US vs.

Valdez (41 Phil 497)

Facts: Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent out to raise anchor. The crew of this boat
consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez and six others among who was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel.
During their work, the accused began to abuse the men with offensive words. Gargantel complained saying
that it would be better if he would not insult them. The accused took this as a display of insubordination,
thus, he moves towards Gargantel, the latter, evidently believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw
himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more. The accused told the
remaining members of the crew to keep quiet or he would kill them. For this reason they made no movement
looking to rescue; but inasmuch as these witnesses are sure that Venancio did not again come to the surface,
efforts at rescue would have been fruitless. As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died
drowning, as a consequence of having thrown himself into the water and upon seeing himself threatened and
attacked by the accused.
It was full midday, and there is nothing that obstruct them to see if ever Gargantel will rise. he was borne
down into the water and was drowned.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Gargantel?
HELD: Yes. The deceased, in throwing himself into the river, acted solely in obedience to the instinct of self-
preservation, and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death. As to him, it was but the exercise of a
choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the same circumstance might have done the
same.
This case illustrates that proximate cause does not require that the offender needs to actually touch the body
of the offended party.
It is enough that the offender generated in the mind of the offended party an immediate sense of danger that
made him place his life at risk. In this case, the accused must, therefore, be considered the author of the
death of the victim.
"If a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to
try to escape, and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is
responsible for the injuries which result." (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.], 701.)

PAR. 1. “an accused is criminally liable for the acts committed by him violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom”
The essential requisites for the application of par. 1 article 4 are that:
a. the intended act is felonious;
b. the resulting act is likewise a felony;
c. the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.

Verdict:
The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio Gargantel, and he
was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance
the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9 Penal
Code.) In accordance with this finding the judge sentenced the accused to undergo imprisonment for twelve
years and one day, reclusion temporal, to suffer the corresponding accessories, to indemnify the family of the
deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs. Said sentenced is in accordance with law; and it being
understood that the accessories appropriate to the case are those specified in article 59 of the Penal Code, the
same is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
People vs. Almonte, 56 Phil. 54
The following are not efficient intervening causes: The nervousness or temperament of the victim, as when a
person dies in consequence of an internal hemorrhage brought on by moving about against the doctor's
orders, because of his nervous condition due to the wound inflicted by the accused. (People vs. Almonte, 56
Phil. 54; See also People vs. Quianson, 62 Phil. 162)
Pp. v. Toleng et. Al
(G.R. No. L-33535, January 17, 1975)

Facts:

The appellants Antonio and Jose Toling, identical twins and both farmers from Barrio Nenita,
Northern Samar were convicted of multiple murder and attempted murder. Antonio had known
through a letter that his daughter Leonora who was working in Manila would give him money.
Together with his twin brother Jose, Antonio went to Manila. The twins arrived in Manila on
January 8, 1965. In Manila, Antonio received a total of 80 pesos from his daughter and his
grandson, Sencio Rubis. The same day, the twins took the Bicol express train coach no. 9 on the
way home. After leaving the station in Cabuyao, Laguna, Antonio with a pair of scissors went into a
stabbing frenzy along with his brother who was wielding a knife. The incident amounted into a total
of 8 wounded and 12 dead, 4 of which died from jumping off the train allegedly to avoid being
killed.

Issue:
Whether or not the twins are liable for the death of the four victims who jumped off the train.

Held:

The Court modified the decision of the lower court. Homicide for the 4 other victims who
jumped off the train and died thereafter was dismissed by the Court. Proximal cause for their
deaths could not be established as there were no witnesses to support that the 4 victims jumped off
because of the stabbing frenzy of the appellants. The Court ruled that "if a man creates in another
man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so
doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries
which result.” However, since no proximal cause was established, the appellants could not be held
liable. As the presumption was “a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act” ,
Sec 5 (c) Rule 131, Rules of Court.

People vs Ortega (276 SCRA 166)

Facts: In 1992, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia and a certain John Doe were charged with murder for
the killing Andre Man Masangkay. As narrated by a witness, the victim answered the call of nature and went
to the back portion of the house where they were having a drinking spree. Accused Ortega followed him and
later they heard the victim shouting for help and when they ran towards the scene he saw the accused on top
of the victim and stabbing the latter with along bladed weapon. Thereafter, Ortega and Garcia brought the
victim to a well and dropped him and placed stones into the well. The trial court found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. The accused appealed averring that the trial court erred in holding them criminally
liable because at the time the victim was dropped into the well, he was still alive.

Criminal Law Case NO.24

Bradecina
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. and Manuel Garcia, accused-appellants
G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997
FACTS:
On October 15, 1992 at 5:30 in the afternoon, Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto
San Andres and Diosdado Quitlong were having a drinking spree in the compound near the house of
Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
On October 15, 1992 11:00 pm, the accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were already
drank joined them. At about 12:30 a.m of October 16, 1992 the victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered the
call of nature and went to the back portion of the house. Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him and suddenly,
they heard a shout from Andre “Don’t, help me!” (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!)
Diosdado and Ariel ran and saw Benjamin on top of Andre who was lying down being stabbed. Ariel got
Benjamin Ortega, Sr., Benjamin’s father while Diosdado called Romeo to pacify his brother. Romeo, Benjamin
and Manuel lifted Andre from the canal and dropped him in the well. They dropped stones to Andre’s body to
weigh the body down. Romeo warned Diosdado not to tell anybody what he saw. He agreed so he was
allowed to go home. But, his conscience bothered him so he told his mother, reported it to the police and
accompanied them to the crime scene.

Manuel Garcia alibi

He was asked to go home by his wife to fetch his mother-in-law who performed a ritual called “tawas” on his
sick daughter and stayed home after.
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. story
After Masangkay left, he left to urinate and he saw Andre peeking through the room of his sister Raquel.
Then, Andre approached him to ask where his sister was. When he answered he didn’t know, Andre punched
him so he bled and fell to the ground. Andre drew a knife and stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm,
thereby immobilizing him. Andre then gripped his neck with his left arm and threatened to kill him. Unable
to move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came, seized the knife and stabbed Andre 10 times with it. Andre
then ran towards the direction of the well. Then, he tended his wound in the lips and armpit and slept.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin and Manuel should be liable for murder.
HELD:
NO.
PARTLY GRANTED. Benjamin is guilty only of homicide.
Manuel deserves acquittal.
If Ortega’s version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the police
authorities. If Ortega’s version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the
police authorities. It is incredible that Diosdado would stab Andre 10 times successively, completely ignoring
Benjamin who was grappling with Masangkay and that Andre was choking him while being stabbed.
• Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take
advantage of such superiority – none shown
o Andre was a 6-footer, whereas Ortega, Jr. was only 5’4”
• Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by
“any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.”
o The essential requisites
1. The intended act is felonious – assisting Benjamin by carrying the body to the well
2. The resulting act is likewise a felony - concealing the body of the crime to prevent its
discovery
3. The unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts
(praeter intentionem) – still alive and was drowned to death
• a person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to kill
• Garcia is a brother-in-law of Benjamin
o Exempt by Article 20 of RPC
ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. -- The penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
• The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
which is imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as
in the case of Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be one degree lower, that is, prision mayor

Issue: Whether or not the accused may be held criminally liable for the death of the victim which is not
attributable to the stab wounds but due to drowning?
Decision: A person who commits a felony is criminally liable for the direct natural and logical consequences
of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more serious than that intended.
The essential requisites for this criminal liability to attach are as follows:
1. the intended act is felonious.
2. the resulting act is likewise a felony
3. the unintended graven wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.

Urbano vs. IAC (157 SCRA 10 [1988])

Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his rice field. He found the place where
he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to
see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he
was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo,
and again on the leg with the back of the bolo.
On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical
expenses of Javier.
On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor
found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the
following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal
by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain
who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion
was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death.
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom."
No. If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is
more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the
symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on
the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22
days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the
petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible,
if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause."
PEOPLE vs. VILLACORTA
G.R. No. 186412
September 7, 2011

FACTS:
While Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and stabbed Cruz on the left
side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body.
Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled.
RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. The Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death
which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
HELD:
The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection and not the stab wound.
In the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries
for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.
If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot
sooner than 22 days later. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote
cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The
infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz
was stabbed to the time of his death.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
 People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, 14 September 1987.
30MAY
Second Division
[SARMIENTO, J.]
FACTS: Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit relationship. The
illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar
examinations. The accused missed his itineraries that day so he decided to go home. Upon reaching home,
the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh
noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping
above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away. The accused went to look for a firearm at
Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC soldier, got an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house but he was
not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the “mahjong session” as it was the “hangout” of
Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle
hitting Koh, as well as Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where
Koh was playing mahjong. Kingsley Koh died instantaneously. Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and
operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet Arnold’s  wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital
as she was hit by bullet fragments.
The accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder as charged in the amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which
does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is sentenced to death.
On appeal by the accused, the Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code defining death inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder.
ISSUE: Is the trial court correct in finding Abarca guilty of the COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER with DOUBLE
FRUSTRATED MURDER?
HELD: NO.
Article 247 of the revised Penal Code:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person
who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any
of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
injury, shall suffer the penalty of  destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he
shall be exempt from punishment.
(Destierro means banishment or only a prohibition from residing within the radius of 25 kilometers from the
actual residence of the accused for a specified length of time. While it is technically not imprisonment, it still is a
penalty imposed under the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.)
The duration of destierro is the same as  prision correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day, to six
(6) years. 
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under
eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter or shall otherwise have consented
to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
3.      Holding
The Supreme Court modified the appealed decision of destierro to arresto mayor from the lower
court sentencing four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor indemnifying Amparado spouses
for expenses and damages.
4.      Reasoning
The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one
committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that the act done
amounts to a felony. The accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility performing an illegal act
when he fired shots at the victim but he cannot be entirely without fault. It appears that before firing at the
deceased, he uttered warning words which is not enough of a precaution to absolve him for the injuries
sustained by the Amparados. The acts of execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a
consequence, nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will; nonetheless, the
Court finds negligence on his part. He is liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365 that is
less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. For the separate injuries suffered by
the Amparado spouses impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor in its medium and maximum period
to being the graver penalty.

People vs. Ulep (GR No. L-36858, June 20, 1988)

People v. Ulep G.R. No. L-36858 June 20, 1988 Criminal Liability, Proximate Cause
AUGUST 27, 2020
FACTS:
On May 21, 1970, at nine o’clock in the evening, Asuncion Pablo Ulep died as a result of physical injuries
inflicted upon her by her husband, accused Macario Ulep. 
The following day, the Chief of Police received a report of the said death of Asuncion who allegedly died of a
heart attack. 
The Chief of Police suggested that an autopsy be conducted but the husband refused to allow the same.
However, the daughter of the deceased by a previous marriage demanded for an autopsy. 

During the investigation, the accused admitted that he caused the death of his wife by elbowing her because
his wife was then drunk and was uttering indecent words.
Ulep, however, retracted his statement in court by narrating that when his wife went to have their palay
milled, a bullcart loaded with sacks of rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on her breast .

The RTC convicted Ulep of the crime of parricide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of his wife.
RULING:
We have previously stated that:
Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or tuberculosis, if the blow
delivered by the accused —
(a) is the efficient cause of death; or
(b) accelerated his death; or
(c) is the proximate cause of death; 
then there is criminal liability. 
“He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.” This is the rationale in Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that “criminal liability shall be incurred by a person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.”
Again, We elucidated that: even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any external wound, it
may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and cause death, and even though the victim
may have been previously affected by some internal malady, yet if the blow with the fist or foot accelerated
death, he who caused such acceleration is responsible for the death as the result of an injury willfully and
unlawfully inflicted. 
We are, therefore, convinced that there is no fundamental disagreement between the two medical
witnesses as to the cause of the victim’s death and that cardiac arrest and primary shock took away
the life of the victim, Asuncion Pablo.
There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell the blame for these in human
acts on his wife. He should answer for her tragic death.
Alvarado vs. People (August 28, 2009)
Doctrine:  A person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from the one he intended.
FACTS: Amado Garcia and Fidel Foz Jr., had a drinking spree in the morning of September 1999 that lasted
the until the evening of that day. Because of the blaring noise of the videoke machine that the two were
enjoying, Manuel Chy, told the group to quiet down. Two days after, the met again on a wedding and again,
Chy told the two to stop singing. On the next day, the two, now with a friend, decided to have a drinking
session and later moved to Punta.
On their way to Punta, they saw Chy. The petitioner suddenly assaulted Chy and struck him on the lower
part of his head with a bottle. When Chy found a way to escape, he rushed to his home and phoned his wife
and told her to call the police. When they arrived, they found Chy unconcsious and later pronounced dead on
arrival at the hospital.

The petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The petitioner contended that he
should only be charged with slight physical injuries as his assault on Chy was not he cause of his death.
ISSUE: WON Garcia is liable for Manuel Chy’s death
RULING: YES. It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional strain from the
beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then surfaces
that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
The essential requisites for the application of this Article 4 of the RPC are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b)
the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the
actor’s wrongful acts. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter
petitioner’s liability for his death. a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from the one he intended.
Belbis vs. People (November 14, 2012)
G.R. No. 181052; 14 November 2012
PONENTE: Peralta
SUBJECT: Homicide
 
FACTS:
 
Version of the Prosecution:
Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. On the night
of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house to do his rounds. At around 10:00 p.m., Veronica Dacir, Jose’s live-
in partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her name and went to where Jose was and saw blood at his back
and shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy (petitioner Alberto Brucales), while
Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was brought to Albay Provincial Hospital where he was
confined for 6 days. Jose was brought back to the hospital on January 7, 1998 and it was found out that his
kidneys had inflamed due to infection. He died the next day.
Version of the Defense:
            Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in engaged in a
conversation with other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home. While on their way home,
they heard Jose’s whistle go off as the latter was following them. Rodolfo asked Jose what is the matter and
the latter replied, “What about?” Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on Rodolfo, but the latter was able to
evade it. The night stick was actually a bolo sheathed on a scabbard. Rodolfo and Jose grappled for the bolo
while Alberto was merely shouting at them to stop. Rodolfo eventually got hold of the bolo but he suffered a
wound in his hand so Alberto took him to the hospital.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt which would warrant his
acquittal.
 
HELD:
          No, petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that he had done the deed to defend
himself. It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape
criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing
evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.
The unlawful aggression, a requisite for self-defense, on the part of the victim ceased when petitioner Rodolfo
was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Rodolfo, who was in possession of the same weapon, already
became the unlawful aggressor. Furthermore, the means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be
commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally
necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. In the present case, four stab wounds to the back of the
victim are not necessary to prevent the alleged continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter
was already without a weapon.
Moreover, the fact that there is a lapse of time from the incident and the death of the victim is not controlling
since what really needs to be proven in a case when the victim dies is the proximate cause of his death. It can
be concluded from the doctors’ testimonies that without the stab wounds, the victim could not have been
afflicted with an infection which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his death. The offender is
criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death
of the victim. The petitioners are found guilty of homicide.

People vs. Bindoy (56 Phil. 15)

Facts: In a tuba wineshop in the barrio market, the accused offered tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to
drink having already done so, the accused threatened to injure her if she would not accept. There ensued an
interchange of words between her and the accused, and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to
take away from the accused the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention
of Emigdio Omamdam who lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening, while
the accused and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, the accused succeeded in
disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the
accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then
behind the accused. The accused was not aware of Omamdam's presence in the place.
Held: There is no evidence to show that the accused injured the deceased deliberately and with the intention
of committing a crime. He was only defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench
away from him, and his conduct was perfectly legal. The accused should be acquitted. Had the accused
attempted to wound Pacas during the struggle, but instead of doing so, he wounded Omamdam, he would
have been liable for the death of Omamdam, because in attempting to wound another, the accused would be
committing a felony, which is attempted homicide, if there is intent to kill, under Art. 249 in relation to Art. 6.
 Yadao vs. People (September 27, 2006)
People vs. Acuram (April 27, 2000)

Facts: The appellant shot the victim who later died. After charges were filed and his commanding officer was
told of the incident, he was ordered not to leave the camp, where he surrendered.
Issue: Whether the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender.
Held: The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and
submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to
save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. In this case, It was
appellant’s commanding officer who surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one’s
superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not
tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law.

A. Causes that produce a different result

People vs. Gona, 54 Phil 605)

People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil 967

b. There is a mistake in the blow — aberratio ictus.
Example: People vs. Mabugat, 51 Phil. 967, where the accused, having discharged his firearm at
Juana Buralo but because of lack of precision, hit and seriously wounded Perfecta Buralo, it was
held that the accused was liable for the injury caused to the latter.

Intent to kill is difficult to prove, it being a mental act. But it can be deduced from the external acts
performed by a person. When the acts naturally produce a definite result, courts are slow in
concluding that some other result was intended. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil. 691-693; People vs.
Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967, cited in People vs. Lao, 11 C.A. Rep. 829)
Facts: 
The accused and Juana Buralo was sweethearts. Juana had been jealous of the accused on account of the
latter having frequently visited the house of another girl. The accused invited Juana to take a walk on the
afternoon of August 9, 1925. Juana refused him, later sending him a note of excuse. On the third day, the
accused went to the threshold of Cirilo Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in some
devotion. There the accused, revolver in hand, requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come downstairs
and as Abellon refused to do so, the accused said: "If you do not want to go upstairs, I will get Juana and if
anyone tries to defend her I will kill him."
The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came downstairs, when they went in the
direction of their house. The accused, who was seen by the two, followed them without saying a word. The
houses being adjacent. As the two girls were going upstairs, the accused, while standing at the foot of the
stairway, fired a shot from his revolver which wounded Perfecta Buralo, the bullet passing through a part of
her neck, and coming out through the left eye, which was completely destroyed. Due to proper medical
attention, Perfecta Buralo did not die and is one of the witnesses who testified at the trial of this case.
The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not responsible for the crime, contends
that the crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a firearm, with injuries, it not having been
proven that it was the accused's intention to kill.
Issue: 
Whether or not the accused is guilty with frustrated murder?
Held: 
Yes.
Ratio:  
Intent to kill is difficult to prove, it being a mental act. But it can be deduced from the external acts
performed by a person. When the acts naturally produce a definite result, courts are slow in
concluding that some other result was intended. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil. 691-693; People vs.
Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967, cited in People vs. Lao, 11 C.A. Rep. 829)
The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his disappointment at her not accepting his
invitation to take a walk, the fact that the accused, revolver in hand, went to look for Juana Buralo at the
house where the devotion was being held, later following her to her house, and especially having aimed at her
person--the head--are facts which, permit of no other conclusion than that, in firing the shot, it was the
accused's intention to kill.
In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. Montenegro (15 Phil., 1), it was held:
We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself
sufficient to sustain a finding of the intention to kill, and there are many cases in the books wherein the
attendant circumstances conclusively establish that on discharging a firearm at another the actor was not in
fact animated by the intent to kill. But, in seeking to ascertain the intention with which a specific act is
committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant
circumstances so far as they are developed by the evidence; and where, as in the case at bar, a revolver is
twice discharged point-blank at the body of another, and the shots directed at the most vital parts of the
body, it needs but little additional evidence to establish the intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another, does not alter his criminal liability.
(Art. 1, par. 3, Penal Code.)
the fact is that treachery was proven and must be taken into consideration in this case, because the accused
fired at Perfecta Buralo, employing means which tended to insure the execution of the crime without running
any risk himself from anyone who might attempt to defend the said offended party. The treachery which,
according to the evidence, would have attended the crime had the bullet hit Juana Buralo was present in this
case because the offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going upstairs with their backs towards the
accused when he fired his revolver.
The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused having intended to kill and performed all the acts
of execution, which would have produced the crime of murder but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will. (Art. 3, Penal Code.)
People vs. Cagoco (58 Phil 524)
c. The injurious result is greater than that intended — praeter intentionem.
Example: People vs. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, where the accused, without intent to kill, struck the victim
with his fist on the back part of the head from behind, causing the victim to fall down with his head
hitting the asphalt pavement and resulting in the fracture of his head, it was held that the accused
was liable for the death of the victim, although he had no intent to kill said victim.
Facts:
on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk
While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee was
about to take leave of his father, the man that had been passing back and forth behind Yu Lon approached
him from behind and suddenly and... without warning struck him with his fist on the back part of the head.
Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part of his body fell on
the sidewalk. His assailant immediately ran away.
The wounded man was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, where he died... about midnight.
Issues:
it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all, should be punished in accordance with article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, or for slight physical injuries instead of murder.
Ruling:
Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended;
but in order that a person may be criminally... liable for a felony different from that which he proposed to
commit, it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a felony was
committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the... crime
committed by the offender.
where death results as the direct consequence of the use of... illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased
or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of
criminal responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the law in these Islands, from criminal liability for the...
natural consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to produce such
consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of intention, while it does not exempt from criminal liability, is
taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance
There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon. There is nothing to indicate that it
was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct consequence of defendants felonious... act, and the
fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from the consequence
of his unlawful act, but is merely a mitigating circumstance... under the circumstances of this case the
defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death was the direct consequence of defendant's
felonious act of striking him on the head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a treacherous...
manner, he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although he did not intend to kill the deceased;
and since the defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Principles:
where death results as the direct consequence of the use of... illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased
or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of
criminal responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the law in these Islands, from criminal liability for the...
natural consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences
People vs. Bindoy (56 Phil 15)
People vs. Bindoy, supra, the accused were not held criminally liable, because they were not
committing a felony when they caused the injury to another. 68 CRIMINAL LIABILITY Wrongful Act
Different From That Intended Art. 4 No felony is committed (1) when the act or omission is not
punishable by the Revised Penal Code, or (2) when the act is covered by any of the justifying
circumstances enumerated in Art. 11.
FACTS: Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Occidental Misamis, for appelant was stenced to 12 years and
1 day of reclusion temporal  and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased with the amount of P1,000. The crime
charged against the accused is homicide. 
In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop. Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to
Faustino Paca's wife Tibay. She refused because she already have one, but Bindoy threatened to injure her if
she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he
carried. Emigdio Omamdam who came to the wine shop to see what;s happening, instead got stabbed in the
chest by Bindoy. This happened when Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the
bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused  and with such violence that the point of the
bolo reached Omamdam's chest who was then behind Bindoy.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable?

HELD: Corroborated by Gaudencio Cenas of the testimony of the accused, Pacas and Bindoy were actually for
the possession of the bolo. When Pacas let go of the bolo, Bindoy had pulled so violently that it flew towards
his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up and who was therefore hit in the chest
without Bindoy seeing him. Bindoy alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent
because he was only defending his possession of the bolo which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him
and his conduct was perfectly lawful. The Court therefore acquitted Bindoy based on the facts stated.
"In many criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission
of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the
mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act."

 Define: Impossible Crime

 What are the requisites of an impossible crime?
Cases:
De Joya vs. Jail Warden (December 10, 2003)
Facts: Petitioner Norma De Joya was charged separately with violations of BP 22. When arraigned in both
cases, petitioner pleaded not guilty. While trial was going on, petitioner jumped bail.  No evidence was thereby
adduced in her defense in any of the two cases. The Court found her guilty. Petitioner remained at large and
no appeal was filed from any of the said decisions.
After five years, petitioner was finally arrested while she was applying for an NBI clearance. She was
forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail. Subsequently, she filed an urgent motion with the MTC of
Batangas City asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code and to order her release from detention.
In an Order dated August 15, 2003, the trial court denied the motion on three grounds:
(a) its decision convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long become final and executory;
hence, could no longer be amended to change the penalty imposed therein;
(b) the SC Circular should be applied prospectively; and
(c) the SC Circular did not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but merely encourages trial court judges to
have a uniform imposition of fine. Petitioner thus filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Supreme
Court praying for her release from the Batangas City Jail on the claim that her detention was illegal.
Issue: Is petitioner entitled to a writ habeas corpus?

Held:  No. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is
not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record:
Sec. 4.  When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment;
or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.  Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense
in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final judgment of the MTC of Batangas
City, convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then, the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus.
Petitioners reliance of our ruling in Ordonez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the
reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is misplaced.  Thus, her plea that as
provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC
Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis.

First.  SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases
already terminated by final judgment.
Second.  As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-
2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.  It
does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law.  SC Admin. Circular No. 12-
2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances
of the accused whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence and
such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be
imposed.

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P.
Blg. 22. The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of
B.P. Blg. 22.  Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
Intod et.al. vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992)
Impossible crime
Subject: Criminal Law 1- Impossible Crime (Legal vs. Factual Impossibility)
Ponente: Justice Jose C. Campos Jr.
Doctrine:  Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
FACTS: Some time in February of 1979, the petitioner, together with three other armed men, went to
Salvador Mandaya’s house and fired gunshots at his bedroom. Unknown to them, Mandaya was not in his
bedroom, and the house was occupied by his son-in-law and his family.
RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner raised the case to CA but the same affirmed the decision.
Petitioner now contends that he is only responsible for an impossible crime under par. 2, art. 4 of RPC.
ISSUE: WON is guilty of impossible crime only.
RULING: YES. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
(1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
(2) there is intention to perform the physical act;
(3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
(4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. This case belongs to this category.
Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was
not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime
and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be
carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality
the crime was impossible of commission.
Petition GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby
MODIFIED. Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
People vs. Balmores (February 16, 1950)
(attempted estafa) serious crime of falsification of a government obligation not an impossible crime
Facts:
It is alleged that Balmores tore off the bottom (cross wise) of a genuine 1/8 unit Phil Charity Sweepstakes
Ticket. This way, the real number on such ticket was removed and that by substituting and using an ink
Balmores allegedly wrote 07400 instead which is actually the winning number. (the removal of the bottom
portion and writing in ink the number was pleaded guilty to by Balmores) Balmores presented the ticket as
genuine to the PCSO so he could claim the money.
However, he was not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of estafa
through falsification of a security because Bayani Miler, the employee to whom the ticket was presented,
immediately discovered the falsification, and caused Balmores’ apprehension. (in short, no exchange of
money and ticket took place)
Issue: (real issue is whether there was estafa)
As to the impossible crime part: since the falsification of the ticket was so obvious, is the consummation
of the crime actually impossible?

 No. Estafa was not committed here by Balmores because he was not able to draw money from his
falsified lottery ticket.
 No. This is not an example of an impossible crime. Since the falsification of the lottery ticket was so
obvious, the recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the crime impossible within
the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code.
 Examples of an impossible crime, which formerly was not punishable but is now under article 59 of
the Revised Penal Code, are the following:
(1) When one tries to kill another by putting in his soup a substance which he believes to be arsenic
when in fact it is common salt; and
(2) when one tries to murder a corpse. (Guevara, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th ed.,
page 15; decision, Supreme Court of Spain, November 26, 1879; 12 Jur. Crim., 343.)

 The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing sweepstakes ticket could cause no harm to anyone and
would not constitute a crime were it not for the attempt to cash the ticket so altered as a prize-winning
number. So in the ultimate analysis appellant's real offense was the attempt to commit estafa
(punishable with eleven days of arresto menor); but technically and legally he has to suffer for the
serious crime of falsification of a government obligation.

The penalty imposed by article 166 for the forging or falsification of "treasury or bank notes or
certificates or other obligations and securities" is reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine
not to exceed P10,000, if the document which has been falsified, counterfeited, or altered is an
obligation or security of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. This being a complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of an obligation or security of the Philippines, the penalty should
be imposed in its maximum period in accordance with article 48. Taking into consideration the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum cannot be lower than prision mayor in its maximum period, which is 10 years and 1 day to
12 years.
People vs. Domasian ( March 1, 1993)
Kidnapping not impossible crime
FACTS: Ponente: Justice Cruz, 1993 Petitioner:
Pablito Domasian – the kidnapper
Dr. Samson Tan – he was a resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico’s father.

Respondent:  People of the Philippines, Solicitor-General Victim:  Enrico Paulo Agra Witnesses:  Enrico
Agra  Tirso Ferreras – Enrico’s Classmate  Alexander Grate – Tricycle Driver where Agra and Domasian
rode, he speculated that the latter was a kidnapper and reported the incident to the tanods.

Events:  Enrico was walking with a classmate when a man, Domasian, approached him and asked for his
assistance in getting his father’s signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed and rode with him in a
tricycle.  Enrico became apprehensive when instead of going to the hospital; he was forced by petitioner
inside a mini-bus, holding him firmly all the while.  They rode another tricycle and alighted from where they
walked in a market.  Domasian talked to a jeepney driver and handed a letter address to Dr. Enrique Agra,
the boy’s father.  They then boarded the tricycle of Grate, which aroused his the latter’s suspicion and
reported the incident to the barangay tanods, together with Grate, they went after Domasian and Enrico. They
were able to recover Enrico, Domasian escaped.  Afternoon of that day, a ransom note arrived to Dr. Agra,
asking for 1 million pesos in exchange of his son, Enrico, who was able to return home earlier that day, after
having been recovered from Domasian.  Dr. Agra identified the handwriting in the letter as Dr. Tan’s, and
this was confirmed by an investigation made by the NBI.

Filling of the Case:  Regional Trial Court convicted Domasian and Tan of Kidnapping
ISSUES:

 Convictions of Reclusion Perpetua are subject to review by the Supreme Court.

 Domasian petitions that he was forced to confess the crime in violation of his constitutional rights.

 Tan petitions that his act of crime, if indeed proven, only constituted an impossible crime.

 W/N the act committed by Dr. Tan constitutes an Impossible Crime.

RULING:  The decision of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed.

Crime against liberty.

 Article 4 Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code States: Criminal Liability shall be incurred:
b. By a person committing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment, or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.

 On the matter of Conspiracy: the acts done by Domasian and Tan were complementary to each other.
Kidnapping of Enrico by Domasian, and Ransom note of Tan, with one end goal in mind, which is, the ransom
of 1 million pesos from Dr. Agra.

 Court held that even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention had already been committed.

 The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had
already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty.
2. The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals, being directed only against the
government and its law-enforcement agencies and limitation on official action.

People vs. Enoja (December 17, 1999)

Murder not impossible crime
G.R. No. 102596 December 17, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICASIO ENOJA @ "Nick", JOSE ENOJA @ "Moros", ANTONIO GALUPAR @ "Tony", RONNIE ENOJA @ "Bud-
oy", and YOLLY ARMADA, accused-appellants.
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses NICASIO ENOJA alias "Nick", JOSE ENOJA alias "Moros",
ANTONIO GALUPAR alias "Tony", RONNIE ENOJA alias "Bud-oy" and YOLLY ARMADA of the crime of Murder
committed as follows:
The victim, Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected commander of the "New People's Army" (NPA) which allegedly
sprayed bullets on the house of Romulo Enojas that killed his daughter and son and burned the house of
Enola brothers' mother.
Paterna, the wife of Insular noticed on the other side of the rice field men carrying firearm and told his
husband about it but he just responded " Nevermind, he is Yolly Armada."
When they met halfway, Armada blocked the couple and pointed his firearm to Siegfred with the barrel of the
gun touching the left side of the body of the latter. Suddenly, Armada fired his gun and as Siegfred turned his
back to run, Armada fired successive shots at him causing him to fall to the ground, wounded.
Almost simultaneously, several armed men appeared and took turns in firing at Siegfred. Among these armed
men were Nicasio Enoja alias "Nick" Jose Enoja alias "Moros", Antonio Galupar alias "Tony," and Ronnie
Enoja alias "Bud-oy". The body of the victim jerked as the accused took turns in shooting him.
Jose Enoja then turned to his brother Antonio Enoja and fired at the latter hitting him on the thigh.
Thereafter, Jose Enoja approached Siegfred Insular who was then lying on the ground and placed the gun he
used in shooting his brother, Antonio, near the hand of Siegfred Insular. Then Jose Enoja placed some live
bullets into the pocket of Siegfred Insular. Jose Enoja called for hammock and, in no time at all, there was a
hammock brought to the place where Antonio Enoja was loaded and, thereafter, brought to the hospital. The
body of Siegfred Insular was, however, left lying on the ground at the scene of the incident.
Nicasio Enoja announced that they would bring Paterna Insular and Teodoro Salamanca to the ricefield where
they would be made to spend the night but Paterna pleaded to Nicasio Enoja to just bring them to the house
of Patria Alcantara about five meters away from the scene of the incident.
The accused granted the request of Paterna and brought her and Teodoro Salamanca to the house of Patria
Alcantara where they were told to stay with the warning not to get out or they would be shot. It was only the
following morning, after policemen and PC soldiers had arrived that Paterna and Salamanca were able to go
out of the house of Alcantara.
The shooting incident reached the police station of Janiuay, Iloilo upon the report of one Alfredo Galupar, and
so, a joint PC-INP team under P.C. Lt. Pangina and police station commander, Sgt. Reynaldo Soroñgon went
to Barangay Caraudan and conducted investigation of the incident. That was already around 8:00 o'clock in
the morning of July 3, 1987. The policemen were able to recovery several empty shells on different caliber of
firearms from the crime scene. One short homemade firearm caliber .30, with one empty shell inside the
chamber was likewise found and recovered from the ground near the left arm of the victim.

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING CONSPIRACY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY;

III. ASSUMING THEM GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED, EXCEPT FOR APPELLANT YOLLY
ARMADA, IN NOT FINDING THAT THE OFFENSE COMMITTED WAS ONLY AN IMPOSSIBLE
CRIME.
Appellant Yolly Armada escaped from the New Bilibid Prison on September 25, 1996.[19] As a result, his
appeal was dismissed and the judgment against him became final and executory. Entry of judgment was
made on January 9, 1997.[20] In the meantime, appellant Jose Enoja jumped bail, which also resulted in
the dismissal of his appeal. Judgment against him became final and executory, and entry of judgment
was made on March 21, 1997. An appellant who escapes or refuses to surrender to the proper
authorities is deemed to have abandoned his appeal, hence, the judgment against him becomes a final
and executory. Nonetheless, the appeal proceeds as to the remaining appellants, Nicasio Enoja and Ronnie
Enoja, who are now detained at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. Our present review, therefore,
concerns only these two appellants.
Appellants further insist that the trial court erred in finding that treachery accompanied the killing,
considering that the victim was already forewarned of the impending danger when he saw appellant Armada
carrying a firearm. Appellants contend that for treachery to exist, the offended party is completely denied of
the opportunity to defend himself, but it is not so in this case.
As an alternative defense, appellants present the theory that even assuming they participated in the
killing of Siegfred, they should only be held liable for the commission of an impossible crime under
Article 4, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, penalized under Article 59 thereof.[31] Appellants
theorize that the shots fired by Armada already resulted in the death of the victim, and hence, their
subsequent shooting of the victim merely constitutes the impossible crime of killing an already dead
person. The proposition not only completely contradicts their defense of alibi and denial, it is also
speculative as to cause of death. The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with alibi.
Appellants Nicasio and Ronnie Enoja claim that they were elsewhere during the offense. For alibi to prosper as
a defense, the accused must show that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at
the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission[32] and that his presence elsewhere
renders it impossible for him to be the guilty party.[33] In this case, Nicasio admitted he was within the vicinity
of the crime but presented the lame excuse that he was inside Salamanca's rice mill at the time of the shooting.
His son, Arnold, corroborated this testimony. But it was put in doubt by the testimony of Salamanca, who
stated that no milling of palay in his ricemill was going on at the time of the shooting. Alibi, especially when it is
corroborated mainly by relatives and friends of the accused, is held by this Court with extreme suspicion for
alibi is easy to fabricate and concoct.
Both Paterna and Salamanca positively identified Nicasio Enoja as one of those who took part in the shooting
incident. Paterna categorically pointed to Ronnie Enoja as the person who shot her husband in the right eye.[35]
Appellants could not attribute any motive against these witnesses to falsely testify against them. In the light of
positive identification by witnesses who have no motive to falsely testify, the feeble defense of alibi cannot
prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.
With respect to appellant Ronnie Enoja, who was born on February 21, 1970, and was below 18 at the time of
the commission of the crime, the trial court correctly appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. Thus, the penalty next lower in degree was imposed on him in its proper period pursuant to Article
68, second paragraph of the Revised Penal Code, which is prison mayor maximum to reclusion temporal
medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed upon appellant
Ronnie Enoja shall be taken from the medium period of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion temporal
minimum or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
medium or four (4) years and two (2) months to ten (10) years. Consequently, the trial court correctly imposed
upon Ronnie Enoja the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 31550,
convicting accused-appellants Nicasio Enoja @ "Nick" and Ronnie Enoja @ "Bud-oy" of the crime of Murder
is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity. The award of P19,200.00 as actual
damages is deleted. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.

Jacinto vs. People (July 13, 2009)

Impossible crime
FACTS:
Petitioner, together with two other women, was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed
as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH
DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust
and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own
account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00, representing
payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int’l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed petitioner’s conviction and her subsequent MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.
RULING:
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same
was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether
the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was
the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People that
under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, there is only one operative act of
execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another.
There can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega
Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed
replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified
theft.

Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving the cash replacement should
not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the
marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Gemma Jacinto was an employee of Megafoam International, received a check amounting to Pho
10, 000 as payment of Baby Aquino to her purchase to Megafoam. However, instead of delivering it to
Megafoam, she deposited it to her bank account. The check was later discovered to be unfunded. Both RTC
and CA ruled that the petitioner was guilty of qualified theft. Petitioner filed a petition for review of certiorari
to SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correctly convicted for the crime of Qualified Theft.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft only. The requisites of an impossible crime
are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with
evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual. Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the
check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that
the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it
was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at
the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out
to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the
cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.

People vs. Callao (March 14, 2018)

Murder not impossible crime
Facts:
While in the market, Hesson and Junello discussed a plan to kill the victim, Fernando Adlawan (Fernando) as
ordered by one Enrile Yosores (Enrile). Sario was not part of the planning and did not know why Enrile
wanted to have Fernando killed.[
At 8:00 in the evening of the same day, Hesson, Junello, Remmy and Sario left the flea market and
When the group reached Fernando's house, Junello, upon seeing Fernando, approached the latter and asked
for a cigarette lighter. After Fernando gave Junello the lighter, the latter struck Fernando on the nape with a
piece of rod. Junello then took a bolo and hacked Fernando's body on the side. Fernando lost
consciousness[13] and as he laid motionless on the ground, Hesson stabbed him twice in the chest using a
knife.[14] Hesson then sliced open Fernando's chest and took out the latter's heart using the same
knife.[15] Junello followed and took out Fernando's liver using a bolo.[16]
Hesson and Junello then fed Fernando's organs to a nearby pig after which they cut Fernando's neck and
sliced his body into pieces.[17] Thereafter, the two (2) accused left the crime scene, followed by Sario and
Remmy.[18]Sario was on the opposite side watching the incident. He and Remmy did not attempt to stop the
two (2) accused or run away for fear that the latter would kill them.[19] Sario went home from the crime
scene[20] and did not tell anyone about the incident because Hesson and Junello threatened to kill him if he
did so.[21]
Hesson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treacher
CA affirmed
The Court agrees with the CA and the People: the victim's fact of death before he was stabbed by Hesson was
not sufficiently established by the defense.
Issues:
The trial court gravely erred in making a finding of conspiracy to commit murder without proving the
elements thereof beyond reasonable doubt
The trial court inadvertently erred in failing to rule that the crime committed was not murder but an
impossible crime.
Ruling:
Hesson is liable for Murder, not for an impossible crime.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently
impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.[67]The third element, inherent
impossibility of accomplishing the crime, was explained more clearly by the Court in the case of Intod v. Court
of Appeals[68] in this wise:Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense
against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
Hesson is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the killing of Fernando. Treachery was proven by the
prosecution and the same qualifies the killing to Murder under Article 248[78] of the RPC, the elements of
which are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him; (3) that the killing was attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Principles:
Impossible crime is defined and penalized under paragraph 2, Article 4 in relation to Article 59, both of the
RPC to wit:ART. 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:x x x x2. By any person performing
an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means.x x x x
Court Ruling:
Sixth, Hesson's defense of denial cannot prevail over Sario's positive identification of Hesson as one of the
assailants. To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. Otherwise, it is
purely self-serving and without merit. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused
by the prosecution witness than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the
crime.65 In the instant case, Hesson failed to adduce evidence to support his denial and overcome the
testimony of the prosecution witness. Denial, unsubstantiated by any credible evidence, deserves no weight in
law.66
In sum, the prosecution more than sufficiently established the participation of Hesson in the crime charged.
Hesson is liable for Murder, not for an impossible crime.
Without admitting his guilt, Hesson argues that he should only be convicted of committing an
impossible crime. Allegedly, he cannot be held liable for Murder because it was legally impossible for
him to kill Fernando as the latter was already dead when Hesson stabbed him.
The Court is not convinced.
Impossible crime is defined and penalized under paragraph 2, Article 4 in relation to Article 59, both of the
RPC to wit:
ART. 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual
means.
xxxx
ART. 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the
aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the
acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the
act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such
person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social
danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto
mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos. (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently
impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.67
The third element, inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime, was explained more clearly by the Court
in the case of Intod v. Court of Appeals68 in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility,
or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible
crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. xxx
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. xxx6