LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O.

RAMOS, Secretary Department of Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the
Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or
(MGB-DENR); RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.  utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)  through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution. 

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.  by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to
exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction. 
FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA
7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance‖
with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance.‖ The
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the
Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid. 
by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996. 
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such
WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is
WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.  ―financial and technical agreements‖ in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its whole contractors contrary to the fundamental law. 
stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by
Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the
Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to
Court of Appeals.  manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and bare title thereto. 
evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements
involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally
of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation,
execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would development and utilization of Philippine natural resources. 
violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian
investments.  When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them
ISSUES:  as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned connected, must fail with them. 
corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. 
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract‖ that Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely
permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.  technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. 
HELD: 
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract 
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional 
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned agreement itself is a service contract. 
corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources. 
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore,
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other area.‖ Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
natural resources are owned by the State.‖ The same section also states that, ―the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial
State.  ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of
its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that
the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from
which they spring must be struck down.  effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133.
G.R. No. 135190.  April 3, 2002
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING
COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and THE HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING
REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents.
FACTS:
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao
Forest Reserve known as the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.” Located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of
Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte, the land has been embroiled in controversy since the mid-80’s
due to the scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration
Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal
area.
Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No. 7076, or the
People’s Small-Scale Mining Act.  The law established a People’s Small-Scale Mining Program to be
implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB)
under the DENR Secretary’s direct supervision and control. The statute also authorized the PMRB to
declare and set aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award
mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions.
On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued Department
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open
to small-scale mining The issuance was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by
Proclamation No. 369, which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which directs
the DENR to study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral
resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not be limited to, studying
and weighing the feasibility of entering into management agreements or operating agreements, or both,
with the appropriate government instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the
declared policy of rationalizing the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such agreements
shall include provisions for profit-sharing between the state and the said parties, including profit-sharing
arrangements with small-scale miners, as well as the payment of royalties to indigenous cultural
communities, among others.  The Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretary for
Legal and Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the Mines and Geo-sciences
Bureau are hereby ordered to undertake such studies.
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court
of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative
(BCPMC), which represented all the OTP grantees.  It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted
Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the “direct state utilization” espoused therein would
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.  It ruled that the DENR Secretary did not abuse
his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since the same was merely a directive to conduct
studies on the various options available to the government for solving the Diwalwal conflict. 
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailed memorandum order
did not adopt the “direct state utilization scheme” in resolving the Diwalwal dispute.
Held:
No, We agree with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not
conclusively adopt “direct state utilization” as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute.  The terms of
the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option
and nothing else.  Contrary to petitioner’s contention, it did not grant any management/operating or
profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the
DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. 
Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR Sec Elisea Gozun et al
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it
comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an
Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and
N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs.
Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes
unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40
as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO
96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private property for private purpose in
contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not
be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation.  They assert that
public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on
its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just
compensation.
Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a
valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people.  This
government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment
curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property.  Public respondents
concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to
regulate by purchase.”
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are;
(1)               the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2)               the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3)               the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4)               the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5)               the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is
not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of
the DENR RR. To wit,
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or
concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided
for in the implementing rules and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of
the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as
a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly
and justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry,
acquisition and use of private lands.
Dolot vs. Paje, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 199199, August 27,2013
Facts
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53 on Continuing Mandamus, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Environment Protection Order (TEPO).
Petitioner Maricris Dolot, et al, filed the aforesaid petition with the RTC of Sorsogon alleging
that mining operations conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
Corporation and TR Ore puts the municipality of Matnog in environmental dangers and despite this fact,
Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining
permit. Similarly, it was alleged that representatives of PMS and DENR did nothing to protect the interest
of the people in same community, thus, respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the
People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the
Local Government Code. Dolot, et al primarily prayed for the shutdown of said mining operations
through issuance of TEPO as well as the rehabilitation of the mining sites and the return of the iron ore
mined in the area.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the
designated environmental court. However, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC averred that SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 limit the power
of such court to try and hear the case as its territorial jurisdiction was limited to violations of
environmental laws within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol,
Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban.
Issue
Whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338.
Ruling
The SC held that such reasoning is plainly erroneous and that RTC cannot solely rely on SC
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining
whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners. As reiterated by the SC, jurisdiction is
the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law. It may either be
over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the
issues framed in the pleadings. BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 also states that
jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC, hence,
original jurisdiction shall be exercised by the RTCs. Both the SC AO and AC merely provide for the venue
where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or
tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress and the same cannot be delegated to
another office or agency of the Government.
The high court further emphasized that venue relates only to the place of trial or the
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the
jurisdiction of the court as it is aimed to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of
trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts. Therefore, RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is incorrect. While it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or
omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in the
RTC of Irosin, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be
waived. Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential
element of jurisdiction. With these, the SC granted the petition and directed the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon to transfer the case to the RTC of Irosin, Branch 55, for further
proceedings with dispatch.
CASE: Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes in
his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et.al. (G.R. No. 180771 and 181527)
DATE: 21 April 2015
PONENTE: J. Leonardo-De Castro
FACTS
 On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102)
with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX).
 The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and
magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon
Strait was conducted.
 On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No. 46 (SC-
46) for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block
covering approximately 2,850 sqm. offshore the Tañon Strait.
 From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Tañon Strait, including
a multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to determine the
area’s underwater composition.
 During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well. Since
the same was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan where the
Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the
Environmental Impact Assessment requirements under Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD
1586), entitled “Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other Purposes.”
  On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the Tañon Strait
issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination
commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably recommended the approval of the latter’s
application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
 On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil
and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.
 From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a depth
of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town.
 On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that the
implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987 Constitution.
 The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit the
waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-
Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their protection. Also impleaded
as unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527,
the petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock,
non-profit, non-governmental organization established for the welfare of the marginal
fisherfolk in Region VII and representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities
of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions are:
- A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish
catch by 50-70% attributable to the destruction of the “payao” or the artificial reef.
- The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public
consultations and discussions prior to its issuance.
- SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, considering that there is no general law prescribing the standard or
uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil
exploration and extraction
- FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer
radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5-
kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial Environmental Examination
 The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and Chairman of
Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) as the
alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counter-allegations are:
- The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal standing to file the
petition.
- SC-46 is constitutional.
- The ECC was legally issued.
- The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June
2008.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON Petitioners have a legal standing
3. WON SC-46 is unconstitutional
RULING
1. No. The Court makes clear that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magic formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Despite the termination of SC-46,
the Court deems it necessary to resolve the consolidated petitions as it falls within the
exceptions. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the
environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the public’s interest, and the
respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition.
2. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen suit,” and
permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violation of our
environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature:
“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of
the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected baragngays copies of
said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.
(Emphasis supplied)”
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure may be retroactively applied
to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the SC had
already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC
allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”
It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real parties in the Petition and
not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
3. Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part:
“The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the
State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.” (Emphases supplied)
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the
Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the Oil Exploration and Development
Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that PD 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law,
the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the
Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then Secretary Vicente S.
Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently
notified of the execution of such contract.
Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural resources are of
paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were out in place to insure
that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise eradicate the corruption that may
easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of
the service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE, obtain the
President’s approval for the execution of any contract under said statute.
The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to serve as a guide for the
Government when executing service contracts.
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having
been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management
plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an Environment Impact
Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.
Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the 2 nd sub-
phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This means that no environmental
impact evaluation was done when the seismic surveys were conducted. Unless the seismic surveys are
part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of
NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.
While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case
may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since
there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy
resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
CASE: Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v. Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (G.R. Nos. 187836 and 187916)
DATE: 25 November 2014
PONENTE: J. Perez
FACTS
 On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by oil companies
(Chevron, Petron and Shell) and Department of Energy for the creation of a Master Plan to
address and minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of communities,
business and offices to Pandacan oil terminals without affecting security and reliability of
supply and distribution of petroleum products.
 On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which
reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to
Commercial I.
 Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification were given six (6)
months from the date of effectivity to stop the operation of their businesses. It was later
extended until 30 April 2003.
 On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the Supreme Court (SC) to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
 Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila an
action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was issued in favor of Chevron
and Shell. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004.
 On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled “An
Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of
2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto”. This
designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone.
 On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and directed Mayor Atienza to
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that the objective of the ordinance is to
protect the residents of manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in
case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
 The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on the 7 March 2007 Decision. The
SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and that it was not impliedly
repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 as there is no irreconcilable conflict between them.
 SC later on denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.
 On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor Lim), the SP enacted
Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light
Industrial Zone, Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium and a Heavy Industrial
Zone where petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly allowed.
 Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Their contentions are as follows:
- It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not promote the general
welfare of the people
- It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as well as
health and environment related municipal laws and international conventions and
treaties, such as: Clean Air Act; Environment Code; Toxic and Hazardous Wastes
Law; Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the Child
- The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119
when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027
 On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and the intervenors oil companies
contend that:
- The petitioners have no legal standing to sue whether as citizens, taxpayers or
legislators. They further failed to show that they have suffered any injury or threat
of injury as a result of the act complained of
- The petition should be dismissed outright for failure to properly apply the related
provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate remedy available
- The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC only exercises
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an
ordinance under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
- It is the function of the SP to enact zoning ordinance without prior referral to the
Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it may repeal all or part of
zoning ordinance sought to be modified
- There is a valid exercise of police power
 On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which essentially amended the
assailed Ordinance to exclude the area where petroleum refineries and oil depots are located
from the Industrial Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor Lim.
ISSUES
1. WON there are violations of environmental laws
2. WON the principle of hierarchy of courts is violated
3. WON the petitioners have legal standing to sue
4. WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the Pandacan Terminals
RULING
1. None. The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied in Section 2,
Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal and
special civil actions before the MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs, and the RTCs involving the
enforcement or violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations
 such as but not limited to: R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act; R.A. No.
8749, Clean Air Act; Provisions in C.A. No. 141; and other existing laws that relate to the
conservation, development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and
natural resources.
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are
allegations of violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral
attacks that would support the other position of the petitioners – the protection of the right
to life, security and safety.
2. No. The SC held that it is true that the petitions should have been filed with the RTC, it having
concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over a special civil action for prohibition, and original
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
However, the petitions at bar are of transcendental importance warranting a
relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375)
3. Yes. The SC referred to their Decision dated 7 March 2007 which ruled that the petitioners in
that case have a legal right to seek the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 because the
subject of the petition concerns a public right, and they, as residents of Manila, have a direct
interest in the implementation of the ordinances of the city.
No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the
assailed ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that concerns a public right.
In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the people is
indisputably a right of utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as residents
of Manila, have the required personal interest to seek relief to protect such right.
4. Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the
continued stay of the oil depots, the SC followed the same line of reasoning used in its 7
March 2007 decision, to wit:
“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting a
sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the
area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila which
recommended the approval of the ordinance:
(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly
flammable and highly volatile products which include petroleum
gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline,
kerosene and fuel oil among others;
(2) The depot is open to attack through land, water and air;
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang
Palace; and
(4) In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire
could spread to the neighboring communities.
The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot
is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which
means that it is a terrorist target. As long as there is such a target in their midst,
the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore becomes necessary to remove
these terminals to dissipate the threat.”
The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil
depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of
any convincing reason to persuade the Court that the life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, the SC holds
that the Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or
another, no matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some, the SC cannot allow the
right to life be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of
probability have no place in situations where the very life of not just an individual but of
residents of big neighbourhoods is at stake.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
1. Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional and invalid with respect to the continued
stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
2. The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to cease and desist from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of the
Pandacan area
3. The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days, submit to the
RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which
relocation shall be completed not later than six (6) months from the date the required
document is submitted.
MMDA v. Jancom
Date: Jan 30, 2002
Petitioner: MMDA
Respondent: Jancom
Ponente: Melo, J.
Facts of the case: After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom won a
contract for the MMDA’s San Mateo waste management project. A BOT contract for the waste to energy
project was signed on Dec 19, 1997, between Jancom and the Philippine Government, represented by
the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-
NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA chair Prospero Oreta.
The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too close to the end of his term.
He endorsed it to President Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign it, for two reasons: the passage of RA
8749, or the Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of San Mateo residents for the closure of the
dumpsite.
When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid waste management projects for Metro
Manila, Jancom filed a petition with the Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the resolution of
the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding the BOT contract
with Jancom, and the call for bids for a new waste management contract.
On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of Jancom. Instead of appealing, the MMDA filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and a TRO. When the CA dismissed the petition, the MMDA
went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the contract with Jancom was not binding because it was not
signed by the President, the conditions precedent to the contract were not complied with, and there was
no valid notice of award.
The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed a motion for appeal instead of for certiorari,
because a certiorari would only apply in cases where there was grave abuse of jurisdiction, something
which the petition did not allege. Correction may be obtained only by an appeal from the final decision.
Since the decision was not appeal, the Court said it has become final and “gone beyond the reach of any
court to modify in any substantive aspect.”
Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the substantive issues, the court took it up just the same, “if
only to put the petitioner’s mind to rest.”
The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319 of the Civil Code.
In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can only allege that there was no valid
notice of award; the contract does not bear the signature of the President; the conditions precedent
specified in the contract were not complied with.
But the Court said that the lack of notice was the government’s fault; though the President did not sign,
his alter-ego did; and anyway his signature was only necessary for the effectivity of the contract, not its
perfection; and that the two-month period within which Jancom should comply with the conditions had
not yet started to run because the contract had not yet taken effect, precisely because of the absence of
the President’s signature.

HELD: The Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a valid and perfected contract
between the Republic of the Philippines and Jancom. The MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same
without the consent of the other. Although the contract is a perfected one, it is still ineffective or
unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President.
Voting: vitug, panganiban, Sandoval Gutierrez concur.
Carpio j: No part, I was former counsel to a foreign partner of Jancom Environmental Corporation.
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution says: The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Does this mean that all administrative decisions and penalties may be rendered only by the Supreme
Court en banc?
On February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which says: A decision or resolution of a
Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at
least three such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Sec 4 (3), Article VIII, 1987
Constitution.