REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRASUS L.

IYOY
G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

On March 25, 1997, Respondent Crasus L. Iyoy, married to Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy, sought the nullity of their
marriage held on the year 1961 on the basis of Article 36, FC, alleging that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant. He averred also that in 1984, Fely left the Philippines for USA and obtained a divorce. She married
another man in 1985. In Fely’s Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988.

RTC and CA declared their marriage null and void finding merit on Fely’s psychological incapacity and the
applicability of Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family Code. Consequently, OSG filed this petition for review alleging
that abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity
and that Article 26, paragraph 2 is inapplicable to the case at bar.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not RTC and CA correctly declared the marriage as null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity of Fely.
(2) Whether or not paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code applies in the case.
(3) Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General can intervene to the annulment proceedings in
accordance to Art 48

Held:

1. No. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. Psychological Incapacity must be characterized by:
Gravity, Juridical Antecedence and Incurability. The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to
support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely. The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts
that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Nonetheless, the root cause for such was
not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a
psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of
celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.

2. No. Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the
said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now,
do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce
from respondent Crasus.

3. Yes, although Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. The general rule is that only the
Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines
once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who
actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or
this Court.  Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of
respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.

G.R. No. L-31618 August 17, 1983

EFREN R. MENDOZA and INOCENCIA R. DE MENDOZA, petitioner, 

vs.
PONCIANO S. REYES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-31625 August 17, 1983

JULIA R. DE REYES, petitioner, 
vs.
PONCIANO S. REYES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS: Ponciano and Julia were married in 1915. The properties in question consisting of Lots 5 and 6, were bought
on installment basis. Thus, the spouses jointly obtained a loan to pay their balance. The corresponding deed of
absolute sale was executed where the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption
vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent. As a result of these sales, TCTs were
issued in the name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES." While Ponciano was absent attending his farm
in Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees,
without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At the same time the spouses were living separately and were
not in speaking terms. Ponciano filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of land
contending that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to
petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent. Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties
were paraphernal properties of Julia and that they had purchased the same in good faith and for adequate
consideration. Julia testified that she bought the two parcels of land on installment basis and that the first
payment came from her personal funds. The CFI declared the properties exclusive and paraphernal properties of
petitioner Julia and ruled that she could validly dispose of the same without the consent of her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in in declaring the properties in question as conjugal properties.

HELD: No. Article 153 of the Civil Code provides: That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses.

The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must be overcome by one who contends that the disputed
property is paraphernal. The presumption is a strong one. As stated in Camia de Reyes v Reyes de llano “It is
sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed
conjugal property.” There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage. Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses. Under Article 161 of the Civil
Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
are liabilities of the partnership. Julia’s claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax Returns which she
herself prepared and filed in behalf of the conjugal partnership wherein she made the statement that the rentals
paid to her were income of the conjugal partnership, and she made to appear the properties in question as capital
assets of the conjugal partnership. Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact
that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. If the
fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its
conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife.