JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner, vs. MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR.

,
Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, respondents.
GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992
Cruz, J.

FACTS

The petitioner filed a complaint for estafa against the private respondent, Paras, who is her
brother, and Saya-Ang, whom her brother sold the same property as hers, with the Office of
Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City and at the same time filed another complaint for
the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City.

The petitioner and the private respondent inherited a piece of property from their parents.
However, the private respondent sold his share for the intestate, evidenced by a private
document, to the petitioner. Nineteen years later, the private respondent sold the same property
to Santiago Say-ang, evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.

After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against
the private respondent with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, presided by the respondent Judge.
Then, before the arraignment of the private respondent, whose counsel is the son of the
presiding judge, the respondent Judge motu propio issued an order dismissing the criminal case
for it has a prejudicial question to a civil action, which must be dealt in the proper civil court
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Although the
petitioner moved for reconsideration, it was denied.

Hence, the petitioner is seeking the Supreme Court for relief in this special civil case action for
certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether or not the motu propio order issued by the trial judge valid in dismissing the criminal
case.

HELD

No. The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in motu propio issuing the
order of dismissal.

The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Cruz declared that the order dismissing the
criminal action for suspension in accordance with Rule 111, Sec. 6, of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended, and even without the accused indicating his defense in the civil case
for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also bias on
the part of the respondent judge.

Furthermore, the SC held that in order for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil
action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action
would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Therefore, the excerpt quoted by the Judge in his Order does not appear anywhere in the
decision of Ras v. Rasul. Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but also wrongly
applied it. The facts of the case are not analogous to those in the case at bar.