1
G.R. Nos. 169727-28. August 18, 2006.* evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt—it implies probability of guilt and requires
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDI-GANBAYAN (4th
Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Public Officers; Preliminary Investigation; Ombudsman; As far as crimes cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman.—On the first issue, the rule is that as far as crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan are concerned, the determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion,
whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime
as defined by law. Whether or not the Ombudsman has correctly discharged his function, i.e.,
whether or not he has made a correct assessment of the evidence of probable cause in a case,
is a matter that the trial court may not be compelled to pass upon.
Same; Same; Same; As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Om-budsman’s
investigatory power, exercised through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to
determine the presence or absence of probable cause;  Exceptions.—As a rule, courts should
not interfere with the Ombudsman’s investigatory power, exercised through the Ombudsman
Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable cause, except
when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In such case, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Indeed, if the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration
in the determination of probable cause, there is abuse of discretion. As we ruled in Mendoza-
Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) ,a writ of certiorari may issue in any of the following
instances: 1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; 2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; 3. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; 4. When the
acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; 5. Where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7. Where the
court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; 9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; 10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied.
Same; Same; Same; Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on
more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify conviction; The
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause prevails over petitioner’s bare allegations of grave
abuse of discretion.—We are not convinced by petitioner’s claim that there is no probable cause
on record for the filing of the Information against him. It bears stressing that probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. It implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence which would justify conviction. The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against
petitioner is buttressed by his encompassing and comprehensive resolution, independent of the
findings of the Senate Committees, as well as the documents appended to the Informations.
Petitioner’s bare claim to the contrary cannot prevail over such positive findings of the
Ombudsman. In fine, the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause prevails over petitioner’s
bare allegations of grave abuse of discretion; that he was not involved in the step-by-step
consummation of the anomalous transaction; and that as President he was involved only in the
top level policy formulation and implementation.
Same; Same; Same; The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require cases to be
set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the
accused before any warrant may be issued—the Sandiganbayan’s determination of probable
cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. —We agree with the
Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require cases to be
set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the
accused before any warrant may be issued. Section 6, Rule 112 mandates the judge to
personally evaluate the resolution of the Prosecutor (in this case, the Ombudsman) and its
supporting evidence, and if he/she finds probable cause, a warrant of arrest or commitment
order may be issued within 10 days from the filing of the complaint or Information; in case the
Judge doubts the existence of probable cause, the prosecutor may be ordered to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice. The provision reads in full: SEC. 6. When
warrant of arrest may issue.—(a) By the Regional Trial Court. —Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to
a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint of information. The periods provided in the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the judge must determine the presence or
absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayan’s determination of probable
cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge should not be

stymied and distracted from his determination of probable cause by needless motions for
determination of probable cause filed by the accused.
Preliminary Investigation; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdictions; Armed Forces of the Philippines-
Retirement and Separation Benefits Systems (AFP-RSBS);  The AFP-RSBS is a government-
owned and controlled corporation, and that its funds are in the nature of public funds—under
Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
committed by presidents, directors, trustees or managers of government owned or controlled
corporations.—In People v. Sandiganbayan and Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled
that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and controlled corporation, and that its funds are in
the nature of public funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by presidents, directors, trustees or managers of
government owned or controlled corporations. Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, whether simple or complexed with other crimes. As
gleaned from the material averments of the Information in Criminal Case No. 28023, the charge
against petitioner is estafa through falsification of public document in the performance of his
duties and in relation to his position as president of the AFP-RSBS.
Same; Ombudsman; The determination of what charges to file and who are to be
charged are matters addressed to the discretion of the Ombudsman, including the matter of
whether the crime perpetrated constitute delito con-tinuado or classified as concurso de delitos,
or involve separate crimes under the category of concurso real delito. —Indeed, the
determination of what charges to file and who are to be charged are matters addressed to the
discretion of the Ombudsman, including the matter of whether the crime perpetrated by
petitioner and his co-accused under the Informations pending in the Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan constitute delito continuado or classified as concurso de delitos; or involve
separate crimes under the category of concurso real delito involve factual issues. Such factual
issues should be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this case. The Court is being
tasked to determine whether the several sales contracts executed by petitioner and his co-
accused were set afoot or triggered by a single impulse and operated by an uninterrupted force
however long a time it may occupy, which, however, is a matter best left to the determination
of the trial court, in this case, the Sandi-ganbayan.
Public Officers; Double Jeopardy; Crimes committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their offices defined and penalized under the Anti-Graft Law do not exclude
prosecution for felonies defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and vice versa—
one may be charged of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised
Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being
charged with a felony under the Code .—On the last issue, we agree with the contention of
2
respondents that the crimes committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
offices defined and penalized under the Anti-Graft Law do not exclude prosecution for felonies
defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and vice versa. Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019
reads: Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. —In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (Emphasis
supplied) It is clear then that one may be charged of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in addition to a
felony under the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or
subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Code.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Renato G. De La Cruz for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General  for the People.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the
nullification of the Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan (4th Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 28022
and 28023, as well as its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (Blue
Ribbon) and on National Defense and Security (collectively, Senate Blue Ribbon Committee)
carried out an extensive joint inquiry into the “ coup rumors and the alleged anomalies” in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines-Philippine Retirement Benefits Systems (AFP-RSBS). In its
Report dated December 23, 1998, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee outlined, among others,
the anomalies in the acquisition of lots in Tanauan, Batangas, Calamba, Laguna and Iloilo City
by the AFP-RSBS, and described the modus operandi of the perpetrators as follows:
“The modus operandi  in the buying of the lots was to cover the same transactions with two
deeds of sale. One deed of sale would be signed only by the seller or sellers (unilateral deed).
Another deed of sale would be signed by the seller or seller and the buyer, AFP-RSBS (bilateral
deed).
The devious gimmicking was uncovered by your Committee which also found out that the
buying prices stated in the unilateral deeds did not match those stated in the bilateral
deeds. To borrow a word from lawyers, the “consideration” ( i.e., prices) in the

unilateral deeds of sale and the bilateral deeds of sale did not tally even if they
covered the same transaction.
Without exception, the deed(s) signed by the seller(s) only (unilateral deeds)
were the one registered with the registrar ( sic) of deeds. These Unilateral Deeds of
Sale recorded lower consideration paid by the System to the buyer(s) than those
stated in the Bilateral Deeds. The motivation was obviously to evade payment of the
correct taxes to the government and save money for the seller(s), broker(s) and
who knows, probably even for the kickbacks going to certain officials of RSBS, the
buyer.
xxxx
The bilateral deeds were kept in the dark files  [of] the System over the years. They were
uncovered only recently as a result of your Committee’s investigation. Your Committee
submits that the reason why the bilateral deeds were kept in the vaults of the
System was to justify the huge lot payments made by the System just in case any
soldier-member of RSBS would be bold or curious enough to inquire about the
matter directly with the System. The curious soldier would then be shown
the bilateral deed to impress upon him/her that indeed the System has spent huge
amounts for the purchase of the lots in question.
Until the investigation uncovered the anomaly, the matter of the two sets of documents
covering the purchases of the same parcels of land made by the System were, like the Clinton-
Lewinsky trysts, kept from the prying eyes officials of the System but so unfair
because the public continues to shoulder, in behalf of the RSBS, the payments for
the pension and retirement benefits of the soldiers.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Initial Report of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which was cited by the Feliciano
Commission in its Report to the President of the Philippines, included the following discussion:
Essentially, the Blue Ribbon Committee found that the real estate purchases by RSBS were
uniformly documented, by two (2) sets of instruments: Firstly, a unilateral covering the same
piece of land, executed both by the seller and by RSBS as buyer. The price stated in the second
bilateral instrument was invariably much higher than the price reflected in the unilateral deed of
sale. The discrepancies between the purchase price booked by RSBS and the purchase price
reflected in the unilateral deed of sale actually registered in the relevant Registry of
Deeds, totaled about seven hundred three million pesos (P703 Million).  The two sets of
purchase price figures obviously could not both be correct at the same time. Either the
purchase price booked and paid out by RSBS was the true purchase price of the land involved,
in which case RSBS had obviously assisted or abetted the seller in grossly un-derstating the
capital gains realized by him and in defrauding the National treasury; or the purchase price in
the unilateral deed of sale was the consideration actually received by the seller from RSBS, in
which case, the buyer-RSBS had grossly overpaid, with the differential, in the belief of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, going into the pockets of RSBS officials. A third possibility was
that the differential between the purchase price booked and paid by the buyer-RSBS and the
3
selling price admitted by the seller of the land, had been shared by the buyer and seller in
some undisclosed ratio.2
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to “prosecute and/or
cause the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who had
signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain parcels of land,”
Ombudsman Investigators Ricardo Sullano, Rodil Buenaventura and Anatolio Alejandrino of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a fact-finding investigation. They
executed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint,3 stating that based on their findings, the following may be
charged with falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019: petitioner B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr., former AFP-RSBS president; Atty.
Meinrado Enrique Bello, Head of the AFP-RSBS Legal Department in charge of Land Acquisition;
Capt. Perfecto Enrique Quilicot, AFP-RSBS Project Officer, Tanauan, Batangas, Land Acquisition;
and Notaries Public Alfredo Nasser and Manuel Satuito.
The matter was further looked into by a panel of Ombudsman Investigators, which issued
on March 30, 2001 a Joint Resolution4 finding probable cause to file the corresponding
Informations for 148 counts of violation of Article 315, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, and Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Meinrado Bello and Atty.
Manuel Satuito. However, it was likewise recommended that the complaint against petitioner be
dismissed, without prejudice to a thorough fact-finding investigation on his liability in light of
this Court’s ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan.5
The Ombudsman did not act on this recommendation. Instead, another panel of prosecutors
was directed to review the Joint Resolution and conduct a thorough investigation of the case.
After conducting clarificatory hearings, the investigating panel issued a Memorandum6 dated
June 15, 2004, recommending to the Ombudsman that petitioner be charged with 148 counts
of estafa through falsification of public documents, and one count violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner’s allegation that he merely relied on the legal staff of the AFP-RSBS
when he signed the unregistered bilateral deeds of sale was considered untenable. The panel
declared that the deeds were used purposely to facilitate the payment of amounts in excess of
that paid to the landowners. Moreover, petitioner, as AFP-RSBS president, could not claim that
he was merely involved in top- level policy implementation.
The Memorandum also stated that the AFP-RSBS had an Investment Committee tasked to
screen project proposals, which was headed by petitioner, Oscar Martinez and other AFP-RSBS
officers; these potential investments were then elevated for further screening and approval to
the Executive Committee, of which petitioner and Martinez were also members. The panel
found that petitioner knew of the unilateral deeds of sale, considering that they were duly
registered with the Register of Deeds and titles were issued on the basis thereof. The
investigating panel clarified that the ruling of this Court in Arias does not apply because
petitioner’s participation consisted of signing and approving documents prepared by his
subordinates relative to the transactions, from the time of conceptualization until payment by
AFP-RSBS.

The panel further found that the culpability of petitioner, Quilicot, Bello and Satuito is
evidenced by the fact that they signed documents in manifest bad faith, with full knowledge of
the anomalous transactions. The bilateral deeds of absolute sale were prepared by the Legal
Department of AFP-RSBS where Bello and Satuito were assigned, later enabling them to amass
enormous profits. The investigating panel “confirmed” the observations of the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee as follows:
We have also noted that in all the 148 transactions of lot acquisition, the Bilateral Deeds of Sale
never bore the marks/annotations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Register of Deeds
of Tanauan, Batangas, as would always appear, if they were used as basis for transfer of title.
These Bilateral Deeds of Sale were attached to the payment vouchers to justify the payment of
the much higher price considerations of the acquired lots, yet, no one of the respondents and
the concerned AFP-RSBS officials and employees questioned the fact that the Bilateral Deeds of
Sale never bore the marks and annotations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue indicative that
the proper taxes have been paid nor that of the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas
particularly the assigned Entry Number and the date of said entry as reflected in its Primary
Entry Book.
From the concerted silence and inaction of the respondents on the glaring irregularities
attendant to the transaction, we can draw the conclusion that these officers of the AFP-RSBS
who passed upon the Disbursement Voucher and the Status Transaction Forms were aware of
the forgeries and the result thereof. All the respondents were acting under a common design
and purpose to give a semblance of regularity to the acquisition of the subject one hundred
forty eight (148) lots at a price very much higher than what was actually paid to the individual
lot owners. The element of conspiracy was therefore present.7
The panel opined that the AFP-RSBS funds used to purchase the parcels of land were trust
funds and for administration purposes.8 Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, the
charter of the AFP-RSBS, intended to create a trust fund for the specific purpose of benefiting
the members of the armed forces, hence contributions thereto were compulsory. Since soldiers
and military personnel rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement, pension
and separation benefits, petitioner and his co-officers occupy positions of trust, with obligations
and responsibilities akin to those imposed on directors and officers of a corporation; and
considering that the responsible officers are not mere directors but trustees, there is all the
more reason to apply the fiduciary relationship principle in this case.
The Ombudsman approved the recommendation of the Panel of Prosecutors without
prejudice to the liability of the landowners involved in the transactions.
4
Petitioner and his co-accused filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the
investigating panel’s June 15, 2004 Memorandum. Petitioner alleged the following:
. 1.RESPONDENT RAMISCAL’S PARTICIPATION IN THE SUBJECT SALE TRANSACTIONS,
WHICH WERE DULY APPROVED BY THE RSBS BOARD, WAS PURELY MINISTERIAL AS
PART OF HIS LIMITED FUNCTIONS AS PRESIDENT OF RSBS.
. 2.THE CONSPIRACY THEORY LINKING RESPONDENT RAMIS-CAL TO THE CHARGES IS
DEVOID OF FACTUAL AND/OR LEGAL BASIS. IN FACT, THE MEMORANDUM FAILED
TO SHOW, AS THERE IS NONE ( SIC) ANY OVERT ACT OF CONSPIRACY COMMITTED
BY RESPONDENT RAMISCAL.
. 3.IN ANY EVENT, THE CHARGES OF FALSIFICATION BASED ON THE BILATERAL
DEEDS HAVE NO LEGAL LEG TO STAND ON AS AGAINST RESPONDENT RAMISCAL.
. 4.MORE THAN THAT, THE CHARGES OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E),
R.A. 3019 HAVE NO FACTUAL AND/OR LEGAL BASES INASMUCH AS THE AMOUNTS
PAID BY AFP-RSBS TO THE VENDORS ARE THOSE THAT WERE INDICATED IN THE
BILATERAL DEEDS OF SALE, HENCE, NO UNWARRANTED BENEFITS WERE
AFFORDED THE SELLERS NOR DID THE [AFP-RSBS] AND THE GOVERNMENT SUFFER
UNDUE INJURY INCIDENT THERETO.9
On September 27, 2004, the Panel of Prosecutors issued a Memo-randum10 to the
Ombudsman recommending that the motion be denied, which the latter duly approved.
Thereafter, the panel of Prosecutors and the Special Prosecutors had a series of meetings
with the Ombudsman, where it was agreed upon that only five Informations for estafa through
falsification of public documents and five Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 would be initially filed with the Sandiganbayan instead of the 148 counts previously
recommended by the Ombudsman. This was due to the lack of prosecutors who would handle
the voluminous cases.11
Of the Informations filed, two were raffled to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, one
of which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28022 for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. The accusa-tory portion reads:
“That on April 23, 1997 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Province of Batangas
and Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused public officers, namely: Brigadier General Jose Servando Ramiscal,
Jr., a high-ranking public official, being then the President of the Armed Forces of the Philip-
pines-Retirement, Separation and Benefit System (AFP-RSBS); Atty. Mein-rado Enrique A.
Bello, Head of Legal Division; Atty. Manuel Se Satuito, Chief of Documentation, Legal
Division; Captain Perfecto O. Quilicot, Jr., Project Officer, and certain John and John
Does, also of the AFP-RSBS, a government entity, being a government owned or controlled
corporation, while in the performance of their official functions and committing the of-fense in
relation to their office, acting with evident bad faith, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with private individuals John Does and Jane Does, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to AFP-RSBS and its members by

purchasing a parcel of land covering an area of seven thousand five hundred eighty-two square
meters (7,582 sq. m.), more or less, situated at Tanauan, Batangas, registered in the name of
Marianito V. Plaza, Glicerio V. Plaza and Petra Maunahan and covered by OCT-11835 and TCT
65973 of the Registry of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas, under a bilateral Deed of Absoute Sale
dated April 23, 1997, making it appear therein that the afore-described real property was sold
by the said owners and purchased by the AFP-RSBS, represented by accused BGen. Jose
Servando Ramiscal, Jr., for the amount of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR PESOS (P1,531,564.00), Philippine Currency, paid
under AFP-RSBS General Voucher No. 61789 dated May 28, 1997 with corresponding Philippine
National Bank Check No. 72789 dated June 3, 1997, when in truth and in fact, accused knew
fully well that the true and real consideration thereof is only TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P227,460.00), Philippine Currency, as correctly
indicated in a unilateral Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1997 executed by the said
owners, thereby resulting to an overprice of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (P1,304,104.00) to the damage and prejudice of AFP-RSBS and
its members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”12
The other, for estafa thru falsification of public documents, was docketed as Criminal Case No.
28023. The accusatory portion reads:
“That on April 23, 1997 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Province of Batangas
and Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused public officers, namely: Brigadier General Jose Servando Ramiscal,
Jr., a high ranking public official, being then the President of the Armed Forces of the Philip-
pines-Retirement Separation and Benefit System (AFP-RSBS); Atty. Mein-rado Enrique A.
Bello, Head of Legal Division; Atty. Manuel Se Satuito, Chief of Documentation, Legal
Division; Captain Perfecto O. Quilicot, Jr., Project Officer, and certain John and Jane
Does, also of the AFP-RSBS, a government entity, being a government owned or controlled
corporation, while in the performance of their official functions and committing the of-fense in
relation to their office, acting with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with private individuals John Does and Jane
Does, and with intent to defraud the AFP-RSBS and its members, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified a bilateral Deed of Absolute Sale dated
April 23, 1997 covering seven thousand five hundred eighty-two square meters (7,582 sq. m.),
more or less, of real property situated at Tanauan, Batangas, registered in the name of
Marianito V. Plaza, Glicerio V. Plaza and Petra Maunahan and covered by OCT-11835 and TCT
65973 of the Registry of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas, by making it appear therein that the
afore-described real property was sold by the said owners and purchased by the AFP-RSBS,
represented by accused BGen. Jose Servando Ramiscal, Jr., for the overpriced amount of
ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR PESOS
(P1,531,564.00), Philippine Currency, from its funds held by the accused AFP-RSBS officials in
trust and for administration, when in truth and in fact, accused knew fully well that the true
and real consideration thereof is only TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR
5
HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P227,460.00), Philippine Currency, as correctly indicated in a
unilateral Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1997 executed by the said owners, and
thereafter, to facilitate the payment of the said overpriced amount by the AFP-RSBS, the
accused used the said falsified bilateral Deed of Absolute Sale as supporting document, among
others, to the AFP-RSBS General Voucher No. 61789 dated May 28, 1997, and relying on said
fraudulent acts, AFP-RSBS released the amount of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR PESOS (P1,531,564.00) by way of Philippine National
Bank Check No. 72789 dated June 3, 1997, which amount included the overprice of ONE
MILLION THREE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (P1,304,104.00)
and which the accused subsequently misappropriated and converted to their personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the AFP-RSBS and its members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”13
Raffled to the First Division of the anti-graft court were two other cases docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2802614 for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and Criminal Case No. 2802715 for
estafa through falsification of public documents. Criminal Case No. 2802816 for violation of
Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 and Criminal Case No. 2802917 for estafa through falsification of
public documents were raffled to the Second Division, while Criminal Case No. 2802118 for
estafa through falsification of public documents was raffled to the Third Division. Criminal Case
No. 2802419 for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Criminal Case No. 2802520 for
estafa through falsification of public documents were raffled to the Fifth Division.
Petitioner filed in the Fourth Division of the anti-graft court (in Criminal Case Nos.
28022 and 28023) an “Urgent Motion for Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and Consolidate
All Cases in One In-
formation with Prayer to Defer Issuance of An Arrest Warrant Pending Resolution
Hereof.”21 The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on January 17, 2005, holding that the
judicial determination of probable cause is not an adversarial proceeding but summary in
nature. While it ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused, it resolved to
hold in abeyance the resolution on the matter of consolidation of all the cases until after it had
acquired jurisdiction over their persons.22 After petitioner posted bail for his provisional
release, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for the consolidation of the cases, considering
that the other cases filed were pending in its other divisions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution and sought to have the cases
dismissed for lack of probable cause.23 He alleged that, in finding probable cause, the
Sandiganbayan merely relied on the findings of the Ombudsman and did not take into account
the other affidavits on record. The Sandiganbayan again denied the motion on February 22,
2005.24
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash25 in Criminal Cases Nos. 28022 and 28023 on
the following grounds:

. I.This Court has no jurisdiction over the offenses charged in both Informations;
. II.In Criminal Case No. 28023 (estafa through falsification), the facts charged being an
essential part of the continuing crime of Estafa separately charged in Criminal Cases
Nos. 28021, 28025, 28027 and 28029, pending in the 3rd, 1st, 5th and 2nd divisions,
respectively, only one Information must be filed for all these cases including those
covered by the OSP memorandum dated June 15, 2004; and,
. III.In Criminal Case No. 20822 (violation of RA No. 3019), the said case is abated
by Criminal Case No. 20823 (Estafa through falsification)
. because the very facts alleged in the former are also the very facts alleged in the
latter.26
On June 2, 2005, the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny the motion, holding that contrary to
petitioner’s claim, it had jurisdiction over the crimes charged.27 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied on August 17, 2005.28 Petitioner then posted bail for his
provisional liberty.
When arraigned on September 1, 2005, petitioner refused to enter a plea, prompting the
anti-graft court to enter a plea of not guilty in both cases.29
On October 7, 2005, petitioner filed the instant petition for certio-rari under Rule 65, praying
that the said Resolution be nullified on the following grounds:
. I.THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUSTAINING THE
OMBUDSMAN’S FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE COMMISSION OF ONE
HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT (148) COUNTS OF ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND ANOTHER ONE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT (148) COUNTS OF
VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE
INFORMATIONS.
. II.THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE
INFORMATIONS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASES NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT
HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
. III.THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE
INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28023 (ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION),
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE FACTS CHARGED THEREIN WERE AN ESSENTIAL
PART
. OF ONE CONTINUING CRIME OF ESTAFA SEPARATELY CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASES
NOS. 28021, 28025, 28027 AND 28029, PENDING IN THE THIRD, FIRST, FIFTH AND
SECOND DIVISIONS OF THE SANDI-GANBAYAN, RESPECTIVELY, CONSIDERING THAT
BASED ON THE DOCUMENTS ADDUCED BY THE PEOPLE AND FOR OBVIOUS WANT
6
OF RELIABLE EVIDENCE, ONLY ONE INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA SHOULD HAVE
BEEN FILED FOR ALL THESE CASES INCLUDING THE REMAINING ONE HUNDRED
FORTY THREE (143) COUNTS COVERED BY THE OSP MEMORANDUM DATED JUNE 15,
2004, ANNEX T;
. IV.THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE
INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 20822 (VIOLATION OF RA NO. 3019)
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE SAID CASE WAS ABATED BY CRIMINAL CASE NO.
20823 (ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION) BECAUSE THE VERY FACTS ALLEGED IN
THE FORMER WERE ALSO THE VERY FACTS ALLEGED IN THE LATTER, THUS
VIOLATING THE RULE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY.30
Petitioner insists that, in finding probable cause against him for estafa through falsification of
public document and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, as it relied solely on the
Memorandum of the investigation panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors. He posits that it behooved
the anti-graft court to review the Om-budsman’s findings and scrutinize the evidence, the
affidavits on record, including the transcript of stenographic notes. As gleaned from the Joint
Resolution dated March 30, 2001, the initial finding of the Ombudsman Prosecutors was that
there was no probable cause to charge him for the acts complained of, in the light of the
Court’s ruling in the Arias case. He asserts that there was no evidence of bad faith on his part
relative to the deeds of sale subject of the Informations filed against him. He insists that based
on the Joint Resolution, and even the report of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, he had no
part whatsoever in the commission of the crimes charged. The disparity of the prices of the
properties in the bilateral deeds of sale, vis-á-vis the unilateral deeds of sale, do not support
the finding of probable cause against him made by the investigating panel of Ombudsman
Prosecutors. Petitioner asserts that there is no evidence on record that he conspired with the
other accused in the commission of the crimes charged.
Petitioner further posits that the Sandiganbayan likewise committed grave abuse of its
discretion when it found probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him
instead of setting the case for hearing. He insists that the anti-graft court failed to consider the
other evidence on record and erred in relying solely on the evaluation and resolution of the
investigating panel of Prosecutors; the fact that he posted bail bonds for his provisional liberty
does not estop him from raising the issue in his Motion to Quash.
Petitioner avers that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged as
provided in Section 4 of R.A. 8249. He insists that the AFP-RSBS is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation and that he does not fall under Salary Grade 27 as required in Section 4
of the law, inasmuch as his position as AFP-RSBS President is not even included under the
Compensation and Classification Act of 1989. Petitioner cites the ruling of this Court in Inding v.
Sandiganbayan31 to support his claim.
Petitioner asserts that the charges filed against him constitute only one crime of estafa
through falsification of public document, in the nature of delito continuado, or a series of

repetition of the same acts arising from one and the same criminal intent. He maintains that
while there are 148 bilateral deeds of sale signed by him and 145 unilateral deeds of sale
signed by the sellers, it cannot thereby be concluded that he is criminally liable for each deed
executed. The number of transactions purportedly entered into is not a gauge in ascertaining
criminal intent for the several transactions. The best test should be the presence of clear,
convincing and positive evidence showing distinct criminal intent for each sales transaction,
which in any event, is wanting in this case. Petitioner further alleges that for multiple
transactions to be considered as separate and distinct crimes, there must be a series of acts
with individual sellers such as
(a) negotiations; (b) discussion of the terms of the sale; (c) finalizing the terms thereof; and
(d) instruction to prepare payment and (e) actual payment. He points out that there is no
evidence that he and the other accused involved ever met with any of the sellers. While he
admits the possibility that he could have signed the bilateral deeds of sale in one sitting, he
insists that these documents were notarized separately; there is even no evidence on record
that the sellers of the property transacted separately with him. He points out that the corporate
officers of AFP-RSBS, especially its President, do not personally deal with any of the sellers. The
bare fact that he executed the bilateral deeds of sale and that the project was approved by the
higher level of the management, cannot lead to the conclusion that he took part in the
implementation of the transactions.
Petitioner maintains that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in filing the charges against him. He insists that
the delictual acts contained in the two Informations, Criminal Case No. 28022 (for violation of
R.A. 3019) and Criminal Case No. 28023 (for estafa through falsification of public document),
are one and the same; to charge him under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 despite his indictment for
estafa is to duplicate the very same charge under another name, which under the principle of
double jeopardy, is proscribed. He further argues that while it is true that, in Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019, the charge against him for said crime is “in addition” to his criminal liability under
the Revised Penal Code, the phrase connotes cumulativeness and simultaneity of liability.
Petitioner points out that the panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors recommended the filing of
only one count of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, but the Ombudsman filed five (5)
counts thereof.
The issues are the following: (1) whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against
petitioner for estafa through falsification of public document and for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019; (2) whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against petitioner for the issuance of warrants
for petitioner’s arrest without first conducting a hearing; (3) whether petitioner may be charged
and prosecuted for five (5) counts of estafa thru falsification of public documents; and (4)
whether petitioner may be prosecuted for both estafa through falsification of a public document
7
and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 without violating his right against double
jeopardy.
The petition has no merit.
On the first issue, the rule is that as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are
concerned, the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, or
reinvestigation for that matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion, whether probable
cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law.
Whether or not the Ombudsman has correctly discharged his function, i.e., whether or not he
has made a correct assessment of the evidence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that
the trial court may not be compelled to pass upon.
As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman’s investigatory power, exercised
through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence
of probable cause,32 except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In such case, the aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.33 Indeed, if the Ombudsman does not take
essential facts into consideration in the determination of probable cause, there is abuse of
discretion.34 As we ruled in Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) ,35 a writ
of certiorari may issue in any of the following instances:
. 1.When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
. 2.When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
. 3.When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
. 4.When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
. 5.Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
. 6.When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
. 7.Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
. 8.Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
. 9.Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
. 10.When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied.36
In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the Om-budsman committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to
charge him with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for estafa through falsification of
a public document.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s claim that there is no probable cause on record for the
filing of the Information against him. It bears stressing that probable cause need not be based

on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. It
implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which
would justify convic-tion.37 The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against petitioner is
buttressed by his encompassing and comprehensive resolution, independent of the findings of
the Senate Committees, as well as the documents appended to the Informations. Petitioner’s
bare claim to the contrary cannot prevail over such positive findings of the Om-budsman. In
fine, the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause prevails over petitioner’s bare allegations of
grave abuse of discretion; that he was not involved in the step-by-step consummation of the
anomalous transaction; and that as President he was involved only in the top level policy
formulation and implementation.
It is true that in the Joint Resolution dated March 30, 2001, the Panel of Ombudsman
Prosecutors found no sufficient evidence that petitioner acted in bad faith and that he merely
relied on the recommendations of his subordinates. However, after a thorough investigation,
another panel of Ombudsman Prosecutors found that, indeed, petitioner not merely relied on
the recommendations of his subordinates but likewise perpetrated overt acts, which, along with
those of the other accused, resulted in the consummation of the crimes charged. Thus, as
maintained by the respondents in their Comment on the petition, petitioner signed documents,
indicating his evident bad faith on the highly anomalous transactions; petitioner was aware of
the forgeries and anomalies in the buying of the parcels of land, yet gave his conformity
thereto, causing grave injury to its members and to the public in general. Thus, it was also
found that petitioner, together with his cohorts, conspired to perpetuate clear fraud on the
government and the AFP-RSBS members by giving a semblance of regularity to real estate
acquisitions at bloated prices.
The fact alone that petitioner was aware, in each transaction, that the two (2) deeds of sale
contain contradictory costs for every acquisition, and that he failed to rectify the same
eloquently speak of his participation in the criminal malevolence. He was a member of the
Investment Committee of the AFP-RSBS, which screened potential investments, that were
thereafter subjected to further screening and approval by the Executive Committee of which he
was also a member; hence, petitioner had full knowledge of the transactions, from the time
they were conceptualized until the properties were paid for. The records show that the
Tanauan, Batangas properties alone were overpriced by about 600%. Thus, petitioner
consented to the crimes charged by the following overt acts:
. (1)Petitioner and his co-accused prepared or caused to be prepared two (2) deeds of
sale covering the same transactions: a deed of sale with the seller or sellers as the
sole signatory or signatories therein (unilateral deeds); and a deed of sale with the
seller or sellers and the buyer, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner (bilateral deeds);
. (2)The considerations in the unilateral deeds of sale and the bilateral deeds of sale did
not tally, notwithstanding the fact that they covered the same subject matter and
transaction, with the bilateral deeds of sale bearing a bloated price; and,
8
. (3)Of these two deeds, the unilateral deeds of sale bore the correct value given to the
seller(s) as evinced, among others, by the fact that the same were the ones registered
with the Registry of Deeds.
The bilateral deeds of sale could not possibly be the basis of the transfer of the properties
because the supporting bilateral deeds carried dates much later than the date of issue of the
titles, which were likewise not filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Registry
of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas. The Court cannot supplant the findings of the Ombudsman
that the unilateral deeds of sale were prepared by the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS, in as
much as both the unilateral and bilateral deeds of sale have exactly the same print and form.
The residence certificate number of petitioner which is indicated in the bilateral deeds of sale is
likewise printed in the unilateral deeds. Petitioner’s fraudulent intent is further proven by the
fact that the Status of Transaction Form (STF), where the subject lots were endorsed for
payment, bore his signature. The unilateral deeds of sale resulted in the issuance of the titles,
which were also the supporting documents enumerated in the STF. In many instances, the
bilateral deeds of sale carry dates much later than the dates their corresponding titles were
issued.
Petitioner was likewise unable to establish his claim that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.
His bare claim that the Sandiganbayan merely relied on the Memoranda of the Panel of
Prosecutors to the Ombudsman and did not scrutinize the evidence appended thereto is not
supported by the records. In the first place, the Sandiganbayan is presumed to have performed
its duty as provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which can likewise be gleaned
from its February 22, 2005 Resolution:
[1] While accused Ramiscal is correct in stating that this Court, in determining the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused, had evaluated
the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and its supporting documents, he is, however,
wrong in presuming that such process failed to consider the evidence the accused adduced
during preliminary investigation. It should be noted that the supporting documents submitted
by the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court included, among others, the counter-
affidavits submitted by the accused at the preliminary investigation. Parenthetically, there is no
need, and the rules do not require this Court, to enumerate in detail what were the supporting
documents it considered in determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant of arrest because the same are matters of record that the parties can easily verify.”38
We agree with the Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure do not
require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
for the arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued. Section 6, Rule 112 mandates
the judge to personally evaluate the resolution of the Prosecutor (in this case, the Ombudsman)
and its supporting evidence, and if he/she finds probable cause, a warrant of arrest or
commitment order may be issued within 10 days from the filing of the complaint or

Information; in case the Judge doubts the existence of probable cause, the prosecutor may be
ordered to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice. The provision reads in
full:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue .—(a) By the Regional Trial Court. —Within
ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,
the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint of informa-tion.39
The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such,
the judge must determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The
Sandiganba-yan’s determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature,
not adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and distracted from his determination of
probable cause by needless motions for determination of probable cause filed by the accused.
We hold that petitioner likewise failed to establish his claim that the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of authority in denying his motion to quash the Information.
First. The anti-graft court correctly ruled that it has jurisdiction over the crimes charged.
In People v. Sandiganbayan40 and Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganba-yan,41 this Court ruled that
the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and controlled corporation, and that its funds are in the
nature of public funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandigan-bayan has
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by presi-dents, directors, trustees or managers
of government owned or controlled corporations.42 Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandi-ganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, whether simple or complexed with other crimes.43
As gleaned from the material averments of the Information in Criminal Case No. 28023, the
charge against petitioner is estafa through falsification of public document in the performance
of his duties and in relation to his position as president of the AFP-RSBS.
9
Second. On petitioner’s claim that he should be charged with only one count of estafa
through falsification of public document instead offive (5) charges, respondents counter that
the criminal acts petitioner and his co-accused are not continuous crimes. Respondents argue
that a continuous crime may exist only if there is only a single criminal intent and the
commission of diverse acts is merely a partial execu-tion of said single criminal resolution. In
the instant cases, the requirement of singularity of criminal intent does not exist because there
are as many criminal intents as there are anomalous transactions, causing grave damage to the
government at each instance. There was no need for the accused to perform another or other
delict-ual acts to consummate the felony. Respondents maintain that petitioner was motivated
by separate intents as he signed each document, all of which are criminal in character; hence,
it is but proper that corresponding Informations be filed against him for each and every act of
falsification committed.
The Sandiganbayan, for its part, sustained the contention of respondents and ruled that the
determination of (a) the charge/s and the person/s against whom the charge is filed are
addressed to the sound discretion of the Prosecutors based on the facts before them; and (b)
the crimes committed by petitioner are separate, and not a single crime consisting of series of
acts arising from a single criminal resolution. Thus:
In the first place, the question of the number of criminal charges that must be instituted
against a criminal respondent (whether one count or multiple counts of the same offense) is
one addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecution service. It is enough, as this Court
has already ruled, that the informations filed in these cases are based on facts establishing
probable cause for the offenses charged. This Court will not compel the Office of the
Ombudsman to file only one information for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents
when its preliminary investigation established the commission of several counts thereof as such
action on the part of this Court would constitute undue interference with the Office of the
Ombudsman’s control over the prosecution of these cases.
In the second place, this Court is not persuaded that what is involved in these cases is a
continuous crime, that is to say, a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a
single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division, with each act in that series being
merely the partial execution of a single delict. On the contrary, the Court is of the view that
what is involved herein are several completed and distinct purported criminal acts which should
be prosecuted as multiple counts of the same type of offense. Thus, as correctly perceived by
the prosecution, there are as many alleged offenses as there are alleged anomalous
transactions involved in these cases.44
When required to comment on the motion of petitioner and his co-accused for a
consolidation of the charges filed against them before the Sandiganbayan, the Special
 10

Prosecutor objected thereto, insisting that there were as many crimes committed by the
accused as there were sales contracts forged by them.
Indeed, the determination of what charges to file and who are to be charged are matters
addressed to the discretion of the Ombudsman, including the matter of whether the crime
perpetrated by petitioner and his co-accused under the Informations pending in the Divisions of
the Sandiganbayan constitute delito continuado or classified as con-curso de delitos; or involve
separate crimes under the category of concurso real delito involve factual issues.45 Such
factual issues should be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this case. The Court is
being tasked to determine whether the several sales contracts executed by petitioner and his
co-accused were set afoot or triggered by a single impulse and operated by an uninterrupted
force however long a time it may occupy, which, however, is a matter best left to the
determination of the trial court, in this case, the Sandigan-bayan.46
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. —In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
It is clear then that one may be charged of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in addition to a felony
under the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or
subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED

Thus, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is hardly
the appropriate remedy and forum for petitioner to ventilate the issues he has raised, as only
jurisdictional issues can be resolved therein. As eloquently expressed by Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, speaking for this Court in Iligan v. Court of Appeals:47

If, as petitioners seem to apprehend, the adverse actions of two lower courts could create a
scenario of multiple prosecutions for the same offense or, more candidly expressed, of double
jeopardy, then this is neither the procedural stage nor the proper occasion to pass upon that
possibility. For, squarely imputable to petitioners is the evident lack of factual basis for and a
grossly defective presentation of that issue for this Court to rule thereon in this proceeding and
at this time.48

It must be stressed that our disposition of the matters in the present recourse will not
foreclose petitioner’s right to ventilate the same in the Sandiganbayan, for as declared in Iligan:

However, this observation would not foreclose relief to petitioners if at the trial of this case the
evidence presented and the developments therein suffice to establish the supervening fact that
indeed there could possibly be a breach of the rule of double jeopardy. Under Section 8 of Rule
117, they can still hereafter raise that defense of non bis in idem, provided that they can lay
the evidentiary bases therefor and refute from the standpoint of substantive penal law what
was earlier said on the nature and the non-identity of the several crimes of Estafa involved
which, to repeat, we pronounced purely on the bases of existing records sans the benefit of
any evidentiary fact since none has been adduced.49

On the last issue, we agree with the contention of respondents that the crimes committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their offices defined and penalized under the Anti-
Graft Law do not exclude prosecution for felonies defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and vice versa. Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
 11

G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003.*

ANAMER SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y.

BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, respondents.

Actions; Criminal Procedure; The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the

punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party—the dominant and primordial
objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender, the civil action is merely
incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused; Unless the offended party
waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. —The criminal
action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the
offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment
of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the
accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an
outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the
vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand,
the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the
former. Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions
involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender.
The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal
action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the
action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the
plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to
avoid multiplicity of suits.

Same; Same; The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on
the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required, (b) where the court declared that the liability of the
accused is only civil, and, (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. —The acquittal of the accused
does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the
court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in
the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability

may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him.
Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; While the prosecution cannot appeal from a judgment of
acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy, the aggrieved party, the offended
party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case
within the period therefor. —If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court
renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from
the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the
aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on
the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
Same; Same; Demurrer to Evidence; If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted
by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case
unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist.—In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion
to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
a case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby
waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a
demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but
also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court. If demurrer is granted
and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not
only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil
liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the
case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due
process is thereby violated.
Same; Same; Same; What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial
judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for
continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for
the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may
adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence.—This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to
evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of
the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court
should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by
way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for
in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Br.
5.
12
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Frank E. Lobrigo for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for the People.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure
of the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th “Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5, 2 dated
November 19, 2001, and its Order3 dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the said court on the civil aspect thereof and to allow her to
present evidence thereon.
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D.
Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7474 which reads as follows:
“That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused, conspiring and
confederating with each other, with intent to defraud by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, on the part of accused NENA JAUCIAN TIMARIO , drew and issue[d]
PRUDENTIAL BANK, LEGASPI CITY BRANCH CHECK NO. 067481, dated October 15, 1996, in
the amount of P214,000.00 in favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION,
represented by its Branch Manager, JERSON O. YAO, and accused ANAMER D. SALAZAR
endorsed and negotiated said check as payment of 300 cavans of rice obtained from J.Y.
BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, knowing fully well that at that time said check was
issued and endorsed, Nena Jaucian Timario did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank to cover the amount called for therein and without informing the payee of such
circumstance; that when said check was presented to the drawee bank for payment, the same
was consequently dishonored and refused payment for the reason of “ACCOUNT CLOSED”; that
despite demands, accused failed and refused and still fail and refuse to pay and/or make
arrangement for the payment of the said check, to the damage and prejudice of said J.Y.
BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”4
Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
thereafter ensued.
The Evidence of the Prosecution

On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y.
Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice,
the petitioner gave the private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential
Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the
amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioner’s assurance that it was
a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon
presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account
(“Account Closed”). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential
Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which,
however, was returned with the word “DAUD” (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave
of Court5 alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following
reasons: (a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof;
(b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the
check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first
check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had
therefore been effectively novated by the issuance of the second check. Unfortunately, her
personal check was dishonored not for insufficiency of funds, but for “DAUD,” which in banking
parlance means “drawn against uncollected deposit.” According to the petitioner, this means
that the account had sufficient funds but was still restricted because the deposit usually a
check, had not yet been cleared.
The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioner’s demurrer to evidence.
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime
charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as
payment for her purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not
establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the
issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding the
private complainant. In fact, the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never
met Nena Jaucian Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the
petitioner’s breach of the warranty that the check was a good one is not synonymous with the
fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit under Article 315(2)(d). The decretal
portion of the trial court’s judgment reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime charged but is hereby held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused
Anamer D. Salazar is therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum of
P214,000.00. Costs against the accused.”6
13
Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the
civil aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule
33 of the Rules of Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the motion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after
her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she
was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the
private respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure in this case, contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended
party, she should have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.
The Petition Is Meritorious
According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure—
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —(a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court. Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for
actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing
fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict
shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.7
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and
indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is
the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the
conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to
vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty
for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other
hand, the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to
indemnify the former.8
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions
involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender.
The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal
action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the
action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the
plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to
avoid multiplicity of suits.
The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof beyond reasonable
doubt, while in the civil aspect of the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of
evidence.9 Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall
govern the procedure to be observed in action, civil or criminal.
The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After
the prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the
14
criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should
render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof:
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment.—If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of
the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3)
the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his
wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is
any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or
waived. In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.10
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the
case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is
a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil
aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it
would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party
or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the
period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a
demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives thesame. The
aforecited rule reads:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence.—After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the
action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court,
the accused waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds
and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its
case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days
from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to
evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before the judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss the
case for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where
the accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to
present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence of the
prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence,
he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect
of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right
to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or
renders judgment not only granting the
demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the
accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a
nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby
violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.:11
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the
fundamentals.
. “(1)No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.
. “(2)In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witness face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.”
15
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of
the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find
universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due
process cannot possibly be met without a “law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”12
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet
adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on
record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or
partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the
case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the
parties may adduce their surrebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 11. Order of trial.—The trial shall proceed in the following order:
. (a)The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case,
the civil liability.
. (b)The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any,
arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
. (c)The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-
rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
. (d)Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted
for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written
memoranda.
. (e)When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution and the accused.
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there
 16

was no waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil
action. Neither did he file a civil action before the institution of the criminal action.

The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued
an order granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal
but only civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and
ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the
petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her
right to due process.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 19,
2001 and January 14, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 5, is hereby DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 7474 for the continuation
of trial for the reception of the evidence-in-chief of the petitioner on the civil aspect of the case
and for the rebuttal evidence of the private complainant and the sur-rebuttal evidence of the
parties if they opt to adduce any.

SO ORDERED.

     Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, orders set aside and nullified.

 17

No. L-33772. June 20, 1988.* act. The only requisite set forth therein for the exercise of the right to file a civil action for
damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on
reasonable doubt. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does
FRANCISCO BONITE, CANDIDO BONITE, VENECIA BONITE, CONSTANCIO BONITE,
not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
ERNESTO BONITE, ANGELINA BONITE, MARIA BONITE and JUANITA BONITE, for
herself and for her minor children namely: NADIJA BONITE, NERIO BONITE, FELIX
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 33 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at
BONITE and MARIA FEDILA BONITE, petitioners, vs. HON. MARIANO A. ZOSA,
bar.—Moreover, Article 33 of the Civil Code assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical injuries
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, 16th Judicial
intentionally committed. The death of the deceased in the case at bar was alleged to be the
District, Branch III and ELIGIO ABAMONGA, respondents.
result of criminal negligence, i.e., not inflicted with malice. Criminal negligence under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code consists in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that,
Criminal Procedure; Civil Liability; The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the
if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. Thus, the law penalizes the negligent or
accused where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.— When the accused in a criminal
reckless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account
case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
to determine the penalty. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not mentioned in
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may still be instituted against him, and
Article 33, no independent civil action for damages arising from reckless imprudence or criminal
only a preponderance of evidence is required to hold the accused liable. The civil liability is not
negligence may be instituted under said article. It is, therefore, not applicable to the case at
extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
bar.
Same; Same; Same; The guilt of the accused in the instant case was not proved beyond
Same; Same; Same; Contention that a reservation be made in the criminal case of the
reasonable doubt; Petitioners have the right to file an independent civil action for damages .—In
right to institute an independent civil action without merit .—Coming now to private
the instant case, the criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence was
respondent’s contention that the enforcement of the right to file an action for damages under
dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the accused (herein private respondent) was not
Article 29, should be subject to the procedure outlined in Rule 111 of the former Rules on
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, herein petitioners have the right to file an
Criminal Procedure, i.e., that a reservation be made in the criminal case of the right to institute
independent civil action for damages, the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case
an independent civil action, we find such contention to be without merit. Article 29 of the Civil
notwithstanding.
Code does not include any such reservation requirement. It allows an action for damages
against the accused upon the latter’s acquittal in the criminal case based upon reasonable
Same; Same; Same; In addition to Article 29 of the Civil Code, petitioners may base such
doubt.
separate civil action for damages on Article 2176 of the Civil Code .—In addition to anchoring
their right to bring a separate civil action for damages under the express provisions of Article 29
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reservation requirement in Section 2 of Rule III of the
of the Civil Code, petitioners may base such separate civil action for damages on Article 2176 of
former Rules on Criminal Procedure has been declared as not in accordance with law .—Besides,
the Civil Code. Acquittal of the accused from a charge of criminal negligence, whether on
the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure that there
reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil action for recovery of civil liability,
be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, has
arising not from criminal negligence, but from a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana. It has been held
been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to
that Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in referring to “fault or negligence” covers acts “not
the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a reservation. In fact, the
punishable by law” as well as acts that may be criminal in character, whether intentional and
reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective.
that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores (delict and quasi-
delict).
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner active participation in the criminal case not a bar to the
filing of an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of the Civil Code .
Same; Same; Same; Private respondent’s claim that the specific provision applicable in
—Lastly, that petitioners actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case does not
the case at bar is Article 33 of the Civil Code is devoid of merit.— In regard to private
bar them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of
respondent’s claim that the specific provision applicable in the case at bar is Article 33 of the
the Civil Code. The civil action based on criminal liability and a civil action under Article 29 are
Civil Code (and not Article 29), because the latter is not applicable to criminal offenses
two separate and independent actions.
proceeding from a tortious act, we find the same to be devoid of merit. It is important to note
that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil action
for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious

PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
Br. III. Zosa, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     A.C. Dulalas & F.G. Zapatos Law Office for petitioners.
     Rufino Abadies for respondent Eligio Abamonga.
PADILLA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, Branch III, dated 25 February 1971,1 in Civil Case No. 2806 filed by herein
petitioners against private respondent, dismissing the complaint for damages, and the order
dated 27 March 19712 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of aforesaid order. The
factual background of the case is as follows:
At about 2:00 P.M. of 24 September 1968, while Florencio Bonite was working as
“caminero” of the Bureau of Public Highways in Barrio Vicente Alto (Dagatan), Oroquieta City,
he was hit by a truck driven by private respondent, as a result of which, Bonite died on that
same day. Consequently, a criminal complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was
filed by the surviving heirs of the deceased (now petitioners) against the respondent
Abamonga, with the City Court of Oroquieta City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 9328.
Petitioners through their counsel Atty. Alberto Dulalas, as private prosecutor, actively
participated in the prosecution of the criminal case against the accused.3
After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the court in the criminal case,
acquitting the accused Abamonga for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.4
On 28 December 1970, petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the same
accused on account of the death of Florencio Bonite, with the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, 16th Judicial District, Branch III, docketed as Civil Case No. 2806. In an order dated
25 February 1971, the court a quo dismissed the complaint for damages. The pertinent portion
of the order5 reads as follows:
“x x x, the court believes and so holds that as the plaintiffs did not reserve the right to file an
independent civil action, and the further fact that the plaintiffs have been represented by a
private prosecutor in the prosecution of the criminal case, the action presently filed by the
plaintiffs is already res adjudicata and therefore, dismisses the complaint without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”
18
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order, but the same was denied:6 hence,
this petition for review.
The main issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not an independent civil action
for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, is deemed barred by petitioners’ failure in the
criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their active
participation in the prosecution of such criminal action.
When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance of evidence is required to hold the
accused liable. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
Article 29, Civil Code, provides thus—
“When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
“If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the
text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.”
In the instant case, the criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence was
dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the accused (herein private respondent) was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, herein petitioners have the right to file an
independent civil action for damages, the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case
notwithstanding.
In addition to anchoring their right to bring a separate civil action for damages under the
express provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, petitioners may base such separate civil action
for damages on Article 2176 of the Civil Code.7 Acquittal of the accused from a charge of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil
action for recovery of civil liability, arising not from criminal negligence, but from a quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana. It has been held that Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in referring to
“fault or negligence” covers acts “not punishable by law” as well as acts that may be criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both
scores (delict and quasi-delict).8

In regard to private respondent’s claim that the specific provision applicable in the case at
bar is Article 33 of the Civil Code9 (and not Article 29), because the latter is not applicable to
criminal offenses proceeding from a tortious act, we find the same to be devoid of merit. It is
important to note that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an
independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not
arising from a tortious act. The only requisite set forth therein for the exercise of the right to
file a civil action for damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal
action based on reasonable doubt. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that
where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.10
Moreover, Article 33 of the Civil Code assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical
injuries11 intentionally committed. The death of the deceased in the case at bar was alleged to
be the result of criminal negligence, i.e., not inflicted with malice. Criminal negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code consists in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. Thus, the law penalizes the
negligent or reckless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty.12 As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not
mentioned in Article 33, no independent civil action for damages arising from reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence may be instituted under said article.13 It is, therefore, not
applicable to the case at bar.
Coming now to private respondent’s contention that the enforcement of the right to file an
action for damages under Article 29, should be subject to the procedure outlined in Rule 111 of
the former Rules on Criminal Procedure, i.e., that a reservation be made in the criminal case of
the right to institute an independent civil action, we find such contention to be without merit.
Article 29 of the Civil Code does not include any such reservation requirement. It allows an
action for damages
against the accused upon the latter’s acquittal in the criminal case based upon reasonable
doubt.
Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure
that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil
action, has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized
amendment to the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a
reservation.14 In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been
deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with
the decisions of this Court declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective.
Lastly, that petitioners actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case does not
bar them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of
the Civil Code. The civil action based on criminal liability and a civil action under Article 29 are
two separate and independent actions.
19
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 25 February 1971 and 27 March 1971 of the respondent
court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered reinstating the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2806 and directing said court to proceed with the trial of the case.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
     Yap (C.J.), Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
     Melencio-Herrera, J., see separate opinion.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Separate Opinion:
I concur but, in my opinion, the following distinction should be made. If there has been active
participation in the prosecution of a criminal case by the offended party, the civil action arising
from the crime is deemed to have been also brought in the criminal case. Consequently, a
judgment finding the accused guilty and granting him damages is binding upon the offended
party and he may not thereafter file a separate civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code
(Roa vs. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8). This is so because the civil action for damages which Article
33 allows to be instituted is ex delicto, this being manifest from the provision which uses the
expressions “criminal action” and “criminal prosecution” (Madeja vs. Hon. Caro, L-51183,
December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 293). However, where the accused is acquitted on the ground
of reasonable doubt, as in this case, the civil action for damages for the same act may be
instituted under Article 29 of the Civil Code, notwithstanding the fact that the offended party
had actively participated in the criminal action.
Incidentally, the rule in Corpus vs. Paje (L-26737, July 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062), which
states that reckless imprudence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code, was deemed not
an authoritative doctrine because, of eleven Justices, only nine took part in the Decision and
four of them merely concurred in the result (Madeja vs. Caro, et al. supra). In that case
involving a criminal prosecution for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide, it was held that
the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal action, following Article 33 of the
Civil Code.
Orders reversed and set aside.

No. L-32055. February 26, 1988.*
REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT BERMUDEZ, petitioners-
appellants, vs, HON. JUDGE A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, DOMINGO PONTINO y
TACORDA and CORDOVA NG SUN KWAN, respondents-appellees.
Quasi-Delict; Actions; Damages; Injured party or his heirs has the choice between an
action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
and an action for quasidelict under Articles 2176-2194 of the Civil Code.—ln  cases of
negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-
delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the
employer solidarily liable for the negligence act of his employee, subject to the employer's
defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case
to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for
quasi-delict.—In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based
on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal cases to file an
independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-
delict.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Even without reservation under Section 2 of
Rule ///, Rules of Court, injured party in a criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the
accused is allowed to recover damages based on quasi-delict. —The appellant precisely made a
reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of
Rule III, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, we have allowed the injured
party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover damages
based on quasi-delict.
APPEAL from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. XVII.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
YAP, J.:
This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from the Order of March 10, 1970 of the
Honorable Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing plaintiffsappellants' complaint in Civil
Case No. 77188 entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. and Adonita Yabut Bermudez, plaintiffs,
versus Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan. defendants," and from the
Order of May 7, 1970 denying plaintiffsappellants' Motion for Reconsideration.
20
The background facts of the case are as follows:
A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a
jeep on which Rogelio, a sixyear old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained
injuries which caused his death. As a result, Criminal Case No. 92944 for Homicide Through
Reckless Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino by the Manila City Fiscal's Office.
Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27, 1969 in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File
Separate Civil Action."
On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages with the Court of
First Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 77188, entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. ? et
al., Plaintiffs, vs. Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, Defendants." Finding
that the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence
in the accident of May 10,1969 constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs
had already elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their
right to file a separate civil action. That being so, the trial court decided to order the dismissal
of the complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the
case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence is finally terminated. From said order, plaintiffs filed the present appeal, stating as
their main reasons the following:
. I.The main issue brought before this Honorable Court is whether the present action is
based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore could proceed independently
of the criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence.
. II.The second question of law is whether the lower court could properly suspend the
hearing of the civil action against Domingo Pontino and dismissed the civil case
against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the fact that a criminal case
for homicide thru reckless imprudence is pending in the lower court against Domingo
Pontino.
. III.The last question of law is whether the suspension of the civil action against
Domingo Pontino and the dismissal of the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng
Sun Kwan by reason of the pending criminal case against Domingo Pontino for
homicide thru reckless imprudence in the lower court could be validly done
considering that the civil case against said defendants-appellees also sought to
recover actual damages to the jeep of plaintiffs-appellants,"
We find the appeal meritorious.
The heart of the issue involved in the present case is whether the civil action filed by the
plaintiffs-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict. The trial court treated the case as
an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the

criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil
action. Said the trial court:
"It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's
negligence in the accident of May 10,1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept
the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already
appeared as complainants. While that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the
right to institute a separate civil action.  If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil
action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That
was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964."
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant
case. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, the Court held:
"The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and his employer's
subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while the criminal case
against the employee is still pending?
To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime and quasi-delict.
According to appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from crime. With
respect to obligations arising from crimes, Article 1161 of the New Civil Code provides:
'Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to
the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary, Title,
on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this book, regulating damages.'
x     x     x     x
It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must
be present: (1) that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties; (2) that
said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability; (3) that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry. (1 Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794 [1964])
Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable."
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an
action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter,
he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the
employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
21
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-
delict.1 The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent
civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
which provide:
"Section 1.—Institution of criminal and civil action.—When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves
his right to institute it separately.
"Section 2.—Independent civil action.—In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of
the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule 111, provides that—
"Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."
The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with
the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a
reservation, we have allowed the injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the
acquittal of the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict. In People vs. Ligon, G.R.
No. 74041, we held:
"However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil
liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages
(Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the appealed orders of the trial
court, dated March 10, 1970 and May 7, 1970, and remand the case for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 22

     Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

     Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part

Petition granted, Orders set aside.


G.R. No. 130148. December 15, 1997.*
JOSE BORDADOR and LYDIA BORDADOR, petitioners, vs. BRIGIDA D. LUZ, ERNESTO
M. LUZ and NARCISO DEGANOS, respondents.
Actions; Appeals; Judgments; Concurrent factual findings of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals are entitled to great weight. — Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in
adopting the findings of the court a quo that respondent spouses are not liable to them, as said
conclusion of the trial court is contradicted by the finding of fact of the appellate court that
“(Deganos) acted as agent of his sister (Brigida Luz).” In support of this contention, petitioners
quoted several letters sent to them by Brigida D. Luz wherein the latter acknowledged her
obligation to petitioners and requested for more time to fulfill the same. They likewise aver that
Brigida testified in the trial court that Deganos took some gold articles from petitioners and
delivered the same to her. Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, however, found as a
fact that the aforementioned letters concerned the previous obligations of Brigida to petitioners,
and had nothing to do with the money sought to be recovered in the instant case. Such
concurrent factual findings are entitled to great weight, hence, petitioners cannot plausibly
claim in this appellate review that the letters were in the nature of acknowledgements by
Brigida that she was the principal of Deganos in the subject transactions.
Contracts; Agency; The basis for agency is representation. —The basis for agency is
representation. Here, there is no showing that Brigida consented to the acts of Deganos or
authorized him to act on her behalf, much less with respect to the particular transactions
involved. Petitioners’ attempt to foist liability on respondent spouses through the supposed
agency relation with Deganos is groundless and ill-advised.
Same; Same; A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon
his peril the authority of the agent. — Besides, it was grossly and inexcusably negligent of
petitioners to entrust to Deganos, not once or twice but on at least six occasions as evidenced
by six receipts, several pieces of jewelry of substantial value without requiring a written
authorization from his alleged principal. A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and
must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent.
Actions; Independent Civil Actions; Judgments; A final judgment rendered in a civil case
absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action. —Petitioners have
apparently lost sight of Article 33 of the Civil Code which provides that in cases involving
alleged fraudulent acts, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
23
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is worth noting that this civil case was instituted four years before the criminal case for estafa
was filed, and that although there was a move to consolidate both cases, the same was denied
by the trial court. Consequently, it was the duty of the two branches of the Regional Trial Court
concerned to independently proceed with the civil and criminal cases. It will also be observed
that a final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is no
bar to a criminal action.
Courts; Speedy Disposition of Cases; It is ironic that while some litigants malign the
judiciary for being supposedly slothful in disposing of cases, petitioners are making a show of
calling out for justice because the Court of Appeals issued a resolution disposing of a case
sooner than expected of it.—It is ironic that while some litigants malign the judiciary for being
supposedly slothful in disposing of cases, petitioners are making a show of calling out for
justice because the Court of Appeals issued a resolution disposing of a case sooner than
expected of it. They would even deny the exercise of discretion by the appellate court to
prioritize its action on cases in line with the procedure it has adopted in disposing thereof and
in declogging its dockets. It is definitely not for the parties to determine and dictate when and
how a tribunal should act upon those cases since they are not even aware of the status of the
dockets and the internal rules and policies for acting thereon.
Same; Same; Presumption of Regularity; It is a legal presumption, born of wisdom and
experience, that official duty has been regularly performed; that the proceedings of a judicial
tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial acts and duties have been and will be duly and
properly performed.—The fact that a resolution was issued by said court within a relatively
short period of time after the records of the case were elevated to the office of
the ponente cannot, by itself, be deemed irregular. There is no showing whatsoever that the
resolution was issued without considering the reply filed by petitioners. In fact, that brief
pleading filed by petitioners does not exhibit any esoteric or ponderous argument which could
not be analyzed within an hour. It is a legal presumption, born of wisdom and experience, that
official duty has been regularly performed; that the proceedings of a judicial tribunal are regular
and valid, and that judicial acts and duties have been and will be duly and properly performed.
The burden of proving irregularity in official conduct is on the part of petitioners and they have
utterly failed to do so. It is thus reprehensible for them to cast aspersions on a court of law on
the bases of conjectures or surmises, especially since one of the petitioners appears to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Florentino V. Floro, Jr.  for petitioners.
     Paulino N. Lorenzo for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari, petitioners assail the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 49175 affirming the adjudication of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan which
found private respondent Narciso Deganos liable to petitioners for actual damages, but
absolved respondent spouses Brigida D. Luz and Ernesto M. Luz of liability. Petitioners likewise
belabor the subsequent resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied their motion for
reconsideration of its challenged decision.
Petitioners were engaged in the business of purchase and sale of jewelry and respondent
Brigida D. Luz, also known as Aida D. Luz, was their regular customer. On several occasions
during the period from April 27, 1987 to September 4, 1987, respondent Narciso Deganos, the
brother of Brigida D. Luz, received several pieces of gold and jewelry from petitioners
amounting to P382,816.00.1 These items and their prices were indicated in seventeen receipts
covering the same. Eleven of the receipts stated that they were received for a certain Evelyn
Aquino, a niece of Deganos, and the remaining six indicated that they were received for Brigida
D. Luz.2
Deganos was supposed to sell the items at a profit and thereafter remit the proceeds and
return the unsold items to petitioners. Deganos remitted only the sum of P53,207.00. He
neither paid the balance of the sales proceeds, nor did he return any unsold item to petitioners.
By January 1990, the total of his unpaid account to petitioners, including interest, reached the
sum of P725,463.98.3 Petitioners eventually filed a complaint in the barangay court against
Deganos to recover said amount.
In the barangay proceedings, Brigida D. Luz, who was not impleaded in the case, appeared
as a witness for Deganos and ultimately, she and her husband, together with Deganos, signed
a compromise agreement with petitioners. In that compromise agreement, Deganos obligated
himself to pay petitioners, on installment basis, the balance of his account plus interest
thereon. However, he failed to comply with his aforestated undertakings.
On June 25, 1990, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 412-M-90 in the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan against Deganos and Brigida D. Luz for recovery of a sum of money and
damages, with an application for preliminary attachment.4 Ernesto Luz was impleaded therein
as the spouse of Brigida.
24
Four years later, or on March 29, 1994, Deganos and Brigida D. Luz were charged with
estafa5 in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 785-M-94. That criminal case appears to be still pending in said trial court.
During the trial of the civil case, petitioners claimed that Deganos acted as the agent of
Brigida D. Luz when he received the subject items of jewelry and, because he failed to pay for
the same, Brigida, as principal, and her spouse are solidarily liable with him therefor.
On the other hand, while Deganos admitted that he had an unpaid obligation to petitioners,
he claimed that the same was only in the sum of P382,816.00 and not P725,463.98. He further
asserted that it was he alone who was involved in the transaction with the petitioners; that he
neither acted as agent for nor was he authorized to act as an agent by Brigida D. Luz,
notwithstanding the fact that six of the receipts indicated that the items were received by him
for the latter. He further claimed that he never delivered any of the items he received from
petitioners to Brigida.
Brigida, on her part, denied that she had anything to do with the transactions between
petitioners and Deganos. She claimed that she never authorized Deganos to receive any item of
jewelry in her behalf and, for that matter, neither did she actually receive any of the articles in
question.
After trial, the court below found that only Deganos was liable to petitioners for the amount
and damages claimed. It held that while Brigida D. Luz did have transactions with petitioners in
the past, the items involved were already paid for and all that Brigida owed petitioners was the
sum of P21,483.00 representing interest on the principal account which she had previously paid
for.6
The trial court also found that it was petitioner Lydia Bordador who indicated in the receipts
that the items were received by Deganos for Evelyn Aquino and Brigida D. Luz.7 Said court was
“persuaded that Brigida D. Luz was behind Deganos,” but because there was no memorandum
to this effect, the agreement between the parties was unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds.8 Absent the required memorandum or any written document connecting the
respondent Luz spouses with the subject receipts, or authorizing Deganos to act on their
behalf, the alleged agreement between petitioners and Brigida D. Luz was unenforceable.
Deganos was ordered to pay petitioners the amount of P725,463.98, plus legal interest
thereon from June 25, 1990, and attorney’s fees. Brigida D. Luz was ordered to pay P21,483.00
representing the interest on her own personal loan. She and her co-defendant spouse were
absolved from any other or further liability.9

As stated at the outset, petitioners appealed the judgment of the court a quo to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed said judgment.10 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners
was subsequently dismissed,11 hence the present recourse to this Court.
The primary issue in the instant petition is whether or not herein respondent spouses are
liable to petitioners for the latter’s claim for money and damages in the sum of P725,463.98,
plus interests and attorney’s fees, despite the fact that the evidence does not show that they
signed any of the subject receipts or authorized Deganos to receive the items of jewelry on
their behalf.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the findings of the court  a
quo that respondent spouses are not liable to them, as said conclusion of the trial court is
contradicted by the finding of fact of the appellate court that “(Deganos) acted as agent of his
sister (Brigida Luz).”12 In support of this contention, petitioners quoted several letters sent to
them by Brigida D. Luz wherein the latter acknowledged her obligation to petitioners and
requested for more time to fulfill the same. They likewise aver that Brigida testified in the trial
court that Deganos took some gold articles from petitioners and delivered the same to her.
Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, however, found as a fact that the
aforementioned letters concerned the previous obligations of Brigida to petitioners, and had
nothing to do with the money sought to be recovered in the instant case. Such concurrent
factual findings are entitled to great weight, hence, petitioners cannot plausibly claim in this
appellate review that the letters were in the nature of acknowledgements by Brigida that she
was the principal of Deganos in the subject transactions.
On the other hand, with regard to the testimony of Brigida admitting delivery of the gold to
her, there is no showing whatsoever that her statement referred to the items which are the
subject matter of this case. It cannot, therefore, be validly said that she admitted her liability
regarding the same.
Petitioners insist that Deganos was the agent of Brigida D. Luz as the latter clothed him with
apparent authority as her agent and held him out to the public as such, hence Brigida can not
be permitted to deny said authority to innocent third parties who dealt with Deganos under
such belief.13 Petition ers further represent that the Court of Appeals recognized in its decision
that Deganos was an agent of Brigida.14
The evidence does not support the theory of petitioners that Deganos was an agent of
Brigida D. Luz and that the latter should consequently be held solidarily liable with Deganos in
his obligation to petitioners. While the quoted statement in the findings of fact of the assailed
appellate decision mentioned that Deganos ostensibly acted as an agent of Brigida, the actual
25
conclusion and ruling of the Court of Appeals categorically stated that, “(Brigida Luz) never
authorized her brother (Deganos) to act for and in her behalf in any transaction with Petitioners
x x x.”15 It is clear, therefore, that even assuming arguendo that Deganos acted as an agent of
Brigida, the latter never authorized him to act on her behalf with regard to the transactions
subject of this case.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1868. By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do
something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.
The basis for agency is representation. Here, there is no showing that Brigida consented to the
acts of Deganos or authorized him to act on her behalf, much less with respect to the particular
transactions involved. Petitioners’ attempt to foist liability on respondent spouses through the
supposed agency relation with Deganos is groundless and ill-advised.
Besides, it was grossly and inexcusably negligent of petitioners to entrust to Deganos, not
once or twice but on at least six occasions as evidenced by six receipts, several pieces of
jewelry of substantial value without requiring a written authorization from his alleged principal.
A person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the
authority of the agent.16
The records show that neither an express nor an implied agency was proven to have existed
between Deganos and Brigida D. Luz. Evidently, petitioners, who were negligent in their
transactions with Deganos, cannot seek relief from the effects of their negligence by conjuring
a supposed agency relation between the two respondents where no evidence supports such
claim.
Petitioners next allege that the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that the decision
of the court below, which it affirmed, is “null and void” as it contradicted its ruling in  CA-G.R.
SP No. 39445 holding that there is “sufficient evidence/proof” against Brigida D. Luz and
Deganos for estafa in the pending criminal case. They further aver that said appellate court
erred in ruling against them in this civil action since the same would result in an inevitable
conflict of decisions should the trial court convict the accused in the criminal case.
By way of backdrop for this argument of petitioners, herein respondents Brigida D. Luz and
Deganos had filed a demurrer to evidence and a motion for reconsideration in the aforestated
criminal case, both of which were denied by the trial court. They then filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set aside the denial of their demurrer and motion for
reconsideration but, as just stated, their petition therefor was dis-missed.17

Petitioners now claim that the aforesaid dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 39445 with respect to the criminal case is equivalent to a finding that there is
sufficient evidence in the estafa case against Brigida D. Luz and Deganos. Hence, as already
stated, petitioners theorize that the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals now being
impugned in the case at bar would result in a possible conflict with the prospective decision in
the criminal case. Instead of promulgating the present decision and resolution under review, so
they suggest, the Court of Appeals should have awaited the decision in the criminal case, so as
not to render academic or preempt the same or, worse, create two conflicting rulings.18
Petitioners have apparently lost sight of Article 33 of the Civil Code which provides that in
cases involving alleged fraudulent acts, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is worth noting that this civil case was instituted four years before the criminal case for
estafa was filed, and that although there was a move to consolidate both cases, the same was
denied by the trial court. Consequently, it was the duty of the two branches of the Regional
Trial Court concerned to independently proceed with the civil and criminal cases. It will also be
observed that a final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil
liability is no bar to a criminal action.19
It is clear, therefore, that this civil case may proceed independently of the criminal
case20 especially because while both cases are based on the same facts, the quantum of proof
required for holding the parties liable therein differ. Thus, it is improvident of petitioners to
claim that the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in the present case would be
preemptive of the outcome of the criminal case. Their fancied fear of possible conflict between
the disposition of this civil case and the outcome of the pending criminal case is illusory.
Petitioners surprisingly postulate that the Court of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction to issue
the denial resolution dated August 18, 1997, as the same was tainted with irregularities and
badges of fraud perpetrated by its court officers.21 They charge that said appellate court,
through conspiracy and fraud on the part of its officers, gravely abused its discretion in issuing
that resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. They claim that said resolution was
drafted by the ponente, then signed and issued by the members of the Eleventh Division of said
court within one and a half days from the elevation thereof by the division clerk of court to the
office of the ponente.
It is the thesis of petitioners that there was undue haste in issuing the resolution as the
same was made without waiting for the lapse of the ten-day period for respondents to file their
comment and for petitioners to file their reply. It was allegedly impossible for the Court of
Appeals to resolve the issue in just one and a half days, especially because its  ponente, the late
Justice Maximiano C. Asuncion, was then recuperating from surgery and, that, additionally,
“hundreds of more important cases were pending.”22
26
These lamentable allegation of irregularities in the Court of Appeals and in the conduct of its
officers strikes us as a desperate attempt of petitioners to induce this Court to give credence to
their arguments which, as already found by both the trial and intermediate appellate courts, are
devoid of factual and legal substance. The regrettably irresponsible attempt to tarnish the
image of the intermediate appellate tribunal and its judicial officers through ad
hominem imputations could well be contumacious, but we are inclined to let that pass with a
strict admonition that petitioners refrain from indulging in such conduct in litigations.
On July 9, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in this case affirming the trial
court’s decision.23 Petitioners moved for reconsideration and the Court of Appeals ordered
respondents to file a comment. Respondents filed the same on August 5, 199724 and
petitioners filed their reply to said comment on August 15, 1997.25 The Eleventh Division of
said court issued the questioned resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on
August 18, 1997.26
It is ironic that while some litigants malign the judiciary for being supposedly slothful in
disposing of cases, petitioners are making a show of calling out for justice because the Court of
Appeals issued a resolution disposing of a case sooner than expected of it. They would even
deny the exercise of discretion by the appellate court to prioritize its action on cases in line with
the procedure it has adopted in disposing thereof and in declogging its dockets. It is definitely
not for the parties to determine and dictate when and how a tribunal should act upon those
cases since they are not even aware of the status of the dockets and the internal rules and
policies for acting thereon.
The fact that a resolution was issued by said court within a relatively short period of time
after the records of the case were elevated to the office of the ponente cannot, by itself, be
deemed irregular. There is no showing whatsoever that the resolution was issued without
considering the reply filed by petitioners. In fact, that brief pleading filed by petitioners does
not exhibit any esoteric or ponderous argument which could not be analyzed within an hour. It
is a legal presumption, born of wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly
performed;27 that the proceedings of a judicial tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial
acts and duties have been and will be duly and properly performed.28 The burden of proving
irregularity in official conduct lies on the part of petitioners and they have utterly failed to do
so. It is thus reprehensible for them to cast aspersions on a court of law on the bases of
conjectures or surmises, especially since one of the petitioners appears to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
Lastly, petitioners fault the trial court’s holding that whatever contract of agency was
established between Brigida D. Luz and Narciso Deganos is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds as that aspect of this case allegedly is not covered
thereby.29 They proceed on the premise that the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory
contracts and not to executed or to partially executed ones. From there, they move on to claim
that the contract involved in this case was an executed contract as the items had already been
 27

delivered by petitioners to Brigida D. Luz, hence, such delivery resulted in the execution of the
contract and removed the same from the coverage of the Statute of Frauds.

Petitioners’ claim is speciously unmeritorious. It should be emphasized that neither the trial
court nor the appellate court categorically stated that there was such a contractual relation
between these two respondents. The trial court merely said that if there was such an agency
existing between them, the same is unenforceable as the contract would fall under the Statute
of Frauds which requires the presentation of a note or memorandum thereof in order to be
enforceable in court. That was merely a preparatory statement of a principle of law. What was
finally proven as a matter of fact is that there was no such contract between Brigida D. Luz and
Narciso Deganos, executed or partially executed, and no delivery of any of the items subject of
this case was ever made to the former.

WHEREFORE, no error having been committed by the Court of Appeals in affirming the
judgment of the court a quo, its challenged decision and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED and
the instant petition is DENIED, with double costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

     Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Petition denied; Challenged decision and resolution affirmed.

 28

G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004.* nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other
SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF
than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity . x x x.
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Criminal Procedure; Informations; Designation of Offense; It is required that the acts and
omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information .—
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
against him. It is required that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense
must be alleged in the Information. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the      David B. Agoncillo for petitioners.
facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in
the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is
     Rodrigo Marinas for Salvador Abunado.
comprised must be alleged in the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to
be alleged in the Information must be determined by reference to the definition and essential
elements of the specific crimes.      The Solicitor General for the People.

Same; Prejudicial Questions; The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions .—A prejudicial
question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it
to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal
case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
CARPIO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Evidence; Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; If he fails to
secure a judicial declaration of nullity and contracts a second marriage, then the second
marriage becomes bigamous.—Now, one must first secure a final judicial declaration of nullity
of the previous marriage before he is freed from the marital bond or vinculum of the previous
marriage. If he fails to secure a judicial declaration of nullity and contracts a second marriage,
then the second marriage becomes bigamous. As the Court stated in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals in explaining Article 40 of the Family Code: In fact, the requirement for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or
her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his
or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Conversely, if the person remarries without securing a judicial declaration of nullity of his
previous marriage, he is liable for bigamy.
Same; Same; Same; However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity .— Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner
Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceno at the
Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but
returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-
marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon
Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage
with a certain Zenaida Biñas before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.3
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa.4 On May
18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.5
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal
trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in
1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and
Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of
complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight

(8) years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Biñas was acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed but
AFFIRMED in all other respects. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance that accused is 76
years of age and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as Maximum. No costs.
“SO ORDERED.”7
Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.
First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage
was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.8 It is required that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the
offense must be alleged in the Information.9
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information
and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It
is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the
Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must
be determined by
reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.10
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage
with another woman while his first marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:
“That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of San
Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, having been legally married to complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16, 1967
which has not been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
29
contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989 which has all
the essential requisites of a valid marriage.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”11
The statement in the information that the crime was committed “in or about and sometime in
the month of January, 1995,” was an obvious typographical error, for the same information
clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on
January 10, 1989. Petitioner’s submission, therefore, that the information was defective is
untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction
unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been
raised.12 It should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its
elements concur—two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which
possesses all the requisites for validity.13 All of these have been sufficiently established by the
prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the
Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the
Court of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the
effect of absolving him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:
“x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he entered
into a bigamous marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and convincing
evidence. But then, a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action
considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime of Bigamy is a public
offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected thereby but even by a civic-
spirited citizen who may come to know the same.”14
Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/ declaration of nullity of marriage was a
prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended
during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.15
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or

innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle
of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.16
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.17
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.18
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.19 In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of  prision mayor for bigamy.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum
term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would be based on the penalty prescribed by the
Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.20
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age,21 which is a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision mayor in its minimum period which
ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term should
be taken from prision correccional in any of its periods which ranges from six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years.
30
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor,as maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Panganiban and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
     Carpio, J., See concurring opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I concur in the result of the ponencia of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago finding appellant
Salvador S. Abunado guilty of bigamy.
The material facts are not in dispute. On 18 September 1967, Abunado married Narcisa
Arceno. While his marriage with Arceno remained unannulled, Abunado married Zenaida Biñas
on 10 January 1989. Subsequently, on 29 October 1999, Abunado obtained from the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with Arceno. On 18 May
2001, the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal rendered a decision convicting Abunado of
bigamy.
The sole issue is whether the second marriage of Abunado to Biñas on 10 January 1989
constitutes the crime of bigamy under Article 3491 of the Revised Penal Code. More precisely,
the issue turns on whether Abunado’s first marriage to Arceno was still subsisting at the time
Abunado married Biñas.
Under the Family Code, before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of nullity
of the first marriage, one must first secure a final judgment declaring the first marriage void.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988, before the second marriage of Abunado on 10
January 1989.
Prior to the Family Code, one could contract a subsequent marriage on the ground of nullity of
the previous marriage without first securing a judicial annulment of the previous marriage. If
subsequently the previous marriage were judicially declared void, the subsequent marriage
would not be deemed bigamous. The nullity of the previous marriage could even be judicially
declared in the criminal case for bigamy,2 although the person remarrying “assume(d) the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy”3 should the court uphold the validity of the first marriage.
Article 40 of the Family Code has changed this.
Now, one must first secure a final judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage
before he is freed from the marital bond or vinculum of the previous marriage. If he fails to
secure a judicial declaration of nullity and contracts a second marriage, then the second
marriage becomes bigamous. As the Court stated in Domingo v. Court of Appeals 4 in explaining
Article 40 of the Family Code:
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Conversely, if the person remarries without securing a judicial declaration of nullity of his
previous marriage, he is liable for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code considers the marital vinculum of the previous marriage to
subsist for purposes of remarriage,  unless the previous marriage is judicially declared void by
final judgment. Thus, if the marital vinculum of the previous marriage subsists because of the
absence of judicial declaration of its nullity, the second marriage is contracted during the
existence of the first marriage resulting in the crime of bigamy.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the marital vinculum of a previous marriage that is
void ab initio subsists only for purposes of remarriage. For purposes other than remarriage,
marriages that are void ab initio, such as those falling under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family
Code, are void even without a judicial declaration of nullity. As the Court held in  Cariño v.
Cariño:5
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
31
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Cariño, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herself, contradicts the statement in her
present ponencia that “under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.” I believe the ruling in  Cariño is
correct and should not be disturbed. As Justice Jose C. Vitug explained in his recent textbook
on Civil Law (Volume I):
The phrase “for purposes of remarriage” is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void
contracts, are inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the
Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a
subsequent marriage is contracted; x x x.6 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void without need of
any judicial declaration of nullity. The only recognized exception7 under existing law is Article
40 of the Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes of
remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one can contract a
subsequent marriage.
Article 40 of the Family Code applies only to a situation where the previous marriage suffers
from nullity while the second marriage does not. Under Article 40, what requires a judicial
declaration of nullity is the previous marriage, not the subsequent marriage. Article 40 does not
apply to a situation where the first marriage does not suffer from any defect while the second is
void.
Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
finding appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of the crime of bigamy.
Judgment affirmed.
 32

G.R. No. 176795. June 30, 2008. * for the prosecution of the accused in order to determine her criminal propensity . . . as a
consequence of the issuance of several checks which subsequently . . . bounced” for “what the
law punishes is the issuance and/or drawing of a check and upon presentment for deposit or
SPS. CAROLINA and REYNALDO JOSE, petitioners, vs. SPS. LAUREANO and
encashment, it was dishonored due to insufficient funds [or] account closed.”
PURITA  SUAREZ, respondents.
Forum Shopping; There is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an
Prejudicial Questions; The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts and other
two conflicting decisions.—A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where
proceedings in other tribunals.—We find that respondents are guilty of forum shopping. There
a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue
is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had
which must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the
already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. Forum
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure  of the guilt or
shopping is the act of one party against another, when an adverse judgment has been
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action
other than by appeal or by special civil action of certiorari; or the institution of two or more acts
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii)
or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
would make a favorable disposition.
Bouncing Checks Law; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; The court has consistently declared that
Prejudicial Questions; The court ruled that there were prejudicial questions considering
the cause or reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal
that the defense against the charge of forgery in the civil case is based on the very same facts
culpability under B.P. Blg. 22.—The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative
which would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the estafa case .—
of the guilt of respondents in the criminal cases. The Court has consistently declared that the
Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 (1980), cropped up in the order of the RTC which was quoted with
cause or reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability
approval by the Court of Appeals. According to the RTC, the ruling in the said case allegedly
under B.P. Blg. 22. In several instances, we have held that what the law punishes is the
“can be squarely applied in this case which nullified and set aside the conviction in a criminal
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and
case because of a prejudicial question.” We do not agree. The Ras case involves a petition for
conditions relating to its issuance; and that the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of forgery. While the civil case was pending, an
prohibitum provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved.
information for estafa  was filed against the respondent in the civil case. The Court ruled that
there were prejudicial questions considering that the defense against the charge of forgery in
Same; Same; The gravamen of the offense [Batas Pambansa Blg.] 22 is the act of making
the civil case is based on the very same facts which would be determinative of the guilt or
or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment .—
innocence of the respondent in the estafa case. The instant case is different from Ras  inasmuch
The nature and policy of B.P. Blg. 22 were aptly enunciated by the Court in Meriz v. People,
as the determination of whether the 5% daily interest is contra bonos mores and therefore
368 SCRA 524 (2001), when it stated: x x x. [B.P. Blg.] 22 does not appear to concern itself
void, or that the total amount loaned from petitioners has been sufficiently paid, will not affect
with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead
the guilt or innocence of Purita because the material question in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is
ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It
whether Purita had issued a bad check, regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance.
is a policy that can easily be eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks
are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of
the legislative enactment can be made. The gravamen of the offense under [B.P. Blg.] 22 is the PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for
payment. The act effectively declares the offense to be one of malum prohibitum. The only The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
valid query then is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad
check, without so much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer.
   Froilan V. Quijano  for petitioners.
Same; Same; What the law punishes is the issuance and /or drawing of a check and upon
presentment for deposit or encashment, it was dishonored due to insufficient funds [or]    Romeo J. Balili  for respondents.
account closed.—The issue has in fact been correctly addressed by the MTCCs when
respondents’ motion to suspend the criminal proceedings was denied upon the finding that TINGA, J.:
there exists no prejudicial question which could be the basis for the suspension of the
proceedings. The reason for the denial of the motion is that the “cases can very well proceed

Petitioners filed this case assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP
No. 00397 dated 17 August 2006 which affirmed the Orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 19 restraining Branches 2 and 5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Cebu City from proceeding with the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) filed against respondent Purita Suarez.
The facts of the case follow.
Respondents, spouses Laureano and Purita Suarez, had availed of petitioner Carolina Jose’s
(Carolina) offer to lend money at the daily interest rate of 1% to 2%. However, Carolina and
her husband, petitioner Reynaldo Jose, later on increased the interest to 5% per day, which
respondents were forced to accept because they allegedly had no other option left. It then
became a practice that petitioners would give the loaned money to Purita and the latter would
deposit the same in her and her husband’s account to cover the maturing postdated checks
they had previously issued in payment of their other loans. Purita would then issue checks in
favor of petitioners in payment of the amount borrowed from them with the agreed 5% daily
interest.
On 7 May 2004, respondents filed a Complaint 3 against petitioners seeking the declaration
of “nullity of interest of 5% per day, fixing of interest, recovery of interest payments” 4 and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that the interest rate of 5% a day is
iniquitous, contrary to morals, done under vitiated consent and imposed using undue influence
by taking improper advantage of their financial distress. They claimed that due to serious
liquidity problems, they were forced to rely on borrowings from banks and individual lenders,
including petitioners, and that they had to scramble for funds to cover the maturing postdated
checks they issued to cover their other borrowings. In their prayer, respondents stated:
“WHEREFORE, it is prayed that upon the filing of the instant case and in accordance with
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure[,] a writ of preliminary injunction or at least a temporary
restraining order be issued restraining defendant from enforcing the checks as listed in Annex
“E” including the filing of criminal cases for violation of B.P. [Blg.] 22 and restraining
defendants from entering plaintiffs’ store and premises to get cash sales and other items
against plaintiffs will [sic] under such terms and conditions as this Court may affix.”5
 
Thereafter, at the instance of Carolina, several cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 6 were filed
against respondent Purita before the MTCC of Cebu City, Branches 2 and 5. Purita, in turn filed
motions to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question, on the
theory that the checks subject of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases are void for being contra bonos
mores or for having been issued in payment of the iniquitous and unconscionable interest
imposed by petitioners. The motions were denied.7
33
Respondents thereafter filed before the RTC a “Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with Temporary Restraining Order”8 seeking to restrain the MTCCs from further proceeding with
the B.P. Blg. 22 cases on the ground of prejudicial question. Petitioners opposed the motion.
Nevertheless, the RTC through its 20 December 2004 Order 9 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, thereby enjoining the MTCCs from proceeding with the cases against Purita.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied due course in the
RTC’s 3 February 2005 Order.10
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals 11 and questioned the propriety of the
RTC’s issuance of a preliminary injunction based on a prejudicial question. The appellate court
stated that respondents had sought to annul the checks for being void pursuant to Article 1422
of the Civil Code which provides that “a contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal
contract, is also void and inexistent.” Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that if the
checks subject of the criminal cases were later on declared null and void, then said checks
could not be made the bases of criminal prosecutions under B.P. Blg. 22. In other words, the
outcome of the determination of the validity of the said checks is determinative of guilt or
innocence of Purita in the criminal case.12
The appellate court also observed that respondents’ resort to an application for preliminary
injunction could not be considered as forum shopping since it is the only remedy available to
them considering the express proscription of filing a petition for certiorari against interlocutory
orders issued in cases under B.P. Blg. 22 which are governed by the rules on summary
procedure.13
Before us, petitioners submit that because under Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure a petition to suspend proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question
should be filed in the same criminal action, the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction as it is not the court where the B.P. Blg. 22 cases were filed. Moreover,
they argue that respondents are guilty of forum shopping because after the denial of their
motion to suspend the proceedings before Branches 2 and 5 of the MTCC, they resorted to the
filing of a motion for preliminary injunction before the RTC also on the ground of prejudicial
question; therefore, they succeeded in getting the relief in one forum (RTC) which they had
failed to obtain in the first forum (MTCCs). Likewise, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the civil case poses a prejudicial question to the B.P. Blg. 22 cases, thus
resulting in the erroneous suspension of the proceedings the latter cases. Finally, petitioners
posit that the RTC erred in issuing the preliminary injunction because respondents have no
clear and unmistakable right to its issuance.14
Respondents, for their part, state that the possibility of a ruling in the civil case to the effect
that the subject checks are contra bonos mores and hence null and void constitutes a
prejudicial question in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases. Thus, proceeding with the trial in the criminal
cases without awaiting the outcome of the civil case is fraught with mischievous
consequences.15 They cite the case of Medel v. Court of Appeals,16  wherein the  Court nullified
the interest rate of 5.5% per month for being contra bonos mores under Article 1306 of the
Civil Code, and recomputed the interest due at the rate of 1% per month. 17 Thus, if their loans

are computed at 1% per month, it would mean that the checks subject of the B.P. Blg. 22
cases are not only fully paid but are also in fact overpaid. They also invoke the case of  Danao
v. Court of Appeals18  wherein the Court allegedly ruled that there is no violation of B.P. Blg. 22
if the dishonored checks have been paid.19 They claim that since the 5% interest per day was
not contained in any written agreement, per Article 1956 20 of the Civil Code, petitioners are
bound to return the total interest they collected from respondents. Respondents point out that
they incorporated in their complaint an application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order to restrain Carolina from enforcing the interest and from filing criminal cases
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Quoting the RTC, respondents explain:
“Since there was no proof at that time that plaintiff sustain or are about to sustain
damages or prejudice if the acts complained of are not enjoined, the application was not acted
upon by the Court. When the attention of the Court was invited by the plaintiffs of the refusal
of the MTC, Branches 2 and 5, to suspend the criminal proceedings despite being appraised of
the pendency of this case, the Court has to act accordingly.”21
Respondents maintain that they are not guilty of forum shopping because after the denial
by the MTCCs of their motion to suspend proceedings, their only available remedy was the filing
of an application for preliminary injunction in the existing civil case filed earlier than the B.P.
Blg. 22 cases. In any case, respondents argue that the rule on forum shopping is not intended
to deprive a party to a case of a legitimate remedy. 22 Finally, they claim that the case falls
under the exceptions to the rule that the prosecution of criminal cases may not be enjoined by
a writ of injunction, considering that in this case there is a prejudicial question which is  sub
judice, and that  there is persecution rather than prosecution.23
The case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question which
necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in the MTCCs.
We find that there is none and thus we resolve to grant the petition.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure  of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 24
Now the prejudicial question posed by respondents is simply this: whether the daily interest
rate of 5% is void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest are
likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer
prosper.
34
The prejudicial question theory advanced by respondents must fail.
In the first place, the validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt
of respondents in the criminal cases. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or
reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under
B.P. Blg. 22.25 In several instances, we have held that what the law punishes is the issuance of
a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance; and that the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibitum provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved.26
The nature and policy of B.P. Blg. 22 were aptly enunciated by the Court in Meriz v.
People,27 when it stated:
“x x x. [B.P. Blg.] 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be
envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and
commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can
easily be eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the
terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative
enactment can be made. The gravamen of the offense under [B.P. Blg.] 22 is the act of making
or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The
act effectively declares the offense to be one of malum prohibitum. The only valid query then is
whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without so
much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer.” 28
Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for
being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases because what
will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial
question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been
breached, that is, if a bouncing check has been issued.
The issue has in fact been correctly addressed by the MTCCs when respondents’ motion to
suspend the criminal proceedings was denied upon the finding that there exists no prejudicial
question which could be the basis for the suspension of the proceedings. The reason for the
denial of the motion is that the “cases can very well proceed for the prosecution of the accused
in order to determine her criminal propensity . . . as a consequence of the issuance of several
checks which subsequently . . . bounced” for “what the law punishes is the issuance and/or
drawing of a check and upon presentment for deposit or encashment, it was dishonored due to
insufficient funds [or] account closed.”29
There being no prejudicial question, the RTC and, consequently, the Court of Appeals
gravely erred when they allowed the suspension of the proceedings in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases.
Now, on to other matters.
 35

We find that respondents are guilty of forum shopping. There is forum shopping when a
party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been solicited, and
in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. Forum shopping is the act of one party
against another, when an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking
another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or by special civil
action of certiorari; or the institution of two or more acts or proceedings grounded on the same
cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 30
Respondents filed their motions to suspend proceedings in the MTCCs hearing the B.P. Blg.
22 cases but unfortunately, the same were denied. Failing to get the relief they wanted,
respondents sought before the RTC, the suspension of the criminal proceedings which was
granted. Respondents tried to extricate themselves from the charge of forum shopping by
explaining that after the denial of their motions to suspend, their only remedy was the
application for preliminary injunction in the civil case—a relief which they had already asked for
in their complaint and which was also initially not granted to them. Any which way the situation
is viewed, respondents’ acts constituted forum shopping since they sought a possiblyb
favorable opinion from one court after another had issued an order unfavorable to them.
The Court notes that three cases, namely, Ras v. Rasul,31 Medel v. CA32  and Danao v. Court
of Appeals33—finding no application to the instant case—were mentioned by the RTC, the Court
of Appeals and by respondents themselves in support of their position.
Ras v. Rasul cropped up in the order of the RTC which was quoted with approval by the
Court of Appeals. According to the RTC, the ruling in the said case allegedly “can be squarely
applied in this case which nullified and set aside the conviction in a criminal case because of a
prejudicial question.”34 We do not agree. The Ras case involves a petition for nullification of a
deed of sale on the ground of forgery. While the civil case was pending, an information
for estafa  was filed against the respondent in the civil case. The Court ruled that there were
prejudicial questions considering that the defense against the charge of forgery in the civil case
is based on the very same facts which would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
respondent in the estafa case. The instant case is different from Ras  inasmuch as the
determination of whether the 5% daily interest is contra bonos mores and therefore void, or
that the total amount loaned from petitioners has been sufficiently paid, will not affect the guilt
or innocence of Purita because the material question in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether Purita
had issued a bad check, regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance.
Meanwhile, respondents misunderstood our ruling in Danao v. Court of Appeals,  which they
claim to have ruled that there could be no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 if the dishonored checks
have been paid. In Danao, the accused was convicted by the trial court for having issued two
checks which eventually bounced. The Court found that there was no proof of receipt by the
accused of any notice of nonpayment of the checks, and thus there was no way of determining
when the five-day period prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end. Thus, the
presumption or prima facie evidence of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the
time of the issuance of the checks did not arise. While there was a finding that the accused had
already paid her obligations prior to receipt of the complainant’s demand letter, 35 there was no
declaration from the Court that such payment exonerated accused from liability for having
issued bouncing checks. Instead, accused was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence, and
not because she had paid the amount covered by the dishonored checks 36 or that the obligation
was deemed paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The impugned Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 17 August 2006 and its Resolution dated 27 February 2007, in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
00397, are SET ASIDE. The preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 19 in its Order dated 20 December 2004 in Civil Case No. CEB-30278 enjoining the
proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is LIFTED AND SET ASIDE and the
MTCC of Cebu City, Branches 2 and 5 are ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the
arraignment and trial in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases pending before them.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr.  and Brion, JJ.,  concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.

Medel v. CA  is the case upon which respondents   anchor their claim that the interest due on
their loans is only 1% per month and thus they have already overpaid their obligation to
petitioners.  In Medel, the Court declared that the rate of 5.5% interest per month on
a P500,000.00 loan is iniquitous, unconscionable and hence contrary to morals, and must
equitably be reduced to 12% per annum. While the Medel case made a finding that the
stipulated interest rate is excessive and thus may be equitably reduced by the courts, we do
not see how a reduction of the interest rate, should there be any, or a subsequent declaration
that the amount due has been fully paid, will have an effect on the determination of whether or
not Purita had in fact issued bouncing checks.