Legal Doctrines

1. Doctrine of Res Judicata

Res Judicata is a rule that a final judgment on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is
conclusive between the parties to a suit as to all matters that were litigated or that could have been
litigated in that suit. The courts employ the rule of res judicata to prevent a dissatisfied party from trying
to litigate the issue a second time.

Res judicata will be applied to a pending lawsuit if several facts can be established by the party
asserting the res judicata defense. First, the party must show that a final judgment on the merits of the
case had been entered by a court having jurisdiction over the matter. This means that a final decision in
the first lawsuit was based on the factual and legal disputes between the parties rather than a
procedural defect, such as the failure to serve the defendant with legal process.

Once a court makes a final decision, it enters a final judgment in the case. The judgment recites
pertinent data about the case, such as the names of the parties, the fact that a jury verdict was
rendered, and the disposition made. The judgment is filed with the court administrator for that judicial
jurisdiction.

The party asserting res judicata, having introduced a final judgment on the merits, must then
show that the decision in the first lawsuit was conclusive as to the matters in the second suit. For
example, assume that the plaintiff in the first lawsuit asserted that she was injured in an auto accident.
She sues the driver of the other auto under a theory of Negligence. A jury returns a verdict that finds
that the defendant was not negligent. The injured driver then files a second lawsuit alleging additional
facts that would help her prove that the other driver was negligent. A court would dismiss the second
lawsuit under res judicata because the second lawsuit is based on the same Cause of Action (negligence)
and the same injury claim.

Source: https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Res+Judicata

2. Sub Judice Rule

Sub judice is a Latin term which refers to matters under or before a judge or court; or matters
under judicial consideration. In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to pending judicial proceedings. The restriction applies to litigants and witnesses, the public
in general, and most especially to members of the Bar and the Bench.

Historically, the sub judice rule is used by foreign courts to insulate members of the jury from
being influenced by prejudicial publicity. It was aimed to prevent comment and debate from exerting
any influence on juries and prejudicing the positions of parties and witnesses in court
proceedings. Relatedly, in 2010, the late Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in filing Senate Bill No.
1852, also known as the Judicial Right to Know Act, explained that sub judice is a foreign legal concept,
which originated and is applicable to countries who have adopted a trial by jury system. She emphasized
the difference between a jury system and the Philippine court system, implying the inapplicability of the
concept in our jurisdiction.
 Acknowledging the fact that sub judice is a foreign concept, Justice Arturo Brion noted in a
Separate Opinion that in our jurisdiction, the Rules of Court does not contain a specific provision
imposing the sub judice rule. He, however, opined that "the fact that the jury system is not adopted in
this jurisdiction is not an argument against our observance of the sub judice rule; justices and judges are
no different from members of the jury, they are not immune from the pervasive effects of media."  In
fact, sub judice rule finds support in the provision on indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. - x x x, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx
c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade

the administration of justice;

xxxx

As can be observed, discussions regarding sub judice often relates to contempt of court. In this

regard, respondent correctly pointed out that the "clear and present danger" rule should be applied in
determining whether, in a particular situation, the court's contempt power should be exercised to
maintain the independence and integrity of the Judiciary, or the Constitutionally-protected freedom of
speech should be upheld. Indeed, in P/Supt. Marantan v. Atty. Diokno, et al., the Court explained:

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in
order to avoid prejudging the issue. Influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A
violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court,

The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of
contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished
for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.

For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does
impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to be
protected is the all important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.
The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.

The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business
unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or
otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of freedom of
speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule
may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights.
 The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be
"extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished.
There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice.
Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court
unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat. 

From the foregoing, respondent may be correct in arguing that there must exist a "clear and
present danger" to the administration of justice for statements or utterances covered by the sub
judice rule to be considered punishable under the rules of contempt.

Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2018julydecisions.php?id=513

3. Double Jeopardy

Rule 117, Sec. 7 Provides that when an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under
any of the following instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea
was entered in the former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.

In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the
judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.

Source: Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, https://batasnatin.com/law-library/remedial-law/criminal-

procedure/615-definition-of-double-jeopardy.html

4. Doctrine of Laches

Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.   It has also been defined as such neglect or
omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.  

The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize
neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result
in a clearly inequitable situation.   As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the
character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's long in action
or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do
so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant.  

The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and . . . is principally a question of
the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.  

The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose
claim or demand has become "stale", or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who
has not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. In other
words, public policy requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown stale for
non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has
become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.  

The following are the essential elements of laches:

(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation complained of;

(2) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's
conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue;

(3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and

(4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant. 

Source: https://phlegaldoctrines.blogspot.com/2013/01/laches.html ; excerpt from Catholic Bishop of

Balanga Vs CA G.R. No. 112519

5. Estoppel

Estoppel  (Article 1431, Civil Code of the Philippines)

a. An admission;
b. Is rendered conclusive
c. Upon the person making it; and
d. Cannot be denied or disproved against the person relying thereon
Concept of Estoppel

Estoppel is a bar which precludes a person from denying or asserting anything to the contrary of
that which has, in contemplation of law, been established as the truth, either by the acts of judicial or
legislative officers or by his own deed or representation, either expressed or implied.

It concludes the truth in order to prevent fraud and falsehood, and imposes silence on a party
only when in conscience and honesty he should not be allowed to speak.

Distinguished from Waiver

A waiver is a voluntary and intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known right. It

carries no implication of fraud. It involves the act or conduct of only one of the parties.

An equitable estoppel may arise, however, even where there is no intention on the part of the
person estopped to relinquish any existing right and frequently carries the implication of fraud. It
involves the conduct of both parties.

In Lopez v. Ochoa (L- 7955, May 30, 1958), the Supreme Court held that waiver and estoppel are
frequently used as convertible terms. The doctrine of waiver belongs to the family of, is of the nature of,
is based on, estoppel. The essence of waiver is estoppel and where there is no estoppel, there is no
waiver. This is especially true where the waiver relied upon is constructive or implied from the conduct
of a party.

Distinguished from Ratification

In ratification, the party is bound because he intended to be bound; in estoppel, the party is
bound notwithstanding the fact that there was no such intention because the other party will be
prejudiced and defrauded by his conduct unless the law treats him as legally bound.

Distinguished from Fraud

Estoppel exists with or without a contract; fraud presupposes an attempt to enter into a valid
agreement or contract. While estoppel may raised as a defense, fraud may properly be a cause of action
on account of the vitiated consent that it produces.

 Admissions

A party may be estopped to insist upon a claim, assert an objection, or take a position which is
inconsistent with an admission which he had previously made and in reliance upon which the other
party has changed his position.

Silence or Inaction

This is sometimes referred to as estoppel by “standing by” or “laches.” Mere innocent silence
will not work an estoppel. There must also be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with
the silence by which another is misled to his injury. But one who invokes this doctrine of estoppel must
show not only unjustified inaction but also some unfair injury would result to him unless the action is
held barred.

Estoppel by acquiescence is closely related to estoppel by silence. In the former, a person is

prevented from maintaining a position inconsistent with one in which he has acquiesce.
Source: https://lawphilreviewer.wordpress.com/2012/01/25/estoppel-memory-aid/

6. Arias Doctrine

In Arias vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 81563, December 19, 1989], Arias and others were accused
of having violated Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in connection with the
scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as right of way to be used for its
Mangahan Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The Sandiganbayan convicted Arias as co- conspirator in the
conspiracy to cause undue injury to the Government through the irregular disbursement and
expenditure of public funds. Arias, as Chief Auditor, passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition
as well as the payment of lands.

The Supreme Court, in acquitting Arias, explained that: "We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias
should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It is
doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers
presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to
rely to a reasonable extent 'on their subordinates and on the good faith of those

prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. xxxx There should be other grounds
than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and
conviction." Otherwise, "a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and
all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements which they have
approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was
the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a
transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each
individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy." [Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563,
December 19, 1989]

Similarly, in Dimapilis-Baldoz vs COA [G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013], the court held that: that
although a public officer is the final approving authority and the employees who processed the
transaction were directly under his supervision, personal liability does not automatically attach to him
but only upon those directly responsible for the unlawful expenditures. As Dimapilis-Baldoz’s direct
responsibility therefore had not been demonstrated, in addition to her good faith xxx, there is no cogent
factual or legal basis to hold her personally liable. "

In Magsuci vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101545, January 3, 1995, the court held that: “the
actions taken by Magsuci involved the very functions he had to discharge in the performance of his
official duties. There has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity
committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Ancla. Petitioner might have indeed been lax and
administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the official reports submitted by his subordinate
(Engineer Enriquez). Still, for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to
commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the part of
cohorts.”

Limitations on the application of the doctrine

However, not all public officers can seek refuge in the Arias doctrine in relying on the
recommendation of subordinates. The Arias doctrine is meant to apply only to heads of office or the
final approving authority.
 Also, the Arias doctrine does not protect the accused public officer when there are attendant
circumstances which should have put him on his guard and examine the checks and vouchers with some
degree of circumspection before signing the same.

In Nava vs. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 160211, Augst 28, 2006, the court declared that:
"Although the Court has previously ruled that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on
their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter into
negotiations, it is not unreasonable to expect petitioner to exercise the necessary diligence in making
sure at the very least, that the proper formalities in the questioned transaction were observed -- that a
public bidding was conducted. This step does not entail delving into intricate details of product quality,
complete delivery, or fair and accurate pricing. xxx Unlike other minute requirements in government
procurement, compliance or non-compliance with the rules on public bidding is readily apparent, and
the approving authority can easily call the attention of the subordinates concerned. To rule otherwise
would be to render meaningless the accountability of high-ranking public officials and to reduce their
approving authority to nothing more than a mere rubber stamp. The process of approval is not a
ministerial duty of approving authorities to sign every document that comes across their desks, and then
point to their subordinates as the parties responsible if something goes awry."

Source: https://www.ibp-elibrary.com/2019/11/how-to-apply-arias-doctrine.html