Torts And Damages Case Digest: Fausto Barredo V.
Severino Garcia And  defense: liability of Barredo is governed by the
Timotea Almario (1942)
G.R. No. L-48006             July 8, 1942
Laws Applicable: ART. 1089, ART. 1092, ART. 1093, ART. 1094 of the Civil
Code, ART. 101, ART. 102, ART. 103, ART. 365 of RPC
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
 May 3, 1936 1:30 am: road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of
the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela
guided by Pedro Dimapalis
 The carretela was overturned and its passenger Faustino
Garcia (16 years old boy) suffered injuries from which he
died two days later
 Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap
 he was driving on the wrong side of the road
and at high speed
 criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the CFI
 CA affirmed CFI: he was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of 1 year and 1 day to 2 years of prision
correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition
that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved.  responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
 March 7, 1939: parents Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario
brought an action in the CFI of Manila against Fausto Barredo as
the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of
Fontanilla  contracts, and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which
 Barredo was careless in employing Fontanilla who had
been caught several times for violation of the Automobile
Law and speeding violation which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be
public and to himself
 Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code
RPC>liability is only subsidiary (no civil action
against the driver Fontanilla Barredo cannot be
held responsible in the case)
 CFI awarded damages for P2,000 plus legal interest 
 CA: reduced the damages to P1,000 w/ legal interest 
 Applied Article 1903: applicable only to those
(obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or
commission not punishable by law
 by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee
ISSUE: W/N the parents may bring separate civil action against Barredo,
thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of
the Civil Code as an employer 
HELD: YES. CA Affirmed.
 quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or
crime
 Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article
1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-
any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx     xxx     xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall
be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which
fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to
the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx     xxx     xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so
done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable
for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated
persons subject to their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable
for any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the
branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the
performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special
agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon
whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which
case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons
mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees
may recover from the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony.  — Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.  — The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5,
and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the
following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for
acts committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under
nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age,
who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having
such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that
there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under
his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be
insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own
property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in
proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate
amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or
to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the
authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner
prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the
persons using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and
secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be
liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt
from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and
proprietors of establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable,
innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall
be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special
police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken
by robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person,
or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall
have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care of and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
 with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx     xxx     xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an
act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
  Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code
and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of
private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the
latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the
penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt.
  distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
Penal Code Civil Code
minors and
other persons
incapacitated persons
subsidiary (articles
direct (article 19) direct(Art. 1903) 
20 and 21)
 same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
 interpretation of the words of article 1093 "fault or negligence not
punished by law"
 consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and
1903 of the Civil Code
 The acts to which these articles are applicable
are understood to be those not growing out of
pre-existing duties of the parties to one
another. 
 But where relations already formed give rise to duties,
whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then
breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101,
1103, and 1104 of the same code. 
 A typical application of this distinction may be
found in the consequences of a railway accident
due to defective machinery supplied by the
employer. His liability to his employee would
arise out of the contract of employment, that to
the passengers out of the contract for passage,
while that to the injured bystander would
originate in the negligent act itself.
 Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases
of negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. It
says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage."
 exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil
Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of
a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided
in article 20 of the Penal Code
(governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that
the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising
from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility
 for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code
 Rationales:
1. Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but
also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of
the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have
very little scope and application in actual life
2. to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages.
There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be
shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances
of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
3. It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should
fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful
and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who
could not exercise such selection and who used such employee
because of his confidence in the principal or director
4. not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress
Case Title : Fausto Barredo, petitioner, vs. Severino Garcia and Timotea
Almario, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari.
Syllabi Class : Damages|Quasi-delict or "Culpa Aquiliana"|Primary and
Direct Responsibility of Employers under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code|Foundations of Doctrines Above Set Forth|Practice of Relying Solely
on Civil Responsibility for a Crime
Syllabi:
1. Damages; Quasi-delict or "Culpa Aquiliana"; Primary and Direct
Responsibility of Employers under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.-
—A head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela resulted in the death
of a 16-year-old boy, one of the passengers of the carretela. A criminal
action was filed against the taxi driver and he was convicted and sentenced
accordingly. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the
right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. Thereafter the parents of
the deceased brought suit for damages against the proprietor of the taxi,
the employer of the taxi driver, under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Defendant contended that his liability was governed by the Revised Penal
Code, according to which his responsibility was only secondary, but no civil
action had been brought against the taxi driver. Held: That this separate
civil action lies, the employer being primarily and directly responsible in
damages under articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
2. Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Practice of Relying Solely on Civil Responsibility for a
Crime.-
—The harm done by such practice is pointed out, and the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq., of the Civil
Code is restored to its full vigor.
3. Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Expeditious Remedy.-
—The primary and direct responsibility of employer under article 1903,
Civil Code, is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs. Such primary
and direct responsibility of employers is calculated to protect society.
4. Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Degree of Proof.-
—There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be
shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance
of evidence. In such cases, defendant can and should be made responsible
in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910, Civil Code. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
5. Id.; Id.; Id.; Foundations of Doctrines Above Set Forth; Literal Meaning of
the Law.-
— The Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence; if it should be held that articles 1902-1910, Civil Code, apply
only to negligence not punishable by law, culpa aquiliana would have very
little application in actual life. The literal meaning of the law will not be
used to smother a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana.
6. Id.; Id.; Id.; Decisions of this Court.-
—Decisions of this Court are also cited holding that, in this jurisdiction, the early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish
separate individuality of a euasirdelito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil legal términology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana.
Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or
act for. which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in negligence under the Civil Code: for instance, Law 6, Title 16, of Partida 7,
a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, cómo quier que el non fizo a
sued for his civil liability arising from his crime. sabiendas el daño al otro, pero acaesció por su culpa."
7. Id.; Id.; Id.; Sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.- 12. Id.; Id.; Id.-
—The decision cites sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain upholding —A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under
the principles above set forth: that a cuasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this principle,
responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under and on the wording and spirit of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary
article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
negligent acts of his employee.
8. Id.; Id.; Id.; Opinions of Jurists.- Dispositive Portion:
—The decision sets out extracts from opinions of jurists on the separate In view of the foregoing, the judgment of, the Court of Appeals should be
existence of cuasi-delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitoner.
under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
9. Id.; Id.; Id.; Distinction between Crimes under the Penal Code and the
"Culpa Aquiliana" or "Cuasi-Delito" under the Civil Code.-
— A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and
the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for
cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose which remedy to enforce. Some of the
differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana
or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are enumerated in the decision.
10. Id.; Id.; Id.-
—The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code.
According to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal
institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos * * * en que
intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093
provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title
XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-1910. This portion of the Civil Code is
exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
11. Id.; Id.; Id.-
—The individuality of cuati-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear
and unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its
EGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian
of said minor, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-24803 [May 26, 1977]
Facts of the Case:
Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named Agapito
Elcano. A criminal complaint was instituted against him but he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of
intent to kill, couple with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint
for recovery of damages against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married
at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill,
with who he was living and getting subsistence, for the same killing. A
motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. The Court of First Instance
of Quezon City denied the motion. Nevertheless, the civil case was finally
dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.
Issues:
1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case.
2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the
time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living
with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married.
HELD: order appealed from is reversed
1. NO.
 separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.
 If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly
to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana  would have very little scope and
application in actual life
 to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. .
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." 
 ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
 in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana  includes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law
 It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict,
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
2. YES
 While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
 Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible
 the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the
duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their
minor married child without their consent
  Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty.
Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
1. Civil law;  Damages;  Quasi-delicts; The concept of culpa aquiliana
includes acts which are criminal in character, whether voluntary or
negligent.-
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia—that the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplates only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts—deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact is actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here
at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations “which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable
by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter 11, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)” And it is precisely the underlined
qualification, “not punishable by law,” that Justice Bocobo emphasized
could lead to an undesirable construction or interpretation of the letter of
the law that “killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life” hence, the ruling
that “(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or causi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.” And so,
because Justice Bocobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that
drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said
Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the
term, “not punishable by law,” thereby making it clear that the concept of
culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation
of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.
2. Civil law;  Damages;  Quasi-delicts; A separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the victim do not recover
damages on both scores.-
. . . It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal
is not a bar to the instant action against him.
3. Civil law;  Damages;  Quasi-delicts; The vicarious liability of the parents
on account of a delict committed by their minor child is not extinguished by
the fact that said, child who is Hiring with and dependent upon said
parents is married.-
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald’s
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees
that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld. . . . . It
must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the
joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article
2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor
children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons.
On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a
minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give
rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And
surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to
it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in
the same manner that the parents are answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be
done by their minor married child without their consent, (Art. 399;
Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies
to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter
of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of
his son.

Torts And Damages Case Digest: Porfirio P. Cinco V. Hon. Mateo Canonoy
Et Al. (1979)
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
Laws Applicable: Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, Art. 31
and Article 2176 of the Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
 Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by
Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito
for a vehicular accident
 At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents
moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination
of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered
 City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
 CFI by certiorari: dismissed
ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action
HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for
 nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated
principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
 Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant
 primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society
 The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also
clearly recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. 
 Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should
be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based
on quasi-delict
 Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
 Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes
not only injuries to persons but also damage to property
 word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Canonoy, J.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Civil Law|Remedial Law|Rules
of Court
Syllabi:
1. Criminal Law;  Civil Law; There can be independent
civil action for damage to property based on quasi-delict
during the pendency of the criminal action.-
Liability being predicated on quasi delict, the civil case may
proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as
specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
2. Criminal Law;  Civil Law; Distinctions between criminal
negligence and quasi-delict.-
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in Article 365 punishes not
only reckless but also simple imprudence. If we were to
hold that Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only
to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the
literal import of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope
and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
damage to property through any degree of negligence—
even the slightest would have to be indemnified only
through the principle of civil liability arising from crime. x x
x Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in
civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases
of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be
made responsible in a Civil action under Articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many
instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
3. Criminal Law;  Civil Law;  Remedial Law;  Rules of
Court; Separate and independent civil action for quasi-
delict recognized in the Rules of Court.-
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict
is also clearly recognized in Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court. x x x Significant to note is the fact that the
foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an
“independent civil action.’’
4. Criminal Law;  Civil Law;  Remedial Law;  Rules of
Court; Civil Actions referred to in Secs. 3 a b of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court interpreted.-
Stated otherwise, the Civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a)
and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is
that arising from the criminal offense and not the civil
action based on quasi-delict.
5. Criminal Law;  Civil Law; Quasi-delict, Concept Of.-
It bears emphasizing that petitioner’s cause of action is
based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasi-delict, as
enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code supra, is so
broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also
damage to property. It makes no distinction between
“damage to persons” on the one hand and “damage to
property” on the other. Indeed, the word “damage” is used
in two concepts: the “harm” done and “reparation” for the
harm done. And with respect to “harm” it is plain that it
includes both injuries to person and property since “harm”
is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In
fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include
damage to property. An instance is Article 2191 (2) of the
Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages
caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful “to
persons or property.”
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of Certiorari prayed for, the
Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sought to be
reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue
City, Cebu, Branch II, is hereby ordered to proceed with the
hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.

Dulay vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220
By LLBe:LawLifeBuzzEtcetera
Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and
Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang,” Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security
guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay,
in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for
damages against Benigno Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard
and/or Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Respondent
Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint
does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s
act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since
the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo),
the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code.  Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based on
negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed
by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies
only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In
addition, the respondent argued that petitioners’ filing of the complaint is
premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is
a condition sine qua non for the employer’s subsidiary liability. Respondent
Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on
the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners
opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the
private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for
damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.
Issues:
(1)   Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes
a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;
(2)   Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed; and
(3)   Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the
Revised Penal Code.
Held: 
(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.” Contrary to the theory
of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.
(2) No. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been
construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted
homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent
civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of
criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused
in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence,
whereas the defendant in Marcia  was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused
by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either
in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to
prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee.
 Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Law|Actions|Damages|Negligence
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law;  Actions; The filing of an independent civil action before Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code
the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in
than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation.+ Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages
2. Remedial Law;  Actions; Nature of a cause of action is determined by the allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term “physical injuries” in
facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.+ Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing
3. Remedial Law;  Actions; The general rule is that the allegations in a death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the [1965]; Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of
defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
judgment upon thesame in accordance with the prayer therein; Elements of physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted
a cause of action.+ homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]).
4. Remedial Law;  Actions; To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause
of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist Dispositive Portion:
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby
indefinite or uncertain.- GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET
support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for
not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of
the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a
complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses
that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev’t. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA
152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]).
5. Civil Law;  Damages;  Negligence; There is no justification for limiting
the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting
from negligence.-
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. Well- entrenched is the doctrine that Article
2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which
are voluntary and intentional.
6. Civil Law;  Damages;  Negligence; The term “physical injuries” in Article
33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death.-
Tayag, Sr. vs. Alcantara
No. 50959                     July 23, 1980
Heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr.         vs.
Honorable Fernando S. Alcantara, Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and
Romeo Villa y Cunanan
Doctrine: Acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to prosecution in a civil
action for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver and the
operator.
Facts:    3)     Direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission;
            On Sept. 2, 1974, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was bumped and hit by a
Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB ’74
and as a result of which he was physically injured causing his instantaneous
death as well as destroying the bike he was riding. The bus was being
driven by defendant, Romeo Villa y Cunanan, at the times of the accident
in a faster and greater speed than what was reasonable and proper and in
a grossly negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent manner.  the prosecution in the civil case for damages based on a quasi-delict. The
The heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., petitioners, filed with the Court of First
Instance a complaint for damages against Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
and Romeo Villa y Cunanan, private respondents, on Sept. 25, 1974. The
private respondents admitted some and denied the other allegations in the
complaints; thereafter, file a motion to suspend trial on the ground of a
pending criminal case against the driver of the bus, Romeo Villa y Cunanan.
The respondent Judge granted the motion and subsequently suspended
the hearing of the Civil Case.
The respondent judge acquitted the accused, Romeo Villa, of the crime of
homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt in the criminal case filed
against him. The private respondents then filed a motion to dismiss the
civil case on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action on the
basis of the driver’s acquittal in the related criminal case. The petitioners
then opposed the motion alleging that their cause of action is based on a
quasi-delict, not on a crime, but the respondent Judge dismissed the
complaint and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners. Hence, this petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the
order of the respondent Judge was filed.
Issue:
            Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of
his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
civil case?
Held:
            Yes, the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the civil case. In this case, the allegations in the complaint show
that petitioners’ cause of action was based upon a quasi-delict. The
essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: 
1)     An act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of
private respondent:
2)     Damage caused by the said act or omission;
4)     No pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
As stated in the case of Elcano vs. Hill, the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished by
the acquittal of the accused in the criminal action arising from the same
act. The petitioner’s cause of action is based on a quasi-delict, therefore,
the acquittal of the driver, Romeo Villa, in the criminal case is not a bar to
petition is granted and the order of dismissal rendered by the respondent
Judge is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.
Case Nature : APPEAL from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, Branch I, F.S. Alcantara, J.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Pleading and Practice|Criminal Procedure|Quasi-
delict|Torts
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law;  Quasi-delict;  Interpretation; Art. 31 of the Civil Code refers to
civil actions based on an obligation arising from quasi-delict.-
—Evidently, the above quoted provision Art. 31 of the Civil Code refers to a
civil action based, not on the act or omission charged as a felony in a
criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from other sources,
like quasi-delict.
2. Same;  Same;  Same;  Same; The requirement of the Rules of Court that
there should be a reservation of the right to file an independent civil action
is contrary to law.-
—The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there
should be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right to institute an
independent civil action is contrary to law (Garcia vs. Florido, L-35095,
August 31, 1973, 52 SCRA 420, 429).
3. Same;  Same;  Same;  Same; An independent civil action for damages in direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission; and (4)
case of acquittal of reasonable doubt is allowed under Art. 29 of the Civil no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
Code.-
—Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on reasonable doubt. Dispositive Portion:
The petitioners, as plaintiffs in the civil case, can amend their complaint WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside, and
and base their action also on article 29 of the Civil Code which allows an the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs
independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on the ground of against the private respondents.
reasonable doubt.
4. Aquino, J., concurring:;  Acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence does not bar a subsequent action for damages due to a quasi-
delict.-
—I concur because petitioner’s action for damages is based on article 2177
of the Civil Code, under which, according to the Code Commission,
“acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for
civil liability from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict or culpa-aquiliana”.
5. Barredo, J., concurring:; The Proceeding and trial in Civil Case No. 5114
should not have been suspended just because of the filing of the criminal
case.-
—I concur and also in the opinion of Justice Aquino. I just like to add that in
my view the proceeding and trial in civil case No. 5114 should not have
been suspended at all just because of the filing of the criminal case.
6. Same;  Same;  Grave Abuse of Discretion; Acquittal of the driver in a
criminal case is not a bar to prosecution in a civil action for damages based
on quasi-delict against him and the operator.-
—The petitioners’ cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the
acquittal of the driver, private respondent Romeo Villa, of the crime
charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil
Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-delict. In the light of the
foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No.
5114.
7. Same;  Same; Requisites of quasi-delict.-
—All the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present,
namely: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part
of private respondents; (2) damage caused by the said act or omission; (3)
CARAVAN TRAVEL v. ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR, GR No. 170631, 2016-02-10
Facts:
On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-
bound lane of Sampaguita Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV,
Parañaque City.[11] A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number PKM
195[12] was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes.[13] To
avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes.[14]
Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid and
loaded her in the back of the van.[15] Espinosa told the driver of the van,
Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital.[16] Instead of
doing so, Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby
subdivision with Reyes still in the van.[17] Fortunately for Reyes, an
unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital.[18]
Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was
Caravan.[19] Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of
organizing travels and tours.[20] Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned
to drive the van as its service driver.[21]
Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes.[22] Despite
medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the accident.[23]
Issues:
First, whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in interest
who may bring an action for damages against petitioner Caravan Travel
and Tours International, Inc. on account of Jesmariane R. Reyes' death
Second, whether petitioner should be held liable as an employer, pursuant
to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
IHaving exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual
loss and is, thus, a real party in interest in this case.
It is particularly noticeable that Article 1902 stresses the passive subject of
the obligation to pay damages caused by his fault or negligence. The article
does not limit or specify the active subjects, much less the relation that
must exist between the victim of the culpa aquiliana and the person who
may recover damages, thus warranting the inference that, in principle,
anybody who suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana, whether a relative
or not of the victim, may recover damages from the person responsible
therefor
II
Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's liability for quasi-
delict provided in Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article 2180's
specification that "[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees . . . acting within the scope of their assigned tasks[.]
Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered owners
are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their vehicles.
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the
employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires
proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver
and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or
her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule
only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle.
Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that
harmonizes it with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
In light of this, the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable.
There, this court stated that Article 2180 "should defer to"[104] the
registered-owner rule. It never stated that Article 2180 should be totally
abandoned.
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the
registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first
establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in
question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a
disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been
proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle
in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the
owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving
forward with the evidence.
The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the
public.
Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration[105]
of the van that hit Reyes.[106] The Certificate attests to petitioner's
ownership of the van.
Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the van.
Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption that the
requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises.
It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under
Article 2180. This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following:
first, that it had no employment relationship with Bautista; second, that
Bautista acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Bautista.
On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time
of the accident.
On the second, petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the accident.
On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the
requisite diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista.
Employing a person holding a non-professional driver's license to operate
another's motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code
Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when it
selected Bautista as service driver; it also committed an actual violation of
law.
III
Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from liability because
Bautista was already dropped as a party is equally unmeritorious. The
liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary.
It does not depend on the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action.
Instead of insisting that Bautista—who was nothing more than a necessary
party—should not have been dropped as a defendant, or that petitioner,
along with Bautista, should have been dropped, petitioner (as a co-
defendant insisting that the action must proceed with Bautista as party)
could have opted to file a cross-claim against Bautista as its remedy.
IV
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it awarded
actual damages to respondent.
Respondent had personal knowledge of the facts sought to be proved by
the Certificate, i.e. that she spent P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses of
Reyes. Thus, the Certificate that she identified and testified to is not
hearsay.
Both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found Bautista
grossly negligent in driving the van and concluded that Bautista's gross
negligence was the proximate cause of Reyes' death.
As such, petitioner must pay the exemplary damages arising from the
negligence of its driver.
For the same reasons, the award of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity is
justified.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 3, 2005 is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS
Principles:
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the
employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires
proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver
and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or
her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule
only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle.
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the
registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first
establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in
question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a
disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been
proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle
in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the
owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving
forward with the evidence.
The victim is, in many cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly
any means to uncover the employment relationship of the owner and the
driver, or any act that the owner may have done in relation to that
employment.
Case Title : CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
petitioner, vs. ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Vicarious Liability ;
Syllabi:
1. Same;  Vicarious Liability; View that the vicarious liability remains with
the registered owner even when the vehicle had been sold to another
person before the accident but the registration has not yet been
transferred.-
—In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, 674 SCRA 117 (2012), the Court
had the opportunity to discuss the interplay between Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code and the registered owner rule. The Court ruled that
the registered owner of a vehicle is deemed the employer of the vehicle’s
driver. Thus, the vehicle’s registered owner is vicariously liable for the
driver’s negligent acts pursuant to Articles 2176 and Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. The vicarious liability remains with the registered owner even
when the vehicle had been sold to another person before the accident but
the registration has not yet been transferred. The Court emphasized in R
Transport Corporation v. Yu, 750 SCRA 696 (2015), that the employer’s
liability for the negligent acts of its subordinate is direct and primary.
2. Remedial Law;  Civil Procedure;  Parties;  Real Party-in-Interest;  “To
qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an action
must be prosecuted, he [or she] must appear to be the present real owner
of the right sought to be enforced.”-
—Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered
actual loss and is, thus, a real party-in-interest in this case. In her
Complaint, respondent made allegations that would sustain her action for
damages: that she exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes; that
Reyes’ death was caused by the negligence of petitioner and its driver; and
that Reyes’ death caused her damage. Respondent properly filed an action
based on quasi-delict. She is a real party-in-interest. Rule 3, Section 2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a real party-in-interest: RULE 3.
Parties to Civil Actions . . . . SECTION 2. Parties-in-Interest.—A real party-in-
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. “To qualify a person to
be a real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he
[or she] must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be
enforced.” Respondent’s capacity to file a complaint against petitioner
stems from her having exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes.
3. Civil Law;  Persons and Family Relations;  Substitute Parental
Authority; Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of
authority of persons exercising substitute parental authority, that is, the
same as those of actual parents.-
—Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of authority of
persons exercising substitute parental authority, that is, the same as those
of actual parents: Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental
authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the
parents. (Emphasis supplied) Both of Reyes’ parents are already deceased.
Reyes’ paternal grandparents are also both deceased. The whereabouts of
Reyes’ maternal grandparents are unknown. There is also no record that
Reyes has brothers or sisters. It was under these circumstances that
respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a child, assumed the role
of Reyes’ parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental authority over
her. As Reyes’ custodian, respondent exercised the full extent of the
statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent. Consistent with Article
220 of the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes’ education and
provided for her personal needs. To echo respondent’s words in her
Complaint, she treated Reyes as if she were her own daughter.
4. Same;  Quasi-Delicts;  Damages; In interpreting Article 1902 of the old
Civil Code, which is substantially similar to the first sentence of Article 2176
of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court (SC) in The Receiver For North Negros
Sugar Company, Inc. v. Ybañez, et al., 24 SCRA 979 (1968), ruled that
brothers and sisters may recover damages, except moral damages, for the
death of their sibling.-
—We note that Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having
reached the age of majority, she was already emancipated upon her death.
While parental authority is terminated upon emancipation, respondent
continued to support and care for Reyes even after she turned 18. Except
for the legal technicality of Reyes’ emancipation, her relationship with
respondent remained the same. The anguish and damage caused to
respondent by Reyes’ death was no different because of Reyes’
emancipation. In any case, the termination of respondent’s parental
authority is not an insurmountable legal bar that precludes the filing of her
Complaint. In interpreting Article 1902 of the old Civil Code, which is
substantially similar to the first sentence of Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
this court in The Receiver For North Negros Sugar Company, Inc. v. Ybañez,
et al., 24 SCRA 979 (1968), ruled that brothers and sisters may recover
damages, except moral damages, for the death of their sibling. This court
declared that Article 1902 of the old Civil Code (now Article 2176) is broad
enough to accommodate even plaintiffs who are not relatives of the
deceased.
5. Same;  Same;  Vicarious Liability;  Article 2180 requires proof of two (2)
things: first, an employment relationship between the driver and the
owner;  and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her
assigned tasks.-
—The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article
2180’s specification that “[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees . . . acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks[.]” Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered
owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their
vehicles. These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in
which the employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180
requires proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between the
driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of
his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner
rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle. The registered-owner rule was articulated
as early as 1957 in Erezo, et al. v. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, where this court
explained that the registration of motor vehicles, as required by Section
5(a) of Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
was necessary “not to make said registration the operative act by which
ownership in vehicles is transferred, . . . but to permit the use and
operation of the vehicle upon any public highway[.]” Its “main aim . . . is to
identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or
injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility
therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.”
6. Same;  Same;  Same;  The source of a registered owner’s liability is not a
distinct statutory provision, but remains to be Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code.-
—Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, 360 SCRA 395 (2001), Del
Carmen, Jr. v. Bacoy, 671 SCRA 91 (2012), Filcar Transport Services v.
Espinas, 674 SCRA 117 (2012), and Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez, 726 SCRA
505 (2014), should not be taken to mean that Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should be completely discarded in cases where the registered-owner rule
finds application. As acknowledged in Filcar, there is no categorical
statutory pronouncement in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
stipulating the liability of a registered owner. The source of a registered
owner’s liability is not a distinct statutory provision, but remains to be
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code: While Republic Act No. 4136 or
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code does not contain any provision on
the liability of registered owners in case of motor vehicle mishaps, Article
2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code imposes an obligation
upon Filcar, as registered owner, to answer for the damages caused to
Espinas’ car. Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a
manner that harmonizes it with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Rules must be construed in a manner that will harmonize them with other
rules so as to form a uniform and consistent system of jurisprudence. In
light of this, the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable. There,
this court stated that Article 2180 “should defer to” the registered-owner
rule. It never stated that Article 2180 should be totally abandoned.
7. Same;  Same;  Same;  The appropriate approach is that in cases where
both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must
first establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in
question.-
—The appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-
owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the
employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the
plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable
presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a
consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no
liability under Article 2180 has arisen. This disputable presumption, insofar
as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the actual driver is
concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the
former that should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence.
The victim is, in many cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly
any means to uncover the employment relationship of the owner and the
driver, or any act that the owner may have done in relation to that
employment.
8. Same;  Same;  Same;  Employing a person holding a nonprofessional
driver’s license to operate another’s motor vehicle violates Section 24 of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.-
—Employing a person holding a nonprofessional driver’s license to operate
another’s motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, which provides: SEC. 24. Use of driver’s license and badge.—. .
. . . . . No owner of a motor vehicle shall engage, employ, or hire any person
to operate such motor vehicle, unless the person sought to be employed is
a duly licensed professional driver. Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to
exercise due diligence when it selected Bautista as service driver; it also
committed an actual violation of law.
9. Same;  Same;  Same;  The liability imposed on the registered owner is
direct and primary.-
—Petitioner’s argument that it should be excused from liability because
Bautista was already dropped as a party is equally unmeritorious. The
liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary. It does not
depend on the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action. Agreeing to
petitioner’s assertion would render impotent the rationale of the motor
registration law in fixing liability on a definite person. Bautista, the driver,
was not an indispensable party under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rather, he was a necessary party under Rule 3, Section 8.
Instead of insisting that Bautista — who was nothing more than a
necessary party — should not have been dropped as a defendant, or that
petitioner, along with Bautista, should have been dropped, petitioner (as a
codefendant insisting that the action must proceed with Bautista as party)
could have opted to file a cross-claim against Bautista as its remedy. The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spell out the rules on joinder of indispensable
and necessary parties. These are intended to afford “a complete
determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties
themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by
the judgment.”
10. Same;  Same;  Same; Like natural parents, persons exercising substitute
parental authority are required to, among others, keep their wards in their
company, provide for their upbringing, show them love and affection, give
them advice and counsel, and provide them with companionship and
understanding.-
—For deaths caused by quasi-delict, the recovery of moral damages is
limited to the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants, and
ascendants of the deceased. Persons exercising substitute parental
authority are to be considered ascendants for the purpose of awarding
moral damages. Persons exercising substitute parental authority are
intended to stand in place of a child’s parents in order to ensure the well-
being and welfare of a child. Like natural parents, persons exercising
substitute parental authority are required to, among others, keep their
wards in their company, provide for their upbringing, show them love and
affection, give them advice and counsel, and provide them with
companionship and understanding. For their part, wards shall always
observe respect and obedience towards the person exercising parental
authority. The law forges a relationship between the ward and the person
exercising substitute parental authority such that the death or injury of one
results in the damage or prejudice of the other.
11. Same;  Same;  Substitute Parental Authority;  Moral Damages;  Given
the policy underlying Articles 216 and 220 of the Family Code as well as the
purposes for awarding moral damages, a person exercising substitute
parental authority is rightly considered an ascendant of the deceased,
within the meaning of Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code.-
—Moral damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for his or her
actual injury, and not to penalize the wrongdoer. Moral damages enable
the injured party to alleviate the moral suffering resulting from the
defendant’s actions. It aims to restore — to the extent possible — “the
spiritual status quo ante[.]” Given the policy underlying Articles 216 and
220 of the Family Code as well as the purposes for awarding moral
damages, a person exercising substitute parental authority is rightly
considered an ascendant of the deceased, within the meaning of Article
2206(3) of the Civil Code. Hence, respondent is entitled to moral damages.
12. Same;  Same;  Exemplary Damages;  As exemplary damages have been
awarded and as respondent was compelled to litigate in order to protect
her interests, she is rightly entitled to attorney’s fees.-
—As exemplary damages have been awarded and as respondent was
compelled to litigate in order to protect her interests, she is rightly entitled
to attorney’s fees.
13. Civil Law;  Persons and Family Relations;  Substitute Parental
Authority; View that if a child has no parents, grandparents, or siblings,
the child’s actual custodian shall exercise substitute parental authority over
him or her.-
—I disagree with the ponencia’s reasoning. In my view, Abejar is a real
party-in-interest, not because she exercised substitute parental authority
over Reyes, but because she has an interest in claiming actual and
exemplary damages from Caravan. Parental authority has no bearing on
one’s status as a real party-in-interest in a quasi-delict case. Parental damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees shall earn interest at
authority refers to the rights and obligations which parents have over their the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the Regional Trial Court’s
children’s person and property until their majority age. This authority is Decision until full satisfaction; and (c) civil indemnity shall earn interest at
granted to parents to facilitate the performance of their duties to their the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the Court of Appeals’ Decision
children. If a child has no parents, grandparents, or siblings, the child’s until full satisfaction.
actual custodian shall exercise substitute parental authority over him or
her. Moreover, the child’s emancipation terminates parental authority. On
the other hand, real party-in-interest refers to the person who is entitled to
the avails of the suit. He or she stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment. The interest involved must be personal and not based on
another person’s rights.
14. Same;  Exemplary Damages; View that courts may also impose
exemplary damages, in addition to compensatory damages, if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.-
—I agree that Abejar is a real party-in-interest, because she incurred actual
damages when she paid for Reyes’ funeral expenses. Courts may also
impose exemplary damages, in addition to compensatory damages, if the
defendant acted with gross negligence. In the present case, Bautista’s act
of leaving Reyes rather than bringing her to a hospital amounts to gross
negligence. Thus, Abejar may recover these damages from Caravan.
15. Same;  Revised Motor Vehicle Law;  Motor Vehicles;  View that the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law requires vehicles to be registered before they
may be used in any public highway.-
—As early as 1957, this Court held in Erezo v. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, that a
vehicle’s registered owner is primarily responsible for the damage caused
to another person. The Revised Motor Vehicle Law requires vehicles to be
registered before they may be used in any public highway. The Court
stressed that the main purpose of the registration is to identify the owner
so that if any accident happens or damage is caused on the public
highways, responsibility can be fixed on a definite individual — the
registered owner.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 3, 2005 is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) actual damages in the
amount of P35,000.00 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the time it was judicially or extrajudicially demanded from petitioner
Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. until full satisfaction; (b) moral

Air France v Carrascoso (Torts)
AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO September 28, 1966 AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims
that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant
airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white
man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over
his dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts
with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint
until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all
other respects", with costs against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist
class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would
depend upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to
a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected
him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose
right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless,
of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-
interest or will or for ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to
be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in
origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be
also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. 
Case Title : AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs.. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Common carriers|Contracts|Damages|Moral damages|Trial
Syllabi:
1. Common carriers;  Contracts; First class tickets.-
A written document speaks a uniform language; the spoken word could be
notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between
passenger and air carrier, adherence to the terms of a ticket is desirable.
2. Common carriers;  Damages;  Moral damages;  Trial;  Bad faith in breach
of contract of carriage.-
Where at the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on
guard that he intended to prove that, while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
the respondent was ousted .by petitioner's manager, who gave his seat to
a white man, and evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract
was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner, it is
therefore unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient
averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence.
3. Common carriers; Exemplary damages.-
The New Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner. The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso
from his first class seat fits into this legal precept.
4. Common carriers; Attorney's fees.-
The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary
damages justifies a similar judgment for attorney's fees. The least that can
be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
attorneys’ fees be given. We do not intend to break tradition that
discretion well exercised—as it was here—should not be disturbed.

Dispositive Portion:
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not
suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs
against petitioner. So ordered,
 ORIENT FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL INC. VS. KEIHIN-EVERETT
FORWARDING COMPANY INC.
G.R. No. 191937, August 9, 2017
FACTS:
On October 16, 2001, Keihin-Everett entered into a Trucking Service
Agreement with Matsushita. Under the Trucking Service Agreement,
Keihin-Everett would provide services for Matsushita's trucking
requirements. These services were subcontracted by Keihin-Everett to
Orient Freight, through their own Trucking Service Agreement executed on
the same day.
When the Trucking Service Agreement between Keihin-Everett and
Matsushita expired on December 31, 2001, Keihin-Everett executed an In-
House Brokerage Service Agreement for Matsushita's Philippine Economic
Zone Authority export operations. Keihin-Everett continued to retain the
services of Orient Freight, which sub-contracted its work to Schmitz
Transport and Brokerage Corporation.
In April 2002, Matsushita called Keihin-Everett about a column in the issue
of the tabloid newspaper Tempo. This news narrated the April 17, 2002
interception by Caloocan City police of a stolen truck filled with shipment
of video monitors and CCTV systems owned by Matsushita
When contacted by Keihin-Everett about this news, Orient Freight stated
that the tabloid report had blown the incident out of proportion. They
claimed that the incident simply involved the breakdown and towing of
tKeihin-Everett independently investigated the incident. During its
investigation, it obtained a police report from the Caloocan City Police
Station. The report stated, among others, that at around 2:00 p.m. on April
17, 2002, somewhere in Plaza Dilao, Paco Street, Manila, Cudas told
Aquino to report engine trouble to Orient Freight. After Aquino made the
phone call, he informed Orient Freight that the truck had gone missing.
When the truck was intercepted by the police along C3 Road near the
corner of Dagat-Dagatan Avenue in Caloocan City, Cudas escaped and
became the subject of a manhunt. The truck was promptly released and
did not miss the closing time of the vessel intended for the shipment.
Matsushita terminated its In-House Brokerage Service Agreement with
Keihin-Everett, effective July 1, 2002. Matsushita cited loss of confidence
for terminating the contract, stating that Keihin-Everett's way of handling
the April 17, 2002 incident and its nondisclosure of this incident's relevant
facts "amounted to fraud and signified an utter disregard of the rule of law.
Keihin-Everett sent a letter to Orient Freight, demanding P2,500,000.00 as
indemnity for lost income. It argued that Orient Freight's mishandling of
the situation caused the termination of Keihin-Everett's contract with
Matsushita.
When Orient Freight refused to pay, Keihin-Everett filed a complaint dated
October 24, 2002 for damages. In its complaint, Keihin-Everett alleged that
Orient Freight's "misrepresentation, malice, negligence and fraud" caused
the termination of its In-House Brokerage Service Agreement with
Matsushita. Keihin-Everett prayed for compensation for lost income, with
legal interest, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
the costs of the suit. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Keihin-
Everett. It found that Orient Freight was "negligent in failing to investigate
properly the incident and make a factual report to Keihin [-Everett] and
Matsushita. Orient Freight appealed the said Decision to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming the trial court's
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 2176 is applicable in this case
RULING:
Negligence may either result in culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. Culpa
aquiliana is the "the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a
vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not
formally bound by any other obligation," and is governed by Article 2176 of
the Civil Code:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter. Actions based on contractual negligence and actions based on
quasi-delicts differ in terms of conditions, defenses, and proof. They
generally cannot co-exist.Once a breach of contract is proved, the
defendant is presumed negligent and must prove not being at fault. In a
quasi-delict, however, the complaining party has the burden of proving the
other party's negligence. However, there are instances when Article 2176
may apply even when there is a pre-existing contractual relation. A party
may still commit a tort or quasi-delict against another, despite the
existence of a contract between them.
Here, petitioner denies that it was obliged to disclose the facts regarding
the hijacking incident since this was not among the provisions of its
Trucking Service Agreement with respondent. There being no contractual
obligation, respondent had no cause of action against petitioner.
The obligation to report what happened during the hijacking incident,
admittedly, does not appear on the plain text of the Trucking Service
Agreement. Petitioner argues that it is nowhere in the agreement.
Respondent does not dispute this claim. Neither the Regional Trial Court
nor the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of the Trucking Service
Agreement to arrive at their respective conclusions. Breach of the Trucking
Service Agreement was neither alleged nor proved.
While petitioner and respondent were contractually bound under the
Trucking Service Agreement and the events at the crux of this controversy
occurred during the performance of this contract, it is apparent that the
duty to investigate and report arose subsequent to the Trucking Service
Agreement. When respondent discovered the news report on the hijacking
incident, it contacted petitioner, requesting information on the
incident.Respondent then requested petitioner to investigate and report
on the veracity of the news report. Pursuant to respondent's request,
petitioner met with respondent and Matsushita on April 20, 2002 and
issued a letter dated April 22, 2002, addressed to Matsushita.Respondent's
claim was based on petitioner's negligent conduct when it was required to
investigate and report on the incident.
Both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals erred in finding
petitioner's negligence of its obligation to report to be an action based on a
quasi-delict Petitioner's negligence did not create the vinculum juris or
legal relationship with the respondent, which would have otherwise given
rise to a quasi-delict. Petitioner's duty to respondent existed prior to its
negligent act. When respondent contacted petitioner regarding the news
report and asked it to investigate the incident, petitioner's obligation was
created. Thereafter, petitioner was alleged to have performed its
obligation negligently, causing damage to respondent.
The doctrine "the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort," on
which the lower courts relied, is inapplicable here. Petitioner's
negligence, arising as it does from its performance of its obligation to
respondent, is dependent on this obligation. Neither do the facts show
that Article 21 of the Civil Code applies, there being no finding that
petitioner's act was a conscious one to cause harm, or be of such a
degree as to approximate fraud or bad faith.
Consequently, Articles 1170, 1172, and 1173 of the Civil Code on
negligence in the performance of an obligation should apply. WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The January 21, 2010 Decision and April 21, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91889 are AFFIRMED.
Case Title : ORIENT FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. KEIHIN-
EVERETT FORWARDING COMPANY, INC., respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Damages ;
Syllabi:
1. Same;  Damages;  Under Article 1170 of the Civil Code, liability for
damages arises when those in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of negligence, among others.-
—Under Article 1170 of the Civil Code, liability for damages arises when
those in the performance of their obligations are guilty of negligence,
among others. Negligence here has been defined as “the failure to observe
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances just
demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.” If the law or contract
does not provide for the degree of diligence to be exercised, then the
required diligence is that of a good father of a family. The test to determine
a party’s negligence is if the party used “the reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation”
when it performed the negligent act. If the party did not exercise
reasonable care and caution, then it is guilty of negligence.
2. Pleadings and Practice;  Names of the Parties;  The petition does not
violate Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court for failing to state the
names of the parties in the body. The names of the parties are readily
discernable from the caption of the petition, clearly showing the appealing
party as the petitioner and the adverse party as the respondent.-
—The petition does not violate Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court for
failing to state the names of the parties in the body. The names of the
parties are readily discernable from the caption of the petition, clearly
showing the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as the
respondent. The Court of Appeals had also been erroneously impleaded in
the petition. However, this Court in Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, et al., 602
SCRA 336 (2009), ruled that inappropriately impleading the lower court as
respondent does not automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal. This
is a mere formal defect.
3. Civil Law;  Negligence; Negligence may either result in culpa aquiliana or
culpa contractual.-
—Negligence may either result in culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual.
Culpa aquiliana is “the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates
a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not
formally bound by any other obligation,” and is governed by Article 2176 of
the Civil Code: Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. Negligence in culpa contractual, on the other
hand, is “the fault or negligence incident in the performance of an
obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability from
such already existing obligation.” This is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174
of the Civil Code: Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Article 1171.
Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any
waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Article 1172. Responsibility
arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is
also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts,
according to the circumstances. Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith,
the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the
law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be
required. Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible
for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable.
4. Same;  Same; Actions based on contractual negligence and actions
based on quasi-delicts differ in terms of conditions, defenses, and proof.
They generally cannot coexist.-
—Actions based on contractual negligence and actions based on quasi-
delicts differ in terms of conditions, defenses, and proof. They generally
cannot coexist. Once a breach of contract is proved, the defendant is
presumed negligent and must prove not being at fault. In a quasi-delict,
however, the complaining party has the burden of proving the other party’s
negligence. In Huang v. Phil. Hoteliers, Inc., 687 SCRA 162 (2012): [T]his
Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences between
quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) and breach of contract (culpa contractual). In
quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent, while in
breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of
the contractual obligation; there is a preexisting contract or obligation. In
quasi-delict, the defense of “good father of a family” is a complete and
proper defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers are concerned,
while in breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in
the selection and supervision of employees. In quasi-delict, there is no
presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party to
prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former’s complaint
will be dismissed, while in breach of contract, negligence is presumed so
long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract and the
burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the
carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is
followed.
5. Same;  Quasi-Delicts; There are instances when Article 2176 may apply contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a
even when there is a preexisting contractual relation. A party may still breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-
commit a tort or quasi-delict against another, despite the existence of a contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. x x x If
contract between them.- a contracting party’s act that breaches the contract would have given rise
—There are instances when Article 2176 may apply even when there is a to an extra-contractual liability had there been no contract, the contract
preexisting contractual relation. A party may still commit a tort or quasi- would be deemed breached by a tort, and the party may be held liable
delict against another, despite the existence of a contract between them. under Article 2176 and its related provisions.
In Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768 (1918), this Court explained why 6. Same;  Same; In situations where the contractual relation is
a party may be held liable for either a breach of contract or an extra- indispensable to hold a party liable, there must be a finding that the act or
contractual obligation for a negligent act: It is evident, therefore, that in its omission complained of was done in bad faith and in violation of Article 21
decision in the Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff’s action as though of the Civil Code to give rise to an action based on tort.-
founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of —In situations where the contractual relation is indispensable to hold a
carriage, and an examination of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that party liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission complained of
the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed from was done in bad faith and in violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code to give
the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have been the rise to an action based on tort.
same in any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant’s
servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate Dispositive Portion:
cause of plaintiff’s injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 21, 2010 Decision and
been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the April 21, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91889
direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury are AFFIRMED.
suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as
constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points
out . . . whether negligence occurs as an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-
contractual obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is
always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or
inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court
holds that a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise due
care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the selection and
direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in either case . . .
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention
to the relative spheres of contractual and extra-contractual obligations.
The field of noncontractual obligation is much more broader [sic] than that
of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of
juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking,
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another
by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the

 Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.  of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to
No. 12191; October 14, 1918
Fisher, J.:
Facts
Jose Cangco, plaintiff, was in the employment of the Manila Railroad
Company in the capacity of clerk. In coming daily by train to the company’s
office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by
the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company’s train free of
charge.  suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it
Upon the occasion in question, the plaintiff was returning home by rail
from his daily labors, and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo
the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding
and, making his exit through the door. When the train had proceeded a
little farther, the plaintiff stepped off, but one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped
from under him and he fell violently on the platform.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o’ clock on a dark night, and as the
railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance
away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult
to discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
On August 31, 1915, he filed an action to recover damages from the
defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the
servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons
upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be menace to the
security of passenger alighting from the company’s trains.
Issue
WON the defendant Manila Railroad Company is liable to pay the plaintiff
damages.
Held
Yes.
The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff
has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of Contract of Carriage.
When the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for
the benefit of the plaintiff and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or
refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in
his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or
negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof
warrant a recovery. 
The defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless
recovery is barred by the plaintiff’s own contributory negligence. And in
this case, Cangco was ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were
there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.
Furthermore, alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a
common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without
was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving
as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. 
The conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet
slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore
he was not guilty of contributory negligence. 
1. MASTER AND SERVANT;  CONTRACT; NEGLIGENCE..-
Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that the
breach was due to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the
latter exercised due diligence in the selection and control of the servant.
2. CONTRACTS;  NEGLIGENCE;  CULPA AQUILIANA;  CULPA CONTRACTUAL.-
The distinction between negligence as the source of an obligation (culpa
aquiliana) and negligence in the performance of a contract (culpa
contractual) pointed out.
3. CARRIERS;  PASSENGERS;  NEGLIGENCE; ALIGHTING FROM MOVING
TRAIN.-
It is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving
train.