Leano-Module 2-Case Study PDF

Leano, Naoimi Jose Merl R.
MTH/11:30-1:30/POLSCI 121
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CASE DIGEST #1:
G.R. NO. 6025-26 (JULY 18, 1956)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
FACTS:
Amado HERNANDEZ5 (member of the CPP and President of the Congress of Labor Organizations) re-filed
for bail (previous one denied) for his conviction of rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and
robberies. The prosecution said to deny this again because the capital punishment may be imposed. The
defense however contends that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The
information states that the “…murders, arsons and robberies allegedly perpetrated by the accused “as a
necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof.”
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
DECISION/S:
No. Under the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and robberies described
therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by HERNANDEZ, as means
“necessary” for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion and that the crime charged in the amended
information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies. Under Article 1346 and 1357, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one
offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty. One of the means by which
rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by “engaging in war against the forces of
the government” and “committing serious violence” in the prosecution of said “war”. These expressions
imply everything that war connotes. Since Article 135 constitute only 1 crime, Article 48 doesn’t apply
since it requires the commission of at least 2 crimes.
CASE DIGEST #2:
G.R. No. 231658
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A.

BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN.
EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW
IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents
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Leano, Naoimi Jose Merl R. MTH/11:30-1:30/POLSCI 121
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G.R. No. 231771
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LIN CUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A. COBRADO,
CARL ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGIDG, RENATO REYES, JR., CRISTIN A E. PALABAY,
AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY REPRESENTATIVE i\RLENED.BROSAS,KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I.
ELAGO, MAE PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D. LIM,
VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY
DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO
ANO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents
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G.R. No. 231774
NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI, ZAHRIA P. MUTI-
MAPANDI, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND)
SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG)
SECRETARY (OFFICER-INCHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHEF
OF STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M. AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL
RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Respondents.
FACTS:
On September 4, 2016, Proclamation No. 55, declaring a state of national emergency on account
of lawless violence in Mindanao, was issued.
On May 23, 2017 at 10:00pm, after the ISIS-backed Maute Group took over a hospital in Marawi
City, established several checkpoints, set ablaze government and private facilities, inflicted casualties on
the part of the government forces, and hoisted the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in
several areas;
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, “declaring a state of martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao,” in pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:
“xxx in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law xxx”
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On May 25, 2017, within the 60-days timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
President Duterte submitted a written report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. After the
submission of the report, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 388 expressing full support to the
proclamation of martial law as they deemed it to be satisfactory, constitutional, and in accordance with
the law. The House of Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 1050 expressing their full
support to the same.
Nevertheless, several persons filed a petition (Cullamat Petition, Mohamad

Petition, and Lagman Petition) under the Paragraph 3, Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
claiming that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because there is no rebellion
or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism do not constitute
rebellion, since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from its
allegiance to the Philippines.
On June 12, 2017, respondents’ consolidated comment was filed as required by the Court.
ISSUE/S:
1.) Are the petitions (GR No. 231658, 231771, and 231774) the “appropriate proceeding covered by
Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution?
2.) Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus,:
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
b. required to obtain favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense; or
c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported;
3.) Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus independent of the actual actions that have
been taken by Congress jointly or separately?
4.) Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
5.) Is the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the calibration of graduated
powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law?
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6.) Is the Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and void:
a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups; or
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region?
7.) Are the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to
Congress sufficient bases:
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao region?
8.) Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements
of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
9.) Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in
Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
DECISION/S:
1.) YES. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate
that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution. Under the said paragraph, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a
different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue
to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers.
The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has to
promulgate its decision.
The Supreme Court is the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Likewise, any action commenced by any citizen to demand the factual basis of
the said proclamation should be denominated as a petition to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
“The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof xxx”
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2.) a. NO. Due to the urgency of the situation, the President cannot be able to verify the accuracy
and veracity of all the facts and information reported to him. In case of actual invasion or rebellion,
there is a need for immediate response and time is paramount in situations necessitating the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, accurate, and precise,
rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual basis. Court's
review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or
suspension.
b. NO. According to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President is not subject to
any condition to obtain a recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense or
other high-ranking officials. The President can declare martial law as long as the following requirements
are present: invasion or rebellion, and when public safety requires it. The power to impose martial law is
vested solely on the President as the Commander-in-Chief, subject to the revocation of Congress and
the review of the Court. Therefore, lack of recommendation even from the Secretary of National
Defense will not compromise the sufficiency of the declaration’s factual basis.
c. YES. The President is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the
proclamation. In reviewing the sufficiency of the proclamation’s factual basis, the Court considers only
the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of declaration, which can be
found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. Past events may
be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as these are connected or
related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.
3.) YES. The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different, but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the
Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
4.) YES. The series of violent attacks committed by the ISIS-backed Maute Group, their brazen display
of DAESH flags, and their attempt to establish a DAESH wilayat or province in Marawi constitute a clear
and open attempt to remove from the allegiance of the Philippine Government, the city of Marawi, a
part of Mindanao, and deprive the Chief Executive of his power, authority, and prerogatives to enforce
laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of
rebellion. Hence, the factual basis for the Proclamation No. 216 is sufficient.
a. Based on Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the parameters for the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are invasion or rebellion, and
when public safety requires it.
b. The basic rule is that he who alleges must prove his case. The burden lies with the petitioners to
prove that the Proclamation No. 216 lacks factual basis. (Rule No. 131: Burden of proof and
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presumptions, Rules of the Court) Otherwise, the President’s actions are presumed to be valid and
constitutional.
c. The President just need to satisfy the given parameters for a valid proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, beyond reasonable doubt.
5.) NO. Judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his
graduated powers be availed of in a given situation. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into
the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least
initially, lies with the President.
“"Graduation" of powers refers to hierarchy based on scope and effect; it does not refer to a sequence,
order, or arrangement by which the Commander-in-Chief must adhere to.”
6.) a. NO. Inclusion of "other rebel groups" does not make Proclamation No.216 vague when
viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to
"other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas
clauses.
b. NO. Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the
proclamation. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing
and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the
proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders in
violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be
resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it
would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise
of its power to revoke.
7.) a. YES. The President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to
show that actual rebellion exists. The President’s conclusion was reached after a tactical consideration
of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. After all, what the
President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
b. YES. The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the discretion to
determine the territorial coverage or application of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. The Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City, the only Islamic
City of the South, thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in Mindanao. Thus,
there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for
symbolic and strategic reasons. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is
not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present
hostilities are in danger of spilling over.
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8.) YES. Rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed. Terrorism
neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. While rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one
cannot absorb the other as they have different elements. For the validity of the declaration of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, there must be a concurrence of
actual invasion or rebellion, and when public safety requires it.
9.) a. NO. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law
and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the nullification of Proclamation
No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55. Among the three extraordinary powers of the President, the
calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. The President may resort to
this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion. “The power to call is fully discretionary to the President;" the only limitations
being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave
abuse of discretion.
b. NO. Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of
the President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine," the unconstitutional statute
is recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared unconstitutional.
CASE DIGEST #3:
G.R. NO. 172070-72 (JUNE 1,2007)
VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B. ECHANIS, and REY CLARO C.

CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
vs.
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JOSELITA C.
MENDOZA, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A.
MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR MERBA A. WAGA, in their capacity as members of the Department
of Justice panel of prosecutors investigating I.S. Nos. 2006-225, 2006-226 and 2006-234, JUSTICE
SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, in his capacity as Chief,
Philippine National Police, P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT. YOLANDA G.
TANIGUE, Respondents.
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G.R. Nos. 172074-76 (June 1, 2007)
LIZA L. MAZA, JOEL G. VIRADOR, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIÑO, CRISPIN B. BELTRAN,
and RAFAEL V. MARIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, in
his capacity as Chief State Prosecutor, the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors composed of EMMANUEL
Y. VELASCO, JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, IRWIN A. MARAYA and MERBA A.
WAGA (Panel), RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Acting Deputy Director, Directorate for
Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM), YOLANDA G. TANIGUE, in her capacity as Acting
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Executive Officer of DIDM, the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP), Respondents.
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G.R. No. 175013 (June 1, 2007)
CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of
Justice and overall superior of the Public Prosecutors, HONORABLE ENCARNACION JAJA G. MOYA, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146, and HONORABLE
ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
150, Respondents.
FACTS:
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No.

1017 declaring a "State of National Emergency", police officers arrested Beltran without a warrant and
the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening,
Beltran was subjected to an (first) inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to
Sedition based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on the occasion of the
20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution.
A second inquest was conducted by the DOJ, this time for Rebellion. The inquest was based
on two letters implicating Beltran, San Juan, and several others as "leaders and promoters" of an alleged
foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have
formed a "tactical alliance."
The RTC indicted Beltran and San Juan as leaders/ promoters of Rebellion.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the inquest proceeding against Beltran was valid.

2. Whether or not there is a probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion.
DECISION/S:
1. The inquest proceeding against Beltran for rebellion is void. Inquest proceedings are only valid
when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant. 14 Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances when such warrantless arrest may be
effected, thus:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful.— A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
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(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
2. There is no probable cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion. Probable cause is the "existence of such
facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within
the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted." To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of
practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of
probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor’s
findings in such investigations. However, in the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor abused
his discretion by ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause,
thus denying the accused his right to substantive and procedural due process, we have not
hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the prosecutor’s
findings. This exception holds true here. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed –
By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or
the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done
in furtherance of a political end.
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CASE DIGEST #4:
G.R. NOS. 138943-44 (SEPTEMBER 17, 2001)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HENRY ALMAZAN, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
On September 28, 1996, at about 4:00pm, accused-appellant Henry Almazan went home
accompanied by his friend Johnald Molina. His wife informed him upon his return that his twelve
fighting cocks had been stolen. He then proceeded to search for them and ended up in Vicente
Madriaga’s house where the latter was playing chess with a certain Allan. The spectators were Vicente’s
son Noli carrying his 2-year old daughter, his grandson Noel, and neighbor Angel Soliva.
Henry Almazan brandished a .38 caliber revolver in front of the group since he suspected Angel
to be the culprit behind the theft of his fighting cocks. He aimed at Angel and fired twice but to no avail.
Vicente tried to calm Henry down while Angel ran away but the accused-appellant aimed instead at Noli,
fired his gun, and killed him. He then turned to Noel and shot him on the thigh. Both Noli and Noel were
rushed to the hospital; the former dying along the way and latter surviving from a mere minor injury
from the gunshot.
Henry contested that his acts were in self-defense. According to him, upon arrival at Vicente’s
house, the group was drinking liquor, mocking him, and threatening him of physical violence. He claims
that Angel was the one that pulled out a .38 caliber revolver and aimed at him but misfired twice that
ensued in a struggle for the weapon between the two men. During the struggle, accused-appellant
claims that Noli was accidentally shot. After successfully wrestling the weapon away from Angel, Henry
claims to have received a blow from behind which caused him to fall and see Noel poised to attack him
with a broken bottle so he fired at the latter’s lower part of the body. His friend Johnald Molina
corroborated his story.
Accused-appellant was charged with murder qualified by treachery for the death of Noli and
frustrated murder for shooting Noel based on a statement of Noel’s attending physician, Dr. Misael
Jonathan Ticman, who said that if not medically treated, the wound might get infected or lead to the
victim’s death. He did send the victim home after undergoing treatment.
Accused-appellant went into hiding after the shooting incident and was caught eight months
later.
Crime committed:
Murder and Frustrated Murder aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation.
Contention of the Accused:

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-Prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
-The testimony of Shirley Abordo, common-law wife of Nilo, is merely hearsay.
-The testimony of Vicente has alleged inconsistencies in various vital points.
-Evidence of the prosecution is impugned for its failure to present Angel who was primarily involved in
the incident and whom the defense claims to be the real transgressor.
For frustrated murder, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding him
guilty, as the wound sustained by Noel was not fatal and could not have caused his death. He also claims
that his act was in self-defense.
The evidence sufficient to establish the absolute and moral certainty of the accused-appellant’s
guilt is absent and he should be acquitted.
Contention of the State:
-Theft of Henry’s fighting cocks constituted sufficient motive for the killing and that as a cockfight
aficionado he must have found it imperative to exact vengeance on his suspected culprits.
-Testimony of Johnald failed to create reasonable doubt on the guilt of Henry since he is a friend [and is]
expected to extend relief to a friend, especially one in need.
-The qualifying circumstance of treachery was appreciated on the ground that the victims were
completely defenseless when attacked and did not commit the slightest provocation.
-Frustrated murder charge is based on Dr. Ticman’s statement where he says “Noel could catch
infection[from the gunshot wound].”
-The witnesses for the prosecution were consistent in their narration of the manner by which the events
transpired, and they remained steadfast in the identification of the perpetrator.
DECISION/S:
No justification for evident premeditation as there was no proof as to the manner and time
during which the plan to kill was hatched.
Testimonial evidence to be credible should not only come from the mouth of a credible witness
but should also be credible, reasonable and in accord with human experience, failing which, it should be
rejected.
For the claim of self-defense to the charge of murder aggravated by treachery, the accused-
appellant failed to discharge the burden of proof that rests upon him to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the elements thereof: (a) that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) that
there was reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) that there was
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the defendant.
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Accused-appellant should be held liable for attempted murder, not frustrated murder since the
victim did not sustain a fatal wound that could have caused his death were it not for timely medical
assistance. Dr. Ticman’s statements are pure speculation and the nature of the wound was that of a
mere minor injury.
The Joint Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Henry Almazan guilty of Murder is
affirmed. However, his conviction for Frustrated Murder is modified by lowering the crime to Attempted
Murder.
CASE DIGEST #5:
G.R. NO. 164007 (AUGUST 10, 2006)
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY
ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG)
MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and B.
GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General of the Judge
Advocate General’s Office (JAGO), Respondents.
FACTS:
Some armed members of the AFP had abandoned their designated places of assignment with
an aim to destabilize the government. Thereafter, they entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier
Luxury Apartments in Makati City, led by Navy Lt. TriLlanes, disarmed the security guards, and planted
explosive devices around the building.
DOJ filed with RTC of Makati City an Information for coup d’etat against those
soldiers while respondent General Abaya issued a Letter Order creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel
tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles
of War. The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel recommended that, following the "doctrine of absorption,"
those charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for
violation of the Articles of War. RTC then issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court
martial against the accused are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat."
In the meantime, the AFP approved the recommendation that those involved be prosecuted
before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit
their answer to the charge but instead they filed with this Court the instant Petition for
Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article
96 of the Articles of War maintaining that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order that the
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offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the
crime of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not those charged with coup d’etat before RTC shall be charged before military
tribunal for violation of Articles of War.
DECISION/S:
Yes. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of
their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such
violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a
bearing of their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-
connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same (under Art. 96 of Articles of
War) – dismissal from the service –imposable only by the military court.
The RTC, in making the declaration that Art 96 of Articles of War as “not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat”, practically amended the law which expressly
vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." It is only the
Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject
matter or nature of an action which can do so. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
CASE DIGEST #6:
G.R. NO. 17748 (MARCH 4, 1922)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GRACIANO L. CABRERA ET AL.,
defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
The plaintiff-appellee is the People of the Philippines. Then defendants-appellants are Graciano
L. Cabrera et al. In the case at bar, on December 20, 1920, policemen of city of Manila arrested a woman
who was allegedly a member of the household of Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia
Barracks in Manila. The next day, policeman Mojica was patrolling when he then come upon several
soldiers. A disorder took place and a soldier was shot and mortally wounded. This caused a desire for
revenge against the policemen of Manila. In the evening of same day, soldiers of the Fourth Company
then escaped through the window of their quarters then divided into groups for attack upon the city
police force. About ten to twelve Constabulary soldiers fired the direction of the intersection of Calls
Real and Cabildo where an American policeman Driskill was stationed. Minutes later, another policeman
was shot dead in Manila. The following day, investigation in the shooting incidents occurred. All the
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herein defendants were charged in on information filed in the CFI of City of Manila with the crime of
sedition, and in another information filed in the same court, with the crimes of murder and serious
physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before different judges of first instance. All but
eight of the accused pleaded guilty for sedition. All the defendants were then sentenced to serve
maximum imprisonment of ten years.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the common crimes are absorbed in sedition.
DECISION/S:
The Supreme Court said that the common crimes are not absorbed in the commission of the
crime of sedition. Thus, it is proper to prosecute them separately from the crime of sedition. Hence, all
the defendants may be held liable for the crime of sedition and other crimes they have committed as
well.
CASE DIGEST #7:
G.R. NO. 5803 (NOVEMBER 29, 1954)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NARCISO UMALI, ET AL. defendants-
appellants.
FACTS:
The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty was said to have been committed
during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of
November 14, 1951, by armed men. It is not denied that such a raid took place resulting in the burning
down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at
P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of
Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of
Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians; that during and after the burning of the houses, some of the
raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stories; and that the raiders were finally
dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain
Alzate.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is a complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder etc.
DECISION/S:
Considering that, assuming for the moment that there is no such complex crime of rebellion
with murder, etc., and that consequently appellants could not have been legally charged with, much less
convicted of said complex crime, and the information should therefore, be regarded as having charged
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more than one offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section 2 (e), of the Rules of
Court, but that appellants having interposed no objection thereto, they were properly tried for and
lawfully convicted if guilty of the several, separate crimes charged therein, we have decided and we rule
that the appellants may properly be convicted of said several and separate crimes, as hereinafter
specified. We feel particularly supported and justified in this stand that we take, by the result of the
case, namely, that the prison sentence we impose does not exceed, except perhaps in actual duration,
that meted out by the Court below, which is life imprisonment.
We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily the most serious, crime
committed here was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the
raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the purpose
of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did not
even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of
force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of a public official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same
Code this was sufficient to constitute sedition.
CASE DIGEST #8:
G.R. NO. 12686 (OCTOBER 24, 1963)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. KAMLON HADJI, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
One morning some two years prior to the trial of this case, the herein defendant, together with
two other armed companions, Ulluh and Angkang, set out to look for two men whom they suspected
were responsible for the disappearance of two of the followers of the defendant. The search ended
when the defendant and his companions chanced upon their quarry, Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling, in
the vicinity of Buhangin Mahaba gathering vines. Thereupon, threatening to kill unless Ajibun and Alling
went with them, Kamlon and his companions seized the pair and brought them to Tigbas, Luuk District
where, at that time, Kamlon was residing. At the market place of Tigbas, Kamlon made known to his
captives the reason for their abduction, and, although Ajibun and Alling disavowed any knowledge or
responsibility for the disappearance of the two persons Kamlon was seeking to avenge, their
protestations of innocence were disbelieved and altogether unheeded.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the common crimes are to be absorbed into the crime of sedition.
DECISION/S:
There is neither law nor jurisprudence which can allow this Court to uphold the defendant's
claim that acts of violence like murder and kidnapping are absorbed by sedition. The aforecited cases of
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Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, cannot properly be invoked as authority for that legal proposition
since those two cases involved the crime of rebellion and not sedition.
Indeed, as this Court adheres to and is guided in great measure by the rule of stare decisis, We
deem ourselves unfree at the moment to disregard our rulings in the cases of People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil.
64, and People v. Umali, G.R. No. L-5803, Nov. 29, 1954. In the Cabrera case, this Court held:
It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is
a crime against public order; murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the
existence of the State, the authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a
crime directed against the lives of individuals. (U.S. v. Abad [1902], 1 Phil. 437.) Sedition in its more
general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state; murder at common law is where
a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign,
with malice aforethought, express or implied.
The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in
point of law however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. Not alone are the offenses com
nomine different, but the allegations in the body of the information are different. The gist of the
information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to attain by
force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons
of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the city of Manila; that gist
of the information in the murder case is that the Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and
criminally killed eight persons and gravely wounded three others. The crimes of murder and serious
physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information for sedition; and the defendants could
not have been convicted of these crimes under the first information.
CASE DIGEST #9:
G.R. No. 81567 (October 3, 1991)
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and
RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD,
T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA:
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,

vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO
NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila,
P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO
AROJADO, respondents.
FACTS:
On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That
the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)
Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before
a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed
by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South
City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was
Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical
Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
ISSUE/S:
ABPS3-A
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.
DECISION/S:
YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5
Rule 113, Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a member
of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized and for subversion
which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.
Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant,
at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot
the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end
there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen
anywhere as agents or representatives of the organized government. It is in this sense that subversion
like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called
"common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same
acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing an organized government
is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of
his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts
mentioned in this case.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-
named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can say that
it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That
would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the
peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the
hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts
constituting the alleged violation of the law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21
An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant
is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on
an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are
indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable
cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in
the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.
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The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested
persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they do
not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of
arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative
sanctions.
CASE DIGEST #10

G.R. NO. 2990 (DECEMBER 17, 1951)
OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the Court of First Instance
of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
because according to said court.
"About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the
town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he
were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth
and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel (Exhibit A, C-I). After securing copies of his photograph,
Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation (Exhibit C, F, G,
H, I), not only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious
suicide.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the stated publication suggest or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and
tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who
may seek to silence the writer.
DECISION/S:
The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general
discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods
other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their
minds.
"The idea of violence prevades the whole letter" says Justice Paredes of the Court of Appeals.
"The mere fact that a person was so disgusted with his "dirty government" to the point of taking his own
life is not merely a sign of disillusionment; it is a clear act to arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction
against its duly constituted authorities. The mention made in said letter of the situation in Central Luzon,
the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and armed
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attacks against the law and the duly constituted authorities cannot but be interpreted by the reading
public as an indirect justification of the open defiance by the Hukbalahaps against the constituted
government, the attempt against the life of President Roxas and the ruthless depredations committed
by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state on lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be
very much better than the maladministration of said President and his men.
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide because he had
"no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the
expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and
arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed was no other than
bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the administration of Roxas and
his men.
The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the
findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon us.
CASE DIGEST #11:
G.R. NO. 36278 (OCTOBER 26, 1932)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISANTO EVANGELISTA, ETAL.,
defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
That on or about the 30th day of May, 1931, and for some time prior thereto, the accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously affiliate to, compose and become members of, the so-called Communist Party of the
Philippines (Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas), an illegal association, whose principal purposes and objects
are to bring about, by the use of force, the downfall of the present form of government and establish of
Russia and run by those affiliated to and in sympathy with said association; to incite a revolt of the
laboring class, advocating and urging struggle between said laboring class and the so-called capitalists,
and other similar objects tending to combat the fundamental basis of the present social order and alter
the regularity of its functions and to the commission of violations of the existing laws, which above-
mentioned association was formed and organized without the legal authorities having been informed of
its aforesaid objects and purposes as well as of the by-laws thereof; and that at the time and place
hereinabove mentioned, in the furtherance of their conspiracy and in utter disregard of the notice or
warning given by the authorities that they could not hold any meeting anywhere, the said accused
assembled, gathered and congregated under the name and auspices of the Katipunan ñg mga Anak
pawis sa Pilipinas (Association of the Sons of the Sweat of the Philippine Islands), another association
having the same illegal aims and purposes as the said Communist Party of the Philippines, at El Retoño
Building, in said City of Manila.
ISSUE/S:
ABPS3-A
Whether or not the Communist Party of the Philippines is an illegal association.
DECISION/S:
Under the law of the Philippine Islands, the association formed by the appellants is clearly
illegal. Article 188 of the Penal Code, as substituted by article 24 of the Royal Decree of September 12,
1897 (Alcubilla, Diccionario de Administracion, Apendice de 1897, p. 454), says that illegal associations
are those the object of which is against public morals, to commit some crime, or to attack the
fundamental basis of the social order or alter the regularity of its functions. Now, according to appellant
Crisanto Evangelista and the constitution and by-laws of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the
purpose of the party is to incite class struggle and to overthrow the present government by peaceful
means or by armed revolution; therefore the purpose of the party is to alter the social order and to
commit the crimes of rebellion and sedition. An association having such an object must necessarily be
illegal (decision of Oct. 8, 1884, of the Supreme court of Spain, 7 Hidalgo, Cod. Pen., 531-532.) The
report submitted by Secretary Hughes to the Senate of the United States, as well as that made by
Hamilton Fish, after an investigation of communism, leads to the same conclusion, namely, that force
and violence are inseparable from communist programs.
CASE DIGEST #12:
G.R. NO. 1513 (FEBRUARY 12, 1904)
THE UNITED STATES, petitioner-appellee, vs. CASIANO SADIAN, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte filed an information in the Court of First Instance of that
province, charging Casiano Sadian, Monico Dada, Roman Dacpo, Basilio Sanchez, and Damian Tabonan
with having formed a secret political society, in the during the latter part of June and early in July, 1903,
they met together with others in the forests of some of the barrios of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte,
for the purpose of forming a secret political society entitled "Kanayonan," the purpose of which was to
obtain the independence of the Philippines by means of insurrection, treason, and rebellion against the
Government of the United States of America in these Islands, this against the provisions of Act No. 292
of the Civil Commission.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of formation and secret political society for the purpose
of promoting rebellion against the authority of the Government.
DECISION/S:
The facts upon which the accusations are based, and which have been established by the
testimony of a number of witnesses, constitute the crime defined and punished by section 9 of Act No.
292, dated November 4, 1901. The evidence plainly shows that Casiano Sadian, with Valentin Butardo,
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Sergio Sadang, and others, organized a secret political society for the purpose of fomenting rebellion
against the constituted government of these Islands and to obtain the independence of the Islands by
means of revolution and war, and that with this purpose in view they endeavored to induce others to
join the party and to increase the number of members, making incisions in their arms and obliging them
to take an oath to defend the country and to fight against the Americans. These acts, fully established by
the evidence, fall within the provisions of section 9 of the Act.
Notwithstanding the denial of the accused Sadian, the evidence of his guilt is more than
sufficient. It shows that she was one of the men who organized the secret political society entitled
"Kanayonan," and that he was one of those actively engaged in obtaining proselytes among his fellow-
townsmen, availing himself of his office as teniente of the barrio and availing himself of the ignorance of
his neighbors. For the purpose of organizing the society he acted with criminal intent, with full
knowledge and the determined purpose of fomenting a rebellion against the government in these
Islands, and consequently he is subject to the personal and pecuniary penalty established by section 9 of
the Act No. 292.
CASE DIGEST #13:
G.R. NO. 8722 (SEPTEMBER 10, 1913)
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BUENAVENTURA BALCORTA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The defendant entered a private house, uninvited, where there were around ten to twenty
persons conducting a divine service. These men are from the Methodist Episcopal Church. The
defendant interrupted the service and threatened the assemblage with a club. While the defendant was
of a different religion, there were no proof that can show that the defendant showed any remarks or
motives against the religion of the people in inside the house, thus article 223 cannot be established
against him, and that his offense was that he disturbed the divine service being conducted at the time.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of interference with the freedom of will in religious
matters.
DECISION/S:
In the case at hand, it was held that the defendant was not guilty of interference with the
freedom of will and conscience in religious matters, but merely interruption of religious services without
motive under Article 571 of the Penal Code. When the defendant went into the house, the people inside
were not holding religious services, but merely reading some verses from the Bible. There has been no
provision that they can find in the law which requires religious services to be conducted in approved
orthodox style in order to merit its protection against interference and disturbances.
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CASE DIGEST #14:
G.R. NO. 12644 (DECEMBER 22, 1917)
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEON MORALES, ET AL., defendants. PEDRO RIGOR,
MARIANO GORUSPE, and CIPRIANO DE LOS REYES, appellants.
FACTS:
This cause was instituted by a complaint filed by theprovincial fiscal, on December 7, 1915,
charging the fourteen defendants with the crime defined and punished by article 223 of the Penal
Code. That shortly after 8 o'clock of the evening of July 15, 1915, about thirty residents of the barrio
of Moriones started out a procession from the Catholic church of said municipality intending to pass
through some of the streets of the town, as they had already done on previous evenings. As they
went along in the procession they said prayers and carried the image of the Virgin of the Immaculate
Conception; but on arriving in front of the Aglipayan church the defendants there posted with others
and provided with clubs and sticks, prevented the Catholic procession from proceeding further and
compelled its members to take another route, which was not a street and was dirty. thereupon
Maximo Cayetano, a resident who on that occasion was conducting the procession and leading
those in it who were saying prayers in novena, replied to the priest, Rigor, that the latter ought not to
prohibit them from doing a good deed, and after this reply, gave the order for the procession to
continue its march; but at this moment defendants attacked said Maximo Cayetano, some of them
with sticks and clubs while a majority of the others engaged in pushing back the people in the
procession, as a result of which aggression they started to run, the image of the Virgin fell to the
ground and was abandoned, and the procession was disbanded. During the disturbance the crown
of the image disappeared and one of its hands was broken.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the defendants committed an act of preventing some other person from
performing any act of worship as stated in article 223 of the Penal Code or was it just a misdemeanor.
DECISION/S:
It is seen that the defendants, by dissolving the procession and by main force dispersing its
members, proposed not only to interrupt and disturb a religious procession, but also absolutely to
prevent the person taking part therein from being able to address their prayers to God in the manner
established by the Catholic church, to the community and confession of which they belonged. This
procedure was entirely unlawful and the acts committed by them are punishable under the aforecited
article of the Penal Code.
In the present case, the crime prosecuted is totally different from that concerned in the case of
the United States vs. Balcorta (25 Phil. Rep., 273), for the reason that the herein defendants, in
dissolving the procession and putting its members to flightby means of violence exercised upon their
persons, prevented them from being able to perform technically religious acts which they were entitled
freely to perform and under the protection of the authorities.
ABPS3-A
CASE DIGEST #15:
G.R. NO. 129609 (NOVEMBER 29, 2001)
RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN BONDOC, TERESITA BONDOC-
ESTO, DIVISORIA FOOTWEAR and CHUA HUAY SOON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 135537 (NOVEMBER 29, 2001)
RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. IDES O’RACCA BUILDING TENANTS ASSOCIATION,
INC., respondent.
FACTS:
Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides O'Racca Building (O'RACCA) since 1959
which is a property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. In 1980, Rodil entered into a sublease
contract with respondents Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay
Soon, members of the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc. On 12 September 1982 BP 233
was enacted. It authorized the sale of "former alien properties" classified as commercial and industrial,
and the O'RACCA building was classified as commercial property. RODIL and Ides O’Racca Building
Tenants Association, Inc., offered to purchase the subject property. Pending action on the offer of RODIL
to purchase the property, Director Factora of the Building Services and Real Property Management
Office granted RODIL's request for another renewal of the lease contract on 23 September 1987 for
another five (5) years from 1 September 1987. The renewal contract was forwarded to then Secretary
Jose de Jesus of Department of General Services and Real Estate Property Management (DGSREPM) for
approval. Upon recommendation of DGSREPM Rufino Banas, De Jesus disapproved the renewal
contract in favour of Rodil and recalled all papers signed by him regarding the subject. Secretary De
Jesus likewise directed RODIL to pay its realty tax delinquency and ordered the issuance of a temporary
occupancy permit to the ASSOCIATION.
On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an action for specific performance, damages and injunction with
prayer for temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against the REPUBLIC,
De Jesus, Banas, Factora and the ASSOCIATION. De Jesus, Banas and Factora were later substituted by
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the
action for specific performance. On 31 May 1988 Factora issued Order No. 1 designating the Land
Management Bureau represented by Director Abelardo Palad, Jr. as custodian of all "former alien
properties" owned by the REPUBLIC. Pending the action for specific performance, RODIL signed a
renewal contract with Director Palad which was approved by Secretary Factora. The renewal contract
would extend the lease for ten (10) years from 1 September 1987. A supplement to the renewal
contract was subsequently entered into on 25 May 1992 where rentals on the previous lease contract
were increased. As a result, the action was dismissed in favour of Rodil. Rodil then filed an action for
unlawful detainer against Divisoria Footwear, Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto and Chua Huay Soon. Upon appeal,
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the Court of Appeals declared the contracts null and void and dismissed the actions for unlawful
detainer.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Rodil has the right to occupy the building by virtue of its lease contract with the
Republic.
DECISION/S:
Yes. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute
of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property
enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi.
Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual
elements required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present.
Private respondents claim that the agreements of 23 September 1987, 18 May 1992 and 25 May
1992 did not give rise to valid contracts.This is true only of the Contract of Lease entered into on 23
September 1987 which the REPUBLIC did not approve. RODIL neither alleged nor proved that such
approval was made known to it. The so-called approval of the lease contract was merely stated in an
internal memorandum of Secretary De Jesus addressed to Director Factora. This is evident from the fact
that Secretary De Jesus, in his letter, asked Factora to duly execute a lease contract and forward it to his
office for approval. The consequences of this fact are clear. The Civil Code provides that no contract shall
arise unless acceptance of the contract is communicated to the offeror. Until that moment, there is no
real meeting of the minds, no concurrence of offer and acceptance, hence, no contract.
However, the same is not true of the contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992. As argued by
RODIL, these contracts are not proscribed by law; neither is there a law prohibiting the execution of a
contract with provisions that are retroactive. Where there is nothing in a contract that is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy or public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained.
The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts because they were supposedly executed in
violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court. The appellate court
however failed to note that the order restrains the REPUBLIC from awarding the lease contract only as
regards respondent ASSOCIATION but not petitioner RODIL. While a temporary restraining order was
indeed issued against RODIL, it was issued only on 25 May 1992 or after the assailed contracts were
entered into. As correctly stated by petitioner, one cannot enjoin an act already fait accompli.
Private respondents argue that the "renewal contract" cannot "renew" a void contract.
However, they could cite no legal basis for this assertion. It would seem that respondents consider the
renewal contract to be a novation of the earlier lease contract of 23 September 1987. However,
novation is never presumed. Also, the title of a contract does not determine its nature. On the contrary,
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it is the specific provisions of the contract which dictate its nature. Furthermore, where a contract is
susceptible of two (2) interpretations, one that would make it valid and another that would make it
invalid, the latter interpretation is to be adopted. The assailed agreement of 18 May 1992, "Renewal of
Contract of Lease," merely states that the term of the contract would be for ten (10) years starting 1
September 1987. This is hardly conclusive of the existence of an intention by the parties to novate the
contract of 23 September 1987. Nor can it be argued that there is an implied novation for the requisite
incompatibility between the original contract and the subsequent one is not present. Based on this
factual milieu, the presumption of validity of contract cannot be said to have been overturned.
Respondent ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision of the Office of the President declaring null
and void the lease contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 should be counted in its favor. We do not
agree. The contention does not hold water. It is well-settled that a court's judgment in a case shall not
adversely affect persons who were not parties thereto.
CASE DIGEST #16:
G.R. NO. 6184 (FEBRUARY 28, 1958)
VICENTE SANTANDER, the heirs of the late FORTUNATA VILLINISO named CONSTANCIO, MATIAS,
GENOVEVA, PAZ, JOSE, IRENEO, and ANATALIA all surnamed SANTANDER and CRISPULO
TAJANLANGIT, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MANUEL VILLANUEVA and CELEDONIA ASUNCION, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
On July 29, 1937, a homestead patent covering a tract of land of over six hectares situated in the
Municipality of Midsayap, Province of Cotabato, was granted to appellant Vicente Santander, married to
Fortunata Villiniso, and on July 8, 1938, Original Certificate of Title No. 1497 was issued to Santander by
the Register of Deeds of Cotabato.
On February 26, 1942, Santander signed a document purporting to be an absolute sale of a two-
hectare portion of his homestead to Celedonia Asuncion, married to Manuel Villanueva, for price of
P480 (Exhibit "I"). It was expressly stipulated in the deed that the conveyance was to become effective
only after the approval of the authorities concerned. Possession of the land conveyed was, upon
execution of the document, transferred to the buyer.
Seven years later, on November 2, 1948, Santander and his children (as the heirs of his deceased
wife) commenced this action in the court below against Celedonia Asuncion Manuel Villanueva, to
recover the two-hectare portion of Santander's homestead in defendants' possession, on the theory
that the land was transferred to Asuncion only in mortgage to secure loan of P180 obtained from her by
Santander way back in June, 1940, and offering to pay defendants the alleged loan. Defendants
answered, denying the allegations of the complaint, and claiming to have purchased the land in question
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from Santander on February 26, 1942 by virtue of the deed of sale Exh. "1", and that said sale had
already been approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on August 2, 1947 (Exhs. "3" and
"3-A") (copies of Exhs. "1" and "3-A" were attached to the answer). Confronted with the deed of sale
Exh. "1" and the corresponding approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, plaintiffs
amended their complaint alleging that the deed of sale Exh. "1" is false and does not express the true
intent and agreement of the parties and that, in any case, said sale is null and void, having been
executed within five years from the issuance of Santander's patent. Defendants filed an amended
answer, insisting on the validity of the sale Exh. "1" in view of the subsequent approval thereof by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the plaintiffs and appellants to pay defendants
and appellees the sum of sixty thousand pesos (p60,000.00) as the alleged repurchase price of the
litigated portion of two hectares of land which forms part of the homestead of said appellants,
notwithstanding the fact that it pronounce the nullity and invalidity of the deed of sale (exh. "1")
involving said portion and notwithstanding further the fact that the stipulated consideration thereof is
only four hundred eighty (p480.00) pesos.
DECISION/S:
There is no question that the sale Exh. "1" was made within five years from the issuance of
appellant Santander's homestead patent on July 29, 1937. It has been the consistent ruling of this Court
that conveyances of homestead of this nature are null and void from inception (Eugenio vs. Perdido, 97
Phil., 41; Acierto vs. De los Santos, 95 Phil., 887; De los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap,
94 Phil., 405; 50 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 1588; and others); and in line with this precedent, the document Exh.
"1" must be declared null and void, and the land conveyed ordered returned to appellants upon their
return to appellants of the purchase price of P480.00.
The subsequent approval of the conveyance by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on August 2, 1947 could not have validated a sale that was void from its inception. As we
have held in the case of De los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, supra, and Pascua vs.
Talens, 80 Phil., 792; 45 Off. Gaz., No. 9 (Supp.), 413, the provisions of law which prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead within five years after the grant of the patent is mandatory, and can not
be obviated even if official approval is granted beyond the expiration of the period. Besides, the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (Exhs. "3" and "3-A") appears to have been given
upon the erroneous assumption that the patent was issued in 1936, in which case said sale would have
been executed after five years from the date of Santander's patent and no longer prohibited by law. The
truth, however, is that Santander's patent was issued on July 29, 1937, and the sale Exh. "1" was made
on February 26, 1942, or within five years from the date of the patent. The approval of the Secretary
was, therefore, based on a mistake of fact, and such is likewise void and of no effect whatsoever.
CASE DIGEST #17:

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G.R. NO. 34022 (MARCH 24, 1972)
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY
WARDEN OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. NOS. L-34046-7 (MARCH 24, 1972)
FERNANDO BAUTISTA, SR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet,
Second Judicial District, Branch III, et al., respondents.
FACTS:
The question raised in these certiorari proceedings is the scope to be accorded the
constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and
breach of the peace.
Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegate of the present
Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above
constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code
penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any
member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a
penalty higher than prision mayor."
Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, for falsification of a public document and for
violation of the Revised Election Code.
The Solicitor General dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision
does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical
inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it
would be unconstitutional.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not senators should be immune from the criminal charges.
DECISION/S:
No. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution, the immunity from arrest
does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the
accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. Breach
of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute.
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It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any
breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. There is a full recognition of the necessity to
have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities.
When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged
class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would
be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the
same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an
unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a
strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.
CASE DIGEST #18:
G.R. NO. L-28519 (FEBRUARY 17, 1968)
RICARDO PARULAN, Petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release immediately and without delay the
body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief prayed for on certain
allegations in the petition, to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary at
Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the administrative and supervisory control of the respondent Director of
Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the
crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, was
rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was charged.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has the jurisdiction to try and decide the
case and to impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense with which he was charged
- evasion of service of sentence.
DECISION/S:
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Place where action is to be instituted. - (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality of province where the offense was committed or any
of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
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There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may
have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the violation
of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or malversation and
abduction may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the crimes of kidnapping and
illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another
and libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated from one province to another. To this
latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of service of sentence, when the prisoner in his
attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the
purpose of the law, moves from one place to another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is
a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force,
however long it may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict shall have escaped from the
place of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the
service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without
warrant, at any place where he may be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in
support of this conclusion, for, under section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a person may be
arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from confinement. Undoubtedly, this right of arrest
without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the
continuous act of committing a crime - evading the service of his sentence.
CASE DIGEST #19:
G.R. NO. 9964 (FEBRUARY 11, 1915)
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEON BANDINO, Defendant-Appellee.
FACTS:
On December 4, 1912, the municipal president of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, filed a written
complaint in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, charging Leon Bandino with the crime of
faithlessness in the custody of prisoners committed with reckless negligence. After making the proper
investigation, the justice of the peace transmitted the record of the proceedings to the Court of First
Instance. Thereafter the provincial fiscal, on July 30, 1913, filed an information wherein he charged the
said Leon Bandino with the aforementioned crime, alleging that the accused, a municipal
policeman having under his care and guard one Juan Lescano, who was serving a sentence in the
"municipal jail of the said pueblo, did, with great carelessness and unjustified negligence, grant him
permission to go and buy some cigarettes near the place where he was held in custody; that the
prisoner, taking advantage of the confusion in the crowd there, fled from the custody of the accused;
with violation of article 358 in connection with article 568 of the Penal Code.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is a connivance between the accused and the said prisoner.
ABPS3-A
DECISION/S:
In the existence and commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of prisoners, it is
essential that there should have been, on the part of the custodian, connivance in the escape of the
prisoner. If the public officer charged with guarding the fugitive did not connive with him, then he did
not violate the law and is not guilty of the crime of faithlessness in the discharge of his duty to guard the
prisoner.
The renowned juridical writer Escriche, in his dictionary "Legislacion y Jurisprudencia," defines
the word "connivance" to be "dissimulation or tolerance, in the superior, of infractions or
transgressions committed by his inferiors or subordinates against the institutions or laws under which
they live."
It may perhaps be true that the accused had no knowledge that the prisoner Lescano would
escape, and that he did not permit him to do so, but it is unquestionable that he did permit him to go
out of the municipal jail, thus affording him an opportunity to get away with ease. Therefore the
prisoner's escape was effected through the tolerance of his custodian, and is deemed also to have been
by connivance with the latter.
According to the rules established by the courts, there is real and actual evasion of service of a
sentence when the custodian, failing intentionally or maliciously to perform the duties of his office,
and conniving with the prisoner, permits him to obtain a relaxation of his imprisonment and to escape
the punishment of being deprived of his liberty, thus making the penalty ineffectual, although the
convict "may not have fled, and where the prisoner's leaving the jail and his evasion of service of the
sentence were effected with the consent and tolerance of the custodian, or rather in agreement and
connivance with him.
CASE DIGEST #20:
G.R. NO.12127 (OCTOBER 13, 1917)
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELADIO CINCO and EUSEBIO REDONA, defendants-
appellants.
FACTS:
It appears that Eusebio Redoña had been deputized to conduct a ale under an execution issuing
from the Court of First Instance of said province, which sale by advertised to take place at the municipal
building in Borongan, Samar, on the 10th day of October, 1914. On that day the property was properly
put up at auction, but according to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, no bid or offer
for the same, or any part thereof, was made by any person during the lawful hours of sale, and as a
result the property remained unsold. On the other hand the witnesses for the defense testify that the
defendant Eladio Cinco made a bid and became the purchaser of the property as sole bidder.
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The theory of the prosecution is that no such sale took place and that by collusion between the
defendants a false return was made showing that Eladio Cinco had become the purchaser of the
property. The trial court so found and we see no reason for disturbing this finding. At any rate the
defendant Redoña, as deputy sheriff, prepared a return of the execution showing that Cinco had
become purchaser at the execution sale, and that the purchase price (P160) had been paid by him to
Redoña.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the offense in this case is punishable under Article 304 of the Revised Penal
Code.
DECISION/S:
In order to sustain a conviction for the falsification of a private document it is necessary to prove that
the falsification was committed to the damage of another, or with the intent to cause such damage.
That this condition is fulfilled in the present case appears obvious for two reasons. In the first
place the falsification was effected for the purpose of giving the appearance of legal validity to the sale,
whereby the debtors in the execution, being the owners of the land, were wrongfully dispossessed; and
in the second place the receipt itself purported to extinguish an obligation which had not been in fact
satisfied. It will be another that the receipt to Redoña was not a counterfeit of the receipt originally
given to Cinco but was a new receipt to Redoña. Besides as we have already seen, Eladio Cinco had paid
only P50 to the judgment creditors when the first receipt was taken by himself; and consequently the
best in any event had been only in part extinguished.
Furthermore the case for the prosecution is evidently not affected by the fact that the whole
transaction was probably fraudulent and that the sale could have been avoided in a proper proceeding.
The falsification of a receipt may clearly sustain a conviction notwithstanding the fact that the principal
debt may be voidable; for the receipt shows the absolute extinguishment of the liability to the extent of
the amount stated therein.
It is however, the opinion of the court that the offense in this case is punishable under article
304 of the Penal Code, in relation with subsection 2 of article 300, notwithstanding statements to be
found in some of the cases tending to a different conclusion. (U. S. vs. Buenaventura, 1 Phil., 428.) In
United States vs. Braga (12 Phil., 202, the accused had used a rubber stamp bearing the name of the
company by which he was employed, signing his own name in connection therewith. He had authority
so to use the stamp for the purpose of buying goods for the company, but not for the purpose of
obtaining money. It was held that in so signing an order by which he obtained money he was guilty of
falsification under article 304 of the Penal Code, in connection with subsection 2 of article 300, for the
reason that in effecting the transaction in question he made it appear that the company was a party
thereto when, as a matter of fact, it did not participate therein.
CASE DIGEST #21:

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G.R. NO. 39047 (APRIL 30, 1985)
ALBERTO PASCUA, CRISPINA PASCUA, SOTERA PASCUA, and EDUARDO MOLINA, petitioners, vs. HON.
ALFREDO C. FLORENDO, CFI of CAGAYAN, CLEMENTE CASTRO, and JULIANA O. CASTRO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against the private
respondents, spouses Clemente and Juliana Castro. The latter, as defendants, in lieu of filing an answer,
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and
that the same is already barred by the statute of limitations.
The trial court denied the respondents' motion after finding that the grounds relied upon by
them did not appear on the face of the complaint. The court subsequently declared the respondents in
default for their having failed to file an answer within the reglementary period. Thus, the petitioners
proceeded to present their evidence ex-parte.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there was fraud committed by Martin Pascua in selling the entire property and
that the action for relief has already prescribed.
DECISION/S:
From the evidence of the plaintiffs, the Court finds that there was really fraud committed by
Martin Pascua in selling the entire property which said Martin Pascua and plaintiffs inherited from their
parents thus excluding the shares of the plaintiffs. Certainly, Martin Pascua could only sell one-fifth of
the property and that the four-fifths were fraudulently conveyed by him. It is clear that there was fraud
on the part of Martin Pascua in selling the shares of his brother and sisters. The action for relief on the
ground of fraud, however, may be brought only within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
(Article 1391, New Civil Code; Section 43 (c) Act 190).
Moreover, even if we add the lower court's finding that there was fraud on the part of Martin
Pascua when he effected the sale of the disputed lot in favor of the respondents, the petitioners are still
barred from recovering the lot because their action should have been filed within four (4) years from
their discovery of the fraud, which in turn, is deemed at the latest to have taken place in 1958, when the
respondents were issued an original certificate of title. This was our ruling in the case of Balbin v.
Medalla (108 SCRA 666) where we stated:
An action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute
of limitations, which requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when the petitioners
herein were issued original certificates of title through either homestead or free patent grants,
for the registration of said patents constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. (Gerona
v. de Guzman, 11 SCRA 153, and cited cases thereof ).
ABPS3-A
In the case at bar, the latest patent was issued on October 14, 1959. There is, therefore, merit in
petitioners' contention that if any action for reconveyance should be commenced, the same should be
filed on or before October 14, 1963. But private respondents' complaint for reconveyance and
annulment of titles with damages was filed only on August 30, 1973 or more than 14 years had already
elapsed from the date of the issuance of the respective titles of the defendants. Consequently, the
action for reconveyance of land titled in the names of defendants (petitioners herein) had already
prescribed.
CASE DIGEST #22:
A.M. NO. OCA-01-5 (AUGUST 1, 2002)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NCR, represented by Nelson L. Acebedo, Dir. IV, Office of the Legal
Affairs, complainant, vs. REYNALDO B. STA. ANA, HRMO I, Leave Division, OCA, respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent gained employment in the Office of the Court Administrator, Supreme Court in
1976. He started as a Laborer and was later promoted to the position of Human Resource Management
Officer I. Sometime in 1996, respondent applied for promotion as Human Resource Management Officer
III. In support of his application for promotion to the said position, he submitted the following
documents:
(1) a Certificate of Eligibility purportedly issued by the Civil Service Commission certifying that
respondent Sta. Ana passed the Career Service Professional examination on February 18, 1996 with a
rating of 83.8%;1 and
(2) a Personal Data Sheet (PDS) dated August 5, 1996 stating, under Item 18, that he passed the Career
Service Professional examination on February 18, 1996 with a rating of 83.8%.2
Upon verification by Atty. Dante Huerta, Field Officer of the Civil Service Commission in the
Supreme Court, it was found that respondent Sta. Ana was not in the CSC-NCR Master List of those who
passed the MOWE Career Service Professional Examination given by the Civil Service Commission on
February 18, 1996 at Ramon Magsaysay High School.3 Atty. Huerta recommended the filing of a formal
charge against respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondent is liable of falsification and shall be dismissed from service in the
government.
DECISION/S:
Under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of "use of falsified
documents" are (1) that the offender knew that document was falsified by another person; (2) that the
false document is embraced in Art. 171 or in any subdivisions 1 or 2 of Art. 172; (3) that he used such
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document (not in judicial proceedings); and (4) that the use of the false document caused damage to
another or at least it was used with intent to cause such damage.1âwphi1.nêt
It cannot be gainsaid that respondent was well aware that the certificate of eligibility he
submitted was false because he knew for a fact that he did not pass the career service examination. It is,
likewise, undeniable that his use of such false document in support of his promotion to HRMO III
prejudiced the other applicants who were genuinely qualified for the position. Then Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa had already issued his official appointment, even though he neither assumed the position nor
received the compensation and benefits pertaining thereto.
Respondent's act of indicating in his personal data sheet that he passed that career service
professional examination when in fact he did not, also makes him liable for falsification of a document
by making an untruthful statement in a narration of facts, as defined under Art. 171, par. 4, of the
Revised Penal Code. In falsification by false narration of facts, (1) the offender makes untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him; (3) the facts narrated are absolutely false; and (4) it was made with a wrongful intent to injure a
third person.
The facts and evidence, coupled with respondent's admission, sufficiently established his
culpability. Respondent's use of a false certificate of eligibility constitutes an act of dishonesty under civil
service rules and his act of making a false statement in his personal data sheet renders him
administratively liable for falsification. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987,
dishonesty (par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of
dismissal from service upon commission of the first offense.
On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on
employees found guilty of these offenses.There is no reason why respondent should be treated
differently. The Court takes note of the fact that initially, respondent did not controvert this evidence
against him. Neither did he admit the charge. In fact, deliberately or otherwise, respondent did not
participate in the proceedings before the CSC. He did not file any answer and failed to appear in the
scheduled hearings despite due notice. When he was found guilty of the charge by the CSC-OLA and was
recommended for dismissal, he filed a petition to transfer jurisdiction to the Office of the Court
Administrator and/or motion to dismiss the case. It was only when his case was transferred to the OCA
did he confess his guilt, more than three years after he was first charged in the CSC.
CASE DIGEST #23:
G.R. NO. 192565 (FEBRUARY 28, 2012)
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
FACTS:
ABPS3-A
Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury when she falsely declared under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping. Tomas filed a motion to quash citing that the Makati MTC has no
jurisdiction as the document was submitted and used in Pasay and that there was no crime committed
as not all of the elements of perjury was present.
The lower courts denied the motion saying that Makati has jurisdiction as it was notarized there
and ruled that she was sufficiently charged with perjury.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati
City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification
was presented to the trial court.
DECISION/S:
The SC denied the petition and held that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the
proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.
The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be
determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who “makes an affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires.” The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is
consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized
person.
Based on these considerations, SC held that its ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article
183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate
for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his
or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When
the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the
actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is
submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath
was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime
committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to
be constitutive of the crime committed.
CASE DIGEST #24:
G.R. NO. 11522 (SEPTEMBER 26, 1916)
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TO LEE PIU, defendant-appellant.

ABPS3-A
FACTS:
The appellant was charged with using a false name. The evidence is to the effect that he came to
the Philippine Islands in 1911 and presented a section six certificate, which is attached to the record as
Exhibit A, wherein his name appears as To Lee Piu. Thereafter, he attached to an application for a
passport the name Toribio Jalijali. Said application was accompanied by the affidavits of two witnesses
and by a baptismal certificate showing that a person by that name was born in the Philippine Islands in
1878. On the trial there was no denial of the fact that appellant signed the name Toribio Jalijali to the
application for a passport; and the only evidence which may be regarded as having been contradicted in
the case is that given by the defendant himself when he testified that he was born in the Philippine
Islands, that his name is Toribio Jalijali, that he went to China at an early age, and, feeling doubtful as to
his ability to prove his right to reenter, applied to the American consul at Canton for a section six
certificate; that, on such application, he stated to the consul that his name was Toribio Jalijali, and that,
upon being told by the clerk of the consulate that it was not necessary to put his surname in such
application, wrote therein the Christian name Toribio alone.
The charge is prosecuted on the theory that To Lee Piu appellant's correct name and that the
name Toribio Jalijali is false.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the conviction must stand.

2. Whether or not the two names in question were different.
3. Whether or not that the name alleged to be false was in fact fase.
DECISION/S:
1. We are satisfied on the whole case that the conviction must stand. From the fact and
circumstances in evidence it appears established beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant
used the name of another person for the purpose of deceiving Government and, by that
deception, to obtain a passport. He came to the Philippine Islands as a Chinese person traveling
for curiosity and pleasure. He so represented himself to the American consul at Canton and, by
that representation, obtained a section six certificate. In his application for that certificate he
stated that he was a Chinese person, and that his name was To Lee Piu .He came to the
Philippine Islands upon those representations; and, by virtue of the certificate obtained thereby,
was permitted to enter the country. Desiring to return to China, or travel in other parts of the
world and, at the same time, be permitted to return to the Philippine Islands at will, he sought
to obtain a passport as a citizen of the Philippine Islands under the sovereignty of the United
States. In order to accomplish his purpose it was necessary for him to show to the authorities of
the Philippine Islands issuing passport that he was in fact a citizen of the Philippine Islands and
as such entitled to a passport. He thereupon took unto himself a Filipino name, one not his own,
and made his application for a passport attaching to his application the name Toribio Jalijali.
ABPS3-A
2. As to the difference between the two names, To Lee Piu and Toribio Jalijali, a mere glance at, or
a single pronunciation of, the two names serves to demonstrate beyond question their
complete unlikeness. It is true that the name Toribio when pronounced by a Chinaman may
sound like To Lee Piu. But it must be observed, in the first place, that the name assumed by the
appellant and signed to the application for a passport is not Toribio but Toribio Jalijali; and, in
the second place, that the name assumed by the appellant in China and that under which he
presented himself to the American consul at Canton, was not Toribio nor Toribio Jalijali, but To
Lee Piu, thus clearly implying that he belonged to the family or tribe of To, and, therefore, was
not of Philippine origin or birth. The claim of the appellant that the clerk of the American
consulate at Canton told him that, in making an application for a section six certificate it was
unnecessary to give his surname, cannot be accepted. Such a contention is so unusual and so
opposed to universal experience that it must fall of its own weight. It seems incredible that an
American consul, or any of his responsible employees, would give such information to a Chinese
person applying for the privilege of entering American territory. It cannot be accepted without
strong corroborative proof that an American consul, or his accredited representative, would
inform the appellant that the most important of his two names, his family name, could be
omitted or entirely disregarded in a proceeding having for its main purpose his identification.
The surname is the only name by which identification is rendered possible. The Christian name,
while being the specific and individual name, is of no value whatever for identification purposes.
One of the most important duties of American officials engaged in permitting the entry of
Chinese persons into American territory is to establish and preserve the identity of the particular
individual to be admitted. Without the ability to identify all control over the admission of
Chinese is lost. It is not to be believed that an American official whose duty it is to enforce the
laws pertaining to Chinese exclusion and to protect the territory of the United States from an
invasion of Chinese laborers, would inform a Chinaman desiring to enter American territory that
he might dispense with the only evidence upon which an identification of him could be based.
The Christian name is without value for the purposes of identification until after the surname is
known.
3. That the name Toribio Jalijali was a false name as applied to the appellant in this case is in our
judgment beyond question in the record. It is undoubted that To Lee Piu was the name by which
the appellant was known in China. It is the name he gave to the American consul and it is the
only name he gave. He alleged that he was born in China in October, 1878, and applied for a
certificate which is required of Chinese persons only. Upon his own statements and the
statement of his government he was given a section six certificate. It would seem to us that
these facts are sufficient to establish, prima facie at least, that the appellant is a Chinese person
and a Chinese subject; that he was born in China in October, 1878; and that his name is To Lee
Piu. These facts being established it is incumbent on the appellant to relieve himself of the
charge that, when he stated under oath in his application for a passport that his name was
Toribio Jalijali and that he was born in Santa Cruz, Manila, on the 27th of April, 1878, he did not
tell the truth; or to give such proof with reference thereto as would raise in the mind of the trial
court a reasonable doubt as to his true name. The only evidence offered by the appellant in this
ABPS3-A
connection was a certificate of baptism of an infant named Toribio Jalijali, born in Santa Cruz,
Manila, in April, 1878. The names of several witnesses appear in this certificate. None of them
were produced on the trial; nor was it shown that these witnesses, or any of them, were dead,
or that the appellant was unable to procure their presence at the trial. No effort was made to
find or offer as a witness his alleged father or mother.
CASE DIGEST #25:
G.R. NO. 40203 (AUGUST 21, 1990)
PATERNO J. QUANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO B. ECHAVEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
A parcel of land with an area of about 3,710 square meters, situated in Mandawe, Cebu, in the
name of the registered owner, Rehabilitation 'Finance Corporation (RFC), now the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are lands belonging to Francisco Echavez, private respondent
herein, and petitioner Paterno J. Ouano.
The property was offered for sale by public bidding by the RFC. Now, it appears that prior to the
second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was
accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties.
As expected, the highest bid submitted, and thus accepted by the RFC, was that of Francisco
Echavez. That they both orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid at the second bidding called
by the RFC, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining
properties; and that to ensure success of their scheme, they had also agreed to induce the only other
party known to be interested in the property a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from
presenting a bid, 28 as they did succeed in inducing Mrs. Bonsucan's group to withdraw from the sale,
paying said group P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence does prescribe."
DECISION/S:
The SC said No. These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had
promised to share in the property in question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining from taking part
in the public auction, and they had attempted to cause and in fact succeeded in causing another bidder
to stay away from the auction.
In order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned. In so doing, they committed
the felony of machinations in public auctions defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code.
ABPS3-A
That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record, as is the fact that thereby
only one bid that of Echavez was entered for the 'land in consequence of which Echavez eventually
acquired it. The agreement therefore being criminal in character, the parties not only have no action
against each other but are both liable to prosecution and the things and price of their agreement subject
to disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in accordance with the so-called pari
delicto principle set out in the Civil Code.
Article 1409 of said Code declares as "inexistent and void from the beginning" those contracts,
among others, "whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy," or "expressly prohibited ... by law." Such contracts "cannot be ratified "the right to set
up the defense of illegality (cannot) be waived;" and, Article 1410 adds, the "action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence ... (thereof) does not prescribe." Furthermore, according to Article 1411 of
the same Code 30 — When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract,
and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action
against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.
The dismissal of Ouano's action by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals was thus
correct, being plainly in accord with the Civil Code provisions just referred to. 31 Article 1411 also
dictates the proper disposition of the land involved, i.e., "the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and
the instruments or tools with which it was committed," as mandated by the provisions of Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code, this being obviously the provision "of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of
effects or instruments of a crime" that Article 1411 makes "applicable to the things or the price of the
contract."
CASE DIGEST #26:
G.R. NO. 124360 (NOVEMBER 5, 1997)
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
G.R. NO. 127867 (NOVEMBER 5, 1997)
EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TANADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS
FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS, petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN
TORRES in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as the
Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation and PILIPINAS SHELL
Corporation, respondents.
FACTS:
In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the enactment of R.A. No.
7638) to control energy-related government activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180 (Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted in pursuance to the deregulation of the power and
energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any person or entity was allowed to import and
ABPS3-A
market crude oil and petroleum products, and to lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities.
Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 since the
imposition of tarrif violates the equal protection clause and bars the entry of others in the oil industry
business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the constitution requiring
every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title.
In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique Garcia,
Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition and Sanlakas
argued that R.A. No. 8180, specifically Section 15 is unconstitutional because it: (1) gives undue
delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy by not providing a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry; (2) Executive Order No. 392, an order declaring the
implementation of the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, is arbitrary and unreasonable
because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the Oil Price Stabilization Plan- a condition not
found in R.A. No. 8180; and (3) Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de
facto cartel among Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation of constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable.
3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.
DECISION/S:
1. No, R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution
prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. The deregulation act
only benefits Petron, Shell and Caltex, the three major league players in the oil industry.
2. Yes, Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore considered void.
The depletion of OFSP is not one of the factors enumerated in R.A. No. 8180 to be considered in
declaring full deregulation of the oil industry. Therefore, the executive department, in its declaration of
E.O. No. 392, failed to follow faithfully the standards set in R.A. No. 8180, making it void.
3. No, section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. A
law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions as long as
they are not inconsistent with the foreign subject. Section 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to
ABPS3-A
the subject of the deregulation of the downstream industry which is R.A. No 8180, therefore it does not
violate the one title-one subject rule.
4. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of legislative
power. The tests to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power are the completeness test
and the sufficiency test. The completeness test demands that the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions such that when it reaches the delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The sufficiency test
demand an adequate guideline or limitation in the law to delineate the delegate’s authority. Section 15
provides for the time to start the full deregulation, which answers the completeness test. It also laid
down standard guide for the judgement of the President- he is to time it as far as practicable when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of peso to dollar is stable- which answers the sufficiency test.

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CASE DIGEST #1:

G.R. NO. 6025-26 (JULY 18, 1956)

Whether or not rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.

CASE DIGEST #2:

G.R. No. 231658

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A.

G.R. No. 231771

G.R. No. 231774

Nevertheless, several persons filed a petition (Cullamat Petition, Mohamad

a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;

b. required to obtain favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense; or

a. What are the parameters for review?

b. Who has the burden of proof?

c. What is the threshold of evidence?

a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups; or

a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or

9.) Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:

a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or

CASE DIGEST #3:

G.R. NO. 172070-72 (JUNE 1,2007)

VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B. ECHANIS, and REY CLARO C.

Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No.

1. Whether or not the inquest proceeding against Beltran was valid.

CASE DIGEST #4:

G.R. NOS. 138943-44 (SEPTEMBER 17, 2001)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HENRY ALMAZAN, accused-appellant.

Murder and Frustrated Murder aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation.

Contention of the Accused:

-Prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

-The testimony of Shirley Abordo, common-law wife of Nilo, is merely hearsay.

-The testimony of Vicente has alleged inconsistencies in various vital points.

Contention of the State:

CASE DIGEST #5:

G.R. NO. 164007 (AUGUST 10, 2006)

CASE DIGEST #6:

G.R. NO. 17748 (MARCH 4, 1922)

Whether or not the common crimes are absorbed in sedition.

CASE DIGEST #7:

G.R. NO. 5803 (NOVEMBER 29, 1954)

CASE DIGEST #8:

G.R. NO. 12686 (OCTOBER 24, 1963)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. KAMLON HADJI, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

CASE DIGEST #9:

G.R. No. 81567 (October 3, 1991)

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991

G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,

G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.

CASE DIGEST #10

CASE DIGEST #11:

G.R. NO. 36278 (OCTOBER 26, 1932)

Whether or not the Communist Party of the Philippines is an illegal association.

CASE DIGEST #12:

G.R. NO. 1513 (FEBRUARY 12, 1904)

THE UNITED STATES, petitioner-appellee, vs. CASIANO SADIAN, defendant-appellant.

CASE DIGEST #13:

G.R. NO. 8722 (SEPTEMBER 10, 1913)

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BUENAVENTURA BALCORTA, defendant-appellant.