Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Criminal Law II Digests
Criminal Law II Digests
Treason Digests
(c/o Anit. Cantos. Damasing. Dela Cruz. Hipolito. Regalado. Santos)
Facts:
Maximo Abad was charged with violation of oath of allegiance when he denied to an officer of the United States
Army the existence of certain rifles at the time of his surrender in April 1901 when in fact, he was aware of the
existence and whereabouts of such rifles. Section 14 of Article 292 of the United States Philippine Commission states
that: "Any person who shall have taken any oath before any military officer under the Civil Government of the
Philippine Islands, whether such official so administering the oath was specially authorized by law so to do or not, in
which oath the affiant is substance engaged to recognize or accept the supreme authority of the United States of
America in these Islands or to maintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by its duly constituted authorities and who shall, after the passage of this act, violate the terms
and provisions of such oath or any of such terms or provisions, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both."
Abad is a former insurgent officer and is entitled to the benefit of the proclamation of amnesty if the offense is one of
those to which the proclamation applies. The denying of the whereabouts of the rifles can be considered an act of
treason, as being an act of adhering to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and comfort, the offense in
this particular case might, perhaps, be held to be covered by the amnesty as being, in substance, treason though
prosecuted under another name.
Treason is defined in section 1 of Act No. 292 to consist in levying war against the United States or the Government
of the Philippine Islands, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the Philippine Islands or
elsewhere. Sedition is defined in section 5 of the same act as the rising publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain
by force or outside of legal methods certain enumerated objects of a political character.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense of violation of oaths of allegiance fall under the category of “treason and sedition.”
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
The offense of violation of oaths of allegiance, being one of the political offenses defined in Act No. 292, is included in
the general words "treason and sedition," as used in the amnesty proclamation of July 4, 1902.
The offenses listed in Act No. 292 include: treason, misprision of treason, insurrection, conspiracy to commit treason
or insurrection, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, seditious words and libels, the formation of secret political
societies, and violation of oaths of allegiance. When the framer of the proclamation used the words "treason and
sedition" to describe the purely political offenses covered by the amnesty, we think it was his intention, without
specially enumerating the political offenses defined in Act No. 292, to include them all under the terms “treason and
sedition.”
Ruling: The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the proclamation of amnesty, and upon filing in the court the
prescribed oath the cause will be returned to the court below with directions that he be discharged.
People v. Adriano
GR#477 – Jun 30, 1947
En Banc
Ponente: Tuason, J.
FACTS: Appeal from decision of the People’s Court sentencing Apolinario Adriano to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP
10,000 plus costs. Adriano was charged with treason for being a Makapili and for bearing arms and assisting the
Japanese Army in its operations in the Gapan-San Leonardo Area from Jan.-Apr. 1945. The People’s Court established
that: Adriano was a Makapili; he performed sentry duties in the Japanese garrison in Gapan, Nueva Ecija; he carried a
rifle in drills led by Japanese commanders; he surrendered to the Americans with rifle in hand.
ISSUE: W/N Adriano is guilty of treason
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HELD/RATIO: No. The Philippine law on treason follows the two-witness test derived from the Anglo-American law on
treason. This test requires the concurrence of two witnesses to an overt act of treason. In this case, each of the overt acts
imputed to Adriano failed the test. Although mere membership in the Makapili organization is a treasonous act in itself
(indicative of adherence and giving aid and comfort to the enemy), such membership is an overt act which should be
proven by at least two witnesses. In this case, no two witnesses saw Adriano doing the same single act as a Makapili.
Hilado, J. dissenting:
Membership being a continuous and indivisible act, it is not necessary that two witnesses have ascertained that Adriano
was a Makapili on the same day. The witnesses agree on the fact that Adriano is a Makapili, hence he should be convicted.
Laurel v Misa
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Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa
77 Phil 856, G.R. No. L-409
January 30, 1947
DOCTRINE: Allegiance is either permanent or temporary. A Filipino citizen owes permanent allegiance to the
Philippines while a resident alien owes a temporary allegiance to our country. Treason cannot be committed in time of
peace. It is a war crime. While there is peace, there are no traitors. There must be a war in which the Philippines is
involved.
FACTS:
This is a resolution of the decision of the SC denying the petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by Laurel.
Anastacio Laurel was arrested by the US Army and was interned under a commitment order for collaborating with
the Japanese during the Japanese occupation. He was turned over to the Commonwealth Government and since then
has been under the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons. He filed an original action in the Supreme Court
invoking the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
He maintains that his arrest was illegal and in violation of his constitutional rights and that the People’s Court Act
682 which suspends the application of the six-hour limitation on detention to political prisoners is unconstitutional.
The SC court in its decision, denied his petition and rejected the petitioner’s contention mainly because no vested
right was violated as the Act is not an ex-post facto law. Although the RPC was in effect during his arrest, he could
not have asked for release after 6 hours as Gen. Douglas McArthur revived the laws of Commonwealth but held the
active collaborationists in restraint “for the duration of the war”.
Laurel, not discouraged, filed a motion and contends that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason because
a) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines, and consequently, the allegiance of Filipino
citizens was suspended; b) there was a change of sovereignty over the Islands upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic
ISSUES:
a) Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines is suspended upon occupation
b) Whether the occupation by an enemy suspends the allegiance of Filipino citizens to the sovereignty
c) Whether the temporary allegiance by inhabitants of a territory to their occupants removes the permanent allegiance
of a citizen to his legitimate government
d) Whether political laws, such as crimes against national security, are suspended or inapplicable against the occupants
e) Whether political laws, such as crimes against national security, are suspended or inapplicable against the inhabitants
f) Whether the occupant may repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason
g) Whether there was a change of sovereignty of the Islands upon proclamation of the Republic and therefore petitioner
can be released as treason was not committed against this sovereignty
h) Whether petitioner can be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
HELD/RATIO:
a) No. Sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier but remains with the
legitimate government. It cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without
putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof. What is suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy which passes temporarily to the
occupant.
b) No. A citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his legitimate government and it cannot be transferred to
the occupant. Moreover, sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during enemy occupation so the allegiance to
the sovereign subsists and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
c) No. The temporary allegiance of inhabitants to occupants is similar to temporary allegiance of a resident alien to the
territory wherein he resides. In the same way that the citizen of a sovereign or government can be convicted of treason
committed in a foreign country, the inhabitant of a territory occupied by military forces of an enemy may also commit
treason against his own legitimate government. Allegiance is not merely the obedience to laws in return for a man’s
protection in his place of residence because by obeying said laws, he is not bound to obey the laws of his own
government.
e) No. Treason is applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government because the
inhabitants of the occupied territory are still bound by their allegiance to the latter during enemy occupation.
f) No. This is not necessary to control the inhabitants and it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the
occupant their allegiance to the sovereign. If an inhabitant is compelled illegally, he can lawfully resist or submit without
becoming a traitor.
g) No. There is no change of sovereignty so the crime of treason committed during the Japanese occupation was
committed against the same sovereign people and the same government.
Perfecto, concurring:
Treason is a war crime and cannot be committed during time of peace. Allegiance to the government was not suspended
during the enemy occupation. 4 kinds: Natural, Acquired, Legal, Local. The idea of suspended sovereignty of suspended
allegiance is incompatible with the Constitution which states that “Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.”
Hilado, concurring:
Allegiance to citizens of the country to the legitimate government and US was not suspended during the Japanese
occupation. Because of the Brian-Kellogg Pact in which Japan is an asignatory, the unjustifiable war is a crime committed
by Japan; hence it is an illegal war.
Dissent:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. Thus, treason
under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the laws of the land are momentarily halted. Regarding the
change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasn’t sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was
under the United States. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the Philippines is
now indeed sovereign.
US v. Dalmacio Lagnason
3 Phil. 495
G.R. No. 1582, March 28, 1904
Ponente: Justice Willard
Facts:
Defendant charged under Act292 with treason, sentenced to death. When Americans occupied Negros Occidental, there
were a band of men in arms against US government led by defendant. Their aim was to establish an independent
government. On October 29, 1902, defendant with band attacked pueblo Murcia, driven off by Constabulary. Defendant
captured. They carried no banners, but did carry two large wooden crosses which were captured, together with the
cannon.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant is guilty.
Held:
Yes. Acts of violence committed by an armed body of men with the purpose of overthrowing the Government was
levying war against the US, and therefore treason, regardless of number of men. No distinction made between foreign
enemy and rebel or insurgent so far as act of levying is concerned. Levying of war had a definite meaning. That the acts
committed by the defendant constituted a "levying of war" as that phrase was understood at the time the act of the
Commission was passed, can not be doubted. Neither can it be doubted that these same acts constituted a "rebellion or
insurrection" within the meaning of the third section of Act No. 292. The two sections can only be reconciled in the
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manner employed in the case against Greathouse (a case mentioned), and that decision should be followed. If rebellion
and insurrection are treason, a defendant can not be convicted under section 3 except on the testimony of two witnesses
to the same overt act or by confession in open court. If they are not treason he could be convicted upon the testimony
required in ordinary cases. The provisions as to two witnesses applied to prosecutions under the second section of the
act of 1862. It is not necessary, however, to decide that question in this case, as the overt act of the defendant was
proved by two witnesses; neither is it necessary to decide whether the omission in section 3 of the phrase "owing
allegiance to the United States," which is found in section 1 taken in connection with section 17 of the act, makes a
difference between the two sections in the case at bar the defendant was a native of Cebu and is therefore covered both
by section 1 and section 3. In a case, an accused has been acquitted because no overt act of treason was proved, and in
another there was acquittal because there were not two witnesses to the same overt act.
Facts:
Count 1: Perez, with other Filipinos, recruited women girls and women against their will to satisfy the lust of Colonel
Mini. The victims included Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and
Flaviana Bonalos. Eriberta Ramo testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused came to her house to get her and told
her that she was wanted in the house of her aunt, but instead, she was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor
Agapito Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her hometown; that the accused came again and
told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did not accept the job; that a week later
the accused came to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls Puppet Governor Agapito
Hontanosas; that Governor Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife; that when she was
brought to Colonel Mini the latter had nothing on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her with a sword
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tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following night, again
she was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped; that finally she was able to escape and stayed in hiding for
three weeks and only came out from the hiding when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.
Count 2: Perez, in company with some Japanese and Filipinos, took Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo
from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor of Colonel Mini in order that Mini
might select those who would later be taken to satisfy his lust. By means of threat, force and intimidation, the above
mentioned two sisters were brought to the headquarters of the Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in
Tagbilaran.
Count 4: On July 16, 1942, Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol, by
Perez and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his
lust, but Perez and Bullecer raped the women first before bringing them to Takibayas. Perez raped Eduarda and
Bullecer raped Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog testified that while on the way to Tagbilaran, Perez through force
and intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the
Japanese Officer named Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused
and his companion, Bullecer, went to her house to take her and her sister; that her sister was then out of the house;
that the accused threatened her with a revolver if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a car where Eduarda
Daohog was; that while they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the car, and their companion
Bullecer took Eutiquia Lamay; that later, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that the accused and
Bullecer brought the two girls to the Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was raped by Takibayas and Eutiquia was
raped by another Japanese.
Count 5: On or about June 4, 1942, Perez commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana and that they
were to be taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a case against a certain Chinese (Insik
Eping), and upon arriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the two girls to the residence of Colonel Mini
and by means of violence, threat and intimidation, Mini abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos;
that Perez followed in having carnal knowledge with Flaviana; that two days later, Perez brought Feliciana Bonalos
to a secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by means of threat and violence had carnal knowledge
with her against her will.
Count 6: Perez, together with his Filipino companion, apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and
Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and reception organized in
honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers which was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25,
1942; that on July 8, 1942, said nurses were forced to attend another banquet and dance in order that the Japanese
officers might make a selection which girls would suit best their fancy.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of Perez in luring women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officials constitute treason.
Held: No.
Ratio:
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to render
assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of the
enemies' hostile designs. His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to
enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the
women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized
the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve
their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State.
Ruling: Perez is guilty of four counts of rape and sentenced for each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from 10 year
of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion temporal.
People v. Alunan
People’s Court Criminal Case No. 3461 – Feb. 27, 1947 - 43 OG 1288
Ponente: Leopoldo Rovira
(NOTE: The decision was rendered in Spanish . Apparently the People’s Court was the post-war court set up to try
collaborators with the Japanese. Rafael Alunan served in the puppet Japanese government in the Philippines.)
FACTS: Rafael R. Alunan was charged with treason before the People’s Court for accepting and discharging official duties
in the Philippine Executive Commission (the puppet government). Among these functions were: accepting and serving in
the ff. positions: Minister of Agriculture and Commerce; Member of the Executive Council; Member of the Preparatory
Commission on Philippine Independence which drafted the 1943 Constitution; Minister of Agriculture and Natural
Resources; participating in a gratitude mission to Tokyo; voting in favor of declaration of war against the Allied Powers;
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conferring with the Japanese emperor; and helping draft and circulate a “Letter of Response” which promised
cooperation with the Japanese, among others. Alunan pleaded not guilty…
ISSUE: W/N Alunan is guilty of treason
HELD: No. Motion to dismiss granted.
RATIO:
Although the witnesses have been able to prove Alunan’s participation in the puppet government, his acts were duties of
a public position held under abnormal circumstances. Such acts cannot be considered as giving aid or comfort to the
enemy. Mere acceptance of public office and performance of the duties of such offices under the Japanese puppet
government do not constitute treason per se. Granting arguendo that Alunan’s acts did constitute giving aid or comfort
to the enemy, he cannot be punished because his adherence to the enemy cause was not proven.
Diaz, J. concurring: (I put this in KASI ETO LANG YUNG ENGLISH ^^)
3 elements of treason: 1) allegiance of the accused; 2) treasonable adherence to the enemy 3) commission by the
accused of an overt act giving OR at least tending aid and comfort to the enemy
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (Sychangco, Formoso, Silayan, and Javalera) do not establish intent on
Alunan’s part to adhere to the enemy. They only establish certain overt acts committed by Alunan. For treasonous intent
to be inferred from overt acts, there must be absolutely nothing in the proof of such overt acts which may negate the
element of adherence. The same records which showed that Alunan indeed served in the puppet government also
showed that Alunan was serving only out of necessity, and was more sympathetic to the Allied cause.
(POSTSCRIPT: Almost none of the other high-ranking officials of the Japanese puppet govt were convicted.)
People v Abad
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FRANCISCO M. ABAD (alias PAQUITO)
G.R. No. L-430
July 30, 1947
PERFECTO, J.
FACTS:
Accused Francisco Abad was found guilty of the complex crime of treason with homicide and sentenced to death, to pay
a fine of P15,000, to indemnify the heirs of Osias Salvador in the amount of P2,000, and to pay costs.
1. December 24, 1943: as an informer and spy of the Japanese Army, join participate in a raid conducted by about fifteen
Japanese soldiers of the Military Police at the house of Magno Ibarra, apprehended the said Magno Ibarra, charging him
of possession of a revolver which had been previously surrendered by Magno Ibarra to the Japanese that Magno Ibarra
still had the revolver.
2. March 11, 1944, caused the arrest and incarceration for more than two months, of one Mr. Francisco, for having
remarked that the Americans would soon return many places in the Philippines had already been retaken.
3. September 28, 1944: forced, coerced, and compelled Osias Salvador and his two brothers to go to the Japanese
garrison where in accused’s presence, were tortured as guerrilla suspects, and although Epifanio and Liberto Salvador
managed later to escape from imprisonment, the said Osias Salvador was unable to do so and died.
4. November 12, 1844: handed over one Francisco Donato to the Japanese soldiers who slapped and kicked the said
Donato, for an incident in which the accused was entirely to blame in that the said accused annoyed Flora Esteban, wife
of Francisco Donato, by throwing sugar cane butts at her.
The lower court found the accused guilty on the first three counts.
ISSUES:
· Whether or not the accused is guilty of the first count. Defense maintains that only one witness testified to the overt
act alleged therein.
o HELD: Not guilty.
o RATIO: Two witnesses were called by the prosecution to prove the first count, Magno Ibarra and his wife, Isabel.
Appellant's going to the Ibarra house, in search of the revolver (testimony of Isabel), is a single overt act, distinct and
independent from appellant's overt act in requiring Magno Ibarra, when the latter went to the garrison, to produce his
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revolver (testimony of Magno). Although both overt acts are inter-related. it would be too much to strain the
imagination if they should be identified as a single act or even as different manifestations, phases, or stage of the same
overt act.
· Whether or not the arrest and incarceration of Francisco was caused by accused. Defense maintains that there
could be other spies who heard Francisco’s remarks.
o HELD: Guilty.
o RATIO: The fact that appellant caused the arrest of Francisco at the auditorium night dance, by pointing him as the
man sought for to the Japanese soldiers who accompanied him and his brother Mariano, in itself alone is sufficient to
find him guilty of adherence to the Japanese enemies and of giving them aid in the attainment of their was purposes.
· Whether or not the accused caused the arrest of Salvador brothers. Defense maintains that it was improbable for
Liberato Salvador to have seen the accused making signs to Japs to arrest the Salvador brothers.
o HELD: Guilty.
o RATIO: It is satisfactorily explained by Liberato that "because a man wanted to by the Japanese begins to observe
everything," he had to observe "because I knew they were making signs"
· In relation to the above, whether or not accused is responsible for the death of Osias Salvador.
o HELD: Not responsible.
o RATIO: It was the escape of Epifanio, and later the escape of Liberato, which must have enraged the Japanese to the
extent of killing Osias Salvador, who, were not so weak, had the same chance as his brothers to escape. If his brothers did
not escape, there is no ground to presume that Osias would have been killed by the Japanese if we take into
consideration that, after almost two and a half months of confinement, the Japanese allowed Fausto Francisco to be
released. There is absolutely no evidence that appellant was present or had anything to do with the killing of Osias
Salvador.
· Whether or not the court erred in admitting evidence of supposed treasonable acts not specifically alleged in the
information (referring to the gathering of info on the whereabouts of guerrilla army members and the shooting of
Domingo)
o HELD: Yes, the court erred. Not guilty.
o RATIO: The fact that accused is described therein as an informer is not enough, because the description is a
conclusion made by the author of the information based on the facts specifically alleged in the four counts. Also, the
lower court erred in finding the facts proven when the testimony of has not been corroborated by any other witness,
thus violating the two-witness rule in treason cases.
· Whether or not the trial court erred in finding accused as informer based on mere assertions of witnesses on
charges not alleged in the information
o HELD: Yes, the trial court erred. Not guilty.
o The pronouncement appears to be based on the testimonies of Publio Dumaual, Rafael Guillermo, and Agustin de la
Cruz, each one of whom testified about facts not alleged in any of the counts of the information, and their testimonies on
said facts appear not to be corroborated by another witness, as required by the two-witness rule.
· Whether or not the court erred in not appreciating 2 mitigating circumstances: the fact that the Abad family was
persecuted by guerrillas, the persecution ending in the killing of Lino Abad Pine and Antonio Abad, father and brother,
respectively, of the accused, and, appellant's age.
o HELD: First circumstance not appreciated. Age is appreciated.
o RATIO: The killing of the father and brother of accused is not considered to mitigate appellant's guilt as they are not
of a similar nature or analogous to those mentioned in article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.Appellant's age can be
considered. He was born on October 20, 1924, and when he committed the acts alleged in counts two and three, the
latter on September 28, 1944, he was not yet 20 years old. The circumstances of this case justify crediting appellant with
a mitigating circumstance of similar nature to that of number 2 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Decision of the lower court modified (1 mitigating). Sentenced to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal and
to pay a fine of P5,000 and the costs.
Facts:
· Faustino Flores, Leon Gutierrez, Felipe Reyes: charged with several counts of treason (2,2 and 5, respectively). Case
concerns the second count, as they are acquitted of their other counts due to lack of proof.
· Dec 1 1944, Barrio Tipas, Taguig, Rizal: Accused lead Japanese troops into a “zonification” (rounding up the men
suspected of being guerillas into an area, having makapilis point guerillas out, and torture or abduct them), arrest 276
men in the process, search houses in the area for supplies to gicve to the Japanese troops, load the 267 men into trucks
which drove them to Pasig, from which they were never heard of again.
· People’s Court finds the three guilty of treason.
Issue:
· Whether or not the accused are guilty of the second account of treason.
· Whether or not the “Zoning” of Tipas constitutes one act of treason for the purposes of the rule that there should be
testimonies from at least two witnesses.
Held/Ratio:
· No. Witnesses’ testimonies for each of the accused fail to disclose that they refer to the same act, therefore these
are uncorroborated. This is a violation of the two-witness rule.
· No. Each of the acts of the accused must be supported by at least two witnesses, or each witness must testify to the
whole act, in order for the rule to be complied with.
DOCTRINE: “No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of 2 witnesses at least to the same overt
act or on confession of the accused in open court.” The 2-witness rule is severely restrictive. Each of the witnesses must
testify to the whole overt act.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgement of the People’s Court.
March 11 1944: Japanese patrol with 17 men and 1 officer were ambushed and liquidated by guerillas in Bibito,
Lopez, Tayabas (now Quezon)
Residents of Bibito and neighboring barrios were arrested and others were ordered to report at the poblacion which
included Antonio Conducto, a guerilla and former USAFFE, his wife, parents and relatives
Witnesses:
Sinforosa Mortero (Antonio’s mother): On March 18, 1944, at about 5PM, she and her family went to the poblacion
from barrio Danlagan. Still in Danlagan, in front of Filemon Escleto’s house, Escleto told them to stop and took down
their names. With her were her daughter-in-law, Patricia Araya, her son Antonio Conductor, and three
grandchildren. After writing their names, Escleto conducted them to the PC garrison in the poblacion where they
were questioned by some whose name she did not know. This man asked her if she heard gunshots and she said yes
but did not know where they were. The next day they were allowed to go home with many others, but Antonio
Conducto was not released. Since then she had not seen her son. On cross-examination she said that when Escleto
took down their names Antonio Conducto asked the accused if anything would happen to him and his family, and
Escleto answered, “Nothing will happen to you because I am to accompany you in going to town.”
Patricia Araya (Antonio’s wife): Filemon Escleto stopped them and took down their names; that after taking their
names Escleto and the Philippine Constabulary soldier took them to the PC garrison; that her husband asked Escleto
what would happen to him and his family, and Escleto said “nothing” and assured Conducto that he and his family
would soon be allowed to go home; that Escleto presented them to a PC and she heard him tell the latter, “This is
Antonio Conducto who has firearm;” that afterward they were sent upstairs and she did not know what happened to
her husband.
Filemon Escleto was charged in the People’s Court with 3 counts of treason for:
ISSUES:
1) Whether Filemon Escleto is guilty of treason
2) Whether Escleto’s making note of persons who went to the poblacion is evidence of an overt act of treason
3) Whether Patricia Araya’s testimony is availing as proof of an overt act of treason
HELD:
1) NO. He is acquitted of the crime of treason.
2) NO. The only point of agreement between the 2 witnesses’ testimonies is that the accused took down the names of
Conducto and of the witnesses and came along with them to the town. This does not show betrayal of Conducto because
he may be merely doing his duties as lieutenant of the barrio. Also, it is not necessary to write down Conducto’s name
because Escleto can merely report him secretly. That there were spies with masks during the registration and that
others were released further support the theory that Escleto was merely following orders in ordering them to write
their names.
3) NO. The only damaging evidence is Araya’s testimony that the accused told a Philippine Constabulary Soldier that the
deceased has a firearm. However, the testimony was not shown to have been made for a treasonable purpose nor did it
necessarily have that implication. In addition, this was not corroborated by another witness.
*People vs. Adriano : The authors of the two-witness provision in the American Constitution, from which the Philippine
treason law was taken, purposely made it “severely restrictive” and conviction for treason difficult.
*Wigmore: Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act; or if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to
each part of the overt act.
*Learned Hand: It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits
together of the same overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths;.
*Cramer: The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that it show sufficient
action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy.
Every action, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the
testimony of two witnesses.
Espionage
Santos vs. Misa
G.R. No. L-319, March 28, 1946
76 Phil 415
Ponente: Bengzon=, J.
Facts:
Santos is a Chinese citizen apprehended in February, 1945, by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States
Army, turned over last September, to the Commonwealth Government, and since then detained by the respondent as
a political prisoner. He was detained due to active collaboration with the Japanese.
Santos claims that the detention is illegal because he has not been charged before, nor convicted by, the judge of a
competent court, and because he may not be confined under Act. No. 682 because he does not owe allegiance to the
US or the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The Solicitor-General declared that Santos may be charged for espionage, a crime against national security wherein
allegiance is immaterial, and may, therefore, be held in custody under Commonwealth Act No. 682
Issue: Whether or not Santos is covered by Commonwealth Act No. 682. (With regard to detention of political prisoners)
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
Section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 682:
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 12
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
Upon delivery the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines of the persons
detained by him as political prisoners, to the Commonwealth Government, the Office of Special Prosecutors shall receive
all records, documents, exhibits and such other things as the Government of the United States may have turned over in
connection with and/or affecting said political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and
take, as speedily as possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, . . .. And, provided, further, That, in the
interest of public security, the provisions of article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall
be deemed, as they are hereby suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners are concerned, until the filing of
the corresponding information with the People's Court, but the period of suspension shall not be than six (6) months
from the formal delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States
in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government.
Santos may be prosecuted for espionage, a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender and considered as an
offense against national security.
Piracy
People v. Lol-lo and Saraw
GR#17958 – Feb. 27, 1922
Ponente: Malcolm, J.
FACTS: Days after leaving Matuta, Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) on Jun. 30, 1920, two boats carrying 12 Dutch
nationals (1 person in one boat, 11 men, women and children in another) were boarded by 24 armed Moros (including
the accused Lol-lo and Saraw) at around 7:00 PM. The Moros took all the cargo from the Dutch. They also raped and
abducted the two women on board. The Moros poked holes in the boat and left the rest of the Dutch in it (they were later
rescued). The two women were able to escape once the Moros docked in the island of Maruro (also a Dutch possession).
Lol-lo and Saraw were arrested after returning to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-tawi. They were charged w/ Piracy
before the Sulu CFI and were found guilty, with punishment of life imprisonment; and to return the stolen 39 sacks of
copra plus 924 rupees in damages, plus costs.
ISSUES: 1) W/N the Sulu CFI has jurisdiction over the crime 2) W/N the defendants are guilty
HELD: 1) Yes 2) Yes
RATIO:
1) Piracy is a crime against all mankind. The jurisdiction of piracy has no territorial limits, pirates being hostes humani
generis (enemies of mankind). Piracy may be prosecuted in any court where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried.
2) The provisions of the Spanish Penal Code on piracy (Arts. 153-154) remained in force after the American takeover, by
virtue of Pres. McKinley’s Instructions. Art. 154 specified that piracy with rape shall be punished by cadena perpetua to
death. Lol-lo, who was proven to have taken part in the rape of the two women, should therefore be put to death - the
crime being aggravated by cruelty, ignominy, and abuse of superior strength (rape of the women, abandonment of the
other victims, 24 armed men vs. 12 men, women & children) with the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.
DECISION: Judgment affirmed with respect to Saraw, modified with respect to Lol-lo.
People v Siyoh
G.R. No. L-57292
February 18, 1986
The People Of The Philippines
vs.
Julaide Siyoh, Omar-Kayam Kiram, Namli Indanan & Andaw Jamahali,
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
Siyoh, Kiram, Indanan and Jamahali were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder. On July
14, 1979, accused fired their guns into the air and stopped the pumpboat wherein de Castro, Hiloen and 2 de Guzmans
were riding, boarded the said pumpboat and took, stole and carried away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo
sets, merchandise and other personal belongings amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency,
ordered them to jump into the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which caused the death of de
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 13
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
Castro and one de Guzman while wounding the other de Guzman. It appears that Siyoh and Kiram were with the victims,
also selling their goods, before the incident happened.
Lower court decision: Sentenced to DEATH. However, considering the provision of Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao
and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities,
under a regime of so called compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is recommended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Siyoh and Kiram are guilty beyond reasonable doubt, considering the credibility of the witness
HELD:
Yes, they are guilty BRD.
RATIO:
Appellants contentions are unconvincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on any of the occasions
when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would make Kiram and his
family immediately suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods would be premature. However,
robbing and killing the victims while at sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided
safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this assertion.
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of
the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that their
husbands were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli
Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven
conspiracy among the accused.
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because
his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died
in a manner different from his companions. The incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided
the case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of
piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or
on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were they hacked
wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were
hacked; that the appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
Decision affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed shall be reclusion
perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the amount
of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.
Illegal Detention
Lino v Fugoso
CECILIO M. LINO
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, LAMBERTO JAVALERA, and JOHN DOE, in their capacity as Mayor, Chief of Police and
Officer in charge of municipal jail, all of the City of Manila
G.R. No. L-1159 January 30, 1947
MORAN, C.J.:
Milo v Salanga
c/o A2015 Crim Digests
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan(Branch IV), and JUAN
TUVERA, SR
[G.R. No.L-37007. July 20, 1987.]
GANCAYCO, J
Doctrine:
Arbitrary detention is commited by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person. The elements of this
crime are: 1) That the officer is a PUBLIC OFFICER or EMPLOYEE, 2) That he DETAINS a person, and 3) That detention is
without legal grounds
Facts:
1.) 12 Oct. 1972 – Information for Arbitrary Detention filed against Juan Tuvera Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo
Mangsat in CFI of Pangasinan stating:
a. 21 April 1973 – Juan Tuvera, Sr. (barrio captain) et al. MALTREATED Armando Valdez, hitting the latter w/
butts of guns and fist blows
b. Tuvera w/o legal grounds and w/ members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring,
confedenrating and helping one another (JRB: I put this for good measure) LODGED and LOCKED
Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about 11 hours.
2.) 4 April 1973 – Tuvera filed motion to quash the Info bec. Acc. To him:
a. Facts do not constitute an offense (i.e., barrio captain =/= public official)
b. Proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information
c. TUVERA’s ARGUMENTS:
i. He didn’t have authority to make an arrest nor jail and detain Valdez (bec. Barrio capt. Only)
ii. He is neither a peace officer or policeman
iii. He was not a public official
iv. He had nothing to do with the detention of Valdez (cops did it)
v. He is not directly or indirectly connected in the admin. Of the Manaoag Police Force
vi. Barrio capts on 21 April 1972 were not yet “Persons in Authority” and it was only through PD 299
that they became such.
vii. Proper charge was ILLEGAL detention, and not ARBITRARY DETENTION
d. Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition to the motion
3.) 25 April 1973 – Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash; found that Tuvera, Sr. was NOT a Public Officer who can
be charged with Arbitrary Detention (see QuickGuide for requisites of Arbit. Det.)
RULING: Petition for Certiorari granted. The questioned order (granting motion to quash) is set aside. CASE
REMANDED to appropriate trial court for further proceedings.
RATIO:
1.) Requisites of Arbitrary Detention are present
a. The Information charges Tuvera (barrio capt.) to having conspired with Corporal Mendoza and Pat. Magsat who are
members of the police force of Manaoag Pangasinan in detaining peti. Valdez for about 11 hrs. in municipal jail w/o
legal ground.
b. Requirement of a “Public Officer” contemplated in Arbitrary Detention:
i. Must have authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of ac rime
ii. Public Officers = policemen, other agents of the law (judges, mayors)
c. Court has held barrio lieutenants (ie, barrio captains/brgy captains) as PERSONS in AUTHORITY
i. US v Braganza - Barrio Lieutenant and a Municip. Councilor arrested a priest in church; no crime committed
by the priest; the 2 were convicted of arbitrary detention
ii. US v Gellada – a Barrio Lieutenant w/ a Mr. Soliman, tied his houseboy Sixto and delivered him to a justice of
the peace, where he was detained during the whole night until 9 am the next day. Justice of the peace
released Sixto bec. He had not committed a crime. Barrio Lieutenant Gellada was convicted of arbitrary
detention
d. RA No. 3590 (Revised Barrio Charter)
i. Powers and duties of a barrio captain include looking after maintenance of public order in the barrio and
assist municipal mayor and councilor in the performance of duties in such barrio, to look after gen. welfare,
enforce all laws and ordinances w/in barrio, organize/lead an emergency group when necessary to
maintain peace and order
e. Prof. Aruego’s Treatise on Barrio Gov’t Law and Administration (VERY IMPORTANT – This part SEALS the
deal)
i. “Upon barrio capt. Depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio…He is the peace
officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such HE MAY MAKE ARREST AND
DETAIN PERSONS W/IN LEGAL LIMITS.
ii. ERGO, one need not be a police officer to be chargeable w/ Arbitrary Detention
iii. Powers and Functions of Mayors SIMILAR to those of brgy capt.; only difference is in size of jurisdiction
iv. TUVERA STUPID ADMISSION:
1. W/ aid of his rural police, he as barrio capt. Could have led arrest of peti. Valdez
2.) A public officer or employee who DETAINS a person w/o LEGAL GROUNDS is guilty of ARBITRARY
DETENTION.
HOWEVER, a person so detained WILL NOT BE RELEASED if afterwards he is detained under a valid information.
People v Bringas
Detention v Kidnapping for Ransom
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 16
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
vs.
CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y GARCIA, BRYAN BRINGAS y GARCIA, JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y CRUZ, ERICKSON PAJARILLO
y BASER (deceased), and EDEN SY CHUNG
[G.R. No. 189093. April 23, 2010.]
VELASCO, JR
US v Cabanag
Detention v Slavery
THE UNITED STATES
vs.
TOMAS CABANAG
[G.R. No.L-3241. March 16, 1907.]
TRACEY, J
US v Vallejo
THE UNITED STATES
vs.
SALVADOR VALLEJO, ET AL.,
[G.R. No. 4367. September 3, 1908.]
TRACEY, J
Rebellion
People v Hernandez
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.,
99 Phil. 515.
Facts:
This refers to the petition for bail filed by defendant appellant Amado Hernandez on June 26, 1954, and renewed on
December 22, 1955. The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion
complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed,
although the lower court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment. On the other hand, the defense contends, among
other things, that rebellion can not be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
The amended Information contained the allegation that on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said
date and continuously thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating, and cooperating with each other, as well as with the 31 other defendants, being then officers and/or
members of, or otherwise associated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee
on Labor Organization (CLO), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain,
cause, direct and/or command the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (“Huks”) to rise publicly
and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the
purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof, as in fact
the said Huks have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids,
sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a
necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and
there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property
to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose.
Ratio:
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: "When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
Pursuant to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code "any person, merely participating or executing the commands of
others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."
The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for "any person who promotes, maintains or
heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein":
1. "engaging in war against the forces of the government",
2. "destroying property", or
3. "committing serious violence",
4. "exacting contributions or"
5. "diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated".
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are,
altogether, subject to only one penalty — prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by "engaging in war against
the forces of the government" and "committing serious violence" in the prosecution of said "war". These expressions
imply everything that war connotes, namely; resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and
contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and
unhappiness that war leaves in its wake — except that, very often, it is worse than war in the international sense, for it
involves internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a
contest between strangers. Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and "committing serious violence", said resort
to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not two or more offense, but only
one crime — that of rebellion plain and simple. Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, one single
crime, it follows
necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor the commission of,
at least, two crimes.
Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed
to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the
Philippines Islands or any part thereof," then said offense becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as,
being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
There is one other reason — and a fundamental one at that — why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the
case at bar: If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that
this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion,
a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in
theabsence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article
48, said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a singlea ggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant. Upon the
other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more
severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately.
Facts:
In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the provincial Fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
Appellant Federico Geronimo, together with Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony, alias Tony Collante alias Taoic,
alias Mang Pacio, alias Bonny Abundio Romagosa alias David, Jesus Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava alias Jessie alias NMT,
alias Balbas, alias Noli, alias Noli Metangere, alias NKVD, Juan Ocompo alias Cmdr. Bundalian, alias Tagle, Rosendo
Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong, alias Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero alias Cmdr. Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago Rotas alias
Cmdr. Jessie, Fernando Principe alias Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo Saguni alias Godo, alias Terry, alias Terpy, Andres Diapera
alias Maclang, alias Berto, alias Teny, Lorenzo Saniel alias Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo, alias Albert, Teodoro
Primavera alias Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias Marquez, Pedro Anino alias Fernandez, Mauro
Llorera alias Justo, Richard Doe alias Cmdr. Danny and John Doe alias Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito and
many others, were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping committed.
In Camarines Sur, the above-named accused being then ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise known as
the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of said Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) having come
to an agreement and decide to commit the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together and confederating
among themselves with all of the thirty-one accused.
Issue:
Held:
Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty to the information. When the case was called for trial on
October 12, 1954, however, he asked the permission of the court to substitute his original plea with one of guilty, and
was allowed to change his plea. On the basis of the plea of guilty, the fiscal recommended that the penalty of life
imprisonment be imposed upon the accused, his voluntary plea of guilty being considered as a mitigating circumstance.
Geronimo’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that the penalty imposable upon the accused was only prision mayor, for
the reason that in his opinion, there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping,
because the crimes of murders robberies, and kidnapping being the natural consequences of the crime of rebellion, the
crime charged against the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion. On October 18, 1954, the trial court
rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various persons killed, as
listed in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate costs of the proceedings. From this
judgment, accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, or simple rebellion.
However, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of
rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating
effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision
mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the
rebellion; and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay
in the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs.
FACTS:
- The said accused, being then ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of
the Philippines and the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HUK), have all come together and agreed to commit the crime
of rebellion (i.e. rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government of the Republic of the Phiippines by making
armed raids, sorties, ambushes, and attacks against Phil Constabulary, Civilian Guards, Police, Army patrols, as well as
civilians). In furtherance thereof, they have committed the acts of murders, pillages lootings, plunders, arsons, and
planned destructions of private and public property to create disorder
- March 20, 1951; 830 AM: Benito Cruz, and other Huk members, entered the house of John Hardie, with violence and
intimidation, then took and carried away therefrom personal properties of material values consisting of a typewriter, a
radio, several pieces of jewelry, books, clothings and other articles belonging to the latter amounting to Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) After ransacking the place, the raiders tied the hands of John D. Hardie and his foreman Donald
Capuano and shot them to death, together with Mrs. Hardie. Late the month, a combat patrol led by Capt. Conrado M.
Cabagui of the 14th BCT, with the assistance of one Tomas Timbresa, as guide, located a Huk camp in the Sierra Madre
Mountains.
- March 21, 1951: Some 70 armed members of FC #32 of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" led by Comdr. Robert,
fought the members of Co "D" of the 14th BCT, Armed Forces of the Philippines under Capt. Conrado Cabague.
- April 21, 1951: Accused Fermin Tolentino, as the Commanding Officer of FC 25 of the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan', leading some 70 armed members of the said organization, attacked, fired at and engaged into a fight the officers
and men of a detachment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
- November 15, 1952: Accused Domingo dela Torre and about 12 other armed men, all members of Huk, in support of
and/or in furtherance of the movement of the said organization to overthrow the established government of the Phil,
while soliciting food from civilians thereat, fought elements of the 7th BCT, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Civilian Commando Unit of Montalban, Rizal.
- April 5, 1951: Elements of the AFP had an encounter with 50 Huks under commander Silang at Sitio Malabayas,
Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal, resulting in the death of one (1) Huk, two (2) EM and wounding of another enlisted man.
- December 11, 1951: Elements of the AFP had an encounter with about fourteen (14) armed Huks under Commander
Aladdin at Sitio Kaulanog, Tanay, Rizal, resulting in the wounding of one (1) enlisted man.
- April 28, 1949: An undetermined number of Huks jointly led by Commanders Viernes, Marzan, Lupo and Mulong,
treacherously ambushed, assaulted, attacked and fire upon the party of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon and her PC escort, whom
they considered as their enemies, resulting in the death of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon, Baby Quezon, Mayor Bernardo of
Quezon City, Maj. P. San Agustin, Lt. Lasam, Philip Buencamino III and several soldiers, and injuries to General Jalandoni
and Capt. Manalang.
- August 25, 1950: An undetermined number of armed Huks raided, assaulted and attacked Camp Makabulos and set fire
on the buildings and installations therein killing Maj. E. D. Orlino, Capt. E. D. Cruz, Lts. Manacias, N. C. Tan, Eusebio
Cabute, and several enlisted men, including Rosario Sotto, a Red Cross Nurse.
- August 26, 1950: About 100 armed Huks, with intent of gain and for the purpose of procuring supplies and other
materials for the support and maintenance of the HMB organization, forcibly brought the cashier of the Provincial
Treasury, Vicente Reventar, from his house to the Provincial Capitol and at the point of guns, forced him to open the
treasury, and from which took money amounting to Php 80,000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellants committed the crime of rebellion.
HELD:
Yes. As stated in the brief for the Government, appellants herein are guilty of simple rebellion, inasmuch as the
information alleges, and the records show that the acts imputed to them were performed as a means to commit the
crime of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, although as Huk Commanders, appellants Benito Cruz and Fermin
Tolentino fall under the first paragraph of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000, whereas appellant Paterno Cruz comes under the second paragraph of said
article, which prescribes the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. Accordingly, the penalty meted out to
appellants Benito Cruz and Fermin Tolentino should be reduced to ten (10) years of prision mayor, with the accessory
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 20
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
penalties prescribed by law, and to pay each a fine of P10,000, and appellant Paterno Cruz should be sentenced to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with the proportionate part of the costs against said
appellants.
Carino v People
FRANCISCO R. CARIÑO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
April 30, 1963 En Banc Labrador, J.
DOCTRINE: In rebellion or insurrection, the RPC expressly declares that there must be a public uprising and the taking
up of arms. The act of giving aid and comfort is not criminal in rebellion unlike in treason.
FACTS:
- Accused was charged with rebellion for allegedly being in conspiracy with the other members of the Communist Party,
between the period from May 6, 1946 to September 12, 1950 for acts committed:
1) The ambush on May 6, 1946 of the 10th MPC Company in Barrio Sta. Monica, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija; resulting in the
death of 10 enlisted men; 2) The raid on August 6, 1946 of the Municipal Building of Majayjay, Laguna; 3) The ambush
on April 10, 1947 of 14 enlisted men in Barrio San Miguel na Munti, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, during which Lt. Pablo Cruz
and Pvt. Santiago Mercado were killed; 4) The raid on the poblacion of Laur, Nueva Ecija of May 9, 1947; 5) The ambush
on August 19, 1947 of a detachment of the 155th Company, in San Miguel, Bulacan, killing two officers thereof; 6) The
raid on Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija of June 1946; 7) The ambush on April 25, 1947 of Mrs. Aurora Aragon Quezon and
party at Barrio Salubsob, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, resulting in the death of said Mrs. Quezon and other members of her
party; 8) The raid on Camp Macabulos, Tarlac, Tarlac, on August 25, 1950; 9) The raid on Sta. Cruz, Laguna, of August 26,
1950; 10) The raid on Arayat, Pampanga, of August 25, 1950; 11) The seizure of September 12, 1950 of an army scout
car in Barrio Mapalad, Arayat, Pampanga and the murder of two TPs on the said occasion; 12) The attack on the
headquarters of a PC detachment of March 28, 1950, at Montalban, Rizal; and 13) The raid on San Pablo, Laguna, of
March 29, 1950, resulting in the death of Major Alikbusan of the government armed forces.
- He admitted the truthfulness of the said events but denied any participation.
- Accused is a good friend and a former high school classmate of Dr. Lava, a well-known Communist leader. The latter
has treated the family of the accused successfully and free of charge and is the godfather of one of the children.
- 1946, nighttime: Lava arrived at their home and asked for shelter as he was being pursued by politicians upon
suspicion of his involvement in the killing of Mayor Roxas of Bulacan. He left early the morning after.
- May 1949: A note from the Lava arrived asking for some cigarettes, powdered milk and canned goods. The note was
brought by a boy of 12 or 15 years, named Totoy, and through him the accused sent the needed supplies. He was
instructed to sign "Turko" all notes to be sent by him to Lava and to address them to "Pinang" in order to conceal their
respective identities.
- 1949 - April 1952: This exchange of notes between them and the furnishing of supplies and foodstuffs by appellant to
Dr. Lava lasted until the accused was arrested and detained.
- He also allegedly provided assistance to the Communist party as a ranking employee of the National City Bank of New
York when he was approached by a prominent member of a special unit of the Communist Party, and delivered the
amount of $6,000 to the treasurer of the communists. He also assisted two top-level communists in opening current
accounts in the National City Bank of New York although their initial deposit was below P2,000, the minimum required
by the bank. (However it was not shown that the persons helped were known by appellant to be communist and the
funds intended to carry out the rebellion.)
- 1949: A spy, Florentino Diolata, heard him state that he was at the command of his comrades for any assistance for the
advancement and promotion of their common purpose at a banquet given by the Communists in honor of Amado V.
Hernandez
INFORMATION: Crime of rebellion with murders, arson, robberies and kidnappings, for having, as a high ranking
officer and/or member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan otherwise
known as the Hukbalahaps (Huks), agreed in conspiracy with 31 other who were charged with the same crime in other
criminal cases then pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government
and disrupting its activities.
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 21
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
CFI Manila: Guilty as accomplice in the crime of rebellion, and sentencing him to suffer two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional and to pay a fine in the sum of P2,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
CA: Affirmed CFI decision and convicted the accused of the crime of rebellion as the acts done by him constitute acts of
cooperation with the communists in their primordial purpose of overthrowing the government and such acts naturally
have contributed to some extent in the advancement and promotion of their purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts committed by the petitioner were enough to render him guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
rebellion
HELD: No.
● There are two elements required in order that a person may be considered an accomplice to a criminal act,
namely; 1) that he take part in the execution of the crime by previous and simultaneous acts and; 2) that he
intend by said acts to commit or take part in the execution of the crime. The acts of the appellant do not prove
any criminal intent of helping the Huks in committing the crime of insurrection or rebellion. Good faith is
presumed, and there is no presumption of criminal intent or aiding the communists in their unlawful designs to
overthrow the Government.
● Even if he had intent, he is still not liable as his assistance was not efficacious enough to help in the success of
the crime so as to make him an accomplice. Appellant's acts did not constitute acts of cooperation in the
execution of the act of overthrowing the government. Appellant was not a member of the Hukbalahap
organization. He did not take up arms against the Government, nor did he openly take part in the commission of
the crime of rebellion or insurrection as defined in article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, without which said
crime would not have been committed. The only acts he was shown to have performed were the sending or
furnishing of cigarettes and food supplies to a Huk leader, the changing of dollars into pesos for a top-level
communists and the helping of Huks in opening accounts with the bank of which he was an official.
● Even if considered an indirect help or aid in the rebellion, they cannot constitute previous or simultaneous acts
or uprising or rebellion, for, unlike in the crime of treason, the acts giving comfort of moral did is not criminal in
the case of rebellion or insurrection, where the Revised Penal Code expressly declares that there must be a
public uprising and the taking up of arms.
DISPOSITION: The judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant ABSOLVED from the charge
contained in the information.
Original Decision: Military Commission - Buscayno convicted of subversion, death by firing squad
SC Decision: No illegal detention. No bail. No double jeopardy.
Buscayno’s cases
-Buscayno and Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. charged before Mil. Comm. 2 with subversion
-staged NPA-sponsored demonstration in Manila
-Aquino gave Buscayno several .45 caliber pistols, two armored vests and walkie-talkies, and ammunition.
-Aquino provided shelter and medical treatment for members of the HMB and NPA
Sison cases
-charged with rebellion before Special Mil Comm 1
-charged with subversion before Mil. Comm. 6
-alleged that accused became and have remained officers of CPP and NPA
-engaged in indoctrination, promotion of communist pattern of subversion
Rebellion case
-Sison and Buscayno assailed jurisdiction of the military tribunal to try civilians like them
-filed petition for habeas corpus, prohibition, mandamus. denied
Instant case
-prayed that the decision of Mil. Comm. 2 be declared void because he was denied his constitutional right to
present evidence and that he be released from detention; charges for rebellion and subversion be dismissed for being in
contravention of the rule on double jeopardy
Issue: W/N they are legally detained. No, not illegally detained and no justification for their release
Held:
Proclamation No. 2045 sanctions continued confinement: persons under detention for rebellion and subversion cannot
enjoy the privilege of the write of habeas corpus
Petitioners were all charged with rebellion. Only Buscayno’s subversion case was decided but the decision is subject to
review. No case against petitioners has been terminated thus, the rule on double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
Petitioners were accused of rebellion for having undertaken a public uprising to overthrow the government. As for
having been accused of subversion, they were allegedly officers and ranking members of the Communist party. Overt
acts of resisting armed forces were incidental to the main charge of being leaders of subversive organizations.
Rebellion may be committed by noncommunists without collaborating with the agents of an alien power. On the other
hand subversion came into existence when the communists sought to dominate the world in order to establish a new
political order.
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 23
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
Enrile v Salazar
In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus, Juan Ponce Enrile v. RTC QC Judge Jaime Salazar
G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990
186 SCRA 216
Ponente: Justice Narvasa
Facts:
In the afternoon of 2/27/1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader JPE, and spouses Panlilio, was arrested by law enforcement
officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the strength of a warrant issued by respondent judge earlier that day,
for rebellion and multiple murder during the period of the failed coup attempt from 11/29 to 12/10/1990. JPE was
taken and held overnight at the NBI headquarters in Taft Avenue, without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the warrant. The following morning, he was brought to Camp Karingal in QC. That day,
JPE, through counsel, filed a petitione for habeas corpus, alleging he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being
held to answer for a criminal offense nonexistent in statute books and charged with a crime in an information for which
no complaint was initially filed or no preliminary investigation was conducted (thus no due process), granted. The
Solicitor General argued that petitioners’ case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because the information in
Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the
information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, of rebellion. The court granted JPE and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty on bail. Petitioners pray for
the abandonment of the Hernandez ruling, rule that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes and that Hernandez
applies only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means, to commit rebellion, but not to acts
committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character.
Issue:
Whether or not rebellion can be complexed with murder.
Held:
No. Hernandez stands. Murder is absorbed in rebellion. If murder were punished separately from rebellion, and the two
crimes were separately punished, then 2 penalties would be imposed, and so the extreme penalty could not be imposed,
which would be unfavorable. The purpose of RPC48 is to favor the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more
severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. If one act
constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one
of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the
penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is
deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for
each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. Hernandez remains binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Also,
since the information does not charge an offense, and disregarding phrasing that rebellion be complexed, indictment is
to be read as charging only simple rebellion. Hence, entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.
People V Lava
23 SCRA 72
Zaldivar J.; May 16, 1969
FACTS:
§ Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz y Adriano, Rosario C. Viuda de Santos,
Angel Baking, Lamberto Magboo, Nicanor Razon, Sr., Esteban Gonzales y la Torre, Marcos Medina, Cesario Torres,
Rosenda Canlas Reyes, Arturo Baking y Calma, Simeon Gutierrez y Rodriguez, Julita Rodriguez y Gutierrez, Victorina
Rodriguez y Gutierrez, Marciano de Leon, Honofre D. Mangila, Cenon Bungay y Bagtas, Magno Pontillera Bueno, Nicanor
Capalad, Rosalina Quizon, Pedro Vicencio, Julia Mesina, Felipe Engreso, Elpidio Acuñ o Adime, Josefina Adelan y Abusejo,
Conrado Domingo, Aurora Garcia, and Naty Cruz were all arrested and charged with the complex crime of rebellion with
murders and arsons under an identical information that:
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 24
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
- On May 6, 1946, these people intended to overthrow the seat of the Gov’t of the Philippine Republic in the City of
Manila.
- And the accused, being high officials of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), of which the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) is its armed forces, decided to commit rebellion and did so by making armed raids, sorties
and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments and committing wanton acts of murder,
spoilage, looting, arson, planned destruction of private and public buildings, to create and spread terrorism.
§ Of the 31, five were acquitted, namely: Julia Mesina, Rosenda Canlas Reyes, Victorina Rodriguez y Gutierrez, Nicanor
Capalad and Aurora Garcia.
§ Of the 26 who were convicted, all appealed to this Court except defendant Esteban Gonzales la Torre. And later on,
Rosalina Quizon, Elpidio Acuñ o Adime, Josefina Adelan Abusejo, Conrado Domingo and Naty Cruz withdrew their appeal.
§ During the pendency of the appeal, defendants Julita Rodriguez y Gutierrez and Magno Pontillera Bueno died.
§ 18 defendants were left to the appeal, namely: Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome
Cruz, Rosario Vda. de Santos, Angel Baking, Lamberto Magboo, Nicanor Razon, Marcos Medina, Cesareo Torres, Arturo
Baking, Simeon G. Rodriguez, Marciano de Leon, Honofre Mangila, Cenon Bungay, Pedro Vicencio, and Felipe Engreso.
Issues:
§ Whether or not the accused are guilty of rebellion.
§ Whether or not a person may be prosecuted and held guilty of the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson,
robbery and/or other common crimes.
Held:
§ Nicanor Razon, Sr. and Felipe Engreso were acquitted.
§ Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz, Angel Baking, Cesario Torres, Simeon G.
Rodriguez, Honofre Mangila and Simeon Bungay are found guilty as principals in the commission of the crime of simple
rebellion.
§ Rosario C. Vda. de Santos, Lamberto Magboo and Arturo Baking, Marciano de Leon and Pedro T. Vicencio is found
guilty as a participant in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion.
§ Marcos Medina is found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion
§ NO!!
§ Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. Decision is MODIFIED.
Ratio:
§ Nicanor Razon, Sr.: No sufficient evidence to show that he had performed any act, which would constitute a
cooperation in promoting the rebellion jointly undertaken by the CPP and the HMB. He is only a member of the CCP, as
secretary and treasurer.
§ Felipe Engreso: Was simply a houseboy of Federico Maclang. He did not know that he was dealing with communists
and was only following orders of his master.
§ Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz, Angel Baking, Cesario Torres, Simeon G.
Rodriguez, Honofre Mangila and Simeon Bungay are ALL high ranking officers of either CPP and HMB. They all
performed their duties and role in fulfilling the goals of the organization and sought for rebellion against the Philippine
gov’t. They were all LEADERS of the rebellion.
§ Rosario C. Vda. de Santos: only a staff member of the National Courier (or Communication) Division of the CPP, and
that she checked and made reports on the arrival and dispatch of couriers. She was merely executing the orders or
commands of others who are superior to her in the organizational set-up of the CPP. And since all this she did while CPP
went underground and HMB was already doing armed operations, she is still liable as a participant.
§ Lamberto Magboo: He is only a courier from the headquarters of the National Courier Division of the CPP in Manila
and was actually working and cooperating with the armed operations to overthrow the government. So still liable as a
participant.
§ Arturo Baking: He is a confirmed communist, and was in full sympathy with the armed struggle being promoted by the
leaders of the CPP and the HMB in order to overthrow the existing government of the Philippines. BUT he was only the
assistant of appellant Cesario Torres, who was entrusted with the publication and distribution of the official organs of
the CPP and the HMB, as well as of the printing and distribution of the documents of these two organizations. Being an
IMPORTANT RE Rebellion
Rebellion cannot be complexed with other crimes.
§ The crime of rebellion is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the purposes expressed in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in the first paragraph of Article 135. That
both purpose and overt acts are essential components of one crime, and that without either of them the crime of
rebellion legally does not exist.
US v Ravidas
DOCTRINE: No crime of misprision of rebellion” (US vs. Ravidas) *Misprision is only to treason
RAPE DIGESTS
c/o Hipolito
1. PEOPLE vs RICKY ALFREDO y NORMAN
G.R. No. 188560 December 15, 2010 VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations, the accusatory portions of which read:
o From April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, accused,
by means of force, intimidation and threats, have carnal knowledge with one [AAA], a thirty six (36)
year old woman, against her will and consent
o From April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian, Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, by means
of force, intimidation and threats, did commit an act of sexual assault by inserting a flashlight into the
vagina of one [AAA], a thirty six (36) year old woman, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
Pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Prosecution’s Version:
Oral testimonies of the victim, AAA; her 10-year old son, BBB; Ernesto dela Cruz; Police Officer 3 James Ruadap; and
Dr. Alma Ged-ang.
In March 2001, AAA, who was six months pregnant, went home to Butiyao, Benguet, along with her family, to harvest
the peppers planted in their garden.
On April 27, 2001, AAA and her son, BBB, returned to their sayote plantation in Cadian, Topdac, Atok, Benguet to
harvest sayote.
April 28, 2001, AAA had the harvested sayote transported to Baguio City. Later that night, she and her son stayed at
their rented shack and retired early to bed.
In the middle of the night, AAA was awakened by a beam of light coming from the gaps in the walls of the shack
directly illuminating her face.
She then inquired who the person was, but nobody answered. Instead, the light was switched off. After a few
minutes, the light was switched on again.
Thereafter, a male voice shouted, "Rumwar kayo ditta no saan kayo nga rumwar paletpeten kayo iti bala!" ("You
better come out if you will not come out I will riddle you with bullets.")
1.b. As between the statement made in an affidavit and that given in open court, the latter is superior
Material inconsistencies in the testimonies and affidavits: (1) whether accused-appellant’s penis was erect or not;
and (2) whether AAA indeed recognized accused-appellant when they were already on the mountain or while they
were still in the shack.
AAA testified in open court that accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina several times but was
unable to do so since his penis has already softened. On the other hand, AAA stated in her affidavit that "the suspect
ordered me to lay [sic] flatly on the ground and there he started to light and view my whole naked body while
removing his pant [sic] and tried to insert his pennis [sic] on [sic] my vagina but I wonder it does not erect [sic]."
There is no inconsistency between AAA’s testimony and her affidavit. The only difference is that she failed to
state in her affidavit that before accused-appellant unsuccessfully tried to insert his penis into AAA’s vagina,
he had already succeeded twice in penetrating her private organ.
There is likewise no incompatibility between AAA’s affidavit stating that she came to know of accused-appellant as
the culprit when they were on the mountain and his flashlight illuminated his face as he lay on top of her, and her
testimony that while they were still in the shack, AAA was "not then sure" but already suspected that her rapist was
accused-appellant "because of his hair." In other words, AAA was not yet sure whether accused-appellant was the
culprit while they were still in the shack, as she only became positively certain that it was him when the flashlight
illuminated his face while they were on the mountain.
Nevertheless, discrepancies do not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, for affidavits, being taken ex parte,
are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer or due
to partial suggestions, and are, thus, generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.
2. The validity of conviction is not adversely affected by the fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not
the one who heard the witnesses
The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous,
especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion. As this Court held in People v.
Competente: The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the
witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal of the Decision
would show that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that it was carefully studied, with
testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions from the Court carefully passed upon. Further, the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were extant and complete. Hence, there was no impediment
for the judge to decide the case.
4. Award of Damages must be modified. For rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the CA was
correct in awarding PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 50,000 as moral damages. However, for rape through
sexual assault under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Code, the award of damages should be PhP 30,000 as civil indemnity
and PhP 30,000 as moral damages.
People v. Cristobal that "for sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral
corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition then
of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the
public good is warranted."
Notably, there were instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the absence of an aggravating
circumstance.
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts award exemplary damages in criminal
cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended
the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information in accordance with Article 2230.
However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not
alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating
circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. x x x
However, Article 2230 must not only be ground for granting exemplary damages because it simply takes into
account the attendance of aggravating circumstance and not the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded.
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory
being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant
— associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness,
oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud — that intensifies the injury.
The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated September 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02135 finding accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified,
accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213 is ordered to pay PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral
damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214, accused-appellant is likewise
ordered to pay PhP 30,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 30,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether accused should be acquitted as AAA’s testimony is inconsistent and full of falsehoods?
2. Whether or not the actions of appellant on January 31, 1994 constitute acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape?
HELD:
1. No. The claim of appellant that he could not have raped AAA because his wife was still in the country during the
alleged period when the rape was committed is so flimsy that it does not deserve even the slightest consideration from
this Court.
o It has been oft said that lust is no respecter of time or place. Neither the crampness of the room, nor the
presence of other people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held sufficient and effective obstacle to
deter the commission of rape. There have been too many instances when rape was committed under circumstances
as indiscreet and audacious as a room full of family members sleeping side by side. There is no rule that a woman
can only be raped in seclusion.
o As to the contention of appellant that the testimony of AAA was barren of any statement that the former's penis was
inserted in the latter's vagina is not quite accurate. AAA categorically stated during her testimony that she was
raped. In her testimony, she stated that “He forced me and inserted his penis inside my vagina” and “he repeated his
acts”.
o As to inconsistency that she was merely wearing a towel and then she stated that she wore a T-shirt and shorts,
these were not inconsistent as there was a lapse of time between the first and the second rape. Likewise, when AAA
testified that she put on her t-shirt and panty, she was referring to the first time of the rape where, after ravishing
her, appellant untied her hands and left only to return to rape her once more. There was enough time for AAA to
dress up.
o Inconsistencies pointed out by appellant are minor ones which do not affect the credibility of AAA nor erase the fact
that the latter was raped. The inconsistencies are trivial and forgivable, since a victim of rape cannot possibly give an
exacting detail for each of the previous incidents, since these may just be but mere fragments of a prolonged and
continuing nightmare, a calvary she might even be struggling to forget. Moreover, a rape victim testifying in the
presence of strangers, face to face with her tormentor and being cross-examined by his hostile and intimidating
lawyer would be benumbed with tension and nervousness and this can affect the accuracy of her testimony.
However, considering her youth and her traumatic experience, ample margin of error and understanding should be
accorded to a young victim of a vicious crime like rape.
o In the disposition and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by these principles:
o first, the prosecution has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt or that degree
of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction;
o second, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence of the defense;
o third, unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial courts, especially regarding the credibility of
witnesses, are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal;
o fourth, an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; and,
o fifth, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution.
2. Yes, crime is not attempted rape but acts of lasciviousness as defined in RPC as elements are absent.
Attempted rape requires that:
o The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
o He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
o The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
o The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance
Appellant’s act of removing the towel wrapped in the body of AAA, laying her on the sofa and kissing and touching
her private parts does not exactly demonstrate the intent of appellant to have carnal knowledge on AAA on that
particular date.
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 32
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
Even so, the said acts should not be left unpunished as the elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness as defined
in RPC in relation to RA 7610, AAA being a minor when the incident happened, are present:
o That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness
o That is done (a) By using force and intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; (c) When the offended party is under 12 years of age
o That the offended party is another person of either sex.
o As defined in IRR of RA 7610: [T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
The actions of appellant on January 31, 1994, by definition, lascivious or lewd, and based on AAA’s testimony, the
intimidation from appellant was in existence and apparent.
Sec 5 of RA No7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child
engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law has it, intimidation need not
necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free
exercise of the will of the offended party
Accused can still be guilty of acts of lasciviousness even if not charged because it is necessarily included in rape.
Under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
DISPOSITIVE: CA Decision finding accused GUILTY of the crime of two (2) counts rape is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the same appellant is also GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness as defined in the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
(+reclusion perpetua for first 2 counts) and per previous ruling of this Court, must also indemnify the victim in the
amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages and pay a fine in the same amount.
CA: Convicted the appellant of simple rape under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, but reduced to P50,000.00 the civil indemnity to AAA
AAA’s minority cannot be appreciated as the prosecution failed to present the certificate of live birth or any other
authentic document to prove the age of AAA at the time of the commission of the offense.
It noted further that the appellant did not expressly admit AAA’s age. Instead, the appellate court appreciated force
and intimidation, noting that the appellant’s relationship to AAA had been proven by his own admission. It stressed
that in incestuous rape, the moral ascendancy of the accused over the victim takes the place of force and
intimidation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether statutory rape or simple rape because of lack of document to prove age (simple rape)
2. What is the applicable law? (RPC Art. 335 and not RPC 266-A)
HELD: CONVICTION AFFIRMED
1. CA properly convicted the appellant for simple rape whose penalty is reclusion perpetua.
An appellant can justifiably be convicted of rape based solely on the credible testimony of the victim. Nothing in the
records indicates to us that the RTC and the CA overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would
change the outcome of the case.
Agree with the CA that the appellant cannot be held liable for qualified, much less statutory, rape; the prosecution
failed to prove by independent evidence the age of AAA, much less the allegation that she was under the age of 12
when she was raped.
The appellate court properly appreciated force and intimidation. In rape committed by a close kin, such as the
victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation
2. Art 335 of RPC on simple rape must be applied. The CA held that the appellant was guilty of simple rape under
Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the crime was committed in 1991, i.e., prior to the passage of
the law imposing the death penalty for rape cases (Republic Act No. 7659: 1993) and prior to the new rape law
(Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997: 1997). The law then in place – Article 335 of the Revised Penal
5. People v Manuel Pruna or Erman Pruna G.R. No. 138471 October 10, 2002
FACTS:
Nature: Automatic review of RTC Bataan decision
Jan. 3, 1995: while 3-yr old Lizette Arabelle Gonzales was defecating at their neighbor’s backyard, a certain Manuel
“Boy” Pruna called him & placed her on his lap. Boy was then under the bridge, sniffing rugby & drinking alcohol
w/some friends. Boy later on brought her to a grassy area & raped her. Boy was later on arrested.
Boy’s counsel filed a motion to put him under psychiatric/mental exam claiming that he couldn’t get a coherent
answer from the accused. But the Nat’l Center for Mental Health issued a certification that he was in fair condition.
Prosecution witnesses:
Jacqueline Gonzales – Lizette’s mom who claims that she was fetching water from the artesian well when incident
happened. She claims she saw Lizette crying & the girl then narrated to her what happened & pulled her to Boy’s
house however accused was not home.
Lizette testified that she knew the accused & that he inserted his penis into her vagina as she was laid down in a
grassy area. She likewise testified that she knew that it was sin to tell a lie.
Dr. Emelita Quiroz – OG-Gyne who examined Lizette testified that girl’s vagina was positive for sperm cells w/c
signified that sexual intercourse took place.
Teresita Magtanob, med tech, corroborated Quiroz’ findings re sperm cells
SPO2 Romeo Bunsoy, PNP member on duty when Lizette reported incident. He conducted an ocular inspection of the
alleged place of incident & discovered that grasses were flattened. People in nearby areas likewise testified that they
saw Boy bring Lizette in that area.
Defense witnesses:
Carlito Bondoc – testified that Boy was at home during the time the incident occurred because he & Carlito were
having coffee.
Boy – denied having raped the girl. Alibi: he was in his house preparing coffee for Carlito.
RTC: convicted of qualified rape sentenced to death, thus automatic review.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON Lizette is a competent & credible witness considering that she was only 3 when raped & 5 during trial (YES)
Gen rule: when a witness takes a stand is to presume that he’s competent.
Burden: upon party objecting to competency to establish ground of incompetency.
Sec. 21, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence (ROE): kids whose mental maturity renders them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting w/c they’re examined & relating them truthfully are disqualified to be witnesses. No precise
minimum age is fixed.
Test of competency: Intelligence not age. As long as child can perceive & make known his perception to other & that
he’s capable of relating truthfully facts for w/c he’s examined. Consider child’s capacity : to receive correct
impressions during incident; to comprehend obligation of an oath; relate to those facts truthfully to the court at the
time he’s offered as a witness. Kid should understand the punishment w/c may result fr false swearing.
Determined by sound discretion of the court & such is respected unless found erroneous. In this case, Boy failed to
discharge burden of proving Lizette’s mental immaturity. RTC held that kid had capacity of observation, recollection
& communication & that she could discern the consequence of telling a lie. Two years lapse since time of incident is
immaterial considering that it’s a most nat. reaction for victims of crim’l violence to have a lasting impression of how
crime was committed & identity of aggressor.
2. WON Jacqueline’s testimony is hearsay? (NO)
Not covered by hearsay rule, Sec. 36, Rule 130, ROE w/c provides that a witness can testify only to those facts w/c he
knows of his personal knowledge except as otherwise provided by the ROC.
FACTS:
The victim in these cases is twenty-one (21) year old AAA. She contracted polio when she was seven (7) months old.
She was not able to study on account of her difficulty in walking. Hence, she could only read and write her name
including that of her friends
On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock (sic) in the early morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in Kalyeng
Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila along with her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when
Abello … mashed her breast.
Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m. Abello again mashed the breast of AAA practically under the same previous
situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the light
coming from outside which illuminated the house.
Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The latter
got awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA exclaimed “Aray” forcing the accused to
hurriedly enter his room. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. The victim on the same date reported the incident to
her sister-in-law and mother.
Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA, Abello interposed the defense of denial. In all of the
instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim at the sala on his way to his room after retiring
home..
3 INFORMATIONS:
on or about the 8th day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously putting his penis inside the mouth of said AAA,
against her will and without her consent.
That on or about the 30th day of June 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, a (sic) years old, and Polio Striken (sic),
with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
mashing her breast, against her will and without her consent.
That on or about the 2nd day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, a (sic) 21 years old, and Polio Striken (sic),
with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
mashing her breast, against her will and without her consent.
RTC: 1. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Paragraph 2, Article 226-A, Republic Act
[No.] 8353 (Anti Rape Law) and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Seven (7) Years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to Thirteen (13) Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum
2. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act [No.]
7610 (Child Abuse Act) and hereby sentences him in each of the two cases to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four
(4) Years of prision correctional (sic), as minimum, to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as maximum.
CA: affirmed Abello’s conviction on appeal but modified the penalties imposed.
1.In Criminal Case No. 19623-MN, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; Appellant is
further ordered to pay complainant, AAA, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each of the two cases
Issue: Whether or not, the court a quo erred in not absolving the accused-appellant of the crime.
Held: We note that both the RTC and CA found AAAs testimony to be positive, direct, and categorical, while the RTC
found the defenses version too strained to be believed for being contrary to human experience. A material point we
noted is that Abello could not say why AAA would falsely accuse him. The substance and tenor of the testimony and the
element of motivation are critical points for us since a straightforward, categorical and candid narration by the victim
The Penalty
The three Informations all alleged the stepfather-stepdaughter relationship between AAA and Abello.
Relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the RPC, as amended, and is an aggravating
circumstance in crimes against chastity and in rape.
This modifying circumstance, however, was not duly proven in the present case due to the prosecution’s failure to
present the marriage contract between Abello and AAA’s mother. If the fact of marriage came out in the evidence at
all, it was via an admission by Abello of his marriage to AAA’s mother.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January 3, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 23746 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS in that:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 19623, we find appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada GUILTY of rape by sexual assault
defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We sentence him to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. He is ORDERED to pay AAA P30,000.00 as civil liability; P30,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN, we find appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada GUILTY of 2 counts
of acts of lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. For each
count, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. He is further ORDERED to pay AAA the amounts of P20,000.00
as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages and P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, in each case.
FACTS:
On March 27, 2000, an Information for rape was filed against appellant which reads as follows: 6 th day of January
2000, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], five (5) years of age and his
grandniece by affinity thus sexual abuse prejudicial to the child’s development
On June 20, 2000, both parties stipulated during pre-trial that the victim AAA was a minor, being born on June 22,
1994
In the afternoon of January 6, 2000, AAA, then five (5) years old, was playing with her friends on the street outside
their house in Sto. Rosario Street, Mandaluyong City.
Appellant called AAA and brought her to his house, which was right next to AAA’s house. At the time, the house was
unoccupied. They went up to the second floor where appellant’s room is located. Inside his room, appellant began
removing AAA’s dress, shorts and panty. Appellant then removed his own clothes. He told AAA to lie on the bed, and
HELD: YES.
He contends that the trial court hastily disregarded his defense of denial, which was sufficient to absolve him in light
of the evidence on record. He emphasizes that the medico-legal officer testified that there were no signs of swelling
on the victim’s vagina when she was examined. Appellant further claims that the victim was coached to make false
accusations against him, considering that he was not in good terms with the victim’s grandmother
To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched
principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even
more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense
In the present case, AAA categorically testified that appellant directly inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her
to feel pain. AAA’s testimony specified the acts committed by appellant when he violated her on January 6, 2000,
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals are in agreement that AAA was categorical, straightforward, spontaneous,
convincing, clear and candid in her testimony. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness
In resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victim’s testimony. The settled rule
is that the trial court’s conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight
and respect, and at times even finality, unless there appear in the record certain facts or circumstances of weight and
value which the lower court overlooked or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result
of the case
Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial
court stood in a much better position to decide the question of credibility
Here, we note that no such facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended
or misinterpreted by the trial and appellate courts.
Appellant’s claim that the criminal complaint was filed against him because he was not in good terms with AAA’s
grandmother deserves scant consideration. The Court finds it incredible for AAA and her grandmother to trump up
charges of rape against appellant for the simple reason that they did not have a harmonious relationship. Well-
settled is the rule that testimonies of young victims of rape deserve full credence and should not be so easily
dismissed as a mere fabrication.
Moreover, it is highly improbable that BBB would allow her granddaughter to be exposed to the ridicule of a public
trial, if the charges were not true. We note that AAA has been in the custody of BBB since she was an infant, and who
treated her as if she were her own daughter. It was thus very unlikely that she would sacrifice her own
granddaughter, a child of tender years, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of a public trial for
rape, if she were not motivated by an honest desire to have her daughter’s transgressor punished accordingly
AAA was never sexually abused because the medico-legal findings showed that there were no signs of swelling on
the victim’s vagina when she was examined. Lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse. A freshly
broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. Even the fact that the hymen of the victim was still intact does not
rule out the possibility of rape. Research in medicine even points out that negative findings are of no significance, since the
hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus
any case, for rape to be consummated, full penetration is not necessary. Penile invasion necessarily entails contact
with the labia. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the
female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the
hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape
As to the penalty, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
o The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
o l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim;
ISSUES:
DIMA MONTANIR: Not beyond reasonable doubt
HELD:
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act No. 7659, Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, now provides:
Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
o 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
o 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
o 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained;
or if threats to kill him shall have been made
o 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping
with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases
where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing
of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art.
267, as amended by RA No. 7659.
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single
penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime.
As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this
provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a
special complex crime.
It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a "direct relation, and
intimate connection” between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be considered
merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the herein special
complex crime
"Where the person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely
sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed
under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under
ISSUES:
1. Whether tHE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
2. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES THAT THE VICTIM WAS FORCIBLY TAKEN AND DEPRIVED OF HIS LIBERTY UNDER RESTRAINT
AND AGAINST HIS WILL AND CONSENT.
3. Whether COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THE ALLEGATION OF MINORITY OF
THE VICTIM.
o Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of all the elements of the crime charged. In
particular, the defense contends that there is no evidence to show that the victim was deprived of his liberty.
HELD: AFFIRM CONVICTION
o The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are:
1. the offender is a private individual;
2. he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
3. the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
ISSUES:
For Lando
1. Whether CONSPIRACY EXISTED BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ALLEGED PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIME.
2. Whether accused should be convicted of homicide instead of murder
3. Whether the penalty of death should be imposed for THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING/SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION,
AGGRAVATED BY RAPE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS NOT DULY PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
For AI
1. Whether there was conspiracy
2. Whether death should be applied as he did not participate in aggravating RAPE
In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:
Circumstantial Evidence
o The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the early morning of
May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution adduced sufficient
circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
o Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main
fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
o A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form
an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the perpetrator.]
o Testimony of witnesses. In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter
“Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan.” (Our agreement is that whoever comes our way should be
eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his
participation as lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA
and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond.
o Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the
Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim
and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates
that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth
was also found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.
o In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a
clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and
brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.
Conspiracy EXISTS
o Prior to the commission of the crime, the group met at the landing field in Carmen, Pangasinan and discussed their
plan to rob the house of the Estrellas with the agreement that whoever comes their way will be eliminated
o Appellant Al served as a lookout by posting himself across the house of the Estrellas with the task of reporting any
movements outside. Fred then climbed the old unserviceable gate of the Estrella compound and then opened the
small door and the rest of the group entered the house of the Estrellas through that opening
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 58
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
o After almost an hour inside the house, they left on board a vehicle with AAA and Sulpacio. AAA and Sulpacio were
brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. In that place, Sulpacio was killed and AAA was
brought to another place and deprived of her liberty.
o These circumstances establish a community of criminal design between the malefactors in committing the
crime. Clearly, the group conspired to rob the house of the Estrellas and kill any person who comes their way. The
killing of Sulpacio was part of their conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of arming himself with a gun constitutes direct
evidence of a deliberate plan to kill should the need arise.
o Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was only forced to participate in the
commission of the crime because he and his family were threatened to be killed. NO IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
NOR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the
evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and
(3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress,
force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.
o There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that he was under duress from his co-
accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability. The
evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and directed to station himself across the house of the
Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m of the following day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the
landing field.
o Thus, while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to a real,
imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay across the house of the Estrellas for almost six (6) hours
and thereafter returned to the landing field where the group was waiting for his report. Subsequently, the group
proceeded to the Estrellas’ house.
o When the group entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his companions. Later,
when the group left the house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them in going to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome,
Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and AAA
o Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he wished to, but he never did. Neither did he request for
assistance from the authorities or any person passing by the house of the Estrellas during the period he was
stationed there.
o Clearly, Al did not make any effort to perform an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to
commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof that would exempt himself from criminal
Alibi and Denial WEAK DEFENSES
LANDO.
o He claims that at the time of the incident he was in his house at Tarlac, together with his family. On the other hand,
the appellants were positively identified by AAA, as two (2) of the six (6) malefactors who forcibly took her and
Sulpacio from the Estrella house in the early morning of May 7, 2002. Both the trial court and the CA found the
testimony of AAA credible.
o As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at the time of the
incident, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible for Lando to be at the scene of the
crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime
was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
o Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime
transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.
Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail. During
the trial of the case, Lando testified that the distance between his house in Brgy. Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac to the
town of Rosales, Pangasinan is only around forty (40) kilometers. Such distance can be traversed in less than 30
minutes using a private car and when the travel is continuous.
o Thus, it was not physically impossible for the appellant Lando to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. In
addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such
identification is credible and categorical
Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery, premeditation/// superior strength absorbed
Alejandro v Bernas
JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, CARMINA A. ABBAS and MA. ELENA GO FRANCISCO
vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. BERNAS, ATTY. MARIE LOURDES SIA-BERNAS, FERNANDO AMOR, EDUARDO AGUILAR, JOHN DOE and
PETER DOE
[G.R. No. 179243. September 7, 2011.]
PERALTA, J p:
FACTS:
Alejandro is the lessee-purchaser of condominium unit No. 2402 (the Unit), 4th Floor, Discovery Center
Condominium in Pasig City under the Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase with the lessor-seller Oakridge
Properties, Inc. (OPI).
On October 15, 2000, Alejandro sub-leased the Unit to the other petitioners Firdausi I.Y. Abbas (Firdausi), Carmina
M. Alejandro-Abbas (Carmina) and Ma. Elena Go Francisco (Ma. Elena) to be used as a law office.
However, a defect in the air-conditioning unit prompted petitioners to suspend payments until the problem is
fixed by the management.
Instead of addressing the defect, OPI instituted an action for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Pasig City, against Alejandro for the latter's failure to pay rentals.
Alejandro, for his part, interposed the defense of justified suspension of payments.
In the meantime, the Discovery Center Condominium Corporation (DCCC) was organized to administer the Discovery
Center Condominium independent of OPI. Respondent Fernando Amor (Amor) was appointed as the Property
Manager of DCCC.
During the pendency of the ejectment case, or on June 10, 2004, OPI, allegedly through respondent Atty. Marie
Lourdes Sia-Bernas (Sia-Bernas), ordered that the Unit be padlocked.
In an Order 8 dated June 11, 2004, the MeTC directed OPI to remove the padlock of the Unit and discontinue the
inventory of the properties. The order was reiterated when the MeTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order in
favor of Alejandro.
However, on August 11, 2004, at 8:00 in the evening, OPI, allegedly through respondent Atty. Jose Bernas, again
padlocked the Unit. The padlocking was allegedly executed by Amor, as property manager, and respondent Eduardo
Aguilar (Aguilar) as head of the security unit, together with security officers John Doe and Peter Doe.
Respondents, likewise, cut off the electricity, water and telephone facilities on August 16, 2004.
On August 17, 2004, the MeTC rendered a Decision in the ejectment case in favor of Alejandro and against OPI.
The court found Alejandro's suspension of payment justified.
The decision was, however, reversed and set aside by the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was in turn
affirmed by the CA.
On October 27, 2004, petitioners filed a criminal complaint for grave coercion against respondents Bernas, Sia-
Bernas, Amor, Aguilar, Peter Doe and John Doe with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig.
o Petitioners claimed that the padlocking of the Unit was illegal, felonious and unlawful which prevented
them from entering the premises.
o Petitioners also alleged that said padlocking and the cutting off of facilities had unduly prejudiced them
and thus constituted grave coercion.
In their Counter-Affidavit, Bernas and Sia-Bernas averred that the elements of grave coercion were not alleged and
proven by petitioners. They also claimed that nowhere in petitioners' complaint was it alleged that respondents
employed violence which is an essential element of grave coercion.
o In addition to the above defenses, Amor and Aguilar maintained that petitioners did not allege that the
former actually prevented the latter to enter the Unit. They added that petitioners in fact gained
access to the Unit by forcibly destroying the padlock.
On March 22, 2005, the OCP issued a Resolution, respondents Fernando Amor and Eduardo Aguilar are charged
with unjust vexation and the attached information be filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. Bail is
not necessary unless required by the Court.
The charges against respondents Jose Bernas and Marie Lourdes Sia-Bernas is dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
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o The OCP held that respondents could not be charged with grave coercion as no violence was employed by
the latter. In padlocking the leased premises and cutting off of facilities, respondents Amor and Aguilar were
found to be probably guilty of the crime of unjust vexation
Appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the appeal was dismissed for their failure to
comply with Section 12, paragraph (b) of Department Circular No. 70.
o The DOJ Secretary, acting through Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda, explained that petitioners failed to
submit a legible true copy of the joint counter-affidavit of some of the respondents.
o Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution 24 dated April 3, 2006.
Notwithstanding the DOJ's conclusion that respondents cannot be charged with grave coercion, it ordered the filing
of information for unjust vexation against Amor, the Property Manager of DCCC and Aguilar as head of the security
division
Elevated the matter to the CA that rendered the assailed Decision 25 on May 23, 2007.
o On whether or not there was probable cause for the crime of grave coercion, the CA answered in the
negative.
o It held that the mere presence of the security guards was insufficient to cause intimidation.
Petitioners claim that there is sufficient evidence on record to prove the fact of padlocking and cutting off of facilities
thereat.
o They insist that the allegations and evidence presented in the Joint Affidavit-Complaint are sufficient to
sustain a finding of probable cause for grave coercion irrespective of any defense that may be put up by
respondents.
o Although violence was not present during the commission of the acts complained of, there was sufficient
intimidation by the mere presence of the security guards.
Respondents do not agree with petitioners that the mere presence of security guards constituted intimidation
amounting to grave coercion and insist that there is no legal impediment to cause the padlocking and repossession of
the Unit as a valid exercise of proprietary right under the contract of lease.
ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE COERCION CAN BE COMMITTED THROUGH INTIMIDATION ALONE BY MERE PRESENCE
WITHOUT VIOLENCE? NO. BUT UNJUST VEXATION
HELD:
For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:
1. that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2. that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and
3. that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the
restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
Admittedly, respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the electricity, water and telephone facilities. Petitioners
were thus prevented from occupying the Unit and using it for the purpose for which it was intended, that is, to be
used as a law office.
At the time of the padlocking and cutting off of facilities, there was already a case for the determination of the rights
and obligations of both Alejandro, as lessee and OPI as lessor, pending before the MeTC. There was in fact an order
for the respondents to remove the padlock. Thus, in performing the acts complained of, Amor and Aguilar
had no right to do so.
NO VIOLENCE. The problem, however, lies on the second element. A perusal of petitioners' Joint Affidavit-Complaint
shows that petitioners merely alleged the fact of padlocking and cutting off of facilities to prevent the petitioners
from entering the Unit. For petitioners, the commission of these acts is sufficient to indict respondents of grave
coercion. It was never alleged that the acts were effected by violence, threat or intimidation. Petitioners belatedly
alleged that they were intimidated by the presence of security guards during the questioned incident.
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause intimidation to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
Material violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind of the victim
which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient.
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In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the presence of
security guardsIt was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it
alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of petitioners.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.
Here, the petitioners, who were allegedly intimidated by the guards, are all lawyers who presumably know
their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by petitioners to be significant because they failed to
mention it in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them
from using it for the purpose for which it was intended. This, according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the
part of respondents
In Sy, the respondents therein, together with several men, armed with hammers, ropes, axes, crowbars and other
tools, arrived at the complainants' residence and ordered them to vacate the building because they were going to
demolish it. Intimidated by respondents and their demolition team, complainants were prevented from peacefully
occupying their residence and were compelled to leave against their will. Thus, respondents succeeded in
implementing the demolition, while complainants watched helplessly as their building was torn down. The Court
thus found that there was prima facie showing that complainants were intimidated and that there was probable
cause for the crime of grave coercion.
Barbasa v. Tuquero applies. In Barbasa, the lessor, together with the head of security and several armed guards,
disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied by the complainants-lessees because of the latter's failure to pay
the back rentals. The Court held that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce
intimidation upon the lessees' employees when the cutting off of electricity was effected. On the contrary, the
Court found that it was done peacefully and that the guards were there not to intimidate them but to prevent any
untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of the lessor's right under the contract.
In the crime of grave coercion, violence through material force or such a display of it as would produce
intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party is an essential ingredient.
Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.
UNJUST VEXATION.
o The second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code which defines and provides for the penalty of
unjust vexation is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some
physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person.
o Nevertheless, Amor and Aguilar may disprove petitioners' charges but such matters may only be determined
in a full-blown trial on the merits where the presence or absence of the elements of the crime may be
thoroughly passed upon
The court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to the determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial
determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction.
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial.
[Probable cause] is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or
positive cause"; nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge
HELD: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Barbasa v Tuquero
ROBERTO BARBASA
vs.
HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO, DOJ Sec, GRACE GUARIN, NESTOR SANGALANG
[G.R. No. 163898. December 23, 2008.]
FACTS:
Petitioner avers that he is the president of Push-Thru Marketing, Inc., which leases commercial stalls CS-PL 05, 19
and 30 in Tutuban Center, owned by Tutuban Properties,
On June 30, 1999, Angelina Hipolito, merchandising officer of Push-Thru Marketing, received a notice of
HELD: NO.
o The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not
prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention
or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation
and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and
liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the
exercise of any lawful right.
o The records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce intimidation upon
petitioner's employees when the cutting off of petitioner's electricity was effected.
o On the contrary, it was done peacefully and after written notice to petitioner was sent.
o The guards were there to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of TPI's
rights under the lease agreements. If the respondents desired a violent result, they would have gone there
unannounced or cut petitioner's electricity through less desirable and conspicuous means
o There could be no grave coercion in the private respondents' act of exercising in behalf of TPI a right afforded
to TPI under the solemn and unequivocal covenants of a contract to which petitioner had agreed and which he did
execute and sign.
o Penalty clause in the Contracts of Lease entered into by the parties that TPI is given the option to cut off
power and other utility services in petitioner's stalls in case petitioner fails to pay at any time
o Contracts constitute the law between the parties. They must be read together and interpreted in a
manner that reconciles and gives life to all of them. The intent of the parties, as shown by the clear
language used, prevails over post facto explanations that find no support from the words employed by the
parties or from their contemporary and subsequent acts showing their understanding of such contracts.
o We could not see how the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan, could have
made a finding of probable cause to file a criminal case for grave coercion against private respondents, in light of
the evidence then and now prevailing, which will show that there was a mutual agreement, in a contract of lease,
that provided for the cutting off of electricity as an acceptable penalty for failure to abide faithfully with what has
been covenanted.
o Although the propriety of its exercise may be the subject of controversy, mere resort to it may not so readily expose
the lessor TPI to a charge of grave coercion. Considering that petitioner owed TPI the total amount of more than P5
million, which was undisputed, we find that the resort to the penalty clause under the lease agreements was
justified.
o A penal clause is "an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of
insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally consisting in the
payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled."
o Quite common in lease contracts, this clause functions to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and to
provide, in effect, for what could be the liquidated damages resulting from a breach. There is nothing immoral or
illegal in such indemnity/penalty clause, absent any showing that it was forced upon or fraudulently foisted on the
obligor.
DISPOSITIVE: DENIED.
Sy v Secretary of Justice
ALFREDO SY for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of GONZALO SY, VERONICA SY, ROSARIO SY, MANUEL SY and JOSE SEE
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, LEON MARIA MAGSAYSAY and ENG'R. EMMANUEL LALIN
[G.R. No. 166315. December 14, 2006.]
FACTS:
1985, Dolores F. Posadas, through respondent, Leon Maria F. Magsaysay, as her attorney-in-fact, filed an ejectment
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case against them to recover a parcel of land in Paco, Manila consisting of approximately 8,295 sq.m.
Several structures stand on the land including their post-war built building which has served as their family
residence with a small sari-sari store. The trial court thereafter ruled in favor of Dolores F. Posadas.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the trial court's decision. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter
court set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissed the complaint.
However, during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, respondent Leon Maria F. Magsaysay obtained
from the office of the Building Official of Manila a Notice of Condemnation dated February 8, 1996.
In response, the [petitioners] caused the assessment of the structural soundness of their residence. Consequently, on
February 20, 1996, a Certificate of Structural Inspection was issued by a licensed engineer, certifying to the general
integrity of the structure which merely needed minor repairs.
In October, 1997, the [petitioners] received a letter from the Office of the Building Official informing them that
respondent Leon Maria F. Magsaysay had requested for the condemnation of certain structures, including the
structure owned by [petitioners]. The [petitioners] were directed to submit their Answer/Comment and supporting
papers.
A scheduled ocular inspection of the property was deferred at the instance of [petitioners'] counsel. Subsequently, an
order of demolition dated February 3, 1998 was issued by Manila Building Official Hermogenes B. Garcia, on the
basis of a Resolution dated February 3, 1998 issued by a committee created to act on the letter dated October 13,
1997 of respondent Leon Maria Guerrero.
The [petitioners] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order with the Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH). The complainants also obtained a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the order of
demolition.
In the morning of August 28, 1998, respondent Emmanuel T. Lalin, together with several men with hammers,
ropes, axes and crowbars, arrived at the complainants' residence and over their protests, demolished the
building which served as their family residence and sari-sari store.
The [petitioners] contend that the respondents' act of demolishing their building without any legal authority to do so
is an act of grave coercion, punishable under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, respondent Leon Ma. Magsaysay, in his counter affidavit, avers that he is one of the co-owners of
the land located at the corner of Pedro Gil and A. Isip Sts., Paco, Manila as evidenced by TCT Nos. 216323 and
216327. He further avers that the demolition of the [petitioners'] structure was based on the lawful order of the
City Building Official of Manila and affirmed by the DPWH.
Respondent Civil Engineer Emmanuel T. La[l]in, for his part, also avers that the demolition was undertaken pursuant
to a duly-issued demolition order and that he was only hired by respondent Leon Maria Magsaysay to implement
the same.
The City Prosecutor of Manila dismissed the complaint for grave coercion for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Justice but same was denied, finding that the demolition was carried
out pursuant to a duly issued demolition order.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which denied the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners alleged that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause for the filing of an
information for grave coercion against respondents and that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in
holding otherwise.
Respondents argued that the determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation is an executive
function, the correctness of which is a matter that the courts may not be compelled to pass upon. At any rate, they
claim that the Secretary of Justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that the complaint for grave coercion is
without merit.
ISSUES: Whether there is probable cause for the filing of an information against respondents Magsaysay and Lalin for
the offense of grave coercion? YES.
HELD:
The elements of grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: 1) that a person is
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be
it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and 3) that
the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is
not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
It is undisputed that on August 28, 1998, respondents, together with several men armed with hammers, ropes, axes,
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crowbars and other tools arrived at the petitioners' residence and ordered them to vacate the building because they
were going to demolish it.
Petitioners tried to stop respondents from proceeding with the demolition but their pleas went unheeded.
Intimidated by respondents and their demolition team, petitioners were prevented from peacefully occupying their
residence and were compelled to leave against their will.
Thus, respondents succeeded in implementing the demolition while petitioners watched helplessly as their
building was torn down.
From the facts alleged in the complaint, as well as the evidence presented in support thereof, there is prima facie
showing that respondents did not act under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
Respondent Magsaysay claimed that the demolition was carried out by the Office of the Building Official, which is
tasked to implement the National Building Code.
We note, however, that respondent Lalin admitted in his Counter-Affidavit that he was hired by Magsaysay to
implement the Demolition Order. The building officials made manifestations before the trial court in Civil
Case No. 98-87513 that they were not aware of the demolition and that respondent Lalin is not connected
with their office. They also denied conspiring with respondent Magsaysay in effecting the demolition.
Likewise, the Office of the Building Official issued an Order 13 dated August 28, 1998 directing respondent
Magsaysay to desist from proceeding with the demolition. On the same date, it also issued a Notice advising
respondent Lalin to stop the demolition for failing to comply with the 5-day prior notice requirement and
considering that the demolition was being effected within the 15-day reglementary period for appeal.
In another Order dated September 10, 1998, the Office of the Building Official declared that the demolition was
hastily done and in contravention of the terms and conditions of the Demolition Order.
Indeed, while respondents claim to have acted under authority of law in compelling petitioners to vacate the
subject property and effecting the demolition, the documentary evidence show otherwise.
From the records, it is clear that a prima facie case for grave coercion exists and that there is sufficient ground to
sustain a finding of probable cause which needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Nevertheless, respondents may disprove petitioners' charges but such matters may only be determined in a full-
blown trial on the merits where the presence or absence of the elements of the crime may be thoroughly passed
upon.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is
such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe
or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause;" nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that
it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the
reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
While it is this Court's general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the
investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, courts are nevertheless empowered to
substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the same was rendered without or in excess of
authority.
ESTAFA DIGESTS
c/o HIPOLITO
FACTS:
The appellants Galicano Alon (alias Grego), and Ricardo Cabrales (alias Maning), together with Tomas Manansala,
Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza, were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the crime of estafa.
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A week prior to February 19, 1932, 'Grego' (Alon) and 'Maning' (Cabrales) in company with another person whom they
called 'Pepe' offered to sell Attorney Perfecto Abordo 17,000 tins of opium at P1.50 each telling him that he could sell
them for P10 a tin.
For profit, Abordo agreed to buy the merchandise, and the accused agreed to sell it to him in lots of 1,000 tins at P600
lot. Delivery of 1,000 tins would take place at 5.30 p. m., at the corner of Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz.
February 19, 1932: Abordo went to the place indicated with the money, and there waited for them. Alon arrived alone in
an automobile and invited Abordo to go with him to the place where the 1,000 tins of opium were kept.
Trusting Alon, who always called Abordo 'brother' because he claimed to be a Mason like Mr. Abordo, the latter went
with him in his automobile to the rotunda of Rizal Avenue Extension. Chauffeur Jose Jonsay was at the wheel.
It was already twilight when they arrived at the rotunda, and there they met Maning (Cabrales), who, in company with
others, was waiting for Abordo in another automobile. The accused Cabrales alighted and shortly thereafter appeared
Pepe who was ordered by Cabrales to get the tins of opium.
Pepe got from a lot nearby, the can, the top of which was opened by Cabrales in order to show Abordo the 6 tins of
opium contained in a wooden box which Abordo saw when the top of said can was opened.
Finding that said tins really contained opium, Abordo believed that the rest of the contents of the can also consisted of
tins of opium. He handed the P600 to Maning, who, after receiving the money, immediately went to the automobile
where his companions were waiting.
At the same time Abordo returned to his car with the accused Alon and the person named Pepe, carrying the can.
While proceeding towards Taft Avenue Extension, Abordo noticed that the accused Cabrales was following in his
automobile, and that when they were nearing the corner of Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz the car in which
Cabrales was riding attempted to block Abordo's way, while Alon told Abordo that those in the other automobile were
constabulary men and it would be better to get rid of the can.
Cabrales, whom Abordo was able to recognize very well, and the companions of the former whom Abordo was not able
to identify because it was already dark, approached his car saying that they were constabulary agents and told Abordo
that he was under arrest.
Knowing that they were not constabulary agents and that their purpose was to get possession of the can, Abordo drew
his revolver and ordered his chauffeur to proceed.
Cabrales and his companions again followed him in their car and for the second time tried to head off Abordo
somewhere before the intersection of F. B. Harrison and Vito Cruz streets, but Abordo proceeded until he arrived at his
house. There he opened the can and inside he found the wooden box, but the rest of the contents of the can was sand.
He bore a hole in one of the tins and found that it only contained molasses.
Defense (Testimony of accused and Miguel Rosales-> convicted 12x for estafa):
o Abordo engaged Cabrales, through the intervention of Rosales, to prepare 1,000 tins of molasses resembling
tins of opium, and that on the afternoon agreed upon for the payment, Abordo refused to deliver the money
because purchaser of said tins had not arrived, and invited the accused to his house in Pasay in order to make
the payment
o Before arriving in Pasay, Cabrales stopped Abordo's automobile and required the latter to hand over the
money, at the same time placing at the side of Abordo's automobile a sack which he said contained the 1,000
tins of molasses asked for by Abordo.
Information: In the municipalities of Pasay and Caloocan, Province of Rizal, within two and a half miles from the city
limits, the said accused conspiring together defraud Perfecto Abordo:
o by means of false and fraudulent representations to Abordo that they had for sale six hundred (600) tins of
opium, a prohibited drug, and that they would deliver the same to him upon paying them P600 in advance
o and by means of other similar deceit, induced the said Perfecto Abordo to give and deliver to them, as in fact he
gave and delivered to them, the said sum of P600,
o in consideration of which the accused gave him a gasoline can which they represented to contain the 600 tins
of opium, when in truth, as the said accused well knew, the said can contained only six small tin cans
containing a black substance which was not opium,
o Tomas Manansala and Galicano Alon have each once been convicted of the crime of estafa
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o Habitual Delinquents: Ricardo Cabrales (1x convicted for robbery, theft 1x, 3x for estafa, last sentence: Feb. 4,
1927) and Isidro Mendoza (1x estafa and 1x robbery, last sentence: October 30, 1922)
Information was dismissed as to Tomas Manansala, Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza for lack of evidence
RTC: Galicano Alon and Ricardo Cabrales guilty of estafa, in accordance with the provisions of article 354. No. 2, of the
Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3244
o PENALTY: four months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties + indemnify P600
ISSUES: Whether or not estafa was committed even though there was illegal consideration? Yes.
HELD:
Estafa as defined in article 315, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that any person who shall
defraud another through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence by altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything
of value which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an
immoral or illegal consideration.
PENALTY: The amount of the fraud being P600, the penalty applicable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period.
ALON: Recidivist as he had already been convicted of estafa -> PENALTY: maximum period (one year, eight months,
and one day of prision correccional)
CABRALES: Habitual delinquent, but his prior convictions cannot be taken into consideration also as an aggravating
circumstance for the purpose of increasing the principal penalty. PENALTY: medium (one year and one day of prision
correccional + additional penalty of eleven years, six months, and twenty-one days of prision mayor bec. Habitual
delinquent)
SolGen mistaken that medium degree of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods based upon the idea that
only the prior convictions of this appellant for estafa are to be taken into account.
All prior convictions of any of the crimes of theft, robbery, estafa, or falsification should be taken into account when a
person is convicted of any one of these crimes and of being a habitual delinquent. To hold otherwise, a person might be
twice convicted of each of these four crimes, and still not be a habitual delinquent.
FACTS:
Information: Charged with the crime of estafa:
o December 10, 1910, in Cavite
o Accused entered the bicycle renting establishment, named 'Ligaya," located in Plaza Soledad in Cavite,
pretended that his name was Jose de los Santos and that he lived at No. 111 Calle Paseo, and rented from the
proprietor of said establishment, named Leoncio Pangilinan, an Iver Johnson bicycle, No. 169787, with the
private marks No. 10 and the initials L. P.,
o Agreeing to the sum of 50 centavos an hour, and to return it after one hour; but having taken away said bicycle
he did not return it at the time agreed or pay the rental thereof,
o Against the will of its owner take possession of it for himself and for the sake of gain, keeping it in his
possession until January 29, 1911, when the said bicycle was found in the possession of the said accused in
the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, P. I."
During trial, evidence put forth that tricycle was valued at P75 or 375 pesetas
TC: Guilty of Estafa as charged and defined and penalized in section 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code, read together
with section 1 of article 534. Convicted the defendant of the misappropriation or conversion of property of the value of
more than 250 and less than 6,000 pesetas.
Defense:
o Since the information fails expressly to allege that the bicycle in question had a specific definite value, and to
set forth just what that value was, a judgment of conviction upon this information should not be sustained.
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o Erred in convicting the defendant of the misappropriation or conversion of property of the value of more than
250 and less than 6,000 pesetas. (No value alleged)
ISSUES:
1. Whether Abad should be convicted of estafa even though the specific value of the object was not alleged in the
information? (YES)
2. Whether the TC erred in convicting the defendant of the misappropriation or conversion of property of the value of more
than 250 and less than 6,000 pesetas? (YES)
HELD:
1. Yes. Mere omission of an allegation of the specific value of the bicycle mentioned in the information did not render it
fatally defective, because the facts alleged in the complaint, when proven, establish beyond any reasonable doubt that the
bicycle had some value.
o It is true that a conviction of the crime of estafa cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that the subject matter of
the fraud perpetrated by the accused had some value, and while in good practice a complaint or information charging
the commission of the crime of estafa should specifically allege the monetary value of the subject matter of the fraud
where that is possible. However, specific value is not necessary, it is necessary that the facts allege that it has some
value.
o Estafa: Bicycle was personal property of some value is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the provisions of
subsection 1 of article 534, which prescribes the penalty to be imposed where the value of the subject matter of the
fraud is not shown to be in excess of 250 pesetas
o Bicycle in question had some value (agreed to rent it for 50 cents/hr)
o It was the personal property of the complaining witness (in use in Pangilinan’s bicycle renting establishment)
o Bicycle had been converted or misappropriated by the defendant
o U.S. vs. De la Cruz: Defendant was convicted of the crime of robbery of a watch, the specific value of which was not set
out expressly in the complaint.
o "Since the crime of robbery is complete when all the other requisites set out in the definition of the code concur,
if the property taken has even the smallest value, we think we would be justified in holding that the watch taken
had sufficient value to sustain a conviction of robbery, unless it affirmatively appeared that it was absolutely
worthless, for without testimony to the contrary a watch, which the owner valued enough to carry, may fairly be
presumed to have some value, however insignificant that value may be."
2. Yes. Trial court erred in convicting the defendant of the misappropriation or conversion of property of the value of more
than 250 and less than 6,000 pesetas.
o Information does not charge that the value of the property taken was more than 250 and less than 6,000 pesetas
although its allegations amount to a charge that a bicycle of some value was taken. No case can a conviction be
sustained for a higher offense than that charged in the information, nor for a different offense, unless it is necessarily
included in the offense charged. It is manifest therefore that the conviction in this case for the higher offense must be
reversed.
o It is true that the witnesses testified that the bicycle in question was worth some P75 (or 375 pesetas), and that, if this
testimony could be taken into consideration for the purpose of classifying the estafa committed by the defendant with
those penalized under the provisions of subsection 2 of article 534, the judgment of conviction should not be disturbed.
o However, the testimony cannot cure its not being alleged in the information because:
o It is in direct conflict with the general rule convictions were not sustained for higher offenses than those charged
in the information, which has its foundation in the constitutional right of the accused to be advised at the outset
of the proceedings as to the precise nature of the charge against him;
o Timely objection was made to the introduction of the evidence as to the specific value of the bicycle, and under
elementary rules of evidence, the testimony in this connection should have been excluded, at least in so far as
it was offered for the purpose of establishing a higher or a different offense from that charged in the complaint.
Dispositive: TC Reversed. Still GUILTY OF ESTAFA but that defined and penalized in section 5 of article 535 of the Penal
Code, read together with section 1 of article 534, and there being no evidence as to the existence of aggravating or
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extenuating circumstances, we sentence him to the prescribed penalty in its medium degree, that is to say, to two months
and one day of arresto mayor
Facts:
February 20, 1920: three Igorots named Jose II, Balatan, and Pepe were on the Escolta, of this city, trying to dispose of
a bar of gold when an Ilocano invited them to go to his house, stating that there was a woman there who would buy the
precious metal.
They accompanied the Ilocano to the house indicated by him where they met a woman, the accused herein, who
apparently, was desirous of buying the gold and requested them to hand it to her so that she might take it to a
silversmith and have it examined, stating that she would return within a short time to report the result.
The Igorot Pepe, who was the owner of the bar of gold, handed it to her, together with P200 in bank notes which he
requested to her to have changed into silver coins as they were more desirable in the Mountain Province.
The woman then left the house at about 12 o'clock on that day, asking the Igorots to wait there. But the woman did not
return. They waited in vain for hours for her and at nightfall they agreed that one of them should remain on watch while
the other two went to the Meisic police station to report the matter.
The police acted promptly and effectively. The policeman Jose Gonzales, assigned to take charge of the case, soon
identified the woman who had taken away the bar of gold, by the description which the Igorots had given him, and at a
few minutes after 11 o'clock he already was in a house on Calle Barcelona, examining the accused as to the
whereabouts of the bar of gold and the bank notes of the Igorots.
As the woman gave evasive answers, it became necessary to ask for assistance from the office of the police, and
shortly thereafter, two other policemen, Mr. Abbot and one Ronas, arrived, who took the woman to the house at No. 541
Calle Regidor, followed by Gonzales and the three Igorots. There the bar of gold divided into three pieces was found
wrapped in a handkerchief and placed inside the water tank of a water-closet. The accused requested one Mamerta de
la Rosa to let her have P150 which she in turn handed to the policeman.
A certificate issued by the Bureau of Science show that the bar of gold delivered to the accused weighed 559.7
grammes and was worth P587.68 at the rate of P1.05 per gramme; whereas, the three bars found by the police
weighed only 416 grammes, and were therefore, 143.7 grammes short. Of the P200 bank notes delivered to the
accused, she returned only P150.
Information:
o Nieves de Vera and John Doe (the latter name is fictitious, his true name being unknown) of the crime of theft
committed as follows:
o February 20, 1920, in the city of Manila, the said accused conspiring and through craft, take and carry away,
with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner, a gold bar weighing 559.7 grams and worth P587.68,
and P200 in bank notes of different denominations, to the damage and prejudice of Pepe (Igorot), owner of the
bar and money aforementioned, in the total sum of P787.68, Philippine currency, equivalent to 3,938.4 pesetas.
TC: Guilty of the crime of theft punished in article 518, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, without any circumstance
modifying the liability, and sentenced her to eight months and twenty-one days of prison correccional, to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P201,20, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
Defense:
o Evidence does not establish the essential elements of theft, the crime charged in the information, but those of
the crime of estafa.
o She cannot be convicted for this crime for the reason that the information upon which she was arraigned was
for the crime of theft, the essential elements of which are different from those of estafa, he recommends the
remanding of the case to the court of origin for proper proceeding in accordance with law.
o Goods appropriated were not taken by the accused without the consent of the owner who had delivered them to
her voluntarily, and this element being lacking, it cannot be the crime of theft.
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o When the things were received and then appropriated or converted to one's own use without the consent of the
owner, the crime committed is not that of theft
ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by the accused falls under theft or estafa? (Theft)
HELD:
o Essential elements of the crime of theft:
o Taking of personal property
o Property belongs to another
o Taking away be done with intent of gain
o Taking away be done without consent of the owner
o Taking away be accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.
o Viada: Getting possession, laying hold of the thing, so that if the things were not taken away, but received and then
appropriated or converted without the consent of the owner, it may be any other crime, that of estafa for instance, but in
no way that of theft, which consists in the taking away of the thing, that is, in removing it from the place where it is kept
by the legal owner, without the latter's consent, of the legitimate owner.
o GEN RULE: Purchase and sale perfect upon agreement on goods to be sold and price and title transfers to
purchaser
o EXCEPTION: If goods sold are the kind which are usually tried, measured, or weighed.
As the goods are not sold in bulk, but by the weight or measurement, the sale is not perfected, since
the risk or deterioration of the goods is not shifted to the buyer until it is measured or weighed;
o In leaving the risk of the goods sold to the vendor until said operation is completed, applying the maxim res
perit domino, it was evidently the intention of the legislator that until then the transfer of the ownership was not
effected: it is true that there exists a promise which binds the vendor, and which, if broken, would give the
purchaser the right to demand delivery of the goods upon payment of its price, after the same had been
measured or weighed, or to claim indemnity for damages;
o But it also true that until the goods sold are delivered, no definite change of ownership takes place, and the sale
is not so to speak finally perfected;
o Where after the sale, but prior to the measuring or weighing, the purchaser takes away fraudulently, that is, with
intent of gain, a part of the goods covered by the contract, this, is evidently , theft, with all its essential
elements, as it cannot be reasonably argued that the purchaser has taken what is his own.
o Groizard: Buyer guilty of theft if converts the whole or part of the thing sold before ownership passes to her or before
delivery
o There is necessity of investigating in whom the ownership is vested to determine whether or not the crime of
theft has been committed.
o The contract of purchase and sale is perfected as between the vendor and the vendee and is binding on both of
them, when they come to an agreement as to the thing and the price. But the ownership passes from the
vendor to the vendee only when the thing is delivered.
o If before this takes place the purchaser converts the whole or a part of the thing sold, he must be dealt with as
guilty of theft, notwithstanding his undeniable right to demand and obtain the carrying out of the contract.
o On the other hand, if the owner of a thing in the lawful possession of another, take it away with or without
employing violence, intimidation or force, will commit neither robbery nor theft, although he may, and must be
criminally responsible for another kind of offense " Rei nostrae furtum facere non possumus."
o Viada Question answered by SC:
o Is the shepherd, who takes away and converts to his own use several head of the cattle under his care, guilty of
the crime of estafa, or of theft? THEFT
o Takes away personal property of another without the owner's consent as accused, with intent of gain, took
away two bucks and a female goat, against the will of his master, the owner of the said cattle, which were under
his care as shepherd
Facts:
Estafa by means of falsification of mercantile documents -> Information included 3 other persons, Teodorico Angeles,
Abelardo Crisologo, and Ricardo Paredes, who were named as codefendants with this accused; but a severance was
had, and the trial of the present appellant occurred at a different time than that of his co-accused, so considered here is
Miguel Concepcion’s alone
Teodorico Angeles was manager of a Aparri branch of PNB, in Cagayan. At the same time Miguel Concepcion is a
resident and representative of Cagayan in the Philippine Assembly and was manager of a limited partnership engaged
in the business of buying and selling tobacco in the Cagayan Valley, known as "Puno y Concepcion."
o The mercantile operations of this firm were for a time carried on upon an extensive scale, and Miguel
Concepcion was naturally therefore frequently brought into contact with Teodorico Angeles as manager of
Aparri branch of the PNB.
o Moreover, it appears that Miguel Concepcion is a son of Venancio Concepcion at that time president of PNB
Manila; and by reason of both his social and business relations Miguel Concepcion evidently acquired an undue
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influence over Teodorico Angeles, with the result that the latter in a great measure surrendered his discretion
as manager of the bank to the will of the former.
October, 1919: Miguel Concepcion had need of funds, which could only be had from PNB and as he apparently had no
bankable security available, recourse was had to the expedient of getting the money upon loans from the bank upon
fictitious warehouse receipts (quedans), with the knowledge and connivance of Teodorico Angeles.
Testimony by Abelardo Crisologo and Ricardo Paredes of how loans were obtained (Paredes is Crisologo’s father-in-
law)
o Charged in the information as joint principals in the offense of estafa by means of falsification of mercantile
documents but who, as we believe, were rather victims of the artifices of their coaccused than designing
participants in crime.
o Abelardo Crisologo had long been an intimate friend of Miguel G. Concepcion; and, as Crisologo lived in
Tuguegarao, it had been the custom of Concepcion on visits to that place in the past to stay in Crisologo's
hospitable home. Paredes was the father-in-law of Crisologo and at the same time an employee of the firm of
"Puno y Concepcion," though prior to September, 1919, he had been employed by the branch of the Philippine
National Bank in Aparri as an inspector.
October 1919: Teodorico Angeles and Miguel G. Concepcion were in Tuguegarao, and they were invited to dine at the
house of Crisologo, Paredes being also present.
After the meals was over, and the appropriate time had arrived for the exchange of confidences, the subject of the
tobacco trade was broached, and Miguel G. Concepcion, directing himself to Angeles, said: "Manager, I have three
thousand quintals of tobacco in the pueblos of Enrile, Peñablanca, and Baggao, and I should like to pledge them to the
bank but I should not like for my name to appear on the documents. I mean that I should not like to make the pledge
myself."
To this Teodorico Angeles replied: "Whose name then would you like to have appear?"
Thereupon Concepcion indicated Crisologo as a person who would perhaps be obliging enough to figure as borrower in
the loan. To this Crisologo at first hesitated to give his assent, but the matter was managed with such diplomatic skill by
the two principal interlocutors that Crisologo yielded, not before Concepcion, however, had pointed out that in making
the pledge Crisologo would not have to appear as owner of the tobacco but merely as depositary.
Explanation given to Crisologo by Concepcion for the necessity of the intervention of someone else than himself was, in
effect, that Concepcion wanted to use the money for the purchase of tobacco in competition with the firm of "Puno y
Concepcion," of which Concepcion was manager, and he thought it would look ugly for his name to appear in
connection with the loan.
Bank lends sum of P55,000 secured by warehouse receipts for 3,000 quintals of tobacco
Three principals met again the next day in the house where Concepcion was then staying in Tuguegarao; and it was
determined that a loan of P35,000 should forthwith be made on the purported security of a quedan to be signed by
Crisologo for 2,000 quintals of tobacco, leaving a loan of P20,000 to be effected later upon the security of another
quedan for the remaining thousand quintals of tobacco.
Angeles assured Crisologo that he had personally inspected the warehouse where that part of the tobacco supposed to
be then in Tuguegarao was deposited and found it to be there as Concepcion had claimed.
Upon this Crisologo indicated his readiness to proceed, and the necessary documents were accordingly prepared.
o Four promissory notes, amounting altogether to the sum of P35,000, signed by Abelardo Crisologo, payable to
the Philippine National Bank and purporting to be secured by the deposit of a quedan for 2,000 quintals of
tobacco.
o Warehouse receipt for said tobacco, in the usual commercial form, signed by Crisologo and purporting to show
that 2,000 quintals of tobacco had been deposited in his bodegas. This quedan was reduced to typewritten from
by Concepcion himself just before the documents was signed by Crisologo, its contents being dictated by
Teodorico Angeles.
October 24, 1919: In Aparri, Angeles discounted the four notes and place the proceeds nominally to the credit of an
individual account then opened in the name of Abelardo Crisologo. Of the account thus placed to the credit of Crisologo,
the sum of P30,000 was forthwith remitted to Concepcion in Tuguegarao by telegraph through the provincial treasurer
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and was by the latter paid to Concepcion in due course. The amount of P5,000 remaining to Crisologo's credit was used
either to pay the charges incidental to the making of the loan or to defray interest upon the loan.
Three or four weeks later the remaining portion of the sum of P55,000, originally agreed upon as the total amount of the
loan, was advanced by the bank upon two promissory notes of P10,000 each, signed by Crisologo, and purporting to be
secured by a quedan for the other thousand quintals of tobacco, supposedly in Baggao, likewise signed by Crisologo.
About this time the firm of "Puno y Concepcion," for which Paredes was acting as buyer, had need of money, and of this
fact Paredes had duly informed Concepcion. The latter therefore instructed Angeles to pay Paredes the proceeds of the
second loan; and accordingly when Angeles discounted the two notes of Abelardo Crisologo for P20,000, on November
19, 1919, he delivered to Paredes the sum of P500 in currency and a draft for P18,000, making P18,500 in all, which
was charged to Crisologo's account.
After the first notes executed by Crisologo had been in the bank for some time, Paredes, acting for Crisologo and others
concerned, made a payment of interest due or to become due upon said notes, using upon this occasion about P1,600,
believed to have been derived from the resources of Concepcion
Paredes acting as attorney in fact to his son-in-law, Abelardo Crisologo, went through the form of executing in favor of
the bank a pledge of the same non-existing tobacco that had been included in original quedans signed by Crisologo
The remainder of the proceeds of the notes was consumed in the payment of charges incidental to the loan and in the
payment of interest. From this it will be seen, and it is an undeniable fact, that although Crisologo signed the notes and
quedans, as above stated, he in no wise profited by the transaction and never so much as saw the gleam of a single
copper proceeding from the loan.
At the time the quedans referred to were signed and delivered to the bank neither Crisologo nor Concepcion possessed
the tobacco which was purported to be on deposits with Abelardo Crisologo; and, although the evidence on this point is
purely circumstantial, it is certain that Angeles knew that the tobacco was non-existent as he assured Crisologo that
Concepcion had the tobacco and that the signing of the documents by Crisologo was a matter of pure form.
The notes have not been paid by Abelardo Crisologo; the tobacco has been found to be non-existent, as Angeles and
Concepcion all along knew; Concepcion denies all responsibility for the transaction, as if he were a total stranger
thereto; and since December 23, 1921, Angeles occupies the grave of a suicide.
After all the notes had long been overdue, and the bank desired to get its credits consolidated. Paredes, also acting
under a power of attorney from Crisologo, went through the form of consolidating the original notes and quedans into
one note and one quedan.
CFI: Miguel G. Concepcion, GUILTY of the offense of estafa by means of falsification of mercantile documents
o PENALTY: Five years, four months and twenty days, prision correccional, with the accessories prescribed by
law; to pay a fine of P1,500; to indemnify the branch of the Philippine National Bank in Aparri in the sum of
P55,000, with subsidiary imprisonment (not to exceed one year) in case of insolvency; and to pay the one-
fourth part of the costs of prosecution.
CFI: Ricardo Paredes and Alberto Crisologo, guilty of the offense of falsification of a commercial document
o PENALTY: six years and one day, presidio mayor, with the accessories provided by law, to pay a fine of P250,
and jointly and severally to indemnify the Aparri branch of the Philippine National Bank in the amount of
P55,000, and each to pay one-fourth part of the costs
ISSUES:
1. Whether Concepcion is guilty of estafa? (YES)
2. Whether Ricardo Paredes and Alberto Crisologo are guilty of falsification of commercial document? (NO)
HELD:
1. Concepcion, guilty of the complex offense of estafa by means of the falsification of mercantile documents.
o The estafa here involved consists in the fact that Teodorico Angeles, as manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and as such having charge of the funds of said institution, converted, misappropriated, and misapplied
the sum of about P55,000 of the bank's money, upon security that was known to him to be wholly fictitious, for the
benefits of the appellant Concepcion and to the prejudice of the bank
Facts:
Prosecution's version
1994: Lateo and Elca proposed that Lucero finance the titling of the 122 hectares of land located in Muntinlupa
allegedly owned by Elca as the sole heir of Gregorio Elca. Title to the property had not been transferred to Elca's name
because of a certain discrepancy between the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 77730. Elca offered to assign to Lucero 70
hectares of said land. She was then introduced to Baldemor, Orlando Lalota and Nolasco de Guzman.
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Lucero released to petitioners about P4.7 million in staggered amounts.
Elca told Lucero that certain portions of the property will first be put in the name of Lateo and would later be assigned to
her. Lucero was given a Deed of Sale dated March 27, 1987. Elca likewise executed an irrevocable Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Lucero.
Later, she was presented certified true copies of three (3) titles, issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City in the
name of Lateo covering approximately twenty-seven (27) hectares of Plan A-7 of the Muntinlupa Estate, situated in
Barrio Magdaong, Poblacion, Muntinlupa.
December 1994: Lucero verified with the Registry of Deeds of Makati, she discovered that the aforesaid titles of the
property were actually registered in the names of Marc Oliver R. Singson, Mary Jeanne S. Go and Feliza C. Torrigoza.
Lucero confronted petitioners and demanded from them return of the money. She was told that they did not have any
money to return. They instead offered a five (5) hectare property identified as Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs 04213-000441
located at Bacoor, Cavite allegedly owned by Elca. Elca, however, demanded an additional P2 million for the transfer of
title. Through a letter, he said that the current valuation of the property is P450.00 per square meter and hence, the
property will be more than sufficient to cover obligates
As it turned out, Elca did not own 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite. He merely had an inchoate right over the Bacoor
property, derived from his Application to Purchase Friar Lands, which covered only 7 hectares. Elca's application was
later amended to cover only 4 hectares, in view of the protest by Alfredo Salenga (Salenga).
Lucero verified this with the Land Management Bureau (LMB), she discovered that Elca only had a pending application
for the sales patent over a four 4-hectare area of the subject land. These misrepresentations prompted her to file a
complaint with the Task Force Kamagong, PACC, Manila.
April 26, 1995: the task force conducted an entrapment at Furosato Restaurant. Petitioners were apprehended in
possession of marked 100-peso bills amounting to P100,000.00, supposedly in exchange for the Deed of Assignment
prepared by Lucero for their transaction.
Petitioners' version
1994: Lucero, Lateo, Oscar Lalota met with Elca in Muntinlupa to discuss the proposal of Lucero to finance the titling of
Elca's land.
June 28, 1994: in a meeting called by Lucero, she laid down the terms and conditions regarding her plans to finance the
titling of Elca's land.
o 22 out of the 122 hectares of the land would be given to the old tenants of the property, the 30 hectares would
be titled in the name of Elca as his retained share and the other 70 hectares would be her profit as financier of
the transaction.
o Lucero would also pay P10.00 for every square meter of the 70 hectares or a total amount of P7 million. All the
expenses for the titling and management of the land would be deducted from P7 million. The remaining balance
would then be given to petitioners
Lucero assigned Oscar Lalota to work for the titling of the land and to prepare all documents necessary thereto.
Baldemor would act as overseer of the transaction as Lucero's attorney-in-fact. Lateo would serve as secretary and
assistant of Lucero. Elca would guard the property to keep off squatters. He and his wife were instructed to sign all
documents prepared by Oscar Lalota.
December 1994: Lucero told Elca that upon verification from the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, she found out that all
the documents submitted by Oscar Lalota pertaining to their transaction were falsified. Oscar Lalota disappeared after
getting the money.
In order to recover her losses from the anomalous transaction, Lucero offered to purchase Elca's property in Cavite.
Elca agreed to sell 2 hectares of his property at a price of P100.00 per square meter. Elca informed Lucero that the land
was not yet titled although the documents had already been completed. Lucero agreed to pay in advance the amount of
P200,000.00 for the immediate titling of the land.
December 21, 1994: Lucero gave no advance payment. Elca was made to return in January 1995. On that date still
Lucero made no payment.
Petitioners’ Arguments:
Transaction involving the Bacoor property do not show that it was an attempt to defraud Eleonor Lucero
Petitioners deny that they deceived Lucero. They claim that Lucero was aware that the Bacoor property is not yet titled
in the name of Elca; and that they went to Furosato restaurant upon Lucero's invitation and on Lucero's representation
that she would hand to them the P200,000.00 needed to facilitate the issuance of title in Elca's name.
Assail the penalty imposed by the CA for being erroneous. OSG asks for modification of penalty to six (6) months of
arresto mayor.
ISSUE:
1. Whether there was attempted estafa not consummated? YES. ATTEMPTED ESTAFA (not consummated because as
yet no damage to Lucero)
2. What penalty to impose?
HELD:
Elements of estafa Art. 315 (2) (a): 2.By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other
similar deceits.
o That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
o That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
o That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he
was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means.
o That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage
Transaction involving the Bacoor property was a continuation of the transaction involving parcels of land in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. When Lucero discovered that Elca's certificates of title over the Muntinlupa property were fake, Elca
offered, as substitute, the 5-hectare portion of his purported 14-hectare lot in Bacoor, Cavite, but asked for an additional
P2,000,000.00, through a letter.
Elca was in no position to transfer ownership of the 5-hectare Bacoor property at the time petitioners offered it to Lucero
because his right was merely inchoate and was still under protest.
Alcantara v. CA: FRAUD AND DECEIT
o Fraud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions,
and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in
damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic
term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one
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individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated.
o Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
ATTEMPTED NOT CONSUMMATED: Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself had been
shown, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted petitioners of attempted estafa
PENALTY
o The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded.
o IF CONSUMMATED: Lucero would have been defrauded in the amount of P100,000.00. Hence, the applicable penalty
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) would have been prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, with an additional one (1) year for every P10,000.00 in excess of the first
P22,000.00; provided, that the total penalty should not exceed twenty years.
o BEC. ATTEMPTED: Two degrees lower than that of consummated pursuant to Article 51. Accordingly, the imposable
penalty would be arresto mayor in its medium period to arresto mayor in its maximum period, or an imprisonment term
ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. And because the amount involved exceeded
P22,000.00, one (1) year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 should be added, bringing the total to seven (7) years.
IDESTH
o However, we agree with the OSG that it would be inequitable to impose the additional incremental penalty of 7 years to
the maximum period of penalty, considering that petitioners were charged and convicted merely of attempted and not
consummated estafa.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED. Petitioners Elvira Lateo, Francisco Elca, and Bartolome
Baldemor are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted estafa, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
four (4) months of arresto mayor.
Facts:
Prosecution: (3 private complainants + Corazon Cristobal an employee of POEA and PO2 Edward Catalan)
o 1998: Lo persuaded private complainants to apply for a job in Italy through the services of accused-appellants.
o Lo introduced them to Calimon who represented herself as a sub-agent of Axil International Services and Consultancy
(AISC), a legitimate recruitment agency. Calimon showed a job order of factory workers purportedly issued by an Italian
firm. Devanadera called up AISC to verify Calimon's representation. The person who answered the phone readily
confirmed accused-appellant Calimon's claim.
o When accused Calimon asked P10,000.00 from each of the private complainants to cover expenses for medical
examination and processing fees for travel documents, both Devanadera and Agramon readily parted with their money,
as evidenced by receipts duly signed by Calimon.
o They likewise gave their respective passports, birth certificates, NBI clearances, resumes and other documents. 19
Thereafter, Calimon brought them to St. Martin's Clinic for medical examination.
o October 24, 1998: Upon the urging of Lo, private complainant Magnaye paid P20,000.00 to Calimon for the latter's
recruitment services.
o January 15, 1999: private complainants were subjected to another medical examination at St. Camillus Clinic, Pasig
City, because according to Calimon the medical examinations at St. Martin's Clinic were not honored by the Italian
Embassy. On the same date, Magnaye gave an additional amount of P15,000.00 to Calimon. While Devanadera and
Agramon gave her an additional amount of P7,500.00 each.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
o Only Lo recruited private complainants and promised to deploy them abroad.
o They deny having collected placement fees, but ironically admitted that the amount collected was for medical
examination, visa and passport fees.
o Not guilty of estafa through false pretenses because they did not commit any act of deceit as it was only accused Lo
who promised to deploy private complainants to Italy for a fee.
ISSUE: Whether they are guilty of estafa and illegal recruitment despite Lo being the only one who promised them for a fee?
(YES)
HELD:
ESTAFA: The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present, hence their conviction for
estafa was proper.
o Accused-appellants' acts of deliberately misrepresenting themselves to private complainants as having the necessary
authority or license to recruit applicants for overseas employment, and collecting money from them allegedly for
processing fees and travel documents, but failing to deploy them and to return the money they had collected despite
several demands clearly amount to estafa.
o Guilty of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code: 2. By means of any of the following false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using
fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
o There are three ways of committing estafa:
o (1) by using a fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits.
o Under this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. In the present case, the deceit consists of accused-
appellants' false statement or fraudulent representation which was made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the
delivery of the money by the complainants. To convict for this type of crime, it is essential that the false statement or
fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the
thing of value.
o Accused-appellants led private complainants to believe that they possessed the power, means and legal qualifications
to provide the latter with work in Italy, when in fact they did not. Private complainants parted with their hard-earned
money and suffered damage by reason of accused-appellants' deceitful and illegal acts.
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
o Calimon committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale because by her conduct, Calimon successfully gave
private complainants the impression that she had the ability to send workers abroad although she did not in fact have
Facts:
o May 17, 1996, 1:00 PM: Montaner, in exchange for cash, issued to private complainant Reynaldo Solis in his house at
Caliraya Street, Holiday Homes, San Pedro, Laguna, ten (10) Prudential Bank checks, specifically, check nos. 0002284,
0002285, 0002286, 0002287, 0002288, 0002289, 0002290, 0002291, 0002292, and 0002293 all postdated June 17,
1996, each in the amount of P5,000.00 all in the total amount of P50,000.00. They were all signed by her.
o Accused represented to complainant Solis that the checks were fully funded.
o October 4, 1996: When private complainant deposited the checks for encashment at Premier Bank, San Pedro, Laguna.
However, they were dishonored for the reason "account closed".
o Ruel Allan Pajarito, Branch Cashier O-I-C of Prudential Bank testified that they placed the mark "account
closed" on the ten (10) checks issued in the account of accused Montaner considering that at the time the
same were presented to them, the account of accused Montaner was already closed.
o Witness Pajarito further testified that as per their records, the account of accused Montaner, account no.
00099-000050-4 was closed on July 11, 1996. The checks were returned on for the reason account closed.
o October 13, 1996: Private complainant verbally and thereafter, thru demand letter formally demanded that accused
settle her accounts. It was received by her husband.
o Despite receipt of the demand letter, accused Montaner failed to pay the value of the ten (10) checks, thus private
complainant Reynaldo Solis filed the instant complaint for estafa.
o Information 3 dated April 21, 1998:
o May 17, 1996: in San Pedro, Laguna, Montaner did then and there feloniously defraud one Reynaldo Solis in
the following manner: said accused by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are fully
funded draw, make and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis the following TEN Prudential Bank Checks Nos.:
0002284, 0002285, 0002286, 0002287, 0002288, 0002289, 0002290, 0002291, 0002292, and 0002293 each
for P5,000.00 with total value of P50,000 and all aforesaid checks are postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for
cash knowing fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the said checks were presented for
payment the same were dishonored by the drawee bank on reason of "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and despite
demand accused failed and refused to pay the value thereof to the damage and prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in
the aforementioned total amount of P50,000.00.
o Appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge leveled against her during her arraignment on June 10, 1998.
o Accused, thru counsel initially manifested that she is intending to file a demurrer to evidence. However, her right to file
the same was considered waived in view of her failure to file the demurrer despite due notice.
RTC: Convicted for Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
o PENALTY: Indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty-
two (22) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum and to indemnify complainant Reynaldo Solis in the amount of
P50,000.00.
CA: AFFIRMED TC’s Decision in toto.
Petitioner’s Defense:
o To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner denied the allegations that she issued
ten (10) checks in private complainant's favor claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from her by one Marlyn
Galope because the latter needed money.
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 95
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
o She gave the ten checks to Galope, signed the same albeit the space for the date, amount and payee were left blank so
that the checks cannot be used for any negotiation. She further told Galope that the checks were not funded.
o When she learned that a case was filed against her for estafa, she confronted Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that
money will not be given to her if she will not issue the said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of dishonor sent
to her by private complainant and claimed that her husband, who supposedly received the notice of dishonor left for
abroad in July 1996 and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.
o Thus, there is purportedly no certainty beyond reasonable doubt that she issued the checks purposely to defraud
Reynaldo Solis into lending her money. She further claims that no transaction had ever transpired between her and
Solis. Admitting that she may have been imprudent, she nonetheless insists that her simple imprudence does not
translate to criminal liability.
HELD:
o Paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides: 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses
or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (d) By postdating a check,
or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
o The elements of estafa under paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are:
o (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued;
o (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
o (3) damage to the payee.
o In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under
paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According to Solis's clear and categorical testimony, appellant
issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his
house in exchange for their cash equivalent.
o Direct Examination: Representation about them? To deposit those checks on their due date, ma'am.
o It was evident that Solis would not have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her issuance of the 10
Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his
cash. However, when Solis attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by the bank because the account was
already closed.
o Solis wrote appellant a demand letter but she did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the amount
necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of
deceit, which is an element of the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second
sentence of paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
o Claims to have entrusted Garope is incredulous and defies ordinary common sense and human experience. Moreover,
it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As aptly
noted by the trial court, appellant's failure to produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her story is fatal to her cause.
DISPOSITIVE: CA Decision AFFIRMED.
Defense of Cardenas:
Appellant claimed that, except for Check No. 1260A, (one of the two checks subject of the fourth case) all the checks
subject of the cases were unsigned as they were issued as a "secondary collateral."
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 98
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
Whenever Nenit entrusted to her jewelry for resale, she was required to and did sign receipts and did issue the
unsigned checks; that failing to resell the jewelry, she would return them and ask Nenit to return to her the receipts she
signed and the unsigned checks, but Nenit would merely claim that she would tear them;
With respect to Check No. 1260A, for P458,000, she having sold the jewelry covered thereby, she affixed her signature
thereon, but she did not cause the check to be honored because she and Nenit agreed to offset the against the amount
which Nenit and her son owed her for jewelry they had borrowed from her.
Appellant thus claimed that the signatures attributed to her on all the checks, except Check No. 1260A for P458,000,
were forged, in support of which she presented National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Senior Documents Examiner
Adela Cruz-Demantillo (Adela) who examined the signatures on the questioned checks and concluded that the
signature on Check No. 1260A and those on other checks were not made by one and the same person.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Cardenas is guilty of the 3 rd and 4th charges because of insufficiency of funds or by reason that checks were
dishonored due to “account closed” despite evidence of forged signature? NO
2. Whether Cardenas is guilty of estafa for Check 001264A despite lack of fraud as the issuance of the check was not the
means to attain the jewelry? NO.
HELD:
1. Checks subject thereof were dishonored due to "payment stopped" or "account closed. However, only photocopies of
the checks bearing "payment stopped" or "account closed" stamped thereon form part of the records and while they
were not objected to, the photocopies of the checks still may not be appreciated as they were not formally offered in
evidence.
Relevant stipulations of the prosecution and defense during pre-trial were that the checks, except Check No.
001260A which is one of the two checks subject of the fourth case, were dishonored because the signatures therein
were different from appellant’s signature on file.
Forged handwriting. The prosecution contends, however, that appellant intentionally altered her own signature on
the checks. In light, however, of the findings of the handwriting expert and, indeed, from the naked eye, a
comparison of the questioned signatures with the standard signature of appellant the possibility that appellant’s
signature on the checks in question was forged is not ruled out.
DISPOSITIVE: Elizabeth Cardenas, is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 8742-13. Appellant is likewise ACQUITTED in
Criminal Case No. 8743-13. She is, however, declared civilly liable to the private complainant, Nenette a.k.a. Nenit Musni,
insofar as the case involves Check No. 001260A, and is ORDERED to pay her its face value of P458,000.00.
Facts:
o February 3, 1994 to March 3, 1994: Abordo recruited Jesus Rayray for possible employment abroad and collected a
total of P14,000 as placement fee. Abordo assured Rayray that he could soon leave for abroad. Rayray was unable to
leave as promised and only saw Abordo again when she was already in jail.
o September 1994: Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Esmenia Cariño in Lipay, Villasis, Pangasinan, to
persuade her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Cariño and Cabanlong used to be neighbors in San Blas,
Villasis, Pangasinan. Upon being convinced by the accused, Cariño gave a total of P15,000 as placement fee. Despite
this payment, Cariño was unable to leave for abroad.
o December 1994: Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Segundina Fernandez in Caramitan, Villasis,
Pangasinan. Cabanlong and Segundina are first cousins. Cabanlong introduced Abordo as a recruiter. The accused
told Segundina that they could secure employment for her son, Jaime, in Hong Kong upon payment of the placement
fee. Segundina and Jaime agreed to the proposition. Segundina gave the accused cash and other valuables amounting
to P45,000. Abordo gave a plane ticket to Jaime, which turned out to be fake; hence, Jaime was unable to leave for
abroad.
o December 1994: the accused went to the house of Exequiel Mendoza in San Blas, Villasis, Pangasinan to convince him
to work in Hong Kong as a security guard. Mendoza agreed to be recruited and to pay P45,000 as placement fee.
Abordo assured him that as soon as he could pay the placement fee, he could work abroad. Mendoza gave Abordo
Issue: Whether the accused are guilty of simple illegal recruitment and estafa under Article 315, 2 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code.
PENALTIES
Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is punished by "the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years) to prision mayor in its minimum period (6 years and 1 day to 8 years), if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty . . . shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. .
The penalty prescribed for estafa is composed of only two, not three, periods. In such a case, Article 65 of the Revised
Penal Code requires the division into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one
period of each of the three portions. Therefore, the maximum, medium, and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed
are:
o Minimum — 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days
o Medium — 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
o Maximum — 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years 25
If the amount defrauded does not exceed P22,000 and there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty
prescribed shall be imposed in its medium period, or 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision correccional to 6 years,
8 months and 20 days of prision mayor.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed. On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime.
o The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 315 is prision correccional in its minimum period (6 months,
1 day to 2 years and 4 months) to prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). From this, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken.
Criminal Case No. V-0654 (for estafa involving P14,000), Abordo is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 months
and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision correccional, as maximum.
Abordo should also refund to Rayray the amount of P14,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information until this
amount is fully paid.
In Criminal Case No. V-0767 (for estafa involving P45,000), Abordo and Cabanlong are sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum. The
accused should also refund to Jaime the amount of P45,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information until this
amount is fully paid
In Criminal Case No. V-0769 (for estafa involving P39,000), Abordo and Cabanlong are sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 9 years of prision mayor, as maximum. The
accused should also refund to Mendoza the amount of P39,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information until
this amount is fully paid.
In Criminal Case No. V-0772 (for estafa involving P15,000), Abordo and Cabanlong are sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision
correccional, as maximum. The accused should also refund to Cariño the amount of P15,000 with legal interest from the
filing of the information until this amount is fully paid.
The penalties in this case consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature of
such penalties. Hence, since the accused are sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should be
served successively.
FACTS:
Ganasi is owner of 2 parcels of land in La Trinidad Benguet
o Parcel 1 (1,468 sqm): NE, provincial road, SW, public land, NW, subdivision plan -> greater value than the
other due to its even terrain and location
o Parcel 2 (1,472 sqm): Bounded on NE by property, on E, La trinidad road, on SE and SW, public land -> has
uneven and hilly terrain
September 1956: Ganasi incurred a P3,500 debt from complainant Dacanay and so he pointed to Parcel 1 to the
complainant, offering it as security or mortgage. He showed them the land, together with the lawyers for an ocular
inspection.
Finding the land suitable for his business of a carpentry shop, Dacanay delivered the money as a loan and the accused
executed a Deed of Mortgage.
Unable to pay on due date, the accused sold the same property to the complainant to settle his obligation.
When Dacanay went to the Register of Deeds to have his ownership over Parcel 1 registered, he was informed that
what he was sold was not Parcel 1 but Parcel 2.
It turned out that the accused had switched lots in the execution of the Deeds of Mortgage and sale; what the accused
had mortgaged and sold was not the land represented by him to the complainant as the security for the loan but another
lot which was worthless for the use intended by the Dacanay.
He immediately went to Ganasi to confront him about it but Ganasi refused to do anything about it so Dacanay decided
to bring the case to court.
Defense
Borrowed for Hawaii fare
No misrepresentation in the legal sense because the complainant was in a position to detect the misrepresentation,
assuming that there was misrepresentation.
o 2 lawyers
The accused contends that there is no law that covers his case, while the Solicitor General maintains that the accused
is guilty of estafa, under paragraph 1 (a) , Article 315, RPC.
DISPOSITIVE: Guilty under 318; penalty is 3 months arresto mayor and pay fine of P3577.70
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 105
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ARSON
c/o HIPOLITO
FACTS:
Eulogio Quilates is the owner of a two-storey house in Paringao, Bauang, La Union.
Among the occupants of his house were his sister Felicidad Quilates; another sister Alicia Manlupig; and nephew
Herminio Manlupig.
Appellant, who is the adopted son of Felicidad, occupied one room in the house.
At around 3:30 p.m. of 24 March 2004, appellant was having a drinking spree with his cousin Herminio and
brothers-in-law Joey Viduya and Ricky Viduya in front of their house.
Appellant and Herminio were arguing over the matter of caring for Felicidad while the latter was confined in the
hospital. Ricky tried to mediate between the two. Appellant was then seen going inside the house to get a bolo.
When he emerged from the house ten (10) minutes later, he ran after Herminio but the latter managed to escape
unscathed. Appellant again went back to the house.
Meanwhile, after pacifying appellant and Herminio, Ricky resumed drinking. A few minutes later, he saw smoke
coming from the room of appellant.
As Ricky was about to enter the house, he met appellant at the door. Appellant apparently tried to stab Ricky but
was unsuccessful. Ricky witnessed appellant stab Felicidad and Alicia.
Herminio, who had since come back to the drinking table, also saw the smoke. He peeped through the small window
of the house and witnessed appellant burning some clothes and boxes in the sala. Herminio immediately went
inside the house to save his personal belongings. Upon emerging from the house, Herminio saw his mother, Alicia,
bloodied.
Alicia testifies that she was sitting on a chair near the toilet when she saw smoke coming out of appellant’s
room. Before she could react, appellant came charging at her and stabbed her. She sustained wounds on her upper
thigh, arms, below her breast and on her ear. Alicia was still able to ask for help, and her daughter-in-law brought
her to the hospital.
Eulogio heard a commotion while he was cooking in the second floor of the house. When Eulogio went down, he
already saw smoke coming from the room of appellant. He then saw Felicidad near the comfort room located outside
the house and was bleeding from her mouth. As he was about to help Felicidad, he met appellant who was then
holding a knife. Eulogio immediately ran away.
Upon seeing Herminio, appellant immediately attacked him with a knife. However, Herminio and Ricky were able to
pin appellant down. Before they could retaliate, the barangay captain arrived at the scene. As a result, eight (8)
houses were razed.
Inspector Ferdinand Formacion responded to the fire incident and saw four (4) houses were already burned. After
putting out the fire, he and the arson investigator conducted an ocular investigation and invited witnesses to the
police station to submit their sworn statements.
SPO2 Rodolfo Lomboy, chief investigator of Philippine National Police Bauang Police Station, was told by witnesses
that appellant intentionally set the boxes on fire inside the house.
Information dated 6 April 2004: crime of arson
o 24th day of March, 2004, in Bauang, La Union, accused, motivated by some evil motive, feloniously set fire
and burn a residential house knowing the same to be inhabited by one FELICIDAD M. QUILATES
burning and killing said FELICIDAD M. QUILATES as well as burning and damaging 9 other neighboring
houses in the process, to the damage of said house-owners in the amount of P3M as well as to the
damage of her heirs
o The charge is qualified by the resulting death of Felicidad M. Quilates.
Also charged in another Information for frustrated homicide
o 24th day of March, 2004, in Bauang, La Union, Philippines, accused, with intent to kill, feloniously attack,
assault and stab with a knife one, Alicia Q. Manlupig inflicting upon the latter stab wounds, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it be reason of causes independent of the will; that is, by the timely
DEFENSE:
He stated that while he was having a drinking spree, he saw Felicidad go inside the house to get a glass of water. He
followed her and gave her water.
He noticed Felicidad light a gas lamp. He then went back to his friends and resumed drinking. He got into a heated
argument with Herminio. The latter struck him in the head.
He immediately went inside the house to get a weapon. He was able to get a bolo, went back outside and hit
Herminio. The latter ran away and appellant chased him.
Appellant met Alicia and confronted her about the actuations of Herminio. But Alicia cursed him. Appellant
thereafter hit her with the knife. Appellant then fell on the ground and lost consciousness because, apparently, he
was struck by something in the back.
Appellant denied setting the house on fire.
Appellant maintains his innocence of the charge of arson. He questions the credibility of some witnesses and
specifically imputes ill-motive on the part of Herminio in testifying against him, especially after their fight.
Appellant submits that the testimonies of witnesses, which failed to turn into a coherent whole, did not prove the
identity of the perpetrator.
HELD:
1. YES. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes:
o (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and
o (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime.
o In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having
been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is
enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.
The photographs, evidencing the charred remains of the houses, established the occurrence of the fire.
2. SIMPLE ARSON because according to a close examination of the records, as well as description of the crime as stated
in the information, the crime committed is in fact simple arson because the burned properties are residential
houses.
There are actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1316.
Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of
the value of the damage caused.
Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments
by any person or group of persons.
Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations,
railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.
FACTS:
At around 10:30 p.m. of July 31, 1998, while then 12-year old Jovelyn Santos was sleeping in the house of her
grandmother Celerina Solangon at Barangay Dangay, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, she was awakened by heat emanating
from the walls of the house. She thus roused her cousin Dorecyll and together they went out of the house.
Jovelyn saw appellant putting dry hay (dayami) around the house near the terrace where the fire started, but
appellant ran away when he saw her and Dorecyll.
Appellant’s neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona, also saw appellant near Celerina’s house after it caught fire, following which,
appellant fled on seeing Jovelyn and Dorecyll stepping out of the house, as other neighbors repaired to the scene to
help contain the flames.
Felicitas also saw Celerina, who was at a neighbor’s house before the fire started, enter the burning house and
resurface with her grandsons Alvin and Joshua.
Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns which led to their death. Joshua sustained second degree
burns.
Information of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder:
o July 31, 1998, at about 10:30 PM at Bgy Danggay, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, accused, with malice
aforethought and with deliberate intent to kill, set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the
complete destruction of the said house and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and
inflicting serious physical injuries on Josua Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
DEFENSE:
Denying the charge, invoked alibi, claiming that he, on his mother Rosalinda’s request, went to Caloocan City on July
15, 1998 (16 days before the incident) and stayed there until February 1999. Rosalinda corroborated appellant’s
alibi.
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RTC: GUILTY of complex crime of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder punishable under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
o PENALTY: DEATH
o Pay the heirs of Celerina Suba Solangon the sum of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages
o Pay and the heirs of Alvin Savariz, 50,000.00 as compensatory damages, P16,500.00 as actual
damages; and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
CA: AFFIRMED but MODIFIED penalty from death to reclusion perpetua bec. of RA 9346 and
additionally awarding exemplary damages to the heirs of the victims (Celerina and Alvin), and temperate
damages to Joshua representing his “hospitalization and recuperation.”
ISSUES:
1. Whether the identity of the malefactor was sufficiently established to find him guilty? (YES)
2. Whether the crime is Double Murder with Frustated Murder? (NO, simple arson)
3. Whether he can be convicted of Simple Arson despite different crime charged in Information? (YES)
3. Whether penalty is correct? (Yes with modification on damages)
HELD:
1. YES. Prosecution witnesses Felicitas’ and Jovelyn’s positive identification of their neighbor-herein appellant
as the person they saw during the burning of the house, given, among other things, the illumination generated by the
fire.
Appellant’s contention that Felicitas’ claim was to be doubted that she saw appellant fleeing away from the burning
house, it being then 10:30 p.m. and, therefore, dark is without merit. Also, that she failed to ask him to stop putting
dried hay around the house if indeed her claim were true is unmerited.
FIRE was already up so cannot be dark.
TESTIMONY OF FELICITAS:
o Portion of the house which was on fire when you saw Balentong for the first time was at the rear portion
going up, sir.
o Balentong was just infront of the house, sir.
o He was about two (2) meters away from the burning portion of the house (not front portion)
TESTIMONY OF JOVELYN:
o The fire was already considerable size when she saw the back of this Ferdinand Balontong
o The surrounding was illuminated by that fire, very visible.
2. SIMPLE ARSON.
People v. Malngan: In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes
was/were perpetrated – whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the
main objective of the malefactor
o (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the
occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
o (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or
edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only
o (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but
fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed – homicide/murder and arson.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, “Amending the Law on Arson,” reads: Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. ─ The
penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the
following: 2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
No showing that appellant’s main objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the fire was resorted to
as the means to accomplish the goal.
Felicitas’ affidavit stated that what she knew is that Celerina wanted appellant, who was renting a house near
Celerina’s, to move out. How Felicitas acquired such “knowledge” was not probed into, however, despite the fact that
she was cross-examined thereon.
Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants, appellant cannot be held
liable for double murder with frustrated murder. This is especially true with respect to the death of Celerina, for
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even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill her to get even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive
him out of the neighboring house, Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered
the burning house to save her grandsons.
3. YES. Even if Information charged appellant with “Double Murder with Frustrated Murder,” appellant may be convicted
of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one
for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing
the act.
As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime
would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson.
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
4. PENALTY: Penalty reclusion perpetua.
DAMAGES: No compensatory damages to heirs of Celerina because entitlement thereto was not proven.
Compensatory damages and actual damages for heirs of Alvin are the same. Since the trial court awarded the
duly proven actual damages of P16,500.00 representing burial expenses, the award of compensatory damages
of P50,000.00 does not lie.
Alvin was hospitalized for five days, hence, an award of P8,500.00 as temperate damages for the purpose would
be reasonable. As for the award to Alvin of moral damages, the records do not yield any basis therefor
No exemplary damages “to the heirs of the victims,” absent proof of the presence of any aggravating
circumstances
When death occurs due to a crime, the grant of civil indemnity requires no proof other than the death of the
victim. The heirs of Celerina are thus entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto[ And so
are Alvin’s.
The appellate court’s award of temperate damages of P25,000.00 to Joshua is in order.
DISPOSITIVE: CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE
CRIME: Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613
PENALTY: Reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.
INDEMNITY: Pay P50,000.00 to the heirs of Celerina Solangon, and the same amount to the heirs of
Alvin Savariz, representing civil indemnity
Pay P16,500.00 to the heirs of Alvin as actual damages for burial expenses, and P8,500.00 as temperate
damages for hospitalization expenses.
Pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of Celerina.
Pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages to Joshua Savariz.
4. PEOPLE vs. CARLITO DE LEON, BIEN DE LEON, CORNELIO “AKA” NELIO CABILDO and FILOTEO DE LEON
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: G.R. No. 180762March 4, 2009
FACTS:
At around 8:30 in the evening of April 5, 1986, Aquilina Mercado Rint and her sister Leonisa Mercado, together with
their nephew Narciso Mercado Jr., were inside a hut owned by their father Rafael Mercado located on a tumana in
Polillo, San Josef, Peñ aranda, Nueva Ecija.
The loud and insistent barking of their dog prompted Aquilina to peep through the window and saw five men
approaching the premises whom she recognized as Gaudencio Legaspi and herein appellants. Aquilina and Leonisa
hurriedly went out of the hut and hid behind a pile of wood nearby while Junior was dispatched to call for help.
From their hiding place, they saw appellants surround the hut and set to fire the cogon roofing.
While the hut was burning, Leonisa grabbed a flashlight from her sister and focused the same at the group in order
to see them more clearly. Upon seeing a light focused on them, Gaudencio ordered the others to leave and the men
immediately fled the premises.
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By the time Junior arrived with his uncles, the hut was already razed to the ground.
On April 6, 1986, Police Officer Lucio Mercado conducted an investigation at the scene of the crime and saw a big
wood still on fire. A certain Julio took pictures of the remains of the hut.
Aquilina and Leonisa valued the hut at P3,000.00 and claimed that a pair of earrings, some beddings, rice, P1,500.00
in cash and plenty of wood were also lost in the fire. They also testified that prior to the incident, appellants had
been to the premises, destroyed the plants, the fence and a hut which was first built therein.
Appellants likewise physically attacked their father and issued threats that if he would not give up his claim on
the land, something untoward would happen to him; and that their father Rafael filed several cases for Malicious
Mischief, Forcible Entry and Serious Physical Injuries against appellants.
June 14, 1989, an Information was filed charging Gaudencio Legaspi, Carlito de Leon, Bien de Leon, Cornelio Cabildo
and Filoteo de Leon with the crime of arson.
o April 5, 1986, in Peñ aranda, Nueva Ecija, above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually aiding and helping one another, did then and there, feloniously burn or set on fire the house of one
RAFAEL MERCADO, an inhabited house or dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of said Rafael Mercado in
an amount that may be awarded to him under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Gaudencio Legaspi died on February 5, 1987 prior to his arraignment.
Appellants Bien de Leon, Carlito de Leon, Filoteo de Leon and Nelio Cabildo were subsequently arraigned and they
all pleaded not guilty to the charge.
DEFENSE:
Appellants denied the charge against them.
Carlito alleged that on the day of the alleged incident, he was working in Cavite where he had been staying for a year
with his family; that his uncle Gaudencio was originally in possession of the tumana contrary to Rafael’s claims; that
his uncle used to plant vegetables and make charcoal therein until 1975 when he took over upon the latter’s request;
and that when Gaudencio passed away in 1987, he applied for a patent over the tumana with the Bureau of Lands.
Carlito also alleged that there was actually no structure on the premises because Rafael’s attempt to build a hut
was foiled by his helper, herein appellant Nelio. On cross-examination however, he admitted that on March 12,
1986, he destroyed the first hut constructed by Rafael on the subject tumana when the prosecution confronted
him with evidence which showed that he was found guilty of Malicious Mischief in Criminal Case No. 1985 filed
against him by Rafael before the Municipal Trial Court of Peñ aranda.
Nelio testified that on the day of the incident, the appellants were in their respective homes and could not have gone
to the tumana to commit the crime as charged; that the burnt parts depicted in the pictures presented by the
prosecution were actually parts of tree trunks turned to charcoal; and that the cogon and bamboo shown in the
pictures were materials brought by Rafael into the landholding during the latter’s unsuccessful attempt to build a
hut on the tumana.
Bien also vehemently denied the charges against him and attributed the same to complainants’ desire to grab
the tumana which rightfully belongs to his mother. He testified that since 1982, he has been living in Rizal, Nueva
Ecija which is about 35 kilometers away from Peñ aranda.
For his part, Filoteo corroborated the claims made by his co-appellants
RTC: GUILTY for the crime of arson, and they are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
pay jointly and severally the heirs of Rafael Mercado the sum of P3,000.00 representing the value of the burned
hut.
CA: Affirmed with modification the RTC Decision as to penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
private complainant P2,000.00 as temperate damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Special aggravating circumstance of being committed by a syndicate
ISSUES: Whether the CA is correct in ruling that penalty is reclusion perpertua by virtue of aggravating circumstance of
crime being committed by a syndicate
HELD: (YES)
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1613 amending the law on arson provides: Sec. 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
Section 4 of the same law provides that if the crime of arson was committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is planned or
carried out by a group of three or more persons, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Under the following provision, the elements of arson are:
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o (a) there is intentional burning; and,
o (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
The appellate court correctly found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of
the two essential elements of the offense.
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There
is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has
deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent. If
there is an eyewitness to the crime of arson, he can give in detail the acts of the accused. When this is done the only
substantial issue is the credibility of the witness.
Testimonies of witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa worthy of credence: The inconsistencies and contradictions
presented in the case at bench do not detract from the fact that Rafael’s house was intentionally burned by
accused-appellants who were positively identified by witnesses Aquilina and Leonisa.
TESTIMONY OF AQUILINA
o Aquilina was in the tumana, outside the house when they burned the house because when the
accused were arriving or entering the premises of the house of my father or the tumana, our dog
barked and we peeped thru the window. They saw that 5 men and she recognized them. After
that, they went outside of the house and hid behind the piles of wood which is more or less
seven meters far. They hid because they were their adversary.
o When she went out of the house, she was only with Leonisa because she already instructed
nephew to go to our house when we noticed them coming and I instructed him to fetch my
brothers.
o When she was already behind the piles of wood, the accused surrounded our house and they
lighted it up with match. Gaudencio Legaspi, first lighted a match for purposes of burning the
house. And the others also lighted their matches after Gaudencio Legaspi lighted his match. The
cogon roofing of the hut was first lighted as it was the portion that could be easily burned.
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The appellants had
not shown that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the time and place of the crime.
Proof of the corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of criminal
offenses. Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been
committed.
In arson, the corpus delicti is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire, e.g., the charred
remains of a house burned down and of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated
testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to
warrant conviction. The corpus delicti has been satisfactorily proven in the instant case.
The appellate court correctly imposed the penalty in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua considering
the presence of the special aggravating circumstance. The crime was committed by a syndicate since it was
carried out by a group of three or more persons.
On the matter of damages, the appellate court likewise correctly awarded temperate damages in the amount
of P2,000.00. In view of the presence of the special aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the
amount of P20,000.00 is likewise appropriate.
DISPOSITIVE: Appeal DENIED. CA DECISION AFFIRMED: crime of arson, PENALTY: reclusion perpetua and pay the
heirs of private complainant Rafael Mercado P2,000.00 as temperate damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
c/o HIPOLITO
01 People v Collado
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO COLLADO (alias NINOY), defendant-appellant.
September 14, 1934
Diaz, J
FACTS:
● Accused Marcelino Collado, between 3 and 4 in the afternoon of July 31, 1933 went to the house of Paula
Bautista, who only had 3-yr old asleep child with her on the house (situated in the eastern part of the town of
Bacnotan of the Province of La Union), on the pretext of asking for a glass of water, stealthily approached her and,
without giving her an opportunity to defend herself, embraced and kissed her and caught hold of her breasts.
● When she recovered from the shock, in spite of the fact that the accused threatened to kill her with a dagger, she
defended herself and bit him on the right side of the chest thereby forcing him to release her instantly.
● She cried for help and, picking up a bolo nearby, tried to strike him (SO BRAVE!!). However, the accused, who is
stronger and more agile than she, succeeded in holding her by the arms and they were found in this position by her
cousin Crispulo Ariola who was the first to come to her aid.
● Surprised, he did not go down the stairs but jumped from the house to the ground, fleeing from the scene of the
crime with the utmost speed.
● witnesses for prosec: her cousin Ariola and Luis Cariaso, who also came to her aid
● witness for the defense: Paulino Palaroan and Laureano Nebrija
● RTC: acts of lasciviousness: two months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months and one day of
prision correccional
● defense:
○ he knew her cousin Ariola and his witness Palaroan were just 6 meters away and conversing; and that his
witness Nebrija was inside the house -> would have been foolish of him to commit such
○ his version was that Bautista reproached him because she had heard, that he had been spreading false
reports that she was his mistress or that the two were maintaining illicit relations
ISSUE: WoN accused is guilty of crime of acts of lasciviousness defined in article 336 (YES!)
HELD: GUILTY, RTC modified: six months of arresto mayor to four years, two months and one day of prision correccional
RATIO:
● on his defense: His knowledge that Ariola & Palaroan were near does not make it improbable for him to have
committed the crime cause she was alone in the house (her husband has gone to Manila about a month ago to work
as an agent) & accused showed her a dagger and threatened to kill her if she did not accede to his desires. He must
have believed that she would neither offer any resistance nor give a cry of alarm. Moreover he might have thought
that said two witnesses would not continue conversing at the same place after he had left them.
● SC doesn’t believe Nebrija’s testimony that he was inside house because aside from his testimony and that of the
appellant, nothing in the record to prove the contrary
○ Ariola and Palaroan did not testify that they had seen said witness come out of house even if they were only
6 meters away
● Cariaso testified that when they went up into the house they found only Bautista and her small child, not
mentioning the appellant
● Palaroan admitted that after he had arrived at his boarding house which is about 25 meters from Bautista's
house and also after Ariola had gone up into the latter house, he saw the appellant walking rapidly. This shows that
the appellant actually came out of said house with the utmost speed and that Palaroan left Ariola when the appellant
went to the offended party's house to ask for a glass of water.
02 People vs Buenafe
May 30, 1956
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO BUENAFE Y CALUPAS, defendant-appellant.
Paras, J.
FACTS:
Victim’s Version:
● While Dominga Reyes (the offended party) was walking near the corner of Algeciras and Espana streets, she
saw the accused alight from a taxicab.
● He then approached, grabbed and lifted her into the vehicle.
● Inside, the accused embraced and kissed her and touched her private parts.
● While she was struggling against the accused to free herself, she succeeded in opening the door of the taxi and at
the same time she leaped out and fell in a canal.
● The accused went after her but she managed to escape until she reached the house of Sims at No. 1103
Washington Street.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of committing acts of lasciviousness (NO)
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HELD: The appealed decision is reversed and the appellant is ACQUITTED.
RATIO:
● Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code any act of lasciviousness committed upon a person of either sex,
is punished by prision correccional if any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 335 is present, among which is
the use of force and intimidation.
● In the case at bar, although the trial court concluded that the appellant embraced and kissed, and took liberties
with the person of, the offended party against her strong resistance, it did not expressly find that said appellant was
prompted by lust or lewd designs.
● Considering that the incident took place in a taxicab while passing along a public thoroughfare and at about
noon time, it is difficult to believe that the appellant could have desired more than the ordinary outbursts of one in
love.
● Even as regards the resistance put up by the offended party, the trial court observed that she struggled against
appellant because of her disappointment in not receiving the P50 promised by him— implying that she resisted not
because she did not welcome appellant's caresses but because she expected him first to comply with his
commitment.
● To sustain the charge of abusos deshonestos, something more must appear than that, with or without her
consent, an ardent lover kissed and embraced for a moment a young woman of whom he was enamored, (U. S. vs.
Gomez, 30 Phil., 22).
FACTS:
18-year old AAA, a college student at the Benguet State University, was at the house owned by Tibong’s parents at
Betag, La Trinidad, Benguet where she was boarding
She occupied a room at the 3-bedroom basement
One of the rooms was occupied by Tibong and his wife; 3rd room was unoccupied
Tibong and AAA are first cousins (AAA’s father and Tibong’s mother are siblings)
Before the incident, Tibong’s wife left the house after a misunderstanding with him
Before midnight of Apr. 17, 2006, Tibong arrived and repaired to the sofa at the basement’s living room
AAA thereafter fell asleep but was awakened at about midnight as she felt someone was undressing her
She saw Tibong wearing only briefs and crouching over her, on top of her bed, and pulling down her pajamas and
panties
She asked Tibong why he was doing that
He replied that they will have sexual intercourse and keep it a secret
She asked if he was not sickened about it; he replied that she need not be bothered about their being cousins
She resisted and pulled up her pajamas and panties but Tibong pulled them down to her knees and mashed her
breasts
He soon told her that they should watch a “bold” movie and apply what they watched
She struggled to free herself but he forced her to lie down
She tried to shout for help; he covered her mouth
He thereafter went towards the CD player which was in fron of the door of her room to insert/play a CD
Finding the opportunity to escape, she grabbed her cell phone and bag and ran out of the house after he failed to
restrain her
She headed towards the highway, took a taxi and proceeded to her elder brother’s house (BBB) in Bahong, La
Trinidad
Tibong claims that from the afternoon of Apr. 17 up to 1 am of the next day, he was drinking liquor with his friend
Benny Malao in 3 places---first at Tibong’s father’s house, then at Maryland, and finally at Malao’s boarding house, all
in La Trinidad
On returning home drunk, he immediately went to sleep in the living room
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 118
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Information:
Attempted rape
With lewd designs...try and attempt to rape AAA... while sleeping and unconscious
Did not perform all the acts by reason that the offended party was awakened, defended herself and escaped
Not because of spontaneous desistance
RTC of La Trinidad:
Guilty of attempted rape
Indeterminate penalty of 3 years and 4 months of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to 8 years and 6
months of prision mayor medium, as maximum
Ordered to pay AAA P25K as moral damages + costs
CA: affirmed his conviction
Tibong’s arguments:
- Tibong, citing Perez vs. CA, contends that there was no attempted rape as he did not commence to insert his penis
into her vagina
- He says that he merely told AAA that they will have sexual intercourse
- That this is not equivalent to carnal knowledge or even an attempt
- He contends that this could just be acts of lasciviousness
ISSUE: Whether the crime committed is attempted rape OR only acts of lasciviousness (ATTEMPTED RAPE)
RATIO:
Art. 6, RPC: attempt: when the offender commences commission of felony directly by overt acts but does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance
While rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature, they are fundamentally different
For in rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness, this element is absent.
Defense’s cross examination of AAA:
o She said that he tried to force his penis into her vagina but she covered her vagina
o That his briefs were already lowered down to the middle of his upper leg
o Petitioner’s acts, as narrated by AAA, far from being mere obscene or lewd, indisputably show that he
intended to have, and was bent on consummating, carnal knowledge of AAA.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision of October 12,
2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 31644 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
04 People v Bon
January 28, 2003.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
NEMESIO BON
FACTS:
● Maricris Bonode: 6 years of age and living with her family at 128 Bearbrand Alley, Pangako St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City.
● Bon (uncle): Also staying in their house and is the eldest brother of Violeta Bonode, the victim's mother
● Aug 19, 1997, 3PM: victim was playing on the upper level of their house while Violeta was downstairs washing
their clothes. After Violeta finished her laundry, she went upstairs and saw Bon lying on top of the victim. They were
fully clothed when she saw them. He had his pants on while Maricris was wearing "sando and shorts". Upon seeing
Violeta, accused-appellant immediately stood up and ran downstairs. Maricris also ran downstairs crying. Violeta
asked her daughter about the incident but the latter refused to answer and just cried.
● Following morning: Violeta learned from her youngest daughter that Bon sexually abused Maricris. When
confronted, the victim told her that Bon poked (sinundot) her private part.
● Violeta feared Bon so she chose not to confront him about the incident. Instead, she transferred to Atimonan,
Quezon with her family.
HELD: RTC MODIFIED; Accused-appellant Nemesio Bon is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, as defined and penalized under Art 336 of the RPC, in relation to Article III, Section 5 (b), of RA No. 7610,
and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as min to fifteen 15 years, 6
months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as max; P30,000.00 as moral damages.
RATIO:
● Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the law in force at the time
of the commission of the offense on August 19, 1997, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or demented.
● Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a
woman.
● People v. Campuhan: touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labia of the female organ and not mere
touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
● The general rule is that factual findings by the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance which could alter the result of the case.
● However, a careful review of the evidence on record of the case compels us to take exception to the aforesaid
rule. The prosecution has failed to discharge its onus of proving, beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
accused-appellant for the crime of rape. Specifically, the evidence adduced by the prosecution does not
conclusively establish the element of carnal knowledge. As testified to by the victim, accused-appellant removed
her underwear, inserted his finger into and licked her vagina. It is therefore clear from the foregoing testimony
that accused-appellant did not have sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with the victim. Absent
direct proof of carnal knowledge, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape.
● It appears that in the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of the victim, she never claimed that accused-appellant's penis
grazed or touched her private parts. According to her, he committed the following acts: "Sinundot-sundot ang pekpek
ko, dinilaan ang pekpek ko."
● The presence of a deep healed laceration on the hymen of the victim does not conclusively prove carnal
knowledge. As testified to by Dr. Suguitan, the laceration could have been caused by introduction of any of the
following objects into the victim's vagina: (1) finger; (2) erect penis; or (3) any other blunt instrument that can be
inserted in the vagina. Standing alone, a physician's finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated does
not prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge that rape may be
deemed to have been established.
ISSUE:
1. Whether accused should be acquitted as AAA’s testimony is inconsistent and full of falsehoods?
2. Whether or not the actions of appellant on January 31, 1994 constitute acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape?
HELD:
06 US v De Vivar
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BRAULIO DE VIVAR, defendant-appellant.
February 11, 1915
Araullo, J.
FACTS:
● Teodora Bondoc, unmarried woman 22 years 8 months and 17 days of age on date of the commission of the
crime, daughter of railroad station agent in Magalang, Province of Pampanga, living at said station with her father
and was being courted by Benigno Indiongco (living in Manila), an employee of the same railroad company
● defendant Braulio de Vivar, company's train conductor on the line between Manila and Magalang, served as an
intermediary between the lovers
● early morning of December 30, 1911: Bondoc left her house and accompanied by defendant who was waiting for
her outside went to a spot near a growth of sugar cane, short distance from the station in the said pueblo, in the
belief that her lover, Indiongco, was awaiting her there for the purpose of joining her and eloping with her, an
elopement which defendant made her believe had been planned the night before.
● when defendant and young woman arrived, she inquired about her lover since she didn’t see him, defendant
replied that before delivering her to him she should be for defendant
● she attempted to return home, but defendant caught her by the hand, gave her a slap and dragged her into the
midst of the sugar cane, threatening her with a dagger he had in his hand, he overcame her resistance and
succeeded in lying with her (NOTE - RAPE, shy pa ang ponente LOL)
● defendant kept Teodora Bondoc among the sugar cane until nighttime, when he took her, also by force, in a
cart through the fields to the house of a relative of his in the vicinity of a wood in the municipality of Capas,
Province of Tarlac. There he remained with her alone for three days and, taking advantage of her helplessness and
by intimidating her, lay with her several times during that period, until, as a result of the search and inquiries
made by her father and brother, she was found in the said house and freed from defendant's control.
● CFI Pampanga: guilty of abduction, fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, indemnify Teodora Bondoc in the sum of P500
ISSUE: WoN accused guilty of abduction given woman’s of legal age (YES)
HELD: CFI affirmed but wont suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency bec of indemnity of P500 he was
sentenced
RATIO:
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 124
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
● Article 445 of the Penal Code punishes by reclusion temporal the abduction of a woman against her will and
with lewd designs; elements:
(1) The person kidnapped must be a woman. It is immaterial whether she be a widow, a married woman, or a
virgin, for all three classes are comprised within the generic term of "woman"
(2) The crime must be committed against her will
(3) It must be committed with unchaste designs — that is, with the intention of lying with the woman
● It is unquestionable that Teodora Bondoc, who had freely gone to the place where she believed she would find
her fiancee, lost her liberty from the moment defendant opposed her returning home, and that,
consequently, it was against her will that she was taken by defendant into the sugar cane ->this was the
commencement of the abduction of the young woman, committed by defendant with violence and against her
will. When he got her into the cane field, he abused her by means of force and intimidation.
● If defendant had then left her free, the crime committed by him might perhaps have been classified as rape,
because then the deprivation of her liberty would have been but brief and only for the purpose of his lying with
her. But, considering that defendant retained her among the sugar cane until night, continued to retain her in
Capas for three days longer in his company and against her will, and that he also enjoyed her carnally there; and
considering the deprivation of liberty of the aggrieved party during all of that time, in connection with the
unchaste designs which defendant entertained toward her and which were the motive of his abducting her
against her will, the acts committed by this defendant, and which were proved at the trial, constitute the crime of
abduction
● Abduction: kidnapping of a woman by removing her from her home, or from whatever place she may be, to take
her to some other, for the purpose of her abductor's marrying her or corrupting her.
○ Defendant deceived Teodora Bondoc by telling her that her fiancee, Indiongco, was awaiting her outside
of her house
○ Briefly, he stole Teodora Bondoc in the one place and took her to the other and kept her in his power for
three days for the purpose of corrupting her. It matters not whether the kidnapping of the young woman
was effected after she had voluntarily left her house, deceived, as she was, by the defendant, or whether
it took place in the house itself; nor does it matter whether the offended party was or was not then of
legal age, because the acts performed by defendant with respect to her involved offenses against liberty,
honor and public order. These are offenses which the law punishes in the crime of abduction with
force, and those same acts contain the elements that go to make such crime, and not that of
abduction with consent to which article 446 of the Penal Code refers.
● could have been abduction with consent if:
○ (provided she was of the age specified by law for the existence of such a crime) fiancee had been in that
place and, taking advantage of the presence of his sweetheart, Teodora Bondoc, had taken her away with
him for unchaste purposes, thus removing her from her father's control -> in that case the defendant
would have been a coprincipal or accomplice in the said crime
○ however, there is no evidence that Indiongco intended this; it was all defendant’s doing
07 US vs Ramirez
March 8, 1919
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUFINO RAMIREZ,. VICTORIANO CORPUS and PLACIDO DE OCAMPO, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
● Rufino Ramirez was, prior to October 13, 1916, an unsuccessful lover of a young lady named Regina
Tolentino.
● In view of his disappointment, Ramirez sought the aid of Victoriano Corpus and Placido de Ocampo for the
purpose of abducting the girl.
● October 13, 1916: The three defendants hired an automobile, it then being nightfall, and proceeded toward the
district of Santa Mesa, Manila, stopping at the Rotonda.
● Regina Tolentino, accompanied by a male companion, Francisco Malabunga, and a female companion,
Marcelina Tolentino, while walking in Calle Santa Mesa, was suddenly grasped by Placido de Ocampo.
Marcelina Tolentino and Regina Tolentino, amidst screams, struggled against Placido de Ocampo but without
success.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the trial court erred in not continuing the case (NO)
2 Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of abduction with force were present (YES)
3 Whether or not the crime was consummated (YES)
HELD: GUILTY OF ABDUCTION WITH FORCE. There being present in the commission of the crime one aggravating
circumstance not compensated by any mitigating circumstance, the penalty provided by article 445 must be imposed in
the maximum degree. Judgment is reversed and each defendant and appellant is sentenced to seventeen years, four
months, and one day of reclusion temporal, together with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay one third of
the costs in the first instance and one half of the costs in this instance.
RATIO:
1. CONTINUANCES.
● The attorney for the appellants contends that the court erred in refusing to grant a further continuance with a
view to giving the defense an opportunity to look for their material witness, who in the case at bar was also one of
the accused.
● It is claimed by counsel that "It is the right of every accused to be able to present as a witness any person whom
he believes to be necessary for his defense," and that to deprive him of said right would be tantamount to denying
him one of the means allowed by law for his defense.
● Between the day when the information was presented and the day of the trial about sixteen months had
elapsed, during which time the defendants had obtained seven continuances.
● This was the situation when the case was called, and counsel for the defense asked for further time to find the
co-accused Ramirez.
● Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Where the court conceives it
to be necessary for the more perfect attainment of justice, it has the power upon the motion of either party to
continue the case. But a party charged with a crime has no natural or inalienable right to a continuance.
● Other jurisdictions have held that three things are necessary to put off a trial on account of the absence of a
witness:
1 First, that the witness is really material and appears to the court to be so;
2 Second, that the party who applies has been guilty of no neglect;
3 And third, that the witness can be had at the time to which the trial has been deferred, and incidentally, that no
similar evidence could be obtained.
● There must be, in order to sustain the motion, facts from which the court can infer that there is a reasonable
prospect that the attendance of the witness, or his testimony, can be procured at a future day.
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 126
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
● Rufino Ramirez, the coaccused, is admitted to be a fugitive from justice. Counsel, after seven continuances had
been granted in the lower court, nowhere purposes to have said witness before the court at a specified time. At
the trial the attorney upon being asked by the court to state whether or not he could make certain the
attendance of the witness replied as follows: "I cannot bind myself to find him for the reason that we do not
know his whereabouts."
● If continuances could be procured on the ground of the absence of one of the material witnesses without stating
that the witness can be brought before the court at a reasonable time in the future, the delays in the
administration of justice would soon become intolerable.
● Whilst great liberality should be extended to persons charged with crime in preparing their defense and
particularly in procuring the attendance of witnesses, the rule must not be relaxed so as to defeat the ends of
justice.
2. ABDUCTION OF ARTICLE 445 OF THE PENAL CODE ANALYZED. ― Article 445 of the Penal Code reads:
"The abduction of a woman against her will and with lewd designs shall be punished by reclusion temporal.
"The same penalty shall be imposed in every case if the female abducted be under twelve years of age."
● Both the civil and the common law authorities agree in the conclusion that the crime of abduction is one
"sumamente grave y odioso" (highly serious and detestable.)
● The penal law regarding abduction, says the supreme court of Spain, was intended to punish the offense against
public morality and the insult to the family of the abducted girl.
● The three elements in the crime punished by article 445 of the Penal Code are:
● (1) That the person abducted be a woman; (2) that the abduction must have been against the will of the woman;
and (3) that the abduction must have been for lewd or unchaste designs.
● That the first two elements are here present is incontestable. The "taking," as contemplated by the Code, is
demonstrated by the force used in snatching the offended girl from a street in the city of Manila and carrying her
to the rice paddies some distance away.
● Stress is laid by counsel for appellants on the absence of the third essential element, namely, lewd or unchaste
designs.
● In a criminal action for abduction, in order to demonstrate the presence of the lewd designs, actual illicit
criminal relations with the person abducted need not be shown. The intent to seduce the girl is sufficient
● The presence of the lewd designs is here revealed by the actions of the accused. Among other indications of this
intent can be mentioned the taking of the girl at night by the use of force and threats to overcome her resistance;
the act of embracing her while in the automobile; the proposition to go to a house in Balic-balic; the beating
of the chauffeur who did not want to start the engine of the automobile, and the fact that Rufino Ramirez had
been making love to the girl prior to the abduction
08 People vs. Crisostomo (Feb. 17, 1923) NOT ABDUCTION BUT ILLEGAL DETENTION
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, a plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO CRISOSTOMO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
ROMUALDEZ, J.
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 127
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
FACTS:
After 8 or 9 am of Dec. 26, 1920, in Bacoor, Cavite: While Macaria Gabriel (30 years old), Macaria, and her aunt
Candida Acuñ a were walking in the direction of their houses from that of Gregoria Acuñ a (to whom Macaria had paid
the sum of P30) the accused met them on the way
Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and Casimiro Garde dragged Macaria along and took her against her will to a rice
field
Macaria was not able to prevent it by her cries and strife and insults
The other defendants, Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, caught hold of Candida (her aunt)
thus preventing her from helping Macaria
Gregoria, attracted by the cries of Candida, went to the place and attacked with a club those holding Macaria until
they released her
As soon as Candida was released by her aggressors, she went to Macaria’s house and reported the incident to
Macaria’s brother, Constantino
Constantino ran after the abductors of his sister overtaking them when they had just released her, which they did
upon seeing him
Prosecution contends that Macaria was abducted by Crisostomo against her will
Defense asserts that there was an agreement between her and Crisostomo and that both of them, by mutual accord,
had escaped from the parental house of said Macaria when her brother Constantino overtook them
Information:
"defendants conspiring and confederating together, did intentionally, unlawfully, and criminally and with unchaste
designs and through force kidnap Macaria Gabriel on a road leading to Salinas, Bacoor, Cavite, taking her therefrom
to a rice field in said municipality against her will"
CFI of Cavite:
Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and Casimiro Garde guilty as principals (14 years, 8 mos, and 1 day of reclusion
temporal)
Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat as accomplices (8 years and 1 day of prision mayor
All of the consummated crime of abduction through violence
Each to pay 1/6 of the costs
Crisostomo is further sentenced to pay to Macaria the sum of P500 as an endowment.
ISSUE:
1) W/N the accused are guilty of ABDUCTION (No)
2) W/N the accused are guilty of ILLEGAL DETENTION (YES)
3) W/N the accused are guilty of ATTEMPTED COERCION (No)
HELD:
1) ABDUCTION
Earmarks of veracity prevail in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses (as found and given credence by the trial
judge)
In addition, the manner of the eloping alleged by the defense is improbable in the case of a woman like Macaria
who, by reason of her 30 years' age, must be presumed more reflexive and cautions in carrying out a
preconceived plan than a young woman
If it were true that it was Macaria's object to escape, she would not have done so in the daytime, nor would she have
gone in company with Candida, nor would she have, so childishly and in the presence of several persons, taken
advantage of the circumstances of her companion entering the house of Gregoria to speak with the latter for some
minutes.
It does not appear that Macaria was under the vigilance of her relatives and, in view of her age, she would have
naturally enjoyed a certain degree of liberty such as to go, as she did, to the barrio of Salinas, Bacoor, from her
residence in Palicot, Imus; with which liberty she could have planned and carried into effect with full success her
escape from the parental house.
Crisostomo also admitted to a Constabulary officer that they deemed it better to abduct Macaria as she firmly
answered in the negative to his previous proposal
On another occasion, he requested Macaria’s another brother Epifaniol to intervene in his favour
2) ILLEGAL DETENTION
The accused deprived Macaria of her liberty even without placing her in an inclosure
llegal detentions consists not only in imprisoning a person but also in detaining her or depriving her in any
manner of her liberty.
o ART. 481. Any private individual who shall lock up or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor.
Neither is it an argument against this finding in the present case that the information by which this
prosecution was initiated is for another crime, for it is alleged therein that the "defendants conspiring and
confederating together, did intentionally, unlawfully, and criminally and with unchaste designs" (the latter were
not proven) and "through force kidnap Macaria Gabriel...
As may be seen, it is alleged in this information that the defendants, in the manner aforesaid deprived Macaria of
her liberty
3) ATTEMPTED COERCION (in so far as the defendants attempted through force to compel Macaria to marry
Crisostomo)
It is not proven that they did in fact attempt to compel Macaria to contract marriage.
It can be supposed that they merely tried to take Macaria away from the environment of the family, in the hope that
she might be persuaded without force or violence whatsoever to marry Crisostomo
On conspiracy:
It is true that no witness testified to having seen or heard the accused conspire or confederate
But in view of their simultaneous acts — three seizing Macaria Gabriel and the other three getting hold of her
companion: joint act and tends to the same end: that of illegally depriving Macaria of her liberty
It cannot be conceived that there was no agreement between the defendants
Said act constitutes in itself evident and sufficient proof of the conspiracy and confederacy
DISPOSITIVE:
The judgment appealed from is reversed
appellants found guilty of illegal detention
principals: eight years and one day of prision mayor
accomplices: two years, four months and one day of prision correccional
each to pay proportionate part of the costs
the endowment that the lower court awarded to Macaria is deleted because they were found guilty of illegal
detention and not abduction
09 People v Garcia
February 28, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY and THREE JOHN DOES, accused.
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
● Cleopatra Changlapon: 19 y.o., sophomore student of B.S. Physical Therapy at the Baguio Central University.
● July 14, 1998, she left school at 6:30 p.m. to go home to Km. 3, La Trinidad, Benguet. As she was crossing
Bonifacio St, Baguio City, she saw a white van approaching so she stopped to let it pass. Suddenly, the van stopped in
front of her. The rear door slid open and Cleopatra was pulled by the arms into the van. She struggled as the door
closed and the van sped away. Something was sprayed on her face which made her eyes sting and feel dizzy. She
shouted, then felt a fist blow on her stomach and fell unconscious.
● When Cleopatra came to (her senses), she was inside a room totally undressed lying flat on her back on a bed
with four men in the room. One of them, who had Bombay features, was also totally naked while the other 3 were in
briefs smoking cigarettes.
● (1st rape) The Bombay-looking man lay on top of her. She tried to push him away but he held her left arm.
Another man with long hair, whom she later identified as accused-appellant Jeffrey Garcia, burned her right chin
with a lighted cigarette. Cleopatra fought back but Garcia held her right arm. While Garcia was seated on her right
side and holding her, the Bombay-looking man proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She tried to kick him
and close her legs, but 2 men held her feet, boxed her thighs and burned her legs with cigarettes.
● (2nd rape) After the Bombay-looking man finished, Garcia took his turn and went on top of her. One of the men
sat on her right leg and pinned it down, while another held her left leg. Cleopatra tried to punch Garcia with her right
hand, but the Bombay-looking man held her right arm. Garcia then had sexual intercourse with her while holding her
left arm.
ISSUE/S:
W/N TC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING GARCIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME
OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE AND FOR THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED IN
CONSPIRACY WITH THREE (3) OTHERS? (NO)
W/N TC GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION TO THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT JEFFREY GARCIA Y CARAGAY IS ONLY A LOOK-ALIKE OF THE REAL CULPRIT? (NO)
W/N TC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLEOPATRA CHANGLAPON HAD POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED JEFFREY
GARCIA Y CARAGAY AS ONE OF THOSE WHO ABDUCTED AND RAPED HER? (NO)
HELD: RTC AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death
for the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and Reclusion Perpetua for each of the three counts of rape;
P146,125.75 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
RATIO:
FACTS:
● At dusk on the evening of June 26, 1910:
○ Lorenza Cornejo, a girl of about 15 years of age, unmarried, left her house to return some flags which she
had borrowed
○ while returning home she was approached by Francisco Reyes, who for some time past had been courting
her, making her promises of marriage, and who had arranged with her to accompany him to this city for the
purpose of getting married.
○ Reyes insisted on Lorenza's going away with him, and accordingly advised her to go alone to the street-car
station, saying that he would follow her, so that no one might see them traveling together;
○ They took a car for this city and went to the house of Jose Torno, situated on Calle Cervantes, and there they
remained and lived together conjugally. They had carnal intercourse about ten times. whenever the
abducted girl demanded of her abductor that he fulfill his promise of marriage, he would reply that his
mother was looking for some influential person who might speak to Lorenza's mother; and that the girl
afterwards learned from her own mother that the defendant was married
○ After more than fifteen days, they were found by the girl's mother, Cirila Escobar, and a policeman. Reyes
was wearing a Chinese camisa, and the girl a chemisette tucked under her skirt.
● charged Francisco Reyes with the crime of consented abduction
● CFI: guilty- two years eleven months and ten days of prision correccional, to pay an indemnity of P3,000 to
the offended party, Lorenza Cornejo, and, in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, in
conformity with article 50, rule 1, of the Penal Code, to pay the costs, and to suffer the other penalties specified in the
said judgment.
ISSUE: WON guilty of consented abduction- yes
RATIO:
● Art 446 (old) penal code: abduction was committed against the person of a maiden of over 12 and under 23
years of age, with her consent and with unchaste designs.
● SC of Spain: purpose of the law is to prescribe punishment for the disgrace to her family and the alarm
caused therein by the disappearance of one who is by her age and sex, susceptible to cajolery and deceit.
● Witnesses: Telesforo Pestañas and Miguela de Guzman saw them going along the street together toward the
street-car station
● Other witnesses: The policeman, Eugenio Wenceslao,and the owners of the house, Jose Torno and Aurelia Ligdao
● it is unquestionable that the defendant, with unchaste designs, through cajolery and false promises of
marriage made deceitfully and in bad faith, succeeded in seducing the young girl who left her mother's house, by
prearrangement with the defendant and at his bidding, inasmuch as he awaited her on the road and they came
together to this city and hid themselves and lodged at the house of Jose Torno
● The crime of abduction, with unchaste designs and the consent of the abducted, was consummated, because the
girl left her mother's house, gave herself up to her abductor, had carnal intercourse no less than 10 times, and
lived with him conjugally
● Although she was not forcibly taken, it is sufficient that the girl should have left, as she did, removing herself
from her mother's custody and yielding to the cajolery, inducement, and promises of her abductor, who took her
away with unchaste designs.
● DEFENSE: The defendant denied the charge and pleaded not guilty,
● The averment by Marcelino de la Virgen can not be held to have been proven, which was to the effect that the
mother of the abducted girl charged him to tell the defendant that he should give her P2,000, else he would be
prosecuted. This statement is unsupported by proof and was denied by the mother
Dispositive:
SUMMARY: Appellants induced and helped the offended party to leave her home to elope to Ligao, Albay in order to
marry Pedro Amante, one of the accused; however she was persuaded to go to San Juan and they ended up at Josefa Sto.
Domingo’s house. She was persuaded to go to the coconut grove and on the way, she was forcibly violated (raped) 4
times: (1) Eligio Amante away from the house into the road to the coconut grove -> alone (2) Francisco Sanchez raped
her as he held her by the hands and threatened her with a knife with Eligio pinning her to the coconut tree and held her
by the feet, (3) Vicente Sanchez, threw her to the ground covered her mouth with a handkerchief and violated her, while
Pedro Amante held her feet and looked on, (4) Pedro Amante, took hold of her hands, and succeeded in violating her.
FACTS:
• Accused Eligio Amante and Pedro Amante were carpenters in the house of Mariquita Motos in Baoa, Camarines Sur,
who is the mother of Jose Sanchez, uncle of the accused Vicente Sanchez. Accused Francisco Sanchez is also Vicente
Sanchez's uncle. All of them were residents of the municipality of Ligao, but during the course of construction of the
house they lived in Mariquita Motos' house.
• Patrocinio Botardo, the offended party, is a young girl 15 years of age and a pupil in the fourth grade of the public
school of Baao, lived alone with her mother, Martiana Botardo, in said municipality.
• Early July (PM):, While Patrocinio Botardo was going to the market with her mother, she met Vicente Sanchez and
Pedro Amante, and Vicente Sanchez introduced Pedro Amante to the girl.
• Pedro Amante began to visit Patrocinio Botardo at her house. After two or three visits, Pedro Amante, who had also
attended the public school of this town, began to make love (probably only woo-> must be virgin for crime to be
committed) to the girl and proposed marriage to her.
• Patrocinio Botardo told Pedro Amante that she could not accept his proposal unless he first asked her mother and
because she was still going to school.
• July 8, 1925 (PM): Pedro Amante and Vicente Sanchez called upon Patrocinio Botardo at her home. Vicente Sanchez
tried to persuade her to marry Pedro Amante, saying that he was a good man; but she insisted in her refusal, because
Pedro Amante had not as yet spoken to her mother.
• July 22, 1925: Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante called on her again and spoke to her mother. They afterwards spoke
to the girl alone and tried to persuade her to accept the proposal of marriage. That night the mother and daughter did
not sleep in their house but in the house of the former's cousin in order to keep her company. During their absence,
Vicente Sanchez entered Patrocinio Botardo's house and took her clothes from her trunk. (See intent to abduct
with taking of clothes)
• The following day, before sunrise, Martiniana Botardo left for Iriga to sell fish. Patrocinio Botardo had asked her
mother's permission to go to her aunt Simeona's house to iron some clothes. At 7 AM (July 23): Patrocinio Botardo left
her house and went to the market, and from there she went to her aunt Simeona's house. Before arriving at her aunt's
house she met the accused Vicente Sanchez and Eligio Amante, who persuaded her to follow them by train from the
station at Baao to Ligao, Albay, in order to marry Pedro Amante.
• As she was already predisposed to marry Pedro Amante, she agreed and they went to the railroad station at Baao.
Upon arriving there, Vicente Sanchez and Eligio Amante said to her: "We should first go to the chapel, lest your mother
might find you here," referring to the San Juan's Chapel. Patriconio at first hesitated, but Vicente Sanchez said to her: "Let
us take the train at San Juan, because my fiancee Pascuala is there."
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 136
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
• Upon arriving at San Juan, where they said they would take the truck, Vicente Sanchez and Eligio Amante took her to
the house of one Josefa Sto.. Domingo and upon arriving there, Vicente Sanchez said. "We had better go along the road
for Pascuala and Pedro Amante ought to be there."
• They immediately went downstairs and followed a long path, bordered by tall weeds, in the direction of a coconut
grove. Upon arriving at a certain place, Vicente Sanchez said to them: "Let us go back because Pascuala and Pedro are
not there."
• They did so, and upon arriving at Josefa's house, Vicente Sanchez had them saying: "I am going to town for a moment,
you wait here with Eligio Amante." Just as Vicente Sanchez had left to buy something to eat, Francisco Sanchez
arrived. Eligio Amante then said: "Let us go to the coconut grove because Vicente, Pedro and Pascuala ought to be there
now." Francisco Sanchez agreed but Patrocinio Botardo refused to go with them so Eligio Amante said to her: "As you
will not come with us, I will tie you with 'panela' (rope)."
• Patrocinio Botardo then remarked: "Am I a carabao that you need to tie me?;" and Eligio Amante replied: "Certainly, if
you do not want to come with us I will tie you with this rope. When a young woman elopes she has an earnest desire to
carry it to a finish."
• Francisco Sanchez and Eligio Amante told her afterward that somebody had told them that Vicente was waiting for
them on the road. Whereupon she consented to go, and they left the house.
• Upon seeing that they were going to a forest where there was no road, Josefa Sto. Domingo said to them: "That is not
the way to the road." Patrocinio Botardo repeated the same remark, but Eligio Amante insisted, saying: "This is the way
to the road."
• When they were a good distance from the house, Vicente Sanchez left them saying: "You go ahead, I will meet you on
the road." While Eligio Amante and Patrocinio Botardo were alone, the former insisted upon taking the latter to an
Indian almond tree (talisay).
• Patrocinio Botardo wanted to take the way that led to the road, but Eligio Amante took hold of her hands and wanted
to take her to a bamboo grove. She refused to go with him and said: "What shall we do there?" and Eligio Amante
replied: "Why won't you go with me?, why won't you obey me? Obey me because it will only take a few minutes."
• As she resisted, he took hold of her hands and feet, threw her on the ground, and tried to violate her. She stood up, but
he again took hold of her hands and feet and threw her on the ground; and as she was down, he held and mounted her.
The girl succeeded in getting up again, but she could not stand and dropped down. Eligio Amante then lay down beside
her, but she stood up for the third time. For the fourth time, he threw her on the ground and held her hands.
• Patrocinio Botardo tried to shout, but could not do so, because Eligio Amante covered her mouth with a handkerchief.
Having completely overpowered her, he raised her dress and succeeded in violating her. It was then about 8 o'clock in
the morning. After having sexually abused her, Eligio Amante invited her to stand up and leave the place with him.
• They had not gone very far when Francisco Sanchez appeared, and addressing Eligio Amante, said "Eligio, first go and
buy tuba, for I want a drink of tuba very much." When Eligio Amante had left, Patrocinio Botardo said to Francisco
Sanchez: "Your companion wanted to violate me;" and Francisco said: "Why did you not shout," and she replied that
she could not because Eligio Amante covered her mouth with a handkerchief.
• A little later, Eligio Amante returned and said "There is no tuba, I was unable to buy it." He then turned and walked
toward a coconut grove. Francisco Sanchez, who remained alone with the girl, wanted to take his turn and violate her,
but as she resisted, he said to Eligio Amante: "She refuses."
• Whereupon Eligio Amante pinned her to an inclined coconut tree and held her by the feet, while Francisco
Sanchez held her by the hands and threatened her with a knife. At the same time, Eligio Amante raised her dress,
and Francisco Sanchez, after slapping her face, caught her around the neck. Francisco Sanchez with the aid of Eligio
Amante succeeded in violating the girl.
• After the violation by Francisco Sanchez, Pedro Amante and Vicente Sanchez appeared. Upon seeing them, the girl
wanted to flee, but Vicente Sanchez said to her: "Now that we are here, will you go?" and she replied: Naturally,
because Francisco Sanchez and his companion wanted to violate me."
• Exhausted and weakened she sat on the trunk of a guava tree, when Pedro Amante and Vicente Sanchez approached
her, the latter saying: Please me also, now that Francisco and Eligio have already abused you." "I do not want to," she
replied Vicente Sanchez then Sanchez then said: "Why not?, I have helped you so that your mother might not overtake
you!"
• As the girl used to consent to their lewd desires, Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante took hold of her hands, and she
said: "Why do you hold me, you are like dogs." The girl had not as yet recovered her strength, and it was an easy matter
for Vicente Sanchez and Pedro Amante to throw her ground, which they covered-with their shirts.
• She wanted to shout, but Vicente Sanchez covered her mouth with a handkerchief and violated her, while Pedro
Amante held her feet and looked on. Pedro Amante then took his turn, notwithstanding her protest and remarks,
EVIDENCE:
• Josefa Sto. Domingo saw that the blanket which she had used was stained with blood, which could not be removed by
the first washing.
• Medical examination on August 12, 1926: Hymen ruptured and a large amount of a mucous like secretion in the vaginal
canal due to a slight inflammation of the vagina, which might have been caused by a sexual intercourse.
DEFENSE:
• Vicente Sanchez claims that on July 21,1925 he went to Naga, a distance of 30 kilometers from Baao, to order a silk
shirt from his old sewing woman Esperanza Margallo, living in his aunt Pilar Sanchez' house until the following day,
when he returned to Baao, arriving there at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
• The accused Francisco Sanchez attempted to prove that on July 15, 1925, at the request of his sister Pilar, he went to
Naga to supervise the repairs on her house and did not return to Baao until the 4th of the following August.
• The accused Pedro and Eligio Amante tried to prove that during the day in question, they were working on the
construction of Mariquita Motos' house in Baao, and that they had not left the place.
• Josefa Sto. Domingo’s testimony that she did not see any of the accused in her house, and that Patrocinio had been in
her house accompanied by two unknown men different from the accused. She testified in the preliminary investigation
because of threat by Juan Botardo, who told her that if she did not testify as he wanted her to, her husband would not be
excluded from the complaint and would not be released. DENIED by Juan Botardo
CFI of Camarines Sur: Eligio Amante, Francisco Sanchez, Pedro Amante and Vicente Sanchez GUILTY of the complex
crime of abduction with consent, with rape (or consented abduction with rape)
• PENALTY: Brothers Amante and F. Sanchez sentenced to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day reclusion temporal,
Vicente Sanchez, on account of being under 18 years of age to 12 years prision mayor, Indemnify the offended
party Patrocinio Botardo in the sum of P500, and each to pay one-fourth of the costs of the action.
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 138
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
ISSUES:
1. Whether the accused are guilty of the crime of consented abduction with rape in view of contradictory testimony of
witnesses? (YES)
2. Whether the relations, which, according to the prosecution existed between the offended party Patrocinio Botardo
and Pedro Amante, were against the will of the former and were brought by the use of force? (Not specifically answered
but still YES)
HELD:
1. Yes. Testimony CREDIBLE. Far from destroying the probative force of said testimony they strengthen the same, as
seen that neither could there have been a conspiracy nor a preconceived plan as to what they were to testify to.
Considering the varied points of view of persons and their perceptive ability, it is but natural that they should differ in
the narration of their observations. It is psychologically impossible that they should agree in all details. Hence, when
the testimony of two witnesses agrees even in its minute details, it ceases to be an accurate statement of the
subjective truth.
MAIDEN CREDIBILITY: The offended party is a young girl fifteen years of against whom there cannot be the least doubt
as to her chastity and honor.
• Like all maidens of her race, the loss of her virginity made her so ashamed that at first she did not want to return to her
town where two of those who had outraged her lived. A girl who has hardly begun to know the ways of the world, and
who has such a high and delicate regard for purity, is not capable of fabricating such a bestial and shameful act of
which she was a victim; her own sentiment of purity would rebel against such an idea, inasmuch as she would be
exposed to the scorn and disrespect of honest people.
• This is shown by the fact that she was ashamed to tell even those who had violated her that she had been
violated, and in accusing those who first had sexual intercourse with her, she only said to those who succeeded them
that they wanted to violate her.
2. YES. The contention of the defense that Patrocinio’s confidence in Amante’s promise after she was violated disproves
her testimony of the outrage she suffered is without merit. If the position in which she found herself and the loss of what
all reputable women consider as their most precious possession are taken into consideration, it is not strange that in
order to save herself from dishonor she should still continue believing him, as a drowning man who clings to the
smallest floating object to save himself from drowning.
TOPIC: PROSECUTION OF CRIMES OF ADULTERY, CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION, RAPE AND ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS
NATURE: Original petition praying that a writ of prohibition issue to the respondent court commanding it to desist and
refrain from further proceedings in criminal case No. 12004 entitled the People vs. Apolinario Samilin, in which the
defendant (petitioner here) is on trial for the crime of rape.
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 139
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FACTS:
• April 16, 1931: Criminal case (Rape committed to girl of 12 yrs. old) was commenced on, by a complaint signed and
filed by the chief of police of the municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan, before the justice of the peace, in conformity
with the provisions of Act No. 1773
• After a finding of probable cause, the case was sent to the CFI Pangasinan
• June 11, 1931: the provincial fiscal signed and filed an information against the accused for the said crime of rape, again
pursuant to Act No. 1773
• June 29, 1931: the petitioner was duly arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty
• November 17, 1931: the trial began with the testimony of the alleged offended party. The trial was continued and set
for hearing on January 13, 1932.
• January 1, 1932: Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) took effect.
• January 13, 1932: Trial resumed; the accused through his counsel moved that the court dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction, invoking article 22 in connection with articles 344, paragraph 2, 336 and 367 of the Revised Penal Code.
• February 9, 1932: Court denied said motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
• LAWS:
o RPC 22: "Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.”
o RPC 344, paragraph 2: The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case
may be.
o Section 1 of Act No. 1773, which took effect October 11, 1907, provides: "Hereafter the crimes of adultery,
estupro (rape of minor), abduction, rape, calumny (slander), and libel, as defined by the Penal Code of the
Philippine Islands, shall be deemed to be public crimes and shall be prosecuted in the same manner as are all
other crimes defined by said Penal Code or by the Acts of the Philippine Commission.
o Act No. 1773 was expressly repealed by article 367 of the Revised Penal Code, saving, however, the cases
covered by article 366 which reads as follows: "Application of laws enacted prior to this Code. — Without
prejudice to the provisions contained in Article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior
to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the
time of their commission.
PETITIONER:
o Complaint was not signed or filed by the aggrieved party (in this case a girl of 12 years), or her parents, grand-
parents or guardian, the court is now without jurisdiction to proceed with prosecution.
o Since January 1, 1932, the RPC 344, paragraph 2, prosecution for rape requires that the complaint shall be made by the
offended party or her parents, grand- parents or guardian as the case may be.
o This is a jurisdictional requirement and the requirement favors the petitioner; and under RPC 22, said requirement
must be given a retroactive effect and relate back to the complaint filed in this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the requirement of article 344, paragraph 2, that the complaint must be made by the aggrieved party or her
relatives favor persons charged with the crimes there mentioned? In other words, should it be given retroactive effect?
(NO)
a. Whether by virtue of the enactment of RPC, the offense is now a private offense out of what was under the
previous code a public offense? (NO)
2. Whether the requirement is jurisdictional in the sense that prosecutions in such cases, begun before January 1, 1932,
and pending thereafter, must be dismissed if the complaints were not signed and filed by the offended party or her
relatives as aforesaid? (NO)
HELD:
1. NO. Article 344, paragraph 2 cannot have retroactive effect as it was not made favorable to the accused. Article 22
makes the penal laws retroactive "favor the persons guilty of felony". Their appellants’ major premise, that article 344,
paragraph 2, is favorable to persons charged with the crimes there indicated fails. There can be no reasonable doubt that
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 140
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
CFI Pangasinan in this case should proceed to final judgment in accordance with article 366 of the Revised Penal Code
UNLESS article 22 stands in the way.
• Article 22 is not to be applied in this case (as provision not enacted to favor the accused); Article 366 applies
insofar as it applies the law at the time of the commission of the offense.
• PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 344: Moreover, it is patent that the provision requiring that the proceedings must be
initiated upon complaint filed by the offended party or her relatives, was enacted out of consideration for the
offended party and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through
with the scandal of a public trial.
• It would be an insult to the Legislature to hold that article 344, paragraph 2 was enacted with the intention of
favoring seducers and rapists.
• Citing People of the Philippine Islands vs. Dionisio Candido, Article 344, paragraph 2:
o In this case, it was argued that the court had no jurisdiction upon the absence of a signature in the
complaint of the offended party as required by Article 344, paragraph 2. Defendant charged with the
crime of abduction with consent upon an information signed and filed by the provincial fiscal was
convicted and sentenced, and an appeal was filed in the SC. The motion for reconsideration was denied
and the judgment of conviction affirmed by the First Division.
• COMPARE WITH: Clemente Laceste vs. the Director of Prisons, Article 344, paragraph 3:
o Criminal liability of the offender which is extinguished upon marriage with offended party benefits co-
principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the abovementioned crimes." It is not to be
overlooked that article 344 provides that marriage "shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him." It is obvious that the provision for the remission of all penalty upon
marriage is favorable both to the principal and the accessory.
1a. No, this is a mere verbal distinction, for it is the government in both cases that conducts the prosecution and
punishes the offender. Nor is it clear that a complaint is any less likely to be filed or any less likely to be vigorously
prosecuted in the one case than in the other. It is not apparent that it can make any real difference to the accused
whether he is tried on a complaint filed by the offended party or on one filed by the fiscal.
● Indeed, it is conceivable that the offended party might insist upon the filing and trial of a complaint which an
experienced and impartial fiscal would be unwilling to file for technical reasons or for lack of sufficient evidence
that would lead to conviction. A private individual might file a complaint out of malice or other improper motive,
which would not ordinarily be imputable to the government or its officials.
2. NOT DOCTRINAL but People vs. Tolentino held that "it does not appear from the Revised Penal Code that it was the
intention of the law to divest Courts of First Instance of jurisdiction over crimes already acquired; the contrary is clearly
implied."
• Penal laws that relate to mere matters of form or procedure are colorless when examined to ascertain whether or
not they favor the accused. They are all designed to secure to the defendant a speedy and impartial trial in accordance
with law, without advantage either to the prosecution or to the defense.
• Viewed in this light, changes in procedure introduced by the Revised Penal Code are not to be given retroactive
effect in the sense that all proceedings prior to January 1, 1932, which conform to the law in force at the time, must be
overturned and new proceedings begun. Article 366 was enacted to avoid the havoc which would have resulted if said
changes had been made retroactive.
DISPOSITIVE: The petition for writ of prohibition is denied with costs against the petitioner.
SIMULATION OF BIRTHS, SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CHILD FOR ANOTHER AND CONCEALMENT OR ABANDONMENT
OF LEGITIMATE CHILD
c/o Hipolito
Art. 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another and concealment or abandonment of a legitimate
child. — The simulation of births and the substitution of one child for another shall be punished by prision mayor and a
fine of not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall conceal or abandon any legitimate child with intent to
cause such child to lose its civil status.
COMPARE WITH: Art. 276. Abandoning a minor. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos
shall be imposed upon any one who shall abandon a child under seven years of age, the custody of which is incumbent
upon him.
When the death of the minor shall result from such abandonment, the culprit shall be punished by prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods; but if the life of the minor shall have been in danger only, the penalty shall be
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The provisions contained in the two preceding paragraphs shall not prevent the imposition of the penalty provided for
the act committed, when the same shall constitute a more serious offense.
FACTS:
Information: Saturnino Capillo and Petrona Paduga charged with Crime of exposing a legitimate child to lose his
civil status
August 12, 1913: in Manila, Saturnino Capillo and Petrona Paduga, conspiring and confederating together and
helping one another, did feloniously expose a child, 1 month old, the legitimate son of the accused Saturnino
Capillo and his wife Vicenta Umanbang to lose his civil status
Saturnino Capillo, with intent to cause his legitimate child to lose his civil status and in cooperation with the
defendant Petrona Paduga, took the said without the permission of his mother Vicenta Umanbang or the
authority of the courts of this city and agreed with one Chua Pue Tee to deliver to him the said child and never to
claim it again
Asking the said Chua Pue Tee at the same time to lend them the sum of P150 to defray the expenses incurred
by the defendant Saturnino Capillo during the last sickness and death of his wife Vicente Umanbang
Received from said Chua Pue Tee the sum of P106 of which P50 corresponded to the defendant Saturnino
Capillo and P56 to defendant Petrona Paduga.
That the living of said child under such circumstances in the possession of said Chua Pue Tee and His wife Sio
Suat King exposes said child to lose his civil status, to wit, that of the legitimate son of the said defendant
Saturnino Capillo and his wife Vicenta Umanbang to that of an unknown and nameless child or at the most to
that of the child of one Chua Pue Tee and his wife.
Aggravating circumstance of price should be taken into consideration.
August 21, 1913: Defendants pleaded not guilty
September 1, 1913: the defendant’s counsel filed a motion, in the nature of a demurrer and argument
That the case be DISMISSED, basing his contention upon the fact that the information fails to show facts of
sufficient weight to constitute a cause of action, that is, that the facts stated do not constitute a crime.
o Article 468 of the Penal Code in force, paragraph 2 of which is mentioned by the prosecuting attorney,
does not define as a crime the acts attributed to defendants. Nor is it inferred from the historical
precedents that the facts which gave rise to this case constitute a crime.
o The hypothesis of the legislator as to meaning of said paragraph 2 is the fact of concealing or exposing a
legitimate child with intent to cause such a child to lose his civil status, when this act is done by the
person to whom the child is entrusted for its nursing or for some other lawful purpose.
o This crime is rather applicable to Spain only, where nursing children are usually given to wet nurses,
living out in the country, who are not able to move their residence to the city where the child’s parents
live.
o In the Philippines the children are usually nursed by their own mother, and, if they are given to a wet
nurse, the latter goes to live at the house of the child’s parents.
CFI Manila: Considered it a demurrer to the information and plea of not guilty considered withdrawn; Granted Motion
and Dismissed the case
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Complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged.
United States APPEALED
ISSUES:
1. Whether Article 468 of Penal Code penalizes abandonment of a child with the intent to lose its civil status and not
merely an exposure or danger to the loss of civil status or simple abandonment? (YES)
2. Whether the CFI properly dismissed the case for lack of cause of action? (YES)
HELD: (YES)
2. The contentions of the parties on this appeal turn upon the meaning which should be given to the word
“expusiere” as found in the original Spanish version.
o The verb “exponer” is given various meaning in “El Diccionario de la LenguaCastellanapor la Real Academia
Españ ola,” 12th edition. Among others “arriesgar, aventurar, ponerunacosa en contingencia de perderse” (to
risk, to adventure, to put a thing in danger of being lost); and also “dejar a un niñ oreciennacido a la puerta de
unaiglesia o casa o en otroparajepublico, por no tener con quecriarlosus padres o porque no se sepaquienes
son” (to leave a recently born baby at the door of a church, or a house or other public place, the parents not
having means to support it, or the paents being unknown).
o Having in mind the qualifying phrase which provides that the offense is committed when the child is
exposed “con animo de hacerleperdersuestado civil” (with intent to expose it to lose its civil status), the
word must be held to have been used by the authors of the code in the sense of to “abandon,” in some such
manner as is indicated in the last of the above cited meaning given the word in the “Diccionario”; that being
the clear, definite and well understood signification of the word when used by the Spanish authors of the
code with relation to infants or children, as it manifestly is in this article.
o The contention of the prosecution is that the true meaning of the language of the statute is that the
prescribed penalties are to be imposed upon “one who conceals, or exposes or subjects to danger of loss of
civil status, a legitimate child, with intent to cause it to lose its civil status.”
o But without the addition of the qualifying phrase “with intent to cause it (the infant) to lose its civil status,”
the transitive verbs “ocultare” and “expusiere” convey no thought of loss of civil status, and in construing the
verb “exponer” to mean “to expose or subject to danger of loss of civil status,” the prosecution gives to it a
meaning which is not found in any dictionary.
o It is worthy of observation, furthermore, that the transitive verb “expusiere” (shall expose) is joined in
grammatical construction with the verb “ocultare” (shall conceal) and, like it, has for its sole object the word
“child” (hijo), and sound principles of grammatical construction forbid the attempt to import into one of
these verbs a meaning from the common qualifying phrase which it is manifestly impossible to give to the
other.
The practice of abandoning new-born infants and very young children at the door of hospitals, churches and other
religious institutions was formerly so well known in Spain that, as will be seen from the definition above cited from
the dictionary of the “Real Academia,” it gave rise to the use of the verb “exponer” (to expose) in a peculiar and
special sense with reference to this practice, when the grammatical object of the verb is an infant or small child. We
are well satisfied that it is in this sense that the word is used in the article of the code under consideration, and that
in this connection it may and should be construed in both Spanish and English by its substantial equivalent to
“abandon.”
“Expusiere” (shall expose) = ABANDONMENT
Groizard: “the exposition which is caused by abandoning a new-born child in place where it cannot be easily
assisted, intending that it should perish and save the honor of the mother, is a crime against life. The exposition of a
child and the abandonment thereof in a place where it may not be in danger may be a crime against the safety of
persons. Only that which has for its purpose the deprivation of the new-born child’s civil status is what constitutes
the present crime.
o It is necessary that the acts committed by the guilty party plainly show his intent.
o The fact that one abandons, in the midst of a lonely forest, an unfortunate child that needs all kinds of
assistance during the first moments of coming into the world cannot be admitted as intent to destroy its civil
status, but as an attempt against its life.
o On the contrary, he who places at the door of a charitable person, a new-born child which is in condition to
stand the first in clemencies of the weather, is supposed to do it in order that it may be taken up and
BIGAMY
c/o Hipolito
RPC 349: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether husband cannot be guilty of the crime of bigamy if the marriage was declared null and void before the filing of
the bigamy case in court? (NO, still GUILTY)
HELD: GUILTY of Bigamy; His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of
his first marriage is bereft of merit.
Elements of BIGAMY:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
2nd MARRIAGE:
o Element 1: Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on
10 December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
o Element 2&3: At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was
legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first
marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years after his second
marriage to Edita.
o Element 4: Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the
essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such
subsequent marriage.
Family Code: A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.
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The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee took the position that
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.
PURPOSE OF REQUIREMENT FOR JUDICIAL DECLARATION: It is also for the protection of the spouse
who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and
hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.
We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a
nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted,
such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier
marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court.
Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or
inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file
Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law,
and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material
only for determining prescription.
The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second
marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous
marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 21 January 2009
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
FACTS:
April 6, 1999: First marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on
at [IE]MELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF
Church officiated the ceremony.
December 8, 2001: Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena Gerldino at Max’s Restaurant,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.
P. Geraldino on in Quezon City (admitted in a counter-affidavit by both parties, Certificate of Marriage)
August 24, 2004: Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Rowena P. Geraldino for the crime of Bigamy.:
o December 8, 2001: ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA,
and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there unlawfully
contract a subsequent or second marriage with his co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly
consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a
married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA.”
Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him.
Accused Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned
Prosecution:
Jesusa Pinat Nollora testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working
there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital
Defense:
Atilano’s testimony
“Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private
complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim
convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As
a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief
PROOF OF MUSLIM FAITH:
o Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueñ o and approved by
one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim
since January 19, 1992 (
o Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueñ o and approved
by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage because he told
this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said private complainant filed the instant
case was due to hatred having learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino.
He further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant and
he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns
of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’
but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena
P. Geraldino, the religion ‘Catholic’ was also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim
since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first
marriage to keep said first marriage a secret
Madueno’s Testimony
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueñ o testified that he is the founder and president
of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority to
convert any applicant to the Muslim religion.
He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran. However, before
marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured.
Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent
If a Muslim convert gets married not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the
Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them equally. He claimed
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 147
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that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the second. Since the second marriage with Rowena
P.Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena
P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as a true Muslim
Geraldino’s testimony
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed
that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was
filed.
She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since
December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O.Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private complainant,
she confronted the former who admitted the said marriage.
Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the latter responded that he was single.
She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of
her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert.
She also claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora Jr., also got
married in accordance with the Muslim rites.
She also belied the allegations of the private complainant about their confrontation and alleged that she came only to
know private complainant at the filing of the case.
RTC: Nollora guilty of bigamy under RPC 349. Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecution’s
failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Penalty: prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
o Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, and did not comply
with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in
both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the
mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant.
o What is clear, therefore, is that a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third
or fourth time. There are requirements that the Shari’a law imposes, that is, he should have notified
the Shari’a Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The
argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation
to notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano
Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Shari’a law. It is the Shari’a Court that has this authority.
o In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in accordance with
the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.
o NO LIABILITY FOR GERALDINO: No sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The
evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between
private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient, being open to several interpretations.
o Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latter’s house in Taguig,
Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation. From this
incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano Nollora,
Jr., were married.
o This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena
P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that
“(E)very circumstance favoring accused’s innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must survive
the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment”
CA: DISMISSED appeal and affirmed TC
o The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his
Islamic religion and was allowed by the Qur’an.
o The appellate court denied Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-
Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nollora’s two marriages were not conducted
in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply.
o Nollora’s claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting the
general welfare.
o Denied MOR
FACTS:
April 10, 1990: Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas wed by Judge
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10,
1986, solemnized at Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes
January 25, 1993: Tenebro contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the RTC Cebu
When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to
petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
September 1995: Information
o April 10, 1990, in Lapu-lapu, Philippines, accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with
Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent
marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first
marriage.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
November 20, 1995: Judicial declaration of nullity of 2nd marriage by virtue of psychological incapacity as penned
by Judge Epifanio C. Llano of the Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26
DEFENSE:
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two
children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place to solemnize their union.
He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman.
He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any
marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage
November 10, 1997: the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, GUILTY of bigamy
o PENALTY: 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
as maximum.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Defense:
He (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and
He (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the
date on which the second marriage was celebrated.
Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the accused is guilty of bigamy despite the non-existence, as alleged, of the first marriage? (Guilty,
inexistence not proven)
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 151
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2. Whether the accused is guilty of bigamy despite the declaration of nullity of 2 nd marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity? (YES)
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either
essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous
marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy.
The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies
the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent
declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the
perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered into
it.
*Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a
valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
* Yes. Except for a void marriage on account of psychological incapacity —void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity
* The complete nullity of a previously contracted marriage being void ab initio and legally inexistent can outrightly be a
defense in an indictment for bigamy
* Strong reservation on the ruling that bigamy is still committed though marriage is ab initio null and void (if marriage is
contracted before the judicial declaration of its nullity)
* Canon law-> reconcile grounds for nullity of marriage
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 153
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* Reasons why except those due to psychological incapacity:
a) Breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of marriage
b) Other grounds are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity however, being a mental state
may not be so readily evident
c) It remains valid and binding until declared judicially as void
FACTS:
March 20, 1969: Nepomuceno married Dolores Desiderio on, in Balagtas, Bulacan,
August 16, 1969: Five months later, he again married Norma Jimenez in Norzagaray, Bulacan.
Information dated December 8, 1969 reads as follows:
o August 16, 1969, in Norzagaray, Bulacan, accused Ricardo Nepomuceno, Jr., being then previously united in
lawful marriage with one Dolores Desiderio, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one Norma
Jimenez.
Upon arraignment on February 4, 1970, accused pleaded not guilty and trial proceeded accordingly. After the
prosecution had presented one witness, the accused, on August 11, 1970, withdrew his plea of not guilty and
changed it into one of guilty. The case however proceeded for the reception of evidence on the civil aspect.
December 9, 1970: Motion to quash was filed on the ground that the information is defective as it charged only the
accused for bigamy without including the second wife and such failure, according to accused, conferred no
jurisdiction on the lower court to try and decide the case.
Said motion was denied on February 22, 1971. On April 28, 1971, private prosecutor orally withdrew the claim for
damages, which the lower court granted.
RTC: GUILTY of Bigamy; PENALTY: ISL 6 Months and l Day of Prision Correccional as minimum, to 6 Years and 4
Months of Prision Mayor, as maximum, with costs.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, accused cited as a single error the lower court's failure to quash the
information for lack of jurisdiction. While awaiting completion of the records the private prosecutor filed a
motion to forward the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal involves a pure question of law.
Two other motions of the same nature were subsequently filed.
CA: In its resolution of May 11, 1973, the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals resolved to give due course to the
appeal, to consider it submitted for decision, the same to be raffled immediately and to refer the motions to certify
the case to the Supreme Court to the Division to which the case may be raffled.
The case was eventually assigned to the Court of Appeals Special Division of Five Justices which promulgated the
resolution of April 14, 1975, by a four to one vote ruled that only a question of law is involved in the appeal, and
decision on the case is not dependent on factual findings to be made so as to bring the case within the competence of
the appellate court. SO submitted to SC for Decision.
o The dissenting opinion holds that there is no question of law involved as what is to be decided is the
question of whether or not the information filed was defective for not including the second wife as an
HELD:
o RPC 349: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proceedings.
o The crime of bigamy is committed when a person contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been judicially declared as presumptively dead.
Accused undeniably contracted two marriages in the short span of five months, which he categorically admitted
when he pleaded guilty.
o Appellant's contention that the crime of bigamy entails the joint liability of two persons who marry each other,
while the previous marriage of one or the other is valid and subsisting is completely devoid of merit.
o Even a cursory scrutiny of RPC 349 will disclose that the crime of bigamy can be committed by one person who
contracts a subsequent marriage while, the former marriage is valid and subsisting.
o Bigamy is not similar to the crimes of adultery and concubinage, wherein the law specifically requires that the
culprits, if both are alive, should be prosecuted or included in the information.
o In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage.
Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be
included in the information as a co-accused.
o Bigamy is a public offense and a crime against status, while adultery and concubinage are private offenses and
are crimes against chastity. In adultery and concubinage, pardon by the offended party will bar the prosecution of
the case, which is not so in bigamy. It is, therefore, clear that bigamy is not similar to adultery or concubinage.
o No reason to include Norma Jimenez in the information as there was no showing in the recitation of facts in the
information to the effect that Norma Jimenez, the second wife, had knowledge of the first marriage,and despite said
knowledge she contracted the second marriage with the accused; nor is there any showing that Norma Jimenez had
had a previous marriage of her of her own.
o Whether or not the second spouse, Norma Jimenez, should be included in the information is a question of fact that
was determined by the fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation in this case. That the fiscal did not include
Norma Jimenez in the information simply shows absence of evidence that could make her liable for the crime.
o Her non-inclusion in the information as a co-accused of appellant Nepomuceno in the crime of bigamy is not
a defect in the information filed against Nepomuceno alone since her inclusion or not in said information
depended upon available evidence against her.
PREMATURE MARRIAGES
c/o Hipolito
FACTS:
May 1904: Pascual Dulay, of about 23 years of age, began courting Gregoria Pimentel a girl of 16, residing in the
pueblo of Aringay, San Fernando, La Union.
Their relations became every day more intimate, on account of the promises of marriage made by the accused Dulay,
and the girl was seduced.
The defendant accomplished his desire for the first time on a certain night in the latter part of December, 1905. The
act was repeated on various occasions from that time until the 28th of April 1906.
ISSUES:
1. Whether he is guilty of seduction? (YES)
2. Whether the child is not his and is not responsible for his welfare as he was born more than 9 months old after alleged
intercourse? (NO, it’s his child)
HELD:
1. The above facts are duly proven in this case, and constitute the crime of estupro (seduction), defined and punished by
article 443 paragraph 3 of the Penal Code
By reason of the intimate relations between the accused and the injured party, the latter was seduced by his
repeated promises of marriage, and she permitted him to lie with her on various occasions from the latter part of
December, 1905, to the last days of April, 1906;
Without any just reason the accused has refused to comply with the promise of marriage made to Gregoria Pimentel
after being pregnant and it is therefore clear that he acted deceitfully when making the promise solely with the
unlawful purpose of inducing her to yield to his desire, and upon pretext of her pregnancy he wrote to her parents
stating that he declined to carry out his promise of marriage.
A promise of marriage given to a woman over 12 and under 23 years of age, with the evil intent of committing an
unlawful act and voluntarily abandoned without just cause, constitutes the deceit referred to in article 458 of the
Code of Spain, equivalent to article 443 of that of the Philippines, according to the doctrine established by the
supreme court of Spain, among other decisions in that of October 7, 1864.
The culpability of the accused as the only author of the crime cannot be denied, inasmuch as he acknowledged that
he had maintained intimate relations with the aforenamed Gregoria Pimentel from May 1904 to the same month
in 1906.
2. Data that child is more than 9 months old and therefore is not his child does not hold merit as it is not shown that the
accused is not the author of the pregnancy of the girl, who states positively that from December, 1905, to April, 1906,
the accused repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her.
PREMATURE MARRIAGES:
REASON FOR FIXING 301 (10 months) DAYS: If the ordinary average duration of the pregnancy of women is nine
months and some days, a tardy birth is not an impossibility or an unusual to have a delayed or retarded conception,
one of the inexplicable mysteries of nature, since the opinions of physicians upon the matter are conflicting; for this
reason the Penal Code, by article 476, imposes punishment upon a widow who marries before three hundred and
one days have elapsed from the death of her husband, a prohibition which is in accordance with other legal
provisions
PURPOSE: It is intended to prevent confusion in connection with filiation and paternity, inasmuch as the widow
might have conceived and become pregnant by her late husband. So that the law when fixing the said three hundred
and one days, admits the possibility that a woman may be in pregnancy for more than nine months, and that
the birth of a child taking place nine months after it was conceived is not an impossibility.
DISPOSITIVE: AFFIRMED Decision. Penalty of four months of arresto mayor, to recognize and maintain the offspring, to
indemnify the injured party, Gregoria Pimentel, in the sum of P1,000 and, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs, should be affirmed with the
costs against the appellant; provided, however, that the amount to be paid to the injured party for the subsistence of her
child until the same shall reach his majority, shall be P15 monthly.
FACTS:
Information was originally filed against the spouses, the two witnesses to the marriage, and the minister performing
the ceremony.
At the request of the prosecuting attorney the case was dismissed with respect to the defendant Antonio de la Llana,
one of the witnesses to the marriage, in order that he might be used as a witness for the Government, under the
provisions of section 34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
With respect to the defendants, Florencio San Miguel and Eulogia Dizon, the spouses, and Teofilo San Miguel, the
other witness to the marriage, the case was also dismissed, under paragraph 2 of article 475 of the Penal Code, for
the reason that Esteban Dizon, the father of Eulogia Dizon, the bride, having, subsequent to the ceremony, given his
consent to the marriage.
The only defendant remaining, therefore, is Domingo San Juan, the minister who performed the ceremony.
CFI: GUILTY of performing a marriage ceremony where one of the contracting parties was under the age of consent;
PENALTY: Four years of suspension for practicing his profession as a minister of the National Evangelical Church of the
Philippines, to pay a fine of 1,500 pesetas and one-fifth of the costs.
ISSUES:
Whether the defendant minister not guilty if there was no intent, in other words, whether the person solemnizing the
marriage may plead similar good faith in defense to an action brought against him under article 479.? (YES)
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 157
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HELD:
o It is not necessary to hold in this action that no crime mentioned in the Code can exist without intent. It suffices for
the present to decide, as we do decide, that one cannot be convicted under article 475 when by reason of a
mistake of fact there does not exist the intention to commit the crime.
Citing United States vs. Marcosa Peñalosa and Enrique Rodriguez, decided January 27, 1902 (1 Phil. Rep., 109),
o Neither of the spouses can be convicted for a violation of article 475 if he acted in good faith and without the
knowledge that the other was under the age of consent.
o “A minor who marries without parental consent in the false belief that she if of age is not criminally
responsible,” and that, “it is not criminal negligence for a husband to rely upon his wife’s statement of
her age nor for the wife to rely upon that of her father.”
o In that case, the facts relative to the guilt of the husband, who was charged with a violation of article 475 of
the Penal Code in that he had married a woman who at the time of the ceremony was under the age of
consent, are stated by the court as follows:
o As for the husband, it has been proved that two days before the marriage was celebrated he received a
letter from the woman in which she said that she was 21 years of age.
o This letter the defendant showed to the clergyman who married them. The woman when the marriage
ceremony was performed took an oath before the clerygman, in the presence of her husband, that she
was 21 years of age.
o The defendant testifies that he had no suspicion that the woman was a minor. This statement has not
been contradicted and we consider that it suffices to demonstrate that the defendant acted under a
mistake of fact, and in conformity with the principle laid down in this opinion he has not been guilty
of a violation of article 475 in connection with article 13, No. 3, nor in any other manner
o Defendant was therefore properly acquitted of the crime charged in the complaint.
o If in US v Penalosa, spouses were acquitted if in good faith, the person solemnizing may also plead good faith
as a defense.
o These presents itself to us no reason why the rule applicable to the persons married should not be alike
applicable to the person performing the ceremony which makes them man and wife.
o It is very easy to deceive an officiating clergyman as to the ages of the persons who present themselves
for marriage – much easier than it is to deceive either of the spouses in relation to the same matter.
o Persons who are sufficiently acquainted with each other to desire marriage are naturally presumed to
know the age of each other. If a man desiring to marry a woman may be excused from criminal
prosecution upon the ground that he has been deceived and mistaken as to her age, it would seem that
the clergyman, who knows neither of the parties and who must of necessity depend upon an
independent investigation in order to determine the ages of the parties, would be in far better position
to invoke the protection of the principle than would the husband.
LAWS:
There is no penalty in the General Orders attached to the solemnization of a marriage between person under age.
o General Orders, No. 68, section 7 (as amended by Act No. 1451), reads as follows: SEC. VII. The person
solemnizing a marriage must make and sign a certificate showing:
3. The real and full names of the parties and their places of residence.
4. Their ages.
5. The consent of the father, mother, or guardian, or of one having the charge of such person, if any such be given, if the
male be under the age of twenty years or the female be under the age of eighteen years.
For the purpose of ascertaining these facts, the person solemnizing the marriage is authorized to examine
parties and witnesses on oath and receive affidavits, and he must state such facts in his certificate.
The marriage shall not be performed in case of nonage, unless the consent hereinbefore required shall be
personality given by the parent or guardian or person having charge of the infant, or certified in writing
over his or her signature, attested by two or more subscribing witnesses and proved by the oath of one of
them.
o It was the intention of the makers of that law to permit the officiating clergyman or other person
solemnizing the marriage to determine the fact of age or nonage upon the testimony of witnesses. To that
end he is given the authority to examine on oath the persons who present themselves for marriage and any
witnesses which they may produce or which he may desire to call relative to age.
o ART. 475. Any minor who shall marry without the consent of his or her parents, or other person standing in
loco parenties, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium degrees.
o The offender shall be pardoned as soon as the parents or the persons referred to in the next preceding
paragraph shall approve the marriage.
o Article 1 of the Code does not contain the words “with malice” that are to be found in the Code of 1822; nevertheless
Pacheco, the eminent commentator, has said that those words are included in the word “voluntary” and he states
positively that crime cannot exist without intent.
o Other commentators, without being in entire conformity with Pacheco, nevertheless are agreed up to a certain point.
o Groizard says: “Such is the general rule; so it is ordinarily.”
o Viada says that “in the majority of cases, in the absence of intent there has been no crime; but that there
can exist in some case the latter without the former.”
o Silvela says: “In effect it suffices to remember the first article, which states that where there is no intent
there is no crime, . . . in order to asset without fear of mistake that in our Code the substance of a crime
does not exists if there is not a deed, an act which falls within the sphere of ethics, if there is not a moral
wrong
o The theory that the absence of the word “with malice” in the prevailing Code has this effect is supported by the
provisions of article 568 which says: “He who by reckless negligence commits an act which would constitute a grave
crime if malice were present shall be punished,” etc.
o The supreme court in several successive sentences has the same doctrine: “It is indispensable that this
(action) in order to constitute a crime should carry with it all the malice which the violation and
intention to cause the evil which may be the object of the said crime suppose.”
o In a cause for falsity the facts involved were that the defendant had married “before the municipal judge
of the pueblo of Rubete without other ceremony than the simple manifestation and expression of his
wishes and those of the woman Leonor with whom he married before said municipal judge
o Relying upon that, on account of his ignorance and lack of instruction, on the 27 th of June, 1882, and the
5th of April, 1884, in the municipal court of the pueblo of Polopos he registered as legitimate children his
sons, Jose and Emilio, the offspring of the illicit union of the defendant and Leonor Gonzales.”
o For the crime of falsity committed by reckless negligence the Criminal Audiencia of Albuñ ol condemned
the said defendant to the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor. The Supreme Court
annulled said sentence “considering that whatever might be the civil effects of the registration of his
three sons entered by the accused in the Civil and Parochial Registers, it cannot partake of the
nature of a crime for lack of the necessary element of volition or intent to offend, essential to every
punishable act or omission; neither did he act with negligence.”
o Falsification of trademarks
o One of the witnesses for the prosecution intimating that the accused was informed by one of the
contracting parties that the girl was under eighteen, and that he, instead of refusing thereupon to go
forward with the marriage, suggested to her that she declare herself to be eighteen or over and that he
would obtain witnesses to substantiate her declaration.
o Evidence or testimony are not sufficient. The documents were proof of the parties’ attestation. They
were duly signed and sworn to by those parties and witnesses. Although the oath is not in the form
prescribed by General Orders, No. 68, nevertheless it contains all of the requisites essential to a valid
declaration under that Act.
o It appearing clear to us that, even though it be admitted that the marriage complained of was illegal and that the
subsequent consent of the parent did not relive the defendant of liability for the part he had taken therein, the
accused acted in good faith without criminal intent, and that he made the investigation required by law in a
reasonably satisfactory manner, the conviction cannot stand.
DISPOSITIVE: The judgment is reversed and the accused acquitted of the crime charged.
LIBEL
c/o Hipolito
8. DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI vs. PEOPLE and SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR
DEL CASTILLO, J.: G.R. No. 172203 February 14, 2011
DOCTRINE: A libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or
any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or
juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." "For an imputation to be libelous, the following
requisites must concur: a) it must be defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim
must be identifiable." Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.
FACTS:
Prosecution:
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated, among others, on the identity of the accused, that the private complainant
is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City and is popularly known by the nickname "Bading" and that the petitioner
calls the private complainant "Bading."
Petitioner’s Claims:
Petitioner takes exception to the CA’s ruling that the controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private respondent’s character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City.
He avers that there is nothing in said printed matter tending to defame and induce suspicion on the character,
integrity and reputation of private respondent.
ISSUES:
1) Whether only question of law can be reviewed? (NO)
2) Whether the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" is libelous as it shows the injurious
nature of the imputations made against the private respondent and tends to induce suspicion on his character, integrity
and reputation as Mayor of Cadiz City?
3) Whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication? (NO)
2a. Whether they comprise fair commentary on matters of public matter which are therefore privileged?
2b. Whether the presumption of malice has not been overthrown?
4) Whether he is liable for the moral damages of P500,000?
2. NO. Phrase does not tend to induce suspicion on private respondent’s character, integrity and reputation as mayor of
Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any
unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondent’s integrity.
Obviously, the controversial word "NEVER" used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word
did not cast aspersion upon private respondent’s integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he
was guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government
service, it is our considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private
respondent’s performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his
reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.
A libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or
juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED. CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
FACTS:
● Sept 20, 1957: Epitacio Buerano was the driver of LTB bus which collided with the Mabuhay Bakery delivery
panel driven by Hipolito Vismonte and owned by Chu Yu in Tanay, Rizal
● Dec 3, 1957: Chief of Police of Tanay, filed case with Municipal Judge, Slight and Serious Physical Injuries
through Reckless Imprudence, alleging:
○ “causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence that the said bus, driven and operated to collide
with the delivery truck of Mabuhay Bakery owned by Mr. Chu Yu, result of which the right front side of the
said truck was greatly damaged and the driver, Hipolito Vismonte, including the two (2) helpers, namely,
Bonifacio Virtudazo and Sy Tian alias Martin, suffered physical injuries on the different parts of the body
which required medical attention as follows:
■ Hipolito Vismonte— 5 days
■ Bonifacio Virtudazo—10 days
■ Sy Tian alias Martin—1 month
● Feb 6, 1958: petitioner found guilty of slight and less serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence and sentenced "to suffer imprisonment from 1 month and 1 day to 2 months and to pay the cost of the
suit
○ petitioner appealed to CFI which later affirmed and sentenced petitioner to suffer four months of Arresto
Mayor and to pay the costs
● In the meantime, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed case in CFI charging herein petitioner with Damage to
property through reckless imprudence. He filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of double jeopardy in that
because he has been previously convicted of the offense charged.
ISSUE: WoN CA erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy (YES)
HELD: petitioner ACQUITTED; CA judgment set aside
RATIO:
● CA based its decision on SC ruling on pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940, which
is no longer controlling
● People v Buan (March 29, 1968), SC thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that —
○ once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, accused may not be
prosecuted again for same act
○ essence of quasi offense of criminal negligence under RPC 365 lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless
act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
○ Then SolGen, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless
act resulted into homicide and physical injuries, then the same consequence must perforce follow where
the same reckless act caused merely damage to property—not death—and physical injuries. Verily, the
value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."
FACTS:
● Oct 17, 1971: the incident leading to the charge happened; the accused/priv resp Gapay was the truck driver; the
victim was Diolito de la Cruz
● Oct 18, 1971: an information for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against the accused
● However, on the same day (Oct 18), the victim died
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 165
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
● Oct 20, 1972: accused was arraigned; pleaded guilty; sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and
commenced serving his sentence
● Oct 24, 1972: another information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against accused
● Defense moved to dismiss
City Court of Manila (Nov 17, 1972):
● Dismissed the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy
● While there is a ruling in Melo vs. People which states: where after the first prosecution, a new fact supervenes
for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at a time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if
indicted for the second offense.
● City Court held that the doctrine of Melo vs. People does not apply in the case at bar because of SC’s ruling in People
vs. Buan
○ People vs. Buan: Article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent state of mind and not the resulting
injury
● It concluded that once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again be prosecuted for the
same negligence although for a different resulting injury
RATIO:
● Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the same
or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former.
● However, as held in the case of Melo vs. People, the rule of Identity does not apply when the second offense
was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the reason that in such case there is no possibility
for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.
● Stated differently, where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
new offense
● In this case: the victim died on the day the information was filed
● The accused was arraigned 2 days after
● Thus, when the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed on October 24, 1972, the
accused was already in jeopardy
● The OSG said on October 21, 1972, the City Fiscal filed an Urgent Motion asking that the "hearing and
arraignment of this case be held in abeyance for there is information that the victim, Diolito dela Cruz died, and the
information would have to be amended."
○ SC: Be that as it may, the fact remains that the victim died 1 day after the accident and the arrest of the
accused. And that on October 20, 1972, the accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced
accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the arraignment and
conviction of the accused.
FACTS:
● Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) –case 1-for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) –case 2- for the death of respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponce's vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
● petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Case1 and was meted out the penalty of public censure
● petitioner moved to quash the Information in Case 2 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence –MTC denied, finding no identity of offenses in the 2 cases
● After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the RTC, in a petition for
certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Case
2 including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question
● Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner's
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest
● Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No.
2803 for petitioner's loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
● RTC: affirmed MeTC. dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803 due to petitioner's forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A.
No. 2803 arising from the MeTC's order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Case
2
● Hence this petition.
● Petitioner denies absconding and explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in Case 2
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his
non-appearance at the arraignment in Case 2 (no)
2. if in the negative, WON petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
Case 2 (yes)
RATIO:
On non-appearance
● Petitioners non appearance at the arraignment in case 1 did not divest him of standing to maintain
petition in the SCA 2803
● Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant's escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond
are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a
suit to review judgments of convictions.
● The RTC's dismissal of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary
question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Case2 finds no basis under procedural
rules and jurisprudence.
● The mischief in the RTC's treatment of petitioner's non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court's treatment of a
defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 11 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the defendant's absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond
On double jeopardy
● The accused's negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior
verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
● It is not disputed that petitioner's conviction in Case 1 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Cases 1 and 2 involve the "same offense."
● Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an
entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
● We find for petitioner. Reckless Imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on persons and property
are material only to determine the penalty
● The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of
the RPC, Art 365, defining and penalizing quasi-offenses
● One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another
test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged
in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or
whether one crime is an ingredient of the other (People v Diaz)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
● Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude . .
. behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight . . ., a single mental attitude regardless
of the resulting consequences.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
We DISMISS the Information in Case 2 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar on the ground of double jeopardy.
FACTS:
· Since 1990, Lourdes Azarcon, a businesswoman, had been borrowing money from Marcosa Gonzales, the latter
being engaged in an informal money-lending business. Between Aug to Dec 1992, Azarcon issues several Premiere Bank
checks payable to Marcosa, for amounts borrowed. However, checks were, upon maturity, dishonored bec. “Account
Closed”
· Dec 1 1993: Marcosa, through counsel, writes letter, demands the P749,000 due her bec. checks were dishonored
· Dec 17 1993: Azarcon replies, asks for "reconciliation of her accountability since [she] has also some receipt
payments covering the checks she has issued" and says that she is willing to settle her account
· Feb 15 1994: Manuel Azarcon, Lourdes’ husband, pays Marcosa P200,000 representing “initial payment” with
undertaking to settle balance within 1 year via monthly installments
· 2 ½ years pass without obligation being paid, prompting Marcosa to file complaint for violation of BP 22 against
Azarcon, involving 120 dishonored checks amounting to P746,250
· Azarcon’s defense: obligation to pay was novated when husband assumed liability
· TC: Azarcon guilty of 824 violations of BP 22, subtracted amounts which prosecution either failed to offer in
evidence or Marcosa failed to dispute
· CA appeals: no prior demand from Marcosa to settle checks after their being dishonored, TC did not appreciate
novation
· CA affirms TC
· Azarcon files petition before SC
ISSUE/HELD:
· W/N Azarcon is guilty of violation of BP 22 (YES)
RATIO:
· Elements for BP 22 violation all present: (1) The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to
account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or it would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
· re: prior demand: Marcosa’s Dec 1 1993 letter satisfies “notice of dishonor” requirement to bring up the
presumption that there was knowledge of insufficient funds
· re: novation defense: no express agreement to a novation, plus initial installment payments were either paid
by Azarcon herself, or received "the account of Mrs. Lourdes Azarcon"
Facts:
Petitioner Cadiao-Palacios was the mayor of the Municipality of Culasi, Province of Antique from July 1998 to June 2001.
During her administration, there were infrastructure projects that were initiated during the incumbency of her
predecessor, then Mayor Aida Alpas, which remained partially unpaid. These included the Janlagasi Diversion Dam, San
Luis Diversion Dam, Caridad-Bagacay Road, and San Juan-Tumao Road, which were contracted by L.S. Gamotin
Construction with a total project cost of P2 million. For the said projects, the municipality owed the contractor P791,047.
Relative to the aforesaid projects, petitioner, together with Victor S. Venturanza, then the Municipal Security
Officer, was indicted in an Information which accused them of demanding money from Grace Superficial of L.S. Gamotin
Construction for in connection with the aforesaid contracts concerning the infrastructure projects, wherein, as public
officers in their official capacities, they had to intervene under the law. The Information accused them of receiving
P15,000.00 in cash and P162,400 in LBP Check No. 3395274.
Both accused voluntarily surrendered and, upon motion, posted a reduced bail bond of P15,000 each. They pleaded “Not
Guilty” upon arraignment.
During trial, the prosecution presented its sole witness—the private complainant herself, Grace M. Superficial
(Superficial). Her testimony may be summarized as follows:
For and on behalf of L.S. Gamotin, she (Superficial) took charge of the collection of the unpaid billings of the municipality.
Prior to the full payment of the municipality’s obligation, petitioner demanded money from her, under threat that the
final payment would not be released, unless she complied. Acceding to petitioner’s demand, she gave the former’s
husband P15,000. Sometime in January 1999, petitioner demanded from Superficial the full payment of her total
“kickback,” which should be 10% of the project cost. The two then agreed that Superficial would deliver a check in lieu
of cash.
On January 25, 1999, petitioner gave to Neil Superficial, then an incumbent councilor and the husband of private
complainant, 3 checks representing the final payment for the construction projects.
On January 26, 1999, Venturanza picked up the check promised by Superficial as payment for the 10% “kickback.” In
accordance with petitioner’s instruction, the check was made payable to Venturanza in the amount of P162,400. The
check was encashed by Venturanza at the Land Bank of the Philippines, San Jose, Antique Branch, which is about 90km -
100km away from Culasi; and the amount was received by Venturanza. It was Venturanza also who deposited the 3
checks, representing the full payment of the project.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses: 1) petitioner herself, 2) Venturanza, 3) Engr. Armand
Cadigal, 4) petitioner’s husband Emmanuel Palacios, 5) petitioner’s Executive Assistant Eugene de Los Reyes, and 6)
Atty. Rex Suiza Castillon. Their testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Petitioner denied Superficial’s allegations. She insisted that she only dealt with the owner of L.S. Gamotin, Engr.
Leobardo S. Gamotin, relative to the infrastructure projects; thus, she could have made the demand directly from him
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 170
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
and not from Superficial. It was Engr. Gamotin himself who claimed payment through a demand letter addressed to
petitioner.
She only met Superficial when the latter received the checks representing the final payment. She further testified that
she never entrusted any highly sensitive matter to Venturanza, since her trusted employee was her chief of staff. She
also averred that she was not the only person responsible for the release of the checks, since the vouchers also required
the signatures of the municipal treasurer, the municipal budget officer, and the municipal accountant. As far as
Venturanza was concerned, she denied knowledge of such transaction. Lastly, she claimed that the filing of the case
against her was politically motivated.
Emmanuel Palacios likewise denied having received P15,000.00 from Superficial. He claimed that he was financially
stable. He also claimed that the institution of the criminal case was ill-motivated as Neil Superficial, in fact, initiated a
complaint against him for frustrated murder
Venturanza admitted that he indeed received the check from Superficial, but denied that it was “grease money.” He
claimed that the P162,400 was received by him in the form of a loan. He explained that he borrowed from Superficial
P150,000 to finance his trip to Australia so that he could attend the wedding of his nephew; and asked for an additional
amount for his expenses in processing his visa. Venturanza, however, failed to leave for Australia. Of the total amount of
his loan, he allegedly spent P15,000 in processing his visa. Venturanza stated that he was able to repay the entire
amount immediately because he obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Aklan, Pandan Branch, to pay the amount he
used in applying for his visa. He further testified that he was persuaded by the Superficials to campaign against
petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan convicted both accused of violating Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan concluded that the following circumstances established the
guilt of both petitioner and Venturanza:
1) That the municipality had outstanding obligations with L.S. Gamotin for the construction of
several public works that were completed in 1998;
2) That petitioner was the person authorized to effect the payment of said obligations which, in fact,
she did;
3) That Venturanza was a trusted employee of petitioner as he was in charge of the security of the
municipal buildings and personnel as well as the adjoining offices;
4) That Venturanza received the 3 LBP checks representing the full payment to L.S. Gamotin and
the LBP check bearing the amount of P162,400;
5) That Venturanza went to San Jose, Antique on January 26, 1999 to deposit the 3 checks and
encashed the P162,400 check;
6) That Venturanza did not receive the above amount by virtue of a loan agreement with Superficial
because there was no evidence to prove it;
7) That Venturanza used the vehicle of the municipality to encash the check in San Jose, Antique;
and
8) That the amount of P15,000.00 initially given to Emmanuel Palacios and the P162,400 appearing
on the check corresponded to the 10% of the total project cost after deducting the 10% VAT and
P10,000.00 Engineering Supervision Fee.
Aggrieved, petitioner and Venturanza separately appealed their conviction. The latter petition was denied by the SC. The
former, on the other hand, went before the SC again in herein petition, mainly challenging the legal and factual bases of
the Sandiganbayan decision.
Issue: WoN Linda Cadiao-Palacios was guilty of violating Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan
dated January 28, 2005 in Criminal Case No. 27434 is AFFIRMED.
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, the prosecution has the burden of proving the following
elements:
1) the offender is a public officer;
2) Who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or benefit;
3) On behalf of the offender or any other person;
4) In connection with a contract or transaction with the government;
5) In which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to
intervene.
At the time material to the case, petitioner was the mayor of the Municipality of Culasi, Antique. As mayor, her signature
was necessary to effect payment to contractors (for government projects). Since the case involved the collection by L.S.
Gamotin of the municipality’s outstanding obligation to the former, the right of petitioner to intervene in her official
capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements 1, 4 and 5 of the offense are present.
Petitioner’s refutation of her conviction focuses on the evidence appreciated by the Sandiganbayan establishing that she
demanded and received “grease money” in connection with the transaction/contract.
Section 3(b) penalizes three distinct acts – 1) demanding or requesting; 2) receiving; or 3) demanding, requesting and
receiving – any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein a public officer in an official capacity has
to intervene under the law.
The Sandiganbayan found Superficial and her testimony worthy of credence, that petitioner demanded “grease money”
as a condition for the release of the final payment to L.S. Gamotin. Aside from the demand made by petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan likewise concluded that, indeed, she received the “grease money” through Venturanza. Therefore,
petitioner was convicted both for demanding and receiving “grease money.”
Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon the SC save in the following cases:
1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; 2) the inference made is
manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; 3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; 5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on
record; and 6) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. The
instant case does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions.
Petitioner contends that it was improbable for her to have demanded the “grease money” from Superficial, when she
could have talked directly to the contractor himself. She insists that Superficial was never a party to the transaction and
that Engr. Gamotin was the one who personally facilitated the full payment of the municipality’s unpaid obligation.
As held in Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan, it is irrelevant from whom petitioner demanded her percentage share of the
project cost. That petitioner made such a demand is all that is required by Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, and this element
has been sufficiently established by the testimony of Superficial.
It was not, therefore, impossible for petitioner to have demanded the “grease money” from Superficial. This was
bolstered by the fact that the P162,400.00 check in the name of Venturanza was encashed by him on the same day that
he deposited the 3 checks. The only plausible explanation is that the amount given to Venturanza was “grease money”
taken from the proceeds of the checks issued by the municipality.
In holding that petitioner and Venturanza conspired in committing the offense, the SC agreed with the
Sandiganbayan that the circumstances enumerated above point to the culpability of the accused. There was no direct
evidence showing that petitioner demanded and received the money, but the testimony of Superficial, corroborated by
the documentary evidence and the admissions of the witnesses for the defense, sufficiently establishes that Venturanza
received the money upon orders of petitioner.
FACTS:
● Government awarded in favor of PIATCO the project for the development of the NAIA IPT III under a build-
operate-and-transfer (BOT) scheme pursuant RA. 695 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).
● May 5, 2003 SC rendered the Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Phil. Int’l Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), declaring as null
and void the 1997 Concession Agreement (Agreement), the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA),
and the Supplemental Contracts entered into bet the Gov’t, through DOTC and the Manila Int’l Airport Authority
(MIAA), and PIATCO (collectively known as the PIATCO contracts)
● The Court ruled that Paircargo Consortium, PIATCO’s predecessor-in-interest, was not a qualified bidder as it
failed to meet the financial capability requirement under the BOT Law. Moreover, the PIATCO contracts were
declared null and void for being contrary to public policy considering that the Agreement contains material and
substantial amendments, which amendments had the effect of converting it into an entirely different agreement
from the contract bidded upon. The provisions under Secti 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Sec 1.06 of the Agreement
and Sec 4.04(c) in relation to Sec 1.06 of the ARCA, which constitute a direct gov’t guarantee expressly prohibited by,
among others, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations are also null and void. The Supplements,
being accessory contracts to the ARCA, are likewise null and void.
● Subsequently, an affidavit-complaint, later amended, was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Ma. Cecilia
L. Pesayco, Corporate Secretary of Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC), charging several persons in
connection with the NAIA IPT III project. The AEDC was the original proponent thereof which, however, lost to
PIATCO when it failed to match the latter’s bid price.
● After conducting a preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan the Info
dated Jan 13, 2005 charging Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Sec, and petr Go, Chairman and Pres of PIATCO, with
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
● June 20, 2005: Go filed his Comment with Motion to Quash.
● Go: Adopting the view advanced by Rivera, Go harped on the alleged "missing documents," including Pesayco’s
amended affidavit-complaint and those others that were mentioned in the resolution of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman finding probable cause against Rivera and petitioner Go, but which were not allegedly in the records.
Go maintained that, there was no supporting evidence for the finding of the existence of probable cause. Go further
alleged that he could not be charged under Sect 3(g) of RA 3019 because he is not a public officer and neither is he
capacitated to enter into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government. At least one of the important
elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is not allegedly present in his case.
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● Sandiganbayan: issued Resolution denying Rivera’s Motion for Judicial Determination (Re-Determination) of
Probable Cause and Motion to Dismiss and petitioner Go’s Motion to Quash.
ISSUES:
1) W/N Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ruling that
Section 3(g) does not embrace a private person within its proviso (No)
2) W/N Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ruling that
there is no probable cause to hold petitioner for trial (No)
RATIO:
● Section 3(g) of RA 3019
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
● elements of this offense
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
● Go’s simplistic syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he cannot be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of
RA 3019, goes against the letter and spirit of the avowed policy of RA 3019 as embodied in Sec 1 thereof:
SEC. 1. Statement of policy. - It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is
a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto.
● As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Luciano v. Estrella, the Court had ascertained the
scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as applying to both public officers and private persons:
x x x [T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA 3019] partakes the nature of malum prohibitum; it is
the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which
Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.
● Like in the present case, the Information in the said case charged both public officers and private persons with
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
● Section 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft law’s application extends to both public
officers and private persons. The said provision, quoted earlier, provides in part that:
SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections
3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than
fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of
any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.
● The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a public officer" does not
necessarily preclude its application to private persons who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with conspiring
with public officers in the commission of the offense thereunder.
● The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and Domingo, and which is applicable to the
present case, is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and,
if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Sec3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h) thereof.
This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.
(Ito yung impt, kebs na yung iba :)))
● Anent the allegation of conspiracy, it is posited by the dissenting opinion that the Information is infirm as far as
petitioner Go is concerned because it failed to mention with specificity his participation in the planning and
preparation of the alleged conspiracy.
● It is well established that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime (as well as the absence (or
presence) of any conspiracy among the accused) is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
● Following these truisms, the specific acts of Go in the alleged conspiracy with Rivera in violating Section 3(g) of
RA 3019 as well as the details on how petitioner Go had taken part in the planning and preparation of the
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alleged conspiracy need not be set forth in the Information as these are evidentiary matters and, as such, are to
be shown and proved during the trial on the merits. Indeed, it bears stressing that "[t]o establish conspiracy,
direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not
necessary. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime
which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of
conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.”
● In this connection, for purposes of the Information, it is sufficient that the requirements of Section 8, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court are complied with:
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
● An accused, like petitioner Go, may file a motion to quash the Information under Section 3(a) of Rule 117 on the
grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In such a case, the fundamental test in determining
the sufficiency of the material averments of an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or
matters extrinsic of the Information are not to be considered.
● As correctly outlined by the Office of the Ombudsman, the facts alleged in the Information, if admitted
hypothetically, establish all the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 vis-à -vis petitioner Go:
1. in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of Philippine International Air Terminals, Co,
2. in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO
3. "xxx which ARCA substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III
under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing that the government shall assume the
liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter’s default specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 (c) in relation to Article I,
Section 1.06 of the ARCA which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT Law and manifestly
grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines."
● Finally, in the assailed Resolution dated March 24, 200806, the Sandiganbayan ratiocinated thus: The rule is that
the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor, the Office of the Ombudsman in this case. Such official is vested with authority to determine whether
or not a criminal case must be filed in court and the concomitant function of determining as well the persons to
be prosecuted. Also, it must not be lost sight of that the correctness of the exercise of such function is a matter
that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon, consistent with the policy of non-
interference by the courts in the determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause.
● Accordingly, upon the foregoing premises, we believe and so hold that any and all questions relating to the
finding of probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman should be addressed to the said office itself, then to
the Court of Appeals and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court.
● On the matter of the judicial determination of probable cause, we stand by our finding that the same exists in
this case, the said finding we arrived at upon a personal determination thereof which we did for the purpose of
and before the issuance of the warrant of arrest. While it may indeed be true that the documents mentioned by
accused-movant as being absent in the records are missing, we nevertheless had for our perusal other
documents assiduously listed down by accused Rivera in his motion, including the information, which we found
to constitute sufficient basis for our determination of the existence of probable cause. It must be emphasized
that such determination is separate and distinct from that made by the Office of the Ombudsman and which we
did independently therefrom.
● The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function of the government
prosecutor, which in this case is the Ombudsman. As a rule, courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise
of discretion in determining probable cause, unless there are compelling reasons. Mindful of this salutary rule,
the Sandiganbayan nonetheless made its own determination on the basis of the records that were before it. It
concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the records for the finding of the existence of probable cause
against petitioner Go.
● Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Clearly, in the light of the foregoing disquisition, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed on
the Sandiganbayan when it held that there exists probable cause against petitioner Go.
HELD:
petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED in toto.
FACTS:
● In its Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Office of the Special Prosecutor argues, citing Meneses v. People,
Balmadrid v. Sandiganbayan Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, and Singian v. Sandiganbayan, that private persons
when conspiring with public officers may be held liable for violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019.
● In the instant case, the Information charges Vicente C. Rivera, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, with committing the offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 "in
conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of Philippine International Air Terminals, Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO) x x x."
RATIO
● We maintain that to be indicted of the offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, the following elements must
be present: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of
the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. However, if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with
the public officer, in consonance with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which is "to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may constitute graft or corrupt practices
or which may lead thereto.
● "Pursuant to our ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, said allegation of conspiracy is sufficient, thus: The
requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but
only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged
● [I]t is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner:
(1) by use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or
(2) by allegation of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding
would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea
to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.
● Thus, the allegation in the Information that accused Rivera "in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO"
committed the alleged acts in violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, is sufficient in form and
substance. Consequently, petitioner Go was validly charged with violation of Section 3(g) when he allegedly
conspired with accused Rivera.
● in the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated March 18, 2008, Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. was acquitted and the case
against him dismissed.
● cash bond returned ; Hold Departure lifted and set aside. No pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts from
which the same might arise were not proven in the case at bar.
● From the said Decision, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court which
was dismissed the petition on December 3, 2008
● The Court resolves to DISMISS the petition for certiorari of the Decision and Resolution dated 18 March 2008
and 16 September 2008, respectively, of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092 for failure of the
petitioner to sufficiently show that any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Sandiganbayan in
rendering the challenged decision and resolution which, on the contrary, appear to be in accord with the facts
and the applicable law and jurisprudence.
● December 3, 2008 Resolution became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments
on February 13, 2009.
● Based on the foregoing, it follows as a matter of course that the instant case against herein petitioner
Henry T. Go should likewise be dismissed. The acquittal of Rivera means that there was no public officer
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who allegedly violated Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. There being no public officer, it follows that a
private individual such as herein petitioner Go could not be said to have conspired with such public
officer. The basis for a finding of conspiracy against petitioner and Rivera has been removed;
consequently, the case against Henry T. Go should likewise be dismissed.
HELD:
Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED subject to the qualification discussed in the body of the decision. Prayer to Refer
Case to the Supreme Court En Banc is likewise DENIED. Comment/Opposition filed by petitioner Go to the said Motion
for Reconsideration (of the Resolution dated September 3, 2007) With Prayer to Refer Case to the Supreme Court En
Banc as well as the Manifestation and Motion are NOTED. Sandiganbayan DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case No.
against petitioner Henry T. Go.
Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the ff. shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to all officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Facts:
January 20, 1999 - DPWH enters into a contract for the proposed construction of the Baguio General Hospital
and Medical Center (BGHMC) Building (Phase I) with Royson and Co., Inc. (Royson), approved by DPWH Sec. Vigilar.
Construction ensues.
An excavation 60 meters deep was made on the area under the area of Proj. Dir. Engr. Arturo Santos. Petitioner,
thinking that its property, which was adjacent to the site, was under threat of erosion, sent three letters to Royson
asking that it hasten the construction of a retaining wall.
Construction of a provisional slope protection measure was started. But due to heavy rains (typhoon Feria), a
collapse of a portion of the slope protection resulted in a landslide. It was alleged by petitioners that the landslide caused
cracks in the house owned by it and prejudiced the structural integrity of the house. This led to petitioner’s complaining
against the project before the Office of the Regional Director of the DPWH Cordillera Administrative Region (DPWH-
CAR) and the Office of the City Mayor (lol seriously, dami mong angal) which directed the Office of the City Engineer of
Baguio City to conduct an investigation.
Findings:
1 Construction being implemented by Royson is not covered by a building and excavation permit
2 That the personnel of Royson alleged that no death resulted in the accident.
3 That portion of the Jimenez’ garage allegedly encroached inside the propert of BGH
4 That the retaining wall is located approx. 7.5m to the nearest building line of complainant. This building is a 2-
storey structure.
5 That cracks on their driveway approx. 5.65m away from the edge of the complainant’s building measuring
approx. 6.00m is observed. The garage floor level is approx. 4.5m above the partially completed 2nd level
retaining wall.
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Royson subsequently builds reinforced concrete slope protection, a grouted riprap, and a retaining wall for the
compound. But the retaining wall of the BGHMC Project collapse. So close.
Petitioner files an Affidavit-Complaint against the respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman, asserting
that its property was damaged. Claims that the damage to its property was due to respondents’ gross negligence,
incompetence and/or malicious conduct because they failed to construct a perimeter fence in the excavations made for
the expansion of the BGHMC despite the fact that petitioner had written Royson about the possibility of an erosion.
Petitioner charges the respondents of causing undue injury to it in the discharge of their official and administrative
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and inexcusable negligence in the construction of the expansion
project of the BGHMC and its retaining wall.
Cammayo, Asst. Sec. of DPWH: he did all he could do to prevent damage to petitioner’s property. In the original plans for
the project, there was no provision for the construction of any reinforced slope protection or retaining wall, thus there
was no obligation to construct such permanent protection measures. He initiated the construction of such measures.
When the rains came, DPWH immediately took action to prevent further erosion. They also discovered a previously
undetected pre-war tunnel which collapsed due to heavy rains. Asserts force majeure.
Ombudsman decision
Dismissed complaint after finding no probable cause to hold the respondents liable for violation of RA 3019. No evidence
of manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the respondents in the
construction of the BGHMC Bldg. It noted that the damage was not w/in petitioner’s property but on a portion BGHMC
property which petitioner encroached.
Petitioner contends that Ombudsman acted w/o jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
resolution and order.
Thus, SC.
Issue: W/N Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
the complaint. (no)
Petitioner insists that the collapse of the retaining wall was due to the respondents’ gross inexcusable negligence on
their respective duties because they failed to ensure that the nec. bldg. and excavation permits have been secured before
the excavation commenced. Dapat walang force majeure. No evidence that collapse was due to rains. Alleges that the
effort to construct a retaining wall was done only after two landslides.
Respondents allege that petitioners failed to establish that any of its assertions.
Determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary investigation is a function that
belongs to the Ombudsman.
For there to be a finding of grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that the discretionary power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.
After examination of the records, the Court concludes that the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion.
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Respondents are charged with a violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.
Elements:
1 accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions
2 the accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
3 the action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused
As noted by the Ombudsman, petitioner failed to point out specific evidence and concrete proof that respondents
demonstrated manifest partiality (mp) or evident bad faith (ebf) in the construction of the BGHMC and its retaining wall,
nor gross inexcusable negligence (gin).
MP - when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another
EBF - connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage; bad
judgment and palpably and fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some
perverse motive or ill will.
GIN - essential to prove that the breach of duty borders on malice and is characterized by flagrant, palpable and
willful indifference to consequences insofar as other person may be affected
Petitioner has not shown that respondents were impelled by such motives in the performance of their
official duties and functions.
Findings of the Ombudsman show that that the collapse was not mainly attributable to respondent’s acts but due
to a confluence of several factors, such as the rains, the discovery of the tunnel, typhoon Feria, the site was on a slope.
Thus was beyond respondents’ control.
As to negligence, Cammayo employed additional slope protection, DPWH installed polyurethane sheets for slope
protection, soils nails were installed, a structural design specialist was immediately hired to prepare plans for a new
reinforced concrete retaining wall. These acts negate the imputation of gross inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that it suffered damages when its property lost lateral support by
reason of the collapsed retaining wall. In Santos v People, the Court equated the concept of “undue injury,” in the context
of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, with the civil law concept of “actual damage,” therefore must be specified, quantified and proven
to the point of moral certainty. Bawal speculative. Must depend on proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding
specific facts which could afford some basis for measuring actual damage. Here, Memorandum of the Office of the City
Engineer of Baguio City stated that main structure of complainant was outside the critical slip circle. Not refuted. Absent
controverting evidence, Ombudsman will not be faulted for relying on the said memo.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Resolution dated February 5, 2002 and Order dated June 27, 2002 of the Ombudsman in OMB Case No. 0-01-0400 are
AFFIRMED.
Facts:
Petitioner was municipal mayor of Calintaan, MindoroOcc, from 1992-95, with Rigoberto de Jesus was municipal
treasurer. 1994, state auditor had a post-audit investigation, revealing that during P’s incumbency, no public bidding
done for a Toyota Land Cruiser, 119bags cement, an electric generator set, constructions materials, 2tires, and a
computer with accessories. There were irregularities supporting their acquisitions. 1998, P and RJ (at large) indicted in
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7separate informations for violation of RA3019(3e). Trial ensued. State auditor lone prosecution witness. For defense, P
called to stand, admitted no public hearing conducted insofar as the purchases he was accused of were concerned. When
asked how purchases were made, said through personal canvass. When asked why that, said no bidding could be done
because all dealers were in Manila, so useless to invite them since nobody would bid anyway. 2005, guilty, each
Information with 6-10years. Appealed, saying not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not P was guilty.
Held:
Yes. Appeal dismissed. Local Government Code explicitly provides rule that acquisitions of supplies by LGUs shall be
through competitive bidding. Exception, among others, is personal canvass of responsible merchants. Since such was
used, LGC provides limitations when it is used as acquisition method: supplies may be procured after personal canvass
of at least 3responsible local suppliers by a committee of 3, composed of local general services officer or municipal
treasurer, local accountant, and head of office/department for whose use the supplies are being procured. The award
shall be decided by Committee on Awards. Purchases shall not exceed P20K (for fourth class municipalities, which
Calintaan is, and below) in any 1month for each LGU. LGU364 also mandates that in every municipality there be a
Committee on Awards to decide the winnings bids and questions on procurement, composed of local chief executive as
chairman, local treasurer, local accountant, local budget officer, local general services officer, and head of
office/department for which supplies are being procured. In case head would sit in dual capacity, a member of the
city/municipal council would elect from its members a person to sit in.
Law uses “shall.” Regarding car, personal canvass effected solely by P, without participation from accountant or RJ. No
showing that award was decided by committee. Only an abstract of canvass supported the award, signed by P and RJ,
without required signatures by accountant and budget officer. P disregarded dual capacity protocol because in all
purchases made, signed in a dual capacity as chairman and member (head of office/department). Strictly prohibited.
Prohibition meant to check and prevent conflict of interest. Same flaws for cement, generator, construction materials,
2tires, computer. Also spent more than P20K.
RA3019(3e) enumerates corrupt practices: “giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, preference
through manifest partiality.” To be guilty, elements must concur:
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official, administrative or judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference.
3rd element may be committed in 3ways, and proof of any is enough to convict under RA3019(3e)
Explaining what “partiality,” “bad faith” and “gross negligence” mean, we held:
“Partiality” is synonymous with “bias” which “excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for
rather than as they are.” “Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill
will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.” “Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission
of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property.”
P grossly negligent in all purchases. Admission that canvass sheets sent out by RJ to suppliers already contained his
signatures because he pre-signed the forms proves utter disregard for actions. Admitted knowing LGC on personal
canvass, but did not follow saying he merely followed practice of his predecessors. Mindless disregard for law in a
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tradition of illegality. He should have been first to follow the law. 4th element present, for while no undue injury proved,
P gave unwarranted benefit or preference to private suppliers, no damage necessary. “Unwarranted” means lacking
adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. “Advantage” means a
more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action.
“Preference” signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.
To be convicted of 2nd mode, sufficient that accused gave unjustified favor or benefit to another, in exercise of functions.
P did just that, repeatedly failing to follow requirements. Private suppliers personally chosen by P. P sentenced to 6-
10years for each count.
Facts:
Petitioner appeals from 2006 CA conviction for RA3019(3e) and RPC171 violations. P was Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation Commissioner, when 11Indian nationals, 3 facing drug trafficking charges, left country in 1994 on the basis
of a BID Self-Deportation Order, saying that since BID has not received prior written request to hold their departure
from any government agency nor from private person, and no indication that they were subject of written complaints,
Indians cleared for self-deportation. Issuance resulted in information against them (P, Associate Commissioner Bayani
Subido, Jr., Associate Commissioner Manuel Roxas) for RPC171 violation. Also charged under RA3019(3e). Indians were
arrested and detained by NBI for making methaqualone, subjected to preliminary investigation. NBI wrote P requesting
they be furnished Indians’ files. Deportation was requested by Indians’ counsel, saying prosecution would only be costly
for government, indorsed and recommended by NBI. However, public prosecutor filed charges against Indians. BID
received requests for self-deportation days before the deportation indorsement was received by prosecutor.
At trial before Sandiganbayan, Subido said that day when they signed the order, it was P’s birthday, had lunch. Order
was presented to him with P’s signature, and recalling DOJ Secretary assuring them no pending charges against Indians,
he signed. Roxas said he went to P’s office and saw DOJ Secretary, then presented with Order, saying no pending case nor
Hold Departure Orders against Indians, so signed. P said same thing, no pending cases, and prosecutor never
communicated with him, P allegedly unaware that Indians were undergoing preliminary investigation. P’s staff said
when instructed to conduct record check, no criminal records found, but they knew Indians were being apprehended for
drugs. 2006, Roxas and Subido exonerated, but P found guilty, 6-12years, that P had ample information about the case,
but granting however that no pending cases were against the Indians, the order should have mentioned that fact, instead
of saying there were no written requests for their departure to be held. Also, the statement that Indians were not subject
to any written complaints was false because P knew they were under preliminary investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not P is guilty.
Held:
Yes. Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, violation for which petitioner was charged, provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Elements are:
a) Public officer;
b) Takes advantage of his official position;
c) Knows that what he imputes is false;
d) Falsity involves a material fact;
e) There is a legal obligation for him to narrate the truth;
f) Such untruthful statements are not contained in an affidavit or a statement required by law to be sworn in.
2offenses share 2common elements: public officer, and act related to public position. RESPECTING THE CHARGE OF
VIOLATING 3 (E) OF RA 3019, the elements which must be indubitably proved are whether petitioner acted with
manifest partiality or evident bad faith, and whether such action caused undue injury to any party including the
Government, or gave any party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Both
elements are present in this case. Manifest partiality and evident bad faith evident from P’s stance that he was never
aware of a case filed in court. Even if true, P was informed by the Undersecretary through the Indorsement. At witness
stand, P admitted knowing they were under preliminary investigation. The deporation benefitted those who would have
stood trial.
RESPECTING THE CHARGE FOR FALSIFICATION, P untruthfully stated that there is no indication from the records that
the Indians are the subject of any written complaints before any government agency nor before any private person. For
that statement is belied by documentary evidence — the July 5, 1994 letter of NBI to petitioner, the July 28, 1994
Indorsement of Undersecretary to petitioner (of NBI recommendation for the deportation of the Indians) and P's own
August 4, 1994 4th Indorsement to prosecutor. P cannot hide behind his subordinates, since he failed to disclose to staff
doing check the information that Indians were undergoing preliminary investigation. Since the BID is an attached agency
of the DOJ, P could have easily requested information on the outcome of the preliminary investigation, of which he was
informed about, or if a case had already been filed in court against the Indians.
Whether the Prosecutor moved to obtain a hold departure order is beside the point, what is material being that there
was a pending preliminary investigation against the Indians, contrary to the statement in the Order that "there is no
indication from the records that the [Indians] are the subject of any written complaint . . .," which pending preliminary
investigation called for the provisional dismissal of the deportation case.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Efren L. Alvarez, at the time of the subject transaction, was the Mayor of the Municipality (now
Science City) of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.
● July 1995: The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Muñ oz under Resolution No. 136, S-95 invited Mr. Jess Garcia,
President of the Australian-Professional, Inc. (API) in connection with the municipal government's plan to construct
a four-storey shopping mall ("Wag-wag Shopping Mall").
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan failed to observe the requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt in convicting the Accused-Petitioner
2. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate the legal intent of the BOT project
3. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan utterly failed to appreciate that the BOT was a lawful project of
the Sangguniang Bayan and not the project of the Mayor Accused-Petitioner herein; and
4. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan utterly failed to appreciate that there was no damage on the then
Municipality of Muñ oz as contemplated by law, to warrant the conviction of the Accused-Petitioner.
RATIO:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. To be convicted under the said provision, the
following elements must be established:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
SC: NO.
● The use of the disjunctive word "or" connotes that either act of (a) "causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government"; and (b) "giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference,"
qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
● The use of the disjunctive "or" connotes that the two modes need not be present at the same time. In other
words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.
● Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan: Proof of the extent or quantum of damage is not essential. It is sufficient that the
injury suffered or benefits received can be perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.
● Under the second mode of the crime defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 therefore, damage is not required.
In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit
to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.
● The third element of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e., through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
● Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 is
enough to convict.
● Damage or injury caused by petitioner's acts though alleged in the information, thus need not be proven for as
long as the act of giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference either through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence was satisfactorily established.
● R.A. No. 6957 as amended by R.A. No. 7718, requires that a BOT project be awarded to the bidder who has
satisfied the minimum requirements, and met the technical, financial, organizational and legal standards provided in
the BOT Law.
● SEC. 5. Public Bidding of Projects. — . . .
● In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement, the contract shall be awarded to the bidder who, having
satisfied the minimum financial, technical, organizational and legal standards required by this Act, has submitted the
lowest bid and most favorable terms for the project, based on the present value of its proposed tolls, fees, rentals
and charges over a fixed term for the facility to be constructed, rehabilitated, operated and maintained according to
the prescribed minimum design and performance standards, plans and specifications. . . .
● Foremost of these minimum legal standards is the license accreditation of a contractor required under R.A.
No. 4566 otherwise known as the Contractors' License Law.
● In fact, a contractor must show that he is licensed by the board before his bid will be considered.
● General Rule: The prospective contractor for government infrastructure projects must have been duly licensed
as such pursuant to R.A. No. 4566.
● API not being a licensed contractor as per the Certification issued by Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board
(PCAB) board secretary Aaron C. Tablazon, is thus not qualified to participate in the bidding and much less be
awarded the BOT project for the construction of Wag-Wag Shopping Mall.
● Petitioner claimed that there was compliance with the law saying that API was not a contractor but a mere
project proponent, for which a license is not a requisite to undertake BOT projects. But the Sandiganbayan correctly
rejected this theory as the clear terms of the MOA itself confirm that API itself undertook to construct the Wag-Wag
Shopping Mall.
● Section 2 of R.A. No. 6957 as amended by R.A. No. 7718, defined the terms "Contractor" and "Project Proponent"
as follows:
● (k) Project Proponent — The private sector entity which shall have contractual responsibility for the
project and which shall have an adequate financial base to implement said project consisting of equity and firm
commitments from reputable financial institutions to provide, upon award, sufficient credit lines to cover the total
estimated cost of the project.
● (l) Contractor — Any entity accredited under Philippine laws which may or may not be the project
proponent and which shall undertake the actual construction and/or supply of equipment for the project.
● Aside from the clear language of the MOA, the attendant circumstances unmistakably showed that API is both
the project proponent and contractor of the BOT project, as it was the one who submitted the proposal and bid to
the SB, through its President executed the MOA with petitioner, deployed manpower and equipment for the clearing
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of the site, conducted groundbreaking, performed excavation and initial construction works, and took responsibility
for the stoppage and non-completion of the project when it entered into a compromise with the Municipality of
Muñ oz. It is to be noted that even as project proponent, API failed to meet the minimum financial standard
considering that it has no adequate financial base to implement the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project. API's paid-up
capital was only P2.5 million, while its stand-by credit line issued by Brilliant Star Capital Lending Co., Inc. was only
for the amount of P150 million, way below the P240 million total project cost.
● While API's proposal passed through the pre-qualification stage, it failed to submit, except for the SEC
registration certificate, a complete set of documents required for a BOT project, in accordance with the BOT Law
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
Petitioner: Assails the Sandiganbayan for allegedly failing to appreciate the legal intent of the BOT Law which allows
contracts on a negotiated basis for unsolicited proposals like the Wag-Wag Shopping Mall project. It asserts that the
procedure and requirements for bidding have been complied with when the Municipality of Muñ oz caused the
publication of the invitation to submit comparative bids for the BOT project was published in Pinoy, a newspaper of
general circulation for three consecutive weeks. Since no comparative bid/proposal was received within sixty (60) days,
the BOT project was rightfully awarded to API, the original proponent.
SC: NO.
● Unsolicited proposals refer to project proposals submitted by the private sector to undertake infrastructure or
development projects which may be entered into by a government agency or local government unit. Section 4-a of
R.A. No. 6957 as amended by R.A. No. 7718 governs unsolicited proposals.
● It was the SB which invited the API to provide information on the construction of a shopping mall project under
the BOT scheme. It cannot be said thus that the development project originated from the proponent/contractor.
Nonetheless, even if the proposal is deemed unsolicited, still the requirements of the law have not been complied
with.
● As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, API's proposal showed that it lacked the requirements as it did
not include a company profile and the basic contractual terms and conditions on the obligations of the
proponent/contractor and the government.
● Had such company profile been required of API, the municipal government could have been apprised of the fact
that said contractor/proponent had been in existence for only three months at that time and had not yet completed a
project, although APRI, which actually undertook the Calamba and Lemery shopping centers also under BOT scheme,
is allegedly the same entity as API which have the same set of incorporators and directors.
FACTS:
● AAA is a 21 year old girl who contracted polio when she was 7 months old. She could only read and write her
name including that of her friends because she was not able to study on account of her difficulty in walking.
● (1st) June 30, 1998, 4 AM: AAA was sleeping in their house in Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila along
with her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when Abello mashed her breast.
● (2nd) July 2, 1999, 3 AM: Abello again mashed the breast of AAA practically under the same previous situation
while the latter was sleeping.
● In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the light coming from outside which
illuminated the house.
● (3rd) July 8, 1998, 2 AM: Abello this time placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. She was asleep but
she awakened when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA exclaimed "Aray" forcing the accused to
hurriedly enter the room he shares with AAA’s mother. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. According to her
testimony, when she awakened, his organ was in her mouth. Her mouth was open and the penis was inside for one
second. When asked if the penis was soft or hard, she mentioned that she got hold of it to push it out of her mouth.
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● The victim on the same date reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.
● July 8, 1998: 3 Informations
○ Criminal Case No. 19623-MN: (RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT– RA 8353)
■ July 8, 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, with lewd
design and by means of force and intimidation, feloniously putting his penis inside the mouth of
said AAA, against her will and without her consent.
○ Criminal Case No. 19624-MN : (SEXUAL ABUSE – RA 7610)
■ June 30, 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, 21 years
old, and Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, feloniously
mashing her breast, against her will and without her consent.
○ Criminal Case No. 19625-MN (SEXUAL ABUSE – RA 7610)
■ July 2, 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila,accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, 21 years old,
and Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, feloniously
mashing her breast, against her will and without her consent.
● Pleaded not guilty. The prosecution relied on testimony of the victim, AAA, who identified Abello as the
perpetrator of the rape and sexual abuses against her.
● DEFENSE: Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA, his defense is confined to his denial
of the accusations. In all of the instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim at the sala on his way
to his room after retiring home.
RTC: GUILTY under the three Informations: Rape, 2 counts of Sexual Abuse
● Criminal Case No. 19623-MN: GUILTY of Paragraph 2, Article 226-A, Republic Act 8353 (RAPE BY SEXUAL
ASSAULT)
○ ISL PENALTY: 7 Years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 13 Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum
● Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN: GUILTY of two (2) counts of Section 5, Article III of Republic
Act 7610 (SEXUAL ABUSE/ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS COMMITTED TO A CHILD)
○ ISL PENALTY: 4 Years of prision correcional as minimum, to 12 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
CA: AFFIRMED Conviction but Modified Penalties
● PENALTY FOR THE RAPE (increased): 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum; ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
● PENALTY FOR 2 COUNTS OF SEXUAL ABUSE (increased and heavier penalty than rape): reclusion perpetua in
each of the two cases
ISSUES:
1. Whether the victim’s testimony should be given credence in light of the ff:
a. AAA was not alone during these alleged incidents (YES)
b. defendant is AAA’s stepfather who has a healthy sexual relationship with her mother (YES)
c. AAA admitted that she was asleep when these incidents happened making it likely that she could have just
dreamed of them? (YES)
2. Whether he is guilty of rape by sexual assault under RA 8353 even if the mode of committing the offense proven
during trial was different from that alleged in the information? (YES)
3. Whether he is guilty of sexual abuse/acts of lasciviousness committed to a child under Sec. 5, Article III of RA 7610
when the victim is not a child and there was no force or compulsion? (NO, but still guilty under RPC 336 for acts of
lasciviousness)
4. Whether he can be held guilty under RPC 336 even if the Informations wrongly designated R.A. No. 7610 as the law
violated? (YES, proven during trial)
5. Whether the aggravating circumstance of relationship (stepfather) should be appreciated? (NO)
HELD: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION; Rape by sexual assault and 2 counts of Acts of lasciviousness under RPC 336
and not RA 7610
1. AAA’s testimony credible. Surrounding circumstances as shown by the evidence, and common human experience are
relied upon when there is difficulty in ascertaining as to who between the 2 parties present at the time of commission of
the crime should be given credence.
● Abello could not say why AAA would falsely accuse him. The substance and tenor of the testimony and the
element of motivation are critical points for us since a straightforward, categorical and candid narration by the
victim deserves credence if no ill motive can be shown driving her to falsely testify against the accused.
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a. Mere denial of one’s involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party.
AAA categorically and unmistakably identified Abello as her rapist and sexual abuser; the identification was positive
because the scene was illuminated by a light coming from outside the parties’ house at the time of the incidents so she
also saw him retreating to her mother’s room.
● He had the opportunity and the means to commit these crimes in terms of his location and close proximity to
AAA who, together with her companions, were then sleeping. Abello admitted that in the wee hours of the
mornings of June 30, July 2, and July 8, 1998, he passed by the sala of their house where AAA and her
companions were sleeping.
b. His relationship with AAA does not insulate him from the crimes charged. The relationship between the offender and
the offended party has never been an obstacle to the commission of the crime against chastity. Studies show that 98.8%
of the victims are women; an estimated 26.7% of these cases involve sexual abuse, while 33% involve incest committed
against children. In these cases, the male spouse, the father of the victim, or close male relatives, have been identified as
frequent abusers.
c. Allegation that AAA could have just dreamed of the incidents complained is preposterous. It is highly unlikely that a
woman in her right mind would expose and declare herself a victim of rape and sexual abuse, when she would thereby
open herself to the humiliating experience of a public trial and to the possible social stigma of being a victim of rape and
sexual abuse.
● She filed the criminal charges because she did not know what to do and thus reported the incidents to her
mother and sister-in-law who thereafter sought police assistance. AAA lived a sheltered life cared for by her
relatives because of her polio. It is highly unusual for her to have the worldly sophistication to invent or
fabricate the charges she made, particularly one made against her stepfather.
● A charge against one’s stepfather, too, is unusual in our socio-cultural context because of the respect we give our
elders, and is only understandable if there is a deeply felt cause for complaint.
3. NOT Acts of lasciviousness committed against a child or sexual abuse under RA 7610 but acts of lasciviousness under
RPC 336. (1) NOT A CHILD (21 years old) AND CAN TAKE CARE OF SELF, (2) NO FORCE OR COMPULSION (merely
awakened)
5. NO. Relationship was not duly proven for failure to present the marriage contract between Abello and AAA’s mother.
Abello’s admission of his marriage is inconclusive evidence to prove the marriage to AAA’s mother, as the marriage
contract still remains the best evidence to prove the fact of marriage.
DISPOSITIVE: GUILTY OF RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT AND TWO COUNTS OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS UNDER RPC
336
NATURE: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision which
affirmed the Decision of the RTC convicting appellant Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of the crime of Other Acts of Child
Abuse punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603
● Appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, developed and operated the fishpond from 1982 to 1987. Sometime in 1997:
FFF occupied the fishpond and the nipa hut beside the same, by virtue of a (MOA) entered into by FFF with the Heirs
of Escolastico, as represented by Segundino Ronquillo.
● After the MOA expired in 1998, appellant and his wife decided to discontinue the lease because they did not
understand the management and accounting of FFF.
● They made several demands on him to return possession of the fishpond but FFF refused, asking for a written
termination of the contract from all the heirs of Escolastico.
● To solve the problem, appellant and Bienvenida engaged the services of FFF as caretaker of the fishpond, providing
him with fingerlings, fertilizers and all necessary expenses.
● FFF still failed to make an accounting. Thus, on September 2, 2000, at around 7AM after pasturing his cattle,
appellant dropped by the house of FFF to ask him to make a detailed accounting because he and his wife were not
satisfied with the harvest in August of 2000.
● MMM, however, retorted, saying that they would no longer make any accounting, as Benny Ronquillo, brother of
appellant's wife, would finance the next cropping.
● Displeased with MMM's statement, appellant got angry and demanded that they leave the fishpond. FFF's family
resented this demand and a commotion ensued.
● BBB got a piece of wood and struck appellant but the latter was able to parry the blow. Appellant got hold of the
piece of wood which actually broke.
● Intending not to hurt anybody, appellant threw the same behind him. Suddenly from behind, VVV appeared, got hold
of the said piece of wood and hit appellant once at the back of his shoulder.
● Appellant claimed that he was surprised that a criminal case was filed by VVV against him for allegedly beating her.
Appellant denied that he beat VVV, saying that the instant case was fabricated and was being used as a means to
extort money from him.
● Ronald Lauren (witness): Testified that he saw BBB strike appellant with a piece of wood but appellant was able to
parry the blow; that appellant threw away the piece of wood; that when appellant threw the piece of wood, there
was no one there at the time; and that appellant left the place immediately.
● RTC: Found that at the arraignment, appellant, through former counsel Atty. Cabahug admitted that he hit VVV,
although unintentionally. Thus, appellant had the burden of proving that, at the time VVV was hit, appellant was
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performing a lawful act. The RTC ruled that the evidence did not favor appellant because his demand for FFF's family
to vacate the fishpond, coupled with threats and punctuated with actual use of force, exceeded the limits allowed by
law. The RTC also held that the injuries sustained by VVV were distinguishable, indicating that the blow was forceful,
and that the force used was strong.
○ GUILTY of violating paragraph (a), Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610; ISL: 6 years prision
correccional to 7 yrs and 4 months of prision mayor.,
● CA: The record of the proceedings taken during appellant's arraignment before the RTC belied appellant's
contention that his defense was one of absolute denial. The CA pointed to a manifestation of appellant's counsel,
Atty. Cabahug, in open court that appellant was putting up an affirmative defense because the act of hitting VVV was
unintentional.
● Furthermore, the defense of absolute denial interposed by appellant cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
statements of VVV and her witnesses, giving full credence to the factual findings of the RTC.
● Information not defective since the allegations were explicit.
○ RTC decision UPHELD with modification as to the penalty.
ISSUES:
HELD: The Petition is DENIED. The CA Decision dated February 20, 2007 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
appellant Leonilo Sanchez issentenced to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
RATIO:
Appellant’s Contentions:
● conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt
● RTC erred when it shifted the burden of proof to him
● RTC and CA erred in ruling that appellant interposed an affirmative defense when, all throughout his testimony
before the RTC, he denied having inflicted any injury on VVV
● VVV and her family had ill motive to implicate him because of the pressure he exerted against them to give up the
fishpon
● VVV, in her testimony, made material inconsistencies as to who got the piece of wood at the back of their house
● he had no motive or intention of harming anyone, otherwise, he would have done so earlier that day
● if BBB was also beaten, he should have submitted himself for medical treatment and examination
● the Information charging appellant was substantially and jurisdictionally defective as the acts complained of were
covered by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
● The case is not one for child abuse, since VVV was neither punished in a cruel and unusual manner nor deliberately
subjected to excessive indignities or humiliation.
● the charge was obviously made as one for child abuse, instead of slight physical injuries, in order to subject him to a
much heavier penalty.
OSG:
● the Petition is fatally defective because it raises purely factual issues
● the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) taken during appellant's arraignment on November 6, 2001 clearly
shows that appellant, through Atty. Cabahug, raised an affirmative defense,
● VVV’s testionies were direct, positive and categorical, corroborated by MMM and supported by the med
examination conducted by Dr. Manalo
● appellant failed to present any reason or ground to set aside the decisions of the RTC and the CA there is no
ambiguity in the Information as the allegations are clear and explicit to constitute the essential elements of the
offense of child abuse:
○ (a) minority of the victim;
○ (b) acts complained of are prejudicial to the development of the child-victim; and
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○ (c) the said acts are covered by the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603.
● However, the CA erred in modifying the indeterminate sentence imposed by the RTC. The offense of Other Acts
of Child Abuse as defined and punished under Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, a special law, carries the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period which is a penalty defined in the Revised Penal Code.
● RTC correctly applied the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing appellant to an
indeterminate sentence of 6 years of prision correccional to 7 years and 4 months of prision mayor
SC:
Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or
not, which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth
and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610.
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.
● Araneta v. People: The provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree
No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned
statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are
different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child's development. An accused can be prosecuted
and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein.
The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the
prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
● It is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and
independence of one thing from other things enumerated.
● Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development" supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. F
● The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three
other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.
On appellant’s guilt
TOPIC: Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
INFORMATION: Information alleges that accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, contained in a plastic sachet, to a poseur-buyer, without
authority of law, and one P500 peso bill was confiscated from the accused to the damage and prejudice of the People of
the Philippines.
Facts:
Civilian informant Iris Mae Cleofe came to Pasacao Police Station to report appellant’s alleged drug trafficking
activities. Task Force Ubash, a unit charged with monitoring drug trafficking in the area, acted on this information and
was directed to go with Iris and conduct surveillance upon appellant.
After their surveillance yielded positive results, Task Force Ubash coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the conduct of the buy-bust operation which will take place that same night at the ouse
of one Edgar Saar. Solero, Commander of Ubash, briefed the team on what do do. They were instructed to synchronize
their watches because at exactly 7:30pm they will enter the place immediately after Iris says, “Uya na and bayad ko.
(Here is my payment.)” as a signal that the transaction has been perfected.
At around 7pm, the team arrives and hides behind plants (yeah. awesome), which offered a good view of the
well-lit porch of Saar’s house. Iris arrives. She enters the house. She proceeds with the transaction and handed over a
marked P500 bill to appellant. She utters the signal, “O, uya na an bayad ko kaiyan ha, baad kun wara-waraon mo iyan,
uya na an bayad ko ha. (This is my payment, you might misplace it.),” her deliberately loud for the team to hear.
Appellant hands over a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. At this point, he was arrested and
handcuffed. Ubash brings him to the police station where he was detained. The sachet was personally submitted by Bearis
to the Provincial Crime Lab, where it was tested by Nobleza.
Test showed that the substance was Shabu. It was then submitted to the PNP Regional Crime Lab office for
confirmatory testing by Clemen, a forensic chemist. Again, positive for Shabu.
Defense version:
Appellant was in Pasacao for a job, and while there he stayed with his friend Saar. Around 7pm that day, he saw
Iris enter the yard and go into Saar’s house. Then she comes out so appellant asks her who she was looking for. She was
looking for a Bongbong Ditsuso. Appellant tells her to wait inside then cooks rice, then returns to the living room to talk
to Iris. Several men then barge in and Iris gives him something which turns out to be crumpled money. He was then
handcuffed after getting punched and hit with a caliber .45 in the nape. He was boarded on a jeep and brought to the
police station.
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RTC Judgment:
Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 and sentencing him to life imprisonment.
CA affirms with Modification (added a fine of P500,000)
Issue:
W/N the procedure in the seizure and custody of illegal drugs was strictly complied with. (No)
Ratio:
Elements to be proven by the prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Sec. 5 of RA 9165
1 identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration
2 the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor
These require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed. There is also a
need to comply strictly with procedure in the illegal drug’s procedure in its seizure and custody.
Evident from the record however, is the fact that the members of the buy-bust team did not comply with the
procedure laid down in Sec. 21. Looking at Solero’s testimony, there is no showing that the procedure was complied with,
as well as his admitting that he had not seen the inventory of the confiscated drugs allegedly prepared by the police
officers and that he only read a little of RA 9165.
Nonetheless, People v Pringas teaches that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Sec. 21 is not necessarily
fatal. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court recognizes
that strict compliance may not always be possible given the circumstances, that the police operate under varied
conditions and cannot at all times attend to the niceties of the procedure in the handling of confiscated evidence.
For the clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved. It must be shown that the
illegal drug presented in court is the very same specimen seized from the accused. This function is performed by the chain
of custody requirement.
In this case, there was no compliance with the inventory and photographing of the drug and marked money.
Every link must be accounted for.
Sabi ni Solero:
Solero ---> some desk officer whose name he can’t remember, which he promised to find out but never did. Also,
from the office ---> provincial crime lab, but can’t remember who brought it there
Sabi ni Bearis:
Solero ---> Bearis ---> provincial crime lab
He identified in court that it was the same specimen he brought since it had the marking “MES,” the initials of
Solero. No evidence however showing that Solero made said marking in the presence of Bearis. It is thus unclear
whether after Solero, the next person who came into possession of the specimen was the desk officer or Bearis.
Sabi ni Nobleza:
Bearis ---> Nobleza (initial test) ---> SPO3 Basagre
Sabi ni Clemen (the chemist):
Insp Lopez ---> Clemen
Here we see that the prosecution failed to present evidence to show how the specimen was transferred from
Basagre to Lopez.
The obvious gaps in the chain of custody created a reasonable doubt as to whether the specimen seized from
appellant was the same specimen brought to the crime labs and eventually offered in court as evidence. No proof of
corpus delicti. Therefore the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used. The
presumption obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated
from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the November 22, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC. No. 01620. Appellant JAY LORENA y LABAG is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause/s.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision with deliberate dispatch and to
report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
FACTS:
● Acting on a tip from a police asset, a police team from the Rodriguez, Rizal police station conducted a buy-bust
operation on the night of September 10, 2002. The target was accused Jaime Gatlabayan (alias Pungay). Arriving at
the target area (Carlton Village, Brgy. Manggahan, Rodriguez, Rizal), the civilian asset pointed appellant to the buy-
bust team. Appellant was then standing under a sampaloc tree. Gatlabayan approached one of the policemen (PO1
Antonio) and asked if he wanted “to score” (buy) shabu. PO1 Antonio said yes, and handed over a marked 100-peso
bill to Gatlabayan, who gave the policeman a sachet containing a white powder alleged to be shabu. PO1 Antonio
then signalled to his colleagues by waving his hand; and Gatlabayan was arrested on the spot.
● In his defense, Gatlabayan claimed that he was the victim of a frame-up. He was in a perya at around 20:00 of
September 10, 2002 when policemen suddenly arrested him without explaining his offense.
● RTC decision (May 10, 2005) - found Gatlabayan guilty and sentenced him to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay
the fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND(P500,000.00) PESOS
● CA decision (July 29, 2008) - affirmed RTC decision, found the testimonies of the policemen PO1 Antonio and
PO1 Jiro, III to be credible. It further held that all elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs - as well as
the identity of the accused - were proven; and that the presumption of regularity of official duties was not
overturned. Gatlabayan appeals this decision to the SC.
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ISSUE: W/N Gatlabayan is guilty “despite the prosecution’s failure to prove the chain of custody of the alleged seized
illegal drugs, in violation of Secs. 21 and 86 of R.A. NO. 9165.)
HELD: NO
RATIO:
● According to the Court, the core issue in this case was “whether or not sufficient evidence exists to support the
conviction of the accused for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.”. In resolving this issue, the Court
opted to review the factual findings of the lower court on the basis of a misapprehension of facts.
● In establishing guilt for the offense of sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the
transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) the buyer
and seller were identified. All three elements must be duly proven.
● Chain of custody - “means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course
of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.” (RA 9165 IRR, sec. 1(b)).
● On the corpus delicti - the very substance which was the subject of the buy-bust transaction must be the same
substance which was offered as evidence to the court.
● Malillin v. People - “As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item
was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.”
● What “links” in the chain of custody need to be proven, People v. Kamad - “First, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.”
● “The testimony of PO1 Antonio clearly lacked specifics on how the confiscated shabu was handled immediately
after the arrest of the accused.” His testimony fails to show who exactly were the persons who were able to handle
the corpus delicti.
● “The prosecution evidence also failed to identify the person who marked the sachet, how the same was done,
and who witnessed the marking. In People v. Martinez, the Court ruled that the "marking" of the seized items - to
truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence -
should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation - in order to
protect innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and the apprehending officers as well from
harassment suits based on planting of evidence and on allegations of robbery or theft.” The affidavits of policemen
Jiro III and Antonio fail to specify the person who marked the corpus delicti, and whether it was marked in the
presence of Gatlabayan.
● The prosecution also failed to establish the identity of the police investigator to whom the buy-bust team turned
over the seized item. Although the Request for Laboratory Examination was signed by a certain Santiago for and in
behalf of Police Senior Inspector Anastacio Benzon, it was not shown that he was the same official who received the
subject shabu from the buy-bust team or from the police investigator.
● “A perusal of the Request for Laboratory Examination and the Chemistry Report No. D-1784-02E [26] reveals
that the marking on the plastic sachet containing the subject shabu was changed to "EXHIBIT 1 JBG." The
prosecution, however, failed to disclose the name and identity of the police officer who changed the marking of the
specimen. Further, the prosecution evidence is wanting as to the identity of the person who submitted the specimen
to the PNP Crime Laboratory; as to whether the forensic chemist whose name appeared in the chemistry report was
the one who received the subject shabu when it was forwarded to the crime laboratory; and as to who exercised
custody and possession of the specimen after the chemical examination and before it was offered in court. Neither
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was there any evidence adduced to show how the seized shabu was handled, stored and safeguarded pending its
offer as evidence in court.”
● “It bears stressing that although the parties stipulated on the results of the laboratory examination (through an
RTC order), no stipulation was made with respect to the ultimate source of the drug submitted for examination.”
● Exacting standards for handling of corpus delicti in drug cases - “While a perfect chain of custody is almost
always impossible to achieve, an unbroken chain becomes indispensable and essential in the prosecution of drug
cases owing to susceptibility of the seized drug to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange. Hence, each and every link in the custody must be established beginning from the seizure of the shabu
from the accused during the entrapment operation until its submission by the forensic chemist to the RTC.”
● Moreover, it must be pointed out that the subject 0.03 gram of shabu was never presented as evidence and
marked as an exhibit during the pre-trial or even in the course of the trial proper (but the plastic sachet which
contained the shabu was presented). “The defense was clearly sleeping on its feet when it did not pose any objection
to the prosecution's offer of [the sachet] evidence.” The corpus delicti in this case “is not legally extant”.
● “[T]he flagrant procedural lapses the police officers committed in handling the allegedly confiscated shabu in
violation of the chain of custody requirement effectively negate the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duties. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the presumption unavailable. It
must be emphasized that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome
the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.”
DISPOSITION: Decision reversed. Appellant Gatlabayan is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released...
Facts:
Alcuizar was charged with violating Sections 5 (Illegal Sale), 6 (Maintaining a drug den), 11 (Illegal possession),
and 12 (Illegal possession of dangerous drug paraphernalia) of R.A. No. 9165 in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-66343 - CBU-
66346. He was tried on 2 separate criminal proceedings. The instant appeal involved the joint trial of Criminal Cases
Nos. CBU-66345 and CBU-66346 before RTC Branch 17 of Cebu City. The Information relating to the criminal case
appealed from pertains to illegal possession of shabu in violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
During the pre-trial conference, the defense admitted the genuineness, authenticity, and truthfulness of the Forensic
Chemistry Report. Both parties then agreed to dispense with the forensic chemist’s testimony.
SP01 Agadier, P03 Rolando Gantuangco, SPO1 Roland Navales, who were all assigned at the Municipality of Carcar Police
Station in Cebu City, secured a search warrant from the court to search the house of appellant on the suspicion that the
latter is selling and in possession of shabu. On 15 June 2003, they conducted a buy-bust operation in Sitio Awayan, with
the subject being the appellant:
SPO1 Agadier was standing in a store across the house of appellant. He witnessed the poseur buyer hand the marked
money to appellant in exchange for 1 deck of shabu. SPO1 Agadier then pursued appellant, who ran to his parents'
house, where he was eventually caught. After the arrest, SPO1 Agadier and his team went back to the house of appellant
to conduct a search. The items recovered inside appellant's house were:
· 1 big heat-sealed transparent plastic pack with white crystalline substance, believed to be shabu
· 2 packs containing 13 decks each of suspected shabu
· 3 disposable lighters
· 1 tooter
· 1 tin foil with traces of shabu residue
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· 1 improvised lamp
SPO1 Agadier related that appellant, appellant's sister-in-law, 1 barangay captain, 1 barangay tanod, and several
photographers were present during the implementation of the search warrant. The barangay captain, barangay tanod,
and 2 photographers were asked to sign the receipt of the seized items.
The seized items were initially in the custody of SPO1 Navales. Upon reaching the police station, SPO1 Navales turned
them over to SPO1 Agadier for marking. SPO1 Agadier prepared the request for laboratory examination before turning
them over back to SPO1 Navales, who then delivered the items and the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory. A Forensic
Chemistry Report was issued, confirming that the specimen submitted was positive for shabu.
RTC Branch 15 of Cebu City acquitted appellant of the charge of illegal sale of shabu and maintaining a drug den
in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of Republic Act No. 9165 in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-66343 and CBU-66344.
RTC Branch 17 of Cebu City acquitted appellant in Criminal Case No. CBU-66346 for illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia, but found him guilty in Criminal Case No. CBU-66345 for illegal possession of shabu. On appeal, the CA
affirmed appellant's conviction.
Issue: WoN the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant for illegal possession of
shabu
WHEREFORE, the 4 December 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00716 affirming the
conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-66345 for illegal possession of
shabu under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant ALBERTO BACUS
ALCUIZAR is declared ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any
other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the
action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
Ratio:
The dangerous drug itself (the shabu) constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense, and in sustaining a conviction
under R.A. No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved.
Evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from
the accused-appellant. Otherwise, the prosecution for possession under R.A. No. 9165 fails.
The chain of custody rule requires that the marking of the seized items should be done in the presence of the
apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and
are eventually the ones offered in evidence. In Lopez v. People, citing Catuiran v. People, the Court held that:
“It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same….”
Appellant cites the failure of the police officer to mark the evidence immediately after purportedly taking it from him,
thus rendering the chain of custody dubious.
SPO1 Agadier admitted that he only marked the seized items at the police station. While the rule allows marking of
evidence to be done in the nearest police station, this applies to warrantless searches and seizures. In this case, the
police officers were able to secure a search warrant prior to their operation. SPO1 Agadier did not offer an explanation
or a justification on why he did not immediately mark the plastic packs of shabu seized inside appellant's house. They
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were given sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its implementation. Thus, failure to comply with the marking
of evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes a 1st gap in the chain of custody.
Appellant also points out the failure of the police officers to give or leave a copy of the inventory receipt upon the
accused or any of his family members pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
“Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.”
Under Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, non-compliance with the prescribed procedures does not
necessarily result in the conclusion that the identity of the seized drugs has been compromised so that an acquittal
should follow, as long as the prosecution can demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized
have been preserved.
SPO1 Agadier narrated that a certain photographer took pictures of the items seized from the house of appellant.
However, the photographs do not appear on the records, nor were they offered by the prosecution as evidence. Thus, the
requirement of taking a photograph was not clearly proven. While the inventory receipt was prepared and appeared on
records, the police officers failed to provide appellant a copy. Appellant construed this omission as fatal.
This omission alone is not necessarily fatal to the cause of the prosecution. However, the Court stated that the barangay
tanod's testimony pertaining to the inventory receipt created a doubt that affected the integrity of the corpus delicti in
general: He and the barangay captain arrived later than the police officers. When they reached appellant's house, the
alleged confiscated shabu were already on top of a table. He was merely asked to sign the inventory receipt, which he did
without hesitation.
The barangay tanod did not witness how the police officers conducted their search and how they were able to discover
the packets of shabu inside appellant's house. Aside from the barangay tanod, no other signatories in the receipt were
presented by the prosecution to authenticate the document.
The 1st gap in the chain of custody was compounded by the vague recollection of SPO1 Agadier regarding the transfer of
custody of the shabu. The 2nd gap in the chain of custody was evident in SPO1 Agadier's statements: It was not indicated
who had initial control and custody of the plastic packs of shabu upon their confiscation. SPO1 Agadier merely claimed
that he turned them over to SPO1 Navales without specifying whether the latter received it while they were still inside
the appellant's house or at the police station. It is also not clear who was in possession of the plastic packs of shabu
while in transit. SPO1 Navales also did not testify to confirm the statement of SPO1 Agadier.
The failure of the police officers to mark the dangerous drugs immediately after their seizure and the vague recollection
of SPO1 Agadier concerning the custody of the drugs from the residence of appellant up to the time it was submitted to
the crime laboratory constitute a huge and significant gap in the chain of custody, which substantially affects the identity
of the corpus delicti.
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
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The Court entertained serious doubts as to whether the prohibited drugs were indeed found in appellant's house,
considering that there were no other witnesses presented to prove it. By the same doubt, the Court had to acquit the
appellant.
FACTS:
Prosecution:
● On the basis of a series of reports received by DAPCO-DEU, Muntinlupa City, from concerned citizens concerning the
illegal drug trade of alias Ricky in Quezon Street, Purok 7, Poblacion, Muntinlupa City, the police operatives of the
aforesaid office conducted a surveillance and monitoring operation on 23 June 2003
● The surveillance and monitoring operation confirmed that alias Ricky was, indeed, engaged in the sale of illegal
drugs which usually took place late at night until dawn.
● June 24, 2003: at around 8:00 p.m., P/Insp. Arsenio Silungan, Chief of DAPCO-DEU formed a buy-bust team to
conduct a buy-bust operation against alias Ricky.
● The team was composed of various police operatives
○ PO1 Forastero: poseur-buyer
○ PO1 Medina: arresting officer
○ Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Zosimo Goce: team leader
○ SPO1 Joel Vega
○ SPO3 Hector Macalla
○ SPO3 Madriaga
○ PO1 Ronald Natuel
○ PO1 Reynold Aguirre
○ PO1 Gunayon
○ PO1 Respicio
○ PO1 Tan
○ PO1 Joseph Tedd Leonor
○ two civilian agents, namely
○ Dalton Ibañ ez
○ Charlie Isla
● The buy-bust team, thereafter, prepared the buy-bust money consisting of two P100 bills (Serial Nos. JX 392195
and DY 711514)
● PO1 Aguirre signed the buy-bust money at the bottom thereof
● also photocopied and recorded in the police blotter (police record)
● A Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet was similarly prepared and transmitted to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) via facsimile
● After all the necessary documentary requirements had been completed, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target
area (Quezon Street, Purok 7, Poblacion, Muntinlupa City) on board two vehicles(Toyota Revo and Anfra Van)
● PO1 Forastero, PO1 Medina, SPO1 Goce, SPO3 Macalla, SPO3 Madriaga and the two civilian agents boarded the
Toyota Revo while the rest of the buy-bust team boarded the Anfra Van
● Upon reaching the area of operation at around 9:30 p.m., the team strategically parked the two vehicles 50 meters
away from each other
● While inside the Revo, PO1 Forastero and PO1 Medina saw their confidential informant some 40 meters away
waiting for them. They nevertheless stayed inside the Revo as they were still waiting for a text message coming
from another asset who would confirm alias Ricky's presence at the target area.
● After an hour, the aforesaid asset texted SPO3 Macalla saying that alias Ricky was already at the target area.
● PO1 Forastero and PO1 Medina then alighted from the vehicle. Upon seeing them, the confidential informant
promptly approached and accompanied them to alias Ricky's place.
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● At this juncture, the other members of the buy-bust team also alighted from their vehicles and followed PO1
Forastero, PO1 Medina and the confidential informant at a distance to provide perimeter security
● After a 15-minute walk traversing a place along the train railways, PO1 Forastero, PO1 Medina and the confidential
informant reached the exact place of alias Ricky in Quezon Street, Purok 7, Poblacion, Muntinlupa City.
● The rest of the buy-bust team then acted as perimeter guards.
● At a distance of about seven meters, the confidential informant saw a person wearing a white sando and black pants
sitting by a lighted house with an open door whom he recognized and identified as alias Ricky.
● The confidential informant then pinpointed alias Ricky to PO1 Forastero and PO1 Medina. The confidential
informant immediately approached alias Ricky and introduced him to PO1 Forastero and PO1 Medina as his
relatives.
● After gaining the trust and confidence of alias Ricky, PO1 Forastero told the former that he would like to
"score" P200.00 worth of shabu and he simultaneously handed to him the two P100.00-peso bills marked
money amounting to P200.00.
● Alias Ricky received the marked money and, in turn, got and opened a black coin purse with white stripes from
his left hand and took out a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing the suspected shabu and
handed it to PO1 Forastero, which the latter accepted.
● At once, PO1 Forastero held alias Ricky's right hand and introduced himself as police officer. PO1 Medina
then assisted PO1 Forastero in arresting alias Ricky by holding the latter's left hand.
● The other members of the buy-bust team, who were within the vicinity, arrived.
● PO1 Medina recovered from the left hand of alias Ricky the coin purse containing 20 more small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets with white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu and a small pair of
folding scissors.
● The two marked P100.00-peso bills were recovered from alias Ricky's pocket by PO1 Forastero. He compared
it with the photocopies with him and they matched
● Alias Ricky was informed of his constitutional rights
● He was brought to the team’s office; they came to know his full name;
● Items seized were immediately marked as follows:
○ “RU” (Ricky’s initials): the subject of the sale (1 small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
suspected shabu)
○ “RU-1” to “RU-20” (inclusive): the 20 more small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with white
crystalline substance
○ “RU-21”: black coin purse with white stripes
○ “RU-22”: small pair of folding scissors
● An inventory thereof was also made
● Afterwards, a Request for Laboratory Examination of the seized items and a Request for Drug Test of appellant both
dated 24 June 2003 were made
● PO1 Forastero, PO1 Medina and PO1 Gunayon then forwarded the seized items to the Philippine National Police
(PNP), Crime Laboratory, PNP Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, for laboratory examination
● Drug test: positive
● Items: positive for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
Defense:
● Presented the testimony of appellant and his common-law wife, Janice Deles
● He denied the accusations and offered a different version as follows:
● Appellant, a tricycle driver, claimed that on 24 June 2003, at around 8:00 p.m., while he was inside their house
fixing a broken flashlight, PO1 Forastero and PO1 Medina suddenly barged in and arrested him for the alleged illegal
sale of shabu
● He denied the same but the police officers insisted that their office received several calls regarding his illegal
drug activities.
● He was then immediately handcuffed by Ibañ ez, one of the civilian agents and was brought out of his house
where they met SPO3 Macalla to whom Ibañ ez purportedly handed the P4,200.00 which the latter recovered from
appellant while they were still inside the house
● He vehemently denied that such money was earned by him from selling shabu. He explained that the said money
was a loan from a certain Corazon Arciaga to be used by his common-law wife as capital for selling fruits.
● He was then made to board the Revo and brought to the office of DAPCO-DEU where Janice followed him.
● In the office, SPO1 Vega allegedly forced him to acknowledge possession of the pieces of evidence allegedly
retrieved from him. He refused. He was then put in jail
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● He nonetheless admitted that it was only at the time of his arrest that he met the arresting police officers; no bad
blood between them
● Also, despite his allegation that Ibañ ez took his money and gave it to SPO3 Macalla, he did not file robbery
charges against them
● Janice corroborated his testimony
● She maintained that Ricky was not in possession and was not engaged in the illegal sale of shabu
● Janice said that at the time and place in question, while she was dressing up their child after giving him
medicine, Ibañ ez, together with PO1 Forastero and PO1 Medina, hastily barged into their house
● Without any arrest warrant or search warrant, Ibañ ez instantly handcuffed and frisked appellant. Ibañ ez
similarly took appellant's money, which the latter borrowed from a certain Corazon Arciaga, and handed it to SPO3
Macalla.
● She forcefully resisted appellant's arrest and likewise tried to retrieve the money but to no avail.
● The police officers successfully brought Ricky out of their house and boarded him inside a vehicle.
● She continuously pleaded not to take appellant but her pleas remained unheeded.
● She then followed appellant up to the office of DAPCO-DEU
2 separate informations
1 Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 (Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals)
2 Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs)
ISSUE: W/N appellant is guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (YES)
● We rely on the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses, absent any showing that certain facts of
weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied.
● For a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements
must first be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
○ What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti.
○ Clearly, the commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires
the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug
from the seller. As long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was
accepted by appellant, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already
consummated.
○ Prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drugs sale beyond moral certainty.
○ The testimony of PO1 Forastero explicitly described how the sale transaction of shabu between him and
appellant occurred (i.e. the narration of facts by the prosecution) The exchange of the buy-bust money and
the small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with white crystalline substance later confirmed as shabu
already consummated the sale
○ PO1 Forastero positively identified appellant to be the same person who sold to him one small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet of shabu for P200.00. When the small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
shabu was presented in court, he also identified it to be the same object sold to him by appellant because of
the markings "RU" representing appellant's initials, which PO1 Forastero himself has written thereon. He
also identified in court the recovered buy-bust money with the signature of PO1 Aguirre at the bottom; their
serial numbers matched the photocopy thereof
● As to illegal possession of shabu it must be shown that (elements): (1) the accused is in possession of an item
or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. These are all present in this case.
○ Incident to appellant's lawful arrest resulting from the buy-bust operation, 20 more sachets of shabu were
recovered in his possession by PO1 Medina
○ In court, both PO1 Medina and PO1 Forastero identified them to be the same objects recovered from
appellant while he was being frisked during his arrest for illegally selling shabu. PO1 Medina similarly
affirmed that the markings "RU-1" to "RU-20" written thereon was done by him.
○ Record is bereft of any evidence to show that appellant has the legal authority to possess the 20 more
sachets
○ Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi,
which is sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession.
○ Appellant miserably failed to discharge his burden to overcome the prima facie evidence.
Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
● PO1 Medina's failure to recall if he placed any marking on the buy-bust money, as well as the date of his
last successful buy-bust operation, was neither fatal nor material for the prosecution of either illegal sale or
possession of shabu as those facts had no bearing or had nothing to do with the elements of the offenses
charged. PO1 Medina was not the one who marked the buy-bust money but PO1 Aguirre nor was he the poseur-
buyer who handled the buy-bust money but PO1 Forastero. Thus, PO1 Medina's failure to recall if he ever put any
marking on the buy-bust money should not be taken against him.
● Even granting arguendo that the buy-bust money has not been marked, jurisprudence is clear that
failure to mark the boodle money is not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Neither law nor jurisprudence
requires the presentation of any of the money used in a buy-bust operation much less is it required that the
boodle money be marked. (only the elements are important to prove the crime/s)
● Further, the discrepancy and contradiction in the testimonies are too trivial, inconsequential and irrelevant to
the elements of the offenses charged; strengthen rather than diminish the prosecution's case
On appellant's assertions that the standard operating procedure supposed to be observed by the buy-bust team was
tainted with irregularities
Criminal Law II. D2016 Digests. 205
Compiled by: HIPOLITO
● There are no provisions either in Republic Act No. 9165 or its Implementing Rules and Regulations requiring
that (1) the Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet that should be transmitted to PDEA must only be signed by
the person who conducted the briefing; and (2) the buy-bust money to be used in the actual buy-bust operation must
be dusted with ultra-violet powder
● The Pre-Operation Report/Coordination Sheet and the use of dusted money are not indispensable to prove the
illegal sale of shabu. These two are not part of the elements of the aforesaid offense.
● coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-
bust operation. While it is true that Section 86 [citation omitted] of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National
Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug
related matters," the provision does not make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-
bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court; not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
● although the buy-bust money were not laced with ultra-violet powder, still, the prosecution was able to
positively identify that the two P100.00-peso bills recovered from appellant right after his arrest were the
buy-bust money as the same were photocopied and entered in the police blotter before the actual buy-bust
operation
On the argument of appellant that the police officers failed to observe the requirements of Section 21, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 (because the seized drugs were not photographed in his presence or his representative
or counsel, a representative from the media, a representative from the DOJ and any elected public official)
● Section 21.
○ (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof
● Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR
○ (a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
● Non-compliance thereto is not fatal and will not render appellant's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. As can be observed, the implementing rules offer some flexibility
when a proviso added that "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items." Thus, what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
● The function of the chain of custody requirement, therefore, is to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of
the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was
tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence.
● In the present case, the chain of custody of the seized drugs does not appear to have been broken.
HELD: CA affirmed.
FACTS:
· Feb 26 2004: 2 members of the Galas Police Station, P/Insp Armenta and PO2 Zamora receive a report from an
informant that a certain alias “Idol” was selling drugs in Brgy. San Isidro, QC. Report is brought before Col. Robert Razon
· Razon forms a buy-bust team; Armenta designated as poseur-buyer, given a P100 bill which he marked with his
initials JA; Armenta also prepares report to Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
· Armenta and informant meet with “Idol” (who turns out to be Arnold Castro) in Brgy. San Isidro: Castro asked
P/Insp. Armenta how much, to which the latter responded "piso", which meant Php100.00. 18 P/Insp. Armenta then
handed the one hundred peso buy-bust money to Castro. 19 The latter, in turn, gave him a transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance that he pulled out from his pocket. Afterwards, P/Insp. Armenta scratched his
head to signal to his team members that the transaction was already consummated. 21 Accordingly, the buy-bust team
immediately closed in and arrested Castro. PO2 Zamora informed Castro of his violation, frisked him and recovered from
his pocket 2 more transparent plastic sachets of white crystalline substance, as well as the marked money. P/Insp.
Armenta took custody of the transparent plastic sachet that Castro sold to him, while PO2 Zamora kept the marked
money and the two (2) other plastic sachets which he recovered.
· 3 sachets are confirmed positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (AKA SHABU)
· Defense: Castro was resting in front of his house, when a police car parked in front of him and 4 police came out,
forced him to board the car, brought him to the police station, and showed him the sachet. When he denied owning it,
one of the officers told him that he would be released if he had money
· RTC: Castro guilty of drug-pushing and possession of dangerous drugs (RA 9165 Art II Sec 5 and 11), sentenced to
life imprisonment + fine (for drug-pushing), and 12 years 1 day minimum to 13 years maximum + fine (for possession)
· CA affirms RTC
ISSUE/HELD:
· W/N Castro is guilty of the offenses charged (YES)
RATIO:
· Re: chain of custody (passing of the drugs) not proved conclusively: Admittedly, testimony about a perfect chain is
not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. Nonetheless, what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items… Concomitantly, it
is Castro who bears the burden to make some showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to
overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers, as well as a presumption
that said public officers properly discharged their duties.
· In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the
following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. Significantly, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the
substance seized as evidence.
· As the poseur-buyer, P/Insp. Armenta positively identified Castro during trial as the seller of the illegal
drugs. He also testified that, using the marked money, he paid for the object of the crime, i.e., the shabu that was
handed to him by Castro. Notably, the testimony of P/Insp. Armenta was substantially corroborated by PO2
Zamora.
R.A. No. 9262 (The Violence Against Women and Their Children Act)"