PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS.

DRILON
[G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988]

FACTS:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed
for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to
travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character.

PASEI, challenges the validity of Department Order No. 1 of the DOLE on the following grounds:
1) it is discriminatory as it only applies to female workers; 2) it is an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power. The respondents invoke the police power of the Philippine State.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:
Yes, the enactment of DO No. 1 is a valid exercise of police power. It is admitted that
Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is
whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power as defined, consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. Its
scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where
it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its
awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.
Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there
is a clear misuse of the power.
DO No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. ―Equality before the law" admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally
to all members of the same class. It is the avowed objective of DO No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers. Discrimination in this case is justified.
Police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may
not be lawfully delegated. The Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with rulemaking powers in the
enforcement whereof. Hence it is a valid exercise of police power.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
[G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

FACTS:
Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as ―An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, was passed.
The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by
foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country.

Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, on the premise that it
violated several treaties which under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted
principle of international law, should be observed by the Court in good faith.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is unconstitutional for it is in conflict with
treaties which are generally accepted principles of international law.

HELD:
No, the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that it
saw no conflict with the treaties which are generally accepted principles of international law.
This is so because the Retail Trade National Law was passed in the exercise of the police power
which cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.

The law in question was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free the citizens and
country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of
the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future.

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy
a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of
the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the state, through which and by
which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of occupation regulated, nor the due
process of the law clause; because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly
evident - as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary - and that in
any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the legislature, with whose power and
discretion the judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of
the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled
the legislature of the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void
for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into
on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any
other conventional agreement.
LUTZ VS. ARANETA
[G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955]

FACTS:
This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to test the legality of
the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment
Act.

Promulgated in 1940, the law in question opens (section 1) with a declaration of emergency,
due to the threat to our industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as
provided in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the
United States market"; wherefore, the national policy was expressed "to obtain a readjustment
of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to
stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential
position in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes."

Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio
Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40
paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-
1950; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of
the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax
may be constitutionally levied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of tax under the CA No. 567 is unconstitutional.

HELD:
No, the imposition of tax under the CA No. 567 is not unconstitutional. The Court held that the
basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for in
Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of the taxing power. Analysis of the Act, will
show that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation
and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an
exercise of the police power.

The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great sources of the state's wealth
and therefore directly or indirectly affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the population
of the State is affected to such an extent by public interests as to be within the police power of
the sovereign.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
[G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989]

FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on
the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229
should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due
process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with
payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O
No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the
President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the
petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued
the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the taking of property under the said laws is a valid exercise of police power or
of the power of eminent domain.

HELD:
Yes, the taking of property under the said laws is a valid exercise of police power or of the
power of eminent domain. The Court held that the cases present no knotty complication insofar
as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to
carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they
may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power
of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender
of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to
the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police
power but of the power of eminent domain. Wherefore, the Court holds the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229. However, the title to all
expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective owners.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ
[G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]

FACTS:
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law punishes a person
"who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." Those who
question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that it offends the constitutional provision
forbidding imprisonment for debt and it contravenes the equal protection clause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:
Yes, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power. The Court held that the said law
is a valid exercise of police power as it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to
proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not
the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently
wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can
be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise
of its police power. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal
protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not
the payee.

Moreover, recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one-third of the entire money supply
of the country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion, consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining
two-thirds consists of currency in circulation. These demand deposits in the banks constitute
the funds against which, among others, commercial papers like checks, are drawn. The
magnitude of the amount involved amply justifies the legitimate concern of the state in
preserving the integrity of the banking system. Flooding the system with worthless checks is like
pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's economy.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

In sum, the Court finds the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS VS. SAN DIEGO
[G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989]

FACTS:
The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) is entitled to take it again. Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East
with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitioner claims that private respondent took the NMAT 3
times and flunked it as many times. Hence, petitioner contends that private respondent may
not, under its rule that a student shall be allowed only 3 chances to take the NMAT. The private
respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds. When he applied to take it again, the
petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of
Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test.

Private Respondent squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of
1972, containing the above-cited rule.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the three-flunk rule is unconstitutional.

HELD:
No, the three-flunk rule is not unconstitutional. MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing
the three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power.

The police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is
the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to ensure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. While
every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times and this is sufficed to say that he
must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools
only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education.
YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
[G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]

FACTS:
President Marcos issued E.O. 626-A amending E.O. 626, which prohibits the transport of
carabaos or carabeefs from one province to another for the purpose of preventing
indiscriminate slaughter of these animals. The petitioner had transported six carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo where they were confiscated for violation of the said order. He sued for
recovery and challenges the constitutionality of the said order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. 626-A is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:
No, E.O. 626-A is not a valid exercise of police power. The Court does not see how the
prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province
than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the
movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be
flippant, dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would
still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition.
The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was
sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no
such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because
the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Moreover, there was no such pressure of time or
action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even
inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. Thus, the Court cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement, that there be a lawful method. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved
by the questioned measure is missing. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby unconstitutional.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA
[G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983]

FACTS:
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition seeking to annul Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64, requiring private cemeteries to reserve 6% of its total area for the burial of paupers,
on the ground that it is contrary to the Constitution. The petitioner contends that the said order
was a valid exercise of police power. The respondent court declared the said order null and
void. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:
No, Section 9 of the ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9
cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and
regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practice in the
City.' The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery. As defined, police power is 'the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. In the instant case,
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation
but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of
law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a
certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the
general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express
provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK VS. SECRETARY OF DSWD
[G.R. No. 175356, December 3 2013]

FACTS:
Petitioners emphasize that they are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens
but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA
9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution, which provides that: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 9257 insofar as it provides that the twenty percent (20%)
discount to senior citizens may be claimed as a tax deduction by the private establishments, are
invalid and unconstitutional.

HELD:
No, the questioned law is not invalid and unconstitutional. The validity of the 20% senior citizen
discount and tax deduction scheme under RA 9257 is an exercise of police power of the State.

The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking
of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which
petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. A tax deduction does not
offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition
of just compensation.

Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and
welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of
partly subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. As a form of reimbursement,
the... law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to
senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of
police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by
due process, must yield to general welfare.

Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on
the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated.

Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is
unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate
correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to... show
properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage.

We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of
the police power of the State.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are
less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in
need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities.

the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price their
products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the
Constitution affords preferential concern... it does... not purport to appropriate or burden
specific properties, used in the operation or conduct of the business of private establishments,
for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that matter

The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price
control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police
power measures.[77] These laws generally regulate public... utilities or industries/enterprises
imbued with public interest in order to protect consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable
pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the rate of return on investment of
these corporations... considering that they have a monopoly... over the goods or services that
they provide to the general public.

On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure