Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility  Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and FACTS: 
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and  Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error
other persons acting in his behalf to:
because the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application
           1.       Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
           2.       Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that  For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

           1.       Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;  1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail
           2.       The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

 1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or him but process only established possessory title
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:  Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the operation
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end
ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.
that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony HELD: YES. Petition Granted.  
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.  Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.

 Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be
Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Carino V. Insular Government (1909)
sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription."  For cultivated

212 U.S. 449 February 23, 1909 land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.

Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds)


 Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him
or his father ever was made. 
 Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.
 There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims
property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent
contrary proof
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 2869            March 25, 1907
MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant,  thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Mateo Cariño, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of Land
Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are,
and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together with a house erected
thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as follows: On the north, in lines
running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cariño, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi;
on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales,
and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of
Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cariño
and Mayengmeng.
By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente
Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a
small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of land is
public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or through any
title of egresionfrom the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered its
judgment in these terms:
Therefore the court finds that Cariño and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and
adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cariño constructed the
house now there — that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cariño held possession for
some years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions
are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions, p.
15.)
The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the
following:
From the testimony given by Cariño as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the
Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cariño erected and utilized as a
domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question,
property which, according to the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property
belonging to Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cariño sold said house to one Cristobal
Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on the adjoining
property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a
place where the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had
lived . . ..
In or about the years 1898 Cariño abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the
property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house
indicated on the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the
property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)
1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial extension
of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such extension containing
40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition
is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a possessory information
under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same month and year; and,
according to such possessory information, the land therein described contains an extension of only 28
hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented
and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or running through its center from north to south, a
considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the said road, the west side, and which
could not have been included in the possessory information mentioned.
2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said possessory
information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the petitioner, all of which is
set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing," and
belongs to the class called public lands.
3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively belonged
to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by
private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. And there is no
evidence or proof of title of egresionof this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is
there any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. 4, The
possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in substitution for that of
adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last law or legal disposition of the
former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory information, the only thing that can be considered.
the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions Therefore, it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly
required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of in accordance with the law invoked herein.
cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without
interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the
9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same, according to
information and during the three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had
the testimony of Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From all of
been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the
which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this case on which
land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by the two witnesses to
judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner,
the possessory information for the following reason: Second, because the possessory information
Mateo Cariño. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in
authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for the
granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cariño and his children have already exceeded
purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish
such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the
Government and required and necessary at all times until the publication of said royal decree was
said Court of Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as
limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is as follows: " A period of one year, not
to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new laws.
to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory informations which are referred to in articles 19 and
20. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain
gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:
case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply
have rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of 1. In finding that Mateo Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed
five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;
only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with
common law."
2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the
contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be certain that he
was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government or State
could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following for example, if the Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as appears from After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be entered in
the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession as attested in the accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it
possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to show any right of came for proper action. So ordered.
ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty years from the
verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
and other conditions prescribe by this law. Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

6. The right of possession in accordance with common law — that is to say, civil law — remains at all
times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when
pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination thereof is
reversed to the government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of
distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time pass
to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal decree of February 13, 1894.

7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and
particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then
appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was reserved
to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, 1 and in
conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine Commission prescribing
rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648,2herein mentioned by the petitioner, in
connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded.

8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained in Act No.
190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period of
prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use thereof
from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining
title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.)
The land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an

Isagani Cruz vs Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the Republic Act No. 8371 or
the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral
domains which may include natural resources.
In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral
domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections
3(a) and 3(b) of said law also violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7
Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and
vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s
guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values,
petition was dismissed and the constitutionality of the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains
beliefs, their rights to their ancestral domains.
may include public domain – somehow against the regalian doctrine.
Republic Act No. 8371             October 29, 1997
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, CREATING A NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE,
ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997."
Section 2. Declaration of State Policies. - The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the
framework of the Constitution:
a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of
national unity and development;
b)The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their
economic, social and cultural well being and shall recognize the applicability of customary
laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domain;
c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop
their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of
national laws and policies;
d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally
enjoy the full measure of human rights and freedoms without distinctions or discriminations;
e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect
their rights and guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of
the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws
and regulations grant to other members of the population and
f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for
cultural integrity by assuring maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education,
health, as well as other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to render such services more responsive
to the needs and desires of these communities.
CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF TERMS
a) Ancestral Domains - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands,inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held
under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present
except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as
a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals, corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their
economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral land, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable
or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and
other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs
but from which their traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities,
particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and
utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership,continuously, to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a
consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential
lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots;
c) Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title - refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of
possession and ownership of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains identified and delineated
in accordance with this law;
d) Certificate of Ancestral Lands Title - refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands;
e) Communal Claims - refer to claims on land, resources and rights thereon, belonging to the
whole community within a defined territory
f) Customary Laws - refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and
practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective
ICCs/IPs;
g) Free and Prior Informed Consent - as used in this Act shall mean the consensus of all
members of the ICCs/IPs to; be determined in accordance with their respective customary
laws and practices, free from any external manipulation, interference and coercion, and
obtained after fully disclosing the intent and scope of the activity, in a language an process
understandable to the community;
h) Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples - refer to a group of people or
homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by other, who have
continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory,
and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed
customs, tradition and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and culture,
became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include
peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations
which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads
of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries,
who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but
who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled
outside their ancestral domains;
i) Indigenous Political Structure - refer to organizational and cultural leadership systems,
institutions, relationships, patterns and processed for decision-making and participation,
identified by ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited to, Council of Elders, Council of Timuays,
Bodong Holder, or any other tribunal or body of similar nature;
j) Individual Claims - refer to claims on land and rights thereon which have been devolved to
individuals, families and clans including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or
paddies and tree lots;
k) National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) - refers to the office created under this
Act, which shall be under the Office of the President, and which shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to recognize, protect and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs;
l) Native Title - refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as
memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never
been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest;
m) Nongovernment Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit voluntary organization that
has been organized primarily for the delivery of various services to the ICCs/IPs and has an
established track record for effectiveness and acceptability in the community where it serves;
n) People's Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit voluntary organization of members of
an ICC/IP which is accepted as representative of such ICCs/IPs;
o) Sustainable Traditional Resource Rights - refer to the rights of ICCs/IPs to sustainably
use,manage, protect and conserve a) land, air, water, and minerals; b) plants, animals and
other organisms; c) collecting, fishing and hunting grounds; d) sacred sites; and e) other areas
of economic, ceremonial and aesthetic value in accordance with their indigenous knowledge,
beliefs, systems and practices; and
p) Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain
ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a
defined territory devolved to them, by operation of customary law or inherited from their
ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions.
CHAPTER III 
RIGHTS TO ANCESTRAL DOMAINS
Section 4. Concept of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral lands/domains shall include such concepts
of territories which cover not only the physical environment but the total environment including the
spiritual and cultural bonds to the area which the ICCs/IPs possess, occupy and use and to which they
have claims of ownership.
Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership. - Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICC's/IP's
private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed
or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.
Section 6. Composition of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral lands and domains shall consist of all
areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs as referred under Sec. 3, items (a) and (b) of this Act.
Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. - The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs t their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:
a. Rights of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and
all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
b. Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to
manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities
for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the
natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
 exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the
ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they
sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to
prevent any interfere with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;
c. Right to Stay in the Territories- The right to stay in the territory and not be removed
therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor
through any means other than eminent domain. Where relocation is considered necessary as
an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with the free and prior informed
consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned and whenever possible, they shall be guaranteed the right
to return to their ancestral domains, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist.
When such return is not possible, as determined by agreement or through appropriate
procedures, ICCs/IPs shall be provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal
status at least equal to that of the land previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for
their present needs and future development. Persons thus relocated shall likewise be fully
compensated for any resulting loss or injury;
d. Right in Case of Displacement. - In case displacement occurs as a result of natural
catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas
where they can have temporary life support system: Provided, That the displaced ICCs/IPs
shall have the right to return to their abandoned lands until such time that the normalcy and
safety of such lands shall be determined: Provided, further, That should their ancestral
domain cease to exist and normalcy and safety of the previous settlements are not possible,
displaced ICCs/IPs shall enjoy security of tenure over lands to which they have been resettled:
Provided, furthermore, That basic services and livelihood shall be provided to them to ensure
that their needs are adequately addressed:
e. Right to Regulate Entry of Migrants. - Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into the domains;
f. Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water. - For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to
integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;
g. Right to Claim Parts of Reservations. - The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains
which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for
common and public welfare and service; and
h. Right to Resolve Conflict. - Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws
of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be
submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary.
Section 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands. - The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs, to their
ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a. Right to transfer land/property. - Such right shall include the right to transfer land or
property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and
traditions of the community concerned.
b. Right to Redemption. - In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights
by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted
by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs,or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration
or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not
exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer.
Section 9. Responsibilities of ICCs/IPs to their Ancestral Domains. - ICCs/IPs occupying a duly certified
ancestral domain shall have the following responsibilities:
a. Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced ecology in the
ancestral domain by protecting the flora and fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;
b. Restore Denuded Areas- To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the reforestation
of denuded areas and other development programs and projects subject to just and
reasonable remuneration; and
c. Observe Laws- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act and the rules and
regulations for its effective implementation.
Section 10. Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion. - Unauthorized and unlawful intrusion upon, or use of
any portion of the ancestral domain, or any violation of the rights herein before enumerated, shall be
punishable under this law. Furthermore, the Government shall take measures to prevent non-ICCs/IPs
from taking advantage of the ICCs/IPs customs or lack of understanding of laws to secure ownership,
possession of land belonging to said ICCs/IPs.
Section 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. - The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the
title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.
Section 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the
Land Registration Act 496. - Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to individually-
owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in -interest, have been in
continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since the immemorial or for
a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral
lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually
used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of
eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this Section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval of
this Act
Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997
FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998.
Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution
prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of
the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in
violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential
right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and
utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles
of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be
doubted.
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185,
2016-08-16
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely:
Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed
their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the
equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and
lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid
and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the General Welfare
Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of
pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial
drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated
only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.[22] It
declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and
oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the
environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban
against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.
Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds
for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on
aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month
transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the
maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers... the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be
appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their
exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically
the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the
City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line
separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local
legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police power, the
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives
of the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police
powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution;
the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive due process requires that a
valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's action.[113] This means that in
exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact
the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate
public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without
unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of
the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking
without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory
if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection
secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's
duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.
[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all
members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein.
Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and
the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial
spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all
persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes
inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does
the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?We
answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift
that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and
to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance
seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the
classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to
eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end
appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of
the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit;
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring
Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
G.R. No.s 171947-48, December 18, 2008
Concerned Citizens vs MMDA
Facts:
January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC Imus, Cavite
against several government agencies for the clean-up, rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay/
The complaint alleged that the water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the allowable standards
set by law (esp. PD 1152, Philippine environment Code).
DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples collected from the beaches around
Manila Bay is beyond the safe level for bathing standard of the DENR. MWSS testified also about MWSS
efforts to reduce pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports Authority presented as evidence its
Memorandum Circulars on the study on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal as its Linis Dagat
project.
RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of the specific
pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Raising the concerns of lack of funds
appropriated for cleaning, and asserting that the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial act which can be
compelled by mandamus.
CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do tasks outside of their usual
basic functions.
Issue:
(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents.
(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not ministerial act of petitioners that can
be compelled by mandamus.
Held:
(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus.
Petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry
out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s
mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of
doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated; discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.
(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree
where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such
measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality
standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and
clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses
incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such
pollution.
Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves
to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the
contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as
water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” This
section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, “to take such
measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards.” In fine, the underlying
duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
Note:
- The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. Ministerial duty is one that
requires neither official discretion nor judgment.
G.R. No. 137174               July 10, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD (DENR) vs.
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION
FACTS:
Respondent MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings sea disposal system. In the
meantime, the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) was abolished by EO No. 192 dated June
10, 1987, and its powers and functions were integrated into the Environmental Management Bureau and
into the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB).
On April 11, 1988, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as Chairman of the PAB, issued an Order directing
MMC to "cease and desist from discharging mine tailings into Calancan Bay." This was appealed by the
MMC with the Office of the President (OP).
In line with the directive from the OP, the Calancan Bay Rehabilitation Project (CBRP) was created, and
MMC remitted the amount of P30,000.00 a day, starting from May 13, 1988 to the Ecology Trust Fund
(ETF) thereof. However, on June 30, 1991, MMC stopped discharging its tailings in the Bay, hence, it
likewise ceased from making further deposits to the ETF.
The PAB sought for the enforcement of the order issued by the OP, however, the CA acted on
Marcopper’s petition and ordered the PAB to refrain and desist from enforcing aforesaid Order.
Hence, the instant petition.

HELD:

ISSUE:
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Republic Act No. 7942 repealed the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, with respect to the power and function of
petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board to issue, renew or deny permits for the discharge of the mine
tailings.
HELD:
The SC held that the CA erred in ruling that the PAB had no authority to issue the Order from the
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It
is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot
be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general
law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which
grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PAB has been divested of authority to act on pollution-related
matters in mining operations is anchored on the provisions of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995). Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code
However, Section 19 of EO 192 vested the PAB with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD 984 defines the term "pollution" as referring to any alteration of the
physical, chemical and biological properties of any water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines , or
any discharge thereto of any liquid, gaseous or solid wastes as will or is likely to create a harmful
environment.

On the other hand, the authority of the mines regional director is complementary to that of the PAB.
While the mines regional director has express administrative and regulatory powers over mining
operations and installations, it has no adjudicative powers over complaints for violation of pollution
control statutes and regulations. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, RA 7942 does not vest quasi-judicial
powers in the Mines Regional Director. The authority is vested and remains with the PAB. Neither was
such authority conferred upon the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board which were
created by the said law. The scope of authority of the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication
Board conferred by RA 7942 clearly exclude adjudicative responsibility over pollution cases.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction

GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was
granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project
or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens,
fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region
interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits
for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?