Week 1

Lambino and Aumentado vs. Comelec G.R. Nos. 174153 And 174299, October 25, 2006
Facts:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The Lambino Group alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article
VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. The
COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution;
Ruling:
1.       The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional
provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section
states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment”
should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated
that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that
the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. There is no presumption that
the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents
bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a
copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2.       A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991
Facts:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in
83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official
hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of
Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the
Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section
3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
Facts:
Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing
of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political
question — h; as resulted in a political crisis.
Held:
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Reasoning:
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or
judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each
of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by
the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without
destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal
reached the floor proposing that “A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings,” this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main
issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.
Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions
Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding, two bidders
participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51%
of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the
contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS
in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. Respondents assert that Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is
not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).
Issue:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
Ruling:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council G.R. No. 202241, July 17, 2012

Facts:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings
held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the
phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House
of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of
either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as
the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from
both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this
case?
2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8
instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?
3. What is the effect of the Court’s finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these
conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch
of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he
is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case
is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief
Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC
likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard,
the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast
number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More
importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the
nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an
object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek
judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. From a simple reading of the
above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The
first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court.
Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative from the private
sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or
special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice and “a representative of Congress.” The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative
of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the
members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. One of the
primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in
Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever
is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either
case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. It is worthy to note that the seven-
member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be
a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be
divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members
of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle
the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached.
The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the
Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every
possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to
break a voting deadlock. The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the
word “Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the
said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then,
when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers,
through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. It is evident that the
definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate.
In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses
is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between
the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department.
3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule,
however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair
play. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of
a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception
applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
Week 2
Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183591,
October 14, 2008
Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of
the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
Ruling:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening
respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or
limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs
counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either
to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people”
as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to
the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 on February 25, 1986 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the
basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."
Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. Corazon Aquino G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986
Facts:
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Ruling:
Yes.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge.
The Supreme Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) v. Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), G.R. No. L-
32052, July 25, 1975
Facts:
This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.
In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the
petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.
Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge
Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that
the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act
No. 444.
PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental
functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue:
Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
Ruling:
YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has
become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of
the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government obsolete.”
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner
can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private
respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of
governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because
petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions,that the labor controversy was
beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner
does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.
A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the
differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne
by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render
overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That
would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on
this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.
Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. no. 164785, April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister
of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.

Ruling:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his
duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for
three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue
curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside
from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a
broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent
language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.
San Juan Dela Cruz vs. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
Facts:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to
use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the
deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to
his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.”
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The
trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten
Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
Issue:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be
considered as a recognition of paternity.
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname
of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission
made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father
in the private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in
any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child
is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
People vs. Perfecto, G.R. NO. L-18463, October 4, 1922
Facts:
The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the
documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion
– edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that
punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case
at bar?
Ruling: No. The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to
protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present
case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change
of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the
SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in
nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and
cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
Callado vs. International Rice Research Institute, G.R. No. 106483, May 22, 1995
Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI
vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human
Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start
because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice
of Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension
and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by
virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and
privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the
same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the
Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and,
accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity,
ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization
granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch
as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed
employees in relation to P.D. 1620."
Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-
employee relationship?
Ruling: No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-
General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to
international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive
upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity
is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by
the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is
the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver
is discretionary on its part.
Week 3

Magallona vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:
On March 2009, the congress enacted RA 9522, amending RA 3046, demarcating the maritime baselines
of the Philippines in order to set the Philippine Territory in accordance with the agreed UNCLOS or the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Challenging the constitutionality of RA 9522, Dean
Merlin Magallona, Atty. Harry Roque, Rep. Risa Hontiveros along with 38 students from UP College of
Law came to the Supreme Court to argue that the said law violated the constitution as it diminishes our
territory since it does not include territories formerly included in the delineation of the Treaty of Paris
and other contested areas. They argue that this would affect the reach of our territorial jurisdiction and
sovereignty over several areas including the Kalayaan Group of Islands and Scarborough Shoal.
Respondent Eduardo Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, along with other officials, contends
on the contrary, arguing that it was enacted to comply with the conditions set forth by UNCLOS and
neither does it diminish our territorial jurisdiction.

Issues:
1. Preliminarily –
a) Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
b) Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

1. a. Yes. The Supreme Court recognized petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally
sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of
national significance necessitating urgent resolution.

b. Yes. When the Supreme Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review by tradition, it
viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the
constitutionality of statutes and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. Issues of
constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the
personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court
inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised,
non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding.

2. No. RA 9522 is not unconstitutional. RA 9522 is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime
zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine territory. Territory may only be
acquired or lost through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, and not through multilateral
treaties or statutes complying with such treaties. Also, the court found that instead of loss, the baselines
set by RA 9522 in determining the Exclusive Economic Zone would increase our maritime waters which
grants us the exclusive right to utilize resources that are found in areas not previously within our
jurisdiction. Petition was dismissed.

Gonzales vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012

Facts:

Sometime in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before the PNP-NCR against Rolando
Mendoza and four others. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the
National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all
relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
appropriate administrative adjudication. On February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner
Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision finding Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave
Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On December
14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were assigned for review and
recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released a draft
Order on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who,
in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than
ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the
case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained
pending for final review and action when Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful
day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service. In the
aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials
prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to
determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions.
However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings
on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body. The IIRC
eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie. It
recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of the
President (OP) for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the
proper administrative proceedings. On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge against
petitioner. Petitioners asseverate that the President has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them
considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with constitutional
independence and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear
the constitutional attributes of said office

Issue:

Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman.
Ruling:

Yes. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means
exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority
over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. It is a basic canon of statutory
construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect,
on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section
8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the
person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary
authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is
simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that
the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.

Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976)

Facts:

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its
primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that
are to be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the citizen
wants martial law to continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several proposed
amendments to the existing Constitution.

The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national referendum in
October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to
the Constitution.
Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that the
power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred to the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation
of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert
that the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the
plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and
allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the
right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised is
political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that
at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise
constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

Issue:

Whether or not the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and
1033).

Ruling:

YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it was of
political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one. This is
because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments to the
constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the power to
propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The normal
course has not been followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the president
undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises
a contestable issue.
Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971)

Facts:

Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8
people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged
that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by
the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the
suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.

Issue:

Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.

Ruling:

The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where
the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be
established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two
closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the
members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there
was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by
force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 (1983)

Facts:

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in
Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the Philippine Constabulary. The raid of the house was
authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest
averring that no warrant of arrest was issued hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just
cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs
know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Issue:

Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al were valid.

Ruling:
Yes. In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the
Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was once again held as discretionary in the president.
The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by
the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must,
indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the
rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be
released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing
the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Facts:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that
he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose
Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the
nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada
on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The
impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA,
bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan
and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined
in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew
their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing
that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.
On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of
office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being
an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

Issue:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits.

Ruling:

The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said
that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in
defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government
on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of
the president was affected. In the former, the question of whether the previous president (president
Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not
political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck
petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara
diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding
is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and
his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner
Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the petitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that
petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of
the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a
non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a
sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure (the term during which the incumbent actually
holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).