G.R. No.
45904 September 30, 1938 will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule,
Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G. UTULO, applicant-
appellee,
vs.
LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
Feliciano B. Gardiner for appellant.
Gerardo S. Limlingan for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the order of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial administrator
of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia.
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac for the administration of his property (special proceedings
No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein
oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The said deceased left legitimate
children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the
widow, are the presumptive forced heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G.
Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said
deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only
forced heirs being her mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same
court the judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife (special
proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs were he himself
and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only property left by the
deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan
Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said
deceased. The oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial
administration of the property of her daughter and the appointment of the applicant
as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no
indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she
stated that should the court grant the administration of the property, she should be
appointed the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the
applicant. After the required publications, trial was had and the court, on August 28,
1936, finally issued the appealed order to which the oppositor excepted and
thereafter filed the record on appeal which was certified and approved.
The oppositor-appellant assigns five errors allegedly committed by the trial court,
but these assigned errors raise only two questions for resolution, namely: whether
upon the admitted facts the judicial administration of the property left by the
deceased Luz Garcia lies, with the consequent appointment of an administrator, and
whether the appellant has a better right to the said office than the appellee.
1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure
providing in part that "if no executor is named in the will, or if a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision enunciates the general
rule that when a person dies living property in the Philippine Islands, his property
should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the deceased left no
however, is subject to the exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the
same Code, as finally amended. According to the first, when all the heirs are of
lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for
the appointment of an administrator. According to the second, if the property left
does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the competent court,
after the required publications, to proceed with the summary partition and, after
paying all the known obligations, to partition all the property constituting the
inheritance among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a person
dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not,
are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings
(Ilustre vs.Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434;
Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367;
Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317).
In enunciating the aforesaid doctrine, this court relied on the provisions of articles
657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code under which the heirs succeed to all the property
left by the deceased from the time of his death. In the case of Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, supra, it was said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in
other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the property of the
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the
death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of
debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the
administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to
administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among
themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that
privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate
may be divided by a petition for partition in case they can not mutually
agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate,
there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the
settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are
all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate
should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The
property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts
against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners
of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of
the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show
that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they
intervened in any way whatever in the present actions. If there are any
heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they have
their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.
In the cases of Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra, Bondad vs. Bondad, supra,
and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra, the same doctrine was reiterated. And in the
case of Fule vs. Fule, supra, this court amplified and ratified the same doctrine in
the following language:
Upon the second question — Did the court a quo commit an error in
refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule? — it
may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the present
action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against his estate and
(b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and
661 of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased
person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. (To
Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil.,
321; Marin vs. Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil.,
434; Nable Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil., 73; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232;
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes
immediately to his heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what reason
can there be for the appointment of a judicial administrator to administer
the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to
which they are immediately entitled? In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad (34
Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, discussing this question, said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death;
in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the
death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of
debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the
administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to
administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among
themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that
privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate
may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually
agree in the division. (Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no
reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of
an administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs when they are
adults and when there are no debts against the estate. (Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, supra; Bondad vs. Bondad, supra;
Baldemor vs.Malangyaon, supra.)
xxx xxx xxx
The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exist in
the divisions of personal as well as the real property. If they cannot agree
as to the division, then a suit for partition of such personal property among
the heirs of the deceased owner is maintenable where the estate is not in
debts, the heirs are all of age, and there is no administration upon the
estate and no necessity thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. Rep.,
559.)
It is difficult to conceive of any class or item of property susceptible of
being held in common which may not be divided by the coowners. It may
be of personal property as well as of real estate; of several parcels as well
as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts;
or of part only of the lands of the coowners as well as of the whole.
(Pickering vs. Moore, 67 N. H., 533; 31 L. R. A., 698; Pipes vs. Buckner,
51 Miss., 848; Tewksbury vs. Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)
We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine
so uniformly applied. We are convinced that if the courts had followed it in all cases
to which it has application, their files would not have been replete with unnecessary
administration proceedings as they are now. There is no weight in the argument
adduced by the appellee to the effect that his appointment as judicial administrator
is necessary so that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the
deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right
of the representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that
he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced
heir and an interested and necessary party if she were living . In order to intervene
in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is not
necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased wife be instituted
— an administration which will take up time and occasion inconvenience and
unnecessary expenses.
2. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine which of the parties has
preferential right to the office of administrator.
The appealed order should be reversed, with the costs of this instance to the
applicant-appellee. So ordered.

When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the
property left by their ancestor is the same as that of any other coowners or
owners in common, and they may recover their individual rights, the same
as any other coowners of undivided property. (Succession of Story, 3 La.
Ann., 502; Mcintyre vs.Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux. vs. Ford, 29
Miss., 57.)
G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA
NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate
without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the
deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving
spouse? These are the main questions which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on
January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate
spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister
Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased
Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the
following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the
deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the
deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from
the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL
Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security
System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter
lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of
the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse
and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition
of private respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for
purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does
exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor
as the surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private
respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de
Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial
court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the
deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the
order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of private
respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following
issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial
administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the
decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as administratrix of the
estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the
surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased
for purposes of administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits
from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole
beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these
institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits;
secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB
and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by several
receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially
settled between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving
heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide
what properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for
herself. She points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the
intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to
the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a
handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot
order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved
from the estate of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the
administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to
receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the
decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some
of the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a certain property
should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However,
the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the
parties.7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the administration
proceedings instituted by private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by
petitioner for the reasons herein below discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor
therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under
this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from
the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting
the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the
heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or
obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for
partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as
they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision
does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course
of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if
the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of
court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without
good and compelling reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in
such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the
estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors
will depend on the circumstances of each case.
In one case, 13
We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have
any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the
manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the
corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in
sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated,
questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and
therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one
heir.
usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary
in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his
wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in
the intestate proceedings of the latter.15
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two
surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit
that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that
these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private
respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of
the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties
are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them
fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will
necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the
estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial
especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an
administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it
to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar
nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may
be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should
there be any, are protected in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there
being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as
between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira
Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding
dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new
action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as

administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such
appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that
same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not
justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find
so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a
G.R. No. L-31979 August 6, 1980
FILOMENA G. PIZARRO, MISAEL G. PIZARRO, AURELIO PIZARRO, JR.,
LUZMINDA G. PIZARRO, DELIA-THELMA G. PIZARRO, ROGELIO G. PIZARRO,
VIRGILIO G. PIZARRO, ROSALINDA G. PIZARRO, JOSE ELVIN G. PIZARRO
and MARIA EVELYN G. PIZARRO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES,
JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO,
HONORABLE VICENTE P. BULLECER, JUDGE OF BRANCH IV OF THE COURT
OF INSTANCE OF DAVAO, ALFONSO L. ANGLIONGTO JR., FELICITAS YAP
ANGLIONGTO, GAUDENCIO A. CORIAS, REGALADO C. SALAVADOR, ALICIA
P. LADISLA and LYDIA P. GUDANI, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 42507-R,
entitled Filomena Pizarro, et al. vs. Hon. Manases G. Reyes, et al., dismissing the
petition for certiorari and mandamus with Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction
which sought to nullify the Order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III,
dated April 10, 1968, dismissing Civil Case No. 5762.
The controversy stemmed from the following facts:
Petitioner Filomena G. Pizarro, is the surviving spouse of the late Aurelio Pizarro,
Sr., while the other petitioners, Misael, Aurelio, Jr., Luzminda, Delia-Thelma,
Rogelio, Virgilio, Rosalinda, Jose Elvin and Maria Evelyn, all surnamed Pizarro, as
well as respondents Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, are their children. Upon
the death of Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., Special Proceedings No. 1421 entitled "In the
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Aurelio Pizarro, Sr.," was instituted by petitioners
through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador on September 21, 1965 in the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch I, presided by Judge Vicente P. Bullecer. Listed among
the properties of the estate were parcels of land situated in Agdao, J. Palma Gill,
and Claro M. Recto Streets, Davao City. On December 23, 1965, the Court, upon
agreement of the parties, appointed Gaudencio A. Corias, Clerk of Court of said
Court, as Administrator of the estate.
On January 11, 1967, the Administrator, through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, filed a
Motion for Authority to Sell the properties located at Agdao and Jose Palma Gil
Streets, Davao City, to settle the debts of the estate initially estimated at
P257,361.23, including inheritance and estate taxes. The heirs, Alicia P. Ladisla and
Lydia P. Gudani, opposed the Motion stating that the claims against the estate had
not yet been properly determined and that the sale of the Agdao lot with an area of
13,014 sq. ms. would be more than sufficient to cover the supposed obligations of
the estate, which they claimed were exaggerated.
The Court, in its Order dated February 7, 1967, authorized the sale "in the interest
of the parties" and since majority of the heirs were in favor of the sale "to avoid
unnecessary additional burden of about P2,000.00 every month. 1 On February 8,
1967, the Administrator moved for the approval of the conditional sale of the Agdao
property to Alfonso L. Angliongto for a total consideration of P146,820.00 payable in
six installments including the down payment. 2 The document of sale stipulated that
the vendor was to cause the ejectment of all occupants in the property on or before
July 31, 1967, otherwise, the vendee was to have the right to rescind the sale and
demand reimbursement of the price already paid. The heirs filed a Motion, also
dated February 8, 1967, to set aside or hold in abeyance the Order authorizing the
sale on the ground that they were negotiating for the sale of said lot to Mr.
Benjamin Gonzales, whose theatre was being constructed on a 1,187 square meter
portion thereof. 3
The Court, in its Order dated February 9, 1967, denied the "Motion to Set Aside"
stating that the grounds relied upon by the heirs were "nothing but speculations and
had no legal basis." 4 The heirs moved for reconsideration alleging that they were
being deprived of the right to a more beneficial sale. 5 On February 11, 1967, a
hearing was held on the Motion for approval of the sale of the Agdao lot to Alfonso
Angliongto. 6 The heirs maintained their objection on the grounds that 1) the sale
would be improvident and greatly prejudicial; 2) there has been no determination of
the debts or obligations of the estate as yet; and 3) the terms of the sale were very
prejudicial to them. The Court denied reconsideration on February 20, 1967, 7 and
approved the sale on the same date stating that "the sale sought to be approved
was more beneficial."
On February 22, 1967, the Administrator presented another Motion for Authority to
Sell the Claro M. Recto lot stating that the proceeds from the sale of the Agdao lot
were not sufficient to settle the obligations of the estate and that the sale of the
property on J. Palma Gil Street was unanimously opposed by the heirs. Authority
was granted by the Court o March 6, 1967. 8
Prior to this, the heirs, in a Motion dated February 27, 1967 prayed that
Administrator Gaudencio A. Corias be asked to resign or be removed for having
abused his powers and duties is such and that, Letters of Administration be granted
instead to Filomena Pizarro. 9 They also terminated the services of Atty. Regalado C.
Salvador, who had acted likewise as counsel for the Administrator.
On March 11, 1967, the Administrator moved that he be allowed to resign.
On June 22, 1967, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, filed a
"Motion for Cancellation or Rescission of Conditional Contract of Sale" of the Agdao
lot in favor of Alfonso L. Angliongto reiterating that it was unnecessary and
prejudicial to their interests, that the sale of the lot in Claro M. Recto Street for
P370.000.00 was more than sufficient to settle the obligations of the estate, that it
was impossible to eject all nineteen tenants, not later than July 31, 1967, and that
the vendee had failed to pay the last four installments due despite repeated
demands. 10 Angliongto's counsel countered that the condition of the sale requiring
the prior ejectment of squatters had not been complied with so that the vendee
would hold in abeyance payment of the balance of the purchase price until all the
squatters were ejected. 11 The Court denied rescission of the sale in its Order, dated
July 3, 1967, stating that the relief prayed for is not within its power to grant, and
that the heirs "should file the necessary action before a competent Court not before
this Court, and much less by mere motion." 12 The heirs moved to reconsider the
said Order. In the meantime, Judge Bullecer was transferred to the Court of First
Instance at Mati, Davao Oriental.
On July 6, 1967, the Administrator presented a "Motion to Approve Final Sale" of
the Agdao lot to spouses Angliongtos stating that the latter had paid the full balance
of P58,728.00. On the same date, the Court approved the same. 13 It appears that
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19342 was issued in favor of Alfonso Angliongto
on July 10, 1967. 14
On July 13, 1967, Gaudencio Corias ceased to be Administrator. 15
Without waiting for the resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
denying rescission of the sale, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P.
Gudani, filed on October 5, 1967, a verified Complaint for "Cancellation of Authority
to Sell and Rescission and Annulment of Deed of Sale and Damages with Preliminary
Injunction" (Civil Case No. 5762, hereinafter called the Rescission Case) in the Court
of First Instance of Davao (raffled to Branch III), against the Angliongto spouses,
Administrator Gaudencio A. Corias, Judge Vicente P. Bullecer, Atty. Regalado C.
Salvador, Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, 16 the latter two having refused to
join as plaintiffs. Petitioners contended inter alia that despite all their efforts to
block the sale "the Administrator taking advantage of the name and influence of the
presiding Judge" succeeded in inducing Angliongto to purchase the lot at a price
allegedly much higher than the reported P12.00 per square meter; that the sale
contained an impossible condition which was the ejectment of the tenants before a
certain date; that there was connivance between the Administrator and the vendee
with the knowledge of the Judge and Atty. Regalado Salvador; and that they had
suffered actual and moral damages by reason of the sale. They also prayed that
since the vendees had entered the lot and destroyed improvements thereon, that
they be enjoined from doing so. Attached to the Complaint was a letter 17 addressed
to the surviving spouse, Filomena G. Pizarro, from Atty. Raul Tolentino to the effect
that the sum of P58,728.00 issued by Alfonso Angliongto in favor of the estate and
which was deposited by virtue of a Court Order had been dishonored by the Bank
because of a stop-payment order of Angliongto.
All the defendants except Judge Bullecer and Atty. Corias who filed a Motion to
Dismiss, presented their respective Answers. Eventually, however, they all adopted
the same Motion predicated mainly on plaintiffs' lack of legal capacity to sue and
lack of cause of action. 18 In addition, the Angliongtos pleaded res judicata, the sale
having been approved by the Court as far back as February 20, 1967 and the final
deed on July 6, 1967, and the corresponding title issued in the name of Alfonso
Angliongto on July 10, 1967. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition 19 as well as a
supplemental Opposition. 20
On October 17, 1967, Judge Alfredo I. Gonzales, as Executive Judge, issued an
Order enjoining the Angliongtos, their agents, laborers, representatives, from
further cutting and destroying coconuts, other fruits and improvements on the
property pending the final termination of the action or until a contrary order is
issued by the Court, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P25,000.00. 21
On April 10, 1968, the trial Court (respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes presiding)
dismissed the Rescission Case (Civil Case No. 5762) on the ground that it could not
review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court besides the fact that a
Motion for Reconsideration was still pending resolution before the Probate
Court. 22 Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal Order was denied on
October 10, 1968.
While the Rescission Case was pending, the Angliongtos filed Civil Case No. 5849 for
Damages (the Angliongtos Case) against the heirs.
On November 25, 1968, petitioners elevated their cause to the Court of Appeals on
"Certiorari and mandamus with Prohibition and Injunction," charging that
respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
Rescission Case and prayed that he be required to take cognizance thereof and that
the Angliongtos be enjoined from exercising rights of ownership over the property.
On February 11, 1970, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition opining that the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, did not abuse its discretion in approving
the sale in the Intestate Case (Sp. Proc. No. 1421), and even granting that it did,
the proper remedy was appeal not Certiorari; that the Court of First Instance,
Branch III, neither abused its discretion in dismissing the Rescission Case (Civil
Case No. 5762) as that case sought to review the actuations of a coordinate Branch
which is beyond its judicial competence; and that since said dismissal was final, the
proper remedy was appeal. It also observed that copies of the Orders sought to be
reviewed were not certified true copies and, therefore, violative of Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
The present Petition before us seeks a reversal of the aforestated findings of the
Appellate Court anchored on the principal contentions that the sale of the Agdao
property should be rescinded for failure of the vendees to pay the purchase price,
and that actually no review of the actuations of a co-equal Branch of the Court is
being sought. We gave due course to the Petition on June 8, 1970.
In a Manifestation filed by petitioners on March 29, 1976, 23 they disclosed that the
Angliongtos had mortgaged the Agdao property to the Development Bank of the
Philippines in Davao City, in violation of the injunctive Order of the lower Court, and
after redeeming the same caused the property to be subdivided into three lots and
titled in their names. Subsequently, they allegedly sold the biggest portion
containing 11,500 sq. ms. to Yu Cho Khai and Cristina Sy Yu for P250,000.00 on
October 25, 1975. Title to said portion has been allegedly transferred in favor of
said vendees.
The primary point, tendered for resolution is the correctness of the ruling of the
Court of Appeals upholding the opinion of the trial Court that the latter was devoid
of authority to review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court.
Secondarily, the propriety of the extra-ordinary remedy of certiorari despite the
existence of the remedy of appeal is also in issue.
Certiorari should lie.
While an Order of dismissal is, indeed, final and appealable as it puts an end to
litigation and leaves nothing more to be done on the merits in the lower Court, 24 so
that certiorari is ordinarily unavailable, that general rule allows of exceptions,
namely, when appeal is inadequate and ineffectual or when the broader interest of
justice so requires. 25In this case, appeal would not have afforded the heirs an
effective and speedy recourse. It would have entailed a protracted litigation and in
the interim, the heirs stood to suffer as a consequence of the approval of the sale.
The prompt stoppage of that sale was vital to them. Thusly, appeal not being
speedy enough to bring about the desired objective and to be of any utility to the
heirs, their availment of certiorari must be held to have been proper.

We come now to the question of correctness of the Order of dismissal of the trial
Court which the Appellate Tribunal had upheld. As a strict legal proposition, no
actuation of the Probate Court had to be reviewed. There is no judicial interference
to speak of by one Court in the actuations of another co-equal Court. The Order
authorizing the sale was issued on February 20, 1967, and on July 6, 1967, the
Court gave its stamp of approval to the final sale. Title was issued in favor of the
vendees on July 10, 1967. To all intents and purposes, therefore, that sale had been
consummated; the Order approving the sale, final.

But, what petitioners sought to achieve in filing the Rescission Case was to rescind
the sale mainly for failure of the vendees to pay the full consideration thereof, 26
which is a valid ground for rescission. That cause of action was within the judicial
competence and authority of the trial Court (Branch III) as a Court of First Instance
with exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation. It was beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the
Probate Court (Branch IV) whose main province was the settlement of the estate.
As a matter of fact, the Rescission Case was instituted after the Probate Court itself
had stated that petitioners' cause of action was not within its authority to resolve
but should be filed with the competent Court. The cause of action in one is different
from that obtaining in the other. It behooved the trial Court, therefore, to have
taken cognizance of and to have heard the Rescission Case on the merits and it was
reversible error for the Court of Appeals to have upheld its dismissal.

In so far as the non-presentation of a certified true copy of the Order of April 10,
1968, sought to be reviewed, its concerned, there seems to have been substantial
compliance with section 1, Rule 65, of the Rules of Court since the copy of the Order
submitted is a duplicate copy of the original and bears the seal of the Trial Court.
Lawyers should bear in mind, however, that a faithful compliance with the Rules is
still the better practice.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the incumbent
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, is hereby ordered to take
cognizance of and hear and decide Civil Case No. 5762 as expeditiously as possible.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO
substituted by their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and
Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and
ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia
Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioners seeking to annul the Decision1 dated July 18, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution2 dated November 13, 2003 denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 65630.3
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine
children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia,
Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of
land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos.
000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the name of Agatona
Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria)
represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of
First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition4 for
Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled
"In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian,
petitioner." The petition was opposed by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who was
represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective
counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an
agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date issued an
Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and
including the undivided half accruing to his spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently
died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify as such
administratrix after posting a nominal bond of ₱1,000.00.6
Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when
the Intestate Estate hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her
brother, oppositor Francisco, together with their respective counsels, appeared; that
Atty. Yray, Francisco’s counsel, manifested that the parties had come to an
agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels suggested that the Clerk
of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner
to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the
approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI)
appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition within 30 days
from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he
issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their
appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where
the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement;
that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed
to attend; that per return of the service, these three heirs could not be located in
their respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided
outside the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:
1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the
time that Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was administering the
properties of the estate (without appointment from the Court) as having
been properly and duly accounted for.
2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the
administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the Court) also
one of the heirs as having been properly and duly accounted for.
3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an
accounting from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as having been
withdrawn.
4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to
first sell it for the sum of ₱40,000.00 subject to the condition that should
any of the heirs would be in a position to buy the properties of the estate,
the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive only Four Thousand Pesos
(₱4,000.00) each.
5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted
from their respective share of ₱4,000.00.9
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs,
informed all those present in the conference of her desire to buy the properties of
the estate, to which everybody present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty.
Taneo explained that the delay in the submission of the Report was due to the
request of respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to make some
consultations on what was already agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it
was only on July 11, 1976 that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty.
Taneo, with the information that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been
agreed upon, provided she be given the sum of ₱5,570.00 as her share of the
estate, since one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray
their father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioner’s Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order10 dated
December 16, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in
order, the same being not contrary to law, said compromise agreement as
embodied in the report of the commissioner is hereby approved. The Court hereby
orders the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale covering all the properties of
the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the payment to her of the sum
of ₱36,000.00. The said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all
the claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid
for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the
heirs. 11
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of ₱5,570.00, as the
same had been allegedly disregarded by the heirs present during the conference.
In an Order12 dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the
new administrator of the estate, purportedly on the basis of the motion to relieve
respondent Gloria, as it appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon
and her absence was detrimental to the early termination of the proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale13 over the
six parcels of land constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in
favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum of ₱36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-
Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos, represented
by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax
Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731 and 000732, which
were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled and
new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132,
2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in Columba’s name; and that later on, Original
Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of
Columba; that some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the
names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and daughter-in-
law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer
certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently discovered the
existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of
Justice, which on June 13, 2000 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.14
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at
the barangay level, but was unsuccessful.15
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation16 of the other heirs
of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,17 and Enrique, filed with
the CA a petition for annulment of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of
Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged
that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was null and void and of no effect, the
same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and
irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their
share of their father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an affidavit,
as well as the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever took
place for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the estate of their parents and
that they never received any payment from the supposed sale of their share in the
inheritance; that the report was done in close confederacy with their co-heir
Columba, who stood to be benefited by the Commissioner's recommendation,
should the same be approved by the probate court; that since the report was a
falsity, any order proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the
certificates of titles in favor of respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity,
since the CFI which issued the assailed order did not appear to have been furnished
a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not in custodia legis of the
consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide the
remainder of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the
administration expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had not yet been
terminated as the last order found relative to the case was the appointment of Lope
as administrator vice Gloria; that they never received their corresponding share in
the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance with
administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their right to the property without due
process of law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be
deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the
assailed order dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was preposterous,
as respondents were represented by counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus,
notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this was only a ploy so that they
could claim that they filed the petition for annulment within the statutory period of
four (4) years; that they have been in possession of the six parcels of land since
May 25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in
the intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the
assailed order; that Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having
received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents were
estopped from assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already
attained the status of finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated
December 16, 1976 as well as the Certificates of Title issued in the name of
Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the subsequent transfer of these Titles in the name of
spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Further,
SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be
continued.18
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the
veracity and truthfulness of the Commissioner’s Report, which was used by the trial
court as its basis for issuing the assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an
agreement, there was a need for all the concerned parties to be present in the
conference; however, such was not the scenario since in their separate sworn
statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent attested to the fact that no
meeting or conference ever happened among them; that although under Section
3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence, there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of an official duty, the same may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence to prove the contrary.
The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not
held accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioner’s Report never mentioned the names
of the heirs who were present in the alleged conference but only the names of those
who were absent, when the names of those who were present were equally
essential, if not even more important, than the names of those who were absent;
(2) the Report also failed to include any proof of conformity to the agreement from
the attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent as
regards the agreed mechanisms for the estate’s settlement; (3) there was lack or
absence of physical evidence attached to the report indicating that the respondents
were indeed properly notified about the scheduled conference. The CA then
concluded that due to the absence of the respondents' consent, the legal existence
of the compromise agreement did not stand on a firm ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was
given to Atty. Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos,
respectively, the same cannot be taken as notice to the other heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos; that a lawyer’s authority to compromise cannot be simply presumed, since
what was required was the special authority to compromise on behalf of his client;
that a compromise agreement entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so
by the principal is void and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;19 that being
a void compromise agreement, the assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were
procured fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the properties to Columba Cuyos-
Benatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly
defective, since the compromise agreement which served as the basis of the Deed
of Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of
₱36,000.00 to the administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the
testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting that he received his share of the proceeds
but without indicating the exact amount that he received; that even so, such alleged
payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial court’s order for
the administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all properties of the estate in
favor of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to the administratrix of the sum
of ₱36,000.00; that said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all
the claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid
for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the
heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished
the trial court nor was said money placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that
the Certification dated December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu
indicated that the case had not yet been terminated and that the last Order in the
special proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new administrator of
the estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which included the execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new
Tax Declarations and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were
tainted with fraud. Consequently, the CA concluded that the compromise
agreement, the certificates of title and the transfers made by petitioners through
fraud cannot be made a legal basis of their ownership over the properties, since to
do so would result in enriching them at the expense of the respondents; and that it
was also evident that the fraud attendant in this case was one of extrinsic fraud,
since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully litigate their case because of
the scheme utilized by petitioners to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a
proper remedy where the aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies, such as
new trial, appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to take through their own
fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the
24 year old Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an official act which
enjoys a strong presumption of regularity - based merely on belated allegations of
irregularities in the performance of said official act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case,
extrinsic fraud existed which is a sufficient ground to annul the lower court's order
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 20
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they
were in possession of affidavits of waiver and desistance executed by the heirs of
Lope Cuyos21 and respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares22 on February 17, 2004 and
December 17, 2004, respectively. In both affidavits, the affiants stated that they
had no more interest in prosecuting/defending the case involving the settlement of
the estate, since the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister
Columba, and they had already received their share of the purchase price. Another
heir, respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier executed an Affidavit23 dated
December 13, 2001, stating that the subject estate was sold to Columba and that
she had already received her share of the purchase price on May 18, 1988. In
addition, Numeriano had issued a certification24 dated May 18, 1988, which was not
refuted by any of the parties, that he had already received ₱4,000.00 in payment of
his share, which could be the reason why he refused to sign the Special Power of
Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the
CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling
the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved the Commissioner’s
Report embodying the alleged compromise agreement entered into by the heirs of
Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character25 and will not so
easily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial
Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a
final judgment or order of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as
additional .ground therefor.26
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character.27 Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent
act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.28 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic
where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to
the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself
but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court. 29
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16,
1976, we find that it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as
there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud,
but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement
of the heirs and to prepare the project of partition for submission and approval of
the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the
first meeting of the heirs. In his Commissioner’s Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he
caused the appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante
Cuyos in the place, where the subject properties were located for settlement, by
sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the
conference scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of
the nine heirs, only six attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly found,
the Commissioner did not state the names of those present, but only those heirs
who failed to attend the conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique
who, as stated in the Report, based on the return of service, could not be located in
their respective given addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged
subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled
conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-
Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably present in the conference, as she
was not mentioned as among those absent, had executed an affidavit30 dated
December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a meeting nor
was there any telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. While Patrocenia
had executed on December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and
Desistance31 regarding this case, it was only for the reason that the subject estate
properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and that she had already
received her corresponding share of the purchase price, but there was nothing in
the affidavit that retracted her previous statement that she was not called to a
meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized statement32 that there was
no meeting held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneo’s holding of a conference with
the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the
purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they
were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged
meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged
agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to show
their consent and conformity thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a
compromise agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative
that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard to afford them the
opportunity to protect their interests. Considering that no separate instrument of
conveyance was executed among the heirs embodying their alleged agreement, it
was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a conference
among the heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated
in the Report.
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a
disinterested party and that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on
Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an
officer in connection with the performance of an official act in the line of his duty
was legally done, such presumption may be overcome by evidence to the contrary.
We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence of the names of the
persons present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the heirs in the
Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing that respondents
were notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the
presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference
was not held accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification33 dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In
Charge (OIC), Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to show that copies of
the Commissioner’s Report were sent to all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as
well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as enumerated in the Notice found at the lower
portion of the Report with the accompanying registry receipts.34
In Cua v. Vargas,35 in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed
constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of
the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-judicial
settlement and partition has been duly published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding.
The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or
had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of
settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all
interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement
and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed
as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed
of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs
who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after
the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of
creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the
decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered
their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule
74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made
without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are
concerned36 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs
were indeed notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was
not established, and not whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report
embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a
hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite
the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI
adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs
attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance
to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void
Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ contentions that all the parties in the intestate
estate proceedings in the trial court were duly represented by respective counsels,
namely, Atty. Lepiten for petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs;
that when the heirs agreed to settle the case amicably, they manifested such
intention through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January 30, 1973; that
an heir in the settlement of the estate of a deceased person need not hire his own
lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented by the judicial
administrator who retains the services of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is
the legal representative not only of the estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and
creditors whose interest he represents; that when the trial court issued the assailed
Order dated December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's Report, the parties’
lawyers were duly served said copies of the Order on December 21, 1976 as shown
by the Certification37 dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that
notices to lawyers should be considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is
represented by counsel, service of notices of orders and pleadings shall be made
upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the
respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy such as a motion for
reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at the
proper time, but they failed to do so without giving any cogent reason for such
failure.
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioner’s Report was received by
Attys. Yray and Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and Francisco, respectively,
but not the lawyers of the other heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed
before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was Gloria’s counsel when she filed her
Petition for letters of administration, while Atty. Yray was Francisco’s lawyer when
he filed his opposition to the petition for letters of administration and his Motion to
Order administrarix Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the
estate. Thus, the other heirs who were not represented by counsel were not given
any notice of the judgment approving the compromise. It was only sometime in
February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax declarations covering the
parcels of land, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante,
were canceled; and new Tax Declarations were issued in Columba’s name, and
Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently issued in favor of Columba. Thus,
they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of
law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or of any
obligation.38
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,39 we stated the consequences of a void judgment,
thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner
in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory. In contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed non-existent.
Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment,
but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which
effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a
valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at
any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement
and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings
founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a
void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be
if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same
position they were in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right
nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can
be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it SO ORDERED.
exhibits its head."40 (Emphasis supplied)

The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a
direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding
whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.41 Consequently, the compromise
agreement and the Order approving it must be declared null and void and set aside.

We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the
judgment after the lapse of 24 years from its finality on ground of laches and
estoppel.

Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of
judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery
and, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.42

There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each

case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.43 The question of
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable
doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used
to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts,
under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice
would result.44

In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February
1998 and filed the petition for annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find
that respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration in annulling
the assailed order. It bears stressing that an action to declare the nullity of a void
judgment does not prescribe.45

Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and
binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-
existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba
pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale,
and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error was thus
committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and
Resolution dated November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos
are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No. 24-BN for the settlement
of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.

No costs.
G.R. No. 168692 December 13, 2010
FRANCISCO TAYCO, substituted by LUCRESIA TAYCO and NOEL
TAYCO, Petitioners,
vs.
Heirs Of Concepcion Tayco-Flores, namely: LUCELI F. DIAZ, RONELE F.
BESA, MONELE FLORES, PERLA FLORES, RUPERTO FLORES, WENCESLAO
FLORES, PURISIMA FLORES, and FELIPE FLORES,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals' Decision2 dated
November 17, 2004 and the reinstatement of the Regional Trial Court's
Decision3 dated October 2, 2001.
The records contain the following facts:
Upon the death of the spouses Fortunato Tayco and Diega Regalado, their children,
petitioner Francisco Tayco, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and Consolacion Tayco
inherited the following parcels of land:
1. A parcel of land (Lot 1902pt.), situated at Buswang New, Kalibo, Aklan
with the area of 9,938 square meters, bounded on the NE by Lots 1848 &
1905; on the SE by Lots 1903 & 1904; on the NW by Lots 1895, 1887,
1890 and 1808, covered by OCT No. (24360) RO-1569 under ARP/TD No.
01025 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed value of ₱15,210.00;
2. A parcel of land (Lot 1896), situated at Buswang New, Kalibo, Aklan,
with the area of 2,123 square meters, bounded on the NE by Lot 1898-C;
on the SE by Lot 1897; on the SW by New Provincial Road; and on the NW
by Lot 1893, covered by OCT No. (24101) RO-1570, under ARP/TD No.
01087 & 01088 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed value of
₱6,910.00; and
3. A parcel of land (Lot 2960), situated at Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, with the
area of 4,012 square meters, bounded on the NE by Lot 2957-J; on the SE
by Lot 2961-H; on the SW by Lot 2660; and on the NW by Lot 2656,
covered by OCT No. (23813) RO-1563, under ARP/TD No. 01782 in the
name of Diega Regalado with assessed value of ₱4,820.00.4
Sometime in September of 1972, petitioner Francisco Tayco and his sister
Consolacion Tayco executed a document called Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of
Shares,5 transferring their shares on the abovementioned properties to their sister
Concepcion Tayco-Flores. The said document was notarized and, on March 16,
1991, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and Consolacion Tayco executed the Confirmation of
Quitclaim of Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land.6
Consolacion Tayco died on December 25, 1996 and Concepcion Tayco-Flores died on
January 14, 1997. Thereafter, petitioner Francisco Tayco filed a case for nullity of
documents and partition with damages with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan claiming that
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado
with Confirmation of Sale of Shares and the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in
three (3) Parcels of Land are null and void; thus, he is still entitled to his original
shares in the parcels of land. According to him, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
was executed at that time, because Concepcion Tayco-Flores was in need of money
and wanted the properties to be mortgaged in a bank. He claimed that the
mortgage did not push through and that he requested his sister to cancel the said
Deed, to which the latter ensured that the same document had no effect. However,
he further claimed that without his knowledge and consent, her sisters Concepcion
and Consolacion executed another document entitled Confirmation of Quitclaim of
Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land in order to have the tax declarations and
certificates of title covering those three parcels of land transferred in the name of
Concepcion. He also alleged that he came to know of the said facts only when he
had the property surveyed for the purpose of partition and some of the heirs of
Concepcion objected to the said survey.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Francisco Tayco, the dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the preponderance of evidence tilts in favor of the
plaintiff and judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Declaring the document entitled, Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate
of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares
(Annex A, Complaint), and the document entitled Confirmation of Quitclaim
of Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land (Annex B, Complaint), as null and
void;
b) Declaring the three (3) parcels of land subject of the above documents
to be co-owned by the plaintiff (½ share) and defendants (½ share);
c) Ordering the parties to submit to the court a Project of Partition
indicating the specific portion allotted to them within 30 days from receipt
of this decision; in case of disagreement, the Court shall order the sale of
all the three (3) parcels with the proceeds to be divided equally between
plaintiff on the one hand and the defendants on the other;
d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱10,000.00
representing litigation expenses, and ₱5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus
cost.
e) The claim for moral and exemplary damages are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.7
In ruling that the assailed documents were null and void, the RTC ratiocinated that
the extrajudicial settlement is a simulated document to make it appear that
Concepcion Tayco-Flores was the owner of the properties, so that it would be easy
for her to use the same as a collateral for a prospective loan and as evidence main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the
disclosed that the intended loan with any financial institution did not materialize, findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
hence, the document had no more effect. Consequently, according to the trial court, by the evidence on record.
since the first document was simulated and had no force and effect, the second
document had no more purpose and basis.
This case clearly falls under one of the exceptions and after a careful review of the
facts of the case, this Court finds the petition meritorious.
The respondent-heirs appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals, and
on November 17, 2004, the latter reversed the former's ruling, disposing it in the
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
following manner:

If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
REVERSING the assailed decision of the lower court and a new one entered
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
declaring defendants-appellants absolute owners of Lot Nos. 1902, 1896 and 2620.
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
The complaint of plaintiff-appellee is dismissed.
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an
ordinary action for partition. x x x.
SO ORDERED.8
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
In reversing the trial court's findings, the CA reasoned out that the genuineness and newspaper of general circulationin the manner provided in the next succeeding
due execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement was not disputed and was duly signed section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has
by the parties and notarized. It added that the recital of the provisions of the said not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
document is clear that it is an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of deceased
Diega Regalado and that petitioner and his sister Consolacion confirmed the sale of
xxxx
their shares to Concepcion.

Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but was denied10 by the same court.
making it a public document14 that can bind third parties. However, this formal
Thus, the present petition.
requirement appears to be superseded by the substantive provision of the Civil
Code that states:
The petitioner raised this lone issue:
ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs
CAN THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF THE and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to
DECEASED DIEGA REGALADO WITH CONFIRMATION OF SALE OF SHARES DIVEST be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
CO-HEIR AND CO-OWNER FRANCISCO TAYCO OF HIS SHARES IN THE THREE (3)
PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION?11
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-
ownership, he expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision among (his) co-
Under question is the validity of the document that contains the extrajudicial heirs." Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-
settlement of the estate of the deceased, Diega Regalado. The trial court ruled that owner of renouncing his right over the property regardless of the form it takes. x x
it is null and void based on its assessment of the facts, while the CA adjudged it x15
valid based on its examination of the said document. Under Section 1, Rule 45,
providing for appeals by certiorari before the Supreme Court, it is clearly enunciated
The trial court, after a keen determination of the facts involved in the case, clearly
that only questions of law may be set forth.12Questions of fact may not be raised
articulated its findings as to the inconclusiveness of the required publication and the
unless the case falls under any of the following exceptions:13
notarization of the document purportedly containing the extrajudicial settlement in
question, thus:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
At the outset, the document, Exhibit A, was executed at Lezo, Aklan which is about
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
ten kilometers from Kalibo where all the parties are residents. Defendant had to hire
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
a tricycle from Kalibo to bring the parties to Lezo. Assuming that a certain Engr.
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
Reynaldo Lopez was helping the defendants at that time in this transaction, he is
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
also a resident of Kalibo, Aklan which is the center of Aklan where almost all the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
lawyers have their offices. Engr. Lopez has also his office here. Why would he still
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
recommend the execution of this document particularly in Lezo and before that
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
particular alleged Notary Public? This sounds incredible.
Defendants alleged that the document was published in a newspaper of general
circulation of Aklan but no affidavit of such publication was presented. Only an
alleged receipt from Engr. Lopez was presented (Exh. 2) but does not prove its
purpose.16
The above findings of fact of the trial court must be accorded respect. It is a
hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons,
because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying. It is not a function of this Court to analyze and weigh
evidence by the parties all over again.17
Anent the true intent of the signatories of the questioned document appearing to be
an extrajudicial settlement of an estate, the trial court found the following facts:
Plaintiff alleged that Exhibit A was executed just to accommodate his sister
Concepcion Tayco to be able to offer as collateral the property in order to raise
money for the marriage of her son Ruperto Flores. But the property was never
encumbered because it was then Martial Law (TSN, 10/14/98, pp. 3-4; 5/6/99, pp.
5-6). This testimony of the plaintiff was never rebutted or denied by the defendant,
Ruperto Flores, who himself testified for the defendants. In fact, he even admitted
that he got married after the execution of Exhibit A (TSN, 2/16/01, pp. 15-16). This
allegation by the plaintiff, therefore, must stand.
Defendants argue that if their intention was to mortgage the property in raising
money, there was no need for the execution of Exhibit A but only a Special Power of
Attorney would suffice. This would be the quickest way if the bank would be
amenable, but the latter would be more protected if the title of the property are
already transferred in the name of the mortgagor. For them, it has only to rely on
the certificate of tile if it decides to deal with it.18
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the
law does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the
required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing, simply because
the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise investment.19 However, in the
construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the parties is
primordial and is to be pursued.20 If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control.21 If the contract appears to be contrary to the evident
intentions of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.22 The denomination
given by the parties in their contract is not conclusive of the nature of the
contents.23 In this particular case, the trial court, based on its appreciation of the
pieces of evidence presented, rightfully concluded that the intent of the signatories
was contrary to the questioned document's content and denomination.1avvphi1
Furthermore, the trial court, before stating its final conclusion as to the nullity of the
document in question, correctly discussed the lack of consideration in so far as that
part of the document which embodies the confirmation of the sale of shares of
siblings Francisco and Consolacion to Concepcion. Thus:
The consideration of ₱50.00 for a 1/3 share of about 16,000 sq. meters real
property in Kalibo, Aklan even way back in 1972 is definitely way below the market
value. Even if we take into consideration the filial love between siblings (Jocson v.
CA, 170 SCRA 233), still, the difference between the market value then and the
purchase price is very great. Even for a market value of ₱1,000.00, a consideration
of ₱50.00 only plus filial love would still be greatly disproportionate. Certainly, the
1/3 share of plaintiff exceeds ₱1,000.00. The filial love between siblings may
affect the discrepancy only if the difference between the market value over
the selling price is slight. (ibid.). It would appear, therefore, that Exhibit A is
merely a simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores is the
owner of the properties so that it will be easy for her to use the same as collateral
for a prospective loan. Should the encumbrance not materialize or if it did after the
obligation thereunder has been paid, the document shall become null and void and
without effect. As the evidence disclosed that the intended loan with any financial
institution did not materialize, hence, immediately thereafter, the document had no
more effect.24
As to the other questioned document or the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in
Three Parcels of Land, the nullity of the first document renders it void because its
effectivity is anchored on the validity of the first document. The Confirmation of
Quitclaim of Shares in Three Parcels of Land came into fruition merely to confirm
the existence of the first document. It was executed on March 16, 1991, when
petitioner Francisco Tayco was still alive. Nevertheless, the said document was
signed only by Consolacion and Concepcion, which prompted the trial court to make
the following observations:
As to Exhibit B, it is surprising why only the two sisters participated in its execution
while the plaintiff who is still very much alive and also a resident of New Buswang,
Kalibo, Aklan was excluded. This document is a confirmation of the execution of
Exhibit A where the plaintiff is a party. The plaintiff would have also been made a
party to this document so that he could have confirmed the sale of his share had it
been so. Could it be, therefore, that defendants did not want the plaintiff to know
this document so that they can obtain the transfer of the titles and the tax
declarations in their names without his knowledge? Unfortunately, however, plaintiff
accidentally discovered the transfer when he tried to survey the property for
ultimate partition.25
To reiterate, in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, this Court is
not a trier of facts, and unless there are excepting circumstances, it does not
routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case.26 The CA, therefore, erred in disregarding the
factual findings of the trial court without providing any substantial evidence to
support its own findings.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals' Decision dated November 17, 2004
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9, dated October 2, 2001, is UPHELD and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171717 December 15, 2010
RAMON B. BRITO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO D. DIANALA, VIOLETA DIANALA SALES, JOVITA DIANALA
DEQUINTO, ROSITA DIANALA, CONCHITA DIANALA and JOEL
DEQUINTO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside
the Decision1 dated January 12, 2005 and Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70009. The assailed Decision set aside
the Joint Orders3 dated June 29, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental, Branch 60, Cadiz City, while the questioned Resolution denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Subject of the present petition is a parcel of land located at Barrio Sicaba, Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental. The said tract of land is a portion of Lot No. 1536-B,
formerly known as Lot No. 591-B, originally owned by a certain Esteban Dichimo
and his wife, Eufemia Dianala, both of whom are already deceased.
and his co-heirs have already disposed of their shares in the said property a long
time ago.
On November 26, 1986, the trial court issued an Order dismissing without prejudice
respondents' Answer-in-Intervention for their failure to secure the services of a
counsel despite ample opportunity given them.
Civil Case No. 12887 then went to trial.
Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a
Compromise Agreement wherein Lot No. 1536-B was divided between Jose Maria
Golez, on one hand, and the heirs of Vicente, namely: Margarita, Bienvenido, and
Francisco, on the other. It was stated in the said agreement that the heirs of
Eusebio had sold their share in the said lot to the mother of Golez. Thus, on
September 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 45
rendered a decision approving the said Compromise Agreement.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-12561 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City in
the name of Margarita, Bienvenido and Francisco.
On January 18, 1999, herein petitioner and his co-heirs filed another Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages, this time against herein respondents. The
case, filed with the RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60, was docketed as Civil Case No.
548-C. Herein respondents, on the other hand, filed with the same court, on August
18, 1999, a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against petitioner and his
co-heirs. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 588-C.

On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Ramon Brito,
The parties filed their respective Motions to Dismiss. Thereafter, the cases were
Sr., together with Bienvenido Dichimo, Francisco Dichimo, Edito Dichimo, Maria
consolidated.
Dichimo, Herminia Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Angelino Mission, Leonora
Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Igmedio Mission, Felicito, and Merlinda Dechimo,
assisted by her husband, Fausto Dolleno, filed a Complaint for Recovery of On June 29, 2000, the RTC issued Joint Orders, disposing as follows:
Possession and Damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Negros Occidental, against a certain Jose Maria Golez. The case was
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders the following:
docketed as Civil Case No. 12887.

1. The Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 548-C is hereby GRANTED and Civil
Petitioner's wife, Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco, alleged that
Case No. 548[-C] is hereby ordered DISMISSED for violation of the rule on
they are the heirs of a certain Vicente Dichimo, while Edito, Maria, Herminia,
forum shopping;
Leonora, Felicito and Merlinda claimed to be the heirs of one Eusebio Dichimo; that
Vicente and Eusebio are the only heirs of Esteban and Eufemia; that Esteban and
Eufemia died intestate and upon their death Vicente and Eusebio, as compulsory 2. The Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 588-C is likewise hereby GRANTED
heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in turn, Vicente and Eusebio, and their and the Complaint dated August 13, 1999 is hereby DISMISSED for want of
respective spouses, also died intestate leaving their pro indiviso shares of Lot No. jurisdiction.
1536-B as part of the inheritance of the complainants in Civil Case No. 12887.
3. All counterclaims in both cases, Civil Case No. 548-C and 588-C are
On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention claiming that likewise ordered DISMISSED.
prior to his marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a certain Francisca
Dumalagan; that Esteban and Francisca bore five children, all of whom are already SO ORDERED.4
deceased; that herein respondents are the heirs of Esteban and Francisca's
children; that they are in open, actual, public and uninterrupted possession of a
portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more than 30 years; that their legal interests over the The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but both were denied
subject lot prevails over those of petitioner and his co-heirs; that, in fact, petitioner by the RTC in an Order dated October 5, 2000.
Herein respondents then appealed the case to the CA praying that the portion of the
RTC Joint Orders dismissing Civil Case No. 588-C be declared null and void and that
the case be decided on the merits.
On January 12, 2005, the CA rendered judgment disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by
us GRANTING the appeal filed in this case and SETTING ASIDE, as we hereby set
aside, the Joint Order[s] dated June 29, 2000 of the RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60,
dismissing Civil Case No. 588-C. Further, let the entire records of this case be
remanded to the court a quo for the trial and hearing on the merits of Civil Case No.
588-C.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution
dated February 13, 2006.
Hence, the instant petition with the following assigned errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
LOWER COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE RECONVEYANCE
CASE OF THE HEREIN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS BEFORE THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 60, CADIZ CITY.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
AMENDMENT OF THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 12887 IS NOT
TANTAMOUNT TO ANNULMENT OF THE SAID DECISION. THE HONORABLE
COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS
CASE.6
In his first assigned error, petitioner claims that the CA erred in holding that
respondents are not parties in Civil Case No. 12887 contending that, since their
Answer-in-Intervention was admitted, respondents should be considered parties in
the said case. Petitioner also avers that, being parties in Civil Case No. 12887,
respondents are bound by the judgment rendered therein.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment,
and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.7 In the present case, when respondents
filed their Answer-in-Intervention they submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court and the court, in turn, acquired jurisdiction over their persons.
Respondents, thus, became parties to the action. Subsequently, however,
respondents' Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed without prejudice. From then
on, they ceased to be parties in the case so much so that they did not have the
opportunity to present evidence to support their claims, much less participate in the
compromise agreement entered into by and between herein petitioner and his co-
heirs on one hand and the defendant in Civil Case No. 12887 on the other. Stated
differently, when their Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed, herein respondents
lost their standing in court and, consequently, became strangers to Civil Case No.
12887. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the
court.8 Thus, being strangers to Civil Case No. 12887, respondents are not bound by
the judgment rendered therein.
Neither does the Court concur with petitioner's argument that respondents are
barred by prescription for having filed their complaint for reconveyance only after
more than eight years from the discovery of the fraud allegedly committed by
petitioner and his co-heirs, arguing that under the law an action for reconveyance of
real property resulting from fraud prescribes in four years, which period is reckoned
from the discovery of the fraud.
In their complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that
petitioner and his co-heirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud.
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through
fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of which is the date of registration
of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.9 Thus, in Caro v. Court of Appeals,10 this Court held as follows:
x x x The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L-33261,
September 30, 1987,154 SCRA 396, illuminated what used to be a gray area on the
prescriptive period for an action to reconvey the title to real property and,
corollarily, its point of reference:
x x x It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the
effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190)
governed prescription. It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil actions other than for the recovery
of real property can only be brought within the following periods after the right of
action accrues:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Within four years: xxx An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the right of
action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the
fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or
constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the
corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of
the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil
Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx xxx x x x (Italics supplied.)
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and
of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well
settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The
only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, which states that the
prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance
can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in
Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No.
190, was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as
mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that article 1144 and article
1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the
old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the
four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title of real property
acquired under false pretenses.
An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, which provides:
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to
the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration on the original petition
or application, x x x.
This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, x x
x for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As such, with more reason should
xxxx
The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and
the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2)
of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of
the certificate of title. x x x11
In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was obtained by petitioner and his co-heirs on
September 28, 1990, while respondents filed their complaint for reconveyance on
August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year prescriptive period has not yet
expired.
The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioner's contention that respondents
are guilty of laches and are already estopped from questioning the decision of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 on the ground that they slept on their rights and
allowed the said decision to become final.
In the first place, respondents cannot be faulted for not appealing the decision of
the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 simply because they are no longer parties to the
case and, as such, have no personality to assail the said judgment.
Secondly, respondents' act of filing their action for reconveyance within the ten-year
prescriptive period does not constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting their
right. The Court has ruled that, unless reasons of inequitable proportions are
adduced, a delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not
considered to be a delay that would bar relief.12 Laches is recourse in
equity.13 Equity, however, is applied only in the absence, never in contravention, of
statutory law.14
Moreover, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey
the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession thereof.15 Otherwise, if the
plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run
against him.16 Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would
be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.17 The
reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to
be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the rationale for the rule being,
that his undisturbed possession provides him a continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by the one who
is in possession.18
In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the
subject property as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a
separate action against respondents for recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing
to respondents' possession of the disputed property, it follows that their complaint
respondents not be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is one in equity,
cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.
In his second assignment of error, petitioner argues that the objective of
respondents in filing Civil Case No. 588-C with the RTC of Cadiz City was to have
the decision of the RTC of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 12887 amended, which is
tantamount to having the same annulled. Petitioner avers that the RTC of Cadiz City
has no jurisdiction to act on Civil Case No. 588-C, because it cannot annul the
decision of the RTC of Bacolod City which is a co-equal court.
The Court does not agree.
The action filed by respondents with the RTC of Cadiz City is for reconveyance and
damages.1awphi1 They are not seeking the amendment nor the annulment of the
Decision of the RTC of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 12887. They are simply after
the recovery of what they claim as their rightful share in the subject lot as heirs of
Esteban Dichimo.

As earlier discussed, respondents' Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed by the RTC

of Bacolod City without prejudice. This leaves them with no other option but to
institute a separate action for the protection and enforcement of their rights and
interests. It will be the height of inequity to declare herein petitioner and his co-
heirs as exclusive owners of the disputed lot without giving respondents the
opportunity to prove their claims that they have legal interest over the subject
parcel of land, that it forms part of the estate of their deceased predecessor and
that they are in open, and uninterrupted possession of the same for more than 30
years. Much more, it would be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. 19

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated January
12, 2005 and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70009 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.