Rule 74- Extrajudicial statement of estate
Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot
1. Figuracion v. Vda. De Figuracion
G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006
On August 23, 1955, Leandro Figuraciom executed a
deed of quitclaim over his
real properties in favor of his six children. When he died
in 1958, he left behind two
parcels of land. Leandro had inherited both lots from his
deceased parents.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however,
was a dispute between
petitioner and her sister, respondent Mary, over the
eastern half of Lot.
While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly
without any debt and she
and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal
heirs, she does not dispute the
finding of the CA that “certain expenses” including those
related to her father’s final
illness and burial have not been properly settled.
ISSUE: Is an action for partition appropriate in this case?
No. In a situation where there remains an issue as to the
expenses chargeable
to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner
points out that the estate is
allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are
Leandro Figuracion’s only legal
heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that
“certain expenses” including those
related to her father’s final illness and burial have not
been properly settled. Thus, the
heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their
father’s estate to settlement
because the determination of these expenses cannot be
done in an action for partition.
In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper
procedure for the accounting of all
expenses for which the estate must answer. If it is any
consolation at all to petitioner,
the heirs or distributees of the properties may
take possession thereof even before the
settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a
bond conditioned on the payment of
the estate’s obligations.
2. G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989 VICTORIA
BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA
PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents. GANCAYCO,
J.:
FACTS:  Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of
Philippine Air Lines, passed away without a will. He was
survived by his legitimate spouse of 10 months, herein
petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita
Pereira Nagac, herein private respondent.  On March 1,
1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of
the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite, a Special Proceeding for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor
pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira.  In her verified petition, private
respondent alleged that:  she and Victoria Bringas
Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that
the deceased left no will  there are no creditors of the
deceased  the deceased left several properties,
namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines
(PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the
PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as
well as savings deposits with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and
located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal  and
finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein
petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary
nurse and as such, one-half of her salary forms part of
the estate of the deceased.
 On March 23, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition and
a motion to dismiss the petition of private respondent,
alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for
purposes of administration and praying in the alternative,
that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration
relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the
surviving spouse.
 The Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent
Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate
of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by
her in the amount of P 1,000.00. The trial court ordered
her to take custody of all the real and personal
properties of the deceased and to file an inventory
thereof within 3 months after receipt of the order.
 Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court,
petitioner brought the case to the CA and the latter
affirmed the appointment of private respondent as
administratrix of the estate in question.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not a judicial administration
proceeding is necessary when the decedent dies
intestate without leaving any debts?
RULING:  The general rule is that when a person dies
leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in
Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or
in case he had left one, should he fail to name an
executor therein.
 An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of
Rule 74. Under this exception, when all the heirs are of
lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate,
they may agree in writing to partition the property without
instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator.
 Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court,
however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no
debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort to an
ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the
heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may
see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the
said provision does not compel them to do so if they
have good reasons to take a different course of action.
 It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned
only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to
an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either
in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with
an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.
 In the case at bar, there are only two surviving heirs, a
wife of 10 months and a sister, both of age. The parties
admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid.
What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not
in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private
respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for
her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the
deceased for her own purposes, since these properties
are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly
disposed of them fraudulently.
 We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling
reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of
the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of
Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to
be substantial especially since the only real property left
has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration
proceeding for no useful purpose would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or
squandered.
 The court below before which the administration
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing
letters of administration, there being no good reason for
burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding.
3. MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA
AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO
AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK
MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY
AVELINO, respondents. G.R. No. 115181.
March 31, 2000
Facts. - In 1989, Antonio Avelino, Sr. died intestate. In
1991, his daughter, Maria Socorro Avelino filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate
of his deceased father. All the other heirs however
opposed the petition and they moved that the petition be
converted into an action for judicial partition of the said
estate. The trial court granted the opposition’s motion
and so Socorro’s petition was converted accordingly.
Socorro’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Socorro then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the trial court in granting the other heirs motion. The
Court of Appeals found no reversible error. Socorro
elevated the petition to the Supreme Court. She insists
that a partition cannot be had because the extent of the
estate is not yet determined hence an administration
proceeding is still needed. She also insists that the
Rules of Court does not provide for a conversion of a
petition for administration to an action for partition.
Issue. - Whether or not Socorro’s petition for the
issuance of letters of administration may be converted
into an action for judicial partition.
Held. - Yes. This can be based on Section 1 of Rule 74
of the Rules of Court. Where the more expeditious
remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the
heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to
submit to administration proceedings. In this case, all the
heirs, with the exception of Socorro, agreed to judicial
partition as they see it to be the more convenient
method. There is no merit to the contention of Socorro
that a partition cannot be had because the extent of the
estate is not yet determined. The extent of the estate
can actually be determined during the partition
proceedings. Therefore, the trial court made no error in
converting Socorro’s petition to an action for judicial
partition.
Doctrines learned. – (1) When a person dies intestate,
or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust,
or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of
Court, then the decedent’s estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a
qualified administrator in the order established in Section
6 of Rule 78.
(2) The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 74 which provide: “SECTION 1.
Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.—If
the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are
all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial
or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose,
the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as
they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition…
(3) When a person dies without leaving pending
obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the
property for judicial administration, nor apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court.
(4) Where the more expeditious remedy of partition is
available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of
them may not be compelled to submit to administration
proceedings, and the court may convert an heir’s action
for letters of administration into a suit for judicial
partition, upon motion of the other heirs.
4. Heirs of Teves v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 109963 October 13, 1999
Spouses Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died
intestate and without debts
in 1943 and 1953, respectively. During their lifetime, the
spouses own two parcels of
land registered in the name of Marcelina and another lot
registered in the name of
Joaquin and his two sisters. However, Joaquin’s sisters
died without issue, causing the
entire property to pass to him. After Marcelina and
Joaquin died, their children
executed extrajudicial settlements purporting to
adjudicate unto themselves the
ownership over the two parcels of land and to alienate
their shares thereto in favor of
their sister Asuncion Teves for a consideration. The
division of the subject lot was
embodied in two deeds. The first Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale was entered
into on June 13, 1956 while the second deed was
executed on April 21, 1959. The
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and sale was executed
on December 14, 1971. After
the death of Asuncion Teves, her children, private
respondents, extrajudicially settled
her property, adjudicating unto themselves said lots.
On May 9, 1984, herein petitioners, heirs of Marcelina
and Joaquin, filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental against private
respondents for the partition and reconveyance of the
aforesaid parcels of land, alleging
that the extrajudicial settlements were spurious.
ISSUE: Should the extrajudicial settlements be upheld?
Yes. An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a
well-entrenched doctrine
that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of a
contract, entered into with all
the required formalities and with full awareness of what
he was doing, simply because
the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise
investment. Therefore, although
plaintiffs-appellants may regret having alienated
their hereditary shares in favor of their  sister Asuncion,
they must now be considered bound by their creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No
own contractual acts. The subject extrajudicial rights of creditors being involved,
settlements were never registered. However, in the case it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, the Court, interpreting Section agreement for distribution in a
1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of manner and upon a plan different from those provided by
Court, upheld the validity of an oral partition of the law. Judgment reversed.
decedent’s estate and declared that
the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does
not affect its intrinsic validity. It
was held in this case that the requirement that a partition
be put in a public document  and registered has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time
the  protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. The object of registration is to  serve as
constructive notice to others. Thus, despite its non-
registration, the  extrajudicial settlements are legally
effective and binding among the heirs of Marcelina
Cimafranca since their mother had no creditors at the
time of her death.

5. Hernandez v. Andal
G.R. No. L-273, March 29, 1947

Cresencia, Maria, Aquilina, Pedro and

Basilia Hernandez are brother and
sisters, who acquired in common a parcel of land from
their deceased father. Maria and
Aquilina sold to the spouses Andal a portion thereof,
which they purport to be their
combined shares by virtue of a verbal partition made
among the siblings Hernandez.
After the sale, Cresencia attempted to repurchase the
land sold to Andal but the latter
refused to sell the same. Later, Andal resold the same to
Maria and Aquilina. Maria and
Aquilina alleged that there had been an oral partition
among them and their brother and
sisters, and that there are witnesses ready to prove such
partition. However, Cresencia
asserted that under the Rules of Court, parol evidence of
partition is inadmissible.

ISSUE: Whether or not oral evidence is admissible in

proving a contract of partition
among heirs

As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they

affect the parties, are
required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of
jural validity or as a means of
providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written
form exacted by the statute of
frauds, for example, “is for evidential purposes only.”
The Civil Code, too, requires the
accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public
instrument, not in order to validate the
act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after
the existence of the acts or
contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be
compelled to execute the
document. It must be noted that where the law intends a
writing or other formality to be the essential requisite to
the validity of the transactions it says so in clear and
unequivocal terms. Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court contains no such express
or clear declaration that the required public instruments
is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an
inherent element of its effectiveness as between the
parties. The requirement that a partition be put in a
public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time
the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. The object
of registration is to serve as constructive
notice. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition
not executed with the
prescribed formalities does not come into play when, as
in this case, there are no

7. SAMPILO ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Dimaliwat, Dianne
FACTS: Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945.
Teodoro left four parcels of land in Pangasinan. He left
as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several
nephews and nieces. Without any judicial proceedings,
Leoncia (his widow) executed an affidavit (Exhibit A)
stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no
children or respondent neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters,
nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the
legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person
to inherit the above properties”. Leoncia then executed a
deed of sale (Exhibit B) of all the above parcels of land
in favor of Benny Sampilo. Benny then sold (Exhibit C)
the parcels of land to Honorato Salacup. These three
documents were registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Pangasinan. Felisa Sinopera instituted
proceedings for the administration of the estate of
Teodoro Tolete. The complaint alleges that the widow
Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of
adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no
rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had
Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said properties
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Felisa Sinopera's
right of action to recover her and her co-heirs'
participation to the lands in question had not prescribed
at the time the action to recover was filed.
RULING: It is argued that as the action was instituted
almost four years after the affidavit of adjudication,
Exhibit "A", was registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the
administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the
same was not brought within the period of two years as
Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of
extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte
proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be
contended that such settlement or distribution would
affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the
death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement
or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is
made, either directly or by implication.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the
case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion
and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74,
barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an
extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years
from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to
persons who have participated or taken part or had
notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2)
when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of
the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements
because not all the heirs interested have participated in
the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having
found that the decedent left aside from his widow,
nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
8. G.R. No. L-6463            August 12, 1911
DAMASA ALCALA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MODESTA PABALAN, PROCOPIO PABALAN,
BASILIO SALGADO and JUAN BANAY-
BANAY, defendants-appellants.
Pedro Guevara for appellants.
No appearance for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 11th day of June, 1910, the plaintiff and appellee
presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of La Laguna, praying that she be appointed
administratrix of the property described in paragraph 4 of
her petition.
After hearing the respective parties, the lower court
appointed the plaintiff as administratrix of said property.
From that decision the defendants appealed to this court
and made several assignments of error.
That on the 23rd day of April, 1897, Juan Banatin died,
leaving a widow (Damasa Alcala), the plaintiff herein,
and seventeen nieces and nephews, whose names are
set out in the petition; that on the 13th day of June,
1897, the said widow and all of the seventeen nieces
and nephews, except Tranquilina Banatin, entered into a
voluntary agreement among themselves for the division
"entre ellos," of all of the property left by the said Juan
Banatin, deceased, except the house described in
paragraph 4 of the petition; that by the terms of said
agreement, the said house was to remain undivided; that
the widow (the plaintiff herein) should receive the one-
half of the usufruct of said house during her lifetime; that
the other one-half of the usufruct should be distributed
equally among the other seventeen heirs; that Francisco
Salgado, one of the nephews, should administer the said
house, collecting the rents of the same and deliver one-
half to the widow (Damasa Alcala) and the other one-half
to the nieces and nephews; that Francisco Salgado,
having failed to pay to Damasa Alcala her share of the
usufruct of said property, was sued by her and a
judgment was finally rendered against him for the same.
(Alcala vs. Salgado, 7 Phil. Rep., 151.) An execution
was issued upon said judgment and one-half of the
undivided property in question was sold some time in the
year 1907, to one Macario Decena. On the 22nd and
24th days of October, 1908 (see Exhibits 2 and 3), the
said one-half of the property in question was
repurchased by the heirs of Francisco Salgado. The
money used in repurchasing the property by the heirs of
Francisco Salgado was the money of four of the heirs of
Juan Banatin, to wit: Modesta Pabalan, Procopio
Pabalan, Basilio Salgado, and Juan Banay-banay (see
Exhibit 4 of the defendants herein), and not the money of
the heirs of Francisco Salgado. On the 25th day of
November, 1908, thirteen of the nieces and nephews or
heirs of Juan Banatin, by means of a public document,
recognized the right of the said Modesta Pabalan,
Procopio Pabalan, Basilio Salgado, and Juan Banay-
banay as the owners of the one-half of the undivided
property in question. (See Exhibit 5.) On the 25th day of
November, 1908, sixteen of the heirs of the said Juan
Banatin, by a public document, unanimously appointed
the said Modesta Pabalan as "administradora" of all of
the house in question, in substitution of the said
Francisco Salgado deceased. (See Exhibit 6.) Since the
25th day of November, 1908, until the commencement of
the present action, Modesta Pabalan had administered
the property in question, collected the rents of the same
and had paid the one-half of said rents to the plaintiff
herein as the usufructuary of the one-half of said
property.
The first assignment of error made by the plaintiff is that
"El juzgado erro al estimar que la testamentaria del
finado Juan Banatin no ha finalizada."
With reference to this assignment of error, the heirs of
Juan Banatin were at perfect liberty to divide the estate
among themselves, assuming the responsibility of any
debts which might exist. There is no proof that any debts
existed. After the actual division of the estate among
themselves they became the absolute owners of their
respective allotments and were tenants in common of
that portion of the property which remained pro indiviso.
After the mutual agreement among themselves for the
division of the estate, either actually distributing their
respective shares or leaving the same undivided, the
property in question was no longer the property of the
estate of Juan Banatin, but the undivided property of the
heirs. They were tenant in common of that portion of the
property which remained undivided. As such tenants in
common the majority of them had a right to agree upon
the appointment of an administrator of their property.
(Art. 398, Civil Code.) The property belonged to them.
They had a right to administer it.
The lower court in appointing the plaintiff and appellee
as administratrix of the property in question, evidently
did so upon the theory that the said property was still the
property of the estate of Juan Banatin. In this theory the
lower court was mistaken. There was nothing left of the
estate of Juan Banatin to be administered. The heirs by
mutual agreement had divided the property among
themselves. There was no occasion and no reason for
the appointment of an administrator by the probate court,
and, therefore, the judgment of the lower court
appointing Damasa Alcala as administratrix of the estate
of Juan Banatin for the purpose of administering the
property mentioned in paragraph 4 of the petition, is
hereby revoked.
We deem it unnecessary in the present case to discuss
the right of a usufructuary to manage or assist in
managing or to administer the property in usufruct which
belongs to tenants in common. That question is not
presented in the present cause.
Without any finding as to costs, it is hereby directed that
a judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the
lower court appointing Damasa Alcala as administratrix
of the property in question. It is so ordered.
Excluded Heirs
7. SAMPILO ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. Teodoro
left four parcels of land in Pangasinan. He left as heirs
his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and
nieces. Without any judicial proceedings, Leoncia (his
widow) executed an affidavit (Exhibit A) stating that "the
deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent
neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children
neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the,
widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the
deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above
properties”. Leoncia then executed a deed of sale
(Exhibit B) of all the above parcels of land in favor of
Benny Sampilo. Benny then sold (Exhibit C) the parcels
of land to Honorato Salacup. These three documents
were registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan. Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for
the administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete. The
complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had
no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and that
Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to
him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any
right to the said properties
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of
action to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to
the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the
action to recover was filed.
RULING: It is argued that as the action was instituted
almost four years after the affidavit of adjudication,
Exhibit "A", was registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the
administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the
same was not brought within the period of two years as
Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of
extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte
proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be
contended that such settlement or distribution would
affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the
death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement
or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is
made, either directly or by implication.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the
case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion
and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74,
barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an
extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years
from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to
persons who have participated or taken part or had
notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2)
when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of
the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements
because not all the heirs interested have participated in
the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having
found that the decedent left aside from his widow,
nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
G.R. No. L-12588 August 25, 1959
ELIGIO LLANERA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ANA LOPOS,
ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Juan A. Baes for appellant.
Toribio P. Perez for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
Gorgonio Llanera died single and intestate on October
13, 1942. He left an estate consisting of the proceeds of
an insurance policy amounting to $5,150.00. Upon the
request of Remedios Ayque Altavano who claimed to be
a relative of the deceased, a petition for settlement of his
estate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Albayon
January 22, 1948, wherein one Elias Ayque was
appointed administrator of the estate. After hearing, the
Court found that the deceased died without parents,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, but left the
following relatives: Ana, Eustaquio, Julia and Maximina,
surnamed Lopos, brothers and sisters of Aniceta Lopos,
who was the mother of Gorgonio Llanera, and Casiana,
Teodoro, Petronilo, Cenen, Felix, Sotero and Ambrosia,
all surnamed Lopos, first degree cousin of the deceased,
being the children of a brother and sister of Aniceta
Lopos. After all the expenses of administration had been
paid, the Court ordered the balance of the estate to be
distributed among said heirs thereby corresponding to
the first group the sum of P1,188.00 each, and to the
second the sum of P1,188.00 each per stirpes. And on
May 28, 1949, the Court ordered the closure and
termination of the
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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It developed later the however that the deceased had a
brother by the name of Zacarias who died on June
19,1935 leaving a son, Eligio, who was born in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna on July 17, 1925. And when in 1953 Eligio
came to know that his uncle Gorgonio died leaving an
insurance policy the proceeds of which were distributed
in the intestate proceedings instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Albay and were adjudicated to those
who were not entitled thereto, Eligio on September 30,
1954 filed a motion in said proceedings in order to assert
his claim over the property as the sole heir of the
deceased, which motion however he later withdrew
because he intended to file a separate civil action for the
vindication of his right in the proper court. And so on
February 21, 1955, Eligio commenced this action in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna to recover the
proceeds of the insurance policy left by his uncle against
those to whom they were illegally adjudicated alleging
that the latter misrepresented that they were the only
heirs of the deceased when in fact they knew well that
he left a nephew who was alive and was the only one
entitled to inherit his
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Notwithstanding the fact that the defendants were duly
served with summons, except one, only Elias Ayque
answered the complaint, and so upon plaintiff's motion,
they were declared in default. And then the case was
called for trial where not even Elias appeared, the Court
alloted the plaintiff to present his evidence. However, on
February 18, 1957, the Court rendered decision
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the venue
was improperly laid and plaintiff's cause of action had
already prescribed. This appeal was taken to this Court
on purely questions of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In holding that the Court of First Instance of Laguna has
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case, the trial
court said, "Rule 75 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that the Court of First Instance of the province
in which the decedent resided at the time of his death
should take cognizance of the proceedings for the
settlement of his estate to the exclusion of all other
courts. Considering that Gorgonio Llanera, at the time of
his death was a resident of Daraga, Albay, it follows that
the Court of First Instance of that province should have
exclusive jurisdiction to settle his estate. Any question,
therefore, as to who are the persons who should be
presented to and decided by the Court of First Instance
of Albay.".chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The flaw we find in this reasoning is that is presuposes
that the instant action is for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased Gorgonio Llanera. Such is not the case
for his estate has already been settled by the Court of
First Instance of Albay so much so that the proceedings
were declared closed and terminated on May 28, 1949.
The present action is to recover the property illegally
adjudicated to the defendants on the ground of fraud and
being an action in personam the same can be filed either
at the residence of any of the defendants or at the
residence of the plaintiff, at the election of the latter(sec.
1, Rule 5). Plaintiff chose to institute the action in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, where he is a resident,
and so it is incorrect to say that the venue of the present
case has been improperly
laid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In holding that the present action has already prescribed,
the trial court also said: "The claim of the plaintiff, in the
opinion of the Court, was filed out of time. In summary
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, any heir
deprived of his lawful participation therein should file the
corresponding petition in the court having jurisdiction of
the estate within two years after the settlement and
distribution thereof (sec. 4, Rule 74, Rules of
Court).While the Rules of the Court do not prescribed
any time limit during which an heir deprived of his lawful
participation in the state of a person which was settled in
a regular testate or intestate proceeding, Article 1100 of
the Civil Code, however, provides that action for
rescission on account of "lesion" shall prescribe after
four years from the time the partition was made.
Considering that judicial partition of the estate of
Gorgonio Llanera was made on May 17, 1949, hence
plaintiff's action was commenced beyond the prescriptive
period provided by
law.".chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Again, we find this reasoning incorrect, for it overlooks
the fact that the present action is not for rescission of a
contract based on "lesion" but an action to recover
property based on fraud which under our law may be
filed within a period of four years from the discovery of
the fraud. (sec. 43 par. 3, Act 190). Since, as alleged in
the complaint, fraud was discovered only in 1953 and
the action was brought in 1955, it is clear that plaintiff's
action has not yet prescribed. It is therefore an error to
dismiss the complaint based on
prescription.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
G.R. No. L-14676             January 31, 1963
CANDIDA VILLALUZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JUAN NEME and FELICISIMA
VILLAFRANCA, defendants-appellees.
Jose L. Lapak for plaintiffs-appellants.
Rosario B. Zono-Sunga for defendants-appellees.
PAREDES, J.:
This case was elevated to this Court "on purely
questions of law." The record discloses that Maria
Rocabo died intestate on February 17, 1937, leaving a
parcel of land granted her under Homestead Patent No.
185321, issued on May 20, 1930, and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 217 (Exh. A), of the
Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte. She left three (3)
daughters, named Sinforosa, Patricia and Maria,
surnamed Villaluz and grandchildren, Candida, Emilia,
Clemencia, Roberto and Isidra Villaluz, legitimate
children of her deceased son Pedro Villaluz; Isabelo and
Teodoro Napoles, legitimate sons of a deceased
daughter; Severina Villaluz and Sinforosa and Leonor
Napoles, legitimate daughters of another deceased
daughter, Gregoria Villaluz.
After the approval of her application, but before granting
of the patent, on March 6, 1926, Maria Rocabo donated
the southern portion of the land to Maria, and the
northern portion to Patricia, in two notarial deeds
donation (Exhibits 1 and 7), giving them the right to
present their deeds of donations to the Bureau of Lands.
The said donees accepted the donations and took actual
possession of their respective portions, but only Maria
Villaluz remained on the entire land because Patricia left.
Maria cultivated and improved the land from 1927 to
1938, inclusive. Maria and Patricia, however, forgot and
cared not to present the deeds of donation to the Bureau
of Lands.
On March 27, 1930, the patent was granted and O.C.T.
No. 217 was issued in the name of Maria Rocabo.
Realizing that the deeds of donation were not in
accordance with the formalities required by law, and
because Sinforosa Villaluz, who had the custody of the
title would not surrender it to the donees, unless given a
share, upon the advise of a Notary Public, Carlos de
Jesus, Maria, Patricia and Sinforosa, on September 1,
1939, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition (Exh. 2)
among themselves, to the exclusion and without the
knowledge and consent of their nephews and nieces, the
herein plaintiffs-appellants, and in virtue thereof, O.C.T.
No. 217 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 269 was issued in their names (Exh. 5) after having
made representations that they were the only heirs of
their mother, Maria Rocabo. On September 2, 1939, the
3 sisters declared the land for taxation purposes (Exh.
4). On September 11, 1939, they sold the land to
Ramona Pajarillo, wife of Adriano Mago and Angela
Pajarillo, wife of defendant Juan Neme (Exh. 3).
Ramona and Angela declared land for taxation purposes
in their names (Exh. 6). On August 3, 1953, the heirs of
Adriano and Ramona sold the undivided interest of the
latter to Juan Neme (Exh. 8), who, on August 8, 1953,
sold the southern half portion of the property in favor of
defendant Felicisima Villafranca (Exh. 13). Thereafter,
the plaintiffs-appellants came to know that the land
which was in the administration of their aunts, Sinforosa,
Patricia and Maria, was already in the possession of the
defendants. After attempts of amicable settlement had
failed, the plaintiffs on June 3, 1954, filed a complaint for
partition of said land and recovery of their respective
shares on the property and accounting of the fruits
thereof.
It also appears that the deeds of sale of the land in
question executed in favor of the defendants, had not
been registered in favor of the defendants and had not
been recorded in accordance with Public Land Act No.
141 and the Land Registration Law, Act No. 496; that the
vendees failed to have their deed of sale (Exh. 3),
annotated on said T.C.T. No. 269, or have the title
thereof transferred in their names.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered
by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment,
dismissing the complaint, with costs against the
plaintiffs, and declaring the defendants the owners of the
land described in the complaint and in the T.C.T. No.
269. Plaintiffs in their appeal, claim that the lower court
erred: (1) In not finding that the extrajudicial partition
(Exh. 2), only affected the partition of Sinforosa, Patricia
and Maria, surnamed Villaluz, on the land in question
and not the participation of the plaintiffs-appellants, as
compulsory heirs of Maria Rocabo; (2) In finding that
plaintiffs-appellants are already barred from claiming
their participation thereon; and (3) In finding that
defendants-appellees are owners, with right of
possession, of the said land.
The contention of the plaintiffs-appellants is meritorious.
The decision found to be an incontrovertible fact that the
land in question should be divided among the heirs of
the decedent Sinforosa, Patricia and Maria Villaluz and
her grandchildren. Thus, the trial Court said:
... The settlement of the estate of Maria Rocabo
was summarily effected by the extrajudicial
partition executed September 1, 1939, by the
three surviving children to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs who were entitled to inherit by
representation. By virtue of the extrajudicial
partition, Exhibit 1, the Original Certificate of
Title No. 217 in the name of Maria Rocabo was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
269 was issued in lieu thereof in favor of
Sinforosa Villaluz, Patricia Villaluz and Maria
Villaluz on September 6, 1939, to the prejudice
of the plaintiffs. . . .
Furthermore, Maria having left no testament or last will,
her heirs succeeded to the possession and ownership of
the land in question from the time of her death (Art. 440,
Old Civil Code, Art. 533, New Civil Code; Lubrico v.
Arbado, 12 Phil. 391). The deed of extrajudicial partition
(Exh. 2), was fraudulent and vicious, the same having
been executed among the 3 sisters, without including
their co-heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to
the same. The partition, therefore, did not and could not
prejudice the interest and participation of the herein
plaintiffs-appellants, and the sale of the land to the
defendants did not and could not also prejudice and
effect plaintiffs-appellants' interest and participation
thereon. The cancellation of O.C.T. No. 217 and the
issuance of T.C.T. No. 269, did not likewise prejudice
the interest and the participation of the plaintiffs-
appellants. The three sisters could not have sold what
did not belong to them. Nemo dat quod non habet.
The trial court held that under Sec. 4, Rule 73 of the
Rules, the plaintiffs' cause of action had already
prescribed. This section, however, refers only to the
settlement and distribution of the estate of the deceased
by the heirs who make such partition among themselves
in good faith, believing that they are the only heirs with
the right succeed. In the case at bar, however, the
surviving sisters could not have ignored that they had
co-heirs, the children of the 3 brothers who predeceased
their mother. Considering that Maria Rocabo died during
the regime of the Spanish Civil Code, the distribution of
her properties should be governed by said Code,
wherein it is provided that between co-heirs, the act to
demand the partition of the inheritance does not
prescribe. (Art 1965 [Old Civ. Code]; Baysa, et al. v.
Baysa, 53 Off. Gaz., 7282). Verily the 3 living sisters
were possessing the property as administratrices or
trustees for and in behalf of the other co-heirs, plaintiffs-
appellants herein, who have the right to vindicate their
inheritance, regardless of the lapse of time (Sevilla v. De
los Angeles, L-7745; 51 Off. Gaz., 5590, and case cited Rosario obtained loans from the Bank of Calape,
therein). secured by a mortgage on thedisputed land, which was
annotated on its OCT. When Rosario applied again for a
Moreover, the acquisition of the land in question is loan, offering theland as security, the bank’s
governed by the Public Land Act No. 141 and the Land lawyer, Atty. Serna, suggested that she submit
Registration Law Act No. 496. And considering that the an extrajudicial settlementcovering the disputed land as
deed of sale had not been registered in accordance with a means of facilitating the approval of her application.
the said laws, the same did not constitute a conveyance The suggestionwas accepted. The extrajudicial
which would bind or affect the land, because the settlement, which was prepared by Atty. Serna,
registration of a voluntary sale of land is the operative
was signed by theheirs, with the exception of Gregorio,
act that transmits or transfers title (Tuason v. Raymundo,
Jr., then only a minor. After the document was notarized,
28 Phil.635).
theOCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued. Upon the
execution of a real estate mortgage on theland, the loan
Defendants-appellees further argue that the extrajudicial
partition should not be taken independently of the deeds was approved by the bank. Rosario exercised rights of
of donation as in fact, according to them, the crux of the ownership over the land. She brought an ejectment suit
case lies mainly in the two deeds of donation, which against Jovita’s husband and son to evict them from the
enabled the donees to possess the land and cut any and ground floor of the house built on the land for failure to
all rights of the plaintiffs-appellants to claim participation pay rent. Shortly thereafter, Jovita learned that Rosario
therein. In other words, it is pretended that after the hadoffered the land for sale. She informed her younger
alleged donations, the land in question was no longer a brother, Gregorio, Jr. and they filed an actionfor partition.
part of the intestate estate of Maria Rocabo, and the As Caridad was unwilling to join in the action for partition
plaintiffs-appellants could no longer participate thereon. against their mother, shewas impleaded as a defendant.
But the deeds of donation, according to the trial court, Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was
were defective and inoperative, because they were not simulatedand therefore void. They claimed that in
executed in accordance with law. The trial court itself
signing the instrument, they did not really intend to
began to count the period of prescription "after the
conveytheir interests in the property to their mother, but
execution of the extrajudicial partition and the issuance
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 269". The donees only to enable her to obtain the loan on thesecurity of the
themselves know that the donations were defective and land to cover expenses for Caridad’s school fees and for
inoperative, otherwise they would not have subsequently household repairs.
decided to execute the deed of extrajudicial partition,
Issue:
which also goes to show that the rights of the three
sisters and the vendees, stemmed from the said
extrajudicial partition. The defendants-appellees, finally
argue that, this notwithstanding, the subsequent
registration of the land in the names of the two donees
and Sinforosa Villaluz pursuant to the extrajudicial
partition on September 1, 1939, and the subsequent sale
thereof by the registered owners to the defendants-
appellees, on September 11, 1939, followed by the
actual, adverse and continuous possession by the
vendees and successors for more than 10 years, before
the present complaint was filed, had barred the right of
appellants to recover title of the property and claim
participation therein. Having held that the three sisters
were mere trustees of the property for the benefit of the
appellants, and it appearing that they had not repudiated
the trust, defendants-appellees' pretension in this
respect is without merit. The finding in the appealed
decision that "there is no evidence that the said
defendants are not innocent purchasers and for value"
(good faith), is of no moment in the case at bar. As
heretofore adverted to, there was no effective sale at all,
which would affect the rights of the plaintiffs-appellants.
Moreover, the lack of good faith on the part of the
defendants-appellees can reasonably be inferred from
thier conduct in not presenting for registration the
supposed deed of sale in their favor; in failing to
annotate the sale on the T.C.T. of the alleged donees,
and in not asking that a transfer certificate of title be
issued in their (vendees') names. It may also be
reasonably concluded that if they did not present the 1.) Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is valid
deed of sale for registration, it was because they knew and can be enforced against petitioners?
that their vendors were not the sole and only heirs so as
to entitle them to the ownership of the land in question. 2.) Whether or not Gregorio, Jr. is barred by laches from
recovering his share in the property?
IN VIEW HEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby Held:1.) Yes. The heirs meant the extrajudicial
set aside, and the case is remanded to the court of settlement to be fully effective. The record reveals
origin, for further and appropriate proceedings.. thatthere was an intention on the part of Jovita and
Caridad to cede their interest in the land to their mother
Ancog vs CA rosario. It is immaterial that they had been initially
motivated by a desire to acquire a loan.Under Art. 1082,
Facts:The land, with improvements thereon, was CC, every act which is intended to put an end to
formerly the conjugal property of spouses Gregorio indivision among co-heirs isdeemed to be partition even
Yapand Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio died, leaving though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or
his wife, private respondent Rosario, andchildren, any other transaction.
petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and
private respondent Caridad Yap ashis heirs. Thereafter,
2.)No. As he did not take part in the partition, he is not
bound by the settlement. At thetime the extrajudicial
settlement was executed, he was a minor. As such, he
was not included or even informed of the partition.
Instead, the registration of the land in his mother’s
name created animplied trust in his favor by analogy to
Art. 1451, CC, which provides that “when land passes
by succession to any person and he causes the legal
title to be put in the name of another, a trust
isestablished by implication of law for the benefit of the
true owner. As a general rule, a resultingtrust arises
where such may be reasonably presumed to be the
intention of the parties, as determinedfrom the facts and
circumstances existing at the time the transaction out of
which it is sought to beestablished. For prescription to
run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated
byunequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust
and proved by clear and conclusive evidence.A cestui
que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust
within 10 years from the time when thetrust is
repudiated. The rule that the prescriptive period must
be counted from the date of issuanceof the Torrens
certificate of title applies only to the remedy of
reconveyance under the PropertyRegistration Decree.
Since this action by Gregorio, Jr. to claim his share was
brought shortly after he was informed by Jovita of their
mother’s effort to sell the property, his claim cannot
beconsidered barred either by prescription or by laches.