SUCCESSION PRELIM CASES (SCRA SYLLABUS ONLY)
Maria Uson, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Maria del Rosario, Concepcion
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiff's and
appellees, vs. CONCHITA McLACHLIN ET AL., defendants and
appellants. [No. 44837. November 23, 1938]
1.DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; FILING OF CLAIM AGAINST A
DECEASED SON BEFORE THE COMMITTED ON CLAIMS AND
APPRAISAL IN THE INTESTATE OF HIS FATHER: PRESCRIPTION OF
ACTION FOR THE RECOVERY OF THE CLAIM.—The filing of a claim
before the committee on claims and apraisal appointed in the intestate
of the father, for a monetary obligation contracted by a son who died
before him, does not suspend the presciptive period of the judicial
action for the recovery of said indebtedness.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.—The claim for the payment of an indebtedness
contracted by a deceased person cannot. be filed for its collection
before the committee on claims and appraisal. appointed in the
intestate of his father, and the properties inherited from the latter by
the children of said deceased do not answer for the payment of the
indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said person.
MANUEL BARRIOS Y BARREDO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. MARIA
PASCUALA DOLOR ET AL., defendants and appellees. [No. 559. March
14, 1903.]
REALTY; MORTGAGE LAW; EVIDENCE; UNRECORDED INSTRUMENTS;
THIRD PERSONS.—The heirs of one of the parties to a contract are not
third persons with regard thereto and the same may be introduced in
evidence in an action against said heirs although never recorded.
ORTIGA BROTHERS & Co., plaintiffs and appellees, vs. FRANCISCO
ENAGE, sheriff of the Province of Leyte, and YAP Tico, defendants and
appellants. [No. 6228. January 30, 1911.]
1.CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATES; CREDITORS.—A person who is not a
creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene
either in the proceedings brought in connection with the estate, or in
the settlement of the succession.
2.ID. ; ID.; PAYMENT OF CLAIMS.—The creditor of the widow and heirs
of a deceased person is only entitled to collect his claim out of the
property which pertains by inheritance to the said widow and heirs,
after all the debts of the testate's or intestate's succession have been
paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs be
known, because the debts of the deceased must first be paid before his
heirs can inherit.
3.ID. ; ID. ; ATTACHMENT.—It is improper to levy an attachment upon
property which has ceased to belong to an undivided estate and which
has passed under the control of a third person whose credit against the
deceased was duly recognized, without opposition, by the committee
of appraisal, when the said property does not constitute the remainder
of the estate, divisible among the heirs, left after the debts of the
deceased have been paid.
4.ID.; ID.; OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY TRANSFERRED.—Creditors who
have obtained the possession of any property through the transfer
thereof in their favor by the administrator or administratrix of an estate,
must be considered as the legitimate owners of the property ceded or
transferred, so long as the cession or transfer of the same is not
annulled by an express judicial declaration made in a proper action
brought on the ground of some vice or defect tending to nullify the
same.
Nebreda, Conrado Nebreda, Dominador Nebreda, and Faustino
Nebreda, Jr., defendants and appellants. [No. L-4963. January 29,
1953]
1.Descent and Distribution; Husband and Wife; Rights of Lawful Wife as
Affected by the New Civil Code.—The right of ownership of the lawful
wife of a decedent who had died before the new Civil Code took effect
became vested in her upon his death, and this is so because of the
imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights of suc-
cession are transmitted from the moment of death (Art. 657, old Civil
Code; Ilustre vs. Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). The new right recognized by
the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children  of the  deceased
can not be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of the lawful
wife over the lands in dispute. While article 2253 of the new Civil Code
provides that rights which are declared for the first time shall have
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may
have occurred under the former legislation, yet this is so only when the
new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same
origin.
2.Id.; Id.; Renunciation of Inheritance Made by Lawful Wife; Future
Inheritance, Not Subject to Contract.—Although the lawful wife has
expressly renounced her right to inherit any future property that her
husband may acquire and leave upon his death, such renunciation
cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance
cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1
Manresa, 6th ed., 123;  Osorio vs. Osorio, et al., 41 Phil., 531).
3.Id.;  Id.;  Donations by Deceased;  Essential  Formalities of Donation.—
Assignments, if any, made by the deceased of real property for which
there was no material consideration, should be made in a public
document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a
separate one (Art. 633, old Civil Code). Assignments or donations which
lack this essential formality have no valid effect.
De Borja vs. Vda. de de Borja, 46 SCRA 577, No. L-28040, No. L-28568,
No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
Civil law; Wills; Remedial law; Testate and intestate pro. ceedings; Rule
of nullity of extrajudicial settlement prior to probate of will inapplicable
to case at bar.—The doctrine of Guevarra vs. Guevarra, 74 Phil. 479,
which holds that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory
and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of
intestacy when the decedent left a will is against the law and public
policy, is not applicable where the clear abject of the settlement was
merely the conveyance by the heir of any and all her individual share
and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of the decedent and not
the distribution of the said estate among the heirs before the probate
of the will.
Remedial law; Testate and intestate proceedings; Settlement entered
into by heir in his individual capacity does not need court approval.—
Where the compromise agreement entered into by and between the
various heirs in the personal capacity, the same is binding upon them
as individuals, upon the perfection of the contract, even without
previous authority of the Court to enter into such agreement. The only
difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is
submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced
by execu-tion proceedings.
Civil law; Succession; Heir may sell her hereditary rights to co-heir.—As
owner of her individual share, an heir could dispose of it in favor of
whomsoever she chose, including another heir of the same defendant.
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Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by Article
1088 of the present Civil Code.
Same; Same; Case at bar, agreement does not compromise status of
heir and her marriage.—A contract which describes one of the heirs as
“the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja,” in itself is a definite
admission of such heir’s civil status in relation to the decedent. There is
nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this
recognition of Ong-singco’s status as the surviving spouse of Francisco
de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her
hereditary rights.
Remedial law; Compromise; Inability of parties to draw new agreement
does not annul a prior one.—The inability among the heirs to reach a
novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise among
them and any of the latter is justified in finally seeking a court order for
the approval and enforcement of such compromise.
Civil law; Contracts; Party who caused the delay in the enforcement of a
contract cannot complain of subsequent devaluation of currency amd
increase of price of land.—In her brief, Ongsingco also pleads that the
time elapsed in the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while
the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished,
the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her
delay in receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary
interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreements
she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel. And as to
the devaluation of our currency, what we said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon,
33 SCRA, 554, that “estates would never be settled if there were to be a
revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency
and properties of the estate,” is particularly apposite in the present
case.
Remedial law; Evidence; Case at bar. self-serving statement of decedent
overpowered by several admissions against interest.—It may be true
that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant are not
conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as
already noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest
of the declarants Fran-cisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana
Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the
self-serving statement of Francisco. Plainly, the legal presumption in
favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda now in dispute has not
been rebutted but actually confirmed by proof.
Bonilla vs. Barcena, 71 SCRA 491, No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
Pleadings and practice; Parties; Substitution of parties in case of death
of plaintiff during pendency of proceedings in action which survives
death of said plaintiff.—While it is true that a person who is dead
cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing
the case up to its completion.
Same; Same; Duty of attorney upon death of party.—The Rules of
Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the
pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court “whenever party to a pending case dies x x x it
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such
death x x x and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representatives.”
Same; Same; Duty of court upon death of party.—Under section 17,
Rule 3 of the Rule of Court “after a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for
the deceased, within such time as may be granted x x x.”
Same; Same; Duty of court where legal representative of deceased
party fails to appear.—Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it
is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear,
to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased.
Same; Same; Duty of court where representative of deceased party
minors.—Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is
directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
Same; Same; Action to quiet title to property as action which survives
death of a party; Test to determine whether action survives or not.—
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the
nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action
which survive, the wrong complained affects primarily and principally
property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury
complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property
affected being incidental. Following the foregoing criterion the claim of
the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels
of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and
property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death.
Succession; Rights to succession transmitted from the moment of
death of decedent.—Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent.” From the moment of the death of the decedent, the
heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights
and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their
rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment
of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite
right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The
right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even
before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings.
Acebedo vs. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 186, G.R. No. 102380 January 18,
1993
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Probate; Jurisdiction; It is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a
deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication.—In
the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a
pronouncement that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective
heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter
should be threshed out in a separate action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the Rules of Court do not
specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to
an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with
the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its
capacity as a probate court.—The Court further elaborated that
although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an
immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special
proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this
authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.
Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted
within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of
Conditional Sale.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is settled that court approval is necessary
for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate.—Petitioners
herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. It
is settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any
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disposition of the decedent’s estate. However, reference to judicial
approval cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of the heirs to
dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership
among the heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no doubt that an heir can sell
whatever right, interest or participation he may have in the property
under administration.—This Court had the occasion to rule that there is
no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, or participation
he may have in the property under administration. This is a matter
which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of an heir to dispose of the
decedent’s property even if the same is under administration is based
on the Civil Code.—The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s
property, even if the same is under administration, is based on the Civil
Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary property is
deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the
moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is
accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by
such heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The law does not prohibit a co-owner from
selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in
common.—The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-owner-ship,
further qualifies this right. Although it is mandated that each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. In other words, the law
does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his
ideal share in the property held in common.
Lee vs. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 85, 423 SCRA 497, G.R.
No. 146006 February 23, 2004
Succession; Settlement of Estates; Probate Proceedings; Where the
appropriation of estate properties is invalid, the subsequent sale
thereof to a third party without court approval is likewise invalid.–From
the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons,
Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly entered into a
memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate
estate among themselves, despite their, knowledge that there were
other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the
estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate
properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose, Rafael and
Antonio Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana
and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise
void.
Same; Same; Same; An heir can only alienate such portion of the estate
that may be alloted to him in the division of the estate by the probate
or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall
have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their
shares.– An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the
property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which
provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted
to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the
decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate
that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate
or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall
have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their
shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided
share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present
case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the
estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philin-terlife) in favor of
petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final
adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue
prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what
happened in the present case.
Same; Same; Same; The sale of the property of the estate by an
administrator without the order of the probate court is void and passes
no title to the purchaser, and any unauthorized disposition of estate
property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for
a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.–Juliana
Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without
court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the
validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate. In the early case of
Godoy vs. Orellano we laid down the rule that the sale of the property
of the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate
court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. x x x Our
jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate
property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court,
there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition.
Same; Same; Same; The intestate court has the power to execute its
order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate
property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent
disposition of estate property would be meaningless.–The question
now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying
the invalid sale? We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court
has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an
unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the
unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property would be
meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the
intestate or probate court’s power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent
transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final
adjudication.
Same; Same; Same; Where the issue is the effect of the sale made by
the decedent's heirs without the required approval of the intestate
court, not with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of properties in the
inventory of the estate, the determination thereon by the intestate
court is not merely provisional.–We are not dealing here with the issue
of inclusion or exclusion, of properties in the inventory of the estate
because there is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife
shares of stock were owned by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez.
Rather, we are concerned here with the effect of the sale made by the
decedent’s heirs, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, without the
required approval of the intestate court. This being so, the contention
of petitioners that the determination of the intestate court was merely
provisional and should have been threshed out in a separate
proceeding is incorrect.
Same; Same; Same; The title of a purchaser of an estate property can
be struck down by the intestate court after a clear showing of the
nullity of the alienation.–The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao
next contend that the writ of execution should not be executed against
them because they were not notified, nor they were aware, of the
proceedings nullifying the sale of the shares of stock. We are not
persuaded. The title of the purchaser like herein petitioner FLAG can be
struck down by the intestate court after a clear showing of the nullity of
the alienation. This is the logical consequence of our ruling in Godoy
and in several subsequent cases. The sale of any property of the estate
by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the probate or
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intestate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Thus, in
Juan Lao, et al. vs. Hon. Melencio Geneto, G.R. No. 56451, June 19,
1985, we ordered the probate court to cancel the transfer certificate of
title issued to the vendees at the instance of the administrator after
finding that the sale of real property under probate proceedings was
made without the prior approval of the court.
Macasaet vs. Macasaet, 439 SCRA 625, G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September
30, 2004
Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; In actions for unlawful detainer,
possession that was originally lawful becomes unlawful upon the
expiration or termination of the defendant’s right to possess, arising
from an express or implied contract.—In actions for unlawful detainer,
possession that was originally lawful becomes unlawful upon the
expiration or termination of the defendant’s right to possess, arising
from an express or implied contract. In other words, the plaintiff’s
cause of action comes from the expiration or termination of the
defendant’s right to continue possession. The case resulting therefrom
must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
Same; Same; To show a cause of action in an unlawful detainer, an
allegation that the defendant is illegally withholding possession from
the plaintiff is sufficient.—To show a cause of action in an unlawful
detainer, an allegation that the defendant is illegally withholding
possession from the plaintiff is sufficient. The complaint may lie even if
it does not employ the terminology of the law, provided the said
pleading is couched in a language adequately stating that the
withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate has become
unlawful. It is equally settled that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as
the nature of the action, is determined from the averments of the
complaint.
Same; Same; This court has consistently held that those who occupy
the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise
that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. A summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce this implied
obligation.—This Court has consistently held that those who occupy
the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise
that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. A summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce this implied
obligation. The unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to
be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
Same; Same; Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18
on pre-trial applies to the preliminary conference. Under section 4 of
this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be excused by the
showing of a valid cause.—Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the
provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the preliminary conference.
Under Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be
excused by the showing of a valid cause; or by the appearance of a
representative, who has been fully authorized in writing to enter into
an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of
documents.
Same; Same; Respondents have the right to appropriate—as their own
—the building and other improvements on the subject lots, but only
after (1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the
increase in value acquired by the properties by reason thereof. They
have the option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land,
unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures—in
which case, the petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.—Respondents
have the right to appropriate—as their own—the building and other
improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the
expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the increase in value acquired by
the properties by reason thereof. They have the option to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably
more than that of the structures—in which case, petitioners shall pay
reasonable rent.
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, 33 SCRA 554, No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
Succession; Testamentary succession; Wills; Interpretation of provisions
of wills; Intention of testator paramount.—The testator's wishes and
intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court
of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to
the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed
and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees,
and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their
own criterion for the testator's wiIl.
Same; Same; Same; Partition of estate in will is valid.—Where the
testator in her will specified each real property in her estate and
designated the particular heir among her compulsory heirs and
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same, the testamentary
disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. This is
a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the
first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code. This right of a testator
to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to
their legitime.
Same; Same; Same; Interpretation of wills; Effect of use of words "I
bequeath" in testament.—The repeated use of the words "I bequeath"
in the testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as
to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-
half disposable portion of the estate where the testator's intent that his
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the
beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, is clear and that said
dispositions were borne out by the use of phrase "my heirs in this
testament" referring to the "devisees."
Same; Same; Collation; Does not apply where no donations were made
by testator during her lifetime.—Articles 1061 and 1063 of the Civil
Code on collation do not apply to a case of a distribution and partition
of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any
previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to
determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some
properties by will which would call for collation.
Same; Same; Partition of estate in will; Heirs cannot compel payment of
their legitime in real estate instead of money as specified in the will.—
The forced heirs may not legally insist on their legitime being
completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in
cash as provided in the will. The properties are not available for the
purpose where the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed
them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to
comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as
solemnized in her will by implementing her manifest wish of
transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries under
the will. That the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly
declined since the testatrix' death provides no legal basis or
justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The
transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted f rom the
moment of death of the decedent and accordingly, the value thereof
must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be
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settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent
fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate.
Solla vs. Ascueta, 49 Phil. 333, No. 24955 September 4, 1926
1.DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION ; PRESCRIPTION OF OWNERSHIP.—
Under the provisions of articles 1940 and 1957 of the Civil Code, as
well as the provisions of sections 38, 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the plaintiffs have lost by, extinctive prescription, not only
all right of action to recover the ownership of the property left to their
predecessors in interest, but also whatever right of ownership they may
have had to the same because of Leandro Serrano's exclusive, open,
peaceful and continuous possession which was adverse to all the world,
including the legatees and their successors, for the period of thirty-
nine years under claim of ownership, evidenced not only by his
applications for possessory information, but also by his exclusive
enjoyment of the products of said property,—even if it is considered
that the legatees have not renounced their part in the legacy—has
given him, by operation of law, exclusive and absolute title to said
property. (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857, 869.)
2.WILLS; INTERPRETATION ; TESTATOR'S INTENTION.—In order to
determine the testator's intention, the court should place itself as near
as possible in his position, and hence, where the language of the will is
ambiguous or doubtful, it should take into consideration the situation
of the testator and the facts and circumstances surrounding him at the
time the will was executed. (40 Cyc., 1392.)
3.ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Where the testator's intention is manifest from the
context of the will and surrounding circumstances, but is obscured by
inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the language will be
subordinated to the intention, and in order to give effect to such
intention, as far as possible, the court may depart from the strict
wording and read a word or phrase in a sense different from that which
is ordinarily attributed to it, and for such purpose may mold or alter the
language of the will, such as restricting its application or supplying
omitted words or phrases. (40 Cyc., 1399.)
In re estate of Calderon., 26 Phil., 333, No. 7856 December 26, 1913
WILLS; SETTLED RULE OF INTERPRETATION.—It is the settled rule that
the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his
will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation; and all questions raised
at trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, except when it may clearly appear that his intention
was different from that literally expressed. (Decisions of the supreme
court of Spain of May 24, 1882; May 8, 1901; October 8, 1902; and
January 14, 1903.)
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez, 64 SCRA 452, No.L-39247 June 27, 1975
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Probate court may pass upon
intrinsic validity of a will before passing upon its formal validity.—The
trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity
even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a
will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue.
Same; Same; Invalidity of one testamentary disposition does not
necessarily invalidate all other dispositions made therein.—The rule is
that “the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will
does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to
be presumed that the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made” (Art 792,
Civil Code).
Same; Same; Statement that testator owns “southern half of conjugal
state is contrary to law because spouses are proindiviso owners
thereof.—The statement of the testatrix that she owned the “southern
half” of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was
a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143,
Civil Code). But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It
may be disregarded.
Same; Same; Provision in a will that testator’s estate be kept intact and
legitimes of heirs be paid in cash is contrary to Art. 1080 of Civil Code
where whole estate was not assigned to one or more heirs.—The
provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be
divided among her heirs during her husband’s lifetime but should be
kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to
article 1080 of the Civil Code. ... The testatrix in her will made a
partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her
husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as
envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the
legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain
undivided only for a period of 20 years.
Same; Same; Renunciation of inheritance by widower subject to
limitation for his support and maintenance and preservation of his
legitime.—Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights
and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership but insofar as said
renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his
one-half share in the conjugal estate, it should be subject to the
limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A
portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his
support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
Same; Same; Husband’s renunciation of hereditary rights and share in
conjugal estate make these assets part of testator’s estate, but without
prejudice to creditors and other heirs.—It should be stressed that by
reason of the surviving husband’s conformity to his wife’s will and his
renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share
became a part of his deceased wife’s estate. His conformity had the
effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will
without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Same; Same; Preterition of surviving spouse who conformed thereto
does not produce intestacy.—In the instant case, the preterited heir
was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy.
Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife’s will and renounced
his hereditary rights.
Same; Same; Testacy is prefereable to intestacy.—Testacy is favored.
Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his
whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be
avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that
sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of
giving it effect.
Same; Same; Probate court should not issue notice to creditors if only
special administrator has been appointed.—A notice to creditors is not
in order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1,
Rule 86 x x x clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor or
regular administrator and not that of a special administrator.
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Same; Same; Courts; A court employee should not be appointed as
administrator of decedent’s estate.—The probate court’s appointment
of its branch clerk of court as special administrator is not a salutary
practice because it might engender the suspicion that the probate
Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the decedent’s
estate. x x x A court employee should devote his official time to his
official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration of a
decedent’s estate.
Enriquez, et al. vs. Abadia, et al., 95 Phil. 627, No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
1.WILLS; PROBATE OF WILL; VALIDITY OF WILLS AS TO FORM
DEPENDS UPON LAW IN FORCE AT TlME OF EXECUTION; TlTLE OF
LEGATEES AND DEVISEES UNDER WILL VESTS FROM TIME OF
ExECUTION.—The validity of a will as to form is to be judged not by the
law in force at the time of the testator's death or at the time the
supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon
and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the
disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is
given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality,
the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
2.ID.; EXECUTION OF WILLS; LAW SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED, ADDING
NEW REQUIREMENTS AS TO EXECUTION OF WILLS; FAILURE TO
OBSERVE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS AT TIME OF EXECUTION
INVALIDATES WlLLS; HEIRS INHERIT BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION;
LEGISLATURE CAN NOT VALIDATE VOID WILLS.—From the day of the
death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and
devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due
process clause of the Constitution against a subsequent change in the
statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills, which
would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes
a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal
requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he
should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs
will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with
more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements
as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and
thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void
wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
Bugnao vs. Ubag., 14 Phil. 163, No. 4445 September 18, 1909
1.EXECUTION OF WILLS; WITNESSES.—While a number of
contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing witnesses to a
will as to the circumstances under which it was executed, or a single
contradiction as to a particular incident to which the attention of such
witnesses must have been directed, may in certain cases justify the
conclusion that the alleged witnesses were not present, together, at the
time when the alleged will was executed, a mere lapse of memory on
the part of one of these witnesses as to the precise details of an
unimportant incident, to which his attention was not directed, does not
necessarily put in doubt the truth and veracity of the testimony in
support of the execution of the will.
2.ID.; TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY DEFINED.—Proof of the existence of
all the elements in the following definition of testamentary capacity,
which has frequently been adopted in the United States, held sufficient
to establish the existence of such capacity in the absence of proof of
very exceptional circumstances: "Testamentary capacity is the capacity
to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is
engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and
the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the
testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty."
Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 332, Nos. L-46430-31 July 30,
1979
Settlement of Estate; Estoppel; The principle of estoppel is not
applicable in probate proceedings relative to question of testamentary
capacity of a person.—The principle of estoppel is not applicable in
probate proceedings, a ruling laid down in the case of Testate Estate of
the Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al. vs. Remedios
Obispo, 50 O.G. 614, penned by Justice J.B. L, Reyes, an eminent and
recognized authority on Civil Law when he was still in the Court of
Appeals, and We quote: “Finally, probate proceedings involve public
interest, and the application therein of the rule of estoppel, when it will
block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances
surrounding the execution of testament, would seem inimical to public
policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of the state
to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if,
executed conformably to law.
Same; Factual findings of probate court and the Court of Appeak that
will in question was executed according to the formalities required by
law conclusive on the Supreme Court when supported by evidence.—
This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the
findings of the lower court declaring the contested will as having been
executed with all the formal requirements of a valid will, are supported
by the evidence. This finding is conclusive upon this Tribunal and We
cannot alter, review or revise the same. Hence, there is no further need
for Us to dwell on the matter as both the lower court and the
respondent appellate court have declared that these are the facts and
such facts are fully borne and supported by the records. We find no
error in the conclusion arrived at that the contested will was duly
executed in accordance with law. We rule that the questioned last will
and testament of Don Jesus Alsua fully complied with the formal
requirements of the law.
Same; The holding of the Court of Appeals that a person who executes
a will is permitted to partition his properties pursuant to Art. 1056 of
the Old Civil Code even before executing his will as long as he
mentions this fact in his will is erroneous.—We are not in conformity
with the holding of the respondent court that the extrajudicial partition
of November 25, 1949 which under the Old Civil Code was expressly
prohibited as against public policy had been validly ratified by the
holographic will of Don Jesus executed on January 5, 1955 and his
codicil of August 14, 1956. Such a holding of the appellate court that a
person who executes a will is permitted to partition his properties
pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code even
before executing his will as long as he mentions this fact in the will, is
not warranted under the ruling of Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra and the
commentary of Manresa as quoted above. We rule, therefore, that the
respondent court erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus
dated November 14, 1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a
party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by
the provisions thereof and hence could not revoke his participation
therein by the simple expedience of making a new will with contrary
provisions or dispositions. It is an error because the socalled
extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a partition;
neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future
inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation inter vivos of
specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.
Same; Donations; There could be no valid donation of the free portion
of the testators’ estate where the properties being donated are not
specifically described.—Considering that the document, the
extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949, contained specific
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designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule that there was
substantial compliance with the rules on donations inter vivos under
the old Civil Code (Article 633). On the other hand, there could have
been no valid donation to the children of the other half reserved as the
free portion of Don Jesus and Doña Tinay which, as stated in the deed,
was to be divided equally among the children for the simple reason
that the property or properties were not specifically described in the
public instrument, an essential requirement under Article 633.
Same; Same; Same.—This other half, therefore, remained as the
disposable free portion of the spouses which may be disposed of in
such manner that either of the spouses would like in regards to his or
her share in such portion, unencumbered by the provision enjoining
the last surviving spouse to give equally to the children what belongs
or would pertain to him or her. The end result, therefore, is that Don
Jesus and Doña Tinay, in the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid
donations of only one-half of their combined properties which must be
charged against their legitime and cannot anymore be revoked unless
inofficious; the other half remained entirely at the free disposal of the
spouses with regards to their respective shares.
Same; A holographic will and codicil is revocable at any time by the
testator.—Respondents insist that Doe Jesus was bound by the
extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949 and had in fact conformed
to said partition by making a holographic will and codicil with exactly
the same provisions as those of Doña Tinay, which respondent court
sustained. We rule, however, that Don Jesus was not forever bound
thereby for his previous holographic will and codicil as such, would
remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is
clear: “A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his
death. Any waiver or restriction of this right to void.” There can be no
restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke his
holographic will and codicil previously made. This would still hold true
even if such previous will had as in the case at bar already been
probated.
Same; The Court may entertain intrinsic validity of a will in certain
cases.—Though the law and jurisprudence are clear that only questions
about the extrinsic validity of the will may be entertained by the
probate court, the Court had, on more than one occasion, passed upon
the intrinsic validity of a will even before it had been authenticated.
Same; A testator may disposed of the free portion of his estate an he
wishes.—The legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in
fact, not one of said forced heirs claimed or intimated otherwise. The
properties that were disposed of in the contested will belonged wholly
to Don Jesus Alsua’s free portion and may be disposed of by him to
whomsoever he may choose. If he now favored Francisca more, as
claimed by private respondents, or Pablo as in fact he was, We cannot
and may not sit in judgment upon the motives and sentiments of Don
Jesus in doing so. We have clearly laid down this rule in Bustamante v.
Arevalo, 73 Phil. 635.
Same; Test of testamentary capacity is at the time of making the will.—
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the
will. Mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body
or from age does not render a person incapable of making a will.
Same; Fact that testator did not cause his will to be probated during his
lifetime, while his previous holographic will and codicil were probated
while he was alive does not mean said testator lacks the requisite
testamentary capacity.—We agree with the petitioner that these details
which respondent court found difficult to reconcile with the ordinary
course of things and of life are mere conjectures, surmises or
speculations which, however, do not warrant or justify disallowance of
the probate of the will of Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did not
cause his will to be probated during his lifetime while his previous
holographic will and codicil were duly probated when he was still alive
is a mere speculation winch depends entirely on the discretion of Don
Jesus as the testator. The law does not require that a will be probated
during the lifetime of the testator and for not doing so there cannot
arise any favorable or unfavorable consequence therefrom. The parties
cannot correctly guess or surmise the motives of the testator and
neither can the courts. Such surmise, speculation or conjecture is no
valid and legal ground to reject allowance or disallowance of the will.
The same thing can be said as to whatever reason Don Jesus had for
selling the properties to his daughter Francisca when he had already
assigned the same properties to her in his will. While We can speculate
that Don Jesus desired to have possession of the properties transferred
to Francisca after the sale instead of waiting for his death may be a
reasonable explanation or speculation for the act of the testator and
yet there is no cer-tainty that such was actually the reason. This is as
good a conjecture as the respondents may offer or as difficult to
accept which respondent court believes. A conjecture is always a
conjecture; it can never be admitted as evidence.
Appeal; Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not absolutely
binding on the Supreme Court; There are exceptions to the general
rule.—But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is
the more basic principle that the “findings of fact” described as “final”
or “conclusive” are those borne out by the record or those which are
based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by the
Supreme Court does not declare the absolute correctness of all the
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. These are exceptions to
the general rule, where We have reviewed and revised the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals.
Sales; The sales in question in the case at bar are valid.—The claim of
the private respondents that the sales were fictitious and void for being
without cause or consideration is as weak and flimsy as the ground
upon which the respondent court upheld said claim on the basis that
there was no need for funds in Don Jesus’ old age aside from the
speculation that there was nothing in the evidence that showed what
motivated Don Jesus to change his mind as to favor Francisca and
discriminate against the other children. The two contracts of sale
executed by Don Jesus in favor of Francisca are evidence by Exhibits
“U” and “W”, the genuineness of which were not at all assailed at any
time during this long drawn-out litigation of 15 years standing. That
the consideration stated in the contracts were paid is also sufficiently
proved as the receipts thereof by Don Jesus were even signed by one
of the private respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The latter cannot
now deny the payment of the consideration. And even if he now allege
that in fact no transfer of money was involved, We find his allegation
belied by Exhibits “X-3” and X-5”, which show that the checks of
Francisca made payable to Don Jesus were in fact given to Don Jesus
as he endorsed them on the back thereof, and most specifically Exhibit
“A” in the annulment case, which proved that Don Jesus actually used
Exhibit “X-1” to complete payment on the estate and inheritance tax on
the estate of his wife to the Bureau of internal Revenue.
Same; Mere inadequacy of price does not vitiate a contract of sale.—
Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent
because of the inadequacy of the given price. Inadequacy of
consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven, which in
the case at bar was not, that there was fraud, mistake or undue
influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not find the stipulated
price as so inadequate to shock the court’s conscience, considering
that the price paid was much higher than the assessed value of the
subject properties and considering that the sales were effected by a
father to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into
account.
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People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, Nos. L-13219-20 August 31, 1960
ID.; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY; MERE ABNORMALITY
OF MENTAL FACULTIES DOES NOT EXCLUDE IMPUTABILITY.—In order
that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must
be complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act,
that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
(People vs. Formigone, 87 Phil., 658; 48 Off. Gaz. 1774.)
Tenefrancia vs. Abaja, 87 Phil. 139, No. L-2415 July 31, 1950
1.WILLS ; ATTESTATION CLAUSE FAILS TO STATE THAT TESTATOR
SIGNED WILL IN THE PRESENCE OF WITNESSES.—Among the
formalities prescribed by law (section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended
by Act No. 2645) to a valid will is the requirement that the attestation
clause should state "the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under
his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses." This
requirement was not complied with in the present case, for the
attestation clause fails to state that fact.
2.ID. ; WHAT is MEANT BY ATTESTATION CLAUSE.—By the attestation
clause is meant "that clause wherein the witnesses certify that the
instrument has been executed before them, and the manner of the
execution of the same." (Black, Law Dictionary.) It is signed not by the
testator but by the witnesses, for it is a declaration made by the
witnesses and not by the testator. And the law is clear that it is the
attestation clause that must contain a statement, among others that
the testator signed the will in the presence of the witnesses. Without
that statement, the attestation clause is fatally defective.
Vda. de Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393, No. L-40804 January
31, 1978
Succession; Wills; Form of wills; Solemnity in the execution of wills;
purpose of.—The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is
attended by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of
an ordinary layman. The object is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity. If there should be any stress on
the participation of lawyers in the execution of a will, other than an
interested party, it cannot be less than the exercise of their primary
duty as members of the Bar to uphold the lofty purpose of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Attestation clause; Attestation clause a separate
memorandum or record of facts surrounding the conduct of the
execution of the will.—Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of
law must contain an attestation clause which, significantly, is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of
execution. Once signed by the attesting witnesses, it affirms that
compliance with the indispensable legal formalities had been observed.
The attestation clause basically contradicts the pretense of undue
execution which later on may be made by the attesting witnesses. In
the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest to the
signature of the testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will,
and their signatures following that of the testatrix show that they have
in fact attested not only to the genuineness of the testatrix’s signature
but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation
clause. By signing the will, the witnesses impliedly certified to the truth
of the facts which admit to probate, including the sufficiency of
execution, the capacity of the testatrix, the absence of undue influence,
and the like.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although attesting witnesses testify against
the due execution of the will, will may be allowed if court satisfiea from
testimony of other witnesses and from all evidence presented that will
be executed and attested in the manner required by law.—All the
attesting witnesses to a will, if available, must be called to prove the
will. Under this circumstances, they become “forced witnesses” and
their declaration derogatory to the probate of the will need not bind
the proponent, hence, the latter may present other proof of due
execution even if contrary to the testimony of some or all of the
attesting witnesses. As a rule, if any or all of the subscribing witnesses
testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember
having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will
may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the
testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that
the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.
Accordingly, although the subscribing witnesses to a contested will are
the best witnesses in connection with its due execution, to deserve full
credit, their testimony must be reasonable, and unbiased; if otherwise,
it may be overcome by any competent evidence, direct or
circumstantial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Testimony of attorney as attesting witness to
a will entitled to great weight; Reasons.—In weighing the testimony of
the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent
attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the
proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than
the testimony of a person casually called to participate in the act,
supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the
attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney
being conversant of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on
details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain those
incidents in his memory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intervention of notary public in ex-ecution of
will deserves great consideration; Reasons.—The function of the Notary
Public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements in the execution of a will. In the absence of any showing
of self-interest that might possibly have warped his judgment and
twisted his declaration, the intervention of a Notary Public, in his
professional capacity, in the execution of a will deserves great
consideration.
Same; Same; Allowance of wills; Probate proceedings not adversary in
character.—The probate of a will is a special proceeding not imbued
with adversary character, wherein courts should relax the rules on
evidence “to the end that nothing less than the best evidence of which
the matter is susceptible” should be presented to the court before a
purported will may be probated or denied probate.
Same; Same; Photographs or pictures showing the act of witnesses
signing the will in the presents of the testator and of each other;
Absence of any photograph or picture showing the act of the testator
signing the will; Effect of.—The only pictures available are those which
show the witnesses signing the will in the presence of the testatrix and
of each other does not belie the probability that the testatrix also
signed the will before the presence of the witnesses. Pictures are
worthy only of what they show and prove and not of what they do not
speak of including the events they failed to capture. The failure to
imprint in photographs all the stages in the execution of the will does
not serve any persuasive effect nor have any evidentiary value to prove
that one vital and indispensable requisite has not been acted on. Much
less can it defeat, by any ordinary or special reason, the presentation of
other competent evidence intended to confirm a fact otherwise
existent but not confirmed by the photographic evidence.
Same; Same; Presumption of regularity in the execution of the will;
Negative testimony; Effect of.—The presumption of regularity can of
course be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,
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but not easily by the mere expediency of the negative testimony of two
attesting witnesses that they did not see the testatrix sign the will. A
negative testimony does not enjoy equal standing with a positive
assertion, and faced with the convincing appearance of the will, such
negative statement must be examined with extra care. For in this
regard, “the condition and physical appearance of a questioned
document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in
the light of surrounding circumstances, may help in determining
whether it is genuine or forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or
exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or did; they may be
biased and, therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead the court or favor
one party to the prejudice of the others. This cannot be said of the
condition and physical appearance of the questioned document. Both,
albeit silent, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting
nothing, and exaggerating nothing.
Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745, No. 46097 October 18, 1939
1.WILLS; PROBATE; ATTESTATION CLAUSE.—The requirement that the
attestation clause, among other things, shall state "that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of three
witnesses, and that the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other," is sufficiently complied with, it appearing
that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the
will according to the stipulation of the parties (Record on Appeal,
stipulation, pp. 10, 14, 15); and this fact being shown in the will itself,
and there being, furthermore, no question raised as to the authenticity
of the signatures of the testator and the witnesses.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.—An attestation clause is made for the purpose of
preserving;, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the
execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved.
(Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be
rejected where its attestation clause serves the purposes of the law.
The law-making body, in recognition of the dangers to which
testamentary dispositions are apt to be subject in the hands of
unscrupulous individuals, has surrounded the execution of wills with
every solemnity deemed necessary to safeguard it. This purpose was
indicated when our legislature provided for the exclusion of evidence
aliunde to prove the due execution of the will. We should not, however,
attribute the prohibition as indicative of a desire to impose
unreasonable restraint or beyond what reason and justice permit. It
could not have been the intention of the legislature in providing for the
essential safeguards in the execution of a will to shackle the very right
of testamentary disposition which the law recognizes and holds sacred.
The pronouncement of this court in Abangan vs, Abangan (40 Phil.,
476, 479). expresses the sound rule to which we have recently adhered
in principle (Rodriguez vs. Yap, G. R. No. 45924, promulgated May 18,
1939; and Grey vs. Fabie, G. R. No. 45160, promulgated May 23, 1939).
Abangan vs. Abangan., 40 Phil. 476, No. 13431 November 12, 1919
1.WILLS; ATTESTATION.—In a will consisting of two sheets the first of
which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the
bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains
only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the
three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed
on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
2.ID.; ID.; TESTATOR'S SIGNATURE.—The testator's signature is not
necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies,
appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator.
3.ID.; DIALECT IN WHICH WRITTEN; PRESUMPTION.—The circumstance
appearing in the will itself that.same was executed in the city of Cebu
and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is
enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that
she knew this dialect in which her will is written.
Cargo vs. Cargo, et al., 92 Phil., 1032, No. L-5826 April 29, 1953
Wills; Attestation Clause; Lack of Signatures of Attesting Witnesses at
Bottom of Attestation Clause, is Fatal Defect.—Inasmuch as the
signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the
same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin, the will is
fatally defective. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts
attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the
attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures.
Taboada vs. Rosal, 118 SCRA 195, No. L-36033 November 5, 1982
Words and Phrases; Testamentary Succession; Wills; The terms
“attestation” and “subscription,” defined.—It must be noted that the
law uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in
witnessing the testator’s execution of the will in order to see and take
note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for
the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a
fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses’
names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such
paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill,
269 SW 2d 911).
Same; Same; Same; The attesting witnesses may sign at the lefthand
margin of the pages of a will instead of at the end of the will.—Insofar
as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered
view that the will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully
satisfies the purpose of identification. The signatures of the
instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will
attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix
but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation
clause.
Same; Same; Same; The law on the formal requirements of a will should
be liberally construed. While perfection in drafting is desirable,
unsubstantial departures should be ignored.—While perfection in the
drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the
usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the
will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449). The law is
to be liberally construed, “the underlying and fundamental objective
permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in
the liberalization of the manner of their ex-ecution with the end in view
of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but
with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of
fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency
in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will.”
Same; Same; Same; Failure of attestation clause to state number of
pages would have been fatal had not the Will at bar consisted only of
two pages and the acknowledgment clause states that the Will has only
two pages.—We have examined the will in question and noticed that
the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in
writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the
fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really
and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which
contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the
testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as “Pagina
dos” comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
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acknowledgment itself states that “This Last Will and Testament
consists of two pages including this page”.
Jaboneta us. Gustilo, 5 Phil. 541, No. 1641 January 19, 1906
WILLS; PRESENCE OF TESTATOR AND WITNESSES; VALIDITY.—The true
test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a
will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they
might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so,
considering their mental and physical condition and position with
relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
Andalis vs. Pulgueras, 59 Phil. 643, No. 39209 March 10, 1934
WILLS; EXECUTION OF WILL.—Under our statute, the execution of a will
is supposed to be one act and cannot be legally effective if the various
participants sign on various days and in various. combinations of those
present.
Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez, 42 Phil., 145, No. 15566 September 14,
1921
1.Wills; Probate; Necessity for Production of Attesting Witnesses.—
When the petition for probate of a will is contested the proponent
should introduce all three of the attesting witnesses, if alive and within
reach of the process of the court; and the execution of the will cannot
be considered sufficiently proved by the testimony of only one, without
satisfactory explanation of the failure to produce the other two.
2.Id.; Pleading and Practice; Objection to Proof of Will by Single
Witness.—Nevertheless, in a case where the attorney for the
contestants raised no question upon this point in the court below,
either at the hearing upon the petition or in the motion to rehear, it is
held that an objection to the probate of the will on the ground that
only one attesting witness was examined by the proponent of the will,
without accounting for the absence of the others, cannot be made for
the first time in this court.
3.Wills; Signatures of Testator and Attesting Witnesses; Use of Right
Margin.—A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the
requirements of existing law is not rendered invalid by the fact that the
paginal signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses appear in the
right margin instead of the left.
De Gala, vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil. 104, No. 30289 March 26, 1929
1.PROBATE PROCEEDINGS; SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS ; REMOVAL.—
The appointment' of a special administrator in a probate case lies in
the sound discretion of the court, and he may be removed without
reference to section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2.WILLS; TESTATOR'S SIGNATURE; THUMB-MARKS.—In executing her
last will and testament, the testatrix placed her thumb-mark between
her given name and surname, written by another person. It was not
mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumb-
mark, but the form of the signature was sufficiently described and
explained in the last clause of the body of the will. Held, that the
signature was valid.
lcasiano vs. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422, No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
Wills; Probate; Policy of Court against undue curtailment of
testamentary privileges.—The precedents cited in the case at bar
exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal
requirements in the probate of a will in order to guard against fraud
and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
testamentary privilege.
Same; Same; Handwriting expert must have sufficient standards of
comparison to prove forgery of testatrix's signature.—The opinion of a
handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of the testatrix's signature
fails to convince the court, not only because it is directly contradicted
by another expert but principally because of the paucity of the
standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering the
advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signatures,
and the effect of writing fatigue.
Same; Same; Variance in ink color not reliable when writings affixed to
different kinds of paper.—The slight variance in blueness of the ink in
the admitted and questioned signatures does not appear reliable,
considering that the standard and challenged writings were affixed to
different kinds of paper.
Same; Same; Fraud or undue influence, diversity of apportionment and
prohibition against contest no evidence of.—Neither diversity of
apportionment nor prohibition against contest is evidence of fraud or
undue influence in the execution of a will.
Same; Same; Fraud and undue influence are repugnant allegations.—
Allegations of fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and
exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate
shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.
Same; Same; Inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his
signature to one page of a will not fatal.—The inadvertent failure of an
attesting witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due
to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not
per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.
Same; Same; Signed carbon duplicate of will needs no publication.—
That the signed carbon duplicate of a will was produced and admitted
without a new publication does not affect the jurisdiction of the
probate court, already conferred by the original publication of the
petition for probate, where the amended petition did not substantially
alter the first one filed, but merely supplemented it by disclosing the
existence of said duplicate.
Garcia vs. Lacuesta, et al., 90 Phil. 489, No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
1.WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; SIGNING BY ANOTHER OP
TESTATOR'S NAMB AT LATTER'S DIRECTION.—When the testator
expressly caused another to sign the former's name, this fact must be
recited in the attestation clause. Otherwise, the will is fatally defective.
2.ID.; SIGNATURE OF TESTATOR; CROSS.—Where the cross appearing
on a will is not the usual signature of the testator or even one of the
ways by which he signed his name, that cross cannot be considered a
valid signature.
Barut vs. Cabacungan., 21 Phil. 461, No. 6285 February 15, 1912
WlLLS; SlGNING BY THIRD PERSON AT TESTATOR'S REQUEST.—With
respect to the validity of a will, it is not important that the person who
writes the name of the testator should also sign his own; the important
thing is that it should clearly appear that the name of the testator was
signed at his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and
in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Balonan vs. Abellana, et al., 109 Phil. 359, No. L-15153 August 31, 1960
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WlLLS; EXECUTION OF WlLL; SUBSCRIBED AT THE END BY SOME
PERSON OTHER THAN THE TESTATOR, INSUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE
WITH THE LAW.—A will subscribed at the end thereof by some person
other than the testator in such manner that the signature of said
person appears above the typewritten statement "Por la Testadora
Anacleta Abellana * * *, Ciudad de Zamboanga," may not be admitted
to probate for failure to comply with the express requirement of the
law that the testator must himself sign the will or that his name be
affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his
express direction.
Unson vs. Abella, 43 Phil. 494, No. 17857 June 12, 1922
1.WILLS; NON-PRODUCTION OF ONE ATTESTING WITNESS.—Though
the general rule is that, if opposition is presented to the probate of a
will, all the attesting witnesses must be produced; nevertheless, there
are exceptions to this rule, to wit: When one of the witnesses is dead,
or cannot be served with process of the court, or his reputation for
truth is questioned, or he appears to be hostile to the cause of the
parties seeking the probate of the will. In such cases the will may be
admitted to probate, if upon the evidence actually introduced the court
is satisfied of the due execution of the will, inasmuch as even if said
witness had been produced and had testified against the application,
the result would not have been changed, if the court was satisfied upon
the evidence adduced that the will has been executed in the manner
prescribed by the law.
2.ID.; INVENTORY MADE PART OF A WlLL; ATTESTATION CLAUSE.—
When in a will reference is made to an inventory of the properties of
the testator, which has thus been made a part of the will, if the will has
an attestation clause that meets the requirements of the law, no other
attestation clause is necessary for the said inventory, but that of the will
will be sufficient for the validity both of the will and the inventory.
3.ID.; ID.; PAGING IN ARABIC NUMERALS.—Paging in inventory with
Arabic numerals is in compliance with the spirit of the law, requiring
that the paging of a will be made in letters, and is just as valid as
paging with letters A, B, C, etc., under the circumstances stated in the
case of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil., 378).
Azuela vs. Court of Appeals, 487 SCRA 119, G.R. No. 122880 April 12,
2006
Wills and Succession; Notarial Will; Attestation Clause; The enactment
of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the
requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is
concerned.—Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the
enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when the statutory
provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance on these cases remains apropos,
considering that the requirement that the attestation state the number
of pages of the will is extant from Section 618. However, the enactment
of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the
requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is
concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed these two
cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: “In the absence of bad faith,
forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language
used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will
was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of article 805.”
Same; Same; Same; A failure by the attestation clause to state that the
testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact
can be checked by a visual examination, while a failure by the
attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one another’s
presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the
only textual guarantee of compliance.—“[I]t may thus be stated that
the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the
allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those
omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would
result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the
will itself.” Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the
testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact
can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the
attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one another’s
presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the
only textual guarantee of compliance.
Same; Same; Same; The failure of the attestation clause to state the
number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw,
despite Article 809; The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to
state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard
against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages
and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages; There is
substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states
elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of.—The failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was
written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law
in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will
is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of
one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in
the pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the
absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to
how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had
ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is
substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states
elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation
in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been
no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805
since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the
will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
Same; Same; Same; The fact remains that the members of the Code
Commission saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal
requisites enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
convinced that these remained effective safeguards against forgery or
intercalation of notarial wills; The transcendent legislative intent, even
as expressed in the comments of the Code Commission, is for the
fruition of the testator’s incontestable desires, and not for indulgent
admission of wills to probate.—At the same time, Article 809 should
not deviate from the need to comply with the formal requirements as
enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the
members of the Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact
remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal
requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery
or intercalation of notarial wills. Compliance with these requirements,
however picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree of
comfort that the testator himself or herself had decided to convey
property post mortem in the manner established in the will. The
transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited
comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testator’s
incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to
probate.
Same; Same; Same; Instrumental Witnesses; Article 805 particularly
segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each
page of the will, from the requisite that the will be “attested and
subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]”—the respective intents
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behind these two classes of signature are distinct from each other;
Even if instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page
containing the unsigned clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate
these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that
do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different
avowal.—The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro.
Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite
that the will be “attested and subscribed by [the instrumental
witnesses].” The respective intents behind these two classes of
signature are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand
corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are
aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the
other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the
witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation
clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from
the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an
unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand
margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such
signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the
clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed
towards a wholly different avowal.
Same; Same; Same; It is the attestation clause which contains the
utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses
themselves—it is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required
under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the
will was written.—The Court may be more charitably disposed had the
witnesses in this case signed the attestation clause itself, but not the
left-hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without
diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses’ signatures on each
and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause
which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary
witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are
required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will
and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will
and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these
elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
Same; Same; Same; Acknowledgment; An acknowledgment is the act of
one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer
or court and declaring it to be his act or deed; It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the
executor of the document has attested to the notary that the same is
his/her own free act and deed.—Yet, there is another fatal defect to the
will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The
requirement under Article 806 that “every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses” has also not
been complied with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted
by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements
under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806.
The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as
the other cited flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should be
treated as of equivalent import. In lieu of an acknowledgment, the
notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko
ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.” By
no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken
whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of
a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own
free act and deed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurat; A jurat is that part of an affidavit
whereby the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was
subscribed and sworn to by the executor.—It might be possible to
construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the
usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the
notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and
sworn to by the executor. Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should
avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary
public, while in this case, the notary public averred that he himself
“signed and notarized” the document. Possibly though, the word
“ninotario” or “notarized” encompasses the signing of and swearing in
of the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the
decedent and the instrumental witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The express requirement of Article
806 is that the will is to be “acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed
and sworn to; The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the
instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they
had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed.
—Even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat,
the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement
of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely
subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof,
much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental
witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The
acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important
legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free
consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty
meaningless act. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the
instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they
had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed.
Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing
for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the
execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent
of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the
testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions
to those persons he/she had designated in the will.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A notarial will that is not acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally
defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.—
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-
evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses
is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public.
Cruz vs. Villasor, 54 SCRA 31, No.L-32213 November 26, 1973
Succession; Wills; Formal requirements; Acknowledging officer cannot
serve as witness at the same time.—The notary public before whom the
will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed
the will. To acknowledge before means to avow; to own as genuine, to
assent, to admit, and “before” means in front or preceding in space or
ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public
himself, he would have to avow, assent or admit his having signed the
will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his
personality into two so that one will appear before the other to
acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.
Notary public; Function of office of notary public.—The function of a
notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements. That function would be defeated if the notary public
were one of the attesting witnesses. For then he would be interested in
sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the
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validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position
and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize
fraud would be thwarted.
Alvarado vs. Gaviola, Jr., 226 SCRA 347, G.R. No. 74695 September 14,
1993
Civil Law; Wills; Article 808 applies not only to blind testators but also,
to those who, for one reason or another, are “incapable of reading their
wills.”—Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to
blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are
“incapable of reading the(ir) will(s).” Since Brigido Alvarado was
incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the
separate occasions of their execution due to his “poor,” “defective,” or
“blurred” vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude
that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term “blind” as it is
used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way
of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and
codicil did so conformably with his instructions.
Same; Same; Same; The purpose of reading the will twice is to make
known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document
before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is
contrary to his instructions.—Article 808 requires that in case of
testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one
of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before
whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to
the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing
and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his
instructions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court held in a number of occasions that
substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has
been satisfied.—This Court has held in a number of occasions that
substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has
been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of
fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible
as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although there should be strict compliance
with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed
aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into
account, may only defeat the testator’s will.—The spirit behind the law
was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict
compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to
insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be
brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when
taken into account, may only defeat the testator’s will.
Lopez vs. Lopez, 685 SCRA 209, G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012
Civil Law; Wills; Testamentary Succession; Attestation Clause; The law is
clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and
prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.—The law is clear that
the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages. While Article 809 allows substantial
compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard
likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment
portion of the subject last will and testament that it “consists of 7
pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial
compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere
examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde.
Testate Estate of the Late Alipio Abada vs. Abaja, 450 SCRA 264, G.R.
No. 147145 January 31, 2005
Succession; Wills; Requisites; Attestation Clause; A will, should not be
rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law.—x x
x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and
inflexible, which would be applicable to all cases. More than anything
else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the
application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to
a regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have
been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the
law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad
faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although
the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or
other non-essential defect. x x x. An attestation clause is made for the
purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts
attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the
memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still
be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore,
should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose
of the law. x x x
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence aliunde not allowed to fill void in
any part of the document or supply missing details.—[T]he so-called
liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the
door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and
where to stop; they draw the dividing line with precision. They do not
allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or
supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. They only
permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to
ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the
requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates
uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Precision of language in the drafting of the
attestation clause is desirable, but not imperative.—Precision of
language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However,
it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute
be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can
reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it.
Caneda vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 781, G.R. No. 103554 May 28,
1993
Wills and Succession; There are two (2) kinds of wills.—In addition, the
ordinary will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the attesting witnesses, hence it is likewise known as a
notarial will. Where the testator is deaf or a deaf-mute, Article 807
requires that he must personally read the will, if able to do so.
Otherwise, he should designate two persons who will read the will and
communicate its contents to him in a practicable manner. On the other
hand, if the testator is blind, the will should be read to him twice; once,
by anyone of the witnesses thereto, and then again, by the notary
public before whom it is acknowledged. The other kind of will is the
holographic will, which Article 810 defines as one that is entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. This kind
of will, unlike the ordinary type, requires no attestation by witnesses. A
common requirement in both kinds of wills is that they should be in
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writing and must have been executed in a language or dialect known
to the testator.
Same; Attestation clause valid even if in a language not known to
testator.—However, in the case of an ordinary or attested will, its
attestation clause need not be written in a language or dialect known
to the testator since it does not form part of the testamentary
disposition. Furthermore, the language used in the attestation clause
likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses. The last
paragraph of Article 805 merely requires that, in such a case, the
attestation clause shall be interpreted to said witnesses.
Same; Purposes of attestation clause.—The purpose of the law in
requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is
written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of
one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in
the pages; whereas the subscription of the signatures of the testator
and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication
and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same
instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses.
Same; Same.—Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the
witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the will as embodied in
the attestation clause. The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong
legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the
authenticity thereof. As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to
the testator, it need be signed only by them. Where it is left unsigned,
it would result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible and
easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the
testator and the witnesses.
Same; Words and Phrases; “Attestation” and “Subscription”
distinguished.—It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the
witnesses should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence
of the testator and of one another. “Attestation” and “subscription”
differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of the senses, while
subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter
mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was published as such,
and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal
publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write
on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of
identification.
Same; Attestation clause which does not state that testament “was
signed by the witnesses in the presence of one another and of the
testator” renders the will null and void.—What is fairly apparent upon a
careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that
while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages
in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state
therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective
signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The phrase “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on
the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin,”
obvi-ously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as
it is immediately preceded by the words “as his Last Will and
Testament.” On the other hand, although the words “in the presence of
the testator and in the presence of each and all of us” may, at first
blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must,
however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the
presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the
words “he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin.” What is then
clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is the statement that the
witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. It is our considered view that the absence
of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection
which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here
sought to be admitted to probate.
Same; Mere defects in form in the attestation clause do not render will
void.—We stress once more that under Article 809, the defects or
imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the attestation
or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfections
would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was
really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this
regard, however, the manner of proving the due execution and
attestation has been held to be limited to merely an examination of the
will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or written.
Same; Same; Defects in attestation clause which require submission of
parol evidence not mere defects of form.—In the case at bar, contrarily,
proof of the acts required to have been performed by the attesting
witnesses can be supplied only by extrinsic evidence thereof, since an
overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis
whatsoever from which such facts may be plausibly deduced. What
private respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses
alleging that they saw the compliance with such requirements by the
instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he is thereby resorting
to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be
doing by indirection what in law he cannot do directly.
Same; Same; Same.—It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now
stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an examination of
the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will
not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to
probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which
cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimat ely, of the will itself.
Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 488, G.R. No. 106720 September
15, 1994
Succession; Wills; Holographic Wills; Probate Proceedings; The grounds
enumerated in the Civil Code and Rules of Court for the disallowance
of wills are exclusive; Issues in a petition to admit a holographic will to
probate.—Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides the cases in
which wills shall be disallowed. In the same vein, Article 839 of the New
Civil Code enumerates the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists
are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a
petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be
resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the
decedent’s last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the
decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will
was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing
were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The object of the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, accordingly, laws on this subject should be
interpreted to attain these primordial ends.—We reiterate what we
held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that: “The object
of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the
laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose
sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and
curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
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unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator’s last will, must be
disregarded.” For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these
formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and
acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New
Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to strictly observe other formalities
will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator.—In the case of
holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the
requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the
testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code.
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten
by the testator.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The requirement of Article 813 of the New
Civil Code affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate.—A reading of Article 813 of the
New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If
the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is
that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however,
does not render the whole testament void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or
insertions do not invalidate a holographic will, unless they were made
on the date or on testator’s signature.—Likewise, a holographic will can
still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations,
cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic
will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate the
will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of
such changes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Only the requirements of Article 810 of the
New Civil Code—and not those found in Articles 813 and 814—are
essential to the probate of a holographic will.—It is also proper to note
that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and
dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814)
separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the
validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be
traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which
the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. This
separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only
the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code—and not those
found in Article 813 and 814 of the same Code—are essential to the
probate of a holographic will.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Probate Courts; While courts in probate
proceedings are generally limited to pass only upon the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated, in exceptional cases, courts
are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and
pass upon certain provisions of the will.—As a general rule, courts in
probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity
of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances,
courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to
do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the case at bench,
decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the
Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand
(which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the
same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she
cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her
father’s other heirs.
Velasco vs. Lopez, 1 Phil., 720, No. 905 February 12, 1903
1.WILLS; FORMALITIES OF EXECUTION.—An open will which fails to
state the hour of its execution in addition to the day, month, and year
thereof, is null and void.
2.ID.; ID.—The observance of all the formalities prescribed for the
execution of a will is essential to its validity.
3.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—Where a statute is plain and
unambiguous the court can not consider the expediency or practical
utility thereof in giving effect thereto.
Roxas vs. De Jesus, Jr., 134 SCRA 245, No. L-38338 January 28, 1985
Civil Law; Wills; Execution of Wills; Purpose of liberal trend of the Civil
Code in the manner of execution of wills in case of doubt is to prevent
intestacy.—This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a
strict and literal application of the statutory requirements regarding the
due execution of Wills. We should not overlook the liberal trend of the
Civil Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the purpose of which, in
case of doubt is to prevent intestacy.
Same; Same; Same; Admission to probate of the will which has been
executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and
the possibility of bad faith and fraud is obviated.—Thus, the prevailing
policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to
guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary
curtailment of testamentary privilege (Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA
422). If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the
formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the
exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate
(Rey v. Cartagena, 56 Phil. 282).
Same; Same; Same; Purpose of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills.—The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of Wills has been expounded by this Court in Abangan v.
Abangan, 40 Phil. 476) where we ruled that: “The object of the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. x x x”
Same; Same; Same; Holographic Will; Absence of evidence of bad faith
and fraud in the execution of a holographic will and absence of any
substitution of wills and testaments; Finding that the will was entirely
written, dated and signed and no question of its genuineness and due
execution, correct.—We have carefully reviewed the records of this case
and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was
there any substitution of Wills and Testaments. There is no question
that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was
entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a
language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness
and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the
genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had
the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will.
Same; Same; Same; General rule that the date in a holographic will
should include the day, month and year of execution; Exception, is the
absence of appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and
pressure and the authenticity of the will; Date “Feb./61” appearing in a
holographic will, valid, under the principle of substantial compliance.—
As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic Will should include the
day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at
bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and
pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only
issue is whether or not the date “FEB./61” appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code,
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probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle
of substantial compliance.
Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, No. L-14003 August 5, 1960
1.WILLS AND LAST TESTAMENT; HOLOGRAPHIC WILL; PROBATE OF;
REQUISITE AS TO NUMBER OF WITNESSES.—Since the authenticity of
the holographic will was not contested, proponent was not required to
produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, Article 811 of our present Civil Code
cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under
penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been
present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by
law, it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
proponent.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PRODUCTION OF WITNESSES MERELY PREREQUISITE.—
Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present and the rule
requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely
permissive if absurd results are to be avoided'.
3.ID.; RESORT TO EXPERT EVIDENCE.—Under Article 811, the resort to
expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it
necessary", which reveals that what the law deems essential is that the
Court should be convinced of the will's authenticity.
Gan vs. Yap [G.R. No. L-12190. August 30, 1958.]
1. HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS; PROBATE OF; EXECUTION AND CONTENTS
OF WILL, HOW PROVED. — The execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity.
Rodelas vs. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16, No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
Civil Law; Wills; Holographic Will; Admissibility of photos tatic or xerox
copy of a lost or destroyed will.—However, if the holographic will has
been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not
be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of
the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made
with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gan vs. Yap,
104 Phil 509, the Court ruled that ‘‘the execution and the contents of a
lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will
itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law
regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity.’’ But, in
Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon
copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the
probate court.” Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or
destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by
the probate court.
Kalaw vs. Relova, 132 SCRA 237, No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
Settlement of Estate; Ordinarily erasures or alterations in a holographic
will does not invalidate the will itself—Ordinarily, when a number of
erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, x x x the Will
is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an
identical commentary when he said “la omision de la salvedad no anula
el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la
sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895.”
Same; Where a holographic will has designate only one heir to the
entire estate and the designation was cancelled and another sole heir
designated, without the cancellation being authenticated by full
signature of testator, entire will is void.—However, when as in this case,
the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but
which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the
full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is
voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the
Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first
written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of
mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given
effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by
law by affixing her full signature.
Same; Same.—The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to
such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic
Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but
not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures,
cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real
intention cannot be determined with certitude.
Dacanay vs. Florendo, 87 Phil. 324, No. L-2071 September 19, 1950
1.WILLS; EXECUTION OF JOINT WlLL OR EXPRESSION BY TWO OR
MORE TESTATORS OF THEIR WILLS IN A DOCUMENT BY ONE ACT.—
The prohibition of article 669 of the Civil Code is directed against the
execution of a joint will, or the expression by two or more testators of
their wills in a single document and by one act, rather than against
mutual or reciprocal wills, which may be separately executed.
2.ID.; PROVISION OF ARTICLE 669, CIVIL CODE, Is NOT UNWISE.—The
provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of a
will by two or more persons conjointly or in the same instrument either
for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third .person, is not
unwise and is not against public policy.
3.ID. ; PROVISION OF ARTICLE 669, CIVIL CODE, Is STILL IN FORCE.—
Considering the wisdom of the provision of this article 669 and the fact
that it has not been repealed, at least not expressly, as well as the
consideration that its provisions are not incompatible with those of the
Code of Civil Procedure on the subject of wills, it is believed that said
article of the Civil Code is still in force. (Doctrine of In re Will of Bilbao,
G. R. No. L-2200, August 2, 1950, reiterated.)
TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS (WITNESSES TO WILLS TO ALLOWANCE
AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS)
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 90 SCRA 183, No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
Court of Appeals; Evidence; Factual findings of Court of Appeals not
generally reviewable.—It will be noted from the above assignments of
errors that the same are substantially factual in character and content.
Hence, at the very outset, We must again state the oft-repeated and
well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding and
conclusive on this Court. This rule has been stated and reiterated in a
long line of cases.
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Same; Same; Same.—Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of
Appeals, when supported by substantive evidence are not reviewable
on appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are final
and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because its premises are
borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and what
is more, when such findings are correct. Assignments of errors
involving factual issues cannot be ventiliated in a review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals because only legal questions may be raised.
The Supreme Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts as set
forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed.
Where the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and
resort to duly proven evidence becomes necessary. The general rule
We have thus stated above is not without some recognized exceptions.
Will; Settlement of Estate; It is presumed that a witness to a will has the
qualifications prescribed by law, unless the contrary is established by
the oppositor.—We reject petitioner’s contention that it must first be
established in the record the good standing of the witness in the
community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his
honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the
witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
Same; Same; Evidence; Naturalization Law; Word “credible” with
regards to witnesses to a will does not have the meaning of term
“credible witness” used in the Naturalization Law.—We also reject as
without merit petitioner’s contention that the term “credible” as used in
the Civil Code should be given the same meaning it has under the
Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for
naturalization must be supported by two character witnesses who must
prove their good standing in the community, reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness.
Same; Same; Same; Words “competent witness” and “credible witness”
compared.—In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an
instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is Arts.
820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends on the
appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion
of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of
Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-
22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that:
“Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a
credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says.
Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given
matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to
believe or not to believe his testimony.”
Same; Same; To be considered a “credible witness” to a will it is not
mandatory that witness’ good community standing and probity be first
established.—In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses
in order to be competent must be shown to have the qualifications
under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications
under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy
of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be
first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in
the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless
the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental
witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible
before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; Contracts; A will duly acknowledged
before a notary public has in its favor the presumption of regularity, as
for example, regarding the date when the notary was furnished the
residence certificates of the witnesses.—But whether Atty. Paraiso was
previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the
witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very occasion and date in April
15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data
appear in the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano
Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961
following the attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same
occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit “F” is a notarial will duly
acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary
public, the same is a public document executed and attested through
the intervention of the notary public and as such public document is
evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It
has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these,
there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.
Same; Same; Same; Findings that testatrix dictated her will to her
attorney without any note is a finding of fact.—It is also a factual
findings of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that
Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit “F”, without any note
or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner
that it was incredible.
Same; Same; Same; Attestation clause best evidence of date the will
was signed.—The attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the
best evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in
permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the
execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause
which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form, a
record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of
failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty
they may still be proved.
Same; Same; Same; Fact that there was conflict of testimony as to
identity of photographer who took a photograph of the signing and
attestation of the will, not a requirement of law, is of minor importance.
What matters most is the photograph itself.—The law does not require
a photographer for the execution and attestation of the will. The fact
that Miss Orobia mistakenly identified the photographer as Cesar
Mendoza scarcely detracts from her testimony that she was present
when the will was signed because what matters here is not the
photographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde
Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya,
Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso.”
Same; Same; It cannot be expected that the testimony of all the witness
will be identical in all their minutest details.—These are indeed
unimportant details which could have been affected by the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory such that by themselves
would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true
execution of the will, (Pascua vs. de la Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it
cannot be expected that the testimony of every person will be identical
and coinciding with each other with regard to details of an incident
and that witnesses are not expected to remember all details. Human
experience teach us “that contradictions of witnesses generally occur in
the details of certain incidents, after a long series of questionings, and
far from being an evidence.
Same; Same; Findings of facts of trial court may be reviewed and
reversed where it overlooked and misinterpreted the facts on record.—
Findings of facts made by trial courts particularly when they are based
on conflicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of
credibility of contending witnesses lies peculiarly within the province of
trial courts and generally, the appellate court should not interfere with
the same. In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals found that
the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and
circumstances established in the record.
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Same; Same; The three instrumental witnesses to the will constitute the
best evidence to the making of the will.—Petitioner’s exacerbation
centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the
witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged evasions,
inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three
instrumental witnesses who constitute the best evidence of the will-
making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the
lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice
thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested
witnesses who stand to receive no benefit from the testament. The
signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been identified on
the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the
petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the
herein conflict is factual and We go back to the rule that the Supreme
Court cannot review and revise the findings of fact of the respondent
Court of Appeals.
Molo-Peckson and Perez-Noble vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, No.
L-8774 November 26, 1956
1.SUCCESSION ; WILLS; WHEN PRETERITION OF BLOOD RELATIVES
ALLOWED.—The testator who has no forced heirs may dispose by will
of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to
acquire it, to the exclusion of his blood relatives. (Articles 763, Civil
Code of the Philippines.)
2.ID.; ID.; ATTESTING WITNESSES', QUALIFICATION OF; RELATIVES AND
EMPLOYEES NOT BARRED FROM BECOMING WITNESS.—The relation
of employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a
will, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main
qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other
qualifications as to age, mental, capacity and literacy are present, is
that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be
entitled credence.
Pascual vs. De la Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, No. L-24819 May 30, 1969
Wills; Subscribing witnesses; Effect of inconsistencies in unimportant
details.—The contradictions and inconsistencies. appearing in the
testimonies of the subscribing witnesses and the notary relating to
unimportant details or to impressions of the witnesses about certain
details which could have been aff ected by the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory, by themselves, would not alter the
probative value of their testimonies on the due execution of the will.
Same; Same; Effect of friendly relations of the subscribing witnesses
with the testator or the beneficiaries.—Friendly relations of the
subscribing witnesses with the testator or the beneficiaries do not
affect the credibility of the former, so that the proven friendship
between the proponent of the will and the instrumental witnesses
would have no bearing on the latter's qualification to testify on the
circumstances surround-ing the signing of the will.
Evidence; Tape recording of conversation; When denied by persons
whose voice was allegedly recorded.—Where there is no adequate
proof that the declarations of a witness were tape recorded, and the
tape recording was done without the knowledge of the witness who
denied that the voice recorded was his, the court cannot give credence
to the alleged tape recording of the conversation contained therein.
Wills; Subscribing witnesses; Unanimity of testimony is not required.—
A will may be admitted to probate even if one instrumental witness
testified contrary to the other two, provided the court is satisf ied that
the will was executed and attested in the manner provided by law.
Same; Undue pressure and influence as ground to avoid a will.—To be
sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so
overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his f
ree agency and make him express the will of another rather than his
own; that the exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must
be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised;
that the burden is on the person challenging that will to show that such
influence was exerted at the time of its execution; that mere general or
reasonable influence is not sufficient to invalidate a will; nor is
moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed to the
testator. or omission of relatives, not forced heirs, evidence of undue
influence.
Same; Same; Presumption of undue influence; Does not apply where
will was drafted by lawyer.—The presumption that undue influence
exists from the fact that the beneficiary participates in the drafting or
execution of the will favoring him, does not apply where the will was
prepared by a lawyer who is the nephew of the benef iciary. A member
of the bar in good standing may not be convicted of unprofessional
conduct, or of having conspired to falsify a testament, except upon
clear proof.
Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil., 500, Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
1.WlLLS; PROBATE OF WlLLS; ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST IN THE
ESTATE, NOT A BAR TO PROBATE OF A LOST OR FOREIGN WlLL.— In
an intestate proceeding that had already been instituted in the
Philippines, the widow and child of the testator are not estopped from
asking for the probate of a lost will or of a foreign will just because of
the transfer or assignment of their share, right, title and interest in the
estate of the deceased. The validity and legality of such assignments
can not be threshed out in the probate proceeding which is concerned
only with the probate of the will.
2.ID.; ID.; PROOF OF LOST WILL; PROVISIONS OF WILL MUST BE
PROVED BY AT LEAST Two CREDIBLE WITNESSES; WHO ARE CREDIBLE
WITNESSES.—Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in
existence at the time of, and not revoked before, the death of the
testator, still the provisions of the lost will must be clearly and distinctly
proved by at least two credible witnesses. "Credible witnesses" mean
competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon
hearsay.
3.ID.; PROBATE OF WILL is A PROCEEDING IN REM; NOTICE TO ALL
PARTIES ESSENTIAL FOR ITS VALIDITY.—In the absence of proof that
the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the
Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that
the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the
Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the
subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such
proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested
parties must be made.
4.ID. ; ID. ; PROCEEDINGS LIKENED TO A DEPOSITION OR TO A
PERPETUATION OF TESTIMONY.—The proceedings had in the
municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition
or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so, notice to all
interested parties was necessary for the validity of such proceedings.
5.ID.; WILLS PROVED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY; PROBATE SHOULD BE
IN ACCORDANCE WlTH ACCEPTED BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL
CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES.—Where it appears that the proceedings
in the court of a foreign country were held for the purpose of taking
the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and the order of
the probate court did not purport to allow the will, the proceedings
cannot be deemed to be for the probate of a will, as it was not done in
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accordance with the basic and fundamental concepts and principles
followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the will
referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a
competent court of this country.
6.WILL, PROBATE OF; LACK OF OBJECTION TO PROBATE OF LOST WILL
DOES EXECUTION.—The lack of objection to the probate of a lost will
does not relieve the proponent thereof or the party interested in its
probate from establishing its due execution and proving clearly and
distinctly the provisions thereof by at least two credible witnesses, as
provided for in section 6, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.
7.ID. ; APPEALS ; JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW
FINDINGS OF FACT AND LEGAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN CASES
INVOLVING MORE THAN P50,000.—In an appeal from a judgment of
the probate court, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, has the power to review and correct erroneous findings of
fact and legal pronouncements of the probate court, where the amount
involved is more than P50,000.
Singson vs. Florentino, et al., 92 Phil., 161, No. L-4603 October 25, 1952
1.Wills; Contested Probate; Testimony of the Three Testamentary
Witnesses.—One of the three instrumental witnesses of the will was
already dead when the case came up for trial and of the two witnesses
then available, one was unable to appear because of paralysis. When
this matter was brought to the knowledge of the court, the latter
manifested its desire to go to the house of the ailing witness for the
taking of his testimony, but the move was prevented because of the
conformity of oppositors' counsel to the taking of his deposition.
Because of this conformity, the deposition was taken and on that
occasion opposing counsel was present and actually took part in the
taking of the deposition, Held: While the taking of the deposition was
not made in strict compliance with the rule (section 11, Rule 77), the
deficiency, if any, has been cured by the waiver evinced by counsel for
the oppositors, which prevented the court from constituting itself in
the residence of the witness. At any rate, interpreting section 11 of Rule
77 in connection with section 4(c) of Rule 18, and harmonizing the two
provisions together, the conclusion may be drawn that even if an
instrumental witness is within the seat of the court but is unable to
appear because of sickness, his deposition may still be taken. A
different interpretation would be senseless and impractical and would
defeat the very purpose which Rule 77 intends to serve.
2.Id.; Id.; Attestation Clause; Statement of the Number of Pages on
which the Will is Written.—If the last part of the body of the will
contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, and the will
itself shows that it is really and actually composed of eight pages duly
signed by the testator and his instrumental witnesses, the will is valid
even if its attestation clause does not state the number of pages or
sheets upon which the will is written.
3.Id.; Id.; Id.; Statement of the Place where Testator's Signature or
Thumbmark had been Affixed on Each Page.—A perusal of the
attestation clause of the questioned will would, at first glance, give the
impression that the testator merely signed or stamped his thumbmark
on the will in the presence of the witnesses without stating the place
where his signature or thumbmark had been affixed, which impression
is caused by the fact that right after the sentence "firmó e imprimió su
marca digital en presencia de todos nosotros" there appears a
semicolon; but if this semicolon is disregarded, it can at once be seen
that the testator signed or affixed his thumb-mark not only at the
bottom of the will but also on the left margin of each and every page
thereon. Held: That semicolon undoubtedly has been placed there by
mistake or through inadvertence, as may be deduced from the use of
the word también made by the witnesses in the sentence immediately
following, which conveys the idea of oneness in action both on the part
of the testatrix and the witnesses.
            Thus considered and interpreted, the attestation clause com-
plies substantially with the law.
Caluya vs. Domingo., 27 Phil. 330, No. 7647 March 27, 1914
1.WlLLS; EXECUTION; SlGNATURE IN BEHALF OF TESTATOR.—Where a
testator is unable to write and his name is signed by another at his
request, in his presence and in that of the subscribing witnesses
thereto, it is unimportant, so far as the validity of the will is concerned,
whether the person who writes the name of the testator signs his own
or not. The important thing is that it clearly appear that the name of
the testator was signed at his direction in the presence of the
subscribing witnesses and that they attest and subscribe it in his
presence and in the presence of each other.
2.ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF WILL.—Under section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure if the attestation clause is defective or even absent, the will
is valid provided it is satisfactorily proved that it was in fact signed,
executed, and attested as required by law.
3.ID.; ID.; COMPETENCY OF ATTESTING WITNESS.—The fact that the
testator in his will mentioned a sale of real estate, fully consummated
before his death, which he had made to one of the witnesses to his will,
does not make such person an incompetent witness; nor does the fact
that he signed the will as one of the attesting witnesses render the will
invalid under section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Merza vs. Porras, 93 Phil., 142, No. L-4888 May 25, 1953
1.Wills; Probate of defective Wills; Phrase "In our Pesence, Expalined.—
Written in the local dialect known to the testatrix, the attestation
clause, as translated into English in the record on appeal reads: "The
foregoing instrument consisting of three (3) pages, on the date above
mentioned, was executed,. signed and published by testatrix Pilar
Montealegre and she declared that the said instrument is her last will
and testament,; that in our presence and also in the very presence of
the said testatrix as likewise in the .presense of two witnesses and the
testatrix each of us three witnesses signed this testament." The
opponent objected that this clause did not- state-that the testatrix and
the witnesses had signed each and every page of the will or that she
had signed the instrument in the presence of the witnesses. Held:
Considering that the witnesses' only business at hand was to sign and
attest to the testatrix's signing of the document, and that the only
actors in the proceeding were the maker and the witnesses acting and
speaking collectively and in the first person, the phrase "in our
presence", used as it was in connection with the process of signing, can
not imply anything but that the testatrix signed before them. No other
inference is possible. The prepositional phrase "in our presence"
denotes an active verb and the verb a subject. The verb could be no
other than signed and the subject no other than the testatrix. The use
of the word "also" is no less enlightening. It denotes that, as each of
the witnesses signed in the presence of the testatrix and of one
another, the testatrix signed similarly or in like manner—in their
presence.
2.Id.; Statutory Construction ; Attestation; Liberal Interpretation.—In
consonance with the principle of liberal interpretation, adhered to in
numerous later decisions of the Supreme Court and affirmed and
translated into enactment in the New Civil Code (Article 827) the
attestation clause of the will in the case at bar is sufficient and valid.
3.Id.; Simple Language Used in the Attestation Clause.—Precision of
language in the drafting of the attestation clause is desirable. However,
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it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute
be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can
reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it. (Ticson vs. Gorostiza, 57 Phil. 437).
4.Id; When two District Wills are Probeted Separately.—Two separate
and distinct wills may be probated if one does not revoke the other
and provided that the statutory requirements relative to the execution
of wills have been complied. with.  intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet
5.Id.; Disheritance Need not be Accomplished in the Same Will.—Article
849 of the Civil Code of Spain does not require that the disinheritance
should be accomplished in the same instrument by which the maker
provides for the disposition of his or her property after his or her
death; it merely provides that "disinheritance can be effected only by a
will (any will) in which the legal cause upon which it is based is
Palacios vs. Catimbang Palacios, 106 Phil. 739, No. L-12207 December
24, 1959
1.WILLS; PROBATE DURING LIFETIME OF TESTATOR; OPPOSITION TO
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL NOT ALLOWED.—Opposition to the
intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
-entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely
to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law, much less if the purpose of the opposition is
to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who
allegedly has been ignored in the will for such issue cannot be raised in
said proceeding but in a separate action. This is especially so when the
testator is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of
his will leaving the effects thereof after his death.
2.ID.; ID.; RIGHT OR POWER OF TESTATOR.—"Af ter a will has been
probated during the lifetime of a testator it does not necessarily mean
that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he
make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he
should die before he had a chance to present such petition, the
ordinary probate proceedings after the testator's death would be in
order." (Report of the Code Commission pp. 53-54) The reason for this
comment is that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code).
Macam vs. Gatmaitan, 60 Phil. 358, No. 40445 August 17, 1934
1.WILLS; PROBATE; PRESENTATION AND PROBATE OF A CODICIL.—
The fact that a will has been probated and the order allowing the same
has become final and executory, is not a bar to the presentation or
probate of a codicil, although its existence was known at the time of
the probate of the will.
2ID.; ID.; ID.; OPPOSITION TO THE PROBATE OP A CODICIL.—The fact
that the oppositor to the probate of a codicil has not opposed the
probate of the will, having knowledge of such proceedings, does not
constitute an abandonment of a right, nor does it deprive her of the
right to oppose the probate of said codicil.
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 451,
No. L-76464 February 29, 1988
Civil Law; Wills; Revocation of Will; To constitute an effective
revocation, the physical act of destruction of a will must be coupled
with animus revocandi on the part of the testator.—It is clear that the
physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not
per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is
coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not
imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator
himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express
direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without
saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intention to revoke must be accompanied by
overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling the will
by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his
express direction.—In this case, while animus revocandi, or the
that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of
the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and
testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt
physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will
carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and
under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show
compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers
burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established
to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the
burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction
of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both
witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were
the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the
kitchen) was located in which the papers proferred as a will were
burned.
Civil Procedure; Res Adjudicata; Doctrine of res adjudicata finds no
application in the case at bar; Requisites of res adjudicata.—The
doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present
controversy. For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former
judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former
judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is, between the
first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
cause of action. We do not find here the presence of all the
enumerated requisites.
Same; Same; Same; Strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered
insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned.—For one,
there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the
probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial
court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only the
intestate Settlement of the estate of Adria iana. As such, that j udgment
could not in any manner be construed to be final with respect to the
probate of the subsequently discovered will of the decedent. Neither is
it a judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is
understandably so because the trial court, in the intestate proceeding,
was without jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the contested will.
After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded on the presence
of a will and with the objective of proving its due execution and
validity, something which can not be properly done in an intestate
settlement of estate proceeding which is predicated on the assumption
that the decedent left no will. Thus, there is likewise no identity
between the cause of action in intestate proceeding and that in an
action for probate, Be that as it may, it would be remembered that it
was precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that the
petitioners instituted this separate action for the probate of the late
Adriana Maloto's will. Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of
the private respondents on this score can not be sustained.
Casiano vs. Maloto, 79 SCRA 232, No. L-32328 September 30, 1977
Special proceedings; Settlement of Estate; Wills; It is not proper to
make a finding in an intestate proceeding that a discovered will has
been revoked. A separate petition for probate of the alleged will should
be ordered filed.—The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain
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the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto in
Special Proceeding No. 1736, an intestate estate proceeding. Indeed,
the motion to reopen the proceedings was denied because the same
was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an
intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked.
As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 1736
stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that “Movants should have
filed a separate action for the probate of the will.” And this court stated
in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that “The more appropriate remedy of
the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners
to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in
question.”
Gonzales vs. Gonzales de Carungcong, 90 Phil. 444, No. L–3272-73
November 29, 1951
1.WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE MADE BY TESTATOR AND SIGNED BY
WlTNESSES, SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES WITH LAW.—An attestation
clause made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental
witnesses, but signed by the latter right under the signature of the
testator, substantially complies with the requirements of law.
2.ID.; ID.; STATEMENT OF SHEETS OR PAGES IN BODY OF WILL HELD
SUFFICIENT WHEN CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH
ATTESTATION CLAUSE.—The statement in the penultimate paragraph
of the will as to the number of the sheets or pages used is sufficient
attestation which may be considered in conjunction with the last
paragraph which was herein held as the attestation clause. The law
does not require the attestation to be contained in a single clause.
3.ID.; TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY; TESTIMONY OF ATTENDING
PHYSICIAN PREVAILS OVER THAT OF TESTAMENTARY WITNESSES.—
Where the family physician attended the testatrix during her last illness
and saw her on the day when the alleged document of revocation was
executed, the testimony of the attesting witnesses tending to imply
that the testatrix was of sound mind at the time said document was
executed, cannot prevail over the contrary testimony of the attending
physician.
Samson vs. Naval., 41 Phil. 838, No. 1823 February 11, 1918
1.WILLS; REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT WILL.—In order that a former
will may be revoked by operation of law by a subsequent will, it is
necessary that the latter should be 'valid and executed with the
formalities required for the making of wills.
2.ID. ; ID.—A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous
will, should possess all the requisites of a will, should be signed and
attested in the manner provided by law, and should be allowed, in
order that the revocatory clause thereof may produce the effect of
revoking the previous will.
3.ID.; ID.; VOID REVOCATORY CLAUSE.—A subsequent will, containing
a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the
reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills,
cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as
said revocatory clause is void.
Molo vs. Molo, 90 Phil. 37, No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
1.WILLS; REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT WILL; EFFECT OF VOID
REVOCATORY CLAUSE.—A subsequent will containing a clause
revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it
was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce
the effect of annuling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory
clause is void (Samson vs. Naval, 41 Phil., 838).
2.ID.; PROBATE; DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION.—Even in the
supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator
could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in
court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior
will where it is founded on the mistaken belief that the later will has
been validly executed and would be given due effect. The earlier will
can still be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent
relative revocation". The theory on which this principle is predicated is
that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is
clearly manifest where he executed two wills on two different occasions
and instituted his wife as his universal heir.
Vda. de Roxas vs. Roxas, 87 Phil. 692, No. L-2396 December 11, 1950
1.WlLLS; PROBATE; TESTIMONY OF ATTESTING WlTNESSES, WHEN
ENTITLED TO FULL CREDIT.—Where the reputation for probity of the
three attesting witnesses has not been impeached, their testimony
confirmatory of the due execution of the will, deserves full credit.
2.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; RELATIVES OF TESTATOR OR HEIR NOT DISQUALIFIED
TO ACT AS ATTESTING WITNESS.—The law does not bar relatives
either of the testator or of the heirs or legatees from acting as attesting
witnesses to the will.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT;
EXCEPTION.—Ordinarily, the findings of fact of a trial court, because of
the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses, are entitled to
great weight. But it is not so, where the court relied on the conclusions
of experts and failed to analyze the oral evidence.
4.ID.; ID.; POOR STATIONERY, LACK OF COPY, OR NONINTERVENTION
OF LAWYER OR NOTARY, DOES NOT AFFECT VALIDITY OF WILL.—The
validity of a will is not affected by the fact that it is written on poor
stationery, that it was not prepared by a lawyer or notary public, or that
no copies were made.
5.ID. ; ID. ; TESTIMONY OF ATTESTING WITNESSES TO PREVAIL OVER
EXPERT OPINIONS.—The positive testimony of the three attesting
witnesses in favor of the due execution of the will ought to prevail over
expert opinions which cannot be mathematically precise but which, on
the contrary, are subject to inherent infirmities. The law, in requiring
the production of all the attesting witnesses .present in the Philippines,
impliedly recognizes the almost conclusive weight of their testimony.
6.ID. ; ID. ; WILL NEED NOT BE WRITTEN IN ONE CONTINUOUS ACT.—
The law does not require that the will should be written in one
continuous act.
7.ID.; ID.; REVOCATION; CRUMPLING OF WILL BY TESTATOR WITHOUT
INTENTION TO REVOKE.—The fact that the testator crumpled the will
does not amount to revocation unless it is shown that the crumpling
was caused with intention to revoke.
Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710, No. L-3378 August 22, 1951
1.COURTS; PROBATE OF WILLS; PRESUMPTION OF JURISDICTION AND
REGULARITY OF JUDICIAL ACTS.—In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, the legal presumption is that a court which probated a
will complied with its duty and acted in lawful exercise of its jurisdiction
in probating said will (See. 69 (m) (n), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court).
2.WILLS; PROBATE; REVOKED WILL CANNOT BE INCLUDED IN
PROBATE OF SUBSEQUENT WILL.—If two wills are presented for
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allowance but one of them revokes expressly and absolutely the other,
the revoked will cannot be included in the probate of the later
subsequent will. The revoked will may be probated and allowed if the
subsequent revoking will is disallowed.
3.ACTIONS; INTEREST REQUIRED TO MAKE A PERSON A PARTY.—In
special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law the interest
required in order that a person may be a party on appeal must be not
merely indirect or contingent but must be material and direct, so that
he will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's
order, decree or judgment. (Espinosa vs. Barrios, 40 O. G. [8 Supp. No.
12] p. 145.)
Austria vs. Reyes, 31 SCRA 754, No. L-23079 February 27, 1970
Civil law; Succession; Testamentary succession; Institution of heir;
Requisites for annulment of institution of heir for statement of a false
cause.—Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Article
850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the
cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the
cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the
face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution
if he had known the falsity of the cause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where will does not state cause for
institution of heir.—Where the decedent’s will does not state in a
specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs,
the will cannot be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code. Such
institution may be annulled only when it is clear, after an examination
of the will that the testator clearly would not have made the institution
if he had known the cause for it to be false.
Same; Same; Same; Interpretation of will; Testacy favored.—Testacy is
favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically
his whole estate, as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is
the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the
testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the
will for the purpose of giving it effect.
Remedial law; Courts; Inherent powers; Power to amend and control
processes.—Every court has the inherent power to amend and control
its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice. In this case, the lower court had power to reverse its order of
December 22, 1959 because the subsequent orders complained of
served merely to clarify the first—an act which the court could legally
do.
Same; Civil procedure; Intervention; Power of court to limit extent of
intervention.—The court has the power to limit the extent of a party’s
intervention in a probate case within its powers as articulated by the
Rules of Court.
Gago vs. Mamuyac, 49 Phil. 902, No. 26317 January 29, 1927
WILLS, CANCELLATION OF; PRESUMPTION.—The law does not require
any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of the will to be
preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the
cancellation or revocation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or
revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be inferred
from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be
found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in
the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in
the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled
or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the
testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his
death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any
other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator.
Manalo vs. Paredes and Philippine Food Co., 47 Phil., 938, September
22, 1925
1.WILLS; PROBATE OF; PROCEEDING "IN REM."—The proceeding for
the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265), and the court
acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested, through the
publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and any order that may be entered therein is binding
against all of them.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION.—Through the publication of the petition
for the probate of the will, the court acquires jurisdiction over all such
persons as are interested in said will; and any judgment that may be
rendered after said proceeding is binding against the whole world.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL.—The court having jurisdiction over the
subject-matter and all the persons interested in the case, any error that
it might have committed in rendering judgment cannot be corrected
through mandamus, but by the proper appeal presented in due time
and manner.
Solivio vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 119, G.R. No. 83484 February 12,
1990
Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate; Courts; Jurisdiction; Trial
court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for partition and
recovery of properties belonging to the estate of a deceased person,
while the probate proceedings for the settlement of said estate are still
pending in another branch of the same court.—After a careful review of
the records, we find merit in the petitioner’s contention that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Concordia Villanueva’s action for partition and recovery of her share of
the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl.
Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in
Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the
submission and approval of the administratrix’s inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record) x x x In the interest of
orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions
of a decedent’s estate, a court should not interfere with probate
proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v.
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31,
1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to
annul a project of partition executed between her and her father in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother: “The
probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered
to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of
the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29,
1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of
the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong v.
Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive
and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his
share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari
v. Bonilla, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who
has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for
reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an independent action, which
would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and
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executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed
of.” (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra;
Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v.
Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Italics
supplied)
Same; Same; Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem, publication
of the notice of the proceedings is constructive notice to the whole
world.—The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of
the time and place of hearing of the petition is required to be
published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court).
Notice of the hearing of Celedonia’s original petition was published in
the “Visayan Tribune” on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh. 4, p. 197,
Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of
May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the
court, published in “Bagong Kasanag” (New Light) issues of May 27,
June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the
notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world.
Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the
same.
Same; Same; Same; Annulment of judgment; Extrinsic fraud; Failure to
disclose to the adverse party, or to the court, matters which will defeat
one’s own claim or defense does not constitute extrinsic fraud that will
justify vacation of judgment.—Celedonia’s allegation in her petition
that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his
mother’s side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in
the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come
from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban’s nearest surviving
relative on his mother’s side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have
been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if
she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission
to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud. “Failure to disclose to the
adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one’s own claim
or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation
of the judgment.” (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622;
First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842;
Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
Wills and Succession; Reserva Troncal; Reserva troncal does not apply
to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant.—Clearly, the
property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of
his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in
question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative
within the third degree on his mother’s side. The reserva troncal applies
to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who
inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not
apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the
reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Evidence; Judicial Admissions; Judicial admissions are conclusive and
no evidence is required to prove the same.—However, inasmuch as
Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the
foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
(from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and
confirmed in her “Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated
April 3, 1978” which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540: “4. That x x x
prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and
movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the
decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other
due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each
other’s house which are not far away for (sic) each other.” (p. 234,
Record; emphasis supplied) she is bound by that agreement. It is true
that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of
Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban’s estate in the
“Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation” which Esteban, Jr.,
during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to
finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well. Her
admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a
judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented
to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v.
Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v.
Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.
70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
Abut vs. Abut, 45 SCRA 326, No. L-26743 May 31, 1972
Special proceedings; Allowance of will;; When court vested with
jurisdictions—The jurisdiction of the court became vested upon the
filing of the original petition and upon compliance with sections 3 and
4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction of court continues until termination of the
case.—Jurisdiction of the court once acquired continues until the
termination of the case, and remains unaffected by subsequent events.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction over persons interested; How acquired.—A
proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court’s jurisdiction
extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. All that section 4 of Rule 76 provides is that
those heirs (additional heirs named in the amended petition but not
included in the original petition) be notified of the hearing for the
probate of the will, either mail or personally.
Same; Same; Absence of notice to individual heirs; Effect of.—Service of
notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of
procedural convenience, not jurisdictional requisite. So much so that
even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been omitted from the
petition for allowance of the will and therefore were not advised—the
decree allowing the will does not ipso facto become void for want of
jurisdiction.
Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al., 17 SCRA 449, No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
Wills; Succession; Probate of will; Court’s area of inquiry is limited to
extrinsic validity of will; When Court may rule on intrinsic validity.—In a
proceeding for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is
limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of
the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity
and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet that
issue.
Same; Preterition; Omission of forced heirs in the will.—Where the
deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line—her parents, and her
holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits
their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents,
not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Same; Preterition distinguished from disinheritance.—Preterition
“consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
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disinherited.” (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil., 325). Disinheritance, in turn, “is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in
the legitime for a cause authorized by law.” (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and
R.C. Puno, “An Outline of Philippine Civil Law”, 1966 ed., Vol. III, p. 8,
citing cases.) Disinheritance is always “voluntary”; preterition, upon the
other hand, is presumed to be “involuntary” (Sánchez Román, Estudios
de Derecho Civil, 2nd edition, Volumen 2.o, p. 1131).
Same; Effects flowing from preterition and disinheritance.—The effects
flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the New Civil Code
“shall annul the institution of heir”. This annulment is in toto, unless in
the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of
devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the
same Code, such disinheritance shall also “annul the institution of
heirs”, but only “insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited”,
which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of
which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
Same; When institution of heirs is void.—Where the onesentence will
institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the
parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specif ic legacies or
bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And
intestate succession ensues.
Same; When legacies and devises merit consideration.—Legacies and
devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as
such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code suggests
that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will—void because of
preterition—would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance.
As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such
institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or
legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir.
Same; Institution of heirs cannot be considered a legacy.—If every case
of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies
and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions
of Articles 814 and 851 of the old Civil Code, regarding total or partial
nullity of the institution, would be absolutely meaningless and will
never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions
contained in said articles concerning the reduction of inofficious
legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be
absorbed by Article 817 of the same Code.
Guevara vs. Guevara, and Quinto, 98 Phil. 249, No. L-5405 January 31,
1956
1.WILLS; PROBATE OF; PROBATE PROCEEDINGS NOT BARRED BY
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.—Reason and precedent reject the
applicability of the Statute of Limitations to probate proceedings,
because the same are established not exclusively in the interest of the
heirs, but primarily for the protection of the testator’s expressed
wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of his ownership
and right of disposition. Inasmuch as the probate of wills is required by
public policy, the State could not have intended to defeat the same by
applying thereto the statute of limitations of action.
2.ID.; ID.; PARTITION PROBATE WILLS CAN NOT BE DISPENSED WITH
EVEN IF DECEDENT LEFT NO DEBTS.—Even if the decedent left no
debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due
execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the
estate in accordance with a will without first securing its allowance or
probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that “no
will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court”; and, second, because the probate of a
will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and
substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial.
Maravilla vs. Maravilla, 37 SCRA 672, No. L-23225 February 27, 1971
Evidence; Testimony of witnesses; Variations in expressions badge of
truthfulness.—The variation in the expressions used by the witness is
the best evidence that he was being candid and careful, and it is a clear
badge of truthfulness rather than the reverse.
Same; Due execution of the will shown by the evidence; Failure of
witness to identify his signature does not bar probate.—A will may be
allowed even if some witnesses do not remember having attested it, if
other evidence satisfactorily show due execution, and that failure of
witness to identify his signature does not bar probate.
Civil law; When witnesses to a will deemed to have signed in the
presence of each other.—It should be remembered, in this connection,
that the test is not whether a witness did see the signing of the will but
whether he was in a position to see if he chose to do so.
Remedial law; Statement of attorney on the due execution of the will
entitled to great weight.—In weighing the testimony of the attesting
witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent attorney, who has
been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution
of the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a
person casually called to participate in the act, supposing of course
that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to
prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney, being
conversant with the requisites of proper execution of the instrument, is
more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other
persons to retain those incidents in his memory.
Civil law; Test of soundness of mind of testator.—To be of sound mind,
it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired or
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
Lopez vs. Gonzaga, 10 SCRA 167, No. L-18788 January 31, 1964
Wills; Probate; Order of adjudication by court distinguished from
testamentary institution of heir; Case at bar.—The order of adjudication
is the judicial recognition that in appointing a person as her only heir
the testatrix did not contravene the law, and that the heir was in no
way disqualified to inherit; just as a final order admitting a will to
probate concludes all and sundry from thereafter contending that
statutory formal requirements have not been observed in executing the
testament. In the case at bar, instead of contradicting the testamentary
institution of heir, the order of adjudication confirms it.
Same; Same; Notice to interested parties; Recording of judicial order
sufficient.—The. failure of the defendant heir? in the case at bar, to file
with the Register of Deeds a certified copy of his letters of
administration and the will, as provided in Sec. 90 of Act 496, and to
record the attested copies of the will and of the allowance thereof by
the court under Section 624 of Act 190, does not negate the validity of
the judgment or decree of probate nor the rights of the devisee under
the will, because. said Section 90 refers to the dealings with registered
lands by an administrator, and defendant heir in the case at bar sought
and obtained the change in the certificates of title in his own behalf
and capacity, and the recording of the judicial orders sufficed as
notice .to interested parties, and was a substantial compliance with the
required recording of the will itself.
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Same; Same; Administrator as trustee; Termination of trust; By approval
of final account and by transfer of title to former trustee thru
repudiation and prescription.—The contention that defendant-appellee
in the case at bar, having been appointed administrator, must be
deemed a trustee up to the present is infantile, because: first, no
administration could continue to exist after the order of the court had
approved the final account, adjudicated the property to the only heir,
cancelled the bond of the administrator, and ordered the case
"archivado el mismo por terminado," and no proof exists that the
proceedings were ever reopened; and secondly, the transfer of the
certificates of title to the defendant's own name in 1936 would
constitute an open and clear repudiation of any trust, and the lapse of
more than twenty years' open and adverse possession as owner would
certainly suffice to vest title by prescription in the defendent-appellee,
since appellants, who knew of the death of the testatrix in 1935, never
made any move to require the defendant to reconvey the property.
Same; Same; Due process; Day in court not denied to parties
represented by counsel.—Where the authority of their counsel to
appear for them was never questioned by appellants until the adverse
decision was rendered by the court below, their contention that they
were denied their day in court is incredible and appears to be but a last
minute attempt to escape the adverse effect of the appealed decision.
Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478, No. L-57848 June 19,
1982
Civil Law; Wills and Succession; Probate; Probate of a will is mandatory;
Reason.—Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. The law enjoins
the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the
Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered
nugatory.
Same; Same; Same; Probate of will does not look into its intrinsic
validity.—Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic
validity. “x x x The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions,
these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated x x x”
Same; Same; Preterition and disinheritance, distinguished.—“x x x
Preterition ‘consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced
heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited.’ (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance,
in turn, ‘is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of
his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law,’ (Justice J.B.L.
Reyes and R.C. Puno, ‘An Outline of Philippine Civil Law’, 1956 ed., Vol.
III, p. 8, citing cases) Disinheritance is always, ‘voluntary’, preterition,
upon the other hand, is presumed to be ‘involuntary’ (Sanchez Roman,
Estudios de Derecho Civil 2nd edition, Volumen 2.o, p. 1131).”
Same; Same; Same; Effects of preterition and disinheritance.—
Preterition under Article 854 of the New Civil Code ‘shall annul the
institution of heir.’ This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are,
in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devices or
legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same
Code, such disinheritance shall also ‘annul the institution of heirs’, but
only ‘insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited’, which last
phrase was omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code
of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of
which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.”
Same; Same; Will should not be denied legality based on dubious
grounds.—As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, “x x x it is
as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not
denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution
of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, x x x”
Same; Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Certiorari; Act done by a
probate court in excess of its jurisdiction correctible by certiorari;
Certiorari available where appeal not a speedy remedy.—Coming now
to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding
that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
dismissing the Testate Case, Certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done
by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by
Certiorari. And even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal,
we harken to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition
for Certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not
afford speedy and adequate relief.
Ralla vs. Untalan, 172 SCRA 858, G.R. Nos. 63253-54 April 27, 1989
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estates; Partition;
Probate of Wills; There can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated, but this rule presupposes that the
properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the
will.—–Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the
heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes
that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced
in the will. Thus, the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where
there are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and
Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each
involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo
Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.
Same; Civil Procedure; Interlocutory Orders; Interlocutory orders, prior
to the rendition of final judgment, are, at any time, subject to such
corrections and amendments as the court may deem proper.—–As
regards the abovequoted paragraph 2, this Court finds that the same is
interlocutory in character because it did not decide the action with
finality and left substantial proceedings still to be had. The foregoing
order of inclusion of the subject parcels of land was a mere incident
that arose in the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla. It is
elementary that interlocutory orders, prior to the rendition of the final
judgment, are at any time, subject to such corrections or amendments
as the court may deem proper. Thus, in issuing the questioned Order
dated July 16, 1981, which reversed the aforementioned interlocutory
order and upheld the project of partition, respondent Judge Untalan
acted well within his jurisdiction and without grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Partition; Judgments; After a partition has become a
judgment of the court, and distribution thereof fully carried out, with
the heirs receiving the properties assigned to them, the latter are
precluded from attacking the validity of said partition or any part
thereof.—–Furthermore, the Court had occasion to rule that: Where a
partition had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of
the court, but distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition
had fully been carried out, and the heirs had received the property
assigned to them, they are precluded from subsequently attacking its
validity or any part of it. Likewise: Where a piece of land has been
included in a partition, and there is no allegation that the inclusion was
effected through improper means or without the petitioners’
knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and
operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the
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court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition . . .
They can not attack the partition collaterally, as they are trying to do in
this case. (Italics supplied).
Maloles II vs. Phillips, 324 SCRA 172, G.R. No. 129505, G.R. No. 133359
January 31, 2000
Remedial Law; Courts; Wills; In cases for the probate of wills, it is well
settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the
extrinsic validity of the will.—In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-
settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the
extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only
after the death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and
allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and
settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of
such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a
petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of
ambulatory nature of wills.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The different branches comprising
each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions
independent of and incompatible with each other.—Indeed, the
jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with
approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or
P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts
under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches comprising
each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions
independent of and incompatible with each other. It is noteworthy that,
although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for
probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other
branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of the testator after his death. Necessarily, therefore,
Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No.
M-4343.
Same; Same; Same; Only if the appointed executor is incompetent,
refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other
persons to administer the estate.—Petitioner, as nephew of the
testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the
testator’s will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the
settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of
the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his
will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the
testator. Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the
trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to
administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this
case.
Teotico vs. Del Val, 13 SCRA 406, No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
Settlement of decedent’s estate; Probate Proceedings; Only an
interested party may intervene.—In order that a person may be allowed
to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the
estate, or in the will, or in the property to be effected by it either as an
executor or as a claimant of the tate, and an interested party has been
defined as one who would be benefited by the estate like a creditor.
Same; Same; Oppositor who would not benefit under the will nor as
legal heir cannot intervene in proceedings.—Where under the terms of
the will an oppositor has no interest in the estate either as heir,
executor or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will, nor would she acquire any interest in any portion
of the estate as legal heir if the will were denied probate, it is held that
said oppositor cannot intervene in the probate proceedings.
Same; Same; Relationship by adoption does not extend to relatives of
adopting parent or of adopted child.—Under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the
adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents
or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law.
Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the
collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is
an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Same; Improper pressure on testatrix; Burden of proof on person
challenging will.—The exercise of improper pressure and undue
influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a
kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as
to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another
rather than her own (Goso v. Deza, 42 O.G. 596). The burden of proof is
on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at
the time of its execution.
Same; Question of intrinsic validity of provisions of will cannot be
entertained in probate proceedings.—Opposition to the intrinsic
validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in
probate proceedings because its only purpose is merely to determine if
the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the
law.
Cortes vs. Court of Appeals, 340 SCRA 715, G.R. No. 117417 September
21, 2000
Civil Law; Property; Settlement of Estates; Probate courts, or those in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and
which are claimed to belong to outside parties.—The long standing
rule is that pro-bate courts, or those in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. Stated otherwise, “claims for title to, or right of
possession of, personal or real property, made by the heirs themselves,
by title adverse to that of the deceased, or made by third persons,
cannot be entertained by the (probate) court.” Same; Same; Same;
When the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them
to submit to the probate court the question of title to property.—By
way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, “when the parties are
all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the
probate court the question of title to property.” Here, the probate court
is competent to decide the question of ownership. More so, when the
opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate
action would be most expensive and inexpedient.
Same; Same; Same; When the controversy is whether the property in
issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to the
decedent the same is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate
court.—In the same way, when the controversy is whether the property
in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to the
decedent, the same is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate
court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in
order to determine the estate of the dece-dent which is to be
distributed among the heirs.
Cayetano vs. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522, No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
Succession; Due Process; Attorneys; There being a proper substitution
of attorneys where the Motion to Dismiss Opposition to reprobate of
will was filed, trial judge acted properly in hearing evidence ex parte on
probate of will in question.—We find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced to support
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petitioner’s contention that the motion to withdraw was secured
through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his
counsel of record. The records show that after the filing of the
contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation
wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his
voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the
petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn
from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in
turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore,
maintain that the old man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the
time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the
respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-
parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
Same; Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic
validity of will is resolved, probate court should meet the issue.—The
third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As
a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
Same; The U.S. law on succession in the state of Pennsylvania applies to
the intrinsic and extrinsic validity of the last will and testament of a U.S.
national and resident of Pennsylvania under whose laws a person may
give his entire estate to a complete stranger.—Although on its face, the
will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at
the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2)
and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide: x x x x the law
which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties
admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that
all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete
stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because
it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and
would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
Same; Same.—It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of
the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).
Motions; Due Process; There was no denial of due process as what the
court repeatedly set for hearing was the Petition for Relief, not the
Motion to Vacate Order of Jan. 10, 1979.—As regards the alleged
absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records will
bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on
separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner’s petition for relief
and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no
reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise.
The court even admonished the petitioner’s failing to adduce evidence
when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no
denial of due process. The fact that he requested “for the future setting
of the case for hearing x x x” did not mean that at the next hearing, the
motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of the
petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a
motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.
Succession; Jurisdiction; Probate of Will of American citizen who left an
estate in the Philippines was properly filed in the City of Manila where
estate is located.—Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion
Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila
where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that
Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a “usual
resident of Cavite” as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is
now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in
the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent
and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction.
Aranas vs. Mercado, 713 SCRA 194, G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014
Civil Law; Succession; The approval of the inventory and the
concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.—The
assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the
approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying
her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the
inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final
determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory
and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject
to revision at anytime during the course of the administration
proceedings.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The final judgment rule
embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,
which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only
the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of an
appeal in due course.—An appeal would not be the correct recourse
for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final
judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41,
Rules of Court, which also governs appeals in special proceedings,
stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a
court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be
the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an
interlocutory order or resolution (interlocu-tory because it deals with
preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and
the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.
Same; Same; Same; Multiple Appeals; Multiple appeals are permitted in
special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that
material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the
special proceedings.—Multiple appeals are permitted in special
proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material
issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special
proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in
special proceedings, viz.: Section 1. Orders or judgments from which
appeals may be taken.—An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First
Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order
or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the
lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate
to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in
part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d)
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Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a
final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator; and (f) Is the final order or
judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the
person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion
for a new trial or for reconsideration.
Civil Law; Succession; Settlement of Estates Deceased Persons; Under
Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration
may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse,
who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate.
—Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the
surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the
person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the
surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the
estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and
responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the
issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of
Court.
Same; Same; Same; The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the
inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the
court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the
executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the
administration of the estate.”—The objective of the Rules of Court in
requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is
“to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities
of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and
equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to
facilitate the administration of the estate.” Hence, the RTC that presides
over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on
the question of what properties should be included in the inventory.
According to Peralta v. Peralta, 71 Phil. 66 (1940), the CA cannot
impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue
of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory
in the absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the
administration of the estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy
ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not
interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it
be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion.” As long
as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders
must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
duty.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; There is no dispute
that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited.—There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an
intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to
belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the
estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All
that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties
to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is
provisional and may be still revised.
Same; Evidence; Notarized Documents; A notarized deed of sale only
enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its
notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the
transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be.—
The fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of
Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the
exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized
deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its
execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal
efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the contents
purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. As the Court has
observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals: x x x. Though the notarization
of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of
regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to
validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place,
intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The
intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract. 
Civil Law; Land Titles; The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring
titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to lands.—
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in
the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately
excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances
admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This
is because: The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to
lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to lands. However,
justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to
bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s
agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of
manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens
system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as
to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the
certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be
sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials,
who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.
Same; Succession; Collation; Article 1061 of the Civil Code required
every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, to “bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.”—Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every
compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to
“bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or
she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the
legitime of an heir “may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on
the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction
of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the
inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the
inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any
compulsory heir by the decedent.
Same; Same; The determination of which properties should be
excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was
well within the authority and discretion of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) as an intestate court.—The determination of which properties
should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with
circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was
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best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or
were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to
exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of
the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Gallanosa vs. Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676, No. L-29300 June 21, 1978
Settlement of Estate; Wills; Res Judicata; Prescription; An action
instituted in 1967 for the annulment of a last will and testament duly
probated way back in 1939 will not prosper.—What the plaintiffs seek
is the “annulment” of a last will and testament duly probated in 1939
by the lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled with an action to
recover the lands adjudicated to the defendants by the same court in
1943 by virtue of the probated will, which action is a resuscitation of
the complaint of the same parties that the same court dismissed in
1952. It is evident from the allegations of the complaint and from
defendants’ motion to dismiss that plaintiffs’ 1967 action is barred by
res judicata, a double-barrelled defense, and by prescription,
acquisitive and extinctive, or by what are known in the jus civile and the
jus gentium as usucapio, longi temporis possesio and praescriptio (See
Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974 61 SCRA 284).
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice. The Rules of Court does not
sanction an action for “annulment” of a will.—Our procedural law does
not sanction an action for the “annulment” of a will. In order that a will
may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the
proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory
(Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of
Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil.
249). The testamentary proceeding is a special proceeding for
settlement of the testators estate. A special proceeding is distinct and
different from an ordinary action (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2 and sec. 1, Rule
72. Rules of Court).
Same; Same; Res Judicata; Consequences of due probate of a will.—The
1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal
validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act 190, sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule
75, Rules of Court; Last par. of art. 828, Civil Code). That means that the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he
executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or
undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the
required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a
forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a
subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of
the will. (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p.
395; Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448). After the finality of the
allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution
cannot be raised anymore (Santos vs. De Buenaventura, L-22797,
September 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 47).
Same; Same; Same; Decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is
binding on the whole world.—On the other hand, the 1943 decree of
adjudication rendered by the trial court in the testate proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of Florentino Hitosis, having been
rendered in a proceeding in rem, is, under the abovequoted section
49(a), binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938;
In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; De la Cerha vs. Potot, 120 Phil.
1361, 1364; McMaster vs. Henry Reissmann & Co., 68 Phil. 142).
Same; Same; Same; Judgment; Grounds for annulment of judgment
after period for filing petition for relief expires.—After the period for
seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on
the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or
(b) that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral
fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is four
years from the discovery of the fraud (2 Moran’s Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pp. 245-246; Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106
Phil. 1159).
Same; Same; Contracts; Prescription; The Civil Law rule that an action
for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not prescribe cannot
be applied to last wills and testaments.—To hurdle over the obstacle of
prescription, the trial court, naively adopting the theory of plaintiffs
counsel, held that the action for the recovery of the lands had not
prescribed because the rule in Article 1410 of the Civil Code, that “the
action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe”, applies to wills. That ruling is a glaring error.
Article 1410 cannot possibly apply to last wills and testaments.
Noel vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 78, G.R. No. 59550, G.R. No. 60636
January 11, 1995
Sales; Mortgage; Equitable Mortgage; In the absence of proof of gross
inadequacy of the price, the fact that the sale was made with what
might appear as an inadequate consideration does not make the
contract one of mortgage.—There are no cogent reasons to deviate
from the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the contract involving the
34.7hectare property was one of sale and not of mortgage in the
absence of a showing that the findings complained of are totally
devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous
as to constitute serious abuse of discretion (Andres v. Manufacturers
Hanover & Trust Corporation, 177 SCRA 618 [1989]). It should be noted
that two contracts had been executed involving said property (the
November 1, 1952 mortgage and the February 16, 1954 sale). In the
absence of proof of gross inadequacy of the price, that the sale was
made with what might appear as an inadequate consideration does not
make the contract one of mortgage (Askay v. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179
[1924]).
Succession; Rights to inheritance of a person who died, with or without
a will, before the effectivity of the Civil Code were governed primarily
by the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889.—Gregorio died in
1945 long before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines on
August 30, 1950. Under Article 2263 of the said Code, “rights to the
inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by
other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court.” Thus, succession to the
estate of Gregorio was governed primarily by the provisions of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889.
Same; Under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, a spouse who is survived
by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent,
was entitled to receive in usufruct the part of the inheritance pertaining
to said heirs.—Under Article 953 thereof, a spouse like Hilaria, who is
survived by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the
decedent, as is obtaining in this case, was entitled to receive in usufruct
the part of the inheritance pertaining to said heirs. Hilaria, however,
had full ownership, not merely usufruct, over the undivided half of the
estate (Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Art. 493). It is only this undivided
half-interest that she could validly alienate.
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Same; Illegitimate children who were not natural were. disqualified to
inherit under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889.—Virgilio was not an heir
of Gregorio under the Spanish Civil Code of 1.889. Although he was
treated as a child by the Nanaman spouses, illegitimate children who
were not natural were disqualified to inherit under the said Code (Cid v.
Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]). Article 998 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which gave an illegitimate child certain hereditary rights,
could not benefit Virgilio because the right of ownership of the
collateral heirs of Gregorio had become vested upon his death (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 2253; Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530
[1953]). Therefore, Virgilio had no right at all to transfer ownership over
property which he did not own.
Same; Sales; It is essential that the seller is the owner of the property
he is selling.—In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the
owner of the property he is selling. The principal obligation of a seller
is “to transfer the ownership of’ the property sold (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 1458). “This law stems from the principle that nobody
can dispose of that which does not belong to him (Azcona v. Reyes, 59
Phil. 446 [1934]; Coronel v. Ona, 33 Phil. 456 [1916]). NEMO DAT QUOD
NON HABET. While it cannot be said that fraud attended the sale to
private respondent, clearly there was a mistake on the part of Hilaria
and Virgilio in selling an undivided interest in the property which
belonged to the collateral heirs of Gregorio.
Same; Same; Trusts; If property is acquired through mistake or fraud,
the person obtaining it is considered a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.—The sale,
having been made in 1954, was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Under Article 1456 of said Code, an implied trust was
created on the one-half undivided interest over the 34.7-hectare land
in favor of the real owners. Said Article provides: “If property is
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes.”
Same; Same; Same; The buyer of a parcel of land at a public auction to
satisfy a judgment against a widow acquires only one-half interest on
the land corresponding to the share of the widow and the other half
belonging to the heirs of her husband become impressed with a
constructive trust in behalf of said heirs.—In Diaz v. Gorricho, 103 Phil.
261 (1958), the Court said that Article 1456 merely expresses a rule
recognized in Gayondato v. Insular Treasurer, 49 Phil. 244 (1926).
Applying said rule, the Gayondato court held that the buyer of a parcel
of land at a public auction to satisfy a judgment against a widow
acquired only one-half interest on the land corresponding to the share
of the widow and the other half belonging to the heirs of her husband
became impressed with a constructive trust in behalf of said heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; The surviving spouse, as the
administrator and liquidator of the conjugal estate, under the law in
force in 1945, occupies the position of a trustee of the highest order
and was not permitted by the law to hold that estate or any portion
thereof adversely to those for whose benefit the law imposed upon
him the duty of administration and liquidation.—Under the law in force
in 1945, the surviving spouse was given the management of the
conjugal property until the affairs of the conjugal partnership were
terminated. The surviving spouse became the owner of one-half
interest of the conjugal estate in his own right. He also became a
trustee with respect to the , other half for the benefit of whoever may
be legally entitled to inherit the said portion. “He could therefore no
more acquire a title by prescription against those for whom he was
administering the conjugal estate than could a guardian against his
ward or a judicial administrator against the heirs of an estate. x x x The
surviving husband as the administrator and liquidator of the conjugal
estate occupies the position of a trustee of the highest order and is not
permitted by the law to hold that estate or any portion thereof
adversely to those for whose benefit the law imposes upon him the
duty of administration and liquidation” (Pamittan v. Lasam, 60 Phil. 908
[1934]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Laches; The doctrine of stale demands would
apply only where by reason of the lapse of time, it would be
inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.—In the same
manner, the doctrine of laches does not apply. Upon orders of the
court in the intestate proceedings, Noel, the administrator of the estate
of the Nanaman spouses, immediately filed an action to recover
possession and ownership of the property. There is no evidence
showing any failure or neglect on his part, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier (Cristobal v. Melchor,
78 SCRA 175 [1977]). The doctrine of stale demands would apply only
where by reason of the lapse of time, “[i]t would be inequitable to allow
a party to enforce his legal rights” (Z.E. Lotho, Inc. v. Ice and Cold
Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., 3 SCRA 744 [1961]).
Moreover, this Court, except for very strong reasons, is not disposed to
sanction the application of the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat
the rights of an owner or original transferee (Raneses v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 187 SCRA 397 [1990]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions based on obligation created by law,
can be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues.—The action to recover the undivided half-interest of the
collateral heirs of Gregorio prescribes in ten years. The cause of action
is based on Article 1456 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
made private respondent a trustee of an implied trust in favor of the
said heirs. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
actions based upon an obligation created by law, can be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues (Rosario v.
Auditor General, 103 Phil. 1132 [1958]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The prescriptive period within which
collateral heirs could file an action to recover their share in the
property sold to a third person accrued from the date of the
registration of the deed of sale with the Register of Deeds, not from
the moment of death of the decedent.—ln its Amended Decision, the
Court of Appeals reckoned the prescriptive period from the death of
Gregorio on October 2, 1945. The ten-year prescriptive period within
which the collateral heirs of Gregorio could file an action to recover
their share in the property sold to private respondent (prescripcion
extintiva) accrued only on March 2, 1954, when the deed of sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds (Cf. Arradaza v. Court of Appeals,
170 SCRA 12 [1989]). From March 2, 1954 to April 30, 1963, when the
complaint for the recovery of the property was filed, less than ten years
had elapsed. Therefore, the action had not been barred by prescription.
Heir of the Late Jesus Fran vs. Salas, 210 SCRA 303, G.R. No. 53546 June
25, 1992
Wills and Testaments; Due Process; Formal notice an idle ceremony
where adverse party had actual knowledge.—After the probate court
rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having been no
claim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner
Fran submitted a Project of Partition which private respondent Maria
M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to which private
respondent Espina expressed her conformity through a certification
filed with the probate court. Assuming for the sake of argument that
private respondents did not receive a formal notice of the decision as
they claim in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, these acts
nevertheless constitute indubitable proof of their prior actual
knowledge of the same. A formal notice would have been an idle
ceremony. In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the
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project of partition, which is normally an implementation of the will
and is among the last operative acts to terminate the proceedings. If
private respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision,
they should have desisted from performing the above acts and instead
demanded from petitioner Fran the fulfillment of his alleged promise
to show them the will. The same conclusion refutes and defeats the
plea that they were not notified of the order authorizing the Clerk of
Court to receive the evidence and that the Clerk of Court did not notify
them of the date of the reception of evidence. Besides, such plea must
fail because private respondents were present when the court dictated
the said order.
Same; Evidence; Due Process; Clerks of Court are now authorized to
receive evidence ex parte. Contrary rule in Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete
abandoned.—Lim Tanhu then cannot be used as authority to nullify the
order of the probate court authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive the
evidence for the rule is settled that “when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.” It may also be
emphasized in this connection that Lim Tanhu did not live long; it was
subsequently overruled in Gochangco vs. Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, wherein this Court, en banc, through Justice, now
Chief Justice, Andres R. Narvasa, in reference to what the trial court
termed as “the doctrinal rule laid down in the recent case of Lim Tan
Hu (sic) vs. Ramolete,” ruled: “Now, that declaration does not reflect
long observed and established judicial practice with respect to default
cases. It is not quite consistent, too, with the several explicitly
authorized instances under the Rules where the function of receiving
evidence and even of making recommendatory findings of facts on the
basis thereof may be delegated to commissioners, inclusive of the
Clerk of Court. These instances are set out in Rule 33, x x x; Rules 67
and 69, x x x; Rule 86, x x x; Rule 136, x x x. In all these instances, the
competence of the clerk of court is assumed.
Same; Same; Same; Clerk of Court need not take oath before receiving
evidence ex parte.—The alternative claim that the proceedings before
the Clerk of Court were likewise void because said official did not take
an oath is likewise untenable. The Clerk of Court acted as such when he
performed the delegated task of receiving evidence. It was not
necessary for him to take an oath for that purpose; he was bound by
his oath of office as a Clerk of Court. Private respondents are obviously
of the impression that by the delegation of the reception of evidence
to the Clerk of Court, the latter became a commissioner as defined
under Rule 33 of the Rules of Court entitled Trial by Commissioner.
Same; It is not necessary to attach original will to petition for probate.
—In Santos vs. Castillo and Salazar vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna,
decided six (6) months apart in 1937, this Court already ruled that it is
not necessary that the original of the will be attached to the petition. In
the first, it ruled: “The original of said document [the will] must be
presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the nonpresentation of
said original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof.”
Same; Failure to attach original of will to petition not critical where will
itself was adduced in evidence.—It is not likewise disputed that the
original of the will was submitted in evidence and marked as Exhibit
“F”. It forms part of the records of the special proceedings—a fact
which private respondents admit in their Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration.
Same; Judgments; Due Process; Fraud as ground for relief must be
based on extrinsic fraud.—Granting for the sake of argument that the
non-fulfillment of said promise constitutes fraud, such fraud is not of
the kind which provides sufficient justification for a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 37
and Rule 38, respectively, of the Rules of Court, or even a separate
action for annulment of judgment. It is settled that for fraud to be
invested with such sufficiency, it must be extrinsic or collateral to the
matters involved in the issues raised during the trial which resulted in
such judgment.
Judgments; Various methods to attack validity of a judgment.—In Our
jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an aggrieved
party to set aside or attack the validity of a final judgment: (1) Petition
for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which must be filed within
sixty (60) days after learning of the decision, but not more than six (6)
months after such decision is entered; (2) By direct action, via a special
civil action for certiorari, or by collateral attack, assuming that the
decision is void for want of jurisdiction; (3) By an independent civil
action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code, assuming that the decision
was obtained through fraud and Rule 38 can not be applied.
Same; Wills and testaments; A probate judgment long closed cannot
be attacked by mere motion for reconsideration.—The probate
judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any
attempt to unsettle it, had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the
court below to annul or set the same aside, by mere motion, on the
ground that the will is a forgery. Settled is the rule that the decree of
probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and
it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law,
except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
proceeding. We wish also to advert to the related doctrine which holds
that final judgments are entitled to respect and should not be
disturbed; otherwise, there would be a wavering of trust in the courts.
Same; Same; Where part of estate not distributed, recourse is not to re-
open probate proceedings, but motion for execution or action for
reconveyance.—The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously
denied by the petitioners, is not a ground for the re-opening of the
testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for execution should have
been filed. In De Jesus vs. Daza, this Court ruled that if the executor or
administrator has possession of the share to be delivered, the probate
court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to
order him to transfer that possession to the person entitled thereto.
This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
However, if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary
period, a separate action for the recovery of the shares would be in
order.
Dael vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 68873
March 31, 1989
Civil Law; Property; The conjugal partnership was automatically
dissolved on May 2, 1957 and the same was converted into an implied
ordinary co-ownership.—When Bienvenida Durana died on May 2,
1957, the first conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved. That
conjugal partnership was then converted into an implied ordinary co-
ownership. It was also at this point in time that the inheritance was
transmitted to the heirs of Bienvenida. Thus, her heirs, Cesario, Nonilon,
Carmencita, Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido, acquired respective and
definite rights over-one-half (1/2) of the conjugal partnership property
which pertained to Bienvenida. Consequently, whatever fruits or
income may thereafter be derived from the properties, including the
copra business, would no longer be conjugal but would belong in part
to the heirs in proportion to their respective shares. The fruits and
income of the other half of the property of the conjugal partnership
would exclusively belong to Cesario.
Same; Same; The fruits and income of the separate properties of
Cesario and Victorina including those acquired through their industry
become conjugal upon their marriage on April 6, 1952.—The marriage
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of Cesario and Victorina on April 6, 1952 also produced the
corresponding legal consequences. From that moment on, the fruits or
income of the separate properties of the spouses would be conjugal,
including those acquired through their industry. Hence, the fruits and
income of Cesario’s share in the inheritance from Bienvenida and of his
conjugal share in the property of the first conjugal partnership would
form part of the conjugal partnership properties of the second
marriage. The fruits and income derived or acquired through these
last-mentioned properties would likewise be conjugal in nature.
Same; Same; The properties enumerated in the inventories submitted
to the probate court could not all have been the properties of the first
marriage.—It would have been ideal had there been a liquidation of
the conjugal partnership properties of the first marriage between
Cesario and Bienvenida. Unfortunately, We cannot determine from the
records the amount of such properties at the time of Bienvenida’s
demise. There is a dearth of proof on this matter. What appears
evident, however, is that, considering the continuity in the operation of
the two businesses during the marital coverture between Cesario and
Victorina which spanned a period of fourteen (14) years, and the fact
that after Cesario’s death Victorina still actively engaged in the same
business until her own death five (5) years later, the properties
enumerated in the aforesaid inventories submitted to the probate
court could not all have been properties of the first marriage.
Same; Same; Same; To apportion the properties involved between the
two conjugal partnership, the total mass of the partnership property
shall be divided between the different partnership in proportion to the
duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective
spouses.—Inevitably, the problem is how to apportion the properties
involved between the two conjugal partnerships. On this score,
guidance should be sought from the provisions of the Civil Code to the
effect that whenever the liquidation of the partnership of two or more
marriages contracted by the same person should be carried out at the
same time and there is no evidence to show the capital or the conjugal
property belonging to each of the partnerships to be liquidated, the
total mass of the partnership property shall be divided between the
different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the
property belonging to the respective spouses.
Civil Procedure; Distribution of Estate; Partial distribution of the
decedent’s estate pending the final termination of the testate or
intestate proceedings should as much as possible be discouraged by
the courts.—It is true that “partial distribution of the decedent’s
intestate pending the final termination of the testate or intestate
proceedings should as much as possible be discouraged by the courts
and, unless in extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance
should not be countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is obvious—
courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the
decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately protected
and all the rightful heirs assured of their shares in the inheritance.”
Same; Same; Same; Validity of the questioned order dated December
11, 1980 sustained.—Nevertheless, after duly considering the foregoing
rules, We sustain the validity of the questioned order. The respondent
court correctly held that “(i)f oppositors would stand to share more in
the inheritance that what was fixed for them in the appealed judgment,
We believe the estate had sufficient assets to ensure an equitable
distribution of the inheritance in accordance with law and final
judgment in the proceedings. Also, it does not appear that there are
unpaid obligations, as contemplated in Rule 90, for which provisions
should have been made or a bond required. It is clear that the
provisions of the Rules of Court, as well as the jurisprudence thereon,
were followed in this particular incident.
Vera vs. Navarro, 79 SCRA 408, No. L-27745 October 18, 1977
Taxation; Settlement of estate; Requisite conditions for taxation
purposes, before a trial court may issue order for distribution of a
decedent’s estate.—Under the provisions of the aforequoted Rule
(Section 1, Rule 90), the distribution of a decedent’s assets may only be
ordered under any of the following three circumstances, namely, (1)
when the inheritance tax, among others, is paid; (2) when a sufficient
bond is given to meet the payment of the inheritance tax and all the
other obligations of the nature enumerated in the above-cited
provision; or (3) when the payment of the said tax and all the other
obligations mentioned in the said Rule has been provided for. None of
these three cases, insofar as the satisfaction of the inheritance tax due
from the estate is concerned, were present when the questioned orders
were issued in the case at bar. Although the respondent Judge did
make a condition in its order of June 5, 1967 that the distribution of
the estate of Elsie M. Gaches (except the cash deposits of more than P2
million) shall be trusteed to Atty. Medina for the payment of whatever
taxes may be due to the government from the estate and the heirs
thereof, this Court cannot subscribe to the proposition that the
payment of the tax claims was thereby adequately provided for.
Same; Same; Testate court should order deposit of sum being claimed
as inheritance tax or order sale of non-cash assets to cover the tax
before issuing order of distribution of decedent’s estate.—In the third
place, considering that millions of pesos in taxes were being claimed by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the least reasonable thing that the
probate court should have done was to require the heirs to deposit the
amount of inheritance tax being claimed in a suitable institution or to
authorize the sale of non-cash assets under the court’s control and
supervision.
Same; Same; An heir is not solidarily liable for the payment of the
inheritance due from a co-heir.—The liability of the herein respondents
Eribal and Abanto to pay the inheritance tax corresponding to the
share of Bess Lauer in the inheritance must be negated. The inheritance
tax is an imposition created by law on the privilege to receive property.
Consequently, the scope and subjects of this tax and other related
matters in which it is involved must be traced and sought in the law
itself. An analysis of our tax statutes supplies no sufficient indication
that the inheritance tax, as a rule, was meant to be the joint and
solidary liability of the heirs of a decedent. Section 95(c) of the Tax
Code, in fact, indicates that the general presumption must be
otherwise.
Same; The mere indorsement of a time deposit certificate in favor of
the Commissioner does not extinguish liability for estate tax.—On the
effect of the indorsement of the time deposit certificates to the
Commissioner, the same cannot be held to have extinguished the
estate’s liability for the estate tax. In the first place, in accepting the
indorsement and delivery of the said certificates, the Commissioner
expressly gave notice that his Office—“x x x regrets that the same
cannot be accepted as payment of the deficiency estate tax in this case
since they cannot, at present or on or before December 9, 1967, be
converted into cash.”
Same; Interest and surcharges are due against the decedent’s estate for
late payment of estate tax.—The interest charge of 1% per month
imposed under Section 101(a) (1) of the Tax Code is essentially a
compensation to the State for delay in the payment of the tax due
thereof and for the concomitant use by the taxpayer of funds that
rightfully should be in the government’s hands. x x x The estate cannot
likewise be exempted from the payment of the 5% surcharge imposed
by Section 101(c) of the Tax Code. While there are cases in this
jurisdiction holding that a surcharge shall not be visited upon a
taxpayer whose failure to pay the tax on time is in good faith, this
element does not appear to be present in the case at bar.
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Same; Contempt; The Philippine National Bank is not guilty of
contempt for disobeying writ of garnishment issued by the
Commissioner where the Bank merely acted in obedience to a court
order to release funds in its possession.—The contempt charge against
the officials of the Philippine National Bank is without merit, it
appearing to the satisfaction of this Court that they exerted reasonable
efforts not to disobey the writ of garnishment issued by the
Commissioner, Indeed, said officials merely acted in obedience to the
order of the probate court which threatened them with contempt of
court after they moved to be allowed to deposit with the said probate
court the money of the estate of Elsie M. Gaches deposited with the
said bank. The Commissioner himself, through the Solicitor General,
admitted later that its writ of garnishment cannot be superior to that of
the probate court’s orders as the estate in question was then in
custodia legis.
Same; Same; Overseas Bank of Manila is not guilty of contempt for
extending maturity period of a time deposit where it acted upon
application of the decedent estate’s executor.—The contempt charges
against the officials of the Overseas Bank of Manila likewise merit
dismissal. In the case of the renewal of the term of the time deposits in
question, the said extension was made by no less than the executor of
the estate himself. The renewal of said term may be considered as
purely an act of administration for the enhancement (due to the higher
interest rates) of the value of the estate, and the officials of the bank
cannot consequently be blamed for acting favorably on the executor’s
application.
Same; Same; Settlement of estate; Estate administrator not guilty of
contempt for applying for extension of date of maturity of time deposit
where no malice or prejudice to the estate was shown.—The contempt
charge against Judge Tan is also not meritorious. There is no sufficient
and convincing evidence to show that he renewed the maturity date of
the time deposits in question maliciously or to the prejudice of the
interest of the estate.
Same; Same; Same; A corporation is not guilty of contempt for refusing
to turn over dividends due the decendent’s estate where it acted in
obedience to a writ issued by the B.I.R. Commission.—The Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company is likewise entitled to exoneration from
the contempt charged lodged against it. In refusing to turn over to
Atty. Medina stock dividends payable to the estate of Elsie M. Gaches,
it is evident that the said corporation acted in good faith in view of the
writ of garnishment issued to it by the Commissioner.
Same; Same; Same; No contempt of court is committed where parties
concerned complied substantially with the court’s orders.—With
reference to the charge for contempt against the respondents Atty.
Medina, Eribal and Abanto, although admittedly the resolutions of this
Court dated July 10 and 17, 1967 were not strictly complied with by the
said respondents, it appears clearly that they immediately deposited
with the probate court shares of stock with a fairly stable liquidity value
of P2,588,520.00.
Attorneys; Settlement of estate; Attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 held
reasonable for services rendered in settlement of estate case.—With
reference to the attorney’s fees to be paid to Atty. Manuel M. Paredes,
this Court is of the opinion, after a careful study of the statement of
services rendered by said counsel to the respondents Eribal and
Abanto which was submitted to this Court, that the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is fair and reasonable.
Moot and academic; Same; With the full settlement of the tax claims,
adjudication of the issue of the case is no longer necessary.—This was
further supplemented by a communication, dated July 19, 1977, of
Deputy Commissioner Conrado P. Diaz, informing the Register of
Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, that the Gaches estate has already paid
all the estate and inheritance taxes assessed against it, and that,
consequently, the notice of tax lien inscribed on the property and
property rights of the estate can now be considered cancelled. With
the full settlement of the tax claims, the requirements of the law have
been fully met, and it has become unnecessary for the Court to issue
orders relative to the main issue.
Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 360, No. L-24742 October 26,
1973
Settlement of estates; Jurisdiction; Venue; Residence of deceased not
element of jurisdiction, but of venue.—For purposes of determining
what court has jurisdiction in the settlement of a deceased’s estate, the
residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.
Same; Same; Court first taking cognizance of settlement of the estate
of a decedent.—Section 1, Rule 73 on venue does not state that the
court with whom the testate or intestate petition is first filed acquires
exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that
“the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.”
A fair reading of the Rule—since it deals with venue and comity
between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction—indicates that
the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely such
court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent’s
last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving
widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate
petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may actually
be false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the
petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court
which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent’s alleged
last will. This is exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-
widow’s filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes’ intestate petition, it
issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion
and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the
petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court’s order
was that ‘if the will was duly admitted to probate by the Quezon City
court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes’
intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and
improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City
court, to the exclusion of all other courts.
Same; Where Quezon City court did not act without jurisdiction in
admitting to probate will of decedent.—Under the facts of the case and
where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their
opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice, the said court cannot be declared, as the
appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to
probate the decedent’s will and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof in accordance with the testator’s testamentary
disposition.
Same; Testate proceedings take precedence over intestate
proceedings. —ln accordance with settled jurisprudence in this
jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of
intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is
found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the
probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even it at
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that stage an administrator had already been appointed x x x. This,
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged
last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as
an intestacy.
Same; Jurisdiction; Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement
proceedings should be by appeal.—Under section 1, Rule 73, the
Quezon City court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent’s
estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-
widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of
the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein—with
the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court—could not be
contested except by appeal from said court in the original case, except
when want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Same; Jurisdictional facts in probate proceedings.—The “jurisdictional
facts” in probate proceedings under section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his
death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such
province.
Same; When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled
even if court had improper venue.—The mischievous effect in the
administration of justice of considering the question of residence as
affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole
proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before
another court of the same rank in another province is too obvious to
require comment.
Same; Same.—lt would be unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one
named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent’s last will and settle
his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under
the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend
much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to
the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to
take up with the probate court.
Venue; Supreme Court may order change of venue under its
supervisory authority over inferior courts.—In the Supreme Court’s
exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts, it may
properly determine that venue was properly assumed by and
transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice
and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the
deference and consent of the Cebu court) xxx and actions taken in the
testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized x x x.
Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380, No. 25489 September 8, 1926
1.WILLS; PROOF OF EXECUTION; FAULTY MEMORY OF SUBSCRIBING
WITNESSES.—A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the
fact that one or more of the subscribing witnesses do not remember
that all of the witnesses were present together with the testator at the
time of the execution of the will, provided the court is satisfied from all
the evidence that the will was executed and attested in the manner
required by law.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ADDITIONAL PROOF SUPPLEMENTAL TO TESTIMONY OF
SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES.—In case of opposition to the probate of a
will, the proponent must introduce all of the subscribing witnesses, if
available; and he is not concluded by their testimony ot the same
extent that a litigant is bound by the testimony of witnesses introduced
in ordinary course. It follows that the proponent of a will may avail
himself of other proof, or additional proof, to establish the instrument,
even contrary to the testimony of some of the subscribing witnesses, or
all of them.
Pecson vs. Coronel, 45 Phil. 216, No. 20374 October 11, 1923
1.WILLS; FREEDOM TO MAKE A WILL.—Although family ties in this
country are very strongly knit, the exclusion of relatives, who are not
forced heirs, from the inheritance is not an exceptional case. The
inhabitants of the Archipelago do not appear to be averse to the
freedom to make a will enshrined by article 783 of the Civil Code,
which has been in force in the Philippines since the year 1889. But even
if the appointment of a beneficiary do not seem to be the most usual
and ordinary because the beneficiary is not a relative of the testatrix
who has relatives by blood, this alone will not render the appointment
void per se.
2.ID.; CONTEST OF; BURDEN OF PROOF.—Where the will is contested
on the ground that the person who read the will to the testator,
following instructions from the heir named therein, read one thing for
another, the party alleging such a fraud is bound to present said
person as witness for the purpose of proving the alleged fraud, and the
omission not accounted for of said proof gives rise to a presumption
that, if it were presented, it would have been adverse to said party.
3.ID.; NAMING OF HEIR; His APPOINTMENT AS EXECUTOR;
FUNCTIONS OF EXECUTOR.—The fact that the only heir named in the
will is appointed executor is no proof that the testator's intention was
that said executor should distribute the estate among the relatives of
the testator, and not that said executor, named as sole heir, should get
all the estate; for to be an heir is not incompatible with being an
executor, inasmuch as the function of an executor is not limited merely
to distributing the inheritance, but he has other duties and powers,
such as to preserve, defend, and liquidate the inheritance until it is
delivered to the person entitled to it.
4.ID.; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; CLERICAL OR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS;
THE EVIDENT INTENTION PREVAILS.—Clerical or grammatical errors
are ordinarily not considered of vital importance where the intention is
manifest. Thus the expression "cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en
presencia de otros" (each of us signed in the presence of others), which
appears to be ambiguous on account of the article "los" (the) being
lacking before "otros" (others), will not vitiate the attestation clause
where it is evident that its omission was due to carelessness of the clerk
or to lack of mastery of the language, and that what was meant is that
the witnesses signed in the presence of each other.
Ortega vs. Valmonte, 478 SCRA 247, G.R. No. 157451 December 16,
2005
Civil Law; Wills; The party challenging the will bears the burden of
proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution; The burden
to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a
showing of credible evidence of fraud.—Fraud “is a trick, secret device,
false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It
may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may
relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception
regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for
the fraud, he would not have made.” We stress that the party
challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud
at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of
fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations
of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
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Same; Same; The omission of some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will.—It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some
relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the testator
was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact
that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior,
as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who
were the ones who had taken “the cudgels of taking care of [the
testator] in his twilight years.”
Same; Same; The conflict between the dates appearing on the will does
not invalidate the document because the law does not even require
that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion.—As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict
between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the
document, “because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will
x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.” More
mportant, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by
three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the
presence of the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator
and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. In
any event, we agree with the CA that “the variance in the dates of the
will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and
persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental
witnesses.”
Same; Same; The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and
the notary are credible evidence of its due execution.—Petitioner failed
to substantiate her claim of a “grand conspiracy” in the commission of
a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent
stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The
testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are
credible evidence of its due execution. Their testimony favoring it and
the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities
required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.
Same; Same; To be considered of sound mind, things that the testator
must have the ability to know.—According to Article 799, the three
things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered
of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the
character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present
case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that
Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his
will.
Same; Same; Testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that
a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.—Between the
highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that
degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy,
there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and
while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or
partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a
person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may
make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory
sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to
whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and
disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held
that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person
shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
Vaño vs. Vda. de Garces, et al, 95 Phil. 333, No. L-6303 June 30, 1954
1.WILLS, PROBATE OF; ISSUE IN CONTESTED WILLS; RULE IN THIS
JURISDICTION—ISSUE IS FlXED BY RULES OF COURT; ISSUE MAY NOT
BE VARIED BY PLEADINGS.—The rule in this jurisdiction is that the issue
in contested wills is fixed by the Rules of Court, that is, before the
probate court can allow the will it must be satisfied upon proof taken
and filed, that the will was duly executed, and that the testator at the
time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting
under duress, menace, and undue influence, or fraud. This issue may
not be varied by the pleadings.
2.ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE; OPPOSITOR MAY ADD OTHER GROUNDS AND
SUBMIT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF.—An oppositor objecting to
the probate of a will on one or two specific grounds may, during the
hearing, add other grounds and submit evidence in support of the
same.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; SERVICE OF OPPOSITION TO ALL PERSONS INTERESTED,
PURPOSE OF.—The purpose of the law (section 10, Rule 77 of the Rules
of Court requiring a person contesting probate to state his ground of
opposition and serve copy thereof to the petitioner and other residents
of the province interested in the estate, is to appraise said persons of
the reasons in opposing probate so that they may prepare the
necessary evidence to counteract and disprove said grounds of
opposition, this, in addition to apprising the court itself of the issue
involved in the proceeding so that it may intelligently direct the
presentation of evidence during the hearing.
4.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING
GENNUINENESS OF SIGNATURE OF TESTATOR.—When the
genuineness of the testator's signature is put in issue, his age, infirmity
and state of health should be given due consideration. Where the
testator, at the time the contested will was made, was 78 years old and
suffering from apparently advanced pulmonary tuberculosis and
rheumatism, it is natural that his signature should lack the firmness,
rhythm, effort and continuity of motion that it had before he became
quite ill and infirm.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES.—Where the three
subscribing witnesses to the will who were in no way related to the
testator, had no interest in the execution of the will and stood to gain
nothing by its probate, under oath assured the court that the testator
voluntarily signed the will, their disinterested testimony can not be
taken lightly.
Ozaeta vs Cuartero (GR No. L-5597, May 31, 1956)
As to the charge that the will was procured thru undue and improper
pressure and influence by those who stood to profit therefrom or by
some other person for their benefit, we note that no direct evidence
has been presented to support it. Appellants, however, maintain that
direct evidence of undue influence is not essential; that a contest on
the ground of fraud and undue influence may be waged successfully
on circumstantial evidence and that the contestant is entitled to the
benefit of all inferences which may be reasonably and legitimately
derived from established facts; and appellants then offer the theory
that after the petitioner had succeeded In convincing the decedent
whom they picture to be then "a very old. man suffering from several
ailments besides cataract in both eyes," to live with him, he
(petitioner), with the tolerance and cooperation of Rosa Gonzales and
her children, who were then living with the decedent in petitioner's
house, instilled fear in his mind and thereafter controlled all his acts in
such a way that he could not but do what he was told and had to sign
whatever papers he was asked to sign. And that, according to
appellants, is how. he came to sign the will In question. But this seems
to us to be far-fetched deduction from the established fact that the
decedent was at the time of the execution of t?he will already old and
somewhat sickly and living with Rosa Gonzales and their children in
petitioner's house. Though appellants would want to make the court
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believe that the decedent was already blind at the time the will was
alleged, to have been executed and that he could, therefore, not have
read or signed it, we find that the Imputation of blindness is not
witness Ariston Hermano, Atty Dinglasan1 s brother-in-law, both
testified that the decedent had to request then to road for him reports
and contracts in 1945 because of his failing eyesight, neither of them
could assure the court that the deceased was in fact blind. On the
contrary, Angel Palanca ' even stated that his father,, the deceased, was
still signing checks in 1945 while Tan Guan Siu, another witness for the
appellants declared that the deceased still had a good sight in July,
1946 and could read-papers by himself in 1949 when lie was already
living in his house on Taft Avenue., It is not denied that the deceased
had cataract in both eyes even before 1941 c But Dr. W. H. Waterous. a
disinterested witness who was treating the deceased, testified that the
latter' s affliction in the eyes impaired only his "distance vision" and he
could still read "inclose-up" In.June, 1946 because his "near vision- was
still good. Dr. Waterous also stated that the deceased could still see
things around" and went unaided to the dark room in-his clinic" when
he went there for a check-up at that time. The decedent, though old
and suffering from diabetis would appear, to be still in full possession
of his mental faculties and was not so helpless as appellants would
picture him to be, and there is no showing that before, during,' and
after the execution of the will,, he was not a master of his will but had
to take orders from' 'somebody o Moreover, the will was signed by him
In the office of a distinguished lawyer, who died a respected member
of this Court, and without the presence of any the beneficiaries named
therein or of 'the petitioner himself whom appellants apparently
suspect of having used pressure or influence in favor of the said
beneficiaries. It is obvious that the claim that the will was obtained thru
undue influence and improper pressure has no substantial factual basis
but is more a matter of conjecture engendered by suspicion which .the
weight of authority regards as insufficient to sustain a verdict defeating
a will on that ground (57 .Am, Jur. 308), "It is not enough that .there
was an opportunity to exorcise undue influence or a possibility that it
might have been exercised. There must be substantial evidence tint it
was actually exercised." (21 A. L.R. 821 c).
Appellants' theory is, furthermore, disproved by decedent's failure to
revoke or otherwise' alter the questioned will as soon as' he stopped
out of petitioner's house and moved to his own where he led a free
man's life up to five' years after the execution of the will in question.
This behaviour of the decedent constitutes a silent ratification of the
contents of the impugned will and refutes the claim of undue influence
and improper pressure, even supposing that these circumstances were,
duly proved. (57 Am. Jur. p. 312c)
It is, therefore, our conclusion that the will involved In tills case cannot
be disallowed on the ground that It was procured, thru improper
influence or pressure.
Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil., 596, No. 16763 December 22, 1921
Wills; Undue Influence.—In the absence of fraud or imposition, mere
affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not
invalidate a will.
Cuyugan vs. Baron, 69 Phil. 538, No. 45804 February 7, 1940
1. TESTAMENTS; LEGALIZATION; MENTAL CAPACITY OF THE TESTA-
DORA. — According to the evidence, S. B., when on December 17,
1932, he executed the will contested by the opposition, he fully
enjoyed his mental faculties. The law does not even require so much
for a will to be valid, since: "In order for the judgment and memory to
be qualified as healthy, it is not necessary that the judgment is intact or
without loss due to illness or otherwise, nor that the testator is in full
possession of his discursive faculties. The loss of memory is not enough
unless it is total or extends to the closest individuals of the family or
property. " (Bagtas against Paguío, 22 Jur. Fil., 232.)
2.ID .; ID .; ID .; ALLEGED WEAKENED WILL OF THE ASSISTANT; UNDUE
INFLUENCE. — Enjoying, as she did, fully her mental faculties on the
date of the execution of her will, this is a sign that neither her advanced
age, nor the illness she suffered, have in any way weakened her will, as
It is proven by his conduct and firmness of character, on that day and
for the next forty days, until the date of his death. The presence of his
nephews VC and RC during the execution of the will does not prove
that said nephews had him under their control, because if such a thing
had happened, it IS that he was there and that he declared for the
opposition, he would not have failed to mention it in your testimony.
3.ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; RETRACTATION OF AN INSTRUMENTAL
WITNESS. — Let us now say two words before closing, about the
statement of the instrumental witness ZN, who was withdrawn at the
new hearing, from his previous statement, and whose testimony the
opponents have presented as additional evidence of the alleged
deception or fraud that they said was a victim SB, making her believe
that it was a complaint for theft of papers which she signed on
December 17, 1932. N, in our opinion, deserves absolutely no faith in
her retraction testimony, and right there we find demonstrations that
destroy her second statement. The circumstance under which the
opponents managed to get N to retract his previous statement obliges
us to deny him credibility in his testimony.
INSTITUTION OF HEIRS
ISIDORO SANTOS, plaintiff and appellant, vs. LEANDRA MANARANG,
administratrix, defendant and appellee. [No. 8235. March 19, 1914.]
1.EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT
OF CLAIMS; TIME FOR PRESENTATION.—If the property of the estate
has been properly inventoried, the committee on claims regularly
appointed, the publication of the notice required by law duly made,
and there has been no fraud in the proceedings, claims or debts which
the law requires shall be presented to the committee on claims must
be presented to it within the limitation of time provided in section 689
(Code Civ. Proc.) or they will be barred.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE WILL.—Directions in the
testator's will that such claims and debts, or any of them, shall be
settled in some other manner are void as opposed to public policy, at
least where there are heirs by force of law.
3.ID.; ID.; ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR.—No action can be
instituted directly against the administrator of the estate for the
collection of claims and debts which the committee on claims is
directed to pass upon.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; DIRECTION IN WILL TO PAY DEBTS.—An itemized list of
debts in the will of the testator which he directs shall be paid does not
obviate the necessity of presenting them to the committee for
allowance. Nor do such directions in a will indicate that it was the
testator's desire to have them paid without being probated in
accordance with the probate procedure provided in Act No. 190.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MISTAKE OF LAW.—If, because of such provisions in
the will, a creditor fails to present such claims to the committee in the
belief that it is unnecessary, he is laboring under a mistake of law for
which no relief can be afforded by the courts.
Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr. vs. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, 657
SCRA 555, G.R. No. 165748 September 14, 2011
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Civil Law; Contracts; Void Contracts; Simulated Contracts; In absolute
simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the
parties have no intention to be bound by it; The main characteristic of
an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really
desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the
juridical situation of the parties—lacking in an absolutely simulated
contract is consent which is essential to a void and enforceable
contract.—Valerio v. Refresca, 485 SCRA 494 (2006), is instructive on
the matter of simulation of contracts: In absolute simulation, there is a
colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no
intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute
simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or
intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical
situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious
contract is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they
may have given under the contract. However, if the parties state a false
cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is
relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real
agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are
present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of the
contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between
the parties and their successors in interest. Lacking, therefore, in an
absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid
and enforceable contract. Thus, where a person, in order to place his
property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to
another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and
control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham.
Similarly, in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely
for taxation purposes, without intending to transfer ownership over the
subject lands.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The primary consideration in determining
the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties—if the
words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention of the
parties, the latter shall prevail.—The primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties.
If the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention of
the parties, the latter shall prevail. Such intention is determined not
only from the express terms of their agreement, but also from the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. The true
intention of the parties in this case was sufficiently proven by the Heirs
of Alfonso. The Heirs of Alfonso established by a preponderance of
evidence that the Deed of Sale was one of the four (4) absolutely
simulated Deeds of Sale which involved no actual monetary
consideration, executed by Alfonso in favor of his children, Policronio,
Liberato, and Prudencia, and his second wife, Valeriana, for taxation
purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most protuberant index of simulation of
contract is the complete absence of an attempt in any manner on the
part of the ostensible buyer to assert rights of ownership over the
subject properties.—The most protuberant index of simulation of
contract is the complete absence of an attempt in any manner on the
part of the ostensible buyer to assert rights of ownership over the
subject properties. Policronio’s failure to take exclusive possession of
the subject properties or, in the alternative, to collect rentals, is
contrary to the principle of ownership. Such failure is a clear badge of
simulation that renders the whole transaction void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Fundamental Characteristics of Void or
Inexistent Contracts.—For guidance, the following are the most
fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent contracts: 1) As a
general rule, they produce no legal effects whatsoever in accordance
with the principle “quod nullum est nullum producit effectum.” 2) They
are not susceptible of ratification. 3) The right to set up the defense of
inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced. 4) The
action or defense for the declaration of their inexistence or absolute
nullity is imprescriptible. 5) The inexistence or absolute nullity of a
contract cannot be invoked by a person whose interests are not
directly affected.
Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled in a long line of cases that where a
deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact
has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lack of
consideration.—It is well-settled in a long line of cases that where a
deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact
has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lack of
consideration. Thus, although the contract states that the purchase
price of P2,000.00 was paid by Policronio to Alfonso for the subject
properties, it has been proven that such was never in fact paid as there
was no money involved. It must, therefore, follow that the Deed of Sale
is void for lack of consideration.
Pleadings; Practice and Procedure; Objection to Admission of Evidence;
The objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at
the proper time, as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably
apparent, and if not so made, it will be understood to have been
waived.—The objection against the admission of any evidence must be
made at the proper time, as soon as the grounds therefor become
reasonably apparent, and if not so made, it will be understood to have
been waived. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be
made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is
given if the objectionable features become apparent only by reason of
such answer. In this case, the Heirs of Policronio failed to timely object
to the testimony of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed to
have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
Parol Evidence; The exception in paragraph (b), Sec. 9, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court—failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto—is allowed to enable the
court to ascertain the true intent of the parties, and once the intent is
clear, it shall prevail over what the document appears to be on its face.
—The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties was clearly put in issue in the Answer of the
Heirs of Alfonso to the Complaint. It was alleged that the Deed of Sale
was only made to lessen the payment of estate and inheritance taxes
and not meant to transfer ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is
allowed to enable the court to ascertain the true intent of the parties,
and once the intent is clear, it shall prevail over what the document
appears to be on its face. As the true intent of the parties was duly
proven in the present case, it now prevails over what appears on the
Deed of Sale.
Same; The operation of the parol evidence rule requires the existence
of a valid written agreement—it is not applicable in a proceeding
where the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as
when a contract may be void for lack of consideration.—The validity of
the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer, and was precisely
one of the issues submitted to the RTC for resolution. The operation of
the parol evidence rule requires the existence of a valid written
agreement. It is, thus, not applicable in a proceeding where the validity
of such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when a contract may
be void for lack of consideration. Considering that the Deed of Sale has
been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and for lack of
consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not precluded from presenting
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement.
Hearsay Evidence Rule; While hearsay evidence whether objected to or
not cannot be given credence for having no probative value, such
principle has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to
object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other
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pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances
prevailing to support the fact in issue.—It has indeed been held that
hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence
for having no probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed
in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility
of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented
or there were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in
issue. In Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED S.A., 138 SCRA 118
(1985), this Court held: Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to
establish a fact in an injunction suit (Parker v. Furlong, 62 P. 490) but,
when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be
considered and given the importance it deserves. (Smith v. Delaware &
Atlantic Telegraph & Telephone Co., 51 A 464). Although we should
warn of the undesirability of issuing judgments solely on the basis of
the affidavits submitted, where as here, said affidavits are
overwhelming, uncontroverted by competent evidence and not
inherently improbable, we are constrained to uphold the allegations of
the respondents regarding the multifarious violations of the contracts
made by the petitioner.
Civil Law; Contracts; Void Contracts; Simulated Contracts; Rescission; A
simulated contract of sale is without any cause or consideration, and is,
therefore, null and void—no independent action to rescind or annul
the contract is necessary, and it may be treated as non-existent for all
purposes.—A simulated contract of sale is without any cause or
consideration, and is, therefore, null and void; in such case, no
independent action to rescind or annul the contract is necessary, and it
may be treated as non-existent for all purposes. A void or inexistent
contract is one which has no force and effect from the beginning, as if
it has never been entered into, and which cannot be validated either by
time or ratification. A void contract produces no effect whatsoever
either against or in favor of anyone; it does not create, modify or
extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers. Therefore, it was not
necessary for the Heirs of Alfonso to first file an action to declare the
nullity of the Deed of Sale prior to executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to set up the nullity of a void or
non-existent contract is not limited to the parties, as in the case of
annullable or voidable contracts—it is extended to third persons who
are directly affected by the contract; Where a contract is absolutely
simulated, even third persons who may be prejudiced thereby may set
up its inexistence.—Article 1311 and Article 1421 of the Civil Code
provide: Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, x x x Art. 1421. The defense of illegality of contracts
is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly
affected. The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent
contract is not limited to the parties, as in the case of annullable or
voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are directly
affected by the contract. Thus, where a contract is absolutely simulated,
even third persons who may be prejudiced thereby may set up its
inexistence. The Heirs of Alfonso are the children of Alfonso, with his
deceased children represented by their children (Alfonso’s
grandchildren). The Heirs of Alfonso are clearly his heirs and
successors-in-interest and, as such, their interests are directly affected,
thereby giving them the right to question the legality of the Deed of
Sale.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Wills and Succession; Art. 842 of the Civil
Code refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will and has
no application to a disposition by Deed of Sale.—Article 842 of the Civil
Code provides: Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may
dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person
having capacity to succeed. One who has compulsory heirs may
dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions
of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. This article refers
to the principle of freedom of disposition by will. What is involved in
the case at bench is not a disposition by will but by Deed of Sale.
Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need not first prove that the disposition
substantially diminished their successional rights or unduly prejudiced
their legitimes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 1412 of the Civil Code refers to
contracts with an illegal cause or subject-matter, presupposing the
existence of a cause—it is not applicable to fictitious or simulated
contracts which are in reality non-existent.—Article 1412 is not
applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts, because they refer to
contracts with an illegal cause or subject-matter. This article
presupposes the existence of a cause, it cannot refer to fictitious or
simulated contracts which are in reality non-existent. As it has been
determined that the Deed of Sale is a simulated contract, the provision
cannot apply to it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Waiver; Where the Deed of Sale
is a void contract, the action for the declaration of its nullity, even if
filed 21 years after its execution, cannot be barred by prescription for it
is imprescriptible; The right to set up the defense of inexistence or
absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced.—Article 1410 of the
Civil Code provides: Art. 1410. The action for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. This is one of the most
fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent contracts. As the Deed
of Sale is a void contract, the action for the declaration of its nullity,
even if filed 21 years after its execution, cannot be barred by
prescription for it is imprescriptible. Furthermore, the right to set up
the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or
renounced. Therefore, the Heirs of Alfonso cannot be precluded from
setting up the defense of its inexistence.
Appeals; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; The rule that only theories
raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party thereto on
appeal should refer to independent, not concomitant matters, to
support or oppose the cause of action.—To begin, although the
defenses of unenforceability, ratification and preterition were raised by
the Heirs of Alfonso for the first time on appeal, they are concomitant
matters which may be taken up. As long as the questioned items bear
relevance and close relation to those specifically raised, the interest of
justice would dictate that they, too, must be considered and resolved.
The rule that only theories raised in the initial proceedings may be
taken up by a party thereto on appeal should refer to independent, not
concomitant matters, to support or oppose the cause of action.
Succession; Partition; Extra-Judicial Partition; Special Power of Attorney;
Partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real
property resulting in change of ownership—it is not a transfer of
property from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in
favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance; Since a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot be considered as an act of strict
dominion, a special power of attorney is not necessary.—This Court
finds that Article 1878 (5) and (15) is inapplicable to the case at bench.
It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not
legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of
ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but
rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that
an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives
the inheritance. It is merely a designation and segregation of that part
which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot,
therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special
power of attorney is not necessary. In fact, as between the parties, even
an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The
requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds
does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors
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are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of
property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation
and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.
Same; Preterition; Words and Phrases; Preterition is the total omission
of a compulsory heir from the inheritance—it consists in the silence of
the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the
testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him
anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting
him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case.—Preterition
has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from the
inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a
compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not
mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is
mentioned in the will in the latter case. Preterition is thus a concept of
testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at bench, there
is no will involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply.
Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario, 2 Phil. 321, No. 1027 May 19, 1903
1.WILLS; CONSTRUCTION.—In the interpretation and construction of
testamentary provisions the intention of the testator controls.
2.ID.; ID.; DESCRIPTION OF LEGATEES.—Where legatees are pointed
out by name in the will the fact that they are referred to as the natural
sons of a third person does not make the legacy conditional upon
proof of such relationship but is descriptive merely.
3.ID.; ID.; ACCRETION.—A legacy of a certain sum to two nephews in
equal shares is payable in its entirety to the survivor of them in case
one dies before the testator.
4.ID.; ID.; LEGACIES.—The reservation of property in a will to the
children of the legatee thereof in case of the latter's death must be
regarded as a legacy if made so by express words; otherwise the
children of the legatee take by inheritance.
5.ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF LEGACIES.—Where the will authorizes the
executor to pay legacies, expressly or by natural inference, action will
lie by the legatee against the executor to compel allowance and
payment thereof.
6.ID.; lD.; ID.—In an action to compel payment of legacies the defense
that an inventory is being formed or that creditors have not been paid
must be set up in the answer in order to be availed of.
7.ID.; ID.; PARTITION OF ESTATE.—An executor who is also an heir is
not qualified to make partition of the estate, and a legatee who seeks
the payment of a legacy involving a partition must sue all persons
interested in the estate.
8.ID.; ID.—Where the executor of an estate dies pending the
determination of an appeal from a judgment rendered against him and
in favor of a legatee, and the latter succeeding as executor dismisses
the appeal, an order may be granted permitting any interested party to
prosecute the appeal.
9.CIVIL PROCEDURE; ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ON APPEAL.—Where the
appellant places his assignment of errors in the bill of exceptions
instead of in his brief, and no objection is made at the opportune time,
the judgment will not be affirmed upon the ground of this
nonprejudicial error.
Belen vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands and De Olaguera, 109 Phil.
1008, No. L-14474 October 31, 1960
WILLS AND TESTAMENT ; CODE ; INTERPRETATION AND
CONSTRUCTION ; PHRASE "YOUR DESCENDANTS" INCLUDES
CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN. - The word "descendants"
(descendants) when used in a will or deed to designate a class to take
property in substitution of named legatees, includes not only children
but also grandchildren. In other words, in the absence of other
indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply is that the
testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all
members thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with article 846,
New Civil Code. So that the original legacy to FD in question should be
equally divided among her surviving children and grandchildren.
Morales vs. Olondriz, 783 SCRA 151, G.R. No. 198994 February 3, 2016
Civil Law; Succession; Preterition; Words and Phrases; Preterition
consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either
because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc.,
he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate
without expressly being disinherited — tacitly depriving the heir of his
legitime.—Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir
from the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named
as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any
part of the estate without expressly being disinherited — tacitly
depriving the heir of his legitime. Preterition requires that the omission
is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or
advances on his legitime. In other words, preterition is the complete
and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator’s inheritance
without the heir’s express disinheritance.
Same; Same; Same; Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but
the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the le-gitimes are
not impaired.—Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory
heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises
and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not
impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or
legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will
result in total intestacy. In the present case, the decedent’s will
evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As
the decedent’s illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the
direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco’s omission
from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition.
Same; Same; Probate Proceedings; The general rule is that in probate
proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to questions on
the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine
the will’s formal validity and due execution.—The general rule is that in
probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to
questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only
determine the will’s formal validity and due execution. However, this
rule is not inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate court’s
jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so
warranted by exceptional circumstances When practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even
before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Words and Phrases; Certiorari is a
limited form of review confined to errors of jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the officer or tribunal acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—Certiorari is a limited form of review
confined to errors of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where
the officer or tribunal acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. As discussed, it is well within the jurisdiction of the probate
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court to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will if probate
proceedings might become an idle ceremony due to the nullity of the
will.
Neri et al. vs. Akutin and Children, 72 Phil. 322, No. 47799 June 13,
1941
1.DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; PRETERITION; EFFECT.—Preterition
consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. (Cf. 6 Manresa, 346.) In the instant case, while the children
of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not
accorded any share in the hereditary property, without expressly being
disinherited. It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by
appellants. The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to
disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.—Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be
valid in so far as they are not inofficious" (art. 814 of the Civil Code),
preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate
succession. (Art 814, Civil Code; Decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain of June 17, 1908 and February 27, 1909.) In the instant case, no
such legacies or betterments have been made by the testator.
"Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly provided, according to
articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code, and where no express provision
therefor is made in the will, the law would presume that the testator
had no intention to that effect. (Cf. 6 Manresa, 479.) In the will here in
question, no express betterment is made in favor of the children by the
second marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in their
behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal. The whole
inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the
mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have already
received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator's
intention, as may be clearly inferred from his will, would have been to
divide his property equally among all his children.
Lajom vs. Leuterio, etc., and Viola, 107 Phil. 651, No. L-13557 April 25,
1960
1.JUDMENTS; COLLATION OF PROPERTIES; PROPERTIES EMBRACED IN
PREVIOUS JUDGMENT IN CASE AT BAR.—The decision affirmed by the
Supreme Court in a previous case ordained the collation of the
"properties in question". The properties in question were described in
an inventory attached to petitioner's original complaint in case No.
8077 and did not include the riceland now being claimed by petitioner.
Hence, the same was not in question in case No. 8077, and was not
covered by the decision therein rendered.
2.SUCCESSION; PRETERITION OF HEIRS; EFFECT ON THE CHARACTER
OF THE ClVlL ACTION IN CASE AT BAR.—Petitioner contends that
because he was the victim of preterition, the institution of heirs made
by the deceased became ineffective, and that civil case No. 8077 was
thereby converted into an intestate proceedings for the settlement of
his estate. Held: There might have been merit in petitioner's contention
if the case were a special proceeding for the settlement of the testate
estate of a deceased person, which, in consequence of said preterition,
would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding for the settlement
of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction over any and all properties of
the deceased. But civil case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the
authority of the court having jurisdiction over the same is limited to the
properties described in the pleadings.
SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
G. de Perez vs. Garchitorena and Casimiro, 54 Phil. 431, No. 31703
February 13, 1930
1.WILLS; INSTITUTION OF HEIRS; FIDEICOMMISSARY HEIR.—The
institution of heirs made in the will in question is in the nature of a
fideicommissum: there is an heiress primarily called to enjoy the estate;
an obligation clearly imposed upon her to preserve and transmit the
whole of the estate to certain third persons; and there are secondary
heirs.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN FIDEICOMMISSUM AND TRUST.
—The heir instituted, or fideicommissioner, as article 783 of the Civil
Code has it, is entitled to the enjoyment of the estate. The
fideicommissum thus arising from a fideicommissary substitution,
which is of Roman origin, is not exactly equivalent to, and should not
be confused with, the English "trust."
Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 113725 June 29,
2000
Civil Law; Succession; Wills; Successional rights are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called
to succeed by operation of law.—It is a general rule under the law on
succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation
to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory
heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs
of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by
operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the
successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of
death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Same; Same; Same; Inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.—Under Article
776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of
subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part
of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by
the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
Same; Same; Same; Substitution is the designation by the testator of a
person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted.
—Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons
to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions
in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of
another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir
should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her
property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.
Same; Same; Same; In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity,
predecease or renunciation.—In simple substitutions, the second heir
takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity,
predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the
provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix’s near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil
provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be
seized and turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants.
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Same; Same; Same; In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is
strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same
later to the second heir; Without the obligation to preserve clearly
imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary
substitution.—In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly
mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to
the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in
fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the
negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix.
Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is
lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmis-sion to the second heir.
“Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in
his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution.” Also, the near
descendants’ right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The
property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs
not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private
respondent.
Same; Same; Same; A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if
the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.—Another
important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing
here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to
whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree
from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is
therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the
second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at
all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Same; Same; Same; Distinction between modal institution and
conditional testamentary disposition.—The institution of an heir in the
manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a
modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the institution,
the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the
charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A “mode” imposes an
obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of
his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in
order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition
suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not
suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.
Same; Same; Same; In case of doubt, the institution should be
considered as modal and not conditional.—Then too, since
testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation
imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it
clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the
testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as
modal and not conditional.
Same; Same; Same; In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty
arises on the face of the Will, the testator’s intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made.—In the interpretation of Wills,
when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application
of any of its provisions, the testator’s intention is to be ascertained
from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances
under which it was made. Such construction as will sustain and uphold
the Will in all its parts must be adopted.
Same; Same; Same; A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act
by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his
death.—Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable
and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect
after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person
intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the
testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of
a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very
purpose of making a Will.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin, 56 SCRA 265,
Nos. L-27860 & L-27896, Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
Appeals; Certiorari; Certiorari available when remedy of appeal not
adequate; Case at bar.—There is a common thread among the basic
issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved
in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the proliferation of more
or less similar or closely related incidents and consequent eventual
appeals. If for this consideration alone, and without taking account
anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and time which
would be involved in as many individual appeals as the number of such
incidents, it is logical and proper to hold that the remedy of appeal is
not adequate in the present cases.
Same; Same; Same; Circumstances considered in determining
inadequacy of appeal.—In determining whether or not a special civil
action of certiorari or prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal,
in instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion is alleged, it is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists
or is possible. It is indispensable that taking all the relevant
circumstances of the given case, appeal would better serve the
interests of justice. Obviously, the longer delay, augmented expense
and trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant to
the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the
same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or
determined in a single special civil action, make the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition preferable for purposes of resolving the
common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the conceded
availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common
fundamental issues would naturally minimize the areas of conflict
between the parties and render more simple the determination of the
secondary issues in each of them.
Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased persons; Where
estate settled when spouses are both deceased.—We are not
unmindful of the fact that under section 2 of Rule 73, “When the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated,
and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of
the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings
of either.” Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this provision
allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are both
deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or
permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter
of sound judicial discretion in which one it should be made. After all,
the former rule referring to the administrator of the husband’s estate in
respect to such liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the
pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule just cited.
Same; Same; When proceedings for settlement of estate deemed ready
for final closure.—The provisions of section 1 of Rule 90 cannot mean
anything less than that in order that a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person may be deemed ready for final closure,
(1) there should have been issued already an order of distribution or
assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those entitled
thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until
after it is shown that the “debts, funeral expenses, expenses of
administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate” have
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been paid, which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is
usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of
the interested party or parties, and not of the court.
Same; Same; Administration of estate; Factors considered in
appointment of administrator.—An administrator is not supposed to
represent the interests of any particular party and his acts are deemed
to be objectively for the protection of the rights of everybody
concerned with the estate of the decedent. On the other hand,
however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority
among those to whom letter of administration should be granted that
the criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality
alone, but more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so
much so that the one assumed to have greater interest is preferred to
another who has less.
Wills and succession; Substitution of heirs; Simple or vulgar
substitution; Fideicommissary substitution; Requisites; Case at bar.—
Legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges’ will provide neither for a simple or
vulgar substitution under article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a
fideicommissary substitution under article 863 thereof. There is no
vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for either (1)
predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3)
incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by article
859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein
because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve
the estate or any part thereof for anyone else.
Same; Same; When substitution of heir occurs.—Substitution occurs
only when another heir is appointed in a will “so that he may enter into
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.”
Same; Institution of heirs simultaneously; Institution considered
partially resolutory; Reasons; Case at bar.—The brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges,
subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as
Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference
to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it
bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and
enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over
them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could
completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter rivos to
anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and
all his right to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely
upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his
brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already
upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative
upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual
existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Same; Same; Same; Institution in case at bar without legal impediment
but cannot apply to legitime.—The Court sees no legal impediment to
this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law,
except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving
spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs.
Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor descendants.
Same; Order of succession and amount of successional rights; Conflict
of laws; Question of foreign law governing matters in issue one of fact;
Foreign law has to be proven.—The question of what are the laws of
Texas governing the matters in issue is, in the first instance, one of fact,
not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken
judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute
between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in
instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge
of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they
have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the
parties concerned do not claim otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exception.—When, with respect to
certain aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given
case do not have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the
Court may take it for granted for the purposes of the particular case
before it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates,
without the need of requiring the presentation of what otherwise
would be competent evidence on the point.
Evidence; Judicial admissions; Case at bar.—PCIB’s representations in
regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which
the other parties and the court are being made to rely and act upon.
PCIB is “not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a
position contradictory to or inconsistent with them.”
Vda. de Aranas vs. Aranas, 150 SCRA 415, No. L-56249 May 29, 1987
Civil Law; Property; Usufruct; Administration; Enjoyment by a
usufructuary of the properties of the testator or administrator as a
reward for his faithful and unselfish services rendered to him, is not
perpetual but only temporary; Testamentary proviso of testator must
be respected and be given effect until the death or refusal to act as
such of the instituted usufructuary/administrator; Fideicommissary
substitution.—A cursory reading of the English translation of the Last
Will and Testament shows that it was the sincere intention and desire
of the testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and
unselfish services by allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the
testator's third group of properties until Vicente's death and/or refusal
to act as administrator in which case, the administration shall pass to
anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and upon
Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select one among
themselves. Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to
enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result from
the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, with the
obligation to return, at the designated time, either the same thing, or in
special cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of
the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a
limitation namely his death or his refusal. Likewise his designation as
administrator of these properties is limited by his refusal and/or death
and therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code
relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not
prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the
usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the
properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente Aranas
prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice
of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. To void the designation of
Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the
desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful
and unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator was
seriously ill or bed-ridden. The proviso must be respected and be given
effect until the death or until the refusal to act as such of the instituted
usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the property can be
properly disposed of, subject to the limitations provided in Art. 863 of
the Civil Code concerning a fideicommissary substitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Validity or invalidity of the
usufructuary dispositions affect the determination of heirs.—It is
contended by petitioners that the ruling made by respondent court
dated November 17, 1977 was already final and not subject to
correction as what was set aside and to be reheard was only regarding
the determination of additional heirs. Such contention is not worthy of
credence. Respondents in their memorandum allege and it is not
disputed by petitioners that the order of November 17, 1977 has not
yet become final because it was received only on January 12, 1978 by
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the counsel for respondent Vicente Aranas and the Motion for
Reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs dated
January 17, 1978 was filed by the said respondent within the
reglementary period. Besides the validity or invalidity of the
usufructuary dispositions would affect the determination of heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legacy; Usufructuary or administrator was
instituted as a remunerative legatee under the last will and testament—
As to petitioners' allegation that the order of July 16,1980 is without
basis, the record shows that during the hearing of the urgent motion
for reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs, it
was proven conclusively by the said respondent Vicente B. Aranas that
he was instituted as a remunerative legatee per mandate of the Last
Will and Testament by way of usufructuary. Likewise the right of the
Roman Catholic Church as the other usufructuary legatee for the
duration of the statutory lifetime of a corporation, that is, 50 years from
the date of the effectivity of said legacy, was also established.
Palad vs. Governor of Quezon Province, 46 SCRA 354, No. L-24302
August 18, 1972
Remedial law; Judgment; Case at bar, law of the case ap-plies.—A prior
decision of the Supreme Court which has long become final respecting
the nature cf the trust created by the last will and testament of the
deceased will not be subsequently disturbed it being already the law of
the case.
Civil law; Property; Usufruct; The 30-year limitation on usufruct under
the Old Spanish Civil Code does not apply to trusts.—Article 515 of the
Old Spanish Civil Code prohibiting the creation of a usufruct for more
than 30 years in favor of any town, province or association, does not
apply to the instant case; because what was constituted by the last will
and testament of the late Luis Palad is a trust, not a usufruct, as held by
the Supreme Court in Government vs. Abadilla, et al., 46 Phil. 642.
Same; Trust; Succession; Devise of income of land for public benefit for
indefinite period is valid.—The devise of the income of real properties
for the benefit of a public educational institution, although without
limitation as to period, is valid. It does not violate the rule against trusts
in perpetuities provided for in Article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Devise of income of land, not a violation of the 20-
year limit on inalienability.—Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which
regards as void any disposition of the testator declaring all or part of
the estate inalienable for more than 20 years, is not violated by the
trust constituted by the late Luis Palad; because the will of the testator
does not inter-dict the alienation of the parcels devised. The will merely
directs that the income of said two parcels be utilized for the
establishment, maintenance and operation of the high school.
Same; Same; Same; New Civil Code provision against in-alienability of
land devised, not retroactive.—Assuming that the trust created by the
deceased falls within the prohibition of Article 870, the same cannot be
given retroactive effect, the testa-tor having died long before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code,
Words and phrases; Meaning of “to establish.”—To establish means “to
settle or fix firmly; x x x place on a permanent footing”; or “to originate
and secure the permanent existence of, to found, to institute, to create
and regulate, as of a colony, estate or other institution or to place upon
a secure foundation.” Thus to “establish a company for any business
means complete and permanent provision for carrying on that
business, and putting a company in operation may well include its
continued as well as its first or original operation x x x.”
Orendain vs. Trusteedhip of the Estate of Doña Margarita Rodriguez,
591 SCRA 258, G.R. No. 168660 June 30, 2009
Civil Law; Property; Trusts; Court of Appeals’ holding that the trust
stipulated in the decedent’s will prohibiting perpetual alienation or
mortgage of the properties violated Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil
Code affirmed; At present, there appears to be no more argument that
the trust created over the properties of the decedent should be
dissolved as the twenty year period has quite palpably lapsed.—We
held in Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 27 SCRA 546 (1969), that the
perpetual prohibition was valid only for twenty (20) years. We affirmed
the CA’s holding that the trust stipulated in the decedent’s will
prohibiting perpetual alienation or mortgage of the properties violated
Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code. However, we reversed and set
aside the CA’s decision which declared that that portion of the
decedent’s estate, the properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, ought
to be distributed based on intestate succession, there being no
institution of heirs to the properties covered by the perpetual trust. As
previously quoted, we reached a different conclusion and upheld the
trust, only insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned. We
refrained from forthwith declaring the decedent’s testamentary
disposition as void and the properties enumerated in Clause 10 of the
will as subject to intestate succession. We held that, in the interim,
since the twenty-year period was then still upon us, the wishes of the
testatrix ought to be respected. Thus, at present, there appears to be
no more argument that the trust created over the properties of the
decedent should be dissolved as the twenty-year period has, quite
palpably, lapsed.
Same; Same; Same; Article 1013 of the Civil Code is among the
provisions on intestate succession, specifically on the State inheriting
from a decedent, in default of persons entitled to succeed; Under
Article 1013 of the Civil Code, the allowance for a permanent trust,
approved by a court of law, covers property inherited by the State by
virtue of intestate succession; Article cannot be applied to depose of
herein decedent’s properties.—We find as erroneous the RTC’s holding
that paragraph 4, Article 1013 of the same code specifically allows a
perpetual trust, because this provision of law is inapplicable. Suffice it
to state that the article is among the Civil Code provisions on intestate
succession, specifically on the State inheriting from a decedent, in
default of persons entitled to succeed. Under this article, the allowance
for a permanent trust, approved by a court of law, covers property
inherited by the State by virtue of intestate succession. The article does
not cure a void testamentary provision which did not institute an heir.
Accordingly, the article cannot be applied to dispose of herein
decedent’s properties.
Same; Same; Same; The herein testatrix’s large landholdings cannot be
subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership thereof would
then effectively remain with her even in the after life.—In this case,
however, we reach a different conclusion as the testatrix specifically
prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her properties which were
definitely more than the two (2) properties in the aforecited case. The
herein testatrix’s large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to
a trust because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain
with her even in the after life.
CONDITIONAL TESTAMENTARY CONDITIONS AND WITH A TERM
Morente vs. De La Santa, 9 Phil., 387, No. 3891 December 19, 1907
Construction of Wills; Conditional Legacies.—A testator may insert
conditional provisions in his will, as prescribed by article 790 of the Civil
Code. Under article 793, a prohibition against another marriage may
also be imposed, in certain cases, upon the widow or widower. But, in
order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition
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must fairly appear from the language used in the will. It will not be
presumed.

Santos vs. Manarang., 27 Phil. 209, No. 8235 March 19, 1914

1.EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT

OF CLAIMS; TIME FOR PRESENTATION.—If the property of the estate
has been properly inventoried, the committee on claims regularly
appointed, the publication of the notice required by law duly made,
and there has been no fraud in the proceedings, claims or debts which
the law requires shall be presented to the committee on claims must
be presented to it within the limitation of time provided in section 689
(Code Civ. Proc.) or they will be barred.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE WILL.—Directions in the

testator's will that such claims and debts, or any of them, shall be
settled in some other manner are void as opposed to public policy, at
least where there are heirs by force of law.

3.ID.; ID.; ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR.—No action can be

instituted directly against the administrator of the estate for the
collection of claims and debts which the committee on claims is
directed to pass upon.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; DIRECTION IN WILL TO PAY DEBTS.—An itemized list of

debts in the will of the testator which he directs shall be paid does not
obviate the necessity of presenting them to the committee for
allowance. Nor do such directions in a will indicate that it was the
testator's desire to have them paid without being probated in
accordance with the probate procedure provided in Act No. 190.

5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MISTAKE OF LAW.—If, because of such provisions in

the will, a creditor fails to present such claims to the committee in the
belief that it is unnecessary, he is laboring under a mistake of law for
which no relief can be afforded by the courts.

Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, No. 22595 November 1, 1924

1.FOREIGN LAWS; PRESUMPTION.—In the absence of evidence to the

contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs,
36 Phil., 472.)

2.POSTPONEMENT OF PROCEEDING; DISCRETION.—It is discretionary

on the part of the court to postpone or not to postpone a particular
proceeding in a case, and when the person applying for it has already
been given ample opportunity to present the evidence that he wishes
to introduce, the court commits no abuse of discretion in denying it.

3.SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY TO

LAW; NULLITY OF.—If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that
he respect the testator's order that his property be distributed in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines and not in accordance with
the laws of his nation, said condition is illegal, because, according to
article 10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his testamentary
disposition, and, being illegal, shall be considered unwritten, thus
making the institution unconditional.

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