Twenty Years of Human Security PDF

Twenty Years of Human Security:
Theoretical Foundations and Practical Applications

Belgrade, April 2015
Editorial
Ivica Đorđević, PhD, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, Marina Glamotchak,
PhD, chercheur indépendant et consultante en analyse stratégique, politique et économique, Paris,
Svetlana Stanarević, PhD, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, Jasmina Gačić,
PhD, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies
Reviewers
Ivica Radović, PhD, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, Želimir Kešetović, PhD,
University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, Šefika Alibabić, PhD, University of Belgrade -
Faculty of Philosophy, Marina Mitrevska, Ss. PhD, Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje –
Faculty of Philosophy, Zoran Jeftić, PhD, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, Bojana
Mihajlovic, PhD, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Geography, Stephan E. Nikolov, PhD,
Institute for the study of Societes and Knowledge, Sofia, Rastko Močnik, PhD, Univerza v Ljubljani,
Filozofska fakulteta, Mitja Žagar, PhD, University of Ljubljana - Institute for Ethnic Studies, Nada
Sekulić, PhD, University of Belgrade –Faculty of Philosophy, Dušan Sakulski, PhD, National Disaster
Management Center, Republic of South Africa, Aleksandra Đukić, PhD, University of Belgrade –
Faculty of Architecture, Boban Milojković, PhD, Academy of Criminalistics and Police Studies,
Belgrade, Ljiljana Došenović, PhD, University of Banja Luka - Faculty of Forestry, Olivera Injac,
PhD, University Donja Gorica, Milica Boskovic, PhD, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security
Studies, Aleksandar Ivanov, PhD, University of St “Kliment Ohridski” – Bitola, Irena Cajner
Mraović, PhD, University of Zagreb - Centre for Croatian Studies, Ljubinka Katć, PhD, University of
Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies, Ivaniš Željko, PhD, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security
Studies, Saša Mijalković, PhD, Academy of Criminalistics and Police Studies, Belgrade
Publisher
University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies
Institut Français de Géopolitique Université Paris 8
For the Publisher
Radomir Milašinović, PhD, Dean of the Faculty of Security Studies
Barbara Loyer, PhD, Directrice de L’Institut Français de Géopolitique Université Paris 8
Proofreading
Dragoslava Mićović, Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade
Cover Page
Ema Radovanović, MA, Academic painter
Graphics Design
Branislav L. Valković, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Studies
Print
ATC, Belgrade
Edition
200 copies
ISBN 978-86-84069-94-0
Note
The authors opinions expressed in this book do not necessary reflect the views
of the institution in which they are employed.
Editorial
IVICA ĐORĐEVIĆ, PhD, MARINA GLAMOTCHAK, PhD,
SVETLANA STANAREVIĆ, PhD,
J ASMINA GAČIĆ, PhD
TWENTY YEARS OF HUMAN SECURITY:

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
2015.
CONTENTS
EDITORIAL 9
Theoretical Foundations of Human Security

Rastko MOČNIK
CONTEMPORARY PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL ANALYSIS AND ACTION 15
Marina MITREVSKA, Marjan GJUROVSKI

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY AND WAY OF ITS ACHIEVEMENT:
THEORETICAL APPROACH TO HUMAN SECURITY 33
Ljubomir STAJIĆ
WHY SAFETY CULTURE 41
Marcos FERREIRA, João TERRENAS

THE VISUAL POLITICS OF HUMAN INSECURITIES:
CRITICAL RESEARCH METHODS FOR A LIMINAL DISCIPLINE 53
Ivica DJORDJEVIĆ, Željko IVANIŠ, Milenko BODIN

THE CONTRIBUTION OF HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT
TO THE WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY 63
Miroslav PENDAROSKI
PERSONAL SECURITY IN TIMES OF GLOBALISATION –
A PERCEPTIVE ILLUSION OR A STRUGGLE FOR SELF-ACTUALIZATION 79
Erjon HITAJ
THE PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE AS A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE MEASURE
TO ACHIEVE HUMAN SECURITY 95
Jørgen JOHANSEN
STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE: MORAL AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES 105

115
Nenad RADIVOJEVIĆ
SAFETY CULTURE IN THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR 129
Ljubinka KATIĆ
PROPERTIES OF PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY IN THE HUMAN SECURITY FIELD 139
Milica V. MATIJEVIĆ, Vesna ĆORIĆ ERIĆ
PEACEBUILDING AND THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORIES 151
Stevan Tatalović
IS HUMAN SECURITY A COMMON GOOD AND CAN IT BE PROVIDED
TO EVERYONE: PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN SECURITY IN QUESTION? 163
Developmental Aspects of Human Security

Jelena ĆALIĆ, Milena PANIĆ, Dragana MILJANOVIĆ,
Jelena KOVAČEVIĆ-MAJKIĆ, Marko V.MILOŠEVIĆ
EDUCATION AS THE KEY SEGMENT FOR PREVENTION
IMPROVEMENT IN DISASTER RISK REDUCTION SYSTEM IN SERBIA 177
Miladin KOSTIĆ, Emir ĆOROVIĆ, Senad GANIĆ, Sibela EMINOVIĆ

ILLEGAL STATE BORDER CROSSING AND SMUGGLING OF HUMAN BEINGS,
CRIMINAL OFFENSES OF ARTICLE 350 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF SERBIA
AS POSSIBLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTION OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION 187
Mladen MILOŠEVIĆ, Božidar BANOVIĆ

WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND HUMAN SECURITY 199
Marina GLAMOTCHAK
ENERGY SECURITY OR ENERGY DEPENDENCE? 211
Ana Isabel XAVIER

A HUMAN SECURITY STRATEGY FOR EUROPE?
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT AFTER THE LISBON TREATY 223
Nada M. SEKULIĆ
THE IMPACT OF THE CONTEMPORARY WARS
ON CHILDREN VULNERABILITY 235
James Alex SIEBENS, Larissa KOUGBLENOU, Ben S. CASE

DEVELOPING HUMAN INSECURITY:
DEVELOPMENT, MARGINALIZATION, AND MAOIST INSURGENCY IN INDIA 249
Tanja TRKULJA
HUMAN SECURITY IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT 265
Human Security Regional and Local Policies and Issues

Jasmina GAČIĆ, Vladimir JAKOVLJEVIĆ, Vladimir CVETKOVIĆ
FLOODS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA – VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN SECURITY 275
Srđan KORAĆ, Marko FILIJOVIĆ
POLITICISATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND UNETHICAL
LEADERSHIP: NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY? 287
Dubravko ALEKSIĆ
QUANTUM ARCHITECTURE AND SAFETY OF OPEN PUBLIC SPACES 297
Paolo BARGIACCHI
DID THE EUROPEAN UNION IMPLEMENT THE HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT
IN THE LIBYAN WAR IN 2011? A CASE STUDY 307
Edin Kalač
IMPROVING HUMAN SECURITY – AN EXAMPLE OF SOUTH WEST SERBIA 319
Strahinja BRAJUŠKOVIĆ
INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT - THE REGIONAL PROGRAM
FOR HUMAN SECURITY AND THE APPROACH FOR SUPPRESSING
TRANS-ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 327
Alexander K. LAUTENSACH, Sabina W. LAUTENSACH

PREPARE TO BE OFFENDED EVERYWHERE: CULTURAL SAFETY IN PUBLIC PLACES 335
Aleksandra ĐUKIĆ, Milena VUKMIROVIĆ, Eva VANIŠTA LAZAREVIĆ

PUBLIC SPACE SAFETY EVALUATION. CASE STUDY:
KOSANČIĆEV VENAC, BELGRADE 349
Bülent SARPER AĞIR

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE OF HUMAN SECURITY:
FROM A CONCEPTION TO THE REALITY? 365
Jelena RAKOVIĆ, Gospava STOJANOVIĆ

ROLE AND CAPACITIES OF LOCAL COMMUNITY
IN ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY – ON THE EXAMPLE OF
POLLUTED DRINKING WATER IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF UŽICE 375
Murat Necip ARMAN, Hikmet MENGUASLAN

THE CONGRUITY BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE CONTEXT
OF HUMAN SECURITY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 387
Milana LAZIĆ
HUMAN SECURITY THROUGH THE PRISM OF DISPLACEMENT OF ROMA 399
Nevena NOVAKOVIC, Aleksandra DJUKIC

URBAN FORM AND PUBLIC SAFETY: HOW PUBLIC OPEN SPACE SHAPES
SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR IN PUBLIC HOUSING NEIGHBOURHOODS 411
Marija POPOVIĆ
INTRODUCING HUMAN SECURITY DISCOURSE IN SERBIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
THE WAY TOWARDS EUROPEAN VALUES AND PRACTICES 423
Svetlana DJURDJEVIĆ-LUKIĆ
SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS:
BEYOND CONFLICT AND FATAL VICTIMS 435
Vladimir MENTUS
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND SELF-EVALUATION OF ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE EU 453
EDITORIAL
The Collection of Works: Twenty Years of Human Security: Theoretical Foundations and
Practical Applications, is realized as a joint project of Center for Human Security Studies,
Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade and Institut Français de Géopolitique, Uni-
versité Paris 8. During the year 2014, the Center organized a series of academic activities
and manifestations to the purpose of marking 20th anniversary of the publishing the UNDP
Report for the year 1994, in which the concept of human security was first promoted as a
comprehensive analytical framework. Simultaneously, these activities underpin the con-
tinuous work of the Center on promoting the human security concept and its significance
for a better understanding of contemporary challenges and treats. Extending our gratitude
to the coleagues who are inspired by the ideas and principles of the human security con-
cept in their research work, we are in position to bring this concept closer to the wider
academic community.
The works are classified in three units:
• The works in the first part of the Collection address the theoretical foundation of the
concept and the conditions that lead to a critical reconsideration of traditional ap-
proach to security.
• The second part includes the works that deal with the relationship between the hu-
man security concept and the achieved level of development.
• The third part contains the works that deal with regional and local aspects of human
security.
In this day and age the security of people is largely determined by the achieved civiclisa-
tional level of development, which brings along many challenges, risks and threats. The
largest part of risk and danger that the inhabitants of this planet are faced with is the ef-
fects of their previous activities i.e. the activities of our ancestors. The viewpoint regard-
ing global resources as cheap raw material for the exploitation of which and the effect of
this exploitation man bears no responsibility leads to the disturbance of global ecological
ambiance. The misbalance in technological development with respect to the philosophi-
cal support (moral-ethical framework) creates a situation in which man holds no regard
for nature as an extremely sensitive surroundings. By proclaiming profit the only measure
of efficacy in the functioning of people, communities, economy and the state, many other
aspects relevant for peoples’ lives are neglected.
The danger to which man is exposed due to their destructive relation towards the environ-
ment assumes drastic forms such as the change of climate and global warming. The lack of
willingness to take appropriate measures so as to restrain the destruction of the environ-
ment affects larger and larger number of people what with the desertification and the grow-
ing number of flashfloods in river basins. Declining of life conditions forces many people to
migrate due to the worsening of ecological situation and is a constant source of problems
for the regions that are still spared the cataclysmic events triggered by natural disasters.
Today, the critical issues that potentially concern all actors on the international political
scene are not dealt with, but the realization of geo-political goals based on theories that
appeared at the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th century is insisted upon. With the fall
of the Berlin wall many humanists have developed expectations that the humanity will
eventually turn to the creation of conditions for the planet Earth to become a happier and
safer place of living after the danger from nuclear holocaust has ceased. It is exactly on the
spur of such expectations that the UNDP in its Report for the year 1994 promotes the con-
cept of human security as analytical framework that is expected to provide an objective
picture of the actual state of affairs and determine the sources of problems people are faced
with in everyday life. The UNDP expert team gathers together in one place all progressive
and humane ideas from the age of enlightment to present day. The concept contains the
ideas of Paris revolutionaries, the ones from the Declaration on Human Rights, the results
of the many century long struggle of workers for their rights, and from the theory of sus-
tainable development. Present is the consciousness that some of historical mistakes must
not be repeated anymore and that nobody must be put in danger just because they are dif-
ferent from the others, but also that it must not happen that anybody makes the decision
to set the war machinery in motion in our name.
The concept is very much disputed by the supporters of real politics with the explanation
that we do not need a new science on the nature and society and that the main streams,
by nature of things, are determined by the mightiest individuals, groups and states. The
trends in the last 20 years confirm that the government of principles based on raw power
functioning to the benefit of realization of some ideological project makes the planet a far
less secure place to live in than it was before the year 1989. Breaking the rules of the inter-
national order and not respecting the declarations all this being done by the most powerful
countries leads to a retrograde process and a comeback to political pre history. National
states are no longer capable to fight the global problems and the existing UN organization
system has no instruments of sanctioning the member states that do not comply with the
basic principles embedded in the foundations of this organization.
The concept of human security is set in such a way that it addresses the problems of citi-
zens as members of global community in formation, independently from their national,
religious and/or any other affiliation. The approach based on the seven dimensional ma-
trix with a set of indicators for each dimension of security enables the determination of
problem sources both on the state (the degree of their development notwithstanding) and
global level. Many of the currently present issues could have been avoided had we imple-
mented the HS concept in practice. Numerous pockets of instability and/or conflict may
not have existed or may have been resolved if the early warning system that is a component
of the concept was applied. We may justly say that the concept of human security, despite
its evident shortcomings, is a serious attempt to link theoretically the change caused by
globalization with the lives of the common people. Due to excessive generalization, the
promoters and protagonists of globalization lose sight of the changes that affect the func-
tionality of nation-state system, which directly reflects in the quality of life of most of the
people on planet Earth.
Global practice is a long way ahead of the actual theoretical-philosophical paradigm of
modern civilization. The presentation of quantitative elements of global processes with-
out an objective perception of their qualitative (development) aspects creates an illusion
of unquestionable universal progress under the influence of global processes. This prob-
lem may be solved with the help of theoretical-analytical model that the concept of human
security is offering. The ability to quantify the actual state of affairs and the effects of the
process is the best quality of the concept. The objectification of the process by way of an
analysis freed from ideological prejudice may contribute to the determination of sources
of the problem and facing its roots.
The works before you address the security challenges of the modern world from various
aspects. Nevertheless, they have a common trait that pervades the thought of all authors
and that is the wish to analyze the existing reality of the civilization to which we belong on
the basis of scientifically established principles. With their critical review the authors give
their contribution to the quest for a new sociological-economic paradigm of the modern
world. The reader may not agree with many standpoints and conclusions presented in
this collection of works, but will certainly have a lot material to think about from a new
perspective on modern security phenomena.
The basic theses that can be drawn from published material are, in short:
1. The modern world is in a paradigmatic crisis because of the gap that exists between
global practices and institutional dysfunctions of the existing system. National bor-
ders are no protection against the proliferation of negative effects of globalization,
coping with them requires a change of the current paradigm of civilization based on
the structures that generate permanent violence as a pattern of behavior.
2. Globalization after 1989 (after the fall of the Berlin Wall) shows that the same prob-
lems of citizens, with minor variations, are present in the entire planetary space re-
gardless of the level of development and geographical location. Solving the problems
of the modern world requires a general consensus and institutions that take care of
respecting the established rules by all regardless of their level of development, eco-
nomic or military power.
3. Modern scientific thought ought to be free of ideological prejudice and critically ana-
lyze the existing situation in order to arrive at appropriate solutions. Dealing with the
causes of the problem demands an objective consideration of the effects of the exist-
ing system functioning. When creating a new model of the functioning of the global
system local specifics based on cultural differences arising from the historical experi-
ence must be taken into account. Inadequate institutional arrangements, and impos-
ing models contrary to the tradition and the existing state of affairs are sometimes a
bigger source of problems than the anachronistic system that is being demolished.
4. Technological progress offers many opportunities, it depends on the social context
whether there will be more positive or negative effects. Technological progress with-
out an ethical framework is a part of the problem, not a part of the solution of it.
5. The privatization of the security system without adequate institutional mechanisms
of control is potentially a source of many problems, both at the internal level of indi-
vidual countries, and at the global level.
6. A change of the form of conflict does not mean that the old geopolitical projects are
abandoned. Insisting on the realization of projects of global domination causes in-
stability and creates the potential for a conflict of global proportions. Insisting on
outdated geopolitical models and technologies that bring profit, but cause a lot of
pollution is a source of threats to the security of people and threatens the survival of
the planet as their natural habitat.
7. The security concerns of the countries in the region of South East Europe are more or
less the same. The inability to learn a lesson from the common history leads to the pe-
riodic repetition of the same mistakes. Countries in the region should, in accordance
with their conditions and needs, create a system based on the positive experience
of the EU. Shortcomings and dysfunction of institutions lead to the problems in the
everyday functioning of the community, and are particularly expressed in emergency
situations such as floods that can cause numerous natural hazards.
At the end, a word to the reader based on the presented viewpoints of the authors: The
modern world has to accept the fact that we live on a small planet that is home to all men.
The resources are limited, but there are technologies and capacities that can help over-
come the resource crisis. However, profit must not be the only criterion of evaluation
of technological and economic processes. Civilization has reached a level that requires
a review of the existing economic paradigm and the establishment of global institutions
with democratic legitimacy. In the given context, the solutions require a global consensus
based on the equality of citizens and the right to a decent life, regardless of geographic,
racial and national origin. The existing international system is outdated and the current
structure should be taken advantage of to create an international order based on new
principles. The scientific community has a responsibility to warn the actual power cent-
ers on dangers arising from the old logic in the new conditions and thereby give its con-
siderable contribution to the security of citizens as members of the global community in
the making.
Belgrade, April 2015. Ivica Đorđević, PhD, Associate Prof.
Marina Glamotchak, PhD, Researcher
Svetlana Stanarević, PhD, Assistant Prof.
Jasmina Gačić PhD, Assistant Prof.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT
UDC 316.42
Rastko MOČNIK*

AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL ANALYSIS AND ACTION1
Abstract: In their interaction, contemporary social processes, although initially mostly of hetero-
geneous origins, trigger the effects that could not have been expected in the perspective of any of
their particular immanent “logics”. Many of these unexpected articulations have a systemic im-
pact on various structural levels from households to larger social groups to nations and up to the
level of the world system. One of the prominent effects is the “deetatisation” of important sectors
of former state functions, including public services and security-related activities and institutions.
This mostly means privatization of services and functions formerly provided and/or performed
by the state. Privatizations open new opportunities for capital accumulation, but also cause new
and deepening social inequalities and marginalize large social groups (the young and the old peo-
ple, the unemployed, the working poor, the immigrants, etc.). A general consequence, however,
is the transfer of the risks towards households and individuals, and the concomitant emergence of
strategies to counter the new challenges. In the popular social strata that do not possess adequate
means to embrace privatizations and eventually to profit from them, these strategies are devel-
oped within the dimensions beyond the individual, at the level of the household and larger social
groups, like ethnic and religious communities. This again leads towards the fragmentation of so-
ciety and produces new social tensions and conflicts, eventually endangering the existing social
and political constructions. Since the state has developed, according to Foucault, in the dimen-
sion of “governmentality” mostly within the fields of public services, their privatization entails a
new formation of governmental practices and of the complex “knowledge-power” as their nec-
essary component. The transformation of “governmentality”, so “important for our modernity”
according to Foucault, into the profit seeking management, articulates regulative practices and
capital accumulation practices into a novel conjuncture that determines our present horizon and
perhaps indicates the future. Fragmentation of disciplines, that has hitherto mostly been the joint
effect of the practices of Foucauldian bio politics and of the spontaneous logic of the institutions
of knowledge, is now much more basically propelled by commercialization of the mechanisms of
social cohesion and the strategies of what Freitag called “technosciences”. To establish the per-
spective that may support a properly scientific analysis and open alternative future horizons, the
adequate theoretical move is to deploy integrative epistemic procedures – such as have been pio-
neered by the efforts of human security approach.
Keywords: world system, transformation, governmentality, social sciences, epistemology
* Professor Rastko Močnik, PhD, University of Ljubljana; e-mail:josip.mocnik@guest.arnes.si

[16] Rastko MOČNIK
In their interaction, social processes, although initially of heterogeneous origins, trigger

the effects that could not have been expected in the perspective of any of their particu-
lar immanent “logics”. Many of these unexpected articulations have a systemic impact on
various structural levels from households to larger social groups to nations and up to the
level of the world-system. One of the prominent effects is the “de-étatisation” of important
sectors of former state functions, including public services and security-related activities
and institutions. This mostly means the privatisation of services and functions formerly
financed from public sources and provided by public agencies. Privatisations open new
opportunities for capital accumulation, but also cause new and deepening social inequali-
ties and marginalise large social groups. A general consequence, however, is the transfer
of the risks towards households and individuals, and the concomitant emergence of grass-
roots strategies to counter the new challenges. In the popular social strata that do not pos-
sess adequate means to embrace privatisations and eventually to profit from them, these
strategies are characteristically developed on the level of the household and of larger social
groups, like ethnic and religious communities. This again leads towards the fragmentation
of society and produces new social tensions and conflicts, eventually transforming the ex-
isting social and political constructions.
In the present contribution, I shall attempt to describe the contemporary context of the
problems of human security. As an outsider to this professional field, I should be appropri-
ately modest and shall only aim to describe the larger picture within which the specialists
are developing the concept of human security, suitable to be operative in the contempo-
rary historical situation.
1. FOUCAULT: SECURITY AS A COMPONENT OF BIO-POLITICS

It seems appropriate to start from perhaps the most provocative notion of security, which
has the advantage that its author presented it in terms of historical analysis with a general
theoretical ambition: the notion of security as proposed by Michel Foucault. If we want to
establish the frame within which it will be possible to elaborate a concept of security capa-
ble to support practices and interventions that would not be just a new type of the mecha-
nisms of power, we should start with a critique of Michel Foucault’s category of security.
Since the state has developed the practices of “governmentality” (the characteristic modern
mode of operation of “power” according to Foucault) predominantly within the fields of
public services, their privatisation entails a new formation of governmental practices and
of the “knowledge-power” complex as their necessary component. The transformation
of “governmentality” into the profit seeking management articulates regulative practices
and capital accumulation practices into a novel conjuncture that determines our present
horizon and perhaps indicates the future. The author of the notion of “governmentality”,
Michel Foucault though considers the privatisations of public services a “fictitious” pro-
blem.2 As his rejection of the problem seems to rest upon a truism (“‘Private’ medicine is
a mode of collective reaction to illness.”), it is this point on which we will centre our cri-
tique, and later develop our own perspective on the problematic. (Foucault 2001:725-726)
2 “A private medicine, a ‘liberal’ one, requested by individual initiative, and submitted to the mechanisms of offer
and demand; besides, maybe confronting it, a management of the medicine decided by authorities, supported by
an administrative apparatus […]. To put the problem in this way, presupposes a somewhat fictitious division.” (my
translation).
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL ANALYSIS AND ACTION [17]
2. FOUCAULT’S NOTION OF SECURITY

Foucault articulates the beginnings of the “dispositif”3 of security to the emergence of the
“bio-politics”, and specifically to the deployment of the strategies of “governmentality”,
the characteristic managerial approach to social questions that he deems “really impor-
tant […] for our present”.(Foucault 1991:112) He considers the triplet “bio-politics → gov-
ernmentality → security” to be the distinctive feature of the contemporary “great form
and economy of power”. (Foucault 1991:104-113)4 For Foucault, security practices and
their apparatuses permit the state to transcend itself – or, more precisely, to emancipate
itself from its otherwise constitutive juridical and administrative constraints. “From now
on, security is above the laws.” (Foucault 2001:367) Security management, according to
Foucault, opens the possibility of a permanent Schmittian state of exception, applied upon
particular “cases”, whose particularity and exceptionality is determined by the “power”.
(Foucault 2001:386)5 The “power” that, in Carl Schmitt’s vocabulary, is the sovereign. The
exercise of the sovereign power and its regulation has always been the central element of
state-regimes, that is, of particular historical juridical-political arrangements. If Foucault is
right and contemporary security management indeed introduces radical transformations
into the relation between the juridical apparatus and the political-executive apparatus,
then it radically transforms the ways the state operates.
However, Foucault refused to centre the transformation introduced by the security-type
of governmentality on the problem of the state. Although he was worried by the control
that the Social State exercised over individuals, (Foucault 2001:387)6 and by the depend-
ence into which it induced them, (Foucault 2001:1186-1187)7 although he held strong
opinions about the state, (Foucault 2001:386)8 and even proposed many elements of a
theory of state,9 he has never developed such a theory in its entirety. His anti-substantialist
3 One of the English translations of the French expression “dispositif” is “apparatus” (others being “device”, “machin-
ery”, “construction”, “deployment”). I am using the French word here in order to preserve its characteristically
Foucauldian hazy and unstable semantics, indicative of his epistemological stance.
4 “And maybe we could even, albeit in a very global, rough and inexact fashion, reconstruct in this manner the great
forms and economies of power in the West. First of all, the state of justice, born in the feudal type of territorial re-
gime which corresponds to a society of laws – either customs or written laws – involving a whole reciprocal play
of obligation and litigation; second, the administrative state, born in the territoriality of national boundaries of the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and corresponding to a society of regulation and discipline; and finally, a govern-
mental state, essentially defined no longer in terms of its territoriality, of its surface area, but in terms of the mass of
its population with its volume and density, and indeed also with the territory over which it is distributed […]. This
state of government which bears essentially on population and both refers itself to and makes use of the instrumen-
tation of economic savoir could be seen as corresponding to a type of society controlled by apparatuses of security.”
5 “This delimitation of the ‘dangerous accident’ actually belongs to the power.”
6 “[…] What results, as an effect of power, from the mechanisms of Social Security that control you continuously
from day to day?”
7 In an interview in 1983, he presented three arguments against the Social State that we would now probably consid-
er neo-liberal: “First, our system of social guarantees, as it was instituted in 1946, has now struck against economic
obstacles that we know. Second, this system, developed between the two wars […], has now reached its limits, as it
fails the political, economic and social rationality of modern societies. Finally, social security, although it may have
had positive effects, has also had ‘perverted effects’: growing rigidity of certain mechanisms and situations of de-
pendence. […] on one side, it offers more security to people, on the other, it increases their dependence.”
8 “The vocation of the state is to be totalitarian, that is, finally, to exercise a tight control over everything.”
9 “Maybe what is really important for our modernity […] is not so much the étatisation of society, as the ‘governmen-
talisation’ of the state.” (Foucault 1991:103; Foucault 2004 a:103) “The famous ‘problem of the Social State’ […] has
to be recognised for what it is: one of extremely numerous re-apparitions of the delicate adjustment between the
[18] Rastko MOČNIK
epistemology led him to abdicate to such a project.10 The result was the fragmentation
of the problem field. On historical axis, fragmentation could be justified by the valorisa-
tion of historical discontinuities (as an antidote against eventual teleological thinking);
on the structural axis, however, fragmentation just remained fragmentation, and even if
presented as a rampart against totalising simplifications, it still left the impression that the
most interesting questions have been left unasked.
It would seem easy to reconstruct a Foucauldian “theory of the state” in terms of histori-
cal genealogy: historical becoming of the modern state would then appear as progressive
sedimentation of components that, at each consecutive phase, rearticulate their mutual re-
lations, and hence their modes of operating. Such an interpretation certainly goes against
Foucault’s “theoretical and methodological decision”, and may even produce demystifying
effects regarding the interface between Foucault’s project and its realisation. The modern
state, as presented by Foucault,11 then appears as a re-articulation of past figurations:
1. The law and juridical apparatus – inherited from the mediaeval “state of justice”,
and now re-articulated into the safeguard of individual freedom and liberties;
2. Police apparatus – the main component of the 16th, 17th century “police state”,
now re-articulated into the regulation of repression;
3.+4. The two novelties, economy and population management, bound together by
mechanisms of security;12
5. Plus the diplomatic-military apparatus transferred from the previous epoch
(when the inter-state system was first formed).
3. INSUFFICIENCY OF FOUCAULT’S CONSTRUCTION

How do these heterogeneous components aggregate? It is true that they have been “re-ar-
ticulated”, but their re-articulation has not occurred in the view of their forming some sort
of a “totality”. In their modern form, they are rather the result of independent processes
whose conjuncture has produced the effects that do not belong to the “programme” or to
political power exercised over civil subjects and pastoral power that exercises itself over living individuals.” (Fou-
cault 2001:963).
10 “I start from a decision that is simultaneously theoretical and methodological, and it consists in saying: let us sup-
pose that universals do not exist, and at this moment I ask the history and historians: how can you write history if
you do not admit a priori that something like state, society, sovereign, subjects exists?” (Foucault 2004 b:5). How-
ever, if the state (or any other form of power) is not a substance, not an entity, it does not follow that it cannot (or,
perhaps, should not) be conceptualised. Conceptualisation is “totalisation” or “substantialisation” only in an em-
piricist epistemic perspective. Having refused to produce a concept of the state, Foucault spontaneously situated
himself within an implicitly presupposed horizon of the nation-state, or of its predecessors. This implicit perspec-
tive prevented him to analyse the state as an element of the interstate system, itself a component of the world-econ-
omy. Foucault’s incapacity to think about the state “from without”, corresponds to his incapacity to think, “from
within”, the relation between the state and economy otherwise than in terms of “paradox” or “laterality”.
11 “Economic practice, management of population, a public law articulated upon the respect of freedom and of liber-
ties, a police with repressive function: you see that the ancient project of police, such as it had appeared in corre-
lation with the raison d’État, dislocates itself, or, rather, decomposes itself among four elements – economic prac-
tice, management of population, law and respect of liberties, police –, the four elements that add themselves to the
grand diplomatic-military apparatus that has not been modified in the 18th century.” (Foucault 2004 a:362)
12 “It will be necessary to frame natural phenomena in a way that they do not deviate […]. It will be necessary to install
mechanisms of security. Mechanisms of security or the intervention, let’s say, of the State whose main function is
to secure the security of those natural phenomena that are economic processes or processes intrinsic to the popu-
lation, this will be the fundamental objective of governmentality.” (Foucault 2004 a:361)
the “logic” of any one of them taken in isolation. What has occasioned this conjuncture? To
say that this conjuncture has been secured by the state leads into circular reasoning, since
the modern state is the effect of the conjuncture, and consequently cannot be causa sui.
How to integrate, e.g., the exercise of freedom and economic practices? They both have to
be “framed”, the former by the juridical apparatus and the later by economic knowledge
as internal limitation to the governmental reason. These are the two central ideological
apparatuses of the modern society: the juridical construction of freedom and equality,
i.e., the institution of the republic; and the economic construction of freedom and com-
petition, that is, the institution of the market. Although they concur upon the notion of
the state as the guarantor of freedom, they are asymmetric: while economic practices can
be conceived, without much harm to the construction, as a way to exercise freedom, the
idea that freedom and equality may be a component of specifically economic practices is
explosive and blows the modern construction into the air. It eventually opens towards the
realisation that freedom and equality in contract and equivalent exchange in circulation
support despotism and exploitation in the production process.13
The problem then is the integration of economic practices into the set of components of
the modern state.14 Put in this way, the question leads into a paradox: on the one hand, eco-
nomic sphere is one of the components of a state or, more precisely, of a particular social
formation (whose other two components are the juridical-political sphere and the cultural
sphere); on the other hand, a particular social formation is just a component within the
world-economy. At a closer inspection, the other two components of a social formation
participate in the same paradox. Political sphere is an element within a formation, while at
the same time it embraces the formation from without, as the formation is an element of
the inter-state system. Culture is at the same time an “element” of a social formation (there
are many cultures within a formation) and “the set” to which a formation belongs as an
“element”, as particular cultures usually spread over several social formations.
However, we can easily avoid this dead-end of “pathological sets” by conceptualising the
differential “within/without” as a social institution that is exclusive in the homogeneous
dimension (it sets apart one social formation from the other within the inter-state system)
and inclusive in the heterogeneous dimension (it integrates heterogeneous social spheres
– economy, politics, culture – into a social formation). Such an institution can equally
integrate the five Foucauldian components without reducing their heterogeneity.15 This
institution is the nation.16 The nation institutionalises the relation between the nation-
state and national economy, national culture or national political sphere. The nation also
13 This move roughly occurs in Marx’s Contribution to the Jewish question (1844).
14 Foucault’s way of posing the problem leads to a dead-end: he considers economic knowledge as “lateral” to the
modern governmentality (Foucault 2004 b:290); and he views the economic link as a “paradoxical” (because disin-
tegrating) element within the cohesive links of population, conceived as “civil society” (Foucault 2004 b:307)
15 It will integrate economic practice, management of population, law and respect of liberties, police in its capacity to
operate as inclusive in its heterogeneous dimension; while the diplomatic-military apparatus will operationalise its
exclusiveness in the homogenous dimension.
16 Foucault spontaneously thinks within the horizon of the nation-state, and consequently cannot conceive its exte-
rior: this is why he cannot develop a theory of the state that requires thinking beyond the horizon of its “object of
knowledge”. Foucault’s explicit refusal to develop a theory of the state thus masks his conceptual incapacity to do
it. On the other hand, he reduces the nation to just another form of civil society (Foucault 2004 b:305-306) or to a
form of “counter-behaviour” against the raison d’État of the police state (Foucault 2004 a:364-365)
[20] Rastko MOČNIK
opposes one national-state against the other within both the interstate system and the
world-economy. Accordingly, the theory of the modern state should be developed upon
the background of the theory of nation.
We can now concretely consider the effects of practices and apparatuses integrated by the
national institution.17 Their efficacy derives from the specificity of their integration into
a nation. The specificity of national integration is twofold: it integrates heterogeneous
practices and their apparatuses without affecting their heterogeneity; it achieves integra-
tion by way of fragmenting the social field (at least in tendency) into atomised individuals.
A nation englobes economy, politics and culture precisely by securing their heterogeneity
or, as the old Marxist adage has it, their “relative autonomy”. Further, a nation achieves
integration by mediating it through the isolated individual. This means that, in the sphere
of economy, an individual will act as homo oeconomicus, in the juridical sphere as a juridi-
cal person, in politics as political subject and in culture as “having” a culture. Precisely this
“sectorialised” way of operating secures the national integration and its reproduction.
However, it achieves something more. The necessity for a wage worker to act as a juridical
person in the sphere of circulation, and the fact that his or her work yields surplus value
in the sphere of production, is the very essence of the specifically capitalist way of exploi-
tation. Breaking down the pre-capitalist “naturwüchsige” or “gemeinschaftliche” ties, and
consequently the establishment of the “free, equal” and isolated individual, is an essential
precondition of the capitalist mode of production. The effect of the specifically national
way of social integration is the introduction of the capitalist mode of production or, per-
haps more exactly, the establishment of the bourgeois class domination.
4. SOCIAL ACTION AND JURIDICAL-POLITICAL APPARATUSES

It is within this frame that we can pose the problem of the possibility (and of the efficacy)
of social action, and specifically of the practices of human security. It is significant, though
ironic, that liberal doctrines agree on the social efficacy of juridical-political action, while
Marxisms seem to diverge on the question. Traditional Marxist doctrines that accompa-
nied and largely informed the juridical-political practices of historical socialisms, firmly
believed that social action and particularly juridical regulations and political measures not
only can affect social reality, but can even trigger historical processes of epochal dimen-
sions.18 After the restoration of capitalism in socialist countries, the Marxists are mostly
wary of juridical-political actions, pointing out that transformations of juridical forms do
not touch relations of production and consequently cannot transform the (capitalist) mode
of production. (Lebowitz 2012; Kliman 2013). Contrary to Marxists, the two most influ-
ential new liberalisms, the German Ordo-liberalism and the global neo-liberalism believe
that regulative action by the state and by supra-state organisms can achieve important ef-
fects. Restoration of capitalism in post-socialist countries has justified their claim; and so
did the recent historical transformation of capitalism in the core countries of the system.
National and international regulations have had a decisive role in the great transformation
17 In Foucault, apparatuses and their practices are efficient by definition; however, they all produce a rather abstract
and monotonous effect of “power”; their agglomerations change, so does the “style” of their operating together,
but the question of their consolidated effect cannot be posed within Foucauldian epistemic field.
18 To mention just a few theoreticians with direct political involvement: besides, obviously, Lenin and Trocki, also
also Rosa Luxemburg, Buharin, Preobraženski, Kollontaj, Kardelj.
of global capitalism since 1980-ies. We shall here follow the aspects of these developments
that may be relevant for the problems of human security.
One of the changes that is perhaps most immediately felt by the population at large, at
least in Europe, is the transfer of risks from larger entities (states, enterprises) downwards
towards households and individuals. What people in their everyday lives experience as
the increasing insecurity of their existence is the result of several independent processes.
Suitably to our present subject, insurance companies and pension funds together with
investment funds contributed to some of these processes. By investing their capitals into
enterprises all over the world, they strategically transformed the orientation and the sense
of their operations. While in the past, the operations of an enterprise were commanded
by the implicit “Fordist contract” between the management and the employees (and other
partners of the enterprise, e.g., sub-contractors), the new “post-Fordist” arrangements
broke the previous contract among the “stakeholders” of the firm and established a new
contract between the management and the owners, i.e., the “shareholders”. (Cohen 2006),
(Daniel, 2006). The strategic goal of the former “stakeholders’” contract were the continu-
ation of the operation of the firm and the employees’ fair participation in the revenue of
the firm, while the new corporate goal is a good stock exchange position (market capi-
talisation) and high profits for the owners (shareholder value maximization) (Peyrelevade
2005:54)19. The pressure for the profits beyond the average profit rate (Aglietta 2004) in-
duced important transformations in the organisation of the enterprise and the labour pro-
cess itself, not to mention the increase of legally problematic and even criminal managerial
operations (cf. the paradigmatic case of Enron) (Aglietta 2004). Corporate governance,
the contemporary form of “the autocracy of capital”, (Marx 1867) new managerial tech-
niques like soft management, emotional management etc., enforce discipline and control,
and internal flexibility of the firm. The new organisation of labour processes emphasises
teamwork, workers’ mutual loyalty, direct producers’ innovation and initiative. The as-
cent of the capitalist mode of production historically proceeded by the progression from
the formal subsumption of labour to the capital towards its real subsumption. Facing the
possibility of its historical descent, capitalist mode now proceeds towards the real sub-
sumption of the human dimension of labour power – by colonising the mechanisms of
intersubjectivity. With respect to our subject, one might perhaps say that capitalism itself
has become the main threat to human security.
Former Fordist progressive orientation of the line of production from conception to pro-
duction to market realisation and to consumer has been inverted. Post-Fordist organisa-
tion of production now starts from the ultimate realisation point and tunes the concep-
tion, design and production itself on the consumers’ particular requirements, conditioned
by their life-styles, ethnic and religious particularities, by their sub-cultures, trendy hypes
and the like. Again, what had until recently seemed to have escaped the constraints of
capitalist productivism and consumerism, has now been integrated and subsumed under
the requirements of capital accumulation.
Perhaps the most important change is the dismantlement of the former integrated produc-
tion process into its constituent parts, delegated to dependent enterprises by way of “out-
19 Referring to the power of pension funds, Jean Peyrelevade suggests that “the old (or those to-be-old) of the devel-
oped countries rule over the young of all countries, the ‘more and more rich’ over the ‘more and more poor’ “.
[22] Rastko MOČNIK
sourcing” and “subcontracting”. This arrangement profits the main firm in many ways:
it operates on the “just in time” principle that means no storing, no waste, and above all
no conflicts over intensification and eventual extension of the labour process. Extra-ex-
ploitation is exported from the main firm to the dependent subcontractors, often small
and medium enterprises, family firms or ethnic businesses. Again, “cultural features” like
family and ethnic loyalty, kinship structures and pre-capitalist gemeinschaftliche bonds are
subsumed to support capital accumulation.
Fragmentation is not limited to the technical composition of operations; it also affects the
workers’ formal-juridical statuses. On the grounds of state legislation, various non-stand-
ard employment contracts are increasingly replacing standard employments: this mostly
means the substitution of labour-law based employments by employments regulated by
the civil law. In these kinds of employments, the worker (often legally styled as “independ-
ent entrepreneur”) formally figures as an equal contractual partner and does not enjoy the
advantages of the labour legislation. Simply put, this means legal abolition of the achieve-
ments of labour movements of the past hundred and more years. The important tenets of
social security are being dismantled, and are replaced by the classical capitalist interplay of
free competition and free and equal contractualism (Supiot 2010).20
The common features of these “fragmentations” (of production line, of the employees’
legal status) are:
1. That they are encouraged by governmental policies or directly introduced by the
state regulation; and
2. That they are introducing market relations into areas that have previously been sus-
tained by social relations of various non-market types.
This kind of state activity corresponds both to the Ordo-liberalism doctrine and to the
neo-liberal policy requirements. In Ordo-liberalism the state is supposed to protect and to
reproduce market relations as the optimal way of social co-ordination; and neo-liberalism
presses the state to generalise market relations all across the social field. The effect is that
market relations start functioning as relations of domination that support new types of
exploitation.21
5. GENERALISATION OF THE MARKET

Generalisation of market relations, presently the main tendency in the policies of transna-
tional capital and its juridical-political apparatuses (from national governments to supra-
state bodies like IMF, WB, or EU), produces two main effects:
1. Fragmentation of the social field into atomised entities, legally styled as
“individuals”,22 sociologically operating as households;
20 This historical regression is elegantly presented and subtly analysed by Alain Supiot. The first expression of the will
to found the post-WW II international order upon law and justice was the Declaration concerning the Aims and Pur-
poses of the International Labour Organisation, proclaimed on 10 May 1944 in Philadelphia (“Declaration of Phila-
delphia”). The declaration preceded the establishment of the United Nations (1945) and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (1948).
21 The new types of exploitation very often take the regressive form of the “production of the absolute surplus-value”,
that is, they intensify labour process without technological innovation or they simply extend the labour time be-
yond the former socially accepted and legally fixed amount of working hours.
22 Legally supported by the “pulverisation of Law into individual rights”, as Alain Supiot aptly describes the neo-lib-
2. Establishment of horizontal relations of competition among the entities of the

same order (individuals, households, enterprises, cities, regions, states), and of
quasi-monopsony23 vertical relations whereby superior entities control and exploit
subordinate entities (most characteristically, big corporations hold a monopsony
position in relation to their smaller contractors; in general, systemic core countries
hold a quasi-monopoly and a quasi-monopsony position over their satellites on the
periphery).
Combined, the two effects constitute a powerful mechanism of domination that operates
in several dimensions. Quite obviously, this mechanism systematically transfers risks to-
wards the bottom: the increasing insecurity of the subordinated is itself a strong incentive
towards their consent to submission and exploitation. What is more, however, is that en-
terprises and individuals caught in a monopsony situation are separated from the market-
socialisation of their production processes. They can sell their product (usually a semi-
product, but often a final product) only to one buyer that controls social conditions of
their production process. This type of arrangement separates individual production unit
as a whole from socialisation of its production process on the market, and often from the
general social conditions of production themselves. This type of separation is an impor-
tant structural novelty. To the separation of the producer from the means of production,
constitutive of the capitalist mode of production, is now added a novel type of separation –
separation from the market-socialisation of the product, often completed by the separa-
tion from the very conditions of production.24
The new separation introduces a new type of dependent labour and of appropriation of
surplus value. In this way, capitalist enterprises (especially in peripheral and semi-pe-
ripheral countries) become dependent on great transnational companies; without formal
transfer of juridical ownership, their monopsony partners appropriate the greater part of
the surplus value they produce. On the other side of the scale, the individuals in possession
of their means of production (like designers, software specialists, etc.), although formally
independent entrepreneurs, are exploited by their business partners who control the so-
cial conditions of their labour.
Generalisation of market relations generates the ideological effect that any source of future
revenue be viewed as “capital”. Applied to the individual, this ideology considers not only
his or her labour power as “human capital”, but includes under this notion also her or his
natural talents, personal traits, education, skills, and even social networks.25 Ideologies of
human capital subordinate education and generally human reproduction to the immediate
reproduction of the existing economy, and may in the areas where they prevail in policy
making,26 pose a threat to capitalist development whose immanent logic requires perma-
eral legal doctrine and practice. (Supiot 2010: 48). Supiot takes this description of the recent developments in na-
tional and international juridical systems from: Jean Carbonnier (Carbonnier 1996: 121).
23 Monopsony is a situation where there is only one buyer and several sellers. The buyer is a monopsonist and can dic-
tate the terms to its suppliers.
24 Monopsony buyer not only markets the final product, but also decides about the social usefulness of the produc-
tion process itself and determines the amount of the “socially necessary” labour spent in it. Monopsonist controls
the conditions of “just in time” delivery, its quality and quantity, the absence of waste etc.
25 Peter Drucker pioneered the view that education is a capital investment in his book The Landmarks of Tomorrow
(1959). The notion of human capital was later popularised by Gary Becker (Becker 1994).
26 As is the case of the European Union.
[24] Rastko MOČNIK
nent technological and organisational revolutions. In a broader sense, “human capital”

ideologies and their like (ideologies of “social capital”, “cultural capital”, etc.) are ideologi-
cal forms assumed by the characteristic late capitalist developments where social relations
and general intellect become the prime productive forces.27 As ideological forms, they sup-
port privatisation of both social relations and the general intellect.
Privatisation of the social field itself radically transforms the way states now operate. States
have always competed to attract capital and to keep it within their jurisdiction (Wallerstein
2004; Volerstin 2005). They now primarily endeavour to create a capital-friendly environ-
ment, that is, such that would permit profits beyond the average: they call it “enhancing
the competitive capacity of the country”, but as all the countries do the same, this strategy
is not likely to increase their “competitive position” (Wallerstein 2004; Volerstin 2005).
Governmental action aiming at “fiscal stability” combined with the reduction of taxes (es-
pecially on capital gains and on high revenues) (Husson 2006) and with the concern for
monetary stability, necessarily leads to the reduction of public services and to their priva-
tisation. These policies also increase pressures upon the labour, as they push down wages,
increase exploitation, introduce flexibility of employment, extend non-standard employ-
ments, substitute labour-law contracts with civil-law contracts, etc. In their function of the
managers of “human resources”, governments attempt to increase the quality of the “gen-
eral intellect”, and engage in “knowledge based society” policies. This usually results in the
imposition of short-term policies in education, in the destruction of scientific disciplines
and of local scientific communities, in commercialisation of education (Freitag 1995) and
generates conflicts within educational apparatuses.28
6. CONTAMPORARY “PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION”?

Generalisation of market relations requires privatisation of activities that are to be launched
upon the market. One can now safely claim that privatisations generate the increase of
social inequalities and the insecurity of large strata of population, they often deteriorate
privatised activities and reduce their accessibility. However, besides these particular ef-
fects, generalisation of market relations introduces a much deeper structural transforma-
tion (Đorđević 2013:58).29 The expression “generalisation of market relations” actually
mystifies the problem, since this “generalisation” actually aims at the services until re-
cently provided by the welfare state in core capitalist countries or by the state in historical
socialisms.30 These activities, dubbed in the European Union jargon as “services of general
27 Marx anticipated this development in Grundrisse … in his speculation about the self-abolition of capitalism. Marx
anticipated that at a certain point of capitalist development, the articulation (Gliederung) of social relations and
“general intellect” would become the most important productive forces. Since both are by definition of a social
nature, this moment would mark the end of capitalism, based upon the private appropriation of the means of pro-
duction and of the produce. Marx did not anticipate that both “general intellect” and social articulation might be
privatised.
28 Cf. the spread of student revolts in 2009-2012 (markedly in Croatia and Serbia, later in Slovenia).
29 “Destruction of welfare state and the principle of total privatisation produce catastrophic results in practice”.
30 Yugoslav socialism is a special case, since “social activities” were regulated by the system of “social management”.
“Social management” operated through a system of “double representation”: territorial units were represented in
the councils (i.e., the managing bodies) of the public-service entities, while public services themselves were repre-
sented in the assemblies of territorial units. Constitution of 1974 reformulated the principle of “double representa-
tion” by establishing “self-managed interest communities” where delegates of the “performers” of public services
together with the delegates of their “users” managed education, science, culture, health, pensions and social care.
Within the system of “self-managed interest communities”, mechanisms of social solidarity were operating beyond
interest”, include the elementary necessities like water supply, and the achievements of
progressive social struggles of the last centuries like public education and health care, pub-
lic pension systems, social services, social housing, etc.
At closer examination, we see that these activities have mostly to do with social reproduc-
tion.31 In socialisms and in welfare-state regimes, these activities were assumed by the state
and financed from public funds.32 Consequently, their privatisation equals private appro-
priation of the means and processes of social reproduction, and separates the members of
society from these means and processes. If the historical capitalist primitive accumulation,
by private appropriation of the “commons” and by dispossessing agricultural producers of
their lands and households, separated the immediate producer from the means of produc-
tion, then the present process that separates individuals from the means and processes of
social reproduction could be termed “contemporary primitive accumulation”.33
It seems an understatement to say that the present attack upon public services only means
the private appropriation of “public wealth”. The qualification “public” means that these
practices were situated within the apparatuses of the state, were managed by their admin-
istrations and executed by the specialists. Ordinary people had only indirect and often
remote access to their regulation and execution, mostly via political mechanisms that de-
termined fiscal policies. However, public services served the population who, in principle,
if not in fact, executed the ultimate “sovereignty” over them. Social reproduction was,
for the larger part, exempt of commodification and commercialisation. According to lo-
cal contexts, reproductive practices were distributed between the state social apparatuses
and households, with a marginal commodified sector (certain medical services, personal
care, etc.). Depending on local conditions, housework remained caught within traditional
division of domestic labour and entailed, to various degrees, gender oppression and ex-
ploitation (Fortunati 1995). The integration of public services into capital accumulation
induces a new distribution of reproductive activities. The main contemporary tendency34
is towards their privatisation, i.e. towards their commodification. Among the poorer strata
of population, financially unable to enrol in the new types of insurance etc., this immedi-
ately triggers the retreat of a large portion of reproductive activities into households.
the alternative “state administration vs. privatisation”. In the period when workers’ self-management in enterprises
was already in decline, social self-management in public services developed a successful pattern of democratic reg-
ulation of non-commodified production and social reproduction.
31 In anthropological terms, they are activities of Marcel Mauss’s “delayed exchange” (exchange among generations)
and “reciprocal exchange”. They were traditionally regulated by kinship structures, neighbourhood mores, cus-
toms and the like.
32 As striking as it may seem in the retrospect, public services, financed from progressive taxation, were regulated ac-
cording to the communist principle “from each according to her-his ability, to each according to her-his needs”.
33 Michael Perelman uses this expression, but does not offer its conceptual definition. In the abstract of the lecture
“From Adam Smith to Angela Merkel. A Short History of Primitive Accumulation” at the Institute for Workers’
Studies (Ljubljana), he describes it as follows: “The barbaric wave of austerity crashing across Europe and much of
the rest of the world both resembles and differs from the classical period of primitive accumulation which deprived
masses of people of their means of production. Although land grabs continue in this modern version of primitive
accumulation, the central thrust is the destruction of all public wealth in the interest of capital. Another difference
is that classical primitive accumulation reflected the optimism associated with a new form of making wealth, while
viciousness of modern primitive accumulation seems to be an attempt to recapture the vitality of early capitalism.
However, despite the short-term benefits of such cannibalistic policies for the capital, in the end the result will be
detrimental to the capitalists, as well as to the rest of society.” (Perelman 2013).
34 Promoted by national governments, EU, IMF, WTO, WB, international agreements, etc.
[26] Rastko MOČNIK
7. IDENTITY FORMATIONS
A large majority of households has found themselves under a double pressure. On the one
hand, progressive suppression of public services burdens households with reproductive
tasks performed by the public sector in the past. On the other hand, multiplication of non-
standard employments (plus growing unemployment) makes the aggregate households’
revenue fragile and precarious. Households have to complete more tasks with less money
and with less secure resources. Consequently, they have to tighten the discipline of their
members and to strengthen the control over them. They do it with the means at hand:
with the help of traditional, most often patriarchal family ideologies, relying upon religion
and other elements of mos maiorum. They seek support in their social environment, where
again religion and ethnicity are the most reliable and often the only available support. The
result is the triumph of identity ideologies whose material existence is the formation of
identity communities. Far from being an effect of a presumed “re-traditionalisation” of
societies, global progress of identity communities is the result of recent transformations in
the capitalist mode of production (intensification of pressure upon the wage labour and of
its exploitation) and of reproduction (increased pressure upon households, re-affirmation
of “pre-capitalist” modes of exploitation).
Identity formations are explosive and conflictual. This is because they come into existence
by a process of condensation of several structural contradictions: class, gender and genera-
tional antagonisms. As the critical structural tensions are displaced upon identity demarca-
tions, intensification of any one of them may trigger a conflict along identity lines. Not only
are the identity formations explosive, they also mystify social conflicts and prevent their
solution. They impose claims of “recognition”, of legal guarantees, of adequate political
representation, of positive discrimination, even of new geopolitical arrangements, etc. –
none of which is able to confront the underlying structural contradictions, while every one
of them strengthens the identity construction, deepens its mystification and supports its
obstruction against an active confrontation with structural antagonisms.
8. SOME CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE

CONCEPT OF “HUMAN SECURITY”
We have traced what seem to be the most important recent social transformations that
may be relevant for the human security theory and for the practices deriving from its con-
cept. It is for the specialists to elaborate upon the concrete consequences of the recent
transformations for the theory and practice of human security. To conclude the present
intervention, I would rather like to consider the following question: what does it mean
for the concept of human security that it is possible, or perhaps even necessary, to re-
elaborate it with respect to particular historical situations?
This question touches the epistemological status of the concept of human security. It
seems that the necessity to constantly review the concept of human security in view of its
application to concrete situations is inherent to this concept. Simultaneously, this neces-
sity of its permanent re-elaboration does not subvert its pretension to universality:
“With minor variations, in both cases35 the idea is the same. The authors employ a new set
of indicators and underline the qualitative difference between the classical notion of secu-
35 The two cases are: UNDP Human Development Report 1994; and Dragana Dulić (ed.), Indicators of human security
in Serbia. Report for 2004.
rity, focused exclusively upon the problems of the state (institutions and territory), and
the concept of human security. A more comprehensive consideration of the situation gen-
erates an analysis of higher quality and makes possible the creation of an adequate strategy
necessary for the transformation of the existing situation. Since this concept [of human
security] pretends to be universal, we shall, in what follows, present an approach that is
structurally based upon the UNDP Report, while it integrates the particular components
of the Report for Serbia.” (Đorđević 2013:109).
The quoted text puts forward the following main features of the concept of human securi-
ty: 1. its polemical nature; 2. its ambition to integrate several heterogeneous perspectives;
3. its practical character; 4. its pretension to be a universalist concept, and at the same
time the necessity of its constant re-elaboration to suit the changing historical scene. Let
us consider these features one by one.
A polemical concept
Human security is a polemical concept: it defines itself against a previous pre-theoretical
notion of security, elaborated exclusively from the point of view of the state, and therefore
being only a one-sided notion that certain epistemologies would define as belonging to
“techno-science”,(Freitag 1995) and others as being practical-ideological.36 Freitag-type of
epistemology would describe the move towards the new concept as an effort to regain the
autonomy of social sciences and to re-orient them back to their original humanist project.
The Althusserian epistemology would define this move as an epistemological break.
This qualitative shift from the former (ideological) notion to the present (theoretical) con-
cept follows from a theoretical epistemic move whose main feature is that it takes into
account concrete specificities of particular historical situations.
A multi-perspectival concept
The break away from ideology and towards theory is inherently connected to the move
from a spontaneous unitary perspective (that of the state) to a comprehensive theoretical
apparatus that is able to integrate several specific perspectives and to organise them into a
complex problem-field. This multi-perspective epistemology affirms the specificity of the
human and social sciences that was for the first time announced by Giambattista Vico in
his polemics against Cartesianism in the humanities.37
In Vico’s view, the method developed by the Ancients, which he called the topical method,
suited the humanities much better than the method proposed by Descartes, which Vico
called the modern critical method. The topical method takes its inspiration from the an-
cient rhetoric and the juridical science, which both presume that things human always
and by their very nature allow for differing and eventually mutually exclusive descriptions
36 Louis Althusser and his school.

37 Vico, Giambattista: De temporis nostri studiorum ratione, pronounced as inaugural oration to the beginning of the
academic year at the Royal University of Naples in 1706; re-written into a dissertatio in 1708. (Latin-German edi-
tion: Vom Wesen und Weg der geistigen Bildung, Godesberg, 1947; English translation: On the Study Methods of our
Time, Indianapolis-New York-Kansas City, 1965; French translation: La méthode des études de notre temps, in:
Giambattista Vico, Vie de Giambattista Vico écrite par lui-même, Grasset, Paris, 1981; Italian: Opere di Giambattista
Vico. Le orazioni inaugurali, I. – VI., Il mulino, Bologna, 1982.)
[28] Rastko MOČNIK
that cannot be reduced to each other. Scrutiny of human affairs is a matter of perspective,
of the point of view, of the places (topoï) from where one looks at them. Consequently,
the humanities should elaborate conceptual apparatus capable to integrate the irreducibly
differing human positions and their corresponding perspectives (Viehweg 1974; Močnik
2013). The concept of human security as presented by Ivica Đorđević engages precisely in
this line of theorisation that honours the specificity of the humanities and social sciences.
A practical concept
The concept of human security is inherently dynamic, as it immanently necessitates its
permanent re-elaboration in the view of changing historical contexts. For the same reason,
this concept is inherently a practical concept: its theoretical elaboration, as theoretical
elaboration, follows practical considerations. One could even say that the theoretical work
upon the concept is guided, in its theoretical effort itself, by practical commitments. For
it is practical considerations, considerations of practical efficiency, that select the aspects
of the situation which need to be theorised. In its immanently practical approach, the con-
cept of human security shares the inherent technical character of the modern science.
Modern science as established by Galileian mathematisation of nature abolished the Ar-
istotelian dualism (Milner 1995) separating the celestial world where everything is “eter-
nal and necessary”, and therefore inaccessible to human action, from the sublunar world
which is variable, and therefore open to human intervention. Aristotelian distinction ac-
tually separates knowledge and action, epistéme and prãxis. True knowledge is possible in
the astral world where things are eternal and necessary, and where, for this very reason,
humans cannot intervene. On the other hand, human action is possible in the sublunar,
human world, the domain, as Aristotle says, of what “admits to bear otherness”, where, for
this very reason, there can be no knowledge and where the most we can achieve is phróne-
sis, “prudence”, that is, practical wisdom. Abolishing this dualism, modern science affirms
itself as inherently practical knowledge, that is, capable to support technical solutions.
Accordingly, human security would be a practical or technical concept deriving from a
presupposed integration of natural and social sciences. However, this presupposition is
problematic: it pretends to integrate two radically differing epistemic fields, the field of
exact natural sciences and the conglomerate of “soft”, in-exact social sciences. Conse-
quently, we are facing a contemporary version of Aristotelian dualism, now perhaps in a
Cartesian rendering.38 Besides, the presumed unity of social sciences is only a desideratum,
and not necessarily a realistic one (Wallerstein 1996; Volerstin 1997).
An inherently incomplete concept that pretends to universality?

Given the above apparent dead-end, a naïve strategy would be to “employ” the idea of
a unified social science as a regulative idea in Kant’s sense.39 The idea of a unique social
38 Since the advent of Galileian physics that deprived studia humanitatis of scientific dignity, the humanities have
been painfully experiencing the problem of the “two cultures” (Snow 2001).
39 “The object of reason is, therefore, the understanding and its proper destination. As the latter brings unity into
the diversity of objects by means of its conceptions, so the former brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by
means of ideas; as it sets the final aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding, which without
this occupies itself with a distributive unity alone.” Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Book II, Chap.
science would then bring “unity” not to the conceptions of understanding, but to the con-
cepts of particular social sciences. Such an attempt would not only be bound to fail, it
would be a-theoretical and mystifying if it were ever to succeed. For, it would presuppose
a totality where totalisation is an effect that precisely needs to be explained (Althusser
1996:74-75). In Althusser’s terminology, “society effect” is an effect that emerges from
the very incompleteness of a particular historical social formation, since it makes it “exist
as society” despite its contradictions and antagonisms. The mechanisms that produce the
“society effect” are, in Althusser’s theory, dimensions of the class struggle of the dominat-
ing class whose domination holds precisely as long as it is capable to secure this effect,
i.e. to make the formation it dominates “exist as society”, i.e. to reproduce it despite its
contradictions and antagonisms.
Accordingly, the “idea” that should regulate the employment of particular social knowl-
edge should be the idea of the inherent incompleteness of this knowledge. Human security
concepts and the practices derived from them are in permanent process of re-elaboration
not because knowledge and social action are lagging behind the course of history, but
because social knowledge is always provisional, incomplete, in need of supplementation.
Precisely the negative side of the concept of human security, its permanent non-saturation
bestows it its universality. The corollary of theoretical incompleteness is the immanent
political nature of the practices and institutions of human security. Theory cannot provide
simple and immediate solutions; it only deploys the horizon where political decisions are
to be taken.
Besides the purely professional theoretical dimension, human security necessarily com-
prises political, that is, human dimension. This may be the only justification for the pre-
sent author to have ventured as a non-expert to contribute to this conference.
III, Sect. VII, Appendix: On the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason; quoted after: Kant, William
Benton – Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago etc., 1952, p. 193.
[30] Rastko MOČNIK
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Milner, Jean-Claude (1995): L’Œuvre claire, Paris: Seuil.
Močnik, Rastko (2013): “Historical Transformation and Epistemological Discontinuity”,

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don: Duke University Press.
UDC 351.78
Marina MITREVSKA, Marjan GJUROVSKI*

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO HUMAN SECURITY1
Abstract: The paper presents theoretical elaboration of the human security concept. According
to the analysis, the traditional paradigm of the security theory is altering by acceptance of the idea
for security of the individual in the society. Therefore, the commencing premise is that the focus
of the traditional security is being changed towards the security of the individual, that is, the indi-
vidual in the society. At the same time, the authors of the paper tries to analyze firstly the message
of this discourse because the human security cannot be comprehended only in military sense as
well as a period of cease of violence. Secondly, it has to incorporate elements that will assess the
influence of economic development, social justice, preservation of environment, democratiza-
tion, disarmament, respect for human rights and rules of law upon the level of human security. As
a conclusion, this analysis indicates that the attempt to provide theoretical foundation for broader
understanding of human security requires outstanding effort to assess the process through which
problems becomes security problems.
Key words: human security, security, conflict, UN.
1. INTRODUCTION
The interlude of enthusiasm about building a new world order and peace dividend after
the fall of the Berlin Wall was very short. In the new millennium, the humanity brought
with it the legacy of the old ideas and the methods for solving the most pressing problems
on a global, regional or national level. If something has changed, it is the rhetoric that justi-
fies the actions and concepts that need to show (and prove) the degree of innovation and
creative thinking in the most important international actors (Vankovska 2006a:413-414).
At this time, the most interesting are the following:
First, the concept of human security,
Second, humanitarian intervention,
Third, managing conflicts,
* Professor Marina Mitrevska, PhD, Faculty of Philosophy-Skopje, Republic of Macedonia, Institute for Security,
Defense and Peace Studies; e-mail: marinamitrevska@yahoo.com; Marjan Gjurovski, PhD, Faculty of Security-
Skopje, Republic of Macedonia; e-mail: mgjurovski@fb.uklo.edu.mk
[34] Marina MITREVSKA, Marjan GJUROVSKI
Fourth, crisis management, and

Fifth, post-conflict peace-building and so on.
Hence, one of the most popular, but in the meantime much-needed concepts of today is
the concept of human security. The reason for this is justified. Namely, it is primarily due
to the generic connection between the concept of human security and that of the security
itself (understood in the most general sense of the notion). Actually, they are closely relat-
ed, and the fundamental connecting link is “the process of securitization”. Thus, confirm-
ing the fact that the human security changes the focus of interest from traditional security
to security of the individual in the society. Human security recognizes that personal pro-
tection of the individual and preservation of his integrity does not come primarily from
the safeguarding of the state as a political entity, but of the approach to the personal well-
being and the quality of life. However, human security does not include only the issues of
individual profit, as, for example, education, health care, protection from crime and so on.
Therefore, it may be understandable that these things can be perceived as part of the goals
of the states (e.g., those that are in phase of post-conflict peace-building). Namely, human
security means much more than the protection of structural, direct physical violence. Or
else, it means security of individuals in their personal environment (e.g., household), their
local communities and their natural environment (Mitrevska 2004b:135-144). Following
these guidelines, that raises the question for security at a different level than the traditional
(national) one, will certainly lead to the prevention of possible resurgence of violence. It is
of vital importance to realize that the security, among other things, entails the protection
of both society and individuals not only from the traditional forms (such as aggression)
but from internal violence (Mitrevska 2004b:135-144). The need for security that is more
focused on the person is actually enhanced by the multiplication of threats and risks and
uncertainty that are arising primarily from non-military spheres. Therefore, every analy-
sis of human security and of its impact on society should take into account the fact that
the horizon of what is meant by peace and security should be expanded. It is obvious that
peace means much more than the absence of war. The message in this discourse is that hu-
man security cannot be perceived any more just in a military sense or as a period of cessa-
tion of violence. Namely, it must include elements that will assess the impact of economic
development, social justice, environment protection, democratization, disarmament, re-
spect for human rights and rule of law on the human security level.
Less visible but equally important is the recognition of the needs that common person
faces and that reflect a growing consensus, hence, security can no longer be narrowly de-
fined as the absence of armed conflict, between or within states. Following this option
would mean ignoring serious problems such as:
• Massive abuse of human rights;
• Forced displacement of the civilian population on a larger scale;
• Terrorism;
• Smuggling of drugs and weapons;
• Environmental disasters as a direct threat to human security.
The consequences of such direct threats to human security, particularly in post-conflict
societies are serious, and therefore more coordinated social approach to solving these is-
sues is needed.
THEORETICAL APPROACH TO HUMAN SECURITY [35]
Within this approach it is considered that human security encompasses much more than
the absence of violent conflict. It includes human rights, affordable education, health care
and the belief that every individual has the opportunity and the chance to fulfil their po-
tential. Each step in this direction is also a step towards poverty reduction, to increased
economic development and of course to strengthening the dam and conflict prevention
(Mitrevska 2004b:138). Exemption, freedom of fear and freedom of future generations to
inherit peace and security are the main connected foundations of human and thus national
security.
All these elements are theoretical challenge for analysis of the development of the theoreti-
cal concept for security issues related to human security. The attempt to provide a theo-
retical basis for a broader understanding of human security includes extraordinary effort
to assess the process by which the problems become security problems (Митревска 2012).
2. GENESIS OF THE IDEA OF HUMAN SECURITY

When it comes to defining the human security, as a need to create a new security paradigm
that in its focus will have the person and its needs, maybe it is the best to start from the
concept of human security promoted by the reports issued by a number of multinational
independent commissions. Thus, in the early 1970s, the Club of Rome Group was issued
extensive material regarding the human security. It represents a kind of introduction in the
idea that states “there is a unique complex of problems that disturbs people of all nations:
poverty (...) destruction of the environment; loss of trust in institutions; uncontrolled ur-
ban expansion; insecure jobs, etc. (...)” The Report further states that “every person in the
world is faced with many pressures and problems that inevitably require their attention
and action.” In short, the Report indicates that: “there is a complex global system that af-
fects the life chances of an individual and there are alternative ways for conceptualizing the
global development and most importantly, the global security to maintain and improve those
life opportunities”.
Furthermore, in the interest of the change of considerations for the development of secu-
rity in the 1980s, two committees contributed, namely:
• Independent Commission on International Development Issues;
• Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues.
The Report of the first commission is based on what is probably the simplest common
interest:
• “for the man to want to survive, and even can be said that he has a moral obligation to
do so.”
This certainly does not initiate exclusively the traditional questions of peace and war, but
also initiates issues such as:
• First, how to overcome the problems with lack of food, and thus hunger worldwide;
• Second, how to overcome the problems with mass poverty, and
• Third, how to overcome the problems of alarming difference between the extreme
living conditions of the poor and the rich.
Seeking answers to the three questions, the Commission with the Report sends a message
that it is necessary for Northern and Western engagement for development and that the
essence lies in the determination for overcoming dangerous tensions and producing rel-
evant and useful results for the nations and regions, especially for the people in all parts of
the world (Митревска 2012).
The Report of the second Commission, entitled “Common Security” directed the atten-
tion to alternative ways of thinking about peace and security. Although the Report by defi-
nition focuses on military issues and the fundamentals of national security, it, however,
confirms that despite these, security in the Third World is jeopardized by poverty and
economic inequality. Hence, the message of the Report is clear:
“Common security requires a dignified and peaceful life for people!”
In 1991, the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance issued “a call for a
shared responsibility”. This call referred to the other challenges of security, and that is, to
“broader concept of security”, that deals with threats stemming from insufficient develop-
ment: “environmental degradation, excessive population growth and emergence of migra-
tions, as well as little progress towards democracy.”
Observed from this context, their message is clear: “The concept of global security must
broaden the traditional focus on the security of states. It should include the safety of peo-
ple!” All these Reports are considered predecessors to define the concept of human secu-
rity. General opinion is that the idea of human security begins with the Report of the UN
Development Programme (United Nations Development Programme - UNDP) from 1993
and 1994.
Thus, the 1993 Report indicates that: “The concept of security must change – from ex-
clusive emphasis on national security towards greater emphasis on human security, from
security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial se-
curity towards food, employment and protection of the environment” (UNDP 1993).
The Report from 1994, entitled “Redefining Security: Human Dimension”, has human secu-
rity as its segment. Namely, the Report points out that “the person stands at the heart of
human security” (“people-centered”). According to it, human security is “about people as
individuals” (UNDP 1993).
Furthermore, the Report indicates that the traditional conception of security, focusing on
territorial integrity, promotion of national interests, and the nuclear threat, ignores the
clear and more present threats directed at any person in general: “For many (...) security
symbolized protection from threats of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, conflicts, (...)
and environmental risks.”
Human security does not refer to weapons, it refers to human life and dignity (...) refers
to how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their right to choice,
what access they have to the market and social possibilities and whether they live in con-
flict or in peace.
Human security in its essence coincides with what in the theory of peace is called positive
peace (Galtung 1988:61). Such perception means positioning of the individual in a society
of welfare, fair structures and institutions, conditions for comprehensive development of
the person, free from fear and ignorance.
In our analysis we accept the thesis that human security, seen through this prism gets
cosmopolitan dimension, that is, ceases to be parole for action or foreign intervention,
but it becomes a priority for any state and for the whole society. In short, according to this
cosmopolitan ethics and philosophy of universal human rights, within the nation-state or
in global relations in general, the individual is the measure, the reason and purpose of all
actions that should lead to elimination of all fears and meet the basic human needs (Vanko-
vska 2006b:60).
In the beginning of conflicts, a new understanding develops of the concept of security.
Once a synonym for the defence of a territory from an external attack, nowadays the se-
curity entails also the protection of societies and individuals from internal violence. The
need for one approach to security that is more focused on the individual is reinforced
by the constant danger that weapons for mass destruction, more specifically the nuclear
weapon, threaten humanity: their very name reveals their scope and their aim, if they were
used. This was a theoretical challenge, as Kofi Annan explains, to develop the concept of
safety issues related to human security (Annan 2001).
Annan claims that it is necessary to expand the horizon of what is understood by peace
and security. According to him, peace means much more than the absence of war. Thus,
human security can no longer be perceived only in military terms. Rather it must include:
• Economic development;
• Social justice;
• Protection of the environment;
• Democratization;
• Disarmament and respect of human rights; and
• Rule of law.
According to Annan, the demands that we face also reflect a growing consensus that
collective security can no longer be narrowly defined as the absence of armed conflict
between or within states. Nonetheless, Kofi Annan notes that the massive abuse of hu-
man rights, displacement of civilian population on a large scale, international terrorism,
pandemic AIDS, drug trafficking, weapons smuggling and environmental disasters are a
direct threat to human security, forcing us to adjust one more coordinated approach to ad-
dressing these issues. For Annan, human security in its broadest form entails much more
than the absence of violent conflict. It includes human rights, exemplary governance, af-
fordable education and health care and the belief that every individual has the opportunity
and the chance to fulfil their potential. According to him, every step in this direction is
also a step towards poverty reduction, economic development and conflict prevention.
He also emphasizes that the lack of freedom, freedom from fear and freedom of future gen-
erations to inherit a healthy environment are the main connected foundations of human
and therefore national security (Annan 2000).
According to Sadako Ogata human security includes several key elements. The first essen-
tial element refers to the possibility for all citizens to live in peace and security in the coun-
try. The second element is that people without discrimination should enjoy all the rights
and obligations, including human, political, social, economic and cultural rights. The third
element has social content or equal access to social and other processes that make eco-
nomic policy. The fourth element is the establishment of the rule of law and independent
judiciary. Each individual in the society should have the same rights and obligations and
be subject of the same rules (Ogata 1998).
From a political aspect human security is researched by Hans van Ginkel (Ginkel 2000:79)
whereby human security is integrated, sustainable, joint security from fear, conflict, ig-
norance, poverty, social and cultural deprivation and hunger. This conceptualization of
human security is built between positive and negative liberties.
The concept of “human security” is being given more attention by the governments of
certain countries. A positive example is the Canadian government, according to which
“human security” means freedom from striking threats to human rights, safety or life
(Canadian Foreign Ministry website). The example of Canada which is often exploited
analytically refers to the defined five priorities in foreign policy advancement in human
security, including:
• Protection of civilians, by strengthening norms and capacities for reducing human
losses in armed conflicts;
• Peace-support operations;
• Conflict prevention by strengthening the capacity of the international security to
prevent or resolve conflicts and development of local innate capacities to deal with
conflicts without violence;
• State management and accountability, taking care for responsibility of institutions
from public and private sector in terms of established norms of democracy and hu-
man rights;
• Public safety, with emphasis on the development of international expertise, capaci-
ties and instruments to impede the growing threats created by the rise of transna-
tional organized crime (Митревска 2012).
Therefore, one concludes that building a network of human security is a great need. Build-
ing humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free from poverty and
despair, which unfortunately is still a dream for many and should be a reality for all. Build-
ing of such principles in every society certainly means guaranteed freedom with equal
opportunities for the full development of its potential. Therefore, building human security
is essential to achieve this crucial goal for every democratic civil society. In this sense, hu-
man security will only mean freedom from threats to human rights, their safety and even
their life.
In this context, it is very important to analyze the concept of the Japanese government
in terms of human security. Namely, the Government of Japan define human security as
the preservation and protection of life and dignity of the individual human being. In this
sense, they consider that human security can be ensured only when the individual believes
in a life free from fear and the lack of freedom, while the emphasis is put on develop-
ment, education, elimination of poverty, reducing unemployment and achieving social
and health care (Takasu 2000).
In the period 2001-2003, the concept of human security was revitalized through two de-
bates led by Canada and Japan. The first, initiated by the Canadian International Com-
mission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, focused on the responsibility to provide
protection, and the second one on the responsibility to ensure the development led by the
Japanese Commission for Human Security (Vankovska 2006a:420).
3. INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION:
DEFINING PRIORITIES OF HUMAN SECURITY
In theories of international relations after the Cold War, the discourse of the relation polit-
ical and economic transformations rapidly increased the risk of internal conflicts. This, in
turn, shifts the focus from insecurity of the nation-state to the insecurity of the individual
and the community. In general, this change led to the notion that to protect and promote
human development in the future, one must address the issue of human security. In this
way, announcing the possibility that “the attempt for development of mankind in its for-
mulation explicitly puts the meaning that the opinions and strategies for development
in its focus must set the welfare of the individual, not only the macro-economy”. There-
fore, human security does not refer to states and nations, but to individuals and people.
Furthermore, the world enters a new era of human security, in which the whole concept of
security will change dramatically. Under such conditions, human security primarily refers
to the security and prosperity of all people. This basically supports the fact that the need
is unquestionable for the major security threats to be specified based on the values of hu-
man security.
First, threats to economic security (lack of productive and gainful employment);
Second, threats to providing food (lack of basic products including lack of opportunity
for owning property, work and secure income);
Third, threats to health security (infectious and parasitic diseases, lack of clean water,
air pollution, lack of access to health care institutions);
Fourth, threats to environmental safety (reducing the amount of water, water pollu-
tion, reduction of arable land, air pollution, natural disasters, etc);
Fifth, threats to personal safety (violent crime, drug trafficking, violence and abuse of
women and children);
Sixth, security threats at the local level (disintegration of families, ethnic discrimina-
tion and clashes, genocide and ethnic cleansing);
Seventh, threats to political security (government repression, systematic violation of
human rights, militarization, etc.).
Hence, we can conclude that human security can only be achieved through development,
and not through weapons. More specifically, in order to revive the new security concep-
tion five pretty radical steps are necessary to be undertaken: conception of human devel-
opment which will have an emphasis placed on equality and continuity, peace building
which will fortify the wider agenda for human security, partnership based on justice, and
not charity, that will allow equal access to global market opportunities and economic re-
construction, a new framework of international institutions and the evolution of global
civil society.
Therefore, the priority of human security is building trust, constructive learning and in-
stitutionalization of collective action. It means that human security is fluid in nature and
only in that case it means much more than protection of unstructured – direct physical
violence. In that sense, human security in the future should be seen as a security of indi-
viduals in their own environment, their local communities and their natural environment.
4. REFERENCES
Alagappa M. (1988): Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanations.

Buzan B., People (1991): States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security studies in
Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub.
Canadian Foreign Ministry website. <http://www.dfait-maeci.
gc.ca?foreignp?humansecurity/menu-e.asp>08/22/01.
Galtung Johan (1988): What is Meant by Peace and Security? Some Options for the 1990s. vo
Transarmament and the Cold War. Essays in Peace Research, Volume VI, Copenhagen:
Christian Ejlers Forlag.
Hans Van Ginkel and Edward Newman, “In Quest of Human Security”, Japan Review of
International Affairs 14.1.2000.
____(2005): Humana bezbednost, Zbornik radova, Fakultet za civilnu odbranu, Beograd.
Kofi Annan, Towards a Culture of Peace, http://www.unesco.org/opi 2/lettres/ Text An-
glais/ Annan E.html.2001.
Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human Security
in Mongolia, “Two-Day Session in Ulaanbaatar, May 8-10, 2000, Press Release SG/
SM/7382.
Митревска Марина (2004a): «Хумана безбедност», Годишен зборник на Филозофски
факултет на Универзитетот «Св.Кирил и Методиј, Скопје.
Митревска Марина (2004b): «Градење на мирот и човековата безбедност во пост-
конфликтна Македонија, Проект: Превенција на конфликти, Фондација Фридрих
Еберт, Скопје.
Митревска Марина (2012): Хумана безбедност, Филозофски факултет, Скопје.
Sadako Ogata, Inclusion or Exclusions: Social Development Challenges for Asia and
Europe, 27 April 1998. www.unhcr.ch/refwold/unhcr/hcspeech/27 ap 1998.htm
08/22/01.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1993,
New York: Oxford University Press.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994.
New York: Oxford University Press, 23 <http:// www.undp.org/hdro/1994/94.
Ванковска Билјана (2006a): “Хумана безбедност: Меѓу науката и глобалната полити-
ка”, Годишен зборник, Филозофски факултет, Скопје.
Ванковска Билјана (2006b): Национална и/или хумана безбедност, Перспективите на
Република Македонија на патот кон НАТО и Европска Унија, Министерство за
одбрана на Република Македонија.
Yukio Takasu (2000): “Toward Effective Cross-Sectorial Partnership to Ensure Human
Security in a Globalized World”, Statement by Mr. Yukio Takasu, Director-General of
Multilateral Cooperation Department, at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building
Asia’s Tomorrow, Bangkok, June 19.
UDC 351.851-057.87
Ljubomir STAJIĆ*
WHY SAFETY CULTURE12
Abstract: In recent years we are witnesses that the student population aged 10-18 is increasingly
the subject of carriers of endangerment but also a medium where new and numerous socio-path-
ological phenomena occur, such as intolerance towards various social groups, different forms of
crime, human trafficking, etc. Student population is the object of threats precisely because of
its vulnerability when it comes to contemporary modalities of recruitment for various antisocial
phenomena.
By reacting to the above mentioned phenomena, state institutions in Serbia and worldwide that
are responsible for protection of safety suggested various modalities to combat threats to school
population. This paper will present realised pilot project which has put a student in the centre of
protection of his/her own safety, by educating and preparing him/herself, through an individual
subject that we called “Safety Culture”, to identify forms and carriers of endangerment and act in
a preventive way to protect him/herself.
Keywords: safety, endangering, safety culture, school, students.
1. INTRODUCTION
Security becomes less and less the concern of a country, and more and more the con-
cern of an individual, society and international community. Today, even the citizens of the
most powerful world countries do not feel safe precisely because of new forms, carriers,
methods and means of threats. None of the countries in the world is capable to guarantee
absolute safety to its citizens.
There are no personal, social or state values for which we could claim that are absolutely
and always safe (starting with life, health, education, psychological and spiritual develop-
ment, physical integrity, economic prosperity, environment, etc.).
Carriers of endangering increasingly use the latest scientific findings on everything that
can endanger a human, a country and the international community. This fact shows that
* Ljubomir Stajić, PhD, Full Professor, Faculty of Law Novi Sad, e-mail: Lj.Stajic@pf.uns.ac.rs
1 Parts of this paper, especially the one relating to the content, goals and methodical notes of the Safety Culture sub-
ject, was published in the Collection of Works of the Faculty of Civil Defence, University in Belgrade in 2005, enti-
tled “To Safety by Learning”.
[42] Ljubomir STAJIĆ
lack of education in something that is important as safety can have unforeseeable con-
sequences. Many countries realised this long time ago and established modern systems
within governmental and non-governmental sector that take care of protection and im-
prove security.3
Safety education is just one, but we could say, the fundamental factor of future safety. The
time when children were safe from many dangers (drugs, sects, contagious diseases, ter-
rorism, criminal, human trafficking, etc.) has passed.
By reacting to the above mentioned phenomena, state institutions responsible for pro-
tection of safety and legal and social order suggested various ways and means to com-
bat threats to school population. The following ways were implemented: 1) hiring school
policemen; 2) hiring physical-technical school security; 3) more drastic punishments for
offences in school and those related to school and students; 4) increasing responsibility
of school head masters and teachers, etc., and 5) various projects and programmes for
increasing school safety.
As it can be seen, all modalities so far were based on solving problem from the outside,
seeing students as targets of threats and passive objects that need to be protected. With the
project we called “To Safety by Learning” we wanted to change the direction of that pro-
cess and make students, alongside teachers, parents and other subjects, the main actors.
This project puts students in a position to use their knowledge and identify, act preventively
and prevent all events that can endanger them and their loved ones, and thus the society.
This creates a line of young people, who by actively protecting their safety will narrow the
space for all carriers of endangerment, which increases the security of the entire society.
This is why we suggest that safety education should be lowered to the level of those who
are the most vulnerable today, and those are primary and secondary school students.
Given the fact that there is professional and specialised education on the higher and high
level, it is necessary that top of this pyramid gets its base through primary education about
safety by introducing subject “Safety Culture” to primary and secondary school students.
2. ABOUT SAFETY CULTURE

Knowledge that is destructively directed can be an endangering factor, but it is also the
most important factor of safety. One should not be reminded that countries with devel-
oped safety culture and different levels of safety education are more stable in political,
economic and any other sense. This is why safety culture is defined as the “collection of
adopted attitudes, knowledge, skills and rules from the field of safety, expressed as behaviour
and process on the need, ways and means to protect personal, social and international values
against all forms and carriers of threats regardless of time and space of their expression” (Stajić
et al., 2013:43).
Namely, safety culture includes:
a. Responsibility (for oneself, others, country, property, international community and
all values that need to be protected - starting from health, moral, cultural heritage to
ecology and genetics);
3 In the Russian Federation, for example, for the students of 6th, 9th and 10th grade an obligatory subject called Ba-
sics of Safe Living has been introduced in cooperation with two ministries – the Ministry of Defence and the Min-
istry of Education. The content of the textbook and preface for it was approved and written by the Minister S.K.
Shoygu, who promoted motto “prevent-save-help”.
WHY SAFETY CULTURE [43]
b. wareness (about needs, ways and means to protect the above mentioned values, then
awareness about forms of endangering, their intensity and duration, awareness of pow-
er and might and need for individual and collective protection and awareness about
one’s own tasks and rights in all that;
c. Solidarity and participation created as a path for achieving safety for all, in every mo-
ment and in the same way, realisation that it is not created for itself, but that it is built,
protected and improved, and these are elements that require both individual and group
work, giving away and investing, with respect for other people and their needs;
d. Motivation to act against endangering phenomena even when they occur to other peo-
ple, motivation to improve safety potentials, motivation to mark dangerous phenom-
ena, etc.;
e. Promotion as an element that carries energy to change things in a positive way, to
improve or simply be in touch with all events important for survival, development and
progress of safety;
f. Inventiveness, boldness and risk – the factors that are unavoidable elements of each
action directed to changes. These factors relate to endangering phenomena that are not
just an object which will disappear if one applies the security system on it. On the con-
trary, they are very volatile and dangerous. They are difficult to root out and have their
own ways of “protection” which sometimes carries the risk of losing a life;
g. Proactive behaviour (action) without which everything else would remain on the lev-
el of description, discontent and without possibility to change anything in the sense of
safety. Action has more modalities that can be observed from different angles: action on
defining interests, values and goals (of an individual, social groups, society or union of
countries); action on identifying sources, forms and carriers of endangerment; action
on defining strategy for protection of values (action on organisation, regulations and
establishing relationships) and action as performance (Stajić et al., 2013).
Based on the above mentioned attitudes, we can see that the safety culture is to a great
extent the result of social heritage that has its own goals and necessary strategy for their
achievement. Safety culture is at the same time an idea on how to find innovative and
creative measures for solving different safety problems. At the same time it strengthens
the presence of professional security subjects on the entire space, which establishes mu-
tual trust and improves relationships between citizens and other safety subjects, as well as
quality of their safety.
From the above mentioned we can see that the safety culture has civil (personal, social,
international – global) and professional dimension. If this link is strong, the community is
safer. The quality of the above mentioned link, apart from social and cultural heritage, is
influenced by education (training), awareness, politics, condition of society (social-polit-
ical and economic circumstances), international surroundings, etc.
3. SAFETY CULTURE AS A SCHOOL SUBJECT

Safety education will not give quick results in statistical sense, but it will definitely enable
a large number of young people to take care of their own safety, safety of their loved ones,
of their people, country and in the end of international community. This is why it is neces-
sary to start moving towards this goal as soon as possible.
Introduction of this subject is an optimal way to achieve the set goal. It is hard to find an
individual who would say that his total safety is at maximum level and he would not want it
to be better. In relation to this, each of us asks several questions: 1) What should I do to be
safer than I already am? 2) How to avoid all endangering phenomena by preventing them?
3) Which organisations can help with this? 4) How to choose optimal ways and means of
protection? 5) How to achieve common safety in coexistence with others?
It is clear that introduction of the “Safety Culture” as an elective subject in schools has,
among other things, a practical importance. If the education could save life of at least one
student threatened by an excess in this way, the entire effort put into this project would
pay off. The future of our country, as well as of all other countries, rests on healthy, edu-
cated and safe young people. We cannot afford any more the luxury to leave the health
(both physical and mental) as well as life of young people to chance. Each failure to do
something today will cost us many times more in the future in every sense, among others
in material one.
In our case we talk about:
• Humanities subject of general civilisation education without ideological, religious
or any other premises with negative connotation. The necessity for young people to
be safe is equal in all nations from east to west, from north to south;
• Subject that promotes tolerance, coexistence, faith in common values, care for
common safety, etc.
• Subject that has practical values and that is not envisaged as just theory but as sub-
ject made of student workshops where students could be practically trained how to
behave in conflict or dangerous situations, or how to recognise and react to immi-
nent and possible excess situations;
• Subject that has prominent economic effects on individuals and society. We just
need to remember the data showing damages that occurred due to floods, fires,
traffic accidents, addiction, various medical interventions and rehabilitations, be-
ing absent from work, insurance expenses, etc.
4. ON REALISED PILOT PROJECT “TO SAFETY BY LEARNING”

Work that has been realised: 1) Reaching consensus about the project and adopting appro-
priate decisions on the level of the Ministry of Education; 2) Adopting curriculum, writing
textbook and making appropriate didactic material; 3) Publishing a call for tender and
selection of teachers; 4) Preparing and realising education of future teachers; 5) Drafting
instruments for assessment and survey among students, teachers and parents on realised
effects of the pilot project; 6) Drafting tests and guidelines for assessing students after
classes are taken; 7) Appropriate media promotion of the project.
The classes were held by security managers - graduated students of the Faculty of Security
Studies. They appeared in a double role - firstly as teachers of the subject, and then as
security managers in schools (replacement for school policemen or as their supplement).
Namely, many endangering phenomena occur within the closed groups, as a result of sub-
cultural states, and state in school itself, whereby information about that is held only by
professors that are in contact with students every day. Security managers were obliged
to point to, react and warn to all events that can be endangering. They were, in fact, the
link between state authorities, school and students. With their expertise they should be
the first ones to notice and identify signs, conditions and causes that indicate to possible
endangering phenomena. We advocate for the new principle: Safety managers are where
students are.
Introduction of this subject, except for society and country, should be interesting for nu-
merous non-governmental organisations and other institutions that deal with various as-
pects of safety one way or the other (protection of women, combating destructive sects,
alcoholism and drug addiction, youth violence, family violence, etc.).
This subject could connect many interested subjects and individuals, primarily: 1) edu-
cational institutions; 2) state authorities competent for public security; 3) non-govern-
mental organisations; 4) some international organisations and 5) producers of means for
personal and collective protection and others.
5. CURRICULUM OF THE SAFETY CULTURE SUBJECT

The goal and the task of the subject:
General goal of studying Safety Culture subject is that students acquire new theoretical
and practical knowledge from various areas of safety on the need, ways and means of
protecting personal, social and international values from all sources, forms and carriers
of endangerment regardless of place and time of their expression.
Special goals of studying this subject are that students, through various forms of teach-
ing, acquire attitudes and skills, and familiarise themselves with the rules on identifying
and acting in situations when unsafe (endangering) phenomena occur or can occur and
endanger them or society. Apart from the above mentioned, the special goals would
be that students acquire awareness about the necessity to respect others (minorities,
people with special needs, etc.), human rights and safety principles with establishing
positive and cooperative relationship towards all social institutions (governmental and
non-governmental sector) that take care of stable state of security and one that is es-
tablished on legal norms.
Tasks of the subject. The main tasks of the Safety Culture subject are:
1. For students to acquire new knowledge through studying relevant content and integrate
it with formerly acquired knowledge on: contemporary sources, forms and carriers of
threats with special attention given to school and family, methods and means of protec-
tion, rights and responsibilities in given situations and reacting (individually or collec-
tively) to the possible occurrence of crisis.
2. To train students to: recognise dangerous - conflict situations among their peers and in
society, recognise substances and agents dangerous for people’s health and ecosystem,
familiarise themselves with means and methods of their own and collective protection
against various forms of endangerment (floods, fires, crime, terrorism, abuse of drugs
and medicines and unhealthy diet, violence, destructive activities of sects, human traf-
ficking and trafficking in human organs, etc.).
3. To familiarise students with: methods, means and reactions of society to dangerous
(unsafe) situations, methods and means and reactions of intelligence in crisis, basic
norms of national and international law on protection of minorities, development of
tolerance and establishing basic norms of human rights.
4. For students to acquire personal awareness on necessity to: respect principle in achiev-
ing safety culture, establishing, maintaining and developing relationship of tolerance,
trust and respect of collective spirit, positive atmosphere as an important condition for
increasing the level of safety culture of individuals and society, building and improving
cooperation with social community and its specialised bodies, accepting habits, skills
and traits of good and successful citizens that take care of their own safety, but also
safety of society and international community.
6. CONTENT OF THE SUBJECT
1. Safety culture and tolerance

• the notion of tolerance
• reasons for dialogue and tolerance
• factors of tolerance (family, school, media)
• indicators of tolerance
• psychological basis of tolerance (tolerance is not a weakness)
• paradoxes of tolerance
• inaccurate thoughts on tolerance
• how to confront intolerance (law, education, access to information, personal
consciousness, local solutions)
• education for tolerance
• international tolerance day
• what is said about tolerance
2. Safety culture and gender equality
• what is gender equality
• equal possibilities for men and women
• problems and difficulties
• traditionalism, prejudices and stereotypes
• standards on gender equality (Declaration on equality between women and men)
• mechanism for achieving equal possibilities
• educational techniques and instruments
3. Safety culture and minority groups
• social status of minority groups
• prejudices and stereotypes about minorities
• international and national standards on protection of minorities
• relationships in multiethnic and multicultural communities
4. Safety culture in conflict prevention
5. Safety culture in prevention of human trafficking
• the notion of human trafficking
• human trafficking as part of organised crime
• how to recognise:
–– recruiting methods;
–– manners of transport of victims;
–– forms of exploitation of victims.

• how to protects oneself against human trafficking
• how to act in case you find out about human trafficking
6. Safety culture in preventing socio-pathological phenomena
• in preventing crime (especially crime in schools and around schools)
• in preventing actions of destructive sects
• in preventing drug addiction, alcoholism and gambling
–– the notion of drug addiction
–– types of drugs
–– means of recognising
–– means of use
–– adverse effects
–– drug-related crimes
–– how to recognise a drug addict
–– how to help and live with an addict
–– punishing drug-related crimes
–– drug addiction and other socio-pathological phenomena
• in preventing violence and hooliganism
• in preventing prostitution
• in preventing juvenile and child pornography
7. Security culture in preventing terrorism
• the notion of terrorism
• new forms of terrorism
• terrorism as a safety problem
• contemporary modalities in combating terrorism
• safety culture in combating terrorism
8. Safety culture on mass rallies in prevention civil riots
• the notion and classification of civil riots
• psychology of mass
–– leaders
–– demonstrators rioters
–– observers
• police and mass
9. Safety culture in the house and family
• which dangers lurk in the house
• the most common accidents with serious injuries and fatal consequences
• violence in family
• the ways of protection and prevention
10. Safety culture in school
• what is safety in school
• duty of students and teachers
• school policeman
• behaviour of students and teachers in preventing threats
• book of records
• safety measures and activities
• technical means in protecting school, premises and students
11. Safety culture in traffic
• dangers that lurk
• desire for self-assertion
• protection measures
12. Safety culture on students’ celebrations and ceremonies (graduation excur-
sions, ceremonies, etc.)
• selection of place, destination and organiser
• rules of conduct
• safety measures
• in charge of safety
13. Safety culture in cooperation with local police and intelligence
• teachers
• students
14. Safety culture in protecting health and environment
• misuse of medicines
• protecting health against contagious diseases
• protecting health against sexually transmitted diseases
• necessity to and means of protecting environment
• 5 June, World Environment Day
15. Safety culture in handling weapons and explosive devices
• weapons in the house (safekeeping and protection measures)
• friend’s weapons
• found weapons
16. Safety culture in protection against natural disasters and technical-technologi-
cal accidents
• procedure in case of earthquake
• procedure in case of flood
• procedure in case of chemical accidents
• procedure in case of ionising radiation
17. Technical means in protecting safety of space, property and people
• means of video surveillance
• sensor alarms and similar devices
• means for personal protection.
7. METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
Realisation of the subject should be seen from the view point of compatibility of knowl-
edge from security sciences and other humanities like sociology, ethics, psychology and
others. It is recommended that during classes teachers should keep in mind that the audi-
ence are students of the first year of high school and that focus should be on the content,
methods and means that are appropriate for this age. Classes should develop critical and
logical thinking and communication with tolerance when expressing the opposing views.
The classes should be realised as creative workshops, as much as possible, in the form of
competition of groups that study forms and carriers of threats and groups that study forms,
methods and means of protection.
It is advisable that, during the school year, students do one written assignment on the
topic of safety culture of their own choice. Furthermore, it would be good to enrich class-
es with multimedia presentation (video, graphic, drawn, schematic or table displays) in
order to make classes interesting and material memorable. Apart from this, excursions,
celebrations, other events and visits should be used for promotion of acquired knowledge
from the field of safety culture.
8. RESULTS OF THE PILOT PROJECT

The pilot project “To Safety by Learning” was realised in the course of 2005/2006 school
year, based on the support of the Council for Preventing Problems in Development of
Children and Youth within the Ministry of Education and Sport of the Republic of Serbia.
Within the first phase of this project, which would last for one school year, it was planned
to introduce “Safety Culture” as an electoral subject in 20 schools in four cities in the Re-
public of Serbia (Novi Sad, Belgrade, Kragujevac and Niš).
The final results of the project:
1. After preparatory training and realisation of the final elaborate of trainees, 18 teachers
and lectures were selected, who were hired for the further realisation of the project.
According to the instructions from the Ministry of Education and Sport, and based
on the data on locations with more problems in the previous period, the following
schools were selected: in Belgrade (Graphics School, School of Shipping Industry,
Shipbuilding and Hydro-Construction; Technical School for Wood Processing, In-
terior Decoration and Landscape Architecture; “St. Sava” Grammar School; “Kol-
ubara” Technical School), in Kragujevac (The First Grammar School of Kragujevac;
The First Technical School; “Sisters Ninković” Medical School and Technical School
for Machine Engineering and Transportation), in Novi Sad (Machine Engineering
Secondary School; “Jovan Vukanović” Technical School; “Pinki” Secondary School
for Transportation; “Mihajlo Pupin” Electro-Technical Secondary School; “Jovan
Jovanović Zmaj” Grammar School) and in Niš (“Bora Stanković” Grammar School;
“Stevan Sremac” Grammar School; Secondary School of Economics and Secondary
School of Commerce).
2. During the school year of 2005/2006, the total of 1,817 first year students from the
selected school attended the classes of the Safety Culture subject.4
4 It should be stressed that students’ attendance was completely voluntary and that the number of students who ap-
plied exceeded all expectations, given that the classes were organised optionally after regular classes that students
had. The number of applied students indicates that there is an understanding for the problem that students face
and the will to solve it in the least painful manner. It is interesting that the project caused even greater interests of
parents, schools and cities where it was not conducted.
3. The beginning of realisation was followed by numerous printing media in the Repub-
lic of Serbia (Politika, Glas Javnosti, Danas, Građanski List, Večernje Novosti, Blic,
PSS Securty Systems) as well as RTS, Novi Sad Television and some local media.
4. Collected final reports of teachers/lecturers point to the following: 1) the interest for
the Safety Culture subject was remarkable; 2) certain topics caused special interest,
predominantly because students did not have the possibility to hear them anywhere
else; 3) there is a pronounced need for this subject (maybe as an electoral subject); 4)
there was an excellent cooperation between institutions from the local community
and parents; 5) as safety managers they could reveal violence in families of certain
students, the ways of distribution of narcotics in school yards, prevented fights and
similar incidents, etc. Furthermore, it was perceived that the cooperation with school
managements was not always satisfactory, because certain head masters were afraid
that realisation of the project would show the true condition which they often tried to
hide or due to unclear guidelines and the role of the Ministry of Education and Sport
in the entire project, which after certain personnel changes in the top of the Ministry,
showed little interest for further work.
5. As a result of the project, the book Safety Culture of Young People – How to Live Safe
was written and published, and it should enable young people to learn contents that
will enable them to live safer and better in an easy, good and proper way. The reason
for writing this publication was to create completely new approach to solving prob-
lems of young people, where young people, together with parents, teachers and other
people from the environment, would become the main and the most important sub-
jects in protecting their own safety, and not just passive objects that someone else
needs to protect. In this way, young people are put into a position where they can use
their knowledge to recognise, act preventively and prevent all events and behaviour
that can pose a threat to them, which is the essence of the concept of the safety culture.
9. CONCLUSION
Never before were international community, countries and even individuals in dispose
of so many forces, means and power to protect safety as today, and still we can say that
safety, especially that of the young, was never more endangered than it is today. For quite
some time, carriers of endangerment to safety pick populations that were, until recently,
protected at least by moral norms as their targets. The population that is very important
for every society, and which is currently targeted, is the student population aged 10-18.
Understanding the significance and consequences of these effects on the safety of the so-
ciety, various state subjects have taken numerous measures and procedures to protect stu-
dents from all forms of threats and various destructive influences. The results are more or
less successful, although none met satisfying levels of safety in every aspect. In order to
complete the range of measures and activities of the country, put students in the centre of
their own protection, and make them subjects rather than objects of their own protection,
a project of introducing Safety Culture subject was proposed. The project includes defin-
ing the content, which in its centre has topics that are related to the culture of safe living
in modern democratic society. Therefore, the special significance and space was given to
tolerance among people, minorities and religions, then identifying forms and means of
endangerment but also ways and means of protection, as well as necessity of joining forces
and proactive relationship in order to increase safety of the society, state and international
community.
In the proposed solution, in our opinion, the country affects the positive condition of its
safety, i.e. prevents conditions and generators that endanger it in the most economical
way. The wider the public what takes care of safety, the smaller the number of those that
participate in its endangerment.
10. REFERENCES
Bin, A. (2004): Učionica bez nasilništva, Beograd: Kreativni centar.

Building A Community School (Third edition). (2001): New York: The Children’s Aid Soci-
ety, Citygroup foundation.
Izazovi demokratije i škola. (2002): Beograd: Institut za pedagoška istraživanja,.
Nasilje u školama – izazov lokalnoj zajednici.(2002): Konferencija Lokalno partnerstvo za
prevenciju i borbu protiv nasilja u školama, Zagreb: Savet Evrope, Ibis grafika.
Popadić, D. (2009): Nasilje u školama, Beograd: Institut za psihologiju, Filozofski fakultet
Univerziteta u Beogradu.
Radovanović, S. (1997): Škola i društvena sredina, Beograd: Institut za pedagogiju i andra-
gogiju Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu.
Ratković, M. (2002): Škola - juče, danas, sutra, Sremski Karlovci: Kairos.
Stajić, Lj. (2005): Učenjem do bezbednosti, Zbornik radova Fakulteta civilne odbrane Uni-
verziteta u Beogradu, 125-135.
Stajić, Lj., Mijalković, S., i Stanarević, S. (2006), Bezbednosna kultura mladih – kako živeti
bezbednos, Beograd: Draganić.
Završna deklaracija konferencije „Lokalna partnerstva u službi prevencije i borbe protiv
nasilja u školama“. (2002): Strazbur: Savet Evrope.
Žunić V., Jovanović G. (1998): Uloga škole u prevenciji nasilničkog ponašanja učenika, Beo-
grad: Prevencija kriminala, Defektološki fakultet.
www.unicef.rs/skola-bez-nasilja-30.html
UDC 351.78
Marcos FERREIRA, João TERRENAS*

CRITICAL RESEARCH METHODS FOR A LIMINAL DISCIPLINE1
Abstract: In this article we set out to explore the relationship between Human Security – both as
discourse and practice – and the panoply of visual research methods and strategies that are avail-
able nowadays to the researcher. Our goal is threefold viz. (i) to underline the critical nature of
Human Security as a liminal field of research and practice; (ii) to explore the visual methods as an
innovative way of representing and assessing critical (in) securities; (iii) to promote these meth-
ods as a most potent way of bridging the gap between levels of analysis: from local (in)securities
to global trends and backwards, from human resilience at local levels to governance choices and
backwards. Taking stock of research and other activities developed in the last four years by the
Observatory for Human Security (OSH), our assumption is such that as an emergent discourse –
both academic and pragmatic – Human Security needs to take a reflectivist turn and foster social
innovation. We uphold that visual methods are (i) part of such innovative set of strategies; (ii)
a way of putting discourse and practice in the limelight and (iii) a tool for narrowing the gap
separating theory from practice. In line with a critical approach to Human Security, we assume
that the researcher always epitomizes reality when he or she studies it and should play a role in
progressive social change. We advance the “visual politics of human (in)securities” as a distinctive
framework (i) implying our specific choices of how to represent security and insecurity in current
global affairs; (ii) identifying a specific ethics linking researchers’ values to research; (iii) enabling
a broader understanding of human affairs and a broader dissemination of research results, thereby
exposing them to a broader public. With the visual politics of human (in)securities we set out to
contribute to a trans-disciplinary and pluralist methodology therefore making up for the insuf-
ficiencies exhibited by traditional approaches.
Keywords: Human security, methodology, discourse, visual politics
* Marcos Ferreira has a PhD in International Relations at the University of Lisbon (ULisboa). He is a lecturer at
ULisboa and a leading researcher of the Observatory for Human Security (OSH).
e-mail: marcosfariasferreira@gmail.com
João Terrenas has a Bachelor degree in International Relations at the University of Lisbon (ULisboa). He is a Mas-
ters student in Security Studies at Aberystwyth University and the office assistant of OSH.
e-mail: terrenasj@gmail.com
[54] Marcos FERREIRA, João TERRENAS
1. INTRODUCTION
With this article the authors set out to explore the privileged relationship between Hu-
man Security – both as an academic discipline and a set of discursive practices – and the
panoply of visual research methods and strategies that are available to researchers these
days. Our goal is threefold, viz. (i) to underline the critical potential of Human Security as
a liminal field of research and practice; (ii) to explore visual methods (mainly the reflex-
ive documentary) as innovative tools for unveiling and assessing the discursive nature of
global insecurities (and their relevant discursive contexts); (iii) to promote these methods
as productive ways of bridging the gap between levels of analysis: from local (in)securi-
ties to global trends and backwards, from human resilience at local levels to governance
choices and backwards. Taking stock of research and other activities developed in the last
four years by the Observatory for Human Security (OSH), our assumption is such that
as an emergent discourse – intersecting academia with real life – Human Security needs
to take a reflectivist turn and foster social innovation and change. We uphold that visual
methods are (i) part of such innovative set of strategies connecting academia to real life;
(ii) a way of putting into the limelight the discursive practices that are constitutive of the
social world (the stuff the social world is made of ), and (iii) a tool for narrowing the gap
that still separates theory from practice due to a clear positivist hegemony in the broad
range of international studies.
In line with a critical approach to Human Security, we assume that researchers bear a
prime responsibility for the reality they epitomize in the images and paradigms they pro-
duce. Therefore, the authors sustain that a founding task for researchers is always to in-
quire into who and what these images are for, the kind of enquiry that makes academic
disciplines complicit in progressive social change. We advance the “visual politics of hu-
man insecurities” as a distinctive framework (i) implying our specific choices of how to
represent security and insecurity in current global affairs; (ii) identifying a specific ethics
linking researchers’ values to research; (iii) enabling a deeper understanding of human af-
fairs and a broader dissemination of research results, making it possible to reach a broader
public. By uncovering the realm of the visual politics of human insecurities we set out to
contribute to a trans-disciplinary and pluralist methodology that is able to make up for the
insufficiencies exhibited by more traditional approaches.
2. THE ARGUMENTS
In his influential book on the nature of thick and thin spheres of justice, Michael Walzer
begins his argument by recalling a picture. It is a picture of people marching in the streets
of Prague in late 1989, of people carrying signs saying “Truth” and “Justice”. By using this
picture, Walzer introduces what he calls a conceptual occasion in his text, a powerful start-
ing point carrying the capacity to connect directly to the readers’ experiences and visual
legacy in the making of his point. The Prague picture becomes a conceptual moment pre-
cisely because, in Walzer’s own words, “(w]hen I saw the picture, I knew immediately
what the signs meant – and so did everyone else who saw the same picture. Not only that:
I also recognized and acknowledged the values that the marchers were defending – and so
did (almost) everyone else” (Walzer 1994:1). The picture becomes conceptual in Walzer’s
exercise because it appeals to the ideas of justice – thick or thin – shared by the readers
of the text but also to the material conditions indispensable to fulfil such ideas. Walzer is
CRITICAL RESEARCH METHODS FOR A LIMINAL DISCIPLINE [55]
not making the point that the same pictures or images always convey the same ideas ir-
respective of the audience. Certainly they can awaken a panoply of different responses
but always work, we believe, as reflexive devices vis-à-vis social ontologies, an idea we
develop throughout the text. Taking the argument further, Walzer notes that the march
had nothing to do with epistemology, for no particular or single account of truth was at
issue: the marchers “were not marching in defence of the coherence theory, or the con-
sensus theory, or the correspondence theory of truth” (Walzer 1994:1). The critical aspect
here, for the authors, and that which makes the picture a reflexive or conceptual moment,
is captured by Walzer when he underlines that although marchers shared a specific culture
and were responding to a specific experience largely unfamiliar to most viewers, it became
possible for them to understand – or to penetrate, in Walzer’s own words – quickly and
unreservedly the “language game” and the “power play” inherent in the picture. The pic-
ture is already working as reflexive device, demanding of the viewer not only a description
or explanation of the social situation but a critical re-reading of power plays and language
games, i.e., all sorts of social structures constraining/enabling action along with and the
unnecessary constraints they impose in people’s lives but also the immanent resources to
achieve resilience.
The argument of this article is sustained by a critical approach to Human Security taken as
a liminal field of research and practice, located ambiguously in-between of international
studies: between global security, development and human rights. The authors uphold the
necessity for a reflexive turn in Human Security studies, in line with David Mutimer’s as-
sumptions of how critical approaches should proceed in their critique of social ontologies.
According to Mutimer, critical security studies should be able to give an answer to (i)
what is real, and provide a way into “understanding social ontology and the creation of so-
cial facts”; (ii) the interests that underlie knowledge claims, translating in “whom particular
forms of knowledge are for and who they serve”; and (iii) what is to be done, assuming that
“critical theory is a theory of praxis, a step in a process of political engagement designed
to transform the world” (Mutimer: 2007 67). Therefore, the reflexive turn upheld by the
authors begins by stressing the need to think critically about human practices as social
ontologies in the sense of historically constituted interactions and transactions embodying
specific language games, power plays and discourses. Methodologically, a discursive prac-
tices approach will help in the uncovering of the multiple ways in which cultural meanings
are produced, sustained and imposed, sometimes through structural violence, but also in
pointing at the immanent resources, inscribed in the current political order, for human
resilience and progressive change. What stems from these assumptions is that instead of
assuming a fixed reality, Human Security studies should focus more on how truth, moral-
ity, security or humanity are established, negotiated, maintained and challenged through
discursive practices.
A Critical Human Security is above all a praxeology, a tool for progressive change, based
on a realistic understanding of the myriad and complex processes inherent in the social
construction of political orders. As R. B. J. Walker has put it, “[m]odern accounts of secu-
rity are precisely about subjectivity, subjection and the conditions under which we have
been constructed as subjects, subject to subjection. They tell us who we must be and then
they often tell us how we might stay this way” (Walker 1997:72). Political orders are al-
ways sustained by inter-subjective phenomena, social dynamics and structures but we
often dismiss the importance of the more subjective structures and processes as critical
loci of morality, power and change. A critical and reflexive Human Security approach can
produce new insights into these loci, the authors sustain, if only researchers and acad-
emicians be able to produce (i) a better understanding of the discursive nature of global
insecurities, and (ii) a critical discourse about that which needs to be secured and how, en-
gaging systematically with the transformations of political life in the sense of taking stock
of the “emerging accounts of who we might become, and the conditions under which we
might become other that we are now without destroying others, ourselves, or the planet
on which we all live” (Walker 1997:78).
As it is sometimes acknowledged, the Human Security approach can be said to be “nor-
matively attractive, but analytically weak” (Newman 2010:82). It is often stressed that hu-
man security is about justice, resilience and emancipation, but it is not always easy to
be critical and policy relevant at the same time, as Newman underlines. The focus on
problem-solving has often curtailed the capacity to produce a critique of institutions and
the power relations that constitute them, which takes further the argument for more re-
flexivity through a more sensitive and pluralist methodology. For Newman, the problem
seems to be an excessive focus on the manifestations of insecurity and the lack of interest
in the underlying structural conditions of insecurity which, in his view, composes a basic
paradox of difficult solution, i.e., “it [human security] apparently calls for a critique of the
structures and norms that produce human insecurity, yet the ontological starting point
of most human security scholarship and its policy orientation reinforce these structures
and norms” (Newman 2010:88). A more coherent engagement with epistemology and on-
tology stuff must come first though in order to identify and explore security’s discursive
contexts and unveil the complex ways in which “the formative order of discourse is not a
stable self-reproducing structure, but a precarious system which is constantly subjected to
political attempts to undermine and/or restructure the discursive context in the course of
history” (Torfing 2005:14). Engaging coherently with epistemology and ontology is often
seen as a nuisance distracting researchers from down to earth, more pressing matters. As
the authors see it though, it is a necessary step in the critical task of de-essentializing and
deconstructing the prevailing claims about security. According again to Newman, “[t]he
normative strands of critical security studies – such as the “Welsh School”, which claims
to seek to change the world for the better – could therefore engage human security as a
bridge between critical security studies and policy” (Newman 2010:92).
The authors adhere to the Aberystwyth School when Ken Booth points out that the main
role of academics in the field consists in “telling the world about the world”. This approach
places at the centre of the IR community and its visions of security one of the critical Kan-
tian questions, viz., the epistemological query about that which we can know about the
world, and how we can know it: how we can produce knowledge about the vast phenom-
ena constituting the world. As far as this motto goes, the world makes its appearance as a
hermeneutical problem that can and must be worked out. According to Hans Blumenberg
(1979), no experience is located in the space of absolute indeterminacy nor does it develop
itself in the mere linear unfolding of causal connection among objects. On the contrary,
the whole experience of the world consists of something that must be read and interpret-
ed, as the very world is approached as a succession of interpretations predating and ensu-
ing – ascribing sense – to other interpretations. To Blumenberg, the experimentability of
the world is directly connected to its legibility.
Such epistemological question marks a substantive part of all the debates in academic IR
and security studies. There is already an epistemological background in the (more or less
constructed) debate between realism and idealism in the 1930s. However, the questions
about how to produce knowledge in IR get deeper in the 1950s debates between behaviour-
ists and traditionalists (still limited to methods) and critically broader in debates between
positivists and post-positivists starting in the 1980s. Epistemological matters (what can
be known), ontological matters (what is there to be known) and methodological matters
(how to proceed to produce knowledge) are directly connected and stem from each other.
A specific epistemology produces a specific ontology and demands or imposes a specific
methodology. In IR historiography, the dominant epistemology is positivism and it has
marked the specific forms of seeing and practicing the discipline. The positivist hegemony
in IR has determined an image of the “international”, and concomitant forms of studying
it, that were imported from the natural sciences. As an epistemological approach, positiv-
ism in IR underlines the strict separation between facts and values, between observer and
the observed, and subscribes to a naturalistic and empiricist paradigm in that it prescribes
the methods of natural sciences be used to study social and political phenomena.
The academic trajectory in IR has also been positivistic in the sense that the methods
prescribed to explore the “international” are clearly “explanatory” instead of hermeneutic:
they approach phenomena from the outside and take the social world as a simplistic line-
arity of causal relations. Observing the “international” and its phenomena is performed in
the passive and disengaged way set down by positivism in order to attain a neutral and ob-
jective knowledge of reality (knowledge as correspondence). This notion of observation
is in line with the aim of reducing social experience to a certain type of behaviour captured
by pure perception, as it were, that which Mitchell calls the ”innocent eye”, the pure vision
stemming from “a merely mechanical process uncontaminated by imagination, purpose or
desire […]” (Mitchell 1986:118). It is the same empiricist and positivist paradigm in IR that
produces dichotomy and radical separation between theory and practice, between theory
and method. As stressed by Jenks, theory has been seen as an individual eccentricity de-
veloped by academics who take an interest in deepening the contested and contentious
side of knowledge production, while “method” is introduced as the good, consensual and
technical side capable of giving some uniformity to a certain epistemic community ( Jenks
1995:12). In IR today, this perspective is still dominant and has been reinforced by those
who take an interest in reifying the most basic and simplistic empiricism in order to im-
pose explanatory methods as the correct way to know the “international”. It is tantamount
to “truth as correspondence” and its claim that knowledge must be an objective reflection
of the world captured by an “innocent eye”.
However, the supposedly innocent eye is more of a blind eye. Pure perception does not
exist per se; it is always already mediated by the mind, by the values and predispositions
of those who see, or as Mitchell puts it above, by imagination, purpose and desire of the
mind capturing reality. At this stage it is maybe useful to contrast this image of the suppos-
edly innocent eye with the perspectivist approach of Merleau-Ponty who underlines that
“the perceived thing is not an ideal unity in the possession of an intellect; […] it is instead
a totality open to the horizon of an infinite number of perspectives that mix according to
a certain style defining the object” (Merleau-Ponty 1964:16). The main idea of Merleau-
Ponty here is that perception is paradoxical, just as the object of perception, and it only
exists in the sense that someone perceives it. These hints, as well as Merleau-Ponty’s per-
spectivism, can contribute to the questioning – in IR too – of the inquisitorial dichotomy

(as Jenks calls it) between “subject” and “the other” in the production of knowledge and
the concomitant hygienizing of observation engraved in the positivist handbook. All of
that comes together in the ideology of scientism influencing the whole spectrum of the
social sciences with its supposedly neutral, amoral and aesthetic paraphernalia implicated
in the production and legitimization of modernity and its regime of truth ( Jenks 1995:7).
Against such positivist epistemology, a visual paradigm in IR and security studies sets
out to underline that reality is always for someone and some purpose, according to Rob-
ert Cox’s well known axiom: “[t]heory is always for someone and some purpose” (Cox
1981:129).
At this juncture, it is useful to recall the reader that a second set of goals in this article has
to do with exploring visual methods as innovative tools for representing and assessing the
discursive nature of global insecurities (plus their relevant discursive contexts). However,
contesting positivism in IR goes well beyond the question of which methods must be used
to produce knowledge about the “international”. In fact, upholding the use of visual tools
as post-positivist methodology stands at the centre of a renewed epistemological project
for IR and Human Security, intent on placing Verstehen (hermeneutic understanding),
interpretation and reflectivism at the centre of knowledge production strategies and the
“social”. This kind of visual paradigm sustained by the authors underlines the need to get
involved in the production of visual tools, and not only reflecting upon the use of visual
methods. By doing so, it departs from the notion of pure perception in the apprehension
of reality to question the lack of hermeneutic understanding and reflection upon human
practices. It involves the setting up of a paradigm according to which, to follow Bryson’s
words on art history, the “visual” represents the concrete effort at unveiling, describing
and interpreting social structures, interactions, transactions and contexts through the nar-
ratives individuals and groups tell about themselves and their lives. What is at stake here,
according to Bryson, is that “the reality experienced by human beings is always historically
produced: there is no transcendent and naturally given Reality” (Bryson 1983:13), which
demands a deeper reflection about the meanings social actors ascribe to social interac-
tions and transactions in which they get involved, viz., the narratives they produce. Such a
visual paradigm for HS, in which practitioners get involved both in the production of con-
tents and the interpretation of contents produced by others, allows for a recuperation of
Jenks’ idea that vision is a very sharp cultural (in the sense of productive) practice instead
of the naked eye that captures a pre-formed and neutral reality waiting to be perceived
( Jenks 1995:10). A visual paradigm for HS is especially fit for uncovering the dynamic
and complex ways in which the social fabric – human insecurities and vulnerabilities but
also human resilience – get produced and reproduced before our very eyes, in multiple
loci that are not easy to capture through words only. If there is a “vision” inherent to this
visual paradigm it stems from the reflexive mind, not from the positivist’s allegedly naked
or innocent eye.
Reflexivity is one of the characteristics of post-positivist IR. In the context of a discursive
and visual approach for HS, being reflexive comes down to acknowledging the close re-
lationship between social practices, increasingly visual, and the visual culture that consti-
tutes the social world. Therefore, a visual paradigm for HS promotes the representation of
social practices, namely (structural) violence and resilience, not in the manner of corre-
spondence to some kind of essential truth but as a way to transcend it according to criteria
of human emancipation. Following Bryson’s logic, it does not imply the mere appropria-
tion of the world through vision but a deep reorganization of that world in the context of
a vision or perspective: one that allows for a critical understanding of how violence (or
insecurities) and resilience get produced and reproduced, or how they get reconstituted as
social practices. It is definitely a discursive or productive approach capable of bridging the
gap between levels of analysis: from local (in)securities to global trends and backwards,
from human resilience at local levels to governance choices and backwards. By unveil-
ing the productive and discursive nature of social interactions and transactions, the visual
methodologies constitute themselves as potent tools to relate individual and specific sto-
ries to the operation of more global, impersonal or abstract political structures, of how the
former become instances of the latter. Visual methodologies have the capacity to provide
or trigger a macro understanding of human (in)security by discussing concrete instance
or illustrations thereof.
Whereas the written word was the organizing stuff of industrial societies, the audiovisual
is probably the organizing stuff of more complex, post-industrial, societies even if the so-
cial sciences have shown a notorious difficulty to appropriate it as a relevant methodology
and strategy in knowledge production (beyond the more common use in the abusive pro-
duction of institutional identities). In order to fix their claim to scientificity, all academic
domains need to reify a set of “summarizing technologies”, and make them legitimate vis-
à-vis their peers, as Fyfe and Law call them (1988). For a long time, the written text in
its multiple forms was tantamount to the highest intellectual faculties by social scientists
in search of recognition by their peers in the natural sciences. In contrast, as Emmison
and Smith underline “images are seen as subversive, dangerous and visceral” (Emmison
2000:14). In academic institutions, always more or less tainted by various forms of con-
servatism, the emergence of a visual paradigm in social sciences – and within the IR do-
main specifically – has proved clearly subversive of a naturalized order of commanding and
obeying that depends on the survival of old paradigms with their ontologies, epistemolo-
gies and methodologies. In conservative institutions with a restricted framework to assess
what the social sciences are for, the emergence of a visual paradigm in IR will always be
perceived as a critical question enmeshed in the contestation of vested academic interests.
The question raised above bears a direct relation to the discursive approach the authors
want to sustain throughout the article. In the sense attributed to it by Foucault, discursive
practices consist in the set of social processes through which a certain reality becomes
dominant by fixing tangible power-knowledge relations. In this context, it all comes down
to understanding and unveiling how specific power-knowledge relations reify specific
conceptions of truth (orders of truth) and that which is accepted as the “real” (The Order
of Discourse 1971; The Archeology of Knowledge, 1972). A visual paradigm that uncovers
the discursive nature of international relations and human (in)security encourages the
production of tools (the reflexive documentary, for instance) for the interpretation of the
complex processes of meaning production both within, across and among communities,
i.e., in the broader range of levels of analysis as possible. What this bridging of the gap be-
tween the micro and the macro makes possible is a better understanding of how cultural
meanings are negotiated and renegotiated in the context of different social structures and
how they become inter-subjective (although always contested) norms. The post-positivist
influence comes by way of accepting that knowledge cannot be divorced from he (or she)
who knows, his or her personal experiences and visions of the world and that the relation-
ship established through a camera, for instance, can be a privileged way of witnessing (and
knowing) how real people live, how they see the world, how they change or adapt to it,
but also how they negotiate, renegotiate and contest meanings, norms, interests and even
their identities.
A visual paradigm for HS makes it easier for the researcher to understand the limitations of
positivism and that the nature of knowledge he or she produces always depends on his or
her locus in the world and the perceptions-cum-interpretations stemming from that. Tell-
ing the world about the world with a camera in hand, the authors sustain, make it easier to
understand how such visions of the world get produced and upheld by complex social ac-
tors and the power play they become involved in. This way, the post-positivist researcher
takes the position of someone who explores the nature of problems and challenges, not
of someone who tests hypotheses, it is the position of someone who conducts research
among people and learns with them, of someone who produces knowledge with people,
not on people. The reflexive documentary specifically – more than the explanatory one
– becomes a privileged tool in the reconstruction or re-reading of such interactions and
transactions, making it possible to produce knowledge from within the specific forms of
life of individuals and communities who constitute the world discursively. The reflexive
documentary should aim at capturing the complexity and contingency of every form of
life, thereby incorporating narrativity as a critical strategy to critically explore the world
and change it for the better. The critical reflexive twist here is that since international and
global structures, and all phenomena stemming from them are always experienced and
interpreted at the level of individual subjectivities, they find a relevant expression in the
stories actors tell about themselves, their lives and their worlds.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The first concluding remark concerns the statement that the approach explored by the
authors in this text is in itself part of the visual politics they prescribe for Human Security
(which is understood here as a liminal academic discipline in need of a reflexive turn). To
be more clear, the authors have a specific political understanding of what Human Secu-
rity (its theory and practice) is for and how a visual paradigm will help put it into effect.
Such political understanding concerns, namely, how a visual paradigm can play a role in a
better understanding (i) of human insecurities and their discursive nature, but also (ii) of
the ways to curb them, empower people and produce resilient communities. The authors
are not only conscious of their political understanding of Human Security (its theory and
practice); they conceive of their activity in such terms and embrace a visual paradigm in
order to accentuate the “political” in Human Security. Moreover, the authors put it into
practice in the use of a visual paradigm – in the sense of using and producing stand stills
and films – within the social process of contestation about global security: (i) what it is;
(ii) who it is for, and (iii) how to refine the institutional or governance rejoinders to risks,
threats and vulnerabilities.
A second concluding remark concerns the connected statement that the reflexive turn de-
fended by the authors for Human Security (as a liminal field of research and practice) can
be productively approached through the concept of a visual politics. The authors claim
that such a paradigm can enhance the understanding of the discursive nature of human
insecurities, vulnerabilities and resilience, as well as the complexity of processes within
which inter-subjective meanings are negotiated, contested or imposed to produce discur-

sive security contexts and structures. The authors also claim that a visual paradigm for
Human Security can be productive by bridging the gap between levels of analysis and in-
tegrating micro-visions with macro-visions of global (in)security, concrete human stories
of suffering and resilience with the interplay of global structures and governance solutions
. The bottom line therefore is that, by unveiling the productive and discursive nature of
social interactions and transactions, a visual paradigm has the potential to become a valu-
able tool in the connection of personal narratives with the pragmatic workings of global,
impersonal or abstract political structures.
4. REFERENCES
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Cox, R. (1981): “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
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Emmison, M. and Smith, P. (2000): Researching the Visual, Sage: London.
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Jenks, C. (1995): “The Centrality of the Eye in Western Culture: an Introduction” in Jenks,
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Newman, P. (2010): “Critical Human Security Studies” in Review of International Studies,
36, pp. 77-94.
Torfing, J. (2005): “Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges” in
Howarth and Torfing, eds., Discourse Theory in European Politics, Palgrave Macmillan:
New York, pp. 1-32.
Walker, R. B. J. (1997): “The Subject of Security” in Krause e Williams, eds., Critical Secu-
rity Studies: Concepts and Cases, UC Press: London.
Walzer, M. (1994): Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, University of
Notre Dame: Notre Dame.
UDC 351.78(100)
Ivica DJORDJEVIĆ, Željko IVANIŠ, Milenko BODIN*

TO THE WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY
Abstract: After the fall of the Berlin Wall the world was at a crossroads. In addition to the dis-
solution of the bipolar world order, the then existing situation is also determined by scientific
and technological progress. Unfortunately, the progress in science is not followed by the proper
development of philosophical thought. Technology has the primacy due to a huge discrepancy
between the investments in natural science and in humanities. Technological progress leads to
the domination of prot-oriented centers of power. The state is slowly, but constantly losing the
impact on the course of events, and its social functions cease to exist one by one.
International organizations founded after World War II are not capable of resuming the respon-
sibility and functions that the national state loses in terms of globalization. The effect of informal
centers of power can be discerned in the work of international organizations such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. The lack of condence in the ex-
isting system of international organizations causes worldwide instability. Starting from 1989, the
world is in a state of permanent economic crisis with a few short intervals of recuperation.
In the absence of a new socio-economic paradigm the concept of human security could point
out the essence and roots of the modern world problems. The analytical potential of seven-di-
mensional matrix could lead to a new model of organization and functioning of civilization by
the force of arguments. The advantage of the concept is its ideological neutrality and objectivity
in the status display.
Keywords: globalization, paradigmatic crisis, human security
1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The fall of the Berlin Wall as an epochal event symbolically represents the disappearance
of the bipolar division of the world and the end of the Cold War between the Eastern and
Western blocs. This event serves as an inspiration for many intellectuals to commit to find-
ing new forms of organization of international relations that are in compliance with the
new conditions. Unfortunately, the perception of the situation after the fall of the Berlin
* Ivica Djordjević, PhD, Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: djivica@gmail.com; ivicadj@fb.bg.ac.rs.
Željko Ivaniš, Phd, PhD, Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, e-mail: landol@eunet.rs
Milenko Bodin, PhD, Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, e-mail: stud.krug@verat.net
[64] Ivica DJORDJEVIĆ, Željko IVANIŠ, Milenko BODIN
Wall and the collapse of the USSR among the key actors of the international scene was not
matchable to the new situation.
Choosing the option that the collapse of ideological opponents is the proof of the supe-
riority of their own system, the West refuses to change anything in the existing system of
international relations.1 On the contrary, the existing international structures are instru-
mentalized in furtherance of geopolitical interests. At the same time insisting on a dog-
matic approach to the transition process in the territory of the former Eastern Bloc further
complicates the situation.2
After the initial enthusiasm and high expectations of what the change would bring, it
showed very quickly that the system turns on to outdated concepts of geopolitical domi-
nation and control of strategic points. After a brief period in which dividends of peace due
to the reduction of expenditures for defense purposes show (Davoodi 1999: 25)3 a wors-
ening of the situation ensues. The reduction of orders in the military-industrial complex
leads to the loss of thousands of jobs and the threat of recession, which gives a new boost
to the warlords (Marshall 1993). This entices choosing the path of least resistance which
in turn leads to an increase in military spending. Although there might have been some
doubt as to the future course of events due to the seeminglyy positive effects of reducing
military expenditure, practice shows that the greatest absurdities are possible. A system
in which for decades the military industrial complex has been the most vital part of the
economy because of the danger of the red dragon from the East is not able to easily switch
to the new conditions. Revitalization of the military - industrial complex requires an ap-
propriate state of affairs that would justify the need for it, which can largely explain a new
spiral of instability and generating a series of conflicts in different regions of the world.
Five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the major trend of events becomes apparent.
Recognizing the negative tendencies of the mentioned process, applying an academic ob-
jective approach in their annual report for 1994 (UNDP 1994), UNDP experts attempt
to provide an analytical framework that would contribute to cease the negative global
trends. Bearing in mind the dominant neo-conservatism forced by profit-oriented centers
of power, they seek a model that by using the power of facts and freed from political and
ideological connotations provides an objective analysis of the effects of actual practice.
2. CHANGE IN THE PYRAMID OF POWER

The liberalization of cross-border traffic and financial transactions contributes to the in-
creased international transfers of goods and capital. However, with multiple tariff rate
lowering and loss of control over cash flows, states as systems of agencies that are sup-
posed to govern the territory under their jurisdiction in accordance with the interests of
the citizens who live in those areas, lose significant revenue sources. In the initial phase,
the loss of customs revenues is offset by increased revenues from sales tax. Over time, with
the expansion of transnational business networks and strengthening the power of trans-
1 Fukuyama work The End of History and the Last Man represents the most drastic form of perception of the then
existing situation among the US establishment (Fukuyama, 1992).
2 The Washington consensus is a step back regarding the concept of the welfare state.
3 The reduction of military expenditures for the accounting period 1990-94 in relation to expenditure for the period
1972-1989 is 34%.
TO THE WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY [65]
national companies (TNCs), this positive effect is lost due to outsourcing production to
regions with cheap labor and the use of transfer pricing mechanisms to avoid obligations
to local institutions. This process is particularly acute in developing countries and leads
to the loss of real power of institutions to control economic processes. Chronic budget
deficits lead to the fact that states are no longer able to pay quality staff for the needs of
increasingly complex conditions in which they operate. In addition to losing the level of
quality of the staff they employ, the states, very often, have a problem to provide modern
technical equipment that would enable appropriate control of cross-border transfers.
The dynamics of modern technological processes and market demand do not tolerate long
holdups of goods at borders so that under the pressure of efficiency and competitiveness
many procedures are shortened at the expense of quality control. This situation is an op-
portunity for manipulation with the stated value of the goods, but also its quality. Major
developed countries can still cope with the above problems while the situation in small
developing countries becomes dramatic. Ruthless competition closes local small busi-
nesses, the potential of TNCs for blackmail leads to concluding unfavorable arrangements
in order to provide new jobs. These processes lead to a state of affairs in which the state
is no longer financially strong enough to be able to perform its constitutional functions
which are normally its main activity. Lack of funds prevents the performance of quality
control functions on the importation of food products4 and general consumer goods5.
Lack of funds in the budget leads to a situation where civil servants are more susceptible
to corruption because of low income, which further impoverishes public funds and so on.
Avoiding the obligations of large corporations in relation to local government leads to de-
pletion of state funds and results in an absurd situation that the functioning of the state
relies heavily on revenues collected from citizens through mandatory taxes. The average
citizen usually falls into the category of losers and suffers more negative than positive ef-
fects of globalization. The described situation created by the rise of power of the TNCs is
made apparent by presenting the data in Table 1, which show that within the top 50 largest
economic entities in the world the number of TNCs is growing and the number of states
is declining. The table uses data on GDP for the state and total revenue for the TNC be-
cause these two indicators are comparable due to their structure. The data are expressed
in current dollars because the aim of the table is to display the rank of economic entity in
a particular year.
4 Food contaminated with various chemicals can worsen the health status of the population, and in some cases also
lead to fatalities.
5 Fake technical goods that do not meet the stated standards lead to accidents with human casualties. For example,
imported extension cords that seemingly have grounding but are made with only two wires are a common cause of
fires in the winter because people believe that these cables are secure and connect them to high-power consumers,
such as heaters.
Table 1: States and TNCs ranked as economic entities on the base of achieved state
GNI and TNC total revenue in 1989 and 2013
1989 2013
GNI/Total GNI/Total
Rank State/TNC revenue in Rank State/TNC revenue in
current USD current USD
1 United States 5,956,035 1 United States 16,903,045
2 Japan 3,279,745 2 China 8,905,336
3 Germany 1,557,638 3 Japan 5,899,905
4 France 1,135,394 4 Germany 3,810,597
5 Italy 977,272 5 France 2,869,763
6 United Kingdom 936,249 6 United Kingdom 2,671,728
7 Canada 538,373 7 Brazil 2,342,552
8 Spain 415,975 8 Italy 2,145,347
9 Brazil 404,313 9 Russian Federation 1,987,738
10 China 354,950 10 India 1,960,072
11 India 338,679 11 Canada 1,835,383
12 Netherlands 287,499 12 Australia 1,512,605
13 Australia 262,270 13 Spain 1,395,916
14 Switzerland 234,090 14 Korea, Rep. 1,301,575
15 Korea, Rep. 230,857 15 Mexico 1,216,087
16 Sweden 221,539 16 Indonesia 894,967
17 Mexico 192,819 17 Netherlands 858,028
18 Belgium 179,759 18 Turkey 821,684
19 Austria 146,501 19 Saudi Arabia 757,058
20 Iran, Islamic Rep. 131,225 20 Switzerland 733,437
21 South Africa 123,514 21 Sweden 592,411
22 General Motors 121,085 22 Norway 521,713
23 Finland 119,699 23 Belgium 518,241
24 Denmark 119,281 24 Poland 510,005
Wal-Mart Stores
25 Saudi Arabi 109,853 25 Inc, United States, 476, 294
Retail & Trade
26 Norway 104,031 26 Nigeria 469,730
Royal Dutch Shell
plc United Kingdom
27 Turkey 101,703 27 451 235
Petroleum expl./
ref./distr.
28 Indonesia 99,094 28 Iran, Islamic Rep. 447,534
29 Argentina 93,730 29 Austria 427,321

Exxon Mobil
Ford Motor, Corporation United
30 92,446 30 390 247
Motor vehicles States Petroleum
expl./ref./distr.
31 Ukraine 84,060 31 Venezuela, RB 381,592
32 Greece 83,695 32 South Africa 380,700
BP plc United
Exxon Mobil,
Kingdom
33 Petroleum expl./ref./ 79,557 33 379 136
Petroleum expl./
distr.
ref./distr.
34 Thailand 73,580 34 Colombia 366,639
35 Hong Kong 65,685 35 Thailand 357,661
36 Algeria 64,189 36 Denmark 346,278
37 Portugalia 63,228 37 Philippines 321,810
38 IBM, IT 59,681 38 Malaysia 309,937
General Electric
United States
39 49,414 39 Singapore 291,788
Electrical &
electronic equipment
Mobil, Petroleum Hong Kong SAR,
40 48,198 40 276,148
expl./ref./distr. China
41 Venezuela, RB 47,107 41 Israel 273,476
42 New Zealand 44,725 42 Chile 268,296
43 Pakistan 44,394 43 Finland 265,539
Volkswagen Group
44 Israel 44,135 44 Germany Motor 261 560
vehicles
45 Egypt, Arab Rep. 42,821 45 Egypt, Arab Rep. 257,360
Toyota Motor
46 Philippines 42,121 46 Corporation Japan 256 381
Motor vehicles
47 Romania 41,808 47 Greece 250,269
48 Colombia 40,955 48 Pakistan 247,041
Glencore Xstrata
49 Malaysia 39,592 49 PLC Switzerland 232 694
Mining & quarrying
Total SA France
50 Ireland 38,959 50 Petroleum expl./ 227 901
ref./distr.
Data for the year 1989:
GNI, Atlas method (current US$): http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.ATLS.CD/

countries?order=wbapi_data_value_1989%20wbapi_data_value%20wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc&
page=5&display=default
Revenues – TNC: http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/1989
Data for the year 2013:
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.ATLS.

CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2013+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc
TNC (a Preliminary results based on data from the companies’ financial reporting; corresponds to the
financial year from 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014.) http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/World%20In-
vestment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx
The records show that there are six TNCs on the list in 1989. In 2013 there are two more of
them, and the number of states on the list decreases for the same number. A more detailed
analysis would take too much space, however it should be pointed that out of the total
number of eight companies on the list for the year 2013, the basic activity of as many as five
of them is the exploitation of developing countries’ natural wealth.6 Perhaps the explana-
tion of the enormous development gap between the rich and the poor countries lies in the
explication of this statistics.
The fact that some profit organizations far exceed the GDP of most countries by the value
of their business activities in one year confirms the thesis of the change in the balance of
power in favor of the TNCs. This entails many practical consequences in terms of realiza-
tion and protection of the interests of citizens living in the countries. An asymmetrical
power structure emerges that increasingly tilts to the side of the TNCs that use the current
situation for the implementation of their business interests that are often at the expense of
the quality of life of the people living in the area where such TNCs operate. Due to their
large funds the presence of TNCs is not limited only to the economic sphere, but they are
increasingly present in the creation of local political environment.
3. THE CURRENT STATUS

The records in Table 1 may help to explain some of the contemporary security phenomena
characteristic for the global happenings after the fall of the Berlin Wall (from 1989 to the
present day). Placing these data in geopolitical context may produce even more valuable
conclusions. Namely, we must reflect upon the fact that today’s largest crisis areas are ex-
actly in the regions rich in globally deficient natural resources, or those that may serve as
oil and gas transportation routes.
6 There are only two companies that make profit by trading undeveloped countries’ natural resources in the list for
1989.
Figure 1: Geographical locations of world conflicts
Source: http://www.conflictmap.org/map
By the data presented in Table 1, we may also conclude that geographical locations of most
of the TNCs justifies and confirms the stereotype division to the rich, developed North,
and the poor, underdevoloped South because all eight companies from the list of the big-
gest ones are located in the north hemisphere.
According to the Freedom House records, , the number of electoral democracies world-
wide has risen from 69 in 1989 to 122 in 2014, accounting for 61 percent of today’s states
(McGann 2015:15). However, this positive trend is overcast with a large shadow because
according to the findings presented in European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD) publication the trust in democracy as a form of the political community or-
ganization diminishes in a large number of countries in the period 2006 – 2010, (Graph 1).
According to the same source, the citizens ‘support for the market economy as promoted
by neoliberal fundamentalists, the advocates of the Washington consensus, also scores a
significant fall, (Graph 2). We are witnessing a profound economic crisis that undermines
the very foundations of the capitalist system. The crisis has been going on permanently
since 2008, and we may track its roots starting from the Asian crisis at the end of the nine-
ties of the last century, onwards, including all those crises that ensue.
Chart 1: Comparative levels of support for democracy, 2006 and 2010.
Source: EBRD (2011): Life in Transition Survey, After the Crisis, European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, London, pg.22.
Chart 2: Comparative levels of support for a market economy, 2006 and 2010
Source: EBRD (2011): Life in Transition Survey, After the Crisis, European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, London, pg.22.
Considering the presented data, the question of the causes of such state of affairs is quite
rightfully posed: Where does such discontent with this system come from? The system
that has been raised to the level of dogma by its supporters for there must not be any
argument about its fundamental principles. Never the less, with a certain, justified level
of reserve regarding the fact that there is a lot of aberration in contemporary functioning
of the capitalism compared to the ideal model as presented by Ayn Rand (1967), we must
emphasize the necessity of the system adaptation in order to comply with the now exist-
ing reality. The scientific and technological progress has changed tha ambiance and instru-
ments available to the people. The fate of mankind depends on understanding contempo-
rary conditions , hazards arising from endless technological strength and opportunities
that it offers to change the world for the better.
4. HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT AS AN ALTERNATIVE

The long-term trend of event development inspires the UNDP experts to offer an ana-
lytical framework that would make possible a better understanding of contemporary pro-
cesses on global level. We have seen that the security state of affairs has not changed for the
better since the end of the Cold War idealistic expectations notwithstanding. Except for
a short period of silence at the beginning of the nineties, the spiral of conflict and violence
has been turned on again. The results of transitional processes in the area of the former
Eastern Bloc are catastrophic in most cases. Ruthless random movement of speculative
capital coupled with local tycoons makes the life of common citizens unbearable. Surveys
conducted in the former republics of the Soviet Union during the 90s of the last century
show grief for the system they once wanted to get away from at all cost. Surely, this mo-
ment does not confirm the quality of life in the USSR, but speaks more of the offered
alternative, which produces catastrophic results in practice. The effects of the transitional
model carried out in Russia are characterized as economic genocide (Bohlen, 1992).
The concept of human security promoted by the UNDP relies on the tradition of many
centuries long battle for the equality of all men and workers’ rights, and contains in it-
self all elements of international declarations dedicated to the protection of human rights,
sustainable development and preservation of the planet ecosystem. By establishing this
concept structurally through seven dimensions of security and introducing a string of indi-
cators by which the current status in each of the dimensions can be quantified the authors
of the report set up an analytical framework that may serve as tools for perceiving the state
of affairs in an area so as to determine the causes of the problem and make a projection of
possible scenarios based on established facts.
The originally set concept is not perfect; it still requires methodological refinement and
procedure clear-cutting in order to obtain exact instruments for comparable results in dif-
ferent space and in time continuity. It is an undeniable fact that by its importance and
potential the concept is a revolutionary shift in social theory, especially in the segment of
security studies. Certainly, like all other theories of social phenomena, this one also can
be abused through the manipulation of research results, but despite the shortcomings it
can serve as a basis for fundamental reform of socio-economic model on the principles of
which the modern civilization is functioning.
In the simplified presentation below, we will try to provide an insight into the analytical
potential of the concept of human security in the context of current global situation. In the
circumstances of loss of influence of state institutions in the area they control

and reloca-
tion of centers of power beyond the control of democratic procedures and the system of
representatives there is a need to reach a new model of regulation of the global community
in the making by a consistent approach and analysis. Institutional system designed to meet
the needs of global citizens should be based on an objective assessment of their needs and
the ways of adapting the existing democratic mechanisms to the new global practice.
The potential that the seven dimensional matrix carries in itself is one of the ways of
achieving a sustainable solution to the problems of modern civilization through its opera-
tionalization. The very idea that the field of security is perceived as a unique space that de-
pends on a variety of intertwined influences is a big step forward compared to the classical
theory of national and / or state security. The protection of the territory and institutions
must obtain a broader context in relation to the ubiquitous global phenomena that do not
recognize state borders. Globalization dramatically affects the change of the content of the
concept of sovereignty and sovereignty itself. However, there is a legitimate question: to
what extent the contemporary state is sovereign, bearing in mind the impact of modern
TNC, IMF and WB on its policies. Can we talk about the realization of citizens’ interests
as members of a particular community of people who live within the state borders if the
work of their representatives and institutions depends on the influence of centers of power
located outside the monitored area.
In the circumstances of globalization, the economic system favors transnational economic
systems that via their networks use all the benefits of free movement of capital and goods.
In return, their obligations in the given context depend on the corporate practice, more
specifically on the part which relates to socially responsible business doing. Unfortunately,
the basic principles of business based on profit maximization dictate the behavior which
does not allow much room for altruism and help the local community. TNC potential for
blackmail is too big for the residents of small poor countries to expect respect for their
interests and standards that are implicit in the developed world. In most cases, the positive
business results of TNCs in these countries are minor, but the negative are very much ex-
pressed. The problem on the economic level gets refracted through the political prism and
emerges on the ecological level. Local politicians turn their blind eye to the violation of the
rights of workers and higher rates of pollution in order to retain or attract TNC production
facilities, not taking into account health and environmental effects of such practice.
One of the inevitable consequences of the described changes at the end of the 20th and the
beginning of the 21st century expresses through a large number of refugees and internally
displaced persons. People who for economic and security reasons emigrate to other coun-
tries due to a reasonable fear of being persecuted just because they are of a different race,
religion, nationality, etc. are called refugees. Internally displaced persons are those who
have left their homes involuntarily, but still live in the same country. A similar fate befalls
the population that is called asylum seekers, people who for political reasons seek refuge
in a foreign country.7
7 “By end-2013, 51.2million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict,
generalized violence, or human rights violations. Some 16.7million persons were refugees: 11.7million under
UNHCR’s mandate and 5.0million Palestinian million registered by UNRWA. The global figure included 33.3million
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and close to 1.2million asylum-seekers. If these 51.2million persons were a
nation, they would make up the 26th largest in the world.” – Source: www.unhcr.org (accessed: 23.55CET, Apr.
1st,2015)
The cultural consequences of uncontrolled global processes are manifested through pro-
liferation of behavior patterns based on the Hollywood production of western view of the
world. The shine and glamour with which the citizens of the third world are bombarded
is not accessible in reality to the majority of the world’s population. Awareness that the
shine seen on screens can only be reached through criminal activities increases the crime
rate in poor countries, especially in the younger part of the population. On the one hand,
crime and the influence of local gangs rise while on the other the percentage of domestic
violence increases because of frustration and dissatisfaction of family members with their
status. In the present milieu various fundamentalist groups appear that use personal dis-
satisfaction of citizens with their status in order to recruit them as new members and use
them as instruments for the realization of the goals of those group. (Djordjevic 2013: 69)
An objective analysis of the current global economic situation should not be limited to
statistics taken from national statistical sources and publications of international institu-
tions without putting their data in the appropriate context. Displaying statistical growth
often conceals stagnation or even a lack of development and improving the quality of life
of citizens who live in the area covered by the statistics. Statistical data relating to the real
level of GDP in transition countries compared to the ones for 1989 best reflect the effects
of the transition process. Interestingly enough, the EBRD that used to present the dia-
grams showing the level of GDP of countries in relation to 1989 in its annual reports for
years no longer presents such data in the most recent reports (2013 and 2014). Probably
this is considered to be an already outdated approach in view of the current situation in
the former Eastern Bloc states. On the contrary, these data can serve as an explanation for
many current situations such as Ukrainian crisis, for example. According to the data avail-
able in the EBRD report for 2012, the level of GDP is below the one achieved in 1989 in
the following countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina (80%), Bulgaria (100%), Georgia (75%),
Moldova (about 60%), Montenegro (90%), Serbia and Ukraine (65%) (EBRD 2012).
In view of these data and based on research concerning the impact of economic situation
on the stability of countries and regions we can expect problems in the countries listed
above in near future. It is symptomatic that the majority of the listed countries has a long
history of cooperation with the IMF and the WB. However, the result of this cooperation
is just lagging behind the average growth of GDP in 33 member countries of the EBRD,
which is 140% in 2012 compared to the year 1989 (EBRD 2012).
Consideration of economic situation in an area requires a complex multivariate analysis. In
addition to monitoring changes in statistical data on the volume of production per capita
and budget deficit it is necessary to change the economic structure in order to employ
a greater number of citizens i.e. prevent economic stagnation. Permanent employment
provides economic security to citizens: the possibility to make long-term plans, provides
a stable source of income, enables investments in housing, professional training and family
planning. Permanent employment and a steady income that provide a decent life dimin-
ish the number of migrants and secure the long-term stability of the area. However the
monetization of economic activities and prioritization of purely statistical data on the state
of public finances on account of an analysis of the specificity of space cannot ultimately
provide a good result of any stabilization program.
The battle against the gray economy is not just a problem of tax collection, but rather
addressing the deeper social problems associated with corruption and functioning of the
system. Economic security means stable institutions and effective system of control in the
realization of public revenue and expenditure. If a large part of economic activity remains
outside the system, then it shows that the state is weak and unable to cope with the infor-
mal centers of power. This entails lesser funds for the purposes of social and health care
systems, leaving a large number of people outside the system of social and health care.
People outside the system, left to themselves become offenders by force of circumstances,
which leads to the problem of sustainability of the community. In such circumstances the
state is not even able to provide the means for performing the basic activities, thus it is
forced to borrow, which leads to the growth of the public in relation to the registered
consumption, a budget deficit and growing public debt ensue, which inevitably leads to
inflation.
Cost of living indices, the average retail prices, poverty index and the percentage of house-
holds with incomes below the line of poverty only serve to confirm the diagnosed condi-
tion. Their recording provides a good material for comparison with other countries and
communities. A stable and strong state with institutions that are able to protect the in-
terests of its citizens is at the basis of economic security at the same time creating and
maintaining a stimulating economic environment. The percentage of citizens who feel
economically insecure (in terms of employment and income stability) is the best status
indicator in a certain area and they may serve as an early warning if they change in a nega-
tive direction. For example, when the findings show that the unemployment of the youth
between 15 and 24 years of age is high, it is a kind of alert against possible projections of
future events in a given area.
To what extent the economy is essential for the stability of an area we can see from the
Graph 1. The authors of the graph have determined the existence of a significant correla-
tion between the outbreak of armed conflicts and the level of GDP in the area of some eco-
nomic entity. Therefore, the importance of economic situation for the stability of an area
and the safety of people who live in it should never be ignored. Let us remind that at the
time of the breakup of Yugoslavia GDP p / c was 4,026 USD (current prices)8. For meth-
odological reasons, it should be noted that the model presented in the chart was made in
2004 and we have no data regarding on which base year is was constructed. Regardless of
the reserve that exists in this respect it should be noted that the social product per capita
in the republics of former Yugoslavia that suffered the most in conflicts after 1990, were far
below the average of the former common state. In this context, we can accept the correla-
tion shown in Figure 4 as a relevant framework for making the analysis and the existence
of a significant correlation between the standard of people and their security. For compari-
son purposes $ 4,026 in 1990 is worth 7,497 USD in 2015 when the average annual inflation
rate for that period is taken into account9.
8 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/downloads/Download-GDPPC-USD-countries.xls (Dec. 16th, 2014).

9 http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm ( Jan. 16th, 2015).
Graph 3: Correlation between GDP p/c and conflict breaking out risk
Probability of new conflict breaking out
In the period of five years (in %)
Income per capita in USD

Source: Human Security Project (2011): Human Security Report 2009/2010, the causes of peace and the
shrinking costs of war, Simon Fraser University, Oxford University Press, p.51. based on: Macartan Hum-
phreys and Ashutosh Varshney, “Violent Conflict and the Millennium Development Goals: Diagnosis
and Recommendations,” First draft, background paper prepared for the meeting of the Millennium
Development Goals Poverty Task Force Workshop, Bangkok, June 2004.
The state of economy and economic indicators are not the only important indicators for
the assessment of the security situation in an area, but they do say a lot about a possible
anticipation of situation in other areas or dimensions of human security. Poor people are
not able to buy quality groceries or take care of their nutritional structure. Empty coffer
does not allow for the acquisition of modern equipment for the control of food in the dis-
tribution system. Low civil servant salaries make this group of employees vulnerable to
corruption and this also contributes to the quality of products present in the food market.
The situation in the field of nutrition is directly reflected on the situation in the field of
population health. Irregular and poor quality diet in combination with foods that are con-
taminated with pesticides and other chemical products distorts the health image of citi-
zens who live in small and underdeveloped countries. When this is added limited funds
in the health system, we have a very bad image of the health care of the population. The
lack of reagents, faulty equipment, and corruption can be a deadly combination for many
citizens who live in poor and underdeveloped countries.
Environmental situation depends largely on economic situation. A high rate of unemploy-
ment is forcing local officials to make many concessions to the TNC in order to convince
them to locate their plants in the area of their country. The concessions are usually made
on account of workers’ rights and environmental standards. Objective analyses of the con-
ditions under which major economic systems come to small developing countries would
show that in most cases the environmental costs and negative effects of over-exploitation
of the population greatly exceed the positive effects on the trade balance and revenues in
the budget. However, this kind of analysis is almost impossible because of references to
classified business information which makes it impossible for the public to get an insight
in the contents of signed contracts.
Bearing in mind the previous dimensions of human security and their mutual interaction
one cannot help but notice how they interact with and together affect the security of both
individuals and the community as a whole. Citizens in their daily lives both at the work-
place and at home can be exposed to the negative effects of pollution from the plant where
they work, or those located in their environment. A weak state with a budget deficit and
corruption can further worsen the situation of citizens when, due to the negative impact
of the quality of environment, they are in need for medical care. The level of personal
and community security is also affected by the quality of infrastructure, road network,
regulation of water flows, wooded area condition, and many other elements that can be
introduced into the analysis in order to obtain precise information on the level of security
of citizens in an area.
And finally, the biggest part of the problem in the sphere of security comes as a result of
the poor functioning of political system. Dysfunctional institutions may occur as the result
of poor electoral system, or abuse in the selection of those in power. System institutions
are the ones that have to deal with problems concerning the quality of life of citizens, and
therefore their level of security. If there is no unity of interest between the political elite
and the people they represent, then the whole system is in trouble. The lack of awareness
about the importance of holding public office, but also the inadequate qualification struc-
ture of the system may result in instrumentalization of institutions for the sake of satisfying
the interests of a narrow circle of people or power centers that control them at the expense
of the interests of citizens. The fact that the political activism of young people and their
(dis)engagement in political life, which is based on the lack of trust in the national elite is
declining raises concern. In effect, many countries in transition are exposed to a phenom-
enon called the “brain drain”.
5. INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION
The concept of human security offers a consistent analytical framework that can provide
an objective picture of the situation and determine the causes of problems that citizens in
a certain area face. The results of the application of the concept depend on the capacity of
the community to put the institutions under democratic control so that they work in its
interest. Taking into account the data relating to the global situation, we have to point
out the fact that many small and underdeveloped countries are not able to deal with their
problems independently. A global consensus is necessary in order to face the global prob-
lems successfully. The existing system of the United Nations is not powerful enough to en-
gage with a practical action and impose sanction upon the countries that do not respect
international norms. The system needs to be reformed so that there can be no privileged
parties regardless of their strength and power.
The concept of responsibility for protection should be consistently implemented (R2P).
If someone gave themselves the right to intervene in a particular area, whether military or
by introducing any kind of conditioning financial assistance they should accept responsi-
bility for the consequences of their actions. The events in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya
and many other crisis areas show that there is no long-term strategic vision as how to act
in those areas.
The concept of human security can provide answers to many key questions essential to
stability in the world and the survival of civilization such as we know it. However, its con-
sistent application requires status analyses of the political systems in developed countries
that determine the major global events, and not only in small, poor and underdeveloped
countries. With this approach we can influence the troubleshooting of the problem that
Galtung recognizes as structural violence (Galtung 2009).
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York Times, 9.Februar.
Conflict Map: http://www.conflictmap.org/map
Davoodi Hamid, Clements Benedict, Schiff Jerald and Debaere Peter (1999): Military
Spending, the Peace Dividend, and Fiscal Adjustment, International Monetary Fund - Fiscal
Affairs Departmen, WP199/87.
Dollar Times: http://www.dollartimes.com
Đorđević, LJ. Ivica (2013): Ljudska bezbednost – globalni kontekst i primena u Srbiji, Beo-
grad: Institut za uporedno pravo – Dosije.
EBRD (2011): Life in Transition Survey, After the Crisis, London: European Bank for Re-
construction and Development.
EBRD (2012): Transition Report 2012, London: European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.
Fukuyama Francis (1992): The End of History and the Last Man, New York: The Free Press.
Galtung Johan (2009): Mirnim sredstvima do mira Mir i sukob, razvoj i civilizacija, Beo-
grad: Službeni glasnik i Jugoistok XXI.
Human Security Project (2011): Human Security Report 2009/2010, the causes of peace and
the shrinking costs of war, Simon Fraser University, Oxford University Press.
Marshall Andrew (1993): „What happened to the peace dividend?: The end of the Cold
War cost thousands of jobs“, Independent, Sunday 03 January, London.
McGann G. James (2015): 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, Think Tanks and
Civil Societies Program The Lauder Institute, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: http:// www.unhcr.org
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UNDP (1994): Human Development Report. New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press.
United Nations Statistics Division: http://unstats.un.org
UDC 159.923.2:316.42
Miroslav PENDAROSKI*

A PERCEPTIVE ILLUSION OR A STRUGGLE FOR SELF-ACTUALIZATION1
Abstract: In the era of overall generalized globalization in which by conditioned reflex reactions
occurs unconditional self-protection, it is necessary to set up the concept of realism to the inti-
mate feeling of security. More precisely, it is necessary to do re-examination of logic of personal
claim for self-awareness about the topic of intimate personal security from the psychological
point of view. Throughout the struggle for personal psychosocial identity, self-consciousness,
the self, the personal character and recognisability, a man begins to doubt his own capacity to
recognize their own safety and /or danger. Often it is thought to limit the losses of his reason
and feeling just auto-destructive perceptive deception, illusion of psychological type while the
globalization stands alone as the only real yardstick when he stands in front of the necessity only
through struggle for self to keep personal boundaries as in psychological and sociological and
even in cultural terms and also, with the domination of virtual reality as a medium of globalization
and in anthropological and historical sense. This paper deals with the topic of theoretical analysis
and views the situation through the prism of the author and from the looks of modern psychol-
ogy and psychopathology to the issue of human intimate self awareness of (in) security, through
labour-dominated analytical and synthetic and also phenomenological approach/method, con-
sidering the application and the occasional comparative analysis and free interpretation of the
phenomenon. The main axis of this paper is trying to explain and then to offer both end features
such as two possible choices of the continuum - the fight against all challenges of globalization
for their own self-esteem or self-deceptive auto-illusion that is safe without active compared to
the same question. The author provides specific answers to these questions: Does the modern
man actually deal with the issue of personal safety or self-deceptive believing that his perceptual
illusion is reality? What does the phenomenon of self-deception mean and the phenomenon of
real struggle for self-realization in terms of globalization and the universal condition of its mani-
festation and psychological domination? The paper gives the results in the form of observations
and theoretical analysis of the psychological literature consulted where necessary. Also, the paper
opens a series of questions that are kind of results derived from the theoretical analysis. The data
and observations are discussed and look at each other in several aspects and also offer the reader
thinking and upgrading. The discussion summarized the general conclusions but operationalized
as procedural possible future directions in the self-actualization and personal development in a
state of real perception of their own self-esteem of security.
Keywords: globalization, self-realization, perceptive illusion, psychosocial identity
∗
Miroslav Pendaroski, PhD., MIT University, Faculty of Psychology, Skopje, R. Macedonia,
e-mail: m.pendaroski@yahoo.com
[80] Miroslav PENDAROSKI
1. INTRODUCTION
We live in an era of comprehensive globalisation, where by means of conditional reflex we
get unconditional reactions of self-protection. In such a constellation of socio-psychologi-
cal conditions, it is necessary to set the concept of realism to the feeling of intimate safety.
To be more precise, it is necessary to re-examine the deliberation and logic of the claim
for personal self-feeling of safety from a personal psychological aspect. The struggle for
the personal psychosocial identity, self-consciousness, self, character and recognisability
makes the man doubt one’s own capacity to recognize one’s own safety and/or jeopardy.
Very often a man is on the verge of thinking that he is losing his mind and that his feeling
is just an auto-destructive perceptive fraud, a psychological illusion, and that globalisation
is the only real measure. A man is faced with the challenge of the need for maintaining his
personal boarders in a psychological, sociological and cultural sense through the struggle
for self-affirmation. If the words of the French reporter Jacques Mallet du Pan on the revo-
lution, namely that “the revolution devours its own children” (Kennedy 2002) are applied
to the phenomenon of globalisation, the question is – who are those children devoured by
it (the globalisation)? They are all the faceless entities that have once been separate identi-
ties, unique, and today they have become just an indiscernible crowd of many a frightened
homunculi identical in all, even in the feeling of personal jeopardy. Globalisation is not
here to enable recognisability of the unique, but to assimilate it into a swarm adequate for
equivalent conclusions on many bases. It is the counterpoint of everything that has been
united under the holistic veil of the specific - the whole, the idiosyncratic and the unique.
Hence, globalisation is the other side of the continuum called personal safety. If personal
safety is legal and uninterrupted enjoyment on the part of a human being in his life, his body,
his health and his reputation (Bouvier 1856:202), then globalisation is a “legal” means to
distance the human being from possessing his own things. Starting with the judicial order
Habeas Corpus, or verbatim “you can own/possess your own body”, one can remark the
historical struggle for the term personal safety to entail the right of the man first of all to his
own organism, to his own body (Margenthaler 1977). Simply, globalisation through the le-
gitimate use of the opportunities to connect everyone with one another, to unify the hab-
its, the models of behaviour, the ideals and values, with one cracking stroke causes aliena-
tion of the man from his own nature of individual being able to make decisions for oneself,
a being who is a slave to his own choices and free rights, but who is also responsible for
his own behaviour. Hence, although seemingly non-existent, a latent phenomenon is its
destructive powers in the form of use of the mass-media, first of all the internet, in the pro-
cess of de-identification, de-realisation and de-personalization of the individual. Through
this gradual process in which it offers a multitude of distractions are assimilated the natural
self-protective boarders of every individual who is in process of becoming a person. Mean-
while, natural consequences are the process of new determination of the term personal
safety and a relativisation of the right of every individual to his own peculiarity, identity,
safety, financial safety, physical comfort, etc. From a completely personally accepted inti-
mate space hedged by the needs and values of a free man (and personal safety is another
name for freedom), in which he himself feels safe at a psychological and realistic level, his
self turns into a diffuse, unclear space of seemingly equivalent socio-psychological alien
in-between-spaces which are a natural threat to him. This perverse process of long de-
evaluation of the contemporary man questions his understanding of reality in relation to
how and whether he feels safe. A number of questions are left unresolved and the main
A PERCEPTIVE ILLUSION OR A STRUGGLE FOR SELF-ACTUALIZATION [81]
one is: the struggle as opposed to all the challenges of globalisation for our own self-feeling
versus self-deceit that we are safe without an active relation to this question. The follow-
ing questions pop up: is the contemporary man really concerned with the personal safety
issue or does he deceive himself through the belief that his perceptive illusion is a reality?
How do the components of personal safety (corporal, economic, emotional, etc.) change
and how do they influence the experience of personal safety on the part of the individual
in an era of globalisation? Which psychological phenomena create the feeling of personal
safety? How is the fear of crime connected to the experience of personal safety? etc.
2. SEVERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PERSONAL SAFETY

Personal safety is a guaranteed right that has been embodied since 1948 in the Convention
on Human Rights. From a legitimate scientific aspect, it is determined as a state that exists
when all necessary measures are taken and efforts are made to repel, to postpone the pos-
sible crime act or when conditions are made for warning of its possible event. The aim of
personal safety is to protect people from physical violence, domestic violence, irresponsi-
ble parents, etc. Generally, the concept of personal safety contains more protection from
personal harm than protection from invasion, attack on privacy (Mergenthaler 1977). This
exact concept introduces to us the hypothesis that this term in its essence is a psychologi-
cal entity. Seen from a psychological perspective, the act of destroying someone else’s in-
timacy is a violation of personal safety. But, in an era of postmodern majority, especially
with the help of globalisation’s main weapon – the internet connection, the concept of
intimacy and personal space has been made relative, and the same goes for someone’s feel-
ing of safety. Actually, personal safety can be seen as a complex phenomenon composed
of two aspects:
1. As a feeling, and
2. As reality
Seen from the aspect of its being a reality, as Schneier emphasises, personal safety pre-
sents a mathematical, statistical concept based on the relation between the possibility of
appearance of all sorts of risks and the effectiveness of their countermeasures (Schneier
2008). Seen from the aspect of personal safety being a feeling, we tread in the psychologi-
cal relativity of experience, or more precisely, in the phenolomenological idiosyncratic
field of the individual differences. It is based on the individual reactions to the source of
danger and jeopardy and to the protective measures (Schneier 2008). This dyad is sche-
matically drawn in Figure 1.
Real safety Safety as a feeling

Reactions of risk and countermeasures
Risks,opportun Efficiency of
ity for rise of countermeasures
crime Emotional Cognitive Behavioural
Figure 1: The two aspects of personal safety

From the above diagram it is clearly seen that the relation inside the two aspects and the
relation between them is very complicated, multidimensional and has different directions
and inter-dependencies. First, real safety influences the way we feel, whether we will feel
safe or not. The research shows that in most of the cases when statistics shows a smaller
actual or possible risk of jeopardy, the feeling of personal safety is greater. Still, there are
certain aberrations from this finding, especially when taking into consideration that some
people feel safe even in unsafe conditions (war, violence, crime, etc.), and others feel un-
safe even in normal peaceful conditions (e.g. in the cases of anxiety and panic disorder,
paranoia, etc.). Then again, the personal experience of safety or self-convincing that we
are safe has a positive influence over the general atmosphere of safety, although it is more
so at the level of suggestion and speculation (an excellent example is Benigni’s movie La
vita e bella) where the main character, although in a concentration camp, creates a make-
believe of some beautiful place and only for a moment he gets to trick reality). Inside the
real safety there exist inter-dependencies in both directions. Namely, on the one hand the
degree of real risk influences the type, quality and intensity of measures taken and on the
other hand, in return, the measures will influence the degree of risk (in case they were
efficient, the probability for the same dangers to appear again is diminished and so on).
As to the aspect of the feeling of safety, the experience depends on the type, the intensity,
the adequacy and so on of the reactions which in their turn are inter-dependent and con-
nected. For example, the emotional reaction of fear in case of endangered personal safety
creates negative thoughts (Something will happen now… They will find us out… etc.), as well
as negative behaviours (escape, hiding, shaking, stuttering, crying, etc). There are reac-
tions even to the counter-measures, we agree with them or not (cognitive), we find them
pleasant or not (emotional), they make us react or not (behavioural).
If we dwell now on the psychological aspects of personal safety, we can deduce a concep-
tion, according to which personal safety as a term of psychological aspect can be taken as
if it is composed of several elements influencing the general experience of personal safety.
Some of them are the following:
• the estimation of danger of victimization (the possibility for us to become victims)
• fear of crime
• the need for safety
• psychology of risk
Estimation of danger of victimization Psychology of risk
A feeling of personal
safety
Need for safety Fear of crime
Figure 2: Presentation of the psychological aspects that create the feeling

of personal safety
Figure 2 clearly illustrates how all the aspects individually work on the development of an
individual concept of experiencing the personal safety. Also, all the separate aspects are
inter-connected and act on each other, thus diminishing or enhancing the unique force of
each of them or through direct action on the increase of the cumulative, common force.
For example, if we think that we are a very easy potential victim of crime, then we per-
ceive risk wrongly, perversely and thus we increase it. Also, the need for safety depends
on whether we experience ourselves as an easy victim or not. Of course, those who believe
to be and feel like easy potential victims will have more and more intense needs for safety.
Then again, if there is a wrong estimation of potential risk, then the level of fear from
crime will be bigger and this will cause more needs for safety. On the other hand, the high
level of satisfied needs for safety will decrease the level of fear from crime, although in real-
ity, this does not have to correspond to the personal experience.
What follows below is a more detailed elaboration of each separate element and its influ-
ence over the perception of personal safety from the perspective of globalization.
3. ESTIMATION OF DANGER OF VICTIMIZATION

AND THE INFLUENCE ON THE EXPERIENCE
OF PERSONAL SAFETY. AM I AN EASY VICTIM OR NOT?
The danger of being a victim is a very realistic phenomenon of contemporary society. The
rise of crime in the world is proportionate to the increase of the potential danger of victim-
ization. Yet, the perception of the danger of being a real victim does not necessarily cor-
respond to the real statistical measures, although most of the research shows that the more
real the presence of the potential victimization or the more we get to be victims of actual
victimization, the bigger the fear of it (Balkin 1979; Liska et al. 1988; Skogan 1986). Ac-
cording to Bennett, the perspective of the phenomenon of victimization is based upon the
principle that the fear of crime and thus potential victimization is a result of the level, the
degree of criminal activities in the society or what people hear about crime, whether from
other people or from mass-media (Bennett 1990:14). This finding itself correctly deter-
mines the limit between the real possibility of our becoming a victim and the fear of crime
which makes us potential victims only through the feeling of fear and negative behaviour
generated through the identification with the public opinion on how much the danger of
victimization is present. Hence, in a psychological sense, it is less significant how large the
real crime rate is which will statistically determine, so to speak, the real level of potential
victimization, but more significant is the experience of people and the reality of their emo-
tional reactions, the cognitive processes and the behavioural components caused by their
own subjective perception. Exactly in an era of globalization, the mass media disseminate
various perceptions, data, and views on the real crime rate and the potential victimization
which act through synergy on the already formed opinion of the individual on the oppor-
tunity of becoming a victim. The accuracy of perception is influenced by a series of other
psychological and psychopathological characteristics of the individual and hence every
individual reacts differently to the same information for potential victimization. There is
a more emphasized feeling of potential victimization especially in those cases where dis-
tinguished traits of the personality exist as relatively permanent predispositions, some of
which are: the inherent wariness, paranoid character, exceeding caution, analyticity etc.
Of course, add to it the constant “bombs” of dramatic information backed up with video
material, the feeling of becoming a victim is only multiplied and extended. This is sche-
matically depicted in Figure 3. Out of all the above-mentioned phenomena, victimization
stands closest to the fear of crime, which we will scrutinize in the following part.
Actual crime rate Disseminated information on crime
• by word of mouth
• official statistics of the state organs • trough mas-media (TV, Internet
(the police, the judiciary etc.) print media etc.)
Perception of potential victimisation
Figure 3: Sources of perception of potential victimization and its influence
4. FEAR OF CRIME AND ITS INFLUENCE

ON THE FEELING OF PERSONAL SAFETY
Although the two phenomena (the risk of victimization/perception of victimization and
the fear of crime) have very similar phenomenology, still they are two distinct entities.
Anxiety, fear of crime, contains within itself a more public, social estimate of the real prob-
lem with crime, whereas the cognitive aspect of the fear of crime stands closest to the
concept of potential victimization (Vanderveen 2006). As indicated above, potential vic-
timization and its risk, both individually and collectively, are a result of the way the public
understands, and the individual/s experience/s the opportunity of control over the situa-
tion, the gravity of the situation, etc.
Fear of crime is composed of three components: 1) Emotional ; 2) Cognitive and 3) Behav-
ioural (Farrall, Gadd 2004; Gray, Jackson, Farrall 2008; Vanderveen 2006; Jackson 2009;
Warr 1987 et al.) The emotional component is composed of emotions, experiences that are
influenced by the public opinion on potential victimization and those can be reduced to
two major categories: a) everyday moments where there is anxiety over a real danger,
and b) more diffuse or ambient-induced anxiety over a potential vague risk (Farrall, Gadd
2004; Gray, Jackson, Farrall 2008). One can notice at once that there exists a clear polar-
ity among these two categories. Namely, everyday anxiety stands in the realm of, so to
speak, normality, whereas in the second case we are talking about an anxious fear of crime
and potential victimization, which represents a pathological conception of creation of a
whole concept of jeopardy, which in times of globalization is only enhanced through the
mass-media and emphasized by the very need for dramatics and sensationalism among
the citizens. Some research of Farrall and Gadd (2004) and of Gray, Jackson and Farrall
(2008) suggests that only in England and Wales the standard measures of fear from crime
are somewhere between 30-50% (Farrall, Gadd 2004; Gray, Jackson, Farrall 2008). These
results demonstrate that the emotional component takes a very significant place and it is a
predisposition for development of neurotic symptomatology and charactero-pathological
changes, as well as changes in personality. The cognitive component shows the exact mag-
nitude of the difference of the statistically shown level of estimate of the crime rate, as
well as the feeling that we are a potential victim, i.e. fear of crime. Namely, the research
company Gallup Poll emphasizes that the American subjects believe that the crime rate
has decreased for the period between 1972 and 2001 (Vanderveen 2006). Contrary to that,
the cognitive aspects point out to the fact that people increase their fear of crime and
feel like easy victims when they have no control over the situation and when they are
raided by a low feeling of self-efficiency, i.e. when they feel ineffective and incapable for
self-defence and self-protection in the event of crime and the possibility of victimization.
This inadequacy of results bears witness to the fact that the cognitive component of fear
of crime is the most important one for the self-feeling, even when statistics shows that the
crime rate has been decreased. This finding also explains the individual differences among
people, i.e. the fact that in the case of equivalent or simultaneous conditions, some people
are afraid of crime, whereas others are not. Personal identification with someone who
has been/is a victim of crime can be considered an aspect of the cognitive component.
This psychological phenomenon is based on the concept of social learning, when through
identification with the victim one’s own victimization is personified, which automatically
leads to increased feeling of fear of crime and narrowed conscience in the estimation of the
real dangers of personal safety. The behavioural component entails the behaviours rising as
a consequence of the intensity of fear of crime. Certain behaviours, above all the evasive
nature (e.g., evasion of certain areas while moving through town, locking of all doors in
the home, evasion of social events, etc.) can point out to a more intense fear of crime, al-
though, in certain cases when personal safety is really endangered in the risk areas, these
measures are completely real and necessary. These three components of fear of crime are
interconnected in several directions. Figure 4 depicts some of the possible connections.
PROCESS 1
Components
Potential source Emotional Cognitive Behavioural

Feelings: fear, Thoughts,convictions:“I am in Behaviours: Escape,
A situation danger”, “I have no control
worry, anxiety, hiding, physiological
experienced as over…”, “I will suffer”
panic etc. reactions, etc.
PROCESS 2
Components
Potential source Cognitive Emotional Behavioural

Thoughts,convictions:“Iam in Feelings:fear,worry, Behaviours: Escape,
A situation danger”, “I have no control hiding, physiological
anxiety, panic etc.
experienced as over…”,“I will suffer” reactions, etc.
Figure 4: Connection of the components of fear of crime

Ferraro in his generic model of fear of crime depicts the complex system like this:
Ecological (macro) crime prevalence Behavioural adaptation (limited danger)
Danger from the environment
(non-civilisation, cohesion)
Perceived risk
Fear
Personal (micro) prevalence (personal status, victimization)
Figure 5: Generic model of Ferraro for the fear of crime (taken and adapted from: Farral,
Gray, Jackson, 2007)
This complex model can be brought into connection to the previous views and findings.
Namely, the ecologic, macro prevalence denotes the true real presence of crime, whereas
the personal micro prevalence refers to the personal perception of the dangers of victimi-
zation. It is connected to the social-economic status and the real domestic dangers. These
two elements act not only upon the behavioural instance, i.e. the behaviours for adapta-
tion of the individual, but also upon the cognitive component embodied in the perceived
risk. Both the behavioural component and the cognitive component directly influence
the fear of crime (the emotional component) apart from the real environmental dangers.
5. THE NEEDS FOR SAFETY AND THEIR INFLUENCE

The needs for safety (the plural is deliberate!) are in the foundation of the general feeling
of personal safety. They are wider than the concept of personal safety, which has a more
narrow sense. Ever since the creation of Maslow’s pyramid for human needs, it is clear that
following the physiological needs: food, water, sex, sleep, etc., there comes the needs for
safety. The literature in this domain, based on a series of research, emphasizes the follow-
ing needs for safety, inserting the need for personal security/safety first: 1) personal secu-
rity/safety; financial security/safety; health and well-being and; safety from accidents, ill-
nesses and their negative effects; love and belonging etc. (Burton 2007; Feltner 2011 etc.)
In case of gratification of the basic needs, the individual takes care of the needs for safety/
security. In exceptional cases, such as: wars, natural disasters, domestic violence, abuse
etc., the individual may re-experience the trauma and thus feel again the post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) or the trans-generational trauma. This points out to the fact that
personal security, and mostly the basic, the physical and health-related one, is a neces-
sary condition for the feeling of personal safety. On the other hand, in case of absence
of personal safety, the needs that emerge have professional and economic character. The
individual feels unsafe and the level of potential victimization is increased in direct pro-
portion to the economic insecurity. The behavioural components that emerge are directed
towards a return of that safety and they entail behaviours such as: saving, taking bank
credits, search for a job that pays more, etc. The cumulative effect of personal safety is
increased along with the increase of the feeling of love and belonging. The individual that
has some interpersonal relation of emotional character feels safer exactly because this inti-
mate need for affiliation has been gratified. Certainly, the needs for health and well-being
are vitally important for the feeling of personal safety (Pendaroski et al. 2013).
6. PSYCHOLOGY OF RISK AND ITS INFLUENCE

The psychology of risk is another one of the basic entities of psychology of personal safety.
Schneier emphasizes that when perception of personal safety is not congruent with the
real safety, this is so because of the fact that the perception of risk does not correspond to
the reality of risk (Schneier 2008:4). Apart from the adequacy of the degree of fear of crime
and the perception of victimization, the adequacy of perception of real risk has a funda-
mental importance to the authenticity of experiencing the personal safety.
Schneier emphasizes the following several ways that people use to distort perception of
risk:
1. People have a tendency to overemphasise the spectacular, although rare risks and to
underestimate everyday risks.
2. People have a problem with the estimate of risk in any situations that are not the
same with their normal conditions/situations.
3. Personified risks are perceived as bigger than the anonymous and non-personified.
4. People underestimate the risks that they have accepted themselves on the account
of those risks over which they have no control or which they have not accepted
themselves.
5. People tend to overestimate the risks that are publicly spoken of and that are object
of wider public discussions and opinions (Schneier 2008:4).
If we engage in discussion of these ways, we can discern the phenomena that directly influ-
ence the feeling of personal safety. Probably people have the need for dramatization and
spectacularity and they neglect the everyday dangers of their safety. For example, most of
the people would be afraid of, say, a big earthquake, a meteorite fall and so on, the events
that occur only once in several years, and they would underestimate the everyday risks of
car crashes, crime, etc. Perhaps the reason for this lies in the fact that most of the risks are
unpredictable and uncertain. Subjectivity disables people to estimate the risks that they
have not experienced. People expect the already known risks and they are not aware of
other risks they have not experienced. The tendency towards increase of the personified
risks comes from the ego-structures which, by means of identification, can make them-
selves equal to the victims. It is interesting, perhaps even contradictory, that the psychol-
ogy of personality reveals that people are more prone to be scared in event of risks that
affect other people in case they see themselves in the personality of the victim, the condi-
tions, etc. Of course, the risks that the individuals take over themselves direct the individu-
als towards maintenance of the rightness of their decisions even in situations when the
environment clearly realizes the great dangers. It is known that personal dignity and pride
have put people in jeopardy, even in life danger. We are probably talking about personality
traits here, such as: stubbornness, adventurism, obstinacy, etc. Added to the conclusions
of the previous paragraphs is Schneier’s claim that people tend to overestimate the risks
that are publicly spoken of and that are mysterious and unsolved. Such an example might
be the many mysterious risks of unsolved murders, disappearing, etc.
Ropeik, Gray add the following tendencies: 1. most of the people are afraid of new risks as
opposed to those that they have been faced with for some time; 2. people are more afraid
of risks coming from people unlike those coming from natural disasters; 3. people are
more afraid of risks in which they see certain personal benefit; 4.people are more afraid of
risks that can prove lethal for them in a fearful way (e.g. shark attack, terrorist attack, etc.),
as opposed to those that kill in a less spectacular and repellent manner (heart attack, etc.);
5. people tend to underestimate risks in case those come from people, companies, groups
in which they have trust; 6. we are more afraid of risks for which we are more aware, etc.
(Schneier 2008:50)
As indicated, there is a series of tendencies towards decrease or increase of risks, usu-
ally because of subjective reasons. However, the conclusion is that the psychology of risk
directly influences the adequacy of perception over personal safety. Globalisation only
increases the opportunity for a distorted perception of risks with its contradictory and
multi-faceted reports of the many potential sources of risk, thus influencing the public
opinion which afterwards changes personal understanding and experience of the phe-
nomenon of personal safety.
7. AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TOWARDS THE NEW FORMS

OF THREAT TO PERSONAL SAFETY
Long gone now are the days when the danger of victimization, the fear of crime and the
psychology of risk were the only, or at least some of the few sources of potential threat to
personal safety, especially in psychological terms. As never before, globalization in every
field has related them to many new dangers to the general safety and the whole concept
of the social bases of safety. Personal safety as a crucial individualistic concept has not re-
mained immune to many new phenomena which simply appeared along with the already
existing dangers to security and the feeling of safety. As emphasized above in the text, the
sense of globalization is a quick connection of all elements composing the new changeable
society of the 21st century. It is a society that we cannot call not even postmodern, since,
as Bauman emphasizes, the so-called Liquid Modernity is preferred exactly because of the
recent decline and failure of postmodernism that can be attributed to the fact that it (post-
modernism) has not managed to go further than the criticism of fundamentalism. Bauman
would like to emphasize that postmodernism simply reduced the whole social system of
differences and contrasts and as a subject of illusion of individuality and the self-presence,
thus excluding the agentives and actors from society itself, but not succeeding in explain-
ing the meanings of the social action and change (Lee 2005:62). Actually, Bauman takes us
to the concept of changeability in the liquid society starting from the premise that solidity,
the permanence as a concept of the social system that was propagated in the era of mod-
ernism failed to withstand the pressure of time exactly because of the fact that the whole
social system and processes at a global level are nothing else, but a changeable process
which is only being emphasized through globalization and it becomes ever more insecure.
If we relate these claims to personal security, we bring ourselves into an even more unsafe
zone of relativity in which newer and newer social processes appear, that go from the
global level to the individual and change the feeling of personal safety. Actually, how could
the individual feel safe at all in a society that changes at a daily basis its core principles,
values and maxims? Bauman emphasizes that today is an era of a so-called rolling incon-
sistency in which the social relations have already wore off and in which intimacy prays to
the changeable nature of the social relations (Bauman 2003a). Alienation continues, says
Bauman, and we are witnesses to that in the breakup of the social relations through the
very fact of the individual choices being locked in the social actions (Bauman 2000:6). He
ends with the thought that this whole process again involves the conditions that give birth
to risk and insecurity, which accentuates the vulnerability of the individual, instead of sup-
porting a unit of individuals that defend their own rights (Bauman 2001).
Exactly these concepts support our thesis of relativity of personal safety in an era of glo-
balization, in which society imposes the globalization power, not of convincing, but of
forcing the respect of its principles that do not come from the solid bases of the identity
of the individual that is a cell in the whole, but from the continuously changeable social
actions which diffusely attack the already incomplete psycho-social identity of the individ-
ual. This social constellation gives birth only to new forms of risk that further induce fear
of victimization, fear of crime and the whole personal insecurity. The general world trends
impose these globalization currents to be conveyed with an enormous speed, of course
through the help of the mass-media in all meridians, regardless of the differences of the
social system. Today they are devastating more than ever exactly because of the opportu-
nity for virtual influence over the most personal things, identity and the feeling of danger
that solidity will be lost, i.e. how firmly enrooted they are in the social milieu in which we
live. This constant insecurity is not only geographic anymore, but with the globalization
currents it is ever-more present in a virtual form, which out of illusion becomes the only
measure of truthfulness and realism.
If now we go back to the announced current dangers to the social and personal safety, we
may emphasise that in contemporary literature these two terms are not separated as con-
cepts, or as terms, because they are considered to be communicating vessels due to the fact
that in liquid society there are no strict borders in anything, especially not in those things
that are psychologically determined. This personal safety is quite a relative term that to-
day with globalization processes is only being accentuated. In this sense, some authors
emphasise several new dangers to the global safety that of course will be reflected in the
perception of personal safety in a more narrow sense. Thus, Buzan, while analyzing the
general changes at a global political level, starting with the end of the Cold War, and then
through the more recent events, such as the 9/11 attacks, classifies the world today into a
so-called first, second and third world (Buzan 2010). Of course, he starts from several cri-
teria as to this categorization, but it is not of primary interest to this work. The importance
of his classification comes from the aspect of the impact that these new dangers to the
general safety have over the personal feeling of safety. Buzan singles out several sectors of
safety that today with globalization and the general geopolitical changes can be imposed as
areas whence a series of challenges to the global and personal safety comes. He states the
following sectors: political, military, economic, social and ecological/environmental (Buzan
2010:432).
Buzan, while considering the changes on a political, economic and military level, clas-
sifies the world into a so-called northern and southern world, as well as in western and
eastern, placing the more powerful military and economic forces and well-off states in the
northern and western world. What is especially important is the segment of changes in
the so-called post-communist states, in which there are tectonic changes of the whole sys-
tem, which influence the whole safety, and personal safety, as well. These weak economies
cannot keep up with the neo-liberal democratic capitalist systems and face an enormous
number of phenomena endangering the general world safety: immigration, increased
crime, cheap workforce, terrorism, etc. Up until a decade ago, the communist regimes
did not have a typical terrorism, which makes threats all around the place nowadays. The
risen Islamic fundamentalism injected in the Eastern-Europe and Western-Europe tissue
penetrates as cancer not only in the pores of global safety, but also in the individual minds
and souls of the innocent individuals. The constant reports of new bombing attacks, inva-
sions in schools, kindergartens, mass executions and similar, simply increase the fear of
victimization virtually, but in a real sense too. The safe and rich western societies also are
not immune to this rise of terrorism, which on the other hand causes increased immigra-
tion to the richer states, but does not leave aside neither those transitional societies, such
as the post-communist ones. Quite often the immigrants stay in some of these so-called
transitional countries and some of them stay on and manage. The new policies of bio-
metrical safety try to improve the situation, but they also give birth to new dangers. These
biometrical devices are not anything new at all. Namely, they come from the 1980s after
the Vietnamese war and the war with the drug cartels of the American-Mexican border so
that their production and modernization goes on even more fiercely in the 9/11 attacks.
In Europe for the first time these devices and documents were used in Great Britain fol-
lowing the fight with IRA. This fight goes on with the ever stricter control of the emigra-
tional processes of the borders joined by the fight with a whole series of new dangers to
safety; drugs, waves of asylum, global terrorism and crime (Andreas 2000; Ceyhan 2008).
The very word biometrical contains the basic message of these most contemporary docu-
ments and devices. In Greek the word Bios means life, whereas metron means measure,
which means that biometrics represents a method for identification of the individual and
a control of the authenticity of its identity through measuring the unchangeable parts of
its body: the cornea of the eye, the fingerprint of the index finger, etc. and saving/memo-
rization of those data for verification and authentication (Van der Ploeg 1999; Lyon 2001,
2003). Statistics shows that these data have significantly decreased criminality, but on the
other hand, as Ceyhan emphasizes, they impose a series of philosophical, sociological and
other issues around the concept of identity and our relation to the other person (Ceyhan
2008:104). Of course, we add the psychological concept for identity, which is question-
able due to the opportunity for the state authorities all around the world to (mis)use our
data for different aims. It is a fact that we are recorded and that our most intimate bodily
differences, that are crucial in the identification, are susceptible for use. Of course, this
concept comes along with a series of moral dilemmas around the ethical principles of use
of the intimate peculiarities of our body. Vulgarization is inevitable as a decrease of the
human dignity with the very fact that we are recorded, marked, measured, monitored,
etc. Although it is completely justified for the countries to protect themselves with such
measures as part of the fight against terrorism, criminality, drugs, etc., however, from a
far-reaching aspect, these devices and documents make relative the staging for personal
safety from the aspect of a general globalization susceptibility of something that is so inti-
mate and authentic – our body!
As Lipschutz emphasizes, “Safety requires security!”, which means that indubitably, for
the feeling, and even more for the reality of safety it is necessary to have a certain se-
cure scientific knowledge (which biometrics enables), but, on the long track, this is not
enough. What it takes is an all-encompassing economic, social, political safety, which
would come from the tactile and efficient tools of the liberal society (Ceyhan 2008:104).
Actually, the overt and scientific care for safety points out to a deeply enrooted feeling of
insecurity! The paradox is that the biometric data provide a greater accuracy of informa-
tion, but at the same time the number of immigrants, terrorists, and criminals is on the
increase, as they are looking for a safer environment and keep fighting for their ideas. The
conclusion is that what is necessary is a wider social, economic and political framework
in order to prevent the spread of insecurity and as a concept of cognition, but also as real-
ity of globalization. If we go back to Buzan, we will see that he believes that the security
measures of the centre, i.e. of the developed world will influence the relations with the
periphery, i.e. the less developed world, but also they will influence the security in these
new and unrecovered economies. However, he emphasizes that this will prompt questions
about the national and state identity, sovereignty and integrity of these poorer states, as
well as the states that have changed their system (the post-communist states, etc.). He ex-
plains appropriately the sectors of safety and their influence over the general, and thus the
personal security. Namely, he believes that the military safety works in the direction of the
perception of the states over the strength of the other states and their powerful defence.
The political security entails the organizational structure and the governing capacities and
ideologies of the states, whereas the economic security allows availability of resources, fi-
nances and the economy in order to maintain the necessary level of well-being and power
of the states. Social security is a concept that maintains the tradition and the cultural and
linguistic benefits, the national and religious identities and their sustainability, whereas
the environmental safety will provide preservation of the local and the global biosphere.
Buzan finally says that neither of these security sectors operates individually and in an
isolated manner, but that all of them are in a mutual integrating relation and they have cu-
mulative action (Buzan 2010). If we deconstruct what has been said above and bring it in
relation to our thesis for personal safety, we may see that there is a hierarchic relation that
comes from these factor/sectors. Namely, the military safety of a state allows its citizens/
individuals to have a relative safe belief in the inseparability and integrity of their states (a
running example for problems that have come from the military insecurity can be seen in
the post-communist states that come from the Soviet bloc: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia
etc., and even more expressed among the new transitional societies that come from the
Yugoslav federation: Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia). Among the
above-mentioned states there is an absence of the strong feeling of safety that comes from
the awareness of the vulnerability of their military systems, which were feeble already,
but became even more vulnerable following a series of local inter-ethnic wars in the men-
tioned areas. Furthermore, the general political insecurity creates a feeling of continuous
questioning of the nation-building capacity, the integrity and the peculiarity of each indi-
vidual/citizen of the relative state. It is understandable enough that the economic security
generates relatively permanent feeling of material security, which in a consumer society,
like the one in the 21st century is the alpha and omega of the quality of life. In this sense,
Lemay and the colleagues emphasise a theoretical presupposition and researches, accord-
ing to which there is a finding that people become materialist only when, for some reason,
they have a feeling of insecurity and deficiency (material) or either literally or symboli-
cally they lack protection from some damage in any possible sense, even emotional, and
this comes from the close relation to other people (Feltner 2011). This is merely a proof
that confirms our thesis that personal safety is tightly connected to the new dangers to it,
which in this case is the material economic security. In societies in which there is no such
security, the people, even when they suffer from intimate dangers, cannot rely even on
consumerism, because they lack funds - hence the paradox about the people in poorer
societies being more materialistic. This is the concept of the capitalist construct of co-
relational interdependence between the quality of life and the material safety. For a large
number of people, the social security of the environment where an individual lives, means
an opportunity for improvement of the collective feeling of a national, religious and cul-
tural past, which has been funded on certain traditionalistic bases and principles. In the
environments, the societies where such a security is missing, there is a danger that this
social staggering will provoke a ricochet phenomenon of reflection of the personal spheres
of an intimate feeling of non-belonging, not being enrooted, etc. (this phenomenon can be
seen among the transitional post-communist societies that come from the eastern bloc).
Finally, of course, what remains is the care even for the ecological, environmental secu-
rity, because it has the greatest globalization power embodied in the enormous powers of
nature to revenge of all the evil that has been incurred on it. Namely, the daily information
on global warming, on the activation of volcanoes, the great floods (the recent examples
with the cyclones in Japan, the floods in Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc.),
the fires, earthquakes and the other natural disasters and movements, simply crystallize
the perception that we live in an unsafe world, in which all that remains would be to try at
least to change our own cognitive concept about what personal safety is?!
8. CONCLUSION
This paper, dealing with the psychological aspects of personal safety, entails several most
significant aspects: fear of crime, victimization, psychology of risk and the needs for safe-
ty. The two basic aspects of personal safety are considered: as a reality and as a feeling.
The foundation has been laid upon the concept of subjectivity as an experience of per-
sonal safety and the findings that are analyzed and depicted through diagrams and backed
up with research and other findings, unambiguously confirm that the feeling of personal
safety in the era of globalization is distorted and inadequate due to the multitude of psy-
chological realities emerged from pre-valuing the postmodern and liquid-modern concept
of experiencing of personal safety. In some extent, there is also a concept in the text that
comes from several recent sectors of global security that influence the feeling of personal
security: economic, military, political, social and environmental sectors. These sectors and
influences are shown and conceptualized as an integrative network of interplays of several
forces which at the end give a total sum of real and perceived personal and global security.
This paper has shown and confirmed that globalization, with the aid of mass media as its
chief weapon, has substantially influenced the reported and analysed psychological seg-
ments of personal safety (victimization, fear of crime, the needs for safety, psychology of
risk). The findings that have been theoretically and analytically elaborated in this paper
are liable to a series of research, but at the same time, they offer a heuristic opportunity of
new ideas and extensions.
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UDC 341.233
Erjon HITAJ*
THE PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE AS A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

MEASURE TO ACHIEVE HUMAN SECURITY1
Abstract: In this paper the author takes under exam the pre-emptive use of force in international
law with regard to the concept of human security. Paying the due attention to the necessary dis-
tinction between pre-emptive and anticipatory use of force in international law, with particular re-
gard to the war against terrorism, it is argued that the pre-emptive self defence is both insufficient
and counterproductive. As the examples of the global “war against terror” show, any strategy to
ensure and guarantee human security by means of pre-emptive military intervention in the ab-
sence of an imminent armed attack is both illegal and non-legitimate. To the contrary, the author
believes that the use of force should entirely meet the criteria on the legitimate recourse to ius ad
bellum: customary international law, the UN Charter and the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Rela-
tions prohibit States from the indiscriminate use of force in international relations. The difficult
peace-building processes in several post-conflict areas of the world demonstrate that the achieve-
ment of the pretended “human security” through measures implicating the use of force not cor-
responding to the actual international law is at best inconvenient but most likely irresponsible and
counterproductive for the human security itself.
Keywords: human security, pre-emptive use of force, anticipatory use of force, ius ad bellum, custom-
ary international law, UN Charter, state sovereignty, non-intervention.
1. INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS
OVER THE CONCEPT OF “HUMAN SECURITY”
The concept of human security, officially born with the Human Development Report
(HDR) of 1994, (UNDP 1994) includes two major components: “freedom from want”
and “freedom from fear”, in the sense that the policy of the State should necessarily aim
the achievement of secure life for the proper nationals, by guaranteeing them adequate
conditions in terms of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and
political security (UNDP 1994: 24).2 But the very most important element of the human
* Erjon Hitaj (PhD) is a Lecturer of Public International Law at the Faculty of Human Sciences, University “Ismail
Qemali”, Vlore, Albania, e-mail: ehitaj@yahoo.it
2 “People in rich nations seek security from the threat of crime and drug wars in their streets, the spread of deadly
diseases like HN/AIDS, soil degradation, rising levels of pollution, the fear of losing their jobs and many other anx-
[96] Erjon HITAJ
security approach, which also represents the object of the present survey, concerns the
“possibility for all citizens to leave in peace and security within their borders” (Ogata
1998).3 According to the Resolution 66/290 of the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, which followed the intentions of the World Summit Outcome,4 human security in-
cludes the right of the people to live freely and in dignity, free from poverty and despair,
with particular attention to the connection between human rights, peace and develop-
ment (UNGAO 2005).5
But it is difficult to guarantee the internal human security of the individuals in terms of
development, health, living conditions, cultural and social rights if there is not enough
external security, guaranteed mostly by the foreign policy of the proper State in a larger
context of international relations. Although considering human security still directly in-
fluenced by the international peace and stability might seem a classical point of view on
the concept at issue, the exact intentions of this search move towards the exploration of
the incidence of the use of force in international relations, and consequently in the global
security. If there is no international peace and stability in the relations among the Nations,
it would be hard and useless to take under exam and explain the internal dimension of the
human security. Therefore, according to our opinion, the milestone of all the concept lies
on this “traditional” concept of external (or collective) human security, which assumes
particular weight in the current times in consideration of the numerous and bloody armed
conflicts involving different geographic areas and relative States of the World.
The return of the armed conflict era, mostly in the Eastern Europe, Northern Africa and
Middle East, involving not just the area Countries, necessarily brings to our attention,
once again, the need for a re-consideration of the “abandoned” rules on the legitimate use
of force. The infinite wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, the suicide and bloody wars in Syria and Libya, the “unacceptable” Russian-Ukrainian
conflict are just some of the clear examples of the insufficiency of the current foreign and
ieties that emerge as the social fabric disintegrates. People in poor nations demand liberation from the continuing
threat of hunger, disease and poverty while also facing the same problems that threaten industrial countries. (…)
The list of threats to human security is long, but most can be considered under seven main categories: • Economic
security, • Food security, • Health security, • Environmental security, • Personal security, • Community security,
• Political security.” (UNDP 1994:24).
3 “Several key elements make up human security. The first essential element is the possibility for all citizens to live in
peace and security within their own borders. This implies the capacity of states and citizens to prevent and resolve
conflicts through peaceful and nonviolent means and, after the conflict is over, the ability to effectively carry out
reconciliation efforts. A second element is that people should enjoy without discrimination all rights and obliga-
tions - including human, political, social, economic and cultural rights - that belonging to a State implies. A third
element is social inclusion - or having equal access to the political, social and economic policy making processes,
as well as to draw equal benefits from them. A fourth element is that of the establishment of rule of law and the in-
dependence of the justice system. Each individual in a society should have the same rights and obligations and be
subject to the same set of rules” (Ogata 1998).
4 “We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all in-
dividuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal
opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to
discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly,” (UNGAO 2005: § 143)
5 “(b) Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses
that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities; (c) Human security recog-
nizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights,” (UNGAR 2012: § 3 (b- c).
THE PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE AS A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE MEASURE TO ACHIEVE
HUMAN SECURITY [97]
internal policy of the States, and of the International Community in general, to guarantee
the human security to all the citizens, regardless of their nationality or ethnic affinity.
2. USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The use of force in the international relations has assumed different dimensions over time.
Considered initially as the most common instrument of dispute resolution between states,
at least till the Second World Conflict, it seemed to be prohibited especially at the end of
Eighties, with the fall of the iron curtain.
Learned the lesson (of the last world War) of the catastrophic consequences of the indis-
criminate use of force in the international relations (Franck 2004; Hensel 2008; Stürchler
2007; Westra 2007; Gardam 2004, Orford 2003; Ku & Jacobson 2002), the UN Charter
disciplined clearly the modalities of the use of force, by imposing a general prohibition
of this “instrument”. Article 2 (4)6 of the Charter firmly rejects the use or the threat of
force against the political independence or territorial integrity against any State or not in
conformity with the Charter itself (Franck 2004).7 The prohibition is absolute and does
not admit any objection, except the case of being the use of force a countermeasure in
the event of an armed attack, perpetrated by an aggressor state; this is the case of the in-
dividual or collective self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the Charter.8 The other ex-
ceptional circumstance sanctioned in the Charter that justifies the use of force is reflected
in the faculty of the Security Council which, according to the dispositions of the Chapter
VII, may authorize such extraordinary act.9
Outside the legal “perimeter” of the UN Charter dispositions, according to the general
international law, use of force is tolerated in particular circumstances: fortuitous case, force
majeure, distress or approval of the entitled subject (Sinagra, Bargiacchi 2009:335-339; Car-
bone, Luzzatto & Santa Maria 2011: 270-273).
Furthermore, in case the Security Council of the UN be paralyzed due to the veto imposed
by one (or more) of the permanent Members, blocking in this way its decision-making
power on the authorization of the use of force in the presence of fulfilled conditions, one
or more states, acting on behalf (uti universi) of fundamental interests of the whole In-
ternational Community, could resort to the use of force against one or more states (Pi-
6 “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”
7 “For the first time, international law fully and formally embraced the Lauterpachtian ground-norm:“there shall be
no violence.” Article 2(4) obliges all member states to “refrain . . . from the threat or use of force”: not just to re-
nounce war but all forms of interstate violence,” (Franck 2004:20).
8 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibil-
ity of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
9 Of particular interest is Article 42 of the Charter: “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include dem-
onstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”
[98] Erjon HITAJ
cone 2003:329-393; Picone 2005:893-954; Picone 2006; Picone 2008:5-38 ), considered

offender(s) of an international norm productive of erga omnes obligations (Tams 2005;
Tomuschat, Thouvenin 2006). In this case, the use of force should necessarily meet the
required criteria as sanctioned in the UN Charter with regard to Chapter VII, besides the
impossibility of the Security Council to authorize these measures due to the veto imposed
by the permanent Member.
3. PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE USE OF FORCE:

A NECESSARY DISTINCTION
Among the restricted exceptions on the use of force in international relations, the most
classic of them is represented certainly by the individual or collective legitimate self-de-
fence. Article 51 of the Charter limits the use of the force on behalf of self-defence only if
an armed attack has occurred. This armed attack should be actual or, at least, imminent
and the reaction of the offended State should also be necessary, immediate and propor-
tional. The reaction, therefore, should exclusively aim the interruption (or the preven-
tion) of the armed attack perpetrated by the offender: once the armed attack has ceased
or stopped, the right to self-defence has no reason to exist anymore. Any armed action
continuing unreasonably after the end of the aggression has to be considered, in principle,
as a reprisal, so prohibited by the international law (Sinagra, Bargiacchi 2009:319).
Lacking in the UN Charter any further element of clarity over the concepts of “armed
attack” and “proportionality” of the reaction to the aggression, it might be of useful help
referring to the general international law, exactly the customary law. In cases of fall-back of
the Security Council, the recourse to the use of force on behalf of legitimate self-defence
could be grounded on general customary law.
Conditioned by the general prohibition of the use of force sanctioned by the UN Char-
ter (Article 51 requires the armed attack to have occurred) the States have tried to find
alternative grounds to legitimate or justify different uses of force in practice. An attentive
doctrine sustains that “(…) the acceleration and escalation of means for launching an at-
tack soon confounded the bright line drawn by the law, effecting a reduction ad absurdum
that, literally, seems to require a state to await an actual attack on itself before instituting
countermeasures. Inevitably, states responded to the new dangers by claiming a right of
“anticipatory self-defence”. That claim, however, is not supported by the Charter’s literal
text (Franck 2004:4; Dinstein 2001).”10
The so-called pre-emptive self-defence is a recent instrument “invented” in the practice
of reaction against an imminent armed attack, which has not occurred yet and, given that
not in line with the content of Article 51, was not regulated or taken under consideration
10 “And “anticipatory self-defence,” too, is vulnerable to reductio ad absurdum. If every state were free to determine
for itself when to initiate the use of force in “anticipation” of an attack, there would be nothing left of Articles 2(4)
and 51, or of Lauterpacht’s “primordial duty” to eschew violence”, (Franck 2004:4). “The prohibition against the
resort to armed force, for instance, as enshrined in Art. 2 (4) UNC, is only confined by the exceptions admitted un-
der UN law itself. Thus, apart from self-defence, it is up to the United Nations alone to either take (Art. 43 UNC) or
authorize coercive measures. Aggressive war is outlawed in absolute terms. Consequently, territorial title derived
from coercive conquest cannot be consolidated into lawful possession; a treaty recognizing such an acquisition as
lawful would be held invalid by any international court” (Tomuschat, Thouvenin 2006:29-30).
HUMAN SECURITY [99]
during the travaux préparatoires of the Charter, at San Francisco (contra Van den Hole
2003:69-106).
This “innovative extension” of the international norm on the self-defence towards a pre-
emptive dimension, except the self-defence tout court in response of an armed attack, falls
exclusively within the discretional power of the Security Council. States can make use of
force, beyond the circumstances of Article 51, only in presence of explicit authorization
of the Security Council. The customary norm on self-defence, recalled directly in Article
51 of the UN Charter, permits the preventive use of force only in case the armed attack is
imminent; therefore, there is no room for reaction to future and hypothetic armed attacks
discretionally to be decided and evaluated by the States (Dinstein 2001:172).11
The difficulty of the theoretical distinction between traditional (and legitimate) self-de-
fence and pre-emptive self-defence represents the difference between the two different
schools of thought over the issue. An expansive interpretation of the right to self-defence,
that includes also anticipatory armed reaction, short of clear evidence, is not supported by
the practice of the international relations. Of the most clear events quoted from the schol-
ars with regard to anticipatory self-defence, namely the Cuba missile crisis (1962-1963),
the Israeli-Arab War (1967), the Osirak bombing (1981), there is quite a concordance on
the fact that the criteria of the legitimate pre-emptive self-defence were met only in the
case of the Israeli-Arab War, when Israeli Air Forces destroyed completely the Egyptian
air force, anticipating the imminent armed attack of the latter (Franck 2004:101; Van den
Hole 2003:82; Sinagra & Bargiacchi 2009:324). In the other two cases (Franck 2004:107-
108),12 mostly the Osirak bombing case, state’s reaction to the Israeli action was extremely
negative, to the point that the Security Council (SCR June 1981),13 followed by the Gen-
eral Assembly (UNGA November 1981),14 adopted proper resolutions that firmly con-
11 With regard to the Pearl Harbor event, Dinstein, (2001:172), states that: “Had the Japanese carrier striking force
been destroyed on its way to Pearl Harbor, this would have constituted not an act of preventive war but a miracu-
lously early use of counter-force. To put it in another way, the self-defence exercised by the United States (in re-
sponse to an incipient armed attack) would have been not anticipatory but interceptive in nature. Interceptive,
unlike anticipatory, self-defence takes place after the other side has committed itself to an armed attack in an osten-
sibly irrevocable way. Whereas a preventive strike anticipates an armed attack that is merely ‘foreseeable’ (or even
just ‘conceivable’), an interceptive strike counters an armed attack which is ‘imminent’ and practically ‘unavoid-
able’. It is the opinion of the present writer that interceptive, as distinct from anticipatory, self-defence is legitimate
even under Article 51 of the Charter.”
12 “In the case of the Cuba missile crisis, the international system appears to have been less than convinced that the
Soviets’ introduction of nuclear-armed missiles – albeit stealthy – genuinely and imminently threatened the US. It
was apparent, for example, that deployment of nuclear-armed missiles on the US and Russian submarines off each
other’s coasts had not engendered similar claims to act in “anticipatory self-defence”. Still, the covert way Soviet
missiles were introduced in Cuba and the disingenuousness, with which their deployment had at first been denied,
strengthened the US claim to be responding to an imminent threat. That claim was so strongly supported by other
states in the Americas as to impede the usual third world rush to judgment against the US,” (Franck 2004:107-108).
13 Security Council Resolution 487, 19/06/1981 (S/RES/487/1981): “The security Council: Strongly condemns the
military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international con-
duct […] Considers that Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered, responsibility for
which has been acknowledged by Israel.” (UNSCR 487: §§ 1-5).
14 “The General Assembly […] Strongly condemns Israel for its premeditated and unprecedented act of aggression in
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct, which constitutes a new and
dangerous escalation in the threat to international peace and security […] Demands that Israel, in view of its inter-
national responsibility for its act of aggression, pay prompt and adequate compensation for the material damage
and loss of life suffered as a result of the said act.” (UNGAR 36/27: §§ 1-3)
[100] Erjon HITAJ
demned such action, closing definitively the door to pre-emptive self-defence, in absence
of occurred armed attack and short of any imminence of it.
4. HUMAN SECURITY AND PRE-EMPTIVE USE OF FORCE:

SOME IMPLICATIONS
The doctrine of pre-emptive use of force earned a new dimension after the terroristic at-
tacks of 9/11 in New York. The American Administration of the time promptly adopted
a National Security Strategy addressing the question of the new issues challenging the se-
curity of the United States, most of all terrorism.15 This Strategy became the “handbook”
of the Bush Administration on the global war on terror in the areas where the US had
to be involved directly or which constituted a threat for the American existence. Relying
on the pinprick theory or the “accumulation doctrine” (accumulation of small-scale armed
attacks), this approach pretends to act in anticipatory way against accumulated but sepa-
rated armed attacks and, and at the same time to fulfil the requirements of Article 51 of the
UN Charter, on the basis of an extensive interpretation of its dispositions.
It was punctually objected that such actions compromise the core elements of the (tra-
ditional) self-defence system: namely the proportionality, the necessity and functionality
of the pre-reaction (Sinagra, Bargiacchi 2009:332). The permanent state of war against
terrorism, with the pretention of grounding on legitimate self-defence losses all the pieces
of legitimacy inasmuch there is no way to measure the proportionality of the armed pre-
reaction; in fact, there is no imminent attack and the decision falls within the discretion of
the state, supposed to be attacked. The Security Council of the UN and general interna-
tional law are clearly ignored and disregarded for the benefit of unilateralism and risk for
global order.16
Therefore, any form of extra-territorial use of armed force perpetrated by the state, short
of legal grounds and legitimacy under general international law, the UN Charter or Securi-
15 “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly
declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with de-
termination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic mis-
siles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’
efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act
against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping
for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies’ plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with
deliberation,” (White House 2002).
16 “189. Can a State, without going to the Security Council, claim in these circumstances the right to act, in antici-
patory self-defence, not just pre–emptively (against an imminent or proximate threat) but preventively (against
a non –imminent or non -proximate one)? Those who say “yes” argue that the potential harm from some threats
(e.g., terrorists armed with a nuclear weapon) is so great that one simply cannot risk waiting until they become im-
minent, and that less harm may be done (e.g., avoiding a nuclear exchange or radioactive fallout from a reactor de-
struction) by acting earlier. 190. The short answer is that if there are good arguments for preventive military action,
with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action
if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by definition, time to pursue other strategies, including per-
suasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment — and to visit again the military option. 191. For those impatient
with such a response, the answer must be that, in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global
order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of uni-
lateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to
allow all. 192. We do not favor the rewriting or the reinterpretation of Article 51» (bold original) [High-Level
Panel Report 2004: § 189].
HUMAN SECURITY [101]
ty Council authorization is outlawed and in violation of international law (Tams 2009:359-

397).
The importance of the legitimate use of force under international law arises particularly
with regard to the concept of “human security”, given the fact that international peace and
security are the primordial conditions for the achievement of the that goal. In the case of
the use of force against terrorist threats of all kinds, it seems to provoke a trade off rela-
tion between the claim to resort legality by combating terrorism and the possible negative
effects of insecurity for individuals in the countries interested in this phenomenon (Von
Tigerstrom 2007).17 The same considerations come out in the case of humanitarian inter-
ventions where, in different cases, the outcomes have not helped in favour of better human
security, but sometimes provoking even worse situations.
Being the international legal order a complex of norms regulating the inter-state relations,
it seems difficult to conciliate it with the “human-centred” nature of human security. In-
ternational law concerns about the states’ security while the human security approach
requires the individuals’ security: the balance of these achievements, though hard to be
reached, is the keynote way of success. The fact that international law safeguards its prop-
er principles consisting in the territorial integrity of the States, their political independ-
ence, and the equality of rights; elements that do not imply any prejudice towards the
human security.
To the contrary, a better human security is achieved by securing compliance with interna-
tional law. In this context, the pre-emptive use of force, short of any imminent armed at-
tacks, although used to combat terrorism or to guarantee humanitarian protection, at the
expense of strict criteria of legality and legitimacy imposed by international law, threatens
the international peace and security, fundamental requirements for achieving human se-
curity.
5. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
In a particular legal order, as the international one, the respect for and the compliance
with its fundamental norms is an undisputable premise for the realization and achieve-
ment of the human security. There is a recent liberal trend of considering the need for
the protection of human security as a pretext for illegal or non-legitimate actions against
the state sovereignty. Any cause of violence as a consequence of armed attack, especial-
ly when it is grounded on the basis of an inexistent right to pre-emptive self-defence or
humanitarian intervention, at the expense of the sovereignty of subjects of international
law, is counter-productive and, thus, unacceptable, unhelpful and dangerous. Unacceptable
because not in conformity with current international law and state practice; unhelpful
because the history of the pre-emptive armed interventions have shown and provoked
prolonged human insecurity; dangerous because it might create a harmful precedent in
17 “Even initiatives that appear to have human security objectives may have unintended negative effects, whether be-
cause they are simply ill conceived, or because they trade off one type of security against another. The ‘war on ter-
rorism’ would seem to be a prime example of both of these: although the prevention of terrorism is a valid objective
that would enhance human security, the strategies chosen have significantly increased other forms of insecurity for
individuals in many countries, whether directly, by threatening their lives and physical and psychological security
through detention or deportation, or indirectly, through the exacerbation of poverty and economic insecurity re-
sulting from the diversion of resources,” (Von Tigerstrom 2007:193).
[102] Erjon HITAJ
the international relations. Post-war situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and other
“warm areas” of the globe show the inefficiency of the pre-emptive use of force doctrine
to restore peace and stability in the world.
HUMAN SECURITY [103]
6. REFERENCES
Carbone, S. M., Luzzatto, R., & Santa Maria, A. (a cura di) (2011): Istituzioni di diritto
internazionale. 4a ed., Torino: Giappichelli.
Dinstein, Y. (2001): War, Aggression and Self-Defence. 3rd ed.. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Franck, T. (2004): Recourse to Force. State Actions against Threats and Armed Attacks, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gardam, J. (2004): Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hensel, H. M. ed. (2008): The Legitimate use of Military Force. The Just war tradition and
Customary Law of Armed Conflict. Hampshire: Ashgate.
Ku, C., Jacobson, H. eds. (2002): Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in Interna-
tional Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ogata, S. (1998): Inclusion or exclusion: Social Development Challenges for Asia and Europe,
Statement addressed at the Asian Development Bank Seminar, 27 april 1998.
Orford, A. (2003): Reading Humanitarian Intervention. Human Rights and the Use of Force
in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Picone, P. (2003): La guerra contro l’Iraq e le degenerazioni dell’unilateralismo. Rivista di
diritto internazionale, 86 (2), 329-393.
Picone, P. (2006): La Comunità internazionale e gli obblighi «erga omnes», Napoli: Jovene.
Picone, P. (2008): “La distinzione tra norme internazionali di jus cogens e norme che pro-
ducono obblighi erga omnes”, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 91 (1), 5-38.
Picone, P. (2005): “Obblighi erga omnes e codificazione della responsabilità degli Stati”,
Rivista di diritto internazionale, 88 (4), 893-954.
Picone, P. (2005): “Obblighi reciproci ed obblighi erga omnes degli Stati nel campo della
protezione internazionale dell’ambiente marino dall’inquinamento” In Starace, V. (a
cura di). (1983): Diritto internazionale dell’ambiente marino, Milano: Giuffrè.
Sinagra, A. & Bargiacchi, P. (2009): Lezioni di diritto internazionale pubblico, Milano, Giuffrè.
Stürchler, N. (2007): The Threat of Force in International Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Tams, C. J. (2005): Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law. Cambridge
Studies in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Tams, C. J. (2009): The Use of Force Against Terrorists. European Journal of International
Law 20, (2), 359-397.
Tomuschat, C., Thouvenin, J. M. (2006): The fundamental Rules of the International Legal
Order. Jus Cogens and obligations Erga Omnes, Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
United Nations (2004): High-Level Panel Report. A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility, UN/Doc/59/565 adopted on 2 December 2004.
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United Nations Development Program [UNDP]: (1994): Human Development Report

1994, New York-Oxford.
United Nations General Assembly Outcome [UNGAO] (2005): Outcome A/60/L.1 adopt-
ed on 20 September 2005.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution [UNGAR] (2012): Resolution 66/290. Fol-
low-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome adopted
on 10 September 2012.
United Nations Security Council (1981): Resolution 487, adopted on 19 June 1981
Van den Hole, L. (2003): “Anticipatory Self-defence Under International Law”, American
University International Law Review, 19, (1), 69-106.
Von Tigerstrom, B. (2007): Human Security and International Law: Prospects and Prob-
lems. Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing.
Westra, J. H. (2007): International Law and the Use of Armed Force. The UN Charter and the
Major Powers, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
White House. (2002): The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, updat-
ed in 2006 and 2010. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (20.X 2014).
UDC 316.48
Jørgen JOHANSEN*
STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE: MORAL AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES1
Abstract: Dead people do not need security; so the core ingredient in Human Security is survival.
There are many reasons for early deaths, and structural violence (Galtung 1969) is one major rea-
son for why people die of other reasons than old age. Within the field of peace studies the main
focus has always been on direct violence (Galtung 1969) and wars were studied as the most typical
form of direct violence. So many research programs analyze wars, perpetrators, profiteers, arms
trade, and the effects of weaponry, negotiations, and reconciliation after violence, etc. However,
there are not many good reasons for leaving out structural violence in such studies. According to
recent statistics the number of people dying of battle related deaths is around 100,000 a year (De-
partment of Peace and Conflict Research 2014). The number of people dying due to structural
violence is around 100,000 a day (Sen and Drèze 1999; Werner and Weiss 2005; Ziegler 2005).
The data from existing databases, national and global statistics, and other primary and secondary
sources will be used to extract specific and additional key data on structural violence in the last
decade. The core here is the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Global Health Observa-
tory (GHO). This paper will search for the “perpetrators” of structural violence and discuss the
possibilities for how to reduce these forms of violence. Who is morally responsible and what can
be done to reduce these forms of violence? Can we imagine some actors being legally responsi-
ble? Identifications of political bodies and decisions behind the reasons for the different forms of
structural violence will make it possible to find the lines of responsibilities. The results of these
identifications will then be used to suggest how to change policy and reduce the numbers of early
deaths.
Keywords: structural violence, perpetrators, moral responsibility, legal responsibility
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is an early draft for a discussion on the need to regard the consequences of
structural violence which is as important as the consequences of direct violence; and wars
in particular. I will describe and compare the casualties of wars with the casualties of struc-
tural violence. Then argue that there is a need to establish legislations that deal with the
perpetrators of structural violence in the same way as we have seen some new institutions
1 Jørgen Johansen, Affiliated with the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration
(PARCC), USA and Faculty member at Hacettepe University, Peace Studies, Turkey.
e-mail: johansen.jorgen@gmail.com)
[106] Jørgen JOHANSEN
and laws aiming to reduce, investigate, and prosecute war crimes. One focus is to highlight
the policies that have deadly structural violence as a consequence. Not to act on these
deadly policies should be seen as crimes of omissions.
2. BACKGROUND
Dead people do not need security; consequently a core ingredient in Human Security is
survival. There are many reasons for early deaths and structural violence (Galtung 1969) is
one major reason why people die of other reasons than old age. Within the field of peace
studies the main focus has always been on direct violence ( Johansen 2006) and wars, the
most typical form of direct violence studied. So many research programs analyze wars,
perpetrators, profiteers, arms trade, and effects of weaponry, negotiations, and reconcili-
ation after violence, etc. However, there are not many good reasons for leaving out struc-
tural violence in such studies.
There has been a development of laws, both national ones and on the international level,
to identify more acts as war crimes. The establishment of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia,2 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,3 as well
as the International Criminal Court (ICC)4 are just a few out of many new institutions to
handle serious crimes. In their own presentation the ICC writes:
The International Criminal Court (ICC), governed by the Rome Statute, is the first permanent,
treaty based, international criminal court established to help end impunity for the perpetrators
of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. 5
I will further argue that the acts of crimes dealt with by the ICC and similar institutions are
minor compare to the structural violence in the world today.
According to recent statistics the number of people dying of battle-related deaths are
around 100.000 a year (Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2014). The number of
people dying due to structural violence is around 100.000 a day (Fischer 2013:170).
Johan Galtung wrote in 1969:
“violence exists when an individual’s ‘realization’ (i.e., the extent of their progress and general
experience of life) is much lower than that of their potential (i.e., what they could have achieved
without any restraints).”
He noted that
“Violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, be-
tween what could have been and what is. Violence is that which increases the distance between
2 The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, more commonly referred to as
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or ICTY, is a body of the United Nations established
to prosecute serious crimes committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and to try their perpetrators.
3 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is an international court established in November 1994 by
the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 955 in order to judge people responsible for the Rwandan Geno-
cide and other serious violations of international law in Rwanda, or by Rwandan citizens in nearby states, between
1 January and 31 December 1994.
4 http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx Accessed 2014-09-04
5 Ibid.
STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE: MORAL AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES [107]
the potential and the actual and that which impedes the decrease of this distance.” (Galtung
1969).
Based on this definition of violent actions there is a need to identify and discuss responsi-
bilities, perpetrators, appropriate reactions, and possibilities for prevention of more than
direct violence. The data from the existing databases, national and global statistics, and
other primary and secondary sources will be used to extract specific and additional key
data on structural violence in the last decades. The core here is the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) and the Global Health Observatory (GHO). This is neither the right place
nor the right context for a full description of the full extent of structural violence.
3. KEY QUESTIONS
The following examples are meant to be the illustrative cases of structural violence, noth-
ing more. They will be used to search for actors that can be hold accountable for the con-
sequences of their policies.
This paper will search for the “perpetrators” of structural violence and discuss the pos-
sibilities how to reduce these forms of violence. Who is morally responsible and what can
be done to reduce these forms of violence? Can we imagine some actors being legally re-
sponsible?
Identifications of political bodies and decisions behind the reasons for the different forms
of structural violence will make it possible to find the lines of responsibilities. The results
of these identifications will then be used to suggest how to change policy and reduce the
numbers of early deaths. The responsibilities can be legal and/or moral; in both cases
there are steps to be taken as reactions to the perpetrators.
3. 1. Some of the Reasons for Premature Deaths

Wars have approximately 300 killed a day. War is ranked 47th in the world as reason for
premature deaths.6 The structural violence dominates the complete list of reasons for pre-
mature deaths.
According to the World Health Statistics the main risk factors are (WHO 2014b):
• Population using water with bad quality and sanitation of low standard
• Population using solid fuels
• Infant nutrition
• Child nutrition
• Adult risk factors
• Alcohol
• Tobacco
If we look at some of these factors in more details we will find:
• WHO reports that in 2012 around 7 million people died - one in eight of total global
deaths – as a result of air pollution exposure (WHO 2014a). Bad cocking facilities
in poor households; weak regulations and implementations of air pollution laws are
6 http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/world-rankings-total-deaths Accessed 2014-08-11

the two key factors. Poor households cannot afford buying better ovens and stoves.
The polluting industries prioritize profit over low pollution.
• Even in the developed countries like the USA up to 39% of annual premature deaths
from 5 leading causes of death could be prevented, the Centres for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) reported in 2014. In 2010, the top five causes of death in
the United States were: 1) heart diseases; 2) cancer; 3) chronic lower respiratory
diseases; 4) cerebrovascular diseases (stroke), and 5) unintentional injuries (Yoon
et al. 2014:170).
• Approximately 1.24 million deaths occurred on the world’s roads in 2010.7 Traffic
regulations, how roads are constructed, high speed, and cars designed to drive at
high speeds are the main reasons for the 3400 killed on the roads every day.
• Globally, an estimated 2,000 children under the age of five die every day from diar-
rhoeal diseases and of these some 1,800 deaths are linked to water, sanitation and
hygiene.8 This is 700-800 000 dying every year; not because there is a lack of drink-
ing water in the world; but because they cannot afford buying clean water on the
market.
3. 2. Mass privatization and deregulation

When people cannot afford to buy what they need to fulfil their basic needs they will face
an early death.
In November 2013, the World Economic Forum released its ‘Outlook on the Global Agen-
da 2014’,9 in which it ranked widening income disparities as the second greatest worldwide
risk in the coming 12 to 18 months. Based on those surveyed, inequality is ‘impacting so-
cial stability within countries and threatening security on a global scale.’
The massive privatization and deregulations of economical systems going on globally have
serious impacts on the mortality. The gap between those “who have and those who do not
have” are wider and deeper than earlier. For the USA Reuter reported in 2013:
“The gulf between the richest 1 percent and the rest of America is the widest it’s been since
the Roaring ‘20s. The very wealthiest Americans earned more than 19 percent of the country’s
household income last year — their biggest share since 1928, the year before the stock market
crash. And the top 10 percent captured a record 48.2 percent of total earnings last year.”10
The extreme levels of wealth concentration occurring today threaten hundreds of millions
of people from living a life according to their full capacities.
In a report from Oxfam in January 2014 (Fuentes-Nieva and Galasso 2014) they present
the following facts:
• Almost half of the world’s wealth is now owned by just one percent of the population.11
7 http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A997 Accessed 2014-08-11

8 http://www.unicef.org/media/media_68359.html Accessed 2014-08-18
9 http://www.weforum.org/reports/outlook-global-agenda-2014 Accessed 2014-08-18
10 http://www.cnbc.com/id/101025377#. Accessed 2014-08-18
11 Credit Suisse (2013) ‘Global Wealth Report 2013’, Zurich: Credit Suisse. https://publications.credit-suisse.com/
tasks/render/file/?fileID=BCDB1364-A105-0560-1332EC9100FF5C83 and Forbes’ The World’s Billionaires
http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/lis Accessed 2013-12-16
• The wealth of the one percent richest people in the world amounts to $110 trillion. That’s
65 times the total wealth of the bottom half of the world’s population.12
• The bottom half of the world’s population owns the same as the richest 85 people in the
world.13
• Seven out of ten people live in countries where economic inequality has increased in the
last 30 years.14
• The richest one percent increased their share of income in 24 out of 26 countries for which
we have data between 1980 and 2012.15
• In the US, the wealthiest one percent captured 95 percent of post-financial crisis growth
since 2009, while the bottom 90 percent became poorer.16
3. 3. Market Economy
Searching for the reasons of these situations and why the gaps between those who are
wealthy and those on the bottom are growing, it is natural to look on the mechanisms of
how wealth is distributed in different parts of the world. In a study published by the Lan-
cet in 2009, it was proven that mortality rates rose in most countries after the change from
communism to market economy.
“During the early-1990s, adult mortality rates rose in most post-communist European coun-
tries. Substantial differences across countries and over time remain unexplained. Although pre-
vious studies have suggested that the pace of economic transition was a key driver of increased
mortality rates, to our knowledge no study has empirically assessed the role of specific compo-
nents of transition policies.” (Stuckler, King, and McKee 2009)
The comments following the article in The Lancet included:
“With all the caveats, Stuckler and colleagues’ study is relevant beyond eastern Europe. Coun-
tries in other regions are, and have been, undergoing economic and social transitions.” (Bobak
and Marmot 2009)
The market economy seems well designed to create growth in the economy. But is does
not include a system to distribute the surplus. With weak states the actors on the market
are able to maximize the profit and GDP is growing. Shareholders are in general more in-
terested in the “bottom line” than what sort of products are produced, levels of pollution,
exploitation of natural resources, or working conditions for the employees (Klein 2002,
2007).
12 Calculated based on information from Credit Suisse, op. cit. Total wealth amounts to $240.8 trillion. Share of wealth
for the bottom half of the population is 0.71 percent. That for the richest one percent is 46 percent (amounting to
$110 trillion).
13 Ibid.
14 The World Top Incomes Database, http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/
15 Ibid.
16 E. Saez (2013) ‘Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (updated with 2012 prelim-
inary estimates)’, Berkeley: University of California, Department of Economics. http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/
saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf and The World Top Incomes Database. http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeco-
nomics.eu/
3.4. Suicide
Also the reasons for premature deaths that often are seen as a problem on the individual,
and not the structural, level have the elements of structural violence. One illustration of
this is suicides.
Suicides are preventable. Even so, every 40 seconds a person dies by suicide somewhere in the
world and many more attempt suicide.(Saxena and Krug 2014)
An estimated 804 000 suicide deaths occurred worldwide in 2012, representing an annual
global age-standardized suicide rate of 11.4 per 100 000 population (15.0 for males and 8.0
for females). However, since suicide is a sensitive issue, and even illegal in some countries,
it is very likely that it is under-reported. In countries with good registration of relevant
data, suicide may often be misclassified as an accident or another cause of death. Regis-
tering a suicide is a complicated procedure involving several different authorities, often
including law enforcement. And in the countries without reliable registration of deaths,
suicides simply die uncounted. (Saxena and Krug 2014)
In terms of policy, 28 countries today are known to have national suicide prevention strate-
gies. This lack of action has obvious serious consequences.
4. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM

Violence Prevention Alliance addresses the problem of violence as defined in the World
report on violence and health (WRVH), namely:
“The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another
person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of result-
ing in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development, or deprivation.” 17
They seem to focus on mainly direct violence, but it is possible to understand the use of
“power” as being more than physical. I argue that if we interpret their definition as includ-
ing “political power” their definition does include structural violence. This then supports
the idea that we can identify the perpetrators of these forms of violence. The use of the
words “the intentional use” points at political decisions. Few, if any, politicians would ar-
gue that their decisions are not intentional.
One can of course argue that even if decisions are intentional, the consequences might
not be. This is what we have seen in discussions on responsibilities for the consequences
of war. In the contexts of war, we have seen a growing use of the term “collateral damage”.
The term “collateral damage” is used for civilians killed without been targeted.18
And when the number of victims in this category is far higher than the intended targets
there it becomes a legal issue. Take, for instance, the investigations of war crimes after the
recent war between Hamas/Gaza and Israel. Many international lawyers argue that the
number of civilians killed is far higher that what can be counted as collateral damage.19 In
the case of structural violence all people killed seem to be regarded as “collateral damage”;
in the meaning unintended consequences.
17 http://www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/definition/en/ Accessed 2014-08-29

18 http://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afpam14-210/part20.htm#page180 Accessed 2014-09-15
19 http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/08/13/an-interview-with-richard-falk-on-the-crisis-in-gaza/ Accessed 204-09-04
But when the results are well known, this argument is no more valid. There is a factual
casual relationship between policy and death. Then those who promote and implement
such policies should be hold accountable for the results. It does not matter if the intentions
are good. Here I follow the utilitarian tradition from Jeremy Bentham20 and John Stuart
Mill.21 Jeremy Bentham’s famous formulation of utilitarianism is known as the “greatest-
happiness principle”. In his later works he argued for the right to intervene in the “free
market” in order to achieve more happiness for as many as possible. Implemented in the
debate on responsibilities for structural violence, his principles can be seen as arguments
for labelling policies that result in increasing structural violence as morally wrong.
For the consequences of a policy that has well documented the increasing rates of prema-
ture deaths the “collateral damage”-effect of market economy, deregulating the market,
maximizing profit, etc. should be discussed in the same category as war crimes. And then
there are both moral and legal responsibilities.
5. ACTS OF CRIME AND ACTS OF OMISSION

Those who know the consequences and do not act to reduce the problem are to some
degree responsible for the result. I have argued in favour of moral responsibility above.
There are two overlapping types of acts we need to discuss: 1) acts and decisions to imple-
ment a specific policy that have violent consequences and 2) acts of omissions. The last
category occurs when those in position do not act in order to reduce the violent conse-
quences.
The acts of omissions can increase the structural violence on huge numbers of people. For
every suicide there are many more people who attempt suicide every year. Significantly,
a prior suicide attempt is the single most important risk factor for suicide in the general
population. For both suicides and suicide attempts, improved availability and quality of
data from vital registration, hospital-based systems and surveys are required for effective
suicide prevention (Saxena and Krug 2014).
The acts of omission take place whenever there are possibilities to reduce well known
violent consequences, but they are not done.
What about looking at it from a legal perspective? Can we justify laws and courts that
regard those who either are active part of the decision making for a policy that results in
Structural Violence and/or those who can, but refuse to act in order to reduce Structural
Violence as perpetrators of violent crimes?
Within Human Rights we have seen a development where the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights has been more powerful and important over time. The Universal Declaration
on Human Rights (UDHR) recognizes a number of economic, social and cultural rights.
But the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is the
primary international legal source of economic, social and cultural rights. The latter has far
from the same status. A development of the status for ICESCR could be a powerful tool to
mobilize more efforts aiming at reducing structural violence.
20 http://utilitarian.net/bentham/ Accessed 2014-09-04

21 http://oll.libertyfund.org/people/john-stuart-mill Accessed 2014-09-04
In the criminal law, an omission, or failure to act, constitutes an actus reus (Latin for “guilty
act”). A summary of criminal law on omissions: “a defendant is only guilty of a crime when
failing to act, where he or she is under a duty to act.”22
Does the law impose a duty to reduce structural violence? The practice today is hardly so.
It’s been a long debate […] whether the omission should be punished by law or not. Many […]
have argued in favour of it and many are going against the idea to punish omission. It’s not been
an easy task to talk on such a complicated issue of law. Authors who support the idea of penal-
izing omission suggest that there should be a clear line between omission, commission and act. It
is fact that there are some circumstances where one could be liable for punishment for the wrong
doings of another. The rule of vicarious liability is a good example of it, where an employer of
a company or firm is liable for the wrong doings of the employee of the same company. Same is
the case in the cases of abetment where a person who abets the crime is liable for the commission
of the crime of the other. 23
The arguments for a legal responsibility with punishment as a consequence are strong.
When I indicated above to the extent to which structural violence is killing people, it would
be a natural consequence to see both those who implement policies that result in structural
violence and those who omit to prevent such policies as perpetrators of the violence.
There are many historical parallels we can make to illustrate this point. When slavery was an
integrated and important ingredient in our economical system few people saw it as a prob-
lem. When the consequences become more widely known and more voices heard against
the system the first ideas of Abolitionism become public (Taylor and Garrison 1974).
Today there is a broad consensus that slavery is inhuman and must be illegal. The same is
with corporal punishment at home. Not too long ago the spanking of children was seen as
a duty, today it is forbidden in a growing number of states. The UNESCO recommends
that corporal punishment be prohibited in schools, homes and institutions as a form of
discipline, and alleges that it is a violation of human rights as well as counterproductive,
ineffective, dangerous and harmful to children (Council of Europe 2005).
6. A MORE TYPICAL CASE OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

Some decades ago the emission of chemicals was not legally regulated. When some of
them were found to be extremely poisonous new legislations were introduced, often ac-
companied with protests from the producers. DDT and CO2 are only two well known
cases where regulations are introduced in country after country. The consequences on
the biosphere are so serious that emissions above certain levels are seen as a crime. It was
the awareness of the consequences that moved these actions from being committed with-
out reflections to being seen as crimes. Today the generally accepted moral tells that it is
wrong to pollute. And the criminal laws follow up and define these actions as crimes. Not
to clean emissions to air, water, and soil is seen as criminal acts of omissions.
22 From Law Teacher: http://www.lawteacher.net/tort-law/essays/omission-means-a-failure-to-act.php#ixzz3CSnBr1IO

Accessed 2014-09-03
23 Ibid.
7. A NEW LEGISLATION?
Can we imagine a similar development when it comes to structural violence? Comparing
with the development of new legislations on war crimes and environmental crimes, it is
difficult to see why some categories of structural violence should not be confronted in a
similar way.
The consequences are clear and extremely deadly. There are obvious possibilities for how
to reduce the negative effects. And still very little is done. For categories like privatization
and de-regulation, it is in fact still a popular policy in many countries and huge institutions
like the IMF and the World Bank are still promoting them, as the study in Lancet proves
the result in more cases of early deaths. When basic needs like food, water, medicine, etc.
are only available on the private market you need an income of more than two dollars a
day or face an early death.
Will the next generations see the structural violence of today in the same ways as our gen-
eration looks at slavery, colonialism, torture, anti-personnel mines, and segregation based
on race that were acceptable some generations ago? Will international courts and/or tri-
bunals be established to deal with those who promote policies which results in serious
structural violence?
The courts dealing with the serious crimes committed in Cambodia during Pol Pot see the
extreme form of Marxism as a criminal ideology.24 Will we in the near future regard Neo-
liberal ideology as criminal as well? Implemented on the products that constitute basic
human needs, it has much more serious consequences than any other ideology in human
history.
There are several options for reactions against the organizers, implementers, and perpe-
trators of Neoliberal Ideology. The courts are already mentioned. They can be modelled
after the ICC or other institutions created to handle war crimes. Other possibilities could
build institutions on the model of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up to
handle the atrocities during the apartheid period in South Africa. There is a problem that
when the perpetrators are too powerful they are regarded as “too big to jail”. After the war
in Vietnam and the horrible war crimes committed by the US soldiers on orders from the
US President, the Government, and the Congress nobody saw any realistic possibility to
have those responsible in a court room. One reaction to that was the Russell Tribunal who
presented and documented evidence as well as called witnesses to the tribunal. Without
the power to punish those who were found guilty, the principle was “Blame and Shame”.
Many international conventions are more used to set a specific standard than to actually
punish those who violate them. And some have moved from the “moral sphere” to more
legally binding documents. The UN Declaration of Universal Human Rights has had such
a journey. We could imagine the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights going through a similar process. Today the violations are so widespread and
frequent that few bother about it. But if it got the same status as the declaration on Human
Rights, it might be a powerful tool to be used against the promoters of Neoliberal Ideology.
24 http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/ Accessed 2014-11-22

8. REFERENCES
Bobak, Martin, and Michael Marmot (2009): “Societal transition and health.” The Lancet
( January 15).
Council of Europe (2005): Eliminating corporal punishment : a human rights imperative for
Europe’s children. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub.
Department of Peace and Conflict Research , Uppsala University (2014) UCDP Conflict
Encyclopedia:. edited by Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Re-
search www.ucdp.uu.se/database.
Fischer, Dietrich, ed. (2013): “Johan Galtung - Pioneer of Peace Research”. Edited by Hans
Günter Brauch. Vol. 5, Springer Briefs in Pioneers on Science and Practice (PSP). Heidel-
berg: Sringer.
Fuentes-Nieva, Ricardo, and Nick Galasso (2014): “Working for the few, Political capture
and economic inequality”. In Oxfam Briefing Paper. London: Oxfam International.
Galtung, Johan (1969)” “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research
6 (3):167-191.
Johansen, Jørgen (2006): “Peace research Needs to Re-Orient.” In Peace Studies in the Chi-
neses Century, edited by Alan Hunter, 31-38. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Klein, Naomi (2002): No logo no space, no choice, no jobs, no logo : märkena, marknaden,
motståndet. Enskede: TPB,. Ljudupptagning :.
Klein, Naomi (2007) The shock doctrine : the rise of disaster capitalism. 1. ed. New York:
Metropolitan books.
Saxena, Shekhar, and Etienne Krug (2014) Preventing suicide: A global imperative. Geneva:
World Health Organization.
Stuckler, David, Lawrence King, and Martin McKee (2009) “Mass privatisation and the
post-communist mortality crisis: a cross-national analysis.” The Lancet:1-9.
Taylor, Clare, and William Lloyd Garrison (1974): British and American abolitionists : an
episode in transatlantic understanding. Edinburgh: Edinburgh U.P.
WHO (2014a): 7 million premature deaths annually linked to air pollution. Accessed 2014-
08-11.
WHO (2014b): World health statistics 2014. Geneva: WHO.
Yoon, Paula W., Brigham Bastian, Robert N. Anderson, Janet L. Collins, and Harold W.
Jaffe (2014): “Potentially Preventable Deaths from the Five Leading Causes of Death —
United States, 2008–2010”. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 63 (17): 369-374.
UDC 351.78:316.72
Goran BAŠIĆ*
HUMAN SECURITY AND MULTICULTURALISM12
Abstract: This paper discusses the relationship between the ethnic nature of modern multicul-
tural societies and the public security. Security is a human right, and providing it is essential for
protecting the life, dignity and freedom of citizens. Requests for the protection and equality of
ethno-cultural identities and the creation of social relations in which ethnic and cultural differ-
ences are not a stability barrier, arise from the people’s needs for not only their personal and
civil rights, but also group and cultural rights. In an effort to recognize the requirements for the
protection of ethno-cultural identity and thus provide stability and development, the modern
liberal state has redefined the paradigm of ethno-cultural neutrality and through the process of
globalization developed a policy for “reducing cultural differences” whose main levers are the
principles of equality, tolerance and respect for diversity.
The responses of nation-states to the challenges of multiculturalism in the 21st century differ
vastly among themselves: from the acceptance of the idea of human security in the immediate
multicultural environment as the basis for development; through recognition of different forms
of autonomy and self-government of national minorities; to the sharp opposition to the demands
of the minorities for the secession or recognition of political autonomy of the ethnically homoge-
neous areas within the modern state. Contemporary politics of multiculturalism, that have been
roughly criticized by the heads of the “Western democracy” states at the beginning of 21st century,
are marked with the fear of terrorism, fear and misunderstanding of Islam and the syndrome that
“the colonies colonized colonizers” (highly increased number of the immigrants from the former
colonies in Africa and Asia in the European countries).
Western Balkan countries, after a period political ethnification and ethnic conflicts at the end
of the last century, have specific policies of “monocultural multiculturalism” as the answer to
the challenges of multiculturalism. The policy of “monocultural multiculturalism” recognizes the
minority rights in accordance with international standards, but also their social segregation and
maintenance of their high ethnic distance. The problem of inter-ethnic relations in the Balkans
is rooted in the theory of the state reason and the concept of national security. There are several
critical areas where ethnicity poses more as the obstacle for establishing stability and develop-
1 The paper was written as a part of the activities of the IDN project: “Social Transformation in the Process of Euro-
pean Integration - a multidisciplinary approach” (III 47010), funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of
the Republic of Serbia.
∗
Goran Bašić, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences and the Director of the Ethnicity Research
Center. e-mail: basicgoran11@gmail.com
[116] Goran BAŠIĆ
ment than as the momentum of cultural interaction and regional stability. In such a constellation,
the concept of human security gains importance only as the mechanism for preventing the con-
flicts and eliminating their consequences.
At first glance, it seems that human security concept has no theoretical and political response to
the contemporary challenges of multiculturalism; it seems that the citizen has been defeated by
the state. However, during the middle of the last century, the similar situation was similar with
the recognition and realization of human rights. Various social movements, born in a multicul-
tural basket, consistently insisting on recognition of the identity of minorities changed the liberal
ideology and the state, and urged the recognition and protection of human rights as the universal
value and priority. It is that tradition in which these changes have occurred, that is the firmest
foothold of the human security strategy.
Key words: Human Security, Multiculturalism, Ethnicity, Diversity
1. HUMAN SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The concept of human security has been widely debated within the scientific and pub-
lic community since 1994, shortly after the UNDP announced the Human Development
Report.3 The essence of this Report is based on the revitalization of the great ideas in the
history of human thought - freedom from fear and freedom from deprivation. Former UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his address to the United Nations on Human Security,
defined security with a significantly wider global strategy that does not stop with the pre-
vention of violent conflict but insists on good governance, access to education and health
care, making environment in which it is possible for people to feel like they can make their
own plans, reduction of poverty, increasing economic growth, elimination of the risk of
conflict. These interrelated categories can move the focus of security from national level
towards the man and his community: “Human security is a child who did not die, a disease
that has not spread, the work position that is not extinguished, an ethnic tension that did
not erupt in violence, a dissident who was not convicted. Human security is not about
guns, it deals with human life and dignity” (UNDP 1994:23).
Many issues have risen regarding the relationship between human rights and human se-
curity on both theoretical and empirical level, but the two of them seem to be of utmost
importance: first, security is itself a human right, and second, the concept of human secu-
rity is largely based on theoretical discourse, practice and scope of the concept of human
rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights directly indicates that security, along
with the right to life and freedom is a basic human right. Other multilateral documents
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights - the
concept of security refers to the individual as the subject of rights and there is no doubt
that the institutional connection between the concept of human rights and human secu-
rity exists. However, this connection is even more noticeable in everyday life and systems
of value of individuals who, especially in circumstances where their personal safety is im-
mediately threatened, ignore every other human right and try to rectify the circumstances
and risks that threaten the fundamental right to life. Conversely, if people feel safe and
3 Prior to the UNDP report, which was finally formulated by Mahbub ul Haq, significant discussions were conduct-
ed that enbled for Canada to adopt the concept of human security as a priority in its foreign policy, and for the UN
Commission on Human Security to begin working.
HUMAN SECURITY AND MULTICULTURALISM [117]
free, if their basic needs are satisfied, they attempt to exercise their right to happiness in
the fullest sense of the term and meet the needs that are beyond the scope of the vital core
of human security.4
In addition, human security as a derived and new social security concept has no social
support or institutional and theoretical capacity within which international law has recog-
nized the concept of general opinion and practice of human rights. Therefore, the human
safety relies both on this infrastructure, and the part of the academic and professional ar-
guments developed in the doctrine of human rights. However, despite still looking for its
place in the international system of values, it is evident that the concept of human security
has also impacted human rights in terms of their social empowerment. Ellen Seidensticker
rightly notes that human security can help mitigate the impact of the state on exercising
the rights, especially if this concept comes into the equal regulatory position, within the
constitutional and legal argument, as the concept of national security. If this balance was
to be achieved the security people would not be neglected in favour of the security of the
state. The same author, focusing on the tension between certain types of human rights,
and the dilemma of priorities of the first and second baskets of human rights, presents the
capabilities of the concept of human security in terms of overcoming these internal con-
flicts. According to her human security can provide a new approach to balancing of civil,
political and socio-economic rights. Finally, usually the most visible indicator of human
security is the threat to human rights, and the safest way to achieve full human security is
to insist on respecting them (Chen, Fukuda-Parr, Seidensticker 2004).
Unlike human rights that have the institutional mechanisms, human security is based on
the value system of the individuals or their subjective feeling of being threatened or not. In
this sense, human security is a broader basis of human rights and aspires to become a para-
digm of values in a globalized world. It includes many categories that the concept of hu-
man rights with its theoretical apparatus and institutional mechanisms does not include.
2. HUMAN SECURITY AND MULTICULTURALISM

The concept of human security did not take as its subject the concept of group security,
as it is the case with its predecessor, the concept of societal security. Its subject is the in-
dividual, in accordance with the liberal doctrine. At the intersection of these two ideas, in
liberal literature the debate whether the concept of human security is wide enough for the
collective of ethno-cultural identities, as well as the natural environment of individuals,
has opened.
In relation to this question, Pier van der Bergs dilemma about whether multiculturalism
is a barrier or incentive to democracy in contemporary society could be reconceptual-
ized (Berghe 1981). This problem can be considered in two planes. The first relates to the
fundamental, civilizational, and cultural differences that present a strong barrier to global
expansion. Huntington’s stance on the conflict of civilizations opens more than one level
of contention in contemporary relations of fundamental Islam and divided Christianity.
In this case it is not a lack of understanding of Islam in the perceptions of European and
4 The concept of vital core is the result of the assumption that institutions are unable to equally effectively protect all
aspects of human security, but it is necessary that they protect the safety aspects that guarantee the survival, liveli-
hood and dignity of people.
[118] Goran BAŠIĆ
American authors and politicians (Esposito 1992), but the essential ideological and cul-
tural diversity. If we bear in mind that many of these differences are based on religious and
traditional values, it is clear that the ideologues of globalization have to take into account
cultural and ethnic aspects as the real basis for determining the space in which the capital
of multinational companies will expand. There is no doubt that in the conditions of ethnic
tensions and constant clash of civilizations the idea of a global society as an incentive for
achieving the common good will not be achieved. It is possible to prevail this situation by
achieving cooperation of the world’s great metropolises, in which the economic aspects
will have much more impact on the financial and economic developments, and thus the
political situation. But such problems that the concept of human security is facing will not
be removed.
On the other hand, multiculturalism fragmented in many aspects, can lead to the forma-
tion of strong macro and micro movements that can undermine both national and global
society. Insisting on overemphasized specificity and particularity could become, not an
obstacle to globalization, but the cancerous tissue that would metastasize in different
social and cultural fields, and would lead to the destruction of the desired global order.
Ethnic exclusivity is the part of the pessimistic projections that think that transnational
control of religious and ethnic conflict is not possible and that it is more realistic to take
into account the cultural and ethnic diversity in the context of the reconceptualization
of economic aspects of globalization (Stiglich 2002). Economic aspects of globalization,
supported by military and technological superiority are its strong arms, but the neglect of
cultural and ethnic dimensions could lead this process to dark corners of homogeneity and
exclusivity. In this sense, the concept of human security should not follow the examples
of the intransigence of the traditional security model and the classical liberal doctrine, but
to take advantage of its internal capacities, and exhaust possibilities from other doctrines
and ideas that would on the basis of the security policy in addition to the individual also
include their immediate community.
The argument for the need of finding a “synergistic” model reinforces the new require-
ments for the recognition of territorialisation of ethno-cultural units - Crimea, Scotland,
Catalonia are the examples which suggest that ethnicity still has the strength and that it
can significantly undermine regional and global security. It also provides a completely new
quality of life for the members of ethno-cultural communities that are prone to finding so-
lutions for national, political, economic and other issues and problems less and less within
the recognition of different self-governments and autonomies (Ghai 2000).
3. NATURE AND POLICIES OF MULTICULTURALISM IN SERBIA

AND THE HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT
The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia,5 in the part that defines global
security environment, adopted the approach of the modern concept of security that takes
into account the importance of the security of an individual and the society as a whole.
However, when it comes to multiculturalism, the national policy document is primarily
aimed at the risks that this and related phenomena are causing, and not at the strategic di-
rections in which the ethnic and cultural diversity is used as a potentials for development.
5 http://www.vba.mod.gov.rs/strategijski_i_doktrinarni_okvir
Specifically, in the part where it considers the regional security aspect, it is emphasized
that “the security situation in the region is characterized by distinct national, religious and
political extremism and the destruction of cultural heritage, which, besides the existing
economic and social problems and under-built state institutions, complicates the process
of faster and more successful democratic transition of the states in the region. The rela-
tions among the states in the region are also burdened by the return of refugees and their
property and boundary problems, and certain problems stemming from inadequate inte-
gration of minority communities and groups in the wider social environment”. Therefore,
the integration of the region into the European and other international security structures
is difficult, which increases the risk of a resumption of crises and armed conflicts. The
strategic solution is based on a theoretical approach where the ethno-cultural relations are
the field in which security structures intervene in order to control and direct the requests
from minority groups to recognize the identity and specific rights: “Due to the complex
nature of security in the region, the countries of Southeast Europe are increasingly in a
position where they have to join efforts to suppress the negative processes that threaten
their safety. The construction of joint mechanisms for the prevention of risks and threats
and crisis management, will create the preconditions for rapid democratic transition of
the countries in the region, thus creating the conditions for convergence and joining of all
countries of the region to the European Union.” 6
The opinions in which multiculturalism and the status of ethno-cultural minorities is pri-
marily the “security” issue, cultural differences are possible triggers of conflicts (Hunting-
ton, 1996), and especially the opinion that multiculturalism has the untameable nature,
were reinforced when several influential politicians challenged the contemporary politics
of multiculturalism.7 To tell the truth, the “Crimean crisis”, the demands of indigenous
European peoples for the recognition of the sovereignty of their nation-state, suggests that
Pandora’s Box has been opened with the recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty. That is the
bogeyman that circles the world and suggests renewing demands for the recognition of
territorial autonomy and independence based on ethnicity. In the past, ethnification of the
policies was for the “invisible” power centres a powerful lever for initiating mechanisms of
global or regional distribution of power. Traditional global, regional and national mecha-
nisms for security, despite their efforts to adapt their operations to modern political and
economic developments, often see the phenomenon of ethnicity as a disturbing factor.
Most often, the ethno-cultural diversity is seen as a “thorn in the side” and insisting on the
6 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, pg. 3-5.

7 In public the most mentioned statement is the one of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who in 2010, at a meet-
ing of the youth of Christian Democratic Union (CDU), said that the multicultural concept, according to which
„people live happily side by side“ failed in Germany, where there are about four million of Muslims (Guardian of 17
October 2010). Chancellor’s opinion was not an exception because it was preceded by a statement of the leader of
the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) Horst Seehofer that multiculturalism is dead in Germany (Der Spiegel
of October 18, 2010). Subsequently, the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that multiculturalism is a failed
concept and called for the restoration of the French identity: “We were too focused on the identity of the person
to come, and not enough on the identity of the state that received them” (The Telegraph of 11 February 2011).
Criticism of European policies of multiculturalism was joined by the British Prime Minister David Cameron who
believes that the long-standing policy of England was a failure and therefore urges for better integration of young
Muslims to help fight the growing “domestic” extremism (BBC News of 5 February 2011). The statements of the
former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar (The Washington Times of February 16, 2011) and Australia’s
John Howard (The Telegraph of 15 September and 29 September 2010) were less prominent in the public, but also
stated that the policy of multiculturalism has not been successful in the integration of immigrants.
[120] Goran BAŠIĆ
legal protection and political participation of minorities is a legitimate demand for their
integration into the broader cultural entity. On the example of integration of Muslims in
Europe, Tariq Ramadan indicates the consequences of European integration policies of
ethno-cultural minorities: “The way in which Islam is very often presented in Europe is
not without consequences. Understood as a problem in secularized societies, Muslims are
put in a position where they have to find solutions in order to adapt their religion and prac-
tices. It almost automatically forces them to adopt a reactive stance, and to feel challenged
to justify their beliefs and practices. In such an atmosphere, it is impossible, for Muslims
as well as for their counterparts, to present a substantial Islamic learning, one that springs
from the recognition of the existence of the One and Only God, and that is nourished by
daily spirituality, which signifies the whole of life and gives it value and meaning” (Rama-
dan 2007).
Abstract policy of cultural integration in Europe contributed to the state of “open ques-
tions related to legitimization of multiculturalists requests”. The effort to control and coor-
dinate open ethnic conflicts in Europe, especially in the Balkans where many conflicts are
burdened with the demands for the recognition of the territorial autonomy of individual
ethnic groups, in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration are facing challenges that require
new ideas and approaches. However, as the ideas that would bolster the fragile construc-
tions of cultural and social cohesion in modern European area are lacking, it has resorted
to pressuring the state to adopt common values, where the culture of human rights had
strategic importance. In such a constellation of states “old democracies” established pub-
lic policies in the attempt to enhance the integration of mainly allochthonous minorities.
It was relatively easy to impose the acceptance of international multilateral and bilateral
documents (UN, OSCE, CoE) to post-socialist countries. These documents should allow
that by adopting the values of liberal democracy the ethno-cultural identity of minorities
would be preserved and their effective participation in public life would be ensured.8
However, the causes of ethnic divisions in some regions and countries are very complex
and are accompanied by ethnic hatred, prejudice and bigotry. In the “western” Balkans,
the threat of high risk to regional security is also the ambiguity of multiculturalism policy
in relation to the fate of the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, the development of
democracy in Macedonia and still open question of Kosovo’s status.
The issue of the status of national minorities in Serbia is a slightly smaller problem to the
security of the region. Serbia has specific post-conflict conditions where it has developed a
policy of segregate multiculturalism that is suitable for strengthening of minority demands
for the recognition of exclusive rights. Serbia is an example of a state that has accepted and
adopted the standards of protection of national minorities, not having already developed a
policy of multiculturalism, which was supposed to provide much-needed social cohesion
for the implementation of other vital reforms. Consequence of badly thought and erratic
policies of multiculturalism has caused the contemporary Serbian society to be greatly
ethnically fragmented. In addition, there are no conditions for substantial decentralization
8 The establishment of a new policy towards national minorities contributed to by the establishment of the OSCE
High Commissioner on National Minorities, whose mandate is early warning and intervention as the result of spot-
ting ethnic tensions in the territory of the member states of the OSCE. In the first few years the High Commission-
er has made a number of recommendations by which through the “soft law” he advocated the standards of rights of
national minorities to education, information and official use of language.
in which various types of autonomy could be part of a stable territorial-political organiza-

tion of the country. The obstacles for the establishment of integrative policy of multicul-
turalism adjusted to the multiethnic nature of the country are the estimations that exclude
the factors of human security from the planning of the integration of ethno-cultural mi-
norities. Supremacy of politics of “Reason of State” over the policy of “The State as Guar-
antor of the Best Interests of Citizens” has gone through several phases.
In the first phase, from 2001 to 2005, the most important decisions regarding the protec-
tion of the rights of national minorities were made in the former federal Yugoslav state, and
then in the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. At the invitation of the Committee of
Ministers of the CoE, Yugoslavia acceded to the Framework Convention for the Protec-
tion of National Minorities on May11, 2001. This formalized a break with the “minority
policy”, which was conducted since the disintegration of the socialist Yugoslav federation.9
Shortly thereafter, in both Parliamentary Houses the Law on Protection of Rights and
Freedoms of National Minorities10 was unanimously passed, and in 2005 the European
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages11 was ratified.
The Law on Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities, which is sub-
stantially based on the Framework Convention, has introduced new institutes to the social
and legal life - a minority self-government (national councils of national minorities); cul-
tural autonomy in the field of education, information and official use of language, alphabet
and culture; and affirmative action. From the adoption of the law it was clear that the
effectiveness of these institutes can only be achieved if member states adopt laws to regu-
late the rights of national minorities specifically. The Republic of Serbia has not done so,
and the first elections of national councils were conducted according to the Regulations
that were made by the Federal Minister for Human Rights and Ethnic Communities. This
bylaw has essentially directed the policy of multiculturalism in Serbia towards the segrega-
tion of minorities and the strong influence of political parties on the election, centralized
organization and operation of minority self-governments. The first election of minority
self-governments were conducted on the basis of the said Ordinance, indirectly, at the
assemblies of electors, where the citizens, who identified themselves as the members of
a national minority and who at the previous local and parliamentary elections had been
elected into the representative bodies, chose among themselves the members of minor-
ity self-governments. These representatives at the time had the responsibilities related to
cultural autonomy that were tentatively established.12 The consequences provisory that
9 The Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ratified the Framework Convention (Law on Ratification of
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, “Official Gazette of FRY - International Trea-
ties”, No. 6/98) in 1998. But with the process that preceded the verification of this instrument, the CoE did not
comply with the prescribed procedure to provide minimum requirements for the protection of national minorities.
10 “Official Gazette of the FRY”, No/ 11/2002, “Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro”, No. 1/2003 - Constitu-
tional Charter and the “Official Gazette of RS”, No. 72/2009.
11 Law on Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, (“Official Gazette of Serbia and
Montenegro - International Treaties”, No. 18/2005)
12 Elector, in accordance with the rules, could be any member of a national minority who gathered the support of
hundreds of fellow citizens or has a support of an organization that represents the interests of national minorities.
Such candidates are not on an equal footing with the candidates for electors who are nominated by a well-organ-
ized political party. The election results indicate that the first assemblies of national councils of national minorities,
in particular the numerous and homogeneously residing national minorities, consisted solely of the representatives
of political parties.
[122] Goran BAŠIĆ
lasted over the next six years were those that the citizens belonging to national minorities
were forced out of these self-governing bodies in which they were supposed to establish
and develop the system of protection of ethno-cultural identity of minority communi-
ties. The mandates of minority governments were taken by their fellow officers and the
members of political parties of national minorities that brought interests and problems of
political life into the field of cultural autonomy (Bašić, Crnjanski, 2006).
A tangle that was created by mixing cultural autonomy and political action is difficult to
describe, but it is possible to identify several consequences of it and which were by no
means in the interests of citizens and the development of a stable and secure social envi-
ronment. First, since then all the important decisions that in the narrow and broad sense
referred to the policy of multiculturalism were made on the basis of exclusive arrange-
ments of “political elite” of national minorities and the parliamentary political parties.
The institutions that were established at the state level to ensure the implementation of
the rights of national minorities were provisory, which behind them had informal power
centres that used cultural autonomy as a convenient tool to achieve wider political goals.
Second, the minority governments are centralized bodies that are elected only at the na-
tional level and therefore are not able to develop the institutional capacity for achieving
full cultural autonomy. Third, the connection between the minority government and local
governments are weak and tentative, except in cases where the members of the same po-
litical party “exercise authority” in both forms of self-government.
Predominant influence of political parties on the election and the work of minority gov-
ernment and its centralized structure have caused the links between the minority govern-
ment and citizens belonging to national minorities not to be established, but also for spac-
es of the impact of different power centres to open, including those dealing with national
and regional security in the work of minority governments.
During the first phase of development of the system of protection of rights of national mi-
norities the Assembly of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro adopted the Charter
on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Freedoms13 which clearly outlined the rights
of national minorities, including the rights of the minority self-governments in the field
of cultural autonomy.14 This document, called the “Small Charter” because it was part of
the constitutional order of the State Union, introduced to the constitutional protection of
minority rights the institute of acquired rights whose legal consequences have not been
clearly explained. The impact of the “Small Charter” was crucial in constitutionalization
of the rights of national minorities in Serbia.
The second phase of the process of development of protection of minority rights begins
with the adoption of the Constitution of Serbia15 in 2006, in which both the spirit and solu-
tions were taken from “Small Charter” and the Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms
of National Minorities.16 The adoption of the Constitution of 2006 constitutionalized the
system of protection of national minorities taken from the legal system of the Union. That
approach caused the following error. Rather than adopting a special law on the protection
13 “Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro”, No. 6/2003.

14 Articles 47-57.
15 “Official Gazette RS”, No. 98/2006.
16 The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Articles: 14; 18; 20-22; 47-49; 75-81.
of national minorities in Serbia, that would be adapted to the nature of multi-ethnicity of

the Serbian society and the needs of citizens, the adopted system of protection of “minor-
ity” rights was “inherited”. This system went along with the needs of politically organized,
territorially numerous and homogeneously inhabited national minorities. More specifically,
the direct benefit of such a system of protection of rights of national minorities was to the
political parties of ethnic minorities - it further strengthened more their negotiating position
(Basic 2006). This is confirmed by the fact that the amendments to the Law on Election of
Deputies17 allowed, in the process of distribution of seats, for the political parties of national
minorities and coalitions of political parties of national minorities to participate, even if they
got less than 5% of votes in the total number of voters ( Jovanović 2005). “Natural threshold”,
which as an affirmative measure was implemented since 2007, was favourable to the National
Assembly mandates won by the representatives of a number of politically well-organized
minorities. All other ethnic minorities do not have this right, even though it is provided in
the comparative electoral systems (Bašić, Crnjanski 2006).
The third phase of the development of “minority protection” starts with the adoption of
the Law on National Minority Councils18 in 2009. It is said that the Republic of Serbia has
not passed a law regulating the status of national minorities, and that the system of protec-
tion of national minorities is developing on an abstract multi-ethnic model. The continu-
ity of this policy is achieved by passing the Act regulating the location, jurisdiction and se-
lection of the bodies representing the interests of national minorities in the field of cultural
autonomy. Passing of this law furthermore strengthened the corporate nature of minority
protection - centralized organization of minority governments was kept, the influence
of political parties on their choices and work was institutionalized and strengthened, the
competences were defined. Some of these are inconsistent with the constitutional and
legal system,19 and in particular the multi-ethnic nature of society.
The problems arose at the very beginning, during the conduction of elections of minority
self-governments. Due to the flaws in the law, poorly organized and conducted elections
and open participation of political parties in the elections the Bosniak minority self-gov-
ernment was not constituted. The Commissioner for Information of Public Importance
and Personal Data Protection,20 the Commissioner for Equality21 and the Ombudsman22
have found numerous irregularities and violations of human rights and minority rights
during the election process.
After the constitution of minority governments the “bad practices” continued. Experience
shows that the conditions for the exercise of full autonomy are only possible for the mem-
bers of the Hungarian minority. This minority is sufficiently numerous, homogeneously
residing in the north of Vojvodina. They have strong traditional institutions in which they
17 “Official Gazette RS”, No. 35/2000, 57/2003 - decision CCRS, 72/2003, 75/2003, 18/2004, 101/2005, 85/2005,
28/2011 - decision US and 36/2011 and 104/2009)
18 “Official Gazette RS”, No. 72/2009, 20/2014 - decision US and 55/2014.
19 The Constitutional Court issued a decision which found a number of provisions unconstitutional (“Official Gazette
RS”, No. 20/2014)
20 Commissioner’s Statement from 26 April, 2010.(http://www.poverenik.rs/yu/saopstenja/889--26-03-2010.html)
21 Commissioner’s opinion on the basis of a complaint against the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights of RS for
discrimination regarding the conditions for the constitution of the National Council of Bosniak national minority
(No. 015/2010) on 11August, 2010.
22 Recommendation of 6 December, 2012. (www.pravamanjina.rs/index.php/sr/podaci/dokumenta/-/454-preporuka)
[124] Goran BAŠIĆ
can develop rights recognized by law, well-organized political party, and clearly defined
national interest. Lastly they enjoy support of both the state and their compatriots in the
Diaspora. All other ethnic minorities lack the capacity to exercise the rights recognized
by the Law on National Councils. In addition, due to the fact that they are insufficiently
numerous, due to the consequences of assimilation and other objective reasons, most of
them cannot use their recognized rights.
However, these reminders do not complete the list of issues related to the policy of multi-
culturalism in Serbia. On the contrary, there are numerous examples of weaknesses of the
policies that define the rights of national minorities. Nevertheless, these problems (the
predominant influence of political parties and centralized structure of minority govern-
ment) indicate the visible and insurmountable obstacles to the effective exercise of “mi-
nority” rights. With the amendments to the Law these problems can be easily removed,
but the delay to do so indicates a substantial obstacle - the state’s interest to “control” the
situation in relation to the complete minority policy through political parties of national
minorities.
4. IS THERE A SOLUTION?
Policy of multiculturalism in Serbia is in serious limbo. It lacks strategic basis and insti-
tutional foundation. In addition, the Constitution of Serbia defined the republic as “the
state of the Serbian people and all citizens who live in it”, which theoretically could be
explained, but it is clear that the practice is firmly based on the model of segregation of
ethnic communities. Fruitless debate has been open and still is about a broader cultural
context, which should offer alternative solutions. The pluralism of ethno-cultural monism
has suppressed civil principle that has shown itself to be successful both for the develop-
ment of democracy, the establishment of the rule of law and for the protection of identities
of indigenous and allochthonous ethno-cultural minorities. Keywords by which we can
describe the policy of multiculturalism in Serbia are: mistrust and lack of ideas.
The examples of successful solutions, but not of complete policies, regarding the estab-
lishment of multiculturalism, exist even in the region, in the practice of the protection of
rights of national minorities in Serbia. What they all have in common is that they are based
on a realistic analysis of social reality and devising solutions that are in favour of citizens.
Protecting the identity of ethno-cultural minorities is effectively realized in conditions
of development of democracy and human rights and strengthening of public awareness
about the common (public) well-being.
In the wake of such solutions, the perceptions of society and the state in relation to multicul-
turalism, as a reality that should be organized, should be established. The key is to change the
paradigm that arranges the policy of multiculturalism - it is necessary to devise a sufficiently
broad and flexible model which will favour the protection of equality of ethno-cultural iden-
tity, while at the same being sufficiently stable, attractive and open in terms of creating social
conditions for overcoming ethnocentricity. This approach is a way out of the current situa-
tion of segregated multiculturalism which adopted legislative guarantees of social toleration
of diversity, but not the acceptance of diversity as such (Bašić 2007).
In modern society there is no ethnicity that can be “immune to the virus” that due to its
primordial characteristics has a firm stronghold in the structure of multiculturalism, but
often poses a risk to public safety. However, the destructive power of ethnicity usually is
encouraged and directed by the factors that they see it as a resource for mobilization in
winning or redistributing political power and economic resources. In such process, eth-
nicity is brought to the fore in order to exert influence on the social, economic or other
policies. Ethnicity becomes mask for the real causes of the conflict.
Consociation, federalism, regionalization, decentralization, autonomy, devolution of
power from central government to regional and local, and other forms of governance in
our multi-ethnic societies and regional practices are adopted mainly under pressure from
the international community. However, even in cases where the establishment of decen-
tralized model of multi-ethnicity management is considered, the consociation democracy,
as the best outlook of this model, is usually reduced to negotiating process in which (na-
tional, political) elite has a decisive role. In other words, it is considered that the essence of
the social contract should be found in establishing the balance between centre-periphery.
Also, the centre represents the area that has the power and is ruled by values and beliefs,
and the periphery is made of the social groups that are governed.
The value system in the centre is the result of consensus, commitment to it weakens when
descending to periphery which is usually heterogeneous and has divided values. The es-
sence of consociation in this sense is not in the institutional harmonization of different in-
terests within a pluralist (multicultural) 23 society, but the consent of the leaders of its vari-
ous segments to participate in its management (Bašić 2007). Political system and relations
in Serbia are striving towards to quasi-consociative model. At the same time, the stable
development of a multicultural society requires the construction of a democratic model
in which no one, not even major ethno-cultural community has the right to represent civil
and political space exclusively in their own interests. For correcting such a model, it is
required to reach a consensus on the basis of which the model of democratic governance
that will harmonize the different interests of a pluralistic society, and develop awareness
of the public good and the importance of the state will be to establish.
Canadian experience with multiculturalism is an indicator of good management of multi-
ethnicity in contemporary society. Since 1971, the federal government developed a policy
of multiculturalism based on the normative and practical action. The base of this policy is
made out of realistic understanding of social relations and creation of a policy that is sup-
posed to provide the affirmation of different cultures and the full participation of minori-
ties in public life. Back in the mid-sixties when the problems of Francophone and Anglo-
phone were the most pronounced, the Royal Commission of experts who should study the
problem of Canadian bilingualism and biculturalism and propose optimal solutions was
formed. They aimed towards the rejection of assimilation models and policies of the melt-
ing identity, and advocated the pluralism of ethno-cultural identities that should, while
preserving features, fit the unique Canadian identity based on a multicultural mosaic of
natives, colonists, and the new wave of immigration that significantly altered the ethnic
picture of Canada. This policy of multiculturalism demanded the changes to the Constitu-
23 Although the consociational democracy is influenced by many factors, including the political system and non-insti-
tutional way of harmonizing the relations between partners, its main levers are the power of veto, proportionality
and autonomy of the segments that are intended to ensure the protection of minority interests. In order to reduce
the risks to the stability of the achieved coalition, the mechanisms for ensuring the protection of the vital interests
of minorities (veto), proportional redistribution of functions and resources and autonomy of the minority commu-
nities in matters relating to its vital interests, are established (Bašic 2011).
[126] Goran BAŠIĆ
tion and the adoption of the Law on multiculturalism,24 the change in immigration policy
and the transformation of the security system in which the specific significance was given
to the concept of human security and the safety of citizens in the immediate environment
(Remacle 2008).
24 Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 1988.

5. REFERENCES
Bašić, Goran, Multikulturalni vašar, u Teofilović, Petar (ur) (2011): Savet za međunacionalne
odnose i lokalni zaštitnik građana u multietničkim sredinama, Centar za istraživanje et-
niciteta, Beograd.
Bašić, Goran (2007): “Društveni identitet i etnokulturna politika”, u Stanovčić, Vojislav
(ur.), Položaj nacionalnih manjina u Srbiji, SANU.
Bašić, Goran (2006)” Iskušenja demokratije u multietničkim društvima, Centar zaistraživanje
etniciteta, Beograd.
Bašić, Goran, Crnjanski, Katarina (2006): Politička participacija i kulturna autonomija na-
cionalnih manjina u Srbiji, Centar za istraživanje etniciteta, Beograd.
Berghe, Pierre, L. Van der (1981): The Ethnic Phenomena, New York, Elsevier.
Chen, Lincoln C., Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, Seidensticker, Ellen (editors) (2004): Human In-
security in a Global World (Studies in Global Equity), Global Equity Initiative, Harvard
University.
Ghai, Yash (2000): Autonomy and Ethnicity. Negotiating Competing Claim in Multi-ethnic
States, Cambridge University Press.
Esposito, L. John (1992): The Islamic Threat Myth or Reality, Oxford University Press.
Jovanović, Milan (2005): “Izborni prag i stranačkisistem”, u: Lutovac, Zoran (ur.), Političke
stranke u Srbiji: struktura i funkcionisanje, FES I Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1996): The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
New York, Simon & Schuster.
Ramadan, Tarik (2007): Evro-američki muslimani – pitanja identiteta i pripadnosti,
Udruženje ilmijje IZ u BiH, Sarajevo.
Remacle, Eric (2008): “Approaches to Human Security: Japan, Canada, and Europe in
Comparative Perspective”, The Journal of Social Sciences 66.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2002): Globalization and Its Discontents, New York.
UDC 351.749:316.7
Nenad RADIVOJEVIĆ*
SAFETY CULTURE IN THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR1
Abstract: Today, countries are not the only safety providers any more. The non-state (non-
governmental, private) security sector has an increasingly important role in providing security
services. New changes caused by contemporary security challenges, risks and threats from the
end of the 20th and beginning of 21st centuries require from countries to legally establish and
enable functioning of the private security sector. This, among other things, implies giving (by
law) broader authority to private security agencies in order to effectively confront increasing and
sophisticated threats to safety of persons, property and business.
The trend of “privatisation of security” is accompanied by numerous problems, especially in
transitional countries. These problems originate from the private security sector, as well as its
surrounding. Numerous examples from practice confirm that, although there is a legal frame
related to the work of agencies for private security, there are still unwanted occurrences such as
work done in a dishonest and irresponsible way, both by security officers and security managers.
Another problem is their insufficient competence and professionalism.
There are numerous factors that affect the way in which the private security sector is established
and in which it functions, therefore this paper, apart from these factors, will show the basic ele-
ments of safety culture of employees in the sector. Furthermore, it will indicate the specificities
of the safety culture of officers and managers through the prism of legal norms related to work of
agencies for private security in the Republic of Serbia. The above mentioned has a goal to point
to directions of practical work of officers and managers, emphasising the importance and need for
constant improvement of their safety culture influencing the successfulness of achieving security.
Keywords: safety culture, private security sector, security officer, manager in private security.
1. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary safety problems from the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centu-
ries demand from countries to reorganise their systems of national security, adjusting it
to new changes. This reorganisation is followed by the process of conscious development
that the entire society (and various collectives) and individuals must assume their share
of responsibility for achieving security. In this way, non-state (non-governmental, private)
* Nenad Radivojević, Assistant, Faculty of Law Novi Sad, e-mail: n.radivojevic@pf.uns.ac.rs

[130] Nenad RADIVOJEVIĆ
security sector has an increasingly important role in offering security services, as an inte-
gral part of the system of national security.
Today, countries increasingly delegate certain jobs of (public) security to private security
sector.2 This delegation is done through law, which enables establishment, functioning
and development of private security sector. The law is the basic but not the sufficient con-
dition in realisation of this process. In this process of reorganisation and adjustment to
new security problems, safety culture plays an important role because “it teaches us that,
in every situation, one should act with extreme caution relying on personal and other peo-
ple’s experience completely following the principle of theory of security sciences” (Stajić,
Mandić 2008:206). The safety culture of national authorities, agencies for private security,
as well as their managers and security officers affects the end result, and that is achieving
the optimum state of security in a country. It should be stressed that the responsibility of
national authorities lies in legally establishing and regulating the field of private security.3
Apart from that, a country should work on and strive for constant development of aware-
ness among agencies and citizens about the need to combat threats. The existence of this
(safety) awareness is one of the basic elements of safety culture, and it reflects the degree
of development of safety culture both of a country and its citizens, and of members of pri-
vate security sector (Stajić et al. 2013).
2. SAFETY CULTURE AS A FACTOR IN ESTABLISHMENT,

FUNCTIONING AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR
The increasing and more pronounced process of “privatisation of security” in Serbia should
be followed by development of professional safety culture (Mijalković 2012) in that field.
Taking into account the fact that the activities of private security are done by profession-
ally trained people (or at least this should be the case), we can see that the safety culture is
an essential factor in functioning of the entire private security sector. In order to achieve
professionalisation, it is necessary that all people in the private sector go through adequate
education process. This includes creating and implementing education programmes in
higher education institutions, institutes and centres for research and promotion of safety
culture, drafting essential documents, including development strategies, development of
databases and national resources, implementing principles and postulates of safety culture
in safety practice and developing and strengthening technical and human (managerial and
executive) capacities (Stanarević and Bodin 2014).
2 Private security sector includes performing activities of private security and detective (investigation) activities.
Private security means offering services, i.e. performing activities of protecting persons, property and businesses
with physical and technical protection when these activities are not in the sole jurisdiction of state authorities, as
well as transport of money, value and other packages, maintaining peace on public meetings, sport events and oth-
er places where citizens gather (monitoring service), which are done by legal persons and entrepreneurs registered
for this activity, as well as legal persons and entrepreneurs that established inner form of organising security for
personal needs (self-protective activity). (Law on Private Security, Official Gazette of RS, No. 104/2013, Article 2,
paragraph 1)
3 When we discuss the responsibility of the country in terms of establishing legal frame of private security in Serbia,
we cannot ignore the fact that Serbia was the last in Europe and the region to legally regulate the field of private
security in late 2013, by adopting two system laws: Law on Private Security and Law on Detective Activity! More-
over, it should be said that these laws cannot achieve their full potential without adopting the accompanying by-
laws, which is the responsibility of the Government, Minister of Interior and Minister of Health, and which are still
not adopted, contrary to the legislation.
SAFETY CULTURE IN THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR [131]
There are numerous factors that affect the way in which private security sector will be
established and how it will function and develop, and they can affect the sector in both
positive and negative sense. These factors, in general, can be divided into factors of objec-
tive and subjective nature.
The factors of objective nature would be: (in)stability of social-economic relations in a
country: (de)criminalisation of society, degree of society democratisation in which there
is (not) a general social consensus on basic social values and directions of development;
economic development of society, especially in transition countries where it is necessary
to finish the process of privatisation and lower the number of unemployed; technological
progress; demographic changes, etc.; defined and regulated legal and political system with
developed credible institutions, systems that should reflect (security) needs and interests
of the majority in society, to determine vital values of society and state, and at the same
time to provide them protection. Law should provide forming of an appropriate business
climate that would enable founding and operation of certain companies (agencies) that
would be chosen and authorised by state to perform certain activities of (private) secu-
rity. These agencies should be allowed to obtain and use certain means (technical, coer-
cion, etc.) that will enable them adequate and unhindered performance of their activities.
Space, as a functioning factor of the private security sector, determines territorial author-
ity and responsibility of security officers. Time is also one of the factors for establishing,
functioning and developing the sector. The general condition of private security in a coun-
try depends on time4 necessary to adopt and implement general and individual acts. The
activities of a manager when it comes to adopting internal acts that will also be used to
protect people, property and business are also important.
On the other hand, the factors of subjective nature include people (persons in the private
security sector), their culture (general, organisational, safety culture, culture of business
protection, culture of work safety), competences, needs, interpersonal relationships, etc.
People perform activities of private security, and as such, with their knowledge, capabili-
ties and needs are the essential factor of all social relations. The way of executing certain
activities of private security certainly depends on their knowledge (theoretical and practi-
cal), skills, attitudes, adopted values, cultural patterns, national mentality, personal ambi-
tions and problems and relationships with other people.
4 One of the main objections of the professional public during adoption of the Law was the fact that it was adopted as
a matter of urgency, without appropriate public discussion. The issue of working hours is certainly very important.
It often happens in practice that certain security officers work more than the statutory maximum of daily and thus
weekly working hours, which on the other hand is not accompanied by adequate cost of labour. This cannot have
positive effects on psycho-physical abilities of the officers, their existence and self-affirmation.
In June 2014, the Labour Inspectorate has filed 10 misdemeanour charges against 10 private security agencies for
abuse with respect to failure to formally employ workers. Namely, out of 9,000 people employed in agencies for
physical and technical security where inspection was done, 2,700 of them are informal employees. These 2,700
people are employed based on the contract on vocational training, which is not a contract of employment. Based
on this contract, the worker does not have to be paid, and if he/she is paid it is often below the minimal labour cost.
Furthermore, under this contract, taxes and contributions do not have to be paid, except health insurance (http://
www.kombeg.org.rs/Komora/centri/c_bezbednost/Aktuelnosti.aspx, accessed on 15th June 2014). According to
some research, when compared to European states, the field of private security in the Republic of Serbia is one of
the lowest when it comes to labour cost of security services on the market, as well as earnings of employees.
3. SAFETY CULTURE IN THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR

The safety culture in private security sector includes the collection of formal and informal
professional norms, values and attitudes that function both within and outside the sector
during the interaction with the environment, and they are used to perform security tasks
(Stajić 2013). It is a specific system of values, language, ideology that brings order to every-
day work of the employees in the sector. The safety culture, among other things, contrib-
utes to defining relationships among employees in the sector, but also their relationship
with the environment.
The main goal of the safety culture in the private security sector is prevention of all forms
and carriers of endangerment, as well as their elimination if they occur. This demands
proactive work of the above mentioned subjects who should express a certain level of
development of specific safety culture, and this predominantly relates to specific knowl-
edge, skills, attitudes and adopted rules. In this way, the safety culture enables a response
to safety risks by carefully selected and proactive habits and not by improvised efforts
(Stanarević et al. 2012). Namely, the practise shows that many endangering phenomena
happened precisely due to disregard for basic principles of the safety culture. This creates
the “culture of insecurity” or “lack of safety culture” as a negative phenomenon that, on the
one hand, suits the needs of an individual, but on the other hand harms a country, compa-
nies and their property and their employees.
As main and visible negligence, which is the result of insufficiently developed safety cul-
ture, the following occur: insufficient education and training and unwillingness to admit
this; lack of investment or insufficient investment in the training of officers;5 insufficient
knowledge on international and national norms and standards of work, security proce-
dures, means of work and safety communication; disrespect for the principle of confi-
dentiality; intentional or unintentional failure to adopt internal acts that would improve
activities of protection of persons, property and business; unsuitable (non objective) as-
sessment of risks of endangered persons, property and business; interference of private
and official in performing security tasks; inadequate application and overstepping author-
ity, and especially excessive use of coercion in certain situations;6 routine and formulaic
performance of tasks; putting personal interests above interests of the company to which
services are provided, and above state (national) interests; desire to distinguish and desire
to work alone and not in a team; establishing informal relationships with persons from
criminal sphere;7 negligence, carelessness; using alcohol and other psychoactive substanc-
es, etc. (Stajić 2009).
5 It is noticeable that agencies for private security that operate in Serbia invest more in technical means than in ed-
ucation of employees, whereby the fact that only educated and trained employee can be a good employee is for-
gotten. It happens vey often that agencies demand from their employees to have certain certificates, i.e. to attend
certain (one-day) courses, which do not effectively contribute (in sense of acquiring new knowledge and skills) to
anything.
6 The case of Fedor Frimerman from Belgrade, who was, it is suspected, beaten to death by security workers in front
of the “Sound” float-bar, generated a lot of public attention. It posed numerous questions, among which the doubt
that members of hooligan groups are often employed as security workers, who are previously known to the police
and against whom numerous criminal charges were filed, starting with violent behaviour to trafficking of narcotics.
(http://www.kurir-info.rs/-clanak-908911, accessed on 1st August 2014)
7 It is not rare that carriers of endangerment to company’s property and business, individually or in cooperation with
certain criminal structures, are actually the very security officers as well as managers.
3.1. The Basics of Employees’ Safety Culture in the Private Security Sector
When we talk about workers in the private security sector, we mean private security of-
ficers, managers and holders of capital (owners of agencies for private security), who are
directly responsible for company’s functioning and execution of security tasks. The basics
of safety culture of the above mentioned persons are principally the same as the basics of
the safety culture of professional subjects of security system (Stajić et al. 2013), and what
differs in the elements of their safety culture is the nature of work they do and it is related
to specific knowledge, attitudes, skills and rules necessary for realisation of safety function
in the domain of their competence.
The degree of development of employees’ safety culture in the private security sector is
reflected in the existence of awareness about the need to respect certain principles. These
principles are: expertise, responsibility, legality, ethics, gradualism and proportionality in
the application of coercion means, truth, objectivity and thoroughness in acting, system-
atic and economical in work, timeliness, secrecy and transparency, cooperation, continu-
ity and elasticity (Stajić et al. 2013 and Stevanović 2012).
Disregard for the principle of expertise (competence) is perhaps one of the biggest problems
which occur in the private security sector. Namely, in order to perform private security
tasks in an adequate way, it is necessary that persons in the sector have theoretic and then
practical knowledge. This is knowledge of security, legal and technical sciences. Primarily,
they need to have elementary knowledge about key notions of security sciences such as:
the notion of security, vital value of society, sources, forms and carriers of endangerment
of persons, property and business, notion and elements of security system structure of the
national security system, etc. This knowledge is acquired through regular education (espe-
cially in high education institutions), and it is developed and improved during later addi-
tional training and self-education. The Law on Private Security8 lays down the conditions9
that have to be met by legal persons and entrepreneurs as well as natural persons in order
to obtain licences for establishing and performing certain operations of private security.
Responsibility in work, and especially during performance of private security actions, is
most certainly one of the key elements of the safety culture of officers. The responsibil-
ity of managers should not be forgotten or disregarded, because their business moves in-
fluence the success of the very agency. When we say “responsibility at work”, we mean
self-responsibility, self-awareness and especially conscious actions in executing security
tasks. It is vital to act in conscious and responsible manner when applying coercion means,
when managing material-technical means (official and those that are protected) and cer-
tain (secret) data which are available during performance of tasks, etc. The special atten-
tion should be given to the use of official fire arms, because their misuse can lead to self-
endangerment, the endangerment of colleagues and employees that work in the object
that is secured or persons that are secured, the endangerment of third persons and their
property, as well as murder.
8 Official Gazette of RS, no. 104/2013, Articles 10 and 12.

9 It is interesting to mention the legal provision according to which a responsible person (manager) needs to have at
least secondary education in order to obtain licence, the same as safety officer as an immediate executor of work.
This will only maintain the absurd situation in practice so far, and that direct executors of work have higher educa-
tion than their managers! We think that the future amendments to the Law should include a provision that stipu-
lates that responsible persons must have at least high education from the field of security, law or technical sciences.
When we talk about the principle of law, i.e. following this principle, it should be pointed
out that the Republic of Serbia has waited for a long time to adopt the Law on Private Secu-
rity. At last, for the first time in Serbia, an umbrella law that comprehensively regulates the
entire area has been adopted. With regard to this, following the principle of law means that
all by-laws from this field should be in accordance with the Law. Following the principle of
law means achieving the goals of existence and functioning of the private security sector as
an integral part of the entire national security system (protection of objective law, protection
of persons, property and business, protection of freedom and rights of citizens, etc.).
The principle of ethics means respecting norms set out by law, but also norms set out by
the “higher law”. It is the question of following certain written and unwritten patterns of
behaviour and acting (the code of professional ethics). In late 2010, the Association for
Private Security within the Serbian Chamber of Commerce adopted the Code of Profes-
sional Ethics of Private Security. All members of the association10 must be familiar with the
provisions of the Code, the disregard of which entails liability. The Court of Honour of the
competent chamber of commerce decides in case of (non)compliance with the Code as a
first instance authority.
Following the principle of gradualism and proportionality in the application of coercion
means leads to the fact that when using certain coercion means11 there are no violations of
human rights and freedoms and at the same time persons and property are protected. The
principle of gradualism comes from the fact that, depending on the situation, one always
starts using ‘milder’ coercion means and goes to ‘stronger’. This also means that before us-
ing coercion means, one will use other measures stipulated by law (warning, order, etc.).
The principle of proportionality means that, taking into consideration the concrete cir-
cumstances in which he/she is, a security officer will use those coercion means which lead
to successful protection of persons and property but with the mildest consequences to the
safety of person on which they are applied.
Following the principle of truth especially comes to the fore when establishing the truth on
sources, forms and carriers of endangerment of persons, property and business (the area of
risk assessment). This will further lead to making the adequate plans for security. Disregard-
ing this principle often leads to wrong allocation of human and material resources, which
leads to material losses, possibility that carriers of endangerment avoid responsibility, and
even the possibility of endangering security officers and persons and property they protect.
The principle of truth is closely related to the principles of objectivity and thoroughness in
acting, because only objective observation of circumstances when identifying threats to
persons, property and business can lead to the adequate security plan. This principle is
often disregarded due to ignorance, non-professionalism in work, bias or self interest oc-
curring as a result of so called informal structure. In order to follow the principle of objec-
tivity, one must first follow the principle of thoroughness in acting that avoids superficial,
formulaic and routine identification of threats, and thus performance of security tasks.
To follow the principle of systematic approach within the context of the private security
sector means to comply with certain actions that always precede each other (security pro-
10 The non-members do not have to comply with the provisions of this Code.
11 Article 46, paragraph 1, point 7 of the Law on Private Security lays down the coercion means: means of restraint,
physical force, specially trained dogs and fire arms.
cedures). Depending on whether they are applied preventively or repressively, there are
safety procedures in the field of: controlling access to objects, data and documentation,
transporting money and other valuable shipments, dealing with suspects and securing the
scene in case of a criminal offence, fire and other accidents, etc. (Mandić 2012).
Economical work means that agencies only take measures, actions and procedures (within
the legal boundaries) that are truly necessary for a successful performance of tasks. In this
way, they save time, financial resources (both their own and of their clients) as well as en-
gagement of workforce. In this way they become more competitive on the market, while
saved financial resources can be used to obtain new technical means necessary for work as
well as for education of their employees.
Following the principle of timeliness of action can be seen from the point of view of preven-
tion and repression. When we talk about preventive measures we discuss the activities of
adopting internal acts that will enable the implementation of the Law. Managers, as well as
professional associations, play an important role in this, because not only are they expect-
ed to initiate, but also to actively participate in their adoption. On the other hand, officers
are expected to timely perceive and prevent certain threatening events by their active en-
gagement, but also to act repressively in case when threatening events already happened.
Respecting the principle of secrecy in work means having awareness about the importance
of keeping certain data secret (trade secret) which was accessed during performance of
certain tasks, and which can harm the client, agency, or the officer or some other person.
Each activity undertaken within industrial and commercial activities results in disclosure,
obtaining, i.e. use of information that is a trade secret without consent of the holder of
trade secret and in a way contrary to the law and good business practices will be con-
sidered part of unfair competition.12 Disclosing data marked as secret can be intentional
or unintentional, and the reasons are numerous, starting with political and material to
negligence, recklessness, carelessness and unprofessionalism, which reflect low level of
the safety culture. Transparency in work is one of the main principles of each democratic
society. It is undisputed that the public has the right to know whether the private security
sector acts in accordance with its authorities given by laws and by-laws. The public in that
way performs an informal control over the sector.
The principle of cooperation in the private security sector includes interaction and offer-
ing support among the agencies, between agencies and their clients, as well as between
agencies and national authorities (predominantly the police) in prevention of crime. This
cooperation should be organised and permanent, and it is mostly based on timely ex-
change of information. By doing their preventive and repressive function, the police can
often obtain certain knowledge in the sense of vulnerability of certain persons, property
or business. Furthermore, the police can determine certain failures in security of certain
companies, and they will notify managers of agencies for private security about that and
offer them help in eliminating these failures. Apart from these preventive activities, coop-
eration is based on repressive domain in situations after certain crimes have been commit-
ted (capturing perpetrators, securing sites, offering relevant information to shed light on
cases, testimony at court, etc.).
12 The Law on Protection of Trade Secrets, Official Gazette of RS, no. 72/2011, Article 8, paragraph 1.
The principle of continuity means permanent presence of security officers in the field, as
well as permanent undertaking of actions and measures in their jurisdiction. Continuity in
performing security tasks is achieved by: organising shift presence of officers in the field,
adopting security plans based on adequate security assessment, keeping radio communica-
tion with the command centre, as well as with the police, fire brigade, health services, etc.
Permanent monitoring and assessment of risks to persons, property and business enables
managers and security officers to timely adjust to all changes. This means that the entire
sector and employees in it have to follow the principle of elasticity. Sometimes concrete
circumstances in which security officers find themselves dictate a deviation from the plan.
This is in accordance with the fact that there are no completely identical security events,
which demands from the officers to take urgent measures in order to adjust to changes in
a way that they are prevented or suppressed.
3.2. Specificities of Employees’ Safety Culture in the Private Security Sector

Specificities of the safety culture of managers are predominantly related to their expertise
with regard to performing functions of management. The main factors of management
in the private security sector 13 should be supplemented with the safety culture, which
apart from organisational culture, contributes to achieving security function in the protec-
tion of persons, property and business. With regard to this, the safety culture of managers
predominantly includes: the attitude that only diligent, expert and responsible approach
to work can contribute to optimum condition of security in society; awareness about re-
specting the Code of the Professional Ethics of Private Security; taking a stand on the need
for sanctioning each unprofessional action of officers that can endanger human rights and
freedoms, their property and business; avoiding contacts and making informal connec-
tions with persons from criminal environment; avoiding tasks that are incompatible with
official duty; knowing the state of security on the territory on which an agency performs
certain tasks, which includes knowing all potential sources, forms and carriers of endan-
germent of persons, property and business; giving priority to preventive actions with re-
gard to repressive actions; making criteria for evaluating the results of work (including
mechanisms for rewarding and sanctioning); respecting security requests when employ-
ing new officers; raising awareness in officers about the necessity to respect human rights
and freedoms when performing tasks; consistent implementation of legal norms related to
operation of an agency and performing security tasks; strict adherence to legal and inter-
nal acts related to treatment of data qualified as a trade secret (by the agency and clients);
giving equal priority to protection of both material and non-material property; checking
credit rating of potential clients; permanent self-education, especially monitoring current
expert and scientific reading from the field of safety, law and technical sciences; reporting
to competent authorities the cases of overstepping and misuse of authority (initiation of
disciplinary, misdemeanour and criminal liability); avoiding unprofessional contacts with
officers, clients and disabling friendships and similar relationships to affect professional
performance of tasks; adopting appropriate security procedures, which will be accom-
panied with appropriate methods and means of officers’ work; preparing and adopting
13 The main factors of management in all organisations, and thus in the private security sector, are: authority, respon-
sibility, trust, discipline, moral (ethics), time, space (Stevanović, 2012).
control plans; avoiding routine and formulaic implementation of control; implementa-

tion of effective and direct control over the employees’ work (direct monitoring when
performing tasks); informing immediate superiors and agency owners, clients as well as
public with work results, conducted controls, as well as with potential measures that were
taken; criticising and praising of officers in order to improve performance in the future;
permanent monitoring of condition in the organisation unit through the exchange of in-
formation with clients, other agencies, state authorities (police, municipal police, sector
for emergencies, healthcare institutions, etc.), conducting unannounced and emergency
controls, etc.; provide assistance to state authorities in achieving security function.
On the other hand, the specificities of officers’ safety culture are predominantly related to
the needs of their performing tasks. It is different from the safety culture of managers pri-
marily in specific authorities and responsibilities. Therefore, the safety culture of security
officers includes: consistent implementation of the Law, the Code of Professional Ethics
of Private Security and security procedures; behaving (at work and outside of it) in a way
that raises the reputation of the entire private security sector; responsible and diligent
treatment of official emblems and coercion means; restraining from unnecessary force;
permanent maintenance and improvement of mental and physical abilities; respecting the
members of certain minority groups; the knowledge of certain rules of verbal and non-
verbal communication at work;14 avoiding tasks that are incompatible with official duty;
avoiding contacts with persons from criminal environment; not mixing private and busi-
ness; not consuming alcohol and narcotics; permanent tracking of domestic and foreign
reading related to tasks they perform.
4. CONCLUSION
Numerous cases of negligence of agencies and their managers and officers occurred due to
disregard for basic principles of the safety culture. This behaviour caused material damage
but also the damages to the image and reputation of agencies, the entire private security
sector and clients to whom the services were offered. The above mentioned indicates that
certain agencies still do not realise the essence and importance of the safety culture as
a new, unique, unavoidable, necessary and increasingly important factor for functioning
and development of the private security sector. By knowing the concept of safety culture,
the managers and security officers enable the creation of adequate safety awareness on
the need to establish, preserve and improve security in the field of protection of persons,
property and business. This will enable the adoption of appropriate strategies, plans and
security procedures as well as their implementation in everyday work, which will have the
ultimate goal to achieve security function.
The promotion and development of the safety culture in the private security sector must
be actively supported by state authorities, educational institutions and of course manag-
ers in agencies. It is necessary to implement basic theoretical postulates of safety culture
concept in education that future managers and officers will have to go through in order to
obtain appropriate working licences. In this way, the adopted base of safety culture could
14 On the importance of non-verbal communication for successful performance of security tasks in the private secu-
rity sector, see: Ljuština, A. (2013). Neverbalna komunikacija i bezbednosna kultura u sistemu obezbeđenja lica i
imovine, Bezbednost, 40(1), 98-108.
be upgraded in everyday work, additional education, self-education to the extent when

they evolve into professional safety culture in the private security sector.
5. REFERENCES
Ljuština, A. (2013). Neverbalna komunikacija i bezbednosna kultura u sistemu obezbeđenja

lica i imovine, “Bezbednost”, 40(1), 98-108.
Mandić, G. (2012): Osnovi sistema obezbeđenja pravnih lica, Beograd: Fakultet bezbed-
nosti.
Mijalković, S. (2012): “Tranzicija kulture nacionalne bezbednosti u posthladnoratovskom
međunarodnom ambijentu”, Kultura polisa: časopis za negovanje demokratske političke
kulture, godina IX, posebno izdanje 1, 273-287.
Stajić, Lj. (2013): Osnovi sistema bezbednosti - sa osnovama istraživanja bezbednosnih po-
java, Novi Sad: Pravni fakultet u Novom Sadu.
Stajić, Lj. (2009): Uloga i značaj bezbednosne kulture u izgradnji bezbednosti države. U:
Srbija – bezbednosni i institucionalni izazovi, Beograd: Institut za političke studije.
Stajić, Lj., Mijalković, S., i Stanarević, S. (2013): Bezbednosna kultura, Novi Sad: Pravni
fakultet u Novom Sadu.
Stajić, Lj., i Mandić, G. (2008): Sistem zaštite imovine i poslovanja, Novi Sad: Pravni fakultet
u Novom Sadu.
Stanarević, S., i Bodin, M. (2014): „Bezbednosna kultura kao društveni resurs nacionalne
bezbednosti”, Vojno delo, (1) proleće, 84-104.
Stanarević, S., Gačić, J. i Jakovljević, V. (2012): „Integrisanje koncepta safety i security
kulture u korporativnu bezbednost”, Godišnjak Fakulteta bezbednosti, 147-163.
Stevanović, O. (2012): Rukovođenje u policiji, Beograd: Kriminalističko-policijska aka-
demija.
Zakon o privatnom obezbeđenju, Službeni glasnik RS, broj 104/2013.
Zakon o zaštiti poslovne tajne, Službeni glasnik RS, broj 72/2011.
http://www.kombeg.org.rs/Komora/centri/c_bezbednost/Aktuelnosti.aspx
http://www.kurir-info.rs/-clanak-908911
UDC 351.78-057.86
Ljubinka KATIĆ*
PROPERTIES OF PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY

IN THE HUMAN SECURITY FIELD1
Abstract: During the past decades, scientific community of researchers in the field of security is
open towards human security concept. New approach requires breaking exclusive security “pro-
viders” closed circle and entry of civil professionals in the field of safety, along with the profes-
sionals from other social and life disciplines. Professional performance of any competence, being
considered warranty of quality, on the other hand requires constant diligence to prevent entry of
incompetent, unauthorized or inappropriate entities into reserved professional authority realm.
In the present paper, the author attempts to show how, under the modern conditions, in the
professionalization degree appraisal, information potential of profession’s structural elements
needs to be reinforced through the analysis of required professional action properties: authority,
autonomy and altruism.
By implementing rigorous form of professionalization idea, which had been insisting that numer-
ous formal conditions were met, the human security field would be left without professionaliza-
tion option. Insisting on education and knowledge based authority, autonomy against external
pressures and altruism as the foundation of professional ethics, make the humanism of human
security idea the constitutive part of professionalism. By firmly linking security with humanity
as the core, many traditional security practices may be considered misuse of profession, or even
professional pathology. The manner of professional activities performance, based on “three A”
mentioned above, allows for the participation of ever-growing group of people in professional
expertise, independently of meeting perhaps somewhat anachronous structural profession deter-
minants, since the expertise field is ever-expanding.
Keywords: human security, professionalization, professionalization dimensions
Homo mensura
Pythagoras
1. INTRODUCTION
“Only a good person can be a good doctor.” Medical historian, Professor Vera Gavrilovic,
PhD, had been greeting numerous generations of students with these words, indicating
* Ljubinka Katić, PhD, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies. E-mail: ljkatic@gmail.com
[140] Ljubinka KATIĆ
the essence of one of the oldest and the most appreciated professions. Although paral-
lels cannot be fully drawn between medical profession, being one of the most developed,
and other less developed professions, being the majority striving towards the profession
status in the security field, inseparability of ethical and professional is a condition, some-
times even the primary one, considered by the professional sociologists to be necessary
in order to consider professional activity status. Professionalization degree is being ap-
praised by the development of structure constituting a profession, along with the criteria
that are harder to measure, including fundamental ethics, minima moralia, authority and
autonomy. For that purpose, the professions in the field of security should not be excep-
tion in any way against other professions, or else they should accept indeterminate status
of half-professions.
Modern understanding of security constantly expands the field of security studies obser-
vation and consequentially grows apart from traditional-realistic view of the security is-
sues. The point of culmination for this expansion is promoting human security concept,
introducing new actors in the focus of security research and practice – individuals. Such
nearly endless expansion causes numerous analytical difficulties, which were plentiful in
the security field as it was. Introduction of individuals as the independent security sub-
jects includes the events and processes in the common theoretical framework, which are
founded upon various philosophical assumptions, guided by various principles and aim-
ing at hardly adjustable goals. One of the consequences of merging insights having the
reference object in state security and its needs with the perspective observant of the same
needs of communities, individuals, even environment, involves dramatic expansion of the
number and types of social groups that can be considered for security assurance and provi-
sion. The major problem is probably due to the fact that perception of threat and relevant
object of security have social, cultural and historical causes, thus being dependant of po-
litical and economic power of privileged security stance. For that reason, it is hard to single
out one aspect of threat without weakening another, commonly conflicting theme. The
definitions of threat and object of protection further indicate all other significant security
elements, such as the methods to achieve security and the subjects invited to provide it. Hu-
man security is still a concept under development, being deeply humane as per its orienta-
tion to humans and environment, however with numerous unknown solutions, making it
malleable resource of manipulations.
One of the difficulties and obstacles in human security development is unclear institution-
al and staffing framework of various security subjects, along with intersections and depar-
tures of competences among traditional and modern security providers. Trying to under-
stand the logic of operation for all relevant participants discovers various foundations for
their authority, various intellectual backgrounds, different sensibilities and focuses, along
with numerous common requirements, predominantly referring to professionalism and
ethical professional activity.
2. SECURITY CONCEPT AND STAFFING CONSEQUENCES

The human security concept often invokes heated debates. Some consider it to be analyti-
cally weak, insufficiently distinctive against similar concepts, even useless; while others
see it as a sole trap of the rich and developed world, politically motivated by “strategic”
intentions that, under the cape of security concerns, maintain their own domination. The
IN THE HUMAN SECURITY FIELD [141]
advocates of this concept recognize strong potential for individual perspective affirmation
which had been neglected within, as a rule, while favoring various collectivistic concepts.
Without initiating a major debate on the nature of human security, we may conclude that
it was not a mere myth in the past twenty years; instead, it is the concept:
• Promoted from the highest international level (UNDP 1994);
• Rooted in scientific-research community of researchers in the field of security; and
• That is objective, finding its application in foreign politics of some states, predomi-
nantly Canada, Japan and Norway (Tanner 2006; Alkire 2006).
Some of the dilemmas in personalized approach to security have common origins with
other social-humanistic and political sciences, or are resulting from sketchy discourse they
provide. The debates on state-centric or human-centric security approach are inseparable
from comprehension of the national state roles in modern world, the nature of power, the
character of state governance and its relation towards an individual, the roles of subjects
in modernization processes and other similar, still more or less ideologically forced ap-
proaches. All of these note their own reasons for and against, which are included in deci-
sion-making equation for determination of security, its issues, how those issues should be
solved, who is invited to solve them and, the most importantly, which approach will have
priority in the event of conflict.
In the historical perspective, the issues of security were merely the question of war and
peace for centuries. Undoubtedly, there is a permanent and strong connection between
the rule of weapon and the rule in general, showing the signs of weakening only recently.
Social composition of armies, even “warlords” was indicative of social structure of ori-
gin. Officer’s service was not profession for centuries; instead, it was a hobby or honour,
source of prestige or profit. The development of society and warfare had established the
systems of educations of officers, since the performance of this duty had been increasingly
requiring professionalism, thus the staff had, under certain circumstances, been expanded
by capable persons from lower social groups. Traditional security professions, being mili-
tary and police, remain the only forces expected to provide security for a long period –
only for the ruler at first, and for the society as a whole subsequently.
Social-political changes after bourgeois revolutions had been gradually strengthening the
principle of civil control of military affairs, which need to be constantly defended up until
the present day. The inclusion of citizens and intellectuals in deliberation of security mo-
tives may be symbolically followed since their engagement in Dreyfus affair.2 Scientific
narrative on security quite consistently starts from individual strategic studies, followed
by studies of mutual relations, without being exhausted. The debate on multitude of top-
ics from security corpus is an important ingredient in social, philosophical, political, his-
torical, psychological and general cultural discourse, thus the answers to the questions
imposed originate from various disciplinary standpoints, being motivated by various theo-
retical, ideological or practical needs. If a given concept is convincing enough, it finds the
advocates in the security discourse. Some of the examples illustrating such transfer may
2 More fame than the affair itself was assigned to Zola’s text “J’accuse”, bringing the intellectuals’ role in public life
into focus (Zola, E, Optužujem, Beograd, Rad, 1955). The very term of intellectual of the time involves not only
knowledge, but the values dimension as well. An intellectual is considered to be the person of thoughtful action,
not only in the name of public prosperity – on behalf of human values as well. For that meaning, intellectual and
professional have numerous common points.
reach consistent development of basic scientific disciplines’ assumptions. This will be in-
dicated through several selected topics.
What outcomes can the philosophical stance in security discourse lead which, for exam-
ple, believes that all subjects may only exist independently, while all collective subjects are
to be considered abstractions, against the opposition? Accepting the rights of collective
entities may similarly be considered as partial or total dismissal of individual’s rights con-
stituting collective. Even more direct link in the conclusion chain on numerous security
motives originates from understandings of state, its role and sovereignty in contemporary
conditions. Security issues have different observations from state and individual perspec-
tive. Let us mention, for example, the issue of illegal immigrants mostly discussed from the
state standpoint – however, not any state – mostly wealthier and developed states, against
the countries of immigrants’ origin, instead of human security of misfortunate individuals
at hand. In state-centric security approach, there is a predominant criminalizing of migra-
tions, thus experts working in this field are lawyers, customs officers, members of military
and security services, while in human-centric approach, hiring humanitarian workers,
social workers, medical professionals, teachers and other professions would be more ap-
propriate, to contribute to preventive mitigation and subsequent resolution of problems.
In the majority of national security strategies, even if mentioned, human security, expect-
edly, is not treated equally with national security.3 Even though the state had been created
to provide security to its citizens, history and modern age testify that it may be, due to
its own strength or weakness, the cause of their insecurity. Assumption of nanny-state or
even utilization of mother-child metaphor (Booth 2007:196) indicates that the priority
of state is to satisfy the needs of the citizens. When the metaphor is no longer in play and
the field is switched to the particular politics, political transfer, this thought may invoke
infantilism of individual, followed by the same analogy for certain nations, disadvantaged
classes, genders, with emancipation being taken care of at national or super-national level,
mostly beyond or above themselves. Another theme with unavoidable reflection to the
security in general, especially human security, originates from the discussions on state
sovereignty erosion. Opposed standpoints start from the theses on the end of the state,
down to the lack of sustainability of belief that the states are gradually being replaced by
other actors. Shaken authority of national state, given in Billig’s warning (Billig 2009), is
not equally distributed – the most powerful global force does not hesitate to strengthen it.
The goal of quoting the selected examples is not to generalize them to all individual themes
from the security corpus – it is to illustrate the importance of collecting and accumulat-
ing knowledge obtained by other sciences through long and slow process. Advancement
in security studies should rest not only on addition of previous knowledge, but also on
rearranging and reconsidering it. Differentiating political, economic and other interests;
ideologies and sciences, being disciplinary roots of security sciences, would significant-
ly contribute to their development, if these sciences are divisible at all. Understanding
theoretical foundations and concepts for security sciences establishment is not possible
otherwise. The distribution of scientific universe of discourse firstly goes towards social-
humanistic science theorists. This broad staffing pool is the place to look for actors to
3 There is an impression that the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia holds this as decoration, with-
out consistent appraisal of threats and risks, although it had been defined as one of the fundamentals of national
security policy at declarative level (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, 2009).
cooperate with professionals in specialized security disciplines on holistic comprehension

of complex security problems – human security in particular.
The scope of various security problem areas is being intensively expanding by including
human security concept in the security discourse. The origins and reference framework of
this multi-dimensional concept dramatically change staffing scope, the ways and methods
to achieve security. Traditional occupations in the field of security are neither the only
nor the self-explanatory actors capable4 of providing dignity of daily human life and qual-
ity of environment, while providing safety and peace. Human security concept had been
promoted through relatively random, however presently familiar, seven dimensions: per-
sonal, economic, environmental, political, community security, health and food security
(UNDP 1994:24-33). These dimensions “are mutually augmenting; giving up on one com-
ponent may obstruct achieving others” (Hampson 2006:46). However, relevant aspects
are characterized not only by the mutual augmentation syndrome, whether positive or
negative, but also the fact that strengthening one component may indicate weakening of
the other; or strengthening one component in certain part of the world may weaken the
same dimension elsewhere, in spite of ever-growing interdependence. The quoted Human
Development Report by the United Nations also lists six major threats to human security:
undisturbed population growth, growing economic discrepancies, migration pressures,
environment degradation, narcotics and other harmful substances trade, and international
terrorism (Hampson 2006:34-37). The already broad list of experts invited to resolve tra-
ditional security problems is expanded to the professions in the field of social work, de-
mography, education, economy, environment, life sciences, technical disciplines, etc. The
list is still incomplete. The contribution to security thought arrives from the highest reli-
gious leaders – the definition of security threats provided by the last Human Development
Report indicates Pope’s statement that people “are not jeopardized only by terrorism, re-
pressions and murders; but also by the economic structure that creates other inequities”
(UNDP 2014:24).
The issues of security, human security in particular, are so fundamental they should and
could not easily be left to any narrow circle of professionals. Similar to numerous other
complex issues in modern world, the human security issues break disciplinary boundaries
for individual professions, thus becoming the interest of all thinking persons.
3. CROSS BETWEEN TWO ROFESSIONALIZATION TENDENCIES

Since Medieval time and occurrence of first universities, professions are considered to be
the product of scientific comprehension of societal and natural phenomena. The majority
of sociological determinants of structural profession analysis first note the necessity of high
“degree of fundamental theories and techniques development, constituting systematically
rounded sum of knowledge about a given subject, thus becoming the foundation of profes-
sional action” (Turner, Hodge, from: Sporer 1990:15). In fact, the degree of high, university
knowledge level, especially predominant type of knowledge, “prominent presence or prac-
tical absence of theoretical (abstract, generalizing, topical) knowledge (Bolčić 2003:72),
indicates the decision of professionalization, i.e. transition of an occupation into profession.
4 In Serbian language, term kadar is often used to designate a group of usually professional workers in a field of work,
while the adjective designates someone capable, in full strength.
This provision is a mere condition sine qua non of profession, but certainly not the only
condition for it to be accepted. Occurrence of professions in the field of security, strictly
pursuant to the first condition, is not related to educated officers’ emergence; instead, it
covers the beginnings of security scientific thought, predominantly through mutual rela-
tions studies. Traditional security professions, being military and police are usually quali-
fied as half-professions or semi-professions – not for the lack of professionalism, but for the
lack of autonomy (Kučuk 1993:97), as an important property of professional activity. The
inclusion of security studies in the university curricula is an opportunity that may remain
unused for the security activities to be performed professionally. That firstly depends on
social conditions constituting the background of professional activity, including the devel-
opment of the plural of security studies, along with the stances, knowledge and intellectual
honesty of researchers involved. For starters, we are interested in flows of human security
professionalization, being a complex field with multitude of scientific foundations.
Contemporary professionalization of security works is the joint between two historical
tendencies flowing in parallel for a long time. Beginnings of professionalization came from
universal, liberal education, free from pressure of dependence from clients, economic co-
ercion and even the work itself. It was believed that only a narrow, exclusive group of
aristocrats was dignified enough to access professions, being the only ones predetermined
for administrative or educative functions. Classical university education was general, non-
specific, creating intellectuals capable of dealing with premises of sovereignty and free-
dom.5 The reality of society industrial development had soon pushed forward the need
for knowledge related to certain production processes, leading to professions branch-
ing – university-founded (universalistic type) and guild, trade-founded (specialist type).
The specialization of skills and increased departmentalization of science in modern world
leads some of the theorists towards the conclusion that the modern university gets the
properties of trade organization, while the classical university, as the universal knowledge
foundation, is being left aback (Liessmann 2009).
Establishing modern security professions, founded on science, had originated both from
universalistic type of education, and as the skill that had received theoretical base through
the development of science. The broadness of the subject covered by security sciences,
especially the ones constituting human security background, open the issue of the degree
to which the security studies are mere academic disciplines, and how far they develop
their clearly recognizable expertise. The application of scientific achievements in secu-
rity practice would consist of all those disciplines and possible professions in the security
field. Scientific foundation of security is within the social-humanistic sciences field broadly
overcoming them, along with technical-technological or procedural aspects of security
(Cvetković 2010). Although those aspects are not neutral regarding theory or value choic-
es, humanistic education is the necessary ingredient for the idea of humanity, humaneness
and human dignity.
Globally, the first security studies are the topic right after the World War II, gaining the
academic discipline status in former Yugoslavia in centrifugal manner, by centralized deci-
5 Universitas had been designated association, community of the ones teaching and the ones learning, with great de-
gree of independence from secular or church authorities, own courts, monopoly to issue diplomas, etc. The foun-
dations of intellectual education had been studies of artes liberals for centuries, followed by long-term learning pro-
cess of law, medicine and theology on top (Balsmeier, Fischer 2006).
sion stipulating that since 1975, the departments of defence had been established as the
security segments in all former republics, apart from Montenegro. Their links with social
sciences is indicating by situating departments with the faculties of social studies (Slove-
nia, Macedonia) and faculties of political sciences (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). To-
day’s Faculty of Security Studies in Belgrade was the only one established as an independ-
ent university subject, after being located at the Faculty of Life and Mathematical Sciences
for a short period. In past four decades, the changes in social circumstances had mostly
changed the nature of these studies in line with the development of science, mostly broad-
ening them towards the integral security field. In some environments, the departments
were closed (Croatia), while in the others, the new faculty of security studies had been
established along the existing ones, as the successors of former police academies (Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia), often taking narrow view of security. Compared
to socially-humanistic narrative of security studies, these dislocations are being regres-
sion, or a specialist, trade-type professional direction at least. Unlike socially-humanistic
approach, the application of procedural, professional knowledge obtained by operative
staff from formal police or military academy often requires efficiency, while sometimes
lacking in scientific or ethic foundations.
Understanding of individual security perspective is neither damaged, nor covered only by
such practically focused, but even the most comprehensive security studies. As suggested
by human-centric approach, the security of individual human life or environment secu-
rity may be sought only at the intersection of nearly all scientific disciplines. So can this
unbound, comprehensive concept be reconciled with the other structural requirement of
profession development noted by Turner and Hodge (Tanner 2006:15) – strengthening mo-
nopoly over professional expertise? The control of profession entry/sustainability is gener-
ally reflected in prescribing education level and type, using specific professional vocabu-
lary, administrative preferences in employment, system of degrees verifying the right to
perform certain activities, etc. In the human security field, monopoly may be effective only
if it is multiplied through each profession active in human security field. Narrow security
professions are even less developed than some other professions for that purpose. Among
numerous professions that should engage in individual human security dimensions, there
are some of the most developed, such as law and medicine, and other, less developed pro-
fessions. Each of the professions is competent for the quality of its own segment of activi-
ties, yet not always having complete awareness of the contribution to human security. As
a course or part thereof, human security is not studied at all faculties and departments of
security (Katić 2011), with the rest of academic public not being too far from laymen re-
garding the knowledge about this concept. In some environments, this is due to the lack of
understanding, and somewhere it is a conscious rejection, occurring due to the suspicion
that human security may turn into the screen that may obscure more important security
problems.
It appears that this complex subject matter provides for one possible path of profession-
alization – the cooperation between multitudes of more or less recognizable professions
sourcing their legitimacy from their own scientific foundations. Under the conditions of
nearly unlimited possibilities for learning and interpolation of experiences among differ-
ent scientific disciplines, it would be anachronous to intentionally silence or exclude any
professional, educated and interested individual, organization or profession from the se-
curity discourse. Such move would be against the best social interest. In a certain sense,
there is an assumption that even laymen are participating in joint political decision making
about the issues of human security, for which they are the bottom line recipients.
The professional expertise of philosophers, sociologists, demographists or historians,
equally as the one provided from the broad field of management, medicine, IT, biology
or finance, should constitute the complementary field, and together with accumulated
expert knowledge from specialized security fields. The thing that can be done by science
and professionals in such a political field such as security is to search for truth and to com-
municate it. In spite of numerous verification that it is in fact “the truth as the science goal
is elaborated only on Sundays” (Liessmann 2009:32), professional ethics is the category
that cannot be overstated. Common mishap of the majority of social and cultural scientific
disciplines refers to the human security field – political decision-makers gladly consider
their results, only if they can “envelop” political interests, i.e. if they give an ideological
service promise. These promises are often kept. It is no accident that staffing corpus of
security professionals contains so many political advisors, high governmental officers, and
former (and future) politicians.
The development degree of other structural elements of the profession, such as being rec-
ognized by the public or organization of professional associations may also be considered in
the context of individual professions only, which participate in the field of human security.
As a form of association in multi-functional concept of human security, it may be consid-
ered only conditionally in the context of Human Security Network, which unifies various
organizations and approaches. As for being recognized by the public, traditional security
professions are better developed than civilian professions in the security field, especially
other professions participating in the human security field action. Their symbolical sys-
tems of uniforms, emblems and ranks are the parallel to civil function of titles, serving
both external recognition and accentuating internal stratification.
Analytical appropriateness of professionalization degree determination for certain profes-
sions through its structural determinants streamlines the majority of researchers towards
the analysis of the said structures. Our research methods are not neutral, although they
are commonly the result of repeating verified practices or canonized texts, they can still
be the indicator of concealed or unconscious rejection to face the truths, which can be
unpleasant. More appropriate and richer knowledge-wise would be to decide on profes-
sionalization based on the components that are more difficult to measure, regarding meet-
ing formal conditions, with multiple methods to perform professional activities. Relatively
independent security sciences, especially in the human security context, are yet to gain
coherency and integrity. The scope of studying is here still being built and extended, thus
deeper, qualitative methods keep being delayed. In order to alleviate this and indicate the
property that is particularly important and specific for professions, yet lacking from the
previous classifications, some sociologists introduce another dimension of profession –
degree of professional ethics development (Županov, Šporer 1986:32). This dimension
encompasses all of the profession characteristics. If the request is observed from formal
stance, it is expected for the professions to have the established ethical codes of conduct,
and to essentially perform their activities in ethically acceptable and altruistic manner. The
very example of this professionalization level is the easiest for comprehending the impor-
tance of internalizing professional prescriptions. It is possible to imagine professions with
numerous members having the best education, whose monopoly on work performance
does not jeopardize other professions at all, being accepted by the recipient environment
and preferred by the state for employment in certain sector, yet performing their work in
a routine, or even socially unacceptable manner. To avoid that structure from serving to
protect cocooned wisdom instead of quality work performance, we are obliged to note
altruistic and ethical action as the primary, inherent property of professional.
4. BEING THE PROFESSIONAL

Speaking of professionalization of any activity performance commonly refers to the ten-
dencies of a profession or group thereof to raise standards of their operation in various
manners. At the imaginary continuum starting at occupation and resulting in profession,
there are numerous transitional states, being the most common in the occupation/profes-
sion practice. The members of professions in medieval past were clearly separated from
society by the very fact that they were an exceptional minority. Narrow educated caste,
which had managed to pass through the gorge of a dead language being Latin and long
lasting education being the university education of the time, was enjoying the privileges
of “spirit nobility”. They were the patricians of the time, against the mass of uneducated
population. If too rigid formal conditions for belonging to a profession are to be estab-
lished, not many occupations can strive for that status. Insisting on consistent adherence
to the basic, formal conditions would, among other things, support the rigid division of
scientific disciplines and areas of work, which is increasingly harder to maintain in mod-
ern conditions. Numerous manifestations of modern world complexity can only be under-
stood through interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approach. The field such as security,
human security in particular, is undoubtedly an example of such an occurrence. If hu-
man security is so fundamental, consisting of several various aspects, it is legitimate to
have everyone holding scientifically relevant knowledge participating in its achievement.
Many professions that (only) appear not to have many intersections with security, being
understood too narrowly, are dealing with the subject in a fresher manner, providing new
insights, holding detailed knowledge, focusing attention towards the new aspects of the
same phenomenon, to the level making them relevant for the human security problem
scope. Professional standard in human security can be raised not by creating new, com-
plex profession, but by integrating and summing up knowledge, approaches and staff from
all sciences, predominantly social-humanistic ones. Comprehensive narrative requires
comprehensive approach. This enables the proposition of a significant inversion – judging
professionalization of social work field is to be enriched by the evaluation of work perfor-
mance. Informative potential of structural profession element needs to be reinforced by
analyzing common properties of professional activity: authority of profession, autonomy
in activities performance and altruism. Achieving the sum of “three A” (Šporer 1990:38)
should be the objective of professionalization, and meeting the structural elements is the
means to the end.
Authority, autonomy and altruism are the properties assigned to individual professions to
the extent perceived to be held by the majority of its members. Such a perception is usu-
ally long-lasting, although it may be distorted favouring or damaging the said individuals.
Consent on the need to have these properties is one of the professionalization require-
ments. The authority of a profession (should) be founded on the knowledge accumulated
during its short or long development. The duration of education, the levels of speciali-
zation and periodical, increasingly strict requirements placed upon professions usually
strengthen their authority. However, the authority may be practically established using
different paths, usually equalizing hierarchical position in the structure of power, money
or government with knowledge-based authority. This may explain one part of mistrust
in human security concept. There is a more or less justified doubt that the human is the
measure, as said by the motto of the present paper, instead of making the ends to the hu-
man security elaboration to maintain various forms of domination used as the aid by the
ideologies cloaked in science. Ideologies are presenting numerous prejudices and stereo-
types regarding race, social class, nations, states, genders or other social issues to be inevi-
table or natural, from the human security standpoint. That may reflect on the selection of
issues considered to be crucial, the resolutions proposed, the definition of endangerment
sources deemed relevant, etc. Critical science questions all authorities, even the scientific
ones. Therefore, a professional resolves the conflict of loyalty by rejecting professional
and moral compasses. For professionals, science is both positive and normative field. For
an economist, valuing the human security aspect, a relevant study subject would be the ef-
fect of economic measures on human lives, social policy, health care and education, social
inequities and similar issues. For an educationalist, the context of work will not remain
inside the classroom where he/she teaches; a linguist will shed light over discriminatory
lingual practices or analyze possible consequences on truthfulness of knowledge by fa-
vouring a single language, in a finer, socio-linguistic elaboration. A philosopher, sociolo-
gist or anthropologist, with the intention not to ignore the facts, would reach new insights
by replacing the word “we” in the sense of “we, the developed Western people” by “we,
the people of this world”, as used by Kofi Annan (Annan 2000). Human security is possible
only if it is comprehensive.
Autonomous person independently determines, evaluates and defines beyond the issues
considered to be important subject matter (content autonomy), extending to paths, meth-
ods and techniques to be used in resolving them (procedural autonomy) (Berdal, from:
Meek, 2003). Autonomous thinking is a prerequisite of professionalization, although ap-
plication mostly requires limitation by generally adopted standards. Freedom to think dif-
ferently, to propose new solutions, to redefine security reality had lead to the develop-
ment of the human security concept. Combined with holding knowledge, a professional’s
autonomy lays foundation for authority. Significant issue of autonomy reference point,
against which professional subjects should act autonomously, indicates that other profes-
sions are not insensitive to influences and pressures of religious dogma in the past or state
politics or financers of scientific research presently.
Altruism in professional acting is the relation towards work, clients, colleagues and com-
munity having the focus on general, instead of personal or any other particular wellbeing.
If the activities of an occupation “do not require mental discipline, quantity of profes-
sional knowledge appropriate for university education or higher causes” (Flexner from:
Bok 2005:25), there is probably no reason to develop it as a profession. Moral stance to-
wards a profession involves firstly understanding fundamental ethical provisions of one’s
own occupation, along with their practical implementation. If implemented consistently,
such a stance suggests the necessity of studying general ethical content, along with the
contents applied to professional activity, during the university education of each future
professional, regardless of whether the education covers the field of social-humanistic or
life and technical sciences. In the world where the number of universities adhering to this
provision increases, our general and professional ethics is being cancelled, even in medi-
cal schools (Savin 2001:176), along with the majority of faculties of security studies over
the territory of former Yugoslavia (Katić 2011). The ethical codes formulated by some
professions are often full of general statements, formulations not imposing any particular
obligations for anyone, however indicating clear awareness that the proposed ideal – rela-
tion would be the “crown” of their profession. In materialistic civilization, expectations on
acting without pragmatic goal are dwindling, especially where there is a lack of personal
or other particular interest. Being completely honest, there was always a lack of individu-
als acting in that manner. However, the professionals are expected to improve the existing
moral practice more than the others.
Professional ethics of all actors participating in human security field should sum up all
other properties of their professions. The subject of their interest has inherent care for a
human, thus opposite acting would therefore be hypocritical. We should not forget that
“adhering to professional standards in a profession is simultaneously the ethical issue of
that profession. […] Each departure from ethical code or misuse of professional knowl-
edge and position favouring one’s own or organizational interest may be characterized as
professional pathology” (Županov, Šporer 1984:49). According to this criterion, numer-
ous traditional practices in the security field, with much lower social considerations, could
be characterized as profession misuse or professional pathology. Infamous role of numer-
ous members of professions in global politics and international relations, the professions
that are highly structured per minute sociology measures, indicates that the ethical issues
were excluded. They were considered even less relevant regarding the environment, mar-
ginalized groups and individuals. All issues and questions, even beyond the international
relations, in the field of human security, starting from poverty, terrorism, genocide, en-
vironment devastation and many others “are inherently ethical in nature” (Dulić 2010:
50). Delaying ethical issues resolution may even turn the human security concept into yet
another missed opportunity.
***
The characteristics of professional acting by numerous actors from heterogeneous group
of occupations participating in human security should be considered professionalization
core in the human security field. Heterogeneity establishes a context where there is hard
to achieve professionalization outside individual professions. The sum of various social-
cultural approaches, yet to become a system, has common goals, each in its own domain of
social reality. They should also have common efforts to perform professional obligations
through provision of knowledge for general wellbeing. Further marginalization of solidar-
ity and social responsibility, being a consequence of more than professional moral erosion,
imposes new challenges for all kinds of professionals, being the ones that can decide how
and what to do, more so than the members of other occupations. Otherwise, they would
also be working within a predefined field, finding routine solutions for routine problems,
turning from professionals to bureaucrats.
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UDC 316.485.6:341.62
Milica V. MATIJEVIĆ, Vesna ĆORIĆ ERIĆ *
PEACEBUILDING AND THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORIES1
Abstract: Despite its great theoretical and practical importance, peacebuilding has remained
an undertheorized topic. The peacebuilding literature, confined to the single case studies and
problem-oriented texts, has failed to develop theoretical frameworks that could enable system-
atic inquiry and critical examination of the contemporary peacebuilding. The authors analyse the
main concepts developed by the conflict resolution theories that have inspired the conception
of peacebuilding and shaped its practice. The outline of the theoretical origins of peacebuilding
given in the paper recalls the key contributions of researchers in the field of conflict theory such
as Johan Galtung’s notion of structural violence, John Burton’s human needs approach, the no-
tion of protracted social conflict developed by Edward A. Azar and John Paul Lederach’s conflict
transformation approach. Born as an answer to the Realpolitik and the conflict management theo-
ries dominant in the Cold War period, the conflict resolution studies have signified radical shift in
our understanding of the conflict. Their insights into the root-causes of conflict have linked the
nature and the complexity of contemporary conflicts to the social, psychological and structural
set-up of the society and have constructed the ideal of sustainable peace. The common denomi-
nator of these theories - the transformation of conflict into peaceful, nonviolent process of social
change - has moved the focus from the state security to a more normative vision of human security
and stressed the importance of the social justice and universal human needs as the paths towards
sustainable peace. Yet, the question remains whether the frameworks and methods developed by
the conflict resolution theory can be consistently applied within the existing international order.
Keywords: peacebuilding, conflict resolution theories, structural violence, root causes of conflict, ba-
sic human needs, protracted social conflict
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War the peacebuilding strategies have become the embodiment
of a newly acquired understanding of human security. Thousands and thousands of mili-
tary and civilian personnel have been sent to different corners of the globe to pave the way
towards the “sustainable peace”. Yet, notwithstanding both its theoretical and practical
importance, peacebuilding has remained an under-theorized topic. In the last decade a
1 Milica V. Matijević, Mr Research Fellow Institute of Comparative Law, Belgrade, e-mail: milicavmatijevic@gmail.com
Vesna Ćorić Erić, Ph.D, Research Fellow, Institute of Comparative Law, Belgrade, e-mail: vesnacoric@yahoo.com
[152] Milica V. MATIJEVIĆ, Vesna ĆORIĆ ERIĆ
growing body of literature on peacebuilding was published but mostly from the pen of
the diplomats and military professionals and based on the single case study method. Hav-
ing description as their primary goal, the main ambition of these studies typically was to
examine the efficiency of different peacebuilding instruments in various conflict settings
rather than to provide a scientific enquiry of this contemporary social phenomenon.
This has had direct consequences for the development of the peacebuilding practice. As Ken-
neth Bush notes, the main issue arising from the problem-orientated approaches to peace-
building is that “they unavoidably exclude more than they include” and bring “inflationary
and deflationary tendencies” in the way the practitioners and policymakers apply the label
‘peace-building’ to their initiatives” (Bush 2004:38). That situation has also resulted in the
limited accumulation of knowledge the consequence of which was a tangible lack of theo-
retical frameworks within which the effectiveness of peace-building activities could be as-
sessed.2 Under the given circumstances, the human rights and democratization have become
a self-explanatory justification of the more and more numerous peacebuilding missions.
The paper aims at tackling this problem through an overview of the main concepts neces-
sary for understanding of theoretical origins of the contemporary peacebuilding. These
concepts are drawn from the opus of four revolutionary researchers in the field of conflict
theory: Johan Galtung, John Burton, Edward A. Azar and John Paul Lederach.
1.1. A short note on terminology

1.1.1. Peacebuilding
The paper uses the term peacebuilding to refer to a sum of strategies and actions undertak-
en at the end of civil war through deployment of military and civilian personnel with the
aim to “identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace”
(Boutros-Ghali 1992). This definition is based on the well know UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali Report from 1992, in which he presented a new classification of
peace operations urged by the changes brought by the post-Cold War era. For the purpose
of this study, the most important aspect of the given classification, which differentiates
between peacekeeping,3 peace enforcement4 and the post-conflict peacebuilding, is its
distinction between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Firstly, peacebuilding is seen as pri-
marily post-conflict activity. As Keating and Knight note “[s]ince peacebuilding looks at
ensuring a lasting peace, it is expected to involve much more than a cessation of hostilities”
(Keating, Knight 2004:xliv). Secondly, the classification places an emphases on the non-
security instruments of peacebuilding, such as the administration of elections, strength-
ening of the civil society, advancement of the systems for the human rights protection,
training of judiciary and police, financial assistance and economic reforms, etc.5
2 Keneth Bush describes this lack of methods and instruments necessary for the systematic evaluation of the interna-
tional peace-building activities as “[a]n unsettling characteristics of the proliferating self-described peace-building
projects” (Bush 2004:40).
3 Boutros-Ghali defines peacekeeping as the deployment of lightly armed UN military personnel for non-enforce-
ment tasks such as observation of cease-fire and control of the buffer zones between the hostile parties. The two
main principles of traditional peacekeeping are mostly determined as: a) prohibition of use of force by peacekeep-
ers, except in self-defence, and b) prohibition of any kind of political activity in the host state.
4 The newly designed missions with the personnel more heavily armed and authorized to use force for purposes oth-
er than self-defence, but which resembled traditional peacekeeping operations in many important aspect.
5 As different from the traditional peacekeeping the primary aim of which is to stop the hostilities. Of course, the au-
PEACEBUILDING AND THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORIES [153]
1.1.2. Conflict resolution theories

The conflict resolution theory is in this work used as an umbrella term that embraces
different conflict theories which either have directly inspired the conception of peace-
building or served as a basis for the further advancement of the peacebuilding practice.
The authors use the term conflict resolution theory in distinction to the notion of conflict
management, which in their view denotes the theoretical approach the main goal of which
is to manage rather than to resolve the conflict. Namely, the conflict management is seen as
the theoretical and practical approach to conflict dominant during the Cold War period,
the focus of which was at the amelioration of conflict at the state level by the so-called
“balance-of-power” instruments such as negotiation, tactical bargaining, coercive third-
party intervention etc. This approach is historically older than most of the conflict resolu-
tion theories presented in this paper, and it is firmly linked to the state-centric framework
of the Cold War system of international relations (Ramsbotham 2000; Richmond 2002;
Woodhouse 2000).
However, for the purpose of clarity, it should be noted that certain scholars and most of
the practitioners use the term “conflict management” to embrace all the conflict theories,
including those that are here situated within the ambit of the conflict resolution theory.
Their main argument is that the term “conflict management” is more in accordance with
the nature of conflict as “a natural, normal and inevitable part of life” that will always char-
acterise human society and hence can only be managed but never resolved (Parlevliet
2002). Despite the obvious value of this argumentation, the authors have opted for the
term “conflict resolution”. In their view, only this term could fully reflect the essence of
a humanistic orientated science – streaming towards unimaginable to widen the scope of
imaginable.
2. CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORIES

AS THE BASIS OF STRATEGIC PEACEBUILDING
Kenneth Boulding coined the term “conflict resolution” to name a study of resolving con-
flict (Richmond 2002:77). As noted above, in this paper the term “conflict resolution” will
be used as a conceptual roof for several different theoretical approaches to conflict that
were born as an answer to the “conflict management” theories and practice developed in
the Cold War period. The common denominator for these theories is their objective – the
transformation of conflict into peaceful, non-violent process of social change rather than
the elimination of conflict. Their assumption that conflicts should be resolved rather than
merely managed came as a logical consequence of the way in which their authors have
perceived the conflict. As opposed to the conflict management, these so-called “second
generation” conflict theories tried to embrace the root causes of conflict sought in the
social, psychological and structural set up of the society. The research of Johan Galtung, in
particular his notion of “structural violence”, was seminal for the further scientific inquiry
of the roots of conflict.
thors are aware of the fact that most of the UN missions deployed after 1990 have been multidimensional in nature
and incorporating the different elements of the different types of peace strategies.
2.1. Johan Galtung: Structural Violence

Johan Galtung developed for his time a revolutionary model of conflict that was based on
the peace research theory.6 By introducing the term “structural violence”, he was the first
to argue that violence does not have to be only a direct one, but can also be entrenched in
the basic structures of the society. If injustice and repression are built into the fundaments
of a society this will sooner or later, claims Galtung, lead to the structural violence where
individuals or groups are deprived of their access to the resources. The structural violence
emerges “when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental
realizations are below their potential realizations” (Galtung 1969:168).
Galtung’s model of conflict presents conflict as a triangle, in the basis of which are the struc-
tural causes of violence (foundation of society) and its inner space is a net of incompatible
goals, attitudes and behaviour. In the societies characterized by the structural inequalities,
incompatible goals produce conflict of interest. Attitudes include emotive and cognitive ele-
ments, but also the objective aspects such as structural relationships and competing material
interests. While under normal circumstances behaviour varies between the cooperation and
coercion, in the violent conflict behaviour includes threats and destructive attacks.
Galtung sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour
are shifting constantly in the context of each other. In an asymmetric conflict,7 he argues,
conflict of interests is deeply entrenched in the parties’ relationship. This is further com-
plicated with the different attitudes of the parties and the parties’ perceptions and misper-
ceptions of itself and the other.
When parties’ interests come into collision and their relationship becomes oppressive
they develop conflictual behaviour that leads to the escalation of conflict. Therefore, to
resolve conflict, in Galtung’s view, involves both transforming the parties’ relationships
and the clash of interests that both lay at its core. For that reason he believes that the
peacebuilding, as opposed to the traditional peacekeeping and peacemaking, is the only
possible way to deal with these structural causes of violence and to resolve the conflict
(Galtung 1996:103-113).8
Another Galtung’s fundamental contribution to the conflict resolution theory is his con-
cept of negative and positive peace. Negative peace refers to the situation characterized by
the absence of direct violence but where structural violence exists, whereas positive peace
encompasses the concept of human security and refers to the situation in which human
beings are capable of developing fully their capacities (absence of structural violence).9
This concept has been crucial for further development of the conflict theory because it has
opened the door for a multilevel, interdisciplinary analysis of conflict.
Johan Galtung’s notion of “structural violence”, although originally developed in the peace
research field, had formed a broad epistemological base for the subsequent developments
6 Peace research has been traditionally seen as a distinct field to the conflict resolution theories but it had, nonethe-
less, very important role in the development of many of the “conflict resolution” agendas (Richmond 2002:79).
7 The asymmetric conflict is a conflict where the conflicting parties are themselves asymmetrical with regards to the
power and the access to the other resources decisive for the course of conflict. Structural violence is strongly re-
lated to this type of conflict.
8 This has inspired Andy W. Knight to regard Galtung’s theory as the origins of peacebuilding (Knight, 2004, p. 357).
9 Peace research theory also refers to positive peace as the “peace with justice”(Fetherston 2000:202).
in the conflict resolution theory. This is particularly noticeable in the work of John Burton
and his sociologically rooted conflict resolution approach.
2.2. John Burton: “Human Needs” Approach

In the long run, the conflict outcomes are not and cannot be determined by the power,
states John Burton. Power is the category difficult to define while conflict is significantly
determined by the subjective categories that often leave little or no space for the rational
analysis by its protagonists.10
Burton’s alternative view of conflict is based on his “human needs” approach. In the “hu-
man needs theory”, later called the “generic theory of conflict”, Burton argues that the
deep-rooted conflict is caused by the denial of the basic human needs. Originally, he has
posited nine universal human needs, three of which are particularly important: identity,
security and distributive justice. While the interests are subject to negotiation, the universal
needs are not because their pursuit is the ontological necessity of all human beings (Bur-
ton 1987:29). These ontological necessities may be suppressed in certain periods but they
will always reappear, creating the conditions for the “protracted social conflicts”.11 Thus,
the satisfaction of the basic human needs is the core condition for the long lasting, “sus-
tainable peace”.
Crucial for the analysis of the practical implication of his human needs theory is the fact
that human needs are not subject to the economic/resource scarcity, in other words, more
for one group does not necessarily mean less for another. This feature of human needs,
as he defines them, has served as a sound basis for his problem-solving methodology and
win-win scenario.12 Conflict, according to Burton, should be approached as a socio-bio-
logical problem and the third party’s role is to establish conditions in which the parties to
the conflict would get the chance to identify and define their conflict. The conflict resolu-
tion should offer methodologies, Burton argues, that would facilitate the problem-solving
process and thus support design of the innovative solutions for the existing conflict of
interests. Burton calls as well for a mediated social action, the role of which would be to
support the process of problem-reframing. Only the reframing of the problems, he argues,
can open a social space for the creative solutions. The establishment of the supportive
framework where the individuals at all levels will get the opportunity to communicate
with each other should be seen as essential in this regard. The task of mediator (third par-
ty) is to make available the necessary knowledge, including the references to similar situa-
tions, in order to help the parties to understand why and how the escalation of the conflict
happened. A mediator should also make the parties aware that each of them probably has
10 This Burton’s statement points at the fact that the rational insights do not play crucial role in the phases of incite-
ment and escalation of conflict. For instance, the knowledge of one party of the conflict that the other party pos-
sesses greater power does not necessarily lead to the termination of conflict.
11 According to Azar, the protracted social conflict is conflict that occurs “when communities are deprived of satis-
faction of their basic needs on the basis of their communal identity”(Azar 1990:12).
12 Researchers Ury, Brett, and Goldberg (1988) have identified three distinct methods which are used by parties to
dispute: a) power-based approach (parties attempt to prove whose power is dominant); b) rights-based approach
(parties attempt to prove who is ‘right’); and c) interest-based approach, also called “problem solving” (parties at-
tempt to reconcile their major interests through the innovative solutions). The first two approaches tend to create
zero sum (win-lose) outcomes while the goal of the “problem-solving” approach is the achievement of a positive
sum (win-win) outcome (Peck 1998:22).
the same negative image of the other, image based on stereotypes that arose in the course
of the conflict. This type of contact is supposed to increase confidence and trust, leading
to a better common understanding. In effect, this means that a discussion of the official
matters can take place at a more informal level, for instance via facilitated “workshop”
approach, so that the civil-society actors can also find their way into the official debates.
As Richmond observes, John Burtons’ problem-solving approach brought the individual
back into the realm of conflict management and “made the case that conflict can be re-
solved at the diplomatic level only with the consent of the individual citizen” (Richmond
2002:9). As a consequence, the contemporary peace operations became enriched with
the innovative practices the origin of which can be drawn from the Burton’s theoretical
approach (Richmond 2002:81).
Although he is one of the most influential scholars in the field of conflict research, Burton
has been also widely criticized for his universal approach to human needs and for the con-
flict resolution methods he developed. The central point of the critics, when it comes to his
universal approach to human needs, was the absence of the method by which their exist-
ence can be tested. With regard to his problem-solving “workshop” approach, it was noted
that this approach could have only a limited application. Distortions caused by the faulty
communications, asymmetry, and the lack of a common cultural ground, (Cohen 2001)
could seriously affect our capability to apply this conflict resolution method. Moreover,
some authors argue that its allegedly ‘universal’ character is rather problematic and that it
tends to impose as dominant the Western style discourse (Van der Merwe 1993:266-267).
2.3. Edward E. Azar: Protracted Social Conflict

In parallel to Burton’s efforts to bring an individual back into the focus of the conflict
resolution theory, Edward A. Azar calls for an end to the traditional distinction between
the internal and external models of conflicts. Azar brings the focus of the conflict theory
on the evident rather than hidden dimensions of conflict. His concept of “protracted so-
cial conflict” depicts intractable, seemingly irresolvable conflicts, which involve sporadic
outbreaks of violence resulting from communal and ethnic cleavages. The notion of “pro-
tracted social conflict” threw a new light on the seemingly inexplicable behaviour of cer-
tain communal groups by explaining it as prolonged struggle for the basic human needs.
As such, Azar’s theoretical contribution was an important step forward for the post-Cold
War conflict theory in its efforts to get out of the state-centric understanding of the inter-
national system.
In Azar’s work, development is equated with peace. Azar identifies the repression and
deprivation of human needs as the roots of the protracted conflict and emphasises the role
of structural factors, such as the underdevelopment. He also stresses that the main way
to reduce the impact of the external systemic causes of the protracted social conflict is to
build responsive social institutions that could diminish their influence. (Azar 1990:133).
Even more importantly, Azar warns that the traditional peace initiatives, which are largely
based on patron-client relationship, could further fragment domestic political institutions
and aggravate conflict situations. Hence, he suggests that the strategies aimed at altering
the usually existing patron-client relationship need to be supported through the multilat-
eral efforts. The complexity of protracted social conflict, according to Azar, postulates
two important assignments for those involved in peacebuilding undertakings: a) careful
tracking of the dynamics of conflict, and b) focus at the social, economic and political
roots of the conflict. The protracted social conflict is the most severe challenge for those
concerned with peacebuilding, reminds Azar, and if the peace approach is too narrowly
conceptualized and is failing to address the roots and the underlying dynamics which drive
the protracted social conflict, a cycle of violence and despair could be further deepened
(Azar 1990).
Edward E. Azar’s new methodological stance, which merged realists’, structuralists’, and
pluralists’ approaches into the multidimensional understanding of conflict, could be read
as an announcement of Lederach’s comprehensive approach to conflict resolution.
2.4. John Paul Lederach: Conflict Transformation13

While working as scholar-practitioner in different parts of the world, John Paul Lederach
has formulated the approach to conflict that encompasses “the full array of stages and ap-
proaches needed to transform conflict towards sustainable, peaceful relations and out-
comes” (Ramsbotham 2000:171). What Lederach calls the “comprehensive approach” to
conflict resolution is his attempt to integrate short-term intervention the goal of which
is to halt violence within the long-term conflict resolution process. The core idea of his
long-term conflict resolution strategy is the importance of identifying and supporting “the
cultural modalities and resources” within the setting of the conflict:
“The principle of indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict transformation must ac-
tively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources within a
given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily ‘see’ the
setting and the people in it as the ‘problem’ and the outsider as the ‘answer’. Rather, we
understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and
resources within the setting.” (Lederach 1995:212).
Lederach’s comprehensive approach entails building of an infrastructure for peace, which
should involve all levels of the affected population. Sustainable and long-term strategy to
conflict resolution hence should necessarily involve active participation of all segments of
the affected population.
In Lederach’s work, a conflict affected society is portrayed as a pyramid. Key military and
political leaders are situated at the apex of a pyramid. Leaders are in the middle in the
sectors such as health, education and those placed high in the military hierarchies, who
“hold the potential for helping to establish a relationship and skill-based infrastructure
for sustaining the peacebuilding process” (Lederach 1997:51). Finally, at the grass roots
level is a vast majority of the affected groups: the common people, refugees and IDPs,
church groups, local leaders, etc. For the conflict resolution to be successful and sustain-
able, the co-ordination of peacebuilding strategies at all three societal levels needs to be
undertaken. Furthermore, the different types of actors (levels) have to be matched with
the different peacebuilding methodologies (Lederach 1997:44-54).
13 Certain scholars place Lederach into the new and separate phase of the development of conflict theory called con-
flict transformation or alternatively, peacebuilding. See Fetherstone (2000) and Richmond (2002). On the contrary
Ramsbotham (2000), Woodhouse (2000), Duffey (2000), etc., situate Lederach’s opus within the broader frame-
work of the conflict resolution theories.
The peacebuilding methodologies, in Lederach’s opinion, have to be adjusted to the three-

level system. He has created different methods for each level of the affected population.
At the top level, a “top-down” approach should be applied. This approach should involve
intermediaries or mediators backed by the foreign governments or international organiza-
tions and the goal of it is a negotiated settlement. The second level is where the problem-
solving workshops, conflict resolution trainings and the development of peace commis-
sions should take place. The third level demands grass-roots, bottom-up approaches.
According to Lederach, peacebuilding from below (bottom-up approach) is of decisive
importance since only in that way peace can be achieved in accordance with the context
and not imposed from the outside.14 At the same time, Lederach emphasizes the role of
the middle-range actors since they have the greatest potential for constructing the founda-
tions of peace due to their impact at both top and bottom levels. Taking into account that
in the conventional practice of conflict resolution, the actors coming from outside of the
conflict (diplomats, peacebuilders, etc.) were valued more highly than the peacemaking
resources within the community, Lederach’s approach brought an immense shift in the
peacebuilding practice.
Both conflict and reconciliation are embedded in relationship between parties, which is
commonly the first victim of the violent conflict. For Lederach, reconciliation is central for
the conflict transformation. For that reason he suggests a move away from “a concern with
the resolution of issues […] toward a frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and
rebuilding of relationship [by using] the relational aspect of reconciliation as the central
component of peacebuilding” (Lederach 1997:24). In his opinion, the reconciliation is a
process which can create social space for facing the past, envisioning the common future,
and through that make possible the process of re-framing of the present. While empha-
sizing the importance of the reconciliation, Lederach refers to the Azar’s notion of “pro-
tracted social conflict” and shows that such a conflict requires strategies that go beyond
the international relations methodology of conflict management. Developing recognition
of relational interdependence - across the lines of conflict and across all levels of society - is
perhaps the single most important goal we can pursue in the deep-rooted conflict, argues
Lederach. Only this can provide “a set of lenses and a long-term, lifetime perspective,
which sharpens and informs short-term decisions” (Lederach, Sampson 2000:55).
This Lederach’s analysis also served as a basis for his “integrated framework of peace-
building”. In the “integrated framework of peacebuilding” the actors and specific method-
ologies are subsystems that enable peacebuilding strategies to be developed from a local
situation while taking into account the systemic (structural) problems. In the Lederach’s
model, a problem-solving approach to conflict resolution and a process-oriented approach
are combined in order to address the multidimensional nature of protracted social con-
flicts. But, “this systemic analysis is only one half or one axis of the integrated framework”
(Fetherston 2000:205). Another half comprises the time-dimension of peacebuilding. Its
first segment refers to the crisis intervention (2-6 months); the second to the preparation
and training for the change (1-2 years); the third to the design of social change (5-10 years)
and the fourth, eventually, to the fulfilment of the desired future (20 years on). Lederach’s
approach to peacebuilding as a set of subsystems that have to be properly integrated is
14 Different interpretation of this segment of Lederach’s theory in: (Fetherston 2000): 205-206).
significant because it points out in a new and qualitatively different way to the importance
of a long-term strategic planning.
3.. CONCLUSION
The conflict resolution theories developed in the last decade of 20th century have signified
radical shift in the understanding of the paths towards the sustainable peace. The new
insights into the root-causes of conflict have lead to better understanding of the nature
and complexity of the contemporary conflicts. The new way of thinking about the conflict
called for new techniques to deal with the structural violence in the war-torn countries.
The conflict resolution approach also brought the individual back into the realm of the
international activities for the restoration of peace. By emphasizing the importance of the
reconciliation process sustained by the networks and mechanisms aimed at promoting
social justice, as the guiding principle in securing the fulfilment of universal human needs,
the conflict resolution theory lead to the development of multi-actor and multidimen-
sional approaches to conflict. It has become the theoretical stronghold of the critics of the
state-centric, static and mono-dimensional nature of the traditional diplomacy and peace-
keeping operations. Eventually, the conflict resolution framework developed by these the-
ories became embodied in the multifaceted peace operations - the operations where the
third parties, acting in coordination, employ diverse instruments adjusted to the different
levels of the conflict situation and its actors.
The deeper insights into the root-causes of conflict were the key factor in the defeat of
the Realpolitik and the opening of the new perspectives in the conflict theories. The focus
was shifted from the state security to a more normative vision of human security. The new
policies on human security, placed in the context of a globalized and fragmented world,
have begun to refer to the fundamentals such as human rights, economic development,
and freedom from identity and representational constraints.
The real-life application of those new policies, however, has once again raised the contro-
versial question of whether the proposed conflict resolution methods are possible within
the current international system. Whether the UN’s “standard operating procedure”, as
Oliver Ramsbotham has described the institutional rigidity of the United Nations system,
can put the theory into practice (Ramsbotham 2000:170). The conflict resolution theory
has developed the set of assumptions about the conflict resolution in the intrastate wars.
Those assumptions have then become part of the new, global peace agenda established
on the principles of liberalization and democratization. Yet, now, more than two decades
after the fall of the Berlin Fall, the international instruments for the application of that
agenda started to look like “Wittgenstein’s locomotive cabin in which a uniform-looking
set of handles in fact fulfils a number of diverse functions”. 15
15 Wittgenstein’s locomotive used as a metaphor means that most of us are increasingly remote from all but the most
superficial understanding of the underlying functions of the tools we rely on (Ramsbotham 2000:170).
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UDC 351.78:351.749
Stevan TATALOVIĆ*
IS HUMAN SECURITY A COMMON GOOD AND CAN IT BE

PROVIDED TO EVERYONE:
PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN SECURITY IN QUESTION?1
Abstract: Human security is marking its twentieth anniversary, but this year just as important is
the twenty fifth anniversary of the end of the Cold War and the establishment of new security par-
adigms. A new concept of security brought new solutions, as well as the new challenges. Another
novelty (and a challenge at the same time) in the security sector is the process of privatization,
and an increasing number of new and notable (private) actors in security sector. The privatiza-
tion of security has become another new paradigm, despite the fact that its unclear structure and
function is not fully made available to theorists and researchers. The private security sector and
private companies are increasingly represented in the security sphere. However, they still are not
a part of the concept of human security. This paper discusses the positive and negative aspects
of privatization and the potential application on the concept of human security. Is it possible to
hand over security of the people to companies that will receive funds for that assignment? Start-
ing issues of human security are often associated with the practical application of the concept
into the institutions. That approach to the concept implies influence in the field of public policy.
However, human security as a concept has not been yet implemented in public policy. Two con-
cepts are important for this public policy field: the first is political discourse (as security is always
mixed with the policy and politics), and the second is the domain of the common good (as the
only indisputable type of protection). Notion of the public or common goods has not been forgot-
ten, but is neglected. The research question posed might be seen as a default, but they still need
constant interpretation. If the safety is the common good, then it is not considered as a debatable
category, but it de facto is. With the advent of privatization, outsourcing, reduced influence of
the state and the ambiguous setting systematization within the security comes to the problem.
Some authors from the field of economy question the notion of the public good for quite some
time. Although this paper quotes the economic theorists who dealt with public good as economic
category, the emphasis in this paper is primarily on the common good as a philosophical and so-
ciological category. For this reason, one section is devoted to the difference and understanding
of the concepts of public good and common good. Parts of the work that could be considered
are related to the economic ideological paradigm of global observation, given that the market
economy and neo-liberal concept that is more dominant than the alternative. One such kind of
deconstruction of the existing socio-political situation may be a question concerning the future
of the human security concept.
* Stevan Tatalović, Master student,Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade,

e-mail: tatalovic.stevan@gmail.com
[164] Stevan TATALOVIĆ
Keywords: human security, community, common goods, privatization
1. INTRODUCTION
An understanding of security as a common good2 is like an understanding of security as
common sense. Security is a concept that is continually being reconstructed. The under-
stating of human security today is not the same as it was twenty years ago. However, re-
search shows that the essence of security issues hasn’t change much from our recent past.
In the 1990’s the world was faced with conflicts in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, the Gaza strip and
the West Bank (Oslo agreement). Twenty years later, in 2014 we are faced with conflicts
in Libya, Syria, Ukraine, the Gaza strip and the West Bank. The being of the concept of
human security has emerged on the wings of change from a bipolar to a unipolar world. Yet
increasingly it seems that the world is slipping back into bipolar segregation and circum-
stances resembling those present during the Cold War.
Periodical analysis shows optimistic progress of security science and its applications.
However, one of the most serious complaints attributed to the human security concept is
that it is stagnant in the face of such change. While the question of why human security does
not change in accordance with the developments will surely be a topic of increasing interest,
this paper will attempt to illustrate that no fundamental change has occurred in the threats
that people are faced with. These threats are still the same and solution to counter them
is yet to be found. The notion of human security as a public good is not simply a question
of what needs to be done but is essentially about setting operationalized roots of security
theory and security practice.
2. SECURITY AS A COMMONG GOOD

There are several important gnomes of security studies which are considered as the alpha-
bet of science and the outset in the opening classes of Security Studies 101. One of those
gnomes points out that security is a public good, meaning that it needs to be provided to
everyone, without restrictions, limited only by threats.
Threats and security are the contradictions. A number of security scholars agreed with this
statement which defined security negatively as the absence of threat. Accordingly to this
objective point of view3 (Walfers 1952) security is in an inverse relationship with threats –
when security grows, threats decline and vice versa. Such a model can used to determine
how much security one needs at a given moment (Baldwin 1997:5-26).
Another gnome, at the same time considered as one of the most important definitions in
security studies, states that the state has the monopoly on violence (Weber 1919). Deborah
2 Common v.s. public good: It is believed that the public goods and common goods are the same. Although, this
paper deals with the issue there is not enough space in it for a debate of this kind. In research of various sources the
author came up with the idea to use coin common goods. Public goods are more appriopriate as an economic term,
common goods as social term. But that does not tell us much about the difference except nominally and leaves
space to think about it only at the level of how we deal in the topic of human security and privatization. Paper does
not leave much room for discussion of this type, and many authors have dealt with this issue should be as short as
possible to make a distinction between what can be caught as an error if such a distinction is not made.
3 Security in objective sense measure the absence of threats to purchased values; in subjective sense the absence of
threats that values are going to be invade
IS HUMAN SECURITY A COMMON GOOD AND CAN IT BE PROVIDED TO EVERYONE:
PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN SECURITY IN QUESTION? [165]
Avant, a prolific author dealing with the topic of privatization of law enforcement, sub-
stantiated it by assessing it as common sense (Avant 2005). Although the relevance of the
concept of monopoly on violence could be said to have been relativized by contemporary
developments, it is of greater significant to focus on society’s and state’s view of this con-
cept. A psychological term critical period represents phases in an individual’s lifespan that
are crucial for development (auditory or visual system) and a parallel can be made in terms
of (human) security which too has critical development phases. Its first such phase is the
social contract.
If we go through Scott Peck’s Road Less Traveled, we would need to look at the construc-
tion of the notion of the social contract. The history of security requires us to review and
deconstruct4 an important event which took place in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which
provided a new view of the state and “implied” state protection. Westphalian peace pre-
cedes the social contract theory, and is preceded by the Machiavellian doctrine presented
in The Prince. It brought us not just the end of the Thirty Years’ War5 but also the establish-
ment of the nation-state.
To understand the horrors of Thirty Years’ War it is important to consult the views of
scholars of that time. Social contract theorist Thomas Hobbes wrote about the war in Levi-
athan where he described his view of Europe and Security with saying homo homini lupus.
Hobbes’ understanding of the world, where all are at odds with one another and where
individual security is constantly endangered, required a proactive approach to change
that state. Therefore, according to Hobbes, people submitted themselves to a social con-
tract and in doing so gave legitimacy to a new entity which would protect them. Whereas
Weber’s standpoint on the monopoly on violence might have included a passive capacity,
Hobbes’s concept necessitates the active use of violence in ensuring an adequate level of
stability and security.
Another important moment is the formation of the nation-state, which occurred later in
the 1700s. Formation of the state and its stabilization through history include the reign
of terror, and the starting premise for each security became a hierarchy. History of state
formation and history of security spans the American and French Revolutions, the Berlin
and the Vienna Congress, the Hague Convention on the law of war (jus ad bellum and jus in
bello), World War I, World War II, Cold War. During this period the world saw the rise of
totalitarian regimes, the formation of supranational entities and their evolution into forms
of super states. Yet, throughout, people remained subordinated to the state. Although the
idea that the government cares about the security of its citizens was the initial premise rep-
resenting the public good, the state did not fulfill its part of the social contract, a circum-
stance which begs the question of whether this failure opened the way for private security
to establish itself as a viable complement to state-provided security.
That second aspect when discussing the notion of a common good is the economy side.
Two frequently quoted economics gnomes, “There is no such thing as a free lunch” and
“The best things in life are free” are clearly contradictory. The fact that the contradictions
are not only semantic in nature fuels disputes among economics scholars, policy makers
and citizens.
4 Michel Fuko’s Genaeology

5 1618 – 1648 (in Europe)
The saying “There is no such thing as a free lunch” originated in the US cities during the
Great Depression and implies that all benefit comes at a cost. Although free lunch was
served in the United States, this practice ceased as a result of the Great Depression when a
profit-focused economic rationale took hold. The phrase “no free lunch” has entered into
recognizable narrative frames owing to writer Robert Heinlein (1965) and into academic
circles on account of Milton Friedman (1975.)
Gregory Mankiw begins a chapter on public goods and common resources in his book
with a verse recognizing that “The best things in life are free” is a title of a popular Ameri-
can song performed by Luther Van Dross ft. Janet Jackson: The Best Things in Life Are Free
(Mankiw 2001). In his introduction, the author categorizes goods according to their ori-
gin, dividing them between those that derive from nature (mountains, rivers, seas, forests,
etc.) and those that are provided to us by the state (maternity hospitals, schools, parks,
celebrations, etc.).
To understand the importance of public goods one should recognize their classification.
Posed questions of exclusion and rivalry get a share of the four types of goods. Goods that
have exclusivity and rivalry are private goods. They belong to someone, and as such are
not available to others. On the other hand, goods that are neither exclusive nor subordi-
nate to rivalry are seen as public goods. One of most recognizable public goods is national
security, or national defense. This example will serve as a guideline to assist in defining
human security as a common good.
Table 1: Four Goods (Source: Mankiw, G., 2001.6)
Private goods Natural Monopolies

• Ice-cream cornets • Fire protection
• Clothing • Cable TV
• Congested toll roads • Uncongested toll roads
Common resources Public goods
• Fish in the ocean • National defense
• The environment • Knowledge
• Congested no toll roads • Uncongested no toll roads
Since its inception national security is considered a common good. Subsequent to the
end of World War II, each administration sought to develop and perfect a reliable set of
executive institutions to manage national security policy.7 Until recently there was no con-
troversy as to whether national security is to be considered a public good. Even the pro-
ponents of the minimal state, including libertarians, had no doubt that national security
should be an issue of state policy. Where a debate exists is regarding the size of the national
defense budget. It is very important to emphasize that authors often make mistakes in
the identification of budget allocations for security and military industry. A comparative
cost analysis has proven itself as a good indicator of different security problems in a coun-
try. Bureaucratization and international monitoring put the budgeting priority ahead of
all other policies. Budgetary allocations for military spending vary. We record their de-
6 The table is prone to interpretation, since it is a direct reflection of American attitudes towards exclusion and
rivalry
7 http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/NSChistory.htm (11.08.2014.).
cline from 1989 to 2000, after which came a period of approximately ten years during the
course of which spending stabilized at a high level. This pattern can be traced in annual
reports of the Stoholm Peace Research Institute (2013) and can be attributed to changes
in global circumstances. However, it remains unclear whether these changes have affected
the understanding of defense as public good. Allocations for human security are different
than those for national security and are allocated according to the requirement of security
policy. Given that the concept of national security may be outdated because threats to
national security are no longer pronounced, further investment in security should focus
on human security instead. The security reform brought changes within the perspective
of leading concepts, shifting focus from state centered to Anthropocentric, while at the same
time expanding capacities of societal security. Nevertheless, it turned out that the shift
only happened at a theoretical level, but not in practice. Bearing in mind that the security
paradigm changes depend on potential threats, it is important to examine how this new
point of view relates to human security. If it is clearly established that protection of na-
tional territory from external attack represents a value of societal significance, then one
can argue that the protection of citizens against poverty and corruption is also of societal
significance. This brings us to another Baldwin’s question: Security for whom? Society or
the state? People or the state?
Does (human) security cease to be a common good in the case of privatization? Let us
return once more to Table 1. Privatization of security has led to the appearance of new
actors on the security scene. They could in some ways be placed in the upper left field as
a private good, but also in the upper right field as natural monopolies. Their placement in
the private goods category is dependent on ownership rather than on exclusion and rivalry.
Those who can afford private security could receive it, limiting others from receiving it
at the same time. If we placed private security into natural monopolies, and by doing so
confirm exclusivity but not rivalry, we would have a clearer picture which circumstances
could allow for its all-inclusive use, making it available to each, according to one’s needs.
What remains unclear is how these needs arise and whether they can be designed or con-
trolled. In this sense it is important to consider the possibility that placing the production
of fear under control could be a slippery slope that could lead to the manipulation of the
public so as to justify the need for funding. A problem that can arise in this case is a cir-
cumstance in which security is a constant need and can only be ensured by private actors.
3. PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY
AS PRIVATIZATION OF A COMMON GOOD
Consideration of the possibility to privatize human security (security for people) is of
greatest significance for this paper’s research question. Until now it was believed that
human security as a common good should not be a commodity. Nevertheless, after the
process of privatization, it eventually appeared on the market, becoming commercial se-
curity. Privatization accompanies the process of globalization. “Fundamentally, globaliza-
tion means deregulation and privatization of public facilities and goods” (Altvater 2004),
which is consistent with the analysis of goods presented thus far in this paper. Public goods
were increasingly being privatized during the end of twentieth century. Thus, privatiza-
tion of security has its own history, regardless of current trends.
Private security had existed before the already mentioned Peace of Westphalia. Although
this gives the appearance that a process of cyclical movement and relapse exists, it is not
the case in this context. The market on the use of violence was regulated during the Mid-
dle Ages by private actors. To preserve their wealth feudal lords engaged mercenaries.
For example, in Italy during the 14th and 16th centuries, there were so-called Condotieri
mercenaries (It. Condotta, means contract), and from the 17th to 19th century the first ever
joint-stock company providing security services was established (Dutch East India Com-
pany, English East India Company and DutchWest India Company) (Petrović 2011) as well
as pirates (or Coursairs) who were informally and occasionally engaged to secure royal
affairs (Vučinić 2006). The later national state rented private security workers to perform
a number of tasks. Rich colonial countries such as England, France, Portugal and the Neth-
erlands engaged them for securing trade routes and defending conquered territories.
Modern historical interpretations would characterize this conduct of colonizing states as
robbery. Contemporary privatization of security is not related to the examples being dis-
cussed, but with neoliberal policies that took hold during the 1980s. British and American
concepts of the private market, termed Reaganomics and Thatcherism, fed the broad pol-
icy of privatization of the public sector of the two countries. Free market, a small govern-
ment, libertarianism are primarily features never established Robert Nozick’s dream, have
pursued in the postmodern world and post-traditional society.
At the end of the Cold War previously expected étatisme was excluded from the security
plan and Weberian element of the overall state management capacity was revised. The
privatization of security is a term that refers to a process of growth in the number and
importance of private actors who perform security activities. For example, unprofessional
and poorly administered security facilities in transitional states devastated by war and cor-
ruption represent more of a threat to development than a capacity for it.
If we return to the beginning of this paper and listen to Deborah Avant: “Private security
affects who and how controls the violence” (Avant 2005). The entire history of standing in
the way of violence included the state, laws, institutes, stakeholders, schools, and it seems
risky to give up all of that and allow one anarcho-capitalist image. The question is whether
society has time, resources and money for such an experiment in which private security
actors are given more space for their activities.
For human security, the situation is clear: the concept is moving from the individual to the
community and vice versa. Such a social contract can be considered acceptable for ordinary
people. Human security in its holistic theoretical approach has a solid theoretical back-
ground, but its practical applications are weak. Theorist Pinar Bilgin represents her stance
in analysis of critical theory: looking through the glasses of traditional security studies “failed
state” is the problem, not because the state does not manage to achieve security for its citi-
zens, but because they fail to fulfill the responsibility of the international community (Wil-
liams ed. 2008). This is not a policy that promotes human security. Human security is inter-
ested in a stable state, one which can cope with all current problems of social functioning; for
this concept the most important question is how vulnerable the people are.
There are clear arguments for and against privatization (Avant 2005). It should be borne in
mind that problems with the privatization of security are not in its functioning and practi-
cal application of the same issues as the privatization of other sectors. That leaves us with
the opportunity to ask another of Baldwin’s questions: At what cost?
4. REASONS FOR PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY

Privatization of security started in the 1980s and was implemented more or less success-
fully in the countries of the Western world. Although the state’s monopoly on violence loses
its significance on account of the privatization process, it is important to determine the
way in which this monopoly came about and to consider the justifications for privatiza-
tion. The number of private companies that are currently operating is greater than ever;
however, this information should be taken with a grain of salt as the number of operating
private companies does not reflect the real need for their existence. An increasing number
of private companies in different countries can symbolize the weakening of the state appa-
ratus, generating the need for private actors to be involved in state programs. The weaken-
ing of the state is not solely linked to the end of the Cold War, but to the period of its entire
duration. The process of the weakening of the state started with a violation of its sover-
eignty. “Basically, the concept of sovereignty is represented with the right to vote and the
power of realization of resolution based on the means of coercion and the established rules
for its use” (Đorđević 2013:25). This reference notes that sovereignty is becoming gradu-
ally more and more limited. The weakening of the state continues with endangering Max
Weber’s concept of state by the process of globalization (Đorđević 2013:36-39). Although
further discussion of the state as the holder of the security would be superfluous, it should
be noted that the modern state has changed. For this paper it is most important to recog-
nize the position of the government institutions in the current constellation of relations
within the state.
Privatization is the transformation of assets and capital from public to private ownership.
Privatization can be viewed both as a process and as a goal. When regarded as a process,
privatization is represented as a transition from an old to a new system, where the new
system functions in the form of private ownership. Thus, when privatization is regarded as
a goal, it is an absolute and established entirely in one of the state sectors or sections. The
reasons why privatization occurred in the security sector are manifold. Although the pri-
vatization process commenced in the 1970s and 1980s in the United States and the United
Kingdom, it picked up pace in the 1990s starting to slowly level off thereafter. The first
privatizations were in the developed economies of the West, which had the ideological
goal to implement privatization at any cost and in all sectors. Neoliberalism is a policy that
involves economic liberalization, free (open) market, deregulation and increased activity
of the private sector in the economy of modern society. This political-economic theory
emerged in Europe in 1930s as one of the ways to overcome inerbellum crisis. Neverthe-
less, experimental neoliberalism was first established in Chile, during the reign of Augusto
Pinochet (Solimano 2012).
Therefore, the first reason for the privatization of the public sector was to open the market
for security services. Another important reason is the establishing of the market. Behind
the opening of the market, there was no influence of invisible hand, but only the circum-
stances that have affected the security sector. The end of the Cold War meant the aban-
donment of the high level of security and hard power. This resulted in the demobilization
of millions of people and created employment opportunities for a large number of skilled
workers willing to work for less money.
The most important reason for the privatization is saving. There are two reasons for sav-
ing: The first one is a simple need to spend less, since the modern states are big debt-
ors and failed budget controllers. The second is hope that certain private security actors
would be able to take on tasks themselves and fulfil them as well as the state does. This
opens a potential problem of reckless conduct toward public goods. In fact, the main prob-
lem of security privatization revolves around this negligence. If security is considered a
common good, are these considerations reason enough to allow for privatization? “The
entire structure of diplomacy and international relations is based on the country as a cor-
nerstone of international law and international relations” (Schreier, Caparini 2005:56). It
is not a question of saving, but of functioning. The refurbishment market that is inefficient
can be a clear reason, but if the proposed solution also inefficient private sector, the ques-
tion is whether it is the only thing that remains profitability.
The privatization of the security sector is formally derived from the need to save. Outsourc-
ing8 is one of the textbook arguments for privatization used by the state for the sake of saving
or making a profit. Marketization of public administration took place in all countries that had
some kind of debt, a consequence of the availability of private type. On the other hand, it is not
uncommon to privatize a wealthy company as well, since privatization often involves sales and
cash flow. As Naomi Klein argues, during privatization, the first cuts are always reserved for
social programs and budgets for defense and security (Chatzistefanou, Kitidi 2011).
Another reason for privatization of security could be a concern relating to an increase in
organized crime professionalization. This argument is a fairly novel one. Professionalized
crime had its rise at the end of the Cold War accompanied by a demobilization of a large
number of security professionals. Being only trained to work in the security sector, a num-
ber of security professionals, after losing their job, chose to “switch sides” as involvement
in criminal activities was more lucrative. This situation is not uncommon in the countries
of the former Eastern bloc, and also takes place in the opposite direction: after privatiza-
tion and security reforms, criminals become employed in the private security industry.
The last argument in favor of security privatization is allowing for effective technical and
technological progress. Overproduction of smart technology does not only benefit those
who defend security, but also those who endanger it. Therefore, private companies, which
due to the nature of the business have a greater profit, also have a greater potential to in-
vest in new technologies as a result. Accordingly, if an agreement was made between the
two of them, both the state and private companies would benefit from this type of business
in favour of safety.
5. EPILOGUE
The fundamental difference between commercial and non-commercial services is that
the former is generally represented as far more lucrative, seeing that the essential aim of
public sector institutions is by and large not the generation of profit. Private security is
not a given, it is a commodity. Only state-provided security is guaranteed, given that it is
functioning in satisfactory manner. Therefore, only such non-commercial security can be
recognized as a common good.
Private security companies are located in nearly every country that adopted the capitalist
economic model. Most often they can be found in countries that had numerous profes-
8 Outsource – Obtain (goods or a service) by contract from an outside supplier

sionals that worked for army or police structures which have collapsed as a result of the
end of Cold War. In the societies with low levels of human development, democracy and
the rule of law, privatization can be accepted as a necessary step, but should not be seen as
a sufficient one. The consequences of the privatization of security in Africa, for example,
have been devastating (Musah, Fayemi 2000:13-43). Mercenaries described in the litera-
ture as dogs of war and representing the main source of unrest in Africa during the Cold
War, put on uniforms of private companies and are now alone responsible for ensuring
the security of the state and human security. Examples from Africa mutatis mutandis can
be aplied to other countries as well. What one should keep in mind are great differences
in budget allocations which countires provide for the ministries in charge of security. An
example in this sense could be the government of Zaire under President Mobutu (1965-
1997) during whose presidency the only thing that the Zaire government was able to “se-
cure” was an undisciplined and predatory army (Williams 2008:2). At the same time the
smallest budget was allocated for education and health care.
Health and education privatization does differ significantly from privatization of security.
School vouchers and private clinics have not contributed to the advancement of health and
education in any particular way. Passionate promoters of libertarianism placed too much
trust in the market hoping that it would help overcome the weaknesses in the functioning
of some of the aforementioned sectors. Nevertheless, scholars of economics show equal
appreciation for public and commercial method of functioning. When talking about secu-
rity one should bear in mind that both public and commercial sectors may exist, provided
they offer security at a satisfactory level. The potential problem could be the changes that
derive from the commercialization of the market. Such a system should provide, for exam-
ple, polycentric law (legal structure),9 equal opportunities at the market, through training
for security workers, etc.
In establishing the place for human security in the system of goods we can consider Mary
Kaldor’s definition of human security – human rights and human development are in-
separable (Kaldor 2007:183) as well as provisions brought forward by the United Nations,
establishing human rights as inalienable (UN Charter 1945). According to UNDP and
Commission on Humans Security instructions from their annual reports – “securtiy must
be made available as public goods and not be sold on the market” (Altvater 2007), private
actors should stick to the same rules of the game. However, private security or organized
crime as modern phenomena harm the idea of a monopoly on violence, thus lowering the
quality of security. Time will show to what extent they indangered safety.
6. CONCLUSION
In considering questions relating to the privatization of public goods, namely the use of
violence, this paper has merely scratched the surface. The question remains to what ex-
tent state interventionism and a paternalistic approach enables security to function. This
can all be a never-ending dispute between interested parties. Hence, there is no definite
answer to the question which model is optimal – the private or the public one.
Common goods are related to security in one more way. People are often willing to stand
in defense of the common goods, even if it sometimes means jeopardizing their own safety
9 Private courts, new laws, etc.

and the safety of those around them. A common good is a value, and security as a common
good becomes a value as well. History shows that people are generally willing to risk a
decrease in safety conditions in order defend their right to common goods. Elmar Altvater
writes in his paper: “Shattered is further the psychosocial security that people derive from
the sense of belonging to communities with which they share their ways of thinking and
behaving” suggesting that one should never try to take away a sense of belonging from
people.
7. REFERENCES
Altvater, E. (2007): “Public goods for human security”, Papeles del Este, No. 14, s. 1–19,
http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/PAPE/article/viewFile/PAPE0707220001A/25673
(09.01.2014.).
Altvater, E. What happens when public goods are privatised?, http://www.rosalux.de/
fileadmin/rls_uploads/.../altvater_0312.pdf (11.12.2013.).
Aris Chatzistefanou, Katerina Kitidi, directors (2011): Catastroika – documentary movie,
Infowar.
Avant, D. (2005): The Market for Force: The Consequences of privatizing security, New York,
Cambridge University Press.
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HUMAN SECURITY DEVELOPMENT ASPECTS
UDC 37:614.86

Jelena KOVAČEVIĆ-MAJKIĆ, Marko V.MILOŠEVIĆ *

IMPROVEMENT IN DISASTER RISK REDUCTION SYSTEM IN SERBIA 1
Abstract: Education is a significant part of the disaster risk reduction (DRR). A key segment
for the inclusion of DRR concepts and practices into the education network is the formal (com-
pulsory) education, within regular primary schools. The present paper covers the analysis and
suggestions for improvement of the current situation related to natural disaster issues in educa-
tion process in Serbia. This segment includes geography as an interdisciplinary science which
provides broad opportunities for understanding all aspects of natural disasters and thus plays an
important role in prevention. Analytical part is focused on policy documents (laws and regula-
tions referring to education and disasters) and on the curricula of geography as a school subject.
The only formal training on natural disasters for teachers, developed for geography teachers and
approved by the Ministry of Education, is presented as well. The training aims to motivate teach-
ers to include the DRR issues into the teaching process prior to the formal inclusion in curricula,
in order to overcome the temporal gap until the complicated and time-consuming process of
curricula adaptation is finished. The opinions of pupils are briefly analysed as well, through the
results of a poll survey, carried out among the pupils in earthquake-struck town of Kraljevo (M
5.4 in 2010). The results show that the children are highly aware of the need for better coverage
of risk reduction in their education. The need for better communication between the institutions
dealing with various segments of DRR in education is stressed. It is suggested how to overcome
the present problems and to head towards the best results in DRR through the compulsory pri-
mary education.
Key words: natural disaster risk prevention, primary education process, geography teaching, Serbia.
1. INTRODUCTION
The role of education in the issue of natural disaster risk reduction has been confirmed
in the majority of relevant references: e.g. Agenda 21, the UN Disaster Reduction Cam-
* Geographical Institute „Jovan Cvijić“, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade
Jelena Ćalić, Ph.D., Research Associate, e-mail: j.calic@gi.san u.ac.rs
Milena Panić, MSc, Research Assistant; e-mail: m.panic@gi.san u.ac.rs
Dragana Miljanović, MSc, Research Assistant, e-mail: d.miljanovic@gi.san u.ac.rs
Jelena Kovačević – Majkić, MSc, Research Assistant, e-mail: j.kovacevic@gi.san u.ac.rs
Marko V. Milošević, MSc, Research Assistant, e-mail: m.milosevic@gi.san
[178] Jelena KOVAČEVIĆ-MAJKIĆ, Marko V.MILOŠEVIĆ
paign on “Disaster Prevention, Education and Youth” (2000), Hyogo Framework for Ac-
tion (HFA) 2005-2015, the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development 2005-
2014, the UN campaign “Disaster Risk Reduction Begins at School” 2006-2007 (UNISDR
2007), etc. The term natural disaster is used herein in accordance with the definition of
the UNISDR (2009:09), which describes the notion of a natural disaster as a “(...) result
of the combination of: the exposure to a hazard; the conditions of vulnerability that are
present; and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce or cope with the potential nega-
tive consequences (...)”
Education helps people to perceive the risk in a realistic way, as opposed to the fatalistic
approach. Gaining knowledge about the proper protective behaviour is a step in the devel-
opment of disaster-resilient societies with an established culture of prevention. Izadkhah
and Hosseini (2005) claim that a number of casualties and material damage decrease in
prepared and educated societies. According to the Pressure-and-Release model defined
by Wisner et al. (2004), education about natural disasters leads to risk reduction. Aysan
(1993, cited in Alcántara-Ayala 2002) defined the notion of educational vulnerability – the
lack of access to information and knowledge, which is one of the components of vulner-
ability as a whole.
In Serbia, the disaster risk reduction has not yet been included in the formal education
curriculum. Therefore, the participants in the process (experts, teachers) apply different
solutions to overcome the present formal limitations. The majority of people involved in
the education system are not aware of the HFA recommendations and tasks (PFA3/CI2 in
particular), so the challenge for those who promote their application is even higher.
2. SIGNIFICANCE OF FORMAL EDUCATION

AND THE ROLE OF GEOGRAPHY SUBJECT
Although children are often regarded as the most vulnerable part of the society when it
comes to natural disasters (UNISDR 2007; Ronan et al 2012), they are at the same time the
most capable of changing (improving) their behaviour patterns and of adapting to newly
obtained knowledge. In the recent period of increased accent on prevention, children
have moved from the role of typical victims to the role of active, creative, enthusiastic
participants. In a longer time span, as future adults, they are expected to be leaders and
promoters of the active attitude towards natural disasters.
The place where all the children are supposed to obtain tuition on various issues is the
primary school. It encompasses the largest proportion of the total population of a country.
The importance of formal (school-based) education regarding its role in learning on natu-
ral disasters is elaborated in many references (Wisner 2006; Fridl et al. 2009; Komac et al.
2010; Ronan et al. 2010; Gulay 2010; Finnis et al. 2010; Johnston et al. 2011; etc). Although
Kuhlicke et al. (2011) recommend a combination of curriculum based, standardized edu-
cation and a kind of informal education, it is the standardized option which should be
selected in cases when the circumstances do not allow for both forms to be applied. About
70,000 pupils in Serbia enroll each year in the 1st grade of primary school (Statistical Sur-
vey of Serbia 2012). During eight years of primary education, the elements of disaster risk
reduction may be gradually included, in accordance with the age. The mechanisms of in-
tensive natural processes and their interactions with society may be taught through the
subjects with synthesis-based approach, like The World Around Us, as well as Nature and
IMPROVEMENT IN DISASTER RISK REDUCTION SYSTEM IN SERBIA [179]
Society (1st to 4th grade) and especially Geography (5th to 8th grade). General awareness
of the presence of natural disasters and the basic steps for their mitigation may be intro-
duced also through the classes of history, biology, physics, languages, art, etc.
Synthetic character of geography, which comprises the interrelations between nature and
society, is a practical tool having a number of applications (Gritzner 2004). One of those
applications is certainly the role in natural disasters prevention. The human-environment
relations may be presented and explained through the integrative geographical approach
(Golledge 2002; Cross 2009; Stoltman 2006). Mitchell (2009) claims that geography is the
natural academic “home” for teaching about hazards.
3. CONDITIONS WHICH PRECEDE DRR INTEGRATION

INTO SERBIAN FORMAL EDUCATION
There are several aspects which illustrate the present conditions for DRR integration: the
legal framework, the geography curricula (textbook contents) and the present state of
DRR knowledge among the pupils.
Legislation related to disaster risk education in Serbia is hierarchically composed of the
following elements: The Constitution, international conventions, and particular laws on
education and emergency situations (Fig. 1). Strategies correspond to the laws, although
they belong to another type of documents. Curricula are defined in regulations enacted
by the Ministry of Education. The Constitution is a basis which serves as a guarantee to
the right of safety for each individual. Among the international conventions, the Hyogo
Framework for Action 2005-2015 has the utmost importance, as it has been one of the
bases for enacting of the Law on Emergency Situations (2009) and the National Strategy
on Protection and Rescue in Emergency Situations (2011). The Article 119 of the Law on
Emergency Situations foresees that training is done through primary and secondary edu-
cation, for getting knowledge on the dangers of natural and other disasters, as well as for
protection. The Article 4 Paragraph 5 of the Law on the basics of education system states
that one of the general aims of the education process is to make children “capable of solv-
ing the problems, application of knowledge and skills in further education, professional
work and everyday life”, which completely corresponds to the need for DRR education.
The Laws on primary and secondary schools (Articles 20 and 24, respectively), declare
that the curriculum is enacted by the minister of education, according to the suggestion
of the advisers for particular subjects. The National Strategy on Protection and Rescue
in Emergency Situations (2011) says within the Strategic section 3 that “issues related to
protection, rescue and disaster risk reduction should be incorporated into the curricula of
all educational institutions”.
The formal curricula within the subject of geography contain only one lesson which is
directly related to natural hazards – the lesson “Volcanism and earthquakes” in the 5th
grade. Therefore, we decided to make a thorough analysis of geography textbooks in order
to determine the actual quantity of information related to natural disasters (for more de-
tails, see Kovačević-Majkić et al. 2014). The lessons precisely defined by the curricula oc-
cur regularly in all textbooks, regardless of the publisher and the edition. Additional con-
tents and aspects related to natural disasters occur randomly, depending on the authors of
the textbooks. When summed up, it was detected that most processes which may lead to
a natural disaster are mentioned only as natural hazards. This means they are presented
mostly through their genesis and influences on spatial physiognomy (natural process of
increased intensity), and not through their impact on society and its transformation. The
clearest example is the aforementioned lesson on volcanoes and earthquakes, which are
treated only as manifestations of plate tectonics. Only in two textbooks there is a short
instruction on how to behave properly during an earthquake. The fact that hazards are
represented at least to some extent leaves place to the teachers to include the interpreta-
tions which would stress the social aspects and contribute to resilience. Presently, until
the curricula are adapted, they have to do this upon their own initiative – an issue which is
further elaborated in the next section of the paper.
Figure 1: Legislation and strategic framework in the function of curricula definition

One of the examples of DRR-oriented educational activities out of the formal education
system is the publication of a booklet named “A family handbook on reacting in emer-
gency situations” (2012), issued by the Sector for Emergency Management of the Ministry
of Interior Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. The booklet is published both in Serbian and
in the languages of the national minorities. It has been issued as a part of the system of in-
terior affairs, and is distributed through the network of police departments and municipal
authorities. In that way, it reaches smaller number of people than it would be the case with
a potential similar publication within the education system.
In order to estimate children’s knowledge on proper reacting in emergency situations
caused by natural disasters, a survey was carried out among the pupils in the town of
Kraljevo. This town and its wider surroundings faced an M 5.4 earthquake on November
3rd 2010 at 1:56 AM, suffering relatively large material damage, with two victims. The sur-
vey took place 16 months after the event. More detailed results are presented in Panić et
al. (2013), and here we stress the answers about the activities during the earthquake. Most
of the participants had an improper reaction during the earthquake: 37% stayed exactly at
the place where they were situated at that moment, 27% ran out immediately, while only
13% reacted in a proper way – crouched under the table or under the door frame. Even at
the time of the survey, the children were not aware that their reactions were mostly incor-
rect: when asked about their opinion on their own reaction at the time of the earthquake,
about 51% of the total number of participants thought that they had acted correctly (al-
though they did not).These results were obtained among 839 children aged 11-15.
4. DRR IMPROVEMENT THROUGH THE PRESENT

SERBIAN EDUCATION SYSTEM
Inspired by the guidelines defined in the Hyogo Framework for Action and a series of the
related documents, a group of researchers from the Geographical Institute “Jovan Cvijić”
SASA have developed a strategy for the inclusion of DRR concepts and practices into the
teaching process. It encompassed the activities prior to formal DRR inclusion in curricula,
as well as the actual initiative directed to the Ministry of Education: to make the adapta-
tions of the curricula.
Prior to the formal DRR inclusion in curricula, in order to overcome the temporal gap
until the complicated and time-consuming process of curricula adaptation is finished, we
opted for developing professional training programs for geography teachers approved by
the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Serbia. According to the experts, these pro-
grams are generally a dominant model of professional development of teachers in Serbia
(Tatić-Janevski and Kovačević 2013). The process was structured in two steps, with the
main idea to help the processes which would lead to full DRR integration in future, and at
the same time provide at least some kind of DRR coverage in schools.
The first step took place in the period 2008-2014, as a part of the professional training for
geography teachers “Natural disasters and geography teaching”. The program is approved
by relevant bodies of the Ministry of Education, as one in a series of various programs for
professional training of teachers. In the mentioned period, 512 teachers (about 17% of the
total number of geography teachers in Serbia) have finished this training. After attending
the program, the teachers are supposed to develop students’ awareness of natural disasters
in their environment and of their role in prevention and mitigation. Each training session
lasted for two days and consisted of theoretical and practical parts, such as field work,
as well as a workshop. During 16 teaching hours, various topics were presented and dif-
ferent activities were held: natural hazards in general, natural hazards in Serbia, floods,
landslides, earthquakes, erosion, atmospheric natural hazards, social and economic con-
sequences of natural hazards, methods for determining natural disasters in local communi-
ties, defence systems against natural disasters, adequate response during natural disasters,
field work and a workshop. Analysis of teachers’ impressions was done through a poll
survey with the participation of teachers who attended the program. As many as 94% of
the participants have stated that the program is applicable in practice, at classes (with
the answers “completely agree” and “mostly agree”). Other results are presented in more
detail in Kovačević-Majkić et al. (2014). Four years after the beginning of the first profes-
sional program, we conducted a survey among pupils to find out how they reacted to DRR
issues, while the surveys among teachers were carried out regularly after each training
session. Finally, all the results were summed up in a study which was used in the process
of curricula revision.
The second step began in 2014 and is planned to be finished in 2018. It is another pro-
fessional training program for geography teachers “How can we protect ourselves from
natural disasters”, which is the upgrade of the previous one. It is directed towards the ap-
plication of the obtained knowledge in the real natural disaster situations. The teachers are
supposed to learn how to instruct the pupils on what to expect and how to behave in an
emergency situation in order to save lives.
Four years after the beginning of the first professional program, we conducted a survey
among pupils to find out how they reacted to DRR issues. The survey among pupils in
Kraljevo included the opinion about the geography curricula. When asked about the pres-
ence of earthquake-related issues in geography textbooks, 35% said they thought that the
present contents were enough, while 65% thought that the existing material “should be
expanded with the instructions on how to behave during an earthquake” (Figure 2). This at-
titude is characteristic for pupils in all grades. More details about the poll survey among
the schoolchildren in Kraljevo can be found in Panić et al. (2013) and Kovačević-Majkić
et al. (2014).
Figure 2: Pupils’ opinion on earthquake issues in geography textbooks

Finally, all the results have been summed up in a study which was used in the process of cur-
ricula revision. The school curricula rely on the formally adopted units called educational
standards. Educational standard is a group of statements which describe the knowledge
and skills which a pupil is expected to show at the certain level at the end of the obligatory
education. There are three levels of standards: (1) Basic level standard – knowledge and
skills achieved by 80% or more pupils; (2) Middle level standard – knowledge and skills
achieved by 50% or more pupils; and (3) Advanced level standard – knowledge and skills
achieved by about 25% of pupils.
The present educational standards for geography are defined in the document entitled
“Educational standards at the final stage of compulsory education, for the subject Geog-
raphy” (defined by the Ministry of Education in 2010). These standards presently do not
contain the knowledge and skills related to the detection and prevention of natural disas-
ters.
In 2012, the process of revision of the present standards began. The study “Natural disas-
ters and geography teaching” (Milošević et al. 2013) was used as a basis for the inclusion
of basic level standards related to the detection and prevention of natural disasters. This
revision will have the experimental status in the first phase. Cooperation and help of the
representatives for geography within the National Survey for Evaluation of Education was
of great significance. The revision of the standards was supposed to be enacted in Febru-
ary 2014. by the National Education Council of the Republic of Serbia. It is very important
to stress that it is suggested that the DRR elements are supposed to have the status of the
basic standards, which are to be reached by more than 80% of schoolchildren. As this is an
experimental revision, it will last for two years, and in this period it will be applied in 190
schools. After this period, it will hopefully be included in the regular education system of
the Republic of Serbia.
5. CONCLUSION
Being aware that (1) there is a need to implement DRR recommendations into educational
process; (2) geography curricula are a bottleneck not properly transferring the legislation-
provided possibilities towards the schools; and (3) the full inclusion of hazard and disaster
risk-related issues into existing education curricula is a time-consuming process; we start-
ed with small and relatively easy, yet effective steps in that direction (professional training
for geography teachers and curricula adaptation).
We were additionally encouraged by the results of the survey among the pupils from
Kraljevo, who recently suffered from a disaster (earthquake) themselves. Although we
detected relatively poor knowledge of schoolchildren about some basic issues, like the
proper reaction in case of an earthquake, the children were aware that they needed train-
ing in order to react correctly before, during and after a natural disaster.
In the meantime, the great majority of teachers who positively responded to the ques-
tion on the applicability of the program in schools indicate that it is possible to take the
responsibility and the initiative, and to include the elements of disaster risk reduction in a
number of other lessons, regardless of the fact that they are not yet in the formal curricula.
The fact that in this phase the process depends solely on the personal readiness and good
will of teachers does not diminish these pioneer steps. Despite the fact that this is a partial
limitation, at the same time it is a good opportunity in a given situation.
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UDC 343.431
Miladin KOSTIĆ, Emir ĆOROVIĆ, Senad GANIĆ, Sibela EMINOVIĆ*
ILLEGAL STATE BORDER CROSSING AND SMUGGLING OF HUMAN

BEINGS, CRIMINAL OFFENSES OF ARTICLE 350 OF THE CRIMINAL
CODE OF SERBIA AS POSSIBLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR PREVENTION OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION1
Abstract: United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with additional
protocol, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women
and Children and Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea were ratified
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose legal successor is the Republic of Serbia, in 2001.
Ratifying the last Protocol Serbia has incurred an obligation to incriminate certain activities relat-
ed to smuggling of human beings. Serbian legislator has amplified the scope of criminal offenses
of illegal state border crossing that led to renaming of incrimination.
In fact, the Criminal Code of Serbia of 2005,which came in force on 1 January 2006 in Article 350
currently regulates the criminal offense of illegal state border crossing and smuggling of human
beings, which is in Chapter XXXI of the same Code titled as “Criminal offenses against public
peace and order”. It could be noticed immediately that on the one hand this regulation protects
the state border integrity and on the other hand, it protects the society of another very dangerous
criminal activity, smuggling of human beings. Since smuggling of human beings is very frequently
carried out by organized criminal groups violating the fundamental human rights, regardless of
the fact that passive objects (victims) often accept to be “the objects of smuggling”, and consider-
ing that Serbia is a transit country on the way to the European Union are sufficient reasons for a
serious analyses of article 350 of the Criminal Code of Serbia.
Incrimination of the involved subjects will be analysed in the paper and specific suggestions de
lege ferenda, particularly regarding legal systematization of this criminal offense, will be provided.
Besides, the available statistical data on frequency of the criminal offenses of Article 350 of the
Criminal Code of Serbia, the structure of the imposed criminal sanctions for the same article and
possible relevant facts to comprehensive analysis of the criminal offense will be pointed out.
Key words: Serbia, smuggling of human beings, illegal migrations
* Miladin Kostić, PhD, Rector of State University in Novi Pazar,a professor at the Departmant of Law Sciences
Emir Ćorović, PhD, Assistant professor at the Departmant of Law Sciences, e-mail: ecorovic@np.ac.rs.
Senad Ganić, PhD, Assistant professor at the Deparment of Law Science, DUNP, e-mail: sganic@np.ac.rs.
Sibela Eminović, Foreign Language Instructor at Department of Philology, DUNP,
e-mail: sibela.eminovic@gmail.com.
[188] Miladin KOSTIĆ,Emir ĆOROVIĆ, Senad GANIĆ, Sibela EMINOVIĆ
1. INTRODUCTION
In free and political jargon the Balkans is often named as a “crossroads”. This is an area
where the East and the West interweave and various cultural, social, religious and other
influences are present. It is an area with a rich historical past. The territory of the former
Yugoslavia, particularly the territory of the present-day Republic of Serbia, is without the
exaggeration the centre of the “crossroads”. It is a territory of transit between the Asian
and EU countries. This transit position of Serbia is a fertile ground for the expansion of
certain negative, namely criminal activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking,
smuggling of human beings, etc.
Serbia is bordered by seven countries. The total length of the border with these coun-
tries is 2,531.8 km and 89 border crossings for international and cross-border traffic (Chal-
lenges of Forced Migration in Serbia 2013:15). In addition, the Autonomous province of
Kosovo and Metohija, according to the Resolution 1244 of the United Nations is under the
protection of the international community and there are more administrative crossings at
the administrative border with the province. Consequently, the government of the Repub-
lic of Serbia does not control its border along the Autonomous province.
The mentioned geo-strategic position of Serbia, the political situation (a part of the terri-
tory under the protectorate of the international community and efforts to join the Euro-
pean Union) has certainly favoured the above mentioned illegal migration and smuggling
of human beings. There are different approaches to this issue. This paper is dedicated to
the criminal legislation of the Republic of Serbia that incriminates illegal border crossing
and human smuggling as a normative framework intended, among other things, suppress-
ing the mentioned phenomenon. Namely, people from different fields (sociologists, politi-
cians, lawyers, social workers, etc.) have been dealing with the issue of human smuggling,
perceived from their point of view. However, having in mind great public expectations of
criminal justice, the overall approach of this issue exceeds the limits of “professional com-
petence” so that everyone is considered to be competent to discuss the criminal justice part
of human smuggling not even knowing the legislative framework of this issue.2 In order
to understand better this issue, the phenomenon of human smuggling should be closely
observed. We will also present relevant statistics on state border illegal crossing and smug-
gling of human beings of Article 350 of the Criminal Code of Serbia (CC) that could provide
us with some idea of frequency of the observed phenomena in our country so that we can
point out the “strictness” of the criminal repression regarding the criminal act.
2. A REFERENCE ON SMUGGLING OF HUMAN BEINGS PHENOMENON

In literature, reports and other available readings “illegal migration” and “smuggling of
human beings” are often equated. In our opinion those terms, do not necessarily overlap.
For example, if only one person illegally crosses into the territory of a state without its
citizenship it is not considered to be smuggling of human beings but an illegal migration.
2 This ascertainment does not refer only to criminal act of human smuggling but to almost all criminal offenses. Long
time ago, Mabel Elliott said there are many so-called scientists and criminal act experts so that any local grocer, a
manipulator at the petrol station and anyone’s “Aunt Mary” knows exactly what is to be done in order to decrease
criminal act rate (Elliott 1962:17).
ILLEGAL STATE BORDER CROSSING AND SMUGGLING OF HUMAN BEINGS, CRIMINAL
OFFENSES OF ARTICLE 350 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF SERBIA AS POSSIBLE LEGAL ... [189]
Some other participants apart from migrants need to be involved in order for the act to be
characterized as smuggling of human beings.
In this sense, smuggling of human beings is the case when one or more persons illegal-
ly transfer migrants for certain benefits (primarily cash) into the destination country or
across the state border (Ignjatović 2007:159; Anđelković 2012:10). Since the country of
origin and migrant destination country could be very distant, which requires crossing
several borders and transit countries stays, smuggling activities are often carried out by
organized criminal groups, which makes it very dangerous.
Smuggling of human beings differs from human trafficking. In fact, smuggling of human
beings relates to the transfer of migrants with their consent across the border and into the
destination country, while the goal of human trafficking is the exploitation of the victims
(Anđelković et al. 2012:10). Exploitation relates to victim’s labour, forcing into prostitu-
tion, begging, committing criminal offenses or similar (Stojanović 2012:1014). In short,
human trafficking consists of “bringing human beings into slave status which includes the
ownership of them” (Ignjatović 2007:159). However, it has been warned that illegal mi-
grants are much highly exposed to risk than in cases of human trafficking since they are
completely dependent on their smuggler, even once they arrive to the desired destination.
Very often they are forced to provide for living on the black market due to their illegal sta-
tus without any protection (Anđelković et al. 2012:10). In other words, those that are not
able to pay a „service“ of transport and transfer to another state, are forced to somehow
„pay back“ the owed sum of money for his smugglers (Ignjatović 2007:159).
The motives that inspire migrants are different. We will not go into any further analysis,
but in most cases, migrants, regarding whether they are legal or illegal, go “in search of
bread” in order to provide “better tomorrow” for themselves. From this point of view, one
form of migration marked as “undocumented labour force migration” that refers to illegal
migrations for some country labour market demands, i.e. engaging migrants has manifest-
ed itself in two main forms: 1) exceeding the allowed stay; and 2) intentional illegal entry
into the country. It is indicated that the described activities are related to other criminal
activities such as counterfeiting of entrance certificates and visas, bribery of civil servants,
etc. Moreover, employers’ involvement in taking advantage of the vulnerability of illegal
works is pointed out (Cohen 2009:825).
Observing the above mentioned, it could be concluded that smuggling of human beings
has the following characteristics:
1. The smugglers are considered to be the persons who organize and carry out the
transfer of migrants across the border of a country, or the destination country, or
that provide illegal immigrants to stay in a foreign country;
2. The goal of human smuggling is the illegal transport across state borders and bring-
ing migrants to the destination country or providing illegal stay in a foreign country;
3. Migrant consents to be “the object of smuggling”;
4. The “transfer service” is paid by migrant (or someone close to him/her) in money
or any other assets;
5. Transport is done by various means and if the “transfer” takes some time, migrants
can stay in certain closed spaces;
6. Poor conditions of transport and accommodation, as well as the inhuman treatment
of migrants may have a negative impact on their health and life;
7. Smuggling of human beings has often been carried out by organized criminal
groups, with a wide network of associates;
8. Smuggling of human beings is often related to other criminal activities such as doc-
ument forgery, bribery, etc.;
9. Smuggling of human beings differs from human trafficking, but there are situations
where it can turn into that phenomenon.
3. CRIMINAL LEGISLATION ON SMUGGLING

OF HUMAN BEINGS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
The Republic of Serbia is the legal successor of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which
ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its two
additional protocols: The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
especially Women and Children and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land,
Sea and Air. The Second protocol, which is, in terms of this paper, the subject of our inter-
est, entered into force on 28 January, 2004.
The CC was adopted in 2005 and entered into force on 01 January, 2006. Article 350 of
the CC criminalized the illegal state border crossing and smuggling of human beings. It
is in the chapter XXXI of the CC, titled as “Criminal offenses against public order and
peace”. Previous criminal legislation of Serbia recognized the offense of illegal state border
crossing while smuggling of human beings was unified with this criminal offense in CC in
2005, after the ratification of the Protocol. However, in the previous Serbian criminal law,
certain activities, which represent smuggling of human beings as a part of criminal act of
illegal state border crossing, were also incriminated.
Regarding the position of systematization of criminal offense of illegal state border cross-
ing and smuggling of human beings of Article 350 of the CC, it could be concluded that
our legislator decided to use it to protect public order and peace. The group of criminal
offenses against the public order and peace includes a range of heterogeneous incrimina-
tions (Stojanović 2012:901). In addition, public order and peace are understood in accord-
ance with Article 2 of Law of Public Order and Peace according to which these goods are
understood as “a state of mutual harmony of citizens based on their behaviour in public
places and acting of agencies and organizations in public life in order to ensure equal
conditions for providing citizen’s rights to personal and property safety, peace and tran-
quillity, privacy, freedom of movement, protection of public morality, human dignity and
right of minors to be protected”.
In the same group of criminal offenses, Article 350a of the CC stipulates criminal offense
of enabling the abuse of the right of asylum, which is functionally related to smuggling of
human beings. Actually, the criminal offense of illegal state border crossing and smuggling
of human beings under Article 350 of the CC applies to immigrants, while the criminal
offense providing abuse of right of asylum under Article 350a applies to emigrants, i.e. Ser-
bian citizens who abuse the right of asylum. However, such arrangement of the criminal
offense in Article 350 CC in part related to the smuggling of human beings is, we dare say,
artificially separated from human trafficking which the CC criminalises in Article 388, in
the group of Crimes against humanity and other values protected by international law. It
seems that in terms of the Convention and its Protocol, one related to human trafficking
and other to smuggling of human beings, the criminal offenses related to these phenomena
are categorized in one place.
The criminal offense of illegal state border crossing and smuggling of human beings in
Article 350 of CC has several forms. We will refer to their basic features in short. “Classic”
case of illegal state border crossing is regulated in paragraph 1of Article 350 of CC while
smuggling of human beings is regulated in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the same article. Ac-
tions incriminated in paragraphs 3 and 4 represent serious forms of smuggling of human
beings.
Paragraph 1 incriminates unauthorized (without proper licence) crossing or attempting to
cross the border of the Republic of Serbia. The offender has to attempt or cross the border
armed or using violence to be this offense. Otherwise, it is treated as misdemeanour.3 For
the offense of paragraph 1 of Article 350 imprisonment of up to one year is prescribed.
Smuggling of human beings is stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 350 of the CC. This crimi-
nal offense is committed by the person who provides another person:1) illegal crossing of
the border of the Republic of Serbia; 2) illegal stay in the Republic of Serbia, or 3) illegal tran-
sit through Serbia. This criminal offense is also marked by the intention to get some benefit
for yourself or someone else. It does not have to be on the property but any other immaterial
benefits. Offenses are punishable by imprisonment of six months to five years.4
The first severe form of smuggling of human beings under paragraph 3 of Article 350 of the
CC, is punishable by imprisonment of six months to ten years, if smuggling of human be-
ings is done: 1) by a group; 2) by abuse of official position; 3) in a manner that endangers
the life or health of persons whose illegal crossing of the borders of Serbia, stay or transit
is provided, and 4) a great number of people is smuggled. It is necessary to clarify these
aggravating circumstances.
The term “group” is defined in Article 112, paragraph 22 of the CC. According to this pro-
vision, a group consists of at least three persons associated for the purpose of permanent
or temporary commission of offenses, provided that such persons are not required to have
defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.
In the case of smuggling of human beings committed by abuse of the official position, only
the employee can be the offender, while in other cases it could be any person.
Smuggling of human beings done in a manner that endangers the life or health of migrants
includes “failure to provide the basic conditions (especially in transportation) in terms of
means of transportation, accomodation, etc.” (Stojanović 2012:923).
Greater number of people in terms of this crime theoretically (Stojanović 2012:923) and
practically (judgment of Appellate Court in Novi Sad number Kž 1-3560/12of 29 Novem-
ber 2011) involves at least five people.
The most severe form of paragraph 4 of the article was introduced by the Law on Amend-
ments and Supplements to the CC of 2009. The same occurs if the smuggling of human be-
ings is committed by an organized criminal group. The term of organized criminal group
is defined by Article 112, paragraph 35 of the CC and it consists of three or more persons,
3 See Article 84 of the Law on Foreigners.

4 Before passing the Law on Amendments and Supplements of CC in 2009, for this offense imprisonment of 3 to 6
months was prescribed.
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more
criminal offenses for which a punishment of imprisonment of four years or more severe
punishment is provided, in order to acquire direct or indirect financial or other benefit.
This type is punishable by imprisonment of three to twelve years.
Otherwise, the Serbian CC in Article 57 paragraph 2 explicitly prohibits the application
of a mitigation of sentence in relation to the explicitly specified offenses including the
aggravated forms of the criminal offense of Article 350 paragraph 3 and 4 of the CC. This
situation has existed since the adoption of the mentioned Law on Amendments and Sup-
plements to the CC in September 2009.
In addition to paragraph 5, Article 350 of the CC stipulates that the assets held or used to
commit an offence described in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the same article will be forfeited.
For example, if weapons or means of transportation were used while smuggling human
beings, these will be forfeited. The strange thing is that the provision for the seizure of as-
sets does not apply to the most serious form of smuggling of human beings of paragraph 4
Article 350 of the CC. However, these assets can be seized by the general rules that apply
to the imposition of security measure of forfeiture Article 87 of the CC.
As the lack of actual legal provision of a criminal offense of Article 350 of the CC it is stated
that inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as the exploitation of smuggled migrants,
are not predicted as a qualified form of the crime which is a deviation from the standard
set out in Article 6 paragraph 3 of the Second protocol (Human rights in Serbia 2011:88).
However, the potential prescribing severe form where the mentioned circumstances will
be predicted, would be lost in some segments of boundaries between the criminal offense
Article 350 of the CC and human trafficking Article 388 of the CC. It should be pointed
out that the migrant himself cannot, according to the letter of Protocol, be the perpetrator
of the offense of smuggling of human being (Article 5of the Second protocol). However,
if the migrant was armed or violently crossed or tried to cross the border of Serbia, it
means that he/she could be an offender of acts of illegal state border crossing of Article
350 paragraph 1 CC (Stojanović 2012:922). In the same way, an illegal migrant in the case
of smuggling will not be abolished of liability for misdemeanour in terms of the Law on
Foreigners. The mentioned Article 5 of the Second protocol (related to Article 6 of the
Protocol) refers only to acts of smuggling human beings while Article 350 paragraph 1 of
the CC as well as violations of the Law on Foreigners protects the inviolability of the state
border of the Republic of Serbia as such.
There is a problem with criminal offense of Article 350 of the CC in the part that it protects
the borders of Serbia, staying or transit to Serbia. Some problems regarding this issue have
been noticed. Specifically, in the international criminal law cooperation related to the
transfer of sentenced persons, i.e. recognition and enforcement of foreign criminal judg-
ments in Serbia which sentenced a citizen of the Republic of Serbia for the crime involving
smuggling of human beings across the third countries border, the contentious issue was
whether the requirement of the dual criminality is fulfilled. The reason for this is, that the
states regarding criminal offenses of smuggling of human beings (and illegal border cross-
ing) and their prescriptions, protects only its border and its territory. So in the process of
transfer of convicts, courts face with the problem of determining, whether the offense is
punishable under the law of Serbia and the law of the country in which judgment was im-
posed, as well. This is because, the provisions of the criminal law, as mentioned, consider
only its border and territory.5 Some of the criminal law in Europe, for example Slovenia, by
criminalization of similar content protect, not only its border and space, but also provide
the implementation of domestic criminal offense for the activities committed abroad in
case that the state where the crime was committed, has accepted international obligation
of such crime preventions, regardless the place of commitment. This provision clearly rec-
ognizes the need for international cooperation in combating smuggling of human beings,
necessary from the point of view of the nature of this phenomenon.6
4. FREQUENCY OF CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF ARTICLE 350

OF CC AND SEVERITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW REACTION:
REVIEW OF STATISTICAL DATA
Statistical data showing “movement” of criminality through years in the Republic of Serbia
are presented in certain publications of the Republic Bureau of Statistics of Serbia.7
In Table 1 the data on total number of criminal charges, indictments and convictions are
given, as well as data on the number of criminal charges, indictments and convictions of
a criminal offense of Article 350 CC. Apart from absolute numbers in the column related
to the offense of Article 350 of CC, the percentage of participation of observed criminal
offense in the total number of criminal charges, indictments and convictions is given in
brackets.
Table 1
Criminal charges Indictments Convictions

Year
Total Art. 350 CC total Art. 350 CC Total Art. 350 CC
2006 105.701 121 (0.11%) 55.369 46 (0.08%) 41.422 32 (0.07%)
2007 98.702 123 (0.12%) 48.903 73 (0.14%) 38.694 65 (0.16%)
2008 101.723 101 (0.09%) 53.035 86 (0.16%) 42.138 67 (0.15%)
2009 100.026 121 (0.12%) 50.404 86 (0.17%) 40.880 75 (0.18%)
2010 74.279 135 (0.18%) 27.860 52 (0.18%) 21.681 50 (0.23%)
2011 88.207 273 (0.30%) 39.439 60 (0.15%) 30.807 57 (0.18%)
2012 92.879 279 (0.30%) 41.621 151 (0.36%) 31.322 122 (0.38%)
2013 91.411 202 (0.22%) 45.704 No data provided 32.241 125 (0.38%)
From the data the number of criminal charges, indictments and convictions increased
significantly during 2012 and 2013 both in absolute numbers and percentage. Obviously,
in the last years the activity of police and judicial authorities of suppressing criminal ac-
tivities of Article 350 of CC increased. The number of criminal charges in those two years
(and during 011) is more than twice higher than in the period from 2006 - 2010. The indict-
5 On this occasion, see the decision of the High Court in Kragujevac Kv-263/13 from 11 September 2013, and the Ap-
pellate Court in Kragujevac Kž 2-2257/13 from 14 October 2013 (Bulletin of jurisprudence 2013).
6 This issue is closely related to the principle of the universal validity of the criminal legislation (Ganić, Ćorović
2013).
7 Newslaters and announcements of the Republic Bureau of Statistics of Serbia are given in the literature at the end
of this paper.
ments varied from 2006 to 2011, but in 2012 that number doubled, compared to some of
the observed years or even tripled. Period from 2012 - 2013 also distinguished the number
of convictions and significant increase in comparison to previous years.
The structure of imposed criminal sanctions is presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Prison Suspended
Year Total Fine Public work
sentence sentence
2006 32 15 0 17 0
2007 65 43 0 21 5
2008 67 45 0 22 0
2009 75 50 0 25 0
2010 50 31 0 19 0
2011 57 37 0 20 0
2012 122 95 1 26 0
2013 125 95 0 30 0
Apart from 2006, prison sentence is the most often pronounced crime penalty. We are
obliged to clarify that the provisions of the CC suspended sentence may be imposed only
for the forms of paragraph 1 and 2 of the Article 350 of CC. Similarly public work could,
according to the legal provisions, be imposed only for the forms referred to in paragraph
1of Article 350 of the CC.
As stated, a number of convictions for this crime were recorded during 2012 and 2013. The
number of prison sentences imposed significantly increased in those years, up to more
than ¾ of criminal sanctions imposed for a criminal offense of Article 350 of CC.
Severity of criminal law repression is presented in the Table 3 providing the range of pris-
on sentences. For the two observed years, 2006 and 2013, the necessary data were not
available.
Table 3
From From From From From From From

Up to 2
Year Total 2-3 3-6 6-12 1-2 2-3 3-5 5-10
Months
months months months years years years years
2006 15 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
2007 43 0 8 17 14 4 0 0 0
2008 45 0 ⁵ 11 16 8 6 0 3
2009 50 0 7 6 11 16 5 5 0
2010 31 0 1 9 8 7 4 2 0
2011 37 0 5 4 18 5 2 3 0
2012 95 2 1 14 46 18 11 2 1
2013 95 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Prison sentences up to one year certainly dominate and within the range those from 6-12
months. One theoretical part considers them as short term prison sentences. Having in
mind that prison sentences make the highest number imposed, the number of sentences
from 6-12 months has also significantly increased as well as sentences exceeding one year.
Prison sentences over 3 years are rare. For period 2007-2012, only 16 of these have been
imposed, and that is 5.31% of total number of prison, while 4 of them that are over 5 years,
which represents 1.32% of all imposed prison sentences in that period.
It will be interesting to monitor criminal policy later, in some future period considering
that in the latest years a significant increase of charges and indictments for criminal of-
fense of Article 350 of the CC which, due to the frequently mentioned slow pace of justice
should get its epilogue in the court.
5. CONCLUSION
Smuggling of human beings represents a huge problem for international community. It
was, after all, the reason for adoption of adequate international legal framework. Certainly,
the Republic of Serbia could not be without this problem. Moreover, its transit position,
i.e. its ancestral role of the tie between the East and the West, makes it fertile ground for
this activity which, unfortunately it is. It is necessary to work on the education of public
authorities, primarily towards development of methodology of detection and prevention
of these crimes. Of course, the path of the Republic of Serbia towards European integra-
tion requires faster and more committed work on smuggling of human beings suppression.
Regarding the criminal law in general, and in relation with the criminal offense of Article
350 of CC, its capabilities are limited, but they should not be underestimated. The public
and policy have high expectations of the criminal justice system. Without going into this
issue, three things are to be mentioned:
1. As for the suppression of crime including smuggling of human beings, we will stick
to the Cesare Beccaria attitude on certainty but not severity of the punishment, as
he pointed out long time ago;
2. Successful suppression of smuggling of human beings, due to its international di-
mension, depends on quality of cooperation between police and judicial authori-
ties of different countries;
3. The above mentioned international dimension of smuggling of human beings must
be taken in account while formulating incriminations, so that the states will be
concerned not only on its border and territory but respecting the rules of interna-
tional agreement create the possibility for national judicial authorities to prosecute
and adjudicate cases of smuggling of human beings committed in another country.
Good examples could be found in comparative law.
Criminal law is a repressive branch of law, but repression is not the aim. Specifically, ac-
cording to criminal law prevention is provided through repression regarding the influence
on perpetrator not to constitute criminal acts, or to deter potential perpetrators of the new
criminal intentions. Presented statistical facts show increased criminal justice reaction in
the area of human smuggling, since the number of claims, prosecutions and convictions
for these criminal acts have been growing. It is assumed that the dark figure of this criminal
act is still high considering Serbian geostrategic and transitional position. So that, hasty
conclusions should not be drawn: it could be concluded, from simple evidence of table
given, that with increased number of prison sentences and stricter penalties, the number
of new claims and accusations is higher, that means that stricter penalties do not decrease,
but increase human smuggling. This, of course is not true. The data provided tell us pri-
marily about the increased state activity in this area. The following notice could best illus-
trate it: more severe criminal sanctions, according to the data from the tables, have been
imposed since 2009, when the Law on Amendments and Supplements of CC was passed,
which excluded the possibility to mitigate sanctions for severe forms of human smuggling
in Article 350, paragraphs 3 and 4 CC. It has a consequence: a stricter punishment policy,
i.e. stricter punishments in that and following years. How “strict” punishment reaction
affects the reduction of this criminal act is the question impossible to be answered now,
since future is to show how justified the legislator’s intention towards stricter punishment
has been.
6. REFERENCES
Anđelković M. et al. (2012): Human trafficking: A handbook for lawyers. Astra – Action
against human trafficking: Belgrade (in Serbian).
Cohen R. (2009): Migration. In: A.Kuper, J. Kuper (ed.), The Social Science Encyclopedia.
Belgrade: Official Gazette, pp. 822-827 (translated in Serbian).
Criminal Code, Official Gazette of Republic of Slovenia ,No. 55/2008(in Slovenian).
Criminal Code of Serbia, Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia, No. 85/2005, 88/2005,
107/2005, 72/2009, 111/2009, 121/2012, 104/2013 (in Serbian).
Elliott M. (1962): Crime in Modern Society. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša (translated in Serbian).
Ganić S., Ćorović E. (2013): “The Principle of Universal Validity of Criminal Legislation
and the Issue of State Sovereignty”. Collected Papers – Novi Sad Faculty of Law Serbia,
Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 245-258 (in Serbian).
Ignjatović Đ. (2007): Criminology. Belgrade: File (in Serbian).
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Law on public order and peace, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 51/1992,
53/1993, 67/1993, 48/1994, 85/2005, 101/2005 (in Serbian).
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protocols, Official Gazete of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -International Treates,
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Bulletin br. 546. Belgrade: Republic Bureau of Statistics (in Serbian).
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UDC 343.72:351.78
Mladen MILOŠEVIĆ, Božidar BANOVIĆ*
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND HUMAN SECURITY1
Abstract: White-collar crime has become a worldwide crime phenomenon, largely due to
the globalization and transition processes. Non-violent and dominantly financially motivated
crimes, committed by the persons of high social status, most frequently within business frame-
work, inflict serious harm to the society and urge for the reaction at national, regional and global
level. In addition to this, last decades of the past century brought up a growth of corporate crime,
a form of white-collar crime. The examples of corporate criminal conduct in this domain include
the cases of human rights violations in Nigeria, India, Sierra Leone, and other regions. The fact
that a large number of states have decided to start punishing corporations with criminal sanctions
is the result of an objective examination of social reality, which has unequivocally shown that
crimes are continually committed on behalf of and for the gain of legal persons, and that those
acts inflict serious damage to states, society and individual rights. The white-collar and corporate
crimes are common in the financial sector, but are also present in the fields of health and safety
at work, environment protection and human rights. In a word, the prevention and reduction of
all forms of the white-collar crime is obviously very significant for the state of human security in
every society.
The authors explain the concept and the main characteristics of white-collar crime and provide
brief insight into the relevant legislative provisions in Serbian law. They also stress the traits of
corporate crime, as a unique and especially dangerous crime phenomenon. The authors analyze
legal framework for white-collar crimes repression and prevention in Serbia, and point to possible
weaknesses of certain provisions. Next, they focus on the relations between human security and
white-collar crime, arguing that the improvement of human security state is highly dependent on
the white-collar crime prevention process.
Key words: white-collar crime, corporate crime, human security.
1. INTRODUCTION
White-collar crime is a form of criminal activity which is characterized by extremely high
dark figure and serious consequences often farther-reaching than those the conventional
crimes cause. Contemporary Serbian society, characterized by economic instability, lack
* Mladen M. Milošević, PhD in Law, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Security Strudies, e-mail: milosevic@fb.bg.ac.rs;
Professor Božidar B. Banović, PhD in Law, University of Kragujevac – Faculty of Law, e-mail: bbvsup@yahoo.com.
[200] Mladen MILOŠEVIĆ, Božidar BANOVIĆ
of legal certainty and high levels of corruption, is a fertile ground for the “revival” of white-
collar crime. One particularly socially dangerous manifestation of this type of crime is also
corporate crime, which involves the commission of criminal acts by the responsible per-
son with even a partial intention of getting benefit for a legal person, or, the actual achieve-
ment of corporate benefits due to the negligent actions of the responsible person.
Serbian legislation has not accepted the principle of culpability of legal persons for crimi-
nal offenses until late 2008, (Law on liability of legal persons for criminal offenses 2008,
hereinafter referred to as LLLPCO), after most European countries (as well as all the
Western Balkan countries) have already done that. However, only six years later, the first
criminal conviction in proceedings against a legal person (First conviction against a legal
person 2014) was recorded. The EU countries, but also the countries of the Western Bal-
kans, passed the appropriate law only a few years prior to us but have developed jurispru-
dence in this area, which clearly shows how inefficient and slow the implementation of the
legal provisions in Serbia actually is. Having this in mind, it remains uncertain whether,
to what extent and in what way our legal system is able to adequately respond to the chal-
lenges posed by the phenomenon of criminality of the legal entities.
In the upcoming pages, we will try to present the concept and characteristics of white-
collar crime in the areas of human security and particularly stress the importance of crimi-
nality of a legal entity as its subspecies. Bearing the latter in mind, we will analyze the
criminal-political arguments for and against the introduction of liability of legal persons
for criminal offenses from the aspect of promoting the fight against white-collar crime.
Finally, we will make conclusions about the effectiveness of the existing legal instruments
in our country in terms of protecting human security in contemporary Serbia.
2. WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND

CORPORATE CRIME - A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The term ‘white collar crime’ was first used by Edward Alsworth Ross in 1907, but was
theoretically developed by Edwin Sutherland, a few decades later. Sutherland pointed out
to the fact that crime is not necessarily linked to lower socio-economic classes. He claimed
that there is no essential difference between white-collar crime and street crime, except in
the social reaction, which in the case of the former is often missing. He defines the white-
collar crime as a crime committed by persons of high socio-economic status within the
framework of their business activities. In those “persons of higher socio-economic status”
the famous American criminologist included business executives and managers, and the
corporation itself. He considered any unlawful conduct can be characterized as an act of
white-collar crime, regardless of whether it is sanctioned by the norms of civil, criminal or
administrative law (Salinger 2005:7; Hartley 2008:2).
White-collar crime is manifested through various forms, whose genesis can be traced par-
allel to the social and economic changes. One of the more recent phenomena that accord-
ing to the basic characteristics belong to white-collar crime is criminality of corporations
(legal entities).
Acts of corporate crime are those committed for the benefit of the corporation by a person
who is legally or factually authorized to act on its behalf (Milosevic 2008). The first part of
this definition differentiates between the two phenomena, while the second emphasizes
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND HUMAN SECURITY [201]
their entwining. The fact that the acts of corporate crime are carried out by persons who
abuse their position in a corporation can lead us to the conclusion that it is a subspecies
of white-collar crime. On the other hand, the motivation of a perpetrator is specific and
clearly separates the crime of legal persons from similar phenomena. However, we must
not lose sight of the fact that the motivation of the perpetrator is sometimes double - he
may strive to satisfy the needs of corporate and personal use, both achieved within the
criminal activities.
Thus, the crime of legal persons is inextricably linked to white-collar crime, but its charac-
teristics make it a relatively autonomous phenomenon.
Criminality of corporations is a subspecies of white-collar crime, and from other forms of
the latter it is distinguished by the orientation of the motives towards gaining illegal use
of legal and not (or not only) the natural person who performs tort or otherwise, with a
related party (Milosevic 2008). In criminological terms this type of criminal activity is
clearly determined by the desire for material gain (Ignjatovic 2010:109). However, in cases
of many criminal affairs it is difficult to separate the criminality of corporations from other
forms of white-collar crime, because the gain acquired for the corporation ends up in the
hands of individuals who developed criminal project. After all, it can be argued that corpo-
rate crime, even when it is oriented at gaining profit of the legal person, always results as
a white-collar crime, because the benefits of it in the end always come to a natural person
(e.g. director or shareholder).
Unlawful activities of the company in some cases have unforeseeable negative conse-
quences, pointing out to the need for responses and criminal sanctions to their tort actions
(Stojanovic, Kolaric 2010:25). According to the estimations of the American Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI), the total annual damage by the American Society of robberies
and aggravated thefts is about $ 3.8 billion, a sum identical to the one that emerged as a re-
sult of only a handful of corporate frauds (specifically, they are well-known cases of com-
panies Tyco, Adelphia, WorldCom, and Enron). Fraud in the field of automotive repairs
cost Americans about $ 40 billion annually; manipulation of securities produces damage of
about $ 15 billion per year, and in the areas of savings and insurance between 300 and 500
billion dollars. (Twenty things you should know about corporate crime 2007).
The most common forms of corporate criminal activity are economic and financial of-
fenses. However, the review of the phenomenology of corporate crime clearly shows that
it affects almost all important dimensions of human security - economic security, legal
order, public health, the environment, the right to work and other basic human rights.
3. FENOMENOLOGY OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME

3.1 White-collar crime in the sphere of threats to economic security
and the safety of trade in food and medicine
Enron Corporation and Tyco International were sued in 2002 for market and financial ma-
nipulation. Enron, according to the relevant American federal agencies, manipulated the
price of its shares and hid the related financial transactions. Several leading corporation
managers who have falsely portrayed the facts of business enterprises were convicted for
insider trading. The term “insider trading” includes any securities trading by the person
who owns the information not available to the public, which, in turn, can have a large
impact on their value (Harris 2003:591-597) and other criminal acts. Tyco International
has agreed to pay, in the name of the settlement, the amount of nearly $ 3 billion due to
accusatory allegations of fraud and violations of shareholders accounting regulations (Mi-
losevic 2012). Swiss pharmaceutical company F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. was convicted
for criminal conspiracy of global proportions in the period from 1990 until 1999, taken to
illegally “rigging”, reared or held up prices and control the market of vitamins A, B2, B5, C,
E and beta-keratin that are used as the most common nutritional supplements in human
and animal nutrition. F. Hoffmann-La Roche pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a fine of 500
million dollars (Hoffmann 1999).
Genentech Inc., a company for the development of biotechnology and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts has admitted that it, in the period from 1985 until 1994, advertised hospitals, medical
staff and others the product Protropin, a synthetic growth hormone for treatment of various
diseases, without the permission by the competent state agencies - the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration. Genentech was fined with $ 30 million, while based on the civil law of damages
had to pay out $ 20 million (Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade, 2008).
3. 2 White-collar crime in the area endangering the environment

Ecological white-collar crime is a major threat to the whole planet. Corporations have,
for the sake of larger profits, become “major threat” to the environment by their flagrant
disregard of the relevant regulations. A good example is the fire in the Swiss company
Sandoz in 1986, caused by a worker who improperly repackaged waste which led to a spill
of waste into the waterways of the Rhine, thus contaminating the drinking water within
a radius of several hundred kilometres and the destruction of flora and fauna to the great
extent (Simovic- Hiber 2007:88).
Notable is the case of a corporation Exxon Valdez, played in 1989. Exxon’s tanker poured
about 11 million gallons (40, 9 million litres) of crude oil into the sea. It is believed that
this is one of the worst cases of environmental disasters caused by human factor in history.
It is estimated that the said amount spilled over approximately 3,400 square kilometres of
space. American federal court leaded the case against Exxon, which has resulted in imposi-
tion of high fines (Cheyette 2008:177-178).
Oil Corporation Chevron is also one of the major pollutants in the energy industry. The
study titled Big Spiller, published in 1989, unveiled the data on oil spill by the corporation
characterizing it as the greatest “pourer” throughout the oil industry. The study estimates
that Chevron poured about 2, 8 million gallons of oil from 1984 until 1989, not including
the millions of gallons that its El Segundo refinery spilled into the underground water
flows (Sallinger 2005:161).
3. 3 Crimes against health and safety at work

The pursuit of profit at all costs is strikingly reflected in cases of flagrant violation of regu-
lations on health and safety at work. Statistical reports show that the number of deaths
at work due to inadequate working conditions in Canada is equal to the number of street
killings. The statistical data for the United States are equally troubling: only in 2001, 5,900
people were killed at work, including traffic accidents during work, falls, accidents with
machinery plants and murders during the performance of work. However, the data on the
total number of killed on the job is also an indicator of the lack of protection of employees
(Sallinger 2008). Hartley mentions the report of the commission created by the President
of the United States in 1972, in which it says that at that time about 100,000 people a year
were dying from the effects of industrial (occupational) disease (Hartley 2008:31).
The official statistics of the American government shows that in recent years the num-
ber of deaths at work is rather high. Throughout 2005 and 2006 in New York 29 persons
were killed, as a result of construction accidents (mostly downs). Representatives of the
American Board for Occupational Safety and Health Administration conducted in 2007,
a program aimed at promoting safety in oil refineries and increased control in this area.
Surprising fact was that the refineries, although they were aware of the program, did not
stop violating regulations on safety at work. Soon after, there was an explosion at the Te-
soro refinery, which caused the death of seven employees, and only a few weeks later, an
explosion at a refinery owned by oil corporation BP, in the Gulf of Mexico, led to the death
of 11 workers (Milosevic, 2012:31).
A striking example of the current white-collar crime in this area is the tragic death of con-
struction workers in Zemun, where improper construction works on the construction of
a retaining wall that was supposed to prevent further landslide (which were temporarily
banned by the decision of the supervisory authority), led to a collapse of several cubic
meters of earth over the workers. Four people died there. Police custody was determined
for three leaders of the ‘Stevan Stevanovic Grading SS’ (Landslide buried workers, 2011).
The Labour Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of the Republic of
Serbia presented the alarming data: in the first nine months of 2011, 37 people were killed
during the performance of work - 20 people were killed in the workplace, while 17 work-
ers subsequently died from severe physical injuries sustained while working (37 workers
killed at work, 2011).
3.4 Violations of basic human rights laws through white-collar crime

The examples of the participation of corporations in human rights violations in conjunc-
tion with the state, which is certainly a form of white-collar crime, is found in the form
of international crimes even during World War II. International crimes present the most
serious form of violation of human rights, but only responsible individuals pay for them
(natural persons) who have made them as perpetrators, accomplices or issuers of the order
(or, again, on the basis of command responsibility) (Kreca 2007:115; Dimitrijevic, Racic.
Djeric, Papic, Petrovic, Obradovic 2005:146-147; Banovic, Bejatovic 2012:34).
The Directors of German companies, which collaborated with the Nazi regime and par-
ticipated in the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against
peace, were prosecuted before the Court of Nuremberg. Despite the fact that the Nurem-
berg judgment referred to the criminal responsibility of individuals from the company, the
literature emphasizes the view that the Court expressed that the crimes were carried out
by the companies (Đurđević 2003:724-725). In the case of the United States v. Krauch, the
Court treats the entity as a means of committing an offense and points to the social respon-
sibilities of enterprises related to the respect for human rights (Engle 2006:291).
Ratner states the court decision in the case of I. G. Farben, emphasizing the part of the
judgment which clearly says that the company has committed crimes against property in
the territory of Poland, Norway, Alsace and Lorraine and France, and that the actions of
the company and its representatives are inseparable part of German policy in occupied
countries and constitute a violation of the so-called Hague Rules (Ratner 2001:477-478).
Foreign oil companies in Nigeria have been one of the initiators of the conflict that in this
country began in 1990s, due to the tensions between them and certain ethnic groups. Cor-
poration Chevron and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation have been present in
the territory of Nigeria since 1957, when they discovered large amounts of petroleum in
the soil of the African state. The government has forced the minority Ogoni ethnic group
to leave the country so that oil corporations could take it and exploit its underground
wealth (Тhe price of oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Ni-
geria’s Oil Producing Communities, 2013). The conflict culminated in 1994, when the
government increased military presence in the region (Milosević 2012:34). It is clear that
the basic political rights of citizens were violated here, including the right to freedom of
assembly and association.
4. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

AS THE INSTRUMENT IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST WHITE-COLLAR CRIME – THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
The main theoretical argument for the introduction of criminal liability of legal persons is
a deterrent effect that it achieves and the adequate social “etiquette” that a criminal con-
viction “sews” to the perpetrators (Radulović 1999:96). Then, the effect of re-socialization
is higher than that of conventional crime, because a legal entity, easier than an individual,
may change itself and reorganize under the influence of the imposed criminal sanctions.
Thus, the general and special prevention are achievable goals of criminalization of corpo-
rate offenses. Corporation as an entity is not reducible to a simple collection of individu-
als in it, so punishing individuals rather than entities is shown as inappropriate. Finally,
the restitution to victims and the wider community, thanks to the economic capacity of
the corporation, is the real goal of crime policy (Braithwaite 1984:290-291). Wells points
out that criminal sanction serves as a basis for determining a property claim which makes
the payment of damages much more certain than if it tries to compensate only through
civil proceedings (Wells 2001:17). If we look from the point of compensation to a wider
community, which is often direct or indirect victim of corporate crime, criminal sanctions
are more appropriate compensatory mechanism because except the compensation for ac-
tual damages they allow for programs, such as certain types of community compensation,
at least partially, of the social price for their criminal activities. That kind of restitution
is much more realistic if the sanction is imposed to a legal rather than a natural person
(Milosević 2012:38).
The approach that takes into account the economic cost of criminality of corporations
starts from the idea that stricter criminal sanctions and their regular application will
achieve greater impact on reducing crime rates. The formula is taken into account, ac-
cording to which the weight of sanctions should depend on the ratio of the social cost of
criminal activity and the probability of detection, in order to deter the company from the
influence of the crime (Arlen 1994:833-835).
Coffee stands out that fact that it is possible to find an autonomous basis for criminal liability
of organizations, which is a strong argument in favour of the claim that it is necessary and
legitimate to punish the organization as a separate entity with its own responsibility. If you
decide exclusively for the system of punishment of individual perpetrators, deterrent effect
would be smaller than in the system of corporate criminal liability. The author explains this
by the fact that the establishment of individual criminal responsibility, although it poten-
tially carries a higher risk for the particular person because it is faced with a possible serious
prison or a fine, is less likely, and there is no such deterrent effect compared to corporate
responsibility, which is easier to determine especially in a system of autonomous collective
criminal responsibility, and consequently carries with it a certain possibility of an internal
disciplinary punishment of the manager who did not comply with the prescribed measures
and procedures. An important argument that is contained just in the fact that it is often very
difficult to determine not only the identity of the offender, but also the actual users of illegal
profits who, in many cases, are the authors of the activities (at least instigators or possibly
tacit users aware of the illegality of sustained use) (Coffee 1998:18).
An important argument against the introduction of corporate criminal liability can be
seen in the problem of the lack of protection of the staff within the company that was not
responsible for the criminal act, but suffers the consequences of attributing blame to the
whole collective (Fisse 1995:382). Bearing in mind that criminal law has a social-ethical
function that requires it to be used not only as a reaction to the act done, but also an
important means of heightening awareness among citizens about what behaviours are so-
cially undesirable and unacceptable from the standpoint of fundamental ethical principles,
shifting the consequences of criminal sanctions on persons who have no direct connection
with the offense seems paradoxical.
Simpson believes that the system of criminal liability of corporations did not achieve the
effects that were expected. Mild penalties associated with a low certainty of sanctions make
preventive effect of criminal policy rather small. Numerous data show a relatively mild pe-
nal policy towards criminality of corporations. Thus, 89% of the 288 corporations were
convicted before the American courts and sanctioned in the period between 1984 and 1987
by fines whose average value was 53, 974 dollars. 16% of these companies were convicted
for the payment of compensation, which had the average value of 239,987 dollars.
The procedures against the corporations last longer and include a large number of inter-
connected actors which hamper the detection of the offense. Linked to this is the problem
of carrying out effective investigations of corporate cases, because the standard investiga-
tive instrumentation applied to the cases of conventional crime is not suitable for exposing
the abuses of corporations. Finally, the selectivity in the application of criminal law by the
relevant state authorities, leads to the fact that the prosecution of the most powerful cor-
porations is rarely done (Simpson 2002:45-61).
5. MODEL OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN SERBIAN LAW

The LLLCPO regulates the issue of criminal justice status of legal persons, bringing the
provisions of substantive, procedural and executive character. The provision of Article 1
of LLLCPO makes it clear that the subject of regulation of conditions of liability of legal
persons for criminal offenses, is the system of criminal sanctions that may be imposed
on them, the rules of procedure in which a ruling on the liability of legal persons, impos-
ing criminal sanctions, the decision on rehabilitation, termination of safeguards or legal
consequences and enforcement of judgments. We believe that the appropriation of the
legislature to regulate the subject matter within the framework of a special law is justified,
because it is an important novelty, which raises numerous questions, among others, those
concerning the relationship with the laws that govern other forms of criminal liability of
legal persons. Separation of matter from Criminal Code is meaningful due to the fact that
the criminal courts have no experience with the categories of corporate liability because
so far their criminal liability has been discussed only by trade and misdemeanour courts,
and this matter is a novelty that deserves a special law that would consolidate its process-
ing, financial and executive aspects. The matter of liability of legal persons for criminal of-
fenses is an exception, not only in the material law, but also the process and the executive
branch, and its regulation of a legal act, instead of breaking the provisions to separate laws,
legally and technically speaking, is a logical solution. Of course, it is important to take into
account that there is no overlap of provisions of this and the related laws, or worse, their
inconsistency.
The provision of Article 2 of the LLLCPO defines the range of offenses for which a legal
person can be held responsible. Its formulation shows how the Serbian legislator opted for
a system of general liability of legal persons. The legal entity is responsible for all criminal
acts under a special part of the Criminal Code and the secondary criminal legislation, if the
conditions laid down for its responsibility are fulfilled.
Liability of legal persons for criminal offenses exists when the following conditions are ful-
filled: a) when he committed a criminal offense; b) if the offense is committed by a person
responsible; c) if the legal person acted within their duties or powers; d) if the offense is
committed with the intent to benefit for the legal entity; e) the liability of legal persons for
the offense may be established even when the offense for the benefit of the legal person
has committed by any other natural person acting under the supervision or control of the
person responsible, and the execution of works is allowed by the failure of the responsible
person (Milosevic 2012).
6 CONCLUSION
Human security is one of the vital values of modern society. The degree of its achieve-
ment is an indication of the overall development and well-being of the nation. White-col-
lar crime and, in particular, corporate crime as its relatively distinct subspecies, seriously
jeopardize the basic pillars of human security - economic and legal security and market
competition, fundamental freedoms and rights, health, distribution of food and medicines
and their safety, environment and safety at work. The fight against this kind of criminal
activity, with the aim of protecting human security, requires the implementation of legal
instruments adapted to the new social reality.
The analysis of the basic characteristics of corporate crime has led us to the conclusion
that even when it is focused on the acquisition of corporate profit it always has as the
resultant a white-collar crime, because the benefits of it necessarily lead to a particular
physical entity. This type of crime is necessarily determined by the desire for material
gain, which is formally expressed by increasing the assets of the legal person as fictitious
entity, but is essentially materialized through profit maximization of individuals who stand
behind the mask of collectivism. These people (mostly managers, agents or senior man-
agement, possibly secondary level) are mostly genuine but hidden authors of the crime,
who conceived the project and turned the enterprise into a criminal ‘machine’ for produc-
ing profits through criminal acts. The “machine” is designed to conceal their constructors
and becomes a long-term source of illegally acquired property income.
In this sense, the introduction of corporate liability for criminal offenses is an important
step in the process of prevention and combating of crime and white-collar crime. If classic
institutes of criminal law are unable to penetrate directly to the cleverly hidden beneficiar-
ies of crime, we think it is legitimate to resort to punishing corporations with such indirect
means which can prevent further growth of criminal profits and allow the return of at least
some of illegal gain and mitigate the social damage produced.
However, the final assessment of the quality and usability of legislation, the legal theory
will provide only after studying the experiences of case law, which is currently very poor,
because six years after the law was entered, only one verdict was carried out in the criminal
proceedings against a legal person, and that happened this year. However, the fact that the
first sentence under the provisions of new law was made, we can hope our society is finally
on the way to more effective protection of the values that promote the human security
concept.
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UDC 351.824.11
Marina GLAMOTCHAK*
ENERGY SECURITY OR ENERGY DEPENDENCE?1
Abstract: Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the concept of energy security is actualized by the
change in geopolitical balance, the general context of security, the challenges of climate change,
population growth, the increase in number of rapid development countries, the emergence of
terrorism and, finally, the limited resources of oil and gas.
The security of various fuels supply and their consumption is at the core of the industrial society.
The post-industrial society requires a different approach and requests the introduction of new
rules regarding the risks that jeopardize the humanity to the point of extinction. The preservation
of the environment and combat against climate deregulation becomes a crucial domain of energy
security.
Keywords: energy security, human security, energy, geo-economics, energy diplomacy
1. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND NEW CONCEPT OF SECURITY

The end of the Cold War opened a revision of the principles that exemplify the matrix of
defense as well as the reconsideration of the theories used for the assessment of problems
on the international scene.
The period of “great war and true peace” is irretrievably gone. The turning point in the
concept of security marks neither the beginning of peace nor the end of uncertainty. “(...)
The end of the Cold War in Europe pulled us out of the centuries-long strategic logic cir-
cuit: the state as an actor, war as a way, and peace as a challenge” (Dufourcq 2008). Possi-
ble conflicts between the countries divided into two antagonistic blocks are replaced with
asymmetric conflicts within states not structured enough, where modernity slowed, and
the war is considered part of the military-security heritage.
The current concept of security incorporates the social changes that have occurred since
the fall of communism: the world in which we are living is significantly (re)defined with
the flow of information and interaction in many spheres of social life which shift from the
national to the international level.
* Marina Glamotchak, PhD, Chercheur indépendant et consultante en analyse stratégique, politique et économique,
Paris, France
[212] Marina GLAMOTCHAK
2. “REFORMED” SECURITY SECTOR

The epoch in which the security and defence was thought of in strictly military terms
(weapons, the number of warheads, etc.) is behind us. Mutation of modern world - col-
lapse of communism, the ubiquity of information technology, and the emergence of ter-
rorism spectacularly and dramatically marked by the assassination of the Twin Towers
- irrevocably changes the attitude towards security and defence. For a new, “reformed”
security sector it is significant that:
• Security issues no longer arise from conventional war and the defence of the state,
but from the internal issues of the countries in conflict (political tension, ethnic
and religious issues, etc.) and post-conflict situations (the instability of the newly
established regime, the tension between internal stability and establishing the rule
of law). The economic situation leads to further instability (underdevelopment,
poverty and uneven development of different regions).
• Asymmetrical wars2 replace conventional ones and engagement of the international
community (Topalovic 2013) becomes a “battle without war”. “Already from the
eighties violence flares up in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Balkans and the Cau-
casus. However, the geographical sway of armed violence in the South should not
result in the conclusion of “savage culture”. On the contrary, violence is the result
of the strategy of (so-called) spatial violence of the leading countries in the world.
They throw to the South the causes of extreme violent behaviour. So, this is what
the Western countries did not know to do during the two world wars” ( Joxe 2002:12).
• The humanitarian dimension in legitimizing military action is introduced.
–– Leaving the field of war, and defence as being of exclusively military nature, the
chapter of crisis and defence as general, social categories opens. With the view
that poverty, lack of economic prospects and the underdevelopment are the
factors causing conflicts, the international community is turning to new meas-
ures of prevention and the promotion of peace in order to prevent internal state
conflicts. The efforts of the international community to stabilize the countries
in (post) conflict situation, often with limited success (Kaldor 2006) are found-
ed on the concept of security based on the human dimension. With proclaimed
humanitarian values, the West defends its interests and ensures the position of
a responsible international actor.
–– International “codification”, based on common values, becomes the primary
condition for the establishment of a new, “international regime” (Krasner 1991)
for the 21st century. The concept of cooperation (Ashton 1992) becomes the
root of establishing international security.
• - The state no longer has the same opportunities in solving certain social situations
and it is losing its monopoly to regulate many domains of social life.
2 In the 1960s, Rand Corporation (American Research Institute) comes to the conclusion that with the concept of
“comparative advantage” (the use of disinformation for military purposes, and introduction of new technological
achievements) applying asymmetric approach the United States can threaten the defense system of the USSR.
The concept of asymmetry remains in the closed circles of experts and scientists dealing with the problem of
proliferation. In the 1990s, the concept gets a new meaning and refers to a strategy of action based on the
exploitation of the weaknesses of the opponent (Angelis 2007).
ENERGY SECURITY OR ENERGY DEPENDENCE? [213]
In the constellation of “cooperative multilateralism” (UN Report 2002) states are expected
to coordinate their policies in the framework of common values and to legitimize the ac-
tions of “humanitarian intervention”, as guarantor of the general, international security.
2.1 Levels of analysis and security sectors

The expert literature on security is conceived at four levels of analysis: human (individu-
al), state (national), international (global) and, more recently, the regional level of analy-
sis. The mentioned levels of analysis focus on so-called sectors. The military, political,
economic, social, and environmental and energy sectors are essential in the concept of
security.
A cross-network of levels of analysis and sectors provides a complete picture of security
(Table 1). Human security is recognized in the way that it networks different levels of
analysis of security and various security sectors in its particular matrix. Human security is
thus defined as an expansive-non-military engagement and multidimensional approach to
understanding different threats in different sectors of social activities that may jeopardize
the human community.
Table 1: Levels of Analysis and Security Sectors
3. ENERGY SECURITY OR ENERGY DEPENDENCE ?

3.1 Energy security
For the last six decades, the production of energy developed in a stable environment
founded on geopolitical stability of the logic of dissuasion from the Cold War era. The two
antagonistic blocs agreed on their areas of interest and everybody subjected to “the culture
of energy rights and equity of access”. The fall of communism, which caused the fall of the
balance existing during the period of military bipolarity, together with a mutation in the
economy, established a new relationship with energy. This time, the new “game” is played
on the energy level.
A new concept of so called extended security is being created in the new global conjunc-
ture. Economic elements gain a strategic dimension and energy is given a special sig-
nificance. Security and defence demonstrate a remarkable pace and become the matrix of
reflection of preserving/gaining the positions in the resulting trends, they are entrusted
with the elaboration of geo-strategic scenarios and protection measures in a number of
emerging risks (provision of new technologies, the security implications of piracy or risk
of energy supply).
In short, in addition to military and political dimensions, security in today’s multipolar
world also gains economic dimension in which the energy holds sway. Due to limited space,
only the military component will be discussed here. In operational terms, the sphere of en-
ergy remains essentially geopolitical except that the emphasis is on the so-called “energy
famine”3 combined with the fear of interruption of supply. The issues related to fossil fuels
(oil, gas, coal) leave the strictly economic domain and fall within the strategic issues. In
addition, despite the diversification of renewable energy sources, GNL (liquefied natural
gas) or return to coal due to the recession, gas remains a source the consumption of which
is growing the most.
In theoretical terms, the actual importance of energy should be viewed through the prism
of geo-economics in which the “energy diplomacy” has a big significance. The issue of en-
ergy transcends national and state boundaries and energy diplomacy is becoming increas-
ingly important in terms of providing energy and economic security of the state. On this
basis, new international and geo-strategic relationships are being built.
3.2 Components of energy security

The meaning and content of the term “energy security”4 was subordinate to various harm-
ful effects that the energy sector caused in the environment (Rapport 2007). Until the
1970s, economic problems, although present in security issues were not explicitly tied
to the issue of national security. Member states of the Organization of the Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) used oil as a political weapon during the Arab-Israeli war in
October 1973 and in the sense of energy consumption this definitely divided the world to
consumer countries and producer countries. According to this division, the actors maintain
relationships of dependence and their interests express in antagonistic categories. The oil
shock of 1973, triggered by political embargo combined with the classic example of con-
sumer panic (Maugeri 2006:261), raised the issue of energy security.
The concept of energy security, created in response to the oil shock, ensures the coordi-
nation among industrialized countries in the event of disturbance in the energy field and
provides a framework of cooperation5 in the field of energy policy. Here the energy secu-
3 In the near future, the global energy demand will exceed the offer.
4 In international law, the energy sector is related to the Agreement on the International Energy Programme (Paris
1974), the Energy Charter Treaty (Lisbon 1994), the Protocol on Energy Efficiency (Lisbon 1994), the amendments
regarding trade provisions of this Agreement (Brussels 1998).
5 The International Energy Agency, based in Paris, was founded in 1974.
rity is focused on finding the solutions for the supply disorders caused by the producing
countries.
The economic recession introduces the principle of rationalization of the supply of oil and
petroleum products thus making a real progress in the understanding of energy security.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the concept of energy security is actualized by the change
in the geopolitical balance, the general context of security, the challenges of climate
change, population growth, the increase in number of rapid development countries, the
emergence of terrorism and, finally, the limited resources of oil and gas.
Energy security has become the centre of every strategic debate. The countries that have
raw material resources are able to influence directly, through energy, the economic devel-
opment of the countries importing energy. The Western countries, lacking raw materials
and being aware of the importance of climate change, are concerned for their energy secu-
rity and adapt to facing serious energy challenges.
Finally, because of the depletion of fossil fuel reserves, it is necessary to develop a strategy
for transition to other sustainable forms of energy.
3.3. Energy security or dependence?

Energy security is not specifically defined or determined in an explicit way. At the state
level, it is about “energy self-sufficiency” (possessing the energy park) and the need to im-
port energy (energy dependence). At the global level, however, there is a general, domi-
nant vision in the energy relations, the “energy dichotomous paradigm”. Energy security
is treated solely as an issue of the consumer countries - which is why the terms “energy
security” and “security of energy supply” are considered identical.
The issue of energy security of the countries that possess energy, expressed in terms of
their dependence on the user (buying energy through long-term contracts that guarantee
a price and a secure supply) has no weight in the professional literature.
Sustainability of economic growth in the developed countries (Green Paper 2006) is close-
ly related to energy supply6 therefore the analysis of the conceptual categories of energy
security relies on:
a) Security components:
• Geopolitics of risk, geopolitical risk references in the energy sector are: localization
of energy resources, access to energy resources, and their utilization, the distance
between the location of energy source and consumption point, the geopolitical risk
of acquiring (which varies depending on whether it is oil or gas);
• Securitization of infrastructure;
• Long-term stability of foreign investments in energy systems (Iran was practically
closed to foreign investments; with the third energy package the European market
puts under consideration the profitability of investments in major energy projects
such as the South Stream);
• Stability of energy contracts (short-term and long-term contracts) ( Jansen J.C. 2004);
• Prospection of potential risks (assassinations, piracy, terrorism, unstable region).
6 On the variety of indicators to determine the energy security (Scheepers M. et al. 2007).
b) Measures taken to reduce energy dependence:

• Saving energy expressed through energy efficiency;
• Interconnection of space (measures of the European Union through the Energy
Community7);
• Increasing competition in the energy market;
• Diversification of energy suppliers;
• Improvement of energy infrastructure and energy stocking;
• Increasing the risk of dependence for countries that have energy.
If the concept of energy security is determined (including the protection of the entire en-
ergy supply chain), its previous definition is more descriptive and based on three different
aspects of this idea:
• Availability of energy in sufficient quantities and at affordable prices8,
• Stability of supply, and
• Physical security of infrastructure.
3.4. European Union, Russia,
Rapid Development Countries and Energy Dependence
The authors put energy dependence in the foreground as an essential item in the defini-
tion of energy security. The import of energy still determines the European Union (EU),
in spite of nuclear energy and renewable energy sources. The risk of additional energy
dependence of the European Union is based on:
• Brutal termination of energy supply (natural disaster or technical breach, act of ter-
rorism and/or political decision);
• Risk of insufficient investments (new energy sources, stockpiling, and transport in-
frastructure);
• Risk of having only one supplier (diversification of suppliers is needed);
• Dependence in the countries of transit;
• Climate change.
The position of a significant consumer of Russian gas gives the EU the right to regulate the
Russian energy influence on its territory. Motivated by fear of an excessive dependence on
Russia and relying in part on the GPA “energy transition” and diversification of sources,
Brussels’ strategies rely on the power of norms and adopt the Third Energy Package.9
For exporter countries, energy security has the meaning of “security of demand” of en-
ergy, regular payment and control of the main pipelines (gas and oil pipelines), and mar-
ket channels of transportation of oil, gas or GNL. In this context, up to the current crisis
with Ukraine, Russia privileges Europe as a “safe consumer” but then this county turns to
China10 as a momentum of “client diversification”.
7 The members of the Community are the EU, Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova (2010),
Serbia, and Ukraine (2011). Norway, Turkey and Georgia have the status of an observer. The Community tends to
receive the countries from Central Asia and the Caucasus.
8 This definition of the International Energy Agency is adopted by many authors (B. Barton, eds. 2005).
9 Internal energy market in the EU is regulated by the “legislative package”. The third package, which intervenes
in the gas and electricity field to enable competitiveness, requires that the transport infrastructure management
and the production management are separated. Many authors believe that these measures are taken against the
monopoly of Russian Gazprom and its two mega gas projects (Nord and South Stream).
10 Russia and China signed (May 21, 2014) the gas agreement for a period of 30 years, worth $ 400 billion.
Finally, energy security to the rapid development countries (China, India, Brazil) is re-
flected in the adaptability of the global energy market and making sure that changes in
energy prices do not affect the balance of payments.
Thus, the concepts of energy security and energy dependence do not always coincide. In
addition, all types of energy (electricity, gas, oil) do not have the same impact on energy
security.
Given the above, energy security could be defined as the protection of general, vital eco-
nomic interests from the instability of energy supply and availability of energy. Intermix-
ing of different interests in the concept of energy security leads to the state of affairs in
which the import-export of energy presumes a substantially strong political component in
addition to the commercial.
3.5. Military Dimension of Energy Security

One of the key problems that the world faces after the collapse of the Soviet Union is a
problem of articulating and defining the most important principles, objectives, priority
axes and new risks of security strategy.
3.5.1 Energy and NATO

After the fall of communism the idea of spreading democracy and establishing the rule of
law goes in parallel with the expansion of the NATO alliance.11 In a few years, NATO “capi-
talizes” on its victory and sets up its security policy as the primary and dominant in the
European region.12 Taking over the domination, including the influence on a part of the
former Soviet territory, the Alliance faces security problems arising from the wider social
context in which energy and energy security are of utmost importance.
In addition to the conflict in the geo-political region rich in natural resources, the Alliance
faces piracy on the sea routes of energy (NATO 2006) and political instability in energy
producing countries. The US operations and regionally deployed forces give some contri-
bution to improving energy security in order to strengthen the capacity of local military to
protect oil pipelines from guerrilla attacks.13 However, it is often impossible to draw a clear
line between military operations directed against terrorism and dictatorships, or actions
of humanitarian intervention, and those aimed at protecting energy interest in the same
areas (especially in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea).
NATO move to a global role in addressing security problems in the world leads to a trans-
formation of its mission. Inspired by the idea to transform into an efficient organization
capable of maintaining peace and security in the world, NATO displays an exceptional
perseverance in adapting to the new security situation. Strategic Concept of 2009 shows
not only a significant shift from territorial defence to a concept covered by human secu-
11 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was created in 1949 to protect Western Europe from Soviet invasion.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO begins to spread to Eastern Europe (with the accession of member
states of the former communist bloc and the Partnership for Peace).
12 French intervention in Central Africa (2013) poses the question again of the necessity of creation of an independent
European army. L’Express, Dec. 20, 2013.
13 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) carried out 259 bomb attacks on pipelines during 2013. After
Israel and Egypt, Colombia is the third country in the order of receiving military assistance from the United States.
rity, but empowers NATO to “develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including
the protection of critical infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners,
and consultations among the allies based on strategic assessment and unpredictable situation
planning” (Rühle 2011).
The problem that NATO faces in realizing this goal, paradoxically, comes from the mem-
ber states of the European Union (EU), which consider energy security as being a national
issue. The member states do not want to “militarize” the issues pertaining to the economy.
NATO must take into account the fact that energy security is already addressed by a sub-
stantial number of participants (International Energy Agency, EU, OECD, private sector)
and its role can only be complementary.
Despite these limitations, NATO manages to get its field of action (acquis) in at least three
areas:
• Dialogue and exchange of information with partner countries (both energy produc-
ers and transit countries) provide a preventive character in relation to acts of terror-
ism and the safety of delivering energy;
• Political dialogue and military cooperation with partner countries from different
regions of the world (the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East) for strengthen-
ing energy security, and
• The protection of critical energy infrastructure (maritime routes, for example) may
be entrusted to NATO on request of a certain country.
Given the importance of energy in maintaining the economic development and the su-
periority of Western civilization based on it, the list of NATO powers is expected to be
expanded in the near future. Prospecting in the areas of energy and security implications,
NATO adapts to new challenges.
3.5.2 The Energy Diplomacy of Russia

Russia, as the successor of the USSR finds itself in a systemic crisis that affects all segments
of the public and social life, especially in the field of security, where it lost the status of
superpower. Faced with the security dilemma in the protection of vital national interests
and its interest-based and strategic space (Eurasia), Russia relies on the energy system
and vast natural resources (oil, gas, rare minerals). Through energy diplomacy, energy
becomes an undeniable element of national security and the last bastion of defence of the
sovereignty and economic development of Russia (Glamotchak 2013). With the arrival of
Putin (1999), the stabilization and consolidation of power is made possible, among other
things, by the events in the global energy market, i.e. the multiple rising of prices of fuels -
oil and gas. Such circumstances create a state of affairs in which Russian economy is based
on export of these kinds of energy.14 Huge potential, skilfully managed energy policy and
high revenues from sales of energy make the energy component become the backbone
of the security strategy of the Russian Federation. Energy becomes a lever to restore the
power of Russia and its global importance (Milosavljević 2013).
14 Boomerang effect of such economy is known as the “Dutch Disease” (the discovery of gas in the North Sea in the
1960s, and strengthening of the national currency on this basis lead to the decline of other sectors of the economy).
The sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU (2014) rely on this Russian weakness.
In the new world conjuncture, the state as a significant economic factor is trying to main-
tain its influence, not any more through military capacity, but through strategic, econom-
ic development. The state seeks to conquer foreign markets by working together with
national, strategic companies. Gazprom becomes a lever of security of Russia, expressed
through geo-economics (Lorot 2001), namely economic security. In this sense, Russia’s
“energy diplomacy” (Glamotchak 2013) has a dual purpose: to raise Russia economically
and to enable it to return to the international scene.
Due to the successive crises between Russia and Ukraine (2006, 2009, 2014),15 caused by
the strategic product - gas - main actors reposition (EU, Russia, NATO), reflected in the
energy security (Pinatel 2011) of the European Union.
At the same time, the terms “gas war” or “gas as a weapon” take us back to the reality of
the world where energy is crucial in the field of geopolitics. Crisis, such as the current in
Ukraine or Syria, are its integral part.
4. CONCLUSION
The import-export ratio of energy is placed in the centre of analysis on energy security to
the issue of the countries that need energy for economic development, and the countries
that have fossil fuels. Actors - producers and consumers are economic categories and en-
ergy (the product) is represented in the securitization of commercial exchange.
To really talk about energy security, it is necessary to fulfil three conditions:
• That the issue of trade in energy is treated as a general matter of public importance
(a part of the state policy of supply). National energy strategy must allow actors
(state) to increase the predictability of possible market-political movement in the
chain of energy dependence;
• Certain fuels (such as gas) should be brought to the level of strategic products, and
• Energy and security issues are converging towards the issues of environmental pro-
tection and preservation of the human community.
Theorists of different provenance agree, and thus come closer to the concept of human
security, that energy security is the basis for the guarantee of economic stability, univer-
sal prosperity and peace. The survival of the society depends on energy; therefore, the
availability of energy sources together with its redistribution is one of the most important
components of energy security. In addition, we see that energy independence can be read
in the context of interdependence (supply and demand), but also in the context of uncer-
tainty arising from social relations (terrorism, political decisions, etc.) and natural condi-
tions (disasters, climate change).
Consequently, the emphasis is no longer placed on the state, the object of traditional refer-
ence of security, but on general, collective security (Buzan 1998:27). The derogation of so
called “routine rules” moves from the state to the individual - as in human security – thus
here it is also in energy security. Any interruption in the supply of energies will primarily
put population at risk, and population is a crucial element in the stability of the state.
15 Brzezinski (1997) considers Ukraine, which rejects Russian influence, the “center of the new American geography”
despite the fact that Ukraine, even after two decades of transition, fails to emerge from the economic structure
inherited from the times of the USSR.
On the other hand, the actors, i.e. bearers of security that, with the development of vari-
ous forms of risk, undertake energy security among other sorts of security should be paid
attention to. They are different types of organizations (state, military organization, inter-
national organizations, etc.) deployed at different levels of social security (state, regional,
international).
The security of various fuels supply and their consumption is at the core of the indus-
trial society. The post-industrial society requires a different approach and requests the
introduction of new rules regarding the risks that jeopardize the humanity to the point
of extinction. Preservation of the environment and combat against climate deregulation
becomes a crucial domain of energy security.
In the centre of each energy security, in which there is the survival of the human popula-
tion, it is necessary to be aware of the dynamics of cohesion between economic and gen-
eral, natural conditions.
5. REFERENCES
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UDC 351.78:061.1EU
Ana Isabel XAVIER*

CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT
AFTER THE LISBON TREATY1
Abstract: The research topic of this paper is the European Union’s approach of Human Security.
The main research questions will deal with the fact that if 1994 represents the UNDP landmark of
Human Security, 2003 is the European Union’s year as Solana’s European Security Strategy (ESS)
was endorsed by the member states in the December European Council. In December 2008, in
the aftermath of Solana’s farewell, the “Report on the implementation of the European Security
Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World” was also endorsed, mentioning twice the Hu-
man Security approach. Between 2003 and 2008, the debate within the EU was lively encouraged
by 13 experts led by Mary Kaldor that presented the Barcelona (2004) and Madrid (2007) reports.
Both documents emphasize the prevention and multilateralism as the main principles to address
the new threats and explore how the European institutions can implement the ESS in order to
explore all possibilities of a European Human Security policy. Moreover, the 2007 report evalu-
ate the main crisis management missions conducted by the EU within ESDP since 2003 through
seven lenses: the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up
approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force. But what
can we infer from the fact that Human Security was never embodied in the European Union’s lexi-
con? Can the EU play an active role in structuring a new international order based on the Human
Security as a new way of thinking about global security? Or, in another way, can we take the risk
that the Human Security cannot go beyond a simple suggestion without any relevance whatso-
ever? What commitments can be pursued in order to establish the Human Security as a strategic
guideline for national and international foreign policies? Finally, to what extent this new security
approach reinforces the EU’s capacity to assume the new responsibilities towards the interna-
tional community? In order to contribute to this debate, this paper will explore specific questions
(Human Rights, Good Governance, Rule of Law, Gender Equality and employment of both civil-
ian and military instruments) in training (Mali and Somalia) and capacity building (Sahel and
Nestor) ongoing civilian missions and military operations (data analysis) that were launched after
* Ana Isabel Xavier is Assistant Professor in Nova University of Lisbon (Portugal) and Post-Doctoral Research
Fellow at the Research Unit in Political Science and International Relations (NICPRI). Her PhD focuses on “The
European Union as a crisis management global player: towards a Human Security Doctrine?” (Coimbra, 2011).
Her main research interests focuses on the EU security actorness, Human Security, Security and Defence, Human
Rights, International Organizations and Globalisation. e-mail: xavier.anaisabel@gmail.com
[224] Ana Isabel XAVIER
the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, and conclude on the challenges and prospects of a Human
Security Strategy for Europe.
Keywords: Human Security, European Union, CSDP
1. INTRODUCTION
If 1994 represents the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) landmark of
Human Security (HS), 2003 is a crucial year for the European Union (EU) as Solana’s
European Security Strategy (ESS) surely represents the beginning of a strategic security
doctrine shared by the member states as well as a preliminary draft of a HS narrative. Later
on, in the aftermath of the farewell of the High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, the implementation report mentions HS twice (European Council
2008:2;10).
From 2003 to 2008, the debate within the EU was lively encouraged by 13 experts led
by Mary Kaldor through the Barcelona (SGESC 2004) and Madrid (HSSG 2007) reports.
Both documents emphasize prevention and multilateralism as the main principles to ad-
dress the new threats and paths the way how the European institutions can implement the
ESS in order to explore all possibilities of a HS doctrine.
But what can we infer from the fact that HS has never been embodied in the EU’s lexi-
con 20 years after the UNDP first reference? To what extent this new security approach
reinforces the EU’s ability to assume new responsibilities towards the international com-
munity? In order to contribute to this debate, we will reflect upon two ongoing military
training operations (EUTM Mali) and civilian capacity building (EUCAP Sahel) missions
that were launched after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, and question the challenges
and prospects of a HS Strategy for the EU.
2. THE EU AND HS: CRISIS MANAGEMENT MISIONS IN PRACTICE

Although the EU is actively present in more than 25 crisis management missions in differ-
ent parts of the globe since 2003, we will focus on two of the most emblematic ongoing
missions in the Sahel region - EUCAP SAHEL NIGER (2012) and EUTM MALI (2013)
framed by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).2
The Sahel is one of the most challenging regions for the European Union policy and no
wonder that the EU shows great concern on the extreme poverty and scarcity, fragile in-
stitutions, weak governance, demographic pressures, terrorism,3 organised crime, illegal
migration, trafficking, political fundamentalism. In fact, “[t]he Sahel is a loosely defined
region that is seen as a hotbed of threats to Europe” (Renard 2010:1-2).
Moreover,
With many Sahelian states faced with worsening insecurity and a declining regional
capacity to address the potential negative spill-over effects, the need for effective EU
2 It represents one of the major innovations of the Lisbon Treaty.

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0026_en.htm
3 Mali has set up, in the framework of the national policy to fight insecurity and terrorism, the Programme spécial
pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement dans le nord du Mali (PSPSDN) to combat insecurity and terrorism in
northern Mali (Koepf 2014).
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT AFTER THE LISBON TREATY [225]
re-engagement cannot be over-emphasised. (Bello 2012:1)

The Joint EU-Africa Strategy, adopted in December 2007, provides the overall platform
guiding the EU relations with the continent. But the intensification of the Libyan and Mali
crisis surely highlighted the risk of a political, security, humanitarian and human rights
domino effect and requires a comprehensive approach to the Sahel region based in the as-
sumptions that development and security are mutually supportive and that the issues are
faced in the Sahel. Moreover, the urgency increased for protecting the Union’s citizens and
interests in the region and preventing the extension of those threats to the Union, while
helping to reduce regional security threats.
In fact,
The formulation of a Sahel Strategy in March 2011 represents the concretisation
of two years of discussions and concerns over the series of challenges arising in the
region, perceived as increasingly threatening to Europe; the upsurge of Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), frequent actions against Westerners, increase in drug
smuggling towards Europe and migration concerns. (Hatzigeorgopoulos 2013:1)
Therefore, with a particular focus on Mauritania, Niger and Mali, the EU Sahel Strategy
adopted by the Council in 21 March 2011 underlines that the EU has a longstanding in-
terest in reducing insecurity and improving development in the Sahel region. According
to the Sahel Strategy, the challenges identified by the EU fact-finding missions to Mali,
Mauritania and Niger (and further in Algeria) are at four levels: development, good gov-
ernance and internal conflict resolution; political and diplomatic; security and the rule of
law; and fight against and prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation.
In sum, for the EU, the problems in the Sahel are cross-border and closely intertwined
and the approach must be a regional, integrated and holistic, encouraging the EU Member
States and other partners with similar interests in the region to play an integrated part
therein. Aware of this priority, framed by the 10th European Development Fund, more
than € 1.5 billion were allocated between 2007 and 2013 to these three countries to sup-
port good governance, rule of law, justice, decentralisation process, agriculture and rural
development, social sectors, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), economic de-
velopment and infrastructures.4
But because the security threats in the Sahel are of a transnational nature, the impact of the
crisis on bordering countries, particularly Niger, calls for a firm response from the security
forces. Two CSDP missions were launched in Niger (EUCAP SAHEL Niger) and Mali
(European Union Training Mission - EUTM) in order to support respectively Nigerien
internal security forces and the Malian army and tackle the regional consequences of the
crisis restoring peace, security and sustainable development in the Sahel. Mr Reveyrand
de Menthon was also appointed the EU Special Representative in March 2013.
On 17 March, the Council met in Brussels and in the conclusions on the implementation
of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, the EU remains deeply
concerned by the crisis in the Sahel region and the objectives in the fields of security,
peace-building, conflict prevention, countering radicalisation and development as well
4 Important elements in linking short-term humanitarian aid with development coordination mechanisms ( Joseph
2014).
as the link between security and development will remain a key priority of the EU action.
That is why the Council invited the EEAS, the EUSR for the Sahel and the Commission to
extend the scope of the implementation of the Strategy to the wider Sahel-Sahara/West
African/Maghreb region in order to ensure the effectiveness of the international collective
action in Mali, Mauritania and Niger that gathers the United Nations, the African Union,
the World Bank and the African Development Bank.
2.1. EUCAP SAHEL (Niger)

Requested by Niger’s government in the summer of 2012,5 the EU launched a civilian
CSDP mission - EUCAP SAHEL - in the Republic of Niger on 16 July 2012 (started in 8
August 2012) with the overall objective of providing advice and training to support the Ni-
gerien authorities to establish an integrated, coherent and sustainable approach to combat
terrorism and organised crime.6
The headquarters were located in Niamey but the mission has liaison officers deployed in
Bamako and Nouakchott, to better take into consideration regional cooperation aspects
between the security forces of Niger, Mali and Mauritania.
Colonel Francisco Espinosa Navas7 was appointed the Head of Mission. The overall au-
thorized strength gathers 80 personnel (52 international police and military experts, the
majority of whom are from the European security forces and justice departments perma-
nently deployed in Niamey, and 28 local staff ). Contributing states were 10 EU Member
States and the budget EUR 6.5 million for the period from 1 November 2013 to 15 July
2014 (end of initial mandate). At this moment the annual budget is of € 8.7 million.
So far, EUCAP SAHEL Niger’s experts have trained around 3,000 members of the coun-
try’s internal security forces, armed forces and judiciary. At the request of the Nigerien
authorities, other courses have already been planned for the coming months, including
a full training programme for the municipal police in Agadez, in the north of the coun-
try. Projects to upgrade and refurbish the security forces’ training centres and automobile
maintenance workshops have also been underway since the second half of 2013.
Furthermore, EUCAP SAHEL became the secretariat for international coordination in
the security sector in Niger. As such, the mission facilitates the coordination of interna-
tional assistance and donations to Nigerien security actors. To increase synergies, the mis-
sion also pursues joint activities with other EU programs as well as other international
actors present in Niger.
5 As stated by the Council decision 2012/392/CFSP of 16 July 2012, on 23 March 2012, the Council approved the
Crisis Management Concept for a possible common security and defence policy civilian mission in the Sahel
and on 1 June 2012, the Prime Minister of Niger addressed to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy an invitation letter with regard to the planned CSDP mission, welcoming the Union’s
CSDP deployment with the aim of reinforcing the capacities of the Nigerien Security Forces, in particular to fight
terrorism and organised crime in an effective, coherent and coordinated manner.
6 As detailed by the Council decision 2012/392/CFSP of 16 July 2012.
7 As published in the Official Journal of the European Union L 200/17. the appointment of Colonel Francisco
Espinosa Navas for a period of 12 months is due to the political and security committee decision EUCAP SAHEL
NIGER/1/2012 of 17 July 2012 SAHEL Niger) (2012/436/CFSP). At present, the Head of Mission of the European
Union CSDP Mission in Niger is Filip De Ceuninck.
2.2. EUTM Mali - EU Training Mission in Mali

Requested by the President of the Republic of Mali on 24 December 2012, in line with rel-
evant international decisions the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012),
the European Union launched on 18 February 2013 a training mission for Malian armed
forces - EUTM Mali - for an initial 15-month mandate. According to the mandate,8 this
mission aims to fully restore constitutional and democratic order through the implemen-
tation of the road-map adopted on 29 January by the National Assembly, help the Malian
authorities to exercise fully their sovereignty over the whole of the country and neutralise
organised crime and terrorist threats. Therefore, the mission both provides expertise and
advice (in particular as regards command and control, logistical chains, human resources,
international humanitarian law9 and intelligence) and training combat units10 at the Kou-
likoro training camp.11
28 states12 committed to the restoration of security and lasting peace in Mali as a major
concern or the stability of the Sahel region and, in the wider sense, for Africa and Europe,
contributing with military personnel under the command of French Brigadier - General
Marc Rudkiewicz.
On 15 April 2014, the Council extended the EU military training mission in Mali by two
years, i.e. until 18 May 2016, allowing military training of four additional battalions of the
Malian Armed Forces. Moreover, the Council established two mobile training teams who
will follow up on the battalions previously trained, once they have returned to their gar-
risons and approved “train the trainer” programmes to contribute to the sustainability of
the mission’s efforts. The common costs for the extension of the mission’s mandate are
estimated at € 27.7 million.
2.3. Towards a Human Security Mission? Definition(s),

Indicator(s) and Guiding Principle(s)
In the previous titles we briefly analysed the background of EUCAP SAHEL NIGER
(2012) and EUTM MALI (2013) highlighting how, since March 2011, the EU has been im-
plementing a comprehensive Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel region
based both on the assumption that development and security are closely linked and can be
mutually reinforcing, and the solution to the complex crisis afflicting the Sahel demands
a regional response.
However, to understand whether and how the EU may eventually implement the princi-
ples of human security, this essay also attempts to sketch an evaluation guide that could
identify priorities and answers to the following questions:
8 Published in the Official Journal of the European Union L 46/27 at 19.2.2013, the Council adopted the 2013/34/
CFSP decision on 17 January 2013.
9 The training of the Malian units contains modules on international humanitarian law and human rights, as well as
on the protection of the civilian population.
10 It is important to note that the mission is not involved in combat operations.
11 Around 200 instructors have been deployed in Koulikoro (60 km north-east of Bamako) training camp, as well as
support staff and a protection force, making a total of around 580 persons. The headquarters of the mission located
at Bamako.
12 23 EU members - Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom + Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Switzerland
Priority 1 - Crossing Perspective from “below” (bottom up) and from “above” (top
down). Are the missions established at a “top down” or “bottom up” level?
Priority 2 - Fight against the roots of structural violence. To what extent the EU emphasiz-
es the importance of the security-development nexus in conflict-regions focusing on the struc-
tural roots of conflict?
Priority 3 - Effective multilateralism and coordination with other local/regional/inter-
national partners. To what extent there exists a regional approach and an integrated geo-
graphic strategy also allowing reattaching prior partnership agreements to the mission?
Priority 4 - Respect for universal principles of international law and building and
strengthening a Human Security State producer. Are the missions geared for a real concern
with the population, in view of the primacy of their human right and development from short
to long term structures of the State?
Priority 5 - Coordination between civilian and military resources
Script: How civilian and military means are balanced in a conflict area where the EU is en-
gaged?
Bearing this “script” in mind, we will explore how these five aspects might serve as ana-
lytical yardsticks for the EU’s ability to act as a HS settler in two important conflicts that
seriously affect European security interests. In fact, it is important to identify well-defined
indicators to develop a lessons learned checklist for future assignments. Therefore, “(...)
a hierarchy of Human Security must be established and guarantees to minimize Human
insecurity should be identified (...)“ (Hasegawa 2004:3).
Regarding priority 1, both missions bear in mind the importance of local elites and local
population as the on-going emergency and the recurrent nature of the crisis in the Sahel
call for both an immediate response to help the people in need and a long-term strategy to
reduce the chronic risks of food security and strengthen people’s resilience. For instance,
EUCAP SAHEL Niger aims at enabling the Nigerien authorities to implement the security
dimension of their own Strategy for Security and Development, as well as at improving
regional coordination in tackling common security challenges.
However, according to Overhaus & Peter (2012:4):
In the end, the extension of state authority is a major goal of EU support for
these countries, putting into question whether the EU has done enough to
foster dialogue with “legitimate non-state actors” as is explicitly foreseen in
the Strategy.
In addition, “France and to a lesser extent a number of other EU member states with im-
portant interests in the region often operate in parallel to the Union” (Bello 2012:4).
Therefore, to overcome those criticisms, the mind-set and educational elites should be
changed from a “top down” decision making to a ground level, taking into account both
governmental and non-governmental platforms. It should also include into peace negotia-
tions civil society groups for and against the government, militias or paramilitary organi-
zations - all sensitivities and willing. This “mixture” should empower the civil society and
promote a movement that works holistically with both government authorities and civil
society to achieve the necessary reforms. It should work in close coordination with the
different ministries or departments, not separating health, education, housing or safety
matters.
Concerning Priority 2, both missions emphasise the need to promote holistic approach-
es to security encompassing conflict prevention and long-term peace-building, conflict
resolution and post conflict reconstruction, linked to governance and sustainable devel-
opment. Moreover, the mandates envision that the EU shall aim at contributing to the
development of an integrated, multidisciplinary, coherent, sustainable, and human rights-
based approach.
In fact, to address the root causes of the crisis, the AGIR (Alliance Globale pour l’Initiative
Résilience Regional13) Roadmap adopted in April 2013 by all members of the Alliance in-
cluding partner countries, international donors, NGOs and civil society focuses on four
key specific objectives and will be translated by partner countries in national resilience
strategies: improve social protection for the most vulnerable households and communi-
ties in order to secure their livelihoods; strengthen the nutrition of vulnerable house-
holds; sustainably improve agricultural and food production, the incomes of vulnerable
households and their access to food; and strengthen governance in food and nutritional
security. In sum, helping address the root causes of malnutrition, improving the function-
ing of regional markets and increase the regional and national capacity to reduce the risks
of disasters.
The EU is indeed the largest contributor to Mali’s development. The EU has allocated over
€1.535 billion to Mali, Mauritania and Niger under the 10th European Development Fund
(2007-2013). In its strategy for the Sahel, the EU has not just mobilized additional financial
resources for projects relating to development and security, with a budget of €167 million.
At the donors’ conference in Brussels on 15 May 2013 for Mali, the international com-
munity made commitments worth €3.2 billion (including €523 million from the European
Commission).14
No wonder that the EU must follow the Sahel region with great concern. The Western Sa-
hel region ranks at the bottom of the UN Human Development Index: population growth
is among the highest in the world (on average, the population of the Sahel doubles every
25 years and about 40% of the children - over 5 million - are under five); the economic cost
of malnutrition is estimated between 2% to 8% of GDP; difficulties to secure adequate
food supply and decent income in the Sahel region due to climate change and ecosystem
degradation.
However, “the EU is already active in the Sahel region as a development actor, but it is still
largely absent as a security enabler” (Renard 2010:5).
Focusing now in priority 3, we acknowledge that multilateralism only makes sense if it is
effective and it should be strengthened in terms of regional and international partnerships.
In Sahel’s case, it is worth noting that the EU welcomes the efforts of the African Union
and other regional actors to promote enhanced coordination in the field of intelligence
and counter-terrorism as well as optimal allocation of national assets and capacities.
Moreover, in both missions, particular attention is given to synergies with other EU and
bilateral projects funded through the European Development Fund, the European Com-
mission Instrument for Stability or by EU member states.
13 The European Commission has launched in 2012 together with regional organisations an international partnership
for resilience in West Africa including Sahel region (Alliance Globale pour l’Initiative Résilience - AGIR).
14 Please see Lavallée (2013) for more data in the EU’s stability instrument addressed to Sahel region.
In fact, for Fiott et al, “[t]he region is very much at the end of the beginning phase. The
principle aspect of a long-term response to the Sahel region remains local, national and
regional” (Fiott et al. 2013:4).
In the case of EUCAP SAHEL NIGER, the mission’s mandate states that the primary re-
sponsibility and ownership for peace, security and development is with the governments
of the Sahelian region but regional and international coordination is key to ensure the
effectiveness of international efforts in support to local and regional endeavours. EUTM
MALI also highlights that the EU will work in close cooperation with regional organisa-
tions and national governments in the Sahel to ensure a broadly rooted implementation of
the EU Sahel Strategy.
However, Rénard shows some concerns as “[a]bove all, the EU should avoid an overem-
phasis on support to the security apparatus in the region” (Rénard 2010:6).
It is also important to be aware that “[t]he Sahel Strategy requires greater operational flex-
ibility in order to respond to the evolving outlook, but adaptation is complicated by long
standing coordination problems in the region” (Bello 2012:17).
The fourth priority regards the respect for universal principles of international law and
building and strengthening a Human Security apparatus. In line with the humanitarian
principles of independence, neutrality, impartiality and humanity, the EU’s speech always
refers to the commitment to continue to provide humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable
people, on the basis of needs, especially this coming months to ensure a coordinated and
effective response to the current food crisis in the Sahel region and to link relief, rehabili-
tation, and development wherever conditions allow it. Moreover, the EU will continue to
promote democracy, human rights, decentralisation policies, good governance including
an independent and fair justice system at local and regional levels, and it will encourage
the fight against corruption as well as counter-radicalisation projects as a means of conflict
prevention, building on local and national initiatives where possible. However, to all those
regions, the EU message is clear: more money means more democracy!
Finally, priority 5 reminds us, when urged for a more capable and more coherent Europe,
the European Security Strategy as the document is intended to gather all the different
instruments and civilian and military capabilities to member states to act more effectively,
overcoming institutional and financial barriers in crisis and post conflict scenarios. In-
deed, as Fiott addresses it: “How military assistance to the region ties in with the broader
developmental and security objectives is vital” (Fiott 2013:1).
Overhaus and Peter also agree that “[t]he EU has to rethink its own instruments so that
they can better connect emergency responses with longer-term approaches” (Overhaus
and Peter 2012, p. 4).
For that purpose, the EU Battlegroups should be adapted for joint operations, whether
civilian or military, both multilateral (UN and NATO) and regionally (regional and local
authorities). In fact, the coordination between civilian and military actors and the involve-
ment of several UN agencies in post-conflict was reinforced by the 2000 Brahimi Report,
as part of a comprehensive understanding of the peace building process with an emphasis
on the social dimension of peacekeeping.
To sum up, all those remarks lead us to think that the security challenges post-Balkan
require indeed a greater emphasis on crisis management capabilities and a strategic frame-
work for how to think and act on the ground in order to give more visibility and recog-
nition to the EU missions and operations. Priorities must be exclusively directed to the
basic needs of the population and communities, with a primacy of their Human Rights.
For this purpose, it should be included in all missions an advisor for human rights and
gender issues. In fact, a High Level Conference held on 27 January 2010 concluded that all
operations conducted by the EU and NATO should work together to ensure that women15
are agents of peace and security, promoting their role in the sustainable development and
peace building.
Moreover, the language should be simplified, guiding mandates for solving concrete prob-
lems, in order to avoid a wishful thinking narrative. At the end of the day, the full respect of
the appropriate process by local population must be assured. Ownership must be indeed a
reality, if the EU wants to be more than an international standard’s taker!
More than make us reflect upon the past, these principles can especially help the EU to
anticipate the near future, based on lessons learned. Finally, they also remember us that, in
its origin, the EU was not created to conduct operations, notwithstanding the overall ob-
jective of security and defence and therefore is still a crisis management player in process.
3. CONCLUSIONS
Since 2003, the EU has gradually been developing a sustainable and credible capacity to
be recognized as a security provider within its borders and beyond its neighbourhood.
However, if the EU wants to act as a strategic player at the global level, a long way has to
be pursued in order to avoid double standards and dissenting voices that question the EU’s
cohesion, both internally and externally.
Indeed, the EU frequently does not seem to practice what it preaches and we can find in
several EU Crisis Management laboratories inconsistencies, negative externalities and a
tendency to an “our size fits all” model. In particular, both case studies that we presented
here, show the other side of the coin: a tendency to prioritise state security to human
security; securitization of development and economic growth; systemic contradiction be-
tween theory and practice; domino effect on the neighbourhood; tension between the
global and the regional powers; difficulties on the formulation of policies and objectives
to address freedom from fear and freedom from want; lack of political will; and lack of a
long term perspective. Establishing HS has not indeed been the primary objective of the
EU, but rather democracy and specially stability.
The next step is thus clear: political will to embrace a Human Security Strategy, reflect-
ing a common ground of the 28 Member States’ Strategic culture on security and defence.
Human Security is mostly a practice and a way of seeing the world and acting on it, which
requires more than a new Treaty or other international document that takes the concept as
a binding legal guidance. Therefore, 20 years after the first reference in the UNDP report,
in the EU “we are not there yet”. There are elements of HS in all EU deployments, but that
does not make it a HS mission as a whole and the CSDP does not embrace a human nar-
15 The 1325 UN resolution on women, peace and security, adopted on 31 October 2000, is a ground-breaking
resolution that calls for the member States to be sensitive to the need to protect women in conflict zones as well as
strengthening its role in the peace keeping, both as gender issues advisors in international missions, and as a bridge
for dialogue with local communities.
rative. To do so, it must cover all stages of the conflict cycle followed by a civilian mission
that regards the broad spectrum of functions and tasks required. Of course, in a certain
way, the EU is already doing HS and, for some countries, enlargement is the instrument by
excellence, because it really interferes with the essence of institutions and people empow-
erment. But is it enough to label it as HS? Is it likely that the EU becomes a “smart power”
(Nye 2013) through a HS approach?
Questions that surely will remain open to discussion while the world witnesses the crisis
in Ukraine, the Islamic State’s ambitions or Gaza’s volatility and questions if the EU is still
up to the expectations of what Jean Monnet sought back in the 50’s in terms of peace and
security: “We unite people, not states!”
4. REFERENCES
Bello, Oladiran (2012): Quick Fix or Quicksand? Implementing the EU Sahel Strategy.
Working paper 114. FRIDE.
European Commission (2014): Mid-Term review of the CT Sahel Project Final Report 2014
European Council (2003): A secure Europe in a better world - the European Security Strategy.
European Council (2008): Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy
providing security in a changing world.
Fiott, Daniel et al. (2013) The Sahel Crisis: Where do European and African Perspectives
Meet?, Policy Brief 02, Brussels: Institute for European Studies
Hasegawa, Yuka (2004): The UN peace operation and protection of Human Security: the case
of Afghanistan, Yuka Human Security perspectives. I (2)
Hatzigeorgopoulos, Myrto (2013): “The EU’s strategy for the Sahel: a new turn in EU ex-
ternal action?”, ISIS Europe: European Security Review.
HSSG - Human Security Study Group (2007): A European Way of Security - The Madrid
Report. European Council: Madrid.
Joseph, Jonathan (2014): “The EU in the Horn of Africa: Building Resilience as a Distant
Form of Governance”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(2): 285-301.
Koepf, Tobias (2014): “The new sahelian terrorist landscape – actors and challenges” in
Barrios, Cristina and Koep Tobias (eds.), 2014. Re-mapping the Sahel: transnational se-
curity challenges and international responses. Issue 19. Paris: EUISS.
Nye, Joseph (2013): The Future of power. New York: Public Affairs
Renard, Thomas (2010): Terrorism and Other Transnational Threats in the Sahel: What
Role for the EU?, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.
SGESC – Study group on Europe’s security capabilities (2004): A Human Security Doctrine
for Europe. European Council: Barcelona.
UDC 314.422.2:355.48
Nada M. SEKULIĆ*

ON CHILDREN VULNERABILITY1
Abstract: The paper gives more detailed analyses of the impact of the concrete contemporary
wars on death and disability rate among children, including the main controversies on the avail-
able data of trends and scope in children mortality caused by wars. The paper includes the data
of the current armed conflict in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine pointing out the
disastrous effect the conflict has had on children. The responsibility of the most powerful states
in the world today and their representatives, together with the war profiteers, must be pointed
more directly.
Key words: children death rate, trends in the global development, contemporary wars, Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict as a case- study
It is just a coincidence, but not less important because of that, that UN commemorates
the 25th anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the same month in
which the Second International Conference on Human Security: Twenty Years of Human
Security is organized in Belgrade this year. To use that opportunity to summarize and put
forward once again some of the open questions and debates related to the issue of the im-
provement of children condition in the contemporary world seems to be one of the most
appropriate topics in the human-security research area at the moment, due to the global
economic, political and environmental changes and challenges that we all experience to-
day. In addition to this, statistically, the children death rate is considered one among the
most important indicators of the level of a state development.
What we face today is that the available quantitative data and the estimations of the future
tendencies related to the children global condition based on them, are far from uniform,
leading to either very optimistic or extremely pessimistic prognoses.
* Nada M. Sekulic, PhD, Associate Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade,

e-mail: wu.wei@sezampro.rs
[236] Nada M. SEKULIĆ
1. CHILDREN MORTALITY RATE IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

In accordance with the UNICEF Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (Re-
ports 2011/12), the number of under-five deaths2 worldwide has declined significantly
and continuously since the end of the II World War. Since 1990, the global under-five
mortality rate has dropped 35 percent - from 88 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990, to 57
in 2010. What is most remarkable is that the decrease in child death does not refer only
to the developed countries. Even the most under-developed ones, such as those in Sub-
Saharan Africa record the drop, which, however, remains insufficient to reach MDG4.3 Of
course, it does not mean that the number of children who died in their early childhood is
insignificant. In Sub-Saharan Africa 1 in 9 children dies before age five, compared to the
developed regions where there is only one in 152. In the comparative and longitudinal
perspective, the global improvement seems obvious (see Table 1).
Table 1 - Comparative data on the drop in children mortality (under-five deaths per 1000
live births)4 (source: UNICEF Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (Re-
ports 2011/12)
Decline
Region 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 MDG 2015 (percent)
1990-2011
Developed Regions 15 11 10 8 7 5 55
Developing Regions 97 91 80 69 59 32 41
Northern Africa 77 59 45 34 26 26 68
Sub-Saharan Africa 178 170 154 133 112 59 39
Latin America 53 43 34 26 22 18 64
Central Asia 76 70 61 52 44 25 44
Eastern Asia 48 45 35 24 16 16 70
Southern Asia 116 102 88 74 63 39 47
South-Eastern Asia 69 57 47 37 30 23 58
Western Asia 63 52 42 37 31 21 52
Oceania 74 67 61 56 51 25 33
World 87 82 73 63 53 29 41
Despite this, the disparity between the last region and the rest of the world has grown. If
we focus on the obvious uniformity of the global improvement, we might overview the
enormous discrepancies in the distribution of children deaths: Some 80 percent of the
2 Under-five child mortality rate is considered highly sensitive universal indicator of the level of the development of
a country. Any statistically significant decrease or increase in infant deaths reflects and influences the condition of
the entire society.
3 Millennium Development Goals is the international development agenda established at the Millennium Summit of
the UN in 2000. The aim of the MDG4 is to further cut child mortality by two thirds by 2015 from the 1990 level.
4 The source for these data stems from the vital registration systems, because they cover the entire population. Since
many countries have incomplete vital registration systems, the additional sources include standardized household
surveys, population censuses and sample registration systems.
ON CHILDREN VULNERABILITY [237]
world’s under-five deaths occur in only 25 countries, and half of these 80% are in only five
countries: India, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan and China.
Despite the continuous trend in decrease of children mortality, the instability of the global
world today (which relates, among other issues, to these discrepancies) does not support
the conclusion that these data necessarily mark overall positive developmental trend. MDG
agenda focuses predominantly on the reduction of children mortality rate concerning the
diseases like pneumonia, preterm birth complications, diarrhoea, intrapartum-related com-
plications and malaria which can be treated by relatively simple medical procedures.
It does not include other diseases, like the increase in malignancies. The number of people
who suffer from cancer is growing rapidly. Only in 2000, 5.3 men and 4.7 million women
were registered with some malignant tumour, and 6.2 millions died from the same reason.
The number of new cases is expected to grow and reach 15 million in 2020. In accord-
ance to the World Cancer Report (2002) “twelve percent people die from cancer and in
industrialised countries more than one in four will die from the disease” (World Cancer
Report 2002). To discuss some of the important carcinogenic factors in the contemporary
world is still a taboo, like taking seriously into consideration the consequences of the use
of depleted uranium in bombing since the war in Iraq, and the pressure on the affected
countries not to present in public the increase in malignancies related to this cause. This
relates to Serbia, among other countries. Depleted uranium was used at 113 locations (in
FRY) using between 11,000 and 13,000 tones of the uranium 235 (fuel waste in nuclear
plants). Public has never been informed on the consequences of the bombing with de-
pleted uranium. In 1999, the federal government established the committee to assess the
damage to the environment. The commission began an extensive and highly skilled work,
mainly based on a qualitative assessment of the damage. However, after the first more ex-
tensive and significant results, the government stopped their work. Consequently, we do
not have the data about the use of depleted uranium and its effect on the public health and
the environment. This case reflects strongly the political influence on the collection and
the presentations of the basic demographic data provided by government.
In addition to diseases, there are a lot of broader non-medical issues which can easily un-
dermine the positive statistical trend in children mortality mentioned above. If the gap
between rich and the poorest countries increases, if the number of armed conflicts in-
creases and if the undesirable consequences of the human influence on the climate change
increase, the tendency of the dropping of children mortality might slow down or even re-
verse in the decades in front of us, particularly because the positive trends in children mor-
tality rate mentioned above might be interpreted as a prolonged outcome of the long-term
period of the post-war rapid modernization all over the world and not as a correlate of
the current social development tendencies. “In 1960, the richest 20 percent of the world’s
population had 70 percent of the world’s wealth, and the poorest had 2.3 percent. Today,
the richest have 85 percent of the wealth, and the poorest have just 1.1 percent. Individual
billionaires, numbering 358, have more wealth today than the combined yearly income of
45 percent of the world’s people. Today, the 13,000 richest families possess a net worth,
which is equivalent to the assets owned by the country’s 20 million poorest families” (Gi-
roux 2003:65). Even the WTO (World Trade Organization) concludes that “richer coun-
tries have been growing faster on average than poorer countries, thereby increasing the
global income disparity” (WTO 1999:3-5).
If we take into consideration war as a factor, statistical numbers seem to be very unreliable.
Children today live in the middle of warfare which is not named as war. These conflicts
have multiple causes and, which is even more important; they do not open sustainable
opportunities for long-term peace resolutions. The line between war and peace has been
blurred, meaning, in the concrete social contexts, that more and more people live extend-
ed number of years in constant crises, which might escalate or actually escalate into armed
conflicts from time to time.
That this is not just exaggerated pessimism confirms the study released by the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), showing that income inequal-
ity has increased between 2008 and 2010 more than during the previous 12 years. (http://
www.dw.de/oecd-warns-of-widening-income-gap-between-rich-and-poor/a-16818836.)
In order to improve this condition, it is necessary to apply effective social policies, par-
ticularly among those who are most afflicted and vulnerable to the contemporary changes
in the global world. However, effective social policies are exactly one of the first targets in
the process of the restrictive restructuration, dictated to the developing countries by the
World Bank and the IMF.
World Bank and the IMF use considerably different data for the justification of their own
approach to the issue of poverty. From their perspective, it seems that the distribution
of income between the developed and underdeveloped countries has fallen, for the first
time in a century and a half (The World Bank 2013). These data support the perspective
from which it seems that the current economic integration between countries, based on
building the open financial market (which does not refer to other markets), influences the
development of each of them, while the control, pressure and the supervision of the IMF
and the World Bank over wide range of countries lead, from this perspective, to their ef-
ficacious participation on the global market with the strong assistance of the IMF and the
World Bank. From that perspective the growing indebts looks like as a path to develop-
ment which is beneficial and economically justified for all.
Political attitude actually influences, more than controversial numerical data, our per-
spective on the current world system, making us to focus on the particular aspects of it
and to use the data that fit our perspective. For example, the meaning of the drop of chil-
dren mortality is different if we consider this tendency influenced by stable and relatively
closed factors which do not change or generally improve during the decades, compared to
the interpretation in accordance with which the dropping of the children death is highly
unstable category due to the impact of unwelcomed changing factors in the global con-
temporary world that we have already mentioned above.
The data are important mostly because they support and legitimize certain kind of poli-
cies, advocacies and actions taken on behalf of the world’s huge population in the process
in which only very few of them participate. The data help target investments and distribu-
tion justifying them as reasonable or unreasonable for all, in spite of the fact that the power
of decision is in the hands of only the richest actors.
Due to this fact, there are almost raging debates among the representatives of different ap-
proaches about the key population data. These approaches are grouped in two basic oppo-
site clusters - those who have optimistic vision of our common global future, considering
that the gap between the rich and the poor is decreasing, that the GDP of the most of the
countries in the contemporary world is continuously rising, that people are healthier, that
mortality rate is reducing (in war and in peace time, among adults and among infants),
that the global neo-liberal economy is structured for the benefit of all, etc.
On the other hand, there are many authors who argue just the opposite: that the global
neo-liberal economy is not sustainable, that we live during times when the armed conflicts
are expanding, the fatality rate is increasing, and the gap between the rich and the poor
is widening. Rarely the proponents of one of these claims do not argue in favour of all of
them. Usually, to argue in favour of one of these indicators means to accept the entire
cluster that goes with it.
It is surprising to see such a huge polarization in interpretations of such fundamental,
global population issues. Consequently, this debate is never the issue of only statistical
methodology, despite that the majority of the articles deal with the statistical methodol-
ogy relating to certain data.
2. WAR FATALITIES WITH THE EMPHASIZE

ON THE CHILDREN DEATH TOLL
In this paper, we will focus on death toll in war with the emphasis on the issue of the chil-
dren vulnerability and death toll in war.
According to the Polynational War Memorial data base, in the 20th century only (including
also the beginning of 21st century), counting all wars from the beginning of the century up
to today, 161 wars were fought in different parts of the world (http://www.war-memorial.
net/wars_all.asp). There are no doubts that the fatalities increased enormously if we com-
pare two most disastrous wars in the previous century - in the I World War 20,000,000 peo-
ple lost their life, while in the II WW there were 50,000,000 of them. However, the wars
fought since that time have been more localized and controlled and engaged only relative-
ly small amount of the continuously rising military capacities of the most powerful states.
They escalated mostly in the underdeveloped and developing regions and were dispersed
all over the world. Even the most disastrous among them, such as Chinese Civil War, Ko-
rean War, Indochina-France War, Vietnam War etc., were not nearly close to WWI and
WWII. This source of data also argues in favour of the increase in number of death tolls,
including direct, as well as indirect war fatalities.
The similar approach has been provided by the UN. According to the UN the combined
sources civilian fatalities were 5% at the beginning of the 20th century, to 15 percent during
World War I, to 65 percent by the end of World War II, to more than 90 percent in the wars
of the 1990. New warfare doctrine permits attacking civilians, including children, without
punishments, and under such conditions, they often become primary targets of war or at
least main collateral victims (Patterns of conflict: Civilians are now targets, www.unicef.
org/graca/patterns.htm)
Collaboration between Uppsala University and the Peace Research Institute, Oslo, has
produced quite different database (Uppsala/PRIO), which consists of passive reports on
violent deaths. Their findings are that violent deaths from war have declined since the
WW II and that recent years have been some of the most peaceful of the past century
(Lacina 2006). They suggest that that warfare has become more benign exactly because
they are designed to minimize civilian deaths, relying on highly precise and technologi-
cally developed weapons.
The authors who rely on this database share several key ideological assumptions interpret-
ed as unquestionable facts. First, they start from the fact that the conventional inter-state
wars in the 20th century (like WWI and WWII) were much more disastrous than uncon-
ventional intra-state ones. Statistically, this is obvious, since the WWI and WWII were
catastrophic in such a scope that additional war like these would threaten the survival and
the heritages of human civilization as we know it. It implies that the post-war period was
not so peaceful and based on peaceful politics, as the previous two wars were disastrous.
Furthermore, it explains why the structure of warfare has changed. Warring politics nei-
ther has diminished, nor has given priority to peace, but it has been transformed into the
other sustainable forms of warfare exactly in order to preserve it as one of the major tool
in the international politics.
The proponents of the optimistic vision of the decreasing of warfare in the second part of
the 20th century even go so far as to say not only that the wars have grown less frequently,
less deadly, but also that they are less likely to become internationalized since the end of
the Cold War (Lacina 2006).
“We have sounded a note of some optimism about the international system. The post-
World War II international system witnessed a remarkable decline in the numbers of com-
bat deaths worldwide. This is in large part due to the decreasing incidence of interstate
and Great-Power wars, the most deadly type of conflict humans have ever faced, and to
decreased casualty levels in civil wars due to less frequent intervention by major powers.
Thus, the success of the post-World War II period has been in building a historically un-
precedented network of peaceful ties among the most powerful states in the international
system. The challenge going into the 21st century is to expand these gains into the areas
still torn by domestic conflict, terrorism, and interstate feuds” (Lacina 2006:679).
There are several arguments that question such an optimistic perspective. First of all, it
does not mean that the wars in the second half of the 20th century were essentially local -
they were more localized and encapsulated, but reflect more than ever the global issues.
The fact that has been no direct conventional war between the major powers since 1954,
and that the incidence of interstate war has declined over the past half century does not
mean that they did not continue their struggles and interstate warring politics, but that
they transfer the battlefields into the underdeveloped regions.
Otherwise, it would be inexplicable why the main wars after 1950s were fought exactly
in the countries which cannot economically afford it. In accordance to the UN reports
among 150 major conflicts since the World War II, 130 have been fought in the develop-
ing world. Their per capita gross national product (GNP) in 1994 included: Afghanistan
(US$280), Angola ($700), Cambodia ($200), etc. In addition, since 1950s, more wars have
started than have stopped. However, since there are not conventional beginning of those
wars and since there are not sustainable resolving of them, they are transformed into con-
tinuous wars (Machel 2000).
Most of these wars were the manifestation of the chronic crisis, keeping the countries
engaged in them in the constant low intensity conflicts that escalated periodically. If we
count them as separate wars, the number of fatalities seems less than it is in reality. For ex-
ample, the wars related to the disintegration of SFRY are counted as several separate wars,
which, actually is only one crisis guided by the same logic of the state break. If we count
all the fatalities of the wars after the World War II, there were at least 13,000,000 of them,
which is not very far from the outcomes of the World War I.
The existence of many low intensity wars does not mean that the world is more peaceful,
just the opposite, it means that we live in the world of constant crisis and constant possible
escalation of smaller conflicts into big ones, with the unpredictable outcomes. The line
between peace and war has been merged and we live in chronic state of tension.
The question whether there are more or less wars in the world depends on how we define
war. They must be analyzed within the framework of the global political and economic
system. Some of the critical factors related to the relationship between economic environ-
ment and new war-torn countries show three critical factors: free trade and direct foreign
transnational corporation investment or incursion; forced structural adjustment, and di-
verging per capita incomes between countries (Obermeyer 2008). In addition, “they are
too often represented in the mainstream media as irrational local tribal conflicts and eth-
nic animosities, while it is actually impossible to understand and thoroughly explain them
without taking into consideration the global issues, since they do not include interests of
the most powerful states in the world or they do not influence the global world. For exam-
ple, “the fight over natural re-sources is one cause. Diamonds have financed long-running
wars in Sierra Leone and Angola. In Sudan, oil fuels the civil conflict. The profits from
narcotics are at the heart of struggles in Afghanistan and Colombia” (Obermeyer 2008).
Three wars with the biggest number of fatalities - Chinese Civil War, Vietnam War and
Korean War, were fought for the new positions of the superpowers in the polarizing 20th
century world.
In addition, wars are very profitable. Not only are they perpetuated by international weap-
ons sale (sales of small arms, which are today easily accessible in the poorest countries,
where it was possible, at least at some points, to buy Kalashnikov rifle for the price of one
chicken /Chivers, 2010:381/), but the biggest profiteers in the global world are undoubt-
edly military industry corporations.
In 2011, the 100 largest contractors sold $410 billion in arms and military services. Just 10
of those companies sold over $208 billion. Wall Street reviewed the 10 companies with the
most military sales worldwide.
These companies have benefited tremendously from the growth in military spending in
the U.S, which has the largest military budget in the world. In 2000, the U.S. defence budg-
et was $312 billion. Growing constantly, it reached $712 billion in 2011. Between 2002 and
2011, arms sales among the top 100 companies grew by 51%.
The United States has an enormous responsibility for fuelling military conflicts through-
out the world. , since the sales are going primarily to developing countries. The issue is
actually not about the political dominance of the USA more than about neoliberal policies
that support corporate profits supporting indirectly taking the lives of children. The Inter-
national Committee on the Red Cross estimates that “some 110 million land mines threat-
en children in more than 70 countries” and that they are chillingly effective: “82.5 percent
of amputations performed in ICRC hospitals are for land mine victims” (Giroux 2003:69).
It is paradoxical, but at the same time quite illustrative, that the most influential members
of the UN Security Council, most responsible for the improvement of the peace policies
in the world today, are the most powerful supporters of the military profiteers. Conse-
quently, the issue is not just about the arms smuggling on the global military market, but
also about the issue how the top military corporations are protected and subsidized by the
extremely profitable defence contracts with the states entitled to improve peace on the
global level.
The question is logical: is the global improvement in peace policies possible today if the
key figures are those who gather the greatest profits from the military markets today?
Seen from that perspective, the arguments presented in the Human Security Report5 and
the PRIO and UPSALA presentations for 2013 seem tendentious. Despite the decrease
in the overall child mortality rate, children today live in a risky world and are especially
vulnerable to the multiple causes of the contemporary crises. They are often pressed be-
tween the warring factions and deprived of the basic children rights and children care,
not because of the lack of resources, but because their lives and security were not recog-
nized as priorities and, on more global level, because of the unequal distribution of wealth
and indifference and negligence of children interests in the framework of the economy in
which the top profits stems from military industry.
Instead of dealing with this issue, the institutions of globalization, such as the International
Monetary Fund, “fuel the new wars by forcing countries into structural adjustment pro-
grams that weaken national economies and create the conditions for conflict. Rigorous
programs of structural adjustment promise long-term market-based economic growth,
but demands for immediate cuts in budget deficits and public expenditure only weaken
already fragile states, leaving them dependent on forces and relations over which they have
little control” (Machel 1996:12).
Consequently, it is reasonable to observe the possible link between the facts presented
above and the fact that the IMF, the World Bank, the USA government and the research
institutes which they support argue in favour of very optimistic perspectives on our global
future underestimating actual warring policies in the global world. Even the nominally in-
dependent research centres, like the Oslo Institute for Peace Research, are financed by the
institutions which are not neutral. Besides their two largest project funders, the Norwe-
gian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Research Council of Norway, their main funders
are the World Bank, Norwegian Ministry of Defence and the European Union (“Income
Statement”, in PRIO Annual Report 2011). The politicised environment surrounding this
issue has generated considerable debate regarding the validity of such studies.
Taking these controversies into consideration, we will present two different research ap-
proaches to the mortality rate in wars, with the emphasis on children death toll.
The Human Security Report Project (HSRP) examined the trend in under-five mortality
for the period from 1970 to 2008 in every country that experienced 1,000 or more bat-
tle deaths. They found that very rarely national mortality rates increased during war. A
country-year in war is defined as a calendar year in which a country experienced 1,000 or
more battle deaths. They counted an increase in the U5MR when the rate for a country
is higher than it was in the preceding year. U5MR increased in only 5 percent of country-
years in war. Just eight countries
5 The Human Security Report Project (HSRP) is inspired by the UN Human Development Report, but it is actually
an independent research centre affiliated with Simon Fraser University (SFU) in Vancouver, Canada. Their
findings and analyses are published in the Human Security Report, Human Security Brief series, and the mini Atlas
of Human Security.
(15 percent) experienced increases in U5MRs in wartime. The six sub-Saharan African
countries accounted for 88 percent of the country-years in war in which under-five mor-
tality increased. The under-five mortality trend data are taken from the consensus esti-
mates of the Inter-Agency Child Mortality Estimation Group (IACMEG). The conflict
data are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), as well as the International
Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).
Table 2 - Increases in the Under-Five Mortality Rate (U5MR) by Country-Year in War,
1970–2008 (Source: Human Security Research Report 2009/10)
Increases in the Under-Five Mortality Rate (U5MR) by Country-Year in War, 1970–2008
Years in War
Years in War
of Country-
Percentage
Number of
Number of
the U5MR
the U5MR
Increased
increased
Country-
in Which
in War in
Country
which
Years
Region
Sub-Saharan Africa 155 22 14.19

Americas 65 0 0
Central & South Asia 96 0 0
East & South East Asia 76 1 1.32
Europe 13 2 15.38
Middle East & North Africa 72 0 0
GLOBAL 477 25 5.24
As the authors of this report noticed, these findings give rise to the question about the reli-
ability of such outcomes. It has been noticed that the sources on which estimations were
made were subjected to a considerable degree of uncertainty. However, they considered
the data accurate enough, concluding that the rates of children mortality decline even in
the warfare.
However, the research conducted in the framework of the 2002-3 world health surveys,
based on another method of collecting and counting data, have considerably different and
not so optimistic implications. The world health surveys were carried out in 2002-3 in 70
countries, which included the data on adult deaths. Due to this, it is impossible to com-
pare directly the following findings with the data presented above, which refer specifically
to U5MR. Besides, children mortality in war should extend beyond U5MR, which target
deaths caused by the most common infants diseases caused by the overall poverty, lack
of medical assistance, malnutrition etc. and provide the instrument for the estimation of
the specifically war context influence on children deaths as well as for the children mor-
tality rate caused indirectly by war (in this paper, we refer only to the direct war injuries,
since even at that level, the instruments of data gathering have not been built satisfactory):
However, the new method presented here relates to the rate of infant mortality at the ag-
gregate level, without specific reference. In 45 countries, the data were gathered from ran-
domly selected household member of the each household including the sample, by asking
to report all of his/her siblings deaths, including the information whether the deaths were
the results of the war injures. Of the 45 surveys with the data on sibling history, 13 were
found to have more than five reported sibling deaths from war injuries in a given 10 year
period.
The big advantage of this type of research is that it was carried out directly in the war-
ring zones while the census often includes the underrepresented data from these zones.
Besides, the total death toll (combat and non-combat deaths affected by war) is always
considerably underestimated in the conflicts of the parties which are not national armies,
which actually prevails in the poorest countries. Based on these sources, the estimation
was counted on the total war deaths, taking the 13 surveys reporting military deaths (the
deaths of civilians or soldiers caused directly from war injures) as the bases of the analy-
ses. The fraction of total deaths due to war injuries in a given time period based on the
survey data was applied to the UN Population Division estimates of total deaths available
for all countries from 1955 onward. The periods between 1955 and 2002 were divided into
blocks of 10 years. To calculate the probabilities of direct war deaths for all, the number of
deaths was divided by the number of siblings alive in a given 10 year block.
The last step was to compare these estimations with those from the Uppsala/PRIO da-
tabase (included in the mentioned Human Security Report) using a linear regression
model, with the values of the first research as the dependent variable and Uppsala/PRIO
war deaths from the same period as the independent variable. The aim was to suggest the
correction of Uppsala/PRIO data.
The estimates lead to the conclusion that a total of 5.4 million (3.0 to 8.7 million) violent
war deaths occurred from 1955 to 2002 in 13 countries, ranging from 7,000 in the Republic
of Congo to 3.8 million in Vietnam. Compared to this, the average ratio of survey estimates
to Uppsala/PRIO data is 3 (Obermeyer 2008).
The adjustments to the Uppsala/PRIO data do not support the claim that war deaths are
declining, implying that it would not be appropriate to take such data as reliable source of
estimations. From that perspective, there is not clear downward trend in war death toll,
and even there is an increase for 1985 through 1994 compared to 1975 through 1984.
Figure 1 - War Deaths by Decade: Uppsala Data as Published and as “Adjusted”

(British Medical Journal, Vol. 336, No. 7659 ( Jun. 28, 2008)
At this point, we cannot present similar comparative estimations concerning the child war
deaths, since they have not been done yet.
Finally, we would like to present some recent data which show the effect that contempo-
rary conflicts have on children. The data are gathered from the OCHRA (United Nation
Office for the Coordination of the Humanitarian Affairs) and relate to the recent armed
conflict between Israel and Palestine which started in the middle of July 2014, while the
military actions ceased at the end of August 2014, when a cease-fire was agreed which
more or less continues until now. During this conflict, 2,131 Palestinians were killed, of
whom more than half were civilians (1,473), including 501 children. Among the total
death toll caused directly by missile attacks in only two months, 23.5% are children deaths
included in 69.12% civilians deaths. 18,000 houses have been destroyed leaving approxi-
mately 108,000 people homeless. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, 11,100
Palestinians, including 3,374 children and 2,088 women and 410 elderly, have been in-
jured. Up to 1,000 of the children will have a permanent disability and up to 1,500 children
have been orphaned. At least 373,000 children require psychosocial support, showing the
symptoms of nightmares, bed wetting and clinging to parents. Thousands of explosive
remnants of war are scattered through the civilian areas affected by the conflict, causing a
major threat, especially to children (http://www.ochaopt.org/.)
With such a picture, we must reconsider seriously the claim that we live in the world in
which war lethality is decreasing, opening better perspectives for children.
3. CONCLUSION
The paper is focused on developing the perspective from which it would be more visible
how children deaths are “disappearing” in the counting of the war death toll, questioning
the optimistic perspective of the possible future of children and young people. It is neces-
sary to establish new or to apply additional methods of analyses and data gathering, which
would provide more accurate and more comprehensive insights into the contexts and fac-
tors that influence children mortality rate in war.
Many of these factors are still taboos. For example, more than 940,000 rounds of weapons
were fired in Iraq, all of them made from depleted uranium. How many children and adults
have died or have suffered the effects of radioactive artillery shells? Hypocrisy and contra-
dictions in the international politics today is illustrated in a very transparent manner in the
interview with Madeleine Albright, the former U.S. Secretary of State under President Bill
Clinton, in the news program, “60 Minutes” on May 12, 1996. When she was asked wheth-
er half a million children who have died in Iraq because of the sanctions is the price worth
it, Albright responded: “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price, we think the price
is worth it” (http://fair.org/extra-online-articles/we-think-the-price-is-worth-it/).
The responsibility of the most powerful states in the world today and their representa-
tives, together with the war profiteers, must be pointed more directly. The debate about
the statistical value of certain findings should not be neutral but accompanied with ethical
advocacy, without which the militarism of the contemporary world might stay invisible,
if not even hidden. Children provide imponderable value and give a chance to all of us for
taking compassion as a factor of priority importance in the international politics and to
overcome the politics based on local interests, national boundaries and profit interests.
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UDC 323.269.6(540)
James Alex SIEBENS, Larissa KOUGBLENOU, Ben S. CASE*
DEVELOPING HUMAN INSECURITY:

DEVELOPMENT, MARGINALIZATION,
AND MAOIST INSURGENCY IN INDIA1
Abstract: This research paper explores the impact of aggressive economic development in India
on the indigenous Adivasi population, and the Maoist insurgency that has grown to challenge the
Government of India (GoI) for de facto sovereignty in large swaths of the country. We combine
content analysis with historical case study to address two complex questions: 1) What are the
causes of the inception and endurance of the Naxalite insurgency? 2) How has the government’s
response affected human security in the conflict region?
We provide a brief history of the insurgency to date and conduct a content analysis of official
press releases from the GoI and the Naxalite rebels. We find that Naxalism stems from resistance
against economic, ethnic, gender, and caste stratifications, worsened by aggressive resource ex-
traction in traditional Adivasi communities. These dimensions support a grievance-based expla-
nation for the insurgency. We then review and evaluate the GoI’s counterinsurgency campaign,
and assess its impact on human security. We find that although the government has recently im-
proved its counterinsurgency doctrine, it is still undermining the human security of Adivasis and
other vulnerable groups by actively violating their legal, political, and human rights in pursuit of
rapid economic development.
Keywords: human security, development, insurgency, indigenous rights, India, Adivasi, Naxalism.
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of human security was developed based on a need to balance the sovereignty
of states with the sovereignty of peoples and individuals. Its three pillars are ‘freedom from
fear,’ ‘freedom from want,’ and ‘freedom from indignity,’ with the objects of these free-
doms being people, not the governments that rule in their names (Acharya, 2001). Un-
fortunately, these goals can sometimes be plied against one another, or used maliciously;
governments may undermine the dignity of their citizens in pursuit of economic develop-
1 James Alex Siebens, Larissa Kougblenou, Ben S. Case , THINK International and Human Security
Author Note: Authors’ names are listed in random order. All authors contributed equally to this project.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to e-mail: communications@thinkihs.org
[250] James Alex SIEBENS, Larissa KOUGBLENOU, Ben S. CASE
ment, or abuse them in the name of security. In such cases it must be remembered that the
human security concept is not only multifaceted but also holistic, and that the pursuit of
one ideal may not legitimize the subversion of another.
Rapid industrialization and resource exploitation can severely undermine human security,
especially “freedom from want,” by causing greater economic hardship for marginalized
communities, the “losers” of extractive development. Such development strategies can
incite civil unrest and conflict by attacking the economic wellbeing, security, and dignity
of individuals and in a society.
Our paper explores the case of the Naxalite insurgency in India and the impact of extractive
economic development on human security. We first examine explanations for the long-
standing Naxalite insurgency through a content analysis of primary Naxalite and Govern-
ment of India (GoI) sources and secondary historical sources. We then review the nexus
of the GoI’s development policies and its response to the insurgency to assess its effects on
the human security of marginalized and vulnerable communities in the conflict area. We
find that the Naxalites’ claims have a strong basis in empirical economic and political con-
ditions. Furthermore, we find that while the GoI has attempted to alleviate the economic
bases for ongoing popular discontent and rebellion, it seems to have in fact prolonged the
conflict by exacerbating the grievances through extractive development strategies, mal
governance, and disproportionate use of violence.
2. THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT: 1967-TODAY

Modern Naxalism2 originated in the 1967 “land to the tiller” uprising in Naxalbari village
in West Bengal, following an attack on a tribal youth by enforcers of local landlords (Hin-
dustan Times 2005). Members of the CPI(M),3 which headed the ruling coalition in West
Bengal, seized the momentum and organized peasants to implement the kind of economic
and social promises – including land reform and the rights of women, Dalits, and Adivasis –
that had won them electoral success (Mohan 1970).
The movement formed village-level Peasant Associations and Peasant Unions, as tens of
thousands became full-time organizers and activists (Sanyal, quoted in Mukherji 2012).
They forcibly imposed land reforms promised by the government’s land ceiling laws, kill-
ing a number of landlords in the process (Mohan 1970). Fearful of association with the
rebellion, the CPI(M) expelled the rebel leaders and ordered police to crush the move-
ment. The perceived betrayal of the peasant uprising by the CPI(M) elites resulted in the
fragmenting of the party, and the brutal suppression of the movement militarized the sur-
viving “Naxalite” factions. Prominent ex-CPI(M) leaders formed their own parties, most
2 The complete history of Naxalism is far too complex to cover in the limited space of this paper. Other than the
citations provided, for an in-depth early history of the various parties and organizations, please see Communism in
Indian Politics by Bhabani Sen Gupta.
3 “Communist Party of India (Marxist).” The Communist Party of India (Marxist) is sometimes abbreviated CPM,
and the Communist Party of India (Maoist) is sometimes abbreviated CPI(M). However, the Communist Party
of India (Marxist) uses the CPI(M) abbreviation, and this is also their official electoral symbol in English, so it
is used here. The Communist Party of India (Maoist) is abbreviated the way they typically abbreviate their own
party in English. It has been suggested that the confusion between the abbreviations may be intentional – at their
founding, the CPI(Maoist) may have chosen this name in order to be easily confused with the CPI(M), which is a
legal political party in India holding many seats in parliament.
DEVELOPING HUMAN INSECURITY: DEVELOPMENT, MARGINALIZATION,
AND MAOIST INSURGENCY IN INDIA [251]
significantly the CPI(M-L),4 which spurned elections in favor of guerrilla tactics (Mohan
1970; Mukherji 2012).
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the movement gained traction, especially in Adivasi-dom-
inated areas of West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar. However, the focus on armed
struggle over mass political organizing led to CPI(M-L) leaders and members being sys-
tematically killed, and in 1972, their founder and leader, Charu Mazumdar, was arrested
and died in police custody (Hindustan Times 2005). The GoI’s counterinsurgency cam-
paign of the early 1970s succeeded in driving the remnants of the original Naxalites un-
derground (Banerjee 2007), and the movement retreated to remote rural areas. However,
the conditions that led to the initial uprising remained, as the Indian government intensi-
fied rapid development programs in the areas inhabited by Adivasis. Around 1980 some
Naxalite factions began to reorganize in the forests of eastern India with the goal of build-
ing a revolutionary armed force (Guha 2007). They clashed with police and the private
militias of the upper-caste landlords (Menon 1980), and engaged in political organizing,
building popular support among the Adivasi populations in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh,
and Bihar. By the late 1990s the Naxalites had established a strong presence in roughly ten
states in eastern and central India, and the insurgency grew more aggressive and ambitious
(Hindustan Times 2005).
In 2004, thirty years after their near destruction, several Naxalite offshoots merged to form
the CPI(Maoist). Along with the unification of the Naxalites’ political message, the merger
combined the groups’ military forces under one command, enhancing their ability to con-
duct offensive operations and control territory. Within a year the Naxalites were active
in 165 districts across 14 states (Institute for Conflict Management [ICM] 2013), and in
2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called the Naxalite insurgency the “single biggest
internal security challenge” for India (Ward, Hackett 2007). By 2009 the insurgents had
increased their control over 58 “highly affected” districts, and were active in more than
195 districts across 16 states (ICM 2013) (See Figure 1).
Like its predecessors, the CPI(Maoist) claims to fight for the liberation of poor peasants,
Adivasis, the Dalit caste, and women, and says that their support among these groups is
strong. The CPI(Maoist)’s 2004 “Party Programme” addresses the oppression suffered by
Adivasi people, and not only orients its platform to the plight of Adivasis but also promises
the right of secession for any tribal groups that seek statehood. CPI(Maoist) documents
promote autonomous control for all regions of India, highlighting their prioritization of
Adivasi areas and Dalit groups.
In many cases the CPI(Maoist) has backed up its rhetoric with action. For example, they
successfully campaigned for higher prices for tendu leaves, a staple cash crop cultivated
by many rural Adivasi and Dalit farmers in central India (Roy 2010). A recent study found
Naxalites to be more active in the areas with high tendu production, indicating that they
have won support by tangibly addressing the economic grievances of Adivasi and Dalit
tendu producers (Rajan, Sen, Teitelbaum 2012).
4 Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)

3. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF PIB & NAXALITE PRESS RELEASES
3.1. Methodology
Our analysis is based, in part, on samples of official statements published by both sides
of the Naxalite conflict. We reviewed a sample of sixty-five Indian Press Information Bu-
reau (PIB) statements and reports issued between 2004 and 2013, and all sixty relevant
CPI(Maoist) press releases and pamphlets from 2010 to 2013 that were available and had
been translated into English.5 We compared the language, content, and framing used by
the PIB and CPI(Maoist) to discuss the war and the conditions of the people involved, and
discerned two competing narratives.
3.2. PIB Press Releases

The PIB is India’s national press service, and its messages are designed to disseminate in-
formation on GoI activities. Overall, the language and content of the sampled statements
lauds the GoI’s efforts and successes.6
PIB reports on the Naxalites generally have two themes, which are often combined in the
same piece. The first reports on “unprovoked” Naxalite attacks on police and soldiers, and
Naxalite atrocities committed against civilians. The second reports on anti-Naxalite poli-
cies and strategies that are currently working well, or announces new initiatives.
Although PIB reports sometimes acknowledge that legitimate grievances drive people
into the Naxalite ranks, the grievances are treated as distinct from the insurgency7 – from
the PIB perspective, the Naxalites “do not have real interest in the development of these
areas.”8 Rather, the Naxalites’ sole aim “is to overthrow the established authority of the
Government (...)”9 According to this narrative, the Naxalites interfere with genuine gov-
ernment attempts to develop “backward” areas because they are not interested in develop-
ment, only violence. Accordingly, most anti-Naxalite “schemes” involve a combination of
military attacks and cash payments to guerrillas who surrender voluntarily.
The PIB statements portray the GoI as a benevolent, if slow moving, agent of progress try-
ing to help vulnerable populations in spite of Naxalite terrorists bent on spreading misery.
5 The PIB sample was taken from the Indian government’s website, by searching for statements on issues relating to the
Naxalites, including development and social issues. Thirty-five press releases were obtained with a keyword search
for the word “Naxalites,” and thirty were obtained from keyword searches of the words “women,” “development,”
and “Adivasi” (ten each). The CPI(Maoist) documents were obtained via the website bannedthought.net, an
independent site that publishes political documents that governments have attempted to suppress. The documents
were accessed between January 2 and February 5, 2014 at: http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-
Docs/index.htm. Documents were written in or translated into English by the CPI (Maoist). A complete list of
articles in the sample is available upon request.
6 The two notable exceptions were: a report on the release of a government study that revealed frightening child
abuse statistics, and a sober acknowledgement by Vice President Shri M. Hamid Ansari of the widespread poverty
in Adivasi areas.
7 For a thorough discussion of the social and economic causes of the insurgency from the government’s perspective,
please see The Naxal Challenge, edited by P.V. Ramana, which was published as the result of a two-day workshop on
the conflict, hosted by the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi in 2005. This type of analysis certainly exists
in government circles and is easily accessible, but the PIB reports presented a much simpler and more one-sided view.
8 July 22, 2009
9 April 7, 2010
Through PIB statements the GoI makes it clear that the unconditional surrender of all
Naxalites is the only acceptable outcome of the conflict.
3.3. Comparison to Naxalite Press Releases

The CPI(Maoist) statements are usually longer and more colorful than the PIB’s, and (un-
surprisingly) present the conflict very differently. It is worth briefly reflecting on the fact
that the CPI(Maoist) is a communist party, which makes it difficult to discuss their pro-
grams, goals, and relationships to communities in an objective way. However, in many
ways the Naxalite movement is a continuation of a long history of Adivasi resistance to out-
side encroachment that precedes Marxism. The Naxalites’ rhetoric presents their version
of communist ideology as the solution to grievances that have sparked peasant uprisings
for centuries – landlord abuse, land theft, excessive taxation, etc. – grievances that find
their current incarnations in GoI development policies. Furthermore, the Naxalites con-
nect their politics to the social and economic plight of vulnerable groups, namely religious
and ethnic minorities and women, whose interests they juxtapose to the Indian State. It is
impossible to divorce the Naxalites from their political ideology, but it is also important
to understand the movement in the context of historical resistance by Adivasi and peasant
groups in India; this is, after all, how they understand themselves.
Many of the CPI(Maoist) reports have similar subject matter to those of the PIB – battles,
assassinations, victories, enemy atrocities, and so on. However, the Naxalite press releases
consistently connect these stories to deprivation and exploitation in local communities.
Most CPI(Maoist) statements mention social issues (land theft, stolen wages, resource ex-
traction, patriarchy, etc.) and connect the story to those issues. By contrast, only one out
of the thirty-five PIB statements about the Naxalites mentions social issues.
Another interesting difference is that the CPI(Maoist) statements about battles report
on the casualties from both sides; they glorify their victories, mourn their losses, con-
demn the massacres of their members and civilians, and apologize for unintended deaths.
In contrast, the sampled PIB reports only mention the deaths of Naxalites when many
government soldiers have also been killed. While this may seem counterintuitive, it casts
government soldiers as martyred guardians of the peace, risking their lives to pacify areas
affected by violence. The Naxalite reports, on the other hand, make the rebels out to be
the protagonists not because of the violence they face in the war, but because of the issues
that make the war necessary.
Finally, the Naxalites make concrete, achievable demands designed to improve people’s
everyday lives, while stressing the need for system-wide change; they call for the release of
political prisoners, an end to exploitative mining contracts, increased autonomy for Adi-
vasi groups, the removal of corrupt officials, and a host of other reforms. This portrays the
Naxalites as practical, and allies them with both village people and liberal groups in seek-
ing progressive reforms and tangible victories.
4. MARGINALIZATION AND BROKEN PROMISES

Our analysis of the PIB and Naxalite press releases has outlined how the Naxalites frame
their motivations in terms of poverty and the struggles faced by Adivasis and other vulner-
able populations of India. Naxalite claims about their strength among these groups appear
to be verified by studies showing that districts with higher percentages of Adivasis and
impoverished communities are more likely to have a strong Naxalite presence (Hoelscher
at al. 2012; Mukherjee 2013). In this section we will provide some background on the Adi-
vasis, and explore how India’s economic development model fuels human security chal-
lenges that may explain the resonance of Naxalism among these vulnerable communities.
4.1. The Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes)

According to the 2011 Indian Census, the Adivasis,10 officially recognized as “Scheduled
Tribes,” constitute 10.87% of India’s total population. The history of the Adivasis, or original
inhabitants of India, has been one of continuous exploitation and dispossession by the non-
autochthonous people of India, punctuated by rebellions and resistance (Indian Parliament
1946). Like indigenous people elsewhere in the world, they have been maligned as “back-
ward,” “primitive,” and “tribal.” The Adivasis’ struggle with migrants to the Indian subconti-
nent began millennia ago, after Indo-European groups settled in India and institutional Hin-
duism cemented the exclusion of non-Hindus from society (Pruthi 2004). Although trade
existed between the Adivasis and other Hindu and non-Hindu social groups, the Adivasis
mainly preserved their autonomous existence, languages, and socio-religious and cultural
practices because of their physical isolation, and the endogamy practiced in Hindu society.
State-imposed restrictions on Adivasi territorial rights began in 1885 as the British imperial
government restricted the use of natural resources from the Indian forests through “Forest
Acts”. Adivasi communities collectively responded to British-imposed power through nu-
merous rebellions aimed at regaining their land and self-determination (Banerjee P. 2010).
At the onset of India’s independence, the question of how to incorporate marginalized
communities into independent India was a central concern. The main options were as-
similation in the mainstream society or protection from rapid modernization and its con-
sequences. A special protection (similar to some provisions of the Colonial Government
Acts) was provided to what the Constitution called India’s “Backward Classes” – “Sched-
uled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes” (Shah 2010). For the Adivasis, this protection, the
“Fifth Schedule,” consisted of affirmative action schemes in government, state-run educa-
tional institutions, loan-providing financial institutions, and the establishment of Sched-
uled Areas to protect their rights over their land, forests, and water (Ministry of Tribal
Affairs [MTA] 2012).
10 “Adivasi” comprises many distinct and diverse ethnic groups occupying a belt stretching from the Bhil regions of
western India through the Gond districts of central India, to Jharkhand and Bengal, where the Mundas, Oraons, and
Santals predominate. Smaller groups of tribal communities can be found in the South of India like the Chenchus,
Todas, and Kurumbas, and smaller endangered communities are located in the Andamans, like Jarawas, Onge, and
Sentinelese. A major portion of the Adivasi population can be found in Northeast-India, like the different Naga sub
tribes, Khasis, Garos, Mizos, Kukis, Bodos and others.Nandini Sundar in Encyclopedia of India by Stanley Wolpert,
Editor in chief. Macmillan-Scribners-Gale. New York, 2006.
However, nearly 70 years after independence, the various constitutional amendments

enacted to protect the Adivasis have not lived up to their intents. With most of India’s
mineral and forest resources located in the protected Scheduled Areas (MTA 2012), the
Fifth Schedule has been under constant threat, and in some areas has been ignored by the
State. Recent years have seen the collusion of neo-liberal state policies and multinational
corporate interests that have sought to exploit the protected forests and resources in the
name of “development”. Adivasis currently face multiple abuses, including plundering of
resources, forced relocation, cultural genocide, forced integration into market economies,
bigotry, and discrimination (Kapoor 2009).
Adivasi communities and individuals have historically interacted with the State in various
ways, some lobbying for increased legal protection and enforcement of the current pro-
tections, some choosing to relocate, and some attempting to ignore the State altogether.
Others, as this paper focuses on, have turned to violent resistance, struggling to recapture
their agency and reassert their rights to their land and to representation in the modern
political landscape.
4.2. Poverty and Extractive Development Strategies

Despite India’s rapid economic growth in the last 20 years, over 270 million Indians11 still
live below the national poverty line (The World Bank 2012). About 70% of India’s poor live
in the nine states that have been recognized by the GoI as being affected by “Left Wing
Extremism” (LWE) (Planning Commission 2013; Naxal Management Division 2013) (See
Figure 2). Roughly 62% of Adivasis or Scheduled Tribes also inhabit the nine states offi-
cially affected by LWE (NIRD, PR 2013).
In the 1990s, the GoI adopted a neo-liberal development model in order to achieve rapid
economic growth, continuing the extractive practices used under British rule. The GoI has
invested in large infrastructure projects such as dams, mines, ports, and power plants, and
created tax-free Special Economic Zones (SEZ) to invite foreign direct investment. These
projects have specifically targeted the bountiful mineral and natural resources found in
states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal.
Central and state governments have used the pre-independence Land Acquisition Act
to claim any property for public purpose (Ministry of Rural Development 1894), while
colluding with corporations to forcibly circumvent the Panchayats Extension to Sched-
uled Areas Act of 1996 (PESA), which required them to obtain the consent of affected
populations (Pelly 2008). The 1894 act was recently repealed and replaced by the Right
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (2013).
However, the improved law comes after years of disastrous consequences for displaced
populations, and the history of the GoI disregarding its own statutes when it comes to
profitable private development makes the implementation of the improved law as unlikely
as its predecessor.
A conservative estimate indicates that around 50 million people have been directly or indi-
rectly displaced due to development projects over the last 50 years (Ganguly, Negi 2011).
Of the directly displaced, it is estimated that over 40% are Adivasis and another 40% are
11 21.9% of the total Indian population

Dalits and the rural poor (Fernandes 2008). More than 20 million of those displaced by
the development projects were displaced by dams (16.4 million), mines (2.5 million), and
industrial development (1.2 million) (Ganguly, Negi 2011). There is also widespread in-
direct displacement, which stems from the implementation of development projects that
continuously increase the consumption of natural resources, consequently stripping vul-
nerable communities of their traditional means of livelihood and sustenance.
Along with the destruction of their natural environment, Adivasis’ traditional production
systems have been dismantled; ancestral and sacred zones, graves, and temples have been
desecrated; kinship groups and family systems have been scattered; and informal mutual
support networks have been weakened. These conditions relegate a majority of Adivasis
to extreme poverty and bondage (Kothari 1996).
4.3. Dissent and State Violence

The prevalence of structural violence against vulnerable populations has been highly vis-
ible in the context of the GoI’s response to movements opposed to economic develop-
ment projects. Adivasis and other vulnerable communities living in the vicinity of natural
resources seem to have been identified as those who “should suffer in the interest of the
country” (Nehru quoted in Kothari 1996:1478).
Development projects have often been accompanied by heavy militarization of the target
area in order to suppress protests (Roy 1999). Historically, the central and state govern-
ments invoked anti-terrorism laws to suppress opposition to the various development
projects. Adivasi dissent became equated with “terrorism” by politicians and the popular
media, a label that expanded to include human right defenders, individuals who oppose
state economic development policies, and the landless poor who are portrayed as obsta-
cles to the nation’s economic growth (Pelly 2008).
Despite its constitutional model, the GoI has failed to uphold fundamental human rights
for its disadvantaged populations. Law enforcement agencies are often the greatest offend-
ers of the human rights of Adivasis and other vulnerable communities (Working Group on
Human Rights in India and the UN [WGHR] 2012). Torture, extra-judicial killings, disap-
pearances and coercion are conducted by the police, armed forces, paramilitary forces,
and Forest Department officials with impunity (Pelly 2008). Custodial torture and rape are
used by the police across the country as alternative tools for criminal investigations and
as punishment for civil dissent. In conflict zones, tribal populations have been forcefully
displaced by security forces (WGHR 2012). The government’s attempts to address LWE
militarily have only increased the instance of such violations of human security.
5. COUNTERPRODUCTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY
We have reviewed how India’s extractive development practices and mal-governance have
fueled the human security challenges faced by Adivasis and other vulnerable communities.
In this section, we will explore the GoI’s response to the Naxalite insurgency, and assess its
impact on the Adivasis.
The counterinsurgency campaigns of the 70s and 80s were almost exclusively focused
on killing or arresting Naxalites and their supporters, whose grievances were left unad-
dressed. The original uprising was motivated by economic and political insecurity, and
sought to implement the measures such as land reform and greater local autonomy. In-
stead of promoting equal opportunities and political rights for the landless peasantry, the
state and central governments employed repressive tactics that only further alienated vul-
nerable populations.
The GoI claims that people mainly cooperate with the Naxalites out of fear, and that the
rebels cynically leverage the oppression of the Adivasis to justify their violence. In reality,
the Naxalites enjoy genuine political support among large numbers of poor peasants and
Adivasis, but also use coercion to acquire additional support and punish their opponents
(Chandra 2013). While the GoI has continued to treat the Naxalite movement as primarily
a problem of “law and order” that must be defeated militarily, it has recently instituted a co-
ordinated two-pronged “carrot and stick” approach to combating the Naxalite insurgency,
offering promises of jobs, training, and infrastructure to the civilians in the affected areas.
In late 2006, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs created the Naxal Management Division
(NMD) to fight the insurgency “in a holistic manner.” Its purview includes “public percep-
tion management” and “assistance to the state governments to fill up critical infrastructure
gaps (…) for construction/strengthening of fortified police stations”, and “for creation of
operational infrastructure and logistics required to combat LWE” (Ministry of Home Af-
fairs [MHA] 2013). The NMD also oversees development assistance to the states affected
by Naxalism. There are some indications that these programs are effective in reducing
violence, which supports the argument that economic insecurity and mal-governance are
the root-causes of the conflict (Hoelscher et al. 2012).
The NMD is also responsible for deploying Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) to com-
bat Naxalism under a unified command, including a specialized anti-Naxalite commando
unit called CoBRA.12 Rather than dealing with the CPI(Maoist) politically and diplomati-
cally, the government has criminalized its members and supporters, and offers a bounty
for each Naxalite killed or captured (Roy 2010). The association of Naxalism with the
legitimate socio-economic grievances of Adivasi communities has led to their increased
persecution.
By creating the NMD, the GoI has demonstrated its intention to direct a renewed anti-
Naxalite counterinsurgency campaign at the national level. However, it has attempted to
distance itself from the controversial “Operation Green Hunt,” described as a massive mili-
tary intervention to uproot the Naxalites from their strongholds (Mukherji 2012; Rajan et
al. 2012). The government’s official position is that “there is no such operation at all” and
that “the Ministry of Home Affairs does not plan or execute operations” (MHA 2013). In-
stead, they assert that the depictions of Operation Green Hunt by journalists and scholars
stem from a cunning Naxalite propaganda campaign against the sweep-and-clear opera-
tions launched by the local police in Chhattisgarh.
Regardless, since 2009 there has indeed been a significant increase in operational tempo
and troop deployment in Naxal-affected states. The NMD claims to have deployed 91 bat-
talions13 of CAPFs in addition to the more than 30,000 state police and Special Police Offic-
ers (SPOs) already involved in the conflict (Mukherji 2012:16; MHA 2013). The GoI has
promised that “the level of deployment will progressively increase in the coming years”
12 Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA)

13 Roughly 100,000 troops
(MHA 2013). The military offensive in 2009 and 2010 correlated with a notable uptick in
civilian and combatant casualties. (See Figure 3)
This “surge” has seemingly decreased the number of Naxalite-controlled districts since the
insurgency’s territorial peak in 2009. However, it is worth noting that government gains
in some states in the center of the “Red Corridor” have coincided with increased Naxalite
activity in other states to the north/northeast.14 This is the expected “balloon effect” of
such a surge on an effective protracted insurgency, wherein the pressure exerted on the
insurgents in one area causes them to simply relocate. This is also evidence of forcible
population displacement by the government forces.
In some areas, like Dantewada, the government has attempted a “fortified hamlet” sys-
tem15 in order to cordon off the non-Naxalite population (Srivastava, Andley 2007). This
amounts to the internment of the civilians in quarantined, heavily guarded camps, as it is
intended to allow the military to treat anyone outside the camps as an enemy combatant.
Anti-Naxalite SPOs, militias, and vigilante units like the “Greyhounds” and the infamous
Salwa Judum have been formed to track and kill Naxalites and their supporters (Singhal,
Nilakantan 2012).
These practices have resulted in frequent indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations,
often involving war crimes such as torture, rape, summary executions, and collective pun-
ishment (Srivastava, Andley 2007; Menon, 1980; Ward, Hackett 2007). It is reported that
in some areas the police go so far as to arrest or shoot any woman with short hair, the
preferred style of female guerillas (Roy 2010). The military occupies agricultural land for
camps, denying farmers access to their livelihood, and has used schools as barracks. In
some cases, security forces have even attacked children for protesting their presence in
schools (WGHR 2012).
6. CONCLUSION
The Naxalite movement began as a rejection of caste-based exploitation and the inequities
of local socio-economic systems. Despite the excesses and destructiveness of the insur-
gency, it has persisted and spread based on prevailing local and systemic economic griev-
ances, and its fight against the extractive development model pursued by the GoI has won
legitimacy for the movement among many Adivasi communities.
The GoI’s increased military presence to suppress resistance to extractive development
actually exacerbates the human security crisis. GoI troops, local security forces, and vigi-
lantes create unrest and undermine the dignity, welfare, and self-determination of Adi-
vasis. Under auspices of improving “law and order” in the rebelling regions, the GoI has
assumed the form of a military occupation in parts of its de jure territory, forcibly extract-
ing the resources and usurping the lands from the indigenous inhabitants in collaboration
with private enterprises. For example, the government has opened negotiation on a num-
ber of international Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and investment agreements with the
partners in Asia and the EU that “could potentially violate human rights to food, health,
14 Since 2009 the insurgency has made inroads in Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar, Nagaland, Assam, and Manipur.
15 The GoI’s fortified hamlet system is reminiscent of the infamously brutal tactic used in the 1960s and 70s by the
U.S. and South Vietnamese Armies against the rebels in South Vietnam.
water, work/livelihood, housing, land, and development, especially of vulnerable groups”

(WGHR 2012:40).
The case of the Naxalite insurgency, and the GoI’s failed response to it, underscores the
importance of the human security concept as an essential compliment to, and the critique
of, the traditional state-centric security paradigm. The Naxalite movement largely began
as a fight for “freedom from want,” while the GoI justifies its martial response in terms of
the need to provide civilians with “freedom from fear”. Ironically, large-scale military op-
erations and the destruction wrought by decades of conflict has only worsened the fears
and economic woes of the population, and subjected many to indignity and death.
The pillars of the human security concept should not be applied selectively, or in isolation
from one another. They form a holistic concept that requires the harmony of the constitu-
ent parts. In this case, the GoI must respect the sovereignty of not only its national bor-
ders, but also its diverse peoples. Both the GoI and the Naxalites must strive for legitimacy
through consent, rather than compliance through coercion. What is needed to resolve
the conflict is an inclusive, sustainable development model, and shared security through
participatory democratic government based on popular sovereignty.
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sInIndia_StatusReport2012.pdf
Tables and figures

UDC 351.78:502.131.1
Tanja TRKULJA*
HUMAN SECURITY IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT1
Abstract: Urban systems are not environmentally sustainable, and their dramatic growth is lead-
ing towards the global environmental and society crisis. The sustainability concept emerged as a
response to the crisis of the environmental and social security in urban systems. Sustainability is a
vital concept for society, economy and environment, and its relationship with the human security
is obvious. This paper examines the process of development from the sustainability concept to
the sustainability science and the concept of human security, as well as their correlation for pur-
pose of promoting the concept of sustainable security.
Keywords: urban systems security, sustainable development, human security, sustainable security
1. INTRODUCTION
The observation that urban systems are not environmentally sustainable is not a value
judgment, but a mere fact. Urban systems occupy only 2 per cent of the world’s terres-
trial surface, but use approximately 75 per cent of the world’s resources, and release a
similar percentage of wastes. Concentration of urban systems’ intense economic processes
and high levels of consumption, both increase and stimulate their demands for resources,
which are not infinite. Dramatic growth of urban systems and modern development prac-
tices are leading towards the global environmental crisis, thus threatening the security of
social systems. Also, the climate change is one of the most serious problems modern cities
are currently dealing with. The sustainability concept (Wheeler 2004:19), based on three
pillars of sustainability - economic, environmental and social sustainability, was created as
a reaction to the existing life security problems in urban systems in the early 1970s. Hu-
man security expands the domain of sustainability by introducing civil and political rights,
which, along with economic, social and cultural rights, represent an integral part of the
social pillar of sustainable development.
2. FROM SUSTAINABILITY CONCEPT TO SUSTAINABILITY SCIENCE

Lexical definition of sustainability is that it is “the ability to maintain something undimin-
ished over some time period” (Kajikawa et al. 2007:222). However, the term “sustainable
* Senior Teaching Assistant Tanja Trkulja, d.i.a., Faculty of Architecture and Civil Engineering, e-mail:
ttrkulja@agfbl.org
[266] Tanja TRKULJA
development” was first used in the early 1980s for the global strategy for preservation of
nature adopted by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). The principle or paradigm of sustainable develop-
ment rose to fame in 1987 when Brundtland Commission (World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development - WCED), in their report “Our Common Future”, formulated
the widely accepted definition of sustainable development, which says: “Sustainable de-
velopment is a development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987:8).
According to the Brundtland Commission, sustainable development has to eradicate
poverty in developing countries, as well as to create a new balance between the mate-
rial wealth of the industrialized world and preservation of nature as a source of life. It
has to be assumed that the consumption patterns and lifestyles of western industrialized
countries could not be transferred to the entire population of the world today or in the fu-
ture. Although different views and interests may co-exist within the concept of sustainable
development, this does not mean that the term is devoid of its actual meaning. Sustain-
able development does not entail for all future generations to enjoy the same standards as
the current one. Therefore, the US National Research Council (NRC), in the report “Our
Common Journey”, drafted in 1999 by the Board on Sustainable Development, defined a
transition of sustainability as a process between the following two generations that “should
be able to meet much bigger needs, but by stabilizing human population, to sustain the life
support systems on the planet, and to substantially reduce hunger and poverty” (National
Research Council 1999:31). Likewise, Sardar Islam believes that the sustainability could
best be secured by intergenerational concern and current generation’s notions about the
sustainability and interests of future generations (Islam 2005:379).
The NRC report suggested the development of the Sustainability Science, based on and
driven by the problem of integrating knowledge from different disciplines and between
theory and practice, focusing on interaction between nature and society and understand-
ing of ecological and social characteristics of specific locations and sectors (Potschin,
Haines-Young 2013:1054).
The concept started becoming more significant among the academic circles after the pub-
lication of an article “Sustainability Science” in the Science magazine in 2001. In this article,
Robert Kates and associates defined the sustainability science as a new field that seeks “to
understand the fundamental character of interactions between nature and society and to
encourage those interactions along more sustainable trajectories” (Kates et al. 2001:641).
After the publication of the NRC report and the article of Kates et al. (2001), research
agendas and the institutional elements of the growing scientific field gained significant
momentum: several international scientific bodies2 were formed, as well as several peer-
reviewed journals,3 several collaborative networks were established to support the sustain-
ability science research throughout Europe, Asia and the United States4 (Miller 2013:280).
2 American Association for the Advancement of Science - AAAS, Forum on Science and Technology for Sustainability,
Roundtable on Science and Technology for Sustainability Program at the National Academy of Sciences, Initiative on
Science and Technology for Sustainability, Earth System Sustainability Initiative (Miller 2013:280).
3 Sustainability Science; Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy; International Journal of Sustainable
Development; Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability (Miller 2013:280).
4 European Sustainability Science Group, Earth System Science Partnership, Integrated Research System for Sus-
tainability Science, United States National Science Foundation, Engineering and Education for Sustainability
-SEES, Sustainability Research Networks, Global Institute of Sustainability, School of Sustainability at Arizona
HUMAN SECURITY IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT [267]
We can single out two contributions of the sustainability science. First contribution of the
sustainability science is its problem-solving perspective: the sustainability science is the
process of shifting from the identification and analysis stage to the problem solving stage
(Komiyama, Takeuchi 2006:5). Another important role of the sustainability science is the
distribution of knowledge to the society, because informing people on the current and
future status of sustainability issues is essential for motivating people to create the social
context for actions securing sustainability (Kajikawa 2008:233-234).
3. HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT

The very term security is a very complex and complicated social phenomenon. Etymo-
logically speaking, the term “security” comes from the Latin securitas-atis, meaning safety,
absence of threat, confidence, protection, etc. (Masleša 2007:2). Security is commonly
defined as “freedom from danger or safety” (Raina 2009). There are Homeland Security
(Personal Security, Societal Security and National Security) and International Security
(Regional Security, Collective Security (group of sovereign states), Common Security
(within the European Union or the Commonwealth of Independent States) and Coopera-
tive Security (___ 2012:18). Human security shifts the focus from survival of a country to
security and well-being of individuals (Center for American Progress 2009:2). The goal of
the human security programme is to secure and improve safety of people and societies.
In order to achieve that, the human security programme must be harmonised with the
programmes of national and international securities, for these programs focus on security
on a higher level – national and international. Actually, all those security levels are inter-
connected and could hardly be efficient on their own (Sida Helpdesk on Human Security
2013:4). Human security implies a safe human, while the national security implies a coun-
try safe from all danger. Human security is impossible without the national security and
vice versa (___ 2012:16).
The governments of all countries, which signed the UN Charter and conventions on hu-
man rights, took responsibility for security of human beings in their own country as well
as worldwide. Their task is to work for indivisibility of four freedoms on which human se-
curity is based (freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom
from fear) in a global dialogue with other countries of the world, simultaneously empha-
sising the connection with sustainable development if possible (Declaration: The Chal-
lenges of human security and global sustainable development 2012:2). Human security
aims to bring freedom from fear and freedom from want to all people in the world (Center
for American Progress 2009:2).
The scope and domain of the human security concept are still not precisely defined. Some
developing communities use human security as a synonym for human development. For
example, in Sweden the human security includes wide range of security related activities,
from protection of individuals and communities from violence, to dealing with poverty
and humanitarian issues. Human security has to go beyond protection itself. It has to deal
State University, Center for Interactive Research on Sustainability at the University of British Columbia, Lund Uni-
versity Centre for Sustainability Studies, Sweden, Center for International Development Sustainability Science
Program at Harvard University, Graduate Program in Sustainability Science at the University of Tokyo, Institute
for Sustainable Solutions at Portland State University, Sustainability Institute at Stellenbosch University in South
Africa (Miller 2013:280-281).
[268] Tanja TRKULJA
with protection on all levels, including the steps for prevention of possible breaches of
security by promoting empowerment of individuals, as well as dealing with consequences
of breaches if they occur (Sida Helpdesk on Human Security 2013:4). Still, human security
primarily focuses on prevention by addressing root causes. The philosophy behind it is
that it is better to cure the illness and not the symptoms (Center for American Progress
2009:2).
Human security is closely linked to the development of human capacities when faced with
climate changes or global economic crisis. Individuals and communities faced with cli-
mate change and increasing uncertainty are challenged to come up with fresh ways to
respond to them, in order to protect their social, environmental, and human rights. Also,
they need to qualify themselves to be able to respond to change through both mitigation
and adaptation. Surprisingly, the issue of climate change has been widely discussed and
debated among scientists and policymakers as an environmental issue, rather than a hu-
man security issue. Current discourses on climate change mainly focus their attention
on economy and policy of climate change management, while insufficient attention is
given to the concept of social endangerment and human security vulnerability (O’Brien,
Leichenko 2007:1). Karen O’Brien and Robin Leichenko in their paper Human Security,
Vulnerability and Sustainable Adaptation put climate change within the discourse on hu-
man security. They emphasize two important dimensions of human security that are di-
rectly influenced by the climate change: 1) a dimension of funds which draws attention
to the fact that not all individuals, communities, regions and nations are equally affected
by the climate change, and 2) a connectivity dimension, which emphasizes the fact that
the security of individuals and communities is being increasingly interconnected through
both space and time (O’Brien, Leichenko 2007:1). Sir David King5 wrote a guest editorial
for the journal Science, warning that “climate change is the most severe problem that we
are facing today, more serious even than the threat of terrorism” (King 2004:176).
Global inequality increased as a consequence of the global economic crisis, i.e. social dif-
ferences within and between countries that have always been and still remain unaccepta-
ble (Declaration: The Challenges of human security and global sustainable development
2012:15). People of all regions and countries should receive basic education and learn
about human values, and the distribution of knowledge to the society should be equal for
all people, regardless of their different cultural identities. These people must find a way
to live together in peace and tolerance, because it is a global prerequisite for all human
values. At the beginning of the 21st century, these features were recognized as the cultural
dimension of the sustainable development, and the “2011 UNESCO World Report” deals
with the interrelationship between education and security (Declaration: The Challenges
of human security and global sustainable development 2012:17).
4. PROMOTION OF HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT

THROUGH THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABILITY
There is seven billion people currently living on the Earth and all of them are entitled to a
good and safe life, and the same principle applies to the future as well. Natural resourced
5 Sir David King has been the Special Representative for Climate Change of the Foreign Secretary since September
2013. He was the British Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor between 2000 and 2007.
are sufficient for everyone, but due to unjust way of distribution throughout the world,
some regions suffer from hunger and water shortages. That way the human security and
sustainable development are seriously violated (Declaration: The Challenges of human
security and global sustainable development 2012:1).
Relationships between the environment and human security are certainly close and com-
plex (Raina 2009). A great deal of human security is linked to the environmental changes.
Also, a great deal of environmental changes is directly and indirectly affected by human
activities and conflicts. Thus, environmental change can have direct and immediate effect
on wellbeing and livelihood, ranging from health to economic productivity and political
instability. Environmental threat can potentially have adverse effect on multiple levels,
from household to the planetary level, because many environmental problems are local-
ized while others are widespread (i.e., climate change). Environmental changes also have
a temporal dimension and can have a significant impact on lives of people today, but they
may also extend into the future to impact the lives of generations to come. On the other
hand, protecting and enhancing the environment could have very positive consequences
for general life and well-being of people and opportunities for their accomplishment. Posi-
tive environment is directly relevant for good life and well-being of all people (Khagram,
Clark, Raad 2003:294). However, efforts to protect nature will fail unless accompanied by
human improvement; efforts to improve the lives of people will fail if they fail to preserve,
if not improve, the essential resources and life support systems (Khagram, Clark, Raad
2003:289). Based on the abovementioned, it can be concluded that the environment influ-
ences the human survival, well-being and dignity, i.e. all aspects of human security, and
vice versa.
Human security, in many ways, contributes to the field of sustainable development:
• It strengthens the social pillar of sustainable development by focusing on people,
and it may have important implications for future sustainable development goals,
priorities and action plans;
• It encourages the sustainable development field towards the “sustainable liveli-
hood” approach;
• It moves the sustainable development field from a primarily needs-based focus, ex-
tends it to civil and political rights, which along with economic, social and cultural
rights become an integral component of the social pillar of sustainable develop-
ment;
• It gives priority to achieving freedom from want and freedom from fear (Khagram,
Clark, Raad 2003:300).
Also, the field of sustainable development has a lot to offer to the human security:
• Nature and society are interdependent, and change if one affects the other;
• Interdependencies of nature and society generate not only threats, but also oppor-
tunities for positive change; researches and actions focusing largely on threats will
miss important opportunities for joint improvement and mutual benefits;
• Threats and opportunities exist on all time and space levels, from local to global,
and they should be examined as such;
• Communities and people must be able to articulate their own aspirations, have the
appropriate means to make their voices heard, and to participate effectively in de-
cision-making process related to security and development issues; human security
[270] Tanja TRKULJA
proponents should empower people to identify what they see as critical insecurities
and best means of promoting security;
• Nature is valuable in its own right, in addition to its instrumental value for human
beings (Khagram, Clark, Raad 2003:301).
Based on this last principle it can be defined that the wider integration model of human
security and sustainable development is “sustainable security”. Sustainable security is a
concept that has been around for almost a decade now. It was first conceptualised by Chris
Abbott, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda, Research Officer, Consultant and Executive Di-
rector of the Oxford Research Group,6 in the publication Global responses to global threats:
Sustainable Security for the 21st century (Abbott et al. 2006). The Sustainable Security
paradigm has been developed as an alternative lens through which to view global secu-
rity, identifying the underlying drivers of conflict and insecurity rather than its symptoms,
such as violence, organised crime or radicalisation. The point is to understand how unmet
human needs and feelings of insecurity interrelate and lead to violence, then to work to
prevent conflict by addressing its root causes (Reeve 2014).
Sustainable security offers a more open space for deliberation, analysis, and action that
could help connecting analysts and practitioners of human and environmental security in
the common purpose to expand the narrow field of state security (Khagram, Clark, Raad
2003:301). Therefore, according to the “Sustainable Security 101”, it represents a modern
concept of national security which includes the concept of human security and rebalances
the three tools of foreign policy: defence, diplomacy, and development - 3Ds (Center for
American Progress 2009:1).7 All three tools of foreign policy must work together in syner-
gy, by combining national and human security, so the American Government could focus
on the dual protection challenges and improving security interests (Smith 2008:4). Sus-
tainable security approach requires some thought about the future of our planet, as well
as its current unsustainable state. Changes to climate, demography, economic production
and consumption, political and national identity, access to information and military tech-
nology, will all condition the future security of our world (Reeve 2014).
Sustainability science focuses on connecting the human imprint on the biosphere to the
co-evolving human-environment condition, as it pertains to a transition towards sustaina-
bility. The link to security is the notion of “vulnerability”, which is defined as the degree to
which a system is likely to experience harm due to exposure to hazard. Linking the human
security paradigm to the sustainability science and the vulnerability analysis framework
necessarily entails placing particular emphasis on the human condition. Human security
focuses on analysing who is vulnerable, how do human actions on particular places and
under specific conditions, affect vulnerability, and what actions could be undertaken to
reduce or mitigate vulnerability. The counterpart of vulnerability is “resilience”, which is
defined as “the capacity of system to respond to change or disturbance without changing
6 For more information see: http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/

7 National security and human security are compatible but distinct. National security focuses on the security of the
state, and governments are its primary clients, while human security is centered on the security of individuals and
thus on a diverse array of stakeholders. National security aims to ensure the ability of states to protect their citizens
from external aggression; human security focuses on the management of threats and challenges that affect people
everywhere— inside, outside, and across state borders. A national security strategy is commonly crafted in real
time and focused on tangible, proximate threats, while a human security strategy aimed at improving the human
condition assumes a longer-term horizon (Smith 2008:4).
its basic state” (Ahern 2010:142). Resilience, as identified in literature, largely depends on
“assets and entitlements that individuals, households and communities can mobilize and
manage in the face of hardship” (Moser, Norton 2001:5). According to this definition, the
connection to the sustainable security would be a relatively direct one: the more assets
people have the less vulnerable and more secure they are; and greater erosion of their as-
sets leads to increase in their insecurities (Khagram, Clark, Raad 2003:302).
Both the vulnerability and the resilience frameworks have a lot in common. That could be
used for enhancement of the sustainable security and development. Both of these frame-
works based on their practices and analysis give opportunity for creation of new and im-
proved tools to be used for development and advances in general human safety. This could
also contribute to the general understanding of available tools, functioning of systems,
as well as to education of the people on vulnerability and resilience related issues, all for
purpose of creating safer and healthier environment. Inter-connected frameworks of hu-
man security and sustainable development suggest that both “rights” and “risks” should
be equally taken into account, because only then we could get the completed picture of
the situation, thus helping us to become more effective in practice (Khagram, Clark, Raad
2003:304).
In order for the Human Security and Sustainable Development to be more successful and
effective, certain institutional structures must be created especially for that purpose. Glob-
al institutions with prerogative to bring global decisions should have all available resourc-
es, both financial and intellectual, in order to be able to deal with the increasing number of
problems endangering our security and our future. Also, work of these institutions must
be democratic, transparent and in accordance with the fundamental human rights, also
they should allow public to have an insight into their activities, for mutual benefit. A world
order committed to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, committed to human security and sustainable development can work out only if
there is a global contribution to it, all people of all regions taking part in the process (Dec-
laration: The Challenges of human security and global sustainable development 2012:4).
5. CONCLUSION
After the elaboration of the sustainability concept and the human security concept, it was
established that the sustainable development and the human security are interconnected.
Environmental changes affect the human security: human survival, well-being and pro-
ductivity, and human beings should be secure from environmental threats. On the other
hand, human activities affect the nature, its processes and flows.
Sustainability should contribute to positive, more sustainable social and environmental
outcomes. The efforts to improve human security would be more successful if the field
of human security would be broadened to a more comprehensive notion of “sustainable
security”. Sustainable security is less anthropocentric and it facilitates the critical integra-
tions of national, human and environmental security. Also, it is parallel with the three pil-
lars of the sustainable development. Sustainable security, by including different levels of
security in its actions, defines the objectives and actions for development which respects
the needs and rights of human beings. This paper was written with aim of promoting the
concept of sustainable security.
[272] Tanja TRKULJA
6. REFERENCES
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HUMAN SECURITY REGIONAL AND
LOCAL POLICIES AND ISSUES
UDC 627.14(497.11)
Jasmina GAČIĆ, Vladimir JAKOVLJEVIĆ, Vladimir CVETKOVIĆ*
FLOODS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA –

VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN SECURITY1
Abstract: Vulnerability and human security have been changing over time and depended on the
physical, social, economic and environmental factors. In modern terms these phenomena have
become multi-dimensional, multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral and dynamic. However, in addition
to empirical changes with respect to the nature of security threats, the increase of vulnerability
and threatening to human security, there have increased the analytical range in their understand-
ing as well as the institutional changes within the security structures. Many countries have aban-
doned the attitude that the floods and flash floods as the most important natural hazards can be
suppressed or controlled, i.e. that can be fought against or placed under full control. With that
regard, the attitude of adoptive management of security and rescue from floods and flash floods be-
comes more and more prevalent, as well as flood risk adjustment or the principle of “living with
floods”. Accepting such attitude, relating cultural values of the society, economy, institutional and
functional possibilities for the purpose of mitigating vulnerability and providing human security
proved prominent in the Republic of Serbia. The state has taken a series of reform steps in view
of recognizing its own physical exposure to food risks. At the same time, after such great floods
which endangered a large part of the country’s territory, the country recognized its social-eco-
nomic weaknesses of the community, as well as the necessity to increase the capacity to mobilize
the resources in mitigating vulnerability and facilitating human security.
Key words: community, vulnerability, floods, resources, human security.
1. INTRODUCTION
Regardless of the obvious differences in the approach to the phenomenon of vulnerabil-
ity, it is always and primarily focused on the physical and social dimension of a commu-
nity. “Vulnerability is a dynamic concept [which] (…) refers to an inability to cope with
risks, shocks and stress” (Vasta 2004). “A condition or set of conditions which adversely
1 Jasmina Gačić, PhD, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade, Serbia,
e-mail: jgacic@sezampro.rs
Vladimir Jakovljević, PhD, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade, Serbia,
e-mail: vjakov@fb.bg.ac.rs
Vladimir Cvetković, M.Sc., The Academy of Criminalistics and Polices Studies, Belgrade, Serbia,
e-mail: vladimir.cvetkovic@kpa.edu.rs
[278] Jasmina GAČIĆ, Vladimir JAKOVLJEVIĆ, Vladimir CVETKOVIĆ
affect people’s ability, to prepare for, withstand and/or respond to a hazard” (Warmington
1995). “Vulnerability is a product of physical exposure to natural hazard, and human ca-
pacity to prepare for or mitigate and to recover from (cope with) any negative impacts of
disaster” (Pelling and Uitto 2001:50). According to Oliver-Smith vulnerability intercon-
nects social and economic structures, cultural values, norms and environmental hazards
(Oliver-Smith 2004). In search of the new approach to vulnerability Cardona (Cardona
2004) concludes that vulnerability results from: a) physical exposure, or rather suscepti-
bility of the social community to be affected by the hazard; b) social and economic weak-
nesses, which implies the relative weaknesses and shortcomings which characterize the
community in the social and economic sense; c) lack of resilience, which is expressed
through inability and limitation of the society to mobilize the existing capacities. It is mul-
ti-dimensional, multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral and dynamic (UNEP 2007). The level
of vulnerability is changing over time and depends on physical, social, economic and en-
vironmental factors (UNU Institute for Environment and Human Security 2004). On the
other hand, the analyses and considerations of the concept of human security show that
security as well as vulnerability are re-defined to incorporate new aspects in relation to the
traditional ones, namely: “safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and
repression” as well as “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of
our daily lives” (Human Development Report, UNHDR 1994:23).2 As is noted by Bruder-
lein, “human security refers to the appreciation of people’s need for safety, along with the
needs of the state, and it minimizes the risks, accepts the preventive measures to suppress
human vulnerability and takes recovery measures where preventive measures have failed”
(Bruderlein 2001). Therefore, the additional energy which lies beyond human security
stems from the knowledge that not only the threats have increased, but also the ability to
respond to those threats: “Nowadays, there is an increasing opportunity to join our ef-
forts and understanding in order to achieve better coordination. Technology and political
changes have increased the prospects for effective coordination, advancement of science
continues to expand our knowledge and the resources we use for providing human secu-
rity are partially available. Therefore, whatever is threatening human security at the mo-
ment, there is a fact that the problem is in the inconsistency between the security threats
and the mechanisms for their resolution” (Elkir 2006). In the past decades, vulnerability
to natural hazards as well as their role in threatening human security again has taken the
precedence over technological, military and other hazards threatening the community.
Many researchers have suggested that flooding is a social event and research must explore
the social context and processes in the community (Fordham 1998; Quarantelli 2005).
Institutional policies, such as the UK National Security Strategy, also state that commu-
nities play a key role in resilience (Cabinet Office 2008). In recent years, many countries
abandoned the view that floods and flash floods can be suppressed and controlled, i.e. that
can be “combated” and placed under full control. With that regard, the attitude of adoptive
management of security and rescue from floods and flash floods, becomes more and more
2 The notion of human security first appeared at the international scene in the Human Development Report 1994 of
the United Nations, where it was stated that “the idea of human security, though simple, is likely to revolutionize
society in the 21st century”. Its predecessors may be found in the documents of the International Committee of the
Red Cross, established in Geneva in 1863, as well as in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the Geneva Conventions which imposed to the countries the obligation to defend the security of the people
wherever they are located.
VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN SECURITY [279]
prevalent, as well as flood risk adjustment or the principle of “living with floods” (Varga,
Mladenović 2002:79; Milojković, Mlađan 2010:172). Accepting such attitude, relating cul-
tural values of the society, economy, institutional, functional possibilities as well as needs
for human security are all clearly visible in the Republic of Serbia. The state has taken a
series of reform steps for recognizing its own level of physical exposure to flood risks. At
the same time, after enormous floods which threatened a large part of its territory, the
state has recognized the social and economic weaknesses of the community, as well as the
need to increase the capabilities to mobilize the resources in order to reduce vulnerability
and facilitate human security.
2. PHYSICAL ASPECT OF VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN SECURITY -

VULNERABILITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA TO FLOODS
Occurrence, extent and duration of natural disasters in most cases cannot be predicted in
advance, but the occurrence of certain phenomena may be assumed on the basis of expe-
rience, statistical data and modelling methods taking into account the place of incidence
(Dragicevic et al. 2009; Prohaska et al. 2009).
The territory of the Republic of Serbia is exposed to numerous natural hazards which
threaten to cause new consequences all the time. Floods represent the most common nat-
ural hazard in the country. The area in Serbia exposed to floods which occur once in a cen-
tury amounts to 1.57 million ha, out of which 1.45 million ha is in Vojvodina. About 80%
of flood exposed area is agricultural land, including 512 bigger settlements, 515 industries,
and 4,000 km of roads and 680 km of railway tracks. It is about 1 million ha of agricultural
land in Vojvodina, 260 settlements, 3,840 km of roads and about 150 km of railway tracks
(National Strategy of Sustainable Development, The Official Gazette of RS, No. 57/08).
In the past 13 years, several large-scale floods were registered in Serbia. They occurred in
1999, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2014.
In July 1999, the basins of major tributaries of the river Velika Morava witnessed flash
floods when eight people lost their lives, tens of thousands of residential buildings and
several hundred commercial buildings were damaged and 30 bridges wiped out in the ba-
sins of the Zapadna Morava, the Jasenica, the Kubrišnica and the Lepenica (Milanović, et
al. 2010). Those floods were caused by heavy precipitation and they affected all left and
certain right tributaries of the Velika Morava and Šumadija region suffered the greatest
damage. In March and April 2000, high water levels occurred in the rivers Tisa and Tamiš
as a consequence of rapid melting of snow on the slopes of the Carpathians and concurrent
heavy precipitation. The situation on the territory of the municipality of Sečanj was the
gravest. The floods threatened the town Jaša Tomić as well. During 2001 and 2002, only
smaller-scale flooding occurred. In June 2001, the largest floods occurred in the basins of
the rivers Jadar, Ždravija, Štira and Lesnička when the municipalities of Loznica, Ljubovi-
ja, Krupanj, Mali Zvornik and Šabac were flooded. The largest flash floods occurred in the
basin of the river Mlava in June 2002. In July 2005, the floods affected Leskovac, Porečje
and Vučje, as well as certain parts of the territories of Niš and Kruševac in the south of
Serbia. 27 settlements were flooded on the territory of Kruševac, 82 buildings were left
damaged, 2,420 ha of land were flooded, 90 residential buildings were damaged and the
roads suffered damage on 23 sections. On the territory of Leskovac, about 25,000 ha of
wheat, corn and vegetable fields were ruined, as well as 2,500 households. In April 2006,
the floods affected the municipalities of Žabalj, Titel, Sečanj and Zrenjanin in Vojvodina,
as well as Negotin, Veliko Gradište, Smederevo, Požarevac, since the Danube and its tribu-
taries reached the highest levels in the past 100 years. 3,000 houses were flooded, leaving
11,000 people displaced or homeless. It was estimated that 225,000 ha were flooded, which
makes 5% of total arable land in Serbia. In November 2007, massive floods took place in
the south of Serbia, especially in the basin of the river Vlasina. Apart from this, heavy pre-
cipitation occurred within 48 hours in the basin of the river Velika Morava. All this led to
flash floods in the basin of the river Velika Morava and its tributaries: the Toplica, the Vet-
ernica, the Nišava, the Vlasina, the Kosanica, the Jablanica. At the beginning of November
2009, great floods took place in Zlatibor and Raška districts. In the following year, 2010,
the floods occurred in several municipalities. In Zaječar, the Beli Timok flooded 500 build-
ings, while the total flooded area was 350 ha. Rapid melting of snow and heavy precipita-
tion threatened the municipality of Kruševac from several rivers: the Južna Morava which
threatened to flood 300 ha of arable land, the river Ribarska which flooded 70 ha of land
and the river Jablanička which flooded 40 houses and 50 ha of land. Jagodina and Paraćin
were threatened by the Velika Morava whereas nearly 300 ha of arable land were flooded.
The greatest damage was sustained by Valjevo surroundings during 2011 and 2012 when
the river Tamnava threatened to flood 200 houses due to precipitation which continued
for several days, while it damaged between 1,500 and 2,000 facilities in the municipality
of Koceljeva. The countries of the Danube river basin suffered great damage from floods,
while the situation in the Republic of Serbia threatened to become very serious in the mu-
nicipalities of Novi Sad, Sombor, Apatin, Inđija and Beočin, whereas the plan to evacuate
1,200 citizens from 550 houses was prepared.
2.1. Flood risks in the Republic of Serbia in 2014

In the past ten years (2006 stands out in particular) in Serbia there were reported frequent
large scale flood events; however, the floods from April and May 2014 surpassed the pre-
vious ones in the size of the affected area, water levels, inflows and duration. The recent
floods have shown a disturbing realistic picture of vulnerability and human security. Due
to the heavy floods affecting several districts, on 15 May 2014 the Republic Headquarters
for Emergencies held an extraordinary session when they passed a decision to recommend
to the Government to declare a state of emergency3 on the entire territory of the Republic
of Serbia in order to utilize the resources from the entire territory and direct them into the
affected areas. In accordance with the Report on the natural disaster - flood which struck
the Republic of Serbia and the measures taken to rescue people and defend the endan-
gered places, the most affected towns were: Obrenovac, Šabac, Sremska Mitrovica, Mali
Zvornik, Krupanj, Ljubovija, Vladimirci, Koceljeva, Šid, Svilajnac, Paraćin, Ub, Lajkovac,
Ljig, Osečina, Smederevska Palanka, Trstenik, Bajina Bašta. To achieve more efficient re-
sponse to the state of emergency, the Republic of Serbia has sent a request for assistance
to the international community, the governments of the Russian Federation, Slovenia and
3 The Law on Emergency Situations defines an emergency situation as the state when risks and threats or
consequences of disasters, emergencies or other threats to the population, environment and material property
are of such scope and intensity that their occurrence or consequences cannot be prevented or remedied by regular
activities of competent bodies and authorities, which is why their mitigation and remedy requires the application
of special measures, forces and resources in an enhanced mode.
Hungary as well as the European Commission, which was forwarded to all members of
European Civil Protection Mechanism.
The preliminary data on the consequences of floods show that the physical aspect of vul-
nerability came to the fore. In the period from 14 to 20 May 2014, there were 30 bridges
destroyed and 50 bridges damaged on the classified roads. Moreover, approximately 200
bridges were destroyed or damaged on the municipal and unclassified roads. Due to land-
slides or mudslides, over 20 classified roads were damaged and several hundreds of mu-
nicipal and unclassified roads. Flash flood has washed away a part of the railroad in Tam-
nava (Ub) in the length of 10 km. Approximately 2,260 residential buildings and 50 public
facilities (mostly elementary schools) were flooded, as well as over 300 business facilities.
The flood wave reduced the reliability of the power distribution system, especially vital
facilities for transmission from the thermal power plant Kolubara and TENT A. Due to
the flooding of the river Kolubara, 80% of the territory of the municipality Obrenovac was
under the water. On the territory of the Republic of Serbia the total of 31,879 citizens were
evacuated, whereby only within the area of Obrenovac 25,000 people were evacuated. As
a result of the food wave 23 people lost their lives. The report on the assessment of the
needs for recovery and reconstruction of the flooded area shows that the total damage in
all sectors amounts to 1.53 billion Euros.4
In response to extremely modified security environment, the state has recognized the
need for the engagement of all available resources – ministries, enterprises, organizations
and services. The analyses of engagement by the Sector for Emergency Situations show
that the entire operating structure of fire and rescue units was engaged, as well as all spe-
cialist rescue teams for work on the water. The specialized civil protection unit for rescue
on the water and under the water was mobilized. During the emergency situation, the Re-
public Headquarters for Emergency Situation held four extraordinary sessions, at which
they mainly discussed the reports on the measures taken by the Republic Directorate for
Water, Public enterprises „Srbijavode”, „Vode Vojvodine” and „Beogradvode”; as well as
the activities of protection and rescue by all subjects and further activities of all lower-lev-
el headquarters. The Report states that the activities of protection and rescue deployed all
forces and resources of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (approxi-
mately 7,300 members). Due to the lack of its own resources, the state accepted the as-
sistance of rescue teams from 13 countries: Russia, Belarus, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Denmark,
Czech Republic, Germany, Romania, Austria, France, Hungary, Macedonia and Monte-
negro as well as the team from United Nations and European Commission. The Serbian
Armed Forces have engaged the total of 15,133 members and provided assistance to the
civil authorities in the implementation of various activities, from evacuation to water sup-
ply and taking care of the vulnerable. The floods have caused numerous serious problems
to the power distribution system of Serbia and with that regard the Ministry of Energy
and Mining in coordination with other state bodies and energy companies took a number
of measures in order to mitigate the consequences of the situation. The Ministry of Civil
engineering, Transport and Infrastructure engaged its sectoral capacities: the Department
of Civil engineering and Urban Planning, the Department for Rail and Intermodal Trans-
port, the Directorate for Inland Waterways and others. The Ministry of Health engaged its
healthcare capacities from their network of healthcare centres. There has been organized
4 www. obnova.gov.rs
the continuous gathering of information on the needs to facilitate health care, available
capacities, the data on the demand of health care institutions for certain medicines and
medical devices. The Ministry of Agriculture and Environment undertook various activi-
ties through their bodies: the Republic Directorate for Water, the Directorate for Plant
Protection, the Agency for Environmental Protection, the Veterinary Directorate, and
the Directorate for Forests.
The Plan of activities was drawn up by the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veterans
and Social Issues and it included establishment of communication with all centres for so-
cial work and social welfare institutions. The Minister of Culture and Information sent an
order, on the basis of Article 79 of the Law on Cultural Property (“Official Gazette of RS”,
No.71/94, 52/11, 99/11), to the central institutions for protection of the cultural heritage
to focus all activities on protection of the immovable cultural heritage: monuments, ar-
chaeological sites, places of interest and cultural and historic complexes and on the protec-
tion of artistic and historical works of art, archival materials, film materials, old and rare
library materials.
Bearing in mind the limited financial resources of the state, the Ministry of Finance, in
addition to opening of dedicated dinar current accounts for flood relief, organized a num-
ber of discussions and meetings with the representatives of international financial institu-
tions in order to identify the available modalities of financing. The Ministry of Economy
engaged the competent institutions: the Privatization Agency, the Development Fund,
the Serbia Investment and Export Promotion Agency – SIEPA, and the National Agency
for Regional Development. The activities such as: provision of urgent help to citizens,
prevention of market distortions, control of price stability, punishing all illegal activities
and ensuring continuity in the provision of telecommunication services were taken by
the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications. The Ministry of State Admin-
istration and Local Self-Government organized around the clock duty for the purpose of
faster notification. There was established the cooperation with the Standing Conference
of Towns and Municipalities initiating the assistance to the vulnerable units of local self-
government. A request for activating the EU Civil Protection Mechanism was sent, along
with taking all necessary steps with the aim to ensure help through all available EU mecha-
nisms and funds to which Serbia as a candidate country has access to.5
2. 1. 1. The efforts of the Republic of Serbia in devising the resources

for response to flood risks
The disturbing changes in occurrence of flood risks called for a new analysis of the situa-
tion and institutional changes within the security system. The necessity of the analysis of
the threats, vulnerability and protection against natural hazards among which floods play
an important part has been defined in the essential national normative and legal state doc-
uments. Although these documents do not explicitly define the notion of “vulnerability”
and “human security”, they pose the advance in organization of the integrated protection
system which would mitigate the consequences of natural hazards. The Constitution of RS
(The Official Gazette of RS, No. 98/06) as the supreme legal act, in Article 190, defines the
5 More information on engagement of all state entities in: Report on the natural hazard – flood that struck the
Republic of Serbia and the measures taken for rescue of the people and defense of the endangered towns, 2014.
role and importance of local community in overcoming the potential vulnerability with
its own capacities as well as the consequences of natural hazards. The issue of tasks, func-
tions and competences of municipalities and local community is always a current issue as
it indicates the real autonomy of local community as well as the potential resources of the
local authorities to implement different activities, as well as mitigation of vulnerability
to natural hazards. Under the Law on Local Self-government (The Official Gazette of RS,
No. 129/07), the contemporary local authorities are obliged, beside prevention of social
problems, to implement also the prevention, protection against natural hazards and crea-
tion of conditions for elimination of their consequences. A unit of local self-government is
responsible, inter alia, for the following tasks: management of water facilities (Article 23),
provision of security against the harmful effects of water and risk management (Article
45), organization and implementation of defence against floods on the waters rank II (Ar-
ticle 53), and also it passes the Operational plan for defence against flooding (Article 55).
The necessity of consideration of natural hazards is also expressed in the National Strategy
for Sustainable Development (The Official Gazette of RS, No. 57/08) which considers flood
protection and encouragement of security against damage incurred by natural hazards as a
state priority as well as the process of institutionalization of civil protection system.
The importance of adaptive flood management is defined by the Law on Emergency
Situations (The Official Gazette of the RS, No.111/09). The law sets forth that protection
against and rescue from floods and other hazards on water and under water, includes plan-
ning, construction, maintenance and enhancement of the damaged facilities for protec-
tion against floods, monitoring and surveillance of water levels, alerting, planning and
implementation of evacuation of people and property from endangered areas, removal
of water from flooded buildings, locating and extracting victims and the drowned, taking
care of the affected citizens and recovery of the flood consequences. This law defines the
preparation of the General and Operational Plan by water management authorities and
enterprises as well as the competences of the units of local self-government in preparation
of Protection and rescue plan. Also, the law defines the obligation of the Republic Hydro-
meteorological Institute, Republic and provincial authority for water management and
public water management enterprises to notify the competent service and headquarters
for emergency situations on water levels, declared phase of defence, situation develop-
ment and measures taken. The new national Water Law (The Official Gazette of the RS, No.
30/10) concretizes the risk of flooding and envisages some of the most important elements
in this field: 1. Protection from harmful effects of water and risk management; 2. Affected
area; 3. Preliminary flood risk assessment; 4. Vulnerability maps and flood risk maps; 5.
Plan of flood risk management; 6. Adoption of the plan of flood risk management; 7. Pro-
tection against flood – measures and works; 8. Defence from flood; 9. General plan for de-
fence from floods and operational plan for defence from floods. Also, it is defined that the
defence from flood on the waters of first order and drainage systems under public owner-
ship shall be organized and implemented by public water management enterprise, and on
the waters of second order the unite of local self-government in accordance with general
and operational plan for defence from flood. The General Plan for defence from flood for
waters of first and second order and inland waterways is passed by the Government of the
Republic of Serbia for the period of 6 years. The Operational plan is prepared by the public
water management enterprise in accordance with the General plan, and is passed by the
Ministry responsible for water management on the territory of the Republic of Serbia, no
later than on 31 December of the current year for the following year.
In the National Strategy for Protection and Rescue (The Official Gazette of the RS,
No.86/11) flood is defined as a natural hazard as one of the greatest threats to life, health
and property of citizens, environment and cultural heritage.6 The Strategy states that the
Institute for Development of Water Resources “Jaroslav Černi” has developed the meth-
odology for classification of torrential flows which has been introduced in the Water Man-
agement Information System. For the purpose of monitoring of the state and changes of
the parameters of hydrological regime of the watercourses in the Republic of Serbia, the
state network contains 187 operating hydrological stations, while for the needs of hydro-
logical forecasts and warnings the data from 70 hydrological stations have been collected
on a daily basis. The Reports are submitted to hydrological stations, and modern digital
equipment for measuring and back-up has been installed as well as the direct access to the
data using GPRS service. Bulletins with hydrological data and forecasts, information and
warnings of high and low waters and ice conditions are distributed to all participants in the
system of defence against flooding and other extreme hydrological phenomena, as well as
to the media.
The importance of natural disasters in the Republic of Serbia and the issue of vulnerability
of the community has been pointed out by passing the new by-law – Guidelines on the
methodology for preparation of the assessment of vulnerability and protection and rescue
plans in emergency situations (The Official Gazette of the RS No. 96/12). The assessment
represents an essential document for development of the Plan for protection and rescue
in emergency situations at the level of the Republic of Serbia and the Plan for protection
and rescue in the autonomous province, local community governments, legal entities and
other companies and organizations. In addition to the other basic elements, a part of the
Plan for protection and rescue is also the Plan for protection and rescue in accordance
with risk measures, where floods as natural hazards take the first place. The Plan for pro-
tection and rescue from floods and destruction of hydro-accumulation dams include: an
overview of watercourses and water reservoirs that may be the cause of flooding with an
overview of the areas potentially threatened by flooding and underground waters, over-
view of flood waves (vulnerable areas) resulting from destruction of dams and overflow
of water from the river beds, overview of resources for evacuation of people from the
affected area into an unaffected area, a list of operational and professional authorities in
charge of defence against flooding, operational procedure for coordination, management
and the activities of the forces for protection and rescue on and under water, evacuation,
treatment, first aid, sanitation and other measures of civil protection. The plan for protec-
tion and rescue from flooding involves planning and implementation of measures in case
of imminent danger of flooding, as well as planning and implementation of measures on
occurrence of floods. The ministry responsible for water management, public water man-
agement enterprises, the authorities of autonomous province and the bodies of local self-
government units prepare the planning documents and reference maps on the basis of a
special law which governs the management of water and protection against harmful effects
for water. Moreover, the autonomous province authorities and the authorities of local self-
6 In developing the National Strategy for Protection and Rescue there were taken into account the recommendations
of the EU Internal Security Strategy and EU Strategy in supporting disaster risk reduction in developing countries.
government units, the authorized and qualified legal entities and other legal entities pre-
pare their protection and rescue plans as an upgrade to those plans. This plan develops the
operational procedures of the entities of protection and rescue in case of floods, defines
those in charge of implementation of activities and their tasks, contains the overview of
the forces that may be engaged in remedying the consequences and ensures the planned
engagement of available resources. Further implementation of defence against floods is
governed by the Decree on establishing a general plan for defence against flooding for the
period from 2012 to 2018 (The Official Gazette of the RS No. 23/12) whereby it is deter-
mined: which measures have to be taken preventively and in the period of arrival of high
waters (external and internal), the manner of institutional organization of defence against
flooding, the duties, responsibilities and powers of the heads of defence, the institutions
and other persons responsible for defence against flooding, ice or flooding of internal wa-
ters, the manner of surveillance and recording of hydrological and other data, forecast of
phenomena and manner of notifying.
The value of the mentioned adopted documents is reflected in recognition of the state’s
own real vulnerability to flood risk, but also in the compliance with the guidelines and
recommendations of the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
(UNISDR) as well as United Nations Development Program (UNDP) .
3. CONCLUSION
Vulnerability and human security are in modern terms increasingly viewed as cumulative
processes interrelated from different aspects and causing a series of other problems, which
mutually aggravate further, or give rise to other problems such as social and economic.
Vulnerability and human security in terms of manifestation of flood risk are multi-dimen-
sional and characterized by weak infrastructure or rather institutions and their insufficient
ability to respond in the preventive and operational terms.
Under the circumstances of manifestation of flood risks, their power combined with vul-
nerability of all exposed elements may result in endangering human security on a large
scale in poor and vulnerable areas, and especially on those places to which the highest
economic investments are focused on. The Republic of Serbia is constantly threatened by
natural hazards and floods in particular. Flood risks in the last decade, especially floods in
May 2014 represent an indicator of extreme vulnerability and endangered human security
in the state, as well as its lack of resilience to respond financially, organizationally and
functionally to their consequences. The importance of the adopted strategies and laws
reflects in the attempt of the state to adapt to flood risk and to create an integrated system
which would respond to the real vulnerability and human safety of the community with its
own, renewed resources in an organized and functional manner.
4. REFERENCES
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a Holistic Perspective: A Necessary Review and Criticsm for Effective Risk Manage-
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Development & People, London-Sterling, Va.: Earthscan, 37-51.
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Upravljanje vodnim resursima Srbije, Institut „Jaroslav Černi“, Beograd
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International Cooperation, Ottawa, ON.
UDC 659.3:17
Srđan KORAĆ, Marko FILIJOVIĆ*

LEADERSHIP: NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY?1
Abstract: Anchored in politico-philosophical tradition and practice of establishing the inter-

national system for protection of human rights, human security concept was conceived by the
UNDP researchers with the aim to include the largest number of factors important to the indi-
vidual-centred perspective of security. The human security concept identifies seven new areas as
indicators of (in)security, including political security which emphasizes how the design of politi-
cal institutions and procedures, performance of public institutions, and accountability of those
who govern affects human security; it establishes a correlation between the effectiveness of the
public service and the quality of life. The paper examines how high level of politicisation of the
top public administration managers and weak ethical leadership create the work environment
conducive to morally wrong behaviour that can affect human security by undermining the quality
of delivered public services, and the protection of public interest. The authors show the harmful
implications that politicisation of public service can have on human security in the case of the U.S.
FEMA response in helping the Hurricane Katrina’s victims.
Key words: human security, political security, politicisation, political appointees, ethical leadership,
public service ethics, responsibility.
1. HUMAN SECURITY, POLITICISATION AND LEADERSHIP IN PUBLIC

SERVICE: WHY DOES ETHICS MATTER?
When the Cold War ended in the 1990s a new security paradigm came to the fore in policy
and scholarly discussions. The changing circumstances in the international arena have
led to the emergence of new security challenges, risks and threats demanding a new ap-
proach, a quite different governmental response that transcends the traditional security
policy perspective. A group of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) re-
searchers proposed in the early 1990s the alternative concept — Human Security. Rooted
1 Srđan Korać is Research Fellow at the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade. E-mail:
srdjan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs
Marko Filijović is PhD candidate at the Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade. E-mail:
mfilijovic@yahoo.com
[288] Srđan KORAĆ, Marko FILIJOVIĆ
in the tradition of establishing the international system for the protection of human rights,
the concept was designed to shift the focus of policy securitisation towards the factors es-
sential for safety of people, regardless of whether they live in post-industrial polyarchies,
transitional countries or poor societies. The UNDP researchers maintain that security
standards have to be set not only at a higher level, but it is also necessary to change the
whole approach to security policy in order to meet new circumstances. They found that
the safety of people is not necessarily vulnerable because of the risks posed by another
state or military bloc. New understanding of security put to the fore people and their com-
munities, and points out that the biggest threats come from civil wars, ethnic and religious
conflicts, pandemics, natural disasters, environmental degradation, massive migration,
transnational organised crime, and a plethora of forms of discrimination and exploitation,
etc. (Đorđević, Keković 2011:92–93). Because the range of threats to human security is
rather broad, the authors of new concept suggest seven (sub)categories/areas to classify
those new threats: 1) economic security; 2) food security; 3) health security; 4) environ-
mental security; 5) personal security; 6) security community; and 7) political security,
tagged as one of the most important (UNDP 1994:24–25, 32).
Political dimension of human security includes factors such as the design of political insti-
tutions and procedures, the performance of public sector, and the rule of law. In addition,
what matters is a responsible government, because the quality of delivered public services
directly affects safety of citizens and their property (Đorđević 2013:143, 147). The impact
of modern state on human life is pervasive: birth, education, work, retirement, and even
death itself are all regulated by ever-multiplying legislation and supervised by a wide array
of public institutions. That is why citizens associate the idea of the state to the behaviour
of bureaucrats they face every day. The effectiveness of protection of the fundamental
rights and freedoms is far more interrelated to the effectiveness of administrative mecha-
nisms and procedures, than to the constitutional guarantees. The exercise of discretion is
in the very nature of administrative decision-making, and it is aimed at providing enough
“room” to make a judgement by taking into account all relevant information necessary to
implement policies, laws, and rules in a particular case (Malcolmson 2004:5). This “room”
gives a public servant freedom of choice that may result in making a bad judgement due to
wrong interpretation of public policy goals. This is where ethical standards step in to re-
solve everyday dilemmas and to serve as an accurate signposts for proper decision-making
that takes into account the common values shared in a society.
Disasters are natural with a view to their cause, but they are man-made by their outcome
in terms of the collective and institutional response to their impact on human communi-
ties. Throughout history, governments and their bureaucracies have been tested for their
competence in managing emergencies, preventing or managing catastrophic disasters,
saving lives and property, and providing security for their citizens. Such tests of compe-
tence are far more significant today than ever before, as a modern public administration
seems to be better equipped technologically and must rely on the trust of citizens whose
expectations about quality of life are bigger than ever before. The loss of democratic legiti-
macy and distrust of public officials may be brought about by systematic failure of state to
protect human security effectively during crisis situations.
Although plans and preparation are essential, the uniqueness of every natural disaster leads
public institutions to react in ways other than it is planned, particularly when the situation
unfolds in unexpected ways or when the crisis is extraordinarily complex. Effective crisis
LEADERSHIP: NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY? [289]
leadership is therefore vital to bridge a gap between the routine tasks of administration,
on the one hand, and the emergency, nonroutine tasks that demand urgency in attention
and action, on the other hand (Farazmand 2007:149–159). There is no effective leadership
without clear ethical guidance, because misconduct of public servants may impercepti-
bly cause a chain of events that leads to direct threat to human security. Unfortunately,
tragic cases of maladministration can be detected only after massive human casualties are
caused, health is greatly jeopardised, and property is immensely damaged.
Human ability to act morally is grounded on the ability to empathise with others, i.e. abil-
ity to identify and understand other peoples’ emotions. An individual with no ability to
empathise with others, and with no feelings of guilt as well, may pose a huge threat to society,
particularly if he/she is a public sector manager. The effective leaders ought to win the re-
spect of subordinates by being courageous in making difficult decisions with due regard
to universal moral principles, accepting responsibility for bad outcomes of their decisions,
and implementing them with a firm belief that those decisions protect and improve the
public interest. Unethical leadership in the public service is not a likely threat to human
security only in the poor and transitional countries; it is also an Achilles heel of the affluent
societies of Western civilisation, and in part can be attributed to public service reforms de-
signed in 1980s and 1990s according to the model of the New Public Management. This re-
form has redefined the roles of elected politicians and career administrators in public pol-
icy process, in a way that undermines the principle of political neutrality as a corner-stone
of public service integrity. The elected officials invest far more effort and time to persuade
high-level public officials to conform to the ruling party’s agenda and policy visions. This
strategy has revived the phenomenon of top-bottom politicisation as a form of increased
governmental/presidential control over public administration, with the spoils system in
the politics of the United States as its most extreme example (Peters, Pierre 2004). From
the ethical perspective, the spoils system is controversial because it favours partisan ap-
pointees openly and has the corrosive effect on a career- and merit-based system of public
service. Every change of the ruling party is stressful for career public servants because of
the difficulties they face in adapting to the political agenda of the new president.
In this paper, we examine how politicisation combined with unethical leadership can af-
fect human security by undermining the quality of delivered public services and, in the
long run, the protection of lives and property as vital societal values. The analysis is be-
ing conducted on the sample of the United States as an affluent post-industrial polyarchy
where high level of politicisation of the top public administration managers seem to ham-
per its capabilities to protect human security effectively.
2. HURRICANE KATRINA: A PUBLIC SERVICE ETHICS DISASTER?

An incident of catastrophic proportions has the potential to imperil thousands of people,
devastate hundreds of communities, and produce far-reaching economic and social ef-
fects. To provide human security, government and its administration must be prepared to
respond in ways that lie outside the normal paradigms in which public servants tradition-
ally operate. In the United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) – a
part of the Department of Homeland Security– has the mission “to support (...) citizens
and first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and im-
prove our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate
all hazards”.2 In other words, FEMA is legally responsible for putting in order and coordi-
nating the needed federal resources for search, rescue, and basic human needs in the case
of a large scale disaster that is beyond the capacity of local and state authorities to handle.
FEMA also provides significant support for equipping and training emergency response
personnel and units throughout the nation, which means that this public agency is clearly
designated locus of responsibility for ensuring the nation’s preparedness. Therefore, in this
analysis we will examine how politicisation and unethical leadership affected the perfor-
mance of FEMA as the key public agency in disaster and emergency management system.
There was a mismatch between what happened during Katrina and how the emergency
system is expected to work. Inadequate public service response to the landfall of Hurricane
Katrina in August 2005 was an abject failure. Katrina is one of the deadliest and most cost-
ly hurricanes in American history; it caused the death toll of over 1,800, displaced more
than a million of Gulf Coast residents (mostly extremely low-income people), flooded 80
per cent of New Orleans and dozens of small communities and industrial plants in four
southern US states, with over USD 100 billion in damages (CNN 2013). Effective bureau-
cratic agencies are characterised by well-established procedures, sound leadership, and
clear objectives. The empirical and anecdotal pieces of evidence suggest that problems
associated with the second factor weakened governmental efforts to respond quickly and
effectively. Two investigative journalists of The Wall Street Journal – Christopher Cooper
and Robert Block (2006) – provide convincing evidence for the practice of poor decision-
making in the days of disaster. They argue Hurricane Katrina was a manageable natural
disaster in New Orleans area due to not so strong winds, only partial collapse of many of
the floodwalls, and quite successful evacuation of the city population (some 90 percent) in
advance of the storm. If so, what went wrong? Cooper and Blockʼs investigation has found
that federal officials failed to provide sufficient quantity of supplies, and in the immediate
aftermath of the storm accurate and real-time information flowed through government
agencies, but in many instances this information sat unused, unread, and even dismissed
by the very people charged with ensuring that timely news about disasters made its way to
the top levels of the federal government.
Many public policy scholars and practitioners agree with the assessment that Hurricane
Katrina was less a natural disaster, but rather an example of massive and dramatic failure
in public governance (Greene 2009:209–210, 222–223). The government and its public
service did not fulfil their fundamental responsibility to protect their citizens, and their
failure to protect was systemic, pervasive, and long-standing. Voluminous reports show
that the US government did not prepare for predictable consequences of hurricane activ-
ity, and authorised changes in the Mississippi Delta region to promote commerce and de-
velopment that altered the environment to make the Louisiana coastline more vulnerable.
The experts at the National Hurricane Centre state that local, state and federal govern-
ment officials had been warned about the danger in New Orleans for many years, giving
FEMA enough time to conceive a plan and develop in detail its implementation (Sobel,
Leeson 2006:68). Even after FEMA officials became aware of an impending category 5
hurricane striking New Orleans with certainty, they chose not to pre-deploy the resources
clearly identified in a study funded by and presented to them in 2004.
2 www.fema.gov/about-agency, accessed 20/08/2014.

The assessments of FEMA leaders and staff, documentation provided by FEMA, and a
review of secondary sources material show that the weak internal business practices, par-
ticularly with regard to human resource management, was one of structural obstacles to
effective agency performance (Panel of the National Academy of Public Administration
2009:52–53). Sobel and Leeson (2006:55–56) maintain that the failures of FEMA were
nothing new, since identical problems manifested themselves after every previous major
disaster; this time the difference was in greater severity of the failure. From the public
choice perspective, the self-interested heads of public agencies generally seek to maxim-
ise the size of the budget under their control, and their personal prestige, which may not
necessarily lead to disaster harm-minimisation. Moreover, public managers seek to ensure
as much recognition as possible for whatever goes right — a phenomenon called “glory
seeking” — devoting additional resources to give citizens the perception that one is pro-
moting and protecting the public interest (Sobel, Leeson 2006:67–68). The root of poor
decision making is linked to the moral immaturity of individual, and analysis of the behav-
iour of top FEMA officials confirms this thesis. FEMA director’s official correspondence
gives a revealing insight into a series of serious mistakes with regard to evacuation and,
later, coordination of first aid (Brennan, Koven 2009:254–265). Brown not only ignored
reports received from FEMA employees about very difficult position of people stuck with
no food and water supplies in the flooded area, but he also was far more concerned with
his appearance in preparation for discussions with the media than with actually ensuring
that FEMA-directed relief efforts were effective. Besides, Brown was advised to roll up
the sleeves of his shirt just below the elbow in order to look more hard-working. While
people were dying, newspapers quoted Brown in New Orleans asking where he can get
something to eat “that’s not fried” (Malveaux 2008:247).
Sound leadership demands timely, reliable and detailed information as a ground to make
a decision about the best possible direction of an action. Yet, neither FEMA Director Mi-
chael Brown nor Department of Home Security Secretary Michael Chertoff were aware
that a convention centre in New Orleans was sheltering thousands of victims until in-
formed of the fact by reporters. Some other decisions were quite absurd when analysed
from the perspective of complying to ethical standards and pursuing the public interest.
For instance, Brown instructed fire departments in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
not to send emergency vehicles or personnel into devastated areas unless local or state of-
ficials communicated specific requests for them — at a time when most towns and cities
lacked working telephones, fax machines, and internet access (Marable 2008:X). While
hundreds of dead bodies floated in New Orleans’s streets and rotted in desolated hous-
es, FEMA also blocked for weeks rescue efforts of other public institutions and private
organisations aimed at delivering airboats, generators, communications equipment, and
trailers and freight cars of food. Moreover, many desperate Americans phoned FEMA’s
telephone number for assistance only to hear recorded messages that all lines were busy
or were disconnected. It seems that hundreds of thousands of largely poor, Black, older
and disabled people were almost intentionally left to a chance to be saved by some of
few rescue teams deployed at the time in the devastated area. The prolonged suffering
of Katrina victims came from FEMA temporary housing programme that had been so
poorly designed and implemented that many thousands of displaced people remained in
a transitional state, not knowing when or if they can return to their homes or even to their
communities (Crowley 2006:129–156).
The depicted unethical practice of managing one of the key public institutions in charge
of disaster relief is not mere coincidence. It is an outcome of politicised managerial caste
in public administration. FEMA is well-known as a federal agency with traditionally large
number of political appointees nominated at managerial positions throughout the whole
hierarchy (Verkuil 2007:165–166). Presidents have long used administrative appointments
in FEMA as a way to repay political favours. Of the 18 individuals who have served as
FEMA’s director, 13 have been entirely unqualified for this position — with the exception
of James Lee Witt, FEMA’s 14th director, who was the first agency head who had previous
experience with crisis management or disaster relief (Sobel, Leeson 2006:70–71). Presi-
dent Bush has appointed two directors of the FEMA: Joe M. Allbaugh (2001–2003) and
Michael D. Brown since 2003 (Bumiller 2005). For instance, Michael Brown was made the
director after he was asked to resign from the International Arabian Horse Association,
and other FEMA top managers came from the White House offices and were either loyal
supporters or close associates of then-president George W. Bush. Not only those nomi-
nations were made on patronage basis, but also Allbaugh and Brown were close college
friends and country-fellows from Oklahoma.
Today’s public sector managers face much more ethical challenges than ever before, be-
cause they are tasked with complying with the well established public service standards in
an ethical manner in a very dynamic environment. Does a typical appointee fit into such
a demanding position of ethical leadership? Most of the FEMA political appointees were
characterised by significant political campaign experience and negligible crisis manage-
ment experience, leading long-term staff to perceive that their leaders were more con-
cerned with politics rather than building agency capacity (Moynihan 2009:7). The appoin-
tees hardly understood the profession and the dynamics and the roles and responsibilities
of actors in the complex multi-level and cross-sectoral system of disaster and emergency
management. As FEMA gradually declined due to incompetent managing, senior profes-
sionals left, taking with them years of experience. Previously hired only to provide surge
capacity during disasters, temporary employees were de facto transformed into perma-
nent staff. The lack of benefits and job security for temporary employees, according to
Moynihan, created a workforce with reduced morale and little sense of shared organisa-
tional culture inherent to public service (Moynihan 2009:8).
FEMAs professional degradation eventually induced an organisational context of the
widespread deficit in specialised knowledge and experience among top officials with a
view to handling major natural disasters. An editorial comment made in the New York
Times ironically noticed that “what America needs are federal disaster relief people who
actually know something about disaster relief ” (New York Times 2005). The US House of
Representatives’ Select Bipartisan Committee established to investigate the preparation
for and response to Hurricane Katrina concluded that “acts of leadership were too few and
far between” (U.S. House of Representatives 2006:1). Apart from failing to demonstrate
strong and decisive leadership in emergency management, Brown admitted publicly that
he had been unaware of the terrible conditions in New Orleans, notwithstanding the con-
tinuous television coverage that lasted several days. On the top of that, Brown attributed
the death toll in New Orleans to “people who did not heed evacuation warnings”, even
though many of the stranded citizens were simply unable to leave the city because they
had no money, no transportation, and no place to go (Schneider 2005:515–516). Brown
and his close associates in top management of the agency used a method of increasing
their relative credit for glory by limiting the amount of good accomplished by others.
They kept private disaster aid competitors out of the disaster zone and obstructed local
government efforts, including the confiscation of fuel and other supplies ordered and be-
ing delivered to other local governmental units in the area (Sobel, Leeson 2006:67–68).
These resources, paid for and ordered by other government agencies, were expropriated
by FEMA without compensation or explanation for its internal use.
Brown’s incompetent and arrogant directing of FEMA seems to be the best evidence of
how the practice of politically motivated appointments of senior civil servants under-
mines the idea of moral agency in public service and, in the long run, reduces ability for
ethical leadership, which is essential for removing human insecurity in situations of cata-
strophic natural disasters. To help those in trouble is a first-order moral prescription of
the upright life in community. Instead of leading his fellow citizens in rescuing the victims
of the hurricane, the federal manager behaved extremely egoistically and indifferent as he
was a person who had nothing to do with the tragic event, as not being the head of a public
institution obliged to prevent and mitigate the consequences of natural disasters on the
lives and property.
3. CONCLUSION
We showed in our analysis how a high level of politicisation of top public service managers
and the lack of ethical leadership create work environment conducive to morally wrong
behaviour that may threaten human security by undermining both the quality of delivered
public services and protection of the public interest substantially. Long and deep-rooted
tradition of politicisation of the public service — even in some of the most affluent post-
industrial polyarchies, such as the United States — may have very harmful implications on
human security, which was widely evidenced by poor emergency response to Hurricane
Katrina.
Disregard for the principle of political neutrality of senior public servants combined with
either insufficiently developed or poor ethical leadership reduce the overall quality of pub-
lic management practice as a cornerstone of public service integrity. The concept of bias
seems to be central to the concept of morality. A partisan-motivated management of the
public service underpinned by unsound ethical leadership is incompatible with the mor-
ally driven performance of public duties, particularly with the obligation of due respect
for the principles and duties that stem from the concept of good governance, democratic
values and norms, and idea of human rights. The idea of acting in a biased manner means a
deviation from decision making based on generally accepted criteria and objective think-
ing; it is unlikely for stable habit-like tendencies to moral virtue to develop into behav-
ioural pattern accepted among top managers and their civil servants that pursue an ideal
of citizen who serves to the public. In such social environment, good character traits that
include empathy, benevolence, and truly unbiased considerations how to apply ethical
standards remain undeveloped or sidelined.
As top-bottom politicisation involves the practice of appointment to managerial posi-
tions based on party affiliation and personal connections to political bosses rather than on
qualifications, there is a sufficient empirical evidence to support the correlation between
political appointment, on the one hand, and poor and ethically immature performance of
managers, on the other hand. Hurricane Katrina highlights the importance of having com-
petent public service led by managers who have well-developed disposition to incorporate
ethical considerations into decision making process. Great moral failures stem from moral
insensitivity, i.e. ones incapability to understand how her/his behaviour affects others,
and to choose the course of action determined on the basis of its potential consequences.
Therefore, the potential danger that an irresponsible and unaccountable appointee poses
for a society does not come primarily in terms of the budget fraud, waste and abuse, but it
stems from his indifference to the suffering of others caused by his decisions.
The political patronage embedded in a democratic political community undermines the
ability of the public service to provide essential elements of human security. Human be-
ings organise governments to do what individuals cannot do for themselves, with protec-
tion and recovery from wholesale catastrophe at the top of the list. As extreme weather
conditions with devastating consequences more often occur in various parts of the world,
the role of an effective emergency and crisis management becomes more important in
the protection of human security. The unethical governmental response to Katrina large-
ly ignored the human security approach based on the people-centred, comprehensive,
context-specific, and prevention-oriented measures. FEMA did not manage to respond in
comprehensive, multi-sectoral and collaborative way; it did not identify the behavioural
changes that had been needed to help mitigate the impact, and, where possible, prevent
the occurrence of threats. The case of Katrina shows that human security is not just a re-
search paradigm suitable for endless academic discussions, but policy-oriented concept
that provides governments and their public administrations a practical framework for the
identification of a wide range threats that can cut life short and thwart the use of human
potential.
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UDC 711.61:351.754
Dubravko ALEKSIĆ*
QUANTUM ARCHITECTURE AND SAFETY OF OPEN PUBLIC SPACES1
Abstract: By real-time mapping of the built space, physical movements and sociological behavior
of users, quantum architecture can improve the safety, readability and attractiveness in urban
environment. It can allow users to choose levels of privacy in built space and can alow them to
take part in real-time design of their environment. This paper describes how quantum architec-
ture can be used for the creation of various models for designing open public spaces.
Key words: quantum architecture, open public spaces, safety
1. INTRODUCTION
When open public spaces are designed by use of concepts of quantum architecture, then
their users are allowed to participate in design on very high and influential level. Participa-
tion is happening in real time, and space is the direct result of the relationship between the
space and a user. Public space can undergo constant changes and it interacts with its users
in real time. The diversity of spatial planning and designing options is on the highest level,
thus flexibility, resilience and potential safety of such space is also very high. Research in
this paper illustrates how quantum architectural space design can potentially affect its us-
ers and their safety in public space.
2. OPEN PUBLIC SPACES: THEORY AND PRINCIPLES

Good open public space design incorporates a high level of understanding of the city life
and of needs of users spending time at it and using it. Creation of a city space most often
comes as a result of a mediator’s interpretation of users’ wishes and needs. Often, when
designing his environment, a man does not do it in accordance with his own wishes and
needs. An urban space is designed based on a previous designing experience, by coming
to some general conclusions regarding a man and his needs. Spaces constructed in such
a way insufficiently correspond to the needs of their users, therefore, it is necessary to
* Senior Teaching Assistant, Faculty of Architecture and Civil Engineering, Banja Luka, e-mail:
aleksicdubravko@gmail.com
[298] Dubravko ALEKSIĆ
analyse the actual needs, wishes, as well as spatial ideas of people utilising a certain pub-
lic space, and to find the appropriate mechanisms to implement the findings (Lazarević,
Bajec 1987).
There is a number of aggravating and justified reasons which make it difficult to integrate
the nature of public life into an open public space designing process. Public life is con-
stantly changing due to inconsistent behaviour of its participants, caused by changes in
user needs happening over time, which then causes permanent changes of numerous dif-
ferent factors influencing the manner in which a public space is used. Open public city
space primary function is to enable various interactions between its users, and high quality
architecture always facilitates the interactions between a public space and the public life.
Considering that, we can safely say that a public space and a location can communicate
with their users (Alexander 1979; Gehl, Svarre 2013).
Most of the developed methods used to examine and enhance the relationship between
public spaces and the public life, i.e. needs users have when at a public space, are based on
the observation and analysis techniques. Due to that, it is necessary to develop the tools
which would analyse the ways in which users utilise a space (Gehl, Svarre 2013).
Christopher Alexander indisputably emphasises the need and the ability of a man to di-
rectly take part in creation of his own environment. He claims that the power and the
ability to create beautiful buildings exist in each man, and that it is the man’s simplest and
deepest innate truth. A man could crate the most supreme, the most beautiful and abso-
lutely harmonious space in an instant (Alexander 1979).
Human resources are increasingly taking over the priority of the natural resources in the
process of public space creation. Talent, skills and creativity of users take priority over
natural potentials of a location on which a public space is being constructed. Ability of
people residing in it primarily determines the success, i.e. the quality of life (Landry 2008).
The essence of a design always lies in the interaction between users and a space. When
designing an open public space, it is necessary to develop the tools and methods for ob-
serving the behaviour of people using the space, in order to create the tools and methods
for open public space designing (Gehl 1987; Gehl, Svarre 2013).
According to the aforementioned, it is clear that there is a constant and great need to
enhance the relationship between the public life and a constructed environment, i.e. be-
tween a city user and his surroundings. That is the reason why the relationship between a
user and its constructed environment is a constant challenge for architects and it must be
one of the key criteria for defining the methodological principles of urban designing, i.e.
open public space designing.
It can be assumed that there is a large number of aggravating and justified reasons which
make it difficult to remove the nature of public life from the process of open public space
designing. Public life is changing on the daily basis because of the unpredictable behaviour
of its users, and because of constant changes of numerous different factors influencing the
way in which the public places are used (Gehl, Svarre 2013).
That is the reason why the majority of modern urban planning methods emphasise the im-
portance of observing the space, and are based on the tools enabling thorough gathering
of data on constructed environment and on processes on-going within. The collected data
are used in the process of reaching conclusions, and the findings lead to predictions, based
QUANTUM ARCHITECTURE AND SAFETY OF OPEN PUBLIC SPACES [299]
on which, by applying various criteria, a form of the constructed space is defined, i.e. the
appearance of open public city places. Assuming that the findings are mostly correct, the
newly-formed space would be a result of the designing based on the data and processes
that were on-going at the location up to the moment when the observation process was
terminated, i.e. until the analysis was completed. Inevitable alterations of the constructed
environment and the changes of processes on-going within after completion of the analy-
sis are generally insufficiently considered in the process of defining the designing criteria.
Also, changes that will eventually occur after the completion of construction at the site
and around it are generally insufficiently integrated in the designing process. The main
reason for that lies in the fact that it is almost impossible to predict any spatial change,
especially after the observation process is finished, i.e. after the analysis is completed.
A space created this way fulfils the purpose of its creation up till the moment when the
environment and its processes change sufficiently enough to lose their role in the process
of creation of the concept which would result in a form approximately the same as the one
constructed. This mostly results in the space stop being used, or being only partly used or
being used in a manner different than intended. Each subsequent change or reconstruc-
tion implies reinitiating the designing process, i.e. new observation process, new analysis
and space construction. Result in which the urban designing methodology, which does
not incorporate tools enabling an existing constructed space to monitor and analyse its
own usage patterns, contributes to the construction with partially uncertain outcome in
the context of its use, i.e. the behaviour and satisfying the users needs. Additionally, it can
be assumed that if spaces have no sufficient level of flexibility, enabling them to timely
change their form and functionality in accordance with the analysis of their own manner
of use, it could result in a need for additional reconstruction. This problem is especially
obvious in open public city spaces because they are used by the large number of various
user groups, whose behavioural patterns can hardly be anticipated, i.e. whose needs and
wishes are hard to meet.
Due to significant and constant changes of the city life, implementing a mechanism which
could improve the designing process in such a way for public spaces to be able to monitor
the user needs and to change in accordance with them, could lead to the enhancement of
the open public city spaces designing process.
3. QUANTUM PARADIGM AND ARCHITECTURE

Why is the architecture examined in this paper called quantum architecture and not, for
example, behavioural, interactive, programmable, virtual, etc.? The answer lies in the at-
titude towards a user. In order for that relationship to be better understood, it is necessary
to give a short overview of the Quantum spatial paradigm, defined by Oosterhuis as an
array of interconnected philosophical attitudes on nature of the cosmos and its approach
to man (Kas Oosterhuis 2011).
Han Feng, in his explanation of the quantum paradigm, describes a concept of the wave-
particle duality. The wave-particle duality concept says that all matter and energy also
have the characteristics of a wave and a particle, and in that way it emphasises the inad-
equacy of the classical physics concept and its explanation of the nature, which implies
that a matter is either a wave or a particle (Feng 2013). Observed from the architectural
perspective, that means that in the process of creation of all versions of the form and its
potentials exist (waves), even if we select only one and construct a space (particle) in ac-
cordance with it. How to bring a space once constructed back to its potential state if we
want to alter it? Similar question was asked by Nicholas Negroponte when he was trying to
define the criteria from the existing form, which was created as a result of the architectural
mechanism. Feng, in the attempt to offer an answer to this question, included the Heisen-
berg’s Uncertain Principle in the explanation of the quantum paradigm. Principle is based
on the premise that every observation of a certain system represent an actual interaction
between the observer and the observed system, i.e. that the observation does not result
only in information on structure of the observed system, but it also reconfigures the sys-
tem itself (Feng 2013). In the context of the idealised definition of the quantum architec-
ture, that means that a user creates a space by being present in it even if only to passively
observe it, i.e. that the architectural form will depend on who uses the space, and not only
on the design previously made by the architect.
4. QUANTUM ARCHITECTURE: PARADIGM AND THEORY

Quantum architecture is a newer spatial paradigm created as a fusion of specific principles
of the quantum theory and the architecture. It strives to explain how it is possible to use
the quantum theory as an instrument for creation of architectural concepts. Quantum ar-
chitecture defines the constructed environment as a space which is not created based on
the predefined and unchangeable elements; instead it is based on the behavioural patterns
of individual participants, each of which has its own role in the process of creation of the
quantum space. It explores various options enabling a user of the constructed space to
participate more directly in its formation and to perceive himself as a creator of the space
he is using.
Ayssar Arida, the author of the book Quantum City, highlights the shortcomings of the
common linear manner of spatial designing and planning. He claims that in the real life
conditions designing mostly remains within the socio-political, economical and morpho-
logical conditions. He explains that such approach is a closed system, which, for a long
term duration, due to the fact that at a certain moment the needs of a user might overcome
the spatial abilities, puts a user in a position to singlehandedly make changes. It is usually
done without knowing the wider contexts in which the space was initially created, and
could additionally diminish the quality of life (Arida 2002).
In the 1970s a similar problem of users was also described by Nicholas Negroponte, one of
the creators of the Generative Architecture2 and a member of the MIT’s Architecture Ma-
chine Group. Negroponte explains that users are generally unable to explain their needs
to the architects, also that the architects tend to transform the users’ ideas into their own.
This is the reason why spaces, which, more or less, do not correspond to the needs of the
people occupying them, are created (Negroponte 1975).
In 1969, the same author, in an article which describes the Theory of Architecture Ma-
chines, presents the idea of using an intelligent mechanical system capable of designing a
space, i.e. he explores the possibility of setting up a dialogue between an architect and an
2 Generative architecture was created under the influence of works of Christopher Alexander, Cedric Price and
Nicholas Negroponte, and it strives to be a process on its own. It criticises the traditional architectural practice,
which insists on the development of a specific form as an ultimate architectural goal. Source: (Steenson, 2014).
artificial mechanism. He claims that such relationship could create a new evolutionary sys-
tem of spatial design, which would facilitate for a user to have a more direct role in creation
of his own environment. It is a system which offers a large number of potential spatial solu-
tions to a user and enables him to make his own choice. Negroponte explains that a me-
chanical system, designing together with an architect, must have an ability to learn from
its own experiences. He also states that a system functions better if it has an ability to ob-
serve and map as many as possible local, as well as global, spatial visual characteristics. He
states that it is possible to create designing methods which would generate a form based
on the given set of criteria, if the problem of defining the criteria from an existing form and
reuse of predefined criteria for creation of a new form is solved (Negroponte 1969).
Arida describes a system which enables a user, even after selecting one of the potential
solutions, to have a permanent option to remodel the selected solution. He suggests for
the strategic planning and methods of scenario planning to be incorporated in the de-
signing process. He claims that this way the process always remains open for changes and
improvements, i.e. it has a bigger error tolerance, but he also warns that it demands for a
change of the attitude towards the designing process and redefining of individual key con-
cepts of the spatial structuring. Arida primarily refers to the role of an architect and the
role of a user in the designing process (Arida 2002).
Kas Oosterhuis, professor at the Faculty of Architecture of the Delft University of Tech-
nology, describes the user’s role in the quantum architecture. He states that a user of a
quantum architecture space is able to communicate or participate in a dialogue with the
space as both a user and a creator of the space. It means that the constructed environment
is always transformable and in a potential state of a change, and it consists of elements
which can communicate with users in real time. Mapping process of spatial patterns and
users behavioural patterns is constantly enabled, and the communication in user-space di-
rection enables user to influence the form and function of the space, without diminishing
its original ability of space transformation (Oosterhuis 2011).
5. QUANTUM ARCHITECTURE: SAFETY AND OPEN PUBLIC SPACES

Safe cities and modern open public city spaces of present time demand different construc-
tion techniques, thus also a fundamental change in concept of approach to planning and
designing of a space, which would primarily enhance and then supersede the traditional
deterministic approach to city planning. It is necessary for the new approach to integrate
the traditional spatial planning with sociological and economic planning, in order for the
designing approach to be more or completely holistic, complex and directly user oriented.
It is also important to involve all users in the process of participation, and, as much as pos-
sible, to strengthen the influence of marginalised user groups on the process of designing
of the space they are directly using (Bollens 2008).
All inhabitants of a city, which are in any way influenced by the project, should take part
in all stages of the project creation. Planning process must include not only the technical
aspects, but also the sociological, political and organisational mechanisms with potential
of increasing the level of user’s involvement and his self-worth. User involvement in the
creation process is of vital importance, because in that way it demonstrates a democratic
process and gives a quintessential representation of the participation. Participation of all
user groups in the process of spatial creation significantly decreases the level of violence
and creates an impression of increased safety in the space (Bollens 2008).
Safety represents a significant aspect of the social life, and its investigation demands a
comprehensive analysis of objective and subjective influences. Subjective influences are
explored through user’s personal perception of safety in the space influenced by various
political, economical, micro-social and other factors. In order to have an adequate under-
standing of the safety, it is necessary to thoroughly examine perceptions, understandings
and interpretations of user’s personal situation. Only then the investigation of safety will
get its full meaning, i.e. high quality (Đurić 2013).
It can be concluded that for an adequate planning of the open space safety, besides map-
ping and analysing public space’s spatial-physical elements, it is also necessary to map and
analyse user’s perception and understanding of the space, as well as user’s personal inter-
pretation of the circumstances around him. Proper insight into the physical aspect of the
space and behavioural patterns of its users represents the basic precondition for the qual-
ity planning of open public city spaces.
Everything that is happening in the virtual space and is accepted by the users of the inter-
net, mobile phone applications, etc., can in the same or altered form be accepted by the
users of the constructed environment.
According to the research of the Pew Research Centre, the mobile phone was the fastest
accepted technology of all times. Today over ninety per cent of the United States inhabit-
ants use mobile phones, more than half of which use smart phones. Highly personalised
nature of smart phones enables them to collect and distribute large number of information
on their users, which could divulge current location of a user, his movements, with whom
he communicates, even how he feels (MIT 2014). Besides the mobile phones, the number
of tablet computer users is constantly increasing, and the assumption is that the use of
Google glass and similar devices, enabling virtual following of everything the users see, is
also at the increase.
Mobile technology and networked society enable simultaneous mapping and analysing of
spatial-physical elements of a constructed environment, as well as behavioural patterns of
users of that constructed environment. Such analysis can facilitate simultaneous collec-
tion of data, both direct and indirect. Direct mapping reflects in monitoring the physical
movements or in users giving a direct opinion on certain spatial element by, for example,
using it or not using it, or by using it in a certain way in case of a multifunctional element.
Indirect mapping, i.e. analysis, implies the interpretation of user’s actions by applying var-
ious analytical methods, set parameters, etc.
The advantage of such approach is that the analysis and mapping are constantly on-going,
at the precise time the space is being used, that is in real time, which, on the other hand,
facilitates timely and gradual changes, i.e. improvements of the public space.
It is the quantum architecture that enables a user to communicate or participate in a dia-
logue with the space at the same time as a user and as a creator of the space. It consists
of elements which can communicate with users in real time, and the mapping process of
spatial patterns and users’ behavioural patterns is constantly available. That is the way to
create very good preconditions for an adequate safety estimate, which automatically in-
creases the potential of safety of public city spaces.
Creating flexibilities and filters in the urban form also increases the level of safety of public
city spaces. Urban planning must maintain the maximal level of flexibility of the city form
by navigating the future options of the spatial development towards the maximal number
of possible future versions of solutions (Bollens 2008).
Deterministic and inflexible approach to the public city spaces planning diminishes the re-
silience of the urban form and makes the space vulnerable from the safety perspective. On
the other hand, strategies enabling users to have a higher level of freedom and give a user
an option to choose himself the guidelines for development of his own environment, must
be flexible, and that way the spaces created as a result of that would be potentially safer.
Quantum architecture represents a space, which was not created only by predefined and
unchangeable elements, but also by the participants having their own behavioural patterns
and their own roles, i.e. by flexible and changeable elements of the space. An architect
designs the quantum architecture by designing the processes, defining the behavioural
patterns of spatial elements and directing the relationship between a user and the space.
He can programme the architecture and create an environment constantly adapting to the
current needs of its users, i.e. a space predesigned to be flexible and composed of possi-
ble potential solutions (Arida 2002; Flachbart, Weibel 2005; Oosterhuis 2011). Applying
these principles on designing of open public city spaces increases their flexibility and re-
silience, and by that it potentially increases their safety as well.
In order to increase the safety of users of open public city spaces, such spaces should meet
the needs of all their users, regardless of differences between them. Safe open spaces serve
as places of democracy and neutrality; they enable the freedom for their users to inde-
pendently choose their own environment, thus promoting healthy interpersonal relations.
Increase of safety in a city represents a challenge when constructing an urban space that
will enable transformation of the way the users think, by facilitating them to recognise the
complexity and diversity of identities all persons have, and by that strengthening the con-
nections between the city inhabitants. City environment, especially open public city spac-
es, must communicate with their users by connecting them and by strengthening their
mutual understanding. Such spaces increase the level of trust between their users and,
automatically, they potentially increase the feeling of safety of the space (Bollens 2008).
Quantum architecture, in a process of creating a space for a large number of various us-
ers, such as open public spaces, chooses the common denominator of each user’s needs
individually as a parameter for its own forming. New mutual attributes that arise as a con-
sequence of the contact between various users, originating from different user groups,
are being added to the different individual user’s attributes. New mutual attributes are the
main input data for creation of the quantum architecture. By utilizing a common denomi-
nator of a group of users as a parameter for the space forming, the architecture is univer-
salising needs of all users within the same space and uses those universalised needs as the
input data for a space creation. This approach creates a space with the characteristics that
are bringing users closer to each other, because they are aware of their residence in a place
that is actually a direct result of their needs, wishes and choices. Bringing users closer to
each other, and increasing the level of their participation in designing of the mutual space,
is increasing the safety level as well.
6. CONCLUSION
Open public city spaces, created in accordance with the principles of quantum architec-
ture may represent a completely adjusted space connecting and uniting the form, func-
tion, significance and needs of the constructed environment and its users, with the form,
function, significance and needs of all other users of the space, that are created and are
functioning on the same or similar principle. It may influence the creation of a mutual pub-
lic space, which would strengthen the connections between the city inhabitants, a space
that would essentially always be built in accordance with the contemporary needs of its us-
ers and would not produce any conflict. Such public places communicate with their users
in a way to connect them and to strengthen their mutual understanding, and by that they
increase the level of trust between the users and automatically they potentially increase
the feeling of safety of the space.
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UDC 351.78(061.1EU):355.48(612)
Paolo BARGIACCHI*
DID THE EUROPEAN UNION IMPLEMENT THE HUMAN SECURITY

CONCEPT IN THE LIBYAN WAR IN 2011? A CASE STUDY
Abstract: The emerging discourse on human security is challenging the legal and political dichot-
omy between national and international security. While these concepts focus on states’ interests
and needs, the contemporary policy debate on human security focuses on people’s interests and
needs in the course of their daily lives. The international discourse on the human security frame-
work started with the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty Report
on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (ICISS 2001) and several implementing reports of the UN
Secretary-General, including the latest adopted on 11 July 2014 by the United Nations General
Assembly, have eventually shaped the concept (UNGA July 2014).
The paper embraces the responsibility to react to situations of serious harm for a population (one
of the three basic elements of the R2P concept) and, in particular, the right to adopt a military in-
tervention for halting gross and systematic violations of human rights in the Libyan War of 2011.
During the war, the European Union (EU) made some elusive remarks to R2P and human secu-
rity concepts, but as legal rationale for its Member States’ military participation to NATO op-
erations the EU invoked the different “humanitarian intervention” theoretical framework. Yet,
the reality on the ground belied the “humanitarian intervention” legal rationale because military
operations blatantly disregarded the limits, scope and purposes of this kind of intervention.
Looking more carefully at EU’s substantial practice (i.e., EU Institutions’ statements and Member
States’ military actions), a different kind of political discourse on intervention in domestic affairs
is actually revealed, that is to say a “democratic”, not simply “humanitarian”, the intervention
whose political goal is to change authoritarian regimes and install new democracies by means of
robust military operations to be conducted alongside the armed organized groups fighting against
the governments of autocratic states.
The paper will prove that in the Libyan case the EU did not invoke, implement, and pursue R2P
and human security concepts and, therefore, the EU practice did not help in making legally bind-
ing at international level the political discourse on these two concepts. In fact:
1) The EU did not expressly and formally invoke the R2P/human security as legal rationale
for EU Member States’ participation to NATO military operations;
2) Even if the humanitarian intervention is part of the wider concept of R2P and notwith-
standing it was formally invoked by the EU, the subsequent foreign military operations
* Paolo Bargiacchi is a Full Professor of International Law at the Faculty of Economic and Legal Science,
Kore University of Enna, Italy, e-mail: bargiacchi71@yahoo.com.
[308] Paolo BARGIACCHI
disregarded its limits, scope and purposes;

3) The EU actually pursued a different objective (regime change by supporting insurgents)
that it is expressly prohibited by the political discourse on R2P and human security.
Keywords: human security, Libyan War, humanitarian intervention, democratic intervention, EU
practice.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War and, above all, during the Libyan and Ukrainian crises the
EU has been seeking to play a very active role in global affairs. In Libya, the EU supported
the rebels and, then, the insurgents and, in Ukraine, it supported those demonstrating
against the Government of President Yanukovych.
The EU seeks legitimacy and authority for its actions by resting on two general underpin-
nings: 1) its fundamental values (inviolable and inalienable rights of the human persons,
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law) enshrined in the founding Treaties are
universal and, therefore, they have to be promoted and spread across the wider world
(to begin with eastern and southern neighbours, i.e. former communist countries in East-
ern Europe and Caucasus and Southern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries) by
transforming the societies of the “others” in the image of the European societies;1 2) the
new concept of “human security” and the related R2P doctrine shift the focus away from
older concepts of state and international security. Their people-centred view of expanded
security therefore requires new approaches and policies in international relations.
The European strategy to advance universal and indivisible human rights and pursue the
human security (whose scope and content is not necessarily identical to the scope and
content of national and/or international security) in the wider world shapes relations and
dialogue with the other countries. In fact, the EU’s comprehensive approach aims at pro-
moting and exporting worldwide its own democratic and neo-liberalistic model. Foreign
countries are therefore supposed to become more and more similar to European States
from a legal, political and economic point of view.
The paper will not judge the political merit of the EU’s approach to international relations.
Using the 2011 Libyan War as a case study, it only explores:
1. if the European model of external action disregards and/or modifies those interna-
tional legal rules most affected by its implementation (the prohibitions on the use of
1 See Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging
to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination,
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” See also Article 3(5) (“In its relations
with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of
its citizens”) and Article 8(1) (“The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming
to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by
close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”). As to the specific provisions on the Union’s external action, see
Article 21(1) (“The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired
its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the
rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity,
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international
law”) and Article 21(2) (“The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high
degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: [...] (b) consolidate and support democracy,
the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law”).
IN THE LIBYAN WAR IN 2011? A CASE STUDY [309]
force and the intervention in domestic affairs, the “right” of humanitarian interven-
tion, and the principle of self-determination), and if it is able to create a new legal rule
legitimizing the “democratic” intervention, that is to say the use of force for the pur-
pose of overthrowing authoritarian regimes and installing democratic governments;
2. if the EU practice fostered or, instead, weakened the international “legalization” of the
political discourse on human security and R2P.
2. DIVERGING PARADIGMS:
HUMANITARIAN OR DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION?
As to the innovative the legal claims advanced by the EU, they must be widely recognized
and effectively accepted by the “majority” of the international “community” or, rather,
“society” (Schwarzenberger 1939; Bargiacchi 2011:82-89) in order to contribute to the
progressive development of international law.
In order to calculate the majority, one might adopt a numerically based criterion (abso-
lute, overwhelming, qualified, relative, simple, etc.), but it would not serve the EU’s pur-
pose given that, for the time being, the majority of states, whatever numerical criteria
one picks, is against the EU’s political approach and related legal claims. In turn, a non-
numerical criterion might take into account the “prevailing social forces” within the in-
ternational society (Quadri 1968). Yet, once again, this criterion would not serve the EU’s
purpose: powerful states like China, Russia and India, and almost entire continents like
Africa, Southern America and Asia, firmly reject the European legal claims and uphold
the “old” international rules.
In order to overcome these hurdles and handle the objections, the EU chose a different
legal background to found its external action. Dropping the majority argument, the EU
makes the case that its own values and standards (democracy, human rights, rule of law,
neo-liberalistic economic model, etc.) are universal, absolute and non-derogable and, as
such, they must prevail over contradictory values and standards regardless of how many
states support and uphold them.
In other words, the EU’s external action in the wider world is founded on the so-called
“European way of life” (Van Rompuy 2014:1) and, at least since 2009-2010, this is particu-
larly true in the context of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with its
southern and eastern neighbours “European Commission and High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, March 2011 &May 2011”.2
The relations and partnerships with these neighbours are developed and built on condi-
tion that third countries would share and implement the principles which “have inspired
the creation, development and enlargement” of the EU (Article 21(1) of the Treaty on the
European Union) and, in particular, the European model of political and economic gov-
2 At the occasion of the signing ceremony of the political provisions of the Association Agreement between the
EU and Ukraine, the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, stated that the Agreement had
recognized “the aspirations of the people of Ukraine to live in a country governed by values, by democracy and
the rule of law, where all citizens have a stake in national prosperity. And the popular yearning for a decent life
as a nation, for a European way of life” (Van Rompuy 2014:1). The ENP framework is proposed to the 16 closest
neighbours: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova,
Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.
ernance. Third countries are therefore required to implement structural economic, social
and political reforms in line with EU’s desiderata and legal commitments undertaken in
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or in the more complex and broad-ranging
Association Agreements. The latest Association Agreements were signed by the EU on
June 27, 2014, with Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. These Agreements define and pursue
a political association founded on the concept of “deep and sustainable democracy” and
“Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area” (DCFTA).3
In Libya, under the pretext of humanitarian intervention, the EU actually disclosed the
will to export – even by the use of force - the democratic “European way of life” in the
name of the absolute, universal and non-derogable European values and interests (Sinagra
2011).
As anticipated, the implementation of the EU’s external action policies and strategies in-
evitably leads to inconsistencies with international legal rules like, for instance, the prohi-
bition on the use of force and the duty not to intervene in domestic affairs (Sinagra 2002).
According to the EU’s long-term strategic vision for democracy, the principle of non-in-
tervention should yield to the right of “democratic” intervention. As a consequence, the
scope of the prohibition on the use of force would narrow and the content of the principle
of self-determination would widen so as to encompass a newly born “democratic” dimen-
sion of this principle (legitimizing revolts or insurgencies of the peoples against authori-
tarian governments for the purpose of installing democracies) in addition to the already
existing “external” (peoples fighting against colonial dominations, alien occupations, and
racist regimes) and “internal” (peoples and minorities of plurinational states fighting
against governments in order to preserve, develop and transmit to the future generations
their ethnic, cultural, political, and legal identity) dimensions.
In the course of the entire Libyan crisis, however, the use of force against the Libyan Gov-
ernment was justified by the international society (UN Security Council, NATO, the EU,
etc.) on the only legal ground of protecting “civilians and civilian populated areas under
threat of attack” (United Nations Security Council [UNSC] 2011, § 5) according to the
doctrine of “humanitarian intervention”.
Notwithstanding the EU always paid lip service to the “humanitarian” paradigm of the Se-
curity Council, its political statements (to begin with those of the European states sitting
as Permanent Members of the Security Council) actually had a completely different tenor.
In line with its long-term strategic vision for democracy, the EU openly disclosed the ob-
jective “to rapidly embark [Libya] on an orderly transition to democracy” and, to this end:
3 A “deep and sustainable democracy” requires ‘free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression and
assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a
fair trial; fighting against corruption; security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and
the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces” (European Commission and High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, May 2011, 3). The DCFTA requires “the
gradual dismantling of trade barriers and aim for regulatory convergence in areas that have an impact on trade
[...] They are designed to be dynamic in order to keep pace with regulatory developments in the EU’s Internal
Market. For the most advanced partners, a DCFTA can lead to a progressive economic integration with the EU
internal market. Through progressive approximation of EU rules and practices, DCFTAs require a high degree
of commitment to complex and broad-ranging reforms” (EuropeanCommission and High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, May 2011: 8). .
a. urged Colonel Khadafi to “relinquish power immediately [having] lost all legitimacy
and [being] no longer an interlocutor for the EU”;
b. “welcom[ed] and encourag[ed] the interim national council based in Benghazi” and
considered the insurgents as a “political interlocutor”;
c. stood “ready to help Libya build a constitutional state and develop the rule of law” (Ex-
traordinary European Council [EEC] 2011, §§ 7-8).
The subsequent NATO military intervention achieved the “democratic” objective set out
in the EU’s declarations (Khadafi was, in fact, overthrown) rather than the narrower “hu-
manitarian” objective set out in the Security Council Resolution 1973. NATO’s military
involvement was not limited to protect civilians (with no direct participation in hostilities
between the Libyan Government and the insurgents), but instead it provided active sup-
port to the insurgents against the other belligerent Power.
Summing up, the Libyan crisis revealed a deep gap between the legal rationale for the
military intervention expressly given by the Security Council, the NATO and the EU (the
“humanitarian paradigm”) and, instead, the real political objective expressly set out in the
EU’s statements and, then, implemented on the ground by NATO’s military operations (the
“democratic paradigm”). In other words, there existed a deep gap between the operational
code or law in action and the myth system or law on the books (Reisman 1979; Pound 1910).
3. POLITICAL DECLARATIONS, LEGAL RATIONALES, AND MILITARY

OPERATIONS IN THE LIBYAN CRISIS: PIERCED THE VEIL OF THE
“HUMANITARIAN” PARADIGM, ARE WE MOVING TOWARDS THE USE
OF FORCE IN THE NAME OF THE “DEMOCRATIC” PARADIGM FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT?
3.1 Applying the humanitarian paradigm to the Libyan crisis: legal inconsistencies
and consequences
An investigation on the EU Member States’ behaviour with respect to the Libyan crisis
should focus on three major aspects:
1. The political stance towards the struggle between the Government and the rebels
and the following non-international armed conflict between the Government and
the insurgents;
2. The legal rationale invoked as a justification for the military intervention;
3. Declared and real goals, objectives, and effects of military operations.
The legal and political analytical framework applied by the international society to explain
the complex issues of the Libyan crisis always had a “humanitarian” and “neutralistic” na-
ture, that is to say:
1. The political stance of the international society was the reaction to the widespread
and systematic attacks committed by the Libyan authorities against civilian popula-
tion and peaceful demonstrators and amounting to crimes against humanity;
2. As a matter of international law, the use of force had only the “humanitarian” objec-
tive to protect civilians and civilian populated areas from the acts of violence com-
mitted by the Government and, since March 2011 on, from the non-international
armed conflict between the Government and the insurgents;4
3. Accordingly, the international military operations were considered as politically
“neutral” because NATO states never had the intention and the purpose of inter-
vening in Libyan domestic affairs by supporting one of the belligerents or promot-
ing the regime change. This is the reason why the non-international armed conflict
between the Government and the insurgents was qualified as “legally separate” and
“coexistent” to the continuing international armed conflict between the foreign
States participating in the military operations and the Libyan state (Human Rights
Council [HRC] 2011, § 66:31).
According to this analytical framework, widespread and systematic human rights viola-
tions committed by state authorities against the civilian population would always narrow
the scope of the prohibition on the intervention in domestic affairs and on the use of force
contained in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the Charter to the extent that these prohibitions
would yield to the right of humanitarian intervention of the international society as also
contemplated by the R2P doctrine (ICISS 2001) in the name of human security (even if
the R2P doctrine shifts the emphasis from a “right” to intervene to a “duty” to protect).5
However, according to the same analytical framework, the prohibition on the interven-
tion in domestic affairs was applied in its full scope once the Security Council had to set
out general and long-term purposes and objectives of the humanitarian intervention. A
military alliance with the insurgents was ruled out in order to avoid NATO’s direct par-
ticipation in hostilities and, therefore, the violation of that prohibition and – ex multis - of
Article 3 of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.6
Accordingly, the alternative paradigm of two “legally separate” and “coexistent” armed
conflicts, one of which waged for exclusively humanitarian purposes, was adopted by the
Security Council (HRC 2011).7 No explicit reference to an alleged “right to democratic
4 UNSC (2011) authorized Member States “acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements”, on
one hand, “to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on [all] flights [...] in the airspace of the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians” (§§ 6-12) and, on the other, “to take all necessary measures
[...] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including
Benghazi, while excluding a foreing occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (§§ 4-5).
5 “When a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure,
and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect” (ICISS 2001:XI).
6 “1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the
responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or
to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State. 2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a
justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal
or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs” (Article 3 of the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977).
7 “The airstrike to enforce the no-fly zone imposed by the Security Council through Resolution 1973 which began
on 19 March brought into being an international armed conflict between the States participating in this military
action and the Libyan state. The Commission has noted that the objective of this international military action is
to enforce Resolution 1973. It is also satisfied that the actions of NATO and other foreign States involved are not
exercising control over the military actions of either of the parties to the non-international armed conflict. As such,
it concludes that the international armed conflict is legally separate to the continuing non-international armed
conflict, and is thus “co-existing international armed conflict”” (HRC 2011, § 66, p. 31).
intervention” was made by the Security Council while the R2P was only cited in the Pre-
amble of UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011), adopted on 26 February.
Yet, the (legally) “humanitarian” and (politically) “neutral” framework, and the related
paradigm of two “legally separate” and “coexistent” armed conflicts, strains against the
facts when applied to the reality on the ground of the 2011 Libyan crisis to the extent that
it proves formalistic and artificial, if not instrumental.
The implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1973 raises several discrepancies and reveals
inconsistencies with international law:
1. The violation of the purpose (humanitarian protection of civilians, not regime
change) and the limits to the use of force (necessary and proportionate to the hu-
manitarian purpose, not a military alliance with the insurgents against the other
belligerent) set out by the UNSC Resolution 1973;
2. The recognition of the rebels as the only “political interlocutor” (while urging the
Government “to relinquish power immediately [in order] to rapidly embark [Libya]
on an orderly transition to democracy”) granted by the EU just a few days after riot-
ing erupted in Tripoli and Benghazi was already a gross violation of the prohibition
on the intervention in domestic affairs and a clear denial of the alleged “neutral”
nature of NATO’s intervention (EEC 2011, §§ 7-8);8
3. The protection of civilians from on-going hostilities by means of weakening
Khadafi’s military strength was already a direct participation in “someone else’s”
armed conflict regardless of the formalistic paradigm of two “legally separate” and
“coexistent” armed conflicts (and once again a clear denial of the alleged “neutral”
nature of NATO’s intervention).
Resolving these legal inconsistencies is almost impossible and using legal fig leaves would
change little, if any. For instance, the paradigm of two “legally separate” and “coexistent”
armed conflicts (HRC 2011) is just a poor excuse for a reality on the ground instead reveal-
ing only one armed conflict in which NATO and insurgents fought together in order to
defeat the Libyan Government.
3.2. Applying the democratic paradigm to the Libyan crisis

If legal scholars are unable to resolve the inconsistencies illustrated in the previous sub-
section, then they only have two options: either to condemn severely the foreign military
intervention for the disregard of the “humanitarian” and “neutral” objectives set out by
the UNSC Resolution 1973, or to drop the “humanitarian” and “neutral” legal rationale
and look for another one which is able to fill the gap between “the law on the book” (the
“humanitarian” objective set by the Security Council in its Resolutions) and “the law in
8 The escalation of the situation in Libya demarked three periods in legal terms: 1) peace-time (when demonstrations
began in mid-February); 2) non-international armed conflict (the change from peace to non-international armed
conflict occurred by or around 24 February, triggering the application of relevant humanitarian international
law); 3) co-existing international armed conflict (“The airstrikes to enforce the no-fly zone imposed by the Security
Council through Resolution 1973 which began on 19 March brought into being an international armed conflict
between the States participating in this military action and the Libyan state [...] legally separate to the continuing
non-international armed conflict, and is thus a “co-existing international armed conflict””) (HRC 2011, §§ 60-66,
pp. 29-31).
action” (the “democratic” objective revealed by the EU’s statements and implemented by
NATO’s military intervention) through a better description of what really happened dur-
ing the 2011 Libyan crisis.
A new analytical framework is therefore required and the EU’s political statements of 2011
help us define its objectives and consequences. Foreign military operations have no longer
“humanitarian” purposes and scope and “neutral” effects and contents, but instead they
have “democratic” objectives and “interventionist” consequences.
According to this different analytical framework:
1. Foreign states have the right to provide rebels and insurgents fighting authoritarian
regimes with political and military support to install democracies;
2. Foreign states have the right to launch military operations to be considered as po-
litically “interventionist”, i.e. to fight alongside the insurgents against the authori-
tarian regimes for the very purpose of participating in hostilities, influencing their
outcome, and eventually defeating the other belligerent;
3. There exists only one armed conflict in which the insurgents and third states form
an alliance against a common enemy for a common goal: the regime change.
The EU’s foreign policy heavily rests upon the American liberal idealism (Walt 2014) and
the related “right to democratic governance” (Franck 1992). In the new millennium, the
ultimate political goal of the EU is to create a new world order of democratic and neo-
liberal states. To achieve that goal, however, the EU needs a new and different legal ration-
ale for its own actions in the wider world. The scope and limits of the “humanitarian” and
“neutral” discourse are too narrow and defined by now, while the more comprehensive
and loose “democratic” and “interventionist” discourse might guarantee a larger legal um-
brella for a more proactive political and military European action.
Having the EU carried out its “democratic” and “interventionist” words with military, eco-
nomic, and institutional deeds, one has to ask the question about their legality and the
potential progressive development of international law in the field – a question to be an-
swered by delving into the “collective legal conscience” (Quadri 1968) of the international
society with objectivity and care.
The “democratic” intervention would amend the prohibitions on the use of force and in-
tervention in domestic affairs. It would legitimize expressis verbis (no longer only de facto)
the right of foreign states to provide political support to rebels and fight alongside insur-
gents in their struggles and armed conflicts against the authoritarian regimes. Eventually,
it would also lead to the reformulation of the self-determination principle according to
which people (or part thereof ) would have the right to fight against their own govern-
ments for installing western-style democracies. For the time being, the riots or insurgen-
cies against authoritarian governments have no legal value for the self-determination theo-
ry. They are just political actions of violent or revolutionary overthrowing of governments,
not the exercise of a legal right. Should, however, the “democratic” intervention turn one
day into binding international law, the “democratic” meaning of the self-determination
principle would indeed become one of its legal pillars.
In other words, the “democratic” intervention would become the instrument of a long-
term political strategy pursued in the name of democracy by the EU while, at least in
theory, the “humanitarian” intervention is “only” the inevitable consequence of a legal

obligation fulfilled in the name of humanity by the international society.
Summing up, the EU is at the crossroads: when further “Libyan crises” will happen, either
it succeeds in changing international law in order to better excuse its policies and actions
aimed at democratizing the wider world, or otherwise it will be even clearer the unlawful-
ness of its quest for worldwide democracy.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The EU practice in the Libyan case revealed a deep gap among political declarations, le-
gal rationales, and military operations, i.e. between the law on the books and the law in
action. This gap did not help in making legally binding at international level the political
discourse on human security.
The political objective to overthrown the authoritarian regime of Khadafi and the scale,
effects and magnitude of NATO’s military operations (in other words: the EU “democrat-
ic” and “interventionist” vision) have nothing to do with the “humanitarian” and “neutral”
features set by the UNSC Resolutions or by the R2P doctrine.
Human security and R2P’s “targets” are peoples, not governments; their purpose is to
protect individuals from widespread and systemic violence, not to install political and eco-
nomic systems in lieu of others; their scope is narrow and limited to certain categories of
human rights violations, not so loose to encompass whatever alleged breach of interna-
tional law.
The R2P expressly rules out regime change from its goals and narrows the scope of mili-
tary operations conducted by foreign states. Military intervention is exclusively allowed
only in exceptional circumstances in which large scale loss of life or large scale ethnic
cleansing is threatened or taking place.
ICISS (2001) does not authorize the military option in case of:
a. “human rights violations falling short of outright killing or ethnic cleansing, for ex-
ample systematic racial discrimination, or the systematic imprisonment or other
repression of political opponents” (ICISS 2001 § 4.25, p. 34);
b. “use of military force by a state to rescue its own nationals on foreign territory,
sometimes claimed as another justification for “humanitarian intervention” [and]
the same goes for the use of force in response to a terrorist attack on a state’s terri-
tory and citizens” (ICISS 2001 § 4.27, p. 34);
c. “a population, having clearly expressed its desire for a democratic regime, is denied
its democratic rights by a military take-over” (ICISS 2001 § 4.26, p. 34).
During the Libyan crisis, the Security Council made no reference at the R2P and human
security discourses because the only declared purpose of its authorization to the use of
force was the humanitarian protection of civilians from the on-going armed conflict rather
than the human security of the Libyan people. Even the EU kept silence on these two
concepts, even if its real and ultimate purpose was not simply humanitarian but actually
encompassed the exportation of democracy by the use of force and the overthrowing of
the Libyan Government.
Summing up, the EU practice did not help in legalizing at international level the political
discourse on human security and R2P for, at least, three reasons:
1. The EU did not expressly and formally invoke the R2P/human security as legal ra-
tionale for NATO’s military intervention;
2. Even if the humanitarian intervention is part of the wider concept of R2P and not-
withstanding it was formally invoked by the EU, the subsequent military operations
disregarded its limits, scope and purposes;
3. The EU actually pursued a different objective (regime change by fighting alongside
the insurgents) that is expressly prohibited by the R2P/human security political
discourse and legal doctrine.
At the Informal interactive dialogue on the latest Report of the Secretary-General on the
Responsibility to Protect (held on 8 September 2014 at the UN General Assembly), sev-
eral UN officials, to begin with the Secretary-General, stressed the urgency of implement-
ing the R2P as adopted by world leaders in 2005 (UNGA July 2014).
As underlined by the Assembly Vice President Isabelle Picco, nearly ten years after the
2005 World Summit “we are still reckoning with [R2P] implications and where and how
to act on and implement this decision”, even if “support for the principle has steadily ex-
panded, leading to a growing consensus on its key elements, including that: a) its scope is
limited to the protection of populations from atrocity crimes [...], and d) that implemen-
tation must take place in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other
established principles of international law” (UNGA September 2014:3).
Exactly these key elements were disregarded or ignored by the EU’s political statements
and NATO’s military intervention. No significant progress in further defining, advancing
upon, and refining the political agenda and the legal discourse on R2P and human security
was therefore brought about by the Libyan crisis.
5. REFERENCES
Bargiacchi P. (2011): Orientamenti della dottrina statunitense di diritto internazionale,

Milano: Giuffré Editore.
European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Se-
curity Policy (March 2011): A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the
southern Mediterranean, COM(2011) 200 final, 8 March 2011.
ID. (2011): A new response to a changing neighbourhood, COM(2011) 303 final, ID. (May
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UDC 351.78(497.11)
Edin KALAČ*
IMPROVING HUMAN SECURITY –

AN EXAMPLE OF SOUTH WEST SERBIA1
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to present the results of the program that was created and
implemented in southwest Serbia. This part of Serbia is one of the most deprived areas in the
country. It is a home to a number of IDPs, refugees and returnees under the readmission agree-
ments. The living conditions of the Roma community are particularly hard. Although the region
is among the youngest in Serbia (more than 50% of population is under the age of 30), the youth
unemployment rate is 60%. The region is ethnically mixed and ethnic groups are divided. In or-
der to address these problems, the UN Team in Serbia implement two year project “Improving
human security in southwest Serbia” with the aim to employ, engage and empower the vulner-
able groups in southwest Serbia. The main project deliverables include: establishment of a formal
recycling and waste collection centre and cooperative, enhancement of the inter-ethnic dialogue
and human rights through art, sports, culture and education and improvement of the access to
services related to citizenship rights and documentation. This project aims to create jobs that will
generate household income, secure access to public and social services, and promote community
cohesion which will collectively enhance and strengthen human security in southwest Serbia. It
will set the ground for a widespread behavioural change and for increased citizen’s engagement
in community related matters.
In the first part of the paper, the author presents the Concept of Human Security. Work further
presents short historical background and the current status of human security in the region of
southwest Serbia. In the third part the article treats the results of the implemented project. The
results of this work represent a significant source of information and establish a basis for solving
the problems in the process of managing human security in the deprived areas in the countries
like Serbia.
Keywords: concept of human security, southwest Serbia, vulnerable groups
1. HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT

Broad security conception is followed by the modern human security theory. The term
human security became popular after being used in the United Nations Development Pro-
* Edin Kalač, UNDP; Joint program coordinator at “Improving human security in southwest Serbia” project, PhD
candidate at Economic Faculty, University of Nis. e-mail: kalac.edin@gmail.com
[320] Edin KALAČ
gram (UNDP) Report in 1994 (UNDP 1994). In this report economic, food, health, envi-
ronmental, personal, community and political dimensions of security were highlighted.
Former United Nations Organization (UN) Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in his Millen-
nium Report stated that human kind should be the most important point of interests for all
the countries and international organizations, particularly for the UN, which would have
to guarantee security for every man (Marczuk 2008).
Human security conception is well-known and is still being developed by the
Western countries and the UN. The Commission on Human Security (CHS) defines
human security as aimed:
“…to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and
human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms
that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and perva-
sive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s
strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic,
military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival,
livelihood and dignity.” (United Nations Human Security Unit [UNHSU] 2009:5).
This definition re-conceptualizes security in a way that moves away from traditional,
state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of states from
military aggression, to one that concentrates on the security of the individuals, their pro-
tection and empowerment. This definition also promotes a new integrated, coordinated
and people-centred approach to advancing peace, security and development within and
across nations.
Human security brings together the ‘human elements’ of security, rights and develop-
ment. As such, it is an inter-disciplinary concept that displays the following characteristics
(UNHSU 2009:6):
• people-centred,
• multi-sectoral,
• comprehensive,
• context-specific, and
• prevention-oriented.
It means using the processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations.
2. APPLICATION OF THE HUMAN SECURITY

APPROACH IN SOUTHWEST SERBIA
“Improving human security in southwest Serbia” project is one of the examples of projects
supported under the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. As Human security
is based on a multi-sectoral understanding of insecurities, therefore, the project entails a
broadened understanding of threats and includes the causes of insecurity relating for in-
stance to economic, health, environmental, social, and personal and community security.
The new Serbian national security strategy is related to the new security thinking (broad
security concept). But providing human security in the region of southwest Serbia is re-
lated to the basic values, such as sustainable development of the economy, society, care
for the environment, and the development of science. The overall project intervention
AN EXAMPLE OF SOUTH WEST SERBIA [321]
and objectives are fully in line with the national and local strategic priorities for southwest
Serbia and with the HSTF priorities and guidelines. The Joint Programme objective is
“To improve the human security of refugee, IDP, migrant and other vulnerable individuals
and communities in southwest Serbia, freeing them from want and need that is associated
with political, social and economic exclusion.”
Human security approach requires working in an integrated manner by directly assessing
externalities and focusing on legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness. Taking into account
the multi-sectoral nature of the human security challenges in the region of South west Ser-
bia, the project takes an inter-agency approach to integrate the comparative advantages
of four UN agencies – UNDP, UNOPS, WHO and UNFPA. Project activities are imple-
mented in direct collaboration with the Government, including the Office for Sustainable
Development of Underdeveloped Areas in the first year of project implementation, and
in the second year the Ministries of Economy (as the Office for Sustainable Development
of Underdeveloped Areas from April 2014 under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Econ-
omy). Local governments, NGOs and community organizations are also involved in the
implementation of the project.
2.1 Overview
Southwest Serbia is one of the most deprived areas in Serbia. It is home to a number IDPs,
refugees and returnees under the readmission agreements. The living conditions of the
Roma community are particularly hard. Although the region is among the youngest re-
gions in Serbia (more than 50% of population is under the age of 30), the youth unemploy-
ment rate is 60%.The region is ethnically mixed and the two largest ethnic groups, the
Bosniaks and Serbs, are divided internally and disenfranchised by the central government.
Southwest Serbia has the highest poverty rate estimated at 30%. It is the poorest perform-
ing region with real growth of 5% over 8 years from 2001-2008.2 This is due to a history
of underinvestment, poor physical, social and educational infrastructure, the collapse of
socially owned enterprises, and brain-drain through out-migration from the region. This
leaves limited business opportunities and a general lack of private investment. As a result,
the unemployment rate in southern and eastern Serbia is 24.8%.
IDPs are at higher risk of disease due to joblessness and poor living conditions, and there-
fore increased stress. According to a recent UNHCR survey (UNHCR 2011) 24.1% of IDPs
suffer from chronic diseases, while 8.5% are classified as disabled. Often, IDPs do not have
access to formal healthcare or Government assistance due to a lack of proper documenta-
tion. The UNHCR survey found that 8% of households reported lacking one or more basic
documents (identity card and birth certificate). The fraction of individuals at risk of state-
lessness is twice as high among the Roma, especially those that fled from Kosovo in 1999,
who are facing multiple deprivations: economic exclusion, exclusion from social services
and exclusion from participation.
In order to address these problems, the UN Team in Serbia has pioneered an innovative
and scalable model that is employing, engaging and empowering vulnerable groups in
southwest Serbia. During the initial analysis, mapping and planning phase of a human
2 Serbian 2008 Household Budget Survey

[322] Edin KALAČ
security programme in southwest Serbia, the program team had a task to ensure that
the programme addresses the actual needs/vulnerabilities and capacities of the affected
communities and presents strategies that are based on the protection and empowerment
framework with the active participation and implementation of the affected communities.
Beneficiaries are politically disenfranchised, socially excluded and economically and cul-
turally underpowered individuals in Novi Pazar and other municipalities in southwest Ser-
bia, especially the women, the youth and the Roma.
2.2 Application of the human security approach

The new Serbian national security strategy is related to the new security thinking (broad
security concept). But providing human security in the region of southwest Serbia is re-
lated to basic values, such as sustainable development of the economy, society, care for the
environment, and the development of science. The overall project intervention and objec-
tives are fully in line with the national and local strategic priorities for southwest Serbia
and with the HSTF priorities and guidelines.
Human security approach requires working in an integrated manner by directly assessing
externalities and focusing on legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness. Taking into account
the multi-sectoral nature of the human security challenges in the region of southwest Ser-
bia, the project takes an inter-agency approach to integrate the comparative advantages
of the four UN agencies – UNDP, UNOPS, WHO and UNFPA. Project activities are im-
plemented in direct collaboration with the Government, including the Office for Sustain-
able Development of Underdeveloped Areas in the first year of project implementation,
and in the second year the Ministries of Economy (as the Office for Sustainable Develop-
ment of Underdeveloped Areas from April 2014 under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Economy). Local governments, NGOs and community organizations are also involved in
the implementation of the project.
Based on an integrated and comprehensive approach, the project focuses on achieving the
following goals:
1. Income Generation and Employment for targeted populations improved;
2. Disenfranchised groups in Sandzak are in better position to enjoy their human
rights and develop human potentials ;
3. To improve access to Social and Public Services,
4. Diffusion and Adoption of the Human Security Concept
Under objective 1 - Income Generation and Employment for targeted populations –the
improved Program has a plan to Establish a formal recycling and waste collection cen-
tre and cooperative in or near Novi Pazar that will provide employment for members of
vulnerable groups. Within this Objective Feasibility Study for Waste Sector Analysis and
recycling model development in southwest Serbia has been done by the pool of experts.
The study analyzed several business scenarios and pointed out the benefits and risks for
each based on experiences from similar projects in Serbia.
The sustainable organization model for the Centre has been developed and agreed upon
with the relevant stakeholders (Collector communities, the City, Public Utility Company,
etc.). Feasibility study has shown that initially proposed business model has a high risk of
not being sustainable due to low productivity levels and legal constraints, as it is the case
with similar project in Serbia that are currently operating with no financial success.
Close partnership with the local stakeholders (the city of Novi Pazar and the Public Util-
ity Company) is agreed as main mitigation measure for this risk. This implies that main
project deliverables (constructions, equipment, etc.) would be vested in the local self-gov-
ernment of Novi Pazar and managed by the Public Utility Company which is obligated to
employ the members of vulnerable communities for work in the Recycling Centre as well
as to have a partnership agreement with cooperation/association of collectors communi-
ties for purchasing collected recyclable materials from them.
The proposed organization model for the Recycling Centre envisages that the Centre
would be owned by the City, operated by the PUC and it will employ at least 10 people
from vulnerable groups in the first year and additional 9 people in the second year to work
in the Centre. The Centre will sign partnership agreement with the cooperative/associa-
tion of the collector’s communities to buy the recyclable materials they collect at a fair
price. Twenty or more cooperative/association members are expected be engaged in the
first year to cooperate with the Centre in this way. In this way the sustainability of the Re-
cycling Centre will be enhanced.
• Under objective 2, the program supported organization of series of different inter-
cultural events in Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin under the name “Strength of Diver-
sity”- in order to diminish ethnic stereotypes between young people from south-
west region and the rest of Serbia. The figures speak for themselves:
• During 2013 and 2014, 10,000 people visited two editions of “Youth Theatre Fes-
tival” during which 16 youth troupes from different parts of Serbia with over 200
participants performed socially engaged plays.
• More than 60,000 young people of different nationalities attended Music festival
“Stari Grad” (2013 and 2014) where speakers and artists promoted ideas of inter-
ethnic dialogue and understanding.
• UNDP supported 51st MOSI 2014 (Inter-municipal sports games), five- day long
sport event, and the biggest in this part of Europe, which gathered over 2,000 ama-
teur competitors from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.
• Ethnically mixed group of 37 young photographers from different parts of Serbia
were gathered at the SWS Photo Workshop 2013 to learn and work together - tak-
ing photos of people and landscapes of the region for the first time.
• In cooperation with Belgrade University of Arts UNDP organized “Summer Arts
School” in Prijepolje which gathered 55 young artists from Serbia, Bosnia and
Montenegro.
• The “Good Host” initiative gathered 250 students and their teachers from Kraguje-
vac, Vranje, Novi Sad and Belgrade to visit southwest region, but at the same time
to build friendship and trust between ethnically mixed children and expose them
to different cultures and customs. During 2014, the return visit was conducted and
the students from Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin were the guests to their peers in
the cities of Serbia.
• The Youth Build Programme in Sandzak in 2013 and 2014 gathers two multi-ethnic
groups with 40 young people in each who are spending months in training courses
adjusted to the labour market needs and focusing on civic activism, trainings in
practical skills, leadership development and development of entrepreneurial skills
[324] Edin KALAČ
in order to gain practical knowledge and experience. Some of the immediate results
are:
• Youth Leadership School for 45 young politicians from all six Sandzak towns or-
ganized two successful modules with the aim to empower young leaders and pro-
vide them with adequate skills, techniques and knowledge necessary for them to
undertake leadership role in the community/party/organization.
Under Objective 3 - To improve access to Social and Public Services – the program com-
pletely rehabilitated and fully equipped the Health Clinic in Blazevo. The Health Clinic has
been handed over to the Novi Pazar Health Centre. Also the specific responsibilities of the
program for the implementation of the output 3.1 are linked to reduced threat of stateless-
ness and improved access to services related to citizenships rights and documentation:
registration, health, education, social protection and employment.
Under Objective 3, the program carried out the following activities:
• The Assessment Phase was performed in Spring 2013 with the aim of tailoring ac-
tivities to specific and cultural needs of the target populations;
• Since the development of the Recycling centre was modified, a “social matrix”
document was created based on the data collected in the assessment phase, for the
whole Roma population in the Novi Pazar area who are all potential beneficiaries of
the recycling centre;
• SWOT analysis of citizens services provided to the Roma in the region was com-
pleted in the Summer of 2013;
• Assessment on health and immunization among the targeted populations was
conducted during the period September-October 2013 followed by trainings for
community nurses in four towns in southwest Serbia held in Spring 2014;
• Registration and documents - Since the beginning of the project until the end of
August 2014, 233 requests for assistance with documents were received for 128 ben-
eficiaries, of which 189 requests were successfully completed, while 44 are still be-
ing processed. Five workshops on access to basic human rights and personal docu-
ments were organized in the Roma settlements in Novi Pazar and Sjenica attended
by almost 120 participants who gained practical knowledge of the rights and proce-
dures for obtaining personal documents;
• Access to Health Services – The Project assisted 30 people with obtaining health
insurance, however, through provision of identity documents we assume that the
project in fact assisted a much larger number of people who applied for health in-
surance independently after acquiring identity documents. Four accredited train-
ings on human rights, minority groups and access to health care were held for the
employees of the Primary Health Care Centres in Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin and
Prijepolje. 252 medical professionals attended the training prepared by the Faculty
of Medicine in Belgrade and they are now better equipped to work with people
from various minorities and cultural backgrounds. The participants also included
staff of the health clinic in Blazevo which was recently established with the support
of the HSTF project. A series of 8 health promotional activities was conducted in
the Novi Pazar region in the Roma settlements with the aim not only to improve
health literacy among the Roma, but also to link them with the existing health ser-
vices that are available to them locally.
• Employment and Social protection – support to social work centres was provided
by the program through trainings organized for their employees,
• Education – Through the project, additional classes for children from the Roma
settlements in Novi Pazar were organized for 38 children, while only 15 completed
the school year due to migration before the end of the school year. It was identified
in the assessment phase that more than three quarters of the Roma adults in Novi
Pazar region were illiterate. Literacy classes were organized in two Roma settle-
ments and 80 adults mastered basic literacy skills – ability to read block letters, to
fill out and sign forms. For teachers who work with Roma children in Novi Pazar
and Sjenica, 9 three-day trainings were organized that significantly improved their
capacity to stimulate better academic achievement for the Roma pupils.
Program engagement in the Objective 4 - “Diffusion and Adoption of the Human Security
Concept” is related to diffusion and adoption of the Human Security Concept in southwest
Serbia. To achieve this objective, program used every opportunity to promote inter-ethnic
understanding, community cohesion and inclusion. “Strength of Diversity Week” – series of
cultural events and “The City of Good Host” - twinning of ethnically mixed schools are just
some examples on how young people can fight stereotypes. The news related to these events
was widely broadcasted through all media.
In order to obtain more relevant data on state of human security, program conducted two
researches titled “Citizens’ attitude towards discrimination in Serbia/Sandžak”. UNDP
also conducted a qualitative study research – focus groups in all six municipalities cov-
ered by the project activities in the purpose of obtaining an initial impression of the state
of human security in Sandzak region.
Program organized cycling “Tour without Borders” with the goal to promote peace, rec-
onciliation and tolerance among people and their countries.
3. CONCLUSION
By bridging the ethnic divide through art, sports competition, education and training as well
as improving economic and health situation for vulnerable groups, the project contributes
to the consolidation and promotion of human security in southwest Serbia. This integrated
approach comprehensively addresses the root causes of human insecurity. The main goal
was to ensure the ownership by the beneficiaries and local counterparts through capacity
building and partnership. This project shows up that the United Nations agencies have the
capacity, ability and will for undertaking effective human security progress in this region.
The Project is playing pivotal role in addressing the need to increase Human Security in
southwest Serbia. In addition, the sensitivity of issues addressed through the project, add
additional complexity to the environment in which the project is operating. Since the pro-
ject is dealing with sensitive issues related to change of human behaviour and perception,
this is directly linked to the length of project’s intervention meaning the longer the particu-
lar subjects are discussed and present, the better impact and change would be achieved.
The project introduced and tested new approaches and innovative models during the im-
plementation of its activities. It is especially important that the project is highly innovative
in diminishing ethnic stereotypes, particularly focusing on youth like activities related to
inter-cultural framework.
[326] Edin KALAČ
4. REFERENCES:
United Nations Development Program (1994): Human Development Report 1994. New
York.
Marczuk, Karina Paulina (2008): “A Conceptualization of the Human Security Doctrine in
the Post-Communist States in the Balkans”; National Security Study, Warsaw Univer-
sity, in _____(2008): Croatian International Relations Review, Vol.13 No.46/47 Svibanj.
United Nations Human Security Unit (2009): HUMAN SECURITY IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE - Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust
Fund for Human Security, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs United
Nations, Madison Avenue New York.
UNHCR (2011): Assessment of the needs of internally displaced persons in Serbia, UNHCR,
February.
UDC 351.746.1:343.9.02(497)
Strahinja BRAJUŠKOVIĆ*
INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT - THE REGIONAL PROGRAM

FOR HUMAN SECURITY AND THE APPROACH FOR SUPPRESSING
TRANS-ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE WESTERN BALKANS1
Abstract: This paper contains an analytical approach of the phenomena of organized crime and
the regional program for Integrated Border Security and Management in the Western Balkans
(IBM).
Organized crime groups take advantage of the lack of close functioning cooperation among the
Western Balkans countries. During the war in the 1990s and sanctions, the cooperation between
political elites and structures from the secret services and different crime cartels came together
behind the scenes and for a common purpose. The Western Balkan countries have reached the
second decade of the 21st century when, in spite of outer political changes, the links between
criminal and other structures are still in place. The reason is that “the basic structures of the state
apparatus” were never dismantled. It seems that the political discontinuity has been followed by
institutional continuity (Eriksen, Solumsmoen 2005:15).
Organized crime from the Western Balkans represents sensitive issues for the EU. This is why
the EU presented the concept of integrated border management in the Western Balkans at the
Conference on Border Security and Management in Ohrid in 2003. This program is known as
the “Ohrid Border Process” and anticipates the development of a modern state system that un-
derstands by itself the common state resource. The successful development and implementation
of this concept will be a key frame for an efficient fight against trans-organized crime, illegal
migrations and prevention of terrorist activities. In this respect, the establishment of the rule of
law should be reached in all the countries through strict reforms in the security sector (police,
army, security forces). At the same time “it will enhanced cross border flows which support the
development of more open societies with a better understanding and tolerance”. (EC 2007b:14)
Keywords: organized crime, Western Balkans, security sector
1. INTRODUCTORY NOTES
The Western Balkans region includes the states newly created from the former Yugoslavia,
with Albania but without Slovenia. This region spreads over approximately 5,000 kilome-
ters of borders with 25 million people. Some could argue that this geographical term could
* Strahinja Brajušković, BSc, Consultant for JHA, Civilnet, e-mail: strahinja70@gmail.com

[328] Strahinja BRAJUŠKOVIĆ
anticipate some kind of Balkan union. However, even though these countries have already
been in the process of integration into the EU for a long time, regional cooperation and
ownership, which are the essence of the EU integration are not genuinely implemented
among the Western Balkans constituting states.
On the contrary, certain “brotherhood and unity” has been developed among organized
crime groups within the region and it is dangerous that criminal groups sometimes have
better mutual understanding than the official political elites. There are many examples of
the cooperation of criminal groups across the countries that were only recently in war,
some cases are only suspected but some are well documented. One of the joint crime ac-
tivities proven in court is the assassination of Ivo Pukanic, Editor-in-Chief of a Croatian
newspapers. The members of criminal groups from different countries of the region were
convincted of this murder.2 This is rather an interesting phenomenon showing that crime
is not selective about nationality, even in highly nationally charged political surroundings.
Money brings together those who find a common interest, and the links are sometimes
surprising and go deeper than many would care to investigate. For the Western Balkans
region this means that it brings together structures that are developed on corruption and
organized crime and often have links to some parts of the security sector across the region.
In that regard the whole region is facing a security problem which also threatens the whole
Europe. Fight against corruption and organized crime and establishing rule of law should
be achieved in the Western Balkans countries through a security sector reform process.
With these ideas, the EU with its partners NATO, OSCE and Stability Pact has proposed
the concept of Integration Border Security and Management in the Western Balkans.
Such an approach to border management requires efficient and effective joint effort by all
competent services involved. The cooperation and coordination cannot be limited to the
national level but should necessarily include the services in all countries of the region and
the international level (EC 2007b:17). The Western Balkan countries must develop strong
security cooperation with their neighbours and create proper internal, regional and fur-
ther international arrangements. An example of good practice of inter-agency cooperation
was established at the Baltic Sea Region with the goal to combat organized crime which
gave good results.3
2. WHAT IS THE SITUATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE WESTERN

BALKANS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EU
The problem of organized crime has multiple aspects and remains a very complex issue for
all Balkans countries. For many years, the scope of organized crime was not a priority con-
cern in the region. In order to analyse that, “it is necessary to take into account the political
and social reasons that have been, and still are behind and the increase in the organized
crime rate in the region” (Group 484 2008:43).
First of all, the wars in the former Yugoslavia have been crucial moments for establish-
ing cooperation among the political elites, secret service structures and organized crime
2 See at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11682415
3 See at http://cbss.idynamic.lv/Civil-Security-and-the-Human-Dimension/task-force-on-organised-crime-in-the-
baltic-sea-region
INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT - THE REGIONAL PROGRAM FOR HUMAN SECU-
RITY AND THE APPROACH FOR SUPPRESSING TRANS-ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE... [329]
groups. Up to now, these links have never been investigated. As a consequence, today’s
Balkan societies have to deal with what is now the second generation of organized crime
groups (OCGs).
Geographically, the Western Balkans is at the crossroad between Europe and the Middle
East. Its borders are not well controlled.
The poor and turbulent economic situation also makes it a very interesting hub for organ-
ized crime and transnational organized crime. Drug trafficking in human beings, weapons’
trafficking, migrant smuggling, etc. are the major problems.
The conductive factor for such a flourishing organized crime environment is the very high
level of corruption without which organized crime activities would not be so easy (from
bribing a police and customs officers for drug smuggling to bribing a bank officer for mon-
ey laundering).
The privatization process that took place in Serbia as in any other ex-socialistic country
also provided a unique opportunity for OCG to recycle in the legal economy their pro-
ceeds from crime.
Such a situation has been very conductive to organized crime groups who have been using
the territory of the Western Balkans as a logistical base for organizing their criminal activi-
ties through which they realize significant financial gains and with which they control the
political life and thus affect the already weak state systems.
Furthermore, the lack of adequate operational cooperation among Western Balkans coun-
tries gave a serious advantage to the organized crime groups to develop their “business” on
a large and transnational territory.
All of the above indicates the various aspects of human insecurity. Such a situation inevi-
tably raises the question of efficiency of the existing security system and the necessity of
its reform. The process of this reform should focus on building the conditions in which
human beings feel safe. That requires the creation of economic, political, social, environ-
mental, healthcare and personal security.
Consequently, human insecurity from the Western Balkans jeopardizes the human secu-
rity in the whole EU and that has a significant impact on the public opinion in the member
states. The EU and member states governments are seeking to convey the message to their
citizens that the crime present at home should be primarily fought outside their countries
through specific institutional cooperation. In that sense, the concept of Integration Border
Security and Management in the Western Balkans is proposed as an approach to develop
a new security system at the regional level. The successful development and implementa-
tion of this concept depends on the effective fight against trans-organized crime, illegal
migration and the prevention of terrorist activities.
3. WHAT IS INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT (IBM)

AND WHY IS IT NEEDED?
Integrated border management (IBM) is a delicate developmental program of global se-
curity which aims to reconcile modern safety requirements, on the one hand, and to fa-
cilitate cross-border trade, on the other hand. The main purpose of IBM is to provide an
appropriate balance between open, but at the same time safe and controlled borders. So,
open borders for trade, tourism and other forms of legal flows of people and goods, but
controlled and secure borders when it comes to the threat posed by irregular migration,
trafficking in human beings, and all the activities of organized criminal networks as well
as terrorism.
IBM is a modern state system which is based on three levels of cooperation. It requires
the joint work of several organs, departments and agencies in an efficient and effective
manner and in coordination with the authorities who are responsible for the creation of
state policy. The goal is to build an efficient state structure more regionally connected and
develop contemporary operational information-technology systems.
In its strategic documents, IBM is defined as “national and international coordination
and cooperation among the relevant authorities and agencies included in border secu-
rity and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient and coordinated border manage-
ment, in order to reach the objective of open, but well controlled and secure borders” (EC
2007b:18).
Such a vision of borders has a positive impact on the respect for human rights, the persons
in need of protection, the mobility of people, trade facilitation, the competitiveness of
the public sector and it supports economic development through increased revenue and
improved human security.
The specific impacts of IBM include: improved practices and governance of border agen-
cies, improved cooperation at borders and cross border, open borders (to legitimate trav-
ellers including refugees and asylum seekers), well controlled borders (improved border
checks and border surveillance, enhanced detection of crime and all illegal activities) as
well as improved state and regional stability.
All the above mentioned will have a positive impact on improving the state of play of hu-
man security in the countries of the Western Balkans.
3. 1. Integrated border management and the EU

The importance of external borders and their crucial role in the proper functioning of the
single market, “zone of freedom, justice and security”, as well as other important aspects
were identified in the first years after the establishment of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), after the first indication of the future formation of the customs union and
the common market. However, the term IBM started to be formally in use in the EU only
recently. At the European Council meeting in Liken in December 2001, a discussion was
initiated about a new subject called: “Integrated Border Management”, which took into
account both the interests of those who are directly related to the borders, and those who
are far away from them.
After a period of debate, IBM came up to a comprehensive, communitarian approach to
border management. This is indicated in the Communication of the European Commis-
sion to the EU Council and the European Parliament in 2002 entitled “Towards integrated
management of the external borders of the EU Member States”. Later, an EU Council Reg-
ulation established a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX.).
3. 2. Integrated border management in the Western Balkan countries

The term “integrated border management” first appeared in the domestic legislation in
the Constitutional Chart of Serbia and Montenegro4 which was adopted in February 2003.
The IBM concept for the Western Balkans was first mentioned in the CARDS regional
program for the Western Balkans: multi-annual indicative programme (MIP) 2002-2006
(EC 2007b:14). In May 2003, the concept of IBM in the Western Balkans actually kicked
off with the Regional Conference on Border Security and Management that was held in
Ohrid. At this conference, the Western Balkan countries agreed to issue a Common Plat-
form5 as proposed by the four partner organizations (NATO, EU, OSCE and the Stability
Pact) which contained the guidelines, policy objectives, principles, tools, support, and
short-term objectives for the countries and partner organizations. Based on this Platform,
as well as on the basis of the conclusions of the Conference in Ohrid, a document called
“Way Forward Document” has been created. It focuses on the initial short-term practical
measures to achieve the goals identified in the Platform.
As a part of the development of these objectives, the European Commission in October
2004 issued a document entitled “Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the
Western Balkans”, which represents the basis for the development of this program. In this
regard, the European Commission has provided a significant funding for the development
of this program, first through the CARDS Regional Program, and later through the IPA
instrument.
This concept anticipates the formation of a modern state system with common states re-
sources. Such an approach to border management requires efficient and effective joint
effort by all competent services involved. The cooperation is not limited to the national
level but necessarily includes the competent services in other countries.
The guidelines for IBM which constitute the basis for all activities of this process address
three levels of co-operation and co-ordination (EC 2007b:19):
1. The first level of intra-service co-operation refers to procedures, exchange of informa-
tion and resources within one ministry or agency. This includes:
a. vertical co-operation: between central, regional and local levels;
b. horizontal co-operation: between different units of the same levels;
2. The second level entails inter-agency co-operation and refers to cooperation/coordi-
nation between different ministries or border agencies, as well as between the opera-
tional officers of the different agencies active at the border.
3. The third level is related to cross-border, i.e. international cooperation.
International cooperation means:
a. Cooperation at local level between officials on both sides of the border;
b. Activities between neighbouring state-organizations (patrols and common con-
tact offices);
c. Exchange of experience at multilateral level to better approach the common work
in the fields such as trans-border crime;
4 Constitutional Chart of Serbian and Montenegro, Article 19.

5 Common Platform of the Ohrid Regional Conference on Border Security and Management, 22 and 23 May 2003
d. Improvement of cooperation in the area of asylum, migration and visas: focussing

on the cooperation aspect between border police and other actors in the migration
field;
e. Extensive cooperation with intelligence services.
4. REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IBM

In 2005, The European Commission launched the regional project “Support to and coor-
dination of integrated border management strategies”. This regional project had the fol-
lowing objectives:
• Preparation and adoption of national strategies and action plans;
• Setting up of different regional networks;
• Support the development of relevant operational techniques;
• Contribution to the compatibility between information systems at the regional
level;
• Drafting regulative framework.
Many reports note the progress achieved in all the objectives (EC 2005:60). Within the
duration of this project the relevant state bodies’ structures were appointed in the coun-
tries of the Western Balkans as the main step towards the creation of a regional ownership.
The International forum of heads of border services to exchange information and strate-
gies to manage their border crossings was established.
The implementation of the concept of IBM in the Republic of Serbia has progressed
and reached a clearly improved level. The National IBM Strategy and Action Plan (EC
2007a:37) were adopted in 2006. In February 2009, the Interagency Cooperation Agree-
ment (EC 2010:58) between the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry
of Agriculture, Water and Forestry and the Ministry for Capital Investments was signed
and defined the areas and forms of cooperation at the national, regional and local level.
However, embedded and formalized cooperation between the institutions is not yet on
the planned level. The cooperation between customs and border police has improved
significantly but there is a perception that phyto-sanitary and veterinary services are ex-
cluded or marginalized in many cases.
In 2009, Serbia concluded a Working Arrangement with the European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of
the European Union (FRONTEX).
The Belgrade-Pristina agreement signed on April 19, 2013 has finally overcome the po-
litical deadlock over Kosovo. Within this dialogue, a working group for IBM has been
created, aiming to deal with the issues of administrative crossings between Serbia and Ko-
sovo. Two liaison officers to Belgrade and Pristina were appointed. Container terminals
for veterinary and phyto-sanitary services were set up at some crossings. Considering the
burning issue of organized crime activity in this border zone, this progress confirms that
the concept of IBM in the Westerns Balkans is more than necessary.
Serbia is the central state of the Western Balkans and one of the three countries in the
region that has received the most significant part of financial support of the EU in view of
the implementation of IBM. Such a position of Serbia requires a proactive approach to the
implementation of IBM. However, many of the goals outlined in the Strategy and Action
Plan are not met.
The implementation of activities to strengthen cooperation and coordination within and
between agencies responsible for border and cooperation with competent authorities
of other countries would favour the exchange of information between the neighbour-
ing countries as well as the joint creation of a regional database. There is evidence which
shows still quite limited exchange of information between border services of neighbouring
countries, for example Serbia and Albania. Border police and customs still have no inves-
tigative powers that would enable better detection and more effective combat of all forms
of cross-border crime.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The EU concept of IBM has gradually developed over the last decade in the Westerns Bal-
kans. One of its major achievements is in regard to the “normalization” and stabilization
of the region where political and ethnic tensions were predominant. At the same time,
the development of IBM unfortunately showed that the construction of regional owner-
ship has remained a significant weakness due to political, institutional and other types of
resistance.
Although IBM remained incomplete, it is a cornerstone of future integration and mem-
bership in European Union (EC 2007b:18). Accordingly, improvement is still needed in
regional cooperation and development of regional ownership. The desirable following
step is to initiate the regional inter-agency coordination platform (EC 2007b:82) and to
sign a Memorandum of Understanding which includes mechanisms and procedures for
the exchange of information at the Western Balkans level. This instrument will include a
legal instrument for a joint threat/risk assessment, information and intelligence sharing,
coordination and the conduct of operations at a regional level.
The reform project on establishing IBM may yield the results only if all the countries in
the region are seriously committed to it. In that regard, the effective abolition of all types
of resistance through bilateral and multilateral cooperation is the way to the successful pre-
vention and prosecution of all illegal cross-border activities of the regional mafia of activi-
ties of the regional mafia. Only in that case will the Western Balkans play a crucial role in
consolidation of the European security. They will also become more attractive for foreign
direct investments and therefore improve all aspects of their human security.
6. REFERENCES
Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro (2003): Constitutional Chart of Serbian and Monte-
negro, Belgrade.
Eriksen Svein, Solumsmoen Dag (2005): Unfinished Transition – Serbian Public Adminis-
tration Reform, 2001-2004, Statskonsult, Oslo, Norway, Belgrade, SCG, March.
Group 484 (2008): Towards White Schengen List Serbia Progress Report on Visa Liberalisa-
tion Process, Belgrade.
European Commission [EC] (2004) Support to and coordination of integrated border man-
agement strategies, Brussels.
European Commission (2005): Progress Report 2005, Serbia and Montenegro, Brussels.
European Commission (2006): Progress Report 2006, Serbia, Brussels.
European Commission (2007b): Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the West-
ern Balkans, Brussels.
European Commission (2008): Progress Report 2008, Serbia, Brussels
European Commission (2013a): Progress Report 2013, Serbia, Brussels.
European Commission (2013b): Thematic global evaluation of the EU support to Integrated
Border Management and fight against Organized crime, Volume I, April 2013, European
Commission Development and Cooperation Aid, Freiburg – Brussels.
European Commission (2014): The final implementation report of the EU Internal Secu-
rity Strategy 2010-2014, June 2014, Brussels.
HUMSEC: Human Security in the Western Balkans: The Impact of Transnational Terror-
ism and Organized Crime on the Peace Building Process. http://www.etc-graz.at/typo3/
fileadmin/user_upload/ETC-Hauptseite/publikationen/Occasional_papers/HUM-
SEC_occpaper.pdf
Regional Conference on Border Security and Management (2003): Common Platform, 22
and 23 May, Ohrid.
UDC 351.85
Alexander K. LAUTENSACH, Sabina W. LAUTENSACH*
PREPARE TO BE OFFENDED EVERYWHERE:

CULTURAL SAFETY IN PUBLIC PLACES1
Abstract: Since the 1990s, the novel concept of cultural safety has revolutionised the practice of
health care and bioethics in many countries. In contrast, the concept has yet to be widely recog-
nised and understood in the public sphere. In the light of the greater mobility of people and the
worldwide displacement of millions, forced or voluntary, much attention has been paid to their
human security in foreign environments. We propose that a focus on cultural safety is becoming
an essential requirement for the human security of displaced minorities everywhere. Our argu-
ment builds on previous work on cultural safety in educational settings (Lautensach, Lauten-
sach 2011), which elicited considerable discussion. We begin with a conceptual analysis of the
relationship between cultural safety and human security under the four pillar model, followed
by a discussion of vulnerability factors (such as dependency relationships, power imbalances,
dominant paradigms, and norms of public conduct) as they apply to displaced cultural minorities
in various settings. Cultural safety emerges as a necessary though insufficient condition for hu-
man security. That analysis leads us to the central question how people’s cultural safety could be
enhanced under such circumstances. We approach the question from empirical scenarios where
the cultural safety of individuals was placed in jeopardy. Such events often manifest as the percep-
tion of offence, which at times gives rise to violent conflict. Recognising the futility of attempts
to prevent all and any offence, our arguments amount to a novel approach to strengthen cultural
safety, and thus human security: preparing both sides for offensive experiences as a means to
pre-empt counterproductive reactions. We discuss various strategies toward that goal that might
allow individuals, families, larger groups and organisations, even governments, to work collabo-
ratively towards ensuring the cultural safety of displaced people, thus making a vital contribution
towards human security.
Keywords: Cultural safety, displaced people, empowerment, human security
1. INTRODUCTION
In the 2014 tourist season a novel phenomenon emerged in the media: ‘flight rage’, akin to
road rage, manifesting as violent disputes between passengers and officials over reclining
* Alexander K. Lautensach, Assistant Professor, School of Education, University of Northern British Columbia,
e-mail: alexl@unbc.ca
Sabina W. Lautensach, Director, Human Security Institute (Canada), e-mail: salaut@gmail.com
[336] Alexander K. LAUTENSACH, Sabina W. LAUTENSACH
airplane seats, noise disturbance, security hassles and procedural delays. Flight rage caused
delays or interruptions of flights to dispose of passengers deemed a security hazard. The
phenomenon illustrates the mounting psychological pressures experienced by passengers
in a climate of political paranoia, booming security and intelligence industries, and genuine
concerns over international grievances and new health threats. Flight rage also represents an
example of inadvertent misbehaviour to which offence is taken as a result of a misinterpreta-
tion of culturally contingent behavioural cues; the offence often gives rise to verbal abuse
and physical violence. This paper suggests how such outcomes might be prevented.
In its effort to survive in a rapidly changing planetary environment, our growing popula-
tion will encounter new security challenges while the existing ones will intensify. Extreme
weather events and other environmental catastrophes will compromise the security of
increasing portions of humanity. The distinctions between traditional security problems
such as armed conflicts, socio-political problems of poverty and injustice, and environ-
mental problems such as famines and displacements have become blurred. In response to
that amalgamation of sources of insecurity, many analysts have favoured comprehensive
models of human security. Their descriptive and predictive power comes from their trans-
disciplinarity and their attention to the well-being of individuals and communities (Alkire
2003; Tadjbakhsh, Chenoy 2007).
We focus on the particular human security concerns that arise from the situation of dis-
placed ethnocultural minorities. Here, too, a well-known source of conflict increases in
both frequency and severity. While displaced people have encountered new challenging
cultural environments throughout history, the frequency and ramifications of such en-
counters are increasing. As well, the reasons for displacement – armed conflict, politi-
cal persecution, climate disruption, regional population pressure – are multiplying as the
conditions for our survival are changing globally. At present, the number of refugees from
Syria alone exceeds three million (UNHCR 2014). Moreover, those encounters are mak-
ing bigger waves as globalisation enhances people’s mobility, by increasing the number of
voices and by increasing the reach of each voice.
Modernist discourse idealises technological development in communication and trans-
portation as the roadway towards the establishment of a global community of empowered
rational actors (Bowers 1993). Yet in spite of our increased connectedness humanity does
not seem to amalgamate easily; we tend to insist on keeping our different worldviews,
spiritual beliefs and cultural idiosyncrasies. The upshot is that most of us are more fre-
quently confronted with expressions and manifestations of difference. This gives rise to
cross-cultural conflict - “actions taken by someone, or reactions to the protest of some-
one, who felt offended in their deeply felt beliefs and values by somebody else’s actions”
(Lautensach, Lautensach 2011:183). People easily take offense when someone blatantly
expresses himself in front of them in language or behaviour that violates their own deeply
held values. The offense becomes particularly deep if the offended individual feels bereft
of means for recourse as a result of some form of disempowerment, exemplified by the
frustration experienced by today’s economy air passenger confronted with a seat that re-
fuses to recline, blocked by a fellow passenger who insists on retaining valuable leg room
as part of their individual sphere of autonomy.
In the absence of unusually forgiving tolerance this kind of conflict easily turns violent.
Beyond the relatively trivial example of flight rage, the violence can become massive and
CULTURAL SAFETY IN PUBLIC PLACES [337]
widespread if the offence is experienced collectively, if it involves values that are held not
just personally but by entire ethnocultural groups. In an earlier work we explored the op-
portunities for mitigating and preventing such conflict in formal education through pro-
active and preventive strategies (Lautensach, Lautensach 2011). The guiding concept for
devising such strategies is cultural safety and how it can be enhanced by preparing people
for offensive encounters and by empowering them to control their reactions reflectively.
In this paper we take a wider view to identify which strategies might prove helpful for
‘preparing to be offended’ in the public domain.
The assumption underlying such strategies is that the offensive experience in principle is
inevitable. As long as the offensive behaviour is inadvertent the offence is accidental and
entirely in the eyes of the beholder. This places much of the onus for preventive measures
on the side of the beholder or recipient, although it by no means frees the potential of-
fender from an obligation to engage in reflective and proactive analysis of their own con-
duct. As our title suggests, we shall concentrate on the recipient side. As the passive party
in the encounter in whose perception the offense might take place, the recipient is better
able to examine the criteria under which a particular behaviour constitutes an offence for
him/her, and to analyse his/her reaction to that experience. We note that in the case of
displaced people it is not necessarily the host culture that takes the recipient’s side; it is
equally conceivable that the newcomer feels offended by the behaviour of the host. Yet the
power differential lends advantage to the host, which arguably adds to his moral obliga-
tion to prevent conflict. We shall discuss questions about moral obligations later; first, we
explain how we place cultural safety within the wider concept of human security.
2. CULTURAL SAFETY AS SITUATED WITHIN HUMAN SECURITY

We defined cultural safety as “a condition perceived by vulnerable recipients (…) that in-
spires them with the confidence that no psychological harm will come to them in their
dependent situation. It includes all the provisions and considerations contributed by the
practitioner in meeting that requirement but it is defined by the beholder” (Lautensach,
Lautensach 2011:185). Conversely, “unsafe cultural practice is any action that diminishes,
demeans or disempowers the cultural identity and well being of an individual” or group
(NAHO 2006:3). A lack of cultural safety entails the risks of shame and physical harm.
Cultural safety is promoted by the effective treatment of a person from another culture by
someone who has undertaken a process of reflection on his/her own cultural identity and
recognizes the impact of his/her culture on his/her behaviour (NCNZ 2011:7). Cultural
safety is often jeopardised in situations where two parties are separated by a power dif-
ferential caused by inequities in capital, influence, knowledge, resources, or social status.
Like cultural safety, human security is a subjective condition defined in the eyes of the
beholder. Yet, with both concepts it is possible to identify universal sources of threats, to
define conditions most likely to be experienced as unsafe and to describe determinants
that promote the opposite (Hastings 2011). Under the Four Pillar Model (Lautensach
2006), human security is determined by four areas that traditionally were considered the
domains of diverse academic disciplines: the military-strategic security of the state and
its citizenry; economic security, particularly its conceptualization through steady-state
models of sustainable economies; the health of populations as described by epidemiology
and community health; and environmental security, primarily determined by the complex
interactions between human populations and the source and sink functions of their host
ecosystems. The four pillars include diverse sources of threats, equal to the ‘seven dimen-
sions’ of the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP 1994): economic, food, health,
environmental, personal, community, and political security.
An important strength of those conceptions of human security is their transdisciplinarity
– their comprehensive coverage of interdependent sources of insecurity that were tradi-
tionally considered under the purview of different academic specialties. The transdisci-
plinary approach is versatile and capable of characterizing synergistic effects and multi-
factorial causation among diverse sources of insecurity (Spady, Lautensach 2013). While
older descriptive models resting on lists of pillars or dimensions paid scant attention to
interactions and hierarchies, more recent conceptual models of human security (Lauten-
sach, Lautensach 2013), such as the ‘concentric circle model’ (Elmqvist et al. 2014), have
addressed that shortcoming.
Bringing the two concepts of cultural safety and human security together, we suggest that
the former acts within the latter as a necessary but insufficient condition. We base this
suggestion on two considerations. First, cultural safety prevents tensions and conflicts
between ethnocultural groups by providing vulnerable individuals and groups with the
confidence that no harm will come to them from the other side. Secondly, in the absence
of sufficient cultural safety such tensions tend to escalate through multiple rounds of mis-
understandings and defensive reactions on both sides, very likely giving rise to violence.
Thus, cultural safety functions as a sine qua non condition for sociopolitical human secu-
rity. It becomes vitally important in situations where deep intercultural differences create
a significant gap and where large numbers of individuals experience that gap in ways that
affect the quality of their lives. In the next section we shall argue that it is the situation of
displaced populations within their host societies where this dependence manifests most
frequently and with the most critical ramifications.
3. DISPLACED PEOPLE SUFFER FROM A PARTICULAR LACK

OF CULTURAL SAFETY
Throughout history individuals and populations found themselves under pressure to leave
their traditional homelands to seek out better futures elsewhere, driven by economic
hardship, political conflict, cultural persecution, environmental disasters and resource
scarcity. Displacement can be voluntary or forced, individual or collective, organised or
chaotic. In recent centuries it became increasingly likely that the destination region was al-
ready inhabited, which created potential friction between newcomers and hosts. Frictions
are particularly likely in cases of a large intercultural gap in values, worldviews, religions
or traditional life styles. Other vulnerability factors include the past history of relations
between the two parties, the extent of the power differential between them, the visibility
of differences, the dominant paradigms and attitudes in forming their behaviour, and tra-
ditional norms of public conduct.
Those vulnerability factors operate in principle with any tourist, visitor, migrant worker
or immigrant. They loom particularly large in the case of refugees, persons who were dis-
placed against their will to the effect that precludes their return to their homeland under
pain of physical harm. This definition includes environmental refugees, in contrast to the
definition in the United Nations’ 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
the 1967 Protocol (Hayes 2013:118) which vastly underestimates refugee numbers (Pearce
2011). Refugees are more vulnerable because their lives are characterised by a paucity of
choices and general economic poverty, by a dependency on anonymous and seemingly
omnipotent bureaucracies, by a lack of familiarity with the host society’s norms and tradi-
tions, and consequently by their special susceptibility to exploitation and violence (UN-
HCR 2006).
The vulnerability of ethnoculturally identifiable newcomers also depends on the degree
to which their presence is seen as a threat to the traditional ways of life of the host culture.
The extent of such a perceived threat determines the likelihood of deliberate xenophobic
affronts, as opposed to offence occurring inadvertently. The extent to which the Other is
perceived as a threat is affected by a culture’s degree of parochialism, the degree to which
it disregards or devalues exogenous influences that clash with local views. Cultural paro-
chialism, sometimes referred to as ‘intolerance for ambiguity’ (Brislin, Cushner 1995),
manifests as a lack of interest in other cultures and places, automatic preference for the
familiar over the unfamiliar, distrust of strangers and their ways, and fear of the unknown.
The continued growth of human populations and their activities has resulted in an expo-
nential increase in their ecological impact on the biosphere, leading since the 1980s to
ecological overshoot (Catton 1980) – the situation where the collective impact exceeds
the capacity of the biosphere to sustainably support it. Overshoot was first demonstrated
by comparisons of ecological footprints against biocapacities (Myers et al. 2002; Wacker-
nagel et al 2002) and later by analyses that showed the transgression of specific environ-
mental boundaries (Griggs et al. 2013). The growing impact as well as the self-reinforcing
effects of overshoot, have contributed to the proliferation of violent conflict (Homer-Dix-
on 1999) and resource shortages (Dobkowski, Walliman 2002) that have caused a massive
increase in the numbers of displaced people worldwide. In 2013, unprecedented numbers
of newly displaced peoples (10.7 million) swelled the total of forcibly displaced peoples to
51.2 million (UNHCR 2014), not counting environmental refugees. Desertification alone
affects 250 million people, and about two billion are at risk (UNCCD 2012); it affects 23%
of all land presently under cultivation (Kutter 2010). Those refugee populations will se-
verely affect the human security of prospective host countries (Altman et al. 2012).
The most recent report by UNHCR (2014) lists as the top countries of origin Afghanistan,
Syria and Somalia; top host countries are Pakistan, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.
While the crises at points of origin show no signs of abating, the limited capacities of those
hosts will soon require that migrations be diverted elsewhere. Host societies further afield
will be largely non-Muslim and culturally more alien to those refugees, which will further
increase the incidence of intercultural conflicts. That renders more severe the sources of
insecurity outlined above, and it lends additional urgency to the need for addressing them.
It has also shifted the balance towards genuine refugees who do not have the option of
returning to their land of origin.
Two less harmful trends that have contributed to the increased incidence of intercultural
contact are the aforementioned expansion of communications among people over great
distances and their increased mobility as an indicator of ‘globalisation’ (Gimesi 2013),
causing the rise in the number of foreign students at Western universities (Brewer, McCa-
be 2014), the brain drain of academic elites from developing countries, and the astound-
ing growth in global tourism. To summarise, those factors contributing to displacement
result from massive global environmental and socio-political changes that themselves can
no longer be averted or mitigated. They underscore the urgency and the expediency of
strategic efforts towards enhancing the cultural safety of vulnerable populations.
4. ENHANCING THE SAFETY OF THE CULTURALLY DIFFERENT

The situation of international students illustrates both the importance of the educational
sector as a forum for intercultural contact and the effect of the power differential on cul-
tural safety. A case that made headlines in Canada involved a Muslim male student who
complained about being forced to take classes together with female students, claiming that
it violated his religious rights. The professor in charge refused to give in to the student’s
demand for separate instruction, whereupon he was disciplined by the university admin-
istration (Stemp-Morlock 2014). The case elicited debate about the extent to which the
Canadian ideal of multiculturalism should inform the accommodation of preferences that
are perceived to violate ideals of pluralism and tolerance – also phrased as the problem of
tolerating intolerance. Other important questions focused on the moral rights and obliga-
tions of newcomers versus those of the host culture. Eventually public pressure led to the
professor’s exoneration while the questions remained largely unresolved.
This example reinforces our proposition that attention to cultural safety is important in
education and health care (Lautensach, Lautensach 2011). Yet our preceding discussion
indicates that the need for cultural safety transcends the realm of the service professions,
that it assumes much greater significance in contexts that involve the wider public sphere
and particularly displaced people. Whereas health care and education deal primarily with
individuals, cultural safety issues in the public sphere involve larger numbers of people.
Chronic negligence of cultural safety can lead to horrific abuses of human rights. Disaf-
fected individuals might respond by committing suicide and/or acts of terrorism, precipi-
tating large-scale military retaliation that can grow into protracted wars.
The importance of cultural safety in the public domain is illustrated by Ruzwana Bashir
(2014), an abuse victim of British-Pakistani origin who went public when an organised
network of child abusers was uncovered around the UK town of Rotherham. An official
report confirmed systematic abuse within the Pakistani expatriate community of at least
1,400 children over at least sixteen years, which authorities refused to report or investigate
(Perraudin 2014). In a typical twist of culturally contingent views of justice, after repeated
attempts to convince Ms Bashir to remain quiet, her own family ostracised her for ‘bring-
ing shame onto the family’. Likewise, on his return from an eight-year prison sentence a
perpetrator was accepted back into the community without much acknowledgement of
his wrongdoings. The Rotherham network gained infamy from its sheer volume but it is by
no means an isolated case. The pervasive occurrence of ‘honour killings’ and other physi-
cal assaults on abused girls in Western countries with sizeable Asian immigrant popula-
tions, shows that the problem for human security is serious and widespread. The result
is physical violence against disempowered members of a cultural minority, often perpe-
trated by their own families as a reaction to a perceived offence.
The legal systems of the host countries and their express commitments to uphold basic hu-
man rights and dignity within their borders oblige authorities and immigrant communities
to address these problems. An overhaul of police, schools and social services might hamper
future attempts by the authorities to turn a blind eye. Bashir (2014) suggested four specific
strategies and areas of reform: better communication of frontline personnel with victims,
especially young girls; mandatory reporting of potential sexual abuse; improved support for
victims and streamlining of prosecutions; and key community appointees responsible for
ensuring that the policies are implemented. In the remaining part of this section we shall
argue that as an additional strategy, education can make a powerful contribution, specifically
geared towards the precautionary and anticipatory preparation for offence.
From a humanist perspective, a satisfactory response to such violations of human rights
and dignity should be preventive rather than punitive, and it must involve both sides. It
is a tall order to demand of any culture to start questioning its own taboos. In a minority
culture such questioning is discouraged as long as its adherents perceive themselves on
the defensive against ‘corrupting’ external influences – in other words, they perceive their
group as culturally unsafe. This defensive view also relies on the misconception that one’s
culture can be protected from change. Yet such conservatism can also help to preserve
cultural diversity and facilitate the survival of indigenous cultures and languages threat-
ened by post-colonial assimilation. The challenge is to accept the overarching priority of
ensuring cultural safety of all affected individuals and to exercise good judgment in target-
ing only those practices that could compromise it. A promising place to begin might be at
the heart of the taboo against admitting victimisation, namely the perception of offence.
According to Ramsden’s (2005) educational model, cultural safety develops in four suc-
cessive stages, beginning with cultural awareness based on a cognitive understanding of
information about cultural differences and the resulting challenges. Secondly, the devel-
opment of cultural sensitivity relies mostly on changes in attitudes and values, towards a
willingness to learn about each other, and towards mutual respect and trust. It is from this
stage onward that the perception of offense can be addressed. In the third stage learners
develop cultural competencies such as skills for intercultural communication, leadership,
reflective conflict resolution, negotiating differences, and establishing a culture of toler-
ance and fairness. In the fourth stage those competencies are brought to bear on the social
environment to bring about cultural safety for all parties.
Although the victimisation of women such as Ms Bashir seems to occur mostly within their
culture, Ramsden’s four-stage intercultural model can be used to address it, for several
reasons. Firstly, the issue involves two cultures, not one. The objections rely on the legal
and moral framework of a Western-style host society to which all immigrants are obliged
to subscribe. Secondly, the model encourages the development of cultural safety as a per-
sonal goal and its elevation to a moral norm, which can motivate a person to question
traditional taboos and perceptions of offence. Thirdly, the development of reflective skills
in stage three, the ability to step outside of oneself and assess one’s potential reactions
and their implications, can greatly empower such questioning. The potential benefits of
those steps justify informal educational efforts in whatever form seems feasible as another
promising strategy towards cultural safety and thus human security.
In the public context, everyone potentially affects everyone else’s cultural safety. How the
individual thinks and behaves under those conditions is determined by his/her cultural
competence. Rights and duties are more evenly distributed, although they differ for host
and newcomer. They will differ in the case of newcomers who arrived voluntarily, but the
differences are more severe for genuine refugees. Likewise, the range of available options
depends on who does the offending – a faceless corporation or a person sitting in the next
bus seat. The extent of the power differential also affects the recipient’s range of options.
The overarching goal of all efforts, educational and otherwise, is utilitarian: to recognise
cultural safety as a positive human right and to maximise it for all parties. There is no pro-
fessional support network in the public sphere, no occasion for formal education except in
employee training and in the briefing of immigration applicants, and possibly through the
influence of religious leaders. Otherwise, much of the educational duty falls to the media
and entertainment industries, which at a time of privatisation and neo-liberal fundamen-
talism presents a challenge of its own. Likewise, social media seem to offer as many pitfalls
as opportunities in this regard.
Besides preparing to feel offended, educational objectives should include rendering ex-
plicit the conditions under which people feel culturally unsafe, discussing the power dif-
ferential and other vulnerability factors as discussed above, bridging between generations
of immigrants and social classes, and by exploring the limits of one’s ‘tolerance’ and how
they are determined. Establishing a consensus on what constitutes human dignity - com-
plementing the widespread discourse based on rights - and how it might be protected from
violations in the form of instrumentalisation and humiliation of persons (Baertschi 2014)
is another important objective. Clearly educational endeavours amount to more than a
mere build-up in mutual tolerance; gross violations of universal human rights and dignity
cannot be excused on cultural grounds – a realisation that in itself constitutes a learning
objective. The challenge is to decide where to draw the line and to formulate a code of
cultural pluralism demanding that “we need fully to understand and appreciate the view-
point of a particular standard before we judge it as inadequate” (Gbadegesin 2009:32).
This amounts to a carefully deliberated balance between cultural relativism (expressed as
moral pluralism in the multicultural ideal) and moral universalism (as exemplified by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights) (UN 1948). ‘Political correctness’ tends to sup-
press such deliberations (Weld 2013). To summarise, both means and ends of education
in the public domain render it extremely challenging as a remedial strategy, but possible.
We have argued that the key concept of preparing to be offended carries great educational
potential for its simplicity and conciseness. Still, considering its limited potential in the
public sphere, education must be complemented by other political efforts, exemplified by
Bashir’s (2014) strategies mentioned above. Such efforts must address power differentials,
question official cultural parochialism, open institutional doors and communicate a wel-
coming attitude. Civil society can make important contributions to such efforts, as exem-
plified by charitable organisations, neighbourhood initiatives and anonymous help lines.
They, too, might benefit further from educational efforts as described above. Underlying
those initiatives should be a readiness to discuss difficult issues in culturally safe environ-
ments, a readiness to listen and to engage in genuine dialogue on critical topics.
It remains to be seen how well this approach might work with such challenges as are posed
by the ethnic tensions between former colonies and their former master countries around
the world, and by the situation of migrant workers in many affluent societies. Historic
examples suggest that the absence of any preparation for offence can lead to disastrous
outcomes.
5. LIMITATIONS OF THE PREPARATORY APPROACH

Possible limits of this approach are exemplified by situations where confrontation between
two well-defined cultural groups has persisted in the form of protracted violent conflict
for generations. A striking example is the Israel-Palestine conflict with its complex histori-
cal background; in this case preparing for offense seems pointless as both sides already
live in a state of persistent and multifaceted injury, aggravated by a cultural legitimation
of revenge. This and other examples show how the reasons for violent conflict can exceed
the occasional cause for offence, including longstanding historical grievances, habitual
abuse of entrenched power differentials, widely advocated confrontational ideologies and
racism, aggravated by the poisonous influence of fundamentalist religion. Against such a
background the individual experience of offence pales to insignificance, to a matter-of-
fact confirmation of the perceived status quo. In a way the opposing parties are already
prepared to be offended, and it offers little help.
Another obvious limit manifests in situations where the offense is too overwhelming, as in
the case of over 2,000 annual cases of female genital mutilation in the UK (McVeigh 2010)
and in other Western societies. The fact that the practice violates local law seems less of-
fensive to the host culture than does the gross violation of universally recognised human
rights, committed on cultural grounds that appear immaterial to the host but all-important
to the newcomer. This kind of moral transgression is clearly in a different category than a
kosher restaurant serving pork, on account of the human suffering and injustice involved
and the violation of moral norms that are globally subscribed. Asking the host culture to
‘just get used to it’ would merely aggravate the offense and damage the status of universal
human rights. A mutually acceptable compromise seems impossible in such situations.
Motivations need to be clearly communicated by each party to prevent misunderstandings
and inadvertent strain on people’s patience, especially where the offence was committed
deliberately. By going public, Ms Bashir went against the express wishes of her family in
the conviction that the pursuit of justice and proactive safety warranted the offence. She
made it clear that the offensive act was deliberate, not an inadvertent slip, but that at the
same time it was not her intent to offend. Such an unwavering conviction makes recur-
rence likely, which the other party deserves to be warned about. The chances that any pre-
paratory efforts on their part can actually prevent conflict depend greatly on the clarity of
communications, which can be aided by mediation. Communication and debate are also
important in order to clarify where the perception of offence came from and to question
its validity. Thus, the scope for communication also defines the room for proactive mitiga-
tion. This applies also to interactions between organisations and governments.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Within those limits, our examples indicate an abundance of opportunity for preventing
conflict by raising the threshold at which individuals take offence, and by rendering poten-
tial offending events subject to reflection and discussion, preferably as part of anticipatory
strategies. Our earlier analysis identified interactive classroom strategies toward preparing
to be offended. In this paper, we discussed some strategies to accomplish that in the public
domain. We established that preparing to be offended serves to enhance cultural safety
and ultimately human security.
Even in the public domain those efforts rely on education of/by government organisations
and civil society, especially institutions dealing with migrants and refugees. Preparing to
be offended does not necessarily mean preparing to forgive, or even merely to tolerate.
Depending on the issue, it relies on efforts to communicate, to evaluate, to reason, to de-
liberate and to question one’s own position knowing that considerations of cultural safety
and justice might necessitate revising that position. At the individual level, preparing to
be offended can pre-empt aggressive reactions and escalation. At the collective level, it
complements and enriches approaches to conflict resolution and peace building (Fischer
2013).
We also saw that the need for anticipatory action is greatly increasing. Current trends sug-
gest an unprecedented increase in intercultural encounters and occasions for taking of-
fence. Especially the expected increase in refugees from inundated coastal lowlands and
from regions rendered uninhabitable by changing climates will necessitate efforts in every
potential host country to minimise potential friction while ensuring adequate dialogue
and peaceful coexistence. This will not be easy for a humanity soon to exceed eight billion,
living on less land, on reduced resources and in weakened economies. In the light of those
global challenges exhibiting the cultural parochialism that still abounds in many commu-
nities will become much riskier. It will not be enough just to prepare to be offended. It will
also not be enough to prepare not to offend. Yet those efforts constitute essential compo-
nents in a recipe that might allow humanity to weather the challenges ahead in acceptable
security.
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UDC 728.22:351.542
Aleksandra ĐUKIĆ, Milena VUKMIROVIĆ, Eva VANIŠTA LAZAREVIĆ*

KOSANČIĆEV VENAC, BELGRADE1
Abstract: Safety is the primary criterion that is necessary to meet to create high-quality open
public spaces. On the other side, safety is considered as a precondition for the use of public space.
The paper deals with the evaluation of the quality of open public spaces, using a tool formed on
the basis of normative theories in urban design, and created and tested on the academic course
Public Space Design and Methods in Urban Design at the University of Belgrade - Faculty of
Architecture. The methodological framework of the research included the analysis of the quality
of open public spaces based on the established criteria, the analysis of the intensity of pedestrian
movement. The particular interest of the research is given to the results related to the relation
between safety level and intensity of pedestrian movement in the territory of Kosančićev venac,
which is located in the centre of the city and it is very poorly attended and used. The obtained re-
sults confirmed that the intensity of pedestrian movement is proportional to the level of safety of
the observed area, as well as, qualitative indicators have pointed to the specific elements of open
public spaces that should be improved to meet these sensitive criteria.
Keywords: safety, public space, quality evaluation tool, pedestrian movement, Kosančićev venac
1. INTRODUCTION
Cities and open public spaces are the places of the intense and complex social life, where
the hierarchy of the qualities of life changes over the time, culture and technology. Safety
and perceptions of safety are among the most important factors contributing to sustain-
ability of contemporary city and provide the vitality of environment, the concentration
of users and attractiveness. The phenomenon of insecurity in European cities was rec-
ognized in early 1990`s and seven years later a few European Conference with focus on
safety have been organized. The problems of crime, fear of crime and urban insecurity
* Aleksandra Đukić, PhD, Associate Professor at University of Belgrade - Faculty of Architecture,

e-mail: adjukic@rcub.bg.ac.rs
Milena Vukmirovic, PhD, Research Associate at University of Belgrade - Faculty of Architecture,
e-mail: milena.vukmirovic@urbanlab.org.rs
Eva Vaništa Lazarević, PhD, Full Professor at University of Belgrade - Faculty of Architecture,
e-mail: eva.vanistalazarevic@gmail.com
[350] Aleksandra ĐUKIĆ, Milena VUKMIROVIĆ, Eva VANIŠTA LAZAREVIĆ
were recognized as the major one for quality of life in the cities (Politechnico di Milano,
IAU Ile-de-France, Regione Emilia Romagna 2007). The European Urban charter asserts
the basic right for citizens of European towns to “a secure and safe town free, as far as pos-
sible, from crime, delinquency and aggression“. This basic right to a safe community has
been an-shrined into many national and local crime reduction programs all over Europe2
(Đukić, Stanarević 2014).
Open public places are accessible to all citizens, regardless of their gender, race, national
or socio-economic affiliation and age. Contemporary urban planning integrates social,
economic, environmental and cultural components, for the purpose of overcoming cer-
tain societal objectives, with high level of security holding an important place (Đukić,
Stajić 2012).
According to De Certau (1949), the pedestrians view strolling as an exceptionally intensive
process, during which the pedestrian recedes into memories and imagination, constructs
stories, thus intertwining concrete places with an imaginary world. In this manner, the us-
ers of the city street temporarily gain control over the material and the symbolic space. As
opposed to the theory that a stroll is an inventive process, there are deterministic theories
that claim that the urban space and the manner of its control influence the physical and
the mental “shaping of the pedestrian” (Fyfe 1998). We can claim that these relations by
all means work in both directions: the users of the public space influence the quality of
the public city space, while it simultaneously “forms” its users (Đukić, Vukmirović 2012).
According to the recent researches in the field of urban safety, five factors which make ur-
ban space unsafe are recognized: the real risk of becoming a victim; anti-social behaviour
- opposite with traditional codes of behaviour; lack of maintenance, cleanliness, survey,
presence of police; the feeling of not being safe as individual - subjective feeling which is
not necessarily linked with real risk (Politechnico di Milano, IAU Ile-de-France, Regione
Emilia Romagna 2007).
2 . PUBLIC OPINION ON SAFETY AND SECURITY

IN SERBIA AND BELGRADE
Based on the research of public opinion on security in Serbia, organized by Belgrade Cen-
tre for Security Policy in 2011, the majority of citizens feel safe.3 In particular, they feel
safest at their homes 84.5%, followed by their settlement of residence 77.9%; finally, two-
thirds of citizens of the Republic of Serbia feel physically safe (75.3%). According to the
BCBP researchers’ findings, this situation is much better than in some European cities,
such as London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Prague or Bucharest. The main reasons for the
sense of insecurity, stated by the citizens, are poor economic situation (15%) and rise in
street crime and violence (11%). When they were asked during the focus groups work if
they would dare to commute around their settlement of residence without fear, most had
given positive answer. The citizens of Belgrade, females in particular, had indicated that
they may not freely commute everywhere, and the parents had expressed certain concern
2 CEN / TR 14383-2:2007, See: www.cen.eu/cen/.../CENTechnicalCommittees/.

3 Research Serbian Public on Security had been designed by the team of Belgrade Security Policy Centre, and
implemented by CeSID in the sample of 1,200 respondents, on April 2011. Focus groups were organised in Sombor,
Valjevo, Zajecar and Belgrade. Complete research results are available at: www.bezbednost.org
KOSANČIĆEV VENAC, BELGRADE [351]
for their children. Focus groups had noted sports hooligans’ violence as the most common
threat to personal security, with some of the participants noting the fear that worsening
economic situation might give raise to crime and anarchy in the streets.
According to the results of survey4 performed by the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade
(2008), an interesting fact is that the answer to the question if they avoid certain parts of
the city, individual settlements or certain parts of areas out of the fear for their own safety,
half of the respondents had selected positive answer. These most common reasons for fear
noted are spatial and social problems. Upon the request to define locations where they
had faced an unpleasant situation, the respondents are divided into two groups by their
answers: particular city areas – mostly central zones and open green areas; and general
ascertainment regarding spatial elements and city operation. The most interesting result
is probably the fact that the majority of respondents (98%) believe that it is possible to
implement measures leading to increase in public city areas security. The majority went
with better lighting, more frequent patrolling by law enforcement as key measures, as well
as different public transportation mode of operation, video surveillance, different orienta-
tion of buildings and better green areas arrangement (Town Planning Institute of Belgrade
2008).
Considering some of the results of the quoted research, it is clear that the urban planning
practice needs a more active involvement of the segment to provide the security measure-
ments guaranteeing better protection of public interest and quality of life for all citizens.
This could be achieved in several manners, one being the implementation of standards,
technical instructions and implementations, namely in the planning and designing phase,
being the prevention phase and also providing the best results in the field of security meas-
ures.
Taking into consideration that the relations between the quality of urban environment
and the quality of particular public places on the one side and the feeling of safety and
security on the other are complex, the detailed analysis was conducted on the territory of
Kosančićev venac. Given territory is considered an appropriate polygon for research, be-
cause it is located in the centre of the city, while it is very poorly attended and used. Having
in mind those safety criteria are considered a prerequisite for active use of a space (Gehl
2008), we wanted to determine whether the reduced level of safety and security cause
the reduced level of use of this important city area. In accordance with this, the different
research results with focus on safety have been analysed and compared with the aim that
such analysis could help urban designers to create safer open urban place.
3. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH TERRITORY

In accordance with the general aim of the research, the focus is placed on spatial level of
the problem, i.e. on the characteristics and elements of public spaces seen from the physi-
cal aspect. The research uses the methods that have been developed and tested for several
years (Đukić, Vukmirović 2012) at University of Belgrade – Faculty of Architecture on
course “Public space design” on Bachelor studies and on course “Urban design methods”5
4 190 respondents sample

5 Both courses are directed by Associate Professor Aleksandra Djukic, PhD. Milena Vukmirovic, PhD, Associate
Researcher, also participated in these courses as an expert in the field of pedestrian space quality.
on Master studies – Integral Urbanism. The study was conducted with the students during
spring semester of the 2010/2011 and 2013/2014 school years.
Figure 1: a) Overall safety and security catalogue list. Source Vukmirovic M., 2014 and b)
Safety and security of particular public space catalogue list. Source: Vukmirovic M., 2010
The implemented research methodology encompasses the following elements: 1) Analy-
sis of overall safety and security covered the entire area processed according to the safety
quality criteria. It was performed using a specially designed catalogue lists (Figure 1a)
with the evaluation section ranging from 1 for the worst condition to 5 for the best condi-
tion. The main objective of this part of the research was to determine the overall safety
rating of the analysed territory. 2) Analysis of safety and security of particular public
spaces incorporated all public spaces in the study territory. They were processed accord-
ing to safety quality criteria. Each catalogued sheet (Figure 1b), related to the specific
public space and safety criterion, had a section for evaluation (also ranging from 1 for the
worst condition to 5 for the best condition). In addition to the estimate of the state of pub-
lic spaces by using a set scale, the detailed analyses of open public spaces were conducted
one by one. The aim of this part of research was to evaluate positive and negative features
of the observed area related to the safety criteria. Both analyses under the safe place con-
sider the public space that minimizes the fears and abilities of various injuries. 3) Analysis
of the intensity of use of public spaces was aimed at investigating the relations between
user (pedestrian6) movement along the streets in the research area and their level of safety.
The network of pedestrian flows is presented in the form of an axis diagram that shows
the intensities of pedestrian movement measured at precisely defined locations at specific
time intervals (on working days from 8-9h, 12-13h, 16-17h and 20-21h and on Saturdays
and Sundays from 12-13 and 16-17h).
3.1 Research territory

Kosančićev Venac is located along the street of the same name, 700 meters west of the city
core – Republic Square in Belgrade. It is practically the oldest section of Belgrade outside
6 Pedestrian movement is of twofold character (Gehl 2010, Vukmirović 2014), since it is perceived as both mode of
transport and an opportunity for many other activities that occurs in public space (sitting, enjoy the area, etc.).
the walls of the Kalemegdan fortress and is planned as the future cultural centre of Bel-
grade. As it is not allowed to change the general shape of the neighbourhood, Kosančićev
Venac is declared a “zone of minor interventions” with several specific points of recon-
struction, which among others include building of lookout point and pedestrian routes
which will connect the narrow city centre with the Sava’s river waterfront.7 Despite such
ambitious plans, the area did not undergo any transformation and it is still inadequately
visited and used. With respect to this, it was attempted to identify whether the decreased
sense of safety and security is the one of the reasons of this state.
4. RESULTS
Following the structure of the presented methodology, three groups of results are ob-
tained. They include: 1) the general overview of the safety and security of Kosancicev Ve-
nac, 2) the safety and security of all public places in the research area, and 3) the intensity
of pedestrian use of Kosancicev Venac.
4. 1 Safety and security of Kosancicev venac

The general overview of safety and security of Kosancicev Venac is obtained by summing
the results of 410 catalogue lists that are processed by the first year students who have
completed the “Public Space Design” course on University of Belgrade – Faculty of Ar-
chitecture during the spring semester of 2013/2014 school year. Considering the fact that
they processed all 6 qualities8 of the research area, the special attention of this work is
given to the safety results. The emphasis was given to the average safety and security score
of the research area and general positive and negative observations. Keeping in mind that
the evaluation section ranges from 1 for the worst condition to 5 for the best condition, 79
evaluators gave 1 to the research area, 155 gave 2, 132 gave 3, 42 gave 4 and only 2 students
evaluated this area with the score 5 (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Graphic of the scores of general safety and security of Kosancicev venac.
7 The only existing connections are two step-streets – “Big” and “Small” steps.
8 Safety, accessibility, legibility, comfort, attractiveness, inspirational qualities and liveability.
Based on these results, it was concluded that the average score of safety and security of
Kosancicev Venac is 2.35. The main reasons for such a bad score are:
• The lack of attractive content
• A small number of visitors and users
• Unmaintained and damaged pavement and old and damaged cobblestones
• Unmaintained and damaged facades and building equipment
• Existence of spaces that are poorly lit
• Inadequate urban equipment
• Street parking along the roadway that exceeds the sidewalk
• Great difference in the height between the area of Kosancicev Venac and the Sava’s
waterfront with only two direct, stair connections
4.2 Safety and security of public places on Kosancicev venac

In contrast to the results obtained by analysing the entire area, the results on the public
space level are slightly positive in relation to the average score that amounts 2.96. The
analysis encompassed all 19 public spaces that belong to the territory of Kosancicev Venac.
These public spaces have been thoroughly evaluated and presented through the prepared
catalogue sheets.
Figure 3: a) Ivan Begova Street, b) Pop-Lukina Street and

c) Kosancicev venac Street safety analysis.
Summarizing the results presented in the catalogue sheets, positive and negative charac-
teristics of the observed public places are determined. The allocated features of the se-
lected public spaces are divided into 6 categories in relation to the actual state of crossings,
pavement, sidewalks, lighting, traffic and facades. The results of the detailed public space
analysis are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: The results of the detailed public space analysis

Vojvode Bojovica Boulevard
Positive Negative Score
Pavement Unmaintained and damaged 2
pavement
Crossings Well equipped with pedestrian Crossings at large distance
signalization
Sidewalks There are no places with tactile effect
Insufficient sidewalk width
Lighting Insufficiently illuminated area
Traffic High speed traffic was noticed
Cubrina Street
Pavement Maintained and not damaged 4
Sidewalks Is not sufficiently equipped
Lighting Well-lit with street lams and by
the lighting from shop windows
Traffic Low intensity traffic
On street parking along the
roadway that does not exceed
the sidewalk
Ivan Begova Street
Pavement Maintained and not damaged 3.5
Crossings There is no marked pedestrian
crossings
Poor visibility due to the corner
buildings
Sidewalks Narrow sidewalks
Lighting Poor lighting
On street parking along the
roadway in some parts of the
street
Kalemegdan Park
Pavement Unmaintained and damaged 3.5

pavement
Sidewalks Well-marked paths Poorly maintained equipment
Lighting In general it is well lit, but there are
parts that are dark
Traffic There is no traffic
Small Stairs
Pavement Unmaintained and damaged stairs 2
Lighting Lighting at a satisfactory level
Marsala Birjuzova Street
Pavement New paving 3
Crossings Crossings are well marked
Sidewalks In some parts of the street, sidewalks
are extremely narrow
Lighting Well-lit streets, but there is dark
passages
Measures for traffic slowdown
Facades Unmaintained and damaged facades
and building equipment
Vojvode Vuka Park
pavement
Lighting The park is well lit
Traffic The park is surrounded by traffic
streets
Pariska Street
Pavement Unmaintained and damaged 3.5
pavement
Crossings Big crossings
Poor visibility
Sidewalks Narrow sidewalks in some parts
There is no pedestrian safety
equipment
Lighting Well-lit
Pop Lukina Street

pavement
Crossings Big crossings
Sidewalks Narrow sidewalks in some parts
There is no pedestrian safety
equipment
Lighting Well-lit
Fruskogorska Street
Pavement Old and damaged cobblestones 3
Sidewalks Narrow sidewalks in some parts in
the line with the roadway
parts that are dark
Traffic Low intensity traffic On street parking along the roadway
that exceed on the sidewalks
Knaza Sime Markovica Street
Pavement Maintained and not damaged 4
Crossings Well equipped and signalised
crossings
Sidewalks At a satisfactory level
Equipped with pedestrian
safety elements
Lighting Well-lit
Traffic Measures for traffic slowdown High speed traffic was noticed
Kosancicev Venac Street

Crossings At the beginning and the end of the
street there are big crossings with
poor visibility
Sidewalks Narrow sidewalks
parts that are dark
Kralja Petra Street
Pavement In some parts unmaintained and 5
damaged pavement
Crossings Well equipped and signalised
crossings
Sidewalks At a satisfactory level
Equipped with pedestrian
safety elements
Lighting Well-lit
Measures for traffic slowdown
Big Stairs
Pavement In some parts unmaintained and 2
damaged stairs
Crossings At the beginning and the end of the
street there are big crossings with
poor visibility
Lighting Well-lit
Zadarska Street

parts that are dark
Karadjordjeva Street
pavement
Crossings Crossings at large distance
Big crossings with poor visibility
There are no any kind of pedestrian
safety elements
parts that are dark
Traffic High intensity traffic
High intensity of heavy transport
As positive characteristics of the public spaces of this area the following are listed:
• Low intensity traffic, and
• Well-lit or lighting at a satisfactory level
However, there are still more negative observations that include:
• Unmentioned and damaged pavement and stairs, old and damaged cobblestones;
• Narrow sidewalks with poor pedestrian equipment;
• Street parking along the roadway that exceed on the sidewalks;
• The appearance of dark spaces, and
• Big crossings with poor visibility.
Karadjordjeva Street was evaluated as the worst, without any positive characteristic. The
reason for this can be found in its dominant character. Karadjordjeva Street still has all the
characteristics of a city road with heavy transport. It is poorly maintained and unsafe for
pedestrians. On the other side, Kralja Petra Street is evaluated as the best in the research
area. It is recently reconstructed and partly pedestrianized street, directly connected with
Knez Mihalova Street as the main pedestrian street in the city. Kralja Petra Street has well-
equipped and signalised crossings. Sidewalks width is at satisfactory level with pedestrian
safety elements, it is well lit and its traffic is of low intensity.
Based on the general overview of the evaluation results presented in the spatial diagram
(Figure 3), we can conclude that the best evaluated streets and public spaces are the places
in the area which is closer to the city centre, in the contrast to the worst evaluated streets
that are closer to the waterfront. Most of the streets pleased in the core of the research area
of Kosancicev venac have an average or lower score (3 of 2).
Figure 4: Safety and security of public spaces in Kosancicev Venac.

Source: Vukmirovic M. 2014
In order to investigate the relationship with the safety and security and the level of use
of the certain area, the presented results are compared with the results of the measure of
intensity of pedestrian movement in Kosancicev Venac.
4.3 Intensity of use of public spaces on Kosancicev venac

Based on the results of analysis of the number of pedestrians on observed public spaces,
it can be concluded that the highest concentration of users can be found in streets that
belong to the parts of the area that are close to Knez Mihajlova Street, as the main pedes-
trian street in Belgrade. During the whole week, pedestrian movement with the maximal
intensity (more than 600 pedestrians per hour) is recorded in this area.
Figure 5: Intensity of pedestrian movement on working days and weekend.

Source: Kozovic K., Zivadinovic I., Spasojevic J., Lucic A., Mackic I. and Santa O., 2014
Maximal intensity of pedestrian movement is noted in Zadarska, Srebrenicka and a part of
Kosancicev Venac Streets during working days and on the waterfront (close to the river)
on Saturday and Sunday in the afternoon (16 -17h). Minimal intensity of pedestrian move-
ment (less than 150 per hour) is recorded in Karadjordjeva and Pariska streets, as well
as the routes of Small and Big Stairs – direct connections of Kosancicev venac with the
waterfront. On the other streets that belong to the territory of Kosancicev venac, we re-
corded the intensity of 150-300 pedestrians per hour.
If we leave out the exceptions (recorded in Zadarska and Srebrenicka Street), the intensity
of pedestrian movement is proportional to the level of safety in observed spaces, which
prove the thesis that the senses of safety and security are the preconditions of more inten-
sive use of public space.
5. CONCLUSION
This research has shown that the quality of the urban environment contributes to the for-
mation of the sense of safety and security. Considering the obtained results, special atten-
tion should be given to the state of crossings, pavement, sidewalks, lighting, traffic and
facades of the particular area.
• Crossings need to be well equipped with traffic signalisations, placed at optimal
distances and to provide good overview.
• Sidewalks should be wide enough, well paved and maintained, and separated from
the parking area along the street. Certain parts need to be equipped with pedestrian
safety elements.
• Good lighting is essential for the sense of safety and security.
• Traffic should be slower in its intensity.
• Facades need to be maintained.
The identified problems and challenges could present an essential input for every plan
and action in public space. Besides that, the research described in this paper highlights the
importance of continuous adjustments and upgrading of public spaces, which will lead to
the prevention of such occurrences in the future.
During the urban planning process, special attention should be given to open public places
and their transformation and re-design according to the most important criteria which
include safety and security. In this process, security measures need to receive more active
involvement in urban practice, with the final objective of crime prevention and fear of
crime alleviation, through preventive actions.
Integral approach in urban planning which recognizes and satisfies various user needs be-
comes a necessity. Important question which arise is: how to include the quality of safety
and security of open public spaces in different levels of urban plans - from general urban
plans to detailed urban plans and urban projects. To achieve that goal, it is important that
urban planners include the existing standards for safety and provide partnership between
local authorities, police and residents in all phases of urban plan procedures.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The paper was realized, as a part of the research project “Modernization of Western Bal-
kans” (No. 177009) and the project “Spatial, Environmental, Energy and Social Aspects
of Developing Settlements and Climate Change – Mutual Impacts” (No TP36035), PP1:
“Climate change as a factor of spatial development of settlements, natural areas and land-
scapes”, both financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Develop-
ment of the Republic of Serbia.
The parts of the research have been done with the Bachelor students from Faculty of
Architecture, University of Belgrade on elective courses and with students from Master
course of Integral urbanism during spring semester of 2013/2014 school years.
6. REFERENCES
De Certau, M. (1949): The Practise of Everyday Life, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Đukić, A., Stajić, LJ. (2012): “Reconstruction of open public space in mega-block towards
safety”. Case study block 21, New Belgrade, International Scentific Conference “INDIS
2012 - Planning, design, construction and building renewal”, University of Novi Sad - Fac-
ulty of Technical Sciences, Novi Sad.
Đukić, A., Stanarević, S. (2014): “Planning and Design safe and Secure Open Public Spac-
es in Serbia”, Conference Proceedings of 1st International Academic Conference on Places
and Technologies - Places and Technologies 2014, University of Belgrade - Faculty of Ar-
chitecture, Belgrade.
Đukić, A., Vukmirović, M. (2012): “Redesigning the network of pedestrian spaces in the
function of reduction of CO2 emission. Case study: Pančevo and Vršac”, Spatium, no.
27, pp. 31-39.
Đukić, A., Vukmirović, M. (2012): “Walking as climate friendly transportation mode in
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Transport Engeneering, vol 1, no. 4, pp. 214-230.
Fyfe, N. (1998): Images of the Streets, Routledge, London.
Gehl, J. (2008): Life between Buildings: Using public space, Danish Architectural Press, Co-
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Gehl, J. (2010): Cities for People, Island Press, Washington.
Politechnico di Milano, IAU Ile-de-France, Regione Emilia Romagna (2007): Planning Ur-
ban Design and Management for Crime Prevention - Handbook, European Commission,
Directorate General-Justice, Freedom and Security, Luxembourg.
Town Planning Institute of Belgrade (2008): Safer Public Places. Case study of open public
spaces in Belgrade, OEBS Mission in Serbia, Belgrade.
Vukmirović, М. (2014): Pedestrian Space and Competitive Identity of a City, Zaduzbina
Andrejevic, Belgrade.
UDC 351.78:061.1EU
Bülent SARPER AĞIR*

FROM A CONCEPTION TO THE REALITY?1
Abstract: Due to the transnational nature of non-traditional security issues, the role of the secu-
rity is no longer limited solely to the defence of the national territory, but to defend interests of a
whole region even a continent. So, it is the interest of the EU to stabilise the regions surrounding
it permanently. In this context, human security conception can be seen as a redefinition of the
role of the EU in its security and foreign policy. Because security issues that need to be addressed
should not only be in reference to the state, but also to individuals and societal groups. Indeed,
the concept of human security broadens the actors and structures identified as being causes of
insecurity.
Keywords: Security, Human Security, European Union, Non-Traditional Security Issues
1. INTRODUCTION
Security has been a debated issue in the academic and policy field over the last three dec-
ades. There is a general acceptance that the concept of security implies freedom from
threats to core values, but there is a disagreement about what those values should be. In
the post-Cold War era, discourses on the concept of security influenced by globalization,
the decline of state power and new security threats have led to a shift in the perception of
security. What is new in this context is the deepening security perspective from the state
security conception which focuses narrowly on external threats to states to a people - and
community- centred definition of human security.
The European Security Strategy (ESS) takes a comprehensive, multilateralist approach,
recognising that “none of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by
purely military means” (European Council 2003). This approach is supported by “a hu-
man security doctrine for Europe”. In this article, it is claimed that the adoption of a hu-
man security concept represents a qualitative change in the conduct of foreign and secu-
rity policy. It provides an enduring and dynamic organizing frame for security action, a
* Bülent Sarper Ağır, PhD., Adnan Menderes University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences,
Department of International Relations, Aydın, Turkey, e-mail: bsagir@adu.edu.tr
[366] Bülent SARPER AĞIR
frame which European foreign policy texts and practices currently lack (Kaldor, Martin,
Selchow 2007:273).
The issues of human security are certainly of great significance for the countries in the
surrounding regions of the EU as well as for the whole of Europe. The aim of the article is
not to describe the large debate around the concept of human security itself, but to analyse
the EU’s human security conception. This article will try to display if, how, and, to what
extent the implementation of the human security concept is useful in the surrounding
regions of the EU.
2. A NECESSARY CONCEPTION: HUMAN SECURITY

For the traditional security conception, the referent object of security is the state and it is
presumed, in a very Hobbesian fashion, that if the state is secure, then so will be also those
that live within it. Security is seen as the protection from invading armies; protection is
provided by military capabilities. The survival of the state has served as the mere reason
for the security of the state. In the last three decades, the concept of “security” within
International Relations discipline has undergone conceptual and practical evolution. For
not all of the developments in the post-Cold War era fitted in the theoretical and concep-
tual frameworks of the traditional security conception, which neglected the non-military
threats to peace and stability. In this respect, critical security scholars examine, inter alia,
human security and societal security - that is, they analyze how threats to individuals and
groups (including their identity) within states should also be seen through the lens of secu-
rity and insecurity (McSweeney 1999; Bilgin, 2003; Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998).
One can easily claim that intellectual underpinnings of human security can be rooted in the
Enlightenment era. For instance, Emile Durkheim argues that the state becomes stronger
and more active as the individual becomes freer. However, compared to its theoretical
background the praxis of human security is a new phenomenon. A series of interrelated
developments created a cognitive space that was necessary for developing such a concept;
decreased threat of nuclear war, predominance of non-traditional security threats, democ-
ratization, strengthening of human rights in national and international policies, globaliza-
tion, poverty and increase number of internal armed conflicts (Prezelj 2008).
Human security is commonly understood as prioritising the security of people, especial-
ly their welfare, safety and well-being, rather than that of states. The urgency of many
threats faced by humanity as a whole creates a critical need for the development of human
security concept. Most analytical and conceptual considerations of human security take
the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report as more or less the alpha of human
security thinking (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 1994). The basic
components of the human security concept - according to the Report - include: economic
security (problems related to poverty); safe access to food; health security (providing ac-
cess to health protection); environmental security; personal security (problems related
to physical security from torture, war, criminal assaults, domestic violence); community
security (existence of the traditional culture and the ethnic groups, as well as their physi-
cal safety); political security (exercise of civil and political rights and protection against
political pressure). Actually, taking the individuals as the core of a security conception
necessitates a threat list beyond the traditional security conception. The human security
conception allows for a deeper and more holistic analysis as it is also concerned with the
FROM A CONCEPTION TO THE REALITY? [367]
root causes of terrorism and organized crime as well as with a larger scale of threats rang-
ing from threats to personal security to threats to economic security.
Conceptually, human security is defined as freedom for individuals from basic insecuri-
ties caused by gross human rights violations and includes both freedom from fear, through
the protection of individuals and communities from direct violence, and freedom from
want, through the promotion of unhindered access to the economy, health and education
(UNDP 1994). Henceforth, human security is concerned with both conflict-related and
development-related threats and vulnerabilities. Narrow definition of human security is
associated with freedom from fear. By using a definition that primarily focuses on violent
threats, the narrow definition clearly separates human security from the established field
of international development. The narrow definition, therefore, restricts the parameters
of human security to violent threats against the individual. This can come from a vast ar-
ray of threats, including the landmines, ethnic discord, state failure, trafficking in small
arms and light weapons (SALW), etc. (Liotta, Owen 2006:91). During and immediately
after conflicts the protection of the individuals against violence and therefore its personal
security is in the foreground.
Human security raises critical questions that point out the referent objects, threats and
means of achieving security. However, it is argued that human security - concept, frame-
work, area of study, or policy agenda - remains poorly consensually defined (Paris 2001).
Even if there is no agreement on the definition of human security concept, decision-mak-
ers increasingly recognize the importance of human security as a policy framework. It
is clear that human security is increasingly employed in post-conflict situations. For the
pattern of security threats and vulnerabilities in a post-conflict situation can hardly be
grasped with a traditional approach to security. Therefore, multi-dimensionality of human
security conception appears well suited to address the security problems existing in post-
conflict societies. Because human security attempts to open up and expand the security by
developing its human dimension.
3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU’S HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPTION

The human security concept has inspired - and at times driven - the official “doctrines”
of some relevant players on the global scene, including such countries as Canada and Ja-
pan. Finally, it has made inroads into the EU policy arena, first by influencing some of the
analytical parts of the ESS of December 2003 (Kotsopoulos 2006). The ESS makes several
references to components of what could be defined as a human security conception. The
ESS sets out what constitutes a threat to national and global security by listing five key
threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state
failure and organized crime. As the ESS points out, “none of the new threats is purely
military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means” (European Council 2003:3-5).
Accordingly, it reflects the changing security environment by recognizing the shift from a
merely military conception of security to the inclusion of non-traditional security threats.
Then, the Human Security Study Group’s report “A Human Security Doctrine for Eu-
rope” was received by High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) Javier Solana on 15 September 2004 and is known as the Barcelona Report (The
Barcelona Report of the Study Group on European Security Capabilities (The Barcelona
Report [BR] 2004). The doctrine recommended the integration of human security into
the EU”s foreign and security policies by proposing that in the 21st century human securi-
ty would be the most appropriate security strategy for the EU. A human security approach
for the EU means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human
being and not focus only on the defence of the Union’s borders (BR 2004). It is argued that
the human security conception is an excellent tool to underline the need of an approach
that focuses on the living conditions of the civilian population in the crisis areas; a fact of-
ten overlooked in the political debates about the crisis management (Tamminen 2008:2).
At the heart of a European human security conception is the set of principles, developed
by the Barcelona Report, which both give substance to the human security conception as
applied by the EU and serve as an operational methodology to guide and evaluate the EU’s
international operations (The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group Com-
prising a Proposal and Background Report (The Madrid Report 2007). These principles
are the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, bottom-up ap-
proach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force (BR
2004:14-20). By using these principles as a framework, it is argued that the EU would add
to what it already does in the area of a normative foreign policy by developing a shared
strategic narrative (Martin 2007:17).
The concept of normative power Europe, put forward by Ian Manners who has identified
five core norms and values which compose the normative basis of the EU; peace, liberty,
democracy, rule of law and human rights. The term of “Europe as a normative power”
means that the EU is viewed as both a creator and propagator of particular above-men-
tioned norms and values (Manners 2002). The discourses and practices associated with
human security conception involve a normative commitment to the reframing of security
debates. In this respect, human security has served as a strategy to foster the emergence
of the EU as a regional normative power aiming to promote regional cooperation, human
rights, democracy and rule of law. For instance, Javier Solana defined EU’s foreign policy
in the following terms: “Our common foreign policy cannot just be interest-based. Pro-
tecting and promoting values, which are part of our history and very dear to the hearts of
our citizens, must continue to be a priority” (Solana 2002). Thus, in ontological terms, a
human security narrative reflects the self-identity of Europeans and reinforces the founda-
tional ideas behind European external relations (Martin 2007:15). As a common security
culture and identity, human security principles establish conditions for the implementa-
tion of European values.
In addition to the normative character of the EU’s human security approach, the Barce-
lona Report suggested the formation of a Human Security Response Force which would
include military units as well as civilian experts that would be suited to carry out human
security operations (BR 2004). The force should be roughly the size of a division, 15,000
personnel. And it is envisaged that at least one-third of the 15,000 personnel would be
police and civilian specialists (human rights monitors, development and humanitarian
specialists, etc.) who would support crisis management operations. The EU’s recently es-
tablished joint civil-military planning unit is a first step in this direction (BR 2004:20-22).
There are three reasons why the EU should adopt a human security concept. The first
reason is based on morality. Whenever European states have intervened abroad for hu-
manitarian reasons, whether in Kosovo, East Timor or Sierra Leone, this has been based
on strong public support, even public pressure, from European citizens. A second reason
is legal. If human security is considered as a narrower category of protection of human

rights, then it is generally accepted that other states and international actors such as the
EU, have not only a right, but also a legal obligation to concern them with human security
worldwide. In this respect, according to Article 4 of the EU Constitution, the EU recog-
nises that it has obligations concerning the human security of people outside its borders.
The third reason for adopting a human security approach is “enlightened self-interest”.
The whole point of a human security approach is that Europeans cannot be secure while
others in the world live in severe insecurity. In failing states and conflict areas, the criminal
economy expands and gets exported: the drug trade, human trafficking and the availabil-
ity of SALW, and even the brutalisation of society are not contained within the conflict
zone but felt beyond it, including in Europe (BR 2004:9-10). There is a clear self-interest
argument here: the effects of insecurity and disorder in the Balkans for instance, are more
strongly felt in Europe in terms of crime, refugee flows and human trafficking than the
effects of conflicts further away (BR 2004:12). Therefore, even if it appreciates the merits
of normative values per se, the EU is fully aware of the benefits associated with the promo-
tion of human rights and democracy in terms of stability and security, in particular, in the
European continent ( Juncos 2005:100).
The Barcelona Report suggested that the EU Constitutional Treaty should introduce some
of the structural changes to the EU’s foreign policy mechanisms that the Union would
need to implement a human security doctrine. For example, the Constitution proposed
concentrating authority in the Office of the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs (Kotsopoulos
2006). However, the “no” votes to the Constitution from the Dutch and French referenda
destructed the chance of creating a human security doctrine for the EU. Although a com-
mon understanding of how the concept of human security is defined, what it implies in
strategic, operational and organizational terms is still absent. In this context, it is not pos-
sible to embed the human security concept in the institutional framework of the EU.
As a result, the human security approach provides an interesting blueprint for the EU to
improve coherence in its external action and to address the challenges set out in the ESS,
as it is better suited to translate the Union’s founding principles into a policy practice (The
Madrid Report 2007). The EU has implicitly incorporated “human security” into its think-
ing - although not as a doctrine proper or a fully-fledged policy (Kotsopoulos 2006). For
instance, the implementation of the ESS in the Balkans provides an important test case on
whether the comprehensive security approach can be applied as prescribed in the ESS.
But, the conclusions of a policy paper prepared by the Finnish Presidency in May 2006
rest on the fact that the spill-over of soft security issues into the hard security agenda of
the Western Balkans has not been properly managed and it requires a revision of the ap-
proach (Finnish Presidency 2006). Therefore, the 2008 Report on the Implementation of
the European Security Strategy was written to update the 2003 ESS. In this report, for the
first time the Council of the EU, which authored the document also explicitly referred to
human security as central to the EU’s particular strategic goals (Martin, Owen 2010:216)?
4. THE EU’S HUMAN SECURITY DILEMMA:

FREEDOM FROM FEAR OR WANT?
The human security conception recognises that “freedom from fear” and “freedom from
want” are both essential to people’s sense of well-being. In this respect, the question arises
as to which approach towards human security is adopted by the EU either implicitly or
explicitly. The Madrid Report states that “A European Way of Security” should focus on
the protection of individuals and communities as well as the interrelationship between
“freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” (The Madrid Report 2007). In 2006 the
Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner explained: “The philoso-
phy underlying the EU’s approach to security is that security can best be attained through
development, and development through security. Neither is possible without an adequate
level of the other. That’s why we focus on the holistic concept of human security” (Ferrero-
Waldner 2006). However, it seems more useful to focus on “freedom from fear” aspect of
human security rather than “freedom from want” since human development is already the
target of much of EU’s development agenda. For example, the development component
of human security has been further enshrined in the 2005 European Union Consensus on
Development, wherein human security is mentioned as a goal of the EU’s development
policy (Gottwald 2012). And also, human security is a precondition for human develop-
ment, but not vice versa. People must first be secure from critical and pervasive threats to
their vital core, whatever the cause, before the mechanisms of development can take root
(Martin, Owen 2010:222). In general sense, this paper argues that the strategies that focus
exclusively on the development in technical terms and neglect human security notably fail
to prevent further violence.
Therefore, the focus shall be given to the “freedom from fear” in order to benchmark EU’s
contribution to the field of human security concept. Accordingly, it can be assumed that
the document of ESS presents a decidedly narrow definition for human security. Indeed,
by emphasizing “law-enforcement (...) with the occasional use of force,” the focus on hu-
man security remains strictly limited (Liotta, Owen 2006). However, when the debate
comes to the “freedom from fear” aspect of human security, it can be said that the EU is
rather weak due to its incapability in its foreign policy to respond to the emergency situ-
ations. Narrow definition of human security requires the EU to establish a more powerful
and capable foreign and security policy under the CFSP and European Security and De-
fence Policy (ESDP).
5. INSTRUMENTS OF THE EU FOR ACHIEVING HUMAN SECURITY

It seems clear that a human security approach is actually more realistic as a way of tackling
current crises and would be more effective than a traditional security approach (The Ma-
drid Report 2007:11). When looking at the field of crisis management in the light of the
human security concept, it is not only about intervening where a ceasefire is concerned,
but also integrates civilian and non-coercive methods such as security sector reform, sus-
tainable development, state-building, and mediation and negotiation efforts by parties
external to conflicts (Liotta, Owen 2006:91). Thus, apart from the changing referent ob-
ject, human security promotes different means to achieve security. As opposed to the hard
power of the military, security should be provided by soft power, long-term cooperation
and preventive measures.
It is argued that top-down approach of the EU’s institution-building strategy has its limits
and should be balanced with bottom-up policies aimed at enhanced citizen participation
and pro-reform consensus building (Bechev, Andreev 2005:3). In this context, the Barcelona
Report puts particular emphasis on the bottom-up approach: on communication, consulta-
tion, dialogue and partnership with the local population in order to improve early warning,
intelligence gathering, and mobilisation of local support, implementation and sustainability.
“This is not just a moral issue”, is noted in the Barcelona Report, “it is also a matter of effec-
tiveness” (BR 2004:17). Most of the threats targeting the physical integrity and dignity of hu-
man beings are locally produced and unique to the region. Therefore, a bottom-up approach
which would provide participation of civil society in agenda making process is necessary,
rather than setting up a human security agenda in Brussels (Ovalı 2009:177).
In terms of implementation of EU’s human security perspective, it is proposed three pri-
orities (Atanasov 2008:18). Priority number one in achieving human security is certainly
human rights. Although the principle is obvious, there are deeply rooted institutional and
cultural obstacles that must be overcome for this principle to be implemented in the real-
ity. Priority number two is human development. This priority is a long-term one, difficult
to realize over a short period of time. Human development, along with the human rights,
is based on the development of democratic society (Atanasov 2008:18). Priority number
three is the balance between liberalism and multiculturalism as a policy. This is particular-
ly relevant at a sub-national level, i.e. for the minority communities, which are one of the
fundamental entities to be protected through the policy and doctrine of human security.
Community security is a significant precondition for complete attainment of human secu-
rity. If a community feels insecure, it mobilizes and starts fighting for its security and its
rights. In heterogeneous regions, therefore, security of the community is a precondition
for security of the individual. It should be underlined the fact that human security is often
unattainable without and before community security (Atanasov 2008:18).
6. CONCLUSION
In order to tackle the post-conflict situations, the EU prefers to follow a more compre-
hensive political framework which is in line with the necessities of human security con-
ception. Through the documents of European Security Strategy: a Secure Europe in Better
World and A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, the EU has started to securitize the hu-
man dimension of security. During the last decade of the 20th century, the countries in
the surrounding regions of the EU experienced situations of tension, which have been
accompanied with armed conflicts, violence and ethnic cleansing, flows of refugees, etc.,
which constituted the main sources for jeopardizing human security. And these kind of
threats originated from these regions reflect negatively on the process of European in-
tegration and the establishment of a security community. International involvement has
nevertheless failed to tackle the underlying conditions which stand in the way of its full
economic and societal recovery that would underpin a lasting peace. Therefore, a human
security approach became essential both in the peace-making process and in security ar-
rangements (Ovalı 2009:171). Moreover, one of the basic prerequisites for improvement
of human security is the improvement of the political, economic and social conditions in
the post-conflict countries.
Indeed, the effectiveness of the EU’s human security conception will be determined to the
extent that it successfully counters human insecurities in the post-conflict regions. Only
then will the fears of spill-over effects of security problems originated be partly dispersed.
Connected to this, the EU should keep engaged in several ways: by providing assistance
and expertise, by insisting on regional cooperation and by prioritizing anti-corruption
measures and reforms of security sector. But, it still remains to be seen whether compre-
hensive European conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion engagements and policies can achieve the human security in the surrounding regions
of the EU.
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UDC 351.778.31:352(497.11)
Jelena RAKOVIĆ, Gospava STOJANOVIĆ*
ROLE AND CAPACITIES OF LOCAL COMMUNITY

IN ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY – ON THE EXAMPLE OF
POLLUTED DRINKING WATER IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF UŽICE1
“The world can never be at peace

unless people have security in their daily lives”
(UNDP 1994:22)
Abstract: Environmental security is integral part of human security. It includes the consideration
of environmental degradation problems and problems with insufficient natural resources. These
problems can bring conflicts as much as endanger the human security. Environmental security
is focused on civil security from irresponsible water, air, soil and wildlife pollution as much as
civil security from inefficient institution for law enforcement. Systematic changes in all segments
of modern society, also in the environmental field, assert an increasingly important role of local
community. In this study we show the jurisdiction, role and capacities of local community in the
environmental security in the Republic of Serbia. Especially is considered the role and capacities
of protection and rescue system subjects in the municipality of Uzice during drinking water pol-
lution.
Keywords: human security, environmental security, local community, water pollution
1. INTRODUCTION
Environmental security and overall development of the contemporary world rely on wa-
ter. In the 21st century, water has become strategically important natural resource; it is es-
sential for man’s life and health, but it can directly or indirectly be a threat to human safety,
due to changes in its structure and quality or the lack thereof.
Water resources are diminishing day after day because underground water reserves are di-
minishing, and surface waters are frequently polluted and are not safe and clean. Safeguard-
1 Jelena Raković, Doctoral student, Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade University, e-mail: jelenarakovic@yah oo.com
Gospava Stojanović, Master student, Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade,
e-mail: gospava88@gmail.com
[376] Jelena RAKOVIĆ, Gospava STOJANOVIĆ
ing water supply is one of community activities, which has a great impact on the function-
ing of the whole community. In many cities, safeguarding the required quantities of quality
drinking water2 becomes a big problem, because the lack of it directly threatens human
safety. More than 700 million people still lack ready access to improved sources of drinking
water. More than one third of the global population – some 2.5 billion people - do not use an
improved sanitation facility, and of these 1 billion people still practice open defecation. It is
of vital importance to safeguard sustainable water supply with the required quantities of safe
water, regular testing of water safety and water supply system management.
The Republic of Serbia is ranked 47th among 180 countries according to the quantity of
water reserves in the world. This means that the Republic of Serbia does not belong to
the countries suffering from water scarcity, but it is not as water-rich as it was believed to
be during the past few decades. Our country has the concentration of more than 20% of
world’s fresh water reserves. We are among the European countries that are the richest in
mineral water springs but regardless of the statistics, every third water supply network in
Serbia is highly risky because it supplies water which is microbiologically and chemically
below the allowed quality level. The last results of drinking water safety tests from 155
water supply systems in the Republic of Serbia show that only 47, 5% of them are safe.
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

HUMAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
The relationships between the environment and human security are certainly close and
complex. A great deal of human security is tied to peoples’ access to natural resources and
vulnerabilities to environmental change — and a great deal of environmental change is
directly and indirectly affected by human activities (Khagram, Clark and Raad 2003:289).
Human security encompasses a lot more than the absence of violent conflict. It includes
“safety from chronic threats, such as hunger, disease and repression”, as well as “protec-
tion from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily lives” (UNDP 1994:23).
The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has repeatedly emphasized the need
for human-centered approach to security. He highlighted the three basic pillars of human
security concept: “freedom from want, freedom from fear3 and freedom of future genera-
tions to inherit a healthy environment” (Winslow 2004:255). Bogardi and Brauch agree
with this approach and claim that human security can rest on three conceptual pillars also
reflecting the corresponding pillars of sustainable development: “freedom from want” –
economic and societal security dimensions, “freedom from hazard impacts” – environ-
mental security dimension – by reducing vulnerability of societies confronted with natural
and human-induced hazards, and freedom from fear – political, military and societal secu-
rity dimension (Bogardi and Brauch 2005:85).
Environmental security is one of the seven dimensions of human security.4 Environmental
security is closely related to “freedom from want”. Being deprived of something endangers
2 Drinking water is the water used for drinking, refinement and food and general utility objects manufacturing, as
well as other peoples’ needs (The Law on Waters, “Official Gazette of RS”, No. 30/10, Article 3, Provision 5).
3 “Freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” as two visions of human security are also stated by Krause (Krause
2004:43:46)
4 Seven essential dimensions of human security: 1. Economic, 2. Food, 3. Health, 4. Environmental, 5. Personal, 6.
Community, and 7. Political security.
ROLE AND CAPACITIES OF LOCAL COMMUNITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY –
ON THE EXAMPLE OF POLLUTED DRINKING WATER IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF UŽICE [377]
people’s lives and health to a greater extent than classical military security threats. Envi-
ronmental security is “a process of minimizing environmental insecurity”, in which the
main focus is human security (Barnett 2001:29). The term environmental security stands
for “the relative public safety from environmental dangers caused by natural or human
processes” (Chalecki 2002). Thus, it can be concluded that environmental security deals
with the “preservation of the local and planetary biosphere as the vital support system, on
which all humankind activities depend” (Buzan et al. 1990).
The approach of human security as well as environmental safety forces institutions to en-
sure institutionalized protection of people, both locally and globally. It is necessary to en-
courage preventive instead of reactive protection. That way people will be able to face the
inevitable “decline in security” (Sen 2000).
3. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF DEFENSE

AND PROTECTION SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA – FROM NATIONAL TO LOCAL LEVEL
The area of protection and rescue in case of emergency situations5 in Serbia is regulated by
the Law on Emergency Situations, while certain areas which could affect the environment
and the safety of citizens are regulated by additional laws. The Law on Emergency Situa-
tions regulates: declaration and management in the emergency situations; protection and
rescue system of persons, material and cultural goods and environment from natural dis-
asters and other accidents; competence of protection and rescue system participants; and
other issues significant for organization and functioning of protection and rescue system.
Protection and rescue system of persons, material goods and environment is “part of na-
tional security system and an integrated form of management and organization of defence
and rescue participants in conducting preventive and operational measurements and ex-
ecution of obligations related to protection and rescue of persons and goods from con-
sequences of natural disasters and other accidents, including the measures of recovery
thereof ”.6 In the process of protection and rescue the forces and resources from the territo-
ry of the local self-governments shall be deployed first, and when those are not sufficient –
the forces and resources from the territory of the Republic of Serbia. Protection and res-
cue system consists of participants, forces, protection and rescue facilities and resources,
resources for help, material and financial as well as other types of resources.7
All participants in the process of protection and rescue produce the Assessment of Vul-
nerability to natural and other disaster which is the essential document for production of
the Plan of Protection and Rescue in Emergency Situations of state agencies, autonomous
provinces, local governments, companies, other legal persons and organizations as well
as the Plan of Protection and Rescue in Emergency Situations of the Republic of Serbia
5 Emergency situation – “a situation when risks and threats or consequences of disasters, emergencies and other
threats to population, environment or material goods are of such a scale and intensity that their occurrence or
consequences cannot be prevented or eliminated through regular activities of competent agencies and services,
and for their mitigation or elimination it is necessary to deploy special measures, forces and means at higher
operational regime”; The Law on Emergency Situations, “Official Gazette of RS” Nos. 111/09; 92/11, 93/12,
Article 8, paragraph 1
6 The Law on Emergency Situations, “Official Gazette of RS” Nos. 111/09; 92/11, 93/12, Article 8, paragraph 2
7 The Law on Emergency Situations, “Official Gazette of RS” Nos. 111/09; 92/11, 93/12, Articles 8/29
(National Plan).8 The Vulnerability Assessment identifies the sources of potential threat,
reviews the potential consequences, needs and capacities to implement the measures and
tasks related to the protection and rescue from natural and other disasters. The Protection
and Rescue Plan is an essential document based on which the protection and rescue par-
ticipants are organized and prepared to participate in the execution of measures and tasks
and rescue of endangered people, material and cultural goods and environment. The Pro-
tection and Rescue Plan in Emergency Situations of local government units is produced
by competent bodies thereof.
4. ROLE AND CAPACITIES OF PROTECTION AND RESCUE SYSTEM

PARTICIPANTS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF UŽICE
DURING DRINKING WATER POLLUTION
The territory of the town of Užice is situated in the south-western part of Serbia and oc-
cupies the territory of 666.15 km². It is situated in the central part of Zlatibor District. The
administrative area has a population of 78,040.9 The territory of the town has a distinc-
tive water potential and it encompasses almost 80 watercourses (rivers, streams, subter-
ranean waters). One of the world’s first hydroelectric power plants is situated on the River
Đetinja, and a dam was built on it in 1986, while the accumulation “Vrutci” was built in
1987, thus solving the town of Užice problems with water.10
The accumulation “Vrutci” has a multiple role: providing raw water for the purpose of
water supply; keeping away flood wave; purification of small bodies of water during the
draught.
In December 2013, the accumulation “Vrutci” stopped being used due to water pollution
caused by blue-green (cyano) algae which are characterized by mycrocystin production
during the process of decomposition. High microcystin concentrations could endanger
human health. The endangered area encompasses the core of the town of Užice, the cen-
tral area of Sevojno and the villages which use the water from the accumulation “Vrutci”.
About 70,000 people live in this area. On 26 December 2013, around 13:00 the Public
Health Institute of Užice announced that there was a strong probability for the recommen-
dation to ban the water from the accumulation “Vrutci” for drinking and food preparation.
Thirteen days later, on 7 January, 2014, Užice Office of Emergency Management reached
a decision on proclaiming an emergency situation for the part of the territory of the town
of Užice in which people were supplied with water from the accumulation “Vrutci”. The
following paragraphs of this paper show the chronology of the events from the moment
when the problem was observed until the day when the emergency situation ceased (Ta-
ble 1).
8 The Law on Emergency Situations, “Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 111/09; 92/11, 93/12, Articles 47 and 48
9 The Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, http://popis2011.stat.rs/?page_id=2162&lang=lat, 29.08.2014.
10 The lake length is 8 km, width is 580 m, depth 68 m, while the volume is 54,000,000m³. The maximum ground level
is 627AMSL.
Table 1 - Chronology of events during drinking water contamination in Užice
No Date Event
14.12.2013. At the accumulation „Vrutci“ a dark red to purple slick 3-5 acres large
was observed on the water surface. The representatives of the town ad-
ministration for inspection and the municipal police visited the scene.
The crew of the Public Health Institute of Užice collected the samples.
15.12.2013 Inspecting the accumulation zones where the hazard might have origi-
nated in order to determine the place of the possible accident more ac-
curately.
16.12.2013. A biologist from the Public Health Institute of Užice performs additional
analyses, considering the fact that higher concentration of oxygen was
found in the sample, which could indicate the presence of algae.
23.12.2013. Water samples were sent to the Institute for Public Health of Serbia “Dr.
Milan Jovanović Batut”.
26.12.2013. A sanitary inspection report was sent to the Town Office of Emergency
Management together with a notice on the accumulation “Vrutci” water
use ban for drinking and food preparation.
27.12.2014. The presence of cyanobacteria in the water was confirmed. The Town Of-
fice of Emergency Management provided water tank trucks and bottled
water with the help of neighbouring municipalities from the territory of
Zlatibor and Moravica districts.
03.01.2014. A sustainable drinking water supply has been established for both people
and institutions by means of water tank trucks. There is no interruption
in normal functioning of institutions.
05.01.2014. About 400 people gathered to protest in front of the Town Hall between
11:55 to 13:45. There were no incidents. Public utility company “Vodo-
vod” started the process of removing the algal layer from the surface of
the lake Vrutci near the dam.
06.01.2014. The Town Office for Emergency Management reached a decision to de-
clare a state of emergency for the part of the town of Užice which uses
the accumulation “Vrutci” for water supply.
07.01.2014. All the necessary preparations were made so that the commencement
of construction works for the alternative water intake structure “Sušička
vrela” could begin January 8, 2014.
24.01.2014. The results of toxicological analysis of water samples from Užice water
supply network, performed at the laboratory of Federal Environment
Agency in Berlin, arrived.
26.01.2014. At 18:00 raw water from water intake structure “Sušička vrela” was
released to the Water treatment plant. The water was released into the
town water supply network at 19:00.
30.01.2014. Cleaning water supply network and chlorine dioxide pretreatment. The
number of algae in the water supply network was significantly reduced,
but nematodes appeared. Water sampling is performed every 12 hours.
01.02.2014. The first samples from water supply network with no algae are recorded.
The number of nematodes is negligible.
05.02.2014
Water supply from the water intake structure “Sušička vrela” was estab-
lished. According to the results obtained from the Institute for Public
Health of Serbia “Dr. Milan Jovanović Batut” and the Public Health Insti-
tute of Užice drinking water is safe and does not contain algae.
The sanitary inspector issued a decision to lift drinking water ban. The
07.02.2014. Mayor of Užice ended the state of emergency. After 43 days, drinking wa-
ter is safe to be used.
• During the water supply problem which lasted for 43 days, the protection and
rescue system participants were deployed. The following parts of this paper will
show the research results of protection and rescue system role and the resources
in the Municipality of Užice during the incident of drinking water pollution in
the case of the accumulation “Vrutci” pollution, obtained by means of a stand-
ardized interview. The interviewees were the competent authorities in the town
administration (the Deputy Mayor and the Head of the town administration for
inspection and municipality police), the Public Health Institute of Užice (gener-
al manager), Public Utility Company “Vodovod” Užice (general manager), and
the Red Cross of Užice (secretary).
The Municipality of Užice has the Plan of Protection and Rescue in Emergency Situations
which is produced based on the Natural and Other Disasters Vulnerability Assessment,
and the interviewees confirmed that they were acquainted with it. The interviewees be-
lieve that they have resources to actively participate and cooperate with other protection
and rescue system participants. The available resources that could be deployed in an emer-
gency situation were collectively evaluated as very good (4.05), while human resources
were evaluated as excellent (4.6), and technical and financial resources were evaluated as
very good (both 3.8). As a resource which is considered to have an important role during
an emergency situation, the interviewees evaluated public support, and it was evaluated
as very good (4.00). The structure of the available resources scores is shown in Chart 1.
Chart 1: The structure of the available resources scores
When answering the question about what the main causes for the accumulation “Vrutci”
pollution were, which resulted in drinking water pollution, the interviewees most fre-
quently said that it was the negligence of the competent authorities due to the lack of
legal framework with precisely ordered competences as well as natural processes – or-
ganic matter. Some of interviewees blamed wastewaters for the accumulation “Vrutci”
pollution. Other pollution causes of the accumulation, stated by the interviewees were the
fact that the lake had various uses, soil erosion after the fire in 2012, which elevated the
level of phosphorus which can stimulate algae development, age of the lake (more than 35
years), and the absence of sanitary regions around the lake. It is evident that based on the
obtained responses it is not precisely defined within whose competence falls the quality
control of the accumulation “Vrutci” although the Law on Waters in Article 74 states that
Public Utility Company which supplies the citizens with drinking water has the obligation
to provide a systematic control of water quantity and quality at the water intake structure
(surface or underground waters) and take measures for securing the safe drinking water.
According to Article 18 of the Law on Waters water intake structures are springs, cap-
tures, river and canal water intake structures, lake water intake structures and dams with
accumulations. In accordance with Article 203 of the Law on Waters, laboratory testing
of drinking water safety is performed strictly by licensed healthcare institutions (public
health institutes and agencies). The same is confirmed by Articles 121 and 122 of Health-
care Law (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos., 107/2005, 57/2011).
According to the interviewees’ opinion, the competent participant authorities reacted in
a timely manner during the town of Užice water supply problem in order to reduce the
immediate danger in time. This is confirmed by the fact that “no disease related to the con-
summation of drinking water was reported. According to the WHO opinion, the measures
undertaken were even considered to be too strict, because drinking water ban due to the
presence of cyanobacteria was declared at the medium risk level and not at the high risk
level when it is customarily declared”.
The protection and rescue system participants stated the following activities which they
undertook during the water supply problem in Užice:
• The Town Office of Emergency Management organized everyday water supply by
means of stationary and mobile water tanks. The Town Office of Emergency Man-
agement secured bottled water supply for children in kindergartens, primary and
secondary schools, healthcare institutions, student dormitories, retirement homes
and supply of especially endangered people (people with special needs through as-
sociations and the Social Service Agency – through Home Care Service and the
Red Cross).
• The Town Administration for Inspection and Community Police established an
operations centre in order to oversee the situation, prepare and convey the infor-
mation to competent authorities, support the participants deployed on executing
measures, report state authorities about undertaken measures, inform citizens and
conduct other activities. The operations centre working hours were from 06:30 to
22:00 every day, and between 22:00 and 06:30 were on-call hours.
• The Public Health Institute of Užice performed laboratory tests at the bottling wa-
ter plant, everyday treatment of water in the town water supply network, until 7
February, 2014, that is until the end of the emergency situation. During the last
seven days of the emergency situation the tests were performed twice a day. They
disinfected over 30 water tanks. They took water samples at the water-filling station
(the spring of Potočanje) where tanks were filled, and they tested drinking water
from the tanks. They regularly informed the public. They tested the water from the
spring “Sušičko vrelo” several times before and after it was released into the water
supply network. Over 3,000 analyses were preformed.
• The Public Utility Company “Vodovod” participated in all activities executed by
the Town Office of Emergency. The company safeguarded a direct water access to
business entities and others on the location where water tank trucks were supplied
with water.
• The Red Cross of Užice obtained 20 water tank trucks through the Red Cross of Ser-
bia, disinfected them and located them on the places of priority in the town. They
also added switch for the lid where the tank is filled with water, so that each water
tank could have its padlock, could be locked and unlocked when it had to be filled
with water. The Red Cross volunteers were deployed on the distribution of water
to the ill and to the people with difficulties in walking according to the list provided
by the Social Service Agency. The Red Cross of Užice was deployed on the task of
meal preparation for the people who worked on the construction of “Sušička vrela”
water pipeline.
• The cooperation with other protection and rescue participants during the water
supply problem in Užice was evaluated in the following way:
• The interviewees evaluated the cooperation with the Town Office of Emergency
Management with an average grade of 4.75. The same grade was given to the Public
Health Insitute of Užice and the Town Administration for Inspection and Munici-
pality Police.
• The cooperation with the Public Utility Company “Vodovod” Užice was evaluated
with an average grade of 3.75, which is the worst result and it points out that it is
necessary to strengthen the cooperation with this participant.
• The best grade, 5.00, was given to the Red Cross of Užice.
The average collective grade of cooperation with the protection and rescue participants
during the problem with water supply in Užice is 4.6 – excellent, which proves their state-
ments about timely reaction and an excellent mutual cooperation. The evaluation of pro-
tection and rescue system participants cooperation is shown in Chart 2.
The objections of local population regarding the work of the protection and rescue system
participant are evident. Local population is not entirely content with their work, except in
the case of Red Cross where there were no objections. Local population is discontent with
their work in the area of “not controlling the water safety of the accumulation “Vrutci””.
This objection was frequently referred to the Public Health Institute of Užice although
water safety control in the accumulation does not fall within their competence, but within
the competence of the Public Utility Company “Vodovod”. The Public Safety Agency of
Užice controls water safety in the water supply network. The Public Utility Company “Vo-
dovod” frequently received local population complaints about the water bills which were
regularly sent to users although the water was not safe to be used.
When it comes to the biggest problems in executing the regulations in the field of emer-
gency situations protection and rescue in the town of Užice, the interviewees frequently
mentioned the lack of financial means and insufficiently developed legal framework. Right
after that, they complained about the insufficient number of people whose job is protec-
tion as well as insufficient technical equipment. They especially highlighted the dismissal
of civil protection units and those are more than necessary in emergency situations. The
interviewees also gave their opinion about what would be essential for the improvement
and development of their strengths in the field of environmental protection. Once again
they confirmed that the absence of civil protection units poses a disadvantage for the lo-
cal authorities. Besides, it is necessary to design plans and studies for sanitary protection
zones, as well as solving problems of wastewater drainage and treatment. Hiring trained
professionals for protection and rescue jobs is another necessity in order for strengths in
the field of environmental security to be developed.
Chat 2: The evaluation of cooperation with protection and rescue system participants
5. CONCLUSION
During the water supply problem which lasted for 43 days, the protection and rescue
participants of the Municipality of Užice were deployed. Research was conducted which
showed that both protection and rescue participants have the strength to actively and
timely participate and cooperate with other protection and rescue participants. We can
conclude that the protection and rescue system of the Municipality of Užice reacted in a
timely manner during the pollution of the accumulation “Vrutci” and executed all the nec-
essary activities in order to timely remove the cause of immediate danger.
The results of laboratory tests from the Public Health Institute of Serbia “Dr Milan
Jovаnović Bаtut” were confirmed at the Federal Environmental Agency in Berlin, and
they showed that the values of microcystin-LR (toxins originating from the nature, which
produce cyanobacteria) in drinking water from the water supply network of Užice were
far below guideline values produced by the World Health Organization, meaning that mi-
crocystin-LR was present in the quantities lower than 1, which is legally allowed and safe
for human use. The absence of microcystin-LR is the indicator that the population has not
been exposed to this cyanotoxin since the period when the analyses began and that the
ban on water use for drinking and food preparation was a preventive measure by which
the risk to the population was reduced to the least possible level. The analyses performed
in Germany also confirmed the absence of other examined toxins in the drinking water.
The analyses were performed with the coordination and full support of the World Health
Organization and they showed that the Public Health Insitute of Užice reacted in a timely
manner and executed all the necessary activities in order to protect the health of the popu-
lation. This is confirmed by the fact that “no disease related to drinking water consump-
tion was recorded”.
However, the water supply problem in the Municipality of Užice was not completely
solved. Although in February 2014, the alternative water intake structure “Sušička vrela”
was built, without the lake sanitation and the accumulation “Vrutci” water disinfection,
the final goal would not be accomplished, and that is safe water for the people of Užice.
Therefore, there is a necessity to perform the additional activities in drinking water treat-
ment and disinfection, and that is the responsibility of the Public Utility Company “Vo-
dovod” Užice. This means improving technical and technological procedure at the water
treatment plant, especially the filtering procedure and applying a stronger disinfectant. It
is necessary to execute these activities because water intake Sušica is susceptible to water
clouding, especially during the periods of high precipitation.
There is number of problems to be solved in order to establish a sustainable water supply
network. A revision of the existing drinking water filtering technology and more intensive
monitoring of relevant parameters is necessary. The city of Užice has to work more inten-
sively on the reconstruction of the water treatment plant for the new technological pro-
cess of raw water treatment. It is necessary to produce a detailed report on defining the
sanitary protection zones of the water spring and solving wastewater drainage and treat-
ment problems. The obsolete water network also reduces the quality of drinking water.
The most efficient means of safeguarding drinking water quality and human health pro-
tection, in all water supply networks regardless of their size, is adopting a preventive ap-
proach management which encompasses the steps from spring, reservoir, system of dis-
tribution, to end users. The responsibility to manage drinking water quality concerns the
water supply company executives and local authorities. Successful management requires
an active participation of the public health services and inspections in accordance with
legal authority. It is necessary to perform the analysis of the complete water supply system,
hazards and events which could threaten drinking water quality, preventive measures and
operative control necessary for safeguarding safe drinking water. The supervision of wa-
ter supply system control should be executed by competent inspection agencies and local
health care services. All the above mentioned represents a basis for continual improve-
ment of water supply conditions.
6. REFERENCES
Barnett, J. (2001): The Meaning of Environmental Security. Ecological Politics and Policy in
the New Security Era. Zed, London–New York.
Bogardi, J., Brauch, H. G. (2005): “Global Environmental Change: A Challenge for Human
Security – Defining and conceptualizing the environmental dimension of human secu-
rity”, in: Rechkemmer, Andreas, (ed.) UNEO – Towards an International Environment
Organization – Approaches to a sustainable reform of global environmental governance.
Baden-Baden: Nomos, 85-109.
Buzan, B., Lemaitre, P., Tomer, E., Ole Wæver (1990): The European Security Order Re-
cast – Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era. London, Pinter.
Chalecki,E. (2002): Environment and Security, Pacific Institute for Studies in Develop-
ment, Oakland.
Khagram, S., Clark, C. W, and Raad F. D. (2003): “From the Environment and Human Se-
curity to Sustainable Security and Development”, Journal of Human Development 4(2):
289-313.
Krause, K. (2004): “Is Human security “More than Just a Good Idea?” in: BICC: Brief 30:
Promoting Security:But How and for Whom?
Sen, A. K. (2000): Why human security?, Text of resentation at the International Sympo-
sium on Human Security in Tokyo
Winslow,D. J.(2004): Human security in Globalization, Armed Conflict and Security; edited
by Alessandro Gobbicchi, Rome: Militaru Centre for Strategic Studies – Rome
Law on Emergency Situations, “Official Gazette of RS””, Nos. 111/09, 92/11, 93/12
Law on Waters, “Official Gazette of RS”, No. 30/10
http://www.sepa.gov.rs/index.php?menu=501000000&id=14&akcija=showXlinked&sea
rch=0&page=1
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/sanitation.shtml
http://www.vma.mod.gov.rs/sr/lekarski-saveti/voda-na-planeti-zemlji#.VBhdV_mSz4I
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/mdg1/en/
http://www.wssinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/resources/JMP_report_2014_webEng.pdf
http://popis2011.stat.rs/?page_id=2162&lang=lat
UDC 351.78:061.1EU
Murat Necip ARMAN, Hikmet MENGUASLAN *
THE CONGRUITY BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE CON-

TEXT OF HUMAN SECURITY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION1
Abstract: There has always been a security dimension in the basic reference documents that ar-
range the European Union’s relations with its neighbours. In the past, especially the issue of mi-
gration was the most important security issue for the EU. By the new enlargements Northern
Africa, Middle East and Southern Caucasus became the new neighbours. Despite their structural
instability, those three regions possess rich energy resources; thus security issues have become
more important for the EU. Within my 2011 article named “The Problematic Fields in European
Neighbourhood Policy: Human Security and Neighbourhood Relations” that focuses on these
security dimensions, I found that European Mediterranean Partnership was penned on the ba-
sis of security community approach and European Neighbourhood Policy which was declared
in March 2003 with the paper on “Wider Europe Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Our
Relationships with the Eastern and Southern Neighbours” were penned on the basis of human
security approach respectively. Although the announced European Neighbourhood Policy was
penned on the basis of human security approach, whether the EU has devised policies accord-
ingly since then against the crisis arising out of Russia and still-tense issues beginning with the
Arab Spring or not should be examined. Especially Ukraine and Syria events are good examples
for us to understand the congruity between theory and practice in the context of human security.
Within this study, the answer will be sought for the question to what extent the policy instru-
ments put forth in the theoretical studies on human security the approach that has been utilized
for the last eleven years against the significant political developments evolving in the EU’s neigh-
bours. As for the methodology of the study, a literature review for understanding the theoretical
background on human security will be conducted; then, news and comment reviews for foreign
policy developments will be carried out. The results of the study will indicate to what extent the
rhetorical approach within the Union’s official documents is applied in real politics.
Keywords: Human Security, ENP, Arab Spring, European Mediterranean Partnership, Ukraine
INTRODUCTION
Galtung defines violence as “insult against basic needs and life of a person” (Galtung
1969:184). This definition is an obvious challenge against realist security understanding
* Murat Necip Arman, PhD, Assistant Professor Adnan Menderes University, Nazilli İİBF International Relations
Department. e-mail: mnarman@adu.edu.tr
Hikmet Menguaslan, MA candidate, Res. Asst., Adnan Menderes University, Nazilli İİBF International Relations
Department. e-mail: hikmet.menguaslan@adu.edu.tr
[388] Murat Necip ARMAN, Hikmet MENGUASLAN
that defines state as the referent object of security during the Cold War. Since 1970’s Peace
Studies started to bring about alternatives to neo-Kantian state-centric security under-
standing. Nonetheless, it dates back to 1990s that human security as a security concept
started to be dealt with. Martin Shaw proposed a security perspective relying on distin-
guishing human and societal security from state security. As a consequence of this chal-
lenge, there has been an academic debate pertaining to broadening of referent object(s)
of security.
In this context, broadening of referent objects of security can be defined as horizontal
extension of security, while diversification of actors as security provider is a vertical exten-
sion (Rothschild 1995:55). Therefore, inclusion of international organizations as security
providers beyond state underlines a vertical extension. While in traditional security un-
derstanding, military power has undertaken significant roles for providing security, now
responsibility to provide security is distributed multi-dimensionally. Today, security is
extended multi-dimensionally, in an upward manner including international institutions
along with nation states, in a downward manner from nation states to local and regional
governments and sideway from nation states to press and public opinion, markets, non-
governmental and civil society organizations. Human security concept is dealt with in a
wide spectrum stretching from physical security of individuals exposed to intra-state po-
litical violence to psychological well-being in their daily lives (Rothschild 1995:55).
In 1994, after United Nations presented threats against human security in Human Devel-
opment Report, the studies of conceptual analysis on human security gained impetus aca-
demically (UN Development Report 1994:22). The human security dimension has been
defined as a “freedom from want and freedom from fear”. In the report, the UN, on the
other hand, categorized human security factors or in other words threats against human
security under seven different types. These are:
i. Threats against economic security; lack of publicly financed job security networks,
insecure employment, lack of productive and profitable employment, etc.
ii. Threats against food security; lack of accession to food and clean water sources,
etc.
iii. Threats against health security; contagious diseases, diseases like cancer, lack of
clean water sources, air pollution and lack of accession to health institutions, etc.
iv. Threats against environmental security; diminishing clean water resources, de-
crease in available farm lands, environmental pollution and environmental degra-
dation, diminishing sources, diminishing forests, desertification, air pollution and
natural disasters, etc.
v. Threats against individual security; suicide, abuse of drugs, violence against wom-
en and children, assault, torturing, etc.
vi. Threats against societal security; families falling apart, extinction of traditional lan-
guages and cultures, ethnic discrimination and intolerance, genocide and ethnic
cleansing, etc.
vii. Threats against political violence; political pressures of governments and states,
systematic violations of human rights, militarization of society, etc.
In addition to this categorization, global and transnational threats are classified into 6
types in the aforementioned report. For the first type, there are international migration,
OF HUMAN SECURITY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION [389]
environmental degradation, uncontrolled population growth which is closely related to

global poverty and its increasing pressure upon non-renewable sources. Second type in-
cludes environmental degradation in global world, poverty, overconsumption and the re-
sulting inequality of economic opportunities led by income inequality in industrialized
countries. Third type of threats is international migration which is a derivation of popula-
tion growth and led by unemployment and policies of developed countries contributing to
international flow of emigrants and refugees. Various types of environmental degradation
such as acid rains, global warming, decreasing biological diversification, extinction of wet-
lands, diminishing tropical and temperate climate forests are fourth type of threats. Fifth
type of threats comprises of drug trafficking which has become a global industry. The last
type of threats contains international terrorism. Human security has been set as a concrete
objective in UN Millennium Summit and an independent Human Security Commission
was decided to be set up.
The definition has been expanded by the Commission on Human Security (CHS): “Hu-
man security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It en-
compasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring
that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Freedom
from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of the future generations to inherit a healthy
natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human and therefore na-
tional security” (UN Human Security Commission Report 2003:4).
Ovalı states that for defining human security as a basic security concept especially since
1990s, the three factors below played quite an influential role:
1. Intra-state tensions and clashes, disintegration of state organs;
2. Supranational and cross-border qualities of current threats,
3. Communication revolution (Ovalı 2006:17-18).
In the post-Cold War era, the axis of armed conflicts took a new direction into the states
beyond the borders of them which was too unlikely in the past. During this period, micro-
nationalisms and religious extremism filled in the power vacuum led by the collapse of the
Socialist bloc. Among the basic indicators of this dynamic, the dissolution of Yugoslavia
and ethnic-religious conflicts in Africa can be counted. Another indicator is that there has
been a steep rise in asymmetric threats since 1990s. Conflicts involving terrorist organi-
zations and paramilitary actors fighting against regular military units of states started to
become widespread as opposed to symmetric wars that armies fought. Lastly, with inter-
net technology, being more and more prevalent, new conflict models in asymmetric wars
have started to emerge. Not only a conflict, a disaster, an epidemic or an economic crisis
breaking out in any part of world spread over more quickly but also they are heard by a
larger amount of people in shorter time than ever.
Along with states as the basic security providers of human security, international or-
ganizations, INGO’s are defined as supportive actors or Force Multipliers (Bell, et al.
2013:397-422). IMF, World Bank or humanitarian aid organizations are among the sup-
portive human security providers. Nevertheless, since that the activities of the civilian-led
organizations are most of the time not more than monitoring, observing and reporting,
perception building is a widely accepted idea, the activities of these organizations have
a limited influence.2 The European Union, as a non-state human security provider, has
a distinguished role. Especially after the declaration of Petersberg Tasks, the EU has in-
creased its efforts to identify itself as a human security provider in its region. Originally,
the emerging task-competence conflict between NATO and the EU in 1990s is among the
underlying factors of this effort. Declaring Petersberg Tasks, the EU, short of providing
security beyond NATO’s capacity and power, signalled that it would be authorized over
issues encompassed by human security. Of course, the immediate cause of this declaration
was the need to find effective conflict resolution techniques that would be implemented
on humanitarian disasters occurring in the Western Balkans.
The experience of the Western Balkans can, of course, be a measure of to what extent
these conflict resolution techniques which were started with Petersberg Tasks in efforts
to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy, are successful. Insomuch as that Kosovo
and Bosnia cases had a success is, to some extent, acceptable. However, the research ques-
tion of this work is the influence of the EU over providing human security on a wider area
covered by the European Neighborhood Policy.
Another strategic importance of the EU about human security is the magnitude of capac-
ity and power on its hands. The table below shows that in 2014, the EU allocated 2 172
million Euros of its 142 640 million Euro budget on security and citizenship.
Source: European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2014/2014_en.cfm

According to these data, the budget of CFSP is 314 million Euros (retrieved from Europe-
an Commission FPI Website). Furthermore, the budget of the European Neighbourhood
Instrument (ENI) is among the significant data. The European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) covers 16 partners to the East and South of the EU’s borders, namely Algeria, Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Republic
of Moldova, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. The
2 See “Conditional Effectiveness of Military and Civilian Human Security Effects” project by Sam Bell, Amanda
Murdie, Patricia Blocksomeve Kevin Brown. retrieved from website: http://www.usma.edu/nsc/siteassets/
sitepages/workshops/blocksome%20kwp%20project.pdf
proposed budget for the new ENI is €18.2 billion for the period of 2014–2020 (retrieved
from European Neighbourhood Info Centre Website, “The new European Neighbour-
hood Instrument: providing increased support to the EU’s partners”).
In addition to these quantitative data, that four (Germany, United Kingdom, France and
Italy) of the twenty eight members of EU being the members of G-8, and that twenty two
of them (Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Croa-
tia, Netherlands, England, Spain, Italy, Letonia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Hungary, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Greece) being NATO members, are quite sound
indicators of the fact that EU has, qualitatively, an advantageous position for providing
human security, as well.
1. AS A PROVIDER OF HUMAN SECURITY: EUROPEAN UNION

There are studies that classify the EU’s policies against the West Balkans in the 1990s as
embryonic human security policies (Žarın 2007:513-545). However, it has been a widely
accepted approach that human security concept was mentioned in the EU literature for
the first time in the report “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”. The Study Group on
Europe’s Security Capabilities EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security
Policy which consists of Ulrich Albrecht, Christine Chinkin, Kemal Dervis, Renata Dwan,
Anthony Giddens, Nicole Gnesotto, Mary Kaldor (Convenor), Sonja Licht, Jan Pronk,
Klaus Reinhardt, Geneviève Schméder, Pavel Seifter and Narcís Serra, presented the re-
port “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe” to Javier Solana on 15 September, 2004 in
Barcelona. In this report, that EU’s foreign policy axis should be reshaped depending on
human security approach was proposed for the first time. The most tangible propositions
brought with the doctrine in the report are:
• A set of seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity that apply to
both ends and means. These principles are: the primacy of human rights, clear politi-
cal authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal
instruments, and the appropriate use of force. The report puts particular emphasis on
the bottom-up approach: on communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership
with the local population in order to improve early warning, intelligence gathering,
and mobilization of local support, implementation and sustainability.
• A ‘Human Security Response Force’, composed of 15,000 men and women, of
whom at least one third would be civilian (police, human rights monitors, develop-
ment and humanitarian specialists, administrators, etc.). The Force would be drawn
from dedicated troops and civilian capabilities already made available by member
states as well as a proposed ‘Human Security Volunteer Service’.
• A new legal framework to govern both the decision to intervene and operations
on the ground. This would build on the domestic law of host states, the domestic
law of sending states, international criminal law, international human rights law and
international humanitarian law (Solana 2004:1).
Barcelona Report suggested the formation of a Human Security Response Force which
would include “military units as well as civilian experts that would be suited to carry out hu-
man security operations” (Solana 2004:21-22). Even though, a ‘Human Security Response
Force’ proposed with the doctrine was never founded, it is obvious that these propositions
have been given importance on the EU’s rhetoric on foreign policy and security policy
since the declaration of the doctrine. A study of mine which finds out that the concepts
pertaining to human security rhetoric were mentioned in the official documents of Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy which was declared with the paper on “Wider Europe Neigh-
bourhood: a New Framework for Our Relationships with the Eastern and Southern Neigh-
bours” in March 2003 and that the Action Plans of European Neighbourhood Policy were
prepared based upon aforementioned doctrine, has been published in the Journal of Inter-
national Relations in 2012 (Arman 2011:45-68). Furthermore, Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin
and Sabine Selchow find out that human security concept creates “the basis of both a
discursive/linguistic shift” on the EU’s operating principles (Kaldor, et al. 2007:273–288).
In addition to those findings, Marlene Gottwald, with discursive analysis, concluded that
during the Libyan Crisis, the EU’s official rhetoric is completely in harmony with human
security perspective (Gottwald 2012:17-23). One can find references to human security in
many official documents belonging to the EU in the following years, as well. For an exam-
ple, a policy paper prepared by the Finnish Presidency in May 2006, examined the status of
the human security, as one of the several dimensions of the EU regional approach.
What is expected from the EU, which claims that it set human security as a main approach,
is that as a human security provider, it should adopt more pro-active attitudes against con-
flicts in its immediate area. What is meant here is not that the EU should identify itself
as a military actor that conducts humanitarian interventions; rather that it should adopt
pro-active attitudes such as effective diplomatic initiatives in the main conflict areas and
ending armed conflicts, organizing aid campaigns, developing influential measures for
problems of refugees and mobilization of international society’s interest on important top-
ics. Below, there is an evaluation of the EU’s expected pro-active attitude on two different
cases that occurred in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU in 2010.
2. SYRIAN CRISIS AND EUROPEAN UNION

Syrian Crisis is a large humanitarian disaster led by especially the invasion of Iraq in 2003
and the Arab Spring in 2010. As the Arab Spring caused governmental changes in Tunisia,
Libya and Egypt, opposing groups in Syria founded a coalition, Free Syrian Army, and
started armed resistance to topple Assad regime (Holliday 2012:11). Nonetheless, taking
the advantage of lack of control in the region, jihadist groups moved to Syria from various
parts of the world, and caused quite a chaotic situation to prevail. As a result of these de-
velopments, many ethnic and religious minorities in the region have been faced with the
threat of genocide.
It is reported that since the first death during anti-governmental protests in Syria occurred
on 18 March, 2011, 169.369 Syrians had lost their lives; over 2.5 million people had to move
to other countries and almost 3 million buildings collapsed or were heavily damaged.
According to Updated Statistical Analysis of Documentation of Killings in the Syrian Arab
Republic report commissioned by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights consisting of Megan Price, Anita Gohdes, and Patrick Ball:
• Sex of the Victims: Of the 191 369 documented killings in this report, 85.1% are
male, 9.3% are female, and 5.6% of records do not indicate the sex of the victim.
• Age of the Victims: Age is unknown for 83.8% of all records, which makes it im-
possible to draw conclusions about the overall distribution of the age of victims.
However, the full enumeration does include 2165 records of victims 0-9 years old;
• Location of Killing: The three comprehensive non-governmental sources included

in this report (the Syrian Centre for Statistics and Research, the Syrian Network for
Human Rights, and the Violations Documentation Centre) all record more killings
in Rural Damascus than in other governorates.
• Combatant and Non-Combatant Status: the status of the victims as combatants or
non-combatants is unknown for all but a few records, and consequently, combatant
status is not assessed in this report (Price, et al. 2014:1-25).
In addition to deaths, especially Syria’s Northern cities were exposed to heavy damage
during this three-year period. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), about 2.5 million have fled to Syria’s immediate neighbours Turkey,
Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, and 6.5 million are internally displaced within Syria. Mean-
while, almost 100,000 have declared asylum in Europe with a small number offered reset-
tlement by countries such as Germany and Sweden (retrieved from Syrian Refugees Web-
site). However, according to the European Commission statements, total number of those
who move to neighbouring countries is 2.9 million. It is quite an understandable situation
in such a humanitarian tragedy that among the numbers there are such kind of discrepan-
cies, considering the blur of borders between Syria and especially Turkey and Iraq.
The European Commission states that what happens in Syria is the world’s largest hu-
manitarian and security disaster (EC ECHO Fact Sheet 2014:1-4). According to the Com-
mission sources, since 2011, €2.881 billion has been mobilized for relief and recovery as-
sistance from the EU and member countries.
Source: ECHO Factsheet – Syria crisis – August 2014

As a result of the power vacuum in the region caused by Syrian Crisis, Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham or Levant (ISIS) or as they call themselves IS (Islamic State) was founded
by extremist Islamist terrorists from various parts of the world. The terrorist group is also
linked to al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), founded by the Jordanian extremist Abu Musab al-Zarqa-
wi and they continue to conduct actions which can be defined as genocide against Turk-
men, Kurd, Christian, Shia and Yezidi people (Gulmohamad 2014:1-11). However, the
USA could not take any concrete measures against these massacres except from a number
of air raids and the EU could not even adopt a harsh attitude rhetorically.
It is rhetorically quite obvious that the EU clearly underlines the gravity of this situation.
The amount of money that has been mobilized for aid and relief cannot be underestimat-
ed. Nevertheless, it must be clearly stated that the EU, as a conflict resolution actor, could
not do well in such a large disaster lasting for over 3 years. It would be overly optimistic to
claim that the EU’s actions in order to solve the conflict which are not more than being a
donator and giving harsh speeches, reached a sound success.
3. UKRANIAN CRISIS AND EUROPEAN UNION

Ukraine is among the most important partners of ENP. Similarly, even when ENP was
still in draft, the possibility that this partner relationship might result in Ukraine’s being a
member of the EU in the future, increased the tension in the Russian-EU relations. In ad-
dition to that, since 1990s, the domestic policy of Ukraine has been shaped by two main
axes: pro-Russian and pro-EU. As a consequence of these domestic policy clashes, the
political crisis in Ukraine ascended to armed conflicts in 2014.
Between 16 and 23 of January 2014, there were deadly anti-governmental protests in
Ukraine, the Parliament tried to descend the tensions by passing a protest law which was
condemned as draconian. However, after only a week, the protests grew uncontrollably,
and the Parliament had to repeal “anti-protest law” and declare amnesty for the arrested
protesters if the seized government buildings were relinquished. After the arrested pro-
testers were released, the protesters relinquished the occupied public buildings in Kiev.
Nevertheless, for unknown reasons, the tension ascended again and during protests be-
tween 18 and 20 of February, the police forces and snipers opened fire with live ammu-
nition on the protesters, almost a hundred people lost their lives during these two days.
Then, on 21 February, President Yanukovych met with the opposition leaders and stated
that a compromise had been reached. However, on 22 February, the Ukraine President
Victor Yanukovych disappeared. As a consequence of Yanukovych’s disappearance, the
Parliament decided to remove Yanukovych from Presidency and new elections to be held
on 25 May, 2014. In addition to that, an interim government was decided to be formed and
Arseniy Yatsenyuk became the Prime Minister of Ukraine.
On 27 February, unidentified pro- Russian armed groups seized key buildings in Simfer-
opol, the capital city of Crimea, and on 1 March, Vladimir Putin’s request for use of force
in order to protect the interests of the Russians at Crimea was approved by the Parliament.
Furthermore, pro-Russian groups in other regions and Kharkiv, the second largest city
of Ukraine, started protests. On 11 March, while the European Commission proposed a
500 million € commercial incentive to Ukraine, Ukraine interim government called the
EU and the USA for mobilization of military, political and economic resources in order
to prevent aggressive actions of Russia. The US President Barrack Obama, urged Putin
to move back armed pro-Russian groups, however, Putin stated that armed groups were
not under the control of Russia. It became more complicated when the Crimea Parlia-
ment declared independence on 16 March and the Russian Federation recognized Crimea
against NATO’s resolution (NATO Declaration, 31 May 2014). On 17 March, the EU and
the USA decided to impose travel bans and asset freezes on several officials from Russia
and Ukraine over the Crimea’s invasion by Russia.
On 18 March Vladimir Putin signed the draft which proposed annexation of Crimea to the
Russian Federation. As a result of this move, the USA and the EU only added several more
to the list of the sanctioned. On 1 April, NATO members met in Brussels and declared that
all military and humanitarian operations were frozen with the Russian Federation. On 7
April, at the eastern cities of Ukraine (Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv), the pro-Russian
protesters seized public buildings and called for a referendum for independence. On 10
April, Vladimir Putin underlined that unless Ukraine paid for its natural gas debts, Russia
would cut gas flow, which in result would influence Europe, as well. Pro-Russian groups
in eastern cities of Ukraine increased the severity of their protests and as a counter-action,
Ukraine interim government declared that there would be terrorist operations in order to
deescalate tension led by separatist pro-Russian groups in the east of the country. Then,
on 17 April, parties to the crisis – the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the USA and the EU
- announced that they would come together in Geneva in order to deescalate the tension
in the eastern part of Ukraine. There was a dramatic shift in Russian foreign policy on 7
May and the Head of State Vladimir Putin stated that pro-Russian separatist groups should
postpone their demands for referendum and encouraged a possible dialogue between
parties, which would be more effective on the potential settlement of problems. He also
added that Ukraine’ presidential elections scheduled for 25 May would be a move “in the
right direction” (BBC News Europe, Ukraine crisis: Timeline).
Petro Poroshenko who had the 54.7% of votes in the first presidential elections of post-
crisis Ukraine, became the new president. The Head of Batkivchina Party and one of the
leaders of Orange Revolution Yulia Timoshenko, released from prison after Yanukovych
fled the country, got only 12.81% of the votes. While this work was put down on paper,
small scale conflicts between pro-government and pro-Russian groups in Ukraine and in
several cities protests for Russia were ongoing. Nonetheless, crisis erupted in Iraq at the
beginning of summer 2014, leading the attention of international society to focus on this
area, resulting in Ukrainian Crisis to be left aside.
After the news that Russian soldiers entered Ukraine in August, 2014, the leaders of the EU
member states, meeting in Brussels, announced that Russia had only a week to move back
its troops from Ukraine. In spite of all these developments, the attitudes of the EU member
states against what is happening in Ukraine, have not been quite effective beyond the com-
mon stance under NATO.
“ To conclude, on September 5, 2014, representatives of Ukraine, he Russian Federation,
the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), and the Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) signed
the Minsk Protocol, an agreement to halt the war in the Donbass region of Ukraine. The
Protocol was prepared by a group consisting of representatives from Ukraine, R Russia
and OSCE.
4. CONCLUSION
The common finding of these two cases is that it is not rhetorically quite easy to assume
the EU which identifies itself as a human security provider, is practically successful. The
process starting with the Arab Spring is extremely far from what the EU, forming a neigh-
bourhood and peace circle encompassing Iraq, Syria and a large area stretching from
North Africa to Eastern Europe, even though it was not covered by ENP, intended (creat-
ing a security community in the region).
According to the sources of the UN Refugee Agency as of September 2014, 2.965.312 Syr-
ian refugees live in various countries of the Middle East, especially Turkey, Jordan and
Lebanon (retrieved from UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response Website). However,
it is estimated that these numbers are quite below the real ones, and thought that only in
Turkey there are over two million Syrian refugees. The EU could not do anything sound
on the refugee crisis which is the largest one ever since the Second World War. Further-
more, for Turkmen, Shia, Christian and Yezidi people facing the threat of genocide by ISIS
(IS) attacks, there is not any tangible policy except from Germany’s military aid to Iraq
Kurdistan.
It is observed that similarly in Ukrainian Crisis, the EU did not manage to have concrete
policies against Russia’s invasion of Crimea region which is problematic considering the
International Law and against frequent raids of Eastern Ukraine by the Russian soldiers.
“However, as far as the Minsk Protocol concerned, the effective contributions of President
Francois Hollande and Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel should not be underestimated.
All these developments can be counted among the basic indicators of the fact that the EU’s
rhetorical claim of providing human security is far from being in harmony with practice.
5. REFERENCES
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Komşuluk İlişkisi”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 8(31), 2011, fall, 45–68.
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Kavramsallaştırması”. Uluslararası İlişkiler, 3(10), 3-52.
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Rothschild, E. (1995): “What Is Security?”. Daedalus, The Quest for World Order, 124(3),
summer, 53-98.
Solana, J. (2004):“A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of
the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities”. Barcelona, september. Re-
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solana/040915CapBar.pdf. (accession date: 11.12.2014).
Syrian Refugees Website: “A Snapshot of the Crisis – In the Middle East and Europe”.
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www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275. (accession date: 11.12.2014).
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ŽARIN, I. (2007): “EU Regional Approach to the Western Balkans – The Human Se-
curity Dimension”. Retrieved from: http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0025-
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UDC 351.78(=214.58)
Milana LAZIĆ*
HUMAN SECURITY
THROUGH THE PRISM OF DISPLACEMENT OF ROMA1
Abstract: Social inclusion of vulnerable groups, as often seen as a vital part of integration of Ser-
bia into the European Union (EU), is also an important issue from a standpoint of human secu-
rity. Poverty Reduction Strategy and other existing public policies have recognized the following
vulnerable groups in Serbia: people with disabilities, children, young people, women, and elderly
over 65, the Roma, internally displaced, uneducated, unemployed, poor people from rural ar-
eas. The Roma inclusion is one of the most challenging and important social inclusion processes
and in focus of the EU and international organizations. However, social inclusion of vulnerable
groups, e.g. the Roma inclusion, is not often linked with the concept of human security in the
public policy making process. In this paper, the question of influence which vulnerable groups
have on human security, in particular the Roma will be explored. The hypothesis for this paper is
the vulnerable groups’ impact on the level of human security in community. Research questions
which will be explored are: Do vulnerable groups impact the level of human security in commu-
nity? Does non-dealing with vulnerable groups, especially the Roma, increase insecurity? Does
inadequate care of the vulnerable groups increase the level of human insecurity in society? This
paper will prove its hypothesis using the method of case study on the displacement of the Roma
communities from non-hygienic, informal settlements into provided households and social apart-
ments in the city of Belgrade. This process is coordinated by the Belgrade City Secretariat for
Social Protection and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Using this case
study, the question on how the displacement of one vulnerable group can affect human security
in community will be explored. The displaced Roma community, as well as the community in
which the Roma will be placed into, can affect each other on the level of feeling of insecurity, and
prove the interconnection between social inclusion and human security and more precise, that
the vulnerable groups impact the level of human security in community.
Keywords: human security, social inclusion, the Roma inclusion, city of Belgrade, displacement,
community, public policy
1. INTRODUCTION
The Roma population in Serbia has been proven to be one the most socially excluded
group and their inclusion in society has been one of the most challenging processes. The
1 Milana Lazic, BA Political Science, Human Security and Gender Equality Coordinator, Social Inclusion and
Poverty Reduction Unit of the Government of Serbia, e-mail: milana.lazic@gov.rs
[400] Milana LAZIĆ
importance of inclusion of the Roma truthfully lies in a prism of strengthening of human

security of individuals, community and society as a whole. The consequences of the Roma
exclusion can be found today in their lack of access to health, education, employment,
proper living conditions, poverty eradication, possible higher rate of violence, human
trafficking, forced marriages, illegal migration and overall human insecurity and higher
mortality rate than average. What also differ the Roma from the above mentioned, are
usually very poor housing opportunities. With the exclusion and human insecurity of one
community in a society, other communities and their neighbourhoods can be affected.
This topic has been under spotlight of international donors, many organizations and in-
stitutions. Thus, there have been a lot of projects aiming to support the Roma inclusion
in various ways and many analyses regarding their status have been done. However, not
many of them have dedicated their attention to human security of the Roma. Moreover,
the mapping of potential human security threats and the level of human security in the
Roma communities has not been explored, and there has not been human security data
mapping using bottom up approach.
In this paper, particular connection between these two concepts, social inclusion and hu-
man security in the case of displacement of the Roma in the city of Belgrade will be exam-
ined. Hypothesis for this paper is that vulnerable groups have impact on the level of human
security in community. Another purpose of this paper is to reflect the importance of en-
countering human security concept when dealing with the problem of the Roma exclusion
in Serbia. Research questions which will be explored are: Do vulnerable groups impact
the level of human security in community? Does non-dealing with vulnerable groups, es-
pecially the Roma, increase insecurity? Does inadequate care of the vulnerable groups
increase the level of human insecurity in society?
This paper will try to prove that the displaced Roma community, as well as the community
in which the Roma will be displaced into, can affect each other on the level of feeling of
insecurity, and prove the interconnection between social inclusion and human security
and more precise, that the vulnerable groups impact the level of human security in com-
munity.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Human Security
When we talk about security, the common thought that comes to mind is security in a
form of a keeper of our nation and our territorial integrity. The instrument which is used
to maintain this kind of security is mostly military and the main threats to this military
security, using sectorial approach (Buzan B., Waever O., de Wilde J. 1998) are war and
terrorism. However, rarely we think of other segments of security which are connected
with somewhat civil security or security on an individual level, such as: security of human
rights, security from being exposed to every day violence, security to live free from want
and the right to human dignity, despite the fact that the threats to their security may differ
and some lead to the global threats (UNDP 1994:2). This other security, not as often seen
as used concept of security and is inter-combined with human rights and social inclusion
is the concept of human security.
HUMAN SECURITY
THROUGH THE PRISM OF DISPLACEMENT OF ROMA [401]
The UNDP Report on Human Development, which is concerned to have shaped and
emphasized the concept of human security, recognizes development as the key for hu-
man security opposed to arm conflict. Human Security concept recognizes the following
list of threats: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security,
personal security, community security, political security (Buzan B., Waever O., de Wilde
J. 1998:25-26). Consequently, for human security, the security of individual humans is es-
sential for the stability of society and it uses a holistic approach “to the diverse source of
insecurities that can lead or are a threat to human beings and its needs to live respectfully.”
(Shahrbanou, Anuradha 2007). Human Security threats thus may lead to social exclusion2
that could lead to a threat of societal or political security.3
2.2. Social Inclusion, Poverty and Exclusion

Social inclusion, on the other hand, is defined as a process “which ensures that those at
risk of poverty and social exclusion gain the opportunities and resources necessary to par-
ticipate fully in economic, social and cultural life and to enjoy a standard of living and
well-being that is considered normal in the society in which they live. It ensures that they
have greater participation in decision making which affects their lives and access to their
fundamental rights.” (CEU 2004).
Another concept which is inseparable both from social inclusion and human security is
poverty. The European Union specified that poverty occurs with people “if their income
and resources are so inadequate as to preclude them from having a standard of living con-
sidered acceptable in the society in which they live.” It is seen as “multiple disadvantage
through unemployment, low income, poor housing, inadequate health care and barri-
ers to lifelong learning, culture, sport and recreation” and their human rights might be at
jeopardy. People who are below or at the poverty line are seen as vulnerable or excluded.
Socially excluded are the ones “prevented from participating fully by virtue of their pov-
erty, or lack of basic competences and lifelong learning opportunities, or as a result of dis-
crimination.” (CEU 2004). They are often lacking the job and education opportunities and
possibilities, they are lacking on opportunity to human and sustainable development as
well as cultural and networking activities. Besides that, socially excluded usually have poor
housing or none, are often more exposed to violence and threatened by hunger, discrimi-
nation and low or no access to decision making and civil participation. Consequently, the
concept of poverty in the sectorial approach to security is recognized as the biggest soci-
etal threat to stability4 and in terms of social inclusion, reflects the failure of society and
social inclusion efforts within society.
2.3. Interconnection between Both Concepts

The inseparable concept of human security is a sustainable development, which “must
go hand in hand with intergenerational equity” (UNDP 1994:19). And since sustainable
human development is more inclusive concept than only sustainable development, it is
2 The word used in the report is disintegration, but the author used the word exclusion as a synonym. (CEU 2004)
3 Using sectorial concept of security, (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998).
4 Copenhagen School, Sectorial Approach to Security which recognizes 5 key sectorial approaches to security:
military, political, economic, ecological and societal. (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998).
[402] Milana LAZIĆ
important to bear in mind that it “puts people at the centre” since “everyone should have
equal access to development opportunities” (UNDP 1994:19). On the other hand, com-
plete social inclusion ensures equal opportunities, minimum standards of living conditions
and access to social services.
Accordingly, human security focuses on ensuring sustainable human development, while
social inclusion focuses on the establishment of minimum conditions and the same start-
ing point for all individuals in the society. On the one hand, human security is oriented
towards development and directing to ensure individual security and on the other, social
inclusion is focusing on ensuring minimal standards of protection of vulnerable groups,
emphasizing individual responsibility. Both concepts are aiming to ensure the access to
sustainable human development and equal access to life opportunities, aiming to provide
minimum standards for living, including human right to dignity, to live free from fear and
free from want.5
The ultimate goal of both human security and social inclusion is an inclusive stability of
society. This is why it is so important to interconnect one with the other, when dealing
with the vulnerable and excluded groups and ensure the holistic approach to security and
inclusion of individuals in society.
3. POSITION OF THE ROMA AND DISPLACEMENT

3.1. Data on the Roma in Serbia
Poverty Reduction Strategy and other existing public policies have recognized the follow-
ing vulnerable groups in Serbia: people with disabilities, children, young people, women,
elderly over 65, the Roma, internally displaced, uneducated, unemployed, poor people
from rural areas (Government of the Republic of Serbia 2011:section 5.8). Different es-
timations indicate there are from one quarter a million Roma living in Serbia up to half a
million. According to the Population Census in 2011, there are 147.604 officially registered
Roma in Serbia (Population Census 2011). Rates of the Roma facing poverty are amount-
ing to almost 50%. Low employment, lack of formal education, living in poor and unhy-
gienic environments and inadequate access to personal documents are only some of the
problems the Roma face (UNOPS 2013). The Report of the Commissioner for protection
of equality stated that the Roma are the most discriminated in Serbia, and to whom most
of people have a significant social distance (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia
2013).
In 2009, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Improvement of the Status of the Roma in the
Republic of Serbia until 2015, prioritizing education, housing, health, employment, anti-
discrimination, poverty reduction and decrease of gender differences (Government of
Serbia 2010). Despite the fact that both national and international policy framework have
recognized inclusion of the Roma one of the key priorities, the Roma people are still the
most vulnerable and excluded groups in Serbia, according to the Survey on Income and
Living Conditions (Babovic M. 2010). Even though the number of poverty reduction has
been decreasing, half of the Roma population remains poor and 6% of those half lives be-
low the hunger line. There are 29% of the Roma capable to work, earning approximately
5 UNDP Definition of Human Security

HUMAN SECURITY
48% of an average salary in Serbia, while 60% of the Roma receives no income (Andelkovic
B., Obradovic M., Radoman J. 2013).
3.2. Displacement of the Roma – The case of the City of Belgrade

Undoubtedly, the most deprived among the Roma are the ones living in number of rough-
ly over 593 informal and unhygienic settlements in Serbia in 120 municipalities (Curcic
2014), with no adequate access to clean water, sewage and electricity. The Progress Re-
port of European Commission for 2013 confirmed this by stating that „the Roma continue
to be subject to discrimination, particularly regarding access to social protection, health,
employment and adequate housing” and that “compliance with international standards
on forced evictions and relocations still needs to be systematically ensured.“ (European
Commission 2013).
Currently, there are two main international projects dealing with the housing of the Roma
and their displacement to adequate housing or enhancement of currently unhygienic, in-
formal settlements. The “European Support for the Roma Inclusion” project is the first
project funded under the EU IPA funds that is directly aimed at social inclusion of the
Roma population in the Republic of Serbia. The project is implemented by the Organiza-
tion of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Serbia, and estimated to
amount of EUR 4.8 million. Project is implemented in cooperation with the Office for
Human and Minority Rights, line ministries and Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction
Unit of the Government of Serbia. The principal goal of all activities under the housing
component of the project in the 20 pilot municipalities is assistance in preparing technical
documentation for applying for IPA 2013 funds, to be used for improving housing condi-
tions and quality of life in the Roma settlements. (Office for Human and Minority Rights,
Government of Serbia 2014).
Another project that has been ongoing is project entitled: “Let’s Build Home
Together“(UNOPS 2013), funded by the Delegation of the European Union to Serbia and
the European Commission with the amount of EUR 3.6 million out of the EU IPA rem-
nant funds. The project was launched in 2013 and overall objective is to provide adequate
housing solutions for up to 200 Roma families evicted from the informal settlements in
Belgrade, Belvil and Gazela, and in line with the City of Belgrade draft Action Plan for the
Resettlement of the Residents of Makis, Resnik, Jabucki Rit and Kijevo Container Settle-
ments (UNOPS 2013). The Project Document lists the following expected results: “select
locations for construction that have adequate planning and technical conditions; consult
families about locations and housing options; construct multi-family blocks, reconstruct
private and village houses; improve infrastructure conditions in the receiving communi-
ties; support drafting of legal documents for ownership; maintenance and security of ten-
ure; prepare the relocation schedule and assistance plan; organize resettlement and give
support to the families during the whole process” (UNOPS 2013). Specifically, it contrib-
utes to achievement of the objectives and tests possible models for sustainable housing
solutions in order to set standards for future support to the Roma families (UNOPS 2013).
The project is being implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UN-
OPS) with the partners: the City of Belgrade, particularly the Secretariat for Social Wel-
fare, the Secretariat for Health, the Secretariat for Child Protection, the Secretariat for
Education, the Belgrade Land Development Agency (Beoland), the City Agency for In-
[404] Milana LAZIĆ
vestments and Housing, the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR),
the Danish Refugee Council and the Housing Development Centre for Socially Vulnerable
Groups (Housing Centre).
The project offers three housing options for the Roma. The first one is to provide addi-
tional constructing material to the ones who have their own housing property, and this
is recognized in 11 cases. The second housing option is to buy a household from people
in rural areas willing to sell them, and this is so far identified for 31 families. In this case,
family or individual is in charge of finding a location by him/her and thus contact the UN-
OPS, after which they estimate the value and ensure that both husband and a wife share
the ownership over their household. The money limit for each house is 8.000 EUR and a
five year limit of not selling the house. The third and the most common option is to secure
social housing for approximately 130 families. The problematic issue with social housing is
finding a location. The ones who are already approved by the City of Belgrade – Orlovsko
naselje, Jabucki Rit and Mislodjin, are on the margins of the city.6
4 . THE CONNECTION -
HUMAN SECURITY AND INCLUSION OF THE ROMA
In previous chapters, conceptual framework and interconnectivity of human security and
social inclusion were presented. The overview of position of the Roma population, as one
of the most excluded, was shown as well as the overview of two main projects on housing
was given. Now the conceptual framework in practice raising the issue of displacement of
the Roma in the City of Belgrade will be examined as well as its connection with human
security and social inclusion.
In 2013 Progress Report for Serbia, the European Commission emphasize that the issue
of forced eviction still needs to be “systematically ensured“ (EC 2013). The First National
Report on Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction (2011) indicated that “problems with
relocation of the Roma living in slums persist” (…) and that “cases of intolerance of the
Roma have been recorded and some have been prosecuted.” (Government of the Republic
of Serbia 2011). These mentioned cases of organized attacks happened on the outskirts
of Belgrade and certain protests were organized in some municipalities where the Roma
were supposed to be relocated, opposed to the unhygienic and informal settlements (Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Serbia 2011). Thus, certain cases of hostility of neighbour-
hoods towards living with the Roma have been recorded, and the displacement of the
Roma is affected with the level of human insecurities in those certain neighbourhoods.
On the other hand, one research tackling the issue of human security threats perceived
by the Roma (2014) covered in 6 cities in Serbia, showed that in 5 of them the Roma saw
the unfavourable socio-economic position as the key human security threat (Radoman,
Tadic 2014). For the Roma displaced into “Kamendin“, a social housing settlement built
for providing housing for different vulnerable groups and located in municipality in the
outskirts of the City of Belgrade, Zemun Polje, physical attacks by organized groups were
seen as the biggest threat to their human security. One of the Roma residents living in this
settlement, for the purpose of abovementioned research stated: “With the first dark, the
6 Personal communication, September 2014. Meeting regarding displacement of the Roma.

HUMAN SECURITY
Roma do not go outside”. The Roma displaced from container settlements now living in
social housing in “Kamendin” claimed that they were a subject to threats by certain group
of hooligans and had been subject to intolerance by other vulnerable groups including
other Roma people living there longer (Radoman, Tadic 2014).
The third objective of “Let’s Build Home Together” project related to providing social
housing can be argued as problematic. Locations for the social housing are to be chosen
upon decision of the City of Belgrade, and the once already approved are on the margins of
the city.7 From a standpoint of social exclusion and concern of “ghettoization” of the Roma,
the human security and social inclusion of the Roma are clearly challenged. Accordingly,
if there is a group of people of already excluded families in one place, living in one settle-
ment and no other communities living with them in that same settlement, there is a little
chance for them to become included in society as easily. Opposed to that option is the one
to be living in the mixed communities, somewhere closer to downtown and motivated to
take an active part in their own inclusion process. And if the Report of the Commissioner
for Protection of Equality came to conclusion that there is the biggest social distance of
majority citizens in Serbia towards the Roma, it is undoubtedly problematic to segregate
them in a settlement with no other mixed communities and restrict their ability to social
inclusion. On the other hand, knowing that the Roma are one of the most excluded groups
in Serbia, the poverty line and low living standards and conditions may impact their in-
crease of domestic crime and violence within their community, but also be unprotected
subject to other physical attacks on the outside of their community. The Project Docu-
ment “Let’s Build Home Together” already targeted the high risk of host communities be-
ing opposed to the Roma arrival and medium risk of inadequate security. These risks were
supposed to be dealt with adequate measures, social education and information campaign,
consultation process and support to receiving communities (UNOPS 2013). Even though
the project implemented by the UNOPS have ensured the supervision of the Office for
Human and Minority Rights, together with Belgrade City Secretariat for Social Protection
of families’ social inclusion and Centres for Social Welfare should be involved, this is not
enough for insurance of human security or an active inclusion, but a protectionist access
to the Centres for Social Welfare and health institutions, without work stimulation and
limitation to only passive consumers of social services living in a “ghetto”. This means that
even though providing durable housing option for the Roma, they are not motivated to be
more easily included in the society and their human security is at stake. What is also very
important to keep in mind is a probability for creating a bigger social gap, higher level of
exclusion and insecurities between the Roma communities compared to the majority of
population. Consequently, those insecurities lead to human security threats that finally
lead to threat to societal stability.
Based on the two examples of hostility towards future neighbours and organized physical
threats, it is clear that the principles of human security and social inclusion are challenged
in the process of providing sustainable housing for the Roma. “The tensions and economic
loss still maintain to be a human security issue, and the Roma and the displaced Roma are
particularly vulnerable.” If the housing of majority of the Roma remains in the margins of
the city, without diversity and encouraging active social inclusion, this solution will not be
7 The ones chosen so far are: Jabucki Rit, Orlovsko naselje and Mislodjin, Personal Communication, September
2014.
[406] Milana LAZIĆ
sustainable from a standpoint of human security. On the contrary, this temporary solution
will just be a procrastination of holistic approach to deal with all the issues at once and
secure sustainable development of the Roma and the inclusive stability of society.
The other ongoing project dealing with the Roma, “European support for the Roma in-
clusion“, by focusing on building capacities of local-self governments to apply for the EU
IPA funds for improvement of housing conditions and quality of life in the Roma settle-
ments, can be seen as a possibly sustainable solution. By giving local-self governments the
opportunity to be involved with the issue of housing for the Roma, the awareness of the
problems of social inclusion and human security can be raised and become more transpar-
ent and implementing the project will give to the Roma a good positive feeling of having
a true support and possibly being motivated to take part in active inclusion. The Standing
Conference of Roma Associations (SKRUG) in Serbia has prepared the proposal of law
on legalization of all informal Roma settlements in Serbia.8 The proposed law is aiming
to oblige the local self-governments to contribute to development of informal Roma set-
tlements, with providing materials to build necessary infrastructure and sewage system.9
This might be a long term sustainable solution and in line with the objectives of “European
support for the Roma inclusion“ project, however it is important to keep in mind possible
stagnation of social inclusion of the Roma communities until the settlements in which they
live in become sustainable. The Study on the Existing Options for Housing of the Roma
(2014) offered an estimation that local-self governments should encounter if it is effective
to pursue the displacement of the Roma from informal settlements opposed to gradually
improve those existing settlements and legalize them. The arguments used against the le-
galization are that the process is very complex and expensive, and it does not guarantee
the effectiveness and sustainability (Vuksanovic-Macura, Macura 2014).
5. CONCLUSIONS
The main goal of this paper was to examine social inclusion and human security in the case
of the displacement of the Roma in the City of Belgrade and to reflect on the importance
of encountering human security concept when dealing with the problem of the Roma ex-
clusion in Serbia. Vulnerable groups, including the Roma, can impact the level of human
security in community and by maintaining the Roma on the margins of society, which may
undoubtedly lead to their social exclusion and increase of human insecurities and misbal-
ance between the Roma and non-Roma communities. This lack of security can increase
mutual feeling of mistrust between the Roma themselves as well. Providing housing with-
out ensuring social inclusion of the Roma and focusing only on the social protection role of
institutions, will lead to passive action or involvement into illegal businesses, both aspects
that can lead to social exclusion.
Thus, the overall goal of all housing projects should be to ensure social inclusion of the
Roma and provide human security, pointing out sustainable human development (Vuks-
anovic-Macura, Macura 2014). Human security can only be ensured with clear and strong
8 Source http://www.mc.rs/predstavljanje-nacrta-predloga-zakona-o-legalizaciji-odrzivih-romskih-
naselja.4.html?eventId=9487
9 Personal communication, 11th September 2014. for the Press Conference on the Draft of Law on Legalization of
Sustainable Informal Roma Settlements.
HUMAN SECURITY
effort of social inclusion of vulnerable groups and providing sustainability by breaking

the chain of ghettoization and social exclusion. Additionally, living on the margins and in
poverty will ultimately lead to not being able to access social participation and as a conse-
quence less safe environment (Open Society Foundations 2010).
Involvement of the neighbours in the Roma community at all levels of individual partici-
pation is crucial for the high level of human security and social inclusion (Open Society
Foundations 2010). And without community police control at a local level, the Roma com-
munities will experience challenge in human security within the community itself and the
role of forming a Local Security Councils. Body formed by local-self-governments can
increase the assurance of human security and advocate for the position of excluded groups
or communities. One possible mechanism is to “build greater community consultation
and participation in shaping policing and security policies” in order to include local resi-
dents into the policing process and advise on neighbourhood security10 The Study on the
Existing Options for Housing of the Roma (2014) considers important that social housing
is combined with the regular housing in order to ensure mixed communities (Government
of the Republic of Serbia 2011).
And as a starting point, The First Report on Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction (2011)
finds “necessary to develop indicators for vulnerable groups” (Government of the Repub-
lic of Serbia 2011) and to provide evidence-based report on human security, and measure
the level of human security in the Roma communities using bottom-up approach.11
10 Compare: Open Society Fund (2007).

11 Personal communication, January 2014, Citizen’s network for peace, reconciliation and human security,
International Conference - Humanizing Security, Istanbul: Turkey.
[408] Milana LAZIĆ
6. REFERENCES
Andelkovic B., Obradovic M., Radoman J. (2013): “Estimation of Efficiency of Local

Mechanisms for Roma Inclusion”. Belgrade: Serbia. Social Inclusion and Poverty Re-
duction Unit. Retrieved from:
http://publicpolicy.rs/publikacije/daf725e70691bf26e5ef8d2b73d074cf98d4b9a6.pdf
Anne Marie Curcic (2014): “A Step Towards Solution of Roma Inclusion Problem in Ser-
bia”, Al Jazeera, September 11. Retrieved from: http://balkans.aljazeera.net/video/
korak-ka-rjesenju-problema-roma-u-srbiji
Babovic M. (2010): Challenges of New Social Policy: Social Inclusion in EU and Serbia, Bel-
grade: Serbia. SeConS. Retrieved from:
http://www.secons.net/admin/app/webroot/files/publications/Izazovinovesocijalnepo-
litikezaweb.pdf
Buzan B., Waever O., de Wilde J. (1998): Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Colo-
rado US and London UK. Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.
Council of the European Union (2004): Joint report by the Commission and the Council on
social inclusion. Brussels: Belgium. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_
social/soc-prot/soc-incl/final_joint_inclusion_report_2003_en.pdf
European Commission (2013): Commission Staff Working Document SERBIA 2013 Progress
Report, Brussels: Belgium. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf
Government of the Republic of Serbia (2011): First National Report on Social Inclusion and
Poverty Reduction in the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade: Serbia. Social Inclusion and Pov-
erty Reduction Unit. Retrieved from: http://socijalnoukljucivanje.gov.rs/wp-content/
uploads/2014/06/Prvi-nacionalni-izvestaj-o-socijalnom-ukljucivanju-i-smanjenju-
siromastva1.pdf
Government of Serbia (2010): Strategy for Improvement of the Status of Roma in Serbia.
Belgrade: Serbia. Ministry for Human and Minority Rights. Retrieved from: http://
www.inkluzija.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Strategija-EN-web-FINAL.pdf
M.P. (2014): “Roma are concerned with economical position and physical threats”, EurAk-
tiv, June 11. Retrieved from: http://www.euractiv.rs/ljudska-prava/7386-rome-brinu-
lo-ekonomski-poloaj-i-fizike-pretnje-
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (2013): Regular Yearly Report of the Commis-
sion for Protection of Equality for the Year 2013. Belgrade: Serbia. Commissioner for Pro-
tection of Equality. Retrieved from: http://www.ravnopravnost.gov.rs/images/files/
Poverenik%20za%20zastitu%20ravnopravnosti%20-%20Izvestaj%202013.pdf
Office for Human and Minority Rights, Government of Serbia (2014): Project Technical
Support for the Roma Inclusion, September 14. Retrieved from: http://www.ljudskap-
rava.gov.rs/index.php/yu/vesti-l/607-projekat-tehnicka-podrska-za-inkluziju-roma
Open Society Fund (2007): Condition of Human Security in Serbia – Report for 2005-2006.
Belgrade: Serbia. Open Society Fund.
HUMAN SECURITY
Open Society Foundations (2010): Muslims in Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities. New York
– London - Budapest. Open Society Institute. Retrieved from: http://www.opensoci-
etyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/a-muslims-europe-20110214_0.pdf
Population Census (2011) Retrieved from: http://popis2011.stat.rs/?page_id=2134
Radoman J. and Tadic M. (2014): (Human) Security of Roma in Serbia and Work of Security
Sector Institutions, Research Report Belgrade. CENTER for Public Policies Research.
Retrieved from: http://www.publicpolicy.rs/publikacije/36466d71d25f36057a187f34ff
e42392f9282eed.pdf
Tadjbakhsh S. and Chenoy A. M. (2007): Human Security, Concepts and Implication. Lon-
don: UK/New York: U.S. Routledge.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (1994). Human Development Report. New
York: U.S. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/
files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf
United Nations Office for Project Services [UNOPS] (2013): Let’s Build Home Together,
Project, Retrieved from: http://www.sagradimodom.org/dokumenti/en/4_783988_
let-s-build-a-home-together-project-document-february-2014.pdf
Vuksanovic-Macura Z., Macura V. (2014): The Study on the Existing Options for Housing of
Roma. Belgrade: Serbia. Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) Mission
to Serbia. http://socijalnoukljucivanje.gov.rs/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/postojeci_
modeli_za_poboljsanje_stanovanja_roma_oebs1.pdf
UDC 728.22:316.62
Nevena NOVAKOVIC, Aleksandra DJUKIC*
URBAN FORM AND PUBLIC SAFETY:

HOW PUBLIC OPEN SPACE SHAPES SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
IN PUBLIC HOUSING NEIGHBOURHOODS1
Abstract: This paper points out the relationship between urban form characteristics and social
behaviour in public open space of public housing neighbourhoods in the context of safety and se-
curity issues. It is based on theoretical assumptions according to which the organization of space
and its physical characteristics influence the relationship between people, their activities and ide-
as. The spatial configuration of neighbourhoods and their public space can affect the individual
and collective patterns of their daily use which support local community identity and its integra-
tion into the global system of a city. At the same time it can be a generator of urban segregation
and experience of insecurity.
The paper is a brief overview of several urban theories as critical rethinking of spatial and social
basis of the concept of the neighbourhood unit. These theories are dealing with the relations
between urban form and forms of sociability, at the same time concerning the safety issue of
neighbourhoods and public spaces. Analytical concepts of these theories of urban heterogeneity
and configurational characteristics of the space are often used in contemporary urban studies as a
tool to measure the spatial performativity in the context of safety problems. Patterns of human co-
presence, spontaneous surveillance and mixing of residents and strangers, who can be supported
and generated through the configuration of urban structures, are considered as the mediators of
experience of safety. Pointing out the safety issue in these theories, the argument of this paper is
that urban form can be considered as a useful instrument for achievement of individual and com-
munity safety.
Keywords: public housing neighbourhoods, spatial configuration, public open space, public safety,
co-presence, spontaneous surveillance
1 Nevena Novakovic, PhD, Senior teaching assistant, Faculty of Architecture and Civil Engineering, University of
Banja Luka, e-mail: nnovakovic@agfbl.org;
Aleksandra Djukic, PhD, Associate professor, Faculty of Architecture, University of Belgrade,
e-mail: adjukic@rcub.bg.ac.rs
[412] Nevena NOVAKOVIC, Aleksandra DJUKIC
1. INTRODUCTION:
THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD UNIT
Familiar pattern of multi-storey residential buildings in the form of towers or slabs ar-
ranged in a generous open space, often with greenery, can be found in cities and towns all
over Europe and beyond. According to some estimates made during 1990s approximately
6 million people in Western Europe live in housing complexes that have more than 2,500
dwellings and over 34 million in Central and Eastern Europe with residential buildings
which have over five floors, without the countries of former Soviet Union (Turkington
et al. 2004:1). The numbers indicate the importance of the subject of inherited collective
neighbourhoods and regeneration of their urban models, especially in the eastern part of
Europe, where these complexes are the dominant model of urban housing.
The concept of the neighbourhood unit is connected with the problem of public safety
from its first spatial conceptualizations to their construction and experience of life in them.
In fact, the criticism of effects of social life in collective neighbourhoods and the depriva-
tion of urbanity after World War II led to the development of social and spatial theories of
urban heterogeneity and complexity. The problem of public safety is at the centre of dis-
course about the relations between spatial form and vitality and liveability of urban areas.
This paper is a brief overview of several urban theories as a critical rethinking of spatial
and social basis of the concept of the neighbourhood unit. These theories are dealing with
the relations between urban form and forms of sociability, at the same time concerning
the safety issue of neighbourhoods and public spaces. The analytical concepts of these
theories of urban heterogeneity and configurational characteristics of the space are often
used in contemporary urban studies as a tool to measure the spatial performativity in the
context of safety problems. The patterns of human co-presence, spontaneous surveillance
and mixing of residents and strangers, who can be supported and generated through the
configuration of urban structures, are considered as the mediators of experience of safety.
Pointing out the safety issue in these theories, the argument of this paper is that urban
form can be considered as a useful instrument for the achievement of individual and com-
munity safety.
Figure 1: Photography of “Borik” neighborhood, Banjaluka, 1974.

(Karabegović 1974:115.)
URBAN FORM AND PUBLIC SAFETY: HOW PUBLIC OPEN SPACE SHAPES SOCIAL
BEHAVIOUR IN PUBLIC HOUSING NEIGHBOURHOODS [413]
The concept of the Neighbourhood Unit was formulated in the early 20th century in the
United States as a model for urban planning of housing units in cities. As an instrument
of urban planning, and very often the regeneration of urban space, it has evolved over the
last century through different interpretations, different use, practical applications and re-
views (Brody 2013). The broadest explanation of the concept that it contains a universal
meaning in the context of architecture and urbanism is that the neighbourhood unit is a
methodological framework for the planning and design of urban areas with defined spatial
or demographic size and dwelling as a dominant function.
American planner Clarence Arthur Perry devised the concept of the Neighbourhood Unit
on the empirically recognized relation between the spatial characteristics of a large city
and the quality of social life (Perry 1998 [1929]). The formulation of this concept was
motivated by Parry’s perception of everyday life in the great city of New York which was
undergoing rapid change and was inspired by social ideals of the urban community. So-
ciological arguments of the Neighbourhood Unit were based on Parry’s experience as a
social worker and then advanced by the scientific theories of the famous Chicago school of
sociology, which saw neighbourhood as the primary social unit – community (Brody 2013).
According to Perry’s interpretation, community as social framework allowed individual
self-realization and spontaneous association of citizens in order to achieve individual and
group interests. Perry recognized the Neighbourhood Unit as a devise for urban planning
of housing complexes in the cities of his time, and as an instrument for achieving the goals
in the social domain of urban life (Новаковић 2014).
One of the main problems that Perry took in consideration when started to develop the
concept of the Neighbourhood Unit was a question of pedestrian security in the period
of automobile expansion in the American cities of the time. The streets were still a basic
place of socialization, pedestrian movement and children’s games. But the streets of New
York had not been equipped with the instruments of regulation of movement as we know
them today, and they constituted a dangerous place for everyday use. At the same time, the
widespread use of automobiles developed a new network of automobile roads that were
cutting residential neighbourhoods and the usual pedestrian paths.
The concept of the Neighbourhood Unit was based on a number of precise planning prin-
ciples of separate spatial structures and their mutual relations. Together they have the
function of defining the spatial and social unit - community of neighbourhood (Perry 1998
[1929]:34-43). Spatial order of the neighbourhood unit had a role as generator of desirable
social order of the community. The concept of urban whole was understood literally in
spatial and social terms. The principles of formation of the spatial units include clearly the
defined spatial boundaries, functional autonomy and self-sufficiency, and in the context of
traffic communications high-speed connection to the neighbourhood which is interlaced
with blind streets. In this way, the residents of the neighbourhood should get a place for
a quiet life and leisure in their spare time, away from the dangers of the metropolis and
harassment from strangers. The Neighbourhood Unit was seen as a primarily a secure area
of a community.
Perry apparently perceived the critical link between the physical and social domains in
city life and tried by defining the principles of spatial organization to achieve certain ef-
fects in the social. At the same time, he could not have been aware of the extent in which
his spatial concept of the neighbourhood, materialized in the form of group of single-fam-
ily dwellings and land parcels in private ownership, will be suited to the development of
the American automobile culture and land development, ultimately decentralization, seg-
regation and alienation, together known as sprawl.
2. CRITICISM OF ARCHITECTURAL DETERMINISM:

NEIGHBOURHOOD SAFETY THROUGH URBAN DIVERSITY
Already after the first phase of mass construction of public housing neighbourhoods after
the World War II, the problems in the experience of living in them were emerging. Avail-
able statistics from 1960s in England, Holland, Denmark and Sweden show a pronounced
preference of residents to single-family dwellings, compared to the collective neighbour-
hoods (Turkington et al. 2004:10). The reasons for this kind of expressed preference are
certainly complex and have empirical and ideological nature. However, dissatisfaction
with life in high-rise multi-family dwellings is usually expressed by families with children.
One of the first obvious problems of living in collective neighbourhood is a problem of
management and maintenance of common open spaces, where there are the first signs of
vandalism and safety problems. It seemed that the practical implementation of the neigh-
bourhood unit failed in generating the sense of community and to the contrary contrib-
uted to the social fragmentation at the city level.
Concepts of the neighbourhood unit and the functional city will mutually produce major
changes in the history of the development of cities and leave deep traces in the urban tis-
sue for a “short” time of the 20th century. These changes have had their repercussions in all
spheres of urban life, caused many intellectual critical reactions and the review of spatial,
socio-political and cultural development of cities of the 20th century during 1960s. The
concept of public urban space appeared as connotation to positive socio-spatial quality
that previously contained dense and heterogeneous cities, and which have been almost
completely lost in recent urban developments.
At the same time, a critical examination of the spatial and social bases of the neighbour-
hood unit and their mutual relationship began in which the concept of public space played
an important role. The concept of public space in the field of architecture and urbanism
was associated with new approaches which were based on explicit anti-CIAM criticism in
which the CIAM rationalist doctrine and practice was “blamed” for the design of stand-
ardized collective housing projects after World War II all around the world (Mumford
2000:268). New approaches were based on the search for the concepts which will express
a different nature and role of cities and sought the promotion of architecture and urbanism
that were sensitive to the needs of users of urban space.
One of the most influential texts which set in a direct the relation the spatial characteris-
tics of neighbourhoods and the lack of social and economic vitality was Jane Jacobs’s The
Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961). This book will be also the main point of
reference in the criticism of modernist and technocratic planning and reconstruction of
cities and neighbourhoods. Jacobs’s negative criticism directly focus on the profession of
urban planning and design, especially the concept of the functional city and his historical
roots in the works of English and American planners and thinkers of urban space. The city
and state administration has also been called to account, but it is clearly depicted that the
heaviest blame for poor quality of life in American cities and neighbourhoods bear the
post-war planners and architects. Spatial characteristics of the post-war neighbourhoods
included a mistake which had its effects in different spheres of life in the neighbourhood,
including a sense of security. This thesis was called architectural determinism in the fields
of sociology and environmental psychology.
Jacobs puts before urban planners, architects and people involved in the management of
cities the problem of approach to planning of urban space and its complexity. Her book is
based on an analysis of the effects of urban planning in the everyday life of neighbourhoods
and the use of public space. With her work Jane Jacobs was affirming the way of observation,
analysis and design of urban space that is rooted in the practical experience and the experi-
ence of urban space from the user’s perspective. “The way to get at what goes on in the seem-
ingly mysterious and perverse behavior of cities is, I think, to look closely, and with as little
previous expectations as is possible, at the most ordinary scenes and events, and attempt
to see what they mean and whether any threads of principle emerge among them ( Jacobs
1992 [1961]:13).” The issues of the everyday life or the “reality” of life in the city is set in con-
trast to the professional ideology that deals with visual order of city and who finds meaning
within itself. Public safety is one of the key topics that Jacobs was dealing with.
On a more general level of analysis, the intellectual domain in which lies the problem of
spatial and functional determinism Henri Lefebvre called operational rationalism (Lefeb-
vre 2003:82-83). Problematic approach to urban planning inside which its analytic “reason-
ing” has been brought to its extremes is based on a detailed analysis of separate elements
- production processes, social and economic organization, spatial structure and function.
According to Lefebvre, planers rationalists see the city and its centre and suburbs such as a
contradiction and disorder, at the same time not recognizing such a state as a condition of
their own existence. Keywords that determine their future actions in order to bring order,
norms and normality in a chaotic reality are the coherence and completeness.
Drawing on the work of Jane Jacobs, a sociologist and cultural critic Richard Sennett also
defines the problem of regression in the planning and design of neighbourhoods and cities
in the 20th century as overwhelming determinism of the visual elements of the city and its
functions. “In particular, what’s missing in modern urbanism is a sense of time – not time
looking backwards nostalgically but forward-looking time, the city understood as process,
its imagery changing through use, an urban imagination image formed by anticipation,
friendly to surprise (Sennett 2006:1).” In Sennett’s criticism the public space has been
identified as the place of coexistence and mixing of individual differences, “the cultures of
city”, which thus opens the perspective of the different possibilities of personal reinven-
tion (Sennett 1991; 2003 [1977]).
Sennett builds a theory of collective culture as a reflection on the theory of urbanity set by
Jane Jacobs. In her book she formulated the principle of urban diversity, based on different
uses of space that complement and support each other in the social and economic sense.
Jacobs writes about urbanity as namely the conjunction of urban sociability and urban
space which includes a variety of different phenomena and the combination of the uses
of the city’s indoor and outdoor areas, diversity of form, appearance and age of buildings.
In the same context, Jacobs mentions public space as place where urbanity is generated,
which is one of the earliest mentions of the term in the history of the discourse.
Jacobs sees the streets as the “most vital organs” of the city and the street neighbourhoods
as the most important urban social spaces ( Jacobs 1992 [1961]:29). Street neighbourhoods
meet the three basic principles of urbanity: public safety, social contact and assimilation of
children. Streets provide daily contact with neighbours and strangers, but the possibility
of personal control of communication and level of sociability as well. Unlike Perry who
defined streets as heavy traffic arteries and a great danger to children, Jacobs saw streets
as the first place of socialization outside the family and the first experience of urban diver-
sity. At the same time, the street enables constant supervision of children by adults and
children contact with the norms of social behaviour, in contrast to the playgrounds in the
park, where children are isolated.
In contrast to Perry’s tendency to completely prevent the entry of those who do not live
in the neighbourhood by the means of spatial organization, Jacobs sees the basic content
of urbanity in the presence of strangers on the streets of the neighbourhood. “Great cities
are like towns, only larger. They are not like suburbs, only denser. They differ from towns
and suburbs in basic ways, and one of those is that the cities are, by definition, full of stran-
gers…The first thing to understand is that the public peace - the sidewalk and street peace
- of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily
by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among
the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves ( Jacobs 1992 [1961]:30-
32).” Simultaneously, an important characteristic of vital cities is a sense of safety in public
spaces, among large number of strangers, and which must be reached without access re-
strictions and the creation of isolated enclaves. According to Jacobs, this spatial fragmen-
tation will reduce the number of opportunities to meet different people and unable new
experiences. Spaces oriented toward corridor space of the street, “eyes upon the street”
as Jacobs called them, allow spontaneous mutual surveillance among passers-by, strangers
and residents, as the basic instrument of urban security.
The main thesis of criticism formulated by Jacobs, Lefebvre and later Sennett, is a thesis
on urban planning principles that give primacy to the static spatial form over the social
process. In fact, from Perry’s concept of the Neighbourhood Unit and throughout the
planning principles of post-war neighbourhoods in Europe, the spatial order of urban
and architectural elements that together define the neighbourhood unit was conceived
as an instrument to establish the desired social organization and order. The relationship
between spatial form and social relations is seen as a simplified, one-way and insensitive to
time. Sociologist David Harvey see this thesis as still applicable to certain contemporary
architectural and urban design practices and ideology of neighbourhoods: “The effect is
to destroy the possibility of history and ensure social stability by containing all processes
within a spatial frame. The New Urbanism changes the spatial frame, but not the presump-
tion of spatial order as a vehicle for controlling history and process (Harvey 2005:23).”
3. SPATIAL FORMS AND BEHAVIOR PATTERNS:

SECURITY IN FORM OF SPONTANEOUS SURVEILLANCE
On the foundations of the theories of urban spatial heterogeneity and complexity, which
was first set by Jane Jacobs, Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson will develop a comprehensive
analytical theory that formulate the principles of social logic of space (1984). According
to this analytic theory called Space Syntax, architecture and urban structures are spatial
configurations in which the relationship between the parts and the way they are linked
together are much more important than any individual part from a social point of view.
The theory of space syntax is developing the approach to the design of spatial basis of so-
cial coexistence and “the architecture of community” where public spaces have a primary
role (Hanson, Hillier 1987). Space syntax techniques are very much used in contemporary
studies of the relation between public safety and urban form of neighbourhoods and pub-
lic spaces.
The theory of space syntax is based on tendency to overcome the model of corresponding
relations between spatial territories and community groups (the Correspondence Model)
and tends to support the social heterogeneity through space means (Hillier, Hanson 1987).
Urban space understood as the configuration can be structured in a way that increases the
likelihood of encounters between people of different social groups, rather than to give
them the corresponding space - territory, or to separate them. “Space may not be struc-
tured to correspond to social groups, and by implication to separate them, but on the con-
trary to create encounters among those whom the structures of social categories divide
from each other. In other words, space can in principle also be structured, and play an
important role in social relations by working against the tendency of social categoriza-
tion to divide society into discrete groups. Space can also reassemble what society divides
(Hillier, Hanson 1987:265).” However, based on the research of the relationship between
the configuration of the street system and the probability of encounters, the conclusion
is that this probability is significantly reduced in hierarchically organized spaces, such as
the neighbourhood unit. Henson and Hillier state that the relationship between the local
organization of space and the global structure of city is a basic spatial issue in context of
vitality, sociability and security. According to them, it is important to create a spatial strat-
egy for the design of local configuration that will be well integrated in the global system,
rather than to localize space to the enclaves.
3.1. Spatial configuration and concept of co-presence

The theory of space syntax assumes that buildings are not just physical objects or artefacts
composed of single elements that together define a particular form. Buildings also form
and organize empty volumes of space in between, so instead we have patterns. The spatial
distribution of buildings and empty volumes mediate the relations between people in the
area, namely groups, separates and connects. According to the theory, the buildings are
sociological objects in two ways: they form a social organization of everyday life through a
spatial configuration in which we live and through which we are moving, and they repre-
sent a social organization as the spatial configurations and elements that we see. Buildings
are, therefore, social object through their own forms and not only through their role as
visual symbols (Hillier, Hanson 1984).
The key concept of the theory is the configuration. According to Bill Hillier, the simplest
explanation of the concept of configuration is that it is a relation which takes into account
other relations (Hillier 2007:1). Configuration is a concept that refers to a whole com-
posed of some components and their interconnections, and not to individual components.
Hillier formally defines the configuration as follows: if there is a relation between two ele-
ments, we can call it a configuration if their relationship changes with respect to the rela-
tion of one or both to the third element (Hillier 2007:24). The relationship between space
and social existence lies not at the level of individual use of space and individuals, but
in the relationship between spatial configuration and group form of people. Encounters,
gatherings, avoiding and interactions are not individual acts, but patterns or configura-
tions formed by a group of people.
The key sociological concept within the theory of space syntax, which can be seen as the
ultimate goal of the research, planning and design of urban space, is the concept of the
simultaneous presence of people - co-presence. The co-presence is much closer to the de-
sirable outcome of the urban planning and design of urban space, because it is a necessary
condition for the occurrence of interaction, communication and the formation of social
relations (Marcus, Legeby 2012:3). As Jane Jacobs notes, it is a necessary condition for
public safety as well. The theory of space syntax points out that the patterns of co-pres-
ence are largely a result of architectural and urban form, and therein lays the importance
of this concept, as the essential link between space and social phenomenon.
Erving Goffman, one of the most important authors and sociologists regarding the sociol-
ogy of everyday life and social communication face to face recognized the importance of
physical environment in their context. When defining the typology of gatherings in a pub-
lic space, Goffman defined the concept of the co-presence as a basic prerequisite for any
kind of social communication (Goffman 1963). Correlation of direct sensory experience
and message transfer through the body is one of the essential conditions of interaction
face to face. Co-presence means that “persons must sense that they are close enough to
be perceived in whatever they are doing, including their experiencing of others, and close
enough to be perceived in this sensing of being perceived” (Goffman 1963:17). Thus, the
interaction can be unfocused, which includes the mutual awareness of actors only in pass-
ing by, and focused with direct mutual awareness and close physical distance. Sociologist
Anthony Giddens also uses the concept of the co-presence in the consideration of social
relations in public encounters, focusing on its sensory and bodily experience (Giddens
1984:64-68).
Through a systematic investigation of how the spatial arrangement of units and perme-
ability controls the access and movement in the urban system, has led Hillier and Hanson
to setting of general principles of analysis of spatial patterns and techniques of research of
basic aspects of social relations embedded in the spatial form. In these studies it was shown
that the two types of social relations significantly contributed to the formation of spatial
form of settlements. These are the relationships between those who live in the area and
who continually use it, and the relations between the residents and strangers, people who
come from other parts of the city. According to this, the public space of the settlement is
treated as a unique interface between the dwelling space and the world outside the settle-
ment, between the resident’s domain and the domain of strangers. The manner in which
this collective space was organized and treated proved to be the most important distinc-
tion between the types of settlements configuration (Hillier, Hanson 1984:17).
The differences in the organization and forms of public space are based on a very sim-
ple principle of theory of space syntax called convex and axial organization of space. The
strangers in most cases are moving through the space of settlements, while the residents
are practicing a much more static usage of the local system. Axial public spaces let stran-
gers into the system, while the convex public spaces are organized like more static zones of
residents in which they therefore have a greater potential of control over the area (Hillier,
Hanson 1984:17). In this simple principle of layout and connection between axial and con-
vex spaces is contained the principle of public safety. Spatial configuration of neighbour-
hood lets the strangers in all public spaces, but controls them by placing housing units of
residents in the immediate vicinity. In this way, the strangers supervise the public space
and at the same time the residents supervise the strangers. Spatial propositions of feeling
of safety are arising from the collective routes of everyday movement and co-presence
generated within the neighbourhood where it is possible to encounter the neighbours and
strangers as well.
Jane Jacobs recognized this principle of safety contained in encounters of residents and
strangers in the public space of neighbourhood. “Safety on the streets by surveillance and
mutual policing of one another sounds grim, but in real life it is not grim. The safety of
the street works best, most casually, and with least frequent taint of hostility or suspicion
precisely where people are using and most enjoying the city streets voluntarily and are
least conscious, normally, that they are policing ( Jacobs 1992:36).” Accordingly, Jacobs
stated that the streets of successful neighbourhoods must have three basic qualities: a clear
distinction between private and public space, houses that have windows and entrances to
the street to allow the monitoring of street life, and continuous daily use of sidewalks or
“live” street. Some of the contemporary empirical studies of public housing neighbour-
hoods and social behaviour in their public space come with the conclusions in the same
line, pointing out the importance of urban form for public safety: “The community of
the street, whether traditional or postmodern, is made up of a complex layering of inti-
macy and anonymity, in which social encounter and urban safety are maintained by the
co-presence of strangers on the street, the interface between local residents and passers-
by on the doorstep and the surveillance of residents over street space from the privacy of
their front windows. The panoptic models of modernism rupture this spatial interface
between inhabitants and passersby and instead they rely almost entirely on surveillance
to preserve safety and generate community. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that
where surveillance is weak or absent, it is replaced by sousveillance, in the sense that the
very openness and unconstitutedness of the public domain allows the perpetrators of an-
tisocial activities to keep a lookout for anyone in the vicinity and to escape unchallenged if
necessary (Hanson, Zako 2007:20).”
4. CONCLUSION
Spatial characteristics of neighbourhoods and their public space can be seen as a media-
tor in the formation of the co-presence of neighbourhood residents and their encounters
with each other and with the residents of other parts of the city. Co-presence is seen as an
essential condition for social interaction and communication, the establishment of social
ties, and security in the use of public space through spontaneous mutual monitoring. This
raises the question of the analysis and measurement of configuration characteristics of
inherited public housing neighbourhoods and their capacity for forming patterns of co-
presence and the use of space. How are the places of privacy and common usage allocated?
How many neighbours are using a common area? Are the residents of the neighbourhood
encountering strangers on their daily routes? Are therefore, the places of common use the
safe places?
Starting from the theory of the configurational characteristics of the built environment
and their effect in the formation of co-presence and constitution of collective use, the goal
of the spatial transformation of the neighbourhood should be public open space which
enables the formation of intense co-presence of residents and strangers with various com-
binations of private and collective use. The appropriate spatial distribution and connectiv-
ity of these places of everyday use play an important role in the social life of the neighbour-
hood, public safety and in the formation of the image and identity of the neighbourhood.
More specifically, it can be concluded that the neighbourhood as a social sphere and form
of sociality is largely derived from the patterns of collective use of public paths and places,
and their spatial patterns.
To interpret the concept of the neighbourhood unit in the context of spatial and social
theories of urban heterogeneity means that the neighbourhood should be understood
otherwise than unambiguously defined territory of its residents connected with strong
social ties. According to sociological and spatial theories that consider the relationship of
space and society, neighbourhood should be understood as a spatial topology, which is an
integral part of the overall urban structure and whose inhabitants are interconnected with
looser social ties and exposed to daily encounters with strangers. The major role in sup-
porting and generating this reconceptualization of the neighbourhood unit has been given
to public open space, as an element of linking the local organization of the neighbourhood
and community to the global system of the city. We are left to consider urban neighbour-
hood concept out of the physical and social determinism and through the focus of quality
of public space.
5. REFERENCES
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Goffman, E. (1963): Behavior in Public Places. Notes on the Social Organization of Gather-
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Hanson, J., Zako, R. (2007): “Communities of co-presence and surveillance: how public
open space shapes awareness and behavior in residential developments” In Proceedings
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Jacobs, J. (1992): The Death and Life of Great American Cities. [1961] New York: Vintage
Books.
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Lefebvre, H. (2003): Urban revolution. [1970] Translated by Robert Bononno. Minneapo-
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Faber and Faber.
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media/objects/articles/the-open-city/en-gb/
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rope. Current trends and future prospects. Delft: DUP Science, Delft University Press.
UDC 351.78:327(497.11)
Marija POPOVIĆ*
INTRODUCING HUMAN SECURITY DISCOURSE IN SERBIAN

FOREIGN POLICY: THE WAY TOWARDS EUROPEAN
VALUES AND PRACTICES12
Abstract: After deepening the research field of security studies to lower levels of analysis (indi-
vidual level), as well as broadening security to new sectors of analysis in addition to the previously
dominant military sector, human security was introduced in security studies. Placing humans at
the centre of interest of security studies and giving them a role of the reference objects of secu-
rity, what human security concept did was humanization of values and principles that underpin
contemporary security practices. Human security discourse has a great research potential within
security studies because of its practical utility, and in addition, human security narrative provides
legitimacy for different practical activities. Although analytically contested concept that is often
put to criticism for its vagueness, this concept has a power to reshape security practices in dif-
ferent ways, depending of the context and this theoretical weakness can be seen as a practical
strength at the same time. Human security discourse, even when it is not officially implanted in
Foreign Policy documents, represents indispensable discourse of different political subjects and
institutions and a background for undertaking various measures and actions in order to protect
the perceived values. The aim of this paper is to research how the discourse of human security is
represented in the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Serbia and what is its role in Foreign Policy
activities of the Republic of Serbia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Firstly, what would be discussed
is the nature and ambiguity of the concept of human security and its vagueness which makes
this concept easily stretchable and politically useful. What will be discussed next are the ways in
which the concept of human security impacts practical policies, and finally, the third part of the
text is devoted to the place and role of the concept of human security in the foreign policy of the
Republic of Serbia.
Keywords: human security, foreign policy, discourse, values.
1 The paper is the outcome of activities related to research project entitled Development of institutional capacity,
standards and procedures in combating organized crime and terrorism in terms of international integrations. This
is Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia-funded research (No. 179 045), managed by the
Academy of Criminalistics and Police Studies in Belgrade (2011-2014). The project manager is Sasa Mijalkovic,
Ph.D, Assistance Professor.
* Marija Popovic, MA, Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, e-mail: marija.popovic@kpa.edu.rs
[424] Marija POPOVIĆ
1. INTRODUCTION
Since Westphalia, the conception of security had been exclusively connected to state and
focused on external military threats. What were supposed to be protected were the sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of the state, as a precondition of overall security of its
citizens. The reasons for this kind of conceptualization were numerous. The patterns of
behaviour in international relations were shaped and strongly affected by mistrust among
states, whose only interest was physical maintenance in anarchical system. Besides, there
were no legal mechanisms for the prevention of international armed conflicts until the
Charter of the United Nations, and the communities of practice were also fostering the
discourse of external military threat.
However, things changed a bit after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when a shift hap-
pened in security threats perception. The biggest challenge stopped to be other state it-
self, but rather the instability caused by internal turmoil and violence in failing or failed
states. They are supposed to be the main generators of other security threats like organ-
ised crime, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal migrations, etc.
All those new security threats are affecting not the state borders, but the life and dignity of
ordinary people around the world. Security became common question, since threats have
the tendency of spillover. For that reason, the discourse of security threat has considerably
changed, shifting from external military threat to various kinds of problems outside that
could subsequently affect our own security.
This is the way how human security discourse became one of the most influential dis-
courses in international relations, since foreign and security policy practices are now pri-
marily subordinated not to state protection, but to human protection. But, the question
that arises from this rhetoric is about practices it evolves, since this concept has a power
to reshape security practices in different ways. Even when it is not officially implanted
in Foreign Policy documents, it represents indispensable discourse of different political
subjects and institutions and a background for different set of practices aimed to protect
their values. How and why they differ across different communities of practice is a part of
the answer this paper aims to offer, with particular emphasis to be given on foreign policy
practices of the Republic of Serbia.
2. HUMAN SECURITY IN FOREIGN POLICIES

Often criticized vagueness of human security makes this concept easily stretchable and
politically useful. Roland Paris compares human security to “sustainable development”
arguing that everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means and those
vague definitions of human security thus “provide policymakers with little guidance in
the prioritization of the competing policy goals” (Paris 2001:88). But, he also argues that
human security is not just a “hot air” because it “chalked up significant accomplishments”
like signing of an antipersonnel land mines convention and the imminent creation of an
international criminal court (Ibid). In addition to these achievements, human security
became a part of different foreign policy agendas like in cases of Japan, Canada and Swit-
zerland, and there has been a lot of human security discourse and practices in foreign and
security policy of the European Union. Human security is often seen as the main ingredi-
ent of the international obligations and object of international organizations’ and states’
interest in their mutual relations (Mijalkovic 2011:110).
THE WAY TOWARDS EUROPEAN VALUES AND PRACTICES [425]
What is human security? What does it involve, to which values does it provide protection, by
what means? There is neither academic nor political consensus on the form and content of
this term. It was primarily defined in the UN Human Development Report, and it was widely
conceived to be a practically useful, political concept that places human needs in the centre
of interest of the international community. In this regard, human security means, first, safety
from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, and second, it means protection
from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or
in communities (United Nations Development Programme 1994:23).
Subsequently, human security has started to be the subject of debate within academia,
and made division to proponents and opponents of the concept of human security. Even
among the supporters of the concept, there are discrepancies when it comes to the pos-
sibilities of narrowing its analytical framework in order to make human security a useful
theoretical concept. However, despite the criticism, this concept cannot be ignored by
Security Studies academia because of the increasing importance and use of the discourse
of human security in different policies. Human security is not only a new framework for
analysis, but it has consequences for “how we see the world, how we organise our politi-
cal affairs, how we make choices in public and foreign policy, and how we relate to fellow
human beings from many different countries and civilizations” (Thakur 2004:348).
But, when it comes to operationalization of the concept, there are some problems aris-
ing. Among many threats directed towards human life and dignity, sometimes it is not
very easy a task to choose the most relevant. Quantitative criteria are considered to be
important and useful, but the most of the authors are aware of the fact that criteria for
securitization of certain human security issues are most often political. Taylor Owen finds
that human security threats would be decided by international organizations, NGO’s and
especially national governments, so the threshold line is set by political priority, capability
and will (Taylor 2004:384).
Some of the researchers are tickled with the question why human security is such a success
story of institutionalization, in spite of all the criticism upon its uselessness and ambivalence
(Buger 2008). Buzan and Hansen find that the most crucial about human security debate is
that it shows that academic criteria are not always what determine a concept’s success or fail-
ure (Buzan, Hansen 2009:205). What actually determines success of any concept depends
on how useful it is as an instrument for achieving certain goals, solving different practical
problems and how useful it is in gaining public attention and support. Human security has
become a leitmotif of public policies, but its utilization is the most notable in foreign policy
discourse, and eventually, in some practices that follow that discourse.
2.1. Practicality of Human Security Concept: Why Foreign Policies?

Foreign policy orientation is a mirror of one state’s commitment to certain values. The
rhetoric and practice of foreign policy are the indicators of objectives that the state seeks
to achieve and also reveal the manner in which they are supposed to be achieved. De-
votion of the states and international organizations to human security concept indicates
a new way of perceiving their roles in international community. It has been a shift from
traditional “self-help” politics of the states to a more open and cooperative politics which
implies the embrace of a wide range of shared political responsibilities. Those shared re-
sponsibilities are concentrated around common values which nowadays are often to be
seen and operationalized through human security. But the extent to which any of the sub-
jects from the political arena is committed to this value differs, as well as the perception
of the threats and the instruments that should be used to exceed those threats to human
security. So, what then the reasons and motives of policy decision makers are to introduce
specific human security agenda is to be seen.
David Chandler suggests three sets of reasons why human security easily entered into
the mainstream policy agendas. The first is exaggeration of new post-Cold War security
threats in the absence of traditional enemies, the second consist of problematization of the
non-Western state and the location of new security threats in the developing world; and
the third set of reasons refer to the facilitation of short-term policymaking in the absence
of clear strategic foreign policy visions. (Chandler 2008:435).
The reasons and motives for the introduction of human security into foreign policy agen-
das are impossible to be generalized, not that it is expectable, because each country has its
own interests, specific perception of security threats, culture and value system, patterns of
friendship and rivalry, etc. Protection of human security beyond national borders is a part
of foreign policy agendas of mostly powerful and developed countries. There is a multi-
tude of possible explanations for that, first of which is that poor countries cannot be fo-
cused on solving the problems of human insecurity outside, because they often lack basic
mechanisms and capacities to provide a satisfactory state of human security in their own
country. The developed countries introduce human security as a foreign policy frame-
work for various reasons, which can be understood only if we understand the interests and
values of those countries, their perception of security threats and the image of themselves
they want to create in world politics. The concept of human security in these countries is
also not universal, but rather focused on specific aspects and problems of human security
(Popović, Mijalković 2013:46). To show how the concept of human security varies from
agenda to agenda, we take the example of Switzerland, Canada and Japan, which officially
included human security in their foreign policy agendas.
The concept of human security has been used as a value framework for the foreign policy
agendas in different manners indicating its adaptability to different foreign policy goals of
these countries. The contents of human security agendas mentioned are different, and the
common item for them all is dedication to human protection and empowerment. That is how
Switzerland tackles the issues of bringing and maintaining peace in conflict areas, civilian
peace-building that includes activation of The Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peace-build-
ing, Human Rights protection and Humanitarian aid in its Human Security Foreign Policy
Agenda made 2007 (Human Security in Switzerland’s foreign policy), Switzerland (FDFA
2007). The promotion of peace and human rights is so important to Switzerland that it is
enshrined in the Constitution as a primary foreign policy objective. Switzerland’s aim is to
make an internationally significant and high-profile contribution in this field. Switzerland’s
Foreign Policy Strategy (2012-2015) is another official document that reveals unambiguous
commitment to human security. It states that “Switzerland is especially well placed to act
in the field of human security”3 offering a dialogue and mediation for resolving conflicts,
concerning its neutrality, experience of direct democracy, federalism, and respect for di
versity. Besides, Switzerland’s commitment to human security has roots also in enlightened
3 Retrieved August 15, 2014, from: www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/.../ressources/resource_en_213355.pdf

self-interest, which is notable from the statement that “(…) In this age of globalisation, coun-
tries have become so interdependent that a conflict or crisis – even in a faraway land – often
has direct consequences for Switzerland: threatening our foreign investments or exports,
endangering our nationals living abroad, or destroying natural resources (…)”. Thus, foster-
ing international stability in turn has a positive influence on the country’s security, access to
resources, and prosperity.4 How strong commitment to human security is can also be seen in
budgetary allocation, where roughly two-thirds of total sum of 1.76 billion CHF is allocated
to development and humanitarian aids, while the remaining third is devoted to conventional
diplomatic activities and defence of Swiss interests.
Canadian support to human security concept is deeply contested case. During the man-
date of Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy human security is embraced and
adapted to Canadian foreign policy image, and it has been widely connected to the report
„Responsibility to Protect“ presented by International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty. Among the possible explanations of the motives for choosing this ap-
proach to human security which rests on military capabilities, the most vociferous and
logic seem to be those claiming Canada’s fear to be marginalized within NATO, between
the USA and the growing EU and concern expressed in many quarters that Canada was
becoming increasingly irrelevant to the United States (Remacle 2008:12; Smith 2006:79).
Bosold and Von Bredow argue that human security in Canada case was just a consequence
of adaptation to new security environment without radically challenging the traditional
patterns of security. Reduction of Foreign Affairs annual budget by 36 % between 1993
and 2000 has led to human security policy which is based on coalition building and mul-
tilateralism (Bosold, Von Bredow 2006:835-836). In the Proceedings “A Decade of Hu-
man Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms” published in 2005, Heather
Smith argues that human security “appears to have fallen on the Canadian agenda and be
squeezed out of the government discourse” because it was associated with the personality
of Lloyd Axworthy, and never became international policy, but just manipulation used to
meet national security priorities in one moment (Smith 2006:79).
Japanese notion of human security has long been quite different from all the perspectives
offered by other proponents of this concept. Association with acts of humanitarian inter-
vention has been unacceptable for Japan because of its constitutional prohibition when it
is up to participation in military interventions. The Japanese government focused on the
developmental and economic aspects of human security. Through the pursuit of economic
security, Japanese policy-makers sought to avoid engaging the country in the military di-
mension of security, which remained highly contested due to the legacy of Japan’s militarist
past (Atanassove-Cornelis 2006:41). However, meanwhile human security ceased to be a
pillar of Japan’s long-term foreign policy and it was transformed into a matter of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) Policy. Actually, as Bert Edström states, it ended up as
“one aspect along others taken into consideration in the formulation and implementation
of Japan’s ODA policy” (Edström 2011:57). He even goes further, finding that Japan is fall-
ing into “ODA fatigue” followed by continuing cuts of Japanese ODA (Edström 2011:54).
In addition to these events, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called for a review of
how Japan interprets its pacifist Constitution to allow its military to participate in conflicts
4 Ibid.
beyond its borders for the first time since the end of the Second World War.5 More active
approach is explained as caused by the threats that North Korean nuclear weapons and
Chinese activity in the South China Sea and East China Sea pose to Japan security.
From all this perspectives and approaches presented, it can be concluded that human se-
curity in foreign policy agendas is a matter of interests and it is always dependent on the
cultural patterns and the ways that security threats are perceived in the international en-
vironment. Therefore, the next chapter will be focused on tracing the presence of human
security discourse and practices in Serbian foreign policy activities.
2.1.1 Human Security in Serbian Foreign Policy Discourse and Practices

The specific objective of this paper is to research and analyze the presence and importance
of human security in Serbia’s foreign policy. In this regard, this part of the paper provides
answers to two basic questions. The first and basic question that is to be answered here is:
Does Serbia use human security discourse in foreign policy? As outlined in previous parts of
the paper, human security is explicitly or implicitly more often likely to be a narrative of the
developed states, an instrument for image-creating and form of reaction to external non-
territorial threats. But, human security is an emerging paradigm among developing, even
non-Western states. Writing on human security in Asian context, Amitav Acharya finds that
divergent perspectives on human security are as much West-West and East-East as East-
West, and they reflect genuine differences on philosophical and practical grounds (Acharya
2001:5). He also finds that although presented as a global issue that fundamentally recast the
security philosophies and policies, human security has also been an instrument of national
strategic priorities that often have strong domestic roots (Acharya 2001:1).
When talking about Serbian Foreign Policy, what is found to be the most problematic is
the lack of the official strategic document on foreign policy orientation. In public discourse
and media reports in Serbia, the prevailing interpretation of the foreign policy priorities
in the absence of clear foreign policy strategy is based on the statements and speeches of
government officials (ISAC 2013:16). Due to the lack of a clear foreign policy strategy in
the form of a document, it is harder to identify human security in foreign policy.
The most important strategic document, National Security Strategy of the Republic of
Serbia does not recognize human security as a foreign policy goal, but a part of internal
politics. Part of the Strategy concerning the main objectives of national security policy
states that special importance is given to creating the conditions for improvement of hu-
man security, which emphasizes the protection of economic, environmental, health, po-
litical and any other security of the individual and the community.6 This is a clear indicator
that human security, at least in official documents, is conceived as a matter of internal
security policy.
In official addresses of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Ivica Dac-
ic, human security has not often been used. However, speaking at the Special Meeting of
the OSCE Permanent Council held on July 15, 2014, in Vienna, he presented the priorities
5 Retrieved July 30, 2014, from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/shinzo-abe-plan-lift-japan-

ban-fighting-conflicts-overseas
6 The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, April 2009. (Retrieved August 1, 2014, from the
official website of the Republic of Serbia: www.srbija.gov.rs)
of the Serbian Chairmanship for 2015 among them also “further updating and strength-
ening the implementation of all OSCE human dimension commitments” which presup-
pose investing additional efforts in their implementation in many areas such as the rule of
law, freedom of expression and freedom of the media, freedom of assembly, protection of
rights of national minorities, etc. He then declared also that “(…) as incoming Chairman-
ship, we will continue the work on human dimension events review, believing that these
issues should be addressed within Helsinki +40 Processes, with a clear aim to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of the Organization, as well as to strengthen the human
dimension (…)”.7
Despite the lack of strategic document on foreign policy, Serbia has allocated certain for-
eign policy priorities. Definition of foreign policy priorities during the period 2008-2012
that induced the most public speculations and that has almost become generally accepted,
was given by the president of Serbia in August 2009, according to which the foreign policy
orientation of the Republic of Serbia was based on four pillars - the EU, the USA, Russia
and China (ISAC 2013). However, one of them is undoubtedly presented through public
discourse as one of the most important: the EU membership.8 Following those selected
priorities, we can do an inquiry into their connectedness with human security practices
and discourse.
Since the EU membership has been set aside as one of the biggest priorities in Serbian for-
eign policy, the closest possible link of Serbian foreign policy with the concept of human
security is found in the activities of the Sector for Security Issues of Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Department for the Common Security and Defence Policy and Security Chal-
lenges. Since one of the most important foreign policy priorities is the EU membership,
Serbia has already started the activities in the area of security and defence policy in order
to take a step closer to the EU Common Security and Defence Policy’s values and practic-
es. Introduction of human security discourse thus represents a way towards achieving one
of the pivotal strategic priorities of Serbia, the EU membership. Achievement of this goal
requires, among other things, compliance with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security
Policy, which nowadays largely relies on the principles of human security. Kaunert and Sa-
rah therefore stress that although human security label has not been officially adopted by
the EU, many EU official documents strongly suggest that the EU’s activities are implicitly
underpinned by human security ideas, like the European Security Strategy, especially in
section on “global challenges” (Kaunert, Leonard 2013:5).
That is how we come to the second question: Does and how Serbian foreign policy practices
support human security? Unlike human security discourse, Serbian foreign policy practices
that support human security went further, due to Serbian orientation towards the Eu-
ropean Union. Even though the chapter concerning foreign, security and defence policy
(Chapter 31) has not opened yet in the negotiation process, Serbia has taken some steps in
order to get closer to the values and practices of the EU foreign and security policy. In this
7 Retrieved August 3, 2014, from: http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/o-ministarstvu/ministar/govori/13932-

2014-07-15-11-03-27?lang=lat
8 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Ivica Dacic, has repeatedly emphasized it in his public
speeches. In one of the latest interviews, given to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel on August 28, 2014, he pointed that
EU membership is one of the most important Serbia’s strategic objectives, Retrieved August 3, 2014, from: http://
www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/o-ministarstvu/ministar/intervjui/14046--q-q?lang=lat,
sense, Serbia signed two agreements with the EU in 2011: the Agreement between the Re-
public of Serbia and the European Union establishing a framework for the participation of the
Republic of Serbia in the European Union crisis management operations and the Agreement
between the Republic of Serbia and the European Union on security procedures for exchanging
and protecting classified information.9 Serbia is now participating in two EU military crisis
management operations.
The first, EUTM Somalia was established to support the stabilization of the state institu-
tions of Somalia. The operation was carried out through training of the security forces of
Somalia, and the Serbian army took part in EUTM Somalia on April 25, 2012 by sending
an officer with medical qualifications for the position of head of the medical service in the
mission. From April 27, 2013, Serbian Army has expanded its participation by sending
medical team that consists of one doctor and three medical technicians. The second is EU
NAVFOR Somalia - Operation Atalanta. This military operation of naval forces of the Eu-
ropean Union in Somalia was established to prevent and suppress the activities of pirates
and armed robbery along the coast of Somalia. Serbian Army officer started the mission
in Operational Command of the mission in Northwood, United Kingdom on February
25, 2013, and a staff non-commissioned officer started the mission on May 27, 2013. In
addition to these engagements, Serbia is participating in six military operations and three
civilian missions under the UN.10
In an interview from 2011, when holding a position of Secretary of State in the Ministry of
Defence, Tanja Miscevic stressed “human-oriented” nature of the EU missions. Answer-
ing to the question about the type and nature of those missions, she pointed out that these
were not “peace missions”, adding also that “the EU missions can’t be purely military mis-
sions and it is more probable that the EU will send police forces to take care not of state
security, but of human security.” Serbian initiative to take part in such missions even before
the opening of chapter concerning foreign, security and defence policy was very positively
assessed in the annual report of the European Commission, and in the European Parlia-
ment resolution on Serbia. She also stressed that Serbia was taking a proactive approach
in order to show readiness for acceptance of the European standards.11
As can be seen, the presence of human security in foreign policy discourse is not par-
ticularly noticeable, but there are certain foreign policy practices based on principles and
values underlying this concept. In the spirit of one of the primary foreign policy goals, and
that is the EU membership, Serbia would eventually reconcile the concept of human secu-
rity with the idea of human security in the European Union. Serbia has already made some
contribution to protection and advancement of human security through two significant
missions aimed at supporting the strengthening state institutions and the improving living
conditions and health of the citizens of other countries. Given the fact that the Republic
of Serbia has no foreign policy strategy, one of the key tasks should be its adoption, and
human security narrative should have a major role in the determination of foreign policy
activities directed towards other countries.
9 The Laws on Ratification with text on the Agreements retrieved July 30, 2014, from: http://demo.paragraf.rs/
combined/Old/t/t2012_03/t03_0085.htm, http://demo.paragraf.rs/combined/Old/t/t2012_03/t03_0077.htm
10 Military missions: Retrieved August 12, from: http://www.vs.rs/index.php?content=4423c1a4-56bb-102f-8d2f-
000c29270931, police missions: Retrieved August 12, 2014, from: http://www.mup.gov.rs/cms_lat/ministarstvo.
nsf/mirovna-misija.h
11 The text of the interview Retrieved July 10, 2014, from: http://www.euractiv.rs/srbija-i-eu/1204-tanja-mievi
Finally, taking into account the current practices, human security framework in Serbian
foreign policy should certainly not be reducible to “freedom from fear”. Serbia should par-
ticipate in human security missions using the most important resources it has - human re-
sources, medical and other professional knowledge that would help people outside facing
poor living conditions and repression to normalize and improve the quality of daily life.
3. CONCLUSION
Human security is not frequently used discourse in the foreign policy of the Republic of
Serbia. However, taking into account the activities like signing the Agreement between the
Republic of Serbia and the European Union establishing a framework for the participation of
the Republic of Serbia in the European Union crisis management operations and the Agree-
ment between the Republic of Serbia and the European Union on security procedures for ex-
changing and protecting classified information, Serbia has shown will and preparedness for
the practices following the logic of human security that the European Union advocates.
Serbian commitment to human security practices in foreign policy cannot be fully ex-
plained only by moral, legal or self-interests reasons. Human Security, Human Rights, De-
mocracy and other European values have been introduced primarily to show loyalty to a
value system that Serbia aspires to be a part of. Unlike some states that officially included
human security in their foreign policy agendas, Serbia participates in foreign policy prac-
tices that underpin human security only implicitly through the EU’s common practices.
Therefore, as accession process progresses, it is expected that discourse of human secu-
rity would be more pronounced, especially in the area of Common Foreign and Security
Policy and Migration, where the EU finds human security very important.
Thus, although we find human security in foreign policy discourse only sporadically, for-
eign policy practices demonstrate strong commitment to this concept, mainly through the
protection of people outside our territory, participating in the UN missions and the EU’s
crisis management operations.
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UDC 623.443:351.78(497)
Svetlana DJURDJEVIĆ-LUKIĆ*

BEYOND CONFLICT AND FATAL VICTIMS1
Abstract: In spite of tremendous technological advancements, the most lethal weapons are still
small arms, “the real weapons of mass destruction” - they are implicated in several hundred thou-
sand deaths and countless injuries in everything from homicides and suicides, large sale crimi-
nality and warfare. The fatalities are only a tip of the iceberg as possession of firearms is related
to various forms of structural and cultural violence, primarily against law-abiding and vulner-
able groups and individuals, affecting cohesion and security of communities, as well as economic
development and trust in public institutions. By applying mixed method, this paper looks into
confluence of factors and processes in the Western Balkans which facilitate small arms prolifera-
tion, and into local perceptions of small arms possession as a source of (in)security, connected
with various forms of violence in broader sense. Research questions are the following: What are
the perceptions of citizens about small arms and the impact of their possession and use on their
own and communal security? What are hidden forms of violence, specific insecurities and coping
strategies among teenagers when faced with small arms related issues at school and in the com-
munity? The research is based on focus groups discussions and interviews undertaken in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia within an ongoing regional project on hu-
man security the author is affiliated with. This qualitative dimension includes a dialogic method
of inquiry, which permits the recognition of the power of the researched in the construction of
knowledge of security, and accordingly reflects the conceptual shift represented by human secu-
rity from states to communities and individuals. It is a more egalitarian and reflexive approach
to the research process, where both researchers and subjects were informing how the data were
processed and understood. In this way the research allowed for the definition of what security or
insecurity means to be constructed in the dialogue directly with the persons involved in discus-
sions, not against a fixed set of indicators which were measured (Kostovicova, Martin and Bojicic-
Dzelilovic 2012). Mixed method approach includes the use of available surveys conducted in the
region in the last five years, and the information available via Ushahidi platform within “Targeting
Weapons” UNDP pilot campaign – voluntary submitted comments and the media reports related
to small arms in Serbia. The dominant perceptions of youth are that they are living in unfinished
states or unfinished peace, which blur the lines between illegal and legal, legitimate and illegiti-
* Svetlana Djurdjevic-Lukic, Public Policy Research Centre, Belgrade; e-mail: svetlukic@yahoo.com. The paper is
prepared within regional research “Hidden Forms and Spaces of Violence in the Western Balkans and Turkey”, a
part of the project “Citizens’ networks for peace, reconciliation and human security”, www.cn4hs.org.
[436] Svetlana DJURDJEVIĆ-LUKIĆ
mate, victims and perpetrators. Such insecurity perpetuates structural and symbolic violence.
There is a need to address the complexity of dual role of arms and different impact on individuals
and various social groups.
Keywords: small arms, human security, violence, small arms surveys, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Montenegro, Kosovo, youth
1. INTRODUCTION
The issues related to arms and weapons have always been a core concern of individual,
community, national and international security. Small arms are weapons that fire a pro-
jectile and are designated for individual use, such as revolvers and self-loading pistols,
rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns (UN 1997).2
They are easy to conceal, simple to handle, have very long life-span and low maintenance
costs. Small arms have a transformative or multiplier effect on coercion and violence (Frey
2004:37). Its role in sudden and harmful downturns in everyday life at home, work or
community, make small arms “Human Security’s elephant in the room” (Engvig 2014:1).
However, within the concept and practice of human security there is also selective pursuit
of particular issues: child solders not military spending; the illicit trafficking in small arms
but not the “legal” trade (Krause 2014a); focus on arms trade or crime control perspec-
tives. Targeting areas for small arms control in global South might be seen as the reproduc-
tion of hierarchical, imperial relations (Stavrianakis 2011). Considering local contexts and
individual perceptions of insecurity as core principles of the human security approach,
this research provides insights about localized and contextualized experiences of the role
of small arms in provision of (in)security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia
and Kosovo.3 Using bottom-up approach and taking into account personal and day to day
forms of threats and vulnerability, the focus is on those who are insecure, the interactions
between individuals and the security problematic.
The paper argues that there is a specific confluence of factors that has enabled small arms
proliferation, which has been an important element of the structural context which affects
the security of young people. It looks not only into experiences of personal/direct vio-
lence, but into young people’s argumentation for or against small arms possession – as a
source of (in)security and related structural and cultural violence which impacts everyday
lives by empowering some at the expense of others.
The research is based on mixed method approach: a broader security context and trends
are analysed by consulting the available quantitative surveys and media reports, while spe-
cific insecurities and coping strategies among the youth in their everyday life are explored
by using qualitative methods. The interviews and focus groups discussions apply the dia-
2 International documents are usually concerned with “small arms and light weapons”, SALW. The term “light
weapons” designates heavy machine guns, portable anti-aircraft guns, and other units or systems which may be
carried by a small number of people, or transported by a pack animal or a light vehicle. Ammunition and explosives
take an integral part of the SALW within which they are used. “Small arms” is frequently used as a broader term,
including light weapons. See: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/definitions.html
3 The term Western Balkans is used here for four countries included in the research: Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. These countries are substantial part of the regional security sub-complex which
includes also Albania and Macedonia. Regional Security Complexes are durable patterns of amity and enmity taking
the form of sub-global, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence which are more intense within
the complex then between states inside the complex and those outside it (Buzan, Weaver 2003:45-46).
BEYOND CONFLICT AND FATAL VICTIMS [437]
logue as a research tool to access and assess human security which permits the recognition
of the power of the researched in the construction of the knowledge of security (Kostovi-
cova, Martin, Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2012). The author believes it is particularly relevant for
researching issues related to illegal activities, as surveys in such cases tend to face high
percentage of refusals, “do not know” answers or generic socially accepted answers.4 Fo-
cus groups discussion with high school students regarding their (in)security and violence
were conducted in Brcko, Bijeljina, Tuzla, Orasje (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Podgorica,
Kotor, BijeloPolje (Montenegro), Belgrade, Novi Pazar (Serbia), Prishtina, Kosovo Polje,
Prizren (Kosovo).5 Additional dialogues related to small arms issue were conducted with
youth activists (15-24 years old) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only country with an on-
going campaign for voluntary collection of illegal arms, and the country where the floods
in May and August of 2014 have literally surfaced huge quantities of arms. Bijeljina, Brcko
and Tuzla – three selected locations – have different ethnic composition and administra-
tive positions in Bosnia. The dialogues were conducted with the youth activists under
the assumption that they have a range of contacts in the community and that they will be
prone to speak more openly.
This Introduction is followed by Chapter 2 which looks into specific confluence of po-
litical, economic, cultural and spatial/geographical factors in the Western Balkans which
enabled small arms proliferation in the 1990s. The sources of illegal arms, their relevance
after various forms of interventions in this region (2.2), the spaces and manifestations of
arms-related incidents and the dynamic of security perceptions in the context of arms
possession (2.3) are explored. Chapter 3 presents the findings on youth’s interaction with
and understanding of small arms as a source of (in)security in different spaces and social
relations, including their copping strategies. Chapter 4 offers the conclusions on various
forms of structural and symbolic violence in the context of arms possession and human
security approach.
4 In particular, it is risky to take a survey’s findings for granted in designing campaigns of voluntary collection of
illegal arms. The most notable case was the household survey within the Small Arms Survey Baseline Assessment
for the Illegal Small Arms Control Project (ISAC) campaign in Kosovo in 2003. The Assessment stressed
that “Kosovans do not appear to be as attached to their weapons as commonly believed”, and more than 50%
respondents thought it “very” or “somewhat likely” that people in their neighborhood would hand in their guns in
exchange for investments in their community. However, after a massive awareness raising campaign, and with the
incentive to provide developmental grants for municipalities which surrender 300+ weapons, only 155 illegal small
arms items were collected by all municipalities in Kosovo combined (Djurdjevic-Lukic 2005).
5 Focus groups discussions in high schools were conducted by Vigan Behljulji, Jasmin Jasarevic, Ruzica Madzarevic,
Ivana Suboticki, and associates from Center for Research, Documentation and Publications, Prishtina, Youth
Resource Center (ORC) Tuzla, Association for Democratic Prosperity ZID, Podgorica, and SeConS - Development
Initiative, Belgrade. It was undertaken within the regional research “Forms and Spaces of Violence in the Western
Balkans and Turkey” organized by the Citizens’ Network for Peace, Reconciliation and Human Security, according
to the methodology developed by Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Mary Martin from the London School of Economics
(including Martin 2014). The author is grateful to Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Mary Martin for providing valuable
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2. CONFLUENCE OF FACTORS AND CONTEXTS

OF SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION
2.1. Global and regional dynamic fuelling small arms proliferation
in the Western Balkans
Dramatic increase of the small arms proliferation in the last 25 years is one of the main
features of the post-Cold War era’s security environment, which is characterized by raise
of non-state actors, lower transport costs and “shrinking spaces” in the era of globalisation.
Political fragmentation, numerous local and identity-driven armed conflicts, formation of
new states and prolonged political and economic transitions have contributed to evolving
transnational organized crime networks, new types of war economies and forced migra-
tions (Lumpe 2000; Naim 2003; Nordstrom 2007; Friman 2009; Kaldor, Rangelov 2014).
Arms possession, threat of use and actual use of it, are common for all the above listed
phenomena. Geopolitical changes made massive conscripts’ armies and their arms redun-
dant, leading to stockpiles leakages, especially in the former communist states. Likewise,
the dynamics of state weakening have contributed to the re-traditionalization of culture
in certain countries, including guns possession by civilians and non-state groups serving
both as protectors and predators. Simultaneously, the notion of imminent global spread of
democracy and liberal values prompted the implementation of various embargo regimes
to the countries considered as violators of human rights. Arms embargoes have jeopard-
ized huge financial interests, and have made SALW a particularly valuable commodity for
smuggling to selected locations (Brzoska, Lopez 2009).
This brief overview of the main manifestation of changed security environment provides
framework within which the small arms issue has become highly relevant for the Western
Balkans. All the processes outlined above have deeply affected this region. The Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was among the leading producers of small arms,
amounting to annual export of $3 billion (SAS 2003). Beside advanced arms industry, the
SFRY has had a massive security apparatus, conscript army and reserves duties – i.e. citi-
zens trained to use arms and entitled to possess it.6 Additionally, widespread arms pos-
session was sourced in tradition of liberation movements and seen as precious family’s
heritage, the object of pride for persons involved in arms production, or a tool of self-help
and/or symbol of distrust in the state within certain local communities.7 The firearms have
been regularly used in celebrating social and family occasions such as weddings, births,
holidays or sport victories (SEESAC 2006).
Massive production of small arms and millions of men who had been trained to use it,
contributed to the severity of civil wars for the new states’ formation in the 1990s. Hun-
dreds of thousands of victims, the brutality of forced migrations and ethnic cleansing have
left many individuals and communities traumatized, without confidence in other ethnic/
religious groups and/or in the state. At the same time, the wars and harsh international
sanctions led to informal economy blurring the line between illegal and legal especially
6 On the top of 180,000 active members, the Yugoslav People’s Army had more than half million of the reserve.
All republics within the former Yugoslavia had their civilian reserve (“teritorijalna odbrana” – territorial defence)
of around 1.5 million people. Brief overview of personnel and weapons in: Aleksandar Ciric, Uspon i sunovrat
Jugoslovenske narodne armije, Vreme br. 894, 21 February 2008.
7 According to Small Arms Survey, in the former Yugoslavia (SFRY) before its break-up 2.3 million rifles were
stockpiled for military use and 1.6 million weapons were registered for personal use (SAS 2001).
from the point of view of people struggling with poverty and violence (Hajdinjak 2002).
The sanctions targeting arms trade were a magnet for greedy profiteers and patriotic Dias-
poras, facilitating transnational organized crime involvement (Strazzari 2008).
As numerous armed groups of various scopes, goals and affiliations were involved in the
“new wars” (Kaldor 1999), a long period of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion of various militias and former combatants was required. Low-level violence by local-
ized insurgent groups such as the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac
and the Albanian National Army (SAS 2002:89) preserved an insecure environment and
risk of tensions escalation in the early 2000s. As an inevitable part of state-building, new
armed forces become the symbol of statehood, while vetting and sensitization for a rule
of law have not been carefully enforced (Heinemann-Grüder, Paes 2001; Djurdjevic-Lu-
kic 2007). This in turn has created a space for reinforcement of violent behaviour in their
ranks. Conflict-related grievances, post-traumatizing syndromes, dislocations, as well as
lack of economic opportunities, all enabled permissive surroundings for crime, family vio-
lence and community violence, contributing to widespread possession of small arms as a
means of self-protection in this region (Davis 2002; Quin at al. 2003; Atonopoulos 2008).
Alongside these historic and economic factors, geographical dimension is of great signifi-
cance in the proliferation of small arms in the region. The Western Balkans position in the
immediate neighbourhood of the EU member-states makes the region important route for
trafficking of illegal commodities such as small arms, which are many times higher priced
on the illegal markets within the EU (Davis at al. 2001).
2.2. Interventions and their limits: A house isn’t a home without a gun
Massive international presence and/or support for post-conflict recovery, state-building
and transition, have included the activities related to small arms control in this region:
addressing demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; establishing the legal
framework for tracing, marking and transferring of small arms, civilian possession and
use; upgrading storage systems; destruction of surplus ammunition and weapons; com-
bating trafficking; reforming the security sector; increasing transparency and account-
ability. Numerous campaigns of illegal arms collection took place during the 1990s and
early 2000s.8 International documents and regimes, established by the UN, OSCE and the
EU, and specifically under the South East Europe Regional Implementation Plans “Com-
bating the Proliferation and Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons” (2001, 2006) have
provided a framework for the governments to establish legal foundations and increased
transparency in that area. However, the initiatives to combat organized crime and control
small arms proliferation have not had substantial impact on what is happening in everyday
life (Grillot 2010; Prezelj 2010), especially due to reduction to rational choice approach
toward the issues (Arsovska, Kostakos 2008; Stavrianakis 2011).
The dynamic of the supply and demand of small arms was assessed back in 2002 as condi-
tioned primarily by unresolved conflicts/status issues, powerful crime networks, and cul-
tural encouragement of violence, with influx of economic factors, issues related to com-
8 The literature addressing these issues includes numerous reports by the UN and its missions in the Balkans, NATO,
OSCE, EU, and specifically publications of the South Easter and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control
of Small Arms and Light Weapons (www.seesac.org); documents issued by national authorities, surveys and
analytical contributions by the Saferworld, Small Arms Survey and Bonn International Centre for Conversion.
munity cohesiveness, structure of security forces, ineffectiveness of the judicial system,

and status of border area (Davis 2002). Dozen years later, many of these issues are still
open or reopen due to economic crisis and political volatility. Politicization of the security
structures and partial criminalization at the eve of the dissolution of the SFRY, reinforced
by the decade of bloodshed, made both national and transnational aspects of organized
crime in the Western Balkans exceptionally hard to grasp (Bendek, Daase, Dimitrijevic,
van Dyne 2010; Kostovicova, Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2008). Criminal networks in the region
take advantage of porous borders, shared languages, and doubled citizenships (Anastasi-
jevic 2010).
National identity issues, which served as “the organizing centre of struggle and fear” (Buzan,
Weaver 2003: 384) in the 1990s, are still relevant. There is an array of internal, bilateral and
sub-regional disputes, which have not been fully resolved either by the peace agreements, or
by the EU accession process. Alongside highly prominent key political issues in the 2000s -
Kosovo’s status, the degree of unity in BH, and the cooperation with the ICTY - there have
been prolonged disputes in defining the polity/citizenship, refugees’ and states’ properties,
unfinished territorial demarcations, cultural and symbolic allegiances such as the use of al-
phabet, names of a state, language, and the status of the Orthodox Church (Djurdjevic-Lukic
2010). These issues impact on the perception of individual and groups’ security.
Namely, perceptions of security are by default locally contextualized, highly volatile and
sensitive to security, politics, economy and cultural dynamic at various levels. It leads to
frequent local “ups and downs” when it comes to security in general and importance of
arms possession in particular, which are difficult to be detected. Several surveys conduct-
ed in the last five years in Kosovo (Saferworld 2009; 2010; 2011) and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina (UNDP 2010-2011; UNICEF 2010), indicate gradual changes regarding perceptions
of (in)security, including the weapons possession 12-15 years after the end of conflicts. Es-
timations for Bosnia and Herzegovina are that 34% of citizens have weapons, with nearly
350,000 legally owned and nearly 750,000 illegally owned (UNDP 2010-2011). In Kosovo
around 25% of respondents felt that weapons ownership makes - or would make - them
or their families safer (Forum for Civic Initiatives and Saferworld 2010:12). Around 37%
of respondents considered that allowing firearms possession is okay (Di Lellio 2009:18).
However, resistance of respondents when it comes to questions on weapons is still sub-
stantial: between half and three quarters of respondents either said “don’t know” or re-
fused to answer any question on weapons ownership (Di Lellio 2009:19).
The perceptions are not necessarily changing in linear progression as it might imply the
dominant discourse of the region’s Europeanization. The official data of law enforcement
agencies has found there is no improvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina with regard to the
number of criminal offences committed with small arms: such offences actually increased
for 50% between 2007 and 2009 (UNDP 2010-2011:5). In 2010 more Kosovo respondents
were interested in acquiring weapons than in 2009 (Bennet, Saferworld 2011).9 Respond-
ents’ assessments in the most recent study include the following: “Every household has a
weapon. Maybe not only one, but for each family member” (Benett, Saferworld 2011:11).10
9 People reported feeling less secure than they did a year ago; the reputation of the Kosovo Police particularly suf-
fered. The following year a serious decline in public perceptions of safety and security was found, but no rise in de-
mand for arms.
10 All family members are probably understood as only male. However, there is a survey’s finding that women are
It echoes earlier findings in Montenegro: “A house isn’t a home without a gun” (SEESAC
2004). The estimation that one in five BH citizens owned a weapon illegally in 2010 also
indicates the increase from 16% of citizens possessing arms illegally as found in a survey
from 2004 (UNDP 2010-2011:8).
2.3. Legal and illegal arms and (in)securities in everyday life

Zooming in on the issue of small arms further, it is possible to unravel the concrete sources
of illegal arms and look into their presence in this region. There are multiple ways of how
legal arms can become illegal under international and/or national laws. According to inter-
national law, arms are illegal when exported to a UN embargoed destination or transferred
without the required documentation (end-user certificate). It impacts the arms producers,
exporting companies and national authorities which are in charge of granting licenses and
export permissions, enforcement and monitoring. Legacy of substantial arms production
and trade is still alive: for example, Serbia occupies prominent 22nd place among the most
significant global traders according to social network analysis (Engvig 2014).11 While po-
litical costs of noncompliance to international embargos for a country in question are an
issue, there is a huge pressure from the producers to provide markets and sustain work-
force, and substantial problems in controlling numerous arms export companies. 12 It is es-
pecially the case in the times of economic crisis which has had severe impact on this region
motivating these countries not to support always the embargos imposed by the European
Union in spite of their aspirations to the EU membership.
According to national laws, arms may be illegal when civilians have arms that are not al-
lowed (bigger calibre, grantees etc.), or when the citizen does not have the proper license
(for a weapon otherwise allowed, or uses license for possession to carry arms). To reduce
this key source of arms misuse, prerequisite is not only comprehensive legislation, but
consistent enforcement. However, it is a key weakness of governance in the region, ac-
cording to annual reports of the European Commission. Transformation of illegal weap-
ons into legal is affected by the scope of required procedure for obtaining a license - usually
quite complicated, and costs of registration, i.e. tax for legal possession - always too high
for many people in the region. These issues are sometimes seen as reasons for decreased
number of registered weapons.13 An additional source of illegal arms possession is leakage
of stockpiles, be they held by police, military or a private company.14 Immense scale of the
Yugoslav Army infrastructure, the wars and formation of new storages, left many stock-
piles scattered across the region. Their proper maintenance involves substantial financial
and manpower costs, as well as technical expertise in explosive ordnance management, all
of which are frequently missing.15
considered by 42,8% of the population part of the decision making process of bringing weapons into household so
that arms might be viewed property of a household, rather than signifiers of masculinity (Di Lellio 2009).
11 Serbia, BH, Montenegro and Kosovo are not parties of the key international mechanism - Wassenaar Arrangement
on Export Control of Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (as of November 2014).
12 There are more than 200 companies registered for arms export in Serbia (Bjelica, manuscript, October 2014).
13 In BH number of registered weapons decreased for 5.604 between 2004 and 2009 (UNDP 2010-2011:12).
14 The extreme case of post-communist states stockpiles looting was in Albania in 1997, when estimated around
600,000 SALW were overtaken by civilians (Heinemann-Grüder, Paes 2001:13). Smuggling of those arms has
contributed to the raise of armed formation KLA in Kosovo.
15 Recent case of arms leakage was from storage at the Belgrade Airport, from where automatic weapons belonging
to the Yugoimport SDPR Company were supposed to be shipped to a buyer abroad. See: 8 October 2014. http://
Illegal arms could be obtained through illegal exchange among the citizens, including par-
amilitary units and criminals, or through illegal company actions - unlicensed production,
weapons leaking from the factory onto the black market, or illegal sales. In the region with
fragile rule of law, and in times of transition and economic crisis, all of these sources of
procurement of illegal arms are relevant.16
Persistent grey areas of the economy and crime, including the trafficking and smuggling
of drugs17 and people, including kidnapping18 and usury,19 are connected with illegal arms
possession. Notoriously porous borders, coupled with widespread corruption (Transpar-
ency International 2013), facilitate the illegal arms smuggling. Substantial difference in
price of arms in this sub-region and in the EU member states - an AK-47 is roughly three
times more expensive (Krause 2014) - presents the additional incentive for smuggling not
only for organized crime structures, but for adventurous and/or impoverished individu-
als. Terrorism and prolonged conflict in the Middle East additionally foster demand for
arms among the members of extremists’ groups in the countries under exploration in this
paper.20
The data about arms-related incidents have documented that its misuse is related not only
to traditional and organized crime activities which are present in many other countries
such as smuggling arms across borders;21 use of arms in burglaries,22 robberies,23 and inci-
dents related to gambling.24 There are wartime hoards - weapons and explosives from long
gone wars,25 or recent conflicts,26 stashed to be used in the next wave of violence and po-
tential politically motivated actions.27 There is severe distance between security structures
and certain local communities manifested as trans-border movement by criminal armed
groups clashing with security forces,28 and the attacks on law enforcement officials.29
www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes.php?yyyy=2014&mm=10&dd=09&nav_id=91843 & http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/

Hronika/501020/UZBUNA-NA-AERODROMU-Ukradeno-oruzje-iz-magacina.
16 In the remaining part of this subsection the focus is primarily on Serbia as there is a useful source of data - an online
platform http://www.oruzjenameti.org/ launched in August 2012 within “Targeting the Weapons” pilot project
developed by the South Eastern & Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms (SEESAC).
The platform provides small arms related news, reports submitted by citizens who saw small arms and personal
opinions and attitudes related to arms. At the time of writing it contained 409 entrants. The incidents are cited
according to the original source, primarily daily Blic.
17 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/489193/Petoro-uhapseno-zbog-droge-i-oruzja
18 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/461678/Uhapsene-tri-osobe-zbog-otmice-i-iznude
19 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/472539/Taksistu-ubio-zbog-duga
20 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/397555/Krivicna-prijava-protiv-vehabija-zbog-nelegalnog-oruzja 6/8/ 2013
21 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/486618/Spreceno-krijumcarenje-vazdusne-puske-na-Batrovcima
22 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/486384/Opljackana-posta-potraga-za-razbojnicima
23 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/492658/Pucali-u-glavu-vlasniku-zlatare-na-Bezanijskoj-kosi
24 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/492714/Mladic-upucan-sa-tri-metka-u-kladionici
25 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/490460/Policija-cisti-cetnicki-arsenal; http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/
Hronika/486058/Otac-i-sin-povredjeni-u-eksploziji-bombe
26 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/473172/Nadjen-arsenal-oruzja-Oslobodilacke-vojske-Preseva-Medvedja-i-
Bujanovca, 13 June 2014
27 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/397555/Krivicna-prijava-protiv-vehabija-zbog-nelegalnog-oruzja 6 August 2013
28 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/490999/OKRSAJ-NA-MERDARU-Zandarm-ubijen-Stefanovic-salje-jake-
policijske-snage
29 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/494573/Molotovljev-koktel-bacen-u-dvoriste-policijskog-sluzbenika-u-
Bujanovcu
Economic incentives, history and ideology are not the only sources of problems, nor
are only illegally possessed small arms. The individuals and groups who are legally
entitled to have small arms in their professional capacity as members of various legal
security structures misuse small arms within the family, in a community, or in relation
to their official duty. Likewise, the civilians who acquired firearms legally may create
insecurity and violence both intentionally and non-intentionally.30 There is selective
support for and enforcement of recently passed laws regulating arms possession, car-
rying and use.31 Persistent lack of high professional standards of security structures is
evident from their involvement in weapons misuse, ranging from cultural i.e. celebra-
tory gunfire,32 to intimidation of colleagues33 or civilians,34 up to killing civilians in
lieu with financial gains.35 Problems in law enforcement are reflected in the cases of
corruption of police officers such as returning weapons to criminals,36 or jeopardizing
lives by inactivity – not revoking firearms licenses to persons with a history of family
violence and bullying.37 Such behaviour represents state’s failure to act with due dili-
gence from the point of international human rights law (Frey 2004), but actions like
these are part of the milieu under which the citizens in the Western Balkans struggle
for security provision.
Alongside versatile forms of arms-related violence, the analysis of places related to
misuse of arms demonstrates that there is no space which might be considered safe.
Incidents are documented in private apartments and office space, at school yards, in
front of a kindergarten, behind a church, in parks, parking lots, gyms, trains, shopping
malls, hunting, restaurants, etc.38 Furthermore, arms-related violence is present in
all types of settlements, ranging from small villages to the cities, in all regions within
Serbia.39
30 Examples of unintentional misuse are deadly incidents involving minors who had an easy access to family’s
weapons, such as: http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/480887/Decak-lovackom-puskom-ubio-najboljeg-prijatelja
31 Celebratory use of firearms is not sanctioned. For example, Tomislav Nikolic, President of Serbia, publicly stated
he expected celebratory fire throughout Serbia after Serbia’s team won water polo championship in July 2014.
32 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/505889/Policajac-se-upucao-na-svadbi-svog-sina.
33 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/448627/Vranje-Policajac-senlucio-napao-kolegu-koji-ga-je-priveo-pa-
pokusao-da-pobegne 10 March 2014
34 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/462402/Policajac-pevacici-oblacio-uniformu-i-pucao 4 May 2014
35 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/393731/Saznajemo-Zandarm-ubio-pa-spalio-dvojicu-mladica-u-audiju-jer-
im-je-dugovao-7000-evra
36 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/494048/Sef-policije-vratio-pistolj-kriminalcu
37 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/494048/Sef-policije-vratio-pistolj-kriminalcu. Not applying legal procedure of
confiscation of weapons used by male persons against female partners might be motivated not by bribery, but due
to underestimation of gender based violence represents a form of cultural i.e. symbolic violence.
38 Cases documented by the platform “Targeting Weapons”, August 2012 – November 2014. The map is available at:
http://www.oruzjenameti.org/main
39 The locations range from a hamlet Suvi Do in tiny municipality Zagubica in Eastern Serbia, to village Stavo in the
mountains area bordering Kosovo, up to 166 registered cases in the area of capital Belgrade, by 3 November 2014.
Map available at: http://www.oruzjenameti.org/main
3. SMALL ARMS AND INSECURITY

OF YOUTH IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
3.1. Space of insecurity: school

How the elaborated confluence of factors sustaining widespread possession and misuse of
small arms, and indications of numerous spaces of related violence, reverberates on young
people’s perceptions of security and the role of arms? The available studies on percep-
tions and attitudes towards small arms have conveyed many signals about youth’s exposure
to small arms. Older researches among elementary and high school students in Belgrade
(SEESAC 2004) and in Montenegro (SEESAC 2006) documented alarming familiarity
with firearm and motivations for carrying a weapon: improved self-image; traditional
values and fear from threats; revenge; vendettas.40 Research conducted after the start of
ongoing economic crisis, such as in Bosnia in 2010 stresses widespread “macho culture”,
leading many young men in need of firearms to feel strong and important, as there is no
other life prospect for them. Almost quarter of households in BH was affected by some
forms of family violence, with substantial direct and indirect impact on children (UNDP
2010-2011). Another study found that even children consider it is easy to purchase small
arms on the black market (UNICEF 2010). In Kosovo there was a noticeable raise of pre-
paredness to obtain weapons in the age group 18-29 (Bennet, Saferworld 2011) which
includes final year high school students.
More recent data available via online platform “Targeting Weapons” also indicate the im-
portant role of small arms in security dynamics among youth, and specifically in school:
“In my town high school student have firearms available and most of them carry it with them
under pretext of self-defence. It is not true as they carry them to threaten peers and to manipu-
late with them when they are frightened.” 41 Incidents include armed persons entering school
building and attacking staff,42 and minors shooting in front of a school.43
While school is supposed to be a secure space devoted not only to knowledge transfer,
but also norms transfer in a zone of safety for physical, mental and social wellbeing, the
findings indicating the frequency of small arms related incidents are not negligible. The
cases of students bringing firearms to schools are documented in the course of qualitative
research on peer-to-peer violence within the project of which this research is a part of.
Many interlocutors among high school students in 12 towns/cities in four countries were
able to recall the examples of its presence in the school; drastic ones include the following:
“My cousin was bringing firearms to school, later he shot himself with the rifle.”44
“A gun was brought into classroom, even showed to teacher, and she did not do anything.”45
“Last month, they found a small bag of weed, and a weapon, in the classroom.”46
40 Motivations listed are from focus groups with high school students in Montenegro.
41 Comment submitted on 31 October 2012, from Pancevo, at: http://www.oruzjenameti.org/reports/view/67.
42 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/506562/Pistoljem-udarao-u-glavu-direktora-skole-u-Lebanu 29 October 2014
43 http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Hronika/492633/Maloletnik-pucao-u-vrsnjaka-ispred-skole-u-Novom-Pazaru
3/9/2014
44 Focus group discussion, Brcko, 25 April 2014
45 Focus group discussion, Bijelo Polje, 18 May 2014
46 Focus group discussion, Prishtina, 20 May 2014
“A student put gun on teacher’s desk and then got a better mark.”47
There is a certain level of accommodation to small arms presence: the management of a
school in Montenegro considers two cases per year as a low number of incidents involving
arms; a student did not find bringing a gun to school intimidating.48 Reporting an explo-
sive device to be planted in a school building has been practised through the region by
students eager to avoid classes, instigating fear among classmates. Ineffective institutional
strategies to deal with peer-to-peer violence, especially in cases of psychological violence,
might lead to escalation which includes use of small arms and fatal victims:
“That guy had some breathing tool, implanted or not - I don’t know, but aesthetically that
looked strange. Someone teased him; the guy went home, came back with a rifle and shot
at everybody. He killed one guy and other managed to escape just because the rifle stuck.
If the rifle didn’t stuck, that would be a massacre. Long time after that the hole from bullets
and blood were visible behind the school”.49
3.2. Space of insecurity: community

Sensitivity of issues related to small arms possession and use makes surveys unreliable,
but use of focus groups discussion as qualitative method in such official setting as school,
might affect insights due to fear of self-incrimination or incrimination of friends. Hence,
the additional field work has been undertaken using dialogue as a research tool in Bijeljina,
Brcko and Tuzla to gain deeper insight about a complex story of lived insecurity involving
arms and coping strategies practised by youth.
The youth activists engaged in a dialogue positioned themselves as pacifists who disliked
weapons and did not possess it. Nevertheless, their relations with arms or people pos-
sessing arms have proved frequent. Numerous recollections of people, places and situa-
tions related to firearms making them insecure have unfold, including local clubs, streets,
parks, roads.50 The examples of interactions included a young person who showed friends
in a way to a picnic a gun permanently stored in his SUV,51 a teenager taking gun to the
seminar “United in diversity” in another BH entity “just in case”.52 Lively black market is
documented: a teenager who admitted to a friend that he sold occasionally arms from fa-
ther’s illegal arsenal to earn some money.53 “Everybody knows someone who knows someone
who sells arms.”54 Gender gap in noticeable: a youngster (17) asked a girl on a date to throw
hand grenades to river;55 arms are used for coercing girls to stay in a relationship.56 These
47 Focus group discussion, Bijelo Polje, 18 May 2014.

48 A student brought father’s official pistol to the male-only high school class to show it to classmates. Focus group
discussion, Herceg Novi, 16 May 2014.
49 Focus group discussion, Bijeljina, 9 July 2014.
50 Statements include: “I know at least 20 people who have firearms; some of them have chests of weapons”(Tuzla); “He told
me he has enough weapons for everybody in the entire street” (Bijeljina); and “Almost everybody has a gun” (Tuzla). In
this section most illustrative and condensed statements are cited, with the note about the place and date.
51 Bijeljina, 16 August 2014.
52 Tuzla, 9 September 2014.
54 Brcko, 10 September 2014.
55 Tuzla, 9 September 2014.
personal experiences capture pervasiveness of small arms in youth’s everyday life and di-
lemmas such interactions open to youth how to cope with it.
Further exploration of security needs and security environment has revealed that firearms
ownership is considered as self-explanatory if a person possesses a business or substan-
tial property,57 as inability of official security structures to provide protection is taken as
granted.58 While the need for arms possession by businesses/property owners is viewed
as legitimate, it still makes interlocutors insecure when they see it and leads them to walk
away from the places or persons who reveal their possession.59 Possession of weapons by
war veterans and refuges is also considered as normal from the perspective of the holders
- for many who survived either being at gunpoint or because of having a gun, the posses-
sion of arms may be felt as a life-time necessity.60 However, there is notion it jeopardizes
community security due to widespread post-traumatic stress disorders among such popu-
lation.61 These views capture contradiction of arms represented both as source of security
and insecurity within the same community, empowering some at the expense of others.
At the same time, there is another perception of war veterans – as “high ranking in society”,
a category explained to include “businessmen, persons who run places with patrons; someone
who drives an expensive car, who was in war, who saw a lot and he knows he needs a gun.”62
War profiteers and their children have been frequently perceived as carriers of arms.63
Other categories of people described as in possession of small arms include inhibited
youngsters, “macho boys” and wannabe gangsters,64 i.e. non legitimate owners who create
another layer of insecurity.
Coping strategies which have been practised among young people are limited to extract-
ing himself/herself from company of persons in possession of arms, or accommodate to
it. Avoidance of persons in possession of arms contributes to reduction of circle of friends
and places which are part of social life,65 and do not provide guarantees for enhanced secu-
rity.66 Disturbing examples of accommodation are related also to gender-based violence:
57 “It practically goes together with good car.” Brcko, 10 September 2014.
58 “Public authorities do nothing, there is lot of criminal activities, and people have to possess guns as they know there
would not be protected.”
59 It is especially pronounced among female and younger interlocutors (dialogues in Bijeljina, Brcko and Tuzla).
60 “Some people were warriors in the war and it is normal for them; I believe the majority of them who were in tranches
now have firearms.” Brcko, 10 September 2014.
61 “All of them who are refugees have arms; all of them were in war and have psychological problems. It is a common
knowledge.” Bijeljina, 16 August 2014.
62 Brcko, 10 September 2014.
63 “His father is a war profiteer, excessively rich; when police stops him and he says whose son he is, they just reply: Thank
you, goodbye. Once he opened a compartment in his SUV and a gun was there. It is probably from his father.” Bijeljina,
16 August 2014.
64 “Wanna be criminals, rich parents’ children, who have someone placed in high positions, and then the police cannot
easily interfere; most of them are minor so there is not enough room to go against them. It is a common knowledge.
Children who are not confident, who are unstable, and then they want to compensate that.” Tuzla, 9 September 2014.
65 “It is a pity I cannot socialize with him anymore, as we had been close, but as I know he has all these firearms, I cannot
take a risk to say something he might dislike, to take his gun and point to me!” Bijeljina, 16 August 2014. “I was horrified
to see a barman to carry gun even at 7 a.m. when there was nobody around…I do not go there anymore” Tuzla, 9
September 2014. “I told him to stop the car so that I can go out, as I do not want to be close to arms.” Bijeljina, 16 August
2014.
66 “The guy [who sells firearms] is my neighbour. If he is drunk and I stroll around, he can take his gun, point at me and
that would be my end!” Bijeljina, 16 August 2014
“That girl was normal, had practised folk dancing, but then she started a relationship with
a guy from a bad company. I told her to break up, and she explained she did it, and then
he showed up with a gun, pointed it to her head and told her: You have to be with me, or I
would blow up your head! She told me that when she was in that relationship one month;
after that she has changed, he involved her on his side; she even included her younger
brother in that group.”67
Formal law enforcement agents in security provision are marginalized and surrendering
illegal weapons is regarded as unwise due to mistrust in the police.68 Law enforcement
structures are considered as incompetent to provide security and/or provide anonymity
for potential surrenders.69 Furthermore, there is a lack of trust into campaigns aimed to
reduction of civilians’ possession of arms as officials are perceived as motivated by tangible
gains, leading to conviction that that they will sell on collected arms.70
Expanding the issue further on broader level of community, there is a paradox: while the
interlocutors are personally distancing from possession of illegal arms, such an attitude
has not necessarily been transcended to the extended family and community of co-ethnics
who possess illegal arms. Narrative of perpetual history and absence of larger scale in-
terethnic reconciliation creates latent fears which are used to justify arms possession.
“I fully understand these people. War was 100 years ago, 70 years ago, 20 years ago - there
are no guarantees that one will not be again tomorrow. It is simply fear as every genera-
tion took part in a war, that they expect sooner or later they will have to go to a war again,
and that it is the reason they keep weapons… Maybe the best way is to bury weapons in a
garden.”71
“People say they have weapons as they believe that a war will happen again, it is inevita-
ble, the state is established in such a way that new conflict may be triggered at any moment,
so they feel safer with firearms - especially refugees or people living at a line of separation,
where at any moment they can feel fear from other and different. Older people tend to speak
more frequently that at any moment we can expect a conflict, either internal or external.”72
There is knowledge about the same narrative in neighbouring countries:
“When I was in Kosovo, I was told that every house has weapons, in our house – of our
relatives – there is also ammunition, even there are children, which is unbearable. But it is
fine for them as they say Serbs will fire again at certain point, so better we shoot them than
that they shoot us. It is such mentality over there.”73
67 Bijeljina, 16 August 2014

68 Low level of trust into BH police was the first reason for arms possession according to most recent survey (UNDP
2010-2011)
69 “Every year they try to influence citizens to get rid of weapons, but citizens do not trust them. They claim there is an
amnesty, but they take names of people who surrender weapons and there is no trust they would not be blamed for
something. And people generally do not trust the police.” Bijeljina, 16 August 2014.
70 A: “Who knows what they actually do with those weapons later, there are no guarantees”; L: “Maybe they sell them out.”
Bijeljina, 16 August 2014
71 Bijeljina, 16 August 2014
72 “If there is the issue of Brcko District’s division, independence of Republica Srpska, the abolishment of cantons –
whatever pops up, we can expect conflict.” Tuzla, 9 September 2014
73 Tuzla, 9 September 2014
This is another form of illegal possession, more covert, even literary buried deeply, which is
put in longer historical perspective and based on ethnic grievances, i.e. the community of co-
ethnics preparedness. Its legitimization indicates that the ultimate source of insecurity for
interlocutors is an “unfinished state” and “unfinished peace”.74 It represents a form of both
structural and symbolic violence as it is based on implicit classification and discrimination of
people, separating of other ethnic groups and the creation of social hierarchies.
4. CONCLUSION
The paper has sought to highlight the interlinked factors behind the proliferation of
SALW, deleterious interplay of various global and regional political, economic, cultural
and spatial/geographical factors in four countries in the Western Balkans, and to explore
how the confluence of factors sustaining widespread possession and misuse of small arms
has reverberated on young people’s perception of (in)security.
The research demonstrates how most of the original factors enabling proliferation in the
region during the 1990s are still present - in different contexts, modified forms and with
uneven intensity – but affecting security provision. Versatile forms and locations of small
arms related incidents, as well as different profiles of perpetrators reveal that misuse is still
widespread in everyday’s life, beyond traditional criminal activities. However, if Human
Security is understood not only as a critical tool and analytical construct but as mobilizing
concept, the efforts have to be made to understand (in)security from the perspective of
the people affected. Zooming on perceptions of small arms among high school students in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia, and youth activists in Bosnia,
findings indicate interactions with small arms which reinforce social, economic and legal
inequalities in a community. Additionally, the role of small arms in intimate relations is still
prominent, rooted into the norms embedded in the context of traditional perceptions of
masculinity, i.e. persistent gender stereotypes, representing symbolic violence.
Specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is small arms possession, being officially legal
on not, which is considered legitimate by interlocutors although it demonstrates either
economic power or a power rooted in a person’s role in the wars. When seen from an
individual perspective, the factors enabling proliferation are not just straightforward, nor
based only on war legacy and “gun culture” understood as tradition of and affection for
arms possession. There are multiple sources of human insecurity such as lack of rule of
law and trust in institutions, corruption, the culture of violence and impunity, high eco-
nomic inequality and the problems in establishing and maintain social cohesion. All these
issues are reflected in arms possession, albeit the differential impacts on different groups
of people. The dominant perceptions of young interlocutors are that they are living in both
unfinished states and unfinished peace, which blur the lines between illegal and legal, le-
gitimate and illegitimate, victims and perpetrators. Such insecurity perpetuates structural
and symbolic violence by various segments of societies legitimizing necessity for small
arms possession for different social and ethnic groups. It demonstrates contradiction of
arms representing both source of security and insecurity within a same community, em-
powering some at the expense of others.
74 “War is considered as normal, and peace as temporary, which is horrifying. Peace comes from a paper, not from the
heart.” Tuzla, 9 September 2014.
All countries in the region have been involved in various arms control measures, and have
passed national strategies for combating small arms and accompanying action plans in the
context of integration to the European Union. However, focus on governmental structures
and international regimes have not necessary provided linear improvement of perception
of security locally. There is a need to address the complexity of dual role of arms and dif-
ferent impact on individuals and various social groups. It renders process by which illegal
possession of arms is legitimized locally a key entry point for further exploration and mo-
bilization of stakeholders for measures to improve human security in this sub-region.
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UDC 338.124.4:351.824.5(061.1EU)
Vladimir MENTUS*
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND SELF-EVALUATION

OF ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE EU1
Abstract: In this study the effects of the recent global economic crisis on the self-evaluation of
economic security of the EU population were examined, by a statistical elaboration of the Euro-
pean Quality of Life Survey database. When looking at the differences between the EU member
countries, in terms of the self-evaluation of ability to satisfy one’s own needs, the economic crisis
has left the greatest negative effect in Greece and Slovakia; in terms of self-evaluation of job se-
curity, the greatest effect was in Greece and Cyprus. The data make it possible for the states to
be ranked by average self-evaluation of economic security of their populations, and by the share
of the population that can be classified as economically insecure – in 2007 before the outbreak
of the economic crisis and five years later. Also, the data from 2012 show that the self-evaluation
of economic security is, on a country-level, positively correlated with GDP per capita, Human
Development Index and Corruption Perception Index, and negatively correlated with the Gini
coefficient; on an individual level, the economic security is positively correlated with the feeling
of happiness, subjective general health, the mental well-being, the level of education, the satis-
faction with social life and negatively correlated with the feeling of social exclusion. Finally, the
self-evaluation of job security was evidenced to be a better predictor of job satisfaction than the
evaluation of ability to satisfy one’s own needs.
Keywords: economic security, economic crisis, the European Union
1. INTRODUCTION: THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE

EU – EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC SECURITY
Although the effects of the current global economic crisis are still quite conspicuous to-
day, seven years after its outbreak, it can be said that the global financial management
has returned to calmer waters (Mugge 2014). The causes of the crisis or the ways of its
overcoming will not be discussed in detail here;2 its global consequences, however, are
∗
Vladimir Mentus, Research trainee, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade; e-mail: vladimirmentus@yahoo.com
2 Briefly, it can be said that crisis was mainly influenceda by various factors “including indiscriminate capital
movement, excessive financial deregulation and high concentration of income in the top distribution” (De Vogli
[454] Vladimir MENTUS
worth further highlighting: for example, in the period 2007-2009 the biggest drop of
the global economy was noticeable since the World War II (the drop of approximately
2.2 to 1.8 percent annually of the world per capita output); the crisis was taking mo-
mentum in both the developed and less developed parts of the world, with a global in-
crease of 30 million unemployed persons during only 2012; markets around the world
experienced the huge disruptions in asset and credit markets, declines of wealth, and
bankruptcies (Claessens et al. 2014).3
Expanding to the whole world, after its outbreak in the United States, the crisis has not
bypassed countries of the European Union. According to the World Bank,4 in 2009 there
was a noticeable decline of GDP per capita in all EU countries, except Sweden and Bul-
garia. During the first two years of crisis, the largest decline was registered in Latvia (20%),
Lithuania (20%), Romania (19%) and Poland (19%). Observing at the level of the whole
EU, in 2012 the GDP per capita declined for over 10% compared to 2007. Also, according
to Eurostat,5 in 2009 unemployment has soared compared with the previous year in all
member states. Looking at the whole EU, it rose from 7% in 2007 to 11% in 2013 - espe-
cially in Greece (from 8% to 28%), Spain (from 8% to 26%), Cyprus (from 4% to 16%), and
Portugal (from 9% to 16%).6 In addition, the EU was experiencing “low levels of consump-
tion and private investment, a bank liquidity squeeze, lack of trust and negative expecta-
tions in the financial markets and between banks and investors, and high public deficits
and debts” (Tridico 2013:1).
The EU countries had different responses to the crisis. To some of them, such as Greece,
Ireland or Portugal, there have been austerity measures imposed and major cuts in public
spending by the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank. How-
ever, according to the IMF, these measures have proven to be extremely unfavorable for
the recovery of these countries, which was the reason why it was relaxed with their im-
plementation (World Economic Outlook report, as cited in Karanikolos 2013). On the
other hand, the countries which have opted for fiscal stimulus, such as Germany, were
recovering significantly faster from the effects of the crisis.7 The impact of the crisis and
austerity measures led to the growth of poverty and social exclusion in more than half of
2013a:391). Vuletić (2013) agrees that the source of the crisis can be traced in large social inequalities (that reduced
aggregate demand, which led to higher structural unemployment). In that sense, overcoming the crisis depends
on “the struggle between the transnational capitalist class (for which the reduction in inequality is not in the
interest because it would lead to the decline of its overall economic and social power) and groups representing
the rest of society. [...] Preservation of the existing order is possible only by gradual establishment of some form
of authoritarian regime. Changes, on the other hand, can lead to outcomes that have not been historically tested”
(Vuletić 2013:29).
3 According to Stiglitz (2009), there are several ways in which crisis is affecting all the countries: the direct impact on
financial markets - access to finance was becoming a problem around the world, especially in developing countries;
through the unprecedented fall in exports; through remittances and labor flows, etc.
4 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
5 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics
6 In other words, 26.6 million of active people was unemployed (whereby youth unemployment is particularly
worrying), which is historical maximum of unemployment in the EU (Leahy et al. 2014).
7 As, however, the crisis is global, response to it has also to be global, and not at the state level. However, this requires
the establishment of global institutions with regulatory function that would, among other things, have a role in
preventing future crises. Such institutions, however, do not exist: those that exist, rather than functioning in the
interest of all, favor the interests of individual countries (and classes - V. M.), without taking into account other
countries (and classes - V. M.) (Kovač 2009).
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND SELF-EVALUATION OF ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE EU [455]
the member states, to reduce of these in just two countries, and no difference in others;
there was an increase in the number of social assistance benefits, an increase in the cost of
living and rising prices of basic goods, and the decline in the national median households
income, especially of those of low incomes (Frazer, Marlier 2012). 8
Associated with the previously exposed, there is perhaps the key issue of harm of crisis
to material well-being and, in that sense, the issue of extent to which the economic crisis
has left a visible effect on economic security within the EU. 9 In addition to the unem-
ployment rate, a factor of crucial importance here is the changing of amount of the
real wages. In Spain, Ireland, Lithuania, Denmark and Latvia, incomes of the lowest
households had been declined more than 5% a year on average in both 2007 and 2012.
Real household incomes, especially of the poor households, dramatically reduced due
to changes to the tax and benefits systems and cuts in public sector wages (Bontout,
Lokajickova 2013). In most countries, with the exceptions of Luxembourg, Portugal
and the United Kingdom, the first blow of the crisis was absorbed by shorter hours,
which caused substantial labour hoarding and “to the extent that shorter working
hours translated into less paid hours, employees may, in any case, have suffered a de-
cline in their real weekly salary” (Paul de Beer 2012:5).
So far the objective indicators of the effects of the crisis have been exposing. However,
objective data could often overlook implicit components relevant to the variable of inter-
est ( Jahedi, Mendez 2014; Marks et al. 2006; Veenhoven 2001). Attitudes and feelings of
people about their own economic security can represent a useful addition to the studies
of this field. Self-evaluation of economic security, especially in the EU during the crisis
context, so far has not been given enough attention in the scientific literature. That is the
main focus in the following part.
2. METHOD
The data about the self-evaluation of economic security came from the European Qual-
ity of Life Survey.10 They are suitable primarily because it is a periodic survey whose pe-
nultimate wave conducted in 2007 and the last in 2012, which allowed chronologically to
compare the average self-evaluation of the economic security before the outbreak of the
8 Parallel to economic crisis, there has been a global decline of trust in political elections and civic organizations
(De Vogli 2013b). According to Eurofund (2012, as cited in Leahy et al. 2014) during the crisis, the EU has been
characterized by the decline of trust in public institutions, especially the government and parliament, and especially
in countries most affected by the crisis; besides that, there is an increased perception of rifts between racial and
ethnic groups, as well as the rich and the poor. There has also been “negative health impacts accumulating in
countries that have been severely affected by the economic crisis and by austerity packages that have cut health
budgets, particularly in Greece, Portugal and Spain” (British Medical Journal 2013, as cited in Ibidem: 15). All these
factors, understandably, have led to growth of euroscepticism (Katseli 2013).
9 Economic security could be defined as “the degree to which individuals are protected against hardship causing
economic losses” (Hacker et al. 2014:S7), which is the definition that has been adopted by many authors. Osberg
(1998:23) gives another definition: “the anxiety produced by a lack of economic safety, i.e. by an inability to obtain
protection against subjectively significant potential economic losses”. Osberg also states that concept of economic
security is important, among other things, because of its direct impact on individual well-being. For example, job
security is found to be one of the most important sources of job satisfaction (Evans and Kelly 1995, as cited in
Osberg 1998). Economic (along with food, health, environmental, personal, community and political) security is
one of the main area of human security concept.
10 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/availability/index.htm
financial and economic crisis, on the one hand, to the advanced time phase of the crisis,
on the other. The sample of the 2007 wave consisted of 31,626 respondents aged at least
18, from the then 27 EU member states, and the 2012 wave sample consisted of 35,516
respondents, aged also at least 18, from the same countries (i.e. excluding Croatia, which
became a member in the meantime).
The perception of economic security is measured by two indicators. The first is a subjec-
tive assessment of respondents on the degree of difficulty of satisfying their needs through
the monthly income of their households. The following question was used for its meas-
urement: “Thinking of your household’s total monthly income: is your household able to
make ends meet?” The second is a subjective assessment of the security of the job. The
following question was used for its measurement: “Using this card, how likely or unlikely
do you think it is that you might lose your job in the next 6 months?”11 Answers on both
questions are given at the six-point scale.
Self-evaluation of economic security has been analyzed at a country-level in 2007 on the
one hand, and in 2012 on the other. More specifically, the changes of the average values of
economic security have been observed as well as changes of the share of the respondents
who can be classified as economically insecure. In addition to the changes in the percep-
tion of security, the correlations of the various country-level and individual-level variables
with the economic security indicators were analyzed. The former are the economic pros-
perity of the country, as measured by GDP per capita, income inequalities level, as meas-
ured by the Gini coefficient, Human Development Index, and finally, the level of corrup-
tion, measured by the Corruption perceptions index. This data originate from the same
EQLS 2012 database. Besides that, on an individual level, the correlations with the feel-
ing of happiness (as measured by ten-point scale) have been measured, subjective general
health (as measured by five-point scale), mental well-being (as measured by WHO-5 men-
tal well-being scale, which is composed of five items: over the last two weeks “I have felt
cheerful and in good spirits”, “I have felt calm and relaxed”, “I have felt active and vigor-
ous”, “I woke up feeling fresh and rested” and “My daily life has been filled with things that
interest me” - where the answers are given on a six-point scale), satisfaction with social life
(measured by ten-point scale) and social exclusion (measured by EQLS social exclusion
index, which is composed of following items: “Life has become so complicated today that
I almost can’t find my way”, “I feel left out of society”, “I feel that the value of what I do is
not recognized by others”, “Some people look down on me because of my job situation or
income” - where the answers are given on a five-point Likert scale).
In order to determine the share of the population that can be considered economically
insecure, the cross-tabulations were done: the proportion of those who can be consid-
ered insecure in terms of ability to satisfy their own needs include those respondents who
answered on foregoing question with “With great difficulty” and “With difficulty”. The
proportion of those who might be considered to have insecure job are those who answered
the foregoing question with “Very likely” and “Quite likely”.
11 One of the problems with the concept of economic security, among others, is how to conceive the interplay of
multiple economic risks (Hacker et al. 2014). By the way, having stable job and enough income are two main
aspects of economic security, at least according to a large part of the EU population: unemployment (54%) and not
enough high salaries and wages (48%) are mentioned as two main explanations of poverty, while the all others are
cited by less than 30% of respondents (TNS Europe 2012).
3. RESULTS
As for the possibilities of meeting needs, before the outbreak of the crisis, on average, the
highest ranked were the populations of Denmark (4.8), Luxembourg (4.64) and Sweden
(4.63) and the lowest were the populations of Bulgaria (2.6), Hungary (2.78) and Romania
(3.02). In 2012, the situation was similar – the populations of Denmark (4.5), Luxembourg
(4.5) and Sweden (4.5) were at the highest and the populations of Greece (2.47), Bulgaria
(2.71) and Hungary (2.74) were at the lowest rank (Figure 1). Bulgaria is an interesting case
Figure 1: Self-evaluation of ability to satisfy one’s own needs by country,

in 2007 and 2012
Figure 2: Self-evaluation of job security by country, in 2007 and 2012

because it is the only country (along with Austria), where a crisis, observing in this way,
had not left visible negative effect (households more easily meet their needs), but it still
belongs to the group of the most vulnerable countries. Also, the greatest decrease ratio
compared to pre-crisis period was in Greece, Slovakia and Ireland. Finally, looking at the
entire EU, an overall negative impact of the crisis on the self-evaluation of ability to satisfy
own needs can be seen (average value drop from 3.86 to 3.63).
Before the crisis, subjectively the biggest likelihood of losing their own jobs had the popu-
lations of Bulgaria (3.31), of the Czech Republic (3.66) and Slovakia and Lithuania (3.77),
and the smallest the populations of Netherlands and Sweden (4.61) and Luxembourg (4.6)
(Figure 2). Five years later, the most insecure about having the job felt the residents of
Greece (3.28), Cyprus (3.3) and the Czech Republic (3.33), and the most secure popula-
tions of Sweden (4.47), Belgium (4.4), and Germany (4.38). Austria, Germany and Bul-
garia are the only EU countries where, during the observed period, there was no drop of
the self-evaluation of their own job security. On the other hand, of the remaining coun-
tries, the largest average decline has occurred in Greece and Cyprus. Finally, looking at
the whole EU, during the same five-year period, there was a conspicuous decline of the
subjective job security (from 4.20 to 3.99).12 As for the share of the population that may
be considered
12 At the end of 2012. 41% of EU population have difficulties in paying their bills at the end of the month, but there
were huge differences between the countries: in Sweden it was 10%, while in Greece it was 89%; by the way, in
Figure 3: The percentages of insecurity by self-evaluation of ability to satisfy one’s own

needs by country, in 2007 and 2012
insecure in terms of the ability to satisfy their own needs, before the crisis the standing
of Bulgaria (42.9%), Hungary (36.7%) andGreece (31.7%) was the worst (Figure 3). On
the other hand, the smallest proportion of insecurity was in Luxembourg (3%), Finland
(3.5%) and Sweden (3.7%). In 2012, the most insecure were the populations of Greece
(50.5%), Bulgaria (40.3%) and Hungary (36.9%), and the most secure were the popula-
tions of Denmark (3.0%), Luxembourg (3.3%) and Austria (4.5%). Looking at the whole
EU, the percentage of economically insecure households has increased during the crisis,
from 13.3% to 17.1%.
11 member states there was more than half of respondents that have difficulties to pay their bills at the end of the
month (TNS Europe, 2012).
Figure 4: The percentages of insecurity by self-evaluation of their own job security by

country, in 2007 and 2012
The share of those who can be considered subjectively job-insecure before the crisis was
the biggest in Bulgaria (22%), Lithuania (19%) and Slovakia (14%), and the smallest in
Austria and the Netherlands (3%) and Malta (4%) (Figure 4). At an advanced stage of
the crisis that picture has changed: the most subjectively job-insecure were among the
populations of Cyprus (32%), Greece (31%) and Latvia (25%) and the least in Germany,
Austria and Netherlands (4%). Thus, in Greece and Cyprus, in 2012 almost a third of re-
spondents could be classified as subjectively job insecure, although in the pre-crisis period
there were less than one-tenth of them. At the level of the whole EU, the proportion of
subjectively job insecure during the crisis has increased from 8.7% to 13.2%.
As one can see in Table 1, there are positive correlations with the GDP per capita of the
EU countries and two indicators of self-evaluation of economic security13. Also, the Hu-
man Development Index, which is also a common measure of the states’ development, is
positively correlated with subjective economic security. The same is for Corruption per-
ception index (which is higher as the perception of corruption declines). At a country-
13 Two things should be mentioned here. The first one is about the shortcomings of GDP as a measure of not only
economic but also any other kind of welfare - see for example Fischer (2008) or Ura & Galay (2004). The second
one is about the principle of declining marginal utility of GDP, because of which we should expect that at its higher
levels, there is no difference in the average self-evaluation of economic security. In other words, we should not
expect that in the economically more developed countries declining of GDP per capita necessarily leads to a
decline of economic security.
level, Gini coefficient is also correlated with the indicators of self-evaluation of economic
security, but negative. The correlation remained significant at the 0.01 level even when the
GDP per capita and Human Development Index were kept under control.
On an individual level, two indicators of subjective economic security are positively cor-
related with the felling of happiness, subjective general health, the mental well-being and
the satisfaction with social life. Also two indicators are negatively correlated with the feel-
ing of social exclusion.
Table 1: The results of correlation analyses
with social life

general health
capita in PPS
development
perceptions
Satisfaction
Mental well
Corruption
coefficient
Subjective
happiness
education
exclusion
Felling of
GDP per
of social
Level of
Human
Feeling
being
index
index
Gini
Ability
to satisfy .259** -.149** .241** .264** .326** .215** .298** .210** .288** -.340**
own
needs
Job
security .197 -.115
** **
.181** .215** .192** .081** .140** .091** .175** -.238**
In order to determine which one is a better predictor variable of satisfaction with pre-
sent job, linear regression was done. The self-evaluation of own job security was evi-
denced to be a better predictor of job satisfaction than the evaluation of ability to satisfy
own needs (R²=.121, F(2/219)=15.072; p<.01) (Table 2).
Table 2: The results of linear regression analyses for satisfaction with present job (crite-
ria) prediction by ability to satisfy own needs and own job security (predictors)
β t
Ability to satisfy own needs -0.205 -3.114*
Job security 0.230 3.497*
*Marks: β: standardized regression coefficient; t: value of t-test ratio, p<.05.
4. CONSLUSIONS
By a statistical elaboration of the European Quality of Life Survey database, the effects of
the recent global economic crisis on the self-evaluation of economic security of the EU
population were examined, whereof the following conclusions were derived: the global
economic crisis has left a visible mark on the economic security of the European Un-
ion population, both in terms of self-evaluation of ability to satisfy their own needs by
monthly income, and in terms of self-evaluation of their own job security; drops of these
aspects of economic security after 2007 however, have not been evenly distributed across
the EU; in certain countries, mainly in the North and the West, it can be concluded that
the crisis has not left any significant effects in this sense (in some of them, insecurity have
even declined), while certain countries have experienced significant rise of insecurity; by
2012, Greece was fared the worst, with the consequences that are still unpredictable and
still with unsolved way of recovery; the self-evaluation of (both indicators of ) economic
security, on a country level, was found to be positively correlated with GDP per capita,
Human Development Index and Corruption Perception Index and negatively correlated
with the Gini coefficient; on an individual level, the economic security (of both indicators
again) is positively correlated with the felling of happiness, subjective general health, the
mental well-being, the level of education, the satisfaction with social life and negatively
correlated with the feeling of social exclusion; finally, the self-evaluation of job security
was evidenced to be a better predictor of job satisfaction than the evaluation of ability to
satisfy one’s own needs.
Acknowledgements
This study was supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technical Develop-
ment of Serbia, through the project no. 179039, entitled Structural, Social and Historical
Changes in Serbian Society in the Context of European Integrations and Globalization.
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http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
APPENDIX
Table 3: Self-evaluation of one’s own job security and self-evaluation of ability to satisfy
one’s own needs by country
own needs 2012/ Ability

One’s own job security
One’s own job security
Ability to satisfy one’s

Job security 2012/Job
to satisfy one’s needs

own needs insecure
insecure 2007 (%)
Job insecure 2007
Job insecure 2012

own needs 2007
own needs 2012
security 2007
own needs
2012 (%)
2007
2012
2007
(%)
(%)
Country
Austria 4.23 4.34 4.21 4.27 3.0 4.2 7.4 4.5 1.03 1.02
Belgium 4.49 4.4 3.98 3.69 6.2 5.7 13.6 16.4 0.98 0.93
Bulgaria 3.31 3.38 2.6 2.71 22.2 22.2 42.9 40.3 1.02 1.04
Cyprus 4.09 3.3 3.29 3.17 9.4 31.6 26.4 28.7 0.81 0.96
Czech Rep. 3.66 3.33 3.5 3.44 9.9 22.0 14.3 20.1 0.91 0.98
Denmark 4.36 4.12 4.8 4.53 9.5 11.5 3.6 3.0 0.94 0.94
Estonia 4.13 3.9 3.64 3.15 9.3 14.8 11.4 22.9 0.95 0.86
Finland 4.21 4.18 4.37 4.15 13.4 11.5 2.9 6.6 0.99 0.95
France 4.28 4.06 3.79 3.51 11.1 14.8 11.9 17.1 0.95 0.93
Germany 4.33 4.38 4.2 4.04 6.1 3.7 8.3 10.1 1.01 0.96
Greece 4.21 3.28 3.1 2.47 8.1 30.6 31.7 50.5 0.78 0.8
Hungary 3.81 3.7 2.78 2.73 8.2 12.1 36.7 36.9 0.97 0.98
Ireland 4.33 3.98 4.34 3.73 5.3 17.6 3.9 13.3 0.92 0.86
Italy 4.14 3.84 3.71 3.6 7.8 14.9 13.3 14.6 0.93 0.97
Latvia 3.84 3.4 3.2 2.91 13.1 25.3 25.3 33.5 0.89 0.91
Lithuania 3.77 3.59 3.39 3.19 18.7 21.7 10.9 19.4 0.95 0.94
Luxembourg 4.6 4.26 4.64 4.5 4.4 5.6 2.9 3.3 0.93 0.97
Malta 4.34 4.26 3.79 3.67 3.7 9.3 11.1 10.8 0.98 0.97
Netherlands 4.61 4.3 4.45 4.11 3.5 4.4 6.9 11.0 0.93 0.92
Poland 3.85 3.72 3.39 3.38 11.4 15.5 24.1 22.8 0.97 0.99
Portugal 3.99 3.59 3.69 3.56 11.2 22.7 13.7 13.6 0.9 0.96
Romania 3.93 3.89 3.02 2.95 11.9 19.1 29.7 31.8 0.99 0.97
Slovakia 3.77 3.35 3.63 3.02 13.6 24.1 15.1 32.0 0.89 0.83
Slovenia 4.09 3.77 3.9 3.48 8.7 11.2 11.0 17.5 0.92 0.89
Spain 4.11 3.65 3.83 3.45 8.4 19.3 10.6 18.7 0.89 0.9
Sweden 4.61 4.47 4.63 4.5 5.8 4.6 3.0 5.5 0.97 0.97
UK 4.45 4.11 4.36 3.87 8.3 13.4 5.6 12.7 0.93 0.89
Total EU 4.2 3.99 3.86 3.63 8.7 13.2 13.3 17.1 0.95 0.94
CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији -
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд
351.7/.8(100)(082)
327(100)(082)
TWENTY Years of Human Security : theoretical Foundations and Practical
Applications / Editorial Ivica Đorđević, Marina Glamotchak, Svetlana
Stanarević, Jasmina Gačić. - Belgrade : Faculty of Security Studies ; Paris
: Institut Français de Géopolitique, 2015 (Beograd : ATC). - 466 str. :
tabele ; 24 cm
Tiraž 200. - Str. 9-12: Editorial / Editorial Ivica Đorđević, Marina
Glamotchak, Svetlana Stanarević, Jasmina Gačić. - Napomene i bibliografske
reference uz tekst. - Bibliografija uz svaki rad.
ISBN 978-86-84069-94-0
a) Сектор безбедности - Зборници b) Међународни односи - Зборници
COBISS.SR-ID 215102732

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Twenty Years of Human Security:

Theoretical Foundations and Practical Applications

TWENTY YEARS OF HUMAN SECURITY:

Theoretical Foundations of Human Security

Marina MITREVSKA, Marjan GJUROVSKI

Marcos FERREIRA, João TERRENAS

Ivica DJORDJEVIĆ, Željko IVANIŠ, Milenko BODIN

Developmental Aspects of Human Security

Miladin KOSTIĆ, Emir ĆOROVIĆ, Senad GANIĆ, Sibela EMINOVIĆ

Mladen MILOŠEVIĆ, Božidar BANOVIĆ

Ana Isabel XAVIER

James Alex SIEBENS, Larissa KOUGBLENOU, Ben S. CASE

Human Security Regional and Local Policies and Issues

Alexander K. LAUTENSACH, Sabina W. LAUTENSACH

Aleksandra ĐUKIĆ, Milena VUKMIROVIĆ, Eva VANIŠTA LAZAREVIĆ

Bülent SARPER AĞIR

Jelena RAKOVIĆ, Gospava STOJANOVIĆ

Murat Necip ARMAN, Hikmet MENGUASLAN

Nevena NOVAKOVIC, Aleksandra DJUKIC

CONTEMPORARY PROCESSES OF TRANSFORMATION

* Professor Rastko Močnik, PhD, University of Ljubljana; e-mail:josip.mocnik@guest.arnes.si

In their interaction, social processes, although initially of heterogeneous origins, trigger

1. FOUCAULT: SECURITY AS A COMPONENT OF BIO-POLITICS

2. FOUCAULT’S NOTION OF SECURITY

3. INSUFFICIENCY OF FOUCAULT’S CONSTRUCTION

4. SOCIAL ACTION AND JURIDICAL-POLITICAL APPARATUSES

5. GENERALISATION OF THE MARKET

2. Establishment of horizontal relations of competition among the entities of the

nent technological and organisational revolutions. In a broader sense, “human capital”

6. CONTAMPORARY “PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION”?

8. SOME CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE

36 Louis Althusser and his school.

An inherently incomplete concept that pretends to universality?

Močnik, Rastko (2013): “Historical Transformation and Epistemological Discontinuity”,

Marina MITREVSKA, Marjan GJUROVSKI*

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY AND WAY OF ITS ACHIEVEMENT:

Fourth, crisis management, and

2. GENESIS OF THE IDEA OF HUMAN SECURITY

Alagappa M. (1988): Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanations.

WHY SAFETY CULTURE12

2. ABOUT SAFETY CULTURE

3. SAFETY CULTURE AS A SCHOOL SUBJECT

4. ON REALISED PILOT PROJECT “TO SAFETY BY LEARNING”

5. CURRICULUM OF THE SAFETY CULTURE SUBJECT

6. CONTENT OF THE SUBJECT

1. Safety culture and tolerance

–– forms of exploitation of victims.

8. RESULTS OF THE PILOT PROJECT

Bin, A. (2004): Učionica bez nasilništva, Beograd: Kreativni centar.

Marcos FERREIRA, João TERRENAS*

THE VISUAL POLITICS OF HUMAN INSECURITIES:

spectivism, can contribute to the questioning – in IR too – of the inquisitorial dichotomy

which inter-subjective meanings are negotiated, contested or imposed to produce discur-

Blumenberg, H. (1979): Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main

Ivica DJORDJEVIĆ, Željko IVANIŠ, Milenko BODIN*

THE CONTRIBUTION OF HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT

2. CHANGE IN THE PYRAMID OF POWER

29 Argentina 93,730 29 Austria 427,321

Data for the year 1989:

GNI, Atlas method (current US$): http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.ATLS.CD/

Data for the year 2013:

GNI, Atlas method (current US$) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.ATLS.

3. THE CURRENT STATUS