SEPARATION OF POWERS
ANGARA VS. THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION G.R. NO. 45081.
JULY 15, 1936
LAUREL, J: FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Angara and
respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were
candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for
the first district of the Province of
Tayabas in the September 17, 1395
election. Petitioner was proclaimed to
be a member-elect of the National
Assembly by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers. Thereafter, petitioner
took his oath.
The National Assembly passed a
Resolution, confirming proclamation
of Angara. Ynsua filed before the
respondent Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the
election of petitioner, and praying
that said respondent be declared
elected member, or that the election of
said position be nullified.
The respondent denied petitioner's
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
Petitioner argues that: the
Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral
Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the
National Assembly, and that the
Constitution excludes from said
jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of said election contests,
which power has been reserved to the
Legislative Department of the
Government or the National
Assembly.
The Solicitor-General appeared and
filed an answer in behalf of the
respondent, interposing the special
defense that the Commission has been
created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the
jurisdiction to decide "all contests
relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly"; that in adopting
its resolution of December 9, 1935,
fixing this date as the last day for the
presentation of protests against the
election of any member of the
National Assembly, it acted within its
jurisdiction and in the legitimate
exercise of the implied powers
granted it by the Constitution to adopt
the rules and regulations essential to
carry out the powers and functions
conferred upon the same by the
fundamental law; that in adopting its
resolution of January 23, 1936,
overruling the motion of the
petitioner to dismiss the election
protest in question, and
declaring itself with jurisdiction to
take cognizance of said protest, it
acted in the legitimate exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions as an
instrumentality of the Legislative
Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is
beyond the judicial cognizance or
control of the Supreme Court, among
others.
Petitioner prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary writ of injunction against
the Commission, which petition was
denied "without passing upon the
merits of the case."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Electoral
Commission acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming
to take cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the herein
petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National
Assembly.
HELD:
The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments
of the government.
The issue hinges on the interpretation
of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The nature of the
present controversy shows the
necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies
created by the Constitution. If the
conflict were left undecided and
undetermined, a void would be
created in our constitutional system,
which may in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework.
Upon principle, reason and authority,
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National
Assembly."
The transfer of the power of
determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the
Legislature long lodged in the
legislative body, to an independent,
impartial and non-partisan tribunal,
is by no means a mere experiment in
the science of government. The
members of the Constitutional
Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their
majority men mature in years and
experience. The creation of the
Electoral Commission was designed
to remedy certain evils of which the
framers of our Constitution were
cognizant. From the deliberations of
our Constitutional Convention it is
evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the
Legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to
an independent and impartial
tribunal. It was not so much the
knowledge and appreciation of
contemporary constitutional
precedents, however, as the long- felt
need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the
people acting through their delegates
to the Convention to provide for this
body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a
composite body in which both the
majority and
minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan
influence in its deliberations was
created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the
Supreme Court.
The grant of power to the Electoral
Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the
Legislature. The express lodging of
that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of
the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. If the power
claimed for the National Assembly to
regulate the proceedings of the
Electoral Commission and cut off the
power of the Electoral Commission to
lay down a period within which
protest should be filed were conceded,
the grant of power to the commission
would be ineffective.
The Electoral Commission in such a
case would be invested with the power
to determine contested cases
involving the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly but subject at all
times to the regulative power of the
National Assembly. Not only would
the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring
this authority from the legislative
body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the
resultant inevitable clash of powers
from time to time. A sad spectacle
would then be presented of the
Electoral Commission retaining the
bare authority of taking cognizance of
cases referred to, but in reality
without the necessary means to
render that authority effective
whenever and wherever the National
Assembly has chosen to act, a
situation worse than that intended to
be remedied by the framers of our
Constitution. The power to regulate
on the part of the National Assembly
in procedural matters will inevitably
lead to the ultimate control by the
Assembly of the entire proceedings of
the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of
the constitutional grant. It is obvious
that this result should not be
permitted.
DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY
POWERS ARANETA V.
DINGLASAN
(G.R. NO. L-2044 AUGUST 26,
1949)
TUASON, J.: FACTS:
The petitions challenge the validity of
executive orders of the President
avowedly issued in virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved
in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is
Executive Order No. 62, which
regulates rentals for houses and lots
for residential buildings. Concerned
in case L-3055 is Executive Order No.
192, which aims to control exports
from the Philippines. On the other
hand, case No. L-3054 relates to
Executive Order No. 225, which
appropriates funds for the operation
of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines during the period
from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950,
and for other purposes. Affected in
case No. L-3056 is Executive Order
No. 226, which appropriates
P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in
connection with, and incidental to,
the hold lug of the national elections
to be held in November, 1949.
Petitioners rest their case chiefly on
the proposition that the Emergency
Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No.
671) has ceased to have any force and
effect.
ISSUE: Whether or the Emergency
Powers Act has ceased to have any
force and effect.
HELD:
Yes. Section 26 of Article VI of the
1935 Constitution provides: ―In time
of war or other national emergency,
the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared
national policyǁ.
Article VI of the Constitution provides
that any law passed by virtue thereof
should be "for a limited period."
"Limited" has been defined to mean
"restricted; bounded; prescribed;
confined within positive bounds;
restrictive in duration, extent or
scope." The words "limited period" as
used in the Constitution are beyond
question intended to mean restrictive
in duration. Emergency, in order to
justify the delegation of emergency
powers, "must be temporary or it can
not be said to be an emergency."
It is to be presumed that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
approved with this limitation in view.
The opposite theory would make the
law repugnant to the Constitution,
and is contrary to the principle that
the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the constitutional scope
of its powers. The assertion that new
legislation is needed to repeal the act
would not be in harmony with the
Constitution either. If a new and
different law were necessary to
terminate the delegation, the period
for the delegation, it has been
correctly pointed out, would be
unlimited, indefinite, negative and
uncertain. Furthermore, this would
create the anomaly that, while
Congress might delegate its powers by
simple majority, it might not be able
to recall them except by a two-third
vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its
powers than to take them back.
Section 4 of the Act goes far to settle
the legislative intention of this phase
of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates
that "the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder shall be in
full force and effect until the Congress
of the Philippines shall otherwise
provide." The silence of the law
regarding the repeal of the authority
itself, in the face of the express
provision for the repeal of the rules
and regulations issued in
pursuance of it, a clear manifestation
of the belief held by the National
Assembly that there was no necessity
to provide for the former. It would be
strange if having no idea about the
time the Emergency Powers Act was
to be effective the National Assemble
failed to make a provision for this
termination in the same way that it
did for the termination of the effects
and incidents of the delegation. There
would be no point in repealing or
annulling the rules and regulations
promulgated under a law if the law
itself was to remain in force, since, in
that case, the President could not only
make new rules and regulations but
he could restore the ones already
annulled by the legislature.
It is our considered opinion, and we so
hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671
became inoperative when Congress
met in regular session on May 25,
1946, and that Executive Orders Nos.
62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued
without authority of law. In setting
the session of Congress instead of the
first special session preceded it as the
point of expiration of the Act, we think
giving effect to the purpose and
intention of the National Assembly. In
a special session, the Congress may
"consider general legislation or only
such as he (President) may
designate." (Section 9, Article VI of
the Constitution.) In a regular session,
the power Congress to legislate is not
circumscribed except by the
limitations imposed by the organic
law.
Upon the foregoing considerations,
the petitions will be granted.
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER EASTERN SHIPPING
LINES V. POEA (G.R. NO. 76633
OCTOBER 18, 1988)
CRUZ, J.: FACTS:
The private respondent in this case
was awarded the sum of P192,000.00
by the POEA for the death of her
husband. The decision is challenged
by the petitioner on the principal
ground that the POEA had no
jurisdiction over the case as the
husband was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the
M/V Eastern Polaris when he was
killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan
on March 15, 1985. His widow sued
for damages under Executive Order
No. 797 and Memorandum Circular
No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as
owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the
POEA but by the Social Security
System and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund. The
POEA nevertheless assumed
jurisdiction and after considering the
position papers of the parties ruled in
favor of the complainant. The award
consisted of P180,000.00 as death
benefits and P12,000.00 for burial
expenses.
The petitioner does not contend that
Saco was not its employee or that the
claim of his widow is not
compensable. What it does urge is
that he was not an overseas worker
but a 'domestic employee and
consequently his widow's claim
should have been filed with Social
Security System, subject to appeal to
the Employees Compensation
Commission. Furthermore, the
petitioner questions the validity of
Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as
violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been
given the POEA to promulgate the
said regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle,
is not subject to delegation.
ISSUE: Whether or not
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is
violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power.
HELD:
No. The authority to issue the said
regulation is clearly provided in
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.
797, reading as follows: ―... The
governing Board of the
Administration (POEA), as hereunder
provided shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to
govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA). ―
Legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot
be delegated. What can be delegated is
the discretion to determine how the
law may be enforced, not what the law
shall be. The ascertainment of the
latter subject is a prerogative of the
legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.
There are two accepted tests to
determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power,
viz , the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when
it reaches the delegate the only thing
he will have to do is enforce it. Under
the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority
and prevent the delegation from
running riot. Both tests are intended
to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of
powers is applicable to all the three
major powers of the Government but
is especially important in the case of
the legislative power because of the
many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare
when executive or judicial powers
have to be delegated by the authorities
to which they legally certain. In the
case of the legislative power, however,
such occasions have become more and
more frequent, if not necessary. This
had led to the observation that the
delegation of legislative power has
become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing
complexity of the task of government
and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the
problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to
say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected
from its delegates, who are supposed
to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the
delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities
and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has
found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out
the general provisions of the statute.
This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation." With this
power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by "filling in' the
details which the Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence
to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as
the implementing rules issued by the
Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect
of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one
such administrative regulation. The
model contract prescribed thereby
has been applied in a significant
number of the cases without challenge
by the employer. The power of the
POEA (and before it the National
Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as
there is a sufficient standard guiding
the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order
itself which, in creating the Philippine
Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to
protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED, with costs against the
petitioner.
BELGICA V OCHOA
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions
taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned
by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-
blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had
swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal
complaints were filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and
three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the
lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other
officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of
the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at
least P900 Million from royalties in
the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended
for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO. Several
petitions were lodged before the Court
similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a
Petition for Prohibition seeking that
the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al
filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari
and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction seeking that
the annual "Pork Barrel System,"
presently embodied in the provisions
of the GAA of 2013 which provided for
the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s
lump-sum, discretionary funds, such
as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for
being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the
Court issue a TRO against
respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed
seeking that the PDAF be declared
unconstitutional, and a cease and
desist order be issued restraining
President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino
III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF
Article and all other Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that
they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-
delegability of legislative power; (c)
checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties;
and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under
Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the
Malampaya Funds, and under Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, relating to the Presidential
Social Fund, are unconstitutional
insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is
unconstitutional. The post-enactment
measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release
and fund realignment are not related
to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators
to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. This violates the
principle of separation of
powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must
be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws. Any action or
step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by
the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf
article as well as all other provisions of
law which similarly allow legislators
to wield any form of post-enactment
authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated
to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers
principle and thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase
“and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the
President”ǁ constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the
limits of the President‘s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. It
gives the President wide latitude to
use the Malampaya Funds for any
other purpose he may direct and, in
effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects”
was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE
ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE
AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT
TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL
SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR
RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH
ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines” was
declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES
THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE
AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME
FUND FOR ANY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE
MAY SO DETERMINE AS A
―PRIORITYǁ. VERILY, THE LAW
DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION
OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE
Petitioner: Regina Ongsiako Reyes
Respondents: Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and Joseph
Socorro B. Tan
Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque. Respondent, a banc issued a Certificate of Finality
registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque,
filed before the COMELEC a petition
for the cancellation of petitioner’s
COC. On October 31, 2012, the
respondent filed the amended
petition on the ground that the
petitioner’s COC contained material
misrepresentations regarding the
petitioner’s marital status, residency,
date of birth and citizenship.
Respondent alleged that the
petitioner is an American citizen and
filed in February 8, 2013 a
manifestation with motion to admit
newly discovered evidence and
amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC
First Division issued a Resolution
cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the
basis that petitioner is not a citizen of
the Philippines because of her failure
to comply with the requirements of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But
on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en
banc promulgated a Resolution
denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was
proclaimed winner of the May 13,
2013 elections and on June 5, 2013
took her oath of office before the
Speaker of House of Representatives.
She has yet to assume office at noon of
June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en
declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution
of the COMELEC en banc final and
executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court
Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Status Quo Ante Order.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the
jurisdiction over the petitioner who is
a duly proclaimed winner and who
has already taken her oath of office for
the position of member of the House
of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred
in its ruling that the petitioner is
illegible to run for office
Discussion:
1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the
1987 Constitution, the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal has
the exclusive jurisdiction to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to
the election returns and qualification
of the members of House of
Representative.
2. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to
reacquire Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office, the
law requires that she must have
accomplished the following 1) take the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines before the consul-
general of the Philippine Consulate in
the USA, and 2) make a personal and
sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. In
the case at bar, there is no showing
that petitioner complied with the
requirements. Petitioner’s oath of
office as Provincial Administrator
cannot be considered as the oath of
allegiance in compliance with RA
9225. As to the issue of residency, the
court approved the ruling if the
COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who
becomes naturalized elsewhere
effectively abandons his domicile of
origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship, he must still show that he
chose to establish his domicile in the
Philippines through positive acts, and
the period of his residency shall be
counted from the time he made it his
domicile of choice. In this case, there
is no showing that the petitioner
reacquired her Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 so as to
conclude that the petitioner
renounced her American citizenship,
it follows that she has not abandoned
her domicile of choice in the USA.
Petitioner claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the
province of Marinduque from
January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not
sufficient to prove her one-year
residency for she has never
recognized her domicile in
Marinduque as she remains to be an
American citizen. No amount of her
stay in the said locality can substitute
the fact that she has not abandoned
her domicile of choice in the USA.
Held:
The instant petition was DISMISSED,
finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC.
ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST v.
ERMITA
FACTS:
RA 9337, an act amending certain
sections of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, is questioned
by petitioners for being
unconstitutional. Procedural issues
raised by petitioners are the legality of
the bicameral proceedings, exclusive
origination of revenue measures and
the power of the Senate concomitant
thereto.
Also, Substantive issue was raised
with regard to the undue delegation of
legislative power to the President to
increase the rate of value-added tax to
12%.
Petitioners also argue that the
increase to 12%, as well as the 70%
limitation on the creditable input tax,
the 60- month amortization on the
purchase or importation of capital
goods exceeding P1,000,000.00, and
the 5% final withholding tax by
government agencies, is arbitrary,
oppressive, and confiscatory, and that
it violates the constitutional principle
on progressive taxation, among
others.
ISSUE:
WON Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108, respectively, of the NIRC giving
the President the stand-by authority
to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12%
when a certain condition is met,
constitutes undue delegation of the
legislative power to tax.
HELD:
NO. The case before the Court is not a
delegation of legislative power. It is
simply a delegation of ascertainment
of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increase rate
under the law is contingent. The
legislature has made the operation of
the 12% rate effective January 1,
2006, contingent upon a specified fact
or condition. It leaves the entire
operation or non-operation of the 12%
rate upon factual matters outside of
the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by
the President. Highlighting the
absence of discretion is the fact that
the word shall is used in the
common proviso. The use of the
word shall connotes a mandatory
order. Its use in a statute denotes an
imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of
discretion.Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to
mean exactly what it says, and courts
have no choice but to see to it that the
mandate is obeyed
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the
President to immediately impose the
12% rate upon the existence of any of
the conditions specified by Congress.
This is a duty which cannot be evaded
by the President. Inasmuch as the law
specifically uses the word shall, the
exercise of discretion by the President
does not come into play. It is a clear
directive to impose the 12% VAT rate
when the specified conditions are
present. The time of taking into effect
of the 12% VAT rate is based on the
happening of a certain specified
contingency, or upon the
ascertainment of certain facts or
conditions by a person or body other
than the legislature itself.
The Court finds no merit to the
contention of petitioners ABAKADA
GURO Party List, et al. that the law
effectively nullified the Presidents
power of control over the Secretary of
Finance by mandating the fixing of
the tax rate by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance. The Court cannot also
subscribe to the position of
petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the
word shall should be interpreted to
mean may in view of the phrase upon
the recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance.
Furthermore, Congress simply
granted the Secretary of Finance the
authority to ascertain the existence of
a fact, namely, whether by December
31, 2005, the value-added tax
collection as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-
fifth percent (24/5%) or the national
government deficit as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1%). If either of
these two instances has occurred, the
Secretary of Finance, by legislative
mandate, must submit such
information to the President. Then
the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by
the President effective January 1,
2006. There is no undue
delegation of legislative power
but only of the discretion as to
the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally
permissible.Congress does not
abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what
job must be done, who must do it, and
what is the scope of his authority; in
our complex economy that is
frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.
As to the argument of
petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party
List, et al. that delegating to the
President the legislative power to tax
is contrary to the principle of
republicanism, the same deserves
scant consideration. Congress did not
delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law. The intent
and will to increase the VAT rate to
12% came from Congress and the task
of the President is to simply execute
the legislative policy. That Congress
chose to do so in such a manner is not
within the province of the Court to
inquire into, its task being to interpret
the law.