LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant vs DELFIN N.

JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial

Administrator of the TESTATE ESTATE of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee
GR L-15737, February 28, 1962

Ponente: Justice JBL Reyes

Principles/Doctrines: Interpretation of Wills and Testaments: Intent of testator must govern
Nature of the Case: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing plaintiff-appellant’s
complaint for recovery of certain properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff’s granduncle Nicolas Villaflor, and
which he granted to his widow, Fausta Nepomuceno.

Date of Death: MARCH 3, 1922 (Nicolas) May 1, 1956 (Fausta)

Kind of Succession: TESTATE-HOLOGRAPHIC WILL (Nicolas) NOT MENTIONED (Fausta)
Cause of Death: NOT MENTIONED

FACTS:

On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolás Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own
handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal
properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor. Clause 6th of the will contains the institution of heirs
while the 12th clause provided that the 6th and 7th clause would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with
Fausta Nepomuceno. On March 3, 1922, Nicolas died without begetting any child with his wife Fausta. Already widowed,
Fausta instituted a special proceeding before the CFI of Zambales for the settlement of her husband’s estate where she was
appointed as judicial administratrix. A project of partition was approved by the court and the proceeding was thereafter
declared closed. By virtue of the approval of such partition, Fausta received the use and possession (NOT OWNERSHIP) of
all the real and personal properties mentioned in the will.

On May 1, 1956, Fausta died without having contracted a second marriage and without having begotten a child. An estate
proceeding ensued where defendant Delfin N. Juico was appointed as judicial administrator.

Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda de Villanueva, the great niece, is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by
Nicolas in his will. He filed an action for recovery of certain properties against the administrator of the estate of Fausta.
Plaintiff LEONOR contends that upon the widow’s death, he became vested with the ownership of the real and personal
properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas, pursuant to the 8 th clause. Defendant DELFIN’s position, which was adopted by
the lower court, is that the title to the properties became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death on account of the fact
that she never remarried.

The lower court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff now comes before the court seeking an appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the interpretation of the will by the lower court showed the intent of the testator.

HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in the will of
Nicolas, was to invest his widow only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the 7 th clause, subject to the
condition that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was
meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the
expressions used by the deceased uso y , posesi mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the
phrase "usoy , posesión " instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly
did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or
enjoyment) during her life time. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir
together with the testator's brother

The Supreme Court, in holding Leonor as reversionary legatee that could succeed to the properties bequeathed by Nicolas,
discarded the expression “mientras viva” (while alive) and considered the words “uso y, posesio n” (use and possession). The
ruling of the lower court is in violation of Article 791.

ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather
than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to
be preferred which will prevent intestacy."

It is well noted that if the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-marriage of his widow, the words “use
and possession while alive” would have been unnecessary, since the widow could remarry during her lifetime. Article 790 of
the NCC provides:

ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use
them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained."
"Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary
intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was
unacquainted with such technical sense.
The Supreme Court finally held that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the
fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator’s words, unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise.

Consequently, the legacies should pass to Leonor, upon Fausta’s death. Fausta had no right to retain or dispose of the said
properties and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for the return.

The decision appealed was reversed and LEONOR was declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties
described in the will.