1. U.S.A. vs. Reyes, G.R. No.

79253, March 1, 1993

2. 2.The Holy See v. RTC, G.R. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994
3. 3.SEAFDEC v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 580
4. 4.Calladov. IRRI, 244 SCRA 210
5. 5.DFA v. NLRC, Sept. 18, 1996
6. 6.Municipality of San Fernando v. Judge Firme, 195 SCRA 692
7. 7.Farolan v. CTA 217 SCRA 298
8. 8.City of Angeles v. CA, G.R. No. 97882, Aug. 28,1996
9. 9.Veterans Manpower v. CA, 214 SCRA 286
10. 10.Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357
11. 11.Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424
12. 12.Meritt v. Gov't. of the Phil. Islands, 34 Phil. 311
13. 13.Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping, Sept. 30, 1954
14. 15.Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486
15. 16.Republic v. Villasor,54 SCRA 84
16. 17.Municipality of San Miguel v. Fernandez, 130 SCRA 56
17. 18.Municipality of Makati v. CA, 190 SCRA 206
18. 19.Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464
19. 20.Arigo et.al v Swift, et.al 735 SCRA102
20. 21.USA vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
21. 22.Buisan vs. COA G.R. No. 212376, January 31,2017

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, GR No. 206510, 2014-09-16

Facts:

On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,[3] otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park
(TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural,...
educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations."
Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and
penalized or fined,... including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise
created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting
body of the TRNP.

In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the
territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of

Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty."

On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles... east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no
reports of leaking fuel or oil.

on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. del Rosario that
the United States will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship."[6]

By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.

petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19);
non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef
(Section 20); and... destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.

Issues:

the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage... operations on
the USS Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises
issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America; and (4) the determination
of... the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with the
executive branch.

whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.
Ruling:

As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[13] we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We... declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance... with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.

ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of
their own and future... generations.

Their personality... to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now
enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases.

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State,[17] is
expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of
territorial... jurisdiction

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on... the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself.

The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.

in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef
system, brings the matter within the ambit... of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He
explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to... comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State
regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.

A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in
which the above provisions may apply.But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the
immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be
required to leave... the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be
liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under
Article 31.

We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage
operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court.

insofar as the... directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structure and marine habitat
adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the
completion of the removal of the USS

Guardian from the coral reef.

In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation
measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of
common security... interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative "the political"--departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this... political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."... we cannot
grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions
thereof... the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of... the United States government. The VFA being a valid and
binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.

WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.

Principles:

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."[10] Specifically, it is "a party's personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being... challenged, and
"calls for more than just a generalized grievance."[11] However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public... interest so requires, such
as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.

international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles
are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized... state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of
nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations
with other states.

the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends."

In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim
par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot... assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q.
B. 171]

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment... against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally... impleaded.

If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a...
diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign
from suit without its consent.

We held that petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of their official functions... when they conducted the
buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their
duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has... not
given its consent to be sued.

This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the
former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) from private,... commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial... transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to
the rights of plaintiff.

Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts
of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or... violated by such acts, for
the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.
it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department... on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional... provision that the State may not be sued without its consent."

The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the
sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international
law,... regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans."

The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle
of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum).[29] The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest... customary
principles of international law.[30] The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different
zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone,... and 5) the
high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[2] dated November 20, 2012 of the Commission on Audit (COA) in COA CP Case No. 2010-089, which denied the money
claims of Madag Buisan (Buisan), et al. (petitioners) against the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in the
amount of P122,051,850.00 for lack of merit, and the Resolution[3] dated February 14, 2014 denying the motion for
reconsideration.

The Antecedents

In 1989, the DPWH undertook the construction of the Liguasan Cut-off Channel (Project) in Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao,
to minimize the perennial problem of flooding in the area. In April 2001, the DPWH received various claims from land owners for
damages allegedly caused to their properties, crops and improvements by the premature opening or the Project. Hence, the
Regional Director (RD), DPWH Regional Office (R.O.) No. XII, Cotabato City, investigated the claims.[4]

The DPWH R.O. No. XII and the Technical Working Group (TWG) recommended in 2004 to pay just compensation to the
claimants. The TWG, however, noted that since the event occurred in 1989, it could not account physically the actual quantity of
the damaged crops and properties. In 2006, an ad hoc committee was created to determine the legality and propriety of the
claims. However, due to the considerable lapse of time and the insufficiency of evidence, no final resolution was made by the
DPWH. The claims were forwarded to the RD of the DPWH R.O. No. XII to be returned to the claimants, as such are considered
to be under the jurisdiction of the COA pursuant to Rule VIII of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA.[5]

On April 14, 2010, the petitioners, represented by Mayor Bai Annie C. Montawal (Montawal), filed a petition with the COA,[6]
praying that the DPWH be ordered to pay the petitioners the sum of P122,051,850.00 as compensation for their damaged crops,
properties and improvements. On September 16, 2010, Buisan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition alleging that Montawal was
not authorized to represent them. In fact, Buisan and the other claimants filed a separate petition with the COA based on that
same money claim.[7]

In its Answer, the DPWH averred that the petitioners failed to establish that they are the owners of crops and properties
allegedly damaged, and that the damage was caused by the construction of the Project. Moreover, the DPWH asserted that the
petitioners' cause of action had already prescribed.[8]

In its Decision[9] dated November 20, 2012, the COA denied the money claims of the petitioners, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission DENIES the herein Petition for money claim for lack of merit.[10]
The COA held that for the petitioners' failure to file their money claims within a reasonable time, they are deemed to have
committed Laches. Furthermore, the petitioners' cause of action had already prescribed in view of Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
[11]

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the COA for lack of merit.[12]

Issue
WHETHER THE COA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM WAS BARRED BY Laches AND
PRESCRIPTION.
Ruling of the Court

The Doctrine of Non-Suability of State insulates the DPWH, a governmental entity, from claims of damages.

The fundamental law of the land provides that the State cannot be sued without its consent.[17] It is a fundamental postulate of
constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the State, as well as its government, is immune from suit
unless it gives its consent. The rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The doctrine only conveys that "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the
State may at times be sued.[18] Suits filed against government agencies may either be against incorporated or unincorporated
agencies. In case of incorporated agencies, its suability depends upon whether its own organic act specifically provides that it
can sue and be sued in Court.[19]

As the State's engineering and construction arm, the DPWH exercises governmental functions that effectively insulate it from
any suit, much less from any monetary liability. The construction of the Project which was for the purpose of minimizing the
perennial problem of flood in the area of Tunggol, Montawal, Maguindanao, is well within the powers and functions of the
DPWH as mandated by the Administrative Code of 1997.

Hence, the Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the DPWH from being held responsible for alleged damages it performed in
consonance with its mandated duty. Nowhere does it appear in the petition that the State has given its consent, expressly or
impliedly, to be sued before the courts. The failure to allege the existence of the State's consent to be sued in the complaint is a
fatal defect, and on this basis alone, should cause the dismissal of the complaint.[20]

The petitioners' cause of action has been barred by prescription and Laches.

The COA denied the petition primarily on the ground that the petitioners filed their money claims only on 2014, or 15 years after
their cause of action arose in 1989. The petitioners' assertion that the cause of action arose in 1992 is self-serving as no pieces of
evidence was presented or even attached as supporting documents in their petition to prove their claim. Worse, the petitioners
could not even pinpoint the exact moment of time of the destruction of their properties.[21]

The petitioners' statement that there were already heavy rains since 1989 that caused flooding in the area negates their
previous claim that the cause of action arose in 1992. If in fact there were already heavy rains since 1989, then it can also be
argued that prior to 1992, their properties were already damaged by the floods and that would be the reckoning point of their
cause of action. This further establishes that their cause of action has already prescribed.

Thus, while it may be argued that the petitioners have a cause of action against the DPWH, the same has already prescribed in
view of Article 1146 of the Civil Code viz.:
ART. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

(2) Upon a quasi-delict. (Emphasis ours)
Undeniably, the petitioners' money claims which were only filed with the DPWH in 2004 or even in 2001 had already prescribed.
As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "[i]t will be the height of injustice for respondent DPWH to be
confronted with stale claims, where verification on the plausibility of the allegations remains difficult, either because the
condition of the alleged inundation of crops has changed, or the physical impossibility of accounting for the lost and damaged
crops due to the considerable lapse of time."[22]

On the other hand, "[l]aches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier."[23]

In the case at bar, Laches has set in as the elements[24] thereof are present. Firstly, the premature opening by the DPWH of the
Project allegedly causing flash floods, and damaging the petitioners' properties took place in 1989 or even in 1992. Secondly, the
petitioners took 15 years to assert their rights when they formally filed a complaint in 2004 against the DPWH. Thirdly, as the
petitioners failed to file a formal suit for their claims before the COA, there is an apparent lack of notice that would give the
DPWH the opportunity to defend itself.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,[25] as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,[26] which were the
applicable laws at the time the cause of action arose, the COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, Rule II, Section 1(b) of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA[27] specifically
enumerated those matters falling under COA's exclusive jurisdiction, which include "money claims due from or owing to any
government agency." Rule VIII, Section 1(a) further provides that COA shall have original jurisdiction over money claims against
the Government, among others. Therefore, the petitioners' money claims have prescribed and are barred by Laches for their
failure to timely file the petition with the COA.

215 Phil. 42

RELOVA, J.:

In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al.",
the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, on April 28, 1978, rendered judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to
private respondents, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Municipal
Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer:

"1. ordering the partial revocation of the Deed of Donation signed by the deceased Carlos Imperio in favor of the Municipality of
San Miguel, Bulacan, dated October 27, 1947 insofar as Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of Subdivision Plan Psd-20831 are
concerned, with an aggregate total area of 4,646 square meters, which lots are among those covered and described under TCT
No. T-1831 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of the Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan;

"2. ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding Deed of Reconveyance over the aforementioned five lots in favor of
the plaintiffs in the proportion of the undivided one-half (1/2) share in the name of plaintiffs Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio,
Adoracion, Rodolfo, Conrado, Ernesto, Alfredo, Carlos, Jr. and Juan, all surnamed Imperio, and the remaining undivided one-half
(1/2) share in favor of plaintiff-spouses Marcelo E. Pineda and Lucila Pongco;

"3. ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the plaintiffs in the proportion mentioned in the immediately preceding
paragraph the sum of P64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals it has collected from the occupants for their use and occupation
of the premises from 1970 up to and including 1975, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from January 1970 until fully paid;

"4. ordering the restoration of ownership and possession over the five lots in question in favor of the plaintiffs in the same
proportion aformentioned;

"5. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,000.00 for attorney's fees; and to pay the cost of suit.

"The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence presented to substantiate the same.

"SO ORDERED." (pp. 11-12, Rollo)

The foregoing judgment became final when herein petitioner's appeal was dismissed due to its failure to file the record on
appeal on time. The dismissal was affirmed by the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12118 and by this Court in G.R. No.
59938. Thereafter, herein private respondents moved for issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment.
Respondent judge, on July 27, 1982, issued an order, to wit:

"Considering that an entry of judgment had already been made on June 14, 1982 in G.R. No. L-59938 and;

"Considering further that there is no opposition to plaintiffs' motion for execution dated July 23, 1982,

"Let a writ of execution be so issued, as prayed for in the aforestated motion." (p. 10, Rollo)

Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality's property or
funds are all public funds exempt from execution. The said motion to quash was, however, denied by the respondent judge in an
order dated August 23, 1982 and the alias writ of execution stands in full force and effect.

On September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order which in part, states:

"It is clear and evident from the foregoing that defendant has more than enough funds to meet its judgment obligation.
Municipal Treasurer Miguel C. Roura of San Miguel, Bulacan and Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan Agustin O. Talavera are therefor
hereby ordered to comply with the money judgment rendered by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao against said municipality. In like
manner, the municipal authorities of San Miguel, Bulacan are likewise ordered to desist from plaintiffs' legal possession of the
property already returned to plaintiffs by virtue of the alias writ of execution.

"Finally, defendants are hereby given an inextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this order by the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan within which to submit their written compliance." (p. 24, Rollo)

When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to comply with the order of September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued
an order for their arrest and that they will be released only upon compliance thereof.

Hence, the present petition on the issue whether the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the hands of the
provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public funds which are exempt from execution
for the satisfaction of the money judgment in Civil Case No. 604-B.

Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. The reason for this was explained in the case of
Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86. Phil. 629 "that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the
accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created, and that to subject said properties and public
funds to execution would materially impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose." And, in Tantoco vs.
Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but
also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the treasury or
when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are
not subject to execution unless so declared by statute." Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the
possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan,
are also public funds and as such they are exempt from execution.

Besides, Presidential Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2 (a), provides:

"SEC. 2. Fundamental Principles. - Local government financial affairs, transactions, and operations shall be governed by the
fundamental principles set forth hereunder:

"(a) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory
authority.

xxx xxx x x x"

Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang
Bayan has passed an ordinance to this effect.

Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court, outlines the procedure for the enforcement of money judgment:

"(a) By levying on all the property of the debtor, whether real or personal, not otherwise exempt from execution, or only on
such part of the property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing cost, if he has more than sufficient property for the
purpose;

"(b) By selling the property levied upon;

"(c) By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment and accruing costs; and

"(d) By delivering to the judgment-debtor the excess, if any, unless otherwise directed by judgment or order of the court."

The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the order of respondent judge, dated July 27, 1982, granting issuance of a writ of
execution; the alias writ of execution, dated July 27, 1982; and the order of respondent judge, dated September 13, 1982,
directing the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan to comply with the money
judgments, are SET ASIDE; and respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the writ of execution.

SO ORDERED.