STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

FINAL EXAMINATION
AY 2021 - 2022
Classwork Notes and Pointers

TABORDA, CHRISTINE ANN S.

I. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION 
A. Legislative Intent
 The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the meaning
and intention of the legislature, to the need that the same may be enforced.
 It is the purpose of construction to discover the intention of the statute.
 Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

a. Ambiguities - a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood

in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs TMX Sales Inc., G.R. No. 83736

January 15, 1992
“In the case of People vs. Rivera (59 Phil 236 [1933]), this Court stated that
statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion. INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FRIENDA
EST, UT EVITATUR INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to
be adopted. Furthermore, courts must give effect to the general legislative
intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the
statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a
particular provision thereof, should be considered. (Manila Lodge No. 761, et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 73 SCRA 162 [1976]) Every section, provision
or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order
to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of
the act is to be taken into view.”

b. Unambiguous language – plain meaning rule; the presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will,
precluding any construction.

Globe-Mackay vs NLRC, G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992

“If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or
verba legis derived from the maxim INDEX ANIMI SERMO EST (speech is
the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by
 the legislature in a statute correctly expresses its intent or will and preclude the
court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its
intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. VERBA LEGIS NON
EST RECEDENDUM, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.”

c. Ascertainment of intention 

People vs Concepcion, G.R. No. L-19190, November 29, 1922

In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the Legislature.”

d. Ascertainment from the whole statute - a cardinal rule in statutory construction is that
legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a while
and not merely of a particular provision. A word or phrase might easily convey a
meaning which is different from the one actually intended.

Manila Lodge No. 761 vs CA, G. R. No. L-41001, September 30, 1976
“It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the
general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four
corners of the statute, 31 and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute,
and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered.”

A statute should be construed as a whole because it is not to be presumed that the

legislature has used any useless words, and because it is dangerous practice to base
the construction upon only a part of it, since one portion may be qualified by other
portions.

Aisporna vs CA, G.R. No. 39419, April 12, 1982

“Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a
whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce harmonious whole.  A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and
give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.  The meaning of the law, it
must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or
section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a
general consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and independently. More
importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that
where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
 specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is
associated. “

e. Ascertained from uniform trend in legislation 

Director of Lands vs Abaja, G.R. No. L-42134, October 21, 1936

“In determining the intention of the lawmaker, we are permitted to look to prior
laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents or the legislative
history of the statute involved.”

f. Legislative Purpose - it is the objective why the law was created.

Litex Employees Association vs Eduvala, G.R. No. L-41106, September 22, 1977
“There is no support for any allegation of jurisdictional infirmity, considering that
the language employed is well-nigh inclusive with the stress on its "and exclusive
authority to act." If it were otherwise, its policy might be rendered futile. That is
to run counter to a basic postulate in the canons of statutory interpretation.
Learned Hand referred to it as the proliferation of purpose. As was emphatically
asserted by Justice Frankfurter: "The generating consideration is that legislation is
more than composition. It is an active instrument of government which, for
purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to be achieved. It is in this
connection that Holmes said, 'words are flexible.' Again, it was Holmes, the last
judge to give quarter to lose thinking or vague yearning, who said that 'the general
purpose is a more is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which
grammar or formal logic may lay down.' And it was Holmes who chided courts
for being apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law when those words
import a policy that goes beyond them." 3What is intended by the framers of code
or statute is not to be frustrated. Even on the assumption that by some strained or
literal reading of the employed, a doubt can be raised as to its scope, the 'imitation
should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. It cannot be denied that if
through an ingenious argumentation, limits may be set on a statutory power which
should not be there, there would be a failure to effectuate the statutory purpose
and policy. That kind of approach in statutory construction has never
recommended itself.”

g. Spirit or Letter of the law 

 Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis (The reason of the law is the soul of the law)
 When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of
its words would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences, or would thwart
or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding or
modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of the law.

Casela vs. CA, G.R. No. L-26754, October 16, 1970

 “Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of
statutes. The courts are not to be hedged in by the literal meaning of the language
of the statute; the spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter. This
rule of construction is especially applicable where adherence to the letter of the
statute would result in absurdity and injustice.”

Matabuena vs Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971

“It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above
pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would
be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a
situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to
be differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion
of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular
relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with
benefits. Certainly, a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If
there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that
what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written,
this is it. Otherwise, the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision
would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an
adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu
que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación
de sus disposiciones.”

B. Construction and Interpretation of the Constitution

 A constitution is a system of fundamental law for the governance and administration of a

nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute, and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates.
 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution, that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative, or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void
and without any force or effect.
 The Constitution is to be construed to intent not only for the effectivity of a few years,
but enduring for a long period of time.

a. The Constitution is superior to a statute 

Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

“The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution.
The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only
under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971

Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my
question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive
residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others,
and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)

x x x           x x x          x x x

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think

Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to
go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering
that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos
living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest
purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as
explained in Gallego vs. Vera is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar
with the conditions and needs of the community" from taking advantage of
favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there
 is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant
and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the
period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be
obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area
for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or
by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the
threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a
period of one year in the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative
District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in
the same.”

b. Intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it given effect 

Nitafan vs. Commissioner, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987

“The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed
that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to
make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that
intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.”

c. Language of the Constitution construed in the ordinary meaning

 It must not be constricted and understood in its broadest sense
 it must be construed to give it a different meaning and understood in its
ordinary meaning

Ordillo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990

“The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the
Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in
common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be
applied in this case.”

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
“In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.”
d. Construction of statute to harmonize with Constitution

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Worker's Union, G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974
“The contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in
harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the
reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. It
follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of impairing a contract, are
obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed
in the legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally destroys
existing contract rights, must be upheld by the courts. This has special application
to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor which are not merely
contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public interest,
must yield to the common good.” 

Manila Trading vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-43263, October 31, 1935
Most constitutional issues are determined by the court's approach to them. The
proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in
favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the
constitution. All doubts should be resolved in its favor.

e. Constitutional provisions are self-executing; exceptions 

 Generally, Constitutional provisions are self-executing except those which are
mere declaration of general principles and state policies where subsequent
legislation is needed to execute such provisions.

 SELF - EXECUTING PROVISIONS - provisions which are complete by

themselves and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
legislation.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
“In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured
or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise
of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe
a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The
omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing
a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be
self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does
not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must
be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right
and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
 necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable.”

“Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the
guiding policies and principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and
general framework of the law and government.5 As a rule, its provisions are
deemed self-executing and can be enforced without further legislative
action.6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through
appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is

a hard row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law
oftentimes submerged in its language. A searching inquiry should be made to find
out if the provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as a
definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and
enforcement.7 The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context
of the provision in question.8

Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-

executing,9 rather than as requiring future legislation for their
enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated
as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign
people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom
of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to
constitutional rights but congressional in action should not suffocate them.”

f. Totality test 
Estrada vs Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

“The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be

considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the
14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high-level legal abstraction. It is
a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January
20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or
not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance
on the issue.
 Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

g. Stare decisis - the doctrine that when court has once laid down a principle, and apply
it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same, regardless of whether the
parties and properties are the same.

 Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.
(Stare decisis et non quieta movere)
 Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and again.
 Supreme Court has the constitutional duty not only of interpreting and
applying the law in accordance with prior doctrines but also of protecting
society from the improvidence and wantonness wrought by needless
upheavals in such interpretations and applications.
 In order that it will come within the doctrine of stare decisis, must
categorically stated on an issue expressly raised by the parties; it must be a
direct ruling, not merely an obiter dictum.
 Stare decisis it not absolute. It does not apply when there is a conflict between
the precedent and the law.

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., vs. Mariano, G.R. No. L-33140, October 23, 1978
“Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it
becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their
action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the
courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be

relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the
expense.”

C. Language 

a. Natural and commonly understood meaning - in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words are given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning. Except if a
statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one construction, the literal meaning will
defeat the purpose which the legislature had in mind.

Alfon vs Republic, G.R. No. L-51201, May 29, 1980

“The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her
surname is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she
should principally use the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil
Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not
equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is
equally entitled.”
 Capati vs Ocampo, G.R. No. L-28742, April 30, 1982
“It is well settled that the word "may" is merely permissive and operates to
confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be"
connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb
indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. 

In Nicolas vs. Reparations Commission, a case involving the interpretation of a

stipulation as to venue along lines similar to the present one, it was held that the
agreement of the parties which provided that "all legal actions arising out of this
contract ... may be brought in and submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper
courts in the City of Manila," is not mandatory.”

Philippine Consumers vs NTC, G.R. No. L-63318, August 18, 1984

The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law
must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest from
the law itself. Hence, the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed
to mean "shall" or "must". It shall be interpreted in its ordinary sense as
permissive or discretionary on the part of the delegate — department or the Board
of Communications then, now the National Telecommunications Commission —
whether or not to promulgate pertinent rules and regulations. There is nothing in
P.D. No. 217 which commands that the phrase "may be promulgated" should be
construed as "shall be promulgated."

Baranda vs Gustilo, G.R. No. 81163, September 26, 1988

“The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says.”
b. Right to vary meaning of words 

Diokno vs Rehabilitation Finance Corp., G.R. No. L-4712, July 11, 1952
“In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term
“shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given
compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation. It has a preemptory meaning, and it
is generally imperative or mandatory. It has the invariable significance of
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is
in favor of this meaning or when addressed to public officials, or where a public
interest is involved, or where the public or persons have rights which ought to be
exercised or enforced, unless a contrary intent appears. People vs. O'Rourke, 13
P. 2d. 989, 992, 124 Cal. App. 752. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p.
90.)

The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is used is an

imperative, and not in a directory, sense. If a different interpretation is
 sought, it must rest upon something in the character of the legislation or in
the context which will justify a different meaning. Haythorn vs. Van Keuren &
Son, 74 A. 502, 504, 79 N. J. L. 101; Board of Finance of School City of
Aurora vs. People's Nat. Bank of Lawrenceburg, 89 N. E. 904, 905 44 Ind. App.
578. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 93.)

However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as "many", when so

required by the context or by the intention of the statute.

In the ordinary signification, "shall" is imperative, and not permissive, though it

may have the latter meaning when required by the context. Town of
Milton vs. Cook, 138 N.E. 589, 590, 244 Mass. 93. (39 Words and Phrases,
Permanent Ed., p. 89.)”

c. Reasonable and effective construction 

Morales vs Paredes, G.R. No. L-34428, December 29, 1930

It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the
Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the
grounds of fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of the decree." Giving
this provision a literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition for
review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on
further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention of
the Legislature and that what it meant would have been better expressed by
stating that such petitions must be presented before the expiration of one year
from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction
and there can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait
until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud. We therefore
hold that a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time
after the rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year
from the entry of the final decree of registration.
d. Technical terms - in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words commonly
used in a statute, which have a technical or well-known legal meaning, is used in the
sense by the legislature.

Manila Herald vs Ramos, G.R. No. L-4268, January 18, 1951

"Action" has acquired a well-define, technical meaning, and it is in this restricted
sense that the word "action" is used in the above rule. In employing the word
"commencement" the rule clearly indicates an action which originates an entire
proceeding and puts in motion the instruments of the court calling for summons,
answer, etc, and not any intermediary step taken in the course of the proceeding
whether by the parties themselves or by a stranger. It would be strange indeed if
the framers of the Rules of Court or the Legislature should have employed the
term "proper action" instead of "intervention" or equivalent expression if the
 intention had been just that. It was all the easier, simplier and the more natural to
say intervention if that had been the purpose, since the asserted right of the third-
party claimant necessarily grows out of the pending suit, the suit in which the
order of attachment was issued.

e. Different languages and translations 

Roldan vs Villaroman, G.R. No. L-46825, October 18, 1939

“Comparing both texts, it will be noted that the Spanish translation is incorrect
because the English phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was translated
"necesarios en el ejercicio de du jurisdiccion en apelacion." The Spanish
translation of the phrase does not quite convey the idea expressed in the
English phrase. Commonwealth Act No. 3 was finally approved in English by
the First National Assembly, wherefore, the English text of the entire law should
govern (section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917).
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of laws is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the legislator (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; People vs.
Concepcion, 44 Phil., 126); and when the language of a law is reasonably
susceptible of two or more interpretations, that should be adopted which
tends to give effect to the manifest intention of the legislator and to promote
the purpose for which it was enacted, and that interpretation should be
rejected which tends to defeat the purpose which the legislators has intended
to attain by its enactment (U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil., 85; U.S. vs. Navarro, 19
Phil., 134).”
f. Context and related clauses 

Danilo Paras vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996

“It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.5 An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision
being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be

interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.
 Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which
we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following
admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict

rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention
is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . .

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a
statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.”

D. Words and phrases 

 In general, a word or phrase used in a statute may have an ordinary, generic,

restricted, technical, legal, commercial or trading meaning.

a. Noscitur a sociis - where a particular or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equal

susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which
it is associated.

Caltex Phils vs Palomar G.R. No. 19650, September 29, 1966

“Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in
association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and
consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis
— which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the
element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery
is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest
indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.”

Magtajas vs Pryce Properties Corp Inc., G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994
“We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code,
local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by
law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have
excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the
section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or
phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words
with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word
"gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word
 should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like
the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.”

b. Ejusdem generis - same kind/same specie; to give effect to both the particular and
general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the
general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not
specifically named by the particular words.

i. When doctrine is applicable:

- when a statute contains an enumeration of particular and
specific words, followed by a general or phrase;
- when the particular and specific words constitute a class or are
of the same kind;
- when there is no indication of legislative intent to give the
general words or phrases a broader meaning.

Mutuc vs COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32717, November 26, 1970

“As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us
was one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to
justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was
granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one
of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and
cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the like." For respondent
Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the
matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-
known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as
those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in
the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.”

Vera vs. Cuevas, G.R. No. L-33693-94, May 31, 1979

Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to
filled milk. The use of the specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the
headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would
restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which
the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general
clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar
rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and
limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.

ii. When doctrine is inapplicable:

 - when the enumeration has no distinguishable common
characteristics and greatly differ from one another
- when the enumeration of the particular and specific words is
exhaustive
- when the enumeration does not thereby restrict the meaning of
the general word, but should include others of the same class
although not enumerated therein

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs CTA, G.R. No. 207843, July 15, 2015
“As the CIR aptly pointed out, the phrase "other matters arising under this Code,"
as stated in the second paragraph of Section 4 of the NIRC, should be understood
as pertaining to those matters directly related to the preceding phrase "disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto" and must therefore not be taken in isolation to invoke
the jurisdiction of the CTA. In other words, the subject phrase should be used
only in reference to cases that are, to begin with, subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the CTA, i.e., those controversies over which the CIR had
exercised her quasi-judicial functions or her power to decide disputed
assessments, refunds or internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto, not to those that involved the CIR's exercise of quasi-
legislative powers.

In Enrile v. Court of Appeals, the Court, applying the statutory construction

principle of ejusdem generis, explained the import of using the general clause
"other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Customs" in the enumeration of cases subject to
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA, saying that: [T]he 'other
matters' that may come under the general clause should be of the same
nature as those that have preceded them applying the rule of construction
known as ejusdem generis.”

Colgate-Palmolive vs Gimenez, G.R. No. L-14787, January 28, 1961

“The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in
the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or
manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of
statutory construction that "general terms may be restricted by specific
words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific
language which indicates the statute's object and purpose." (Statutory
Construction by Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our
opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items
in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, it is
true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that
may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other
items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification. Thus
"fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or food
products because they are used in the farming and poultry industries, respectively.
 "Vitamin concentrate" appears to be more of a medicine than food or food
product, for, as matter of fact, vitamins are among those enumerated in the list of
medicines and drugs appearing in the appendix to the law. It should also here be
stated that "cattle", which is among those listed preceding the term in question,
includes not only those intended for slaughter but also those for breeding
purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that under, Republic Act No. 814 amending the
above-quoted section of Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch", which does not
always refer to food for human consumption, was added among the items grouped
with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles
alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used
in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used
in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the
principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the
law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco
Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831).
Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the
preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental
cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words
in their general sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms
are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with
them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely
as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in
connection with other rules of construction. (See Handbook of the Construction
and Interpretation of Laws by Black, p. 215.216, 2nd ed.)”

c. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius - the express mention of one person, thing
or consequence implies the exclusion of all others

i. Application:
- granting powers
- creating rights and remedies
- restricting common rights
- imposing penalties and forfeitures

Chua vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88979, February 7, 1992
“A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant,
like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the latter are
extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former is not. It will be
noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement
to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded
from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-
INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature
would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention
been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and benefits to those expressly
mentioned.”
Centeno vs Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is
expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where
a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a
statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned. 

ii. Limitations; versus inclusio unius est exclusio alterius: 

- these principles are mere tools of statutory construction and
cannot defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature
- these are auxiliary rules of interpretation which can be ignored
when other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was
not intended to be exclusive.
- these principles do not apply where the enumeration is by way
of example or to remove doubts
- these principles do not apply when there is some special reason
for mentioning one thing and none for mentioning another
which is otherwise within the statute, so that the absence of any
mention of such other will not exclude it.
- these principles do not apply if its application will result in
incongruities or a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
- these principles do not apply if adherence thereto would cause
inconvenience, hardship, and injury to public interest.

Escribano vs Avila, G.R. No. L-30375, September 12, 1978

“The maxim does not apply in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the
operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them,
but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not
have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them
(Springer v. Philippine Islands, 72 Law. ed. 845, 227 U.S. 189; People v.
Manantan, 115 Phil. 657,668).

"The maxim is no more than an auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored

where other circumstances indicate the enumeration was not intended to be
exclusive" (Manabat v. De Aquino, 92 Phil. 1024, 1027).

The maxim cannot be applied in this case because, as shown above, the fact that
the Court of First Instance is not mention in the amendment, as being empowered
to conduct a preliminary investigation in cases of written defamation, has nothing
to do with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing a
law, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief
sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it should give the law
 a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than
one which will defeat it (82 C.J.S. 593)”

Primero vs CA, G.R. No. L-48468-69, November 22, 1989

“It cannot be disputed that, ordinarily, the enumeration of specified matters in a
statute is construed as an exclusion of matters not enumerated unless a different
intention appears. However, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
only an auxiliary rule of statutory construction. It is not of universal
application—neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not
be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature
(Statutory Construction, Martin, sixth edition, 1984, pp. 71-72). Where a statute
appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or
things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other ... things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by
not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not
be invoked (Ibid, p. 79). Applying the same in the instant case, it cannot be
convincingly argued that a bayonet is not a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon,
possession of which outside of one's residence is decreed by P.D. No. 9 to be
illegal. True enough, if the carrying outside one's residence of such weapons as
fan knife, "balisong" or club, which are less deadly than the bayonet, are
prohibited under the law, there is no logical reason why the bayonet should be
exempted from the prohibition.”

d. Doctrine of last antecedent - relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless
the context otherwise requires

 Ad proximum antecedens fiat relation nisi impediatur sententia

 It has been held that the qualifying effect of a modifying word or phrase will
be confined to its immediate if the atter is separated by a comma from the
other antecedents.
 it is subject to the exceptions:
(a) that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all
antecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be made
extensive to the whole;
(b) where extension to a more remote antecedent is clearly
required by a consideration of the entire act; and
(c) where the intention is not to qualify the antecedent at all.

Roldan vs Villaroman, G.R. No. L-46825, October 18, 1939

“The resolution of the Court of Appeals denying the motions of the Solicitor-
General, and now assailed in this petition, rely principally upon its decision
rendered in the case of Mujer vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna (CA-G.R. No.
613, September 21, 1936), holding that the phrase "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction" only refers to its approximate antecedent " and all other auxiliary
 writs and process", and not to the writ of mandamus or to the writs of prohibition,
injunction, certiorari, and habeas corpus mentioned in the only sentence if said
section, in reliance upon the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should
be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. The rule of interpretation
applied is in fact the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or condition
phrases found in a law (59 C.J., sec. 584, p. 985 but the rule is subject to the
extension that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all the
antecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be made extensive to the
whole. This exception is summarized in the same volume of the Corpus Juris, at
pages 985 and 986, as follows: "This rule is, however, merely an aid to
construction and will not be adhered to where the extension to a more remote
antecedent is clearly required by a consideration of the entire act. Slight
indication of legislative intent so to extend the relative term is sufficient.
Where several words are followed by a clause as much applicable to the first and
other words as to the last, the clause should be read as applicable to all." (Stevens
vs. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 137 N.E., 859; Warner vs. King, 107 N.E., 837;
Grenough vs. Phoenix Ins. Co. of Hartford, 92 N.E., 447; State vs. St. Louis, 73
S.W., 623; Nebraska State Ry. Commission vs. Alfalfa Butter Co., 178 N.W.,
766; Myer vs. Ada Xounty, 293 P., 322; Porto Rico Ry., Light and Power Co. vs.
Mor, 253 U.S., 345.)”

e. Conjunctive and disjunctive words:

1. OR as disjunctive - signifying disassociation and independence of one thing

from each of the other things enumerated.
2. OR as to mean AND – only when the spirit or context of the law so warrants
3. OR as “That is to say”/interpretative/ expository – Giving that which precedes
it the same significance as that which follows it.
4. OR as to mean successively – To follow the order in which objects, acts or
persons have been named in the statute
5. AND as conjunctive – Used to denote union, binding together, or relating one
to the other
6. AND as to mean OR – Only resorted to when a literal interpretation would
pervert the plain intention of the legislature as gleaned from the context
of the statute or from external factors
7. AND/OR construed – shall be given to both conjunctive and disjunctive
accordingly as one or the other may best effectuate the purpose intended
by the legislature.

Centeno vs Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994

Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned
above, the enumerations therein given which include the words "charitable" and
"religious" make use of the disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as used
in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It often connects a
series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or" is used,
the various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately.  Accordingly,
 "charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration using the
disjunctive "or" should be given different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There
is no compelling consideration why the same treatment or usage of these words
cannot be made applicable to the questioned provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1564.

f. Construction as mandatory or directory 

 Mandatory statute - a statute which commands either positively that

something be done or performed in a particular way or negatively that
something be not done, leaving the person concerned no choice on the matter
except to obey.

1. Statutes conferring power

2. Statutes granting benefits
3. Statutes prescribing jurisdictional requirements
4. Statutes prescribing time to take action or to appeal
5. Statutes prescribing procedural requirements
6. Election laws on conduct of election
7. Election laws on qualification and disqualification
8. Statutes prescribing qualifications for office
9. . Statutes relating to assessment of taxes
10. Statutes concerning public auction sale

 Directory statute - a statute which is permissive or discretionary in nature and

merely outlines the act to be done in a such a way that no injury can result
from ignoring it.

1. Statutes prescribing guidance for others

2. Statutes prescribing manner of judicial action
3. Statutes requiring rendition of decision within prescribed period
4. Constitutional time provision

 Note: There is no universal rule by which directory statutes are

classified from mandatory statutes.

i. Determination of character of provisions 

Chartered Bank vs. National Gov't. Auditing Office, G.R. No. L-38513, March 31,
1987
“There is no absolute formal test for determining whether a statutory direction is
to be considered mandatory or directory. As with any question of statutory
construction the decisive factor is the meaning and intention of the legislature, to
be ascertained from a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object and the
 consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other (Gonzaga
"Statutes and Their Construction," p. 99)”

ii. Negative, prohibitory, or exclusive words - generally indicative of mandatory

statutes because there is only one way to follow negative statements which is
not to do what is indicated.

McGee vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-5387, April 27, 1954

“One additional reason for holding that article 338 of the new Civil Code should
be subordinated and made subject to the provisions of article 335 so as to limit the
permission to adopt granted in article 338, to parents who have no children of
their own, is that the terms of article 335 are phrased in a negative manner - the
following cannot be adopted, while the phraseology of article 338 is only
affirmative - the following may be adopted. Under the rule of statutory
construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory
while those in the affirmative are merely directory.

". . . negative (prohibitory and exclusive words or terms are indicative of the
legislative intent that the statute is to be mandatory, . . ." (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, sec. 263, p. 523.)

"Ordinarily . . . the word ’may’ is directory, . . .

(Crawford, op. cit., sec. 262, p. 519.)

"Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, or, as it has been
aptly stated, there is but one way to obey the command ’thou shalt not’, and that is
to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act. And this is so, even though the
statute provides no penalty for disobedience." (Crawford, op. cit., sec. 263, p.
523.)”

g. Time of performance of duties

Portillo vs. Salvani, G.R. No. L-32181, March 10, 1930

“To avoid all misunderstanding, it should be said that we have not neglected to
take under observation the undeniable fact that the law imposes the duty of
prompt action primarily upon the court and secondarily upon the protestant, and
that the parties, particularly the protestee, have no control over the action of the
court. To punish the litigants for the wrongs of the court which the litigants have
no power to prevent is not subversive of justice. All this must be conceded. At the
same time, not to put strength into the law would completely nullify its force.
Confronted with this dilemma, we turn again to rest our judgment on what we
conceive to be the legislative purpose in changing the law for courts of special
jurisdiction. Should a judge be inclined to move tardily, we entertain little doubt
that on the initiative of the protestant either the Department of Justice would take
action or the appellate court would coerce the judge to activity. The burden in
election contests is continually place on the protestant, and the law is peculiarly
 obligatory upon him - much more so than upon the protestee who occupies a
purely defensive position.”

Tanseco vs. Arteche, G.R. No. 36300, September 13, 1932

“In the same case the Court of First Instance decided the case within thirty days
after the papers reached that court, but more than thirty days after the proceeding
had been begun in the Supreme Court. Held, that the provision of law that a
proceeding of this kind shall be decided within thirty days after the filing of the
complaint is merely of a directory character, and that, even supposing that the
time should be counted from the date when the action was begun in the Supreme
Court, the trial court committed no error in entertaining the proceeding.”
h. "May" "must" and "shall"

 As a general rule, “shall” and “must” are used for mandatory statutes, and
“may” is used for directory statutes, unless legislative intent provides
otherwise.

Bersabal vs. Salvador, G.R. No. L-35910 July 21, 1978

“As a general rule, the word "may" when used in a statute is permissive only
and operates to confer discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative,
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-
18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the Court is
left with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus
memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on
request.”

i. Punctuation 
 Semi- colon – used to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, what
follows must have a relation to the same matter it precedes it.
 Comma and semi-colon are used for the same purpose to divide sentences, but
the semi – colon makes the division a little more pronounce. Both are not used
to introduce a new idea.
 Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the
intelligible meaning of written words.
 An ambiguity of a statute which may be partially or wholly solved by a
punctuation mark may be considered in the construction of a statute.
 The qualifying effect of a word or phrase may be confined to its last antecedent
if the latter is separated by a comma from the other antecedents.
 An argument based on punctuation is not persuasive.
US vs Hart, G.R. No. L-8848, November 21, 1913
“When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the
courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that
construction of the statute which will give it effect. The construction finally
 adopted should be based upon something more substantial than the mere
punctuation found in the printed Act. If the punctuation of the statute gives it a
meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it
may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the
words of the statute as thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation
alone is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation
when necessary, to give to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature,
disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others
where necessary.”

j. Casus Omissus  - when a statute makes specific provisions in regard to several

enumerated cases or objects, but omits to make any provision for a case or object
which is analogous to those enumerated, or which stands upon the same reason,
and is therefrom within the general scope of the stature, and it appears that such
case or object was omitted by inadvertence or because it was overlooked or
unforeseen.

 Such omissions or defects cannot be supplied by the courts.

 The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate and apply
only if and when the omission has been clearly established.

People vs Manantan, G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962

“The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the
defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is
applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have
been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can
operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.
In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did
not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely
called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges.”

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the
mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already
mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a
substitution of terms.”
k. Reddendo singular singulis  - referring each to each; requires that the antecedents
and consequences should be read distributively to the effect that each words is to
be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriately related
and to which it is most applicable.

People vs. Tamani, G.R. No. 22160, January 21, 1974

“The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25,
1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by
registered mail, is not well-taken. The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be
construed as referring to "judgment" (see section 6 of Rule 120), while the word
"notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is
sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to each;
referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object", or "let each
be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively"
(76 C. J. S. 175).

Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was
served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1)
day within which to file his notice of appeal and not eleven days. That
construction is an application by analogy or in a suppletory character of the rule
governing appeals in civil cases which is embodied in section 3, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court.”

l. Provisions, exceptions and saving clauses 

i. Proviso - commonly found at the end of a section, or provision of a statute, and

is, generally, introduced as a rule by the word “Provided” or phrase “but nothing
herein.”

CIR vs Filipinas Compania de Seguros, G.R. No. L-14880, April 29, 1960
“Even though the primary purpose of the proviso is to limit restrain the general
language of a statute, the legislature, unfotunately, does not always use it with
technical correctness; consequently, where its use creates an ambiguity, it is the
duty of the court to ascertain the legislative intention, through resort to usual rules
of construction applicable to statutes, generally an give it effect even though the
statute is thereby enlarged, or the proviso made to assume the force of an
independent enactment and although a proviso as such has no existence apart
from provision which it is designed to limit or to qualify. (Statutory Construction
by E. T. Crawford, pp. 604-605.)

. . . When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind, and the statute should be construe with reference to its intended scope and
purpose. (Id. at p. 249.)”

ii. What proviso qualifies:

- The phrase or clause immediately preceding it
 - The phrase or clause immediately following it

o Except if legislative intent is clearly indicated that the proviso should

qualify the other preceding provisions or the whole statute itself.

ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 109902, August 2, 1994

“In the case of Mercado, Sr. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 11 this
Court ruled that the proviso in the second paragraph of Article 280 relates only
to casual employees and is not applicable to those who fall within the definition of
said Article's first paragraph, i.e., project employees. The familiar grammatical
rule is that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately
preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to other
sections thereof, unless the clear legislative intent is to restrict or qualify not
only the phrase immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier provisions
of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole. No such intent is observable
in Article 280 of the Labor Code, which has been quoted earlier.”

iii. Conflict between proviso and enacting clause 

Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. L-34024, April 5, 1978
“The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute.
When there is irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the
statute the former is given precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the
latest expression of the intent of the legislature.”

iv. Construction and effect

Samson vs. CA, G.R. No. L-43182, November 25, 1986

“Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be
strictly, but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with
exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by
implication ... (Francisco, Statutory Construction, p. 304, citing 69 C.J., Section
643, pp. 1092-1093, emphasis supplied).

Where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, it is to

be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned
(Martin, Statutory Construction, 1979 ed., p. 71 citing Dave's Place vs. Liquor
Control Comm., 269 N.W., p, 504).”
v. Saving clauses  – a clause in a provision of law which operates to except from
the effect of the law what the clause provides, or to save something which would
otherwise be lost.

Ocampo vs. Buenaventura, G.R. No. L-32293, January 24, 1974

“In the motion to dismiss filed before the Board of Investigators of the Police
Commission,4 respondents alleged that the proceedings in the city mayor's office
cannot be attacked, invoking for the purpose Section 26 of the Police Commission
Act, to wit:

Section 26. Saving Clause.— All pending administrative cases involving

police service and personnel shall be absorbed by the Police Commission
one hundred days after the publication of the Police Manual containing
rules and regulations relative to such matters.

The trust of their argument is that the city mayor then had jurisdiction because his
decision was rendered on August 8, 1967, while the Police Manual was
promulgated later on December 30, 1967. But the ruling in Police Commission v.
Hon. Judge Eloy Bello,
et al.5 where this Court had occasion to elucidate on the "saving clause" of the
POLCOM Act, is relevant to the issue and disposes of the respondents' argument.
This Court said:

Section 26 of the Police Act is, as expressly stated therein, a mere saving
clause, and refers solely to the administrative cases involving police
service and personnel which were pending at the time of the effectivity of
the Act.

The Police Commission was required to absorb the said pending cases within 100
days after it shall have published a Police Manual. The said Section 26 may not be
interpreted to mean that the Board of Investigators of each city or municipality
and the Police Commission could not legally function to carry into effect the
purposes of the Act until after the lapse of the said 100 days, because Section 28
provides that '(t)his Act shall take effect upon its approval.' Since the Act was
approved on September 8, 1966, it became effective immediately on that
date. (Emphasis Ours.)

Lastly respondent Judge in his order in question dated June 1, 1970, gave the
following reason for denying the motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial
of the case on the merits: "... considering that the said defendant has already filed
his answer, containing special defenses embodying the grounds stated in the
motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the trial ..., the said motion to dismiss
and/or suspension of trial is hereby denied." The denial is apparently predicated
on the prior filing of an answer.
 As a general rule a motion to dismiss is interposed before the defendant pleads
(Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). However, there is no rule or law prohibiting
the defendant from filing a motion to dismiss after an answer had been filed. On
the contrary, Section 2 of Rule 9, expressly authorizes the filing of such motion at
any stage of the proceedings when it is based upon failure to state a cause of
action,6 as in the case at bar where the complaint failed to state a cause of action
as alleged by petitioner in his very motion to dismiss and/or suspension of the
trial. The respondent Judge therefore, erred in denying said motion. The
surrounding circumstance at the time of the filing of said motion warranted
suspension of the trial on the merits.”

E. Intrinsic aids to construction - found within the statute

 In resorting to intrinsic aids, one must go back to the parts of the statute.
 If the language of the statute is clear and unequivocal, there is no need to resort to
intrinsic aids.

a. Giving effect to entire statute 

People vs Eugenio Garcia, G.R. No. L-2873, February 28, 1950

“One of these rules is that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and
reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that
conflicting intention in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded,
unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.)”

b. General and special provisions 

Manila Railroad Co. vs Collector, G.R. No. L-30264, March 12, 1929
“Based on these facts, it was the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs that
dust shields should be classified as "manufactures of wool, not otherwise
provided for." That decision is entitled to our respect. The burden is upon the
importer to overcome the presumption of a legal collection of duties by proof that
their exaction was unlawful. The question to be decided is not whether the
Collector was wrong but whether the importer was right. (Erhardt vs. Schroeder
[1894], 155 U. S., 124; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. Collector of Customs [1913], 26
Phil., 647.) On the other hand, His Honor, Judge Simplicio del Rosario, took an
opposite view, overruled the decision of the Collector of Customs, and held that
dust shields should be classified as "detached parts" of vehicles for the use on
railways. This impartial finding is also entitled to our respect. It is the general
rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend
their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every case
of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government
and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor
presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly
import. (U. S. vs. Wigglesworth [1842], 2 Story, 369; Froehlich & Kuttner vs.
Collector of Customs [1911], 18 Phil., 461.)”
c. Preamble and recitals 
Preamble
o It is a part of the statute written immediately after its title, which states
the purpose, reason for the enactment of the law.
o Usually express in “whereas” clauses
o It is not an essential part of the statute. But it may, when the statute is
ambiguous, be resorted to clarify the ambiguity, as a key to open the
minds of the lawmakers as to the purpose of the statute.

People vs Echaves, G.R. No. L-47757-61, January 28, 1980

“We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to
squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in
squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of
involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of

Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the
Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and
communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works,
the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing
and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal
Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal
constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river
banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits
on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem
in urban communities all over the country;

WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been

unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the
affluent class;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's

drive against this illegal and nefarious practice.

It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal

constructions on public and private property. It is complemented by Letter of
Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest
of public health, safety and peace and order.”

d. Title, headings, and marginal notes 

Title
 o it carries weight because of the Constitutional requirement that “every
bill must embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.”
o It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in its language to its construction
and to ascertaining legislative will.
o If the meaning of the statute is obscure, courts may resort to the title to
clear the obscurity.
o The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or restrict
the scope of law, and a statute couched in a language of doubtful
import will be constructed to conform to the legislative intent as
disclosed in its title.

People vs Yabut, G.R. No. 39085, September 27, 1933

It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and
unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble
or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text, especially where
such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids
indicating the general nature of the text that follows. (Cf. In re Estate of Johnson,
39 Phil., 156, 166.) A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised Penal
code will reveal that they were not intended by the Legislature to be used as
anything more than catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way the
subject matter of each article. Being nothing more than a convenient index to the
contents of the articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event have the effect of
modifying or limiting the unambiguous words of the text. Secondary aids may be
consulted to remove, not to create doubt.

F. Extrinsic aids to construction 

 These are existing aids from outside sources, meaning outside of the four corners of the
statute. If there is any doubt as to the meaning of the statute, the interpreter must first find
out within the statute.
 Extrinsic aids therefore are resorted to after exhausting all the available intrinsic aids and
still there remain some ambiguity in the statute.
 Extrinsic aids resorted by the courts are history of the enactment of the statute; opinions
and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement
administrative laws; contemporaneous construction by executive officers; actual
proceedings of the legislative body; individual by members of congress; and the author of
the law.
 Other sources of extrinsic aids can be the reports and recommendations of legislative
committees; public policy; judicial construction; and construction by the bar.

i. In general 

“It is a well-accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, courts may

examine both the printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic
 matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history
of its enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill and purposes to be
accomplished by the measure.”

People vs. Muñoz, G.R. No. L-38969-70, February 9, 1989

“The majority pronouncement is that said provision did not abolish the death
penalty but only provided for its non-imposition. Our reading, however, is that
when the Constitution states that the death penalty shall not be imposed, it can
only mean that capital punishment is now deemed non-existent in our penal
statutes.

It is because of the imperfection ("awkward" as termed by the majority) of the

language used, and its susceptibility to two conflicting interpretations, contrary to
the majority opinion that the text is plain, that resort must be had to judicial
construction.

It is elementary in statutory construction that it is the intent of the statute that

must be given effect. The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines the
construction thereof, and the Court looks less to its words and more to its context,
subject matter, consequence and effects (Manila Race Horse Trainers Association
vs. de la Puente, 88 Phil. 60). A statute must be read according to its spirit and
intent, and where legislative intent apparently conflicts with the letter of the law,
the former prevails over the latter (Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051). This
intent must be ascertained from the words of the statutory provision itself.
However, in a situation such as in the case at bar, where the intent does not
decisively appear in the text of the provision as it admits of more than one
construction, reliance may be made on extrinsic aids such as the records of the
deliberations of the body that framed the law in order to clearly ascertain that
intent.”

ii. Existing general or public policy of state 

Republic vs Workmen’s Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-30320 March 29,
1972

“The same principle is laid down in Molina vs. Rafferty (38 Phil., 167), on page
169 in which this court makes the following quotation from Cooley on Taxation,
volume 1, 3d ed., p. 450:

The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature
should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found it
should be made to govern, . . . if the words of the law seem to be doubtful import,
it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain
what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the
circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was
meant to be redressed; . . . And where the law has contemporaneously been put
into operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it,
 this construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled
to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative
purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive.”

iii. Motives and opinions of Legislature or its members or of third persons

Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-8888, November 29,
1957 
“In reply to this, appellees point out that said chairman could not have spoken of
the Congressional intention in approving Republic Act 601 because he was not a
member of the Congress that passed said Act. Naturally, all he could state
was his own interpretation of such piece of legislation. Courts do not usually
give decisive weight to one legislator's opinion, expressed in Congressional
debates concerning the application of existing laws. Yet even among the
legislators taking part in the consideration of the amendatory statute (Republic
Act 1197) the impression prevailed that, as the law then stood chocolate candy or
chocolate bar was exempted, but cocoa beans were not.”

iv. History and passage of Act 

Oliva vs. Lamadrid, G.R. No. L-23196, October 31, 1967

Moreover, the legislative history of the bills which later became said Republic
Act No. 2670, amending Republic, Act No. 720, shows that the original proposal
was to give homesteaders or free patent holders a period of ten (10) years within
which to redeem their property foreclosed by rural banks; that this proposal was
eventually found to be unwise, because its effect would have been to dissuade
rural banks from granting loans to homesteaders or free patent holders — which
were sought to be liberalized — said period of redemption being too long, from
the viewpoint of said banks; and that, consequently, the proposal was given up,
with the specific intent and understanding that homesteaders or holders of free
patent would retain the right to redeem within five (5) years from the conveyance
of their properties, as provided in the general law, that is to say the Public Land
Act, or Commonwealth Act No. 141.

It is, therefore, our considered view that plaintiff herein has the right to
repurchase the property in question within five (5) years from the date of the
conveyance or foreclosure sale, or up to February 4, 1966, and that having
exercised such right and tendered payment long before the date last mentioned,
defendants herein are bound to reconvey said property to him.

v. Legislative debates and reports of committees or commissions

Manila Jockey Club vs. GAB. 107 Phil, G.R. No. L-12727, February 29, 1960
“Appellants cite in their briefs a number of authorities sustaining the view that in
the interpretation of statutes susceptible of widely differing constructions,
legislative debates and explanatory statements by members of the legislature may
be resorted to, to throw light on the meaning of the words used in the statutes. Upon
the other hand, the appellees, likewise, quote in their briefs other authorities to the
effect that statements made by the individual members of the legislature as to
the meaning of provisions in the bill subsequently enacted into law, made
during the general debate on the bill on the floor of each legislative house,
following its presentation by a standing committee, are generally held to be
inadmissible as an aid in construing the statute. Legislative debates are
expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not safe guides
and, hence, may not be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the
lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was
put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by
resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not speak, may not
have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other.

In view of these conflicting authorities, no appreciable reliance can safely be placed

on any of them. It is to be noted in the specific case before us, that while
Congressmen Marcos and Abeleda were, admittedly, of the view that the additional
sweepstakes races may be inserted in the club races, still there is nothing in
Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted, which would indicate that such an
understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of Congress
received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely
devoid of any such indication. This is, therefore, not a case where a doubtful
wording is sought to be interpreted; rather, if we adopt appellants’ theory, we would
be supplying something that does not appear in the statute. It is pertinent to observe
here that, as pointed out by one of appellants’ own cited authorities, in the
interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation
of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information to the
intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention
or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity.
In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by
the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses
that meaning. The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements — an internal
and an external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure
of the latter may defeat the former. The following, taken from 59 Corpus Juris
1017, is in line with this theory:

"The intention of the legislature to which effect must be given is that expressed
in the statute and the courts will not inquire into the motives which influence
the legislature, or individual members, in voting for its passage; nor indeed as
to the intention of the draftsman, or the legislature, so far as it has been
expressed in the act. So, in ascertaining the meaning of a statute the court will
not be governed or influenced by the views or opinions of any or all members
of the legislature or its legislative committees or any other persons."
 vi. Contemporaneous construction - construction placed upon the time of or after a
statute’s enactment by the executive, legislative or judiciary
authorities (Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima in Lege -
contemporary construction is strongest in law)

 Contemporaneous construction is given much weight because it is expected

that the officials called upon to enforce the law have familiarized themselves
with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law.
 It is disregarded (a) when there is no ambiguity, (b) where the construction is
clearly erroneous, (c) where strong reason to the contrary exists, (d) when the
court has previously given a different interpretation.
Bengzon vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-42821, January 18, 1936
“While contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, yet where a
construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative department and
accepted by the various agencies of the executive department, it is entitled to great
respect. It is our understanding that it has been the practice of the Chief Executive
in the interpretation of his constitutional powers to veto separate items in bills
analogous to that before us, and that this practice has been acquiesced in
previously without objection, so that it would require a clear showing or
unconstitutionality for the courts to declare against it. Since, therefore, legislative
intent and executive purpose is evident, it devolves upon the judiciary to give
differential attention to the attitude assumed by the other two branches of the
Government.”

vii. Practical construction or usage - best interpreter of things

Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Collector, G.R. No. L-27761 December 6, 1927
“This rule is well stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, volume 2, page
889, where it is said:

"The practical construction given to a doubtful statute by the department or officers

whose duty it is to carry it into execution is entitled to great weight and will not be
disregarded or overturned except for cogent reasons, and unless it is clear that such
construction is erroneous." Citing numerous decisions.”

G. Prospectivity or Retroactivity of Statutes

a. General prospective construction - Under Article 4 of the New Civil Code provides,
“Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.” Hence, laws
are presumed to be prospective unless the intendment of the legislature to give them a
retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used. In case of doubt, it shall be resolved against retroactivity.
 b. Remedial statutes - retroactive effect except where the statute itself expressly or by
necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation,
or where to apply it would impair vested rights.

c. Statutes relating to offenses and prosecutions - as a rule are applied prospectively.

Felonies and misdemeanors are punished under the laws in force at the time of their
commission (Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code).

However, as an exception, it can be given retroactive effect if it is favorable to the

accused who is not a habitual criminal (Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code).

d. Curative Statutes - In Development Bank of the Phils. Vs. CA, it was held that
“legislations which reach back on past events to correct errors or irregularities and to
render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the
purpose the parties intended.” Except when application would impair obligations of
contracts or disturb vested rights.

e. Statutes relating to remedies and procedure - will be construed as applicable to

actions pending and undermined at the time of their passage. However, Rules of
Procedure should not be given retroactive effect if it would result in great injustice
and impair substantive right. Procedural provisions of the Local Government Code
are retrospective.

H. Construction of particular statutes

 If a statute should be strictly construed, nothing should be included within the scope that
does not come clearly within the meaning of the language used.
 But the rule of strict construction is not applicable where the meaning of the statute is
certain and unambiguous, for under these circumstances, there is no need for
construction.
 On the other hand, there are many statutes which will be liberally construed. The
meaning of the statute may be extended to matters which come within the spirit of reason
of the law or within the evils which the law seeks to suppress or correct.
 Liberal interpretation or construction of the law or rules, however, applies only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not
a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration
of justice.

a. Remedial statutes 

International Corporate Bank vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-69560, June 30, 198
“Petitioner now assails the motion of the plaintiff (now private respondent) filed
in the trial court for the release of the proceeds of the money market investment,
 arguing that it is deficient in form, the same being unverified (petitioner's
Memorandum, Rollo, p. 266). On this score, it has been held that "as enjoined by
the Rules of Court and the controlling jurisprudence, a liberal construction
of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial
justice." (Maturan v. Araula, 111 SCRA 615 [1982])."

b. Penal statutes - those laws by which punishments are imposed for the violation or
transgression of their provision:

 As a general rule, penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the
State, and liberally in favor of the accused. The reasons behind the rule are:
(1) the law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual, (2) the object is to
establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and
(3) the discretion of the court limited. The rule is NOT to be used to defeat
legislative intent or the clear purpose of the law.

People vs. Padilla, G.R. No. 47027, February 4, 1941

“It is contended, however, that notwithstanding the infringement of section 4 of
Act No. 138, the defendants cannot be punished therefor since the said Act No.
138 imposes no appeal sanction whatsoever, and the penalty provided by Act No.
108 cannot be correctly extended to and applied in this case. This argument is, in
our opinion, without merit. The very title of Act No. 108 gives unmistakable
notice of the legislative intent of the laws of the nationalization of certain rights,
franchises or privileges," and section 1 of the same Act applies the punishment
provided therein to "all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision
requires Philippine or United States citizenship as a requisite for the exercise of
enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege." Under Act No. 108 any legal
provision, whether existing at the time of the passage of said Act No. 108 or
promulgated thereafter, would fall within its scope, so long as said legal provision
requires Philippine or United States citizenship as a requisite for the enjoyment of
a right, franchise or privilege. One of such legal provisions is section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 138. While "statutes prescribing punishments or
penalties should not be extended further than their terms reasonably justify"
(Snowden v. Brown, 60 Fla. 212, 53 So. 548, 549), this rule of strict
construction is subordinate to the rule of reasonable, sensible construction
having in view the legislative purpose and intent, and giving effect to the
same. It is not to be so unreasonably applied as to defeat the true intent and
meaning of the of the enactment found in the language actually used.
(Chapman v. Lake, 151 So. 399, 402-403.) Although not so expressly stated, Act
No. 138 is cumulative of Act No. 108; and it is no objection that one statute
creates an offense and another Act provides for its punishment.”

c. Statutes in derogation of fundamental rights - laws enacted by the state curtailing or

restricting the enjoyment of rights;
  As a general rule, if there are two reasonably possible constructions where one
would diminish or restrict a fundamental right and the other would not, the
latter shall be adopted so as to allow the enjoyment of such fundamental right.
Provincial Chapter of Laguna NP vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-53460, May 27, 1983
“Indeed, "of two reasonably possible constructions, one of which would diminish
or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so,
latter construction must be adopted" (16 C.J.S., 69 footnote). Hence, the more
logical interpretation is that which gives effect to Section 10 of Article XII (C) of
the 1973 Constitution and does not violate the individual’s basic right to
association.”

d. Legislative grants - Statutes providing grants to local government are strictly

construed against the grantee because of the benefits and advantages gained by the
grantee and must follow the conditions or requisites provided by the grantor in order
to obtain such privilege.

Manila Lodge No. 761 vs CA, G. R. No. L-41001, September 30, 1976
“It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the
general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four
corners of the statute, 31 and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute,
and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered. 32 It is,
therefore, necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in
order to unravel the legislative intent.”

e. Revenue laws - The Constitution provides that “Each local government unit shall
have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.” The clear implication of this
provision is that statutes prescribing limitations on the taxing power of local
government units must be strictly construed against the national government and
liberally in favor of LGU’s, and any doubt will be in favor of the latter.

Republic Flour Mills vs Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-28463, May 31, 1971
“Then, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory construction
requiring fidelity to the legislative purpose. What Congress intended is not to be
frustrates. Its objective must be carried out. Even if there be doubt as to the
meaning of the language employed, the interpretation should not be at war with
the end sought to be attained. No undue reflection is needed to show that if
through an ingenious argument, the scope of a statute may be contracted, the
probability that other exceptions may be thought of is not remote. If petitioner
were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded
from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to
sympathetic consideration. It is desirable then that the gates to such efforts at
undue restriction of the coverage of the Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end
result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. That
 kind of approach in statutory construction has never recommended itself. It does
not now. “

f. Labor laws - doubts in the interpretation of Workmen’s Compensation and Labor

Code should be resolved in favor of the worker. It should be liberally construed to
attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his
dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain in an injury.

The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its beneficiaries and the law by
its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor.

Villavert vs. ECC, G.R. No. L-48605, December 14, 1981

“It should be noted that Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, provides that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of
this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in
favor of labor."

g. Social security laws - The sympathy of the law on social security is towards its
beneficiaries and the law by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality
in their favor.

Vicente vs. ECC, G.R. No. 85024, January 23, 1991

“The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the
welfare of government workers, especially the humble rank and file, whose
patience, industry, and dedication to duty have often gone unheralded, but who, in
spite of very little recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their appointed tasks.
It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its
beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms,18 requires a construction of utmost
liberality in their favor. It is likewise for this reason that the Court disposes of this
case and ends a workingman's struggle for his just dues.”

h. Corporation laws 

Home Insurance Co. vs. Eastern Shipping Lines, G.R. No. L-34382, July 20, 1983
“According to many authorities, a constitutional or statutory prohibition against a
foreign corporation doing business in the state, unless such corporation has
complied with conditions prescribed, is effective to make the contracts of such
corporation void, or at least unenforceable, and prevents the maintenance by the
corporation of any action on such contracts. Although the usual construction is to
the contrary, and to the effect that only the remedy for enforcement is affected
thereby, a statute prohibiting a non-complying corporation from suing in the state
courts on any contract has been held by some courts to render the contract void
and unenforceable by the corporation, even after its has complied with the
statute." (36 Am. Jur. 2d 299-300).”
i. Insurance laws - contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus, ambiguity in the words of an insurance
contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary.

Del Rosario vs. Equitable Insurance, G.R. No. L-16215, June 29, 1963
“. . . . And so it has been generally held that the "terms in an insurance policy,
which are ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain . . . are to be construed strictly
against, the insurer, and liberally in favor of the insured so as to effect the
dominant purpose of indemnity or payment to the insured, especially where a
forfeiture is involved," (29 Am. Jur. 181) and the reason for this rule is that the
"insured usually has no voice in the selection or arrangement of the words
employed and that the language of the contract is selected with great care and
deliberation by expert and legal advisers employed by, and acting exclusively in
the interest of, the insurance company" (44 C.J.S. 1174). Calanoc v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-8151, Dec. 16, 1955.

. . . . Where two interpretations, equally fair, of languages used in an insurance

policy may be made, that which allows the greater indemnity will prevail.
(L'Engel v. Scotish Union & Nat. F. Ins. Co., 48 Fla. 82, 37 So. 462, 67 LRA 581
111 Am. St. Rep. 70, 5 Ann. Cas. 749).

j. Administrative laws 

Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, G.R. No. 84811, August 29, 1989
“As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become
necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation
of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they
can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the
increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now
not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally

construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance
with the legislative purpose.  Following this policy in Antipolo Realty
Corporation v. National Housing Authority,  the Court sustained the competence
of the respondent administrative body, in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction
vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the parties
under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.”

k. Retirement and pension laws - liberally construed in favor of the recipient because
such laws were made to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that
the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.

Re: Application for Retirement-Britanico, A.M. No. 6484-Ret. May 15, 1989
 “Retirement laws should be liberally construed and applied in favor of the persons
intended to be benefitted thereby.”

l. Naturalization laws - strictly construed against the applicant because citizenship is a

privilege which endows rights which foreigners cannot, and the applicant must follow
the conditions and requisites provided clearly and specifically provided by state in
order to obtain citizenship.

Velasco vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-14214, May 25, 1960

“Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant" (Co Quing y
Reyes vs. Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are constrained to hold that the trial court
did not err in denying the petition for naturalization.”

m. Special or local laws 

Llanto vs. Dimaporo, G.R. No. L-21905, March 31, 1966

“On top of all of these is the fact that section 12 of the Local Autonomy Act
leaves us with but one guidepost in the interpretation of powers allocated to local
governments, thus:

Sec. 12. Rules for the interpretation of the Local Autonomy Act. —

1. Implied power of a province, a city or municipality shall be
liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as
to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of
the local government and it shall be presumed to exist.

Autonomy is the underlying rationale of the Local Autonomy Act. By the statute
itself no interpretation thereof should be indulged in which would cripple the
board's powers. This legal yardstick stops us, too, from writing into the statute the
Finance Secretary's approval as a condition precedent to effectivity of the
resolution herein questioned.”

n. Statutes offering rewards 

Penid vs. Virata, G.R. No. L-44004, March 25, 1983

“It is a basic tenet in both American and Philippine jurisprudence that statutes
offering rewards must be construed in favor of informers and with regard to the
purpose for which they are intended, with mere technicality yielding to the
substantive purpose of the law. Otherwise, the government would lose a positive
and effective means of checking anomalies that are committed in the detriment of
the finances of the state. (48 Am. Jur. 112; Rubic v. Auditor General, 100 Phil.
772.)”

o. Habeas Corpus rules 

 Enrile vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990
“While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing
should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it
raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding. The
rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil.
805), the writ of habeas corpus being ‘the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The
scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of illegal
detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes —’
have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers
(Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420)”

p. Statutes prescribing formalities in wills - A will must be executed in accordance with

the statutory requirements otherwise it is entirely void.

In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy. G.R. No. L-14322, February 25, 1960
“Thus, it has been held that "Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in
the execution of wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page
1097, ‘A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements;
otherwise it is entirely void.’ All these requirements stand as of equal importance
and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will.
No power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or
dispense with those enumerated in the statutes" (Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca, 43
Phil., 405, 407; See also Saño v. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban v. Gorecho 50
Phil., 30; Quinto v. Morata, 54 Phil., 481).”

q. Probation laws - should be liberally construed to give first-time offenders a second

chance to maintain his place in society through reformation.

Santos To vs. Paño, G.R. No. L-55130, January 17, 1983

“Under the circumstances as just pointed out, We find no sufficient justification
for respondent judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent offender. We find,
instead, that the liberality with which the Probation Law should be applied in
favor of the applicant for its benefits affords the better means of achieving
the purpose of the law, as indicated in Our decision in the case of Balleta Jr. vs.
Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. L-49907, August 21, 1979, 92 SCRA 719, cited by the
Solicitor-General who, as earlier stated, recommends granting of the instant
petition for probation.”

r. Election laws - should be reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their purpose
which is to (1) effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the choice of their
representatives and (2) give effect to the express will of the electorate because the
application of election laws involves public interest and imposes upon the
COMELEC and the courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their
command who is the real candidate elected by the people.
 Pahilan vs. Tabalba, G.R. No. 110170, February 21, 1994
“It has been frequently decided, it may be stated as a general rule recognized by
all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers
may not be defeated by mere technical objections. An election contest, unlike
an ordinary action, is imbued with public interest since it involves not only the
adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but also the paramount
need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate
with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift.
Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain period one
whose right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately
cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest,
which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure with
protract and delay the trial of an ordinary
action.” 

s. Construction with reference to civil law 

People vs. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989

“However, petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code which
states that "the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day the
crime is discovered by the offended party,the authorities, or their agents. . cannot
be construed in the same manner because the rule on constructive notice is limited
in application to land registration cases. It is argued that haste should be avoided
in applying civil law presumptions to criminal suits.

Although caution should be observed in applying the rules of construction in civil

cases in the interpretation of criminal statutes, the Court will not hesitate to do so
if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant. Hence, in Mercado v. Santos, 66
Phil. 215 (1938), the Court applied the presumption arising from the allowance of
a will to bar a criminal action. In theft particular case, the petitioner filed a
petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife. The will was duly
probated. Sixteen (16) months thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against
petitioner for falsification or forgery of the will. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the case claiming that the order probating the will is conclusive as to its
authenticity and due execution. The motion having been denied, the petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) which ruled that "the
judgment admitting the will to probate is binding upon the whole world as to the
due execution and genuineness of the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are
concerned, but not for the purpose of punishment of a crime." But the Supreme
Court reversed the CA decision by ruling that, in accordance with See. 625 of the
 then Code of Civil Procedure which provides that "the allowance by the court of a
will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution,"

t. Construction with reference to other statutes - statutes which refers to other statutes
and makes them applicable to the subject of legislation; the adopting statute shall be
construed to incorporate the reference statute as a whole.

Escosura vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc. G.R. Nos. L-16696 and L-16702, January 31,
1962
“Respondent-appellant’s contention to the effect that the clause "before all leaves
of absence with pay shall have been exhausted", precludes the employees from
invoking the benefits of the law, since they have been paid their sick leave pay
although not in full, (arguing that if the intention of the law was to require full
compensation, it would have used the word "full" to modify "pay", ) is untenable.
On the contrary, the legislative practice seems to be, that when the intention is to
distinguish between full and partial payment, the appropriate modifying term is
used, as it appears in Commonwealth Act 647, governing maternity leave of
married women in the service of the Government or any of its instrumentalities,
where the law granted "maternity leave with full pay" to permanent and regular
female employees who have rendered two or more continuous years of service;
"half pay" to permanent and regular employees who have rendered less than two
years of continuous service and "maternity leave without pay" to temporary
employees. On the other hand, Republic Act 679 regulating the employment of
women and children in Commercial and Industrial establishments or other places
of labor, provides in its Section 8 that "the employer shall grant to any woman
employed by him who may be pregnant vacation leave with pay for six weeks
prior to the expected date of delivery or miscarriage at the rate of not less than
60% of her regular or average weekly wages." Again in Republic Act 843,
Section 98(a), granting vacation and sick leaves to judges of municipal courts and
justices of the peace, the law simply says that they "shall be entitled annually to
15 days vacation and 15 days sick leave with pay." Finally, in Article 1695 of the
New Civil Code, it is provided that "househelpers shall not be required to work
more than 10 hours a day. Every househelper shall be allowed four days vacation
each month with pay." In all theses laws, it is not disputed that the phrase "leave
with pay", used without any qualifying adjective, meant that the employee was
entitled to full compensation during the period of his leave of absence.”

u. Statutes relating to same subject matter in general (in pari materia) - when two or
more statutes refer to the same specific or particular subject. It may either be
expressed or implied.

City of Naga vs. Agna, G.R. No. L-36049, May 31, 1976
“The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section 2309 of
the Revised Administrative Code. It is a well established principle in statutory
construction that a statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts on the same
 subject in the absence of words to that effect unless there is an irreconcilable
repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is evidently intended to
supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to comprise itself the sole and
complete system of legislation on that subject. Every new statute should be
construed in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject
matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be
done by any fair and reasonable interpretation ... It will also be noted that Section
2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264
(Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same subject matter-enactment and effectivity
of a tax ordinance. In this respect they can be considered in pari materia. Statutes
are said to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or to
the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object.  When
statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that
they should be construed together. This is because enactments of the same
legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform
system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier
enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in
mind the existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act
with reference thereto. 8 Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to
have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and
they all should be construed together. 9 In construing them the old statutes
relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the new provisions
and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so construed that effect
may be given to every provision of each. However, when the new provision and
the old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail
as it is the latter expression of the legislative will. 10 Actually we do not see any
conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2
of the Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). The conflict, if any, is more
apparent than real. It is one that is not incapable of reconciliation. And the two
provisions can be reconciled by applying the first clause of Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code when the problem refers to the effectivity of an
ordinance changing or repealing a municipal license tax already in existence. But
where the problem refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an entirely new
tax, let Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) govern.”

v. Conflicting or inconsistent statutes -

Gordon vs. Veridiano, G.R. No. L-55230, November 8, 1988

“Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should
endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one
as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the
judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally
the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same
time also according due respect to a coordinate department of the government. It
 is this policy the Court will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the laws
above-cited and the conclusions that should follow therefrom.”

w. General and special statutes - General and special laws which are in pari materia must
be harmonized. In case of irreconcilable conflict, the special law shall prevail
irrespective of the time of its enactment.

Exceptions:
1. Where legislative intent is clear that the general enactment to cover all laws and
repeal all prior laws relating to the subject matter
2. Where the special law merely creates a general rule and the general law
provides specific rule

Butuan Sawmill vs. City of Butuan, G.R. No. L-21516, April 29, 1966
“Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general — the terms
of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special —
the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a
general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. (State vs. Stoll,
17 Wall. [U.S.], 425) (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 224)”

x. Municipal ordinance inferior to statute - the ordinance must give way

Primicias vs. Municipality of Urdaneta, G.R. No. L-26702 October 18, 1979
“An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must not
contravene . . . the statute," for it is a "fundamental principle that municipal
ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state." 8
Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance
and a statute, the ordinance "must give way." 

y. Statute prevails over administrative regulation 

Hijo Plantation vs. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-34526, August 9, 1988
“Moreover, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law
and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails
because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). Rules that subvert the statute cannot
be sanctioned (University of Sto. Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376;
Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340). Except for
constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental
law itself, a public official must locate to the statute relied upon a grant of power
before he can exercise it. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the
authority conferred by statute (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v.
 Santiago L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493; cited in Tayug Rural Bank v.
Central Bank, L-46158, November 28,1986,146 SCRA 120,130)”

z. Construction of statutes adopted from other jurisdictions - statutes patterned or copied

from statutes of foreign countries; the courts shall take into consideration the
construction of foreign courts relating to the adopted statutes, as well as the law itself
and the practices under it, unless said construction is given prior to its enactment.

U.S. vs. de Guzman, G.R. No. L-9144, March 27, 1915

“These statutory provisions, as will be seen, are not widely dissimilar from our
own, though we have no provision requiring a written statement of the reasons for
dismissal to accompany motions of this nature, a feature nevertheless which might
well be adopted by the trial courts without the necessity for statutory enactment.”

aa. Statutes construed by other courts

Phil. Education Co. vs. Soriano, G.R. No. L-22405, June 30, 1971
“It is not disputed that our postal statutes were patterned after statutes in force in
the United States. For this reason, ours are generally construed in accordance with
the construction given in the United States to their own postal statutes, in the
absence of any special reason justifying a departure from this policy or practice.
The weight of authority in the United States is that postal money orders are not
negotiable instruments (Bolognesi vs. U.S. 189 Fed. 395; U.S. vs. Stock Drawers
National Bank, 30 Fed. 912), the reason behind this rule being that, in establishing
and operating a postal money order system, the government is not engaging in
commercial transactions but merely exercises a governmental power for the
public benefit.”

I. Amendments, revisions, codes and repealing acts

a. Presumption of Intent to change law 

Amandy vs. People, G.R. No. 76258, May 23, 1988

“It may also be stated that even if a convicted person falls within the classes of
those qualified for probation, the grant of probation is not automatic of
ministerial. Probation is a privilege and its grant rests upon the discretion of the
court (Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 149). The discretion is exercised primarily
for the benefit of society as a whole and only secondarily for the personal
advantage of the accused.

The Probation Law has been with us for more than a decade now and, perhaps, it
is time for Congress to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of this
 innovative and far-reaching program. Until Congress changes the law, however,
we can only apply it as enacted.”

b. Special law not repealed by general law by implication

Phil. Railway Co. vs. Collector, G.R. No. L-3859, March 25, 1952
“A statute is not to be deemed repealed, by implication, by subsequent act upon
the same subject unless the two are manifestly inconsistent with, and repugnant
to, each other, or unless a clear intention is disclosed on the face of the later
statute to repeal the former one.

 A general law cannot amend, alter or repeal, by implication, a special law or

charter. A special and local statute, providing for a particular case or class of
cases is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and
application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of
the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
law.”

c. Implied repeals 

Ramirez vs. CA, G.R. No. L-23587-88, June 10, 1976

“Also under paragraph 8 of Circular 133 (supra) it is so provided that circulars
consistent with the provisions of Circular 133 are deemed incorporated thereto.
However since Circular 20 is inconsistent and runs counter to it then by necessary
implication the same is abrogated and repealed. And as Sutherland 2 an eminent
authority on Statutory Construction says-"When a subsequent enactment covering
a field of operation coterminous with a prior statute cannot by any reasonable
construction be given effect while the prior law remains in operative existence
because of irreconcilable conflict between the two acts, the latest legislative
expression prevails and the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict."

“It may be argued that the function of the appellate court is not to consider the
merits of a cause on the basis of supervening extraneous circumstances but merely
to review the judgment of the lower court with a view to determining whether it
was erroneous or correct when it was rendered. But because judgment is
suspended by appeal, it is without finality; that to give it finality the appellate
court must itself pronounce its judgment, and that in so doing it must be governed
by the existing law. When the previous law under which alone validity could be
given to the judgment has been repealed, the sole prop and foundation for support
of the judgment has been removed, and of necessity it must be declared null and
void (Yeaton v. United States (1809) 5 Cranch (U.S.) 281, 3 L. Ed. 101).”

d. When implied repeal cannot be given retroactive effect

Tac-an vs. CA, G.R. No. L-38736, May 21, 1984

 “The petitioner also argues that the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu
was repealed on June 19, 1965 by Republic Act No, 4252, hence the approval of
the Provincial Governor became unnecessary. Suffice it to say that at times
material to the case, i.e. when the Deed of Quitclaim was executed, when the
approval by the Provincial Governor was given and when the approval was
revoked, Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu
were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature the
repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. It should also be stated that
the land in question must be presumed to be conjugal in nature and since the
spouses of the Acopiado brothers did not consent to its transfer to the petitioner,
the transaction was at least voidable.”

e. When reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases

Comendador vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991

“It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle
is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.”

SOURCES AND REFERENCES:

Statutory Construction by Ruben Agpalo 2009 Edition
https://www.lawphil.net/
https://www.chanrobles.com/
https://www.studocu.com/ph/
https://lexclassrooms.com/
Cases (in-text citations)