Week 1

Lambino and Aumentado vs. Comelec G.R. Nos. 174153 And 174299, October 25, 2006
Facts:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition
had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters.
The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals. The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)
and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. On 30 August 2006,
the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v.
COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution;
Ruling:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision
that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment”
should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated
that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that
the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment
is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. There is no presumption that the proponents
observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The
Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people
signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet
after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991
Facts:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in
83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved
jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold
more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of
Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution
namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of
Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer
only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
Facts:
Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of
a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political
question — h; as resulted in a political crisis.
Held:
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Reasoning:
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential
truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that
part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by
the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without
destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence
that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal
reached the floor proposing that “A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings,” this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main
issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because
it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of
the government.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions
Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding, two bidders participated:
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending
the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the MPHC
matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter,
which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner invokes
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision
and requires implementing legislation(s).
Issue:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
Ruling:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council G.R. No. 202241, July 17, 2012

Facts:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings
held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the
phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of
either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as
the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from
both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this
case?
2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8
instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?
3. What is the effect of the Court’s finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these
conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch
of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he
is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case
is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice
can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise
screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s
duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of
aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly,
the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. From a simple reading of the
above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first
paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it
goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On
the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members
of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a
representative of Congress.” The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to
the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in
the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. One of the primary and basic rules
in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of
the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter
it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article
VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made
on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only
a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. It is worthy to note that the seven-member
composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a
stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be
divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of
the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the
JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached.
The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the
Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every
possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to
break a voting deadlock. The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
“Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and
the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said provision
was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the
Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through
oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. It is evident that the definition of
“Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage
of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same
holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,
however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses
exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department.
3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords
no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however,
is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair
play. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance
upon a law creating it. Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17,
2012)
Week 2
Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183591,
October 14, 2008
Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
Ruling:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute
is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets
the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory,
the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter
to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate
the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this
freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the
“Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain
does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a
vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed
to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 on February 25, 1986 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis
of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces
of the Philippines."
Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. Corazon Aquino G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986
Facts:
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Ruling:
Yes.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge.
The Supreme Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) v. Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), G.R. No. L-
32052, July 25, 1975
Facts:
This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.
In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the
petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.
Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge
Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that
the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act
No. 444.
PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental
functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue:
Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
Ruling:
YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become
obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a
distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the
present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government obsolete.”
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner
can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private
respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of
governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because
petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions,that the labor controversy was
beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner
does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.
A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation
that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it
has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can
hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause
for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot
suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.
Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. no. 164785, April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister
of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Ruling:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty
as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three
months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue
curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside
from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a
broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent
language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.
San Juan Dela Cruz vs. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
Facts:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to
use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the
deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his
birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.”
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial
court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography,
the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
Issue:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be
considered as a recognition of paternity.
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname
of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission
made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in
the private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in
any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child
is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
People vs. Perfecto, G.R. NO. L-18463, October 4, 1922
Facts:
The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the
documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared
from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by
herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr.
Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes
those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case
at bar?
Ruling: No. The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to
protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present
case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change
of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the
SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in
nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and
cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
Callado vs. International Rice Research Institute, G.R. No. 106483, May 22, 1995
Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI
vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human
Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start
because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice
of Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension
and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue
of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges
as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the
Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and,
accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity,
ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted
by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived
the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation
to P.D. 1620."
Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee
relationship?
Ruling: No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-
General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical recognition
by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international
organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in
order not to embarrass a political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer
of the government or other officer acting under his direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by
the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the
only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver
is discretionary on its part.
Week 3

Magallona vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:
On March 2009, the congress enacted RA 9522, amending RA 3046, demarcating the maritime baselines
of the Philippines in order to set the Philippine Territory in accordance with the agreed UNCLOS or the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Challenging the constitutionality of RA 9522, Dean
Merlin Magallona, Atty. Harry Roque, Rep. Risa Hontiveros along with 38 students from UP College of Law
came to the Supreme Court to argue that the said law violated the constitution as it diminishes our
territory since it does not include territories formerly included in the delineation of the Treaty of Paris and
other contested areas. They argue that this would affect the reach of our territorial jurisdiction and
sovereignty over several areas including the Kalayaan Group of Islands and Scarborough Shoal.
Respondent Eduardo Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, along with other officials, contends on
the contrary, arguing that it was enacted to comply with the conditions set forth by UNCLOS and neither
does it diminish our territorial jurisdiction.

Issues:
1. Preliminarily –
a) Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
b) Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

1. a. Yes. The Supreme Court recognized petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally
sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of
national significance necessitating urgent resolution.

b. Yes. When the Supreme Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review by tradition, it
viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality
of statutes and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. Issues of constitutional import are
sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the
petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself
constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the
letter of procedural rules notwithstanding.

2. No. RA 9522 is not unconstitutional. RA 9522 is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime
zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine territory. Territory may only be
acquired or lost through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, and not through multilateral
treaties or statutes complying with such treaties. Also, the court found that instead of loss, the baselines
set by RA 9522 in determining the Exclusive Economic Zone would increase our maritime waters which
grants us the exclusive right to utilize resources that are found in areas not previously within our
jurisdiction. Petition was dismissed.

Gonzales vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012

Facts:

Sometime in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before the PNP-NCR against Rolando
Mendoza and four others. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the
National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all
relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
appropriate administrative adjudication. On February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner
Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision finding Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave
Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On December
14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were assigned for review and
recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released a draft
Order on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who,
in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than
ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the
case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained
pending for final review and action when Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful
day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service. In the
aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials
prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to
determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions.
However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings on
the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body. The IIRC
eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie. It recommended
that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of the President (OP) for
further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper
administrative proceedings. On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge against petitioner.
Petitioners asseverate that the President has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the
Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence and that they,
as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of
said office

Issue:

Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman.

Ruling:

Yes. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable
by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive.
Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government
officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a
statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as
an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that would
render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. Indubitably, the manifest
intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was
to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power
of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least
diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the
lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another
from administrative liabilities.

Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976)

Facts:

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its
primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that are
to be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the citizen wants
martial law to continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several proposed amendments to
the existing Constitution.

The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national referendum in
October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without
force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that the
power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred to the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation
of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that
the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the
plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and
allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the
right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised is
political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that at
this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent
power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

Issue:

Whether or not the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and
1033).

Ruling:

YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it was of
political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one. This is
because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments to the
constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the power to
propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The normal
course has not been followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the president
undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises
a contestable issue.

Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971)

Facts:

Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people,
Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that
there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC
headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the
suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.

Issue:

Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.

Ruling:

The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where
the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be
established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two
closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the
members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there
was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by
force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 (1983)

Facts:

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong,
NV, were arrested by members of the Philippine Constabulary. The raid of the house was authorized by a
search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no
warrant of arrest was issued hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and
companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina
petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Issue:

Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al were valid.

Ruling:

Yes. In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the
Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was once again held as discretionary in the president.
The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by
the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must,
indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the
rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be
released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the
success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Facts:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he
had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose
Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the
nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada
on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The
impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA,
bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan
and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined
in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that
only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election.

On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office
in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being
an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

Issue:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner
Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits.

Ruling:

The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said
that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in
defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on
the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the
president was affected. In the former, the question of whether the previous president (president Estrada)
truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck
petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara
diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is
acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his
emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada
had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the petitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner
is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987
Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting
President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting
President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president
from suit is concurrent only with his tenure (the term during which the incumbent actually holds office)
and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).