LAND  CLASSIFICATION  CASE  DIGEST  

 
(EDITED  BY:  ALYSSA  AFRICA)  
 
SUBMITTED  TO:  
 
ATTY.  ERWIN  TIAMSON  
 
SUBMITTED  BY:  
 
AGTARAP,  ALEXIS  S.  (CASES  1  AND  2)  
TAPALES,  CHARMAINE  JILL  C.  (CASES  3  AND  4)  
COMON,  DIANNE  G.  (CASES  5  AND  6)  
CABBUAG,  JAYTRICH  L.  (CASES  7  AND  8)  
BILLONES,  ZANDALEE  R.  (CASES  9  AND  10)  
ARCOL,  VOLTERE  EDMARK  (CASES  11  AND  12)  
DELA  CRUZ,  ARIS  C.  (CASES  13  AND  14)  
CORPUZ,  MA.  VISITACION  C.  (CASES  15  AND  16)  
VALERIO,  MARY  KAYE  C.  (CASES  17  AND  18)  
PERLAS,  VAN  REGINE  L.  (CASES  19  AND  20)  
GUEVARA,  RON  JASON  A.  (CASES  21  AND  22)  
ELAURIA,  MARIA  CARLOTA  R.  (CASES  23  AND  24)  
SERRANO,  YVETTE  P.  (CASES  25  AND  26)  
SARSOSA,  ROCHELLE  MARIE  S.  (CASES  27  AND  28)  
BAGALANON,  KIRK  JOSEPH  (CASES  29  AND  30)  
 
 
 
 
 
REGALIAN  DOCTRINE  
 
1.    Johnson  &  Graham's  Lessee  v.  McIntosh  (1823)  
 
Facts:    
Two  grants  were  conveyed,  one  in  1773  and  the  other  in  1775,  by  the  chiefs  
of  the  Illinois  and  Piankeshaw  nations  to  petitioner  Johnson  who  claimed  title  to  the  
property.  Petitioner  contends  superior  title  because  his  title  came  directly  from  the  
Indian  nations  who  owned  the  land,  while  defendant  McIntosh  claims  superior  title  
due  to  a  direct  conveyance  from  the  United  States  government.    
Issue:  
Whether  or  not  a  title  conveyed  by  the  Native  Americans  can  be  recognized  
by  the  Federal  Courts.  
Held:  
No,   a   title   conveyed   by   the   Native   Americans   cannot   be   recognized   by   the  
Federal  Courts.  Title  to  lands  is  and  must  be  admitted  to  depend  entirely  on  the  law  
of  the  nation  in  which  they  lie.    
Discovery   of   America   by   Great   Britain   gave   them   the   exclusive   right   to   settle,  
possess,  and  govern  the  new  land,  and  the  absolute  title  to  the  soil,  subject  to  certain  
rights  of  occupancy  of  the  Native  Indians.  By  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  the  
United   States,   the   powers   of   government,   and   the   right   to   the   soil,   passed   to   the  
United  States,  subject  only  to  the  Indian  right  of  occupancy,  and  the  exclusive  power  
to  extinguish  that  right  was  vested  in  that  government  which  might  constitutionally  
exercise  it.  
Conquest  gives  a  title  that  the  Courts  of  the  conqueror  cannot  deny,  respecting  the  
original  justice  of  the  claim  that  has  been  successfully  asserted.    
2.    Mateo  Carino    vs.  The  Insular  Government  (1907)  
Facts:  
In   1904,   appellant   Mateo   Cariño   filed   his   petition   in   the   Court   of   Land  
Registration  praying  that  title  to  a  parcel  of  land  consisting  of  40  hectares,  1  are,  and  
13   centares,   situated   in   the   town   of   Baguio,   Province   of   Benguet,   together   with   a  
house  erected  thereon  be  granted  to  him.  The  court  of  Land  Registration  adjudged  
the  property  in  question  to  be  public  land.  
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  the  subject  property  is  a  public  land.  
 
Held:  
Yes,  the  subject  property  which  the  petitioner  claims  title  thereto  is  a  public  
land.   The   land   mentioned   in   possessory   information   is   "used   for   pasture   and  
sowing,"  and  belongs  to  the  class  called  public  lands.  Under  the  express  provisions  
of  law,  a  parcel  of  land,  being  of  common  origin,  presumptively  belonged  to  the  State  
during   its   sovereignty,   and,   in   order   to   perfect   the   legitimate   acquisition   of   such  
land  by  private  persons,  it  was  necessary  that  the  possession  of  the  same  pass  from  
the  State.    
There  is  no  evidence  or  proof  of  title  of  egresion  of  this  land  from  the  domain  
of   the   Spanish   Government,   nor   is   there   any   possessory   information   equivalent   to  
title  by  composicion  or  under  agreement.  Sections  12  and  13  of  the  act  of  Congress  
of   July   1,   1902,   reserved   to   the   Government   the   alienation   of   public   lands.   This   is  
also   in   conformity   with   other   laws   enacted   under   this   act   of   Congress   by   the  
Philippine  Commission  prescribing  rules  for  the  execution  thereof,  one  of  which  is  
Act   No.   648,   herein   mentioned   by   the   petitioner,   in   connection   with   Act   No.   627,  
which  appears  to  be  the  law  upon  which  the  petition  herein  is  founded.  But  said  act  
admits  such  prescription  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  title  and  ownership  to  lands  
"not   exceeding   more   that   sixteen   hectares   in   extent."   (Sec.   6   of   said   act.)  
Considering   the   intention   of   Congress   in   granting   ownership   and   title   to   16  
hectares,  that  Mateo  Cariño  and  his  children  have  already   exceeded  such  amount  
in  various  acquirements  of  lands,  all  of  which  is  shown  in  different  cases  decided  by  
the  said  Court  of  Land  Registration,  donations  or  gifts  of  land  that  could  only  have  
been  made  efficacious  as  to  the  conveyance  thereof  with  the  assistance  of  these  new  
laws.  
   
3.  Mateo  Carino  vs  Insular  Government  of  the  Philippines  (1909)  
 
Facts:      
Carino  is  an  Igorot  in  the  province  of  Benguet.  Carino  and  his  ancestors  had  
held  the  land  as  owners  since  time  immemorial.  He  is  recognized  as  owners  by  the  
Igorots  and  he  inherited  the  land  from  his  father  in  accordance  with  Igorot  customs.  
No  document  of  title  was  issued  from  the  Spanish  Crown.  The  government  has  taken  
possession   of   the   property   for   public   and   military   purposes.   The   position   of   the  
government   is   that,   Spain   assumed,   asserted   and   had   title   to   all   the   land   in   the  
Philippines   except   so   far   as   it   saw   fit   to   permit   private   titles   to   be   acquired.   The  
Supreme  Court  denied  Carino  of  his  claim  and  ruled  in  favor  of  the  government  and  
the  case  was  brought  to  US  Supreme  Court  by  writ  of  error.  
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  Carino  is  the  rightful  owner  of  the  land.  
 
Held:    
Yes,   US   Supreme   Court   reversed   the   decision   of   the   Philippine   Supreme  
Court   and   granted   Carino   ownership   over   the   land.   Justice   Holmes   delivered   the  
opinion  of  “native  title”  to  valid  land  rights  established  by  testimonies  or  memories  
on   land   that   has   been   held,   occupied   and   utilized   in   ownership   since   time  
immemorial  by  indigenous  populations.  The  decree  of  June  25,  1880  made  Carino’s  
father   the   legal   owner   of   the   land   when   it   declared   that   those   who   have   been   in  
possession   for   20   years   (cultivated   land)   or   30   years   (uncultivated   land)   shall   be  
deemed   owners.   In   addition,   Benguet   was   inhabited   by   a   tribe,   characterized   as   a  
savage   tribe   and   was   never   brought   under   the   civil   or   military   government   of   the  
Spanish  Crown.  
 
   
4.  Cruz  vs  DENR  Secretary  (2000)  
Facts:    
Isagani  Cruz  and  Cesar  Europa  brought  the  suit  to  assail  the  constitutionality  
of  the  IPRA  law  which  grants  the  Indigenous  People  (IP)  or  the  Indigenous  Cultural  
Communities   (ICC)   the   ownership   and   possession   of   their   ancestral   domains   and  
ancestral   lands.   They   positioned   that   the   IPRA   law   amounts   to   an   unlawful  
deprivation   of   the   State’s   ownership   over   lands   of   public   domain   as   well   as   the  
natural  resources  therein,  in  violation  of  the  regalian  doctrine.  The  respondents  and  
interveners  defended  the  constitutionality  of  the  IPRA  law  by  asserting  that  it  is  an  
expression  of  the  principle  of  parens  patriae  and  that  the  State  has  the  responsibility  
to  protect  and  guarantee  the  rights  of  those  who  are  at  a  serious  disadvantage.  
Issue:  Whether  or  not  the  IPRA  law  is  unconstitutional.  
Held:    
The   petition   was   dismissed.   The   necessary   majority   (7-­‐7)   was   not   obtained  
even   after   deliberation.   Justices   Puno,   Vitug,   Kapunan,   Mendoza   and   Panganiban  
gave  their  separate  opinions:  
PUNO:  
The   non-­‐inclusion   of   ownership   by   the   ICCs/IPs   over   the   natural   resources   in  
Section   7(a)   complies   with   the   Regalian   doctrine.   Section   1   of   the   Implementing  
Rules   gives   the   ICCs/IPs   rights   of   ownership   over   "lands,   waters   and   natural  
resources."  The  term  "natural  resources"  is  not  one  of  those  expressly  mentioned  in  
Section  7  (a)  of  the  law.  Our  Constitution  and  jurisprudence  clearly  declare  that  the  
right   to   claim   ownership   over   land   does   not   necessarily   include   the   right   to   claim  
ownership   over   the   natural   resources   found   on   or   under   the   land.   The   IPRA   itself  
makes  a  distinction  between  land  and  natural  resources.  Section  7  (a)  speaks  of  the  
right  of  ownership  only  over  the  land  within  the  ancestral  domain.  It  is  Sections  7  
(b)  and  57  of  the  law  that  speak  of  natural  resources,  do  not  give  the  ICCs/IPs  the  
right   of   ownership   over   these   resources.   The   ICCs/IPs'   rights   over   the   natural  
resources  take  the  form  of  management  or  stewardship.  
Justice  Puno  vote  to  uphold  the  constitutionality  of  the  Indigenous  Peoples  Rights  
Act  of  1997.  
 
VITUG:  
The  provisions  of  IPRA,  in  their  totality,  are,  in  my  view,  beyond  the  context  of  the  
fundamental  law  and  virtually  amount  to  an  undue  delegation,  if  not  an  
unacceptable  abdication,  of  State  authority  over  a  significant  area  of  the  country  and  
its  patrimony.  I  vote  to  grant  the  petition.  
 
 
   
DOJ  OPINION  
 
5.    OPINION  NO.  023,  Series  of  1995  
 
Issue:   Whether   the   prohibition   in   Section   4(a)   of   R.A.   No.   6657   ("Comprehensive  
Agrarian   Reform   Law   [CARL]   of   1988")   against   the   reclassification   of   forest   lands  
applies  to  "unclassified  public  forest".  
 
This   Department's   aforesaid   opinion   is   based   on   the   premise   that   since   the   CARL  
made   reference   to   "forest   lands"   without   any   qualification   and   considering   that  
"forest  lands"  under  the  Revised  Forestry  Code  (P.D.  No.  705,  as  amended)  include  
public   forest,   forest   reserves   and   permanent   forest,   the   prohibition   against   the  
reclassification  of  "forest  lands"  under  the  CARL  should  apply  to  unclassified  public  
forest.  
 
Held:    
By   way   of   reconsideration,   however,   you   request   us   to   take   a   second   look  
stating  that  under  the  Revised  Forestry  Code,  the  term  "public  forest"  refers  to  the  
mass  of  the  public  domain  which  has  not  been  the  subject  of  the  present  system  of  
classification   for   the   determination   of   which   lands   are   needed   for   forest   purposes  
and  which  are  not,  and  that  our  Opinion  No.  169,  s.  1993  could  not  have  obviously  
treated   unclassified   public   forest   "as   being   included   in   the   prohibition   under   the  
CARL"   which   is   a   prohibition   against   a   reclassification   of   forest   lands,   and   not  
against  a  classification  in  the  first  instance".  
 
Section  4(a)  of  the  CARL  provides  a  prohibition  on  the  reclassification  of  forest  
lands  (or  mineral  lands)  to  agricultural  lands  until  after  Congress  shall  have,  by  law,  
determined  the  specific  limits  of  the  public  domain.  
 
Indeed,  the  key  word  to  the  correct  application  of  the  prohibition  in  Section  4(a)  is  
the   word   "reclassification".   Where   there   has   been   no   previous   classification   of  
public  forest  [referring,  we  repeat,  to  the  mass  of  the  public  domain  which  has  not  
been  the  subject  of  the  present  system  of  classification  for  purposes  of  determining  
which  are  needed  for  forest  purposes  and  which  are  not]  into  permanent  forest  or  
forest   reserves   or   some   other   forest   uses   under   the   Revised   Forestry   Code,   there  
can  be  no  "reclassification  of  forest  lands"  to  speak  of  within  the  meaning  of  Section  
4(a).  
 
Thus,   obviously,   the   prohibition   in   Section   4(a)   of   the   CARL   against   the  
reclassification   of   forest   lands   to   agricultural   lands   without   a   prior   law   delimiting  
the   limits   of   the   public   domain,   does   not,   and   cannot,   apply   to   those   lands   of   the  
public   domain,   denominated   as   "public   forest"   under   the   Revised   Forestry   Code,  
which   have   not   been   previously   determined,   or   classified,   as   needed   for   forest  
purposes  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Revised  Forestry  Code.  
 
   
SUB-­  CLASSIFICATION  OF  AGRICULTURAL  LAND  
 
OLD  RULINGS  
6.  Jones  vs  Insular  Government  (1906)  
 
Facts:  
On  the  16th  day  of  January  1904,  F.  Stewart  Jones  filed  a  petition  to  the  Court  
of   Land   Registration   that   a   certain   tract   of   land   in   the   Province   of   Benguet   be  
registered   in   his   name.   The   Solicitor-­‐General,   however,   opposed   the   inscription  
upon  the  ground  that  the  property  was  a  public  land.  Jones  objected  that  the  court  
had  no  jurisdiction  to  register  the  land  situated  in  that  reservation  because  Act  No.  
1224   deprived   the   said   court   of   jurisdiction   over   lands   situated   in   the   Province   of  
Benguet.   Then   according   to   Act   No.   648,   the   Civil   Governor   can   reserve   from  
settlement   or   public   sale   any   public   domain   not   being   directed   by   law;   and   that   it  
shall   be   the   duty   of   the   court   to   issue   notice   to   claims   for   all   private   lands   be  
presented   for   the   Land   Registration   Act   within   six   months,   otherwise   it   would  
forever  be  barred.  Subsequently,  a  letter  by  Governor  Taft  was  directed  to  the  Judge  
of   the   Court   of   Land   Registration,   which   requested   that   the   land   mentioned   be  
brought   under   the   operation   of   the   Land   Registration   Act,   and   in   accordance   with  
the  provisions  and  limitations  of  Act  No.  648.  
 
Issue:  Whether  the  land  in  question  be  registered  in  the  name  of  Jones  
 
Held:  
Yes.   Section12   of   Act   No.   648   reposed   to   the   Government   of   the   Philippine  
Islands   the   power   to   dispose   land,   including   all   public   lands,   subject   to   limitations  
also  mentioned  in  Section  13  of  the  same  Act,  with  the  general  purpose  to  require  
the  Government  to  classify  lands  and  to  pass  a  homestead  law  —  that  is,  a  law  which  
would  state  the  rules  and  regulations  by  virtue  of  which  title  to  the  public  lands  of  
which  it  can  be  decided  in  every  case  whether  an  act  of  the  Commission  constitutes  
a  rule  or  regulation  within  the  Act’s  meaning.  It  authorized  the  Government  of  the  
Philippine   Islands   to   classify   lands   according   to   its   agricultural   character   and  
productiveness,  and  shall  immediately  make  rules  and  regulations  for  the  lease,  sale,  
or   other   disposition   of   the   public   lands,   with   the   exclusion   of   timber   and   mineral  
lands,  and  that  it  shall  not  exceed  16  hectares.  
Section   14,   on   the   other   hand,   is   not   limited   to   agricultural   lands,   as   are  
sections   13   and   15.   It   includes   mineral   and   timber   lands.   So   far   as   it   relates   to  
proceedings   theretofore   taken   under   Spanish   laws   its   benefits   are   not   limited   to  
natives  of  the  Islands  nor  to  tracts  not  more  than  16  hectares  in  extent.  Where  the  
only   claim   is   possession,   no   possession   for   any   definite   time   prior   to   August   13,  
1898,  is  required,  nor  is  proof  of  any  possession  whatever  after  that  date  demanded.    
It   is   of   the   court’s   opinion   that   the   authority   given   by   the   Commission   to  
issue   to   a   native   a   patent   for   16   hectares   of   land   of   which   he   was   in   possession  
during   the   month   of   August,   1898,   was   intended   to   limit   the   general   power   of  
control  which  by  section  12  is  given  to  the  Commission.  
   
7.  Mapa  vs.  Insular  Government  (1908)  
 
Facts:  
  Cirilo  Mapa  sought  to  have  registered  a  tract  of  land  of  about  16  hectares  in  
extent.  Judgment  was  rendered  in  his  favor  and  the  Government  appealed.  Evidence  
adduced   that   the   land   in   question   is   lowland,   and   has   been   uninterruptedly,   for  
more  than  twenty  years,  in  the  possession  of  Mapa  and  his  ancestors  as  owners  and  
the  same  has  been  used  during  the  said  period,  and  up  to  the  present,  as  fish  ponds,  
nipa  lands,  and  salt  deposits.    
 
Issue:   Whether   or   not   the   land   in   controversy   is   agricultural   land   within   the  
meaning  of  Act  No.  926  section  54.  
 
Held:  
  Yes.  The  phrase  "agricultural  land"  as  used  in  Act  No.  926  means  those  public  
lands  acquired  from  Spain  which  are  not  timber  or  mineral  lands.  The  question  as  to  
whether   the   lands   there   involved   were   or   were   not   agricultural   lands   within   the  
meaning  of  the  sections  was  neither  discussed  nor  decided.  In  fact,  it  appears  from  
the   decision   that   those   lands   were   within   the   strictest   definition   of   the   phrase  
"agricultural   lands."   It   appears   that   such   lands   had   been   cultivated   for   more   than  
twenty  years.  
 
   
8.  Government  of  the  Philippine  Islands  vs.  Abella  (1926)  
 
Facts:  
  On  September  21,  1915,  Maria  del  Rosario  presented  a  petition  in  the  Court  
of  First  Instance  for  the  registration  under  the  Torrens  system,  of  the  very  land  now  
in  question.    The  judge  denied  the  registration  of  the  entire  northern  portion  of  the  
land  upon  the  ground  that  said  portion  was  more  valuable  for  timber  purposes  than  
for  agricultural  purposes.  
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  said  portion  was  for  timber  purposes.  
 
Held:  
  Yes.   The   Supreme   Court   after   a   consideration   of   the   evidence   affirmed   the  
decision  of  the  lower  court.  In  the  course  of  that  decision  the  Supreme  Court  said:  
"We  have  examined  the  plans  and  all  the  evidence  presented  in  this  case  and  are  of  
the  opinion  that  the  trial  court  was  correct  in  its  declaration  that  this  did  not  mean  
the  old  road  to  Boñgabon.  The  fact  that  nearly  all  the  northern  property  is  forestry  
land  is  a  further  indication  that  the  applicant's  possessory  information  title  did  not  
include  the  land  running  up  to  the  road  to  Bongabon,  because  all  the  papers  which  
the  applicant  has  regarding  this  property  call  the  land  palayero."    
 
   
9.  Cornelio  Ramos  vs.  Director  of  Lands  (1918)  
 
Facts:  
In  1907,  Cornelio  Ramos  bought  a  parcel  of  land  (Parcel  No.1)  from  Restituto  
Romero   who   gained   possession   of   a   considerable   tract   of   land   in   San   Jose,   Nueva  
Ecija   in   the   year   1882,   and   obtained   a   possessory   information   titled   to   the   land,  
registered   as   such   sometime   in   1896,   by   taking   advantage   of   the   Royal   Decree   of  
February   13,1894.   Ramos   instituted   appropriate   proceedings   to   have   his   title  
registered  before  the  CFI  of  Nueva  Ecija,  but  was  opposed  by  the  Director  of  Lands  
on   the   ground   that   Ramos   has   not   acquired   a   good   title   from   the   Spanish  
government  and  by  the  Director  of  Forestry  on  the  ground  that  the  first  parcel  was  
forest  land.      
 
Issues:    
1. Whether  or  not  the  actual  occupancy  of  a  part  of  the  land  gives  color  of  title  
sufficient  to  prove  title  to  the  entire  tract  of  land.  
2. Whether  or  not  the  land  in  question  is  a  forest  land.  
 
Held:    
Yes,   because   of   the   doctrine   of   constructive   possession.   The   general   rule   is  
that  the  possession  and  cultivation  of  a  portion  of  a  tract  under  claim  of  ownership  
of   all   is   a   constructive   possession   of   all,   if   the   remainder   is   not   in   the   adverse  
possession  of  another.  It  should  be  noted  that  Ramos  and  his  predecessor  in  interest  
fulfilled  the  requirements  of  the  law  on  the  supposition  that  the  premises  consisted  
of  agricultural  public  land.    It  was  said  that  the  phrase  "agricultural  public  lands"  as  
used   in   Act   No.   926   means   "those   public   lands   acquired   from   Spain   which   are   not  
timber  or  mineral  lands."    
No,   because   the   presumption   should   be,   in   lieu   of   contrary   proof   that   the  
land  in  question  is  agricultural  in  nature.  When  the  claim  of  the  citizen  and  the  claim  
of   the   Government   as   to   a   particular   piece   of   property   collide,   if   the   Government  
desires   to   demonstrate   that   the   land   is   in   reality   a   forest,   the   Director   of   Forestry  
should  submit  to  the  court  convincing  proof  that  the  land  is  not  more  valuable  for  
agricultural   than   for   forest   purposes.   But   a   mere   formal   opposition   on   the   part   of  
the   Attorney-­‐General   for   the   Director   of   Forestry,   unsupported   by   satisfactory  
evidence  will  not  stop  the  courts  from  giving  title  to  the  claimant.  
   
10.    Ankron  vs.  Government  of  the  Philippine  Islands  (1919)  

Facts:    
Ankron   filed   an   action   in   the   CFI   of   Davao   to   register   under   the   Torrens  
system  a  certain  parcel  of  land  situated,  bounded  and  particularly  described  in  the  
plan  and  technical  description  attached  to  the  complaint.  The  Director  of  Lands,  as  
the   oppositor,   alleged   that   the   land   in   question   was   the   property   of   the   U.S.  
government   under   the   control   and   administration   of   the   Government   of   the  
Philippine  Islands.  Hon.  Francisco  Soriano  said  that  the  land  has  been  cultivated  and  
planted   for   more   than   44   years   prior   to   the   decision.   It   was   formerly   occupied   by  
Moros,  Mansacas,  and  others  but  they  sold,  transferred,  and  conveyed  all  their  right,  
title  and  interest  to  the  applicant,  and  that  the  possession  under  claim  of  ownership  
of   the   applicant   and   his   predecessors   in   interest   was   shown   to   have   been   open,  
notorious,   actual,   public   and   continuous   for   more   than   44   years   past.   The   CFI  
rendered   a   decision   in   favor   of   Ankron,   subject   to   the   right   of   the   government   to  
open  a  road  thereon  in  the  manner  and  conditions  mentioned  in  said  decision  which  
includes   Ankron’s   consent,   and   that   the   opening   of   the   said   road   should   be   15  
meters  wide.    
 
Issues:  
1. Whether   or   not   Ankron   failed   to   prove   his   possession   and   occupation   in  
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  par.6,  Section  54  of  Act  No.926.  
2. Whether  or  not  the  land  in  question  can  be  registered  in  accordance  with  the  
existing  Land  Registration  Law  for  the  reason  that  they  are  manglares.  
Held:  
No,   because   the   important   requisites   for   registration   of   land   imposed   by  
par.6,  Section  54  of  Act  No.926  are  (a)  that  the  land  shall  be  agricultural  public  land  
as  defined  by  the  Act  of  Congress  of  July  1,  1902;  (b)  that  the  petitioner,  by  himself  
or   his   predecessors   in   interest,   shall   have   been   in   the   open,   continuous,   exclusive  
and   notorious   possession   and   occupation   of   the   same   under   a   bona   fide   claim   of  
ownership   for   a   period   of   ten   years   next   preceding   the   taking   effect   of   said   Act.  
Ankron  proved  that  the  land  in  question  is  an  agricultural  land,  and  that  he  and  his  
predecessors  in  interest  had  occupied  the  same  as  owners  in  good  faith  for  a  period  
of   more   than   40   years   prior   to   the   commencement   of   the   present   action.   Hence,  
par.6,   Section   54   of   Act   No.926     has   been   fully   complied   with   and   therefore,   the  
applicant  is  entitled  to  have  his  land  registered  under  the  Torrens  system.  
Yes,  par.6,  Section  54  of  Act  No.926  926  only  permits  the  registration,  under  
the   conditions   therein   mentioned,   of   "public   agricultural   lands."   The   fact   that   the  
land   is   a  manglar  [mangrove   swamp]   is   not   sufficient   for   the   courts   to   decide  
whether  it  is  agricultural,  forestry,  or  mineral  land.  It  may  perchance  belong  to  one  
or  the  other  of  said  classes  of  land.  The  Government,  in  the  first  instance,  under  the  
provisions   of   Act   No.   1148,   may,   by   reservation,   decide   for   itself   what   portions   of  
public   land   shall   be   considered   forestry   land,   unless   private   interests   have  
intervened  before  such  reservation  is  made.  
   
11.  The  Director  of  Forestry  vs.  Ruperto  A.  Villareal  (1989)  
 
Facts:      
Ruperto  Villareal  applied  for  the  registration  of  a  land  consisting  of  178,113  
square  meters  of  mangrove  swamps  located  in  the  municipality  of  Sapian,  Capiz.  He  
alleged  that  he  and  his  predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest  had  been  in  possession  of  the  land  
for  more  than  forty  years.  When  the  application  was  approved  by  the  Court  of  First  
Instance   and   which   decision   as   affirmed   by   the   Court   of   Appeals,   The   Director   of  
Forestry   filed   a   petition   for   review   on  certiorari  claiming   that   the   land   in   dispute  
was  forestal  in  nature  and  not  subject  to  private  appropriation  
Issue:  Whether  or  not  mangrove  swamps,  or  manglares  are  legally  classified  as  part  
of  our  public  forest  lands.  
Held:   No.   Mangrove   swamps   or   manglares  should   be   understood   as   comprised  
within  the  public  forests  of  the  Philippines  as  defined  in  the  aforecited  Section  1820  
of  the  Administrative  Code  of  1917.  The  legislature  having  so  determined,  we  have  
no  authority  to  ignore  or  modify  its  decision,  and  in  effect  veto  it,  in  the  exercise  of  
our  own  discretion.  The  statutory  definition  remains  unchanged  to  date  and,  no  less  
noteworthy,  is  accepted  and  invoked  by  the  executive  department.  
It  follows  from  all  this  that  the  land  under  contention  being  admittedly  a  part  
of  the  mangrove  swamps  of  Sapian,  and  for  which  a  minor  forest  license  had  in  fact  
been   issued   by   the   Bureau   of   Forestry   from   1920   to   1950,   it   must   be   considered  
forest   land.   It   could   therefore   not   be   the   subject   of   the   adverse   possession   and  
consequent   ownership   claimed   by   the   private   respondent   in   support   of   his  
application   for   registration.   To   be   so,   it   had   first   to   be   released   as   forest   land   and  
reclassified  as  agricultural  land  pursuant  to  the  certification  the  Director  of  Forestry  
may  issue  under  Section  1827  of  the  Revised  Administrative  Code.  
The   decision   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   is   set   aside   and   the   application   for  
registration  of  title  of  private  respondent  is  dismissed.  
 
   
NEW  RULINGS  
12.    DENR  et  al  vs.  Yap  et  al.  (2008)  
 
FACTS:    
On   November   10,   1978,   President   Marcos   issued   Proc.   No.   1801   declaring  
Boracay   Island   as   part   of   tourist   zones   and   marine   reserves   under   the  
administration  of  the  Philippine  Tourism  Authority.  
Claiming  that  the  Proclamation  precluded  them  from  filing  an  application  for  
judicial   confirmation   of   imperfect   title   or   survey   of   land   for   titling   purposes,  
respondents-­‐claimants   Mayor   Yap,   Jr.,   et   al.   filed   a   petition   alleging   that   Proc.   No.  
1801   raised   doubts   on   their   right   to   secure   titles   over   their   occupied   lands.   They  
declared  that  they  themselves,  or  through  their  predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest,  had  been  
in  open,  continuous,  exclusive,  and  notorious  possession  and  occupation  in  Boracay  
since   June   12,   1945,   or   earlier   since   time   immemorial.   Respondents-­‐claimants  
posited  that  Proclamation  No.  1801  did  not  place  Boracay  beyond  the  commerce  of  
man  since  having  classified  Boracay  as  a  tourist  zone,  it  was  susceptible  of  private  
ownership.    
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  Boracay  is  susceptible  of  private  ownership.  
   
Held:  
No,   Boracay   is   not   susceptible   to   private   ownership   as   it   is   an   unclassified  
land  of  the  public  domain  prior  to  Proclamation  No.  1064.  Prior  to  Proclamation  No.  
1064   of   May   22,   2006,   Boracay   Island   had   never   been   expressly   and  
administratively   classified   under   any   category   of   land.   In   keeping   with   the  
presumption   of   State   ownership,   a   positive   act   of   the   government   such   as   a  
presidential   proclamation   or   an   executive   order;   an   administrative   action;  
investigation   reports   of   Bureau   of   Lands   investigators;   and   a   legislative   act   or   a  
statute  is  required  in  order  to  declare  a  parcel  of  land  as  alienable  and  disposable.    
In   the   case   at   bar,   no   such   proclamation,   executive   order,   administrative  
action,  report,  statute,  or  certification  was  presented  to  the  Court.    The  records  are  
bereft  of  evidence  showing  that  prior  to  2006,  the  portions  of  Boracay  occupied  by  
private   claimants   were   subject   of   a   government   proclamation   that   the   land   is  
alienable   and   disposable.  Matters   of   land   classification   or   reclassification   require  
proof  and  cannot  be  assumed.  
SUB  CLASSIFICATION  
 
13.    De  Aldecoa  vs.  Insular  Government  (1909)  
 
FACTS:  
A   certain   Juan   Ibañez   de   Aldecoa   applied   for   registration   of   his   title   in   a  
certain  parcel  of  land,  in  1904,  in  the  town  of  Surigao.  Said  registration  was  deemed  
in  accordance  with  the  New  Land  Registration  Act.  Objection  was  made  on  the  part  
of   the   Insular   Government   on   grounds   that   said   move   by   de   Aldecoa   was   not   in  
accordance  with  the  laws  then  in  force  being  the  land  in  question  was  the  property  
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  is  now  under  the  control  of  the  Insular  
Government.  De  Aldecoa,  in  his  amended  petition,  relied  on  the  pertinent  provisions  
of  Section  54  of  Act  No.  926  that  gives  opportunity  to  concerned  occupants  of  public  
lands  to  perfect  their  claims  as  in  the  present  case,  wherein  a  parcel  of  land  that  is  
susceptible   of   being   cultivated,   and   ceasing   to   be   agricultural   land,   was   converted  
into  a  building  lot.  
 
ISSUE:  Whether  a  parcel  of  land,  that  is  susceptible  of  being  cultivated,  and,  ceasing  
to  be  agricultural  land,  which  was  converted  into  a  building  lot,  is  subject  to  the  legal  
provisions   in   force   regarding   government   public   lands   which   may   be   alienated   in  
favour  of  private  individuals  or  corporations  
 
HELD:  
Yes,   it   may   be   alienated.   From   deduction,   with   the   exception   of   those  
comprised  within  the  mineral  and  timber  zone,  all  lands  owned  by  the  State  or  by  
the  sovereign  nation  are  public  in  character,  and  per  se  alienable  and,  provided  they  
are  not  destined  to  the  use  of  the  public  in  general  or  reserved  by  the  government  in  
accordance  with  law,  they  may  be  acquired  by  any  private  or  juridical  person.    
The   interpretation   that   urban   real   estate,   that   is   not   mineral   or   forest   in  
character,   be   understood   to   fall   within   the   classification   of   agricultural   land,   is  
deemed  to  be  most  rational  and  beneficial  to  public  interests.  
 
   
14.  Krivenko  vs.  Register  of  Deeds  of  Manila  (1947)  
 
FACTS:  
Petitioner   Alexander   A.   Krivenko,   an   alien,   bought   a   residential   lot   in   1941.  
Registration   of   said   lot   was   interrupted   by   the   war.   When   Krivenko   resumed   his  
registration  in  1945,  after  the  war,  the  Register  of  Deeds  of  Manila  denied  said  move  
for   registration   on   grounds   that   petitioner   is   an   alien   and   prohibited   by   the  
Constitution   to   own   land.   When   the   Court   of   First   Instance   sustained   that   denial  
made   by   the   Register   of   Deeds,   Krivenko   brought   the   case   to   the   Supreme   Court  
with  connected  Constitutional  inquiries  on  the  prior  mandates  that  allow  aliens  to  
acquire  public  agricultural  lands  for  industrial  and  residential  purposes.  
 
ISSUE:  Whether  an  alien  under  our  Constitution  may  acquire  residential  land.  
 
HELD:  
No,   an   alien   cannot   acquire   residential   land.   Although   primarily,   pertinent  
provisions  of  the  Public  Land  Act  No.  2874,  enacted  prior  to  the  Constitution,  permit  
aliens   to   acquire   public   agricultural   lands   used   for   industrial   and   residential  
purposes,  they  were  stricken  out  with  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  such  being  
the  highest  of  all  the  laws  of  the  land.  
The   Constitution,   still,   prohibits   the   acquisition   of   land   for   residential  
purposes   by   aliens   and   the   Highest   Court   reiterated   that   they   are   construing   the  
Constitution  as  it  is  and  not  as  they  desire  it  to  be.  
 
   
MINERAL  LANDS  
 
15.  Lepanto  Consolidated  Mining  Company  vs.  Dumyung  (1929)  
 
Facts:  
The  Republic  of  the  Philippines  commenced  in  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  
Baguio   City   Civil   Cases   for   annulment   of   Free   Patents   and   of   the   corresponding  
Original  Certificates  of  Title  on  lands  in  question  of  the  defendants.    
The  Lepanto  Consolidated  Mining  Company,  petitioner  herein,  filed  motions  
for  intervention  which  alleged  that  a  portion  of  the  titled  lands  in  question  is  within  
the   intervenor's   ordinary   timber   license   and   another   portion   of   said   lands   is  
embraced  in  its  mineral  claims.  
The   Court   of   First   Instance   of   Baguio,   Branch   I,   dismissed   the   civil   cases  
because  there  was  a  clear  showing  that  upon  the  issuance  of  said  Free  Patents  the  
same  were  duly  registered  with  the  office  of  the  Register  of  Deeds  hence,  these  titles  
enjoy  the  same  privileges  and  safeguards  as  Torrens  titles  ,  and  Original  Certificates  
of  Title  of  the  defendants  are  now  indefeasible.  
The  plaintiffs  moved  for  reconsideration  alleging  that  that  the  lands  covered  
by   the   patents   and   certificates   of   title   are   timber   lands   and   mineral   lands   and,  
therefore,  not  alienable  as  provided  in  Sec.  2  of  Commonwealth  Act  No.  141.  
The   trial   court,   to   clear   this   issue   finds   Republic   Act   No.   3872   applicable  
which  gives  due  regard  to  National  Cultural  Minorities  to  be  issued  free  patents.    
 
Issues:  
1.  Whether  or  not  the  lands  in  question  are  timber  and  mineral  lands  ;  and  
2.   Whether   the   private   respondents   belong   to   the   cultural   minorities   and   are  
qualified  under  Republic  Act  3872  to  be  issued  free  patents  on  said  lands  
 
Held:  
Yes,  the  lands  in  question  are  timber  and  mineral  lands.  However,  evidence  
needed   to   prove   private   respondents’   membership   of   the   National   Cultural  
Minorities   is   absent,   likewise   with   their   continuous   occupation   and   cultivation  
either   by   themselves   or   through   their   predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest   of   the   lands   in  
question  since  July  4,  1955;  and  that  they  are  not  the  owner  of  any  land  secured  or  
disposable   under   the   Public   Land   Act   at   the   time   they   filed   the   free   patent  
applications.  
Clearly,   the   trial   court   erred   ruling   that   the   titles   based   on   the   patents  
awarded  to  the  private  respondents  have  become  indefeasible.  It  is  well  settled  that  
any   certificate   of   title   issued   on   non-­‐disposable   lots   such   as   forest   or   timber   and  
mineral   lands   regardless   of   innocent   purchase   for   value,   is   void   and   shall   be  
cancelled.   Possession   of   forest   lands,   however   long,   cannot   ripen   into   private  
ownership.  
   
16.  REPUBLIC  VS.  CA  AND  DELA  ROSA  (1988)  
 
Facts:  
An  application  for  registration  of  a  parcel  of  land  was  filed  by  Jose  de  la  Rosa  
situated  in  Tuding,  Itogon,  Benguet  Province.  According  to  the  application,  Lots  1-­‐5  
were   sold   to   Jose   de   la   Rosa   and   Lots   6-­‐9   to   his   children   by   Mamaya   Balbalio   and  
Jaime  Alberto,  respectively,  in  1964.    
The  application  was  separately  opposed  by  Benguet  Consolidated,  Inc.  as  to  
Lots  1-­‐5,  on  the  ground  that  the  June  Bug  mineral  claim  covering  Lots  1-­‐5  was  sold  
to  it  on  by  the  successors-­‐in-­‐interest  of  James  Kelly  and  that  ,  Benguet  had  been  in  
actual,   continuous   and   exclusive   possession   of   the   land   in   concept   of   owner,   as  
evidenced   by   its   construction   of   adits,   its   affidavits   of   annual   assessment,   its  
geological  mappings,  geological  samplings  and  trench  side  cuts,  and  its  payment  of  
taxes  on  the  land,  while  Atok  Big  Wedge  Corporation,  made  claims  as  to  portions  of  
Lots   1-­‐5   and   all   of   Lots   6-­‐9,   and   by   the   Republic   of   the   Philippines,   through   the  
Bureau  of  Forestry  Development,  as  to  lots  1-­‐9.    
The   Bureau   of   Forestry   Development   also   interposed   its   objection,   arguing  
that   the   land   sought   to   be   registered   was   covered   by   the   Central   Cordillera   Forest  
Reserve  under  Proclamation  No.  217  dated  February  16,  1929.  Moreover,  by  reason  
of   its   nature,   it   was   not   subject   to   alienation   under   the   Constitutions   of   1935   and  
1973.    
The  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  the  surface  rights  of  the  de  la  Rosas  over  the  
land  while  at  the  same  time  reserving  the  sub-­‐surface  rights  of  Benguet  and  Atok  by  
virtue  of  their  mining  claims.  
Both  Benguet  and  Atok  have  appealed  to  this  Court,  invoking  their  superior  
right  of  ownership.  The  Republic  has  filed  its  own  petition  for  review  and  reiterates  
its   argument   that   neither   the   private   respondents   nor   the   two   mining   companies  
have  any  valid  claim  to  the  land  because  it  is  not  alienable  and  registerable.  
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  the  claimants  have  right  of  ownership  over  the  lands.  
 
Held:  
No,  while  it  was  formerly  a  forest  land,  its  conversion  to  a  mineral  land  still  
sustains  the  fact  that  it  cannot  be  appropriated  nor  disposed.  This  is  an  application  
of  the  Regalian  doctrine  which,  as  its  name  implies,  is  intended  for  the  benefit  of  the  
State.  Once  minerals  are  discovered  in  the  land,  whatever  the  use  to  which  it  is  being  
devoted  at  the  time,  such  use  may  be  discontinued  by  the  State  to  enable  it  to  extract  
the  minerals  therein  in  the  exercise  of  its  sovereign  prerogative.    
Hence,  the  land  was  not  and  could  not  have  been  transferred  to  the  private  
respondents   by   virtue   of   acquisitive   prescription,   nor   could   its   use   be   shared  
simultaneously   by   them   and   the   mining   companies   for   agricultural   and   mineral  
purposes.  
   
NATIONAL  PARKS  
 
17.  Carino  vs  The  Insular  Government  of  the  Philippine  Islands  (1909)  
 
Facts:    
Carino  is  an  Igorot  of  the  Province  of  Benguet  where  the  land  lies.  For  more  
than   50   years   before   the   Treaty   of   Paris,   April   11,   1899,   the   plaintiff   and   his  
ancestors   had   held   the   land   as   owners.   His   grandfather   had   lived   upon   it   and   had  
maintained  fences.  His  father  had  cultivated  parts  and  had  used  parts  or  pasturing  
cattle,  and  he  had  used  it  to  pasture  in  his  turn.    
No  document  title  had  issued  from  the  Spanish  Crown.  In  1893-­‐1894,  and  again  in  
1896-­‐1897,   he   made   an   application   under   the   royal   decrees   then   in   force,   nothing  
seems   to   come   of   it.   In   1901,   the   plaintif   filed   a   petition   alleging   ownership   under  
the   mortgage   law   and   lands   were   registered   to   him,   that   process   however,  
establishing  only  a  possessory  title,  it  said.  
The  Position  of  the  Government  is  that  Spain  assumed,  asserted  and  had  title  to  all  
the   land   in   the   Philippines   except   so   far   it   saw   fit   to   permit   private   titles   to   be  
acquired;  that  if  there  was,  a  decree  of  June  25,  1880,  required  registration  within  a  
limited  time  to  make  the  title  good;  that  the  plaintiff’s  land  was  not  registered  and  
therefore  became,  if  it  was  not  always,  public  land;  that  the  United  States  succeeded  
to   the   title   of   Spain   and   so   that   the   plaintiff   has   no   rights   that   the   Philippine  
Government  is  bound  to  respect.  
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  the  applicant/plaintiff  owns  the  land.  
   
Held:    
Yes,  the  applicant  is  the  owner  of  the  land.  It  is  true  that  Spain  in  its  earlier  
decrees   embodied   the   universal   feudal   theory   that   all   lands   were   held   from   the  
Crown   and   perhaps   the   general   attitude   of   conquering   nations   toward   people   not  
recognized   as   entitled   to   the   treatment   accorded   to   those   in   the   same   zone   of  
civilization   with   themselves.   It   seems   probable,   if   not   certain,   that   the   Spanish  
Officials   would   not   have   granted   to   any   one   in   that   province   the   registration   to  
which  formerly  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  by  the  Spanish  laws  and  which  would  have  
made   his   title   question   good.   Whatever   may   have   been   the   technical   position   of  
Spain,  it  does  not  follow  that,  in  view  of  the  United  States,  he  had  lost  all  rights  and  
was  a  mere  trespasser  when  the  present  Government  seized  his  land.  The  argument  
to  that  effect  seems  to  amount  to  a  denial  of  native  titles  throughout  an  important  
part  of  the  island  of  Luzon,  at  least,  for  the  want  of  ceremonies  which  the  Spaniards  
would  not  have  permitted  and  had  not  the  power  to  enforce.    
 
   
18.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
19.  Lepanto  Consolidated  Mining  Corp.  vs.  Manuel  Dumyung,  et  al.  (1979)  
 
Facts:  
  RP,   represented   by   Director   of   Lands,   filed   Civil   Case   Nos.   1068,   1069,   and  
1070  for  annulment  of  Free  Patents  Nos.  V-­‐152242,  V-­‐155050,  and  V-­‐152243  and  its  
corresponding   Certificate   of   Title   Nos.   P-­‐208,   P-­‐209   and   P-­‐210   on   the   ground   of  
misrepresentation   and   false   data   and   information   furnished   by   Dumyung   et   al.  
Lepanto   Consolidated   Mining   Corp.   (Lepanto)   filed   a   Motion   for   Intervention  
alleging  that  portion  of  the  titled  lands  is  within  ordinary  timber  license  No.  140-­‐62  
dated  July  7,  1961  and  another  is  embraced  in  its  mineral  claim.  
  RP   filed   a   criminal   case   for   falsification   of   public   documents   that   cause   the  
suspension  of  the  aforesaid  civil  cases.  The  trial  court  dismissed  the  case.  
   Thereupon,   the   defendant   filed   a   motion   to   dismiss   the   civil   cases   stating  
that  the  extinction  of  criminal  cases  carries  with  it  the  extinction  of  civil  cases.  The  
same   was   granted   by   the   CFI   in   Baguio   City,   Br.   1   stating   in   its   order   that   upon  
issuance   of   Free   Patents,   the   properties   become   private   properties   of   defendants,  
and  that  the  Original  Certificate  of  Title  is  indefeasible.  It  also  stated  that  defendant  
belongs  to  Cultural  Minorities  of  the  Mountain  Province.  
  RP   filed   an   MR   and   was   dismissed.   Thereby,   a   petition   was   filed   before   the  
SC.  
 
Issue:   Whether   or   not   the   original   certificate   of   title   of   respondent   were  
indefeasible.  
 
Held:    
No.  It  is  well  settled  that  a  certificate  of  title  is  void  when  it  covers  property  
of  public  domain  classified  as  forest  of  timber  and  mineral  land.  Any  title  issued  on  
non-­‐disposable  lots  even  in  the  hands  alleged  innocent  purchaser  of  value  shall  be  
cancelled.  
  In  the  instant  case,  the  land  is  under  the  timber  or  forest  and  mineral  lands  
which   are   classified   as   Public   Land   and   thereby   not   alienable   or   disposable   under  
the   Public   Land   Act.   It   is   within   the   authority   of   the   president,   upon   the  
recommendation  of  the  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  to  classify  these  lands.    
   
20.  Republic  vs.  Peralta  (2003)  
 
Facts:  
  Respondent   claimed   that   they   are   the   heirs   of   Benedicto   B.   Alondray   who  
applied  and  was  granted  Homestead  Patent  No.  V-­‐11244  by  the  Secretary  of  DENR  
over  Lot  No.  3561  with  an  area  of  237,898  sq.  m.  It  was  a  portion  of  Lot  No.  2988  of  
the  Guiang  Cadastre  located  in  Davao  City,  and  on  the  basis  of  the  patent,  OCT  No.  P-­‐
275  was  issued.  They  purchased  the  property  from  their  father  Benedicto  and  were  
issued  TCT  No.  T-­‐134231.  The  land  was  classified  as  alienable  and  disposable  by  the  
Bureau   of   Land   and   they   were   in   the   possession   since   November   1965.   Bureau   of  
Forestry   Development   (BFD)   sought   their   permission   to   use   the   land   and  
constructed   a   building   in   the   area.   Respondents’   lawyer   demanded   BFD   to   vacate  
but  was  ignored.  The  BFD  asked  again  the  permission  of  Benedicto  to  use  25  sq.  m.  
of   the   land   to   install   generator,   it   was   not   assented   but   still   BFD   continue   in   the  
construction.   They   demanded   BFD   to   vacate   the   premises.   They,   then,   filed   a  
complaint  for  recovery  of  possession  and  ownership.  
    In  their  answer  BFD  stated  that  the  land  was  part  of  Mt.  Apo  National  Park  
which  is  considered  inalienable  land  under  Proclamation  No.  59,  and  that  although  
the  land  is  declassified  as  alienable  and  disposable  property  per  Land  classification  
map  No.  1412,  it  should  not  prevail  over  Proclamation  No.  59.  
  RTC  ruled  in  favor  of  respondent  and  ask  BFD  to  vacate  the  land.    
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  the  subject  land  is  part  of  Mt.  Apo  National  Park.  
 
Held:    
Yes,   it   is.   The   trial   court   erred   in   dismissing   the   case   since   they   formed   a  
panel   of   commissioner   to   conduct   relocation   survey   and   the   report   of   the   panel  
revealed  that  145,682  sq.  m.  of  the  land  belong  to  Mt.  Apo  Natural  Park  but  the  same  
was  not  presented  as  evidence  nor  was  the  panel  asked  to  testify  with  the  result.  
  SC  relaxed  the  rule  on  perfection  of  appeal  to  avert  miscarriage  of  justice  to  
the   state   through   the   negligence   of   OSG.   Being   a   case   of   public   interest,   the   court  
deemed  it  proper  to  set  aside  the  order  of  RTC  and  CA  and  re-­‐open  the  case  anew.  
 
   
21.   Sta.   Monica   Industrial   and   Development   Corporation   vs.   CA   and   The  
Republic  of  the  Phils.  (1990)  
 
Facts:  
The   Court   of   Land   Registration   of   Zambales   confirmed   the   title   of   Justo   de  
Perio  over  two  (2)  parcels  of  land  in  Zambales  in  1912.  In  1936,  a  portion  consisting  
of  10,400  square  meters  of  the  second  parcel  was  sold  to  the  Province  of  Zambales.  
TCT   No.   T-­‐1369   was   issued   to   Mercedes   de   Valencia   pursuant   to   an   extrajudicial  
settlement  of  De  Perio's  estate.  In  1962,  De  Valencia  sold  the  first  parcel  to  Ricardo  
Baloy,  while  in  1967,  De  Valencia  subdivided  the  second  parcel  into  five  (5)  lots,  two  
(2)   of   which   was   sold   to   the   petitioner.   Consequently,   the   petitioner   consolidated  
the  two  (2)  parcels  of  land  and  subdivided  them  into  several  residential  lots  which  it  
sold  to  individual  buyers.  
Respondent   Republic   of   the   Philippines   filed   with   the   Court   of   Appeals   a  
complaint   for   the   annulment   of   the   decree   in   Land   Registration   Case   (LRC)   No.  
6431,  alleging  that  it  was  null  and  void  for  lack  of  jurisdiction  because  the  land  was  
still  within  the  forest  zone  and  it  was  not  until  January  31,  1961  that  said  land  was  
released   by   the   Bureau   of   Forest   Development   as   alienable   and   disposable   under  
Land   Classification   Map   No.   2427.   Hence   it   cannot   be   the   subject   of   disposition   or  
alienation  as  private  property.    
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  the  two  (2)  parcels  of  land  be  considered  as  private  lands  
 
Held:  
Yes.   The   Public   Land   Act,   which   took   effect   on   July   26,   1904,   was   the   law  
applicable  to  De  Perio's  petition  for  confirmation  of  his  title  to  the  two  (2)  parcels  of  
land.  A  person  who  had  been  in  open,  continuous,  exclusive  and  notorious  session  
and  occupation  of  public  agricultural  land  for  a  period  of  at  least  ten  (10)  years  prior  
to  July  24,  1904  could  petition  for  the  confirmation  of  his  title  over  the  land  he  had  
so   possessed   and   occupied.   The   Court   held   that   land   classification   maps   drawn  
several  years  after  the  issuance  of  the  decree  in  1912  fail  to  conclusively  establish  
the   actual   classification   of   the   land   in   1912   and   the   years   prior   to   that,   and   are  
insufficient  to  overcome  the  presumption  in  favor  of  the  decree's  regularity.    

   
22.  REP.  OF  THE  PHILS  vs.  CA,  et  al.  (2001)  
 
Facts:  
Petitioner  Republic  contends  that  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Rizal,  sitting  
as  a  land  registration  court,  which  took  cognizance  of  the  land  registration  case  and  
all  the  proceedings  conducted  therein  were  invalid,  that  land  registration  courts  at  
the   time   the   Spouses   Gana   filed   their   application,   had   no   power   nor   authority   to  
determine   whether   the   land   applied   for   was   forest   or   agricultural   land   subject   of  
registration  since  the  authority  to  classify  lands  was  then  vested  in  the  Director  of  
Lands  as  provided  in  Act  Nos.  926  and  2874,  that  the  land  covered  by  OCT  No.  4216  
was   still   part   of   the   unclassified   forest   land   in   1927.   Therefore   the   land   is   not  
classified   as   alienable   and   disposable.   Under   the   Regalian   Doctrine,   all   lands   not  
otherwise  appearing  to  be  clearly  within  private  ownership  are  presumed  to  belong  
to  the  State;  thus,  whatever  title  issued  before  such  classification  is  considered  null  
and  void  ab  initio.  
 
                 On   the   other   hand,   private   respondents   claim   that   property   was   already  
privately   owned   during   the   Spanish   regime.   Thus,   such   person   who   has   held   the  
property   under   color   of   title   may   institute   a   land   registration   case   to   have   the  
property  brought  under  the  Torrens  system  and  have  a  title  issue  in  his  name.    
 
Issue:   Whether   or   not   the   subject   property   of   spouses   Gana   is   a   privately-­‐owned  
land.  
 
Held:  
                 Yes.   Even   assuming   that   a   particular   piece   of   property   was   not   yet   privately  
owned,   private   individuals   or   entities   who   held   "agricultural   public   land"   openly,  
continuously,  exclusively  and  notoriously,  in  the  concept  of  owners  "for  a  period  of  
ten   years   next   preceding   the   twenty-­‐sixth   day   of   July   1904   were   conclusively  
presumed   to   have   performed   all   the   conditions   essential   to   a   "government   grant"  
and  to  have  received  the  same,  and  shall  be  entitled  to  a  certificate  of  title  to  such  
land.  
 
   
23.  Republic  vs.  Court  of  Appeals  (2008)    
 
Facts:  
Petition   is   by   Republic   of   the   Philippines,   a   complaint   for   reversion,  
annulment   of   decree,   cancellation   and   declaration   of   nullity   of   titles.   Trial   court  
issued   a   decree   in   1930   in   favor   of   spouses   Carag,   predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest   of  
private   respondents   Heirs   of   Antonio   Carag   and   Victoria   Turingan   (private  
respondents),   covering   a   parcel   of   land   containing   an   area   of   7,047,673   square  
meters  (subject  property),  situated  in  Tuguegarao,  Cagayan.  Transfer  Certificates  of  
Title   were   issued   adjudicating   100,000   sqm   to   the   Province   of   Cagayan   and   the  
remaining   6,997,921   to   spouses   Carag.   Bienvenida   Taguiam   Vda.   De   Dayag   and  
others  filed  with  the  DENR  requesting  the  same  to  file  an  action  for  the  annulment  
of   the   decree   on   the   ground   that   the   trial   court   did   not   have   jurisdiction   to  
adjudicate   a   portion   of   the   subject   property   which   was   allegedly   still   classified   as  
timber  land  at  the  time  of  the  issuance  of  same  decree.  
 
Issue:   Whether  or  not  the  disputed  portion  was  still  classified  as  timber  land,  and  
thus  not  alienable  and  disposable,  when  the  decree  was  issued  in  1930  
 
Held:  
No,  the  lands  were  alienable.  Unless  specifically  declared  as  mineral  or  forest  
zone,  or  reserved  by  the  State  for  some  public  purpose  in  accordance  with  law,  all  
Crown   lands   were   deemed   alienable.   Petitioner   has   not   alleged   that   the   disputed  
portion   had   been   declared   as   mineral   or   forest   zone,   or   reserved   for   some   public  
purpose  in  accordance  with  law,  during  the  Spanish  regime  or  thereafter.  Petitioner  
has  not  alleged  that  the  Governor-­‐General  had  declared  the  disputed  portion  of  the  
subject  property  timber  or  mineral  land  pursuant  to  Section  6  of  Act  No.  2874,  the  
prevailing  law  in  1930.    
 
   
24.  Republic  of  the  Philippines  vs.  Court  of  Appeals,  En  Banc  (2001)    
 
Facts:  
Petitioners  move  to  revoke  the  OCT  of  private  respondents  over  the  disputed  
land.   The   parcel   of   land   involved   in   this   case   is   located   in   Tindig   na   Mangga,   Las  
Piñas,  Metro  Manila,  with  an  area  of  996,175  square  meters  (disputed  land),  more  
or  less,  and  covered  by  OCT  No.  4216.    
The   Municipality   of   Las   Piñas,   Rizal,   now   Metro   Manila,   was   originally  
classified   as   a   forest   land   and   out   of   2,556   hectares   comprising   it,   1,200   hectares  
were   declared   A   and   D   lands   in   1928   under   LC   Map   No.   766.   The   rest   of   the  
municipality   was   declassified   as   forest   land   and   declared   A   and   D   lands   only   on  
January  3,  1968  under  LC  Map  No.  2623.  
It  appears  that  in  1929,  the  spouses  Gana  obtained  a  title  over  the  disputed  
land  under  OCT  No.  4216.  Such  land  had  been  surveyed  and  duly  registered.  On  the  
basis   of   investigations   conducted   by   the   then   Bureau   of   Lands,   now   Lands  
Management  Bureau,  it  was  found  that  the  property  covered  by  OCT  No.  4216  was,  
at   the   time   of   its   issuance   in   1929,   still   formed   part   of   the   forest   zone   and,   hence,  
incapable  of  registration  as  private  property.  
 
Issue:   Whether   or   not   the   Court   may   reverse   the   judgment   rendered   in   1929  
regardless  of  the  loss  of  records  and  evidence    
 
Held:  
No,  the  judgment  still  stands.  This  Court  had  already  made  a  declaration  on  
the   genuineness   and   validity   of   OCT   No.   4216   and   the   titles   derived   therefrom   by  
private  respondents  in  the  Margolles  case  promulgated  in  1994.  The  Margolles  case  
had   long   become   final,   thus   the   validity   of   OCT   No.   4216   should   no   longer   be  
disturbed   and   should   be   applied   in   the   instant   case   based   on   the   principle   of   res  
judicata   or,   otherwise,   the   rule   on   conclusiveness   of   judgment.   Allowing   repeated  
suits  seeking  to  nullify  OCT  No.  4216  like  the  present  case,  will  bring  to  naught  the  
principle   of   indefeasibility   of   titles   issued   under   the   Torrens   system   of   land  
registration.  
   
25.  Republic  vs.  T.A.N.  Properties,  Inc.  (2008)  
 
Facts:  
TAN   Properties   Inc.   applied   for   Original   Registration   of   Title   of   two   lands  
located  at  Sto.  Tomas,  Batangas.  The  trial  court  issued  an  Order  of  General  Default.  
Respondent   submitted   two   certifications   issued   by   the   DENR.   On   June   3,   1997,   a  
certification   by   the   Community   Environment   and   Natural   Resources   Offices  
(CENRO),  Batangas  City,  certified  that  the  first  lot  falls  within  the  ALIENABLE  AND  
DISPOSABLE  ZONE  under  Project  No.  30,  Land  Classification  Map  No.  582.  A  second  
certification  was  also  issued  by  the  Regional  Technical  Director,  Forest  Management  
Services   of   the   DENR   (FMS-­‐DENR),   stating   “that   the   subject   area   falls   within   an  
alienable   and   disposable   land.”   RTC   and   CA   adjudicate   the   lands   in   favor   of   TAN  
Properties.    
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  the  land  is  alienable  and  disposable.  
 
Held:  
No,   the   land   is   not   alienable   and   disposable.   The   certifications   are   not  
sufficient.   Under   DAO   No.   20,   the   CENRO   issues   certificates   of   land   classification  
status  for  areas  below  50  hectares.  In  this  case,  respondent  applied  for  registration  
of   the   lot   which   is   over   50   hectares.   The   CENRO   certificate   covered   the   entire   Lot  
10705   with   an   area   of   596,116   square   meters   as   per   DAO   No.   38,   series   of   1990.  
Hence,   the   CENRO’s   granting   of   certificate   is   beyond   their   authority.   The   Regional  
Technical  Director,  FMS-­‐DENR,  also  has  no  authority  under  DAO  Nos.  20  and  38  to  
issue   certificates   of   land   classification.   The   certification   issued   by   the   Regional  
Technical  Director,  FMS-­‐DENR,  in  the  form  of  a  memorandum  to  the  trial  court,  has  
no  probative  value.  Further,  it  is  not  enough  for  the  PENRO  or  CENRO  to  certify  that  
a   land   is   alienable   and   disposable.   The   applicant   for   land   registration   must   prove  
that  the  DENR  Secretary  had  approved  the  land  classification  and  released  the  land  
of   the   public   domain   as   alienable   and   disposable,   and   that   the   land   subject   of   the  
application   for   registration   falls   within   the   approved   area   per   verification   through  
survey  by  the  PENRO  or  CENRO.  In  addition,  the  applicant  for  land  registration  must  
present   a   copy   of   the   original   classification   approved   by   the   DENR   Secretary   and  
certified   as   a   true   copy   by   the   legal   custodian   of   the   official   records.   Respondent  
failed  to  comply  with  these  requirements.    
26.  Victoria  v.  Republic  (2011)  

Facts:  
Petitioner   Victoria   applied   for   registration   under   the   law   a   certain   lot   in  
Bambang,   Taguig   City.   Victoria   testified   that   she   and   her   predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest  
have   been   in   possession   of   the   property   continuously,   uninterruptedly,   openly,  
publicly,  adversely  and  in  the  concept  of  owners  since  the  early  1940s  or  for  more  
than   30   years   and   have   been   declared   as   owners   for   taxation   purposes.   The  
Republic   did   not   present   any   evidence   in   support   of   its   opposition.   The   MeTC  
rendered  a  decision,  granting  the  application  for  registration.  The  Republic  appealed  
the  MeTC  decision  to  the  Court  of  Appeals  (CA),  pointing  out  in  its  brief  that  Victoria  
failed  to  present  evidence  that  the  subject  property  is  alienable  and  disposable  land  
of  the  public  domain  and  that  she  failed  to  establish  the  kind  of  possession  required  
for   registration.   Victoria   replied   that   the   Conversion/Subdivision   Plan   she  
submitted   carried   a   notation   that   the   property   is   within   alienable   and   disposable  
area.  She  attached  to  her  brief  a  Certification  dated  November  6,  2006  issued  by  the  
DENR,  verifying  the  subject  property  as  within  the  alienable  and  disposable  land  of  
the  public  domain.    
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  the  land  is  alienable  and  disposable.  
 
Held:  
Yes,  the  land  is  alienable  and  disposable.  To  prove  that  the  land  subject  of  the  
application  for  registration  is  alienable,  an  applicant  must  establish  the  existence  of  
a  positive  act  of  the  government  such  as  a  presidential  proclamation  or  an  executive  
order;   an   administrative   action;   investigation   reports   of   Bureau   of   Lands  
investigators;   and   a   legislative   act   or   statute.   The   applicant   may   secure   a  
certification   from   the   government   that   the   lands   applied   for   are   alienable   and  
disposable,  but  the  certification  must  show  that  the  DENR  Secretary  had  approved  
the   land   classification   and   released   the   land   of   the   public   domain   as   alienable   and  
disposable,  and  that  the  land  subject  of  the  application  for  registration  falls  within  
the   approved   area   per   verification   through   survey   by   the   PENRO   or   CENRO.   The  
applicant   must   also   present   a   copy   of   the   original   classification   of   the   land   into  
alienable  and  disposable,  as  declared  by  the  DENR  Secretary  or  as  proclaimed  by  the  
President.  In  this  case,  Victoria  complied  with  the  requirements.    
27.  Llanes  vs.  Republic  of  the  Philippines  (2008)  
 
Facts:  
Spouses  Gabriel  and  Maria  Llanes  applied  for  registration  of  their  title  over  a  
parcel  of  land  located  in  Batangas.  The  said  subject  property  was  in  the  possession  
of   Gabriel’s   grandmother,   Eugenia   Valencia   since   the   1930s   and   later   bought   by  
Gabriel’s  brother  Servillano  Llanes  in  1965.  On  December  29,  1995,  Spouses  Llanes  
purchased   the   subject   property   from   Servillano   and   religiously   paid   its   real  
property   taxes.   Eventually,   Spouses   Llanes   conveyed   the   subject   property   to   ICTSI  
Warehousing  Inc.  by  virtue  of  Deed  of  Absolute  Sale  for  which  the  latter  applied  for  
registration  of  title  over  the  subject  property  before  the  Regional  Trial  Court  (RTC)  
of   Batangas.   However,   the   sale   could   not   push   through   since   the   subject   property  
was   still   in   the   name   of   Spouses   Llanes.   During   the   initial   hearing,   the   spouses  
Llanes   was   opposed   by   the   Republic   on   the   grounds   that:   (1)   neither   the   Spouses  
Llanes  nor  their  predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest  had  been  in  an  open,  continuous,  exclusive  
and  notorious  possession  and  occupation  of  the  subject  property  since  12  June  1945  
or  earlier;  and  (2)  the  muniments  of  title  and/or  tax  declaration(s)  and  tax  payment  
receipt(s)   cannot   constitute   competent   and   sufficient   evidence   of   bona   fide  
acquisition  of  the  land.  
 
Issue:   Whether   or   not   the   spouses   Llanes   are   the   bona   fide   owners   of   the   subject  
property.  
 
Held:  
Yes.  Section  14  of  the  Property  Registration  Decree  or  P.D.  No.  1529  provides  
that   “The   following   persons   may   file   in   the   proper   Court   of   First   Instance   an  
application  for  registration  of  title  to  land,  whether  personally  or  through  their  duly  
authorized   representatives:   (1)   those   who   by   themselves   or   through   their  
predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest  have  been  in  an  open,  continuous,  exclusive  and  notorious  
possession   and   occupation   of   alienable   and   disposable   land   of   the   public   domain  
under    a  bona  fide  claim  of  ownership  since  June  12,  1945,  or  earlier.”  The  evidence  
submitted   by   the   Spouses   Llanes   establishes   that   the   subject   property   became  
alienable   and   disposable   as   early   as   26   March   1928;   and   the   Spouses   Llanes   and  
their   predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest   have   been   in   an   open,   continuous,   exclusive   and  
notorious  possession  of  the  subject  property.      
28.  Republic  of  the  Philippines  vs.  Javier  (2009)  
 
Facts:  
According  to  Neptuna  Javier,  she  acquired  the  subject  land  through  a  Deed  of  
Donation   executed   by   her   paternal   aunt,   Catalina   Javier,   on   November   27,   1956.  
However,  Catalina  and  her  husband  had  been  in  possession  of  the  subject  property  
since  1907.  Catalina’s  heirs    questioned  the  execution  of  said  Deed  before  the  Court  
of   First   Instance   (CFI)   of   Rizal   in   which   the   latter   declared   the   donation   void.  
Nevertheless,   in   Deed   of   Partition   Catalina’s   heirs   allocated   the   subject   land   to  
Javier.   On   March   25,   1999,   Javier   filed   before   the   Municipal   Trial   Court   (MTC)   a  
verified   Application   for   Original   Registration   of   Title   to   the   subject   property,  
pursuant   to   Section   14   of   the   Property   Registration   Decree   or   P.D.   No.   1529.   On  
November   18,   1999,   the   Republic   filed   its   Notice   of   Appearance  and  Opposition  to  
Javier’s  application  for  registration,  claiming  among  other  things  that  neither  Javier  
nor   their   predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest   had   been   in   an   open,   continuous,   exclusive   and  
notorious   possession   and   occupation   of   the   land   since   12   June   1945;   and   that   the  
muniment/s   of   title   alleged   in   the   application   did   not   constitute   competent   and  
sufficient  evidence  of  a  bona  fide  acquisition  of  the  subject  land.  
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  Javier  was  the  bona  fide  owner  of  the  subject  land.  
 
Held:  
Yes.  Javier  was  able  to  sufficiently  establish  her  title  to  the  subject  property,  and  is  
entitled   to   register   under   Section   14   of   P.D.   No.   1529   that   “The   following   persons  
may  file  in  the  proper  Court  of  First  Instance  an  application  for  registration  of  title  
to   land,   whether   personally   or   through   their   duly   authorized   representatives:   (1)  
those  who  by  themselves  or  through  their  predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest  have  been  in  an  
open,   continuous,   exclusive   and   notorious   possession   and   occupation   of   alienable  
and   disposable   land   of   the   public   domain   under     a   bona   fide   claim   of   ownership  
since   June   12,   1945,   or   earlier.”   The   totality   of   evidence   on   record   bears   Javier’s  
claim,  in  compliance  with  the  said  requirements,  entitling  her  to  the  registration  of  
title  to  the  subject  land  under  Section  14  (1)  of  the  Property  Registration  Decree.  
 
   
   
29.  Republic  vs.  Imperial  Credit  Corporation  (2008)  
 
Facts:  
On  February   14,   2000,   respondent   filed   before   the   RTC   of  Antipolo  City   an  
application   for   registration   of   a   parcel   of   land,   as   shown   on   Plan   PSU-­‐178075  
containing   an   area   of   8,993   square   meters.   The   application   alleged,   among   others,  
that   respondent   “subrogated   former   owner   Jose  Tajon,   who   has   been   in   open,  
continuous,  exclusive  and  notorious  possession  and  occupation  of  the  parcel  of  land,  
being   a   part   of   the   alienable   and   disposable   lands   of   the   public   domain,   under   a  
bona   fide   claim   of   ownership   since   12   June   1945,   by   virtue   of   Deed   of   Sale   with  
Mortgage  executed  on  07  March  1966.  
Petitioner   argues   that   contrary   to   the   Court   of   Appeals’   ruling   that  
respondent  was  able  to  prove  its  claim  under  paragraphs  (2)  and  (4)  of  Section  14,  
Presidential   Decree   (P.D.)   No.   1529,   respondent’s   application   for   registration   was  
actually  based  on  paragraph  (1)  of  Section  14,  P.D.  No.  1529,  the  conditions  under  
which   were   not   sufficiently   established   by   respondent’s   evidence.   Although  
petitioner  concedes  that  respondent  was  able  to  show  that  the  land  applied  for  has  
been   declassified   from   the   forest   or   timber   zone   and   is   an   alienable   public  
agricultural   land,   respondent’s   evidence   failed   to   satisfy   the   requirement   under  
paragraph   (1)   of   Section   14,   P.D.   No.   1529,   that   is,   respondent’s   possession   and  
occupation  of  the  property  for  the  length  of  time  and  in  the  manner  required  by  law.  
 
Issue:  Whether  the  parcel  of  land  is  can  be  registered  under  PD  1529.  
 
Held:  
No.  Under  the  Regalian  doctrine,  the  State  is  the  source  of  any  asserted  right  
to   ownership   of   land.   This   is   premised   on   the   basic   doctrine   that   all   lands   not  
otherwise  appearing  to  be  clearly  within  private  ownership  are  presumed  to  belong  
to   the   State.   Any   applicant   for   confirmation   of   imperfect   title   bears   the   burden   of  
proving  that  he  is  qualified  to  have  the  land  titled  in  his  name.    
The   reckoning   date   under   the   Public   Land   Act   for   the   acquisition   of   ownership   of  
public   lands   is  June   12,   1945  or   earlier,   and   that   evidence   of   possession   from   that  
date  or  earlier  is  essential  for  a  grant  of  an  application  for  judicial  confirmation  of  
imperfect  title.  
   
30.  Republic  v.  Humbilla  (2005)  
Facts:  
On   March   5,   1999,   respondents   filed   an   application   for   registration   of   title   for   Lot  
No.  6218-­‐B  in  Subdivision  Plan  Csd-­‐04-­‐004665-­‐D  situated  in  Alaminos,  Laguna  (the  
Property).[1]  Respondents   alleged   that   they   have   been   in   open,   continuous,   public,  
peaceful   and   notorious   possession   and   occupation   of   the   Property,   by   themselves  
and   their   predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest,   prior   to   June   12,   1945.   Among   others,   the  
respondents   presented   the   following   documents   to   support   their   application:   1)   a  
blue   print   copy   of   the   subdivision   plan[2]  Csd-­‐04-­‐004665-­‐D   approved   by   the  
Director   of   Lands   through   Assistant   Regional   Director   Ernesto   Viquiera;   2)   a  
technical   description[3]  approved   by   the   Land   Management   Bureau   of   the  
Department  of  Environment  and  Natural  Resources  (DENR);  3)  a  certification  from  
the   DENR   Community   Environment   and   Natural   Resources   Office   (CENRO)   which  
states   that   the   Property   is   entirely   within   the   alienable   and   disposable   zone   as   of  
December   31,   1925   and   has   not   been   previously   titled;[4]  4)   a   report   of   the   Land  
Management  Bureau  stating  that  the  Property  is  not  covered  by  any  previous  land  
registration   case;[5]  and   5)   tax   declarations   dating   from   1999   back   to   1945   in   the  
names  of  Mateo  Abrigo  and  Rodrigo  Abrigo  after  the  former’s  death.[6]  
Issue:  Whether  the  parcel  of  land  is  part  of  the  alienable  and  disposable  zone.  
Held:    
No.   The   petitioner’s   contention   that   the   Property’s   status   as   alienable   and  
disposable   land   was   unsubstantiated   is   likewise   unavailing.   As   stated   earlier,   the  
respondents  offered  as  evidence  before  the  trial  court  a  certification  from  the  DENR  
CENRO  stating  that  the  Property  is  entirely  within  the  alienable  and  disposable  zone  
classified   under   Project   No.   8,   Land   Classification   Map   No.   582   and   certified   on  
December  31,  1925.