Article III: Bill of Rights

SEC. 4. NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED ABRIDGING THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF EXPRESSION, OR
OF THE PRESS, OR THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.
1. Near v. Minnesota Facts:
 Herein petitioner was charged of violating the law prohibiting the
 Liberty of speech business of regularly producing or publishing malicious,
and of the press is scandalous and defamatory newspapers, magazines or other
not an absolute periodicals.
right, and the  Petitioner’s publication entitled “The Saturday Press” circulated
State may punish editions allegedly devoted to malicious, scandalous and
its abuse. defamatory articles (1) That a jewish gangster was in control of
 Any system of gambling in Minneapolis (2) That law enforcers were not
prior restraints of performing their duties and that (3) The Chief of Police grossly
expression comes neglected his duties and has illicit relations with the gangsters
to this Court and participates in graft.
bearing a heavy  During the pendency of the case, the petitioners were prohibited
presumption from publishing more editions of The Saturday Press and other
against its publication containing malicious, scandalous and defamatory
constitutional matter.
validity.  Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the statute.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the statute is unconstitutional for violating
petitioner’s liberty of speech or of the press was violated.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The regulation used by the statute violates freedom of
speech, of expression and of the press.
 The statute is aimed at the distribution of scandalous
matters (public nuisance) (1) detrimental to public morals
and to the general welfare (2) tending to disturb the peace
of the community and (2) provoking assaults and the
commission of crime.
 In order to obtain an injunction to suppress the future
publication, it is not necessary to prove the falsity of the
charges.
 Defamatory – injures reputation
 Scandalous – circulates charges of reprehensible conduct
WHEREFORE, the law is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 The statute is directed not simply at the circulation of
scandalous and defamatory statements with regards to
private citizens, but against public officers of corruption,
malfeasance in office, or serious neglect of duty – which
constitute a public scandal.
 The object of the statute is not punishment, but
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suppression of the offending newspaper or periodical.
The reason of the statute is that prosecutions to enforce
penal statutes for libel do not result in efficient repression
or suppression of the evils of scandal.
 The statute does not only suppress the offending
newspaper, but puts the publisher under effective
censorship.
 It is not the publication of any material which is
suppressed, but that of publications considered as
nuisance.
WHEREFORE, decision appealed from is REVERSED.
The law is too restrictive. Publication is needed to inform the people.
2. Freedman v. Facts:
Maryland  Herein petitioner was convicted of violating Maryland’s motion
picture censorship statute by exhibiting a motion picture
 Invalid prior (Revenge at Daybreak) without submitting it to the Maryland
restraint without State Board of Censors for prior approval.
judicial  The State concedes that the movie does not violate statutory
intervention. standards, and would have issued a license if properly submitted.
 Lacks “prompt”  Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the statute, arguing
final judicial mainly that it presents a danger of unduly suppressing protected
decision or expression.
immediate
judicial recourse Issue/s:
after restriction. 1. Whether the motion picture censorship statute violates
liberty of expression.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Prior submission of a film to censorship is valid only if it
takes place under procedural safeguards (1) The burden of
proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the
censor (2) While the state may require advance submission of all
films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of
unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a
manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor’s
determination whether a film constitutes protected expression.
 It is apparent that Maryland’s procedural scheme does
not satisfy these criteria.
 There is no time limit imposed for completion of the
Board action.
 Initial decision by the censorship board, without any
judicial participation, effectively bars exhibition of
disapproved films unless the exhibitor undertakes a time-
consuming appeal to the Maryland courts.
 There is no statutory provision for judicial participation
in the procedure nor even assurance of prompt judicial
review.
 There is an invalid prior restraint.
 WHEREFORE, decision appealed from is REVERSED. liberty and security of the very people the Government
hopes to make "secure."
Censorship is frowned upon because there is prior restraint.  The word "security" is a broad, vague generality whose
Censorship is prior restraint before the actual publication or contours should not be invoked to abrogate the
dissemination fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The
3. New York Times Facts: guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the
Co. v. US  Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara commissioned a expense of informed representative government provides
classified history of the U.S. role in Indochina in 1967, two years no real security for our Republic.
 The government into the Vietnam War. WHEREFORE, decision of CA REVERSED.
carries the heavy  The New York Times gained access to this history three years 4. People v. Perez Facts:
burden of later and started to publish portions of its contents in articles in  Isaac Perez was a municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon. He met
showing 1971, six years into the war.  Criticism is with Fortunato Lodovice one morning and they became engaged
justification for  Soon after the first article appeared, a federal district court judge permitted to in a discussion regarding the administration of Gov. Gen. Wood.
the imposition of ordered the newspaper to stop publishing the classified penetrate even to  Perez shouted a number of times “The Filipinos, like myself,
prior restraint. information. This order was based on the federal government's the foundations must use bolos for cutting off Wood’s head for having
pursuit of an injunction based on irreparable harm to national of Government. recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our
security. Criticism, no independence.”
 Granting an injunction against the Times would constitute a prior matter how  Perez was charged with a violation of Art. 256 of the Penal Code
restraint, generally disfavored by courts under the First severe, on the (Contempt of the ministers of the Crown).
Amendment. However, the government used statements by the Executive, the  It was contested whether Perez violated Art. 256 or Act No. 292
Secretary of State and an affidavit from the Navy general counsel Legislature, and (Treason and Sedition Law).
to support its argument that serious harm would befall the the Judiciary, is
nation's interests if publication did not halt. CA granted within the range Issue/s:
injunction (prior restraint). of liberty of 1. Whether art. 256 was the proper charge against the accused.
 On the other hand, the government had not been able to secure an speech, unless the
injunction against the Washington Post, a similar type of intention and Ruling:
newspaper, for publishing similar content. The division between effect be 1. No. The Court opined that the law infringed was the Treason and
these outcomes resulted in an appeal to the Supreme Court. seditious. Sedition Law
 Sedition – the raising of commotions or disturbances in
Issue/s: the State. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a
1. Whether the prior restraint of publication was a violation of violation of the public peace, yet it does not aim at direct
the first amendment. and open violence against the laws, or the subversion of
the Constitution.
Ruling:  Criticism, no matter how sever, is within the range of
1. Yes. Prior restraints are rarely justified, even in matters of liberty of speech unless the intention and effect is
extreme government importance or national security, since they seditious.
are among the most disfavored forms of restricting the freedom  The words uttered by Perez were seditions because they
of speech. (Justice Black) suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies.
 In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
free press the protection it must have to fulfill its
essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve Not only “what the accused said” but “what he could do”
the governed, not the governors. The Government's 5. Dennis v. US Facts:
power to censor the press was abolished so that the press  Herein accused were convicted for (1) willfully and knowingly
would remain forever free to censure the Government.  Convicting a conspiring to organize as the Communist Party, a group whose
The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets defendant of a members advocated to overthrow the US Government by force
of government and inform the people. non-speech and (2) willfully and knowingly advocating the duty to do the
 To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the related offense same.
publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe based on speech  RTC and CA both found the accused guilty under the Smith Act.
out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental is permissible  Petitioners-accused herein challenge the constitutionality of the

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 only if the speech statute. not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well.
created a clear  Lawful purpose: To insure a free, orderly and honest election by
and present Issue/s: regulating "conduct which Congress has determined harmful if
danger that the 1. Whether the liberty of speech of the accused was violated. unstrained and carried for a long period before elections it
crime would be necessarily entails huge expenditures of funds on the part of the
attempted or Ruling: candidates, precipitates violence and even deaths, results in the
perpetrated. 1. No. The “clear and present danger” test was applied. corruption of the electorate, and inflicts direful consequences
 The overthrow of the government by force is certainly a upon public interest as the vital affairs of the country are
substantial enough interest for the Government to limit sacrificed to purely partisan pursuits.
speech.
 The court was convinced that the following established a Issue/s:
clear and present danger: 1. Whether RA 4880 is unconstitutional.
a. Formation of a highly organized conspiracy with
disciplined members subject to call; Ruling:
b. Inflammable nature of world conditions; 1. No. The 2 tests for permissible restriction of speech are:
c. Similar uprisings in other countries; and  Clear and present danger test – the evil consequence of
d. Touch and go nature of US relations with other the comment must be extremely serious and the degree
countries with whom the petitioners were of imminence extremely high before it can be
ideologically aligned. punished.
 Convicting a defendant of a non-speech related offense  Clear – a causal connection with the danger of the
based on speech is permissible only if the speech created substantially evil arising from the utterance in
a clear and present danger that the crime would be question.
attempted or perpetrated.  Present – the time element, identified with
WHEREFORE, decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. imminent and immediate danger.
 The danger must not only be probable but very
Smith Act does not merely criminalize the overthrow of the likely inevitable.
government. It wants to criminalize the destruction of the government  Dangerous tendency rule – if the words uttered create a
through violence. dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
Lawful purpose – to preserve the government. prevent, then such words are punishable.
6. Gonzalez v. Facts:  Assembly - a right on the part of citizens to meet
COMELEC  The case involves RA 4880 limiting the period of election peaceably for consultation in respect to public
campaign or partisan political activity. affairs.
 Free speech and  Herein petitioners assail that the statute infringes upon freedom  As to the right to peaceably assemble, the right is a
free press – the of speech and expression. necessary consequence of a republican institution and it
liberty to discuss  Candidate – any person aspiring for an elective office whether or complements the right to free speech.
publicly and not he has already filed his candidacy or nominated by his WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.
truthfully any political party.
matter of public  Partisan political activity / election campaign – acts designed to For nomination, etc.
interest without have a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a 150 days for local
censorship or person or persons to a public office. 90 days for national
punishment.  Provisions in the statute state that “simple expression of opinion 7. Ayer Prod. V. Judge Facts:
 2 tests for and thoughts concerning the elections shall not be considered as Capulong  Petitioner herein wants to exhibit “The Four Day Revolution”
permissible part of election campaign,” and “Nothing stated in this act shall which was essentially a re-enactment of the events that made the
restriction of prevent any person from expressing his views on current political  The interests EDSA revolution possible.
speech (1) clear problems or issues or from mentioning the names of candidates sought to be  Private Respondent Enrile opposes such as a violation of his right
and present for public office whom he supports.” protected by to privacy.
danger (2)  Sen. Tañada argued the purpose of the statute which is to repress privacy (1) right  Petitioners assert their right to freedom of expression.
dangerous being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess to be free from  The trial court granted a TRO partially enjoining petitioners from
tendency rule. of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss unwarranted production and filming of parts of the series that included the life
publicity and (2)
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 wrongful of private respondent.
publicizing of the
private affairs of Issue/s:
an individual. 1. Whether the order of respondent judge violated petitioner’s
right to freedom of expression.
2. Whether the movie constitutes an unlawful intrusion upon
private respondent’s right of privacy.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Respondent judge has restrained petitioners from filming
the entire proposed motion picture. In Lagunzad, there was no
prior restraint. In cases regarding freedom of speech and
expression, there is a weighty presumption of validity. There was
no clear and present danger that would warrant such prior
restraint.
2. No. The subject relates to a highly critical stage in the history of
this country which must be regarded as having passed into the
public domain as an appropriate subject for speech and
expression.

The movie was not mainly about the life of private
respondent Enrile, but of his role in the events of the
change of government. Such intrusion is reasonably
necessary to keep the film a truthful historical account.
 Moreover, Enrile is a public figure, whose right to
privacy is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary
citizen.
WHEREFORE, TRO is DISSOLVED. Petition GRANTED.
Freedom of expression includes freedom to exhibit motion pictures.
8. Adiong v. Facts:
COMELEC  The assailed COMELEC resolution prohibits the posting of decal
stickers for campaign on mobile places (vehicles).
 Petitioner, a senatorial candidate, assails the resolution as a
violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the COMELEC resolution violates freedom of
expression.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The prohibition is null and void on constitutional grounds.
 It unduly infringes the citizen’s right of free speech.
There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant
the restriction.
 The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more
for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful
the equally vital right of sufferage (Mutuc v.
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COMELEC).

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like
cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any
substantial government/public interest. It is a form of
expression of an individual’s preference by displaying it
to convince others to agree with him.
 Furthermore, the restriction is overbroad as it also
violates an individual’s right to property by restricting as
to where the decals and stickers should be posted.
WHEREFORE, petition GRANTED.
Borderline situations – in borderline cases (esp. in election cases), it
should lean more towards freedom.
9. SWS v. COMELEC Facts:
 Petitioners herein assail a provision in the Fair Election Act
 Content-neutral which prescribes a limit on the airing of election surveys.
regulation (not  Election survey – measurement of opionions of votes as regards a
based on the candidate’s popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter o
message) vs. public discussion relating to the elections, including voter’s
content-based preference for candidates.
regulation (look
at the message Issue/s:
and judge 1. Whether the provision violates freedom of expression and of
whether to allow the press.
or not; more of a
form of prior Ruling:
restraint) 1. Yes. The provision lays a prior restraint on the freedom of
speech, expression, and of the press by prohibiting the
publication of election surveys within 15 days before a national
election, and 7 days before a local election.
 These freedoms enjoy a weighty presumption of validity,
and the government carries the burden of showing
justification for enforcement of such restraint.
 Requisites of a valid government regulation: (O’Brien
Test)
a. Within the constitutional power of the
Government
b. Furthers an important government interest
c. Government interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression
d. If incidental restriction is essential for the
furtherance of such interest
 The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the
expression falls within one of the few unprotected
categories.
 It cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right
of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued
by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of
apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such
 evils.
 Invalid because:
a. Imposes prior restraint
b. Direct and total suppression of a category of
expression
c. Government interest can be achieved by means
other than suppressing the freedom of expression.
WHEREFORE, petition GRANTED.
10. Diocese of Facts:
Bacolod v.  Petitioners herein posted a tarpaulin outside of the San Sebastian
COMELEC Cathedral in Bacolod City.
 The tarpaulin was 6ft. by 10ft in size. It contained the heading
“Conscience Vote” and it was about the candidates who voted for
(Team Patay) or against (Team Buhay) the RH Law.
 Respondent, in her capacity as election officer in Bacolod, sent
the Diocese a notice to remove campaign materials because of
the size requirement 2ft. by 3ft.
 Petitioners assail such order as a violation of their freedom of
expression.
Issue/s:
1. Whether petitioner’s freedom of expression was violated.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The tarpaulin is not a form of political advertisement, but a
form of expression by the petitioners on political matters (RH
Law), and it was not even solicited or sponsored by any candidate
for the elections.
 While it is true that the present petition assails not a law
but an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this
court has applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution
even to governmental acts.
 While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure
of the named candidates and political parties, this does
not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for
consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-
list group.
 The right to freedom of speech includes all forms of
speech, from vocal to even symbolic speech.
 The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote
for one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize
that choice to the public in general, in the hope of
influencing their votes.
 There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulins to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
 Size does matter – larger space and larger fonts enable
the petitioners to voice out their opinions on important
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matters.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
6 theories of why freedom of speech is important:
1) The right of the people to participate in public affairs,
including the right to criticize government actions.
2) Deliberative Democracy
3) Safety Valve – if you repress people from expressing their
anger, this would lead to a dangerous tendency to rebel against
authorities.
4) Free market of ideas – gives a broader sense of wisdom as
to what is happening (from different perspectives).
5) The Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to
protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses
perpetrated through the framework of democratic governance – there
must be debate.
Expression is a marker for group identity – groups are able to voice
out collectively. (Women’s groups, indigenous peoples).
11. 1-United v. Facts:
COMELEC  The assailed COMELEC Resolution prohibited herein petitioners
from posting propaganda material on public utility vehicles and
public transport terminals.
 Here petitioners are private owners of such, and assail that it
violates their right to free speech.
 Petitioners argue that the prohibition curtails their ideas of who
should be voted by the people, and that there is no substantial
public interest threated by the posting of political advertisments
in PUVs and transport terminals.
 COMELEC argues that privately owned PUVs and transport
terminals are public spaces subject to their regulation.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the COMELEC Resolution violates the right to
free speech of the petitioners.
2. Whether the COMELEC Resolution is void for not
complying with the O’Brien Test.
Ruling:
1. Yes. There is prior restraint on the freedom of speech of the
petitioners to express their preference through the posting of
propaganda material in their property, and to convince others to
agree with them.
 Prior restraint: As a result of the resolution, owners of
PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully inhibited
from expressing their preferences, and the sanction is
revocation of their permits.
2. Yes. The requisites of the O’Brien test are (1) regulation is
within the constitutional power of the government (2) furthers an
important governmental interest (3) such interest is unrelated to
 the suppression of free expression (4) incidental restriction of
free expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of such interest.
 Substantial government interests:
i. Equalizing the opportunity, time, and space for all
candidates
ii. Putting a stop to excessive campaign spending
 The resolutions are not within the constitutionally
delegated power of the COMELEC.
 There is a difference between “permit to operate
transportation for public” and “ownership per se
of the vehicles.”
 The Constitution requires a franchise for the
operation of a public utility, but not for the
ownership of its facilities.
 There is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to
free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals.
 The prohibition on posting of propaganda materials on
PUVs and transport terminals is not included in RA
9006.
 There are other provisions in the RA 9006 that would
further the same government interests.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
As against Adiong – it was a private vehicle.
12. SWS v. Facts:
COMELEC  Herein petitioners (Social Weather Station and Pulse Asia)
conducted election surveys and then published its results.
 Pursuant to a letter from Rep. Tiangco (UNA), COMELEC
issued a resolution requiring petitioners to disclose the identities
of the subscribers who paid for the pre-election survey.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the order to disclose subscribers is a violation of
freedom of speech.
Ruling:
1. No. The Court recognized that published election surveys may
influence voter preferences.
 The effects of election surveys on voter behavior:
i. Bandwagon effect – voters support the leading
candidate.
ii. Underdog effect – voters support the losing
candidate.
iii. Motivating effect – individuals who had not
intended to vote are persuaded.
iv. Strategic Voting – voting is influenced by
chances of winning.
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v.
Theory of Free-will effect – voters cast their
ballots to prove the polls wrong.
 On the requisites for a valid regulation of declarative
speech: (for content-neutral regulation)
i. Fair Election Act supports the inclusion of
subscribers among those persons who “paid for
the survey.”
ii. The compelling reason is that regulation of
election surveys affects the guarantee of equal
access to opportunities for public interest.
iii. Election surveys are not merely descriptive, but
formative. They can shape the outcome of the
elections.
iv. The resolution does not suppress expression, but
merely regulates it.
 There is no prior restraint because what is regulated is
only the manner of publication of election surveys.
WHEREFORE, resolution is VALID.
It would discourage subscribers (sometimes the candidates
themselves) from subscribing to SWS or Pulse Asia.
13. Davao City v. Facts:
Aranjuez  Herein petitioner Davao City Water District was about to have its
anniversary fun run.
 Petitioner required its employees to attend the fund run and to
wear “sports attire.”
 The employees did wear sports attire, but written on their clothes
“CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na!”
 Other members also attached similar posters of their grievances
to a post in the motor pool area, though was not among the
officially designated places.
 The company filed a complaint in the CSC. The CSC ordered
merely the reprimand of the employees, except the casual
employees. The CA affirmed the CSC decision.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the concerted activity of the employees of DCWD
warranted their punishment.
Ruling:
1. No. The CSC brushed technical rules (lack of notice of appeal)
aside and decided on the merits of the case since the case
involves the security of tenure of DCWD employees.
 The concerted activity was not covered by the prohibition
because it was “without intent for work stoppage” which
is required under the definition in sec.5 of the
memorandum.
 Any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or
 through their employees organizations, with the
intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands of
force concession, economic or otherwise, from
their respective agencies or the government.
 The employees did not violate the directive of DCWD
officers to attend the fun run and to wear sports attire.
 In wearing and posting inscriptions, the employees
exercised their freedom of expression.
 Furthermore, in line with civil service rules, the violation
of a mere office memorandum issues as an internal
regulation of posting of grievances inside the office
premises warrants only a reprimand, not a dismissal.
WHEREFORE, resolutions appealed from are MODIFIED.
14. Rubin v. Coors Facts:
Bewing Co.  Herein respondents applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (BATF) for approval of its labels and other
advertisments.
 BATF denied the same pursuant to the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act (FAAA) since the labels disclosed the
alcohol content of the drinks.
 The purpose of FAAA was prohibiting strength wars –
competition among brewers trying to attract customers based on
the potency of their drinks.
 The District Court ruled that there is legitimate government
interest, but said that the law does not advance such interest
materially. CA affirmed.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the law violates the First Amendment right to free
speech.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Commercial speech is also protected under the First
Amendment.
 Hudson case provides for the test to determine whether a
regulation of commercial speech is constitutional:
a. Commercial speech must concern lawful activity
and is not misleading – the respondent seeks to
disclose truthful details about its products.
b. There is substantial government interest –
curbing strength wars
c. Regulation directly advances the interest -
FAAA prohibits labels from disclosing alcohol
contents, but not other advertisements.
d. Not overbroad
 Commercial speech doctrine – commercial speech is also
protected under the First Amendment, but:
a. The government may prohibit the same when it is
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misleading; and
b. Compel the disclosure of information when the
public safety and welfare so requires.
WHEREFORE, CA decision is AFFIRMED.
15. Policarpio v. Facts:
Manila Times  Herein plaintiff (Executive Secretary of local UNESCO national
commission) filed a complaint against the defendants for 2
libelous and defamatory articles in the Saturday Mirror, to wit;
(WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED PRESIDENTIAL COMPLAINTS
AND ACTION COMMISSION RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON
FRAUDS) and (PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS
AGAINST POLICARPIO).
 It stated that the petitioner was charged with malversation and
estafa because she allegedly used UNESCO stencils for private
and personal uses.
 Petitioner argues that the articles caused her:
o Ridicule;
o Jeopardized her integrity, good name and business and
official transactions; and
o Caused her grave embarrassment, untold and extreme
moral, mental and physical anguish.
 CFI ruled that the petitioner had not proven that the defendants
acted maliciously in publishing the materials.
 Plaintiff argues that the false statements were purposely made to
give the impression that the said investigation had shown that the
plaintiff was guilty, or at least probably guilty.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the plaintiff should be awarded damages.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Although newspapers enjoy a certain degree of discretion in
determining the manner of presenting information to the public
and that presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal,
such must not only be (1) true but also (2) fair (3) made in good
faith and (4) without any comments or remarks.
 Art. 354 of the RPC provides for the presumption that
every defamatory imputation is malicious. The only
exceptions are (1) private communication in the
performance of a legal duty (privilege communication )
and (2) A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without comments or remarks of judicial, legislative, or
other proceedings not confidential in nature.
 Defendants however presented the plaintiff in a position
worse than that in which she in fact was.
 Either the defendants knew of the falsity (thus, they
would be malicious) or not (thus, they would be
negligent).
 It is obvious that the filing of criminal complaints with
 the city fiscal by another agency of the government, as
against a private individual, implies the higher
probability that the accused is guilty.
WHEREFORE, decision appealed from is REVERSED.
If civic duty to tell the authorities, not defamatory.
If the person is a private individual, the presumption of malice is
conclusive. (intruding into privacy of the private individual)
Inaccuracies may be excused because of deadlines, etc. However, the
articles must also be true and fair.
16. Lopez v. CA Facts:
 The Manila Chronicle published a news article regarding a man
 Mistake is no named Fidel Cruz who was seen by an American plane in
excuse to absolve Babuyan Claro.
publishers  Fidel Cruz allegedly stated that the people in Babuyan Claro
because libel is were suffering terrors being committed since Christmas of 1955.
harmful on its  When the military went to Babuyan Claro, what they found
face by the fact instead, was a man who merely wanted transportation home to
that it exposes the Manila. The article was then branded as a “hoax.”
injured party to  The photo of Fidel Cruz published was of a certain Fidel G.
more than trivial Cruz, who initiated a complaint against herein petitioners.
ridicule, whether  Herein petitioners invoked freedom of the press in arguing that
it is fact or they did not commit libel.
opinion is o Elements of libel:
irrelevant. a. Allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another;
b. Publication of the charge;
c. Identity of the person defamed; and
d. Existence of malice.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the petitioners should be liable to pay all the
damages to Fidel Cruz given a more liberal construction of
freedom of press and that they owned up to their mistake
and immediately published a correction.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Damages may be recovered through a civil case of libel.
 Lu Chu Sing – the repeal of the old libel law did not
abolish the civil action for libel, as it is reinforced in the
New Civil Code.
 Libel – malicious defamation, expressed in writing,
printing or by signs or pictures, etc. tending to blacken
the memory of a dead person or impeach the honesty,
virtue, or reputation of one who is alive, and thereby post
him to public hatred.
 Treatise of Newell – publication of a photograph of a
person in a libelous article is a libel committed against
the person whose picture is published.
` 8

The SC recognized that their decisions make an
impression that press freedom would be curtailed if an
action for libel is not scrutinized in order to remove
doubts that it is being used to penalize the exercise of that
constitutional right.
 There could have been malice considering that (1) there
was a pressure of a daily deadline and (2) reasonable care
was not satisfied (thus awarding damages).
 Policarpio – clarification does not wipe out the
responsibility arising from the effects of the first article,
but may mitigate damages.
WHEREFORE, CA decision MODIFIED as to damages.
In cases of public officials/public figures (ex. Dayan, driver of De
Lima – private acts are public interest – debatable), there must be
ACTUAL MALICE (to destroy that person) for one to be held liable
for libel/defamation.
17. Miller v. Facts:
California  Petitioner herein operated a mail-order business. His company
was engaged in the distribution of pornographic books and films.
 He sent out a brochure advertising his products containing
graphic depictions of sex acts. By mistake, 5 brochures were
mailed to a restaurant, and the owner reported it to the police.
 Petitioner was charged with violating California law against
obscene matter.
 Obscene – materials that were utterly without redeeming social
value. (based on previous SC decisions)
 Legitimate interest: suppressing significant danger of offending
the senses of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.
Issue/s:
1. Whether obscene materials are protected by the First
Amendment of the US Constitution.
Ruling:
1. No. Benefits from exposing ideas through obscenity are clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. (Roth v.
US)
 Three elements: (Memoirs v. Massachusetts; abandoned)
a. Dominant theme is sex
b. Patently offensive representation of sexual matters
c. Material is utterly without redeeming social value
 New basic guidelines:
a. Appeals to the prurient (excessive interest in
sexual matters) interest of an average person
applying contemporary community standards
b. Describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way
c. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or social
value
 No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale of
 obscene materials unless they describe patently offensive
“hardcore” sexual conduct (sexual acts, masturbation,
excretory functions, lewd exhibition of genitals).
 Offensiveness should be based on contemporary
community standards and not national standards because
people in different States vary in their tastes and
attitudes. Diversity should not be strangled by absolute
uniformity.
WHEREFORE, decision is VACATED. Case is REMANDED.
Prurient character depends on community standards.
18. Gonzales v. Facts:
Kalaw-Katigbak  Herein petitioners submitted their movie “Kapit sa Patalim”
to the respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
 Obscenity can Television.
only be  Respondent classified the movie “For Adults Only” with
determined by the deletions of some scenes.
courts; the board  Petitioners claimed that the classification was without basis
can only classify. and was a restraint of artistic expression.
Issue/s:
 Whether the Board committed grave abuse of discretion
thus violating the freedom of expression of the petitioners.
Ruling:
 No. The Court ruled that the only reason for the dismissal of
the petition is that it lacked the requisite number of votes to
maintain that the act was a grave abuse of discretion.
 Furthermore, the Court noted the following scenes:
a. Taken in a theater-club, concentrated on some
women erotically dancing naked, or nearly naked.
b. Women kissing and caressing as lesbians.
c. Excessive violence attending the battle between
robbers and the police.
 Tests mentioned by the Court:
a. Hicklin test: judging obscenity by the effect of
isolated passages upon the most susceptible
persons. Abandoned.
b. Clear and present danger test: censorship,
especially so if an entire production is banned, is
allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil to public
public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest.
c. New test: whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community (Filipino) standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest.
 The company was given an option to resubmit the movie for
` 9
reclassification into “For General Patronage” if it would
remove the obscene and violent scenes.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED.
19. Pita v. CA Facts:
 Herein petitioner is a publisher of “Pinoy Playboy,” a men’s
magazine.
 Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by then Mayor
Bagatsing of the City of Manila, law enforcers raided newsstands
and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, seizing materials believed
to be obscene. They then burned the materials in public at the
University Belt along C.M. Recto Ave., Manila.
 Petitioner seeks for an injunction from the court to enjoin the
enforcers from preventing the sale or circulation of his
publication, alleging that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
educational magazine which is not per se obscene.
 The trial court denied the injunction, and the CA dismissed
petitioner’s appeal.
Issue/s:
1. Whether petitioner’s right to freedom of expression was
violated by the enforcers in the search and seizure.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court is not convinced that the private respondents
have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had
been sought.
 The enforcers were not in possession of a lawful court
order:
a. Finding said materials to be pornography; and
b. Authorizing them to carry out a search and
seizure.
 Tests to determine obscenity: (Kottinger)
a. Whether the tendency of the matter is to corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication
charged as being obscene may fall.
b. Whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense
of men as an indecency.
c. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case, 8 and
that ultimately, the question is to be decided by
the judgment of the aggregate sense of the
community reached by it.
 The Court used the standards established in Miller:
a. Appeals to the sexual interest of an average
person applying contemporary community
standards;
b. Describes sexual conduct in a patently
 offensive way; and  Furthermore, section 15 of BP 880 provided for Freedom
c. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or Parks where petitioners could assemble without the need
social value. of a permit. Unfortunately, the only constituted freedom
 The mayor could not have validly ordered the raid park was in Cebu City.
without a search warrant. Thus, the following
guidelines should be followed: 2. Yes. The CPR dispensed with the need for the law enforcers to
a. Authorities must apply for a search warrant exercise “maximum tolerance” before dispersing the rallyists.
from a judge;  The CPR allowed the enforcers to preempt the danger
b. Authorities must convince the court that the that would be caused by rallyists, and allowed the former
materials sought to be seized are obscene and to immediately cause the dispersal of the latter, even if
post a clear and present danger; there is yet no violence or danger to public order or
c. Judge must determine whether the materials or safety because of the behavior of the rallyists.
obscene, and must judge on a case-to-case WHEREFORE, petition DENIED. BP 880 is CONSTITUTIONAL.
basis; CPR is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
d. The court may issue a warrant if probable
cause exists;
e. The proper suit should be filed pursuant to Art.
201 of the RPC; and
f. Any conviction is subject to an appeal.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
20. Bayan v. Ermita Facts:
 Herein petitioners stage 3 separate rallies.
 Pursuant to BP 880, the rallyists were dispersed by law
enforcers, and they claim that some of their members were
injured during the dispersal.
 BP 880 requires that a permits shall first be secured from the
City Mayor. The mayor used the “clear and present danger” test.
 Petitioners assail the validity of BP 880 as it deprives them of
their liberty, specifically their freedom of speech or expression,
and freedom to peaceably assemble.

Issue/s:
1. Whether BP 880 is unconstitutional for violating
petitioners’ freedom of speech and freedom to peaceably
assemble.
2. Whether the Calibrated Preemptive Response is
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
1. No. The legislation assailed does not constitute a prior restraint
against the freedom of the petitioners as it did not regulate the
content of the speech, but only the time, place, and manner of the
same.
 The legislation is content-neutral based on the test:
a. Within the constitutional power of the Government;
b. Furthers an important government interest;
c. Government interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and
d. If incidental restriction is essential for the furtherance of
such interest.
` 10
OBSCENITY
21. Miller v. Facts:
California  Petitioner herein operated a mail-order business. His company
was engaged in the distribution of pornographic books and films.
 He sent out a brochure advertising his products containing
graphic depictions of sex acts. By mistake, 5 brochures were
mailed to a restaurant, and the owner reported it to the police.
 Petitioner was charged with violating California law against
obscene matter.
 Obscene – materials that were utterly without redeeming social
value. (based on previous SC decisions)
 Legitimate interest: suppressing significant danger of offending
the senses of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.
 Issue/s:
2. Whether obscene materials are protected by the First
Amendment of the US Constitution.
Ruling:
2. No. Benefits from exposing ideas through obscenity are clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. (Roth v.
US)
 Three elements: (Memoirs v. Massachusetts; abandoned)
a. Dominant theme is sex
b. Patently offensive representation of sexual matters
c. Material is utterly without redeeming social value
 New basic guidelines:
a. Appeals to the prurient (excessive interest in
sexual matters) interest of an average person
applying contemporary community standards
b. Describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way
c. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or social
value
 No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale of
obscene materials unless they describe patently offensive
“hardcore” sexual conduct (sexual acts, masturbation,
excretory functions, lewd exhibition of genitals).
 Offensiveness should be based on contemporary
community standards and not national standards because
people in different States vary in their tastes and
attitudes. Diversity should not be strangled by absolute
uniformity.
WHEREFORE, decision is VACATED. Case is REMANDED.
22. Gonzales v. Facts:
Kalaw-Katigbak  Herein petitioners submitted their movie “Kapit sa Patalim”
to the respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
 Obscenity can Television.
only be  Respondent classified the movie “For Adults Only” with
determined by the deletions of some scenes.
courts; the board  Petitioners claimed that the classification was without basis
can only classify. and was a restraint of artistic expression.
Issue/s:
 Whether the Board committed grave abuse of discretion
thus violating the freedom of expression of the petitioners.
Ruling:
 No. The Court ruled that the only reason for the dismissal of
the petition is that it lacked the requisite number of votes to
maintain that the act was a grave abuse of discretion.
 Furthermore, the Court noted the following scenes:
d. Taken in a theater-club, concentrated on some
women erotically dancing naked, or nearly naked.
` 11
e. Women kissing and caressing as lesbians.
f. Excessive violence attending the battle between
robbers and the police.
 Tests mentioned by the Court:
a. Hicklin test: judging obscenity by the effect of
isolated passages upon the most susceptible
persons. Abandoned.
b. Clear and present danger test: censorship,
especially so if an entire production is banned, is
allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil to public
public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest.
c. New test: whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community (Filipino) standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest.
 The company was given an option to resubmit the movie for
reclassification into “For General Patronage” if it would
remove the obscene and violent scenes.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED.
23. Pita v. CA Facts:
 Herein petitioner is a publisher of “Pinoy Playboy,” a men’s
magazine.
 Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by then Mayor
Bagatsing of the City of Manila, law enforcers raided newsstands
and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, seizing materials believed
to be obscene. They then burned the materials in public at the
University Belt along C.M. Recto Ave., Manila.
 Petitioner seeks for an injunction from the court to enjoin the
enforcers from preventing the sale or circulation of his
publication, alleging that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
educational magazine which is not per se obscene.
 The trial court denied the injunction, and the CA dismissed
petitioner’s appeal.
Issue/s:
2. Whether petitioner’s right to freedom of expression was
violated by the enforcers in the search and seizure.
Ruling:
2. Yes. The Court is not convinced that the private respondents
have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had
been sought.
 The enforcers were not in possession of a lawful court
order:
g. Finding said materials to be pornography; and
h. Authorizing them to carry out a search and
 seizure.
 Tests to determine obscenity: (Kottinger)
a. Whether the tendency of the matter is to corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication
charged as being obscene may fall.
b. Whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense
of men as an indecency.
c. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case, 8 and
that ultimately, the question is to be decided by
the judgment of the aggregate sense of the
community reached by it.
 The Court used the standards established in Miller:
a. Appeals to the sexual interest of an average
person applying contemporary community
standards;
b. Describes sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way; and
c. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
social value.
 The mayor could not have validly ordered the raid
without a search warrant. Thus, the following
guidelines should be followed:
1. Authorities must apply for a search warrant
from a judge;
2. Authorities must convince the court that the
materials sought to be seized are obscene and
post a clear and present danger;
3. Judge must determine whether the materials ar
obscene, and must judge on a case-to-case
basis;
4. The court may issue a warrant if probable cause
exists;
5. The proper suit should be filed pursuant to Art.
201 of the RPC; and
6. Any conviction is subject to an appeal.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
24. Barnes v. Glen Facts:
Theater  The case involves Indiana’s public indecency law which prohibits
nudity.
 Herein respondents want to show exhibitions of pure nudity in
their respective establishments.
 Respondents contend that expressive speech is protected by the
First Amendment, and that the law fails to satisfy the third
standard of the O’Brien test – that even though prohibiting nudity
in public generally may not be related to suppressing expression,
prohibiting the performance of nude dancing is related to
expression because the state seeks to prevent its erotic message.
` 12
Issue:
1. Whether nude dancing as expressive speech is protected by
the First Amendment.
Ruling:
1. No. The Court used the O’Brien test in determining the
constitutionality of the statute.
a. It is within the constitutional power of the State to
regulate.
b. The substantial government interest is protecting order
and morality.
c. The statute is unrelated to the suppression of such
expressive speech such as nude dancing.
i. The requirement that the dancers don pasties
and a G-string does not deprive the dance of
whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply
makes the message slightly less graphic. The
perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is
not erotic dancing, but public nudity.
d. The statutory prohibition is not a means to some
greater end, but an end in itself. It is without cavil that
the public indecency statute is "narrowly tailored;"
Indiana's requirement that the dancers wear at least
pasties and a G-string is modest, and the bare minimum
necessary to achieve the state's purpose.
i. Indiana's requirement that the dancers wear
at least pasties and a G-string is modest, and
the bare minimum necessary to achieve the
state's purpose.
WHEREFORE, the ruling of the CA is REVERSED.
25. FCC v. Pacifica Facts:
Foundation  The case involves a satiric humorist, George Carlin, who
recorded a 12-minute monologue entitled “Filthy Words” before
 Content-based a live audience in a California theater.
regulation was  Filthy Words contained words one wouldn’t say on the public
allowed. airwaves and ones that one would never say.
 It was mostly  Respondent, a New York radio station, broadcasted Filthy
based on nuisance Words. Thereafter, a complaint was received by the Federal
rationale. Communications Commission (FCC).
 The FCC issued a declaratory order granting the complaint and
holding that respondent could have been the subject of
administrative sanctions. In the event that subsequent complaints
are received, the FCC will then decide whether it would impose
sanctions.
 FCC found a power to regulate indecent broadcasting in the
following statutes:
a. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976 ed.) - forbids the use of "any
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communications.”
b. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) - requires the Commission to
 "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio
in the public interest."
 The FCC characterized the language as “patently offensive,”
though not necessarily obscene, and treated it in accordance with
the law on nuisance, where the law generally speaks to
channeling instead of prohibiting, and that the concept of
indecency was connected with the exposure to children.
 The FCC then noted that the broadcast was made at a
time when children were undoubtedly in the audience
(early afternoon).
 CA reversed, ruling that the order of the FCC was overbroad.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the FCC’s order was a form of censorship.
2. Whether the broadcast was indecent within the meaning of
sec. 1464.
3. Whether the order violates the First Amendment.
Ruling:
1. No. It is not censorship because it was still broadcasted. The
FCC’s order did not purport to engage in formal rulemaking or in
the promulgation of any regulations.
 The order "was issued in a specific factual context";
questions concerning possible action in other contexts
were expressly reserved for the future.
 The specific holding was carefully confined to the
monologue "as broadcast."
 It is true that the Commission's order may lead some
broadcasters to censor themselves. At most, however,
the Commission's definition of indecency will deter
only the broadcasting of patently offensive references
to excretory and sexual organs and activities.
2. Yes. Contrary to Pacifica’s claim that the broadcast was not
indecent within the meaning of the statute because of the absence
of prurient appeal, the words “obscene, indecent, or profane” are
written in the disjunctive, implying that each has a separate
meaning.
 Prurient appeal is an element of obscene, but not of
indecent, which refers merely to nonconformance with
accepted standards of morality.
3. No. Although the order of the commission was clearly content-
based, no such rule is mandated by the Constitution. The
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.
 Roth v. US – Obscene materials have been denied
protection of the First Amendment because their
content is so offensive to contemporary moral
standards.
` 13
 Central tenet of the First Amendment is that it must
remain neutral in the market of ideas.
 Two characters of speech are:
1. Capacity to offend; and
2. Social value.
 The content of Pacifica’s broadcast was clearly vulgar,
offensive, and shocking, and is thus unprotected by the
First Amendment.
 Of all forms of communication, broadcasting has
received the most limited First Amendment protection
– like when a broadcaster may be deprived of his
license and his forum if the Commission decides that
such an action would serve "the public interest,
convenience, and necessity.”
 Broadcasting presented over airwaves reaches the
citizens not only in public, but also those in the privacy
of their homes.
 Broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even
those too young to read.
 Commission’s decision was entirely on a nuisance
rationale under which content is important, and the
commission only emphasized the time of day that it
was broadcasted.
WHEREFORE, CA decision REVERSED.
26. Renton v. Playtime Facts:
Theater  The case involves the zoning ordinance in Renton which
prohibited adult theaters within 1,000ft. from residential zones,
 Not a regulation family dwellings, church, park, or schools.
primarily of  Adult theater – an enclosed building used for presenting films,
speech, but of its cassettes, and the like which are related to specified sexual
secondary effects activities or specified anatomical areas for observation by patrons
to the therein.
surrounding  Herein respondents acquired 2 existing theaters with the intention
community. of exhibiting adult films, and the theaters were within the area
proscribed by the ordinance.
 Respondents assail the constitutionality of the ordinance on the
ground that it violates the First Amendment.
 The District Court ruled in favor of Renton, the CA reversed.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the ordinance violates the First Amendment.
Ruling:
1. No. The Renton ordinance, like the one in American Mini
Theatres, does not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely
provides that such theaters may not be located within 1,000 feet
of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling,
church, park, or school. The ordinance is therefore properly
analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.
 
Furthermore, the ordinance is not aimed at the content
of the films shown, but rather its secondary effects on
the surrounding community.
 Contrary to the CA’s rationale that nevertheless the
ordinance is invalid for having a motivating factor to
restrict the exercise of First Amendment rights, it is a
principle of Constitutional law that Courts will not
strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the
basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.
 The ordinance is designed generally to protect and
preserve the quality of the city’s neighborhoods,
commercial districts, and the quality of urban life, not
to suppress the expression of unpopular views.
 Zoning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable
secondary effects of such businesses are to be reviewed
under the standards applicable to "content-neutral"
time, place, and manner regulations.
 Lastly, there is not prohibition but only a regulation
since the ordinance also provided some 520 acres in the
City of Renton, open to use as adult theater sites.
 The Court also found no constitutional defect in the
method chosen by Renton to further its substantial
interests. Cities may regulate adult theaters by
dispersing them, as in Detroit, or by effectively
concentrating them, as in Renton.
WHEREFORE, CA decision REVERSED.
27. Bethel School Facts:
District v. Fraser  Respondent Fraser was a student at Bethel High School. He
delivered a speech, to an audience of 600 students, nominating a
 Speeches in fellow student for elective office.
schools may also  Fraser referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic,
be protected by
and explicit sexual behavior. Even before delivering his speech,
the First two of his teachers told him that it was inappropriate and might
Amendment, have severe consequences.
unless it intrudes
 The school authorities’ sanctions were a 3-day suspension and
upon (1) the work
dropping Fraser’s name from the list of candidates for graduation
of the schools or
speaker.
(2) the rights of
 Fraser’s father filed a case in the District Court, which ruled in
other students.
favor of Fraser. Thus, he was able to deliver the graduation
speech. The CA affirmed.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the school’s sanction against Fraser violated the
First Amendment.
Ruling:
1. No. students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
` 14
 Tinker - The marked distinction between the political
"message" of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual
content of respondent's speech in this case seems to have
been given little weight by the Court of Appeals. In
upholding the students' right to engage in a
nondisruptive, passive expression of a political
viewpoint in Tinker, this Court was careful to note that
the case did "not concern speech or action that intrudes
upon the work of the schools or the rights of other
students."
 It intruded upon the work of the teachers as some
teachers had to discuss the speech with their
students, particularly on the sexual metaphors
used.
 It intruded upon the rights of other students on
their sensibilities on the topic of sexuality,
especially the younger students around 14 years of
age.
 Public education must prepare students for citizenship in
the Republic, and must inculcate the habits and manners
of civility.
 These fundamental values of "habits and manners
of civility" essential to a democratic society must,
of course, include tolerance of divergent political
and religious views, even when the views
expressed may be unpopular. But these
"fundamental values" must also take into account
consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in
the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow
students.
 Even in the Manual of Parliamentary, the use of
indecent language is prohibited during the
proceedings.
 The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in
matters of adult public discourse. It does not follow,
however, that, simply because the use of an offensive
form of expression may not be prohibited to adults
making what the speaker considers a political point, the
same latitude must be permitted to children in a public
school.
 New Jersey - the constitutional rights of students
in public school are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings.
 Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public
school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and
offensive terms in public discourse. The determination
of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school
board.
 The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was
 plainly offensive to both teachers and students -- indeed,
to any mature person. By glorifying male sexuality, and
in its verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting to
teenage girl students. It would also be seriously
damaging to those who were 14 years old and on the
threshold of awareness of human sexuality.
 This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has
acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute
interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience
where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience
may include children.
 These cases recognize the obvious concern on the part of
parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to
protect children especially in a captive audience -- from
exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.
 On the issue of due process, the school disciplinary rule
proscribing "obscene" language and the prespeech
admonitions of teachers gave adequate warning to Fraser
that his lewd speech could subject him to sanctions.
WHEREFORE, CA decision REVERSED.
28. Hazelwood School Facts:
v. Kuhlmeier  The case involves a school publication entitled “The Spectrum”
whose staff members are students.
 The Spectrum’s May 13, 1983 issue had 2 articles which were
deleted by the school principal:
a. Teenage pregnancy; and
b. Effects of divorce on students.
 The respondents contend that the school officials violated their
First Amendment rights by deleting such articles.
 District Court ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed.
Issue/s:
1. Whether The Spectrum is a public forum thus should not be
subjected to review by school authorities.
2. Whether respondents’ First Amendment rights were
violated.
Ruling:
1. No. School facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if
school authorities have "by policy or by practice" opened those
facilities "for indiscriminate use by the general public or by some
segment of the public, such as student organizations.
 Hazelwood Policy – “School sponsored publications
are developed within the adopted curriculum and its
educational implications in regular classroom
activities.”
 Although the objective of Journalism II was to teach
“leadership responsibilities as issue and page editors,”
it did not imply any relinquishment of school control
` 15
over the activity.
The school did not intend to open the pages of
Spectrum to indiscriminate use, but reserved it only for
its intended purpose as a supervised learning
experience for journalism students.
2. No. The articles were not entitled to full protection by the First
Amendment.
 A school must be able to set high standards for the
student speech that is disseminated under its auspices --
standards that may be higher than those demanded by
some newspaper publishers or theatrical producers in
the "real" world -- and may refuse to disseminate
student speech that does not meet those standards.
 The school must also be able to take into account the
emotional maturity of the intended audience.
 Education of the youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers and school authorities as loco
parentis.
 It is only when the decision to censor a school-
sponsored mode of student expression has no
valid educational purpose that the First
Amendment is so "directly and sharply
implicated, as to require judicial intervention
to protect students' constitutional rights.
 Furthermore, the principal could reasonably have
feared that the articles would infringe upon the right to
privacy of those mentioned therein, although with
anonymity.
 There are only a limited number of pregnant
students in the school, and if even one of the
teachers could identify 1, or possibly all 3,
much more can the students identify the same
people.
 There was no express consent from the parents
of the students who talked about divorce.
WHEREFORE, CA decision REVERSED.
29. Fernando v. CA Facts:
 The case involves a violation of Art. 201 of the RPC prohibiting
 Judicial the dissemination of obscene materials to the public.
determination is  After conducting police surveillance on the store “Gaudencio E.
necessary for the Fernando Music Fair” (Music Fair), Judge Laguio issued a search
issuance of a warrant for copies of magazines and VHS tapes allegedly
warrant to seize containing obscene pictures and pornographic shows.
obscenity.  The petitioner waived his right to adduce evidence and submitted
 Prurient interest the case for decision.
 RTC convicted the petitioner. CA affirmed the decision in toto.
Issue/s:
 1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s
conviction.
Ruling
1. No. Since the petitioners waived their right to adduce evidence,
the court resolved the case on the basis of prosecution’s evidence
alone.
 The State, in pursuing its duty as parens patriae, may
regulate or limit obscenity as it is an unprotected
speech.
 Doctrines on obscenity:
i. Kottinger – test to determine obscenity was
(1) whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene, is to corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences
and into whose hands a publication or other
article charged as being obscene may fall; (2)
that which shocks the ordinary common
sense of men as an indecency; (3) obscenity
or indecency must depend upon the
circumstances of the case, to be judged by
the aggregate sense of the community
reached by it.
ii. Go Pin – if the materials are shown for the
cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by
people interested in art, there would be no
offence committed. This is inapplicable,
however, when the material in question is for
commercial purposes.
iii. Padan y Alova – an actual exhibition of the
sexual act, preceded by acts of
lasciviousness, can have no redeeming
feature.
iv. Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak – measures
obscenity in terms of “dominant theme” of
material taken as a whole rather than in
isolated passages.
v. Pita – Kottinger failed to afford a conclusive
definition of obscenity. Go Pin and Padan y
Alova gave too much latitude for judicial
arbitrament.
vi. Miller v. California - (a) whether to the
average person, applying contemporary
standards would find the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
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political, or scientific value.
 Patently offensive: (a) patently
offensive representations or
descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or
simulated; and (b) patently offensive
representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions,
and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
vii. What remains clear is that obscenity is an
issue proper for judicial determination
and should be treated on a case to case
basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.
 The magazines and VHS tapes showed pictures of
men and women in the nude doing the sexual act, and
the VHS tape entitled “Kahit sa Pangarap Lang”
showed Myra Manibog dancing which excited the
sexual instinct of male audience.
WHEREFORE, CA decision AFFIRMED.
ASSEMBLIES
30. Navarro v. Facts:
Villegas  This case involves the denial of a permit to rally at the Plaza
Miranda.
 Primicias v. Fugoso - respondent Mayor possesses reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to
be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use
thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and
order.
 The respondent mayor expressed his willingness to grant the
permit during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays so they would not
cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of
the community, and even offered the Sunken Gardens as an
alternative site of the demonstration to be held in the afternoon
(Thursday).
 With present assemblies and demonstrations, the mayor believed
that a public rally at Plaza Miranda poses a clearer and more
imminent danger of public disorder, and petitioner has
manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the petitioners’ right to peaceably assemble was
violated.
Ruling:
1. No. The civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only
in an orderly society.
 
The petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal
duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their
application for permit unconditionally.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED.
Separate opinions:
1. Villamor, J., concurring:
 The right is not denied. The mayor offered an alternative,
which is not unreasonable. There being no arbitrary refusal
to grant permit, petitioner is not entitled to writ.
2. Castro and Fernando, JJ., dissenting:
 The right to freedom of assembly while not unlimited is
entitled to the utmost deference and respect.
 The only explanation given by the mayor was “In the
greater interest of the general public, and in order not to
unduly disturb the life of the community, this Office,
guided by a lesson gained from the events of the past few
weeks, has temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing
any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or
demonstrations during week days.”
 The above does not meet the standard of the Primicias
ruling. Thus, this is a prior restraint of a constitutional 32. Reyes v. Bagatsing
right.
 No
31. Philippine Facts:
Blooming Mills  The petitioners in this case sought to stage a mass demonstration
Employment Org. v. in Malacañang due to the abuses of the Pasig police.
PBM  The petitioners informed the respondent company (employer),
which did not allow all of the petitioners to stage the mass
demonstration at the same time – ordering that those in the AM  Balancing
shift should report for work.
 Respondent alleges that the petitioners violated the No Strike and
No Lockout agreement in the CBA.
 Petitioners contend that their demonstration was a valid exercise
of their freedom of speech and freedom to peaceably assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances, and that it  Clear and present
was not a strike since it was not directed against the respondent
company. Lastly, that they did not violate the CBA since they
gave the company prior notice before the mass demonstration.
 Respondent company dismissed petitioners working in the AM
shift.
 CIR ruled that the petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad
faith.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the petitioners’ freedom to peaceably assemble was
violated.
Ruling:
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1. Yes. The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the
right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by
the sovereign people.
 Hierarchy of civil liberties – the freedom of the petitioners
to peaceably assemble enjoys primacy over respondent
company’s right to property in the form of profit.
 Gonzales v. COMELEC - the freedoms of speech and of
the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials.
 The respondent failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an
effective demonstration especially by a labor union, which
is their total presence in order to generate the maximum
sympathy for the validity of their cause and immediate
action on the part of corresponding government agencies.
 Respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor
practice because of its refusal to permit all of its employees
and workers to join the mass demonstration, and it is
likewise the duty of the respondent company to assist its
employees who were being abused by public officials.
WHEREFORE, CIR decision SET ASIDE.
Facts:
 Herein petitioner is the counsel of the Anti-Bases Coalition
more which sough to stage a peaceful march and rally from Luneta to
balancing of the gates of the US Embassy, 2 blocks away. Then a short
interest rule, it program would be held, and afterwards a petition based on the
should be clear resolution adopted by the International Conference for General
and present Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign
danger test. Military Bases would be presented to a representative fo the
of Embassy.
interest <  Respondent mayor denied the permit based on the police
dangerous intelligence reports regarding possible subversion to disrupt the
tendency < clear embassy.
and present  A minute resolution was issued by the Court granting the
danger. mandatory injunction since there was no showing of a clear and
present danger.
danger –
IMMINENT. Issue/s:
1. Whether the denial of the permit violated petitioners’ right to
peaceably assemble.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet
peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public
concern.
 It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing, as 's the case with freedom of expression, of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent.
  Justice Frankfurter: It is in order to avert force and
explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of
communication that the guaranty of free speech was
given a generous scope.
 Safety valve theory – it must always be remembered that
this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing
parties the opportunity to give vent to their-views, even
if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion.
 On the choice of Luneta as the assembly area:
 Hague v. CIO - Whenever the title of streets
and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.
 Municipality of Cavite v. Roxas - reference
was made to such plaza "being a promenade
for public use.
 As to the use of the streets to the gates of US Embassy:
 The ordinance issued prohibiting
demonstrations within 500ft. from foreign
missions (embassies) was based on the Vienna
Convention.
 However, the respondent herein failed to prove
that the designated area for the rally was
within 500ft. from the building of the
embassy.
 The Court abandoned the ruling in Villegas and laid
down the following guidelines for the issuance of a
permit:
1. Applicants should inform the licensing
authority of the date, public place, and time. If
private place, applicants should only get the
consent of the owner of private property.
2. Application should be filed ahead of time to
enable the public official to appraise whether
they may be a valid objection.
3. Refusal or modification must satisfy the clear
and present danger test.
4. If the public official is of the view that there is
a clear and present danger, the applicants must
be heard on the matter.
5. The decision must be transmitted at the earliest
opportunity.
6. There must be recourse to proper judicial
authority.
 Ordinarily, the remedy in these cases is to set aside the
denial and order the respondent official to grant it
(mandamus), but there was an urgency to issue the
mandatory injunction in this case.
` 18
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
33. Malabanan v. Facts:
Ramento  Herein petitioners were students of the respondent Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation.
 Even though this  Petitioners applied before the school authorities for a permit to
is a private hold a meeting at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
institution, it is (VMAS) basketball court. The permit was granted.
governed by rules  The general assembly was held, and the students expressed their
of CHED or the vehement and vigorous opposition to the merger of the Institute
Legal Education of Animal Science and Institute of Agriculture.
Board (LEB). The  The problem, however, stemmed from the fact that the general
school does not assembly was held in the second floor lobby, then the students
have absolute went around the building, causing disruption of classes and
power to control stoppage of work of non-academic employees.
its premises.  The school authorities sanctioned them primarily with a
Education is preventive suspension, then a suspension for 1 academic year for
imbued with illegal assembly as provided for in the Manual of Private
public interest. Schools.
 The Court issued a TRO to enjoin the ministry of education from
enforcing their decision.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the petitioners’ freedom to peaceably assemble was
violated.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Suspending them for one year is out of proportion to their
misdeed. Subsequent punishment without clear and present
danger.
 In compliance with the ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the
students did get the consent of the owner of the private
establishment (school).
 But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which
for any reason — whether it stems from time, place, or
type of behavior — materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
 It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be
totally absolved for the events that transpired.
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the
permit. Respondents herein could thus take disciplinary
action.
 Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too
severe. While the discretion of both respondent
University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the
rule of reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much
 lesser penalty. To avoid this constitutional objection on
due process, it is the holding of this Court that a one-
week suspension would be punishment enough.
 Thus, in granting permit for rallies in schools:
1. There may be conditions as to the time and
place of the assembly to avoid disruption of
classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel.
2. Even if, however, there be violations of its
terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
34. Tolentino v. Sec. Facts:
of Finance  The case herein involves the Expanded Value-Added Tax
(EVAT) Law. It is levied upon the sale, barter or exchange of
goods and properties as well as the sale or exchange of services.
It imposes 10% tax on the gross value in goods or services.
 Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
 Herein petitioners Philippine Press Institute (PPI) is an
organization of newspaper publishers for the empowerment of
journalism.
 Petitioners contend that the withdrawal of the exemption granted
to the press from the NIRC because it singled out print media
transactions, a discriminatory treatment as against broadcast
media.
 Even though the exemption was subsequently restored by a
resolution of the Sec. of Finance, herein petitioners still retain
their claim because of the possibility that the exemption may be
removed again.
Issue/s:
1. Whether withdrawing the exemption granted to the press is
discriminatory and violates freedom of the press.
Ruling:
1. No. the press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State.
 What the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits
are laws which single out the press or target a group
belonging to the press for special treatment or which in
any way discriminate against the press on the basis of
the content of the publication.
 The exemption was a privilege, and being so, the law
could take back such privilege anytime without offense
to the constitution. By granting exemptions, the State
does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign
prerogrative.
 Grosjean v. American Press – the license tax was
` 19
discriminatory as it was laid on gross advertising
receipts only of newspapers whose weekly circulation
was over 20,000, thus it applied to only 13 out of 124
applicants in Louisiana.
 Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota – the tax was
discriminatory when it later made to pay special use tax
on the cost of paper and ink which made these items the
only times subject to use tax that were component of
goods to be sold at retail. The US SC held that the
differential treatment of the press suggests that the goal
of regulation is not related to suppression of expression,
and such goal is presumptively unconstitutional. It
would therefore appear that even a law that favors the
press is constitutionally suspect.
 VAT is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of
a privilege/constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale
or exchange of goods and services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. It is not a burden
on the exercise of a right.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED.
35. Acosta v. CA Facts:
 Petitioners herein are public school teachers in Metro Manila.
 Public service They did not report for work and instead participated in mass
involves public actions at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning
interest. the government for redress of grievances.
Detrimental to  Petitioners participated in the mass actions and refused to comply
government with the return-to-work order issued by the Sec. of Dept. of
services. Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).
 Petitioners were administratively charged with grave misconduct,
gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law, etc.
 Sec. Cariño found the petitioners guilty as charged and ordered
their immediate dismissal from the service.
Issues/s:
1. Whether petitioners’ dismissal based on their exercise of
right to peaceably assemble is unconstitutional.
2. Whether petitioners were wrongly denied their right to
backwages.
Ruling:
1. No. These 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike;
they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or
absence from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to
perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons (MPTSA v.
Laguio, Jr.).
 Bangalisan v. CA – there was an undisputed fact of
stoppage of public services by petitioners which
produced adverse effects upon their students for whose
education they are responsible. Their exercise of
 freedom to peaceably assemble constituted conduct
prejudicial to the interest of the service. Thus,
punishable under the Civil Service rules.
 Jacinto – SC upheld MPTSA and Bangalisan rulings,
constituting stare decisis.
 The ability to strike is not essential to the right of
association. In the absence of statute, public employees
do not have the right to engage in concerted work
stoppages for any purpose (strike).
2. No. As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any
compensation if he has not rendered any service.
 Contrary to petitioner’s claim that they be entitled to
backgwages due to their non-conviction of the complaint
filed, being found liable for a lesser offense is not
equivalent to exoneration.
 Jacinto – the decision of a dept. secretary confirming the
dismissal of an employee under his jurisdiction is
executory even pending appeal thereof. Preventive
suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but
only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to
conduct an unhampered investigation.
 An appeal is curative of any supposed denial of due
process.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED.
36. Bayan v. Ermita Facts:
 Herein petitioners staged 3 separate rallies.
 Pursuant to BP 880, the rallyists were dispersed by law
enforcers, and they claim that some of their members were
injured during the dispersal.
 BP 880 requires that a permits shall first be secured from the
City Mayor. The mayor used the “clear and present danger” test.
 Petitioners assail the validity of BP 880 as it deprives them of
their liberty, specifically their freedom of speech or expression,
and freedom to peaceably assemble.
Issue/s:
3. Whether BP 880 is unconstitutional for violating
petitioners’ freedom of speech and freedom to peaceably
assemble.
4. Whether the Calibrated Preemptive Response is
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
3. No. The legislation assailed does not constitute a prior restraint
against the freedom of the petitioners as it did not regulate the
content of the speech, but only the time, place, and manner of the
same.
 The legislation is content-neutral based on the test:
a. Within the constitutional power of the
` 20
Government;
b. Furthers an important government interest;
c. Government interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and
d. If incidental restriction is essential for the
furtherance of such interest.
 Furthermore, section 15 of BP 880 provided for Freedom
Parks where petitioners could assemble without the need
of a permit. Unfortunately, the only constituted freedom
park was in Cebu City.
 BP 880 codified the ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing.
4. Yes. The CPR dispensed with the need for the law enforcers to
exercise “maximum tolerance” before dispersing the rallyists.
 Maximum tolerance – the highest degree of restraint that
the military, police and other peacekeeping authorities
shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal
of the same.
 The CPR allowed the enforcers to preempt the danger
that would be caused by rallyists, and allowed the former
to immediately cause the dispersal of the latter, even if
there is yet no violence or danger to public order or
safety because of the behavior of the rallyists.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED. BP 880 is CONSTITUTIONAL.
CPR is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
37. Pader v. People Facts:
 Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor in Morong
 Clearly Bataan.
defamatory, but  One night, while he was on the terrace of his house, petitioner
level of insult appeared at the gate and shouted “PUTANGINA MO ATTY.
(grave or slight). ESCOLANGO NAPAKAWALANGHIYA MO!”
 Atty. Escolango was dumfounded and embarrassed. He filed a
complaint for grave oral defamation.
 MTC convicted the petitioner. RTC affirmed in toto. CA
affirmed with modification.
Issue/s:
1. Whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral
defamation.
Ruling:
1. Slight. the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however,
the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only
slight.
 Defamatory words will fall under one or the other,
depending not only upon their sense, grammatical
significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging
them separately, but also upon the special circumstances
of the case, antecedents or relationship between the
 offended party and the offender, which might tend to
prove the intention of the offender at the time.
 Trial court failed to appreciate the fact that:
a. the parties were also neighbors;
b. that petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the
defamatory words; and
c. that petitioners anger was instigated by what Atty.
Escolango did when petitioners father died.
 Reyes v. People - The expression “putang ina mo” is a
common enough utterance in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger
or displeasure.
 It is just an expletive that punctuates one’s
expression of profanity.
 It was after a previous incident involving his
father that a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty.
Escolango would utter words expressing anger.
 Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings
of resentment and not necessarily to insult the
latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor,
occasional gestures and words of disapproval or
dislike of his person are not uncommon.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED. CA decision SET ASIDE.

` 21