G.R. No. 107427 January 25, 2000 JAMES R. BRACEWELL, Petitioner

G.R. No.
107427 January 25, 2000
JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in
1
LRC Case No. M-77, which was reversed by respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision dated
2
June 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26122. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied
3
by respondent court on September 30, 1992.
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters
of land located in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. The facts show that sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles,
married to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and
Jimenez families of Las Piñas; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the
name of Maria Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her
son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of
petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria Cailles.
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an
4
action for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. The
case was docketed as L.R.C. Case No. 4328. On February 21, 1964, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Solicitor General, opposed petitioner's application on the grounds that neither
he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor have they
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at
least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subject land is part of the public
5
domain.
The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an action filed by

Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig,
Rizal. The case was finally disposed of by this Court in G.R. No. 51263 where the rights of Maria
6
Cailles were upheld over those of the oppositor Leonardo.
On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were forwarded to the Makati
7
Regional Trial Court where it was docketed as Land Registration Case No. M-77. The Solicitor
8
General resubmitted his opposition to the application on July 22, 1985, this time alleging the
following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time; and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not
constitute acquisition of the lands applied for.
9
On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of petitioner. The
Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and
10
set aside the lower court's Order. It also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its
11
Resolution of September 30, 1992.
Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following grounds —
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in finding that the commencement of thirty (30) year
period mandated under Sec. 48 (b) shall commence only on March 27, 1972 in accordance with
the classification made by the Bureau of Forestry in First (1st) Indorsement dated August 20,
1986.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an ERROR in DRAWING conclusion and
inference that prior to the declaration by the Bureau of Forestry in March 27, 1972, the parcels of
land sought to be registered by Applicant was part of the forest land or forest reserves.
III. The Honorable Court of Appeal ERRED and failed to consider VESTED RIGHTS of the
12
applicant-appellant and his predecessors-in-interest land occupied from 1908.
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to the subject land
under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and through his
predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since 1908. On the other hand, it is the respondents' position that since the subject parcels of
13
land were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972, petitioner did not have
any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963. Neither was the requisite thirty years
possession met.
We agree with respondents.
14
In Republic vs. Doldol, the requisites to acquire title to public land were laid down, as follows
—
. . . . The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands
of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided
for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (emphasis in the original).
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that the
applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied
with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable
public land. On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show that the
parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was
conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or
disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-
interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such
possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable
of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or
confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
15
domain.
16
A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, where a homestead patent issued
to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the ground that at the time it was
issued, the subject land was still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court ruled as
follows —
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director of Lands vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340).
Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. This petitioners failed to do. 1âwphi1.nêt
We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to the inalienable and undisposable portion of
the public domain. Thus, any title issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio
because at the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of
the original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the
same because the area was not yet classified as disposable public land. Consequently, the title
issued to herein petitioners by the Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.
Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or
indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There
can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or
17
alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until
18
released therefrom and open to disposition. Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
19
agricultural lands of the public domain.
Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order recognizes
private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We only find on record the Indorsement of
20
the Bureau of Forest Development from which no indication of such exemption may be
gleaned.
Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for confirmation of imperfect
title, we see no need to discuss the other errors raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Records, Vol. I, pp. 268-271.
2
CA Records, pp. 30-34.
3
Id., p. 45.
4
5
Id., pp. 20-21.
6
Id., pp. 136-142.
7
Order, Las Piñas Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 79; Records, Vol. I, p. 98.
8
9
See Note 1.
10
See Note 2.
11
See Note 3.
12
Petition for Review, p. 8; Rollo, p. 15.
13
See Exhibit "U" for the petitioner, Exhibit "1-A" for respondent; 1st Indorsement of the Bureau
of Forest Development, dated 20 August 1986, with the following remarks: "Verification disclosed
that subject areas fall within the Alienable or Disposable Land, under Project No. 13-A of Las
Piñas, Metro Manila certified and declared as such on March 27, 1972 as per Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1141 per LC Map 2623".
14
G.R. No. 132963, 295 SCRA 359, 364 [1998].
15
Spouses Villarico vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105912, 28 June 1999.
16
G.R. No. 94524, 295 SCRA 296, 310 [1998].
17
Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81961, 172 SCRA 455 [1989].
18
Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 73974, 244 SCRA 537, 546 [1995].
19
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50464, 181 SCRA 443,
448 [1990].
20
See Note 13.
VOL. 56, MARCH 29, 499
1974
Republic vs. Animus
*
No. L-37682. March 29, 1974.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO SAMSON
ANIMAS, in his capacity as Judge of CFI
South Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos
City, ISAGANI DU TIMBOL and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL
SANTOS CITY, respondents.
Public land Act; Forests; Free patents; Land Registration Act; Defense of indefeasibility of title
issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the State.—The defense of indefeasibility of a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the State in an action for
reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest
reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the
Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. Although the Director of Lands has jurisdiction over
public lands classified as agricultural under the Constitution, or alienable or disposable under the
Public Land Act, and is charged with the administration of all laws relative thereto, mineral land and
timber lands are beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority
over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests
and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom,
including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in
question is a forest or timber land is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of
Forest Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the category of
forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958. When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed
his application for free patent over the land in question on June 3, 1969, the area in question was not a
disposable or alienable public land but a public forest.
Same; Same; Same; Titles issued over non-alienable public lands void ab initio.—Titles issued to
private parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered thereby is not disposable public land but
forest land are void ab initio. x x x A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no
authority to do so. If a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by mistake
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
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500 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Animas
or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of
Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by
virtue of said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included.
Same; Same; Same; Misrepresentations in obtaining free patent.—The misrepresentations of the

applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing thereon are sufficient
grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law.
Same; Same; Same; Effect of failure of applicant to comply with conditions of land grant.—A
certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is
produced through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although
the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the
grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void.
Same; Same; Same; Award of title may be reopened on ground of fraud even after lapse of one-
year period.—The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for
fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by
registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the
height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
Same; Same; Same.—Considering that it is the State that is seeking the cancellation of the title of
respondent, said title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the State.
A title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance
thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Prescription does not run against the State.—Public land
fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in
accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the State in such
cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State. The right of reversion or
reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription.
501
VOL. 56, MARCH 29, 501

1974
Republic vs. Animas
PETITION for review from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Br. I, General
Santos City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M.
Kapunan and Solicitor Patrido M. Patajo for petitioner.
Quitain Law Office for private respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I,
General Santos City, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case No.
1253, entitled “Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Isagani Du Timbol and the Register
of Deeds of General Santos City, Defendants”, instituted by the plaintiff to declare null and
void Free Patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 based
thereon issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol; to order the aforesaid defendant
to surrender the owner’s duplicate of O.C.T. No. P-2508 and the defendant Register of Deeds
to cancel the same; to decree the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public
domain, and granting such further relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by
Precila Soria, who on February 23, 1966, transferred her rights to the land and its
improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application therefor on February
3, 1969, as a transferee from Precila Soria.
On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President of the
Philippines for the land in question, and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal of the patent to the
Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508
was issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol.
502
502 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Animas
On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of Forestry,
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City
(Civil Case No. 1253), to declare free patent No. V-466102 and Original Certificate of Title
No. P-2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab initio and to order
the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public domain. The action is based on the
ground that the land covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under
the Public Land Act; that in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity where the
land in question is situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land
was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to be inside the area which was reverted to
the category of public forest, whereas the application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol
was filed on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years thereafter; that the said patent and title
were obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and
cultivated the land applied for.
Invoking the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-28591, 30 SCRA 207-
301), holding that a certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio,
unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land covered by the application is part
of the public domain when it is not, the respondent court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that said Certificate of Title based on the patent had became indefeasible in view of
the lapse of the one-year period prescribed under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act for
review of a decree of title on the ground of fraud. From this order of June 22, 1973,
dismissing the complaint, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines has appealed to this Court for
review.
After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground that the area
covered by the patent and title is not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone
and, hence, the patent and title thereto are null and void.
The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does
not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land
503
VOL. 56, MARCH 29, 503

1974
Republic vs. Animas
is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands
are not alienable or disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of
1973. Although the Director of Lands has jurisdiction over public lands classified as
agricultural under the constitution, or alienable or disposable under the Public Land Act, and
is charged with the administration of all laws relative thereto, mineral and timber lands are
beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over
the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public
forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products
therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code).
That the area in question is a forest or timber land is clearly established by the certification
made by the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the area which was
reverted to the category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958. When
the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in question
on June 3, 1969, the area in question was not a disposable or alienable public land but a
public forest. Titles issued to private parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered
thereby is not disposable public land but forest land are void ab initio. In Gatchalian vs.
Pavilen, et al., L-17619, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA p. 508, 512, this Court said:
“And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a patent because the land involved was
still inalienable forest land when granted, then it may be plausibly contended that the patent title would be ab
initio void, subject to attack at any time by any party adversely affected.” (Gatchalian vs. Pavilen, et al., L-
17619, Oct. 31, 1962, supra, citing Civil Code Arts. 1409 and 1421; Vaño vs. Insular Gov’t, 41 Phil. 161;
Aderable vs. Director of Forestry, L-13663, March 25, 1960).”
A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no authority to do so (Knight
vs. Land Ass., 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974; italics supplied). If a person
obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands
which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not
504
504 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Animas
have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of
said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included. (See Ledesma
vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769)
The case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-28591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA
297, relied upon by respondent Court in dismissing this case, is not controlling. In that case
no forest land was involved but agricultural public land which was first covered by a patent
issued to one party and later registered under the Torrens System by the other party. The
litigation was between private parties where the party who registered it under Act No. 496
sought the nullity of the title of the patentee under the Public Land Act. In the case at bar the
party seeking the nullity of the title and reversion of the land is the state itself which is
specifically authorized under Section 101 of the Public Land Act to initiate such proceedings
as an attribute of sovereignty, a remedy not available to a private individual.
The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that applicant Isagani Du Timbol was never in
possession of the property prior to his filing the application, contrary to the provisions of law
that the applicant must have been in possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30 years;
that the applicant, after diligent search by the Acting Chief of the Survey-Party, Francisco R.
Alcones, in South Cotabato, could not be contacted because he is a resident of Davao City;
that there are no existing signs of improvements found in the area in question as it is not
under cultivation but covered with grasses, bushes and small trees; that it is being used as
ranch for grazing cows by the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot; that no monuments were placed
on the area surveyed which goes to show that there was no actual survey thereof; that the
property in question is inside the ranch of the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot under Pasture
Lease Agreement No. 1244 and, therefore, inside the forest zone; and that said ranch has a
fence around it to show that other persons could not enter and cultivate the same, and that the
signature of then Acting District Land Officer Elias de Castro of South Cotabato has been
forged to facilitate the issuance of patent in favor of Isagani Du Timbol.
The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud in
505
VOL. 56, MARCH 29, 505
1974
Republic vs. Animas
the filing of the application and obtaining title to the land, and if proven would override
respondent Judge’s order dismissing the case without hearing. The misrepresentations of the
applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing thereon are
sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public
Land Law which provides as follows:
“That statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions or parts of any concession,
title or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement thereon or omission of facts,
changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statement, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. x x x”
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it
is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his
name although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure
on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for
holding such title void (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G. R. No. L-17696,
May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA, 71, 79-80; italics supplied). The lapse of the one year period within
which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof,
for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been
secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity.
Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. (J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Macalindog, L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938, page 38).
Considering that it is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani
Du Timbol, said title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against
the state. A title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year
from the issuance thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General, (Sumail
vs. Court of First Instance of Cotabato, 51 O.G. p. 2414 Phil. L-8278, 96 Phil. 946; Eugenio,
et al., vs.
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506 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Animas
Perdido, et al., G. R. No. L-7083, May 19, 1955; De los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church
of Midsayap, G.R. No. L-6088, Feb. 24, 1954, 94 Phil. 405).
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or
reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act (Director of
Lands vs. Jugado, et al., G. R. No. L-14707, May 23, 1961). Prescription does not lie against
the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the state (Article
1108, paragraph 4 of the New Civil Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state
is not barred by prescription (Republic of the Philippines vs. Ramona Ruiz, et al., G. R. No.
L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348; People vs. Ramos, G. R. No. L-15484, Jan. 31,
1963, 47 SCRA 12; Government of the Philippines vs. Monte de Piedad 35 Phil. 728; 751-
753).
Even granting that the title of private respondent Isagani Du Timbol can no longer be
reopened under the Land Registration Act, the land covered thereby may be reconveyed to
the state in an action for reconveyance under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public
Land Act), for the remedy of reconveyance is adequately covered by the prayer of the
complaint for the grant of such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent court, dated June 22, 1973,
dismissing the complaint, and that of September 29, 1973, denying the motion for its
reconsideration, both issued in Civil Case No. 1253 of the respondent court, are hereby
annulled and set aside. The respondent court shall proceed to hear said Civil Case and render
judgment thereon accordingly.
Costs against respondent Isagani Du Timbol.
Makalintal, C. J., Castro, Makasiar and Muñoz Palma, J., concur.
Teehankee, J., files a brief concurrence.
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1974
Republic vs. Animas
TEEHANKEE, J.:
I concur in the judgment setting aside respondent court’s orders which erroneously dismissed
petitioner’s complaint on the ground of purported indefeasibility of private respondent’s
torrens certificate of title under section 38 of Act 496 and ordering the remand of the case for
trial and disposition on the merits. Petitioner’s complaint is not barred by the cited Act since
it duly alleges that respondent’s torrens title was issued pursuant to a free patent covering
forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act and if these factual
allegations are duly established at the trial, petitioner would be entitled to a judgment that the
patent and title of respondent, being part of the forest zone, are null and void.
Orders annulled and set aside.
Notes.—It is not only the right but the duty of the Director of Lands to conduct an
investigation of the facts that led to the issuance of a free patent for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the said facts were true, or whether they continue to exist and are
maintained and preserved in good faith. In such investigation the existence of bad faith,
fraud, concealment or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts may be inquired
into. And, if the facts disclosed in the course of the investigation so warrant, the Director of
Lands may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the properties to the State.
(Cebedo vs. Director of Lands, 2 SCRA 29).
Not only is the Director of Lands not authorized to issue a free patent over that part of the
public domain classified as forest land; he is not also authorized to grant to another a free
patent for land that had ceased to be a public land and had passed to private ownership. (De la
Conde vs. Magtira, 18 SCRA 402; Garcia vs. Director of Lands, 80 Phil. 474; Lacaste vs.
Director of Lands, 63 Phil. 654; Lizada vs. Omanan, 59 Phil. 547). A patent granted over a
parcel of land which at the time of the grant was no longer part of the public domain is a
nullity. (Vital vs. Onore, 90 Phil. 855; Lucas vs. Durain, L-7856. Sept. 23, 1957).
508
508 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Animas
A judgment in a land registration proceeding that a tract of land is public land, does not bar
other persons from filing a subsequent land registration proceeding for the judicial
confirmation of their title to the same land, under section 48 of the Public Land Law (C.A.
141) on the basis of a “composicion” title and continuous and adverse possession thereof for
more than thirty years. (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, 20 SCRA 641).
Since it is the Director of Lands who processes and approves applications for a grant of
public land and who orders the issuance of the corresponding patents in his capacity as
administrator of the disposable lands of the public domain, the action for annulment of a
certificate of title issued pursuant to an award of public land should be initiated by him or at
least with his prior authority and consent. (Kayaban vs. Republic, 52 SCRA 360).
Although a parcel of land is one over which a private party has an imperfect title such
person and the Director of Lands may consider the same as still forming part of the public
domain and subject to the issuance of a patent thereby obviating the necessity of judicial
confirmation under Act 496. (Ibid.; Antonio vs. Barroga, 23 SCRA 360).
LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE
See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume one, page 942 on Forests.

See also SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume two, page 1248 on Land Registration; page
1748 on Prescription; and page 1792 on Public Lands.
Peña, Narciso, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1974 Edition.
Ponce, F. D. R., The Philippine Torrens System, 1964 Edition.
Bautista, C. A., The Public Land Act, Annotated, 1957 Edition.
509
VOL. 56, MARCH 29, 509

1974
Bello vs. Court of Appeals

Noblejas, A. H., Law on National Resources, 1974 Edition.
————o0o————
VOL. 295, SEPTEMBER 359
10, 1998
Republic vs. Doldol
*
G.R. No. 132963. September 10, 1998.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

(represented by Opol National Secondary
Technical School), petitioner, vs. NICANOR
DOLDOL, respondent.
Land Registration; Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141); Statutes; Legal Research;
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the parties had a better right to
possess the lot through the erroneous application of an outdated version of Section 48 of the Public
Land Act, and the Office of the Solicitor General likewise erred in assuming that the thirty-year
proviso in the aforementioned section was still good law.—The appellate court has resolved the
question as to who between the parties had a better right to possess the lot through the erroneous
application of an outdated version of Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Likewise, Solicitor Renan E.
Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor General erred in assuming that the thirty-year proviso in the
aforementioned section was still good law. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by
R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an
applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now
reads: “(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.” (Italics ours)
Same; Same; The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
360
360 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Doldol
of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land
Act.—Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that
the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied
with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
Same; Same; The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public
domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.—The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that
Doldol had been occupying the portion reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law, as
presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945
or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Same; Same; The privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no
contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such
lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by
the government of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler.—
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his
occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with
the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to
segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to the
school, given that then President Corazon Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General: “(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view
of preemption confers no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the
President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public
use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the
imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by
361
VOL. 295, 361

SEPTEMBER 10, 1998
Republic vs. Doldol
reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Amado Y. Mabulay for respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27,
1997, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissing herein petitioner’s
complaint, as well as its resolution of March 5, 1998, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio
Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an
application for saltwork purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development.
The Director of Forestry, however, rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the
Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-
237, Opol Cadastre as a school site. This reserved lot unfortunately included the area
occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970.
Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High
School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol
National School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the school
made several demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to move.
362
362 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Doldol
In view of Doldol’s refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint for
accion possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in
the school’s favor and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he
occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the
filing of the complaint in 1991.
Opol National School’s motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied by
the Court of Appeals in its resolution of March 5, 1998, Opol National School elevated its
case to this Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it held,
contrary to the evidence on record, that respondent had been in open, continuous, notorious
and exclusive possession of the land in dispute for thirty-two years.
The petition is meritorious.
In ruling in Doldol’s favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision on Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (otherwise known as the Public Land Act). Said provision, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942, provides as follows:
“Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certification of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.” (Italics ours)
363
10, 1998
Republic vs. Doldol
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred that a citizen of the
Philippines may acquire alienable land of the public domain if he has possessed the same for
thirty years. Finding Doldol to have occupied the disputed lot for thirty-two years, it ruled
that the former had acquired ownership of the same, thereby negating Opol National School’s
claim over the questioned area.
1
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs. CA where this
Court, citing Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 (1991) declared that:
“The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.”
xxx xxx xxx
. . . with the latter’s proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land.
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain
and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent
and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the parties had a better right
to possess the lot through the erroneous application of an outdated version of Section 48
_______________
1
235 SCRA 567 (1994).
364
364 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Doldol
of the Public Land Act. Likewise, Solicitor Renan E. Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor
General erred in assuming that the thirty-year proviso in the aforementioned section was still
good law. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation
2
of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942,
which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b)
now reads:
“(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.” (Italics ours)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that
the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable, in
accordance with the District Forester’s Certification dated September 20, 1978, that the
subject area is within Project 8, an alienable and disposable tract
_______________
2
Approved on June 22, 1957.
365
10, 1998
Republic vs. Doldol
of public land, as appearing in Bureau of Forest Land Classification Map No. 585. Doldol,
thus, meets the first requirement.
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had been
occupying the portion reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law, as presently
phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or
earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since
his occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having
complied with the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the
land in question as to segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore,
assert a right superior to the school, given that then President Corazon Aquino had reserved
the lot for Opol National School. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:
“(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no contractual or vested right in
the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the
public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even
though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and
3
no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.”
In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in dispute.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
27, 1997, and Resolution dated March 27, 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is hereby
REINSTATED.
_______________
3
Republic vs. CA, 73 SCRA 146 (1976).
366
366 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Blaquera vs. Alcala
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution annulled and set aside, that of the trial court reinstated.
Notes.—An attorney who discovers the futility of his client’s application for land
registration because the land applied for is forest land must inform his client that he has
withdrawn the application. (Santos vs. Panganiban, Jr., 120 SCRA 799 [1983])
It matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property
for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has
been complied by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period being tacked to his possession.
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567 [1994])
——o0o——
[No. L-8451. December 20, 1957]
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC

ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO, INC.,
petitioner, vs. THE LAND REGISTRATION
COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, respondents.
1. 1.
2. CORPORATION SOLE; COMPONENTS AND PURPOSE OF; POWER TO
HOLD AND TRANSMIT CHURCH PROPERTIES TO His SUCCESSOR IN
OFFICE.—A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated
with the clergy * * * designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership
of the church which was regarded as the property owner (I Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, p. 682-683). It consists of one person only, and his successors (who will
always be one at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in
order to give them some legal capacities and advantages particularly that of
perpetuity which in their natural persons they could not have. * * * (Reid vs. Barry,
93 Fla. 849 112 So. 846). Through this legal fiction, church properties acquired by
the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his death not to
his personal heirs but to his successor in office. A corporation sole, therefore, is
created not only to administer the temporalities of the church or religious society
where he belongs, but also to hold and transmit the same to his successor in said
office.
597
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 20, 1957 597
Roman Cath. Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Reg. Com., et
al.
1. 2.
2. ID.; PERSONALITY OF, SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THAT OF
ROMAN PONTIFF.—Although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it
exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with the laws of the
country where it is located, is considered an entity or person with all the rights and
privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of that country, separate and
distinct from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice
to its religious relations with the latter which are governed by the Cannon Law or
their rules and regulations.
1. 3.
2. ID.; ID.; POWER AND QUALIFICATION TO PURCHASE IN ITS NAME
PRIVATE LANDS; 60 PER CENTUM FILIPINO CAPITAL REQUIREMENT
NOT INTENDED TO CORPORATION SOLE.—Under the circumstances of the
present case, it is safe to state that even before the establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every corporation sole then
organized and registered had by express provision of law (Corporation Law, Public
Act No. 1459) the necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name private
lands located in the territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry and for
which it was created, independently of the nationality of its incumbent unique and
single member and head, the bishop of the diocese. It can be also maintained without
fear of being gainsaid that the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines
has no nationality and that the framers of the Constitution did not have in mind the
religious corporation sole when they provided that 60 per centum of the capital
thereof be owned by Filipino citizens. Thus, if this constitutional provision were not
intended for corporation sole, it is obvious that this could not be regulated or
restricted by said provision.
1. 4.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION REQUIREMENT LIMITED TO OWNERSHIP
NOT TO CONTROL.—Both the Corporation Law and the Canon Law are explicit in
their provisions that a corporation sole or "ordinary" is not the owner of the
properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof and holds the
same in trust for the church to which the corporation is an organized and constituent
part. Being mere administrator of the temporalities or properties titled in his name,
the constitutional provision requiring 60 per centum Filipino ownership is not
applicable. The said constitutional provision is limited by its terms to ownership
alone and does not extend
598
598 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Roman Cath. Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Reg. Com., et
al.
1. to control unless the control over the property affected has been devised to
circumvent the real purpose of the constitution.
1. 5.
2. ID.; CORPORATION SOLE WITHOUT NATIONALITY; NATIONALITY OF
CONSTITUENTS DETERMINES WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT is APPLICABLE.—The corporation sole by reason of their
peculiar constitution and form of operation have no designed owner of its
temporalities, although by the terms of the law it can be safely implied that they
ordinarily hold them in trust for the benefit of the Roman Catholic faithful of their
respective locality or diocese. They can not be considered as aliens because they
have no nationality at all. In determining, therefore, whether the constitutional
provision requiring 60 per centum Filipino capital is applicable to corporations sole,
the nationality of the constituents of the diocese, and not the nationality of the actual
incumbent of the parish, must be taken into consideration. In the present case, even if
the question of nationality be considered, the aforesaid constitutional requirement is
fully met and satisfied, considering that the corporation sole in question is composed
of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.
The f acts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Teodoro Padilla, for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General José G. Bautista and
Solicitor Troadio T. Quianzon, Jr., for respondents.
FÉLIX, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao seeking the reversal of a resolution issued by the Land Registration Commissioner in
L.R.C. Consulta No. 14. The facts of the case are as follows:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao,
executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the same city covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 2263, in favor of the Roman Catholic Administrator of Davao, Inc., a
corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philip-
599
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 20, 1957 599

Roman Cath. Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Reg. Com., et al.
pine laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. When the
deed of sale was presented to the Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, the latter
having in mind a previous resolution of the Fourth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila wherein the
Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60 per cent of the members of their
corporation were Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor of their congregation a deed of donation
of a parcel of land—
required said corporation sole to submit a similar affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of the
members thereof were Filipino citizens.
The vendee in a letter dated June 28, 1954, expressed willingness to submit an affidavit,
but not in the same tenor as that made by the Prioress of the Carmelite Nuns because the two
cases were not similar, for whereas the congregation of the Carmelite Nuns had five
incorporators, the corporation sole has only one; that according to their articles of
incorporation, the organization of the Carmelite Nuns became the owner of properties
donated to it, whereas the case at bar, the totality of the Catholic population of Davao would
become the owner of the property sought to be registered.
As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the registerability 01 the
document, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for
resolution in accordance with section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151. Proper hearing on the
matter was conducted by the Commissioner and after the petitioner corporation had filed its
memorandum, a resolution was rendered on September 21, 1954, holding that in view of the
provisions of Sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was
not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60
per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Administrator of Davao,
Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens,
600
there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian
citizen. It was also the opinion of the Land Registration Commissioner that section 159 of the
Corporation Law relied upon by the vendee was rendered inoperative by the aforementioned
provisions of the Constitution with respect to real estate, unless the precise condition set
therein—that at least 60 per cent of its capital is owned by Filipino citizens—be present, and,
therefore, ordered the Register of Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of sale in
the absence of proof of compliance with such condition.
After the motion to reconsider said resolution was denied, an action for mandamus was
instituted with this Court by said corporation sole, alleging that under the Corporation Law,
the Canon Law as well as the settled jurisprudence on the matter, the deed of sale executed by
Mateo L. Rodis in favor of petitioner is actually a deed of sale in favor of the Catholic
Church which is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for the establishment and
maintenance of places of worship, and prayed that judgment be rendered reserving and
setting aside the resolution of the Land Registration Commissioner in question. In its
resolution of November 15, 1954, this Court gave due course to this petition providing that
the procedure prescribed for appeals from the Public Service Commission or the Securities
and Exchange Commission (Rule 43), be followed.
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution reads as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.
Section 1 of the same Article also provides the following:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral
601
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 20, 1957 601
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT, grant, lease, or concession AT THE TIME OF THE
INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
In virtue of the foregoing mandates of the Constitution, who are considered "qualified" to
acquire and hold agricultural lands in the Philippines? What is the effect of these
constitutional prohibition on the right of a religious corporation recognized by our
Corporation Law and registered as a corporation sole, to possess, acquire and register real
estates in its name when the Head, Manager, Administrator or actual incumbent is an alien?
Petitioner consistently maintained that a corporation sole, irrespective of the citizenship of
its incumbent, is not prohibited or disqualified to acquire and hold real properties. The
Corporation Law and the Canon Law are explicit in their provisions that a corporation sole or
"ordinary" is not the owner of the properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator
thereof. The Canon Law also specified that church temporalities are owned by the Catholic
Church as a "moral person" or by the dioceses as minor "moral persons" with the ordinary or
bishop as administrator.
And elaborating on the composition of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, petitioner
explained that as a religious society or organization, it is made up of 2 elements or divisions
—the clergy or religious members and the faithful or lay members. The 1948 figures of
602
the Bureau of Census and Statistics showed that there were 277,551 Catholics in Davao and
aliens residing therein numbered 3,465. Even granting that all these foreigners are Catholics,
petitioner contends that Filipino citizens form more than 80 per cent of the entire Catholics
population of that area. As to its clergy and religious composition, counsel for petitioner
presented the Catholic Directory of the Philippines for 1954 (Annex A) which revealed that
as of that year, Filipino clergy and women novices comprise already 60.5 per cent of the
group. It was, therefore, alleged that the constitutional requirement was fully met and
satisfied.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that although it might be true that petitioner is not
the owner of the land purchased, yet he has control over the same, with full power to
administer, take possession of, alienate, transfer, encumber, sell or dispose of any or all lands
and their improvements registered in the name of the corporation sole and can collect,
receive, demand or sue for all money or values of any kind that may become due or owing to
said corporation, and vested with authority to enter into agreements with any persons,
concerns or entities in connection with said real properties, or in other words, actually
exercising all rights of ownership over the properties. It was their stand that the theory that
properties registered in the name of the corporation sole are held in trust for the benefit of the
Catholic population of a place, as of Davao in the case at bar, should not be sustained because
a conglomeration of persons cannot just be pointed out as the cestui que trust or recipient of
the benefits from the property allegedly administered in their behalf. Neither can it be said
that the mass of people referred to as such beneficiary exercise any right of ownership over
the same. This set-up, respondents argued, falls short of a trust. Respondents instead tried to
prove that in reality, the beneficiary of
603
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 20, 1957 603
ecclesiastical properties are not the members or faithful of the church but someone else, by
quoting a portion of the oath of fidelity subscribed by a bishop upon his elevation to the
episcopacy wherein he promises to render to the Pontifical Father or his successors an
account of his pastoral office and of all things appertaining to the state of this church.
Respondents likewise advanced the opinion that in construing the constitutional provision
calling for 60 per cent Filipino citizenship, the criterion is not membership in the society but
ownership of the properties or assets thereof.
In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the following: A
corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy.
Conceived and introduced into the common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which
was referred to as "that unhappy freak of English law" was designed to facilitate the exercise
of the functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for and on behalf of the church which
was regarded as the property owner (See I Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one
at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some
legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons
they could not have had. In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or deans,
distinct from their several chapters (Reid vs. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846).
The provisions of our Corporation law on religious corporations are illuminating and
sustain the stand of petitioner. Section 154 thereof provides:
SEC. 154.—For the administration of the temporalities of any religious denomination, society or church and
the management of
604
the estates and properties thereof, it shall be lawful for the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder of any such
religious denomination, society or church to become a corporation sole, unless inconsistent with the rules,
regulations or discipline of his religious denomination, society, or church or forbidden by competent authority
thereof. See also the pertinent provisions of the succeeding sections of the same Corporation Law copied
hereunder:
SEC. 155. In order to become a corporation sole the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder of any religious
denomination, society, or church must file with the Securities and Exchange Commissioner articles of
incorporation setting forth the following facts:
* * * * * * *"
(3) That as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder he is charged with the administration of the
temporalities and the management of the estates and properties of his religious denomination, society, or church
within its territorial jurisdiction, describing it;
* * * * * * *
(As amended by Commonwealth Act No. 287).
SEC. 157. From and after the filing with the Securities & Exchange Commissioner of the said articles of
incorporation, verified by affidavit or affirmation as aforesaid and accompanied by the copy of the commission,
certificate of election, or letters of appointment of the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, duly certified as
prescribed in the section immediately preceding such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, as the case may be,
shall become a corporation sole, and all temporalities, estates, and properties of the religious denomination,
society, or church therefore administered or managed by him as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder
shall be held in trust by him as a corporation sole, for the use, purpose, behoof, and sole benefit of his religious
denomination, society, or church, including hospitals, schools, colleges, orphan asylums, parsonages, and
cemeteries thereof. For the filing of such articles of incorporation, the Securities & Exchange Commissioner
shall collect twenty-five pesos. (As amended by Commonwealth Act No. 287); and
SEC. 163. The right to administer all temporalities and all property held or owned by a religious order or
society, or by the diocese, synod, or district organization of any religious denomination or church shall, on its
incorporation, pass to the corporation and shall be held in trust for the use, purpose, behoof, and benefit of the
religious society, or order so incorporated or of the church of
605
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 20, 1957 605
which the diocese, synod, or district organization is an organized and constituent part.
The Canon Law contains similar provisions regarding the duties of the corporation sole or
ordinary as administrator of the church properties, as follows:
"Al Ordinario local pertenence vigilar diligentemente sobre la administración de todos los bienes eclesiásticos
que se hallan en su territorio y no estuvieren sustraidos de su jurisdicción, salvas las prescripciones legítimas
que le concedan mas amplios derechos.
"Teniendo en cuenta los derechos y las legítimas costumbres y circunstancias, procurarán los Ordinarios
regular todo lo concerniente a la administración de los bienes eclesiásticos, dando las oportunas instrucciones
particulares dentro del marco del derecho común". (Title XXVIII, Código de Derecho Canónico, Lib. III, Canon
*
1519).
That leaves no room for doubt that the bishops or archbishops, as the case may be, as
corporation's sole are merely administrators of the church properties that come to their
possession, and which they hold in trust for the church. It can also be said that while it is true
that church properties could be administered by a natural person, problems regarding
succession to said properties can not be avoided to rise upon his death. Through this legal
fiction, however, church properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by
operation of law, upon his death not to his personal heirs but to his successor in office. It
could be seen, therefore, that a corporation sole is created not only to administer the
_______________
*
Translation.—Unless by lawful provisions more ample rights are conferred upon him, to the local Ordinary pertains the
duty to exercise diligence in the administration of all the ecclesiastical properties located within his territory and to avoid
their removal from his jurisdiction.
Taking into account the rights and the legitimate customs and circumstances, every Ordinary shall endeavour to regulate
everything concerning the administration of the ecclesiastical properties and shall give, within the bounds of Common Law,
timely and particular instructions therefor.
606
temporalities of the church or religious society where he belongs but also to hold and transmit
the same to his successor in said office. If the ownership or title to the properties do not pass
to the administrators, who are the owners of church properties?
Bouscaren and Elis, S. J., authorities on canon law, on their treatise comment:
"In matters regarding property belonging to the Universal Church and to the Apostolic See, the Supreme Pontiff
exercises his office of supreme administrator through the Roman Curia; in matters regarding other church
property, through the administrators of the individual moral persons in the Church according to that norms, laid
down in the Code of Cannon Law. This does not mean, however, that the Roman Pontiff is the owner of all
church property; but merely that he is the supreme guardian" (Bouscaren and Ellis, Canon Law, A Text and
Commentary, p. 764).
And this Court, citing Campos y Pulido, Legislación y Jurisprudencia Canonica, ruled in the
case of Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil. 881, that:
"The second question to be decided is in whom the ownership of the properties constituting the endowment of
the ecclesiastical or collative chaplaincies is vested.
'Canonists entertain different opinions as to the person in whom the ownership of the ecclesiastical properties
is vested, with respect to which we shall, for our purpose, confine ourselves to stating with Donoso that, while
many doctors cited by Fagnano believe that it resides in the Roman Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, it
is more probable that ownership, strictly speaking, does not reside in the latter, and, consequently, ecclesiastical
properties are owned by churches, institutions and canonically established private corporations to which said
properties have been donated'."
Considering that nowhere can We find any provision conferring ownership of church
properties on the Pope although he appears to be the supreme administrator or guardian of his
flock, nor on the corporations sole or heads of dioceses as they are admittedly mere
administrators of said properties, ownership of these temporalities logically fall and devolve
upon the church, diocese or
607
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 20, 1957 607
congregation acquiring the same. Although this question of ownership of ecclesiastical

properties has off and on been mentioned in several decisions of this Court yet in no instance
was the subject of citizenship of this religious society been passed upon.
We are not unaware of the opinion expressed by the late Justice Perfecto in his dissent in
the case of Agustines vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacán, 80 Phil. 565, to the effect that
"the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila is only a branch of a universal church by the
Pope, with permanent residence in Rome, Italy". There is no question that the Roman
Catholic Church existing in the Philippines is a tributary and part of that international
religious organization, for the word "Roman" clearly expresses its unity with and recognizes
the authority of the Pope in Rome. However, lest We become hasty in drawing conclusions,
We have to analyze and take note of the nature of the government established in the Vatican
City, of which it was said:
"GOVERNMENT. In the Roman Catholic Church supreme authority and jurisdiction over clergy and laity alike
is held by the pope who (since the Middle Ages) is elected by the cardinals assembled in conclave, and holds
office until his death or legitimate abdication. * * *. While the pope is obviously independent of the laws made,
and the officials appointed, by himself or his predecessors, he usually exercises his administrative authority
according to the code of canon law and through the congregations, tribunals and offices of the Curia Romana. In
their respective territories (called generally dioceses) and over their respective subjects, the patriachs,
metropolitans or archbishops and bishops exercise a jurisdiction which is called ordinary (as attached by law to
an office and so distinguished from delegated jurisdiction which is given to a person. * * *." (Collier's
Encyclopedia, Vol. 17, p. 93.)
While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of their faith, the Roman
Pontiff is the supreme head; that in religious matters, in the exercise of their belief, the
Catholic congregation of the faithful through-
608

out the world seeks the guidance and direction of their Spiritual Father in the Vatican, yet it
cannot be said that there is a merger of personalities resultant therein. Neither can it be said
that the political and civil rights of the faithful, inherent or acquired under the laws of their
country, are affected by that relationship with the Pope. The fact that the Roman Catholic
Church in almost every country springs from that society that saw its beginning in Europe
and the fact that the clergy of this faith derive their authorities and receive orders from the
Holy See do not give or bestow the citizenship of the Pope upon these branches. Citizenship
is a political right which cannot be acquired by a sort of "radiation". We have to realize that
although there is a fraternity among all the catholic countries and the dioceses therein all over
the globe, this universality that the word "catholic" implies, merely characterize their faith, a
uniformity in the practice and interpretation of their dogma and in the exercise of their belief,
but certainly they are separate and independent from one another in jurisdiction, governed by
different laws under which they are incorporated, and entirely independent of the others in
the management and ownership of their temporalities. To allow theory that the Roman
Catholic Churches all over the world follow the citizenship of their Supreme Head, the
Pontifical Father, would lead to the absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who
embrace the Catholic faith and become members of that religious society, likewise citizens of
the Vatican or of Italy. And this is more so if We consider that the Pope himself may be an
Italian or national of any other country of the world. The same thing may be said with regard
to the nationality or citizenship of the corporation sole created under the laws of the
Philippines, which is not altered by the change of citizenship of the incumbent bishops or
heads of said corporations sole.
609
VOL. 102, OCTOBER 31, 1957 609
We must, therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its
mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country where it is
located, is considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges granted to such
artificial being under the laws of that country, separate and distinct from the personality of
the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the latter
which are governed by the Canon Law or their rules and regulations.
We certainly are conscious of the fact that whatever conclusion We may draw on this
matter will have a farreaching influence, nor can We overlook the pages of history that arouse
indignation and criticisms against church landholdings. This nurtured feeling that snowballed
into a strong nationalistic sentiment manifested itself when the provisions on natural
resources to be embodied in the Philippines Constitution were framed, but all that has been
said on this regard referred more particularly to landholdings of religious corporations known
as "Friar Estates" which have already been acquired by our Government, and not to
properties held by corporations sole which, We repeat, are properties held in trust for the
benefit of the faithful residing within its territorial jurisdiction. Though that same feeling
probably precipitated and influenced to a large extent the doctrine laid down in the celebrated
Krivenko decision, We have to take this matter in the light of legal provisions and
jurisprudence actually obtaining, irrespective of sentiments.
The question now left for our determination is whether the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church in the Philippines, or better still, the corporation sole named the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in
the Philippines
610
pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution.

We see from sections 1 and 5 of said Article quoted before, that only persons or
corporations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines may
acquire or be assigned and hold private agricultural lands. Consequently, the decisive factor
in the present controversy hinges on the proposition of whether or not the petitioner in this
case can acquire agricultural lands of the public domain.
From the data secured from the Securities and Exchange Commission, We find that the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga was incorporated (as a corporation sole) in
September, 1912, principally to administer its temporalities and manage its properties.
Probably due to the ravages of the last war, its articles of incorporation were reconstructed in
the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 8, 1948. At first, this corporation sole
administered all the temporalities of the church existing or located in the island of Mindanao.
Later on, however, new dioceses were formed and new corporations sole were created to
correspond with the territorial jurisdiction of the new dioceses, one of them being petitioner
herein, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which was registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 12, 1950, and succeeded in the
administration of all the "temporalities" of the Roman Catholic Church existing in Davao.
According to our Corporation Law, P u b 1 i c Act No. 1459, approved April 1, 1906, la
corporation sole
is organized and composed of a single individual, the head of any religious society or church, for the
ADMINISTRATION of the temporalities of such society or church. By "temporalities" is meant estates and
properties not used exclusively for religious worship. The successors in office of such religious head or chief
priest incorporated as a corporation sole shall become the corporation sole on ascension to office, and shall be
permitted to transact business as
611
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 611
such on filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission a copy of his commission, certificate of election or
letter of appointment duly certified by any notary public or clerk of court of record (Guevara's The Philippine
Corporation Law, p. 223).
The Corporation Law also contains the following provisions:
SECTION 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its church,
charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts for such purposes. Such
corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by it upon obtaining an order for that purpose from the
Court of First Instance of the province in which the property is situated; but before making the order proof must
be made to the satisfaction of the Court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell has been
given by publication or otherwise in such manner and for such time as said Court or the Judge thereof may have
directed, and that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell should be granted. The
application for leave to mortgage or sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the bishop, chief priest, or
presiding elder, acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by any member of the religious denomination,
society or church represented by the corporation sole: Provided, however, That in cases where the rules,
regulations, and discipline of the religious denomination, society or church concerned represented by such
corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate and personal
property, such rules, regulations, and discipline shall control and the intervention of the Courts shall not be
necessary.
It can, therefore, be noticed that the power of a corporation sole to purchase real property,
like the power exercised in the case at bar, is not restricted although the power to sell or
mortgage sometimes is, depending upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of the church
concerned represented by said corporation sole. If corporations sole can purchase and sell real
estate for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, can they register said
real properties? As provided by law, lands held in trust for specific purposes may be
612

subject of registration (section 69, Act 496), and the capacity of a corporation sole, like
petitioner herein, to register lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title thereto may be
issued in its name (Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Insular Government, 26 Phil. 300-1913).
Indeed it is absurd to conceive that while the corporations sole that might be in need of
acquiring lands for the erection of temples where the faithful can pray, or schools and
cemeteries which they are expressly authorized by law to acquire in connection with the
propagation of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith or in furtherance of their freedom of
religion, they could not register said properties in their name. As professor Javier J.
Nepomuceno very well says "Man in his search for the immortal and imponderable, has, even
before the dawn of recorded history, erected temples to the Unknown God, and there is no
doubt that he will continue to do so for all time to come, as long as he continues 'imploring
the aid of Divine Providence'" (Nepomuceno's Corporation Sole, VI Ateneo Law Journal, No.
1, p. 41, September, 1956). Under the circumstances of this case, We might safely state that
even before the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the Republic of the
Philippines every corporation sole then organized and registered had by express provision of
law the necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name private lands located in the
territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry and for which it was created,
independently of the nationality of its incumbent unique and single member and head, the
bishop of the diocese. It can be also maintained without fear of being gainsaid that the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of the
Constitution, as will be hereunder explained, did not have in mind the religious corporations
sole when they provided that 60 per centum of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino
citizens.
613
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 613
There could be no controversy as to the fact that a duly registered corporation sole is an
artificial being having the right of succession and the power, attributes, and properties
expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence (section 1, Corporation Law). In
outlining the general powers of a corporation. Public Act No. 1459 provides among others:
SEC. 13. Every corporation has the power:
***
(5) To purchase, hold, convey, sell, lease, let, mortgage, encumber,
and otherwise deal with such real and personal property as the purposes for which the corporation was
formed may permit, and the transaction. of the lawful business of the corporation may reasonably and
necessarily require, unless otherwise prescribed in this Act: * * *.
In implementation of the same and specifically made applicable to a form of corporation

recognized by the same law, Section 159 aforequoted expressly allowed the corporation sole
to purchase and hold real 'as well as personal properties necessary for the promotion of the
objects for which said corporation sole is created. Respondent Land Registration
Commissioner, however, maintained that since the Philippine Constitution is a later
enactment than Public Act No. 1459, the provisions of Section 159 in amplification of
Section 13 thereof, as regard real properties, should be considered repealed by the former.
There is reason to believe that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked by
respondent Commissioner was under consideration, the framers of the same did not have in
mind or overlooked this particular form of corporation. It is undeniable that the
nationalization and conservation of our natural resources was one of the dominating
objectives of the Convention and in drafting the present Article XIII of the Constitution, the
delegates were goaded by the desire (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2)
to serve as an instrument of
614
national defense, helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through
peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of
international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence
(See The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Professor Jose M. Aruego, a Delegate to
the Constitutional Convention, Vol. II. P. 592-604). In the same book Delegate Aruego,
explaining the reason behind the first consideration, wrote:
"At the time of the framing of the Philippine Constitution, Filipino capital had been known to be rather shy.
Filipinos hesitated as a general rule to invest a considerable sum of their capital for the development,
exploitation and utilization of the natural resources of the country. They had not as yet been so used to corporate
enterprises as the peoples of the west. This general apathy, the delegates knew, would mean the retardation of
the development of the natural resources, unless foreign capital would be encouraged to come and help in that
development. They knew that the nationalization of the natural resources would certainly not encourage the
INVESTMENT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL into them. But there was a general feeling in the Convention that it
was better to have such a development retarded or even postponed together until such time when the Filipinos
would be ready and willing to undertake it rather than permit the natural resources to be placed under the
ownership or control of foreigners in order that they might be immediately developed, with the Filipinos of the
future serving not as owners but utmosts as tenants or workers under foreign masters. By all means, the
delegates believed, the natural resources should be conserved for Filipino posterity".
It could be distilled from the foregoing that the framers of the Constitution intended said
provisions as barrier for foreigners or corporations financed by such foreigners to acquire,
exploit and develop our natural resources, saving these undeveloped wealth for our people to
clear and enrich when they are already prepared and capable of doing so. But that is not the
case of corporations sole in the Philippines, for, We repeat, they are mere administrators of
the "temporalities" or prop-
615
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 615
erties titled in their name and for the benefit of the members of their respective religion
composed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos. No mention nor allusion whatsoever is
made in the Constitution as to the prohibition against or the ability of the Roman Catholic
Church in the Philippines to acquire and hold agricultural lands. Although there were some
discussions on landholdings, they were mostly confined in the inclusion of the provision
allowing the Government to break big landed estates to put an end to absentee landlordism.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the above referred to inhibitory clause of
Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution does have bearing on the petitioner's case; even
so the clause requiring that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation be owned
by Filipinos is subordinated to the petitioner's aforesaid right already existing at the time of
the inauguration of the Commonwealth and the Republic of the Philippines. In the language
of Mr. Justice José P. Laurel (a Delegate to the Constitutional Convention), in his concurring
opinion in the case of Gold Creek Mining Corporation, petitioner vs. Eulogio Rodríguez,
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of
Mines, respondent, 66 Phil. 259:
"The saving clause in the section involved of the Constitution was originally embodied in the report submitted
by the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and Other Natural Resources to the
Constitutional Convention on September 17, 1934. It was later inserted in the first draft of the Constitution as
section 13 of Article XIII thereof, and finally incorporated as we find it now. Slight have been the changes
undergone by the proviso from the time when it came out of the committee until it was finally adopted. When
first submitted and as inserted in the first draft of the Constitution it reads: 'subject to any right, grant, lease or
concession existing in respect thereto on the date of the adoption of the Constitution'. As finally adopted, the
proviso reads: 'subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution". This recognition is not mere
616

graciousness but springs from the just character of the government established. The framers of the Constitution
were not obscured by the rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They
well knew that conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of acquired
property rights. Withal, they erected a government neither episodic nor stationary but well-nigh conservative in
the protection of property rights. This notwithstanding nationalistic and socialistic traits discoverable upon even
a sudden dip into a variety of the provisions embodied in the instrument."
The writer of this decision wishes to state at this juncture that during the deliberation of this
case he submitted to the consideration of the Court the question that may be termed the
"vested right saving clause" contained in Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution, but some
of the members of this Court either did not agree with the theory of the writer, or were not
ready to take a definite stand on the particular point I am now to discuss deferring our ruling
on such debatable question for a better occasion, inasmuch as the determination thereof is not
absolutely necessary for the solution of the problem involved in this case. In his desire to face
the issues squarely, the writer will endeavour, at least as a digression, to explain and develop
his theory, not as a lucubration of the Court, but of his own, for he deems it better and
convenient to go over the cycle of reasons that are linked to one another and that step by step
lead Us to conclude as We do in the dispositive part of this decision.
It will be noticed that Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other
things, that "all agricultural lands of the public domain and their disposition shall be limited
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations at least 60 per centum of the capital of which
is owned by such citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT AT THE TIME OF THE
INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION."
617
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 617
As recounted by Mr. Justice Laurel in the aforementioned case of Gold Creek Mining
Corporation vs. Rodríguez et al., 66 Phil. 259, "this recognition (in the clause already
quoted), is not mere graciousness but springs from the just character of the government
established. The framers of the Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric of democracy
or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They well knew that conservation of
our natural resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of ACQUIRED PROPERTY
RIGHTS".
But respondents' counsel may argue that the preexisting right of acquisition of public or
private lands by a corporation which does not fulfill this 60 per cent requisite, refers to
purchases or acquisitions made prior to the effectivity of the Constitution and not to later
transactions. This argument would imply that even assuming that petitioner had at the time of
the enactment of the Constitution the right to purchase real property, that power or right could
not be exercised after the effectivity of our Constitution, because said power or right of
corporations sole, like the herein petitioner, conferred in virtue of the aforequoted provisions
of the Corporation Law, could no longer be exercised in view of the requisite therein
prescribed that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation had to be Filipino. It
has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary corporations which
are formed by no less than 5 incorporators, is composed of only one person, usually the head
or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of
determining any percentage whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only the administrator
and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said corporation
sole; (3) such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the
diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no nationality and
the citizenship of
618
the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or administration
of the corporation sole, nor affects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their
respective diocese or corporation sole.
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem obvious that when the
specific provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner (section 1, Art.
XIII), was under consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked
this particular form of corporation, If this were so, as the f acts and circumstances already
indicated tend to prove it to be so, then the inescapable conclusion would be that this
requirement of at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to apply to
corporations sole, and the existence or not of a vested right becomes unquestionably
immaterial.
But let us assume that the questioned proviso is material, yet We might say that a reading
of said Section 1 will show that it does not refer to any actual acquisition of land but to the
right, qualification or power to acquire and hold private real property. The population of the
Philippines, Catholic to a high percentage, is ever increasing. In the practice of religion of
their faithful the corporation sole may be in need of more temples where to pray, more
schools where the children of the congregation could be taught in the principles of their
religion, more hospitals where their sick could be treated, more hallow or consecrated
grounds or cemeteries where Catholics could be buried, many more than those actually
existing at the time of the enactment of our Constitution. This being the case, could it be
logically maintained that because the corporation sole which, by express provision of law,
has the power to hold and acquire real estate and personal property for its churches, charitable
benevolent, or educational purposes (section 159, Corporation Law) it has to stop its growth
and restrain its necessities just because the cor-
619
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 619
poration sole is a non-stock corporation composed of only one person who in his unity does
not admit of any percentage, especially when that person is not the owner but merely an
administrator of the temporalities of the corporation sole? The writer leaves the answer to
whoever may read and consider this portion of the decision.
Anyway, as stated before, this question is not a decisive factor in disposing this case, for
even if We were to disregard such saving clause of the Constitution, which reads: subject to
any existing right, grant, etc., at the time of the inauguration of the Government established
under this Constitution, yet We would have, under the evidence on record, sufficient grounds
to uphold petitioner's contention on this matter.
*
In this case of the Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple, G. R. No. L-6776,
promulgated May 21, 1955, wherein this question was considered from a different angle, this
Court, through Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, said:
"The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the
Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty
per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporation or associations allowed to acquired agricultural
land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands
that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens."
In that case respondent-appellant Ung Siu Si Temple was not a corporation sole but a
corporation aggregate, i.e., an unregistered organization operating through 3 trustees, all of
Chinese nationality, and that is why this Court laid down the doctrine just quoted. With
regard to petitioner, the Roman Catholic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which likewise is a
non-stock corporation, the case is different, because it is a registered corporation sole,
evidently of no nationality and registered mainly to ad-
_______________
*
97 Phil., 58.
620
minister the temporalities and manage the properties belonging to the faithful of said church
residing in Davao. But even if we were to go over the record to inquire into the composing
membership to determine whether the citizenship requirement is satisfied or not, we would
find undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the
territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizens. As indicated before, petitioner has
presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion fully covers
the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution. These facts are not
controverted by respondents and our conclusion in this point is sensibly obvious.
Dissenting Opinion—Discussed.—After having developed our theory in this case and
arrived at the findings and conclusions already expressed in this decision. We now deem it
proper to analyze and delve into the basic foundation on which the dissenting opinion stands
up. Being aware of the transcendental and far-reaching effects that Our ruling on the matter
might have, this case was thoroughly considered from all points of view, the Court sparing no
effort to solve the delicate problems involved herein.
At the deliberations had to attain this end, two ways were open to a prompt dispatch of the
case: (1) the reversal of the doctrine We laid down in the celebrated Krivenko case by
excluding urban lots and properties from the grasp of the term "private agricultural lands"
used in section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution; and (2) by driving Our reasons to a point
that might indirectly cause the appointment of Filipino bishops or Ordinary to head the
corporations sole created to administer the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Church in the
Philippines. With regard to the first way, a great majority of the members of this Court were
not yet prepared nor agreeable to follow that course, for reasons that are obvious. As to the
second way. it seems to be misleading because
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VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 621
the nationality of the head of a diocese constituted as a corporation sole has no material
bearing on the functions of the latter, which are limited to the administration of the
temporalities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines.
Upon going over the grounds on which the dissenting opinion is based, it may be noticed
that its author lingered on the outskirts of the issues, thus throwing the main points in
controversy out of focus. Of course We fully agree, as stated by Professor Aruego, that the
framers of our Constitution had at heart to insure the conservation of the natural resources of
Our motherland for Filipino posterity; to serve them as an instrument of national defense,
helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic
penetration; and to prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the
consequent danger to its internal security and independence. But all these precautions
adopted by the Delegates to Our Constitutional Assembly could not have been intended for or
directed against cases like the one at bar. The emphasis and wonderings on the statement that
once the capacity of a corporation sole to acquire private agricultural lands is admitted there
will be no limit to the areas that it may hold and that this will pave the way for the "revival or
revitalization of religious landholdings that proved so troublesome in our past", cannot even
furnish the "penumbra" of a threat to the future of the Filipino people. In the first place, the
right of Filipino citizens, including those of foreign extraction, and Philippine corporations,
to acquire private lands is not subject to any restriction or limit as to quantity or area, and We
certainly do not see any wrong in that. The right of Filipino citizens and corporations to
acquire public agricultural lands is already limited by law. In the second place, corporations
sole cannot be considered as aliens because they have no nationality at all. Corporations
622
sole are, under the law, mere administrators of the temporalities of the Roman Catholic
Church in the Philippines. In the third place, every corporation, be it aggregate or sole, is
only entitled to purchase, convey, sell, lease, let, mortgage, encumber and otherwise deal with
real properties when it is pursuant to or in consonance with the purposes for which the
corporation was formed, and when the transactions of the lawful business of the corporation
reasonably and necessarily require such dealing—section 13-(5) of the Corporation Law,
Public Act No. 1459—and considering these provisions in conjunction with Section 159 of
the same law which provides that a corporation sole may only "purchase and hold real estate
and personal properties for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes", the
above mentioned fear of revitalization of religious landholdings in the Philippines is
absolutely dispelled. The fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to
receive bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the main source that the friars had to
acquire their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite
that bequests or gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes,
was, in the opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection against
the revitalization of religious landholdings.
Finally, and as previously stated, We have reason to believe that when the Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention drafted and approved Article XIII of the Constitution, they did not
have in mind the corporation sole We come to this finding because the Constitutional
Assembly, composed as it was by a great number of eminent lawyers and jurists, was like any
other legislative body empowered to enact either the Constitution of the country or any public
statute, presumed to know the conditions existing as to particular subject matter when it
enacted a statute (Board of Com'rs of Orange County vs. Bain, 92 S. E. 176; 173 N. C 377)
County
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VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 623
"Immemorial customs are presumed to have been always in the mind of the Legislature in enacting legislation."
(In re Kruger's Estate, 121 A. 109; 277 Pa. 326).
"The Legislative is presumed to have a knowledge of the state of the law on the subjects upon which it
legislates." (Clover Valley Land & Stock Co. vs. Lamb et al., 187, p. 723, 726.)
"The Court in construing a statute, will assume that the legislature acted with full knowledge of the prior
legislation on the subject and its construction by the courts." (Johns vs. Town of Sheridan, 89 N. E. 899, 44 Ind.
App. 620.)
"The Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the subject with which it was dealing * * *."
(Landers vs. Commonwealth, 101 S. E. 778, 781.)
"The Legislature is presumed to know principles of statutory construction." (People vs. Lowell, 230 N. W.
202, 250 Mich. 349, followed in P. vs. Woodworth, 230 N. W. 211, 250 Mich. 436.)
"It is not to be presumed that a provision was inserted in a constitution or statute without reason, or that a
result was intended inconsistent with the judgment of men of common sense guided by reason." (Mitchell vs.
Lawden, 123 N. E. 566, 288 111. 326.) See City of Decatur vs. German, 142 N. E. 252, 310 111. 591, and many
other authorities that can be cited in support hereof.
Consequently, the Constitutional Assembly must have known:
1. 1.
2. That a corporation sole is organized by and composed of a single individual,
the head of any religious society or church operating within the zone, area or
jurisdiction covered by said corporation sole (Article 155, Public Act No.
1459);
3. 2.
4. That a corporation sole is a non-stock corporation;
5. 3.
6. That the Ordinary (the corporation sole proper) does not own the
temporalities which he merely administers;
7. 4.
8. That under the law the nationality of said Ordinary or of any administrator
has absolutely no bearing on the nationality of the person desiring to acquire
real property in the Philippines by purchase or other lawful means other than
by hereditary succession, who, according to the Constitution must be a
Filipino (sections 1 and 5, Article XIII);
9. 5.
10. That section 159 of the Corporation Law expressly authorized the corporation
sole to purchase and hold real estate for its church, charitable, benevolent or
educational purposes, and to receive bequests or gifts for such purposes;
11. 6.
12. That in approving our Magna Carta the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, almost all of whom were Roman Catholics,
624
1. could not have intended to curtail the propagation of the Roman Catholic
faith or the expansion of the activities of their church, knowing pretty well
that with the growth of our population more places of worship, more schools
where our youth could be taught and trained; more hallow grounds where to
bury our dead would be needed in the course of time.
Long before the enactment of our Constitution the law authorized the corporations sole even
to receive bequests or gifts of real estates and this Court could not, without any clear and
specific provision of the Constitution, declare that any real property donated, let us say this
year, could no longer be registered in the name of the corporation sole to which it was
conveyed. That would be an absurdity that should not receive our sanction on the pretext that
corporations sole which have no nationality and are non-stock corporations composed of only
one person in the capacity of administrator, have to establish first that at least sixty per
centum of their capital belong to Filipino citizens. The new Civil Code even provides:
"ART. 10.—In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail."
Moreover, under the laws of the Philippines, the administrator of the properties of a Filipino
can acquire, in the name of the latter, private lands without any limitation whatsoever, and
that is so because the properties thus acquired are not for and would not belong to the
administrator but to the Filipino whom he represents. But the dissenting Justice inquires: If
the Ordinary is only the administrator, for whom does he administer? And who can alter or
overrule his acts? We will forthwith proceed to answer these questions. The corporations sole
by reason of their peculiar constitution and form of operation have no designed owner of its
temporalities, although by the terms of the law it can be safely implied that the Ordinary
holds them in trust for the benefit of the Roman Catholic faithful of their respective locality
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VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 625
or diocese. Borrowing the very words of the law, We may say that the temporalities of every
corporation sole are held in trust for the use, purpose, behoof and benefit of the religious
society, or order so incorporated or of the church to which the diocese, synod, or district
organization is an organized and constituent part (section 163 of the Corporation Law).
In connection with the powers of the Ordinary over the temporalities of the corporation
sole, let us see now what is the meaning and scope of the word "control". According to the
Merriam-Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 580, one of the acceptations of
the word "control" is:
"4. To exercise restraining or directing- influence over; to dominate; regulate; hence, to hold from action; to
curb; subject; also, Obs.—to overpower.
"SYN: restrain, rule, govern, guide, direct; check, subdue."
It is true that under section 159 of the Corporation Law, the intervention of the courts is not
necessary, to mortgage or sell real property held by the corporation sole where the rules,
regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, society or church concerned
represented by such corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling and
mortgaging real estate, and that the Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of the
corporation sole has no say either in the manner of acquiring or of selling real property. It
may be also admitted that the faithful of the diocese cannot govern or overrule the acts of the
Ordinary, but all this does not mean that the latter can administer the temporalities of the
corporation sole without check or restraint. We must not forget that when a corporation sole
is incorporated under Philippine laws, the head and only member thereof subjects himself to
the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts of justice and these tribunals can thus entertain
grievances arising out of or with respect to the
626
temporalities of the church which came into the possession of the corporation sole as
administrator. It may be alleged that the courts cannot intervene as to the matters of doctrine
or teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. That is correct, but the courts may step in, at the
instance of the faithful for whom' the temporalities are being held in trust, to check undue
exercise by the corporation sole of its powers as administrator to insure that they are used for
the purpose or purposes for which the corporation sole was created.
American authorities have these to say:
It has been held that the courts have jurisdiction over an action brought by persons claiming to be members of a
church, who allege a wrongful and fraudulent diversion of the church property to uses foreign to the purposes
of the church, since no ecclesiastical question is involved and equity will protect from wrongful diversion of the
property (Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 4 L.R.A.—n.s.-1154).
The courts of the State have no general jurisdiction and control over the officers of such corporations in
respect to the performance of their official duties; but as in respect to the property which they hold for the
corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the same supervision as in other
cases of trust (Ramsey vs. Hicks, 174 Ind. 428, 91 N. E. 344, 92 N. E. 164, 30 L.R.A.—n.s.-665; Hendryx vs.
Peoples United Church, supra.)
Courts of the state do not interfere with the administration of church rules or discipline unless civil rights
become involved and which must be protected (Morris St., Baptist Church vs. Dart 67 S. C. 338, 45 S. E. 753,
and others). (All cited in Vol. II, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 960-964.)
If the Constitutional Assembly was aware of all the facts above enumerated and of the
provisions of law relative to existing conditions as to management and operation of
corporations sole in the Philippines, and if, on the other hand, almost all of the Delegates
thereto embraced the Roman Catholic faith, can it be imagined even for an instant that when
Article XIII of the Constitution was approved the framers thereof intended to prevent or
curtail from then on the acquisition by corporations sole, either
627
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 627
by purchase or donation, of real properties that they might need for the propagation of the
faith and for other religious and Christian activities such as the moral education of the youth,
the care, attention and treatment of the sick and the burial of the dead of the Roman Catholic
faithful residing in the jurisdiction of the respective corporations sole? The mere indulgence
in said thought would impress upon Us a feeling of apprehension and absurdity. And that is
precisely the leit motiv that permeates the whole fabric of the dissenting opinion.
It seems from the foregoing that the main problem We are confronted with in this appeal,
hinges around the necessity of a proper and adequate interpretation of sections 1 and 5 of
Article XIII of the Constitution. Let Us then be guided by the principles of statutory
construction laid down by the authorities on the matter:
"The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom the constitution
emanated is the language in which it is expressed. The words employed are to be taken in their natural sense,
except that legal or technical terms are to be given their technical meaning. The imperfections of language as a
vehicle for conveying meanings result in ambiguities that must be resolved by resort to extraneous aids for
discovering the intent of the framers. Among the more important of these are a consideration of the history of
the times when the provision was adopted and of the purposes aimed at in its adoption. The debates of
constitutional conventions, contemporaneous construction, and practical construction by the legislative and
executive departments, especially if long continued, may be resorted to to resolve, but not to create ambiguities.
* * *. Consideration of the consequences flowing from alternative constructions of doubtful provisions
constitutes an important interpretative device. * * * The purposes of many of the broadly phrased constitutional
limitations were the promotion of policies that do not lend themselves to definite and specific formulation The
courts have had to define those policies and have often drawn on natural law and natural rights theories in doing
so. The interpretation of constitutions tends to respond to changing conceptions of political and social values.
The extent to which these extraneous aids affect the judicial construction of constitutions cannot be formulated
in precise rules, but. their influence cannot be
628
ignored in describing the essentials of the process" (Rottschaeffer on Constitutional Law, 1939 ed., p. 18-19).
"There are times when even the literal expression of legislation may be inconsistent with the general
objectives of policy behind it, and on the basis of the equity or spirit of the statute the courts rationalize a
restricted meaning of the latter. A restricted interpretation is usually applied where the effect of a literal
interpretation will make for injustice and absurdity or, in the words of one court, the language must be so
unreasonable 'as to shock general common sense'". (Vol. 3, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 150.)
"A constitution is not intended to be a limitation on the development of a country nor an obstruction to its
progress and foreign relations" (Moscow Fire Ins. Co. of Moscow, Russia vs. Bank of New York & Trust Co.,
294 N. Y. S. 648; 56 N. E. 2d 745, 293 N. Y. 749).
"Although the meaning or principles of a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its
adoption, a constitution must be construed as if intended to stand for a great length of time, and it is progressive
and not static. Accordingly, it should not receive too narrow or literal an interpretation but rather the meaning
given it should be applied in such manner as to meet new or changed conditions as they arise" (U.S. vs. Lassic,
313 U.S. 299, 85 L. Ed., 1368).
"Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used and that
construction which effectuates, rather than that which destroys a plain intent or purpose of a constitutional
provision, is not only favored but will be adopted" (State ex rel. Randolph Country vs. Walden, 206 S. W. 2d
979).
"It is quite generally held that in arriving at the intent and purpose the construction should be broad or liberal
or equitable, as the better method of ascertaining that intent, rather than technical" (Great Southern Life Ins. Co.
vs. City of Austin, 243 S.W. 778).
All these authorities uphold our conviction that the framers of the Constitution had not in
mind the corporations sole, nor intended to apply them the provisions of sections 1 and 5 of
said Article XIII when they passed and approved the same. And if it were so as We think it is,
herein petitioner, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., could not be
deprived of the
629
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 629
right to acquire by purchase or donation real properties for charitable, benevolent and
educational purposes, nor of the right to register the same in its name with the Register of
Deeds of Davao, an indispensable requisite prescribed by the Land Registration Act for lands
covered by the Torrens system.
We leave as the last theme for discussion the much debated question above referred to as
"the vested right saving clause" contained in section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution. The
dissenting Justice hurls upon the personal opinion expressed on the matter by the writer of the
decision the most pointed darts of his severe criticism. We think, however, that this strong
dissent should have been spared, because as clearly indicated before, some members of this
Court either did not agree with the theory of the writer or were not ready to take a definite
stand on that particular point, so that there being no majority opinion thereon there was no
need of any dissension therefrom. But as the criticism has been made the writer deems it
necessary to say a few words of explanation.
The writer fully agrees with the dissenting Justice that ordinarily "a capacity to acquire
(property) in futuro, is not in itself a vested or existing property right that the Constitution
protects from impairment. For a property right to be vested (or acquired) there must be a
transition from the potential or contingent to the actual, and the proprietary interest must
have attached to a thing; it must have become 'fixed and established' " (Balboa vs. Farrales,
51 Phil. 498). But the case at bar has to be considered as an exception to the rule because
among the rights granted by section 159 of the Corporation Law was the right to receive
bequests or gifts of real properties for charitable, benevolent and educational purposes. And
this right to receive such bequests or gifts (which implies donations in futuro), is not a mere
potentiality that could
630
be impaired without any specific provision in the Constitution to that effect, especially when
the impairment would disturbingly affect the propagation of the religious faith of the
immense majority of the Filipino people and the curtailment of the activities of their Church.
That is why the writer gave as a basis of his contention what Professor Aruego said in his
book "The Framing of the Philippine Constitution" and the enlightening opinion of Mr.
Justice José P. Laurel, another Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in his concurring
opinion in the case of Goldcreek Mining Company vs. Eulogio Rodríguez et al., 66 Phil. 259.
Anyway the majority of the Court did not deem necessary to pass upon said "vested right
saving clause" for the final determination of this case.
JUDGMENT
Wherefore, the Resolution of the respondent Land Registration Commission of September

21, 1954, holding that in view of the provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the
Philippine Constitution the vendee (petitioner) is not qualified to acquire lands in the
Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, properties or
assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is actually owned or
controlled by Filipino citizens, and denying the registration of the deed of sale in the absence
of proof of compliance with such requisite, is hereby reversed. Consequently, the respondent
Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale executed by
Mateo L. Rodis in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc.,
which is the subject of the present litigation. No pronouncement is made as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Bautista Angelo and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Parás, C. J., and Bengzon, J., concur in the result.
631
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 631
LABRADOR, J., concurring:
The case at bar squarely presents this important legal question: Has the bishop or ordinary of
the Roman Catholic Church who is not a Filipino citizen, as corporation sole, the right to
register land, belonging to the Church over which he presides, in view of the Krivenko
decision? Mr. Justice Felix sustains the affirmative view while Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the
negative. As the undersigned understands it, the reason given for this last view is that the
constitutional provision prohibiting land ownership by foreigners also extends to control
because this lies within the scope and purpose of the prohibition.
To our way of thinking, the question at issue depends for its resolution upon another,
namely, who is the owner of the land or property of the Church sought to be registered?
Under the Canon Law the parish and the diocese have the right to acquire and own property.
"SEC. 1. La Iglesia católica y la Sede Apostólica, libre e independientemente de la potestad civil, tiene derecho
innato de adquirir, retener y administrar bienes temporales para el logro de sus propios fines.
"SEC. 2. Tambien las iglesias particulares y demas personas morales erigidas por la autoridad eclesiástica en
persona jurídica, tienen derecho, a tenor de los sagrados canones, de adquirir, retener y administrar bienes
temporales." (Canon 1495) (Código de Derecho Canónico por Miguelez-Alonso-Cabreros, 4a ed., p. 562.)
The Canon Law further states that Church property belongs to the non-collegiate moral
person called the parish, or to the diocese.
"In canon law the ownership of ecclesiastical goods belongs to each separate juridical person in the Church (C.
1499). The property of St. John's Church does not belong to the Pope, the bishop, the pastor, or even to the
people of the parish. It belongs to the non-collegiate moral person called the parish, which has been lawfully
erected. It is not like a stock company. The civil law does not recognize this canonical principle; it insists on an
act of civil incorporation or some other legal device." (Ready Answers in Canon Law by Rev. P. J. Lydon, DD.,
3rd ed., 1948, p. 576.)
"Parish. 3. A portion or subdivision of a diocese committed to the spiritual jurisdiction or care of a priest or
minister, called
632
rector or pastor. In the Protestant Episcopal Church, it is a territorial division usually following civil bounds, as
those of a town. In the Roman Catholic Church, it is usually territorial, but whenever, as in some parts of the
United States there are different rites and languages, the boundaries and jurisdiction are determined by rite or
language; as, a Ruthenian or a Polish parish. "5. The inhabitants or members of a parish, collectively."
"Diocese. 3. Eccl. The circuit or extent of a bishop's jurisdiction; the district in which a bishop has authority."
(Webster's New International Dictionary.)
We are aware of the fact that some writers believe that ownership of ecclesiastical properties
resides in the Roman Catholic Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, but the better opinion
seems to be that they do belong to the parishes and dioceses as above indicated.
"Canonists entertain different opinions as to the person in whom the ownership of the ecclesiastical properties is
vested, with respect to which we shall, for our purpose, confine ourselves to stating with Donoso that, while
many doctors cited by Fagnano believe that it resides in the Roman Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, it
is more probable that ownership, strictly speaking, does not reside in the latter and, consequently, ecclesiastical
properties are owned by the churches, institutions and canonically established private corporations to which said
properties have been donated." (3 Campos y Pulido, Legislación y Jurisprudencia Canónica, P. 420, cited in
Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil., 881, 888-889.)
The property in question, therefore, appears to belong to the parish or the diocese of Davao.
But the Roman Catholics of Davao are not organized as a juridical person, either under the
Canon Law or under the Civil Law. Neither is there any provision in either for their
organization as a juridical person. Registration of the property in the name of the Roman
Catholics of Davao is, therefore, impossible.
As under the Civil Law, however, the organization of parishes and dioceses as juridical
persons is not expressly provided for, the corporation law has set up the fiction known as the
"corporation sole."
633
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 633
"It tolerates the corporation sole wherever and as long as the state law does not permit the legal incorporation of
the parish or diocese. The bishop officially is the legal owner." (Ready Answers in Canon Law, supra, p. 577.)
and authorizes it to purchase and hold real estate for the Church.
"SEC. 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its church,
charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts for such purposes. Such
corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by it upon obtaining an order for that purpose from the
Court of 'First Instance of the province in which the property is situated; but before making the order proof must
be made to the satisfaction of the court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell has been given
by publication or otherwise in such manner and for such time as said court or the judge thereof may have
directed, and that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell should be granted. The
application for leave to mortgage or sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the bishop, chief priest, or
presiding elder, acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by any member of the religious denomination,
society, or church represented by the corporation sole: Provided, however, That in cases when the rules,
regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, society or church concerned represented by such
corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling, and mortgaging real estate and personal
property, such rules, regulations, and discipline shall control and the intervention of the courts shall not be
necessary." (The Corporation Law.)
And in accordance with the above section, the temporalities of the Church or of a parish or
diocese are allowed to be registered in the name of the corporation sole for purposes of
administration and in trust for the real owners.
The mere fact that the Corporation Law authorizes the corporation sole to acquire and hold
real estate or other property does not make the latter the real owner thereof, as his tenure of
Church property is merely for the purposes of administration. As stated above, the bishop is
only the legal (technical) owner or trustee,
634
the parish or diocese being the beneficial owner, or cestui que trust.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the property in question belongs actually either to the
parish or the diocese of Davao, the next question that possess for solution is, In case of said
property, whose nationality must be considered for the purpose of determining the
applicability of the constitutional provision limiting ownership of land to Filipinos, that of the
bishop or chief priest who registers as corporation sole, or that of the constituents of the
parish or diocese who are the beneficial owners of the land? We believe that that of the latter
must be considered, and not that of the priest clothed with the corporate fiction and
denominated as the corporation sole. The corporation sole is a mere contrivance to enable a
church to acquire, own and manage properties belonging to the church. It is only a means to
an end. The constitutional provision could not have been meant to apply to the means through
which and by which property may be owned or acquired, but to the ultimate owner of the
property. Hence, the citizenship of the priest forming the corporation sole should be no
impediment if the parish or diocese which owns the property is qualified to own and possess
the property.
We can take judicial notice of the fact that a great majority of the constituents of the parish
or diocese of Davao are Roman Catholics. The affidavit demanded is therefore, a mere
formality.
The dissenting opinion sustains the proposition that control, not actual ownership, is the f
actor that determines whether the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership of lands
should or should not apply. We may assume the correctness of the proposition that the Holy
See exercises control over Church properties everywhere, but the control cannot be real and
actual but merely theoretical In any case, the constitutional prohibition is limited by its
635
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 635

terms to ownership and ownership alone. And should the corporation sole abuse its powers
and authority in relation to the administration or disposal of the property contrary to the
wishes of the constituents of the parish or the diocese, the act may always be questioned as
ultra vires.
We agree, therefore, with the reversal of the order.
Montemayor 'and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:
I regret not being able to assent to the opinion of Mr. Justice Felix. The decision of the
Supreme Court in this case will be of far reaching results, for once the capacity of
corporations sole to acquire public and private agricultural lands is admitted, there will be no
limit to the areas they may hold until the Legislature implements section 3 of Article XII of
the Constitution, empowering it to set a limit to the size of private agricultural land that may
be held; and even then it can only be done without prejudice to rights acquired prior to the
enactment of such law. In other words, even if a limitative law is adopted, it will not affect
the landholdings acquired before the law become effective, no matter how vast the estate
should be.
The Constitutional restrictions. to the acquisition of agricultural land are well known:
"SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years.
636
renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant." (Article XII, Constitution of the Phil.)
"SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines." (Art. XII, Constitution of the Phil.)
In requiring corporations or associations to have sixty per cent (60%) of their capital owned
by Filipino citizens, the constitution manifestly disregarded the corporate fiction, i.e., the
juridical personality of such corporations or associations. It went behind the corporate entity
and looked at the natural persons that composed it, and demanded that a clear majority in
interest (60%) should be Filipino. To me this was done to ensure that the control of its
properties (not merely the beneficial ownership thereof) remained in Filipino hands. (Aruego,
Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 2. pp. 604, 606.)
"The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure their conservation for
Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping prevent the extension into the
country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a
source of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence. * * *"
"The Convention permitted aliens to acquire an interest in the natural resources of the country and in private
agricultural lands as component elements of corporations or associations. The maximum limit of interest that
they could hold in a corporation or association would be only forty per centum of the capital. Accordingly the
control of the corporation or association would remain in Filipino hands.
In its report the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources
recommended that the maximum limit of interest that aliens could hold in a corporation or association should be
only twenty-five per centum of the capital. The purpose of the committee was to enable Filipino-controlled
corporations or associations, if necessary, to interest aliens to join
637
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 637
their technical or managerial staff by giving them a part interest in the same. The sub-committee of seven
embodied this recommendation in the first draft of the Constitution; but in the revised article on General
Provisions, it raised the amount to forty per centum." (emphasis supplied.)
It was in recognition of this basic rule that we held in Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si
Temple, 51 Off. Gaz. p. 2866, that if the association had no capital, its controlling
membership must be composed of Filipinos. Because ownership divorced from control is not
true ownership.
From these premises it can be deduced that the preliminary question to be decided by the
court is the following: what and who exercises the power of control in the corporation sole
known as "The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc."?
Under section 155 of the Corporation Law, the bishop, or other religious head, as
corporation sole, is "charged with the administration of the temporalities of his church." It
becomes then pertinent to inquire: if he is only an administrator, for whom does he
administer? And who can alter or overrule his acts?
If his acts as administrator can not be overridden, or altered, except by himself, then
obviously the control of the corporation and its temporalities is in the bishop himself, and he
must be a Filipino citizen. If, on the other hand, the final say as to management, exploitation,
encumbrance or disposition of the temporalities resides in another individual or body of
individuals, then the control resides there. To possess constitutional capacity to acquire
agricultural land or other natural resources, that body making the final decision for the
corporation must have at least 60 per cent Filipino membership.
By this test, the body of members professing the Catholic faith in the diocese of Davao
does not constitute the controlling membership. For under the rules of the Roman Catholic
Church the faithful can not control the acts of
638
the Ordinary; they can not override his decision, just as they do not elect or remove him.
Only his hierarchical superiors can do that; the control is from above, not from below. Hence,
the fact that 90 per cent (or even 100 per cent) of the faithful in the diocese should be
composed of Filipino citizens is totally devoid of significance from the standpoint of the
constitutional restrictions in question (see Codex, Canons 1518 and 1530, paragraph 1, No.
3).
Moreover, I do not think that the body of Catholic faithful in the Davao diocese can be
taken, for the purpose here under consideration, as the Church represented by the Ordinary of
Davao. That body does not constitute an entity or unit separate and apart from the rest of the
faithful throughout the world that compose the Roman Catholic Church that has always
claimed ecumenical (universal) character. There is no Catholic Church of Davao district and
independent of the Catholic Church of Manila, Lipa or Rome. All those professing Catholic
faith are members of only one single church or religious group. Thus the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente is not part of the Catholic Church, precisely because of its independence.
If, then, the Catholic Church of Davao is part and parcel of the universal Catholic Church,
it can not be considered separate and apart from it in this case. And if considered with it,
obviously the condition of 60 per cent Filipino membership is not satisfied when all the
Catholic faithful in the world are taken into account.
The unity and singleness of the various dioceses of the church appears expressly
recognized in section 163 of the Corporation Law, which provides that the corporation (sole)
shall hold the temporalities, not for the diocese; but for the benefit "of the church of which
the diocese—is an organized or constituent part."
"SEC. 163. The right to administer all temporalities and all property held or owned by a religious order or
society, or by the diocese,
639
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 17, 1957 639
synod, or district organization of any religious denomination or church shall, on its incorporation, pass to the
corporation and shall be held in trust for the use, purpose, behoof, and benefit of the religious society .or order
so incorporated or of the church. of which the diocese, synod, or district organization is an organized and
constituent part/'
So that, even from the standpoint of beneficial ownership, the diocese of Davao can not be
viewed as a group legally isolated from the Catholic Church as a whole.
Nor does court control over the acts of the corporation sole constitute a guarantee of
Filipino control that would satisfy the purposes of the constitution, for the reason that under
section 159 (last proviso) of the Corporation law, the court intervention is dispensed with
where the rules and discipline of the church already regulate the acquisition and disposition
of real estate and personal property.
"Provided however, That in cases where the rules, regulations and discipline of the religious denomination,
society, or church concerned represented by such corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding,
selling, and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, regulations, and discipline shall control
and the intervention of the courts shall not be necessary" (emphasis supplied.)
It is argued that a distinction must be drawn between the lands to be devoted to purely
religious purposes and the lands held in ordinary ownership. But where in the Constitution is
such a distinction drawn? Under it, capacity to acquire agricultural land for the erection of a
church is capacity to acquire agricultural land for any lawful purpose, whether it be for
convents or schools or seminaries or haciendas for their support or land to be held solely for
enjoyment of the revenue. Once the capacity to acquire is granted, the way is paved for the
revitalization of religious landholdings that proved so troublesome in our past. I can not
conceive that the Constitution intended to revive them.
640
It is also argued that, before the Constitution was adopted, the corporations sole had, by
express statute, the right to acquire agricultural land; and that the Constitution was not
intended to destroy such "acquired property rights." If followed, the argument destroys the
constitutional restrictions. All aliens had a capacity to acquire agricultural land before the
Constitution came into effect, because no prohibition existed previously. Must their right to
acquire and hold agricultural land be conceded in spite of the Constitution?
That the law should have expressly conferred capacity to acquire land upon corporations
sole was not due to any special predilection for them; it was exclusively due to the principle
that corporation, as artificial entities, have no inherent rights, but only those granted by the
sovereign. Unless conferred, the corporate right would not exist.
Furthermore, a capacity to acquire in futuro, is not in itself a vested or existing property
right that the Constitution protects from impairment. For a property right to be vested (or
acquired) there must be a transition from the potential, or contingent, to the actual, and the
proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must have become "fixed or established"
(Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). If mere potentialities can not be impaired, then the law
would become unchangeable, for every variation in it will reduce some one's legal ability to
*
do or not to do. Already in Benguet Consolidated vs. Pineda, 52 Off. Gaz. 1961, we have
ruled that no one has a vested right in statutory privileges or exemptions. And in his
concurring opinion in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodríguez, 66 Phil. 259 (cited by Justice
Felix), Mr. Justice Laurel squarely declared that "contingency or expectation is neither
property nor property right." (cas. cit., p. 269.) Finally, the point is also made that the
Ordinary, as religious corporation sole, has no citizenship, and is not an alien. The answer is
that under the Constitution of
_______________
*
98 Phil., 711.
641
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 20, 1957 641

Romero vs. Villamor, et al.
the Republic, it is not enough that the acquirer of agricultural land be not an alien; he must be
a Filipino or controlled by Filipinos.
Wherefore, I am constrained to conclude:
1. (1)
2. That the capacity of religious corporations sole to acquire agricultural land
depends upon 60 per cent Filipino membership of the group or body
exercising control of the corporation;
3. (2)
4. That if control of any such corporation should be vested in a single person,
then such person must be a Filipino citizen;
5. (3)
6. That in the absence of evidence on these points, the order appealed from,
denying registration of the conveyance, should be affirmed.
Concepción, J., concur.
Resolution reversed.
_________________

G.R. No. 107427 January 25, 2000 JAMES R. BRACEWELL, Petitioner

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G.R. No. 107427 January 25, 2000 JAMES R. BRACEWELL, Petitioner

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G.R. No.

107427 January 25, 2000

JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner,

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an action filed by

Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following grounds —

We agree with respondents.

Republic vs. Animus

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

500 SUPREME COURT

Republic vs. Animas

Same; Same; Same; Misrepresentations in obtaining free patent.—The misrepresentations of the

VOL. 56, MARCH 29, 501

Republic vs. Animas

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

502 SUPREME COURT

Republic vs. Animas

VOL. 56, MARCH 29, 503

Republic vs. Animas

Republic vs. Animas

Republic vs. Animas

506 SUPREME COURT

Republic vs. Animas

Makalintal, C. J., Castro, Makasiar and Muñoz Palma, J., concur.

Teehankee, J., files a brief concurrence.

VOL. 56, MARCH 29, 507

Republic vs. Animas

508 SUPREME COURT

Republic vs. Animas

LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE

See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume one, page 942 on Forests.

VOL. 56, MARCH 29, 509

Bello vs. Court of Appeals

Republic vs. Doldol

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

360 SUPREME COURT

Republic vs. Doldol

VOL. 295, 361

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Republic vs. Doldol

xxx xxx xxx

Republic vs. Doldol

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Republic vs. Doldol

Republic vs. Doldol

366 SUPREME COURT

Blaquera vs. Alcala

Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC

VOL. 102, DECEMBER 20, 1957 597

598 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.

The f acts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 102, DECEMBER 20, 1957 599

600 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Section 1 of the same Article also provides the following:

VOL. 102, DECEMBER 20, 1957 601

602 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

604 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

(As amended by Commonwealth Act No. 287).

VOL. 102, DECEMBER 20, 1957 605