LEE HONG HOK V.

DAVID
G.R. NO. L-30389, DECEMBER 27, 1972

DOCTRINE: Imperium distinguished from dominum. The government authority possessed by the state which
is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; and its capacity
to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by
the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and
other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

FACTS: Petitioners Lee Hong Hok et al. claim that the Torrens Title of Respondent David over the disputed
land (which is part of the Naga Cadastre) should be declared null and void. The CA found no legal justification
for nullifying the right of David over the disputed land arising from the grant made in his favor by appropriate
public officials. David had acquired lawful title over said land. The Director of Lands awarded him an order for
issuance of a sales patent pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. Subsequently, on the basis of such
order, the Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an
OCT was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE: WON the State can dispose of lands which have not passed into private ownership.

HELD: In this case the land in question is not private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof for having been formed
by reclamation.
It is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government." It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode
of acquisition recognized by law.
In the case at bar, a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT was issued in favor of respondent David by competent
public officials. He had acquired the grant and title legally. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land
were published, the actual sale and award thereof to David were not clandestine but open and public official
acts of an officer of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application,
and the said deceased occupied the land since 1938.
(The first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII says that “all lands of the public domain x x x and other natural
resources are owned by the state,”)
A grant by the government through duly competent public officials cannot be disregarded on the premise that
land not passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state.
In discussing the concept of jura regalia, the Supreme Court said:
“2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in
public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the
concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter
further. The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide
for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by
the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two
concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium. As far as the Philippines was
concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, a case of Philippine
origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the
Crown . . ." That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was adopted by the present
Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. What was stated
by Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive discussion of the matter in the leading case of Valenton v.
Murciano, decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias in these words: "We having acquired in sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the
royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be
restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in
those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future
and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage,
confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may
remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish."
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government that "as to the unappropriated public lands
constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, . ."

They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant. Where, as in this case, it was
found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly categorized
as public land is undeniable. What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands finds application.
Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or
their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by
any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain."

For it is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government." It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion
of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: "The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern
portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been
acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and
remains part of the public domain."
To repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid of merit.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS & DE LA ROSA

G.R. NO. L-43938, APRIL 15, 1988

FACTS: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965,
by Jose dela Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The
land was divided into 9 lots and according to the application of registration of the parcel of land, Lots 1-5 were
sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in
1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September
22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it
on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive
possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual
assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the
land.
Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims
located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the
mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok,
which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its
annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered
was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929.
Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
Trial Court: The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.
CA: Reversed the trial court. Affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Basis of CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is “no conflict of interest” between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-
known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject
to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.
ISSUE: Whether respondent court’s decision, i.e. “the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at
the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim,” is correct.
HELD: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the 1935 Constitution prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time
of its adoption.
The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription. The use of the land could not be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for
agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at
that time. Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to
existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws
then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the
obtention of a patent over it.
As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did,
to Benguet and Atok. The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot
be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining
claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not
cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was
cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the
State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and
even private land devoted to “agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than
mining.” Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of
such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to
which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for
both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are
discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued
by the
State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus
converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for
any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein. For the loss sustained by
such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings.

CARINO VS INSULAR GOVERNMENT

212 US 449

FACTS: Mateo Carino applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it was granted by the court, but the
Government of the Philippines and the government of the United States appealed to the Court of First Instance
of Benguet, because they were taking the property for public and military purposes. The CFI dismissed the
application for registration. On appeal, the CFI decision was affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court. The
case was brought to the US Supreme Court via writ of error.
Carino is an Igorot, and possessed the subject land for more than 30 years before the Treaty of Paris. He and his
ancestors had held the land for years. The local community recognizes them as the owners of the said land. His
grandfather lived upon it and maintained fences around the property. His father raised cattle on the property and
he had inherited the land according to Igorot custom. However, no title was issued to them from the Spanish
Crown. He tried twice to have it registered during the Spanish occupation but was not successful. In 1901 he
filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was only granted a possessory title.
Relevant Laws:
• Philippine Commission’s Act No. 496
• Philippine Commission’s Act No. 926 (An Act Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the
Homesteading, Selling, and Leasing of Portions of the Public Domain of the Philippine Islands) – this law dealt
with acquisition of new titles and perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. Benguet was one of the
excluded provinces under this Act.
Carino’s contention: he could register the land under Philippine Commissions Act no. 496 which covered the
entire Philippine archipelago. Government’s contention: Spain had title to all the lands in the Philippines except
those it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired. There was a decree issued by Spain that required
registration within a limited time but Carino’s land wasn’t registered, hence, such land became public land.
ISSUE:
Primary: Whether Carino could register title to the land albeit Benguet was excluded from Phil Com Act No.
926.
Based on the issue: Whether Carino owns the land.

HELD/RATIO: YES, Carino could register the land if ownership could be maintained.
“Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what,
by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of
an almost forgotten law of Spain.”
Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it does not follow that the US would view Carino to have lost
all his rights to the land – this would amount to a denial of native titles throughout Benguet just because Spain
would not have granted to anyone in the province the registration of their lands.
The Organic Act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property and rights acquired there by the US would be for
the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This same statute made a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the
Constitution, and it provides that “'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws”.
It would be hard to believe that “any person” didn’t include the inhabitants of Benguet, nor it meant “property”
to refer only to those lands which had become such under a ceremony (of registration) many of the people of the
land may have not even heard of.
Although in Sec. 14 of the Organic Act, it is said that the Philippine Commission may prescribe rules and
regulations for perfecting titles to public lands, it should be noted that this section refers to those cases where
the land was admitted to be public land. The US SC hesitates to suppose that it was intended to declare every
native who had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still remains: what property and rights did the US
acquire?
In cases such as the instant case, the presumption would and should be against the government. As far back as
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership; it was never public
land. It would not be proper to just let the conqueror to dictate how to deal with the Philippine tribes if it really
meant to use the rights acquired by them “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof”.
The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. They
didn’t intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle of prescription was admitted: that if they
weren’t able to produce title deeds, it is sufficient if they show ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription.
Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required everyone to get a document of title or else lose his
land, it does not appear that it meant to apply to all but only those who wrongfully occupied royal lands. It
doesn’t appear that the land of Carino was considered as Royal land nor was it considered to have been
wrongfully occupied. Two articles of the same decree provided that titles would be attributed to those who may
prove possession for the necessary time. There were indications that registration was expected but it didn’t
mean that ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof was not to confer title to them but to
establish it.
OH CHO VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS 75 PHIL. 890 8/31/1946
Facts: Oh Cho is a citizen of the Republic of China who purchased a residential parcel of land in Guinayangan,
Tayabas in 1938. The subject land has been in the continuous, public, and adverse possession of the
predecessors in interest since 1880. In June 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of the subject land, which
was opposed by the Director of Lands following the Constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring private
or public agricultural lands. The CFI however overruled the opposition and decreed the registration applied for.
Hence, the present appeal by the Director of Lands. The Director of Lands maintained its opposition on the
ground of lack of title to the lot and of disqualification as alien from acquiring lands of the public domain. Oh
Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He also
failed to show that he and ay of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant.
Issue: Whether Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration he was applying for, considering that he failed to
show title to the lot and that he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain.
Held/Ratio: NO, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration because the earliest possession of the subject
land by Oh Cho’s first predecessor in interest began in 1880 and because his immediate predecessors failed to
apply for registration. All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain, unless the land has been in the possession of an occupant and predecessors in
interest since time immemorial since such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never
been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. As such, the applicant does not qualify under the
exception. Oh Cho is neither entitled to a decree of registration under the provisions of the Public Land Act
since he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain. Arguably, Oh Cho’s immediate
predecessors in interest could have been entitled to a decree of registration had they applied for registration;
consequently, the right of the immediate predecessors in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed to
also have been acquired. However, Oh Cho’s immediate predecessors failed to apply for registration. As such,
they did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title, which was transmissible to the applicant.
Judgment was reversed and the application for registration was dismissed.
REPUBLIC VS CA 1999
Facts: In 1957, one Matias Bustamante filed an application for registration under Act No. 496 of a tract of land
containing an area of 880,000 square meters.
The Director of Forestry and of Fisheries filed oppositions to the forecited application, alleging that the said
parcel of land, with the exception of 97,525 square meters, is a part of the Timber Land Block "A" Land
Classification Project 44, which is converted into fish ponds.
The lower court rendered a Decision in favor of applicant Bustamante.
On appeal the Court of Appeals found that 783,275 square meters of the land applied for were accretions added
to applicant Bustamante's riceland and that said accretion was caused by the sea on the southward portion of
said riceland.
CA then ruled that the said accretion belongs - not to the riparian owner - but the State. All lands thrown up by
the sea and formed upon the shores, belong to the national domain and are for public use. When brought up on
certiorari to the Supreme Court, the foregoing Judgment was affirmed in toto. Portions of the lot declared in the
foregoing judgment as part of public domain has been leased to Mr. Porfirio Morado by the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Secretary of Agriculture, for a period of twenty-five (25) years, under Fishpond
Lease Agreement No. 5132.
On July 6, 1988, Zenaida Bustria, daughter of Isidro Bustria filed a complaint against Porfirio Morado in the
Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, for ownership and possession over the lot in
question, asserting that Porfirio Morado maliciously applied for a fishpond permit well-knowing that said lot
had always been occupied, possessed and the lot in question is part of the public domain which he developed
and converted into a fishpond. Respondent RTC Judge rendered a decision, declaring the plaintiff as the
exclusive and absolute owner of the land in question.
On April 19, 1994, petitioner, invoking §9 of B.P. Blg. 129, 3 filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the
annulment of the trial court's decision. Petitioner alleged that the land in question is formed part of the public
domain, hence, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) has jurisdiction over its disposition in
accordance with P.D. No 704, §4.
On October 4, 1995 the, Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition.
Issue: Whether the decision of the Regional Trial Court is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due
process of law
Decision: The petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The land involved in this case was classified as public land suitable for fishpond development. In
controversies involving the disposition of public land, the burden of overcoming, the presumption of state
ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant. Private respondents have not discharged
this burden.

The fact that the land in dispute was transformed into a "fully developed fishpond" does not mean that it has lost
its character as one declared "suitable for fishpond purposes" under the decree. By applying for a fishpond
permit with the BFAR, Isidro Bautista admitted the character of the land as one suitable for fishpond
development since the disposition of such lands is vested in the BFAR. Consequently, private respondents, as
his successors-in-interest, are estopped from claiming otherwise. It is settled under the Public Land Law that
alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly,
continuously, and exclusively for 30 years is ipso jure converted to private property by the mere lapse of time.
However, only public lands classified as agricultural are alienable. Lands declared for fishery purposes are not
alienable and their possession, no matter how long continued, cannot ripen into ownership. Since the disposition
of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall within the jurisdiction of the BFAR, in accordance with
P.D. No 704, §4, 21 the trial court's decision, dated December 17, 1991, is null and void.

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY VS VILLAREAL GR No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

Facts: The petitioner, Director of Forestry was one of the several persons who opposed the application for
registration of a parcel land classified as mangrove swamps in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz with an area of
178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps, to the applicant Ruperto Villareal. He alleged that he and his
predecessors-in-interests had been in possession of the said parcel of land for more than forty years (40). Both
parties agreed in one point that the disputed land was a mangrove swamp. The respondent argued that mangrove
swamp are agricultural land but the petitioner contended that it is a forestall land therefore not disposable.The
Court of the First Instance of Capiz however grants the application of the respondent. The decision of the lower
court was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence the Director of Forestry elevated the case to the
Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not, mangrove swamps are agricultural land or forest land.
Held: The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Furthermore the legislative definition
embodied in section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which declares that mangrove swamps
or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines hence they are not alienable. The evidence
presented by the respondent in its claim were not sufficient to prove its possession and ownership of the land, he
only presented tax declaration. Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the application
for registration of title by the respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 83609 OCTOBER 26, 1989

FACTS:
           
On July 20, 1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar, the private respondents, claimed to be the owners of two parcels of
lands situated in Capiz and filed a joint application for registration of title to the said lands.

On December 16, 1976, the Director of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on
the grounds that the respondents were not applicants neither predecessors-in-interest to possess sufficient title to
acquire ownership and that the lands in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the State.

On February 24, 1977, the respondents filed an amended application which was approved on March 14, 1977.
The CFI of Capiz held on granting the application for confirmation and registration of the two parcels of land
filed by private respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of
ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for registration,
introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of
the land into productive fishponds.

The respondent court affirmed the decision in toto, and it held that the classification of the lots as timberland by
the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as
forest land than as agricultural land. Thereafter, the Director of Lands through the OSG filed a petition before
this Court for the review of the said decision.

ISSUE:           
Whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48(b) of CA 141

HELD:
No. The lots cannot be registered under Section 48(b) of CA 141.
A positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register
under the Torrens System

Hence, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural
land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded.

Director of Lands vs CA and Bisnar G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989

Facts: In this case, Ibarra and Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of the subject lands. They claimed
that they inherited the subject land and that they had been paying the taxes thereon. The Director of Lands and
the Director of Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application and one of their grounds was that the
properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not
subject to private appropriation. The RTC granted the petition of Ibarra and Bisnar on the ground of prescription
which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether the subject land be owned by Ibarra ang Bisnar through prescription.

Decision: No, the subject lands cannot be acquired through prescription.

As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the classification
or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of
the Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room
for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through the Office of the President.

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as
forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Also, unless and until
the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

Here, the applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80)
years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands
by planting coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds.
However, the properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, not subject to private appropriation.

Therefore, rules on confirmation of imperfect title cannot apply.

CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariň o went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as
the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented
possessory informationand no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part
of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred
that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino
vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute
owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character
as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything
but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has
apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose. While the State has always recognized the right of
the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he
must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did
the State remained the absolute owner.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN

CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA
G.R. No. 75042
November 29, 1988

FACTS: Properties Involved:

 Lots 1, 2, and 3 situated in Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province.
 Lot 4 located in Barrio Bucal (Taguan), Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province.

On February 2, 1979, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena filed an application for confirmation of title for the
aforementioned four parcels of land. However, the Solicitor-General (in behalf of the Director of Lands and the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development) filed an opposition to this application on April 20, 1979, citing
that the Bishop of Lucena did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcels of land being
applied for.

The Bishop of Lucena provided evidence that Lot 1 was acquired by the Roman Catholic Church thru Rev.
Father Raymundo Esquenet by purchase from the spouses Atanacio Yranso and Maria Coronado on October 20,
1928, while Lot 2 was acquired by purchase from the spouses Benito Maramot and Venancia Descaller on May
22, 1969.

The remaining portions of Lots 2 and 3 were already owned and possessed by the Roman Catholic Church even
prior to the survey of the said lots in 1928. Lot 3 was also used by the church as a burial site since 1918. All 3
lots are declared for taxation purposes in the name of the Roman Catholic Church as a cemetery site. The fourth
lot was acquired by donation from the spouses Paulo G. Macasaet, and Gabriela V. de Macasaet on February
26, 1941. A new chapel stands on this lot.
The Bishop of Lucena has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of Lots 1, 2, and 3 for a period of more
than 52 years through its predecessors-in-interest, and a total of 39 years with respect to Lot 4.

The Solicitor-General did not adduce evidence to support its opposition. When the case was submitted, the
lower court ordered the registration of the lands together with the improvements thereon in the name of the
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA.
On appeal, the Solicitor-General contends that the Bishop of Lucena is disqualified from owning alienable lands
from the public domain because the constitution prohibits a private corporation from doing so.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole, is qualified to apply for
confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land.

RULING: Yes, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena is qualified to apply for the confirmation of its title to to
the 4 parcels of land.

1. The acquired lots are already private lands upon acquisition of the church. Hence, the constitutional
prohibition does not apply anymore.
2. Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 allows a corporation sole to purchase and hold real estate and personal
property for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts
for such purposes.  A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the
clergy. It consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time) are
 incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages which in their natural
persons they could not have had.
3. The Bishop of Lucena has satisfactorily proved that they are in open, continuous, and exclusive
possession of the subject lots in the concept of owner.

The decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.