PEOPLE v. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ

9/23/2020 PEOPLE v.
INOCENCIO GONZALEZ
411 Phil. 893
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Many unfortunate tragedies would not have happened if the improvident use of a
firearm did not exacerbate a simple altercation over traffic. This is one of them.
On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman was shot to death in
the course of her husband's altercation with the accused-appellant and his son along the
Garden of Remembrance within the Loyola Memorial Park in Marikina. The trial court
found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. This case is before us on automatic
review.
The details of what actually transpired in the few seconds immediately preceding the
shooting are controverted by both parties but the events leading to this tragedy are not
disputed.
In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m. both the families of the private
complainant Noel Andres and that of the accused-appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were on
their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. The appellant was driving a white
Isuzu Esteem with his grandson and three housemaids, while the private complainant
was driving a maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his two year old
son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar Valdez. At the
intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while the accused-appellant Gonzalez
was turning left towards the exit and the complainant Noel Andres was headed straight
along the road to the exit their two vehicles almost collided. Noel Andres was able to
timely step on the brakes. The appellant continued driving along his way while Noel
Andres drove behind the appellant's vehicle for some time and cut him off when he
[1]
found the opportunity to do so. Noel Andres then got out of his vehicle and knocked
[2]
on the appellant's car window. This is as far as their versions of the incident coincide.
The prosecution's version of the incident is that Noel Andres calmly told the appellant
to be careful with his driving and informed the latter that he, Andres, is with his family
and to this Gonzalez allegedly replied, "Accidents are accidents, what's your problem."
Andres stated that he saw the appellant turning red in anger so he decided to go back to
his vehicle when he was blocked by the appellant's son who said, "Anong problema mo
sa erpat ko." Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded his
vehicle, sat at the driver's seat, closed the door, and partially opened the car window
just wide enough to talk back to appellant's son, Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers
said "Binaril kami". He turned to his wife Feliber Andres and saw her bloodied and
unconscious. He turned around and saw his son Kenneth and nephew Kevin were also
wounded. Andres admitted in court that he and Dino were shouting at each other so
that he did not hear the shot. Andres then got out of his vehicle to warn the appellant
not to flee. He then took the wounded members of his family to the exit where there
was an ambulance standing by. The three were then taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital
lawyerly.ph/juris/view/ccc3e 1/18
9/23/2020 PEOPLE v. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ
and were later transferred to the Quezon City Medical Center.
The defense's version of the incident is that Andres cut the appellant's path by
positioning his FX obliquely along the appellant's lane from the latter's left side. Andres
then got out of his vehicle, stood beside the appellant's car window, and repeatedly
cursed the appellant, "Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong
magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo mo."[3] The appellant stayed inside his car and allegedly
replied, "Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang." The appellant
Gonzalez and another witness for the defense, Quidic, testified that Noel Andres went
back to his vehicle to move it in such a way that it is straight in front of the appellant's
car. Andres allegedly got out of his vehicle again and continued shouting and cursing at
the appellant.[4] Dino, the appellant's son, who rode in another vehicle decided to go
back when he did not see his father's car behind him. When Dino arrived at the scene
he confronted Andres and the two had an altercation. Both Dino and the appellant
stated that Andres remained outside his vehicle during the altercation with Dino. When
Andres suddenly reached for something inside his vehicle, Dino froze on the spot where
he stood. This prompted the appellant to get his gun from the glove compartment and
feeling that his son was threatened he got out of his car ready to shoot. When he saw
that Andres did not have a weapon he put down his hand holding the gun. This is when
the appellant's daughter Trisha who was riding in Dino's car arrived at the scene,
walked past Dino and Andres, and pushed the appellant away. She hugged her father
and in the process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand
and with Trisha's substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his
balance and the gun accidentally fired. The accused stated that he did not know he shot
somebody until the private complainant's sister-in-law, Francar Valdez, got out of the
vehicle carrying a bloodied small boy. The defense claims that the appellant did not try
to flee and even told the complainant's sister-in-law to take the wounded to the hospital.
On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime of Murder, Double

Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder was filed against herein accused-appellant:
st
"That on or about the 31 day of October 1998, in the city of Marikina, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack,
assault and employ personal violence by means of treachery and abuse of superior
strength upon the person of Noel Andres y Tomas, by then and there shooting him
with a Glock cal. 9mm pistol but instead hitting one Feliber Andres y Ordoño, on
the left back portion of her head, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal
wound which directly caused her death, as well as hitting John Kenneth Andres y
Ordoño and Kevin Valdez y Ordoño physical injuries which ordinarily would have
caused their death, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce
it by reason of some cause or causes, independent of their will, that is, the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to John Kenneth Andres y Ordoño and Kevin
Valdez y Ordoño to their damage and prejudice as well as to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Feliber Andres y Ordoño."
On arraignment the accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged.
The case records show that Feliber Andres, the wife of Noel Andres did not die
instantaneously. She lived to give birth to a baby girl[5] by caesarian section and died
the following morning on November 1, 1998. The Autopsy Report[6] states:
"FINDINGS: Fairly nourished, fairly developed female cadaver, with post mortem
lividity. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic. Surgical incisions
were noted at left tempero-parietal region. Surgical incisions is also noted at the
abdominal region secondary to a caesarian section.
HEAD: (1) gunshot wound, point of entry, left fronto-temporal region, measuring 1
by 0.9 cm, 9 cm from the anterior midline, with a uniform abraided collar
measuring 0.2 cm., directed posteriorwards, slightly downwards, and
medialwards, fracturing the frontal, and left temporal bones, lacerating the left
cerebral hemisphere, with a deformed slug fragment embedded and recovered at
the posterior lobe of the left cerebral hemisphere. (2) hematoma, left orbital
region, measuring 4.5 by 2 cm, 4 cm from the anterior midline. There are subdural
and subarachnoidal hemorrages. Stomach contains 1 ½ glassful of partially
digested food particles mostly rice and meaty material.
CONCLUSION: Cause of death is gunshot wound on the head."
Kenneth and Kevin were treated for extraction of metallic fragments on their faces.
They were discharged from the hospital six days later or on November 6, 1998.
On June 25, 1999 the trial court rendered judgement finding that the shooting was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and held the appellant guilty of the
complex crime of murder for the death of Feliber Andres and for two counts of
frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez and
sentenced the appellant to the maximum of the imposable penalty which is death. The
trial court held:
"Beforehand, the Court takes note of the judicial admissions on the verbal
declarations of the accused that the court `a quo' has jurisdiction over the case;
that he owns the black Gluck 9 mm. automatic pistol; that the said gun will never
fire even if he drops it; that only one bullet was fired from his gun; and that the
victim Feliber Andres is already dead. With this exegesis and the declarations in
open court of the eyewitness of both the prosecution and some of the defense,
there is no real dispute on the antecedent facts showing that the accused fired on
Noel Andres but instead hit and caused the fatal injuries to the victims John
Kenneth Andres, Kevin Valdez and Feliber Andres resulting to the ultimate death
of the latter. The court takes further judicial admissions of the accused made in
their memorandum demonstrating the existence of five (5) sequences of events
leading to the death of Feliber Andres and the wounding of John Kenneth Andres
and Kevin Valdez which are as follows: First is when Noel Andres overtook the car
driven of the accused and cut cross his path; Second is when Noel Andres alighted
from his vehicle and confronted Inocencio; Third is when Noel had an argument
with Dino Gonzalez, the son of the accused; Forth is when, Inocencio seeing his
son having confrontation with Noel, got his gun to protect Dino; and Fifth is when
Inocencio had a struggle with his daughter. Trisha Gonzalez, who tried to reach for
the gun and as a result of which Inocencio lost his balance and as he was falling
backward to his side, his right arm holding the gun hit the rear window of the
Tamaraw FX van and the gun accidentally went off hitting the victim, who were all
then inside the van.
The court likewise take judicial notice on the feature of the automatic pistol used in
this case which is capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions. Practically, the stages before an
automatic firearm would be capable of firing are as follows: 1) the loading of a
bullet into the chamber of the gun; 2) the cocking of the hammer, if uncocked; 3)
the releasing of the safety pin; 4) the pressing of the trigger to unleash the hammer
so that the firing pin will hit the cartridge to propel the bullet out to hit the target.
Realistically, it demonstrates that a gun will not fire even if the bullet is loaded in
its chamber if the hammer is uncocked; or even if cocked if the safety pin is
engaged; or even if the safety pin is disengaged if the trigger will not be pressed.
However, even if the gun is fired if it is not aimed and leveled to the target, the
purpose of firing it shall not be achieved. Contrarily, once a gun is drawn against a
person, the means methods and forms employed for its execution is already
conceived. And once it is tended directly and specifically to insure its execution, it
consequently produces the conscious and deliberate intention. Finally if all the
acts of execution had been effectively done without risk on the part of the offender
arising from any defense coming from the offended party, treachery results. In
brief, there is treachery when the offender commits any crime against persons,
employing means, methods and forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make (People vs. Mesa 276 SCRA 407;
People vs. Carlos Patrolla, Jr. G. R. No. 112445, March 7, 1996). To appreciate
treachery two (2) conditions must be present, to wit: 1) the employment of means
of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or

retaliate; and 2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
(People vs. Azugue, 268 SCRA 711; People vs. Peña, G. R. No. 116022, July 1, 1998,
p. 1)
In the case at bar and guided with the above-quoted doctrinal cases, logically, the
accused is positive of the crime charged against him. When he alighted with a
drawn gun to protect his son and released all the safety measures of his gun as he
fired and missed at Noel who was then unarmed, but instead hit Kevin Valdez,
John Kenneth Andres and Feliber Andres which resulted to the death of the latter,
demonstrate that the accused has executed the two (2) conditions to generate
treachery enough to qualify the crime committed to murder."
XXXX XXXXX XXXX
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused Inocencio Gonzalez,

Jr., y Esquivel is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder penalized
under Art. 248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of Death
by lethal injection.
The accused is further ordered to pay the following civil liabilities:
1. To the private complainant Noel Andres:
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Feliber Andres;
b) the amount of P3,363,663.60 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of
the deceased Feliber Andres;
c) the amount of P98,384.19 as funeral expenses;
d) the amount of P271,800.56 for the hospitalization expenses incurred for the
injuries sustained by the deceased Feliber Andres and the amount of P23,622.58
representing the expenses for the untimely delivery of the child Ma. Clarisse
Andres;
e) the amount of P51,566.00 representing the hospitalization expenses for the
injuries sustained by the victim John Kenneth Andres;
f) the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages suffered for the untimely death
of his wife Feliber Andres and for the injuries caused to his son John Kenneth
Andres;
g) the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees and a fee of
P2,000.00 per appearance; and
h) the costs of the suit.
2. To the private complainant Nicasio Valdez:
a) the amount of P73,824.75 as actual damages for the injuries sustained by the
victim Kevin Valdez; and
b) the amount of P75,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED."
In his appeal, Gonzalez submits the following assignments of error:
"1. The trial court committed reversible error when it found that treachery was
present.
2. The trial court committed reversible error when it presumed that there was
treachery by taking judicial notice of the feature of the automatic pistol involved in
this case.
3. The trial court committed reversible error when it violated the constitutional
right of the accused-appellant to due process when it took judicial notice of the
feature of the automatic pistol involved in this case without notice.
4. The trial court committed reversible error when it found Accused-Appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Double
Frustrated Murder.
5. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation, lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong, provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceded the act, incomplete defense of relative, and voluntary surrender.
6. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to find that the
shooting incident was accidental.
7. The trial court committed reversible error when it gave credence to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Elmer Ramos and Moises Castro.
8. The trial court committed reversible error when it disregarded the basic
principle that the accused is presumed innocent and his guilt must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
9. The trial court committed reversible error when it ordered Accused-Appellant
to pay for the civil liabilities."
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be rendered exempting him
from criminal and civil liabilities. Appellant declared that he had no intention to shoot
Noel Andres much less his wife nor the children. He lost his balance when his daughter
Trisha approached and pushed him backwards to stop him from joining Dino and Noel
Andres but the appellant tried to free his right hand holding the gun and it accidentally
fired. The single bullet fired hit the last window on the left side of the Tamaraw FX.
The appellant claims that he did not see the passengers inside the vehicle at the time of
the shooting. This is corroborated by the testimony of two witnesses for the prosecution
who testified that the windows of Andres' vehicle are heavily tinted so that a person
outside the vehicle would not be able to see if there are people inside. It is also argued
that had the appellant intended to shoot Noel Andres he could have simply done so by
shooting at him directly. The defense asserts that the evidence for the prosecution failed
to establish the attendance of treachery and without the attendance of the said
qualifying circumstance the crime committed is homicide, not murder.
The appellant also points out that the trial court made the factual finding that the
shooting happened in a matter of seconds and that it was preceded by a heated
argument between the parties. Such being the case, it is argued that the shooting could
not have been attended by treachery. There was no time for the appellant to consciously
and deliberately employ the mode of attack against Noel Andres, nor against any one of
the actual victims, to insure its execution and at the same time to eliminate any form of
retaliation from the alleged intended victim. And yet, the trial court, contrary to the
evidence on record, held that the loading of the bullet into the chamber of the gun, the
cocking of the hammer, the release of the safety pin and the pulling of the trigger by the
appellant of his automatic pistol constitute conscious and deliberate effort to employ
the gun as a means of committing the crime and resultantly, qualified its commission by
treachery. Such a finding presupposes that the appellant loaded the gun to shoot Noel
Andres only that very moment when his son Dino and Noel Andres were arguing. This
conclusion has no basis on record. The appellant testified that his gun was loaded
before he left the house and two witnesses for prosecution stated in court that a few
seconds after Noel Andres and Dino started shouting at each other, the appellant got
out of his car and shot at the last window on the left side of the complainant's vehicle.
Further, the appellant assigns as error the procedure adopted by the trial court in taking
judicial notice that the gun used by the appellant is an automatic pistol and as such, it
will not fire unless aimed at the intended target. The procedure taken by the trial court
is contrary to Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.[7] The trial court should have
given both parties the opportunity to present evidence, expert evidence, if necessary, to
inform the court on the subject matter. The appellant argues that the factual finding
borne by such erroneous procedure is equally erroneous. The gun used by the appellant
is a semi-automatic and not an automatic pistol which means that the pistol used has no
external safety pin to be released and that the hammer need not be cocked. The pulling
of the trigger, intentional or not, will fire the gun. The use of a semi-automatic pistol
does not necessarily imply treachery.
Appellant also argues that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Castro and Ramos
were improperly given credence by the trial court. The appellant contends that a
reading of their testimonies would show that their narration of the incident is rather
absurd and would show that they did not witness the actual shooting. Defense
witnesses, Gonzalez and his daughter, Trisha, on the other hand, testified that Castro
and Ramos arrived at the scene only after the shooting.
As regards the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, it is argued that considering
that there was no intent to kill and that they stayed in the hospital only for six days, the
crime committed is physical injuries. It is argued that the trial court erred in awarding
damages. The bunch of receipts allegedly representing the medical expenses incurred
for the injuries sustained by the victims was erroneously admitted in evidence, without
first requiring the prosecution to establish the authenticity of the receipts. The appellant
also points out that the award for loss of earning capacity has no basis as the deceased
was unemployed at the time of the incident.
Finally, the appellant assigns as error the trial court's rejection of the mitigating
circumstances pleaded by the defense which allegedly attended the commission of the
crime, i.e., lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, passion and obfuscation,
incomplete defense of a relative and voluntary surrender. The appellant asserts that
these mitigating circumstances were duly proven during the trial and are supported by
the evidence on record. The private complainant Noel Andres testified that he saw the
appellant getting red in anger after they, Andres and the appellant, had a heated
argument immediately prior to the shooting. These admitted circumstances show that
the appellant was not in his proper state of mind at the time of the shooting. First, he
was angered by Andres' abusive language and later he got out of his car with a loaded
gun to protect his son from a perceived danger. The appellant clams that his willingness
to help the injured and his voluntary surrender to the police should likewise be
considered as mitigating circumstances in the imposition of penalties.
The Solicitor-General agrees with the appellant that the crime was not attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and hence the crime committed by the appellant
for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide, not murder. The appellee takes into
consideration that the shooting was preceded by a heated argument and that the
supposed victim was placed on guard that attack was imminent. It also appears that the
shooting was done impulsively. There is no evidence that the appellant deliberately
employed the means of attack to insure execution of the crime and at the same time
eliminate the risk of retaliation from the private complainant. The appellee also agrees
with the appellant that the trial court erred in equating the use of an automatic pistol
with treachery. The trial court made the factual finding that the appellant's automatic
pistol would not fire unless aimed and the trigger is deliberately pulled and hence
treachery attended the shooting. The appellee submits that if we follow the reasoning of
the trial court it would appear that the appellant intended to shoot at the complainant's
vehicle only as the shot was fired at the last window on the left side of the FX away from
where Andres was allegedly seated. The fact that the gun was drawn and fired does not
mean that the mode of attack was consciously and deliberately employed.
However, with respect to the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, the appellee
disagrees with the contention that the appellant is liable only for slight physical
injuries. The injuries sustained by both children are head injuries and could have
caused their death if not for the immediate medical attention given them. The number
of days spent in the hospital is not determinative of the severity of the wounds. Their
nature and location should instead be considered. The appellant cannot escape liability
for frustrated homicide for the injuries of the two children on the ground that he fired a
single shot at the vehicle of Noel Andres. He is liable for all the consequences of his
unlawful act even if the crime committed is different from that intended.
As regards the pleaded mitigating circumstances, appellee asserts that none can be
considered in favor of the appellant. There is evidence on record that the appellant did
not voluntarily surrender to the police and it appears from the testimonies of witnesses
that he entertained the possibility of flight but his car was stuck in traffic along the exit
of the memorial park. His pretense of incomplete defense of a relative is belied by his
own admission that when he saw that Noel Andres did not have a gun he lowered his
hand holding the gun. There was allegedly no threat on the life of his son at the time of
the shooting, no uncontrollable fear nor irresistible force that would mitigate the
commission of the offense.
The Solicitor-General also seeks to uphold the pecuniary awards granted by the trial
court. The appellee alleges that it is not denied by the appellant that Feliber Andres was
a 38 year old registered nurse at the time of the shooting. Although she was then
unemployed on account of her pregnancy, she still had earning capacity and the trial
court properly applied the salary of a government nurse under the salary
standardization scheme in the computation of damages for the loss of earning capacity.
The receipts presented in evidence by the prosecution to establish hospitalization and
other medical expenses incurred by the private complainants by reason of the injuries
suffered by the victims were duly authenticated by the prosecution witnesses and there
is no dispute that they are exact copies of the original receipts presented in court. The
objections raised by the appellant in this regard were duly met by the evidence
presented by the private complainants.
In sum, the appellee asserts that considering that the appellant fired a single shot and in
the process committed four offenses the appellant should be held liable for the complex
crime of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres, double frustrated homicide against
Kevin and Kenneth and attempted homicide against Noel Andres. Under the rules on
complex crimes the penalty for the gravest offense, i.e., reclusion temporal for
homicide, should be imposed in its maximum period.
The appeal has merit.
Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the
deliberate employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime against
persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise. For treachery
to be appreciated two elements must concur: 1) the employment of means of execution
that would insure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim
and leaving the latter without an opportunity to defend himself and 2) the means
employed were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.[8] The suddenness
of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position
of the victim at the time the attack was made or the fact that the victim was unarmed do
not by themselves render the attack as treacherous.[9] This is of particular significance
in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he gained an
advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered
defenseless.[10] The means employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of
attack must be shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused
to insure the consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the
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risk of retaliation from the intended victim.[11] Accordingly, it has been consistently
held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the
spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not
attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a
treacherous mode of attack.[12] Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his
infuriation by reason of the victim's provocation was held to be without treachery.
Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or
acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the
victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of
reprisal.[13] For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been
preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the
part of the latter.[14]
This Court has also had occasion to state that whether or not the attack succeeds against
its intended victim or injures another or whether the crime committed is graver than
that intended is immaterial, as long as it is shown that the attack is attended by
treachery, the said qualifying circumstance may still be considered by the court.
[15] Thus, the determining factor on whether or not the commission of a crime is
attended by treachery is not the resulting crime committed but the mode of attack
employed in its execution.[16]
Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must be shown to
have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself. [17]
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not
attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber
Andres is homicide and not murder.
The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a chance encounter. They
were total strangers before their vehicles almost collided at an intersection inside the
memorial park. Unfortunately, heated exchange of remarks that followed the near
collision was fanned by a short temper, which in the case of the appellant, was
augmented by the improvident use of a firearm.
From a reading of the transcript of the testimonies of the witnesses, it would appear
that Noel Andres, who had his pregnant wife and child with him, among others, on
board the Tamaraw FX provoked the altercation. After the near collision of his vehicle
with that of the appellant, he tailed behind the latter's car towards the exit until he had
the chance to cut him off to scold him for his failure to observe traffic rules.[18]Andres
stated in court that he calmly told the appellant to be careful with his driving and
denied that he was angry when he alighted from his vehicle to confront the appellant.
[19] His statement is belied by the witnesses, two prosecution witnesses included, who
uniformly testified that Andres quarreled with or shouted and cursed at the appellant
for the latter's recklessness at the intersection.[20] The appellant narrated in court that
Andres repeatedly shouted at him, "Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na gago ka pa".
[21] Andres' hostile behavior towards the appellant is evident from his statement in
[22] 12/18
court that he noticed the appellant turning red in anger.[22] It is highly improbable for
Gonzalez to have turned red in anger had Andres been polite, as he claims he was, in
scolding Gonzalez. Andres could have simply communicated to the appellant his
disgust for the latter's bad driving when he overtook the appellant's car near the scene
of the shooting but instead he chose to block the appellant's path, insult and virtually
provoke the appellant to retaliate.
Andres stated in court that when he noticed Gonzalez' infuriation he immediately

walked towards his vehicle, because according to him the altercation was over. On his
way to his FX he met another man, whom he later found out to be the appellant's son,
Dino. It appears that the altercation was far from over because again Andres had a
shouting match this time with Dino.[23] In a matter of seconds, the appellant alighted
from his car and fired a single shot at the last window on the left side of Andres' vehicle
at an angle away from Noel Andres. The single bullet fired hit Feliber Andres on the
forehead near the temporal region above the left eye and the two children with metallic
fragments of the bullet on their faces, one at the cheek and the other below his left eye.
The prosecution did not present evidence as to the exact seating arrangement of the
victims inside the vehicle; suffice it to say, that an examination of the pictures of the
vehicle[24] one of which shows a mass of blood stains on the left side (towards the
driver's seat) of the white seat cover below the head rest[25], would show that the
deceased Feliber must have been seated at the front passenger's seat and the children at
the middle row behind the driver's seat.[26] Another picture shows a bullet hole on the
last window on the left side of the vehicle[27] and another shows that the front
windshield appears undamaged.[28] A ballistics expert appeared in court for the
prosecution and testified that the bullet fired at the FX came from the appellant's gun,
which fact was admitted by the defense. The prosecution did not inquire from the
ballistics expert regarding the trajectory of the bullet or the approximate distance of the
appellant from the FX when he fired his gun to establish whether or not the appellant
aimed for Noel or Feliber or simply fired indiscriminately at the latter's vehicle.[29]
At first blush it would seem that the shooting of Feliber Andres was attended by
treachery as she was inside the FX witnessing her husband's altercation, first, with the
appellant then with the appellant's son, totally defenseless from the shot that came
suddenly from her left side. Public outrage over the death of Feliber was heightened by
the fact that she was then pregnant with her second child and her death left a new born
baby girl and a two year old boy motherless.
However, a meticulous review of the evidence prevents a conclusive finding of treachery

and any doubt must be resolved, like the fact of the commission of an offense, in favor
of the accused. The pictures indicate that Gonzalez fired at the FX at an angle away
from Noel Andres and that Gonzalez was not aiming at anybody in particular. It is not
disputed that the appellant's car was directly behind the complainant's FX and that
Gonzalez who was then seated at the driver's seat alighted from his car, took a few steps
then fired at the left side of the FX. Whether Noel Andres was seated at the driver's seat
inside his vehicle when Gonzalez fired at the FX, as the prosecution asserts, or was
standing by the door of the driver's seat outside his vehicle, as the defense submits, it is
clear that the shot was fired away from Noel Andres. The bullet hit Feliber near her
temple above the left eye indicating that she was facing left towards her husband when
the shot was fired.[30] The direct hit on Feliber's head shows that the angle of the shot
was indeed away from Noel Andres. Even the eyewitness for the prosecution testified
that had the appellant intended to kill Noel Andres he could have shot directly at him,
considering that Noel Andres was just a few steps away from him[31] and that Noel
Andres was visible from the outside because his window was partially open.[32] The
pictures show that the bullet hole was on the third window on the left side of the
Tamaraw FX[33] belying any attempt to shoot Noel Andres. Two prosecution witnesses
Ramos and Castro unequivocally declared that "nothing or no one" prevented Gonzalez
from shooting directly at Noel Andres and that Gonzalez could have simply done so if he
wanted to. But after alighting from his car, Gonzalez took a few steps and shot at the
left side window of the FX.[34]
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by itself
amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant deliberately
positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he fired the
shot. On the contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the position of the appellant's
car was not of his own doing but it became so when Noel Andres overtook his car and
cut off his path.
We note further, that the appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel Andres even
after the latter cut off the appellant's path. Andres stated in court that the appellant did
not alight from his car nor opened his window until he, Andres, tapped on it.[35]For his
part Gonzalez categorically stated in court that he did not point his gun nor threatened
Andres during their short spat.[36] Gonzalez, although he had his gun in his car, did not
react to Andres' cursing until the latter was having an altercation with the appellant's
son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived that his son was in imminent danger.
[37] Whether he overreacted or he shot at Andres' vehicle out of rage over Andres'
aggressive behavior, one thing appears clear to us, that the shooting was not done in
cold blood. It is undisputed that the windows of the FX are heavily or darkly tinted so
that a person outside would not see if anybody was inside.[38] The pictures of the
FX[39] on record confirm the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses
that the other passengers of the FX were not visible from the outside. Gonzalez
admitted in court that Noel Andres mentioned that he has passengers with him while he
was shouting and cursing at Gonzalez but there is no indication that Gonzalez had any
opportunity to see the passengers when he fired the shot. The totality of the evidence
on record fails to support a conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of
attack to gain undue advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any
decisive evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus the crime
committed is homicide.[40]
The trial court's finding that the loading of the gun, the cocking of the hammer and
finally the pulling of the trigger constitute a deliberate effort on the part of appellant to
use the gun as a means of a treacherous attack is patently erroneous. A single and
continuous attack cannot be divided into stages to make it appear that treachery was
involved.[41] The entire incident happened in a matter of minutes, as testified to by
witnesses, and as noted by the trial court.[42] It was error to our mind for the trial court
to divide the assault in stages to arrive at the conclusion that the mode of attack was
consciously employed by the appellant. Contrary to the finding of the trial court that
the appellant prepared the gun before getting out of his car, the appellant testified that
he loaded his gun before he left the house and that it was ready to fire when he alighted
his car. There was no time for him to reflect on the mode of attack since he just picked
up his gun and alighted from his car and shot at the FX a few seconds after Dino and
Noel Andres started shouting at each other.[43] We note further that the trial court
pointed out that from the fact that the appellant prepared his gun to shoot, this was an
indication of the deliberate employment of the gun as a means to kill; i.e. that the use of
an automatic pistol shows that the shooting was attended by treachery.
We do not agree that the weapon used, by itself, is determinative of treachery, unless it
is shown, and it is not herein shown, that the appellant deliberately used the gun to
insure the commission of the crime and to render the unarmed victim defenseless. As
discussed above, the encounter between the appellant and the Andresses was a chance
encounter and the appellant's gun was in the glove compartment of his car even before
he left his house. The shooting was clearly a spur of the moment or impulsive decision
made by the appellant preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of the private
complainant. Jurisprudence teaches us that under the circumstances, treachery is not
obtaining. In the case of People vs. Valles,[44] the accused, a security guard, fired his
Armalite and mortally wounded the victim when the latter approached the accused four
times insisting on entering the workplace wearing improper uniform, then cursed and
insulted and challenged the accused to a fight. We held that the shooting was not
attended by treachery as the shooting was preceded by a heated altercation at the
instance of the victim. It is to be noted that the kind of weapon used against an
unarmed victim was not taken into consideration in determining the attendance of
treachery; it is the mode of attack employed by the accused under the particular
circumstances of a case that determines its attendance in the commission of a crime.
We find that the prosecution has not discharged its burden to show that the shooting
was attended by treachery and we are convinced that the crime committed for the death
of Feliber Andres is homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime committed
are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines whether the
crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is made manifest by
the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill the victim.[45] In a case
wherein the accused did not know that a person was hiding behind a table who was hit
by a stray bullet causing superficial injuries requiring treatment for three days, the
crime committed is slight physical injuries.[46] In case of doubt as to the homicidal
intent of the accused, he should be convicted of the lesser offense of physical injuries.
[47] We have earlier pointed out that the intent to kill is absent in this case. It was also
found that one small metallic fragment was extracted from Kenneth below his left eye
while another fragment was extracted from Kevin "immediately below the level of his
[48] 15/18
skin before the cheek bone".[48] An examination of the testimonies of the attending
physicians, showed that the wounds sustained by the two children from the metallic
fragments are not in themselves fatal but may cause death if left untreated. One of the
attending physician testified in court that the fragments themselves "will not cause
complication, it is the entry of the fragment" or the open wound that is susceptible to
infection.[49] Two small fragments were no longer extracted from the face of Kevin
Valdez, as the doctor deemed it to be without danger of complication.[50] We note that
the various sizes of the metallic fragments were not established, at least to give an
indication of the severity of the wounds sustained. Both children were discharged after
six days of treatment and there is no showing that they required subsequent treatment
or that they were immobilized for a greater number of days by reason of the injuries
sustained. Considering the nature and location of their injuries and the number of days
required for their treatment, we find that the crime committed for the injuries sustained
by the children are two counts of slight physical injuries under Art. 266 of the Revised
Penal Code which imposes a penalty of arresto menor or imprisonment for 1 to 30 days
for injuries sustained that has incapacitated the victim for one to nine days or required
medical attendance for the same period. For evident lack of criminal intent to kill the
complainant, Noel Andres, as above stated, the information for attempted homicide
must fail.
The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation,

incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded
by the defense, were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in the
imposition of penalties. The testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the
appellant's pretense of voluntary surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the appellant
drove away towards the gate of the memorial park while he was questioning him after
the shooting and had not Noel Andres and onlookers blocked his path the appellant
could have fled the scene of the crime.[51]
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. For this
mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an unlawful act
sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim;
(2) that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the
commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused's mind;
and that (3) "the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a
spirit of lawlessness or revenge".[52] Noel Andres' act of shouting at the appellant's son,
who was then a nurse and of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and
obfuscation as it is claimed by the accused. Besides, the appellant's son, Dino was
shouting back at Noel Andres. It was not a case wherein the appellant's son appeared
helpless and oppressed that the appellant lost his reason and shot at the FX of Noel
Andres. The same holds true for the appellant's claim of provocation on the part of Noel
Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong
committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed.
The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the circumstances of the case.[53]The
aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant and his son may be
demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the
complainant's vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a
relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the
appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino
Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating
circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means
employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The
intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from
the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim.
[54] The appellant's use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in the
shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible
consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes
committed.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the
appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight
physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is
hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor in its medium period.
The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes under Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code are not applicable in this case. Art. 48 applies if a single act constitutes two
or more grave and less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means of
committing another; in such a case, the penalty for the most serious offense shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Art. 9 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 25
defines grave felonies as those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or
afflictive penalties from reclusion perpetua to prision mayor; less grave felonies are
those to which the law attaches a penalty which in its maximum period falls under
correctional penalties; and light felonies are those punishable by arresto menor or fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos. Considering that the offenses committed by the act of
the appellant of firing a single shot are one count of homicide, a grave felony, and two
counts of slight physical injuries, a light felony, the rules on the imposition of penalties
for complex crimes, which requires two or more grave and/or less grave felonies, will
not apply.
The pecuniary award granted by the trial court for actual damages was duly established
by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as supported by the original receipts for
hospitalization and other medical expenses presented in evidence by the prosecution.
The award for loss of earning capacity is likewise sustained for the reason that while
Feliber Andres was pregnant and was unemployed at the time of death, it is not
disputed that she was a registered nurse and had earning capacity. Noel Andres also
testified that he and his wife had plans to go back to Saudi Arabia to work after Feliber
had given birth to their second baby. While there is no evidence as to Feliber's actual
income at the time of her death, in view of her temporary separation from work because
of her pregnancy, we do not consider it reversible error for the trial court to peg her
earning capacity to that of the salary of a government nurse under the salary
standardization law, as a fair estimate or reasonable assessment of her earning capacity
at the time of her death. It would be grossly inequitous to deny her spouse and her
minor children damages for the support that they would have received, considering
clear evidence on record that she did have earning capacity at the time of her death.
The awards for moral damages for the death of Feliber Andres and for the injuries
sustained by the two children, which under the circumstances are reasonable, are
likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED. The appellant is
hereby found guilty of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres and is sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period,
as maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed against Kenneth
Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto
menor.
The pecuniary awards granted by the trial court are hereby sustained.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., see dissenting opinion.
Puno, Kapunan, and Panganiban, JJ., joins the dissenting opinion of J. Pardo

PEOPLE v. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ

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PEOPLE v. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ

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9/23/2020 PEOPLE v.

411 Phil. 893

and were later transferred to the Quezon City Medical Center.

On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime of Murder, Double

On arraignment the accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged.

CONCLUSION: Cause of death is gunshot wound on the head."

of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or

XXXX XXXXX XXXX

"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused Inocencio Gonzalez,

The accused is further ordered to pay the following civil liabilities:

1. To the private complainant Noel Andres:

c) the amount of P98,384.19 as funeral expenses;

P2,000.00 per appearance; and

h) the costs of the suit.

2. To the private complainant Nicasio Valdez:

b) the amount of P75,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.

In his appeal, Gonzalez submits the following assignments of error:

The appeal has merit.

Andres stated in court that when he noticed Gonzalez' infuriation he immediately

However, a meticulous review of the evidence prevents a conclusive finding of treachery

The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation,

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