DEDICATION

With Love and Concern

To My Parents, Brother and Sisters

And to my godchildren
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

“A Life lived without Good Relatives and Good Friends is simply Vegetation” – Musongong H

I wish to begin by thanking the Almighty God who has blessed me forever with good

friends and relatives all the days of my life.

The first of these friends which God has blessed me with is His Grace Cornelius

Fontem Esua who has assumed the onus of my integral formation as a person. I will also wish

to express gratitude to Rev. Fr. Bartholomew Anyanwu for the fatherly care which he has

exercised with patience to help me actualise this work. Special thanks to Rev. Fr. Peter Takov

for showing me the way to Hannah Arendt whom I have developed special interest in since

then. Special thanks to Rev. Fr. Michael Niba whose very person is an edifice of

gentlemanliness, Frs. John Berinyuy and Terence Chi who have always advised like a brother

and Mr. Shafak Fidel who made himself always available for support.

Profound gratitude to my parents who have always put academics at the forefront of

my life. Immense thanks too to: Mr Ndofor Bernard (RIP), Mr. Ndofor Joseph, Mrs. Ndofor

Lilian, Ms. Lorrain Niba, Mr. Ndofor Gabriel, Mrs. Ndofor Ethel, Ms. Ndofor Adeline, Dr.

Anita M.S. Richards, Mrs. Helen Musongong, Ms Patricia Asangana, Lloyd George Ndita,

Abongwa Ulrich Ndita, who have supported me in one way or the other and to my godfather

Rev. Fr. George Ngwa.

Life throughout the period of philosophical studies would have been a bed of briers

without the love and concern shared with my friends especially: Patrick Atang M., Leo

Ndanjong, Benedict Ndikum, Killian Ndonui, Alfred Ngalim, Conrad Azefac, Francis Tche,

Nsaikila Elvis, Ernest Njodzeven, Rev. Fr. James Chickezie, Rev. Fr. Paul Njokikang, Victor

Ndang, Edmond Sone, Harris Wadinga, Richard Suh, Mbuh Marcellus, Kizito Gopte, Anselm

Yofendeh, Feralin Mindende, Yakap Ursulle Ettienete, Nyufi Ngam, Marie-Laurence

Akoumzoh Me-Abar, Nancy Peguy Djo.

ii
 CONTENTS

DEDICATION...........................................................................................................................i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.......................................................................................................ii
CONTENTS............................................................................................................................iii

GENERAL INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................v

CHAPTER ONE1
AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE MAIN CONCEPTS1

1.1 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY......................................................................................1

1.1.1 The Concept of Responsibility............................................................................1
1.1.2 The Personal Dimension of Responsibility........................................................2

1.2 DICTATORSHIP AND TOTALITARIANISM...................................................................3

1.2.1 Hannah Arendt on Dictatorship.........................................................................4
1.2.2 Hannah Arendt on Totalitarianism...................................................................5

CHAPTER TWO7
2 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DICTATORSHIP
7
2.1 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DICTATORSHIP.....................................................7

2.2 ARGUMENTS RAISED AGAINST PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DICTATORSHIP

10
2.2.1 The Weight of Temptation................................................................................10
2.2.2 The Absence of a Crime Witness......................................................................10
2.2.3 The Source of the Authority to Judge..............................................................11
2.2.4 Sense of Morality of the Germans....................................................................12
2.2.5 “Coperatio in malo” and the Lesser Evil.........................................................13
2.2.6 The Reason-of-State Argument........................................................................14
2.2.7 Identification of Unlawful Orders....................................................................16

2.3 A DEDUCTIVE CONCLUSION TO ARENDT’S THOUGHT ON PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.. 17

CHAPTER THREE18
3 AN ETHICAL APPRAISAL OF HANNAH ARENDT’S PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DICTATORSHIP18
3.1 AN ADDENDUM TO THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY......................18

3.2 MORAL OBLIGATION OF A PERSON........................................................................20

iii
 3.3 FREEDOM OF CHOICE AS A CAUSE FOR RESPONSIBILITY.....................................21

3.4 VOLUNTARINESS OF THE ACTS OF CITIZENS..........................................................22

3.5 THE DUTY TO PRESERVE LIFE................................................................................23

3.6 THE DIFFERENCE AND EFFECTS OF OBEDIENCE AND CONSENT..........................23

3.6.1 Obedience..........................................................................................................23
3.6.2 Consent..............................................................................................................25
3.7 THE NEED FOR THE USE OF THE CONSCIENCE......................................................26

3.8 THE NEED FOR A RESPONSIBLE USE OF AUTHORITY............................................27

3.9 THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF CITIZENS......................................................................28

3.10 INQUIRY FOR THE PRESENCE OF MODIFIERS OF RESPONSIBILITY.......................29

3.10.1 Ignorance..........................................................................................................29
3.10.2 Passion..............................................................................................................30
3.10.3 Fear...................................................................................................................31
3.10.4 Force..................................................................................................................31
3.10.5 Habit..................................................................................................................32

CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................33

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................34

iv
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In a world characterised by men who are wanderlust in a realm of power, fame and a

triumph of heroes, the emergence of superman tendencies1 like that of Hegel and F. Nietsche 2

and the effectiveness of the schadenfreude syndrome, there is bound to be an impetuous rise

of evil; an evil that embarrasses every sense of virtue that exists in man by its magnitude.

This was the characteristic of the epoch in which Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) lived.

Hannah Arendt was a Jewish American-based political theorist and philosopher who

lived in Germany during the period of the Third Reich but moved on to America for safety. A

period (1933-1945) when the rise of Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) and his cohorts marked the

beginning of one of the greatest holocausts the world has ever known: the massacre of

millions of Jews by the Nazi.3 This act alongside others was committed by many under the

command of One.4 Despite this, the One cannot function alone and therefore needs the

assistance of cogs.5 It is in the line of Cogs that a figure Adolf Eichmann (1906-62), emerges.

He was the head of the Gestapo Office of Jewish affairs. 6 An office delegated to assemble

Jews from as far as without the boundaries of Germany for extermination in Germany.

Personal responsibility under dictatorship is an essay written by Arendt under the

inspiration of the Eichmann trial that took place in Israel in 1961. Eichmann was a cog of

Hitler yet Arendt holds that he, as a person, is responsible for the crimes he committed. This

dissertation is thus divided into three chapters. Chapters one and two aim at an understanding

of Arendt’s essay and chapter three dwells on an ethical appraisal of Arendt’s view. This

work ends with a Conclusion and Select Bibliography.

1
‘Superman Tendencies,’ refers to that which is highly anthropocentric and vouches for the exhibition of the
magnanimity of human potentialities free from a recourse to the supernatural.
2
Cfr. P. VARDY, Being Human, Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd, London 2003, 5-7.
3
Cfr. H. MAU – H. KRAUSNICK, German History 1933-45, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., New York 1963,
123-126.
4
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, Jerome Kohn
(ed), Schocken Books, New York 2003, 29-30.
5
Ibid, 29.
6
H. MAU – H. KRAUSNICK, German History 1933-45,126.

v
 CHAPTER ONE

AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE MAIN CONCEPTS

In this essay, Hannah Arendt expresses her opinion on how far one is responsible as an

individual in a state under a dictatorship. To enhance the understanding of the aim of this

essay, it is primordial to have a proper apprehension of the meaning of the concepts used by

Arendt. This chapter would seek a proper understanding of these concepts: Personal

Responsibility, Dictatorship and Totalitarianism and the Cog Theory.

1.1 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Personal Responsibility is a fundamental aspect of this essay necessitating a proficient

understanding of the concept before delving into the main work. However, there is also a

need for an understanding of what political responsibility is. Despite the fact that Arendt

takes for granted the definition and understanding of the concept of Responsibility, below is a

write-up on the concept of Responsibility.

1.1.1 The Concept of Responsibility

Responsibility refers to “Moral or legal accountability for one’s actions.” 7 The term

responsibility can be used in several senses. Three of these several senses are:

A cause-effect relationship between an agent and an action or a

consequence, without implying anything with regard to the ethical
character of the act; it also indicates a moral or legal obligation
binding one to do or to avoid doing something, this is responsibility
in an objective sense; ascriptively, responsibility attributes blame or
credit to an agent who acts with or without due conformity to moral
or legal norms of conduct, this is responsibility in the subjective
sense.8

Worthy of note is the fact that responsibility in the prescriptive and ascriptive senses

necessarily presupposes a human agent’s freedom in his actions. This freedom must be

7
C. HARNEY – P. MEAGHER, “Responsibility” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, McGraw-Hill Book Company,
New York 1967, 392.
8
Ibid.
exercised in agreement with moral and judicial norms. 9 Now, there also exists a concept of

subjective responsibility without which one cannot hold a person responsible for an act as a

person. Subjective responsibility takes account of knowledge, voluntariness, and freedom

which are essential to a human act. It is this subjective responsibility that is “essential to the

definition of crime.”10 Of all the senses in which the term responsibility is spoken of, Arendt

is most concerned with subjective responsibility, that is, personal responsibility; “a necessary

condition of the justice of a person’s receiving what he deserves.”11

1.1.2 The Personal Dimension of Responsibility

One of the distinctions which Arendt makes is between the responsibility of a person

and that of a system. As far as she is concerned, the judges at the Eichmann trial were right

when they held that “there is no system on trial, no history or historical trend, no ism, anti-

Semitism for instance, but a person.”12 Even a functionary is a person and it is in the capacity

of person that he faces trial and not otherwise.13 This explains why at court, the judges

directed their questions to the individual and not to the system: “Did you, such and such, an

individual with a name, a date and place of birth, identifiable and by that token not

expendable, commit the crime you stand accused of and why did you do it?” 14Answers which

arose such as “Not I but the system did it in which I was a cog,” 15 were proven limping by the

question, “And why, if you please, did you become a cog or continue to be a cog under such

circumstances?”16 These questions and answers go to show how personal responsibility does

exist especially in situations like that of the Third Reich. All judgements are addressed to a

person as an individual.
9
Cfr. C. HARNEY – P. MEAGHER, “Responsibility” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 393.
10
Ibid.
11
A. KAUFMAN, “Responsibility, Moral and Legal,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Macmillan
Company and The Free Press, New York 1972, 183.
12
Ibid, 30.
13
Cfr. Ibid.
14
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 31.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.

2
 With respect to the part played by a system, Arendt holds that,

Still, while courtroom procedure or the questions of personal

responsibility under dictatorship cannot permit the shifting of
responsibility, from man to system, the system cannot be left out of
account altogether.17

The above statement implies that systems as such may have a part to play in the responsibility

each person holds as an individual. Responsibility cannot be absolutely attributed to the

person alone. Systems do influence peoples’ actions and as such share in the responsibility

they hold as far as these actions are concerned; though in a secondary way. It therefore

follows that Arendt does not ignore external influence on a person as a modifier of

responsibility.

1.2 DICTATORSHIP AND TOTALITARIANISM

Dictatorship and totalitarianism are vital concepts in this essay. As such, it is of equal

necessity to attain due understanding of the concept of Dictatorship. Due to the variety of

forms of dictatorship, it will also be necessary to define precisely what type of dictatorship

Arendt is representing in her essay.

Primus inter pares is the fact that “Dictatorship is based on force.” 18 Dictatorship can

be distinguished into totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships. Authoritarian dictatorship

includes, “tyranny and a kind of crisis government that does not rest on constitutional

provisions but on a combination of force and general consent.” 19 Totalitarian dictatorship

attempts to procure a total transformation of the human condition. This form of dictatorship

must, therefore, attempt to obtain an unlimited power over everyone, since the existence of

anyone or any area of human existence, public or private, permanently outside the scope of

its control would constitute an existential denial of the dictator’s claim to direct an all-

embracing transformational process for man.20 A totalitarian government implies dictatorship

17
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 32.
18
E. GOERNER, “Dictatorship” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 858.
19
Ibid.
20
Cfr. E. GOERNER, “Dictatorship” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 858.

3
and not vice versa. Totalitarianism is the “deification of a power system.” 21 A state under its

influence, assumes total centralisation of control in the hands of a ruling party through which

the government functions; the state attempts a mental conditioning of the people; it tolerates

no expression counter to its will; it engages in acts of police terror against opposition from

within, treating its opponents not merely as individuals guilty of criminal behaviour, but as

members of a segment of society deemed hostile to the ideology of the state; it substitutes a

terrestrial ideology for religion.22 In the words of Arendt:

Wherever a totalitarian system arose, it developed entirely new political

institutions and destroyed all social, legal and political traditions of the
country. No matter what the specifically national tradition or the
particular spiritual source of its ideology, totalitarian government always
transformed classes into masses, supplanted the party system, not by one-
party dictatorship, but by a mass movement, shifted the centre of power
from the army to the police, and established a foreign policy openly
directed toward world domination.23

It is this type of dictatorship that Arendt is concerned with in her work. That is, the

totalitarian dictatorship of Adolf Hitler. Below is what Arendt holds of the two principles in

her essay.

1.2.1 Hannah Arendt on Dictatorship

Hannah Arendt explains that Dictatorship:

In the old Roman sense of the word was devised and has remained an
emergency measure of constitutional, lawful government, strictly limited
in time and power; we still know it well enough as the state of emergency
or of martial law proclaimed in disaster areas or in time of war. 24

This type of dictatorship is called a constitutional dictatorship.25 She continues:

We furthermore know modern dictatorships as new forms of government,

where either the military seize power, abolish civilian government, and
deprive the citizens of their political rights and liberties, or where one
party seizes the state apparatus at the expense of all other parties and
hence of all organized political opposition.26

21
S. POSSONY, “Totalitarianism” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 210.
22
Cfr. Ibid.
23
H. ARENDT, Totalitarianism, A Harvest Book –Harcourt, Inc., New York 1976, 158.
24
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement.
25
Cfr. E. GOERNER, “Dictatorship” in New Catholic Encyclopedia,858.
26
Cfr. E. GOERNER, “Dictatorship” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 858.

4
According to Arendt, these two forms of dictatorship objurgate freedom in political opinions

but they do not hinder private life and non-political activity. 27 In line with these definitions of

dictatorship, all political opponents are victims of persecution therefore, the government

becomes unconstitutional, however, dictatorship is not criminal “in the common sense of the

word.”28 The crimes in such governments are mostly only directed towards vehement

opposition.

1.2.2 Hannah Arendt on Totalitarianism

A totalitarian government will commit crimes against innocent29 people with respect

to the party in power. In the totalitarian government, total domination reaches out into all, not

only the political, spheres of life.30 This form of administration is “indeed monolithic;”31 that

is:

There is no office and indeed no job of any public significance, from

advertising agencies to the judiciary in which an unequivocal acceptance
of the ruling principles is not demanded.32

As a consequence:

Whoever participates in public life at all, regardless of party membership

or membership in the elite formations of the regime, is implicated in one
way or another in the deeds of the regime as a whole. 33

Worthy of note is the fact that “a totalitarian system can only be overthrown from within not

through revolution, but through a coup d’état unless, of course, it is defeated in war.”34 The

main machinery that runs the totalitarian dictatorship is the Cog Theory.

27
Cfr. H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 33.
28
Ibid.
29
“Innocent,” is used here with respect to the specific crimes people are accused of by the government and not
absolute innocence.
30
Cfr. H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 33.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Cfr. H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 34.

5
1.2.2.1 The Cog – Theory

In describing the political system, Arendt explains the relationship existing between

the various classes of people in terms of cogs and wheels. It is these cogs and wheels that

keep the administration moving. A cog is a person working in a system and this person must

be dispensable without causing any handicap to the whole system. 35 This explains why any

form of resistance or threat can be retarded without any worry. It is on this ground that the

defendants in the post-war trials rightly said to excuse themselves: “if I had not done it,

somebody else could and would have.”36 This helps to make “the personal responsibility of

those who run the whole affair a marginal issue.” 37

In the case of the Third Reich, which is a totalitarian dictatorship, all power was in the

hands of ONE; Hitler himself. He was, therefore, politically responsible for all that happened

in Germany. In this respect, “everybody else from high to low who had anything to do with

public affairs was in fact a cog, whether he knew it or not.” 38 This, however, must not rip

citizens off their personal responsibility in any way.39 There are approaches which citizens

could use to free themselves from sharing in Hitler’s malice. For example, Eichmann, and the

other culprits could flee the country and seek asylum in another country. This was really

possible because a man in Eichmann’s place had the means to escape. He could not complain

of poor finances or a problem of barricades because he had power in his hands. This implies

that he still had a question to answer – why were you a Cog and why did you remain a Cog

all along?

35
J. SYKES (ed.), “Cog,” in The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982, 180.
36
Cfr. H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 29.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid, 30.
39
Ibid.

6
 CHAPTER TWO

2 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DICTATORSHIP

2.1 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DICTATORSHIP

Assuming that a full understanding of the concepts involved in the title of this essay

have been attained (namely: Personal Responsibility, Dictatorship and totalitarianism and the

Cog theory), it is fitting to delve into the case involved in Arendt’s essay. The aspect of

Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship is actually summarised by Arendt under two

questions which she asks (in the context of the World War II epoch in Germany). These two

fundamental questions include:

First, in what way were those few different who in all walks of life did
not collaborate and refused to participate in public life, though they could
not and did not rise in rebellion? And second, if we agree that those who
did serve on whatever level and in whatever capacity were not simply
monsters, what was it that made them behave as they behaved? 40

In short, she is asking what difference exists between those who shunned all cooperation with

the regime and those who served the regime consciously. Arendt seems to be very indulgent

in her response towards the first question. She says:

The nonparticipants, called irresponsible by the majority, were the only

ones who dared judge by themselves, and they were capable of doing so
not because they disposed of a better system of values or because the old
standards of right and wrong were still firmly planted in their mind and
conscience.41

She observes that most of those who cooperated with the Nazi were the members of the

respectable society who had hardly known intellectual delinquency. As such she concludes

that the nonparticipants were those whose consciences did not function in a gullible way;

accepting whatever came as a new system of rules. She says of these people that:

They asked themselves to what extent they would still be able to live in
peace with themselves after having committed certain deeds; and they
decided that it would be better to do nothing, not because the world
would be changed for the better, but simply because only on this
condition could they go on living with themselves at all.42
40
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 43.
41
Ibid, 44.
42
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 44.

7
Succinctly, she means that these seemingly pious ones were not so much concerned with the

Judaeo-Christian law of “thou shalt not kill”43 but they did not want to be haunted by their

consciences. In this case Arendt holds that though this is a lowly developed intelligence with

relation to moral matters, it is better than being rigid to laws. For laws and moral codes

change with relation to society. In other words she is only ingeminating the statement of

Blaise Pascal that “the heart has its reasons, which reason does not know.” 44 This therefore,

can be referred to an appeal to the conscience. In response to the reproach against those who

washed their hands of the happenings in Germany, she says:

There exist extreme situations in which responsibility for the world,

which is primarily political, cannot be assumed because political
responsibility always presupposes at least a minimum of political power. 45

And for her, impotence or complete powerlessness is a good excuse for staying inert in such

situations. From this excuse, she extrapolates the virtue of good will and good faith to face

realities and not to live in illusions.46

In the second place, she also gives her opinion as concerns those who not only

participated but who thought it their duty to do whatever was demanded. To these people she

affirms their love for the virtue of obedience:

Every organization demands obedience to superiors as well as obedience

to the laws of the land. Obedience is a political virtue of the first order,
and without it no body politic can survive.47

Surprisingly enough, there is a fallacy in all this. A fallacy challenged by the words of

Madison who says, “all governments rest on consent.”48 The error lies in equating consent to

obedience. Obedience in an adult presupposes consent, unlike the case with young children

who just obey without necessarily giving consent. Arendt brings in the Platonic and

Aristotelian concept which holds that every body politic is constituted of rulers and ruled. In
43
Deuteronomy 5:17.
44
P. BLAISE, Pensee, T. S. ELLIOT (ed.), E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc, New York 1958, 61.
45
Ibid, 45.
46
Cfr. H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 45.
47
Ibid, 46.
48
Ibid.

8
line with this concept, she holds that, no man can ever accomplish anything, good or bad,

without the help of others.49 This is because every action can be divided into two parts, the

beginning which can be attributed to the leader and the accomplishment which involves the

activity of another. In this light, those who obey the leader actually support him and his

enterprise. He would be impotent if boycotted by all. Conversely, if one obeys the laws of a

country, then one is actually supporting its constitution which is unlike in the case of rebels.

Conclusively, she says that the nonparticipators “are those who have refused their

support by shunning those places of ‘responsibility’ where such support, under the name of

obedience, is required.”50 She seems to proliferate this as the ideal attitude in cases like that

of Germany at her time. This can be called in other words Civil disobedience. By implication:

The reason, however, that we can hold these new criminals, who never
committed a crime out of their own initiative, nevertheless responsible for
what they did is that there is no such thing as obedience in political and
moral matters. The only domain where it can apply to adults who are not
slaves is the domain of religion, in which people say that they obey the
word or the command of God because the relationship between God and
man can rightly be seen in terms similar to the relation between adult and
child.51

This statement explains that one cannot use obedience as an excuse for an unacceptable act.

In situations with gravity like those in Germany, consent was to be given priority to

obedience in defining cooperation between the cog and the master. However, there are some

more arguments which according to Arendt are limping but which kept coming up in defence

of the world criminals

2.2 ARGUMENTS RAISED AGAINST PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DICTATORSHIP

Hannah Arendt states in this essay that despite the existence of personal

responsibility, there are some arguments brought up by accused persons to vindicate

49
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 47.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid, 48.

9
themselves especially when faced with situations like that of the Eichmann. Arendt sees these

arguments, as trivial excuses masquerading as modifiers of responsibility. These arguments

were raised especially in defence of the actions of Eichmann during his service in the Nazi

regime. Below is a presentation and exposition of these arguments.

2.2.1 The Weight of Temptation

Not yielding to the persuasiveness of temptations is a virtue which is easily preached

yet difficult to practice. This is also the opinion of Arendt when she writes that: “I had

somehow taken it for granted that we all still believe with Socrates that it is better to suffer

than to do wrong. This belief turned out to be a mistake.”52 It is difficult to trust in man due to

his weakness especially when he is faced with difficulties. Quoting Mary McCarthy, Arendt

says that “while a temptation where one’s life is at stake may be a legal excuse for a crime, it

certainly is not a moral justification.”53 As such, even though man may fall into temptation,

one’s moral actions are not automatically justified because they were done under constrained

conditions.

2.2.2 The Absence of a Crime Witness

Here, a question is posed as to whether one who had not been at the scene of an action

can pass judgement. This question was one of Eichmann’s chief arguments. He argued that

all the cases fired against him were “post-war legends born of hindsight and supported by

people who did not know or had forgotten how things had actually been.”54 In response to

this, Arendt holds:

It would be impossible to establish a courtroom procedure or a

historiography if judging by hindsight is ignored. For by
hindsight, the judge may have good reason to mistrust
eyewitness accounts and judgements of those present at a crime
scene.55
52
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 18.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Cfr. H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement,19.

10
This statement of hers explains that the absence of the judges at a crime scene does not

disqualify them as judges of those crimes so committed. Besides, once evidence was clear,

these judges could use it in congruence with law to judge the accused.

2.2.3 The Source of the Authority to Judge

Judging by hindsight does not make the judge an infallible person for there exists the

“widespread fear of judging that has nothing whatever to do with the biblical ‘judge not, that

ye be not judged.’”56 This fear should be differentiated from that which should arise in terms

of “casting the first stone.”57 Merging the two would correctly affirm the proposition that no

one is infallible but then it fallaciously frees agents from responsibility. As a result, the

question arises of “who am I to judge?” 58 This implies we are all the same and equally bad

and anyone who makes an effort to remain half decent is either a saint or hypocrite. Some

people hold that instead of judging individuals, it is better to blame “all deeds or events on

historical trends and dialectical movements.”59 Judgement of persons like Hitler is “vulgar,

lacks sophistication, and should not be permitted to interfere with the interpretation of

history.”60

2.2.4 Sense of Morality of the Germans

The sense of morality of a person is highly influenced by the amount of intellectual

education that person receives. This is a valid postulation especially when it has to do with

ethical problems which are either not easily apprehended instinctively by the mind. The

Germans were stratified in two groups as far as this was concerned. This is shown below; that

is, the academically delinquent citizens and the knowledgeable.

56
Cfr. Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid, 20.
60
Ibid.

11
2.2.4.1 The academically delinquent citizens

Germany at the time Arendt was growing up was marked by “a poor sense of

morality.”61 The youth were brought up under the assumption that “moral conduct was a

matter of course.”62 Virtues, like rectitude, were matters of course and could not be used in

evaluating a given person. As a result they were “confronted with moral weakness, with lack

of steadfastness or loyalty, with this curious, almost automatic yielding under pressure,

especially of public opinion, which is so symptomatic of the educated strata of certain

societies.”63 Alongside the World War, this helped to handicapped their sense of morality.

Thus, they were “outraged, but not morally disturbed, by the bestial behaviour of the storm

troopers in the concentration camps and the torture cellars of the secret police. All this was

terrible and dangerous, but it posed no moral problems.” 64 At this, Arendt concludes that “it

would be impossible to understand what actually happened without taking into account the

almost universal breakdown of personal judgement in the early stages of the Nazi regime.”65

2.2.4.2 Accusation of the Knowledgeable

On the other hand were the intellectually viable. That is, those who were fully

qualified in matters of morality and held them in the highest esteem. Unfortunately, these

learned people were described by Arendt as proving themselves “incapable of learning

anything”66 and “yielding easily to temptation.”67 These learned people were conducted

completely by fear which existed in them due to the horrors of the Nazi. This is because they

had been framed or intended to be applied to conditions as they actually arose. “It would have

been strange indeed to grow morally indignant over the speeches of the Nazi bigwigs in

61
Cfr. H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 22.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid, 24.
65
Cfr. Ibid.
66
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 25.
67
Ibid.

12
power.”68 Arendt describes this situation between the incarcerated knowledgeable elite and

the uneducated people as “a position between the devil and the deep sea.”69

2.2.5 “Coperatio in malo” and the Lesser Evil

2.2.5.1 Coperatio in malo

Coperatio in malo, literary means cooperating in evil: this is used to describe a

situation where one person assists another, in one way or another, to carry out an act which

injures the good of a person or a society. This was an evident exercise in the epoch of the

German holocausts;

What the courts demand in all these post-war trials is that the defendants
should not have participated in crimes legalized by that government, and
this nonparticipation taken as a legal standard for right and wrong poses
considerable problems precisely with respect to the question of
responsibility.70

Arendt considers here two sets of people in Germany: that is, those who were personally

responsible; and those who were diffident with respect to participation. Those who

participated claimed that they appear guilty just because they remained steadfast on the job

trying to retard the actualisation of worse plans. This is because only from within the regime

could help come for at least some victims.71 They felt that more blame should be directed to

those who advertised selfishness and cowardice by retiring to private life, thereby taking the

irresponsible way out.72

The above argument, according to Arendt, would have seemed politically plausible if

the Hitler regime had been toppled, because as said above, totalitarian systems can be best

conquered from within. Personal or moral responsibility for Arendt is everybody’s business.

68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid, 34.
71
Cfr. Ibid.
72
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 34.

13
2.2.5.2 The Lesser Evil

From the preceding quotes under coperatio in malo, it can be deduced that “the

argument of the ‘lesser evil’ has played a prominent role.” 73 This argument holds that where

there are two evils concerned, “it is your duty to opt for the lesser one, whereas it is

irresponsible to refuse to choose altogether.” 74 Those who refuse are accused of not wanting

to contribute towards the future growth of the society. In response to this, Arendt emphasises

that “what is easily forgotten is the fact that the ‘lesser evil’ chosen is evil.” 75 As far as the

case in Germany is concerned, the holocaust was so terrible that a worse evil could not be

thought of. As such, one cannot affirm any action in affiliation with this holocaust as the

“lesser evil.”

For Arendt, the concept of lesser evil in the milieu of a totalitarian government is only

a strategy used to bait government officials and citizens into acceptance of evil after all. 76

This continues until the lesser evil becomes less than no other evil. The lesser evil theory

suffers a reductio ad absurdum giving room for the worse crimes one can think of.

2.2.6 The Reason-of-State Argument

Another argument raised by the accused as concerns the war crimes, is that all the

crimes they committed were “‘acts of state’ or that they were committed upon ‘superior

orders’.”77 To begin with, Arendt makes a distinction between “acts of state” and “superior

orders.” Superior orders are “legally within the realm of jurisdiction” 78 while “acts of state”

are “outside the legal framework; they are presumably sovereign acts over which no court has

jurisdiction.”79 Those who proliferate the theory of “acts of state” hold that it is synonymous

73
Cfr. Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
Cfr. Ibid, 36.
76
Cfr. Ibid.
77
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 37.
78
Cfr. Ibid, 37.
79
Ibid, 38.

14
to a “crime” committed by an individual in self-defence. 80 In this case it is aimed at rescuing

the state. These acts according to them can go “unpunished because of extraordinary

circumstances, where survival as such is threatened.” 81 Arendt is strongly opposed to this as

far as totalitarian governments in the same state as that of the Nazi regime are concerned.

This is because the crimes of this regime “were in no way prompted by necessity of one form

or another.”82 On the contrary the crimes jeopardised the possible victory of Germany in the

wars. She holds that there is a “complete reversal of legality” 83 which the political reason-of-

state and legal concept of acts of state do not portend. This is because state laws depend much

on political power or an element of power politics making it liable to abuse. 84 It is in this light

that in the Hitler regime,

There was hardly an act of state which according to normal standards was
not criminal. It was no longer the criminal act which, as an exception to
the rule, supposedly served to maintain the rule of the party in power but
on the contrary, occasional noncriminal acts were exceptions to the ‘law’
of Nazi Germany, concessions made to dire necessity. 85

From what Arendt says, it can be deduced that the acts of state of Germany at the time of the

Third Reich were not necessary because the state was not at risk. As such even superior

orders which demanded such monstrous acts are never to be considered proper. This leads to

the need for identification of unlawful orders.

2.2.7 Identification of Unlawful Orders

Being conscious of the principles involved in administration, Arendt states that “the

argument of ‘superior orders,’ or the ‘judges’ counterargument that the fact of superior orders

is no excuse for the commission of crimes, is inadequate.” 86 This statement is made with the

presupposition that orders are ordinarily legal. Because of this, anyone receiving orders

80
Cfr Ibid.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid, 38.
83
Ibid, 39.
84
Cfr. Ibid, 38.
85
Ibid, 39.
86
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 39.

15
should be able to discern the criminal nature of a particular order. Furthermore, orders to be

disobeyed should be “manifestly unlawful.”87 The unlawfulness of the order should be

explicitly clear and free of controversy. On the other hand, if the order seems unlawful, it has

to “be clearly marked off as an exception, and the trouble is that in totalitarian regimes this

mark belongs to noncriminal orders.”88 An example is the Hitler regime. In this light, Arendt

explains how Eichmann received the order to stop the deportation and dismantle the death

factories as an unlawful order.

What is most important now comes in the statement she makes:

A feeling of lawfulness lies deep within every human conscience, also of

those who are not conversant with books of laws an unlawfulness glaring
to the eye and repulsive to the heart, provided the eye is not blind and the
heart is not stony and corrupt.89

With this presupposition,

The men who did wrong were very well acquainted with the letter and the
spirit of the law of the country they lived in. What we actually require of
them is a ‘feeling of lawfulness’ deep within them to ‘contradict’ the law
of the land and their knowledge of it.90

This certainly is the call to personal responsibility under a dictatorship through decisions

made by following our hearts and conscience. Epistemologically, our human nature grants us

an independent faculty free from law and public opinion. This faculty judges “spontaneously

every action that befalls our path.”91

Unfortunately, the consciences of the people of that time were corrupt. She even

explains that Eichmann, at the trial saw cruelty a greater evil than murder because he insisted

that he gave directives that “unnecessary hardships are to be avoided.” 92 Alongside the

corrupt conscience, was the political orientation of nihilism which stated that “all is

permitted.”93 Because of this, respected members of a respectable society could not apply
87
Ibid, 40.
88
Ibid.
89
Ibid.
90
Cfr. Ibid.
91
Cfr. H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 41.
92
Ibid, 42.
93
Ibid.

16
their reason but only sought to satisfy the “will of the Führer” which was convertible with the

law of the land.

2.3 A DEDUCTIVE CONCLUSION TO ARENDT’S THOUGHT ON PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

From all she has said, it can be deduced that Hannah Arendt, assents fully to the

opinion that there exists a personal responsibility by all; even under a dictatorship. She

concludes her essay by saying, “the question addressed to those who participated and obeyed

orders should never be, ‘Why did you obey?’ But ‘why did you support?’” 94 This flows from

her stand which says it is not a matter of obedience but of consent that drives the actions of

people in such situations. Granted that man is a speaking animal, words have to be used with

precision for much would be gained on the part of the cogs of the Hitler regime if the word

“obedience” is brought in to qualify their actions. Arendt asserts:

If we think these matters through, we might regain some measure of

self-confidence and even pride, that is, regain what former times
called the dignity or the honour of man: not perhaps of mankind but
of the status of being human.95

CHAPTER THREE

3 AN ETHICAL APPRAISAL OF HANNAH ARENDT’S PERSONAL

RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DICTATORSHIP

This chapter deals with an appraisal of Hannah Arendt’s essay on Personal

Responsibility under Dictatorship. Many times, man spontaneously shuns responsibility

especially when it has to give rise to pain or suffering. With the hope that an understanding

has been attained of what Arendt holds in the preceding chapters, this chapter would proceed

with a philosophical evaluation of Arendt’s essay. Since this essay is evaluated from an

ethical point of view, only the ethical approach of Hannah Arendt to the judgement of the

94
Ibid.
95
Ibid, 27.

17
criminals of the Third Reich would be considered. However, to begin with, it would be

necessary to have a little bit more on the concept of personal responsibility.

3.1 AN ADDENDUM TO THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

This essay of Hannah Arendt is highly dependent on the actual existence of a personal

responsibility which every human person is supposed to assume by virtue of existence. It is in

this light that a more profound understanding of personal responsibility and a proof of its

actual existence is necessary for her essay to stand grounds.

To begin, it is first necessary to go with Rosmini, that there is a first moral law. 96 He

further enunciates that “the human mind forms all judgements with the idea of universal

being, which is innate in the human spirit as the form of intelligence.”97 This universal being

for him is the first moral law. He explains that this is because all things with their perfections

are ultimately acts of being. For a being must act in order to be. “The word being means

simply the first activity and every activity.” 98 There can be no moral good or evil without

being. He deduces from the above propositions that “because the idea of a universal being

constitutes the light of reason, the moral law is expressed fairly well in the formula, ‘Follow

reason’. But it would be more accurate to say, ‘In all that you do, follow the light of

reason.”99 This formula for Rosmini is the most general in ethics and morality and expresses

the first law more accurately than any other.100 Another important point Rosmini makes is

that “the principle of ethics is placed in human beings by nature.” 101 He deduced this from the

syllogism that “if the idea of being is innate and functions as supreme law, it follows that by

nature we bear within our soul the seed of all morality.”102

96
Cfr. A. ROSMINI, Principles of Ethics, Camelot Press, Southampton 1867, Article 2, §3.
97
A. ROSMINI, Principles of Ethics, Article 2, §4.
98
Ibid, §5.
99
A. ROSMINI, Principles of Ethics, Camelot Press, Southampton 1867, Article 2, §7.
100
Cfr. Ibid.
101
Ibid, Article 3.
102
Ibid, Article2, §8.

18
 Great wonder may arise as to why this doctrine of Rosmini is adopted in this work.

This is to explain that fundamentally, responsibility is strictly personal. In the preceding

chapter, it is defined as “Moral or legal accountability for one’s actions.”103 Actions are only a

result of judgement which resides in the individual. Every act, therefore, has its agent and this

agent is responsible for the act despite the conditions the agent finds itself. This, therefore,

should give Arendt credit and also place her essay on a good start. Even under a dictatorship,

there is a personal responsibility because every act has its agent and this agent acts based on a

judgement from within the self. As Lucas J. R. will put it, “to be responsible is to owe an

answer to the question: Why did you do it?” 104As such, Hitler, Eichmann and every other

advocate of evil in the epoch of the Third Reich is responsible fundamentally for any actions

carried out. Of great importance is the statement of Peschke: “the order in a community

would be preserved by personal responsibility and by common decisions.”105

3.2 MORAL OBLIGATION OF A PERSON

Another principle which is worth appealing to is that of moral obligation which every

person has as an individual. No matter the circumstance in which one finds oneself, one has a

moral obligation which must be respected. Moral obligation has its elements, that is: one is

free to act and to decide; it excludes any physical coercion, external or internal; it implies a

kind of constraint which is absolutely destructible and which deals with freedom in itself. 106

This is not just any kind of constraint but that which is “exercised by the intellect upon free

will.”107 Moral obligation is not ambiguous in its objective but then it is “the binding power

which comes from right reason alone as the constraining power.” 108 Jacques Maritain says

that “I can violate this obligation, but if I violate it I shall be bad.”109 This is not a baseless
103
C. HARNEY – P. MEAGHER (eds.), “Responsibility” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 392.
104
J. LUCAS, The Freedom of the Will, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1970, 4.
105
Cfr. K. PESCHKE, Christian Ethics, Vol. II, Theological Publications, Bangalore 2009, 571.
106
Cfr. J. MARITAIN, An Introduction to the Basic Problems of Moral Philosophy, Magi Books Inc., USA 1990, 172.
107
Ibid.
108
Ibid.
109
Ibid.

19
conclusion; it is based on “the natural impossibility for the will to will anything except as

good.”110

This point on moral obligation congruent with the opinion of Arendt that we are all

bound to do good and avoid evil. It is a duty which is innate to every human person. All

persons are conscious of the good whether educated or not. Therefore, all the citizens of

Germany were morally obliged to do the good. Anyone who acted malevolently was to be

held responsible for it, primarily. This point makes Eichmann and all Hitler’s cohorts

seriously responsible for their acts during the holocaust in Germany. We are all obliged to

‘respect life’ for it is “a rule whose habitual and exceptionless observance serves human

societies better than any other rule that could be devised.” 111 Further, when this rule is

tampered with, “our sensibilities are brutalised. We are thus prepared to compromise the rule

in other cases.”112 This explains the horror in Germany which all began under the guise of the

lesser evil. This theory of lesser evil, for Arendt, should be held with moderation.

3.3 FREEDOM OF CHOICE AS A CAUSE FOR RESPONSIBILITY

Every human person has a moral obligation and duty in all aspects of life. Furthermore,

the fundamental and most difficult of these duties is making choices. “Individuals cannot

avoid being conscious of their freedom.”113 This is because, “freedom enables a person to do

what he wants, but it does not tell him what to want.”114 Jean-Paul Satre explains that:

Freedom is the primary condition of human existence, the brute fact

that we can and must make choices and, consequently, ‘make
ourselves’ into what we will be. Responsibility follows freedom; to
have choices and to be able to make a difference is to be responsible
for what one chooses and the difference one makes. 115

110
Ibid.
111
H. GARTH, Reason and Right, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana 1984, 114.
112
H. GARTH, Reason and Right, 114.
113
P. VARDY, Being Human, Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd, London 2003, 132.
114
A. FAGOTHEY, Right and Reason, The C.V. Mosby Company, Saint Louis 1976, 137.
115
R. C. SOLOMON – J. K. GREENE, Morality and the Good Life, McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., London 1999,
407.

20
As such, freedom is not an easy gift to handle; this however, is not a reason good enough for

a person’s malevolence. One should know that, “not all freedom is necessarily good; it could

include a vicious license or a true liberty.” 116 It is true that all forms of laws only help to

threaten human freedom but at the same time it must be noted that law aims at eliminating

vicious licenses and to promote true liberty; 117 all for the good of the human society and its

progeny. However, the law does not actually limit freedom. Jacques Maritain says thus:

In a particular order of freedom, man may either leave himself open

to activations toward the good proceeding from First Cause, or he
may slip away from these activations and go of his own accord
towards an evil action. He can choose one direction or the other. That
is a property of his freedom.118

Freedom, however, goes along with responsibility. Fagothey holds that: man is indeed

responsible for his choices.119 This is absolutely true because of all acts there are those which

man can control (which is the concern in this section). These acts because they can be

controlled imply consent. Therefore:

A person is the cause of his own decision and is therefore responsible

for the act chosen. There is no other reason why this act was done
rather than not done except that the man himself, by the choice of his
will under the guiding light of his intellect, made that act to be. The
act is his insofar as he did it.120

From what has been said on freedom of choice and its relation to responsibility, it can be

concluded that all persons in Germany were responsible in one way or the other with relation

to the actions carried out. As to whether a person was a cog or master, anyone who acted in

favour of Hitler’s wish was to be held responsible for the act. Therefore, Eichmann again had

no case in this light. He was responsible for the commands he gave out. Freedom depends on

the possibility of forming another judgement about the desirability of the end proposed.

116
Cfr. A. FAGOTHEY, Right and Reason, 137.
117
Cfr. Ibid, 138.
118
J. MARITAIN, An Introduction to the Basic Problems of Moral Philosophy, Magi Books Inc., USA 1990, 79.
119
Cfr. A. FAGOTHEY, Right and Reason, 143.
120
Cfr. Ibid, 24.

21
3.4 VOLUNTARINESS OF THE ACTS OF CITIZENS

Ethically, there is always that distinction between voluntary acts and involuntary acts.

This distinction lies in whether there is an act of the will. If there is an act of the will, then the

action is voluntary, otherwise it is not voluntary. 121 But to know to what degree the acts are

voluntary, it is necessary to discern the intention. It is fundamentally on the grounds of

intention that responsibility could be modified relatively to persons. Eichmann gave others

for mass murder in service to the Führer. He is guilty of intending these acts both actively and

virtually. This is because he was conscious of the order he gave out at the time he gave it out

and never revoked it. So, while he did other things he was virtually conscious of the acts that

were carried out. This makes him responsible for his acts. This now grants some kind of

redemption to those who claim that what they did, they only did with the intention of

ameliorating the tragedy. Unfortunately, there are more other conditions to be fulfilled in

order to free oneself from responsibility over an act.

3.5 THE DUTY TO PRESERVE LIFE

Everything by instinct seeks to preserve at least its own life or a life of its own species.

This is in accordance with the natural law of all beings which is “the proper way in which, by

reason of their specific nature, and specific ends, they should achieve fullness of being in

their behaviour.”122 What more of rational beings like man? “Respect for a person’s life, his

or her bodily and mental integrity and health is one of the fundamental human rights.” 123

Fundamentally, “it is never lawful directly to kill an innocent man.” 124 Innocent here is used

to refer to one who has not done any harm that can be compared to his life against the

society: it is irrespective of whether he is an enemy or friend, a means or an end. It is never

121
Cfr. Ibid, 35.
122
J. MARITAIN, William Sweet (ed.), Natural Law, St. Augustine’s Press, Indiana 2001, 29.
123
K. PESCHKE, Christian Ethics, Vol. II, 251.
124
J. RICKABY, Moral Philosophy, Longmans, Green, and CO., London 1919, 203.

22
correct for murder to be carried out even as a means to an end. 125 How worse it was for Hitler

who alongside his brutally horrendous regime murdered thousands of people with the vicious

intention of establishing a pure race; these people did not pose any direct threat to the

existence of the German nation. These murders did not in anyway help Germany positively.

This is a direct defiance of the law which preserves life. Hence, Arendt is right to consider

these people guilty and responsible for such vicious acts.

3.6 THE DIFFERENCE AND EFFECTS OF OBEDIENCE AND CONSENT

3.6.1 Obedience

Obedience has its origin from the Latin audire which means to hear. Literary, this word

means: “a readiness to listen to the expression of another’s will and to do it; the promptness

of the will to carry out the command of somebody in authority in a spirit of responsibility.” 126

Obedience according to Truhlar is founded on authority and this authority is ordained for

good; be it common or private.127 Obedience can otherwise be defined as “the adaptation of

an individual’s will to the authoritative will expressed in law.” 128 Furthermore, the subject

accepts orders “as commanded, and renounces conflicting possibilities. Thus, he renders to

authority what is its due, namely, submission.”129 The first quote from Truhlar shows that

obedience has a great relation with law. However, Truhlar says, “one does not proceed

simply in accordance with its true meaning, giving the reality of the concrete case due

consideration. It belongs to epikeia130 and epikeia is the more important part of justice.”131

125
Cfr. Ibid, 205.
126
Cfr. K. PESCHKE, Christian Ethics, Vol. II, Theological Publications, Bangalore 2009, 571.
127
Cfr. K. TRUHLAR, “Obedience,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 605.
128
Ibid.
129
Cfr. Ibid.
130
Epikeia is a restrictive interpretation of positive law based on the benign will of the legislator who would not
want to bind his subjects in certain circumstances. It is derived from Greek meaning “reasonableness”.
131
Ibid.

23
 Looking at obedience along side personal responsibility, it is important to remember

that it is the subject that gives the will to the superior. As such it is a conscious and wilful act.

That is why Truhlar says:

The possibility that a superior could command something objectively

sinful requires the subject, even in his obedience, to keep clearheaded
and to remain capable of independent thought. To obey without moral
certainty of the lawfulness of what is commanded would be immoral.
In his own conscience, the subject remains responsible for whatever
he does even when he acts under obedience.132

Even if an act is performed under command, the subject is still to be held responsible for that

act. The first reference in personal judgement should be the objective good of the eternal

law.133 This is because “the superior is not the cause of truth.” 134 Truth is extra-mental and

also ontologically independent. The fact that Hitler was an authority does not make him

infallible and so Eichmann had to take time to discern orders and be sure of their moral

validity. This dismisses the claim of some of the killers who were depending on the fact that

whatever they did was an execution of an order. Even they may claim that they submitted

their wills in benevolent times, they always had the choice to recant from malicious orders. A

continuous yielding to these orders shows that Eichmann and colleagues were comfortable

with the acts they carried out to a horrendous degree. This continuous execution of orders

despite their moral implications only helps to express a certain degree of consent in the agent.

This is why Arendt makes a remark that: “Eichmann was a banal man who thoughtlessly

obeyed his Führer’s will.”135

3.6.2 Consent

Consent, a word and act commonly misused with the word Obedience, is yet different

in its own way. It is more active than obedience. Obedience can be considered passive with

132
Ibid.
133
A. MÜLLER, “Authority and Obedience in the Church,” in Concilium, F. BOCKLE (ed.),Vol. 5, Paulist Press,
New York 1966, 77.
134
Cfr. K. TRUHLAR, “Obedience,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 605.
135
E. YOUNG-BRUEHL, Why Arendt Matters, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2006, 44.

24
relation to consent. Consent refers to “an act of the will acquiescing in a judgment of the

mind.”136 To further explain this definition, it can be said that “before consenting, one must

make up one’s mind that what is proposed is good. It is the will’s determination to implement

the verdict of the mind that something is worthwhile.”137 Because it is an act of the will,

consent automatically carries responsibility for whatever it assents to either notionally or

really. Thomas Aquinas defines consent as: “the application of the appetitive movement to

the decision of counsel.”138 Reading a preceding section to the mentioned quote, Aquinas

writes that:

Consent denotes the application of the appetitive movement to

something that is already in the power of the person applying it. In
this process of willed activity, there is first the apprehension of the
end; then the desire of the end; then counsel about the means to the
end, and then the desire to take the means.”139

Summarily, it can be said that consent would rest on a foundation of freedom of judgement,

deliberation, and a free giving of oneself to a particular action which one holds of as good.

“Consent implies that one knows what is proposed for one’s acceptance and acquiescence.” 140

This should be the right term to define the act of the will of the cogs of Hitler especially those

who in one way or another cooperated with him. This of course, includes Eichmann.

3.7 THE NEED FOR THE USE OF THE CONSCIENCE

Conscience etymologically comes from the Latin conscientia, which means knowing

with.141 The conscience is not distinct from the intellect and as such it knows with the

intellect. This makes our judgments about rightness or wrongness intellectual and rational. 142

Conscience is defined by Fagothey as: “the practical judgement of reason upon an individual

136
A. DOOLAN, “Consent,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 211.
137
Cfr. Ibid.
138
THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologia 1a 2ae, 15.3.
139
Ibid, 1a 2ae, 15.1.
140
A. DOOLAN, “Consent,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 211.
141
Cfr. A. FAGOTHEY, Right and Reason, The C.V. Mosby Company, Saint Louis 1976, 208.
142
Cfr. Ibid.

25
act as good and to be performed, or as evil and to be avoided.” 143 Granted that it is not distinct

from the intellect, it therefore, puts Arendt’s argument (which vindicates the intellectually

delinquent and accuses the knowledgeable) on a good reasonable path. Following from the

link which Fagothey puts between the conscience and the intellect, it shows that the

conscience would only respond with relation to what is known by the intellect. As such, a

person whose intellect is not properly informed will have a poor result of reflection and self

examination, while that person with much intellectual knowledge would have much material

to use for self examination. To put it in purely ethical terms, the knowledgeable have a better

chance of arriving at synderesis144 than the intellectually delinquent. They can better

systematise the moral principles in their minds for use as the basis of one’s conduct.

Therefore, the level of intellectual formation of the people of Germany at the epoch of the

holocaust can be considered as a modifier of responsibility with respect to the crimes

committed. Even those who were knowledgeable could still be victims of a poorly formed

conscience; a conscience formed with the wrong moral principles.

According to Fichte, a growth in knowledge and morality includes “an ordinary

knowledge of morality common to all men because the ‘voice of conscience’ speaks clearly

and unequivocally within each of us.”145 This quote would explain why the acts of the officers

of the Third Reich would still seem absurd despite all the excuses they may put forth. Some

acts violate the conscience fundamentally, especially those against the natural law. As such

Arendt would be right to classify these men as vicious.

143
Ibid, 209.
144
Synderesis, refers to the habitual possession of first principles in moral matters. It is a function of the
practical intellect which informs a person of good and evil and further incites to good and murmurs at evil.
145
J. BOURKE, History of Ethics, Image Books, New York 1970, 37.

26
3.8 THE NEED FOR A RESPONSIBLE USE OF AUTHORITY

It is truly said that “no community can exist without an ordering and coordinating

authority.”146 Unfortunately, the Nazi regime made a great attempt in destroying this essential

property of authority. Authority comes from the Latin auctoritas rooted in the verb augere

which means to increase or to enrich. A proper definition of authority is “an institution meant

for the enrichment and promotion of those over whom it is exercised.”147 Therefore, authority

is supposed to educate and to coordinate. This was far from the reality in the Nazi regime and

so in addition to the accusations Arendt places against this regime, it can be added that they

are guilty of a misuse of authority. The only education which people most evidently could

get at that time was being more skilled in doing away with the other. Therefore, Eichmann

too was guilty of misusing authority because with consent to Hitler’s malice, he ordered the

murder of many.

3.9 THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF CITIZENS

Primordially, every citizen has to show concern and love for the state to which the

citizen belongs. This love and concern demands the active participation of the citizen in the

well being of the state. That is, there is need for a “conscientious compliance with the laws of

a nation.”148 This conscientious compliance is owed to a government that satisfies all

reasonable requests, to governments that host uncomfortable authorities and also in times of

austerity.149 In addition, citizens have to “make the weight of their opinion felt, so that civil

authorities may act with justice and laws may conform to moral precepts and the common

good.”150 This should give a proper answer to Arendt’s question: “in what way were those

few different who in all walks of life did not collaborate and refused to participate in public

146
K. PESCHKE, Christian Ethics, Vol. II, 564.
147
Ibid.
148
K. PESCHKE, Christian Ethics, Vol. II, 689.
149
Cfr. Ibid.
150
Ibid.

27
life, though they could not and did not rise in rebellion?” 151 There is something called civil

disobedience which can be carried out by citizens for the correction of societal ills. It is

factually “a basic duty of citizens.”152 This is what was required of those who did not condone

with the activities of the Nazi. However, it should be noted that this should be done with the

most possible avoidance of violence and when other methods of resolution have failed.153

A question worth asking with reference to the case of Germany is: what about a

situation where there was neither room for dialogue nor change and all forms of resistance

were approached with an annihilating effect? It is only proper to hold with Arendt that those

who remained reserved did just the best thing they could do at that epoch; shrinking away

was the only effective mode of civil disobedience at that time. Any external expression of

resistance which was noticed implied an end to life. That is why Arendt correctly writes:

Impotence or complete powerlessness is, I think, a valid excuse. Its

validity is all the stronger as it seems to require a certain moral
quality even to recognize powerlessness, the good will and good faith
to face realities and not to live in illusions. Moreover, it is precisely in
this admission of one’s own impotence that a last remnant of strength
and even power can still be preserved even under desperate
conditions.154

3.10 INQUIRY FOR THE PRESENCE OF MODIFIERS OF RESPONSIBILITY

It is necessary to bring out the various modifiers of responsibility in order that the

arguments raised by the war criminals may be re-examined. It is on this note that the

following modifiers to responsibility would be brought up in this work. A modifier would

already presuppose the existence of a certain degree of responsibility. However, the degree of

responsibility is dependent on the degree of voluntariness. Voluntariness would be said to be

complete or perfect if the agent has full knowledge and full consent. These modifiers would

only seek to see to what extent the responsibility of these war criminals could be moderated.

151
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 43.
152
K. PESCHKE, Christian Ethics, Vol. II, 650.
153
Cfr. SIDNEY HOOK, “Social Protest and Civil Disobedience,” in PAUL KURTZ (ed.), Moral Problems in
Contemporary Society, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliff, New Jersey 1969, 167-168.
154
Cfr. H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 45

28
That is, would depend on “what thing does diminish the degree of voluntariness in a

particular human act?”155

3.10.1 Ignorance

Lack of knowledge affects the voluntariness of a human act as to make the act less a

human act.156 The will of man is not independent of the intellect. For man cannot will what he

does not know. Ignorance has three levels, that is: vincible, invincible and affected ignorance.

More explicitly this would refer to: ignorance that can be overcome by acquiring the requisite

knowledge; ignorance that cannot be overcome because knowledge cannot be acquired;

ignorance deliberately cultivated in order to avoid knowing what ought to be known

respectively. Arendt explains that intellectual formation at her early years did not pay much

attention to moral questions.157 This of course, led to a wave of ignorance which attacked the

people of that epoch. However, this type of ignorance would be vincible ignorance which

according to Fagothey only lessen responsibility but does not destroy it. 158 Therefore, those

cogs that were intellectually malnourished could be excused of some of their crimes that

deserved a proper use of synderesis; this would be in reference to vincible ignorance.

However, some crimes committed like killing, would not be permitted by ignorance because

it rests on natural law. By simple intuition, every man should know that killing is wrong.

Eichmann who did not only kill but commanded the mass murder of a large population of

Jews is uncompromisingly guilty of the crime of murder.

3.10.2 Passion

Passion, highly influences the actions of man. Strong levels of passion can inhibit

one’s capacity to think properly; especially in situations of anguish where life can be so

appalling and death seem an attractive release. 159 At such levels, it may affect voluntariness

155
Cfr. A. FAGOTHEY, Right and Reason, Second Edition, 101.
156
Cfr. Ibid, 37.
157
Cfr. H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 22.
158
Cfr. A. FAGOTHEY, Right and Reason, Third Edition, 37.
159
Cfr. P. VARDY, Being Human, 130-131.

29
and hence leading to ignorance.160 Therefore, there is need for recourse to the cause of a

particular passion in question. This would be in relation to antecedent emotion or consequent

emotion. Antecedent emotions are involuntary in that they come up so quickly that one may

act faster than one thinks. This lessens responsibility more while consequent emotion is

voluntary as it results from a person who has consciously built up anger from within; either

by remembering a past experience or revoking some past insults. Therefore, one who acts out

of consequent anger is guilty. The horrors of the Third Reich could not have been as a result

of antecedent anger but out of consequent anger; anger generated by Adolf Hitler over a

period of years. Therefore, Hitler and his cogs especially people like Eichmann are

irrevocably guilty; guilty of a crime whose effects have left judges and world laws stunned at

what kind of punishment should be meted.

3.10.3 Fear

Fear refers to the apprehension of impending evil. This fear according to A. Fagothey

can only be a modifier of responsibility when it is a motive for acting and not a mere

accompaniment of our acts. It is when we act from fear and not merely with fear.161 Fear as a

modifier does not destroy responsibility but only lessens responsibility. An act that is

motivated by fear is voluntary but it would never have been willed if not for the experience of

fear encountered by the one who acts. As such it lessens the responsibility of an agent. 162

“Acts that are the result of fear, though it be grave and unjust, are not invalid unless this is

provided in the law.”163 In applying this to the case in Germany, one would have to be

conscious of the fate of a cog that disobeyed the Führer. This could arouse an unimaginable

amount of fear in the cogs. This, therefore, could gives some credit to the cogs in their

actions. However, the inability of the cog to escape the regime must also be consulted. For

160
Cfr. Ibid, 38.
161
Cfr. A. FAGOTHEY, Right and Reason, Third Edition, 37.
162
Cfr. Ibid, 37.
163
J. CHATHAM, “Force and Fear,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1003.

30
those who had the opportunity to leave the country for example in Eichmann’s case, fear

would not free them at all. Eichmann could escape the Führer but he did not. Therefore, he

and the other elites who assisted Hitler are still responsible for their crimes.

3.10.4 Force

Force is defined as a “pressure from a greater thing that cannot be resisted – Vis

autem est maioris rei impetus, qui repelli non potest.”164 Force by its nature induces a kind of

fear in its victim as far as this victim is rational. Chatham writes that “all acts that are the

result of physical force are invalid.165 A. Fagothey explains that there is a difference between

force and fear though these two are linked in a way. He says, “as a distinct modifier of

voluntariness, force must be understood in its strictest sense as no mere threat but the actual

use of physical might.”166 This modifier does not vindicate any of the German elites that

Arendt accuses. This is because there is no such case where force in this sense was used on

them to make sure they killed another. It could only be with respect to fear and this would

therefore lead us back to the principles under fear. Force cannot be used as an excuse for the

vindication of these people.

3.10.5 Habit

Habit can be seen as a “constant way of acting obtained by repetition of the same

act.”167 Habit may affect its host so much that his actions become spontaneous or in other

words, the person becomes volatile in action. Deliberation only comes after the act had been

committed. It is rather unfortunate that habit would be just the least of modifiers that would

vindicate the accused. This is because they were dealing with murder and to acquire the habit

of murder is absurd. This is because “we cannot do habit-forming acts without getting the

habit.”168 Habits come about by doing habit-forming acts. The habit of murdering would arise

164
Ibid.
165
Ibid.
166
AUSTIN FAGOTHEY, Right and Reason, Second Edition, 107.
167
Ibid, 108.
168
Ibid.

31
from murdering. This therefore, places the accused in situation where they cannot be other

than guilty for murder.

CONCLUSION

Personal Responsibility under dictatorship poses a real problem to man in every

society as he can be referred to in J. J. Rousseau’s words as “born free but every where in

chains.”169 The question of “how free is man?” is a fundamental pillar in answering the

question of personal responsibility under dictatorship. At the bottom of Arendt’s argument is

the capacity to judge, which according to her needs to appeal to conscience and natural law, it

does not cancel the place of Freedom of Choice. As Arendt rightly holds, even the most

ignorant of all people have that inner voice which should guide them to the moral good. 170

This voice, Blaise Pascal calls “the reason of the heart”.171

A proper coordination of the will and the intellect with a constant appeal to the

conscience is a praiseworthy aspect found intrinsic in Arendt’s whole essay. Man is a free

being. This free being is free by virtue of his will which acts on what is presented to it by the

intellect. Furthermore, to properly discern the good from the evil, there is need for an appeal
169
Cfr. J. ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, Hafner Press, New York 1947, 5.
170
H. ARENDT, “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgement, 40.
171
P. BLAISE, Pensee, 61.

32
to the conscience. This is where the criminals of the Third Reich failed. Through repeated

malice under the guise of a lesser evil, they marred their consciences and acted like brutes.

They ignored the place of human dignity.

By virtue of the freewill, Eichmann and all other culprits of Hitler’s regime were

responsible personally for the acts they committed. These were human acts and not acts of

man implying a degree of ratiocination and hence consent. Granted that the modifiers do not

vindicate Eichmann and his cohort of their crimes, it can be concluded that Hannah Arendt is

right to find Adolf Eichmann fully responsible for his crimes; crimes not found in any law book, crimes

against the human status, crimes simply invisible to any previous formulation of morality or law.172

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______________, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality

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Cfr. H. ARENDT, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Europe Publishing House,
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33
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35