or
defense of actions on behalf of the estate, the discovery, recovery or preservation of the
properties of the estate. In other words, the intestate court may resolve the nature of the
claim as a necessary expense in the care, management and settlement of the estate.
In the present case, petitioners averment that the fees in question are not proportionate to the
services rendered by private respondent fails to consider the numerous properties involved and
the private respondents labor for thirteen years, during which time he became responsible for
the estate of Don Andres. In fact, the established standards in fixing attorneys fees calls for the
upholding of the award.
Rule 86 Issue:
W/N the order in question is already barred? - YES.
5. Villanueva v. PNB, 9 SCRA 145 - Banguis
Ruling: Issue:
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory W/N PAMBUSCO’s claim was properly admitted by the probate court? - YES.
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a
decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was Ruling:
initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 The general rule is that when an action is one for recovery of money, debt or interest, and the
and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, defendant dies before final judgment in the CFI, the said money claims should be filed in the
all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court testate/intestate proceedings “to avoid useless duplicity of procedure.” (Sec. 21, Rule 3 ROC)
and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, However, whether the original suit for the recovery of money - as in this case - proceeds to its
subject to certain exceptions. conclusion, or is dismissed and the claim covered thereby is filed with the probate court, one
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' thing is certain: no substantial rights of the parties are prejudiced.
claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties An exception to the aforementioned rule is made in the present case. At the time of the death of
of the estate. A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement Encarnacion, PAMBUSCO had already rested its case after presentation of its evidence. The
of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even deceased was then substituted by Jose (administrator), without objection. By this substitution,
institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent the estate had notice of the claim and the estate was thus represented. At no point in time did
money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non- the estate (through Jose) impugn the authority of the regular courts to determine the civil case.
forum shopping. In fact, Jose even took active steps to protect the interests of the estate by filing an answer with
counterclaim, and by going to trial. The case was even elevated to the SC, and has now become
final. As such, the estate waived its right to have PAMBUSCO’s claim re-litigated in the estate
proceedings. For, though presentment of probate claims is imperative, it is generally
7. Elchico v. Pampanga Bus, G.R. No. L-18936, May 23, 1967 - Calantoc
understood that it may be waived by the estate’s representative. And, waiver is to be
determined from the administrator’s acts and conduct.
Topic: How claims presented/prosecuted
o The revival of the civil action against the administrator, the decedent’s
Doctrine/s:
1. The general rule is that when an action is one for recovery of money, debt or interest, and the representative, is generally considered equivalent to presentation of such claim in
defendant dies before final judgment in the CFI, the said money claims should be filed in the the probate court and dispenses with the actual presentation of the claim. The
testate/intestate proceedings “to avoid useless duplicity of procedure”. An exception is when administrator represents the deceased’s estate itself and is an alter ego of the heirs.
the estate, through its administrator, waives such rule and proceeds with the civil case. More than this, he is an officer of the probate court. In the present circumstances,
2. Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court permits acceptance of claims belatedly made, for presentment of PAMUSCO’s claims in the intestate proceedings was at best
cause shown and on such terms as are equitable. reduced to a mere formality.
It does not matter that PAMBUSCO’s claim was filed with the probate court beyond the 6-
Facts: (this involves 2 proceedings - CIVPRO and SPECPRO) month period from March 25, 1955, set forth in the notice to creditors. Section 2, Rule 86
Pampanga Bus Company (PAMBUSCO) filed a civil case against Valentin Fernando and permits acceptance of such belated claims.
Encarnacion Vda. de Fernando to collect P105,000 upon a contractual obligation. o Here, the claim was filed in the probate court only on February 25, 1959, while the
Encarnacion died and by this time, PAMBUSCO in the civil case presented its evidence and defendants in the civil case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The record
submitted its case. does not show that the administrator objected thereto upon the ground that it was
o (March 23, 1955) Meanwhile, intestate proceedings for the estate of Encarnacion filed out of time. The pendency of that case is thus, a good excuse for tardiness in
the filing of the claim. Besides the order of the lower court of March 18, 1961
were filed and notice to the estate’s creditors was given for them to file their claims
allowing payment of PAMBUSCO’ claim impliedly granted petitioner an extension
within 6 months from the first publication of the notice.
of time within which to file said claim.
The court in the civil case ordered Jose Nicolas, then administrator, to substitute for the
The judgement in PAMBUSCO’s favor should be enforced. Petitioners’ objection - after
deceased Encarnacion. As such, PAMBUSCO’s complaint was amended, naming Jose and
judgment had become final in the civil case - that PAMBUSCO’s claim should have been
Valentin as defendants. No objection was made on the substitution. Jose, as administrator, filed
litigated in the probate court does not impair the validity of said judgement. For, such objection
an amended answer with counterclaim against PAMBUSCO and in due course, presented his
does not go into the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter.
evidence.
The CFI in the civil case ruled in favor of PAMBUSCO.
8. Heirs of Pizarro, Sr. v. Hon. Consolacion & Tan, G.R. No. L-51278, May 9, 1988 - Caro
o (February 25, 1959) While the defendants were perfecting their appeal from the
judgment of the CFI, PAMBUSCO registered its “contingent” claim in the intestate Topic: How claims presented/prosecuted
proceedings - for whatever money judgment may be rendered in his favor in the Doctrine: First 2 paragraphs in Held.
civil case.
An appeal to the CA was made, which affirmed the CFI. The SC likewise dismissed the Facts:
defendants’ appeal by certiorari for having been filed out of time and for raising issues of fact. Respondent Luis Tan filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration in favor of one
o The judgment in the civil case having reached finality, PAMBUSCO moved in the Alfonso Atilano in CFI Davao. The petition alleges that Tan is the only surviving son of
intestate proceedings that the heirs and/or the present joint administrators Ignacio
and Almazan be ordered to pay the share of the deceased in the judgment debt.
Dominga Garcia who died intestate in China, but left a parcel of land in Davao. Such lot is in In order to guarantee faithful performance, JDS posted a performance bond of P795,000. JDS
the possession of petitioner-heirs of Pizarro. executed the performance bond, jointly and severally with petitioner, Stronghold Insurance,
Pizarro heirs filed an opposition claiming that Pizarro (their dad) bought ½ of the lot via Co., Inc. (SICI).
extrajudicial settlement executed by Vicenta Tan in HK. Several times, respondent’s engineers called the attention of JDS to the alleged alarmingly
During trial, Tan and the Pizarro heirs entered into a compromise agreement whereby Pizarro slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the fear that construction will not be finished
heirs agreed to withdraw their opposition to the appointment of Atilano as admin, and for the within the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders were unheeded by JDS.
intestate proceedings to proceed in due course → approved Dissatisfied, respondent extrajudicially rescinded the contract and informed JDS thereof. Such
After Atilano submitted his inventory, respondent court ordered the filing of creditors’ claims rescission, according to the contract shall not be construed as a waiver to respondent’s right to
against the estate within 6 months from date of 1st publication recover damages from JDS and the latter’s sureties.
[not impt] Meanwhile, Tan and the City of Davao filed a joint motion for the court to take Respondent then sent JDS two letters demanding for payment of the performance bond but
notice of their agreement to file a joint motion to proceed with the determination of heirs of both letters went unheeded, so respondent filed a complaint against JDS and SICI seeking for
decedent Garcia which will be determinative of their respective claims payment for the amount representing additional expenses incurred by respondent for the
[not impt] Pizarro heirs filed their opposition to the joint motion on the ground that it is without completion of the project using another contractor, as well as damages.
procedural basis. → court granted the joint motion, taking note of the Tan x Davao City According to the Sheriff’s Return, summons were duly served on SICI. However, Jose D.
agreement. Santos, Jr., died the previous year, and JDS was no longer at its address, and its whereabouts
Tan then filed a motion to exclude Pizarro heirs from the case on the ground that they don’t were unknown.
even claim to be Garcia’s heirs and that the EJ deed of partition allegedly made in HK was SICI then filed an answer alleging that respondent’s money claims are not extinguished by the
simulated. death of Jose D. Santos. And even if this were not the case, SICI had been released from its
Pizarro heirs filed an opposition. They also filed 2 claims against the estate: (1) P350k liability under the performance bond because there was no liquidation, with the active
representing services allegedly rendered by daddy Pizarro for Vicenta Tan (2) P200k for participation and/or involvement, pursuant to procedural due process, of herein surety and Jose
advances of realty and income taxes on the lot D. Santos, Jr., hence there was no ascertainment of the corresponding liabilities of Santos and
Tan countered that the claim was barred for having been filed beyond the 6mo period. SICI under the performance bond. At this point in time, said liquidation was impossible
Court dismissed both claims for being filed out of time. because of the death of Santos, who as such can no longer participate in any liquidation.
Pizarro heirs argue that the court’s order for period of filing claims violated §2 R86 providing The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the claim against JDS did not
that filing should be for 6mo starting from the 6th month after the date of the first publication survive the death of Santos. However, upon MR by respondent, the lower court modified its
until the 12th month [ex. 1st publication: 1 Jan 2018. Period for filing claims is 1 July-1 Jan decision holding that Stronghold is liable. The case against Santos remained undisturbed. This
2019] was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Issue:
W/N the claims were filed out of time? - NO. W/N SICI’s liability under the performance bond was automatically extinguished by the death of Santos,
the principal? - NO.
Ruling:
The range of the period specified in R86 is intended to give the probate court the discretion to Ruling:
fix the period for the filing of claims. The probate court is permitted to set the period provided As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
it is not less than 6 months nor more than 12 months from the date of the first publication of the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is
notice thereof. Such period once fixed by the court is mandatory. prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only
[Purpose is speedy settlement of estate and early delivery of the property to the person entitled obligations that are personal or are identified with the persona themselves are extinguished by
to it] The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and death.
those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of §5, Rule 86 of the Rules expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a
administration have been paid is the ruling spirit of our probate law. contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually
The period set by the respondent court was obviously too short. Since the order was void, what extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court,
applies is the period provided for in §2 R86. The 1st publication of the notice was on March which is not then acting as a probate court.
30, 1978. Thus the two claims against the estate filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts
respectively were filed on time. with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law.
Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which
9. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation, G.R. No. 147561, merely passed on to his estate.
June, 2006 - Celeste Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the
performance bond. Consequently, SICI as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary
Topic: Claims allowed obligation under its performance bond.
Doctrine: As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the Under the law and jurisprudence, respondent may sue, separately or together, the principal
obligation – obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the debtor and the petitioner herein, in view of the solidary nature of their liability. The death of
law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of the principal debtor will not work to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the
Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a solidary creditor. Evidently, despite the death of the principal debtor, respondent may still sue
deceased debtor. petitioner alone, in accordance with the solidary nature of the latter’s liability under the
performance bond.
Facts:
Respondent Republic-Asahi entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor of 10. Gabriel v. Bilon, G.R. No. 146989, February 7, 2007 - Coronel
JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and drainage system in Republic-
Asahi’s compound within 240 days, where the Republic-Asahi is to pay P5,300,000. Topic: Claims allowed
Doctrine: All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable
the same be due, not due, or contingent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner provided in these
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Thus, in In relation to this, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court states:
accordance with the above Rules, the money claims must be filed against the estate. SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or
Facts: implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, and judgment for money against the
Petition for review on certiorari was filed assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
Appeals. Petitioner, represented by his surviving spouse, Flordeliza V. Gabriel, was the owner- except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
operator of a public transport business, Gabriel Jeepney. Petitioner had a pool of drivers, which administrator may bring against the claimants.
included respondents, operating under a boundary system of P400 per day. Respondents filed Thus, in accordance with the above Rules, the money claims of respondents must be
their separate complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, and separation pay against filed against the estate of petitioner Melencio Gabriel. Petition denied with
petitioner. On March 17, 1997, the Labor Arbiter handed down his decision, in favor of the modification that the money claims of respondents should be filed against the
respondents claim. Incidentally, on April 4, 1997, petitioner passed away. On April 18, 1997, a estate of Melencio Gabriel, within such reasonable time from the finality of this
copy of the above decision was delivered personally to petitioner’s house. The labor arbiter’s Decision as the estate court may fix.
decision was subsequently served by registered mail at petitioner’s residence and the same was
received on May 28, 1997.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner appealed the labor arbiter’s decision to the National Labor 11. Hilado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009 - Dolar
Relations Commission, it affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision but upon motion for
reconsideration, it was reversed. NLRC held that the case is for recovery of money which Topic: Claims allowed
does not survive, and considering that the decision has not become final, the case should have Doctrine: Persons with contingent claims against the estate of the deceased may be allowed to access the
been dismissed and the appeal no longer entertained. (NLRC considered, the decision of the records of the intestate or testate proceedings.
labor arbiter as not final because there was no proper service of copy thereof to petitioner,
however SC ruled that the service via registered mail and subsequent appeal cured the Facts:
procedural defect). Robert Benedicto died intestate, survived by his wife Julita and his daughter Francisca.
Aggrieved by the decision of the NLRC, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. At the time of Roberto’s death, there were 2 pending civil cases involving the petitioners
On August 4, 2000, the CA reversed the decision, it held that the decision of the Labor Arbiter against him.
became final and executory and disagreed with the ratiocination of the NLRC that the death of Julita filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favour, which the RTC
the Husband on April 4, 1997 ipso facto negates recovery of the money claim against the of Manila granted.
successors-in-interest. As basis, CA used Section 3, Rule III of the NLRC Manual on Julita filed an Inventory of the Estate. A list of liabilities was attached to the inventory, which
Execution of Judgment, which provides: included the 2 pending civil cases litigated in Bacolod (torts cases against Roberto).
SECTION 3. Execution in Case of Death of Petitioners then filed with the RTC of Manila a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,
Party. Where a party dies after the finality of the praying to be furnished with copies of all processes and ordered pertaining to the intestate
decision/entry of judgment of order, execution thereon may proceedings.
issue or one already issued may be enforced in the following Respondent Julita opposed this, contending that Petitioners had no personality to intervene in
cases: the intestate proceedings of Roberto.
Petitioners then filed 2 other Manifestations/motions, which sought to set a deadline for the
submission of the inventory, and alleged that the inventory so far that was submitted was
a.)x x x ; inaccurate, respectively.
b) In case of death of the losing party, against his
The RTC denied the Petitioners’ manifestation/motion on the ground that there are not
successor-in-interest, executor or administrator;
interested parties within the contemplation of the ROC to intervene in the intestate
c) In case of death of the losing party after
proceedings.
execution is actually levied upon any of his
On appeal, the CA also dismissed the petition, holding that the claim of the Petitioners’ against
property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction
the deceased Roberto were contingent or expectant as these were still pending litigation.
thereof, and the sheriff making the sale shall
account to his successor-in-interest, executor or
Issue:
administrator for any surplus in his hands.
1. W/N Petitioners may be allowed to access the records of the intestate proceedings? - YES.
The CA set aside the NLRC’s ruling that the money claims of the respondent’s
2. W/N the Petitioners can compel the placing of a deadline on submission of the inventory? -
can no longer be availed of, due to the death of the petitioner. Petitioner filed a
NO.
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Ruling:
Issue: (You can skip this is. It's just fluff, but it helps give some context to what the SC’s saying)
W/N the claims survive? - YES. While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest
Ruling: required of an intervenor must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply
Yes, however, the same shall be governed by Section 20 (then Section 21), Rule 3 of the Rules contingent and expectant.
of Court which provides: Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
SEC. 20. Action on contractual money claims. When the action is for recovery of necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings, as the settlement of estates fall within
money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be
The Rules of Special Proceedings entitle any interested persons to participate in varying In a motion dated November 25, 1968, Angelina P. Echaus prayed for the resolution of her
capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. The claims against Benedicto were based on previous motion to direct payment of the judgment credit which was held in abeyance, stating
tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal that the petition for relief from judgment filed in Civil Case No. 6628 was dismissed by the
Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed trial court which dismissal has become final and executory in view of the failure of Avelina
under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These actions, being as they are civil, Magno (Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) to file a record on appeal on time.
survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to On February 26, 1969, respondent Judge Ramon Blanco issued an Order reiterating his
Section 1, Rule 87. position that the motion to direct payment of the judgment credit cannot yet be resolved and
holding in abeyance the resolution thereof in view of the writ of preliminary injunction issued
(1) by the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, (PCIB v. Blanco), enjoining
While there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed respondent judge from hearing Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672, entitled "Testate
to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges" and "Testate Estate of Charles N. Hodges," respectively.
Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there Petitioner then filed the instant petition for mandamus dated April 21, 1969 seeking: a) to set
is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. aside respondent judge's order of February 26, 1969; and b) to order PCIB to pay the judgment
The Petitioners asked to be furnished copies of all the processes and ordered issued in credit in Civil Case No. 6628.
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of It is the contention of petitioner that the judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 is now final and
the estate. While the utility of this relief is unquestioned, it must be counterbalanced by the fact executory and the execution thereof becomes a matter of right under Rule 39, Section 1 of the
that the interest of the Petitioners remain inchoate and contingent. Rules of Court. The duty to order the execution of a final and executory judgment is ministerial
Instead of ordering the courts to furnish the Petitioners copies of the records, they will be and the failure of respondent judge to issue such order is a proper case for mandamus.
allowed access to the records of the proceedings. This is more preferable than mandating the On the other hand, private respondents contend that the judgment rendered in Civil Case No.
service of court processes and pleadings to them. This will be less cumbersome on the intestate 6628 is null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. Money claims against a
court while providing a viable means by which the interest of the Petitioners in the estate are defendant who dies without a judgment having been rendered in the Regional Trial Court shall
preserved. be dismissed and prosecuted as a claim in the estate proceedings as laid down under Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This procedure was not followed in Civil Case No. 6628.
Also, even, if it is assumed that the judgment in the said civil case is valid, the claim presented
(2)
in the estate proceedings is already barred by the statute of non-claims.
Petitioners also seek the setting of a deadline for the submission of a verified and complete
inventory of the estate. However, the SC cannot grant said relief. Sec. 1 of Rule 83 requires the
administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased within 3 months from appointment, while Sec. 8 of Rule 85 requires the Issue:
administrator to render an account of his administration within 1 year from receipt of the letters 1. W/N the money claim should have been filed in the intestate estate of CN Hodge? - YES.
testamentary or of administration. There are reliefs available to compel an administrator to 2. W/N the judgement sought to be enforced by the petitioner is barred under the ROC? - NO.
perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the 3. W/N Mandamus is proper? - NO.
party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these
duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and
available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the
estate. Ruling:
It must be noted that Civil Case No. 6628 which is a money claim, was instituted during the
12. Echaus v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-30453, December 4, 1989 - Loyola lifetime of C. N. Hodges. During its pendency and before a decision could be rendered by the
Regional Trial Court hearing the case, C. N. Hodges died. Upon his death, he was substituted
Topic: Claims allowed by PCIB as administrator of his estate. Being a money claim, said civil case should have been
Doctrine: Money claims against a defendant who dies before a decision could be rendered in the civil dismissed and instituted as a money claim in the intestate estate of C. N. Hodges (Sp. Proc. No.
case, should have been instituted as a money claim in the intestate estate of the deceased person 1627) in accordance with Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,
However, this is not to suggest that because the claim of petitioner was pursued to its
conclusion in Civil Case No. 6682 instead of being dismissed and filed as a money claim in
Special Proceedings No. 1672, the judgment rendered therein is null and void.
Facts: Citing the case of Ignacio v. Pampanga Bus Co., Inc, the court held that “The philosophy
The petitioner herein, Angelina Puentevella Echaus, in her own behalf and as Administratrix of behind the rule which provides for the dismissal of the civil case is that, upon the death of a
the intestate estate of her deceased father Luis Puentevella, assisted by her husband, Rene defendant, all money claims should be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings ‘to avoid
Echaus filed a complaint on May 30, 1962 against Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) useless duplicity of procedure.’
praying for an accounting of the business covering the Ba-Ta Subdivision, the recovery of her Moreover, when PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges was ordered to be
share in the profits and remaining assets of their business and the payment of expenses and substituted as defendant, it registered no objection to the order. Thus, even if We admit for the
moral and exemplary damages. However, C.N. Hodges died which resulted to the filing of a sake of argument that the trial court, after the death of C. N. Hodges has no jurisdiction to
petition for the settlement of his estate. A notice to the creditors was published in “Yuhum”, a render a judgment therein, the argument must fail. PCIB, participated actively in the said case.
newspaper of general circulation. It did not appeal the decision rendered therein, neither did it raise the issue of jurisdiction at
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the private respondent to pay the any stage.
amount indicated in the decision. On January 21, 1967, the same trial court issued an order The judgement sought to be enforced by the petitioner is not barred under the Rules of Court.
granting plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against PCIB (administrator The above argument of private respondent is not correct. The Rules of Court allows a creditor
of the estate of C.N. Hodges). However, the writ was not enforced as plaintiff opted to file a to file his claim after the period set by the court in the notice to creditors, provided the
motion dated February 20, 1967 in Special Proceedings No. 1672 (estate proceedings of conditions stated in the rules are present. The rule provides:
deceased C. N. Hodges) for the payment of the judgment. o Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.-... . However, at any time before an
order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his
claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on First, the claim in question arose after the death of the decedent. Assuming without deciding
such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding that the contract on which the claim is based is valid, the decedent appears to have complied
one (1) month. (Rule 86). with it up to the time of his death. It was the executrix who dismissed the claimant from the
o It is clear from the foregoing (Section 2 of Rule 87 [now Rule 86]) that the period service as administratrix or manager of the haciendas of the deceased.
prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the Second, the claim is not for money, debt, or interest but for 150 cavans of palay a year for 29
estate may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the agricultural years. Even if it wanted to, the probate court could not determine in advance
discretion of the court for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. the value of the palay in money because the price of palay varies from year to year.
Nonetheless, the petition for the writ of Mandamus is dismissed for lack of merit. The court Gabin also presented this claim when she filed a motion in the probate court for her to be
stressed that the time for paying debts (and legacies) is to be fixed by the probate court having appointed as co-administratix of the estate based on the said “contract of service”. The judge
jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased (Sec. 15, Rule 18). In the absence of any showing denied the motion without prejudice to the right of Gabin to present a claim in due form against
that respondent judge who is taking cognizance of the estate proceedings had already allowed the estate. The mere reservation by the judge to Gabin of her right to present the claim in lieu
the administrator to dispose of the estate and to pay the debts and legacies of the deceased, a of her appointment as coadministratrix did not preclude the court from denying said claim if,
writ of mandamus will not issue to compel him to order payment of petitioner's claim. after hearing, it found the same to be improper or not allowable in these proceedings.
Dispositive Portion:
13. Melliza v. Melliza, (different title of the case - Gabin v. Melliza) Without deciding whether or not the contract claimed upon is valid and binding against the heirs of the
decedent, and without prejudice to any proper action that Gabin may bring upon said contract, denial of
the claim is affirmed. Costs against Gabin.
Topic: Claims allowed
14. Olave v. Canlas, G.R. No. L-12709, Feb. 28, 1962 - Payad
Facts:
1944, January 19: Raymundo Melliza (Raymundo) and Laureana Gabin (Gabin) entered into a Topic: Claims allowed
written agreement whereby Gabin will administer certain haciendas owned by Raymundo for a Doctrine: A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security
period of thirty (30) years. As compensation for said personal services Raymundo agreed to may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by ordinary action in court making the executor or
pay Gabin 350 cavans of palay every agricultural year. They also stipulated that Gabin cannot administrator a party defendant, and need not file his claim before the probate court to share in the general
be dismissed without just and legal cause, and in case of dismissal she shall have the right to be distribution of the assets of the estate. Under the same theory, an action to recover real or personal
indemnified for the rest of the period at the rate of 150 cavans of palay for each agricultural property from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, may be prosecuted by the interested person against
year. the executor or administrator independently of the testate or intestate proceedings.
1945, December 11: Raymundo died and testamentary proceedings were instituted in the CFI
of Iloilo for the administration and distribution of his estate. Facts:
Having been deprived by the executrix Remedios de Villanueva of the administration of the Amadeo Matute Olave died on April 4, 1855.
haciendas in question, Gabin presented to the probate court a claim against the estate of Testamentary proceedings were instituted before the CFI.
Raymundo for the payment of her 150 cavans of palay beginning the agricultural year 1945-
During the lifetime of Matute, he was a party defendant in a civil case wherein Atty. Paterno
1946 until the expiration of 30 years.
Canlas was his counsel. They entered into an agreement that the atty’s fees will amount to 20%
The heirs opposed the claim on the following grounds: of the market value of the property in litigation payable upon termination of the case.
1. That, not being a claim for money, it is not a proper claim under section 5 of Rule
On August 4, 1953, upon motion of Atty. Canlas, the court stated that his claim for atty’s fees
87 (now Rule 86);
is thereby established on the P100,000 balance of the deposit in the Clerk of Court and all other
xxxxx
properties involved in the said case. The court also ordered the lien to be annotated on the titles
Probate court denied the claim of Gabin. Hence this appeal. of all the real properties involved in the case.
After the death of Matute, Atty. Canlas filed an urgent for the amount of P85,000 deposit be
delivered to him in full settlement of his services as he had already filed the brief in the then
pending case before the SC.
Issue: The administrator of the estate opposed claiming that the court had no jurisdiction because the
W/N Gabin’s claim for the cavans of palay as compensation against the estate can be allowed in the motion involving a money claim must be submitted to the probate court.
testamentary proceedings? - NO In the meantime, the CFI granted Atty. Canlas authority to withdraw partial payments from
said deposit. Then on April 30, 1957, it issued an order holding that it had authority to entertain
Canlas' claim for attorney's fees.
Ruling:
Hence, this petition.
Sec. 1, Rule 87 (now Rule 86) provides that immediately after the granting of letters
testamentary or of administration the court shall issue a notice requiring all person having Issue:
money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court; and Having Amadeo Matute Olave died before the attorney's fees he agreed to pay to his counsel Paterno R.
Section 5 provides that all claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express Canlas had been fully paid and after the claim of the latter for attorney's fees had been established as a
or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and charging lien in the ordinary civil case, which court shall entertain the payment of the balance of said
expenses of the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, claim? - The court in the ordinary case has jurisdiction.
must be filed within the time limited in the notice. "
'By money claims, is meant any claim for "money, debt, or interest thereon," according to Ruling:
section 21 of Rule 3 and section 1 of Rule 88 (now Rule 87). Not all money claims may, [DOCTRINE]
however, be presented, but only those which are proper against the decedent, that is, claim
upon a liability contracted by the decedent before his death. Accordingly, claims arising after
his death cannot thus presented, except funeral expenses."
It cannot be gainsaid that a charging lien established on the property in litigation to secure the
payment of the attorney's fees of Atty. Canlas partakes of the nature of a collateral security or Topic: Claims allowed
of a lien on real or personal property within the meaning of the provisions of our rules. Doctrine: A perusal of Rule 86, Sec. 5 shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obligation
The reason behind the rule which exempts money claims covered by a mortgage or other of the decedent created by law.
collateral security or lien from the jurisdiction of probate courts appears well-stated in the
American authorities as follows: Facts:
o According to the weight of authority, a creditor whose claim is secured by In 1969, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue filed a motion for allowance
mortgage, pledge, or any specific lien need not present his claim for allowance in of claim and for payment of taxes, which represents the indebtedness to the Government of the
order to preserve his right to subject the property covered by the lien to the late Tongoy for deficiency income taxes in the total sum of P3,254.80 as above stated, covered
satisfaction of his claim, for the reason that such claims cannot in any just sense be by Assessment Notices.
considered claims against the estate, but the right to subject specific property to the The Administrator opposed the motion solely on the ground that the claim was barred under
claim arises from the contract of the debtor whereby be has during life set aside Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
certain property for its payment, and such property does not, except in so far as its The trial court dismissed the motion.
value may exceed the debt, belong to the estate, and the instrument being of record
or the property being in the possession of the creditor is notice to all the world of Issue:
the contract. W/N the statute of non-claims Section 5, Rule 86 of the New Rule of Court, bars claim of the government
The conclusion is also supported by the principle that a probate court, being of limited for unpaid taxes, even if it still within the period of limitation prescribed in Section 331 and 332 of the
jurisdiction, has no authority to enforce a lien unless conferred by a statute. The statutory National Internal Revenue Code? - NO.
jurisdiction of a probate court is exclusive, and since the lien referred to in Section 1, Rule 88
is not among those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 87, it is reasonable to assume that all money Ruling:
claims secured with a lien are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court. A perusal of the aforequoted provisions shows that it makes no mention of claims for
PETITION DISMISSED. monetary obligation of the decedent created by law, such as taxes which is entirely of
different character from the claims expressly enumerated therein, such as: "all claims for
15. First National City Bank of New York v. Cheng Tan, G.R. No. L-14234, Feb. 28, 1962 - Santos money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due or contingent, all claim for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
Topic: Claims allowed decedent and judgment for money against the decedent."
Doctrine: A deficiency judgment is a contingent claim and must be filed with the probate court where the o Under the familiar rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio
settlement of the estate of the deceased mortgagor is pending, within the period of time fixed for the filing alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not
of claims. mentioned. Thus, if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate,
everything else must necessarily, and by implication be excluded from its operation
and effect.
Facts: o The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's
On July 2, 1947 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in Civil Case No. estate in the form of exception from the application of the statute of non-claims, is
59502—which was an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage—ordering the defendants not hard to find. Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and
therein,— Silvio Cheng Tan alias Silvio Cheng Pan amongst them—to pay, jointly and certain availability are imperious need.
severally, The First National City Bank of New York the sum of P142,000.56.
Even assuming arguendo that claims for taxes have to be filed within the time prescribed in
After the sale of the mortgaged properties a deficiency judgment was rendered for P98,256.13. Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, the claim in question may be filed even after the
After execution there was a remaining balance of P38,090.06. expiration of the time originally fixed therein:
Petitioner filed a case for collection of the balance against Silvio Cheng Tan. o Section 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. - In the notice provided in the
Cheng Tan died during the pendency of the case. preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the
One of the heirs substituted him but filed a Motion to Dismiss. Stating that he should file his estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after
claim in the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of said deceased the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim
within the time previously limited the court may, for cause shown and on such
Issue: terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one
W/N Petitioner should just file his claim with the settlement of the estate of the deceased? - YES na YES! (1) month.
Ruling: 17. People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994 - Tolentino
Deficiency judgment is a contingent claim and must be filed with the probate court where the
settlement of the estate of the deceased mortgagor is pending, within the period of time fixed Topic: Claims allowed
for the filing of claims. Doctrine: It is clear from the exclusive enumeration in Sec. 5, Rule 86 that money claims arising from
Were the present proceedings allowed to continue, they could end with nothing more than a delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a
judgment reviving the one subject matter of the action. Thus revived said judgment could not civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a
be enforced except through the probate court because the judgment debtor died before claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused.
execution could be actually levied upon any of his properties.
There is, therefore, no need to prosecute the present action the herein plaintiff-appellee having Facts:
the right to go directly to the probate court to file his claim based on the deficiency judgment Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June
mentioned heretofore. 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay.
16. Vera v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-31364, March 30, 1979 - Sta. Ana
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his
Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to conviction.
hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
The SolGen expressed his view that the death of the accused does not extinguish his civil delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must
liability. subject to Section 1, Rule 111 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the SolGen arguing civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised
his criminal and civil penalties. determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of
Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be
criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule
judgment is rendered. 87 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Summary of the Court’s ruling [nasa case talaga siya guys]:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability? - In this case,
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
YES.
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. (xxx)
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
Ruling:
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. (xxx)
As jurisprudence evolved, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section
Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto. may be enforced either against the executor/ administrator or the estate of the accused,
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego,et al. departed from this long- depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego’s death civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction. This court in an unprecedented prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego’s appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was pendency of the criminal case conformably with provisions of Art. 1155 of the CC that should
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
A reexamination of the SC decision in Sendaydiego impels them to revert to the old ruling.
(Translation: SC changes their mind back to old ruling and says civil liability will only survive
if not solely based on or independent of a criminal action). 18. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No.
170498, January 9, 2013 - Villadolid
[Part of ruling related to SPECPRO]:
Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if Topic: Claims allowed
defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Doctrine: All money claims against an already deceased person must be filed in SPECPRO not ordinary
Court’s conclusion: actions.
“When the action is for the recovery of money’ ‘and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed Facts:
to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided’ in Rule 87 of the Sherwood Holdings Corp Inc (SHCI) filed complaint for sum of money against Absolute
Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).” Management Corp (AMC). This complaint was alleged to come from P8.3M worth of
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against undelivered plywood and plyboard products which SHCI bought from AMC.
him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on SHCI, in lieu of its order, gave METROBANK checks to AMC’s general manager, Chua. (take
appeal.”Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of note also that before the commencement of this case, Chua died and the settlement of his estate
procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. was commenced).
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the AMC, now, as a defense, impleaded through a third party complaint METROBANK. It was
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was discovered that METROBANK allowed the deposit of the checks to a certain Ayala Lumber
held liable for Sendaydiego’s civil liability. and Hardware – a sole proprietorship owned by Chua.
“What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 (SPECPRO TOPIC)
of Rule 86, are contractual money claims while the claims involved in METROBANK answered that AMC is estopped from questioning this because it knew of this
civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or transactions. Further, it filed a FOURTH PARTY COMPLAINT against the ESTATE OF
real property.” CHUA alleging that in case of that contingent event that METROBANK would be held liable
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against to pay, the ESTATE OF CHUA should be held liable to it (Section 11, Rule 6).
the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money RTC – wrong remedy. Metrobank’s claim stems from a quasi-contract (cobro de Io indebido)
and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims and thus should be filed in the SPECIAL PROCEEDING for the settlement of the estate of
arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be Chua, not through a fourth party complaint.
no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim CA – affirmed.
referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a
claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
Issue:
W/N Metrobank availed correct remedy? - NO. On the other hand, Section 5 of Rule 86 provides that a judgment for money against the
decedent must be filed with the court in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate. In other
words, the cut-off date is the date of actual levy of execution.
Ruling:
o If the judgment debtor dies after such levy, the property levied upon may be sold.
Rule 86, Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. –
o If he dies before, the money judgment must be presented as a claim against the
All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
estate, although the same need no longer be proved as the judgment itself is
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the
conclusive. But the judgment creditor will share the estate with other creditors,
last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
subject only to such preferences as are provided by law.
within the time limited in the notice[.]
The contingent indebtedness of Metrobank to AMC also falls under the principle solutio
indebiti which arises when something is delivered through mistake to a person who has no
right to demand it. It obligates the latter to return what has been received through mistake. Time of death Procedure
Thus, a quasi-contract
Under Maclan v Garcia, it was held by SC that quasi-contracts fall within purview of implied After entry of judgment or order + Present as a claim against the estate
contracts, thus making it fall under this provision. Also, the case is a contingent one, which is Before levy on properties
also a claim that falls under the same.
LASTLY, under statcon principle of lex specialis derogate generali, specific provisions prevail
over general ones. We read with approval the CA’s use of the statutory construction principle
of lex specialis derogat generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section After entry of judgment or order + Property levied upon may be sold
11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims After levy on properties
against the deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings,
while the rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court, merely apply suppletorily.
Petition DENIED. RTC and CA AFFIRMED.
19. Evangelista v. La Provedra, 38 SCRA 379 - Yap Case herein: The death of the deceased Santos preceded the levy of execution on his
properties. Hence, the judgment against should be presented as a claim against the estate, and
Topic: Procedure on Claims the sale at auction carried out by the sheriff is null and void.
Doctrine: Judgment must be presented as a claim against estate, where judgment debtor dies before levy
of execution on his properties. Fallo: Writ of execution and all proceedings which took place by virtue thereof, including the sale itself
and its registration, if it has been registered, are ordered set aside.
Facts:
This case is a continuation of the original case entitled La Proveedora v Santos, wherein the 20. Briones v. Henson-Cruz, G.R. No. 159130, August 22, 2008 - Acabado
CFI rendered a decision in favor of La Proveedora, ordering Santos to pay the unpaid
difference in the rent of the premise. Topic: Procedure on Claims
After the order was rendered, Santos, the judgment debtor, died. Doctrine: The ruling on the extent of the Special Administrator's commission - effectively, a claim by the
Subsequently, CFI issued a writ of execution pursuant to which the Provincial Sheriff levied on special administrator against the estate - is the lower court's last word on the matter and one that is
a parcel of land and on the house situated thereon, both owned by Santos. An auction sale of appealable. (This is the doctrine in relation to the topic. The actual issue of this case is forum shopping;
the said properties was scheduled. this was merely collaterally addressed)
In the meantime, an intestate proceeding for settlement of the estate of Santos was filed.
Facts:
Petitioner herein, Hollanda Evangelista, was appointed special administratrix of the intestate.
Resp. Ruby Henson filed a petition for probate of her mother’s holo will. Her sister Lilia
Even prior to her appointment, having been notified of the writ of execution and scheduled
opposed, alleging Ruby understate the value of the estate and acted with unconscionable bad
auction sale of the properties levied upon, Evangelista informed the Provincial Sheriff of
faith in its management.
Santos’ death and demanded that he desist from proceeding with the sale. She also filed an
urgent motion in court for the writ of execution to be recalled. But motion was denied, the sale Lilia also prayed for appointment as Intestate Administratrix. Lilia moved for appointment of
was carried out, and La Proveedora was declared highest bidder. Prudential Bank as an Interim Special Administrator of the estate. Trial court partially granted
and appointed Atty. Briones.
Hence, Evangelista filed a petition for certiorari to annul the writ of execution and subsequent
proceedings which took place by virtue of the original case. Atty. Briones performed multiple acts as Special Administrator. After he submitted his final
report, the trial court ordered an audit of his administration, the expenses of which would be
charged against the estate, and also directed payment of Atty. Briones’ commission.
Issue: The respondents filed a Notice of Appeal assailing the order of payment, filing their record on
W/N the writ of execution issued by the CFI was proper? - NO. appeal. RTC denied and disapproved he record on appeal for forum shopping.
They filed a petition for mandamus before the CA assailing the RTC’s disapproval of their
Notice of Appeal. They likewise filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
Ruling:
assailing the order of the RTC appointing an auditor.
Section 7, Rule 39 provides: “Where a party dies after the entry of the judgment or order,
Atty. Briones imputed that the petitioners were guilty of forum shopping, since both petitions
execution thereon may issue, or one already issued may be enforced in the ff. cases: (c) In case
assailed the same order.
of death of the judgment debtor after the execution is actually levied upon any of his property,
the same may be sold for the satisfaction thereof, and the officer making the sale shall account
to the corresponding executor or administrator for any surplus in his hands.”
CA granted the petition for mandamus and commanded the RTC judge to give due course to However, in spite of a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution filed by respondent-
the appeal. The RTC may only dismiss an appeal, motu proprio or on motion, only where the appellant Administratrix and still pending resolution, Parades plaintiff-appellee, below
appeal was out of time or for failure to pay docket and other fees. sold the property he acquired in execution sale in favor of his co-petitioner, Victorio
Ignacio.
Issue: Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition to the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution, CFI
W/N the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping by the filing of two different petitions before the CA? - Manila issued an order setting aside the Writ of Execution and the Sheriff's Sale and
NO. Petition dismissed. Public Auction of the property without prejudice to the filing of the judgment as a claim
in the proceedings for settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Ruling: Hence, this petition by plaintiff Paredes.
Atty. Briones alleged the CA failed to consider the issue of forum shopping. The CA merely
stated that since the RTC had no power to disallow the appeal, it was not necessary to discuss Issue:
the issue. W/N CFI erred when it issued an order setting aside the Writ of Execution and Sheriff’s Sale and Public
The assailed order of the RTC resolved the matter of appointment of an auditor, the payment of Auction of the property without prejudice to filing claims in the settlement proceedings? - NO.
the Special Admin.’s commission, and the directive to the Special Admin. to deliver the shares
of the heirs.
Ruling:
The part of the order relating to the appointment of an auditor is interlocutory, since the
designation did not have the effect of final determination on the merits. The second part If the defendant dies after final judgment has been rendered by the CFI, as in the case at bar,
relating to the payment of commission, is an independently determinable issue, being the the action survives. And as already above stated, the appeal should proceed with the
court’s definite and final word on that matter, subject only to an appeal. deceased defendant being substituted by his legal representative.
o This would prevent a useless repetition of presenting (anew) before the probate
From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrator's commission is no less a
claim against the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the court the evidence already presented in the Court of First Instance on the validity of
Rules recognizes this when it provides for "Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an the claim. Consequently, contrary to respondents' claim, the judgment against the
Estate. "Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a claim against the estate deceased Kuntze became final and executory; it was not arrested by his death on
"is appealable as in ordinary cases." Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on July 19, 1973.
the extent of the Special Administrator's commission - effectively, a claim by the special But it was error on the part of the plaintiff Paredes, now one of the petitioners, to have
administrator against the estate - is the lower court's last word on the matter and one that the money judgment in his favor executed against the properties of the deceased Kuntze.
is appealable. The proper remedy of plaintiff Paredes should have been to file his claim in the
Therefore, there is no forum shopping, since neither the petition for certiorari relating to administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased defendant Kuntze where private
the audit nor the petition for mandamus relating to the commission would result in litis respondent is the administratrix.
pendentia nor res judicata in the other. They involved two different and distinct issues. Judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed at the time limited in the notice (to
creditors) before the court where the administration proceeding involving the estate of the
21. Paredes v. Moya, G.R. No. L-38051, Dec. 26, 1974 - Banguis deceased Kuntze are pending. Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides:
o All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or
Topic: Procedure on Claims implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
Doctrine: All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent and judgment for
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness money against the decedent, must be filed (before the probate court) within the
of the decedent and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed (before the probate court) time limited in the notice (to the creditors); otherwise they are barred forever,
within the time limited in the notice (to the creditors); otherwise they are barred forever, except that they except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the administrator may bring against the claimants. (1st sentence, Section 5, Rule 86 of
claimants. the Rules of Court) (Emphasis ours)
Consequently, the respondent court, in the challenged order of November 2, 1973,
Facts: correctly nullified its order of execution issued on August 18, 1973 pursuant to the
Petitioner Severino Parades commenced a suit in 1964 in CFI-Manila for the collection of judgment which became final and executory on June 28, 1973 and the corresponding levy
separation and overtime pays against his employer, August Kuntze. on execution on August 22, 1973 and the public auction sale held on October 2, 1973.
o A decision was rendered against the defendant August Kuntze, from which In the case of Aldamiz vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, promulgated on
judgment, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. December 29, 1949 (85 Phil. 228), We already held that the writ of execution was not the
While the case was pending appeal in the said Court, August Kuntze died on June 19, proper procedure for the payment of debts and expenses of the administration. The
1972. Accordingly, plaintiff Parades (now petitioner) was duly notified. proper procedure is for the court to order the administratrix to make the payment; and if
o Thereafter, Carmencita D. Navarro Kuntze, administratrix of the estate of the there is no sufficient cash on hand, to order the sale of the properties and out of the
deceased, was substituted in his place as party in the appealed case. proceeds to pay the debts and expenses of the administration. We followed the same ruling
CA dismissed the appeal for appellant's (Kuntze) failure to file the printed record on appeal, in the case of Domingo vs. Garlitos, June 29, 1963, 8 SCRA 443, with respect to the payment
and so the record of the case was ordered remanded to respondent court. Then a motion for of estate and inheritance taxes.
execution was filed by plaintiff-appellee (petitioner Parades). The petition to set aside the above orders of the court below and for the execution of the
In 1973, the provincial Sheriff of Rizal levied on the properties of defendant-appellant (now claim of the Government against the estate must be denied for lack of merit.
substituted by the Administratrix of the estate of the Deceased, consisting of two (2) lots o The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate
covered by TCT No. 45089 issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. of a deceased person, as an inheritance tax, is for the claimant to present a claim
o In the auction sale conducted by the Sheriff, petitioner Paredes being the highest before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the
bidder, acquired said lot for the total sum of P17,296.16, as per certificate of sale amount thereof. To such effect is the decision of this Court in Aldamiz vs. Judge of
which was duly annotated in the back of TCT No. 45089. the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-2360, Dec. 29, 1949, thus:
. . a writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules let the properties mortgaged and described in paragraph '3' of the complaint be sold at public
of Court for the payment of debts and expenses of administration. The auction, with the proceeds thereof to be applied to the payment of the above-mentioned
proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate mortgage indebtedness and other sums herein adjudged.
or the sale or mortgage of real property of the deceased and all Defendant spouses Dominador and Adoracion Danan appealed to the Court of Appeals which
debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the modified the judgment by eliminating therefrom the portion ordering the said spouses to pay
proceeds of the sale or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage moral damages. Dissatisfied, the defendant spouses filed a petition for review with this Court,
should be issued upon motion of the administrator and with the but their petition was denied.
written notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the The records of the case were remanded to the court below and upon application, a writ of
Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. execution was issued. When the sheriff was about to levy upon the mortgaged properties,
And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made, the herein private respondent Adoracion Danan, opposed the levy on execution and filed a motion
regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied with. to set aside the writ of execution for reasons that the properties are in custodia legis and that
We hold that the same rule must be applied in connection with money judgments against the judgment should be presented as a money claim in the Intestate Estate of Dominador
the deceased that have already become final, such as the money judgment in favor of Danan, pursuant to Sec. 5. , Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court since Dominador Danan had
petitioner Paredes. No writ of execution should issue against the properties of the died on November 7, 1970, while the case was pending appeal before the Court of Appeals and
deceased. The claim for satisfaction of the money judgment should be presented in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate had already been instituted.
probate court for payment by the administrator. Acting upon the motion, the respondent Judge issued an order directing the sheriff to desist
Our decision in this case against the petitioner Paredes binds his co-petitioner Victorio G. from enforcing the writ of execution, and set the incident for hearing. After hearing the parties,
Ignacio not only because the order of execution and the public auction sale in question are null the respondent Judge issued an order setting aside the writ of execution.
and void, but also because petitioner Ignacio cannot be considered as a purchaser in good Petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, but their motion was denied.
faith, for Ignacio purchased the "Right of Execution Sale" of Paredes over the property Unable to obtain, relief, the spouses, Benito Manalansan and Ines Vitug-Manalansan filed the
in question on October 10, 1973 when, at that time, the respondent administratrix of the instant petition, seeking the annulment of the order and to direct the respondent Judge to
estate of Kuntze had already filed on September 6, 1973 a motion to quash the Writ of proceed with the execution of the judgment rendered in the foreclosure proceedings.
Execution and auction sale; as a matter of fact the validity of said writ of execution was still
up for respondent court's resolution on October 14, 1973 after the parties shall have submitted Issue:
memoranda on the question raised in the aforesaid motion as required by the respondent court W/N the probate court has jurisdiction over the said property? - NO.
in its order of September 29, 1973.
Ruling:
SC = Order of the Lower Court nullifying its Order of Execution of August 18, 1973, the levy on The saving clause in Sec. 7, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which the respondent
execution dated August 22, 1973, and the auction sale of October 2, 1973, is AFFIRMED. Certiorari Judge required to be performed and the observance of which he gave as reason for setting aside
DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the judgment (in favor of Paredes) as a claim in the the writ of execution he had previously caused to be issued, and in delegating the authority to
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased (Kuntze). execute the judgment in the foreclosure proceedings to the probate court, does not confer
jurisdiction upon the probate court, of limited jurisdiction, to enforce a mortgage lien. Nor can
22. Manalansan v. Castaneda, G.R. No. L-43607, June 27, 1978 - Bries it be relied upon as sufficient ground to delegate the execution of the judgment of foreclosure
to the probate court. As stated, the rule merely reserves a right to the executor or administrator
Topic: Procedure on claims of an estate to redeem a mortgaged or pledged property of a decedent which the mortgage or
Doctrine: The saving clause in Sec. 7, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which the respondent Judge pledgee has opted to foreclose, instead of filing a money claim with the probate court, under
required to be performed and the observance of which he gave as reason for setting aside the writ of said Section 7 of Rule 86. While the redemption is subject to the approval of the probate court,
execution he had previously caused to be issued, and in delegating the authority to execute the judgment in the exercise of the right is discretionary upon the said executor or administrator and may not be
the foreclosure proceedings to the probate court, does not confer jurisdiction upon the probate court, of ordered by the probate court upon its own motion.
limited jurisdiction, to enforce a mortgage lien. Nor can it be relied upon as sufficient ground to delegate Besides, the action filed herein is for the foreclosure of a mortgage, or an action to enforce a
the execution of the judgment of foreclosure to the probate court. As stated, the rule merely reserves a lien on property. Under Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is an action which
right to the executor or administrator of an estate to redeem a mortgaged or pledged property of a decedent survives. Being so, the judgment rendered therein may be enforced by a writ of execution. In
which the mortgage or pledgee has opted to foreclose, instead of filing a money claim with the probate the case of Testamentaria de Don Amadeo Matute Olave vs. Canlas, the Court ruled that an
court, under said Section 7 of Rule 86. While the redemption is subject to the approval of the probate action to enforce a lien on property may be prosecuted by the interested person against the
court, the exercise of the right is discretionary upon the said executor or administrator and may not be executor or administrator independently of the testate or intestate proceedings "for the reason
ordered by the probate court upon its own motion. that such claims cannot in any just sense be considered claims against the estate, but the right
to subject specific property to the claim arises from the contract of the debtor whereby ha has
Facts: during life set aside certain property for its payment, and such property does not, except in so
The spouses Dominador and Adoration Danan constituted a mortgage over their fish-pond and far as its value may exceed the debt, belong to the estate.
residential lot, situated at Lubao, Pampanga, in favor of herein petitioners, spouses Benito Since the mortgaged property in question does not belong to the estate of the late Salvador
Manalansan and Ines Vitug-Manalansan, to guarantee the payment of the amount of Danan, according to the foregoing rule, the conclusion is reasonable that the probate court has
P62,574.80, within one (1) year, with 12% interest thereon, compound annually. As the no jurisdiction over the property in question, and that the respondent Judge had abused his
mortgagors did not pay notwithstanding demands, an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage discretion in delegating the execution of the judgment to the probate court.
was filed. The fact that the defendant Salvador Danan died before, and not after the decision of the Court
The trial court held judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants sentencing of Appeal became final and executory will not nullify the writ of execution already issued.
the latter to pay the former, jointly and severally, within a period of ninety (90) days from date, Thus, in Miranda, vs. Abbas, judgment was rendered two months before the death of the
the sum of P62,574.80 with interest at 12% compounded annually, from June 2, 1962 until the defendant. Since neither the defendant nor his heirs after his death appealed from the judgment,
full obligation is paid; to pay further the sum equivalent to ten (10) percentum of the amount the writ or execution was issued as a matter of course. The death of the defendant was
due and unpaid as attorney's fees, plus moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of communicated to the trial court six months after the decision had become final. The successors
suit. In the event that defendants shall fail to make payment within the period heretofore stated, of the decedent contended that the writ of execution issued was void because contrary to
Section 7, Rule 39, the defendant died before, not after, the entry of judgment. The Court that the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator
rejected the theory, saying: to pay it as an expense of administration.”
o We cannot accept this argument. The provision (Section 7 of Rule 39) relied upon In the instant case, no written petition has ever been filed by Atty. Luna and the interested
by the petitioners cannot be so construed as to invalidate the writ of execution parties had not been previously notified thereof nor of the hearing held by the court.
already issued in so far as service thereof upon the heirs or successors-in-interest of Consequently, the orders issued by the CFI (including all orders implementing the 1st order)
the defendant is concerned. It merely indicates against whom the writ of execution are null and void, as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.
is to be enforced when the losing party dies after the entry of judgment or order. The Court also finds that the order of execution is null and void, not only because it was
Nothing therein, nor in the entire Rule 39, to our mind, even as much as intimates intended to implement the 1st order, which in itself was null and void, but because a writ of
that a writ of execution issued after a party dies, which death occurs before entry of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the ROC for the payment of debts and
the judgment, is a nullity. The writ may yet be enforced against his executor or expenses of administration.
administrator, if there be any, or his successors-in-interest. o The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale
or mortgage of real property of the decease, and all debts or expenses of
23. Aldamiz v. Judge of CFI of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-2360, December 29, 1949 - Calantoc administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage. Such
order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administrator
Topic: Procedure on claims and with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the
Doctrine: The court procedure for the collection of attorney’s fees is for the counsel to request the Philippines.
administrator to make payment and file an action against him, in his personal capacity and not as an o Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into
administrator, should he fail to pay. If judgment is rendered against the administrator and he pays, he may possession of their respective portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment
include the fees so paid in his account to the court. The attorney also may, instead of bringing such an of the debts and expenses of administration, and it is later ascertained that there are
action, file a petition in the testate or intestate proceeding asking that the court, after notice to all persons such debts and expenses to be paid.
interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an expense of administration. Furthermore, as to the issue on laches, although it is true that Gavino failed to appeal the 1st
order within the time provided by the ROC, he cannot be considered as being guilty of laches.
Facts: Here, aside from Gavino, there are other interested parties who have never been notified of the
Santiago Aldamiz, the decedent, was a Spaniard and member of the commercial partnership order complained of, and as to them, said order has not yet become final and executory.
“Aldamiz y Rementeria.” The other members were the brothers, Gavino and Jose Aldamiz. o Even so, Gavino has not lost his appeal through his own negligence. When he
In 1937, Santiago died in Spain and probate proceedings were instituted. Gavino was appointed received notice of the order of the Court fixing Atty. Luna’s fees, he immediately
administrator and as such, he was represented by respondent Atty. Juan Luna. The latter then wrote his lawyer a letter asking for a substantial reduction and extension of time to
instituted testate proceedings for the estate of Santiago Aldamiz. pay. His lawyer, in fact, advised him through a letter that he file a motion for
After 10 years from the date of his appointment, Gavino, through Atty. Luna, submitted his reconsideration, but he received this letter after the 30-day period had expired.
accounts for the years 1944-1946 and also a project of partition with a view to close the testate
proceedings. The court approved the accounts but refused to approve the project of partition
unless all debts including attorney’s fees be first paid.
It is for this reason that Atty. Luna, without previously preparing and filing a written petition to
have his professional fees fixed, and without previous notice to all the interested parties,
submitted evidence of his services and professional standing so that the court may fix the
amount of his compensation, and the administrator to make payment thereof. The failure to file
a written claim and to notify the interested parties was, however, not due to bad faith or fraud,
but to an honest belief on the part of Atty. Luna that such requirements were not necessary
under the circumstances.
The Court issued an order (herein referred to as the “1st order”) awarding Atty. Luna, in
payment of his professional services, an amount of P28,000 in the following manner:
1. For the institution and preparation of the pleadings in the probate case, and for the
project of partition - P15,000;
2. For the registration of a parcel of land in favor of the estate - P5,000;
3. For 3 naturalization cases - P3,000; and
4. For services rendered in the deduction of inheritance tax - P5,000.
Gavino was able to pay P5,000 only, hence, Atty. Luna filed an ex-parte motion for execution
(again without notice to all interested parties), which was granted. 2 parcels of land belonging
to the commercial partnership “Aldamiz y Rementeria” were levied on execution and sold at a
public auction.
Issue:
W/N the order of the court fixing the amount of Luna’s attorney’s fees is null and void? - YES.
Ruling:
The court procedure for the collection of attorney’s fees is for the counsel to request the
administrator to make payment and file an action against him, in his personal capacity and not
as an administrator, should he fail to pay. If judgment is rendered against the administrator and
he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his account to the court. The attorney also may,
instead of bringing such an action, file a petition in the testate or intestate proceeding “asking
Rule 87 Doctrine: Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the
notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the
24. Melgar (Balla’s heirs) v. Hon. Buenviaje & Sps. Prades 179 S 196 - Caro decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.