Logica Modernorum: Professorof Mediaevalphilosophyin The Universitiesof Nijmegenand Utrecht

LOGICA
MODERNORUM
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTOR'I'
OF EARLT TERMINIST LOGIC
E?
L.M.DE RIJK,PI—I.D.
Professorof MediaevalPhilosophyin the Universitiesof Nijmegenand Utrecht
.!
VOL. II - PART ONE
THE ORIGIN AND EARL? DEVELOPMENT OF THE
THEORV OF SUPPOSITION
ASSEN - MCMLXVII
VAN GORCUM & COMP. N.V. -DR. H. ]. PRAKKE & H. M. G. PRAKKE

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.
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PREFACE
In this work it will be attempted to show how the LOGICAMODERNORUM

had its origin, long before the thirteenth century, in the logical and gram-
matica! theories current in the Western uentres of studies: Paris, Oxford
and presumably & school in Northern ltaly'.
The First volume dealt with what was considered as one of the two
roots of this development: the twelfth century theories of fallacy. The
present volume discussesthe other source : the development of Mediaeval
grammar from an elementary discussionof (Latin) grammar to a lin-
guistic-semantictheory of (Latin) language.It x-vas the latter contribution
that was of extreme importance for the origin af [:he theory of snppu-
sition, and generally speaking, of terminist logic.
The purpose of this volume is to trace the details of the origin of the
theory of supposition, including appellation and copulation, and to
discuss the theory of the propcrties of terms as found about 1200.
Besides, some historica] evidence will be given for the origins of the
tracts dealing with the properties of syncategorematic terms and those
discussing the other specific elementa of the LOGICAMODERNORUM.
The author has thought it of some importance for further investigation
in this Held to edit in full the main treatises on which the present study
is based.They will be found in the second part of this book. They have
been arranged chronologically, except for the anestiones Victorinus,
which are to be considered as an extra.
The Index nominum,the Index locorumand the Indexsaphimratumaim at
completeness. The Index verborumet rerum is not exhaustive: it only trics
to give a number of words and phrases considered as important for our
understanding of the conceptual and doctrina] contents of the edited
tracts, and to facilitate the reader's oricntation in this study.
The author is highly indebted to all those who have contributed to
the completion of this volume, especially to those who took over the
troublesome work of compiling some of the Indexes. I wish to express
my cordial thanks to Mr H. A. G. Braakhuis For making the Indexlocorum
and the Index nominum,and to Mr C. H. ]. M. Kneepkens, who spent
much of his time, labour, and sagmcityr
to compose an extensive Index
sophismatumet exemplorum.
] also oFfer my gratitude to all those of my friends and colleagucäs
who
have continually accompanied me with their interest and encouragement
during the preparation of this work. Miss Marie Theräse d'Alverny
(Paris, Poitiers), ProfessorBernhard Bisschoff (Munich) and Mr Pierre
Michaud-Quantin (Paris) were kind enough to give me valuable in-
formation on some manuscripts. The kind co-operation of the Con-
servatorsof the manuscriptcollectionsof manyLibraries (Assisi,Berlin,
Bruges, Cambridge, Chartres, Cologne, Dresden, Erfurt, Florence,
Leyden, London, Marburg, Milan, Munich, Nuremberg, Orleans,
Oxford, Padua, Paris, Tours, Tübingen, Vatican City, Venice, Vienna,
and Wolfenbüttel) hasbeen of substantialhelp for me.. Mr W. ]. M.
Bronzwaer was kind enough to purify' barbarisms and to correct
other offences againstthe English language,for which ] am very grateful.
I owe & great debt of gratitude to the Netherlands Organisation for
the Advancement of Pure Research(Z.W.O.), who madethe publication
of this work possible through their generoüs Enancialhelp.. [ exPressmy
corclial thanks to the editors of the series WijsgcrigeTekstencn Studies,
Miss C. ] de Vogel and Mr K. Kuypers, and to the Boardof Curators
of the Universit)r of Utrecht, for their x-xfillingnessto give the work &
place in this series. Finall)r I thank the Publisher and his assistantsfor
the great care and accuracy expended on the publication.
Nijmegen, November 1967 L. M. DE RIJK

CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME
PART ONE
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION. ANALï'SIS OF THE

MANUSCRIPTS CONCERNED. 11-94
. . . . . . . . . . .
] - Introduction 2 - Analysisof the Manuscripts: (l) Berlin, M:
Lat. oct. 76 (2) Berlin, MsLar. oct. 262 (3) Cologne, Dombiblio-
thek, Ms 201 (4) London, British Museum, Roya!Mss2 D IX
(5) London, British Museum, RayalMss2 D XXX (6) London,
British Museum,RoyalMss8 A VI (7) London, British Museum,
qua! M;: 9 E XII (8) London, British Museum, 12 F XIX
(9) London, British Museum, Add. Mss8167 (10) Munich, C.]..M.
4652 (11)Munich, C.L.M. 14.458 (12) Munich, C.L.M. 14.763
(13) Nuremberg,Germ. Nat. Museum, M: 27.773 (14) Oxford,
BodleianLibrary, Digby 2 (15) Oxford, Bodleian'Libraly, Digby24
(16) Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby 174 (17) Oxford, Bodleian
Library, Laud.Lat. 67 (18) Paris, B.N.Lat. 11.412 (19) Paris,
B.N.Lat. 14.069 (20) Paris, B.N.La£. 15.130 (21) Paris, B.N.Lar..
lS.14l (22) Paris, B.N.Lat. 15.170 (23) Vienna, l*'.P.L.
2486 (24) Vienna, V.P.L. 2499 (25) Wolfenbüttel, Cod.56.20.
Aug. 3"
CHAPTER ll ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIAEVAL

GRAMMAR..................... 95-125
1 - lntroduction 2 - Same Preliminary Remarks on the Develop-

ment of Grammar in the Middle Ages 3 - The Doctrine of the Verb
Substantive from the Late Eleventh Century to about 1140
4 - Twelfth Century Grammar as an Autonomous Art 5 - On the
ContextualApproachmadeby the Grammarians
after PeterHelyas
6 - Some Additional Remarks on the Interplay between Mediaeval
Grammar and Aristotelem Logic and Philosophy 7 - The Con-
tcxtual Approach as the Key-Notion of Terminism
CHAPTER 111 THE INCREASING USE OF SPECIAL TEXT-

BOOKS OF LOGIC IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE
TWELFTH CENTURT 126-176
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 - On the lntrusion of Dialectic into the Whole Fielcl of Knowledge
2 - Two Tract's on Logic from the School of William of Champeaux
dialeticasecundumWilgelmum (I.)) A reportatiaof a
(a) Introductiones
School-Dispute in the School 01 St Victor 3 - Four Compendia of
Logic from the School of Mont Ste Geneviäve (a) Introductiones
minoresMontane (b) Introductione:maioresMonranc (c) A Fragment
of Another Compendiumof Logic (cl) An Abbreviation of some
Montane 4 - Two Compendia01'Logic found in Berlin,
Introducrianeæ
Lat. oct. 76 (a) Introductionesdialetica (b) A Fragment of Another
Compendium 5 - The Nuremberg ExcerptaIntroductianum:Various
Excerpts from the School of the Petit Pont and from other Schools
6 - The Compendium found in Berlin, Lat. oct. 262 7 - On the
General Character of these Compendia 8 - Some Notes on the
Terms 'introductfo', 'summa', and 'an' (a) introduccia(nes)(b)
summa(e) (c) am
CHAPTER IV THE THEORV OF SlGNlFlCATlON IN

TWELFTH CENTURV LOGlC UP TO ABOUT 1140 177-220
.
1 - Preliminary: Boethius 2 - William of Champeaux 3 - Peter
Abailard (a) signy'ï'catia
and impmitia (inventio, institutio) (IJ) no—
mina sumpta- nominasubstantiva(substantialia) (c) res - intellectus,
vox (d) theory of predication 4- - Adamand the School of the
Petit Pont 5 - Alberic of Parisand His School (a) the Periher-
in Paris, B.N.Lat. 15.015 (b) The Periher-
meneias-commentary
meneias-commentary in Berlin, Lat. Fol. 624 (c) The Introductiones
maioresin Paris,B.N.La£.15.141 (d) the Categoriae-commentaryin
Padua,Bibl. Univ. 2084- 6 - The Meralogiconof John of Salisbury
CHAPTER V ON THE THEORï OF SlGNlFlCATlON IN

TWELFTH CENTURV GRAMMAR. 221-263
1 - William of Conches 2 - PetrusHelyas 3 - The Commentary

on Priscian in Vienna, V.P. L. 2486 4- - The Gloss Promisimus
CHAPTER VI THE TRACT ON LOGIC CONTAINED [N

MS OXFORD, 0165? 174. ANALTSIS OF lTS
CONTENT. [TS ORIGIN AND DATE 264-291
.
A - General Survey of Its Content B - Some Remarks on this
Treatise. lts Origin and Date
CHAPTER VII ARS MELIDUNA. ON THE THEORV OF

TERMS. 292-305
CHIAPTER VIII ARS MELIDUNA. ON THE DENOTATION

OF THE TERMS 306-318
.
CHAPTER IX ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEOR'I' OF PRO-

POSITION 319-356
.
CHAPTER )( ARS ;HEUDUNA. THE THEORV OF THE
ENUNTIABILE 357—
390
CHAPTER Xl SOME TREATISES ON LOGIC DATING

FROM ABOUT 1200. 391-4—07
I - TractatusAnagnini 2 - The Ars disputandi Burana preserved in

Munich, C.LM 4652 3 - The ArsdisputandiEmmerana preservedin
.
Munich, C.LM. 14.458 4-- On the Development of the Mnemonic
VersesUsedin MediaevalLogic 5 - Two Tracts Deprcdicabilibus
and De locis in Munich, C.L.M. I4.4-58 6 - A tract De univocatione
in Munich, C.]..M. 14.458
CHAPTERxn THE DIALECTICAMONACENSIS

PRESERVED
lN MUNICH, C.]..M. l4.763 4-08-4-[5
CHAPTER Xlll SOME EARLï OXFORD TRACTS ON

LOGlC 416-4—48
.........
l - BodleianLibrary, Ms Digby2, Ff. 26f-67V 2 - BodleianLibrary,
M.':nglgy 24, Ff. l7fü-45'f'3 3 - British Museum, qua! Mss12 F XIX,
Ff. 90'5-105'93 4- British Museum, RoyalMss 12 F XIX, Ff. 106?"-
-
110?b 5 - British Museum, Add. Mss 8167, Ff. 1391'3-196"?b
6 - The Relationshipof TheseCapies 7 - On Two RelatedCom-
pendia of Logic in London and Paris (3) A Compendiumof Logic
found in London, British Museum, Roya!Mss8 A VI (I:) A Com-
pendium of Logic found in Paris, B.N.Lar.. IS.l70 8 - On the
Reconstruction of the Original Treatise Cumsit. nostra(T) 9 - On
the Dates and Provenancesof the Treatises Discussed (a) The
Logica Cumsit nostra (IJ)The LOgicaUr dicit (c) The !ntroducüones
dialeticaparisiense:found in B.N.Lat. 15.170
CHAPTER XIV THE SUMME METENSES FOUND IN PARIS,

B.N.LAT. Il.412 449-490
.
CHAPTER XV THE DOCTRINE OF FALLACV AND THE

ORlGlN OF THE THEORIES OF SUPPOSITION 491-512
I - Univocation 2 - Figure of Speech 3 - The Fallacie Londinenm

4- - The Tract on Fallacies in the Dialectica Manaceniis
CHAPTERxw THE GRAMMATICAL ORlGlN AND

EARLV DEVELOPMENT 01: THE THEOR'f OF
APPELLATION(SUPPOSITION) 5l3-554-
1 - Preliminary Remarks 2 - The Terms 'supponere',

'suppositum',
and 'suppositia' as Grammatica] Terms in Twelfth Cantuar')rGrammar
3 Appellation
-
and Supposition in Some- Logical Tracts Dating from
the Third Quarter of the Twelfth Century 4- - Signj/i'cacfaand
Appellatia in the Ars Meliduna 5 - SigHWCta-cio,
Supposiria, and
Appellacioin the Pallade Landincnses6 - Signljfï'catioand Suppasicio
in the TractatusAnagnini 7 - Suppositionand Appellation in Four
Later Tracts
CHAPTER XVII THE LOGICAL THEORï OF THE PRO-

PERTIES OF TERMS UP TO ABOUT l200
.
l - The Problem of Meaning in the Middle Ages 2 —Appellation
3 - Supposition 4-- Suppositionand the RelatedNotions in the
sermonum5 - Copulatiün 6 - The various
Tractatusdepraprietatibus
kinds of supposition (a) communis discreta (b) determinata
- -
cmy'usa (c) cadum tantum - caqfusaet distributiva (d) mobilis -
inmobilis (e) restricm - ampliata ([ ) suppositio materialis (g) sup-
positio simplex (or maneriaiis) - sappasiciapersonalis 7 - Some Notes
on the Origin of the Ternünoloæf (a) materialis (l)) simplex
(c) manerialis (d) personalis (e) discretus (f ) communis (g) can-
fusus (h) discribuüvus (i) mobilis (j) descensus8 - An Additional
Note on the Origin of Other Tracts Characteristic of the Logica
Modernorum (3) De relativis (I)) De. gncgtegarcmatibus(c) De
impliciti: (421)De modis significandi (e) Sophismatalogicalia and
grammaticalia (f) De inwlubihbus (g) De obligationibus (h) De
consequentiis 9 Conclusion
-
BOOKS AND ARTICLES REFERRED TO

. .
LlST OF THE MANUSCRIPTS USED
LlST OF lNClPlTS
..... . . . ..... . .......
PART TWO
EDITION OF A NLIMBER OF TRACTS DATING

FROM c. ll30 UP TO c. 1220
] Introductiones Montane niinores

. ...........
ll Abbreviatio Montana
. . . . . ...............
III Excerpta Norimbergensia
. . . . . . . . . . ......
I De arte dialetica
. . . . . . .............
2 De arte disserendi
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....
3 Introductianes Norimbergenscs
. . . . . ..........
IV Ars Emmerana
V Ars Burana. 175-213
. . . ....................
VI Tractatus Anagninf 215-332
. .
lDepredicabiHbus............... 217-232
.....
2 De argumentationum generibus 233-257
3 De suppositionibus 258-282
......
4- 08 propositionum generibus earumque probatione 283-296
.....
555-598 5 De quinque dicdonum generibus 297-326
...............
6 De arte sophistica 327-332
VII Tracratusde univocatianeManacensis 333-35 [

..............
VIII IntroductionesParisiensis; 353-373
...................
IX Logica "Ur. dicit" 375-4-11
.....................
X Lagica "Cum sil: nostra" 413-4-5[
. . . . . . . . . . . .....
Xl Dialectica Manacensis 453-638
. ...................
XII FaHacieLandincnses 639-678
XIII FaHacfe Magistri Willelmi 679-702

..................
XIV Tracratus de praprietatibus sermonum 703-730
..............
XV anestiones Victorinus 73 l-769
....................
599-605
INDICES
606-607
A INDEX LOCORUM
608-614-
B INDEX NOMINUM
C INDEX VERBORUM ET RERUM
D INDEX SOPHISMATUM ET EXEMPLORUM
7-71
73-107
l09-l4l
lI3-126
127-133
134—14-1
143-174-
CHAPTER ]
INTRODUCTION. SHOR'I" ANALTSIS

OF THE MANUSCRIPTS CONCERNED
1 - Introduction
T he historians of logic all agree instating that it has not hitherto been
possible to trace the details of the develoPment of the earl)r doctrine of
supposition and, generally speaking, of the theory of the so-called proper-
ties of terms (praprietatesterminorum). The origins Of terminist logic are
rightly said to be asyet shrouded in darkness' However, this much seems
.
to be certain: the theorias of the logica modernorum,which were so
prominent and fundamenta], indeed, in Mediaeval logic, criteriology,
and metaphysics, were already taking shape in the second half' of the
twelfth centuryï.
-- .
As & matter of fact some remarkable attempts have been made to Ell
up this important gap in our knowledge of the history of logic. 1111952
Erwin Arnold published his inquir)r into the origin of the theory of
supposition, the later development of which was regarded by this author
as the root of modern European subjectivisnü. "l*he part of his study
which deals with the origin of the theory of supposition is, admittedly,
highly speculative. Arnold reduces the need 01 distinguishing several
kinds of snpposition to the attentive study which the Mediaeval scholars
1 See e.g. Joseph P. Mullally, TheSummulaclogicalcs.'JPeterqupain, Notre Dame 1945,

p. XXXIX; Ph. Boehner,Mediam!Lagic.An Outline 01 Ita Developmentfrom 1250to
c. 1400, Manchester 1952, p. 27; Gulio Preti, Studi sulla logicaformale ne! Medicam, in:
Rivista critica cli storia della FilosoEa 8 (1953), pp. 351-352; William Kneale and
Martha Kneale, TheDevclopmen: quagic, Oxford 1962 (reprint 1964), p. 246.
: SeeB. Geyer, PeterAbaelardsPhifoxophischc Schriften,Münster 1919-1933(Beiträge XXI),
Untersuchungen,& 8, pp. 622-633; Martin Grabmann, Bearbeitungenund Auslegungendcr
aristatehschenLogik aus der Zeit von Peter Abaelard bis PetrusHispanus,Berlin 1937; Ph.
Boehner, op. cfr., p. 27. -— Prantl's view (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande,vol. 111,
passim)of the Byzantinianorigin of the theory of the properties of terms hasbeenrefuted
by many authors. See M. Grabmann, HandschrU-thche Forschungenund Funde zu den
SchriftendasPetrusHispanus,desspäterenPapstesJohannesXXI (gast. 1277),
philosophischen
München 1936, pp. 8-14 and The same, Bearbeitungcn undzluslcgungcn,
p. 5.
3 Erwin Arnold, Zur Geschichte
der Suppasmansthcarie.
Die Würzeln des modernen euro-
päischenSubjektivismüs,in: Symposion,JahrbuchFür Philosophie,Band111
[pp. 1-134],
München 1952.
12 LOGICA MODERNORUM 11
devoted to Aristotelian syllogistics, especiall)r Aristotle's theory of the

paralogism. As to the latter theory, the Erst volume of my Lagica Moder-
norumaimed to show the influencethe twelfth century theory of fallacy
exerted on the origin of terminist logic. However, Arnold's approach to
the matter under discussion is quite different from that of the present
author. He sets up a merely speculative argument, sometimes sagaciously
enough, about what he thinks to have been the true origin of terminist
logic. In fact, he just constructs a number of logica] connections which
might.have existet] between the Aristotelian syllogistics and the twelfth
century theory of suppositionl. He speculates how, starting from pas-
sages in Aristotle's logica] and metaphysica] works, Mediaeval scholars
might have arrived at the theory of the properties of termsï. But the
historiam of logic, like all students of history, is not interested in how
things might have been, but how they have really taken place. The author
frequently assures his reader that his views will certainly be conürmed
when the as yet inedited logical works of the second half of the twelfth
century will be available. Insteadof studying theseworks (extant mostly
in Munich (!) manuscripts) he thinks it enough to quote:3the Few lines
Msgr Grabmann compiled from them in his study of the development of
logic in this periodä The same must be said of his views of twelfth cen-
tury grammarS. Without a 511er of evidence, logic is said to have
influenced grammar in & fundamenta] way and the puassibilit),r of the rever-
se is not even imagined. The author even goes so Far as to "correct"
Charles Thurot's views on the subject, which, as a matter of fact, are
strongly snpported by manuscript evidencef'. As to the preponderant röle
Arnold in accordance with the usual opinion of medievalists, it is
—
true — attributes to Peter Abailard for the origin of terminist logic, the
next chapters will show that Abailard was only an important, but decid-
edly not the most important, link of a long chain'r'.
Finally, Arnold's view about the origin of the term 'suppositio' as used
! ap. ris., pp. 27 Ff. For some interna] criticism upon Arnold's view, see Giulio Preti,
La dartrina della vox signg/ïcativa ncUa semanticaterminisrica classica, in: Rivista critica di
storia dellaElosoFla10 (1955), p. 226, n. II.
2 See e.g. his chapter: Die Veränderungdes Verhältnissesvan &:ng und Gegenstanddurch die
rgffckticrendeBetrachtungder Rede(ap. tit., pp. 33-51), the final sentence of which is:
"diese These über die Entstehung der Lehre der proprietates terminorum gilt es im
dritten Teil zu beweisen". Unfortunately the stringant historica! prüof is failing there
(ap. cfr., pp. 52-10I).
3 ap. til., pp. 60 Ff. 4 Bearbciwngcnund Auslegungcn,pp. 17FF.
5 ap. cfr., pp. 765. * See below, Chs. ll and V.
? See also below, p. 19, n. 3.
INTRODUCTION 13
as & technical term from about 1150 comes in for comment.! After his
attempt2 to reduce its primary sense to the doctrine of syllogistics ex-
plained in Aristotle's Prior Anabrtics(I, 25 b32 Ff,), he tries to trace back
the.term 'suPpositio'to & passage of the Posterior
Analytics(l, 76 1323Ff.)3.
Aristotle distinguishes &Etcbpwmfrom fnroäläaagand aiïüpma. The
former are propositions that are necessarily and immediately true, and
are necessarily thought to be true4. It must be agreed that the term
ünöösmg (: suppositio)does not have the same meaning in this passageit
has elsewhere in the PosteriorAnalytics ("assumption of something that
cannot and need not be proved", vi-z. of the existence of the primary
objects of a science),but should rather be taken to mean "the assumption
of something that is provable" (e.g. by a superior science).5However,
in this passageas well, the rerm undoubtedly has an epistemological
meaning forming part of Aristotle's theory of demonstration:
Anal. Pan. ' 10, 76 b27-34: 560: [J.Evoüv That which is capable of proof but as-
Bem'ccï:öv'rcz).cqzüaïvstaüïöf; ir;] Seiiag, sumed by the teacher without proof is, if
Taüf', &&v pb.- öoxoüv'ca; lmpBaEx-nTi;) the pupil believes and acccpts it, hypo-
pavääuovu, üTtOTïa'ETcll,xai. Ecr-rw oüx thesis, though only in :: limited sense
&ïtliüg ünöäscm;&).lä: rcpöc;äxsïvov[;övov, hypothesis that is, relatively to the
—
äv SE:?] [rqöemcïg ävoüü'qgSöi'qr; '?)xoü. pupil; if the pupil has no opinion or a
ävmvriag &uoücrqg ).GILBch-n 115 1616, contrary opinion On the matter, the same
al-L'Eï'cat. xui. TOüTq.)Baacpäper.ünöüemg assumption is an illcgitimatc postulata.
xa?.aïrnpm' Ecrrl.ïtip aï'c'qpo:'cö £ine-unw- Therein lies the distinction between hy-
Tim Toü pavüävovïog T?)8651],"F)& äv 'tu; pothesis and illegitimate postulate: the
u'cïtosstx'rövöv )..ozchEv'gxui xpütm. [m'] latter is the contrary of the pupil's
Setiam. Opinion, demonstrable, but assumedand
used without demonstration!
(OJard translation)
Amolds' interpretation of ünöäemg(suppositio): the "substitution of a

thing by its nmne" Hnds no support at all in the text of the Posterior
Analytics :
! op. cfr., pp. 845.

: op. cfr., pp. 26 Ff. For some critics, see the remarks of Giulio Preti, referred to above,
p.. 12, n. l.
3 Arnold erroneously has 771).
4 SeeW. D. Ross, Aristotle's Prior and PosteriorAnalytiü. A Revised Text with lntl'üduction
and Commentary,Oxford 1949,ad loc. (p. 540).
5 See W. D. Ross, ibid.
6 On the terms 67:695an and m[mpm, see Th. Heath, ;l'lathematicsin Armotle, Oxford
1949, pp. 54-57. ln our passagethe term ünöSs-stgundoubtedly has the meaning of
"an hypothesisrülativ-æl),r
to the pupil" (in contra-distinction to the more usualsenseof
"an hypothesisin an absolutesense"). Seeop. tit., p. 55.
1bid., 76 b35-77 514: 01. pb; oüv Spor. The deHnitions — viz. those which are
0137:3161»ü'noääcem (oüöäv"fäp sïvm "ä not expressed as statements that anything
käïsrat), &M' äv ïaïg rcpo'ccïascwori is or is not — are not hypotheses: but it
[1:11
ünnääamg,Toüg3' öpouc,[J.öïlO'U Ewïsaäm is in the premisses of :: scicnce that its
Ssï' TOüTO8' oüx ünöäsmg (5! [r?] xoti".16 hypotheses are contained. DeFlnitions
&xoüew ünöüaalv 'tu; elvat. cp'hast), &)Jk' require only to be understood, and this is
öcmv övrmv 1653&xeïva elvat, *(Evs-cw. 'rö not hypothesis — unless it be contended
supnäpacpa. (0138'6 *(smgärpnq uþsuS'T] that the pupil's hearing is also an hypo-
üno-rE-Be'rm,ibanep Twäc,Equum, läïovrsg thesis required by the teacher. Hypo-
(bg oü Seï fig 4:56851.xpücäat, rbv 83: theses,on the contrary, postulata facts on
"(swgäTp-qvuþeüösaämläïowac noömlav the being of which depends the being of
rbv oü noömicw 1")süäsïow rha! *(sïpap- the fact inferret]. Nor are the geometer's
*(ampäfpnq hypotheses false, as some have held,
päv'qvoüx Eüäsïav oöaav. &»BE.-
oüSäv cupmspaïverm Tt?) rävös elvat. urging that one must not employ falsehood
ïpapg'hv '?)Vaürög EQBETKTM,&n& 16»: and that the geometer is uttering falselmod
&& Toütmv ö'qloüpsva.) En "tö «'Ev-qyo: in stating that the line which he draws is
:»:chürcöäemgnäüa "ä üq 5109 13du; äv & foot long or straight, when it is actually
oüöä-repwtoütü)v.
päpst, 01.8' «Spor. neither. The truth is that the geometer
does not draw any conclusion from the
being of the particular line of which he
speaks, but from what his diagrams
symbolize. A further distinction is that all
hypotheses and illegitimae postulates are
either universal or particular, whereas &
definition is neither.
Aristotle's ünöB-emqdefinitcly hasnothing to do with any theory of the

signification and the function of tenus.! As & matter of fact Arnold
does not seem quite sure of the correctncss of his own interpretation,
but thinks that, in fact, it hasbeen that of Mediacval scholars? However,
this hardly seems to be & tenable suPposition. How can we imagine that,
reading the Latin translation of the PosteriorAnalytics, the Mediaeval
logician could have understood our passagesin Arnold's way, since we
know him to have them read as follows3:
! Sec also the. preceding note. For thc general meaning of 'assumption'put by the mathe-
matici.-anto the learner for acceptance in the course of instruction as found in Platü as
well as in Aristotle, see Hcath, ap. cfr., p. 55.
2 op. ciæ,,p. 86: "Ob dasgelungenist oder ob auch eine andereInterpretation dieser
anscheinend unausschöpfbarenAristotelesstellenvertreten werden kann, ist jedochder
ideeengeschichtlichen Fragcstellung unserer Arbeit entsprechend nicht einmal von allzu
groszer Bedeutung, geht es uns doch in erster Linie darum, zu erklären, wie im mittel-
alterlichen logischen Denken auf der aristotelischen Grundlage die Suppositionslehre
entstanden ist.".
3 Translatioananymaedited by L. Minio-Paluello (ArmordesLatinusIV 2, Bruges-Paris
1953, IJ. 2119-36). lt must be noticed that the translation madeby Gerardof Cremona
(cl. 1187) (edited by L. Minio-Paluello in Aristonis:LatinusIV 3, Bruges-Paris1954)does
nowhere use the word 'suppositio'.
INTRODUCTION 15
Ana]. Post. (transl. anonyma), 76b27 -77a4: lgitur quecumque quidcm monstrabilia
existentiasumit ipsa non monstrans,hec, si apparentiaquidem sumit discenti, snpponft
et est non simpliciter suppositiosed ad illum solum, si autem (aut) nulla existente
opinione aut et contraria existente accipit idem, petit. Et in hoc differunt suppositioet
petitio: est enim petitio quod est subcontrarium discentis opinioni aut quodcumque
aliquis demonstrabile existenssumit et utitur non monstrans.
lgitur diffinitiones non sunt suppositiones
— neque enim esseaut non dicuntur —;
sed in propositionibus suppositiones. DiFEnitiones autem solum intelligi oportet; hoc
autem non suppositio nisi et audire snppasitianemaliquis essedicat. Sed quibuscumque
existentibus eo quod illa sunt Et conclusio. Neque geometra falsa supponit.,sicut quidam
dixerunt dicentes quod non conuenit falso uti, geometram autem mentiri dicentem
pedalem que non est pedalis aut recte scriptam non rectam existentem. Geometra uero
nichil concludit eo quod hec sit linea quam ipse locutus est, sed ea que per ista sunt
manifestata. Amplius petitio et snppasitia omnis aut sicut totum aut sicut in parte,
diFEnitionesautcm neutrum istorum.
But even if the Latin text could conceivably have led the Mediaeval reader
to an interpretation of suppositiosuch as Arnold's, his hypothesis meets
with someinsurmountabledifSculties. (1) SinceArnold rejectsThurotis
view of Petrus Helyas as introducing the Latin term suppositio in his
commentary on Priscianll written about 1150, he'must date the supposed
borrowing of our term from the PosteriorAnalytics as early as the 1140'5
at the last.z But it must be home in mind that we are expressly told by
the author of the translatio anonyma that Lhe Parisian masters did not
clarelccture npon this difficult work of Aristotle's in his days(the 1140'5):
Translatioananyma.Proiogusï: Vallatum multis occupationibus me dilectio uestra com-
pulit ut Posteriores Analeticos Aristotilis de greco in latinum transferrem, quod eo
aH'ectuosiusaggressussum quod cognoscebamlibrum illum multos in se scientie fructus
continere, et certum erat notitiam eius nostris temporibus Latinis non patere. Nam
translatio Boetii apud nas integra non inuenitur, et id ipsum quod de ea reperitur uitio
corruptionis obfuscatur. Translationem uero lacobi obscuritatis tenebris inuolui
silentio suo perhibent Franciemagistri, qui, quamuisillam translationemet commentarios
ab eodemIacobotranslatoshabeant,tamennotitiam illius libri non audentprofiteri.
(2) Not & single commcntary on the PosteriorAnabrticsclatingfrom the

twelfth century is preservedand we Findthem rather late in the thirtecnth
centuryä No doubt, this fact does not give much suPport to Arnold's
1 CharlesThurot, De Ia logiqucde Pierred'Espagnc,in: Revuearchäologique, Nouvelle

Särie 5 (10), Paris 1864, pp. 277-278. See also Chapter XVI of the present study
(pp. 5175.).
1 Arnold (ap. cin, p. 90) speaksof 1140—1150 indeed.
3 ed. Minio-Paluello(flristotefcs
LatinusIV 2), p. 3.
4 See.M. Grabmann,Afiswtelcsim 12jahrhundert,in: Mittelalterliches Geistesleben111,
p. 106.
16 LOGICA MODERNORUM "
thesis. (3) In Fact, we never Hnd the term 'suppositia'as found in the
PosteriorAnaiyticsbrought into connection by any Mediaeval commentator
with the theory of supposition. See, for instance, the comments Thomas
Aquinas makes upon our passagewith l'egard to the diFFerencebetween
petitio and suppositio:
ln Arist. Anal. Post. !, m'. 162 ed. Spiazzi (p. 210): Deinde, cum dicit: anecunque
igiiur etc., distinguit suppositiones et petitiones ad invicem. Sciendum tamen est,
. . .
quod aliquid commune habent, et in aliquo dilTerunt. Hoc quidem commune est eis,
quod cum sint demonstrabilia, tamen demonstrator accipit ea non demonstrans, et
praecipue, quia non sunt demonstrabilia per suam scientiam, sed per aliam, ut supra
dictum est. Unde et inter immediataprincipia computantur, quia demonstratnr utitur
eis absquemedio, eo quod non habeantmedium in illa scientia.
Differunt autcmad invicem: quiasi quidem talis propositiosit probabilisaddiscenti,
cui Fit denmnstratio, dicitur suppositio.Et sic suppositio dicitur non simpliciter, sed ad
aliquem. Si vero ille nec sit eiusdem opinionis ncque contrariae, oportet quod de-
monstratur hoc ab eo petat, et tunc dicitur petitio. Si autem sit contrariae opinionis,
tunc erit quaestio,de qua oportet disputari inter eos. Hoc tamenomnibus communeest,
quod unoquoque corum utitur demonstrator non demonstrans, cum sit dcmonstrabilc.
One may wonder, indeed, how Arnold can uphold his interpretation
of ünöäsaiq(suppositio),this term being in our passages
so closelyrelated
to aïmpa (petitio), the meaningof which undoubtedly lies in the domain
of instruction and demonstrative art.
Arnold's view of the separate origin of the technical use of supponere
and suppositio is not acceptable eitherI as will be shown in Chapter XVI
,
of the present study,2
The main criticism 01' Arnold's views must be directed against his
lack of historica] sense which made him speculare about historical de-
velopment without searching for evidence in the manuscripts of the
period. Besides, many speculationsof his are simply untenable in them-
selves.
Father Desmond Paul Hem)r has recently sh-Dwn3that there exists &
common set of problems about significatio, common contrasting attitu-
des, and common ways of solution between the Burleigh — Ockham
debate on suppositioand the issuestaken by Anselm of Canterbury in his
De grammatico.The late Father Boehner in his Mediam! Logic conjectured4
' op. m., pp. 7411". 2 Seebelow, pp. 518Ff.

3 TheEuri)! Hisrogf quuppositio, in: Fl'nnciscan Studies 23 (1963), pp. 205—212.
Logic. An Outline of [ts Developmentfrom 1250 to c. 1400, Manchester
4 .rHediei-al
1952, p. 27.
INTRODUCTION 17
that the roots of the theory of supposition might well be traced back to
St Anselm, but he added no Further details. Father Henry has selected
certain aspecta of the fourteenth century debate on snpposition and has
apparentlysupportedBoehner'sconjecture in shox-ving
not oni)r that the
same issues were being debated as early as the eleventh century by
St Anselm, but also that they were being resolved by means of di-
stinguishing different kinds of signiji'catia.
The resemblances are interesting enough, indeed. However, when
trying to trace a certain line of development, two basic questions may
well be asked,as is recognizedby father Henry l-nirnrns-elfI
: (1) are there in
Anselm's Degrammaticoany signs ofconnection with the actual vocabulary
of the later doctrine of supposition?, and (2) is there any evidencethat
this work continued to be & persistent influence in the development of
that doctrine? As to the First question, Henry points to the use of the
verb isupponere'once found, indeed, in Anselm's work.2 Henry thinks
we might well havehere a special,technical useof supponere
applied at
exactly the point where questions as to kinds of signilïcation arise, name-
ly, in the course of the employment of categorica] words such as sub-
scantia,qualitas, and so on: at such a point, he continues, one would then
saythat suchwords (1005er referred to aspraedicamenta) srood(suppasited)
for adjectiva] words or for the things which the latter are used to signify.
Hox-vever,the term 'supponerc'is nothing but "a mere stylistic alternative
which vaguely conveys the notion of some kind of subsumption" and,
accordingly, belongs to the sphere of the praedicabilia doctrine. As &
matter of fact, this is the usual meaning in contexts of that kind. The-
refore Henry is right in admitting, after all, the latter interpretation of
our term as quite possible.3 The author's adducing the term 'appeüario'
is not successful either.4 He must admit himself that the term is found
in Priscizm and that the Roman grammarian may well be a common
,source for Anselm's and for the later logicians' use of the tenu. As
regards the second question, thinks that there really is some
I—Iuenryr
'ap. cfr., p. 211.

2 Ch. XIX, cd. Schmitt (5. AnselmiCantuariensisArchiepiscopiOperaOmnia, Vol. [) p.
1653-" : Unam autem voccm plura signiücantcm non ut unum, non video quid prohibeat
pluribus aliquando supponipraedicamentis, ut si albusdicitur qualitas et habere. 'Albux'
enim non ita signiFlcat qualitatem et habere ut unum, quemadmodum 'homo' significat
ut unum substantiam et qualitates quibus constat homo. Res enim quae appellatur homo,
est unum quiddam constans ex iis quae dixi; res vero quae appelatur albus, non est unum
aliquid ex habereet qualitate constans,quia nihil appellatur albusnisi res quae habet
albedinem, quae nequaquamconstat ex habere et qualitate.
30p.cit.,p.211. 40p.cit.,pp.2ll-212.
evidence of persisting acquaintmïce, and hencc of the possibility of

Anselm is, of course, often quoted by Ockham,
persisting inFlLuantJ-e.I
who takes over en bloc the former's account of 'nihil', and tries to extencl
it to all empty names. Again, Henry may be right in supposing that
Anselm is one of the sancti whom Ockham has in mind when he speaksz
about those who persist in maintaining sentences such as 'grammaticus
est(gramnnrntim!'.3
However, the occurrence of the same issuesin Anselm's views about
signifi'catioand Ockham's views about supposition can decidedly not be
considered as sufficient evidence for the thesis that the. roots of the theory
of supposition might well reach back to St Anselm, unlessthis thesis is
not to be understood as making Anselm something like the Eather of the
theory of snpposition, which he decidedlyr is not. The absence in Anselm's
work of the special technical terms of that tl'uetor)rmust prevent us from
consideringSt Anselmasmore than just one of the important Mediaeval
scholars who, standing in the gramnmtical-logical tradition of the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, were investigating the same sort of
problems concerning meaning 01"terms and, no doubt, in doing so
contributed, in one way or another, to the origin of the theory of
supposition in its proper sense. An accurate investigation of the most
representative. works of the period between St Anselm and Ockham is
indispensable to give. the right place to all the authors of this long tra-
dition.
As regards the interesting studies 01"Giulio Preti on the development

of Mediaeval logic4 it can be acknowledged that he made quite & number
of relevant observations. However, historical accuracy was apparently
not his main concern. So he deliberately prefersï- the. interpolated version
of Peter 01'Spain'sSummulaeIogicalesmadeby the Efteenth centur)lr]ohn
Versor (d. about 1480) to the original tract as edited from a reliable
thirteenth century manuscript by Prof. Bc-cluerïslci.6Accordingly, the
1 ap. cfr., p. 212. 3 Summatarius logicae I, chs. 5-9.
3 Cfr. Anselm, De grammatica, chs. 12; 16; 18, and see Henry, ap. cfr... p. 210.
4 referret] to above, p. 11Il n. 1 and p. 12, n. 1.
5 5128his La daurina della voxsignffï'cativanella semamicaterministica, p. 224, n. 2.
quasc codice manu scripto Reg. Lat. 1205 edidit
Lagicales
6 PetriHispaniSummulac
[. M. Bocheüski O.P.. Marictti T orino 1947. — The present author is preparing &
critical edition of all the logica] works of Peter of Spain basedon the best manuscripts.
This edition will be publishedassoonas possibleafter the publication of the present
work, which was intended asan indi5pcnsablepreparatory study to this edition.
ANALïSls OF THE MANUSCRIPTS 19
author investigates the important connection between logic and grammar

from the stanclpoint of Efteenth centur)r logic as represented by Versor.l
Besides, of the important works written in the period between Peter
Abailarcl and Peter of Spain he has used only the. brief excerpts Msgr
Grabmann published in his short stucly of the development of logic
during the period between these mastersF- However, unlike Arnold,
Preti is Full)r aware of the speculativa character observations such as his
will necessarily have until the manuscripts containing the important
missing links of this development have been published in full.3
One conclusion only can be drawn from the foregoing remarks: the
search for, and investigation of, the manuscripts containing logical and
gmmmatical works of the Period between Peter Abailard and Peter of
Spain is an indispensable requirement for our knowledge of the origin
of the theory of supposition, which apparently took shape in the second
half of the twelfth century. Accordingly, this chapter will be concluded
by & survey of the manuscripts concerned. The existence of & great num-
ber of them was already lmox-vnthanks to Msgr Grabmann and other
historians, but they have mostly not been investigated thoroughly.
Significantly enough, our most important source, found in Oxford Ms
Digby 174, was unknown hitherto.
2 Analysis of the manuscripts

-
B E R I. ! N, STAATSBIBUOTHEK DER STIFTUNG PREUSZISCHER KULTURBESHZ
(formerly PreuszischcStaatsbibliothek)
Many of the manuscripts have since, the Second World War been in the
Westdeutsche Bibliothek at Marburg a. Lahn, or in the Universitäts-
bibliothek in Tübingen. A few are missing.
Lit.: Valentin Rose und Franz Schillmann, Verzeichnis der lateinischen
Handschriften der königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin, 3 vols Berlin 1893-1919.
! ap. cfr., pp. 2305.

1 For this work, sce above, p. 12, n. 4.
3 Studi sulla Iogicafarmalc nel Medicam, p. 352. — His overestimating Abailard's röle in
the development, like the other historians', may be partly ascribed to a peculiar slip
madeby Grabmannin readingsomemnnuscriptsof the period after Abailard. T hey
frequently have certain topic rules (e.g. nulla contraria respectueodempredicari posscde
eodem) preceded by the siglum m. p. (for: maxima propoxm'o), which Grabmnnn rend as
;I-IagjstcrPetrus. See his' Bearbeitungenund Auslegungcn,p. 22; see alse his ;l'litrefaltcrlichcs
lll (posthumously edited München 1956), p. 108.
Gcistexlebcn
1 Bcrol.MS Lat.oct. 76 (kept in Tübingen now) is & parchment codex in

.
1611"),which formerly belonged to Sankt Peter in Erfurt. A librarian's
note is on the Erst fly-leaf: Regulaedegeneribus,et introductionesdialectice
artis, et alia utilia. There is & table of contents (P. 11"):Alphabeticum
grecum, et numeri; regulae de generibus nominum; de terminatione
ablativi singularis; De nominibus civitatum [examples: Roma, Perusiam,
Carthago,Thebae,Athenae];de divisione rerum notabilissinmrum; intro-
ductiones dialecticae; introductiones rhetoricae; regulae de nomine.;
de pronomine; cle adverbio; de coniunctionibus; de prepositione et
interiectione; Explicationes vocum etymologicae, et alia utilia. The
introductionesdialetica are found on Ff. 81'-111'. This part was written in
the first half of the twelfth century. The title (INTRODUCTIONES DIA-
LETICE)was written in red at the top of f. 8". This section consistsof
two parts:
Ff. 8V-111': & short introduction to logic. For this part see below,
—
our Chapter lll, pp. 152-155.
F. 111": the initia] words of another compendium on dialectic. See
—
below, our Chapter III, p. 155.
2 BeroI.MS. [.m.c-ct. 262, lost now since the Second World War. It was a
parchment codex ofseven Folios, Fo-rmerl)rFormingpart ofanother codex,
as folios 80-86. Grabmann dated it about 1200. See his Bearbeitungcn
und
Auslegungender aristotelischenLogik aus der Zeit mn Peter Abaelard bis Petrus
Hispanusin Abh. (ler Preuss. Akad. der Wiss. Jahrgang1937IIPhil. Hist.
Klasse, Berlin 1937, p. 40. lt contained two tracts:
Ff. 11'-7r & complete compendium of logic. Inc.: Tria rerum genera
-—
distinguit nostra disciplina, scilicet significantia, significata,, appellata.
Expl. : Summe Deus Christe, per te liber exPlicit iste. All we have of the
compendiumis the introductory section, quoted by Grabmann,op.cit.,
pp. 40-4-1. See belox—v,
our Chapter III, p. 161.
f. 7r-7V: & short tract De proverbiis. See Grabmann, op.cit., p.. 40. It
—
is lost now.
c 0 L0 C NE, DOMBIBUOTHEK
Lit.: Ph. JaFfä and G. Wattenbach, EcclesiaeMetropolitanae Coloniensis
codicesmanuscripti, Berlin 1874.
ANAL'I'SIS OF THE MANUSCRIPTS 21
3 MS 201. A parchment codex in 80 0174 folios, x-vritten in double columna

in an elegant and [ine hand dating From the second part of the eleventh
century. Many lacunas.Fol. 58? and half 01 581'is left blank. This manu-
scripl 0111)rcontains :: commentary on the Priscianus maior (Insugramm.
l-XVI). On f. 1" :: later hand wrote in red color: Liber iste vocaturars
grammatica.lt was originally numbered Darmstadt2182.
The work was also found, in & somewhat later reduction, in Chartres,
Bibliothäque de la Ville, MS 209, Ff. 11'-86'-'(12th century, from the
ChapterLibrary), but it wasdestroyedby Ere during the SecondWorld
War (26 march 1944).A much abbreviatedversionis Foundin & twelfth
century Fleury manuscript, now Paris, B.N. Nouv. achat. 1623, Ff. ll'-
561' See R. W. Hunt, Studicson Priscianin the Eleventhand TweyïhCcnturies,
.
in: Mediaevaland RenaissanceStudies ] (London 1943), pp. 195-196.
In the Cologne cepy our cammi::ntalr)rhasthe following incipit:
L : b : r : st : v : c : t : r : rs gr : m : t : c : ex quo nomine materia eius demon-
stratur; grama enim grece littera latine interpretatur; inde gramatica, idest litteralis ars,
nominatur, quia de litteris tractat. Sedquatuor diversis modis. Agit enim de litteris secun-
dum hoc quod littere accipiuntur, idest ut (ut -i- MS) singiljgtim accepte voces individue
litterate; et secundum hoc quod syllabe, idest collectim sub üno spiritu sine intervalla
pl'ülateet hoc utroque modo, scilicet non signiEcative(sine significalnlteMS).Agit etiam
de illis secundum hoc quod sunt signiFlcative, idest hoc solo respectu quod ad aliquid
signiEcandumproferuntur, sive in coniunctione sive extra coniunctionem illud Eat, non
attendit. Hoc quoque respectu littere vocantur dictiones, quia aliquid dicunt, idest
designant. Et sic accepte dividuntur in octo partes orationis. Agitque in Libro Con-
structionum de litteris secundum hoc quod in coniunctione posite perfectum generant
sensum. Et tunc orationes vocantur. Et ideo quia, licet diversis modis, ubique tamen
de littera agit, ex nominegeneralismaterie operi suo titulum imposuit, dicens: incipit
ars gramatica, idest litteralis.
!.O N D O N, BRITISHMUSEUM
Lit.: Sir George F. Warner and Julius P. Gilson, Cataloguscj- Westem
Manuscript: in the Old Rayal and King's Collections 4- vols London 1921.
Vol. 1: Royal MSS IA H 1 E X1;v01.ll:Roya1M5512A1-20E X.
4 qua! MSS2 D IX is & parchment codex of 177 folios (81 in. x 6 in.)
containing miscellaneous tracts on theology and canon law in Latin,
written in earlythirteenth century,rhands.GatheringsOFeight leaves.On
1'. 1 is & thirteenth camur),r inscription: Liber Anselmi abbatis depluribus
sententiis.It had the old Royal press-mark "no 55'.
This manuscript contains a treatise and miscellaneous notes on canon
law; theological and scriptura] notes; an epistle 01 Pope Celestine lll to
the deanof Rouen, dated 24-]uly 1093, an analysisof the contents of

the books of the Old Testament written in various hands; a great collec-
on varioussubjects,precededby & prefäceand
tion of Scripture passages
a table of chapters, and written in various hands...
I t is part seven of our
manuscnpt:
[7] Ff.5912]ZSV: Inc.: De dubiishistoriesentenciis.
Ut complanata-
scripture
supeücicfaciliuscxcerpatur It is followed by an index:
etc..
......
[8] [. 1261'4':Index of Scripture texts on varioussubjects.
Next & treatise on logic is found:
& tract on fallacies: Inc. : Incipit prologusjäUaciamm.

[9] Ff. 1271'3-134-1'11:
Ad maiorcmfallaciarum evidentiam videndum est quid sit meta. This treatise
will be edited in full in our second part as tract XII under the title:
Pallade Londinenscs.
The remainder of f.. 1341'and the Erst half of f. 13:133 is Hlled with
excerpts from Gregory the Great's Moralia, written in another thirteenth
century hand. The last tract in our manuscript is unfmished and goes
from l35"-16l"-'. It is & treatise on law which opens as Follows: (O)Iim
edebaturactio per scripturam et sine scriptura. Et sine s(criptura) variis modis.
Hodie veronon aliasjit actionis editio quam per ablationem libelli conventianalis
cum coram iudice ordinario litigandum cst.
The eleventhpart of this codex is an index of subjectsin the Book of
Psalms(Ff. 162T-177v),in which a prayer for the feastof St Paul's Con-
version is inserted. '
RoyalMSS2 D XXX is & parchmentcollective codexof 14-4- folios (915in.

)( Gg in), in different handsdating from the thirteenth century. The
fly-leaves (Ff. 1-8; l4l-14-4) are from a contemporary manuscript on
civil law in double colurns of unequal width. lt belonged to Rochester
Pricn'yras & gift of R. (?) de Stokes(f. 9). It bearsthe Old Royal press-
mark 'no 317'.
ff. 11'3-78") the Biblical books Ecclesiasticusand Wisdom in the Latin

—
of S.]erome's version, with the Glasaordinariain the marginsand verbal
comments between the lines.
Ff. 791'3-94'") and 103Tü-106vb: Summa Magistri Rodberti Blundi in

——
arte grammatica. The work is written in :: small hand much abbreviated,
in double columns. It Opensas follows:
ANAL'I'SIS OF THE MANUSCRIPTS 23
lustas parit petentium preces necessitas, quotiens eius qui petitur debitum et facultas
occurrunt. Libet igitur precum vestrarum circumstantiasintueri, ne si iuste fuerint,
inpetratione iusta fraudentur. Petitis itaque de ratione construendi, precipua quidem
parte gramatice, precepta vobis commoda prestari. Fateor equidem si nondum contigere
vos que postulatis satis necessariapostulari. Quibus enim quilibet liberalis eget artifex,
hiis vos non egere non aFFlrmem. Hac enim sine peritia verum caligabit dialectici cultus
oratoris insitum vilebit. thuid enim, nisi iuncture vocum claruerint, signiücationcs
clarebuntet quomodopersuadebitoratiosit pro picturis rethoricis nevossoloecismorum
(solo(e)s MS) vel barbarismorum exhibeat, presertim cum ex ( ) aliis vocum
......
nexibus varie signiEcationes predeant et loquendi vitia mentes audientium naturaliter
inimiccnt? Sed quid matheseos studiosi, quid nature conscii, quid ethici doctores a
laicali ruditate dissidebunt, si non sermone legitimo valeant suassententias interpretari?
Et hiis de causis indigentiam vestram nolo necessariaminEtiari. Sed numquid debitum
vestrum infitier, cum nichil potius doctor discipulis debeat quam doctrinam, nisi vel ab
eius ofiïtio 1malab eius facultate semota sit? Sed omtium qua ratione dissimulem cum
argumentum oFEtii possit esse professio. At certe facultatem pudice negarem, si non
illud vererer ne 1vcltacita quedamiactationisspeciesvideretur, vel ipsa possetgram-
matica suos subaudire contemptus. Ut igitur utramque suspitionem amoveam morem
vestre geram voluntati.
Quid vos velim exspectareprefatus?Exspectetisigitur non verbosasillas disputationes
in quibus queritur et SülVitUl', ut ex equo dividunt quaternum. Illa magis exspectate que
minus trita, precipue Librum Constructianum,illuminent Et ad omnium intelligentiam
valere possunt librorum.. Et ne vagetur animus, hunc ordinem pensare. (I)Nprimis de
constructione dicetur et eius spetiebus; (s)ecundo de interrogativis; (t)ertio de de-
111onstrativis; (qu)arto de relativis, (q)uinto de evocatione; (s)exto de appositione;
(s)eptinw de conceptione; et hec suas habebunt subdivisiones; (0)ctav0 de regimine
partium; (n)ono de Figuris constructionum; ad quorum intelligentiam nec de barba-
rismis nec de soloecismis tacebit U R.
Nomen constructionis tripliciter accipitur. Dicitur enim constructio dictionis cum
dictione. Dicitur et constructio dictionum. Dicitur etiam constructio orationis. Nec
idem est constructiodictionis cum dictione et constructiodicrionum. Sicut enim aliud est:
'Socratesest similis Platoni' et aliud 'Socrateset Plato sunl:similcs', similiter aliud est con-
structio dicrionis cum dictione et aliud constructio dictionum.
Unfortunualnsl)rthe work is incomplete here and breaks 03 in the

discussionof appositio(ch. 6). BetweenFF.94-and 103part of & treatise on
logic is interpolated, in double columns, but in a different hand. See
below, pp. 23-24.
Who is this master Robert Blund? I think some valid arguments may be
adduced for identifying him with a certain Master Robert Blund who
flourished in the last quarter of the twelfth century. See below Ch.V,
pp. 255-257.
Ff. 951'3-102'4'3: part of & treatise on logic, interpolated in our copy
—-—
of Master Robert's- treatise on grammar. lt was x-vritten in double columns
by & handdifferent from the foregoingand probablydatingfrom about
1200. No doubt the sheet containing this treatise is out of its proper
place, now, as the result of & binder's mistake. The proper tract is
preceded by some rhyming verses: (S)ecta Meludina velut erroris medicina
and the treatise itself begins: (M)eludine professionis quam ea pars
philosophie que ratio disserendi dicta est sibi ducem elegit, perfecta et
integra in huius operis volumine consum(m)atur cognitio. Unfortunatel)r
our copy is incompleteso that we do not have&completesurvey(summa)
of the main points of view on logic as held in the School of Melun. For
this work, see below, Ch. VI, pp. 282-286.
Ff. 1061'3-1131") and 124Tü-132V'): a grammatical tract which opens

—
as follows:
Absolute cuiuslibet discipline perfectio duplici comparatur exercicio, uno quidem ad
officium, reliquo disputationum inquisitioni accommodato, ut orator ex oFFnciodicit
composite ad persuadendum,retor disserendocirca artem dubitabilia queque proponit et
disquirit atquehocquidemimperat,illud vero famulatur,ut quodsecundumsensumestei
quod ad rationem transivit imitetur. In quibus maxime dialetica utilitas colligitur que ex
communibus ad hoc instituta circa omnem scientiam dubitandi viam aperit disserentibus.
Hanc obintelligentes plurimi aut garrulitati tantum studium accomodant, aut hoc exosi
Sophistevicium in contrarium relabuntur cum simplicitate silentium. ltaque sic erudiunt
ut cum dubitare nesciantsingulasine dubitatiüne percurrunt, vel siquid dubitant, vigiliis
multis elaborataparumsapiatquestiophilosophicapro inventioneinterdum collectarum
ordinem transponuntregularum nequeaudentex se quicquam, sed littere tantum cum
Iudeis arbitrantur insistendum. Hoc me compellit que intacta plurimorum ignorantia
preteriit et que doctoris mei ad provectos loquentis perstrinxit brevitas, prout al:- eo
michi videor accepissesingula circa constructionem ambigua quantum suFFicioexplanare.
lt apparently is a grammatica] work on constructioand discusses the

subject matter of the Priscianus minor (: Priscian, Inst.gramm. XVII-
XVIII). A contemporary hand wrote the title SummamagistriPetriHispani
in artemgrammaticamat the top of f . 1061".Warner and Gilson (catalogue,
[, p. 60) think it more probablethat the work is by the twelfth century
grammarian Petrus Helyas, since it is not found elsewhere among the
works of Peter of Spain. ln Fact, it sometimes has been ascribed to Petrus
Helyas (e.g. in Bruges, Bibliothäque de la ville, MS 544: Liber Petri
Absoluta)and elsewhereto some master P.H. [ think Petrus
Helyeinscriptus
Helyas is to be considered as & quite serious candidate for the authorship
of our Summa.However, the question cannot be decided untill all manu-
scripts concerned will be adduced For an accurate investigation. As far
as[ know, the work is found in niue manuscripts: Vienna2498 (5. xn !),
Oxford, flflerton Collega, MSS 301 and 309; Bruges, MSS 534 and 544;
London, British Museum, Regia]MSS 12 P XIX (see below, nr. 8,
ANALïSlS OF THE MAN LISCRIPTS 25
p. 37); Paris, B.N. Lat. 5505 and Nouv. acq. lat. 910; Tours, Biblio-
thïæquemunicipale, MS 843.
The rest of our manuscript contains & set of sermons on scriptura]
texts (IT. 133l'-14fI-0v -I- ll4r-123v).
RoyalMSS3 A V! is & parchment codex of 72 folios (71; in. )( 6 in.),

written in several dilïerent handsdating partly from the first, partly from
the second half of the thirteenth century. Most of the hands are very
minute and much contracted. lt originally belonged to St Augustine's in
Canterburyandhasthe press-mark(f. 6): lcah'st. IX, gr. !' (: nr 820 in
the catalogueprinted by Montague R. James, AncientLibraly qf Camcr-
bwy, p. 283), but on the fly-leaf (P. IV) there is & later press—mark:
'dist. 7, gr. 5' and the note: 'Liber WfH' de Clara quemportavit ad Sanctum
Augustinum'.The codex afterwards belonged to John Theyer.
The codex contains quite & number of treatises on theology, dictamen,
grammar, and logic, all of them in Latin and nearly all fragmentary,
interspersed with theological and grammatica] commonplaces, in several
hands, in prose and verse. I 0111)!'
mention the tFeatiseson grammar and
logic. For the other parts, see the catalogue of Warner-Gilson [, p. 209.
Ff. 29f-35V: incomplete commentary on Priscian's Institutioncs, lib.
—
XVll-XVlll (Priscianusminor). The work is anonymous and opens as
follows: Ut vult Aristotiles libro de Anima quod lingua congruit in duo
opem nature, scilicet in gustum et loquelam, in gustum propter esse,
in loquelam propter bene esse, secundum quod dicit Aristotiles quod
omne animal habet gustum et tactum, non tamen loquelam., Est enim
loquela.propter bene esse, ut videlicet aliis exprimamus quod apud nos
est, secundumquod dicit Plato quod ad hoc est sermo ut presto sint
mutue voluntatis indicia. Sed licet sermo nobis sit a natura, modus tamen
loquendi ab arte est, ut congrue loquendo vel vere. Ars loquendi pluribus
modis dividitur: in grammaticam, de qua est nostra principalis inten-
tio
......
It breaks off on f. 35'-'.
Ff. 36Ta-46Vb& tract on the so-called sophismatagrammaticalia, which

—
are, in fact, difficult propositions or expressions in the art of grammar. It
is acephalous and written in double columns by an early thirteenth
century;r hand. After F. 36 four or more leaves are lost. The only com-
plete discourse begins on f. 38ra with the phrase: (m)adio vini ad dena-
rium, veilli qui non habet. Circa presentem orationem septem principaliter
26 LOGICA MODERNonun-i "
querebantur. Primo utrum essctperfecta vel imperfecta et de illis que ad

perfectionem requirerentur. Secundoutrum ablativus poneretur absolute
et de quibusdam aliis que pertinent ad istam questionem. Tertium de
constructione huius ablativi 'modio' cum hac dictione 'vini'. Quarto
utrum propositio construatur et de vi et natura prepositionis quam habet
in prepositione (!) et compositione sui ipsius cum aliis partibus orationis, et
de quibusdamaliis que huic constructioni adiacent. Quinto de construc-
tione huius interiectionis et de quibusdam aliis que sunt annex hu(i)c
questioni.Sextode constructionehuius nominis 'qui' cum hoc verbo'ho-
bet' et de natura ipsius. Septimo de hoc adverbio 'non' et de natura et de
oFEcioipsius. This 'sophism'ends 011[. 46Vb: Et sic patet solutio ad
omnia que de isto sophismatequerebantur.
and 511'5-52"): & tract on suppositio, relatio, restrictio,
IT. 'ïi-71'ïl-4ïl-8'h"J
—
ompliatio, appcilatio and distributio. It is x-vrittcn in double columns by &
hand of the First halfof the thirteenth century. The initia] part apparently
15mlssmg m our copy:
Terminus autem aut signilïcat universale aut particulare. Signiücotio alia rei substantive
et hoc Et per nomen substantivum, ut 'homo'. Alia est rei adiective et hoc Et per nomen
adiectivum, ut 'albus', vel per verbum, ut 'currit', quia preprie non est adiectivum vel
substantivum, sed aliquid significat adiective vel substantive, quia adiectivatio vel sub-
stantivatio sunt modi rerum quo signilïcantur et non significationes. Nomina substantiva
dicuntur supponere. Nomina vero adiectiva et verba dicuntur corpulare. Suppositio est
acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo. Differunt autem suppositio et signiFlc-atio,quia
signilïcare est per impositionem vocis ad rem signiEcnndam, suppositio vero est acceptio
ipsius termini substantivi [monle (for iam ?) pro aliquo significantia rem pro aliquo. Ut
cum dicitur 'homo currit', iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro Sorte et Platone et sic de
aliis. Quare signiücatio prior est suppositione nec sunt idem, quia significatio est vocis,
supponere vero termini iamque compositi ex voce. et signiücatione. Ergo snppositio non
est signiEcatio. Capulatio est acceptio termini adiectivi pro aliquo.
The tract on supposition ends on f. 47?" und remarkably parallels

Peter of Spain's SummulocIogicoios, nrs 6.01-6.1 ] of the edition by
Bochefïski. Next the tract De relativisis Found(Ff. 471'')"-'-*f'*)
and this, too,
shows many resemblanceswith that in Peter's Summulae,but, again, it
seemsto be lessextensive than the discussion in Peter's work. The third
tract is on restrictio(Ff. 47Vü-4-8T'3')
and runs parallel with Peter's Summu-
Ioe, nrs ! l.Ol-l l. 17; the other sectionsfound in Peter (nrs I l.18-11.23
are missing). Next the tract Deampliotionibusi s found (Ff. w
4-81'h'ï'3) hich
is substantially the same as that in Peter's Summuloe.The short treatise
De appellationibus(Ff.48W'ï'b) is nearly identical with that in Peter's
Summulae.The last tract is that on distributio. It is incomplete (Ff. 48"? ;
ANALïSlS OF THE MANUSCRIPTS 27
and much resemlalesPeter's Summulae,

511'3-521'IJ) nrs 12.01-12.24 (up
to the phrase: ...... quod nulla propositio est verior quam illa in qua idem
predicatur de se).
No doubt, we have in Royal MS 8 A V] either an early abbreviated
version of the last part (TractatusVI and VlIl-Xll) of Peter of Spain's
Summulaelogicales, or, more probably, an older re(laction (iF not a
source) of Pcter's work. The different order of the tracts certainly
raises one of the main problems. However, all questions must be post-
poned, now, and will be discussed in the introduction to my edition of
Peter's logical works. Compare also the tracts found in our manuscript
on Ff. 67?" and 658?"LFf,; see below, pp. 32-33.
Ff. 531'3-56") contain several introductory notes to commentaries on
—
some books of the logica vetus and nova, written in diH'erent hands,
probably clating From about the middle of the thirteenth century.
a. F. 531'34'": an introduction to Porphyry's Isagogc.

f. 53m: Tres sunt partes in quibus philosophia dividitur. Est enim rationalis philosoPhia,
moralis, et naturalis.Dicitur enim rationalisphilosophialogica,queeaque:sunt intus (?)
dividit et apprehendit. Apprehendit enim universalia que non sunt sensu perceptibilia,
sed mediante (inmediate MS) sensuveniunt in intellectum. Unde dicit Aristotiles: ex
multis sensibus una memoria, ex multis memoriis unum experimentum, ex multis
eicperimentis unum universale in anima, quod est principium artis et scientie.
Naturalis philosophia est que comprehendit particularia et sensu perceptibilia, que
apud naturalem philosophum sunt priora. Unde dicit Aristotiles in Phisicis: "particularia
sunt priora secundum naturam". Particularia enim sunt posteriora apud rationalem
philosophum,universaliaautempriora. Undedicit Aristotiles in Posærioribus
universalia
essepriora secundumnaturam.Videtur essecontradictioet mirum est si universaliasunt
priora et posteriora. Universalia autem sunt priora simpliciter et secundum naturam,
quoad nos autem posteriora. Particularia sunt priora quoad nos et quoad naturam
posteriora. Ea igitur que sunt priora in phisicis, sunt posteriora in logicis, et cconverso,
quia universalia sunt priora in logicis et posteriora in phisicis. Unde Aristotiles dicit in
Phisicis: universale aut nichil est aut posterius eat. Non est igitur contradictio universale
esseprius et posterius secundum diversas vias. ln fautione (?) enim et in operatione sunt
posteriora. ln abstractione enim operationis sunt priora, quia phisica est de hiis qud fiunt
et que sensu percipiuntur, logica autem de hiis que non Fiunt et que intellectu com-
prchcnduntur.
Moralia philosophia non apprehendit universalia neque particularia, sed solummodo
ea que ad contemplationemsunt pertinentia, quia moralisphilosophusnon intendit ut
sciat, sed ut bonus Fiat. Unde dicit Aristotiles in Echicis: "non ut sciamus, sed ut boni
Eamus".
Sedquia de naturali et morali ad presensnegotium non pertinet, de illis dicere non
estOpportunum.De rationali, que pertinet ad presensnegotium,disseramus.
Omnis artiFlcioseoperansprimo intendit Enem et posteadividit ea que sunt ad
Finem.Incipit enim a Hue, quia Finisest primo movens;posteadividit ea per que est
28 LOGICA MODERNORUM '11
devenire in Enum propositum, quia mediantibus illis finem suum proscquitur. Finis vero
totius logice speculationis est scire. Dicendum igitur quid est scire. Scire est per causam
cognoscere, quoniam omnis scientia acquiritur per demonstrationem. Ut dicit Aristotiles
in Posterioribux,demonstrativus sillogismus faciens scire. Et amnis sillogismus cx propo-
sitionibus, omnis propositio ex terminis. ln logicis enim speculationibusde hiis crat
dicendum, quia hec sunt ea per que devenimus in scientiam. De terminis igitur primo
dicendumest, quia ex terminis Et omnisprepositio, ex quibus est sillogismus.Terminus
enim in propositione dupliciter dicitur: aut terminus subiectus, aut terminus predicatus.
Quia predicatuscst dignior in propositione, de predicato dicendum cst. Porphilius (!)
autem adquiescens precibus Grisarorii (!) amici sui exorantis ut sibi librum intro-
ductorium in PredicamcnmAristotilis constitueret, quia liber ille erat de terminis secun-
dum quod sunt ad predicationem, propter hoc in suis!mroducrionibus
de hiis qua erant
ad predicationem erat dicendum. Cum igitur quidquid predicatur aut est genus aut
species aut differentia aut proprium aut accidens, de hiis enim quinque que.sunt quinque
universalia,erat dicendum,quia quidquidpredicaturest universale,predicanturautem
hec quinque universalia in differenti modo. Quorum diFferentiam in sequentibus
dicemus.
Thus the introduction is continued on P. 53").
b. Ff. 53v-54f contain an introduction to Aristotle's Perihermeneias,

written by & different thirteenth century hand in one column:
[. 531': Cum attendatur duplex sermo, est enim quidam sermo qui est coniunctio rei
cum voce mediante intellectu, quidam est coniunctio intellectus cum ipsa voce.,in qua
coniunctione intellectus se ipso coniungitur non informatus:: rc extra sedab animasola,
prenotandum est de quo genere intendat Aristotiles in hoc libro qui dicitur Liber
supra hunc locum, Aristotelem intenderede
Sicut dicit Cümumimtatc-rl
Perihermenias.
illo genere sermonis qui est coniunctio intellectus cum voce. Agit enim de vocibus
secundum quod posite sunt supra intellectum ita quod Fiat ibi quies non descendendoad
informationem rei extra. ln Libro autem Predicamcnrorum agit Aristotiles de illo genere
sermonis qui est coniunctio rei cum voce mediante virtutc intellectiva. Agit enim in
sicut dicit Commentator, dc vocibus secundum quod posita sunt circa res
Prcdicamenris,
et tunc non Et quies supra intellectum, sed contingit descendere ad infornmtionem rei
extra. Secundum quam determinationem distinguimus duo genera nominum. Secundmn
enim coniunctionem rei cum voce attendimus nomina rerum sive nomina prima in-
tentionis, ut substantiam,quantitatem, et sic de aliis. Secundumautem coniunctionem
intellectus cum voce attendimus nomina nominum sive nomina secunde intentionis,
supra que nomina, ut iam dictum est, fundatur operatio Aristotilis in hac scientia.
( etc.).
......
c. [. 54f-ï' the same hand continues to give an introductor)! note on

Aristotle's Categoriae:
f. 53: Ut testanturphilosephi,animacreataest inperfecta.Propter hoc auteminfunda-

tur anima in corpore ut perficiatur virtutibus et scientiis. Sed de perfectione eius
quantum (ad virtutes) ad presensrelinquimus. Dc perfectioneautem eius quantumad
! viz. Averroes.
ANALVSIS 01: THE MANuscmp-Ts 29
scientiashic intendimus. Et quia omnis scientia est de rebus -— de eo enim quod non est,
non est scientia —- sunt autem tria principia rerum, scilicet natura, voluntas, ratio.. Et
secundum ista tria principia dividitur philosophia in tres partes: in naturalem, moralem,
rationalem. Naturalis autem scientia est de rebus nature. Moralis autem scientia est de
moralibus rebus. Rationalis autem de rebus rationis. Sed de rebus naturalibus et de rebus
muralibus relinquimus. De rebus autem rationis hic ostendimus. Res autem rationis
tripliciterest. Est enim res coniuncta congruitati, et etiam res coniuncta ornatui, et
etiam res coniuncta 1veritati. Res autem coniuncta cungruitati est gramatica. Res vero
coniuncta ornatui est rethorica. Dc re autem coniuncta veritati est logica. De rebus
autemconiunctiscongruitati et ornatui non intendimusin hac parte sedsolummodocle
rc rationis coniuncta veritati. Quod nichil aliud est quam veritas. Et quia veritas du-
pliciter potest esse, potest enim esse veritas cum complexione, aut sine complexione.
Si sine complexione, tunc est scientia Prcdicamcnrorum.Si cum complexione, tunc
dupliciter. Aut enim erit complexaet indigcnsaliquo precedenti,aut erit complexaet
non indigens aliquo precedenti. Si sit complexa et non indigensaliquo precedenti, sic
Si de complexionect indigensaliquo precedenti, tunc aut crit
est LiberPerhermcnias.
perpetua aut cuntingens. Si perpetua, tunc est Liber Posteriorum.Si contingens, tunc
dupliciter: aut ut in pluribus, aut ut in paucioribus. Si contingenset ut in pluribus, sic
est Liber Thopicorum. Si contingens et ut in paucioribus, sic est Liber Elenchorum. Et quia
incomplexum prius est quam complexum, prius enim est dictio quam oratio, ideo
precedit scientia Predicamentorum
onmes alias scientias. Que est de incomplexa. Est
enim de omnibusincomplexis.Et quiaprius complexumn'u'nindigensaliquo precedenti
quam complexum indigens aliquo precedenti, quia se habet per modum absoluti, alterum
per modum comparati, ideo scientia Pcriarmeniasprecedit scientiam Priorum que est de
re comparata. Et quia perpetuum prius est quam contingens, perpetuun'n enim dicit
semper esse, ideo scientia Priorum precedit scientias illas que sunt de contingenti. Et
quia contingens ut in pluribus magisparticipat naturam perpetui quam contingens ut in
paucioribus, ideo scientia Thapicorumquc est de re ut in pluribus, precedit scientiam
Elencharum, que est de re ut in paucioribus. Et sic manifestum est quod scientia Elm-
chorumdebet subsequi omnes alias scientias. Et sic manifesta est ordinatiü istarum
scientiarum inter se.
Hoc habito, cum hic intendamusprincipaliter de. scientia Predicamenrarum,
potcst
parere ordo istius in se ( . ..... etc.).
d. Ff.54v-551'give an introcluction to Aristotle's Tapica,written by the

samehand:
54'-'-SS'":Quoniam ut tcstatur abactoribusnaturalibus,proportionantur rationalia,de
rationalibus intendentes a naturalibus sumamus exordium. Sicut ergo duplex est prin-
cipium in naturis, materiale scilicet et formale, sic habemus duplex principium in
scientiis, intellectum materialem et intellectum formalem. Et sicut rationale principium
in naturis potens est recipere formam quamlibet — est enim sicut tabula rasa, ut dicit
Aristotiles —sic intellectus materialispotensest recipere multos habitus. Sicut enim in
naturis generatur aliquid mediante motu et quasi (?) ( ), similiter generatur
......
scientia mediante intellectu agente, qui abstrahit species sensibiles a fantasmate. Ut
dicit Aristotiles in tertio De Anima quod ill anima rationali necesseest esse quamdam
differentiam quam vodamusagentem intellectum qui facit in potentia intelligibilia in-
telligi in effectu,quemadmodum
lux facit coloresactu.
Item. Sicut in- (SSI') dividuo generato triplex virtus naturalis relinquitur: virtus
generativa propter salvationem sue speciei, virtus nutritiva propter conservationem sui
ipsius in esse, virtus augmentativa ut ad quantitatem debitam perducatur, et in nobis
triplex relinquitur virtus, scilicet sensus, qui respondet virtuti generativa que est
in individuo, mediante enim sensu adquiritur in nobis scientia. Quod testatur al)
Aristotile in Prima Posteriarumdicente: "omnis doctrina etc. ex preexistenti Et
. . . . . .
cognitione", et alibi in eodem: "pereunte uno sensunecesseest scientiam deficere".
Relinquitur etiam in nobis quedam virtus que respondet virtuti nutritive. Et hoc
dupliciter: aut que retinet species sensibiles, et hec est prima imaginatio ; aut que retinet
speciesintelligibiles, et hec est memoria. Habemus etiam virtutem que respondet virtuti
augmentarive.Et hec est ratio. Ratio enim est quod ministrat multa mediaad idem
probandum, et sic contingit scientiam augmentari.
Sicut in naturis duplex est generatio,generatiosimpliciter et generatiosecundum
quid, generatio simpliciter est quando substantia scitur, ut si homo hominem, arbor
arborem, et planta plantam; generatio secundumquid quando accidensgeneratur, ut si
ex homine albo Hat niger, vel econverso sic habemusduplicem scientiam. Quedam
—
enim est scientia simpliciter et est per causas necessarias et tractatur in Ponerioribus. Unde
dicit Aristotiles: "scire autem opinamur unumquodque etc." Quedam autem
..... .
est scientia secundumquid. Et hoc dupliciter. Quod potest haberi in hac divisione:
omnis sillogismus faciens scire aut est de eis que sunt et non possunt aliter se habere et
sic est ex eis que semper sunt. Et talis est sillogismus discipline. Aut est ex eis que sunt
et possuntaliter se habere.Et hoc dupliciter. Potestenim esseex eis que magispartici-
pant essequam non esseet sic est ex eis que sunt frequenter. Et talis est sillogismus
dialeticus sive tlmpicus. Vel potest esseex talibus que minus participant essequam non
esse. Et sic est ex eis que sunt raro. De his autem est sillogismus sophisticus. Ex hiis
autem potest parere ordinatio librorum ad se invicem. Et hoc dupliciter. Cum enim tota
logica sit de ratiocinatione sillogistica, ratiocinatio autem sïllogistica dupliciter potest
considerari, prout est in genere supra omnem materiam, et sic de ipsa est scientia
Priorum, vel prout descendit ad materiam. Et hoc tripliciter secundum triplicem
materiam. Quadam enim est ex eis que semper sunt, et sic: est in Pasteriaribus. Quadam
est ex eis que sunt frequenter, et sic est in Topicis.Quedamest ex eis que sunt raro, et
sic:est in Elenchis.Est autem duplex ordinatio horum librorum. Possuntenim ordinari
vel a parte ordinabilium, vel a parte ordinationis. Si a parte ordinabilium, tunc est Liber
Priorumprimus. Prius est enim unumquodquedum est in genere quam dum est in specie.
Liber autem Posteriora": secundus. Est enim ex necessariis que simpliciter priora sunt
quam probabilia. Probabile enim est quasi privatio necessarii et necessariumvero quasi
habitus; prius enim est habitus quam privatio. Hac eadem ratione Liber Thopicarumest
tertius, Liber autem Elencharumest quartus. Est enim Liber Thapjcorumex probabilibus.
Liber autemEIenchorum ex apparentibusprobabilibuset prius estprobabilequamapparens
probabile ratione predicta. Si a parte ordinationis ordinantur, contrarius erit ordo.
Prior enim est fantasia quoad nos que ordinat ea que sunt in Elenchis,et sic est Liber.
primus. Deinde est opinio que ordinat Llwpicalia,et sic est LiberThopicarum
Elcnchorum
secundus. Deinde vero est intellectus, qui ordinatur scibilia, et sic est liber Posteriorum
tertius. Quare Liber Priorumultimus et quartus.
Ex iam dictis patet quid sit subiectum in hac scientia de qua intendimus ad presens,
scilicetde scientiatradita in Thapicis.Estautemibi subiectumthopicussillogismus,sicut
in Elenchis sophisticus.Patetetiam quid sit materia,quoniamprobabile.Quod habetur
ex littera: Propositumquidcmnegotii
...... etc.
ANALïSls OF THE MANUSCRIPTS 31
This introduction is continued on the remainder of this page (P.551").
e. Ff. 551-"-"-56'*rcontain another introduction to the Categories, written

by the same hand that wrote PF.53v-55'V.
[. 55'-': Omnis acceptioanime est duplex, scilicet rei et actus. Et omne.discibile (!)
significat acceptumab anima cum ratione. Quare omne dicibile necesseest in hec duo
partiri, ut unum sit signilïcativum actus, alterum sit signiEcativum rei. Sed cum virtutis
rationalis tria sunt opera, ordinare, comparare et conferre, erit triplex obiectum
huic triplici actui. Obiectum primi actusest predicamentumaut principium
respondens
quod est significativum rei per modum rei ad aliud. Obiectum secundi actus est nomen
aut enuntiatio, que sunt signilïcativa actus per nwdum actus. Quod enim nomen signi-
ficet actum per modum actus patet.. Hec enim vox 'nomen'signiHcativaest significativi
rei.. Unde actus eius terminatur super actum.. Obiectum ultimi actus est ratiocinatio sive
sillogismus, in quo est collatio primi ad ultimum per medium.
Quantumad id triplex obiectumtriplicis actusattendunturtresscientie. Sedeaque
est de. obiecto primi actus bipertitur. ln eam que est de Predicamentis.— de qua est
presensintentio —, et aliam que est de SexPrincipiis. De obiecto secundi actus est una
scientiaque simul est de nomine et verbo et enuntiatione,et hec attenditur in Libro
Periarmenias.De obiecto tertii actus est scientia Priorum, in qua determinat de sillogismo
quoad commune esse.non applicando ad materiam. Sed cem ista forma communis per
materiam contingentem et necessariam diversificatur secundum speciem, necesse est
quod sint plures scientie de sillogismo secundum communitatem sue forme et con-
tractionem eius ad materiam determinatam.
Next there follows a speciücation of the several books of the Organum,

which much resembles that of the introductory note to the Topica. The
remainder of this note also discusses the speciFlc object of the Categoriae
(f. sem).
Ff. 57r-62V and 65r give & treatise on logic in the form ofa Summula.
——
It is very roughly scribbled by & hand quite different from the foregoing
hands, and is illustmtecl with diagrams. For this tract, see below, Ch.
xm,pp.4333.
[ 631' contains a grammatical diagram.
.
Ff. 63Vü-64m interposed in the mjdst of the foregoing tract contain
—
the initia] part of & commentary on the Priscianusminor. Inc.: (G) R
amatica est naturale principium discipline. Vel grmnatica est ars recte
scribendi vel recte scripta pronuntiæidi. Que dividitur in quatuor partes:
orthograüam, ethimologiam, Prosodiam, diasintaticam. In ortografia
docetur que sit convenientia litterarum ad constitutionem sillabe
apte (. ..... ). In ethimologia instruitur que sit recta origo clic-
tionum. In prosodia doctrinam dedit Priscianus qualiter sit unaqueque
dictio pronuntianda. ln quarta parte tradidit artem de constructione,

qualiter dictiones sunt ad invicem constructibiles.
—-
Ff. 641'3-64ï'h contain :: work on the. regimina partium. Quoniam ex
significatione 1verbi cognita maxime procedit determinatio regiminis
partium orationis cum cetere partes serviant ( ...... ) primo breviter
videndum est de significatione verborum. It is x—vrittenby the same hand
as F. 63V and is incomplete. The same tract is found in MSBurng/315 f. 2.
where it is called Summadc Regiminibus.
The second half of P. 651' and the First half OFF. 65v contain & note on
logical conversion. The remninder of P.65" and the major part of F. 661"
give the Lord's Prager with some glosses. The remainder of f. 661"
contains a grammatical note on "iube Darnne'; similar notes are found on
P. 663'. Logical notes are found on f. 67m'm. The nine Erst lines of
[. 67") are almost illegible. After a lacuna of three lines the initia] lines
of Peter of Spain'sSummulae logicalesare Found(with some omissions),
written in an early thirteenth (.:enturJ;rhand:
67"): (D))valetica est ars arcium ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. Et ideo
in acquisitione scicnciarum dialetica debet esseprima. Dicitur autem dialetica :- dia,
quod est duo, et logos, quod est scrmu, et lesis, quod est racio, quasi duorum racio vel
sermo, scilicet opponentis et respondentis in disputacione. Sed quia disputacio non est
haberi nisi per sermonem nec sermo nisi mediante voce et omnis vox est sonus, :- sono
igitur tamquam (a priori) inchoandum est.
Sonus igitur est quitquid (!) auditu auris pruprie percipitur. Dico autem ( illc-
. . . .
gible in "17pharosral:by «.:de ) per sonum. Sonus dividitur in sonum qui est vox
......
et in sonum qui est non vox. Sonus vox idem est quod vox. Vox autem sic describitur:
vox est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus naturalibus instrumentis formatus. Naturalia in-
strumenta sunt hec: os, labia, dentes quibus os formattir os labia dentes guttur similia.
Sonorun1
Here the text breaksoH'and another hand. somewhat later and rougher,
continuas as follows:
Ars cst collectio plurium preceptorum ad unum Enem tendentium. Sed cum dico:
'omnishomocurrit; ergoSor', ibi sunt multa precepta ad unum Finemhabentem. Ergo ibi
est ars. Solutio. Duplex est Finis, Enis particularis et Fmisuniversalis. Preceptorum
collectio facit artem tendentem :(tandem MS) ad Enem generalem et universalem,
scilicct discernere verum a falso vel facere orationem congruam. Sed cum dicimus:
'omnishomocurrit; argaSor', precepta quibus probatur tendunt ad Encm particularem.
Queritur cle dialetica. Dialetica est ars discernendi verum :: Falso.Sed contra. Omnis
diFEnitio debet.
Here the text abruptly ends, at the end of the page. Under the Fll'St
is read: Secundum
column (f.. 673'11) duasdispositiones,
wxrrittenby the same
ANALVSIS OF THE MANUSCRIPTS 33
later hand.Theseare the initia] words of John le Page's(JohannesFagus

or Pagius) Appellationes,
opening as follows: Secundum duasdispositiones
terminorum inext daplcx acws. This work is found in Paris, B.N.Lat. 11412
(see belox-v,nr. 18, p. 82 f.) and B.N.Lat., 15170 (see below, nr. 22,
p. 88).
The same rough hand begins a work on logic nearly at the middle of
F. 6811.
Ff. 681'3-72V'1:An intmductor)r work on logic, which Opensas Fol-

—-
lows:
(l)atroducendis in artem dialeticam primo videmus quid sit ars, quid dialetica, quid
introductio. Ars est collectio plurium preceptorum ad unum Finem tendentium
( ...... (illegible in my photostat by a fold in the manuscript.) ) Contra.
.......
Omnis bona cliFHnitio debet convenire 5u(0) diFHnito et non alii. Sed inest huiusmodi
collectio in hac: 'omnis homocurrit'; possunt ibi multa precepta colligi ad habendum
collectionem; ergo est ars. Solutio. Dicimus quod duPlexest Finis:particulariset uni-
versalis. Precepta collectio quorum faciunt artem reduci ad Finem universalem sive
generalem, scilicet discernere verum a falso vel facere orationem congruam. Sed cum
dicitur: *amnishomocurrit', preceptaque hancprobant tendunt ad Enem particularem.
Queritur de dialetica et unde dicatur. Dialetica est ars animi] ad (ars MS) omnium
motoriorum principia viam habens et ideo in (in)quisitionc scientiarum dialetica debet
esseprima. Dicitur autem dialetica a dia, quod est duo, et logos quod (est) sermo, et
laxis, quod est ratio, quasi duorum (681'0) ratio vel sermo, scilicct opponentis ct respon-
dentisin disputatione.Sedquia disputationon potestfieri nisi per sermonemnecsermo
nisi mediante voce et omnis veuxest sonus, a sono tamquam a digniori incoandum est.
Sed ad hoc quod dico quod dialetica est ars discernendi verum a falso, potest sic
0b1J1C1 (!). Omnis diFFmitiodebet convenire suo diffinito et non alii. Sedhec convenit
alii, scilicct gramatice. Quare nulla (: nugatory) est diFEnitio. Solutio. Dico quod
discernereverumafalso est dupliciter, scilicet per se — et sic convenit logice — et per
accidens, et sic convenit gramaticc. ltcm. Obicitur contra hoc quod dicitur quod
dialetica est ars artium, £f.-ianuaScientiarum,qua clausaomnesclauduntur, qua aperta omnes
appariunmr, sine qua nulla, quia per hoc videtur innucrc quod excella(t) omnes alias
scientias. Solutio. Dicimus quod non dicitur "ars artium etc." quia sit dignior
.....
quia subperior (!) adalias,sedquia manifestatipsaset deservitipsis.
This commentary breaks off on [. 72"). It contains questions and s'olu-

tions on an introductony explanation of the main points of logic. ln spite
of the initial x-vords,Ehe underlying textbook is not that of Peter of
Spain. No doubt, it is to be considered as one of the sources of Peter's
Summulae logicales.
7 Royal JHSS9 E XII. A parchment collective codex of 256 Ff. written in

diFferent hands dating from the twelfth and thirteenth century. Original-
ly it belonged to Merten Priory, co. Surrey: Hunc librum dedit may.
David Londoniensis eccl. b. Marie de Meritona, quem qui abstulerit vel

quocumque 1110th alienaverit vel pignori supposuerit vel extra septa
ecclesie commodaverit vel titulum istum deleverit vel mutaverit, ana-
thema sit (["F.], lOï'). It hasthe Old Royalpress-mark'no IISO'.
lt contains & number OF theologica] treatises and questions, among
which someby the handof masterSimon canonof Tournai (1201). See
the catalogueof Warner-Gilson. I give only the logica] tracts.
lï. 981'3-991'
1J: Tractatus inplicitarum, a brief anonymous tract on
—
implicit propositions in logic. It has an initial in green and s-vaswritten in
& diFferent hand than the preceding treatises. It is minute and seems to
date from the second half of the. twelfth century. [t opens as follows:
Inplicite propositiones:. dialeticis appellanturin quarum qualibet inplicantur vel in-
volvuntur due. lnplicitas (propositiones addedby a contemporagf hand) Faciunt tales
termini: 'id quod', 'ea que', 'sciuni', [solum] 'tantum', 'preter', 'incipit', 'desinit', 'nunc
primo', 'nunc uhima'.
luxta inplicitus primo habeatur hec regula: omnis inplicita habet duas explicitas.
Item: omnis implicita equivaletcopulative constantiex explicitis (inplicitis MS). Verbi
gratia: 'Socratesestid quodhomo';hec inplicita equivalethuic copulativa.constante(!) ex
explicitis (inplicitis MS) 'Socratesest aliquid et illud est homo'. Hec est vera; quare et
implicita vera.
The tract is complete and entls as follows:
f. 99"): Similiter et de ista: 'unum solumquod est anima! cstfenix', sic sume explicitum:
'unum solum quod est anima! estfenis et nil aliud quod sit anima! ectfenix'. Explicit tractatus
implicitarum.
No doubt, we have in this cap)r one of the oldest tracts preserved on

implicil propositions in logic.
Ff. 2271'3-2313'hseem to have been written in the same hand of the
——
second half of the twelfth century as part of & treatise of systematic
theology, allied to, but not apparently based upon, the Sententieof Petrus
Lombardus (Inc.: Augustinusin libro de doctrina Christiana breviter
theologie materiam assignans ). Our item consistsof three dif-
......
ferent parts at least:
a. — Ff. 2271'3-2291'3: & tract on fallacias, which is entitled in our

nmnuscript FaHacie magistri Willelmi lt has the incipit: INCIPIUNT
.
FALLACIEMAGISTRI WILLELMI. Fallacia apud logicos dicitur deceptio. For
the complete text of this tract, seeour Part 2 Text XIII. lt turns out to be
,
a tract on fallacies written by the author for the use of young theologiam.
Seethe explicit: Hec rudibus theologis nostris ne falluntur de fallaciis
ANALVSIS OF THE MANLISCRIPTS 35
proposuimus. It is followed by the beginning of a tract on the loci

communes.
b. ——[T. 229m-230Pb: Inc. Locus argumenti est sedes argumenti, idest
id unde argumentum Fn'matur et elicitur, vel id unde trahitur conveniens
argumentum ad questionem. The tract breaksoffin the middle off. 2301'13
in the discussion of the. locusa divisione.
It might be concluded From this that master William probably x-vrote
a complete introduction to logic for his theological pupils. As to the
identity of this master William, one might suggest that he is William de
Monte, chancellor of Lincoln, also called William of Leicester. He was a
famous theologian towards the end of the twelfth century. Before,
prübabl)Irabout 1180, he had been & well-known professor at the Mont
Stä Genevieve in Paris, where he numbered Alexander Neckam among
his puPils. He died in 1213. SeeJosiahCox Russe", DictionmyrJ Writers
quhirteenth Ccntmy England, London etc. 1936, p. 196.
c. — f. (f.
2311'3-4") 230? is left blank) containssometheologicalnotes,
x-vritten in the same handwritting as the preceding parts. The Fll'Stis upon
the scriptural text-facitc vobis amicosde mammonainiquitatis, ut cum dgfcceri-
tis, recipiam vosin eternatabernacula. Inc. : Nota quod verba ista vite intel-
ligenda sunt de bonis et malis, secundum quosdam de mediocriter bonis
et mediocriter malis, secundum alios de summe malis etiam et summe
It is apparently&note or &pupil's reportatio,for we read in
bonis (2311'11).
it: Set Magister dicit quod hec opinio est falsa affirmans quod merita
ecclesie(esseMS)summemalisproficiunt. Al: the endof the samecolumn
another note begins: Nota. quod queriter an dolus sit in isto de quo
dicitur: "populus hic me labiis honorat, cor autem etc". The
......
third note begins towards the end of f. 2311"?and begins as follows:
Sciendum quod principium sine principio et principium de principio et
principium de utroque principio appellationes sunt et nichil aliud signi-
Flcant quam Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus.. Ergo secundum hoc non
potest Heri relatio per 'illud' ad hoc nomen 'principium'. Verbi gratia.
Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti. Pater est principium
sine principio, Filius est principium de principio. Ergo Pater et Filius
sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti et Filius est principium de illo
principio, vel non. Ergo Pater et Filius est unum principium et Filius est
principium de se principio.
The fourth note is found F. 231 *"3. Inc. Sciendum quod quis loquatur
hic: hos (!) meum aperui et attraxi spiritum, quia mandatatua deside-
rabam, an ubi iustus vel malus. Constatquod vix iustus. Sedquomodo
dicitur in glosa: non invenio in me perfectum boni cum esset iustus? The
Efth note runs as Follox-vs(F. 231VU): Nota quia verum est quod qui
oFFenclitunam personam, oFfendit omnes. Sed qui oFFendit Spiritum
Sanctum, oFfendit Patrem, et qui olïendit Patrem, peccat per impoten-
tiam. Ergo qui peccat in Spiritum Sanctum, peccat per impotentian'l.
The same column contains the initial part OFthe sixth and last note,
after five lines alrmd)lr(at the bottom of F. 231'-"-"):lnc:
which l)reaks01'1C
Sciendum quod hoc argumentum est falsum: *duo bonasunt; utrumquees.':
meritorium vite eterne; alterum potestj'eri sine altero; ergo maioris meriti sunt
duo quam unum'.
These theologica] notes may well form part OF& school course taught
in the surroundings of master William de Monte, who is the presumable
author of the FaHacicand the tract De locis.
qua! MSS 12 FXIX. A parchment codex 01 137 Folios (12 in. )( 8 in.)
written by several hands of the fourteenth century. The Hy-leaFF. 187 is
from & late thirteenth ('nenturyrmanuscript of Aristotle's Nicomachean
Erhicsin Latin, containing part of Book [, l 100 a 2-1 102 1) 28. There are
initials Hourished in red and blue, some with a little geld. This beautiful
book forrnerlyrbelongedto ReadingAblaey(F.2v : Hic est.liber sanaeMarie
Radyng).On 1. IV we read: Istumlibrum dedit-jï'atcr WillelmusdeHarlcstone
claustmh'bus in claustro, quem qui alienaverit ve! scienter violaverit anathema
sit. 011 f. 1861' the name of Willelmus de Dene is Found. It bears the
Old Royal press-mark ino. 411'. On the Erst fly-leaf the title is Found:
Liber ïsagogeijïrü, but this work is missing in the present manuscript.
lt contains the following works:
Ff. 31'11-1
FH"a
: part of the connncntar)lr of Walter Burle.)ron Aristotle's
—
on chs. 5-9 OFAristotle's
Categories(seethe explicit). It is a (340mlm—zntar)r
Categoriesonly. Inc.: SUBSTANTIA AUTEMESTQUE PROPRIEetc. Hec est
secunda pars huius libri et continet quatuor capitula. The explicit is 011
1. I3W: EXPLICITTRACTATUSDATus A MAGISTROWALTERODE BLIRLE?
SUPERLIBRLIMPREDICAMENTORUM.
ff. 141'3-231'3: The same author's Cmnmentar)r on the Perihermeneias
—
of Aristotle. Inc.: mundum OPORTETCONSTITUERE.Cum cognicio
sillogismi sit Finislogices et cognicio partis precedit cognicionem tocius et
sillogismus habet partes The colophon is Found on F. 23":
. . . . . ..
EXPLICITTRACTATUSLIBRI PERVARMENïASDATus A MAGISTROWALTERO
DE BURLEï.
ANAL'l'SlS OF THE MANLISCIUPTS 37
Ff. 23f'J-33V') : The same writer's commentary on the De sexprincipiis

—
of ps.-Gilbert de la Porröe. Inc. : FORMAESTCOMPOSITIONICONTINGENS.
Quamvis Aristotiles in libro PredicamentorumsuFFncienter Our
......
(209)!'is incomplete at the end at the result of the loss OFsome leavesafter
F. 33; it ends alartlptl)r at the explanation of the lemma: Cantentioautem
oritur. This page is badi)r blurred. The following page (P. 33?) is left
blank.
Next a number of grmnnmtical works are found from Ff. 34r-89ï'.
[[ do not know, indeed, why Father Boehner said that after the three
Foregoingworks of Walther Burley "immediately (!after fol. 33) follows
Folio 123". See his Introduction to the edition OFBurley's De puritate artis
logicaetracratuslongior. (New ïork 1955), p. Xll)].
Ff. 341'3-1'0: an acephalous Fragment of a grammatical tract.
—
Ff. 35f3-4-4-V'J:& treatise on grammar, being & discussion of the
—
subject matter involved in the Priscianus
maior (Inst. gramm.l-XVI). The
work opens as Follows:
STrenuum negociatorem mecum non iudico qui rem lfön auget. Negociacio autem
nostra saltibus glorie ceteris preeminencius fremitat.
The text of the treatise propter begins (f. 35m): Primo querendum est
itaque causa iuvencionis litterarum. The treatise is incomplete at the
end as& result of the loss of some leavesafter [. 44, and breaks oFf in the
chapter on nouns.
Ff. 45P3-7SW: the same grammatical treatise on constructioas is found

—-
in RoyalMSS,2 D XXX, f. 106r sqq. lt ends about the middle of f. 75:41:
Sicut enim gerundia adverbialiter ponuntur, ut istudealegendo',imde ad
legendum' sic et inFmitivi adverbialiter ponuntur. Unde et
...... ,
illud egent quod aliis (!) sicut adverbia. Dicimus enim tjtudeolegere'
sicut dicimus: 'studeobcne'.
f. 761'34'U: the fragmentary beginning ofa commentary on Aristotle's
—
Physics.Inc.: Intencio mea in hoc [lacuna] est glosare librum Aristotilis
qui dicitur Auditusnaturalis. The same incipit is found in Paris, B.N.Lat.
16.519 f. 1: Intentio mea in hoc sermone est ( etc.).
......
— ff. 77r-89V : vcrborum
Formacianes (title given in the colophon), being
& table of the perfect and supina of over 1600 Latin verbs, alphabetically
arranged. Inc.: Atitestor, attestatus sum, attestatum.
Ff. 901'3-981'3:& logical treatise in the Formof summulas,which opens

—
38 LOGICA MODERNORLIh-l u
as follows: Cum sit nostra presens intencio ad artem dialeticam, primo

oportet scire quid sit materia artis dialetice. Quare magis dicit presens
intencio quam preterita vel futura? It is the. text of an important tract
on logic with an interspersed commentaw. The proper Summuiaeend
on F. 981'3.For this treatise called the Logica Cumsit nostra, see below
Ch. XIII, pp. 416-4-4-8.
Ff. 981'13-104-1'5:
a tract on fallacies. Inc. : Ut dicit Aristotiles in libro
—
Eienchormn,quatuor sunt genera disputacionum, scilicet disputacio
doctrinalis, temptativa, dialetica, sephistica.
Ff. lO4-fb-105V'): the same tract on fallacies in a shorter version. Inc. :

—
Secundum Philosophum primo Elenchorum quatuor sunt genera dispu-
tacionum, scilicet clisputacio doctrinalis, dialetica, temptativa, et
sophistica. It hasthe colophon (f. lOSV'J): EXPLICILINT FALLACIE BREVES.
No doubt, both tracts on fallacies belong to the preceding Summuiae.See
also below, nrs. 14-and 15.
Ff. 1061'3-110"): part of another, more extensive, commentary on

—
the Logica Cumsit nostra. Inc. Cum sit nostra presens intencio. Queritur
quare magis dicit *cum' quam is." ex quo est coniunctio ita bene sicut
'cum' Solutio. Dicendum est quod hec coniunctio ILcum" significat certitu-
.
dinem, isi' significat incertitudinem, sicut patet de modo significandi.
Sed dignior est certitudo quam incertitudo. Ideo magis dicit 'cum' quam
IEsi".[. llOV is blank.
ff. lllm-l 12"): beginning of & tract on consequentia,which opens

—
as follows: Consequentia est quedam habitudo inter antecedens et
consequens. Antecedens est illud ad quod sequitur aliud. Consequens est
illud quod sequitur ex alio.. Ut hic: isi homoest, animal est' ; ianimai cxt'
Est consequens, 'homoest' est antecedens.The Erst words of this incipit
are Founcl in the opening words of & tract De consequentiisascribed to
some master Rudolphus Anglicus in Vienna, V.P.L. 4698, P. 87"; but
it is definitely & diiïerent tract, as appears from the rest of the incipit:
Inc. : (C)0nsequentia est quedam habitudo vel sequela in qua consequens
se habet ad antecedens. In quo sciendum est quod in argumento tria
Oportet considerare. Seealso MS Erfurt, Amplon.Qy 273. Ff. 141r-151v.
[T. I IZW-l 15") :. the initial part ofa more extensive reduction of the
—
tract on "difficult propositions" (or"sophisms") found in Oxforcl,
Digby MSS 2 and 24- and Paris, B.N.Lat. l4-.069 (see above, nrs. 14, 15
and 19), with & similar incipit as is found there:
ANALïSIS OF 'I'HE MANUSCRIPTS 39
a-j'i'rmacioin qua universaleuniversaliterswnptumpredicatur, ut habetur ab Aristotile

Nulla es.',
in primo Peryarmenias. Hec autoritas communiter glosatur sic: nulla est propositio
affirmativa vera in qua universale ctc. Contra: Probo qu0d ista glosa non valet, quia hec
est vera: 'isti sunt.omneshomines', demonstratis omnibus hominibus per hoc pronomen
'isti '. Similiter hec est vera: 'omnissoi csr.omnissal'. Ergo aliqua est propositio aFErmativa
vera in qua universale universaliter sumptum predicatur. Cuius contradictorium est
datum in glosando regulam.
of Walther Burley. Inc.

Ff. ll6f3-1221'": the tract Dc consequentiis
—
Quia in sophismatibus probando et improbando consequentiis utimur,
ideo circa naturam consequentiarum multa oportet scire. Our copy is
anonymous. It is found with the name of the author in & Florence
manuscript (Med. Laurcnziana,cod.Plut. XII, sin. 2, Ff. 203V'J-2121'h)and
in Oxforcl, Boclleian,Digby MSS24- (see below, nr. 15, p. 61) and in
Bl'uges,Bibliothäquedela Villa, MS 500, ff. 95v-101v.
Half of [. 122"? and the whole of f. 1221?are left blank.
ff. 1231'3-1261'13: the tract on the dictiones exclusivae OF Walther

——
Burley. Inc. Circa dictiones exclusivas est sciendum quod dictio exclusiva
addita subiecto removet predicatum ab oppositis subiecti, ut sic dicto:
( !' . . . . .
tantum homo cum: removetur currere ab omnl alto ab homme et attrlbm-

.
tur homini solum. Ideo hec: 'tantum homo currit' exponitur sic: homo
currit et nichil aliud ab homine currit. The end ofour copy has the colophon
(F. 129"): MAGISTRIw. DE BURLETE.The
EXPLICIUNTEXCLLISWE
treatise is also found in Bruges, Bibl. de la ViHe, MS 500, Ff. 813'11-851'".
ff. 126v3-129WJ: the tract on the dictiones exceptivaeof Walther

—
Burley. Inc. : Hoc signum 'pretcr' aliquando tenetur exceptive, aliquando
diminutive. Quando tenetur exceptive, tunc denotat instanticum essein
suo preiacente, ut si dicatur: 'nichil preter Sortemcurrit', denotatur ista
duo contradicere: 'nichi] currit' et '50 currit'. On F. 129") the Colophon
-
is Found: EXPLICILINT
EXCEPTWE w. DE BuuL'. Another copy
MAGISTRI
of this work is in Bruges, Bibl. de la Villa, MS 500, Ff. 85W-89T'J. The
latter manuscript gives & better incipit than the London copy does:
Circa exceptivas est sciendum quod hec dictio 'preter' etc.
... ...
Ff. l30T3-l33v3: the tract on suppositionesOFthe same author. Inc.:
——
Eorum que dicuntur quedam dicuntur cum complexione. et quedam
dicuntur sine complexione. Ea que dicuntur sine complexione sunt ut
'homo', 'animal'. Et ea que dicuntur cum complexione sunt ut 'homo
currit', 'animal currit'. Ex quo patet quod incomplexum est pars com-
plexi. The explicit is (f. I33V3): EXPLICIUNT DATEA
SLIPPOSITIONES
M. w. DE BounL'. Another copy is Found in Bruges, Bibl. de Ia Villa,

MS 500, FF.891'0-941'3.
Ff. 133V'J-138W: & tract De insolubilibus without the author's name.
-—
1t opens as follmvs: Circa insolubilia queruntur duo, primo circa insolu-
bilc simplex, secundo circa insolubile compositum. Thc work undoubt-
edly belongs to Walther Burley, as appears from the copy in Paris, B.N.
Lat. 16.621, F. 2431" (another anonymous copy is Found in Paris, B.N.
Lat., 16.130, f. 1141").For & discussionof Walther's De insolubilibusand
some older tracts on this subject, see L. M. de Rijk, SameNotason the
Mediaeva! Tract dc insolubilibus, with the Edition q]. a Tracr. dating jiam the
Endqfthe TnveyihCentmyin VIVARILIM, a Journal For Mcdiacva] Philosophy
and the Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages, 4- (1966), pp. 83-115.
Ff. 1381'5-14-8"): the tract Dc obligationibus of Walther Burley. Inc.:
—
In disputatione dialetica sunt due partes, scilicet opponens et respondens.
Opus opponentis est sic inducere orationem ut faciat respondentem
concedere impossibilia, que propter positum non sunt necessaria
concedere. Opus autem respondentis est sic sustinere positum ut
prapter ipsum non videatur aliquod impossibile sequi sed magis prapter
positum. On 1. 148") we read the Colophon:
EXPLICITOPTIMUSTRACTATUSDE OBLIGATIONIBUSDATLISA MAGISTRO
WALTERODEBURLEïEANNO DOü-HNIMILLESIMOTRECENTESIMO SECUNDO.
Other cepies are found in Bruges, Bibl. de la Villa, MS 500, Ff. 72m-
81'") and in Venite, Bib1.SanMarco, CI. Xl cod. 12, Ff. 37f-41v.
For the relation OF these x-vorks of Walther Burley to his tract De
puritate artis logicae, see the edition Of the latter work by Boehncr (New
Tork 1955) pp. XIII-XIV.

The next page(f. 1481?)is left blank.
FF.1491'3-174W: a tract entitled in the colophon: Abstractionescum
—
obligationibus et insolubilibus and ascribed to magister Richard de Kilvinc-
toun. Inc.: Solvere non est ignorantis vinculum, tertio Metaphisicc
capitulo primo. Qui igitur insolubilium vinculi sunt ignari, modum
istorum ambiguum nequiunt aperire, sed huiusmodi vinculo ut bruta
funiculo in domum abducuntur. On F. 174V3 the colaphon is read:
EXPLICILINTABSTRACTIONES cum OBLIGATIONIBUSET INSOLUBILIBUS
DATLISA MAGISTRO mcanoo DE KILVINCTOUN.The author mentioned is
Richard of Killington (d. 1361), Dean of St. Paul's 1351-1361. For this
rather obscure author, see F. M. Powicke, The A*!ediaevalBooksqf .«Herwn
Collega,Oxford 1931, pp. 24-26, and A. B. Emdcn, A Biographica! Register
ANALTSIS OF THE MANUSCRIPTS 41
qfOJjbrd Io A.D. 1500 (Oxford 1957—59)

dthc Universis)! vol ll, pp. 1050-
51, which among otherx-vorks mentiens Sophjsmataattributefl to Richard
in Paris, B.N. Lat. [6134 and Erfurt, flmplon. F 313 (art. 6) and O 76
(art. 7). Richard came from Kilmington in the bislwpric of ïork aswe
are told by the author himself in his commentary on the Fll'Stbook OFthc
Sententiae, med in Brugcs, Bibl. de la Villa, MS 503II f. 793"): Ego
Richardusdc Kilmington Eboracensisdyocesis.
However, the sametract is ascribedto ThmnasBradx-vardine
(d. 1349)
in several 111anuscripts: Brugcs, Bibl. de la Villa, MS 500", Ff. 134T-143V;
Erfurt, Amplon. Oct. 76, Ff. 6f-21V, and Vcnice, San :lffarco, Cl. XI,
cod. 12, Ff. 27r-37v. An anonymous copy is Foundin Oxford, Bodleian
Library, Can. Misc. 219.
The rest of f. 174V is left blank. The remaining part of our nmnuscript
is roughly scribblcd by a hand diHïerentfrom the Forcgoing.It contains
six items on astronomy, calendar, metrica! algorism and arithmetics.
The Erst item (an anonymouscommentary on John (le Sacro Bosco's
treatise on spherical astronomy) is precedcd .l.-))"a few logica] notes
(f. 175m): (I)Tu scripsisti aliquam propositionem veram heri etc.
......
(2) So- Fuit tantus sicut fuit Plato; hcc incipit esseFalsa etc.
......
(3) Ais(?) Antechristi necessarioesset falsum etc. (4) Post &
...... Aliqua
necessarium esse ipsum esse post a
...... etc. (5) prapositio
potcst incipere essefutura necessario..... . ctc.
Thc la.st itcm is & eulogy on Aristotle, possibly For some University
commemoration. For all these items, see the catalogue of Wamer and
Gilson I, pp. 67-68.
zlddïtiona! MSS 8167 is a collective parchment codex of 196 Folios written

in different hands. lt contains three maior tracta:
H.. 311'11-87"): & copy OF the Summa dictaminis Of magister Guido
—
Faba,preserved in quite & number of Mediaeval manuscripts. Inc. : Quasi
modo geniti infantes lac concuPiscentie rationabile.
Ff. 1361'3-1541'4: a grammatical treatise, beginning: Eorum que

—
accidunt littere et sillabe quedam sunt communia, quedam prcpria.
Communia sunt ista que utrique accidunt, sed propria que accidunt
littere tantum vel sillabe tantum.
Ff. 1891'4-1961'11contain another COP)'written in & thirteenth century
—
hand of the logica Cum si: nostra. See above, nr. 8, pp. 37-38; below,
nrs. 14and 15; andbelow, chapter XIII, pp. 416-448.
xl] U N I C H, 131!VERISCHE STAATSBIBUOTHEK
Lit.: Carol. Halm, G. Lnubmann and others: CataloguscodicumIapinorum

BibliothecaeRegiaeflfonaccnsis,Munich 1868-81, Vol I, 2 (1871): nrs
2501-5250; vol. [12 (1876): nrs lllOI-1502S.
10 C.]...M. 4652 is a collective parchment manuscript in 120 of [ 17 Folios.

It formerly belonged to the libr—m-yof Benediktbeum and consists of four
dilïerent parts, which are listed in the table of contents written by a later
hand on the First fly-leaf (F. lr):
Iste liber est monasterii Büdictüpeiren;
Metrista cle productione creaturarum
Palpanista bernarcli
Fabule aviani poete
Quedam loycal ia.
The same hand repeated the note on the ownership at the bottom
of f. l*', and of [. 651': ISTELm' E MENS?" NEI BEDICTIEPEIRE;
The Erst part (Ff. lV-28V)waswritten by ïm eleventhcentury handand
contains part of the poems of Alcimus Avitus; the second part of our
codex (Ff.29f-4-6V)is a fourteenth century copy of BernardusGeistensis's
Palponista; the third part (Ff. 47T-64-v), x-vritten by & thirteenth century
hand, contains the Avianusnovus(IT. 4-7T-6ll') and the Catonovus(Ff. 61?-
64?), the last pageof which (F. 641?)waswritten by a fourteenth century
hand. For all these parts, see Emil Grosse, NovusAvianusin: Programm
des Königlichen Friedrich-Collegiums zu Königsberg in Pr., Königsberg
in Pr., 1868, pp. [[[-V. '
The Fourth part only concerns us here. lt has been analysed by M.
Grabmann in his Bearbeitungenund Auslegungcnder aristotelischenLogik aus
der Zeit von PetrusAbaelardbis PetrusHispanusin: Abh. (ler Preuss. Akad.
der Wiss. 1937, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, pp. 36—4—0. His analysis must be
corrected in some points.
This part was written by several different hands FF.65-92; 93-103
dating from about 1200. [I: contains the following works:
— Ff. 65f-68V: an incomplete tract on the predicabilia. A later hand

added the title SaIr-Jta artibus,
in doubt
110 For Sompta arthUS.
in this
1:01"
work, see below, Ch. Xl, pp. 391—393.
Ff. 69"-72'-r : & tract on categorical and hypothetical propositions and
—
argumentations(generaargumentationum). Seebelow, pp. 393-394.
ANALVSIS OF THE h-lANLISCRlPTS 43
[T. 73r-78V: & complete tract on suppositio.See below, pp. 394-396.

——
The second half of P. 781?is left blank.
Ff. 79f-81f: & tract discussing the several kincls of proposition. See
—
below, p. 396. The second halfof F. 811"is left blank.
Ff. Slï-9OV: a tract on the five kinds of dictiones.See below, p. 397.

—
The secondhalfof f. 88V is leFt blank.
— FF.
9 1f-92V: part of & tract on the ars sophistica.
See below, p. 397.
The Ff. 65f-92V will be edited under the title Tractatus Anagnini in
our second part as Tract VI .
F. 93? contains a number of stray notes on diFFlcultwords, a.0. simona-

—
les (simonists); [aperta]. There are also found the well-known lines:
Summus Aristotiles trutinando cacumina rerum, in duo divisit quicquit (!) in
orbefuit. (quoted by Ahin of Lille in his Distinctiancsdictorumtheologiae
(e.d. Migne, P.L. 210, col. 981). At the bottom of the page it says:
dialetica est mater scientiarum.
Ff. 939-1033': & set of grmnmatical discussions going under the title
—
OPPOSICIONESGRA(MATICE).
Ff. lO4-P-l161": :: tract on dialectic, x-vritten in :: handwritting probably

—
clating from the second Imlf of the twelfth century. For this work, see
below, Ch.. Xl, pp. 397—398.lt will be edited in full asTract V.
Ff. ] l6V-l l7V: part of ïm explanation OFthe Lorcl's Prayer.

—
——[. l 17'": somestray notes (on saucia,on littera, on logical argumenta-

rion).
11 C.]..M. l4.458 is a collective parchment codex formerly belonging to

the library of Sankt Emmeran (no Em.E.81), in 40 uf 133 Folios. It was
written by many hands, which have been determined by Prof. Bischoff as
follows (he waskind enoughto inform me in :: personalletter): FF.1-28:
early fourteenth century, German?; Ff. 29-4—4:middle of the thirteenth
century, possibly German; ff. 45-58: Erst half of the thirteenth century
(of which Ff. 56-58 may be a comtempomry addition), Western; Ff. 59-
82 first half of the thirteenth century, neither defmitely German nor
Western; Ff. 83-94: first half of the thirteenth century, French; Ff. 95-
102: first half of the thirteenth century, Westem; Ff. 103-118: early
4—4 LOGICA h'IODERNORUM u
thirteenth century, if not late twelfth century; Ff. ll9-l33 early

fourteenth century.
This codex contains a great number of works on logic. It was analysed
by Grabmann in his Bearbcitungenund Auslegungen,pp. 16-24. His cle-
scription needs correction in some minor points.
On the Front coverture of our codex the librarian of Sankt Emmeran
x-vrote Collectura varia dyalectica and & later hand added: ex boethiuser.
alpharabio. There is & Iibrarian's note on the backside: Callactura varia
dyalectica ex Boethio Aifarabia Aristotele et aliis.
Ff. lrü-Zlm: the Fallaciaemaioresof PeteroFSpain. SeeM. Grabmann,

—
Handschrijïriiche Forschungenund Funde zu den philosophischenSchryïen des
PetrusHispanus, in: Sitz. Ber. der Bayer. Akad. der Wiss., Phil. Hist.
Abh. 1936, Heft 9. München l936, pp. 84-96 and I27.
I'T. 211'3-28V3: the tl'ElCtSDe relativis, De ampliationibus, De appellatio-

—-
nibus, De restrictionibus,and De distributionibus(incomplete) of Peter of
Spain's Summulaeiogicales. The rest Of [. 283'3 is left blank.
Ff. 291'11-39"): a tract on clinlectic. Inc.: In omni doctrina convenit

—
ordinem observare. Igitur in doctrina dialetica ut ordinatus sit processus,
ordinem nostre doctrine premittamus. For the rest of this introduction,
see Grabmann, op.:it., pp. 19-20. The tract has the following parts:
a 29Tü-31v'3: introduction (discussionof sonus, vox, nomen, etc.)

b 31vU-33m: discussion of the predicabiiia. For the incipit, see Grab-
mann, op.cit., pp. 17-18.
: 331'3-391'": discussion oF disputatio. it opens as Follows:
Inquisitio cuiuslibet disputationis est ut traitur aliqua questio vel in [idem vel in scientiam
vel in apparentemFidemvel scientiam. ln Fidem, ut inquisitio dialetici (dialetica MS),
in scientiam, ut inquisitio demonstratoris, in apparentem [idem vel scientiam, ut in-
quisitio süphistc. Sed unusquisque istorum artificum utitur argumentatione et omnis
argumentatio utitur argumento per quod habeantconnecti extrema, illud autem medium
non connectit extrema nisi per habitudinem ad extrema. Sed illa habitudo est locus.
Unde unusquisqueistorum utitur loco. $ed locus est virtus argumenti, argumentum
autem est virtus argumentationis et omnis argumentatio resolvitur in propositionem et
conclusionem. lgitur antequam agatur de loco secundum ordinem Boccii prius agendum
videtur utile de propositione,questione,et reliquis..Sedquia alibi dictum estsatisde pro-
positione, cum idem sint subiecto propositio et questio, ut dicit Boecius,non differant
nisi solo modo, primo agendum est de questione.
ANALTSIS OF THE MANLISCRIPTS 45
The tract on disputatioconsistsof three parts:
a general introduction (33Tü-34Vü)
b De locis dialeticis(34W-37T"); for the incipit, see Grabmann, op.ci£.,

p. 18.
c De lacissophisticis
(37rl3-391'0)..
A somewhat later hand added in the
margin of P. 37") : alter tractatus defallaciis, by which he apparently refers
to Peter of Spain's FaHaciaemaioresfound in the beginning of our manu-
script. The presenttreatise clearly joins in with the generalintroduction
of this part of our Dialectica as appears From the initial words:
Omnis disputatio, ut dictum est alibi (viz. f. 331'3),vel tendit ad scientiam, vel ad Eclem,
vel ad apparentem fidem vel scientiam. ldest (?) quedam disputatio tendit ad hoc ut
appareat facere scientiam, lwcest verum probare, et sic ad scientiam vel ad fldem veram,
cum tamen non faciat. Dicto igitur de vestigiis variorum argumentorum, hocest de locis
dialeticis, consequenter dicendum est de vestigiis argumentorum apparentium et non
hocestde locis sophisticis.
existentiun'n,
For the rest OFthis incipit, see Grabmann, ap.cit., p. 18.

Next are Founda tract on insolubiliaand one on imphcationcs.
! think,
they do not belong to the proper treatise on (lialectic. The Dialectica
presumably ends with the tract on fallacies:
Cum enim dicitur: 'Sor cir,nigcr' dicitur affirmatiü nigri simpliciter. Cum autem dicitur:
CII nigcr' dicentes: 'ergo non est niger', negatio non dicitur secundum idem. Sic:enim
I['.-ut:.w':
dicitur secundum partem, affirmatio vero prior dicebatur secundum totum. Similiter
'phu't in Africa; erga pluit' contra: 'non pluit in Aji'ica; erga nur.-pluir', non est contra-
dictio, quia non est secundum idem.
Et hec suFFlciant.
I think this conclusion Et hec su-Hïciantrefers to the whole treatise. The

same somewhat Fmer hand that wrote the last chapter of the treatise on
Fallacies(f. 39T'J),wrote the two additional tracts Dc insolubilibusand
De implicationibus.
Ff. 391'11-4-01'0:De insolubilibus

—
Ff. 4-01'11'1'1): De implicatianibus.
——
Both tracts havebeendiscussedand edited by L. M. de Rijk, SameNotas
on the :l-flediaeml Tracr De insolubilibus, with the Edition q]- a Tract Dating
from the End (Jthe Tweyih Cemmy in VIVARIUM4- (1966), pp. 83-115.
46 LOGICA MODERNORLIM 11
F. 4-0V3: the initial part of & discussion of necessarioand contingenter.Inc.

(C)onsequenter dicendum est de istis dictionibus 'necessario',*concingen-
te:". After a lacuna of about 16 lines there is & set of notes of practical
school-dispute.Inc. Quod impossibilis positio habeatsustineri, sic proba-
tur. The end comes011[. 401") with the word Expliciunt.About 25 lines
of that column are left blank.
A similar hand continues on f. 411" with some more logical tracts,
introduced by & tract that announcesa discussion of the di vcrsiimproprieta—
tum et qffciorumqueconsideranturin sermone and about copulatio,appellatio,
suppositioet multa alia. In fact we only Find & discussion of suppositioand
appellatio :
Ff. 4lfa-4-2Vb Dc suppositionibus;De appellationibus. Both tracts will

—
be edited in our second part as Tract XIV under the title: Tractatus de
prop rietati bus sermonum.
The same hand continues with a tract on jiuka positio, being a kind of
obligatio:
Ff. 42vb-43PU: Inc. Cum respondens multis modis habet obligari in

disputatione, de illa obligatione quejälsa positio nuncupatur, hic tractan-
dum est..
Explicit (f. 4370): Et hec sufüciant de falsa positione. On [. 43W'W &
short discussion of the argumentatiocomplexionalis,viz. the. syllogism (Erst,
second,and third figure) is added. Inc. : Cum argumentatio multis modis
dividatur, hanc divisionem sumamus ut ex illa eligamus illam partem de
qua intendimus..
The remainder of f. 433r contains a. note on predicatio (essentialis
and
accidentalis)and a.note on signyï'careand supponere,
added both of them
by & contemporary hand:
Aliud est signiücare, aliud supponere. Item. Aliud est supponere, aliud locutionem
reddereveramvcl falsam.[tem. Figuraest dictionis quandoa simplici adparticularefit
ergoaliquishomo',vel quandoa pluribus determinatisad
processus,ut 'homoestspecies;
unum determinatum: 'ut animal est.Sar, animal est Plato, et sic de singulis; ergo animal est
Cicero'(ci ho MS., for: Cicerho?).
The samehandadded& diagramon suppositio:

ANALï'SlS 01: THE MANUSCRIPTS 47
—-suppos,-t1onumg -
-!
I
alia communis alia discreta
ut 'homo' ut 'Sor'
communium
'—— - - .— . . -
*
I
alla
. accudentahs allo naturalis
ut 'homo est' ut 'homo' per se
'omnis homo ost animal' "
I
...accidontalium
- - ...... .... I
alia simplex alia personalis
ut 'homo est species' (ut) 'homo est animal '
poroonahum
[ —-——I
alia determinata alia confusa
ut 'homo currit' ut 'omnis homo currit'
vel 'aliquis homo currit'
CD" USGI'UH] ———-—- - . -

-— -—
[
alia necessitate rei alia necessitate modi
....nocossitoto roi
i— ]
alia ex parte subiecti alia ex parte predicati
F. 4-4-1'is left blank and f 44V3'Vb discusses some syncategorematic terms

.
'forte', 'oliud quom', 'altoriusmodi', 'bis', 'vfx', 'totalitcr'. The greater
part of f. 4—4-Vb
is left blank.
A somewhat earlier hand wrote f

on . 451" Sancti Spiritus assit nobis gratia
and began & new logica] treatise:
ff. 451'0-4-91'3:an Ars disputandi. lt will be edited as our Trac: IV

—
under the title: Ars Emmerono.Seealso Chapter Xl, pp. 399-4—00.
——f. 491'5-"3: & stray question on logic. See Chapter XI, 13.4—04.
Ff. 49f'J-50rb : & tract on predicabilia. See Chapter XI, pp. 4—04—4—05.
—
Ff. 501'5-53"): & tract on the loci communespreccdcd by an introduc-
—-
tion (on propositio, questio, etc.). See Chapter XI, p. 405.
[. 53FD'W: three logical problems. See Chapter XI, 13.406.

—
Ff. 53V3-56fb: & complete tract on univocatio. See below, p. 406 F. lt

—
will be edited in our second part as Tract VII..
Another conten'uporary hand again x-vrote Sancti Spiritus assit nobis gratia
and continuecl with an interesting logical fragment on the meaning of
predicari.The author opposeshimself (nosautemnominalcs
dicimus,F 571")
.
to the Reales(Ff. 56"); 571").
Ff. 56T'J-57V: Inc. Terminorum alius est predicabile, alius non. Ut
—
ergo melius pateat quis terminus sit predicabile, quis non, videndum est
quid sit predicari.
After a lacuna of about Four lines an incomplete tract on nomenappellati-

vum and nomen proprium is Found written in & contemporar)r hand. It is
OFsome importance For our knowledge of the theory of signi 'catio in the
grammatical schools.
IT. 57v-58T: & grammatica] tract on the appellative and proper nouns.
—
F. 58'43' opens with two stray notes, one 011 res corporea and res incorporea;
the other on the three 111eanings
OFthe Greek word amas.Thereafter the
initia! part of & grammatical tract on consumamis found. Inc. : Quoniam
de exigenda partium orationis multi multa locuti sunt nec tamen aliquid
ex ea distinxerunt, pro modulo nostre capacitatis de ea aggrediamur
disserere. lt breaks off on the end OFP. 583").
The folios 59-1 18 contain & number of commentaries on the logica vetus,
written by several hands of the beginning and the first half of the
thirteenth (:«FmturJ,r
(that of H'. 103-118 may be of the last part of the
twelfth century; see above, pp. 43-44).
Ff.591'-821': & complete cmnmentnry on Boethius' De yllogismis

—
hypotheticis. Inc. Intentio boetii est in hoc Opere tractare de sillogismis
ypotheticisregularibus.Per hoc quoddicimus intentionemeius tractare
de ypotheticis sillogismis excluclimus ab hoc tractatu sillogismos cathe-
goricos. The work is found also in MS Orleans 266, pp. 7313-1183 and
& fragment of it in Munich, C.L.M. I4.779 Ff. 66T-671'.
H'. 83f-931' : an incomplete commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge. Inc. ln
-—-
libris philosophicis auctore Boetio sex inquiri atque expediri convenit.
Folio 94- is left blank.
ANALVSIS OF THE MANuscnlf-Ts 49
FF.95f-1021': an incomplete commentary on Aristotle's Categories.

—
Folio 102V is left blank. Inc.: Intencio Aristotilis est in hoc opere de
decem primis vocibus prima decem rerum genera significantibus in eo
quod res significant di5putare. The text runs practically parallel to that
found in Paris, B.N.Lat. l3.368, H'. 195T3-214V'),and in Rome, Vat. Reg.
230, Ff. 411'3-65'4'1.
[T. 103r-118V: an incomplete commentary on Boethius' De topicis

—
diüïsrentüs.Inc. : Incipit liber Boetii de topicis cliH'er-cntiis,idest precepta
illa que traduntur nobis auctore Boetio de topicis diH'erentiis, idest de
localibus(liFFerentiis;rapasenim grece Iocusdicitur latine. Quare vero
dicantur differentiis vel etiam loci, in sequentibus manifestius clarabit.
Topicorum autem intentio facilis argumentorum est inventio. Et bene
dicitur Facilisinventio. Topica enim non docent primitus invenire; illud
enim naturalis ingenii est. Sed facilius invenire.
The last part of our codex was written by an early fourteenth century
hand:
-—
H'. ll9f-1331'. A copy of the commentary on Aristotle's Categories
by Thomasof Erfurt, attributed in our manuscript to & master Johannes
Swevus. Inc.: Equivoca dicuntur etc. Liber iste continuari potest
......
ad illa que dicta sunt de universalibus in prohemio sic. For the rest of
this incipit, see Grabmann, op. cfr., p. 23. For this part of the manuscript,
see C. Verhaak, Zeger van Kortrijk, Commentatorvan Perihermeneias.ln-
leidende studie en Tekstuitgave, with an English Summary, Brussel 1964,
pp. XXVll-XXIX, and Facsimile 6 (Summary, pp. CXXlX-CXXXIH).
12 'C.L.M. l4.763 is a parchment collective codex of 188 folios in 80 and

consists of several parts dating from the tenth, twelfth and thirteenth
centurias.
A fF. 1-63. Remigius in Donatum minorem; this section was written in

the tenth century.
B Ff. 64-88: Grammatica latina, written in & twelfth c«entun')r

hand.
C H'. 89-14l : logical tracts, written by an earlyrthirteenth century hand.

Seebelow, pp. 52-54.
D Ff. 142T-163V: This part was written in 2111 early fourteenth centur)r
hand. It contains the Enal part of Peter of St. Amour's commentary on
the Categories,which is found complete in Paris, B.N.Nouv.Acq.Iat'.1374,
Ff 13P-34-f,and a complete (:(:qurof & commentary on the Perihermeneias.
.
Inc.: Primum quidem Oportet constituere, quid nomen. Quid debeat
dici subiectumin hacscientia, patet ex divisione loyces(Ff. l4-2V-163V).
This work is ascribed by a different hand in the explicit to Hervä de
Nädellec O.P.: Et est opus editum (: magistro Ervegia magisu'oin theologia
Ordinis predicatorum.The same hand that copied the tract, wrote: Iste
liber est fratris hauurci (?), the last word in rasura.However, ] havesome
serious doubts on the correctness of this attribution. I think the author is
the Herveuslogicus mentioned by John of Garland, Moralescolarium,
vss64—9 Ff.ed. L. ]. Paetm-v:
647-652: Fallunt doctores iustos quidam seniores

Nautis peiores et ventis mobiliores.
Regnat in Hervco logicali palma tropheo,
Cuius corda deo fragrant quasi thure Snbco.
Dum largis itidcm facit invidiam domat, idem
Cuius laudo Fidem,cum sit michi cognita pridem.
This Herveus is called magister or sophistain the marginal glosses. It is

not likely that the master Herveus to whom "the palm of glory in logic
belongs and whose virtues rise to heaven like frank incense from Arabia"
is to be identified with the. theologian Hervä de Nädellec O.P. Besides,
the Morale scholarium was written in 1241 ln this year the master Herveus
.
must already have had a great name among the logicians. But Hervä de
Nädellec (d. 1323)can scarcelyhaveseenthe light in the thirties. See
also L. ]. Paetow, MoralcScolariumquohn aj Garland( johannesdc Garlan-
dia), Berkeley 1927, p. 178, n. 649.
This ccr-mmentar)ron the Perihermeneiasis part of & commentary on
the works of the logica vetus found in Paris, Arscnal 530, Rome,
Vat.?al.Lat. 1007, Oxford, Merten 296, and Munich, C.]..M. 8002 and
our C.]...M. 14.763. I give the contents of the Vatican mmmscript:
Rome V.P.L. 1007 (13th. eant.):

Ff. Im-SW: an anonymous commentary on Porphyry's lsagagc. Inc.: Sicut dicit
—
Philaxophu: secundozllctaphisicorum, inconveniensest simul querere It is also found
.......
in Oxford, zl-lertan296, Ff. 1"-7'-'. It may be by Herveus, whose other commentarius on
the logica mus are found in this manuscript. See the colaphon on P.29"). Part of this
work is found in Paris, Arsenal530, [T. 32'r'sqq.
ANALïSIS 01: THE MANLISCIUPTS 51
IT. S*r'h-IOW: Questiones super libro porphirii, possibly by the hand of 1-lerveus.
—
Inc.: Circa librum Porfïrii quedamin generaliqueruntur.Primoutrumsit possibilealiquid scire.
Et arguitur quod non, quoniam nichil convenitscire
......
Ff. llm-21m: Comm.
in Arm. This
Praedicamento. work is also found in Oxfortl,
—
Merton, 296, H:.78-241'. Part of this work seems w be in Paris, Arscnal 530, ff. 1612201'
(and Vienna, V.P.L. 244, ff. 60f-66l'?)
Ff. 211'5-291'13':
Comm. in finis:. Other copies are: Oxford, zl'Ierwn296,
Perihermeneias.
—
Ff. 24'40"; Paris, Arsenal 530, Ff. 21f-28l'; Munich, C.]..M. 8002, IT. 983'3-1091-"0
(incomplete)and our manuscriptMunich C.]..M. 14.763, Ff. I42V-163'f'.Inc. Primum
oportetconstituerequid nomenetc. Qyid debeat.dici subiectumin hac scientiapatet ex divisione
logicos. The explixit on 1. 29") is: Explücn sententiasuper libra pevarmcnias Aristotiüs Deo
gratias. Expliciunt .fcnrcntiac inpar libro pcryarmcnias Arfstotihs. Deo gratias. Explicit sen—
ten(tia) super vcteremlogicam edita :: magistra [rasure] britanc. Deo gratias.
Anotherwork of this masterHerveusmaybe the Abstractiancs

Hcrvici( !)
Saphistaepreserved in Paris, B.N.Lat., 15.170, Ff. 481'3-52113.See below,
m'. 22, p. 88. The final part of this manuscript is an expositio
johannis
Morem, mc.: Qyoniamdisputationismembrum:Ff. 29V3-32Vü.
As to the life-time of this master Herveus, some documents may be
consulted occurring in the MagnumPastoraleof the Notre Dame in Paris,
edited from Paris, B.N.Lat. 5526 by M. Guärard (4-vols Paris, 1850):
I, p. 143 (junc 1252): Guerinus(lc Villa Dombla et Isabelliscius uxor, ad quospertinebat
dimidia pars decimae Villac Dümblac proHtcntur sc vendidisse ex eadem
......
decima magistro Hervea Britoni canonica Rcmemi duos modios bladi annui redditus.
], p. 138 (18 January, 1275): magistro Hervca Britoni dicta Rauco, canonico
......
parisiensi
......
1, p. 143 (5 August, 1276) MagisterHerveusBrito canonicusParisiensistradit Auberta

......
quinque quateria vineae sitae etc.
......
1, p. 143 (December, 1276): decimam Villac Dmnblac quam Herveus
...... ......
Brito dictu: Raucus canonicus Parisiensis capitulo Parisiensi testamento suo dederat
.....
1, p. 14-3(7 December, 1276): defunctus HerveusBrito

...... .......
From this evidence the conclusion can be drawn that Master Herveus
Brito, surnamed TheHoarse(Raucus),was canon of Reims First, and of the
Nortre Dame in Paris afterwards, and died between 5 August and 7 De-
cember, 1276.
E Ff. 164-188: & commentar)r on Terence, x-vritten in & twelFth centur)r

hand.
52 LOGICA MODERNORUM u
We are only concerned, now, with the works of section C of this

manuscript. lt consists of the following tracts:
—-
f. 89V3'F'J: introduction to a treatise on dialectic. See our second
part, Tract Xl, pp. 459-4-60.
Ff. 901'0-121"): an important treatise on dialectic. See below, our

——
Chapter XII, pp. 408-415. It will be edited in full as our Tract XI,
pp. 46l-638.
From f. 121") (EXPLICIT.INCIPILINTTRACTATUS) a number of tracts on
logic are found, the interrelations of which ar not quite clear.
Ff. 1211'11-1221'5:& general introduction into dialectic, with the

—
following incipit:
Quoniam inferioris cognitio & suo dependet superiori tractaturi de enunciacione et de
eius partibus, scilicet nomine et verbo, et cum unumquodque istorum sit vox et omnis
vox sonus,ideo a sonotamquama superiori inchoandumest. Sonussic describitur: sonus
est suum sensibile aurium, idest quod proprie auribus percipitur.
Ff. 122r5-123W: a. tract on the loci communes:

—
INCIPIUNT LOCI. Locus in communi sermone est superFlcies aeris rem includens neque
maior nequeminor [corpore] quam id quodincludit.. Et secundumhoc locusest quantitas.
Item. Alio modo dicitur locus substancia locans et includens rem. In qua similitudine
dicitur locus in dialetica. Nam sicut substantialocata suam trahit firmitudinem a loco,
sic argumentatio suam trahit & lGCOErmitudinem. ln hac similitudine sicut idem ille
locuspotestreciperediversasuccessive
corpora,sic idem'locuspotestdiversasconfirmare
argumentaciones. Unde a Boecio describitur: locus est sedesargumenti.
f. 123V3'Vb: & short tract on moda] prapositions:

—-
Viso de prapositionibus de inesse videndum est de propositionibus modalibus. Nam
prapasitionum alia est modalis, alia est de inesse. Modalis est ista in qua coherencia vel
discoherencia predicati cum subiecto determinatur dictione modali ut 'Sortemcurrereest
necessarium','Sortemnoncurrereext possibile'. Sunt autem quatuor dictiones que reddunt
propasitiones modales, scilicet 'ncccsrarium', 'païsibjle', 'contingens', 'inposibl'le', et
adverbia que derivantur ex illis. Illa est de inesse in qua coherencia vel discoherencia
predicati cum subiecto non determinatur aliqua dictione modali, ut 'Sar currit', 'Sar
non currit'.
ff. 123vD-125T3: & tract on fallacies:

—-
FALLACIE.Primum oportet determinare quot (quod MS) coniectant qui in disputacioni-
bus decertant et corrixantur (Cp. Arist... Soph.EL, 165l) 12-13). Deinde locus sophisticus
declaretur. Sunt autem numero quinque species: redargucio, falsum, inopinabile,
soloecismus, et nugacio.
f. I251'a'1'11: a short tract on the equivalence OFprapositions:

—
Quoniamcleequipollenciaproposicionumad presensintendimus,
DEEQUIPOLLENCIIS.
videamusquid sit equipollencia. Est autem equipollencia equalitas positarum (?) vel in
duabuspropositionibusvel in pluribus. Et cognosciturex eo quod negatiopreponitur vel
postponitur signo.
f. IZST'J'W: & tract on the universalia:

—
DE umvmsaunus. Testante PorFii-io cognitio quinque univemalium utilis est ad
scienciam predicamentorum, ad (liff'iniciones, ad divisiones, et ad demonstracionem.
Quod autem cognicio quinque universalium valeat ad scienciam predicamentorum,
palam est ex hiis. Dantur enim quedam documenta ab Aristotile in illo libro, ut hoc:
diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diverse sunt species.
F. 1261'5'V'J: a short tract on syncategorematic terms:

—
SINCATEGOREMA'M. Quoniam ignari virtutis nominum sepe paralogizantur, teste
Aristotile in primo Elencarum,virtutes quarundam dictionum que mentibus rudium
dubitationem ingerunt declaramus.Sed primo de istis dictionibus 'solus' et 'tantum',
que conveniunt in prima intenciüne, quia utraque notant adequacionem ad aliud.
DiHel-unt tamen in hoc quia hec dictio 'solus' notat exclmionem circa subiectum hoc
—
ideo est quia est dictio adiectiva; vult enim ponere rem siiam circa subiectum —, hec:
autem dictio 'tantum' notat exclusionem utriusque et potest determinare utrumque,
scilicet subiectum et predicatum, predicatum secundum se, subiectum racione principii
subintellecti.
Ff. 126V'J-129"): & tract on Aristotle's Categories, divided in our

—
copy into two sections:
:: Ff. 126'i'b-l281'IJ
DE FREDICAMENTIS TRACTATUS. Encium aliud substancia,aliud accidens, idest encium

aliud est ens in subiecto, aliud non ens in subiecto. Hec divisio Flt per aFFlrmacionemet
negacionem, inter quas nichil est medium quia eciam inter substanciam et accidens nil
cadit medium.
b Ff. 128fb-129m: & tract on opposita:
TitaCTA'rus DE OPPOSITIS.Postquam vidimus de predicamentis, secundum ordinem

Aristotilis videamus (le appositis. Oppositorum quatuor sunt species. Quedam enim
apponuntur ut relativa, quedam ut contraria, quedam ut affirmatio et negacio, quedam
ut privacio et habitus.
This tract ends about the middle of f. 1291'3. It is innmzcliatel)r followed

by some stray notes on logical matter, ending at the end of P. 129"),
where about four lines are left blank.
f. 1291'3-1'0: stray notes on logical matters.

—
54 LOGICA MODERNORUM n
Ff. 129'43—1
371'3: an extensive tract on the signa distributiva, without
-—
title:
Inter signa distributiva primo dicendum est de hoc signo 'omnis'. Dc quo talis datur
regula: hoc signum 'omnis' terminum sibi inumediateadiunctum confundit distributiva
et mobiliter, terminum vero mediate adiunctum confundit non distributiva et in-
mobiliter.
Ff. 1371'3-14-0"): & tract on relativa, without title:

—
(U)t melius pateat de relativis, quod presentis est negocii, primo notandum quod
relativorum aliud est supponens,aliud copulam. Relativumsupponensest hoc pronomen
'ille' et 'ipse', et similia. Relativum copulansest hoc nomen 'alius' et 'reliquus' et similia.
Sedprimo queratur quid sit relacio. Et ponetur Fortequodsit quidammodusintelligendi.
Et hoc solet poni a quibusdam.Sedsi hoc ponatur,obicitur contra.
Ff. 140F'J-14-ll'": some notes on the terms 'necessario' and 'contingen-
-—
ter '
(D)E hiis adverbiis 'necessario'( lacuna. ) sic sequeretur quod Sor non esset
... ..
Sor contingenter. Primo notandumquid sit necessitaset quid contingcnciact quociens
dicatur necessarium
et contingens.
These notes end about the middle of P. 141"). They are Followed by
another short note on 'necessarium' ancl some theological lines.
N U R E M B E R G, GERMANISCHESNATION/ILMUSEUM
There exists no printed catalogue of the colleCtion of Latin manuscripts

preserved in this museum.
13 Germ.Nat.Mus. 27.773 is a collective parchment codex in 80 of 129

extensively amlysed by W. Wattenbach, Einealte Gremmatik,
Folios. [t x-vas
in: Anzeiger für Kunde (ler deutschenVorzeit. Neue Folge 19 (1872),
pp. 119-122. See also M. Grabmann, Bearbeitungenund Auslegungen,pp.
31-36.
Besides & number of grammatical works this codex contains three parts
on logic:
A Ff. 4-ll'-54ï' what is called in the manuscript Excerpta Introductio'num,

written in & hand dating from about 1150. It may be divided into two
main parts:
- PF.
41r-47r
ANALVSIS OF THE MANUSCIUPTS 55
IT.471'-54-*'. For these parts, see below, Chapter III, pp. 155-I60.
—
Both parts will be edited in our second part as Tract Ill under the title
Excerpta Norimbcrgcnsia.
B PF.55T-72v: an abbreviation OF an introductory compendium on

logic. It was written by & hand of about the same time as the preceding
part. For this work, seebelow, Chapter [II, pp. 148-150. lt will be edited
under the title Abbreu-*iatio in our secondpart (Tract Il).
zlflontana
The Folios 98-99 contain several diagrams on qualitas, ad aliquid, situs,
quando, ubi, habere, facere, pati., opposita, inmutatio, prius, simul, and
sonusand quantitas.
C Ff. lOOTa—l29") are written in a Ene handwriting of the thirtcenth

century with many red and blue initials. This part contains the compila-
rianes supra summulamPetri Hispani, which are Found in three Munich
manuscripts, C.L.M. 4603; C.L.M. 6905, and C.L.M. 22.294-, and in
Paris, B.N.Nouv.acq.lat. 308. See M. Grabmann, Handschrjfiliche For-
schungenunde Funde, pp. 67—69.
0 A*F0 RD, BODLEIAN

usmmr
Lit.: Catalogi codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleianae. Pars nona
codices & Kenelm Digby donatos complectens by
...... ......
G. D. 'Macray. Oxford 1883.
consisting Of 152 folios. It is a

14 Digby 2. A parchment codex in 1613'10
collective manuscript written by different hands all dating From the se-
cond halFof the thirteenth century. [t was Formerly headed ThomasAllen
in ]6m0 13.
lt contains several works, and Fragmentsof works, on theological,
astronomical and computistic, medical, geometrical, philosophica], and
logical and grammatical subjects.
IP-4-ï': Prognosticatio eclipsium ab anno 1281 usque ad annum 1300

4-V-5V: Hymni nd Virginem beatam et ad Ihesum crucileum, cum
notis musicis
5": Dialogus inter Mariam Magdalenam querentem Dominum in horto
et ]hesum ipsum
9: Old English poem of 24- lines upon the Passio Christi
6v: Old English prayer and hymn to the Virgin
7?- I 31": Kalendarium
l4-P-151'
: Tabula per quam sciri indubitanter
possunt diesSeptuagesime,
Quadragesime,Pascheet bisextus (beginsin 1282)
151":Pious resolutionsin Old English verses(12 lines)
IS'": French addressand versesto the Virgin
16'-'-25V: Tractatus de Kalendariis componendis, opening as follows:
Per veterumsagacitatemcompositusfuerat Kalendarius. This incipit is not
found in A. C. Little, Initia OperumLatinorum quaesaeculisXIII, XIV, XV
attribuuntur secundumordinem Alphaberi disposita, Manchester 1904- (reprint
New Vork 1958).
The next part of our manuscript [Ff 26T-95V]is part 11 in the de-
scription given by Macray. It is said to contain & Tracratus de logica,
ad-fï'nem.However, this part does not form & unity. The
impcrjizctus
Following tracts are to be distinguished:
a. 26r-67V': a treatise on logic, which has the form of Summulaeand

consists of the following tracts:
[. 26f-361'. Inc.: Cum sit nostra presens intencio ad artem dyaleticam,
primo oportet scire quid sit materia artis dyaletice
2. 36V-387. Inc.: Ut dicit [Ar.] Boecius argumentum est racio rei

dubie faciensFidem
3. 38v-42V. Inc.: Ut dicit Boecius locus est sedes argumenti.
4. 4-2U-4-5V.Inc.: Ut dicit Aristotiles omnis sillogismus constat ex

propositionibus et propositio ex terminis. [Another hand added at the
t0p Of f. 431": suppositio suscantiva rei designatio, vel potest dici quod sup-
positio est proprietas extremi secundumquod extremumordinatur ad rerum

naturam in prapasitione].
5. 4612673'. Inc.: Ut dicit Aristotiles in principio Elenccorum (!),
quatuor sunt genera disputacionum, scilicet disputacio doctrinalis,
dyaletica, temptativa, sephistica. Disputacio doctrinalis est que procedit
ex primis et veris principiis et immediatis, qualiter disputat geometer.
Dyaletica est illa que procedit ex probabilibus tantum. Et sunt probabilia
que vera videntur omnibus vel pluribus vel sapientibus. Ad quid pertinet
proprie?; ad opinionem. Disputacio temptativa est illa que procedit ex
illis que videntur respondenti. Et pertinet ad experimentum ignorancie.
Disputacio sophistica est illa que procedit ex apparentibus probabilibus.
Ad quid pertinet?; ad apparentem gloriam quoad Opponentem et ad
deceptionem quoad respondentem.
ANAL'A'SIS 01: THE MANUSCRIPTS 57
This is an extensive tract on fallacies based on Aristotle's Sophistici

Eienchi. lt ends as follows: Sed videtur quod ista fallacia non diFfert ab
equivocacione quia in omni paralogismo equivocacionis interrogantur
plura ut unum sub eadem voce, hic autem sub diversis vocibus. EXPLICI-
UNT FALLACIE.
b. 68r-79V: Tract on the predicabilis: written in the same hand as the

foregoing Summuiae. It is named Summa brevis porfriana in the explicit
(f. 79V). Inc. Cum cognicio quinque universalium, scilicet generis,
speciei, differencie, preprii, et accidentis, sit necessaria ad doctrinam
predicamentorum, ubi ista tanguntur, et etiam sit necessaria ad diffini-
ciones, quia constat ex genere et diFFerenciis, et etiam sit utilis ad divi-
siones, cum sit divisio generis in species et dilïerentias, et accidentis in
accidentia, et etiam sit utilis ad demonstracionem, cum eius subiectum
sit species, passio, ( ) diFFmitio, — propter hoc:facit PorHrius
......
brevem et utilem tractatum de quinque universalibus, non determinando
questiones difficiles.
A possible hint as to the author of this Summais found on f. 71v : verbi
gratia: si Willelmus est homo et homo est animal et animal est sub-
stancia, ergo a primo Willelmus est substancia. No doubt, he may be
identified as Willelmus de Montoriel. See below, p. 58.
f. 79I'H' is bac"),rstainedand rather difficult to read. The tract ends as

follows (P.79"): (Et hec) sufficiant. EXPLICIT QUODT' GANICUS (or
GAMCUS ?). Then, on the next lines:
HEC PUER EST TIBI SUMMA BREVIS BONA PORFIRIANA
FUNDE PRECES ORE PRO SUMME COMPOSITORE.
The remainder of f. 79Wcontains a fragment of :: last will : £ In.)

.....
nomine patris et [ilii et spriritus sancti Amen. Ego 11.de. 1). ( )
......
et nolens intestatus discedere...... etc. (partly illegibile as :: result
of the damp stain).
c. Ff. 30f-84V: & fragment of :: commentary on Aristotle's Categories. It

is the Enal part of the commentary written by some Willelmus de Mon-
toriel, as appearsfrom the explicit:
f. 341; Fortasse alii sunt modi eius quod est habere. Sed predicti sunt
maxime usitati. Propterea de aliis, si qui fuerint, reliquatur intencioni
studentis. Explicit Summa libri predicamentorum quam fecit Willelmus

Ffr (: frater!) de Mentoriel
WILLELMUS DE MONTORIEL ME FECIT PREVALEO MEL.
For the first part of this Summa, see Digby 24; below, nr. 15, pp. 59-60.
The name of our author is once used in an example. We read 011f. BOV:
Quod contrariorum compositorum (instead of oppositorum)
non semper
sit una pars vera et altera Falsapatet. Cum enim Willelmus non sit,
neque erit vcrum Willelmum essesanumnequc egrum. In privacionc vero et
habitu sic est quod necesseest altermn partem esseveram et alteram
falsam semper, licet fuerint composita (read, again: opposita). Ut
* Willelmus habe: visum' * Willelmus estcccus'; ista sunt opposita privacione
——
composita (For: apposita).Et tamen Willelmo non existente neutra pars
est vera, scilicct neque essececumneque essevidentem.
So far I have not found any evidenceabout this Willelmus de Montoricl
(:?Mount Oriel). Hc is not mentioned by Ulyssc Chevalicr in his
Räpertoiredessources historiquesdu mqyenäge. (Bio-bibliographie, 2 vols
Paris 1903-06; reprint New ïork 1960), nor in Emdcn, A Biographica!
Register cythe Universi? sf ().-Jard to A.D. 1500, Oxford 1957-59. If we
are right in takingji fel'ji'ater, he might have bclongcd to some (the
Oxford ?) community of the BlaclcFriars or to that of the Gl'C)'Friars.
d. Ff. 85f-94-ï' : an incomplete commentary on Aristotlc's Perihermeneias.

It opens as follows: In principio doctrine libri Pcryermenias oportet
materialiter diffinire quid sit nomen et quid 'vcrbum, que sunt partes
intcgralcs orationis et principia materialia. Postea oportet difünire
negationem et affirmationem, que sunt species cnunciacionis. Deinde
oportet scire quid sit enunciacio, et quid subiectum huius libri, et quid
oracio, et quid genus cnunciacionis. 1t cnds abruptly at the end of F. 94",
dealing with the appositioand convenientia01'propositions. It seems to be
obvious that this treatise, too, is by the hand of Willelmus de Montoriel.
Next :! number 01"computistic, mcdical, and mathematical fragments
are found:
1'.951'4'": & Fragment & some commentary on & compotusrersifcatus.
—
Inc. Gaudetctc.. ExPositio huius vcrsus talis est: iste tres dictiones descr-
viunt tribus mensibus in quibus locantur sedes clavis cuiuslibet änni,
scilicet gaudet, lux, et phebus.
' As is known,fis sometimes written ashg. Cp.—Hïzcisri

in the explicit of MS 1313ny24,
f.. 90fb (below, p. 71).
ANALïSIS OF THE rs-mwuscmp'rs 59
Ff. 9612] 1 11": A tract on computistics. Inc.: Compotista autem par-

—
tes temporis quandoque dies maiores quandoque dies minores determinat.
FF.! 1IV. Four superstitious Fonnulas contra-Huxumsanguinisin Latin,

—
English and French.
The next quire (IT. 112f-121V')is written in a similar handwith ink of
& somewhat blacker colour. It appears not to have bclonged to our
manuscript originally. As & matter of fact the initial words of the next
tract which begins on f. 1221'(nulla est a—Dïrmacio
......
etc.) are
written at the end of f. IIIV, which Folio apparently immediately
prcccdcd what is now numbered F. 122.
Ff. 1121'-121V. A tract De compositionequadrantis. lnc. Post chilindri
——
compositionem nunc cuiusdam instrumenti horologici, 1dclelicctquadran-
tis, connpositionem investigemus.
——Thc next part (F. 122f-14-0v)is dcscribedby Macray as d

Tractatus e
universalibus, imperfectus ad finem, praemissa tabula, in qua homo deducitur
a genere generalissimosubstantia. However, it is & tract of sophisms,
preceded by & depiction of the wclI-known arbäi' porphyriana.The tract
is alsofound in MS Digby2 (Ff. 6lm-901'13)and in Bruges,Bibliothäquc
de la Ville, MS 497, Ff. 74—T11-95W.
For this work, see below, nr. 15,
pp. 62-72.
——On Ff. l4-1T-14-7ï'

a treatise called by Macray: Philosophia
A ristotelis
pcr magistrum Rogerum Baurth, per dominum Robertum Russe! de Merstone
philosophiae relata. It opens as follows: De philosephia inquirenda
quedam continet necessaria et quedam utilia.
— Ff. 149T-1501' contain some Formulae(samplcsof lettres),

Ff. lSOV-152v contain & short tract on grammar (incomplete). Inc.:
—
Quid est littera? Littera est minima pars vocis.
15 Digby 24. A parchment codex of 105 Ff. consisting of two parts which
did not originally belong together.
dating from the end of the thirteenth century

A. Ff. lT-16V, in 16:010
and written by the same hand that wrote part of Digby 2. These are the
sixtccn leavesmissing in Digby 2. Rather clumsily, they havebeen bound
as Ff. 1-16 in Digby 24. They contain the grcatcr part of William of
Montoriel's Summa Predicamentarum, the last five leaves Of which are
60 LOGICA MODERNORUM I!
found in Digby 2 (as Ff. 80-84); see above, 111'.14, pp. 57—58.This Summa
on Aristotle's Categories
opensas ['olim-vs: Equivoca T sunt res est signi-
ficata 'i' per nomen equivocum in sermone sunt quarum solum nomen
commune est sed dianicio diversa. Verbi gracia, hamo verus, qui est
animal verum, et homopictus, qui est animal pictum, dicuntur equivoce
animal, quia hoc nomen 'animal' predicatur de utroque secundum eam-
dem vocem, sed diffmicio animalis prout predicatur de homine vero ita:
anima] est substancia animata sensibilis; diFFmicio vero animal prout
predicatur de homine picto est [animant talis: animal est assi(milacio)
[stain in our manuscript]substancieanimatesensibiliset non substancia
animata sensibilis. Et sic patet quod iste diFFmiciones sunt diverse et
propterea nomen est equivocum. The First folio is damaged by & teat at
the edge.
B. Ff. l7f-105'ir in 40 minori, written in diFFerenthandwritings partly

(lating from the fourteenth century, partly from the thirteenth century.
This part of our manuscript formerly was the codex ThomasAllen 170. lt
has the following parts:
—- Ff. The
17f-4-5'b'. same Summulae asare found in Digby2 (Ff. 26f-45V)
together with the tract on fallaciesalso found in Digby 2 (Ff. 47f-67'").
The text is not completely the sameas in Digby 2 (Seebelow, Chapter
XIII, pp. 420 Ff). On f.4-51"Jhere is a change of hand From the Efth
line onwards. This fme hand, dating also from the fourteenth century, it
seems, addedthe explicit at the end Of [. 4590";
EXPLICIUNTL SUMULE
CUM OMNIBUS FALLACIIS.
QUI SCRIPSIT CARMEN
SIT BENEDICTUS AMEN.
The scribe of this part of our codex (Ff. 17-45) might have been one
Thomas Dovevil, since the same hand wrote at the foot of F. 171': Ego
Tomas Dovcvi! sum bonus scriba. There are tentamina plumae (malediccus
Qyi scripsitcam] Qyi scri) at the bottom of f. 45. Next & hand
maledictus
similar to that which wrote Ff. 17-45, begins & commentary on the fore-
going Summulae:
Ff.45v'J-46m: Quare magis dicis 'cum' quam 'si'? Quia 'cum' signi-
—
licat certitudinem et 'si' signiflcat incertitudinem, et dignior est certitudo
incertitudine; ergo melius dicitur cum quam si. Quare magis 'prescns
intencio' quam 'preterfta' vel 'furura'? Quia presens se habet ad modum
ANALïSIS OF THE MANUSCRIPTS 61
habitus, preteritum et Futurum ad modum privacionis. Sed dignior

est habitus quam privacio; ergo etc:. Quare magis dicis 'intcncia' quam
Quia Intenciose habet ad presens, propositumacl preteritum
1[;!)mpusirum-'?'
et ad futurum. This commentary breaks oFFon [. 461"D. The next page
(F.460) is written in one column and containssomesixteen lines of the
next work (Ff.471'3-551'13) and a number of meaninglessscribbles
(tcntaminaplumae,110doubt).
Walther Burley's treatise De consequentiis.
Ff. 471'3-551'13. Inc.: Quia
—
in sephismatibus probando et reprobando consequenda utimur, ideo
circa naturam consequenciarum multa oportet scire. Et ideo sciendum
quod hec regula est bona.: *quicquid sequitur ad consequens,
sequitur ad
It is written in &fourteenth century handwriting quite similar
antecedens'.
to that of P.460. The same hand added the explicit on [. 55"), lines6-8:
EXPLICIUNTREGULEDATEA DOMINOWALTERODE BURELE'I'CIRCACON-
SEQUENCIAS. EXPLICITHOC TOTUM PRO QUO (Macray wrongly read:
Christo)DA MICHIPOTUM.The remainder of this column (F.45fb) is
[illed with a number of logical notes; mc.: Actualia multiplicitas est
quando dictio vel oracio sub eadem forma plufä signilïcat, sicut patet
in isto paralogismo: 'canis currit; celestesidus est canis; ergo etc.,.
Ff. 55V-59V: & number of sophismataIagicaliu. Inc.: 'Omnis homoest

——
homo'. Quod hec sit vera probo tribus rationibus. Prima ratio est ista:
Quelibet singularis est vera: Ergo. Sophisma: verum a prima: 'nullus homo
de-ert ub homini (For: omni) homine; et omnishomoest (homo); ergo omnis
homoestomnishomo'. Antecedensest verum. Ergo consequens.The minor
part of P.591'is left blank. The Sophismata enclon f. 591,at the bottom
of the page. The next folio (6OP'H')is written in dilïerent handwritings
dating from the thirteenth and Fourteenthcentury.
F. 601" is written in two columns. lt contains the initial part of a

—
tract on syncategorematic terms (Dc yincatcgorcumatibus). lt opens as
Follos—srs
(f. 601'3):Omnis (!) sincagreuma(!) autestdispositiosubiecti vel
predicati aut compositionis. Si subiecti, hoc: dnpliciter. Aut dicit
predicati singularitatem (sic hoc signum 'solus'), aut distributionem; et
hoc (Inpliciter: aut pro partibus integralibus, et sic hoc signum itotus';
aut pro partibus subiectivis; et hoc dupliciter: vel pro pluribus quam
duobus, et sic hoc signum 'omnis', vel pro duobus tantum, et sic hoc
signum 'omnis', vel pro duobus tantum, et sic: hoc signum luterquc'. Si
fuerit dispositio predicati, hoc tripliciter. The fragment ends with the
words: nulla est a—Hïrmativa,idestnulla estpropositio ajïrmutim, which are
the initia] words of the next tract (Ff. 611'0-901'0).Another hand wrote
the initial words of our tract (omnis sincagreumaaut est dispositio subiecti)
and added a few lines aboutjür and latro. Fol. 60'", written in one Column
contains some logica] notes written in & handwriting somewhat diFFerent
From the foregoing.
On f. 61m the same Hne hand that wrote the main part of f.601'
—
begins & treatise which opens as follows: NULLA ESTAFFIRMATIO»: QUA
UNIVERSALEUNIVERSALITER summum PREDICATUR,ut dicit Aristotiles
[De Interpr., 17IJ14-16]. Et hoc potest esseduPliciter(!); aut quod non
predicatur universale sumptum universaliter, aut quod falsa sit affirmatio
in qua universale sic se habens predicatur, aut quia aFFlrmatursuperius
de inferiori aut inferius de superiori aut ( ). Et nota quod modo
......
Falsaest aFFlrmatiopredicato sic se habente. Et etiam si aFFnrmeturinferius
de superiori, manifestum est quod omnis afErmativa est falsa in qua
universale universaliter sumptum predicatur. Est tamen aliqua dubitatio
quando idem de se predicatur utrobique sumpto universaliter sic:
OMNISHOMO ESTOMNISHOMO.
Quite :: number of sophisms (or better: propositions or exPressions
difficult From a logica! point of view) are discussed.The author deals
with no fewer than 282 of such expressions:
(l) OMNISHOMO ESTOMNISHOMO

(2) OMNISHOMO ESTTOTUMIN QUANTITATE
1'.611?') (3) OMNISHOMOESTuwus SOLUS
Homo
(4) OMNIS HOMO EST ALIQUIS HOMO
(5) OMNISHOMOESTHOCALIQUID' dealt with
(6) OMNISHOMOESTmnwmuum together
(7) OMNISHOMOESTSINGULARE
[. 61W (8) OMNISAPOSTOLISUNTDUODECIM
F.611er (9) OMNEANIMALESTSANUM
(10) OMNEANIMALFLIITIN ARCHANOE
['. 621'11 (11) OMNECOLORATUM EST
(12) OMNIS1:15leEST
[. 62") (13) OMNEBONUMVELNON-BONUM )
ESTELlGENDUMdealt
(14) OMNE ANIMAL ESTSANUMVELEGRUM with
(15) OMNISHOMOVELasmus ESTrusunus 5 to-
(16) QUICQUIDESTVELNONEST,ESTZ gethei-
1 The Aristotelian term 1685 TI..

2 preceding note: "secundum Tullium autem est istud antiquum sophisma".
ANALTSIS OF THE h'IANUSCl-IIPTS 63
62'4'3 ('7) OMNE RACIONALEVEL IRRACIONALEESTSANUM

.
.62vb
(13) OMNISPROPOSICIOVEL Elus CONTRADICTORIAESTVERA
(19)TU ESQUILIBET VEL DIFFERSA QUOLIBET
(20)Tu ESQLIIDLIBETVEL A QUOLIBETDIFFERS
631?a (21)Tu SCISQUIDLIBETVEL QUIDLIBETIGNORAS
.
(22)Tu SCISQLIlDLlBETVEL NlCI—IlL
63va (23) OMNISHOMO ESTET Auus HOMO EST
.
(24) OMNISHOMO ET DUO HOMINESSUNTTRESHOMINES
(25) OMNEVERUMET *DEUMESSE' DIFFERUNT
63V'J (26) OMNEVERUMET *DEumESSE, ) dealt
.
SUNT Duo VERA with
(27) OMNEVERUMET Sgether
to-
(DEUMESSE!PONUNTINNUMERUM -
(28)OMNIS GRAMATICLISEST ET QUILIBET SCIENSIPSUM ESSE

OMNISHOMO ESTET QUILIBETVIDENSILLUM ESTAsmus
(29)GRAMATICUMESTTANTUM TALIS
OMNIS HOMO EST ET QUILIBET DIFFERENSAB ILLO EST
(30)NON-HOMO
--
(31)OMNE QUOD ESTvmum SCIRI A TE ESTVERUM
OMNIS HOMO QLII ESTALBUSCURRIT
.64rb (32)OMNE NESCITUMTE SCIRI A TE ESTFALSUM
(33)OMNE QUOD ESTvmum SCIRI A TE ESTFALSUM
.64va (34)ITEM. DEUSESTIN QUOLIBET[NSTANTINON EXISTENS
(35)QUlDLlBET Auquonum ANIMALIUM EST NON-HOMO,
.64vb (36)QUORUM QUIDLIBET ESTHOMO.
(37) OMNE ALIUD QUAM ANIMAL QUOD ET SORTESSUNT Duo,
DIFFERTA SORTE
65ra
(33)Tu ESALIUD QUAM ANIMAL QUOD ESTROME
(39) OMNE ALIUD QUAM ANIMAL QUOD EST HICINTUS, EST
LAPIS
(40) QUIDLIBET QUALELIBETDE QUOLIBETTALI s(c)1T SEIPSLIM
ESSETALE QUALE IPSUMEST
(41) SOR mcrr OMNE ENUNCIABILEIN A ET IN B
65rb
(42)5011VIDET OMNEM HOMINEM [N A ET IN B
65va
(43) OMNIS HOMO ESTANIMAL ET ECONVERSO
(44) OMNEM HOMINEM VIDENS VIDENS EST UNUM SOLUM
HOMINEM
65vb
(45) CUIUSLIBETHOMINIS Asmus CURRIT
(46) OMNIS HOMO momum QUANDO UNUS SOLUS HCHHO
monrruu
64 LOGICA MODERNORUM ll
66ra
(47) OMNEM HOMINEM MORI ESTIMPOSSIBILE
66rb ] A PLATONE, PROPERTUR & SORTE
(43) QUICQUID AUDITLIR
' (49) ALBUM FUIT DISPUTATLIRLIM

66vü
(QUI scwrrOMNE scn QLI)ICQUID scwrr
66vb (50) UTERQUE ISTORUM ESTUTERQUE ISTORUM
(51) LITERQUEISTORUM ESTTANTUM ALTER ISTORUM
(52)ISTI FECERUNTLAPIDEM, demonstratis duobus quorum
(53)unus fecit lapidem
67ru
(54) ISTI SCIUNTSEPTEMARTES
(55) ISTI PUNGNANT (!) UT VINCANTSE
67rh
(56) HELENAPEPERITDECEMFILIOS
67va
(57) HELENA PEPERITDECIESDECEMFILIOS
67vb
(53) ITEM. HEC ESTVERA: UTERQUEISTORUMmomenta
(59) ADAM ET NOE FUERUNT
(60) UTROQUE ISTORLIMCURRENTENON cunnu- LITERQUE
68ra
(61) NEUTRO lSTOllUM CLIRRENTECURRIT ALTER ISTORUM
(62) NEUTRUM OCULLIM HABENDOTU POTESVIDIERE
(63) LITERQLIEISTORUMESTHOMO VEL ASINLIS
63rb
(64) UTERQUE ISTORUM VEL RELIQUI ISTORUM QUORUM
NELITERDIFFERTAB HOMINE, EST ASINUS
(65) ALTER [nonum EST HOMO VEL R(ELIQU us) QUI EST
HOMO EST asmus
(66) UTERQUEISTouum ESTHICINTUSET auus ESTHlClNTUS
(67) UTERQUEISTORUM ET DUO SUNT TRIA
68vu
(63) ms DUOSLINTTRIAETNON PLURA
(69) DUO PATRESET DUO FILII SUNT TRIA ET NON PLURA
68vh
(70) PLURA PLURIBUSSEXSUNT mucroxm PAUCIORIBUSSEX
(71) TOTUSSORTESESTh-IAIORSORTE
(72) QUICQUID EST,ESTHomo VEL NON ESTHOMO
(73) SORTESET PLATOSUNT HOMINES
69rn
(74) scm NASCITURIN B
(75) ANIMAL ESTPARSANIMALIS
(76) lN QLIALIBETPARTEANIMALIS ESTANIMA
(77) ITEM. TOTA VERA curus ALTERA PARSESTVERA
(73) ITEM. A EST13; ESTA, NON ESTB; ERGO A DIFFERTA n
69rh
(79) 51ALIQUID ESTVERUM, ESTVERUM IN HOC INSTANTI
(80) su ALIQUID ESTVERUM, IPSUMESSEESTNECESSARIUM
69vn (8l) ITEM. 51 ALIQUID EST,IPSUMESTDEUS
(32) 51Tu es HOMO ET ASINLIS,TU ESLEO ET CAPRA
69vl)
(83) FALSUMESTVERUM, 51ANTICHRISTUSEST
ANALï515 01: THE h-lANLlSCIUPTS 65
(34) OMNEFALSUMDIFFERTAB A 51ANT1CH1115TU5

EST
(85) UTRUMQUE[STORUMESTVERUM, 51 ALTERUM[STORUM
ESTFALSUM
(36) 51ALIQL115 DICITTEESSEA (1115:
51Nu111 AN1MAL),DlClTVERUM
7Ora (37) 510100 TE ESSEA51Num,0100 wanum
(33) 51QUIDLIBETNON ESTHOMO, HOMO NON 1551" HOMO
70rb
(39) 515011.DE NECESSITATE ESTMORTALIS,5011.DE NECESSITATE
NON ESTMORTAus
51 1115015TE ESSELAPIDEM,TU NON 5015TE ESSE
11'1511-1.
(90)LAPIDEM
(9') 51TLI ESUBIQUE,TU NON ESUBIQUE
(92) 51 0111le 1111011051010
ESTVERA,NON OMNIS PROPOSICIO
ESTVERA
70vh
(93) 51NULLA 1111011051c10ESTVERA,ISTAPROPOSICIO ESTVERA
(94) 51NULLUM TEMPUSEST,AUQUOD TEMPUSEST
(95) 51NULLUSHOMO ESTHICINTUS, ALlQu15HOMO ESTHIC-
INTUS
7lra
(96)51NICHlL EST,ALIQUID EST --
7lrh
(97) AN1MALCURRERE51HOMO cuuru'r ESTNECESSARIUM
71vu (93) IMPOSSIBILE ESTTE CURRERE51TLI 1ACE5
(99)POSSIBILEESTTE TACERE51TU LOQLIERIS
(100)DEUM135513 51A NON 15an ERIT vmum lN A
(101)A ESSE51A NON ERIT NON ERIT VERUMIN A
7lvh
(102)51DE EO QUOD EST5011.VERUMNON ESTIPSUMESSEVEL
NON ESSE,5011.EST
(103)51AD (10 1115)HOMINEMESSEQUOD ESTVERUMSEQUITUR
AN1MALESSE QUOD ESTwanum, HOMOEST
72rn
(104)5011.DICIT 10 QUODESTVERUM,51SOLUSPLATOLOQUITUR
(105) TU ESBONUSET MALUS51 Tu ES [BONUS ETF MALUS
72rb
(l06) 51 VERUM ESTTE CURREREET TE NON CURRERE,Tu 135
A51Nus
(!) EST
(107)515011.EST51PLATOEST(51MS), c1-uc1-11-:110
72va
(105)QUICQUIDCONTINGAT51TU ESA51Nus,TU ESCAPRA
(109)AD QUO(D) LIBET ENUNTIABILE SEQUITUR IPSUM ESSE
VERUMNEC AUQUA TAL15SEDP TUA (?)
(110)AL1QU1D1-251'
IMPOSSIBILE
ET 1051111
NECESSARIO
ESTVERUM
(111)AL1QUA1NQUANTUMSUNTEQUWOCASUNTUNWOCA
(112)AL1QUAINQUANTUMCONVENIUNTDIFFERUNT
(113)AuQUA INQUANTUMDIFFERUNTCONVENIUNT
(114)AUQUA INQLIANTUMSUNTDWERSA,SUNT51M1L1A
73rb (115)ALIQUA [NQLIANTUM SUNT summa, SUNT DISSIMILIA

(116)ITEM. HOMO INQLIANTUM ANIMAL DIFFERTAB ASINO
(117)LOGICLIS
INQUANTUM
CLERICUS
DIFFERT
A PHILOSOPHO
73va
(118)QUANTO ALIQUID MAIUS EST,TANTO MINUS VIDETUR
(119)QUANTO mimus 51:15,TANTO MINUS 5c1s
(120)QLIANTOMAIUSES(ENSms) FEDus,TANTOMINUSES(ENS
MS) FEDUS
(121)QUANTO PLUS AD(D)ISCIS, TANTO MINUS 5015
73vb
(122)SIVE HOMO QUI ESTASINUSESTPLATOSIVE Tu 155ASINUS
TU ESCAPRA
(123)QUALECLIMQUEESTALIQUID 51 IPSUM EST ALBUM, TALE
ESTALIQUID 51IPSUMESTmenum
7414(124)UBICUMQLIE EXISTENSEST ALIQUID 51 IPSUM EST ROME,
EXISTENSESTALIQUID 51 IPSUM ESTPARISIUS
111105141
)
(125)QLIODCUMQUEESTALIQUID 51ESTHomo,
IDEM ESTALIQUID 51 ESTASINUS dealt
(126)QUECUMQUE SUNT SEPTEMTOT SUNT EADEM 51 w1'th
SUNT QUINQUE
to
(127)QUANTUMCUMQUE EST ALIQUID 51 EST mcum- gether
Tum, TANTUM ESTALIQUID 51ESTMONOCUBITUM
(123)QUOTIENSFUISTI SEDENS,FUISTI HOMO
74rb (129)NULLUS HOMO LEGlT mmsms N151IPSE511"ASINUS
(130)NICHIL ESTVERUM NISI IPSUMSIT FALSUM
(131)ITEM. CREDIT SORTES51-:DECIPIIET PROPONATLIR:50111'155
DECIPITURNISI DECIPIATUI!
(132)SORTESDICIT FALSUMN151DICAT FALSUM
(133)ITEM. NICHIL ESTVERUM NISI IN HOC INSTANTI
74vb
(134)NECESSARIUM ESTTE SEDEREVEL NON SEDERE
75ra
(135)OMNE ANIMAL ESTRATIONALE VEL IRRATIONALE
(136)Tu 5C15AN 0111le HOMO cuan; ERGO Tu 5c15 OMNIS
HOMO AN cunnu-
75rb
(137)TU 51:15AN DE MENTIENTE511"FALSUMSORTEMESSEasmum
(138)SORTESscrr AN PLATOscwr AN SORscmT AN PLATOscmT
ALIQUID DE EO
75va (139) SIMILITER. TU SCIS AN OMNE ANIMAL SIT RATIONALE ET AN
[DEM [RRATIONALE
(140) TU SCIS AN OMNIS HOMO SIT SOR AN ILLE DIFFERT A SORTE

TU SCIS AN OMNE ANIMAL VEL IRRATIONALE
75vb
(141) SIT RATIONALE
(142)ITEM. Tu 5c1sALIQUID ESSEQUOD NON 5c15ESSE

(143)DEUSVULT NE FACIASMALUM
ANAL'fSlS 05 THE MANUSCRIPTS 67
(1447rr5m. Tu 5c15NETIBI [NE 1151]CONCLUDATUR

76rn (145)NULLUSHOMO NULLUM ANIMAL EST. ET DE NICHILO
NICHIL ESTVERUM
76rb
(146)NULLUSHOMONULLUSHOMOEST
(147)NlCHlL NICHILEST..51175NICHlL NULLA1155551"
(143)NULLUSHOMONULLUSHOMOEST
(149)DENICHILONICHlL 551"VERUM
76va(150)NULLUSHOMOESTomms HOMO
(151)NON ALIQUID551"ETTU 55ASINUS
(152)ITEM. mcnn. ETCHIMERASUNTFRATRES
76vh
(153)ALIQUIDNECESTNEC5511",ETESTET5511"
(154)NON HOMOVIDENSsuum ASINUMNECsuus ASINUS551"
CAPRA
(155)Tu 5c15 QUOD NICHIL 5015, QUOD 51 505,
NlCHlL 5c15
77ru
(156)ITEM. 51Tu 5c15QUODmcnn. 5015,NICHILSClS
(157)ALIQUACREATURANON ESTHOMO
(153)ITEM. NULLOCURRENTECRESCLINT TIBI CORNUAFRONTE
77rb (159)NULLUMHOMINEMSEDERE 551"NECESSARIUM
(160)ITEM. AD NULLUM HOMINEM 5555 SEQUITUROMNEM
HOMINEM5555
(161)ITEM. NON AD OMNEMHOMINEM5555[NON] SEQUITUR
OMNEMHOMINEM5555
(162)AD ALIQUEMHOMINEM5555 NON SEQUITURALIQUEM
HOMINEM5555
77va (163)NULLUMHOMINEM5555SEQUITURAD ALIQUEMHOMINEM
5555
(164)51NULLUSHOMOEST,ALIQUISHOMOEST
(165)ITEM. NULLUSHOMOPOTEST scmE QUODALIQUISHOMO
POTESTscmE
77vb(166)NULLUMCAPUDHABENSESTALIQUODCAPUDHABENS
(167)ITEM (IDEMMS). mcnn. VIDENS551"ALIQUIDVIDENS
73ra
(168) A NULLOENUNTIATUMA NULLOVEREchn'un
78rb
(169) TLI NON POTESVERENEGARE TENON 5555ASINUM
78va
(170) NEGATUM5555LIGNUM551"VERUM
78vb
(171) 50111-55
ESTALIUDANIMALQUAMBRLINELLUS
(172)SORTES DESINITscmE PLURA(ex PLUSms) QUAMDESINIT
SCIRE
(173) PLURASCILINTLIR A 50111'5
QUAMA 5050 50111'5
7911'5'2L
(174) PLURASUNTVERADE 5101TOTIDEMQUAM SUNTVERADE
PAUCIORIBUS SE
79rb
79vu
(175)PLURA SUNT mum QUAM IMPARIA
(176)mam. QUECUMQUE SUNT VERA DE 5101 TOTIDEM SUNT
FINITA; INFINITA SUNT VERA DE SIBI TOTIDEM ;' ERGO
INFINITA SUNT FlNlTA.
(177)QUOD INCIPIT ESSEDESINIT NON ESSE
79vb(178)son DESINIT ESSEALTER ISTORLIM
80rn
(179)sones INCIPIT ESSEALTER.15'r01mm
(180)503. DESINIT ESSESIMILIS PLATONI
(ex DESlNlT 14:80)ESSEsumus PLATONI
(181)SOR INCIPIT
(182)son. DESINIT ESSEsumus PLATONI
30rh
(183)son VULT ESSESIMILIS PLATONI
SOva
(184)SORTESET PLATO DESINLINT ESSETALESQUALESIPSI SUNT
(185)SORTESDESINIT VIDERE OMNEM HOMINEM
(186)SIMILITER. somus INCIPIT VIDEIIE OMNEM HOMINEM
(187)SORTESDESINIT scmE QUICQUID 5011"
BOvb
(188)SORTESINCIPIT 5c11uzQUICQUID scrr
(189)50111'1-25
DESINITSCIREPLURA QUAM PLATO
(190)PLATO DESINIT SCIREPLURA QUAM SORTES
(191)(SAMESOPHISM)
81ra (192)SORTESDESINITscmE SE NICHIL DESINEREsc11ua
glrb
(193)OMNIS HOMO INCIPIT ESSE
(194)IDEM EST: OMNIS HOMO DESINIT ESSE
(195)SORTESDESINIT ESSENON DESINENDOESSE
81va(196)501111'155
INCIPIT 135515
51 EST ET NON FUIT; DESINIT ESSE51
ESTETNONFUIT '
glvb
(197)SORTESDESlNlT ESSEALBISSIMUSHOMINUM
(198)SORTESDESlNlT 11:10an OMNEM HOMINEM PRETERPLATO-
NEM
32ra
32rb
(199)Tu NON CESSASCOMEDEREFERRLIM
(200)DECEMPRETERQUINQUE SUNT QUINQUE
(201)DECEM ANIMALIBUS cuuRENTlnus ( ...... )
(202)DECEM ANIMALIA PRETER DUO SCIUNT SE ESSEANIMALIA
ALBA
82vu(203)OMNIA DECEM PRETERUNUM SUNT NOVEM
82vb(204)OMNIUM DUORUM FRATRUM UTERQUE PRETERUNUM EST
ALBUS
(205)OMNIS NUMERUS PRETERBINARIUM EXTENDIT LINITATEM
(UNITANTEM MS) NUMERO
PRETER DUO
(206)QUELIBET ET TRIA SUNT PLURA DUOBUS
NUMERO
ANALTSIS 01-' THE MANUSCRIPTS 69
33ra
(207) 0154le HOMO VIDET OMNEM HOMINEM PRETERSORTEM
(208) NULLUS HOMO VIDET nsmum PRETERBRUNELLUM
(209) son 1315VIDEBIT OMNEM HOMINEM
33rh
(210) 0154le HOMO NECESSARIOCURRIT PRETERSORTEM
(211)LITERQUE[STOIIUM PRETERUTRUMQUE ISTORLIMDIFFERT
AB 15T0
(212)0111le HOMO PRETEROMNEM HOMINEM DIFFERTAB lSTO
(213)QUIDLIBET EST QLIIDLIBET QUOLIBET EXISTENTEPRETER
QLIIDLIBET
83va
(214)OMNIS HOMO EXISTITPRETERSORTEM
33vb
(215)51 NON ALIQUID cumm', ALIQUID cumu'r
(216)TANTUM OMNIS HOMO CURRIT
(217)51 TANTUM 0111le HOMO CURRIT, NON TANTUM 031le
HOMO cumuT
(213)51TANTUM PATEREST,NON TANTUM PATEREST
(219)51 TANTUM ALTER 15701311111
EST, NON TANTUM (ALTER)
ISTORUM EST
3414(220)TANTUM UNUS HOMO 1351"UNUS Homo
(221)TANTUM UNUM EST
34rh
(222)TANTUM ALTERISTORUMESTHOMO VEL ASINUS
(223)TANTUM ALTER ISTORLIMVEL RELIQUUSESTHOMO
(224)TANTUM DUO VEL TRIA sum" TRIA
The-jblios 34-86 are damagcd by mars as to make 1': impossible m
rccom'rruc: the mc:
(225) ( ) 155515
HOMINEM ESTvmum
......
( ) EST NECESSARIUM
(226) ......
84va(227) TANTUM VERUM POTESTESSEvmum
(223)TANTUM wanum 1551"vmum
(229)TANTUM VERUM ESTIDEM VERO
( )
84vh
(230)TANTUM ......
(231)TANTUM ISTA QUE SUNT HOMINES SUNT ANIMALIA
35ra
(232)SORTESscrr TANTUM TRES HOMINES CURRERE
(233)POSSIBILE EST sonum VIDERE OMNEM HOMINEM NON
VIDENTEM 513
85rb ( )
(234)50P1—115MA ......
( )
85va
(235)SOPHISMA ......
(236)TLI NON ERIS asmus DONEC ams
5013 EST ALBUS QUO ( ...... )
85vb
(237)
HOMINES SLINT QUI NON
(238)
SOL"! NOVEM SOLI SUNT
ANIMALIA SUNT
(239)
SOLA DECEM ALBA ET ILLA NON SUNT SOLA
70 LOGICA MODERNORUM Il
(2 40) sonus DENARnPARS ESTUNUM ETNULLUSNUMERUS

36m (241) SOLANECESSARIASUNTvERA
(242) SOLACONTINGENTIA 5555VERAESTVERUMCONTINGENS
56rb (243) ETDuo SUNTTRES
5011'1'55
(244) (
......
) SEPTEM AR'rEs
(245) 5011 5c1( ...... )
36va (246) SOLUSSORTES scrr QUODAuus A PLATONEIGNORAT
86vb
(247) SOLUS50575555'1'DIFFERENS
A 5050 SORTE
(248) SOLUSGENITWUS PRECEDITURA 5050 NOMINATIVO
37rb (249) SOLUSsoru'55VIDET55
(250) SOLUSSORTES SClTQUODA NULLOAuo scrrun
(251) 5051sonu ALIQUID551"IDEM
(252) ADSOLUM SORTEM CURRERESEQUITUR SORTEM
CURRERE
37va (253) ADSORTEM 5555SEQUITUR.SOLUMSORTEM 5555
(254) SOLUMSORTEM 5555SEQUITUR ETAD ALIUM
AD5051'5151
5555
37vb
(255)SOLUM5011EST51son ETAuus HOMOSUNT
(256)IMPOSSIBILE
FUIT505515155
(257)IMPOSSIBILE
POTEST 5555VERUM
(253) INPOSSIBILE ESTTE SCIRE PLURA (QUAM) Tu SClS
sera (259)INPOSSIBILE
ESTDICIQUODIMPOSSIBILE
ESTch1
(260)QUODNULLIESTDUBIUM,OMNIBUS ESTCERTUM
(261)SICUT55 HABETINPOSSIBILE 511:55
AD NONINPOSSIBILE,
HABET AD NONNECESSARIUM
NECESSARIUM
(262)51cur SE HABETHOMOAD NON HOMO,51c55 HABET
ANIMALADNONANIMAL
(263)51cur55HABET PROPINQLIITAS ME!ADPARIE-
ETDlSTANTIA
TEM,51c55 HABETPROPINQUITAS ETDlSTANTIA AD
11:151
ROMAM
ssrb (264) SICUT55HABETNovENAmusAD55NAmum,51055 HABET
SENAmus ADQUATERNARIUM
(265)OMNEQUODEST,NECESSE EST5555QUANDO EST
(266)NECESSARIUM FUITNONNECESSARIUM
sava(267)NECESSARIUM POTEST(5555)FALSUM
38vb
(268) 0111leHOMODENECESSITATE AN1MAL
551"
(269)0114leANIMA05 NECESSITATE ESTALIQUAlsrAaum
(270)CONTINGENTIA NECESSARIOSUNTvERA
39rn
(271) ANIMAANTICHRISTINECESSARIO5511-
(272)SORTES ESTHOMO
QUICQUID EST NECESSARIUM
(273) EST DE NECESSITATE VERUM,
(274) QUICQUIDESTNECESSARIOVERUMVELFALSUM,ESTNECES-
SARIUMVELINPOSSIBILE
89") (275) OMNEQUOD NECESSE ESTESSEVEL NON ESSE,NON CON-
TINGIT ESSE
89W (276) OMNISHOMOCURRITCONTINGENTER
(277) son VIDETUTRUMQUEISTORUMCONTINGENTER
(278) POSSIBILEESTOMNEMHOMINEMDIFFERRE (DICEREMS) AB
ANTICHRISTO
89") (279) POSSIBILEESTANTICHRISTUM
ESSEHOMINEM
90?"- (280) POSSIBILEESTSORTEMSCIREQUICQUIDscrr PLATO
(281) POSSIBILEESTOMNEMHOMINEMCURRERE
90") (282) POSSIBILEESTOMNEMASINUMESSE HOMINEM.
At the end of P. 90") the following explicit is found:

Expliciunt ista, qua tu, Ricarde Sophista,H'ecisti, morum flos et doctor
logicorum. Dirige scribentis, Spiritus alme, manum. Expliciunt abstractiones.
Macray suggestedthat the author should be identified as Richard Fitz

Ralph (Siraph)who died as archbischopof Armagh (henceArmaghanus)
in 1360. However, this surmise is refuted by the date of our copy and
that of three other copies we have of this work, viz. Digby 2, Paris,
(incomplete and anonymous,dating from
B.N.Lat. 14069, Ff.261"*J--331'ïL
the Erst decadesof the thirteenth century, which gives only & fragment
under the title Dedialecticismcis (tricae : trumperics)
of our Abstmctianes,
added by & seventeenth century hand); Bruges, Bibliothäque de la ville,
MS 497. The last manuscript being & collective codex dating partly from
the fourteenth centur)r (Ff. 1-40 and 41-73) and the thirteenth century
(Ff. 74-95) contains in its latter part (Ff. 74-95) another cepy of our
sophisms, with the title: Abstracciones Magistri Ricardi Sophiste.The copy
is complete and gives our explicit in & slight variant. Expliciunt ista, qua tu,
Ricarde Sophiste,jbcisti, morum vir doctus,fas logicorum.
ln spite of Richard's prominent position in his own days very little is
known of him. He is mainly known as & theologian, and is said to have
been the Firstofthe order of the Black Friars in England to have written &
commentary on Lombard's Sententiae.(before 1240; see F. M. Powicke
in Proceedings qfthe British Academy)16 (1930) and in Speculum,9 (1934),
p. 143). He was the Fll'StDominicamto incept under Robert Bacon,
sometime after 1227. Richard certainly lectured with Robert
l:)l'ta-babl)r
Baconin the schoolof St Edwardto the Oxf'ord Dominicans,where they
acquirecl reputations as great preachers as well as great theologiam. He

died 1248, in the sameyear as Robert Bacon. Only his thcological x-vorks
were known hitherto. See Josiah Cox Russe", Dictionmy qf' I'Vritcrsqf'
Thirteenth Centwy England, London etc. 1936, pp. 114-1 15. An excellent
swd)r 01"his life and x-vritingswas given by F. Pclster: Das Lebenund die
Schryien desOJJEJI'derDominikanerlehrcrsRichard Fishacrein: Zeitschrift für
KatholischeTheologie 54 (1930), pp. 517-553. For his teachingsin the
general Fleld of philosophy ancl theology, see D. E.. Sharp, The Philosoph):
cj- Richard Ffshacre((I. 1248) in: The New Scholasticism7 (1933), pp.
281-297.
If thc explicit in Oxford Digby 24-and Bruges, MS. 497 (morumfas) is
to be taken as referring to a work on ethics, one may well think of the
mammam:which were intel'mingled with his PostillacsuperPsalterium(not
[bund hitherto) aswe are told by Nicolas Triveth:
Ricardus Super Sententia: scriptum temporibus suis perutile c0111posuit, et super
Psalteriumusque ad psalmum septuagesimum PamHas edidit pulcherrimas,
moralitatibus suavissinmsintermixtas (see. Annales,ad annum1240, edited hy
T. [log in the Procecdingaof the EnglishHistorical SocietyIX (1845), p. 230.
Besicles,there are referencesto & work called De Paenitentia(Inc. : Quia,

ut habet Sanctus Augustinus; see Russe", op.cit., p. 1 15) and & sermoof
Richard'smentioned in a note found in a mmmscriptin [psx-vichMuseum
(cod. 6) which is entitlccl Destrumonesde septempeccatismortalibus. lt can
be noticed that Du l:)cmla)rin his Historia UniversitatisParisiensis
(111,708)
exPlicitly mentiens Richarcl's concern with philosophie subtletics (by
which we uncloubtecllyare to understandlogical subtleties):
Richardus Fishakcr, alias Fisachrius, Anglus ex Excestriensi patria (Exetcr),
Roberti Baconi comes individuus (inseparabiccampanion),cum quo Oxonii et
deinde Lutetiae (in Paris)conversatusest, Dominicanorum familiae sc adiunxit.
Philosophicnssubtilitates, que tunc temporis in scholis magni Fiebant,imprimis
professusest. Obiit Oxonii reversusad suosanno 1248.
Thus, our Abstractionesmight Flt in very well with what Du Buoulayr

says
about Richard. As to the name sophista,it was quite common in the
Middle Agcs to call & logician & saphista.CompareSt. Thomaswhen he
writes (Summa Theol. ], 39, 4, arg. 1): "quia, ut saphistaedicunt, terminus
singularis idem significat et supponit". From this passage we may conclu-
de that our term expeciall)r refers to a "modern logician". The term
abstractiones
seems to be morc difficult to cxPlain (For: excerptsor m'a):
noteson logical matter ?).
ANAU'SIS 01: THE MANUSCRIPTS 73
To continue our analysis of MS Digby 24, the First halfoff. 90? contains
a fragment on logic (about supposition), the initia! part of which is illc-
gible as the resultïof' & clamp stain. The renmincler contains a number of
proper names xwitten rather loosely, presumably & list of persons acting
as testesof & document, a few lines of x-vhichare written on the same
page. nlong with those names. Next some notes on the ars sophistica are
Founcl:
ff. 9l1'11-92'f'3: Inc.: (A)cl eviclenciam [ällacie accidentis notandum

—
quod cum materialiter dicatur accidens, sumitur hic accidenspro omni eo
sine quo res potest esse.,dummodo composicionem habeant ad invicem
et quod unum dicatur de alio. Unde sumitur hic accidenssicut sumitur in
Porlïrio. Et est secundum quod inferius dicitur accidentale respectu
superioris, ut homo respectu animalis. Sed sive sic sumatur sive sic, aut
dicitur id quod dicitur subiectum in universali ratione accidentis medius
terminus, aut id quod dicitur accidens,quod aliter (autem MS) probatur
de alio et assignatum. Si ergo subiectum sit medius terminus, dicetur
Fieri processus a subiecto ad accidens. Si mutemaccidens, dicetur Heri
processus ab accidente ad subiectum. Et sic solum erant duo modi para-
logizancli iuxta hanc Fallaciam. Sed sive sic, sive sic, semper accidit ista
Fallacia,eoquod iste medius terminus aliter se habet ad unam extremita-
tem quam ad aliam. Unde fallacia accidentis dicitur provenire ex mcdii
variatione. Si autem eadem ratione sumatur utrobique, semper tenebit
argumentum.
This note on the fallacia accidentisis followed by an interesting note
011 cquivocation (ff. 9I*'ü-92Th): (C)irca equivocationem triplex Et
questio. Prima est an nomen equivocum sit unum an multa. Secunda
questio est an signum universale adveniens nomini equivoco distribuat
ipsum pro omnibus suis significatis (ex assignatis MS) an pro uno solo
tantum. Tertia questio est an propositio in qua subicitur nomen equi-
vocum vel predicatur, sit una vel Plures.
It is followed by an incomplete note on amphibology (f. 921'5'W). The
remainder of this page contains some grammatical notes on the Greck
languageand on evocatis: (P.921"): Evocatio est immediataassociatiodiver-
sarum personarum eidem verbo personali supponendum). These notes
are written in a hanch-vriting(of the Fourteenthcentury, it seems)(lif-
fercnt From the [bregoing
—
Ff. 93rü-102ï'3' contains an acephalous commentary on Aristotlc's
SophisticiElenchi,which is also incomplete at the end. lt waswritten by
some very minute but quite legible hands dating all of them from the
beginnings of the thirteenth century.
It opens as follows:
Oportet enim precongnoscere(!) de quo sit hic intentio et ad quid et qualiter in genere
sive in universali, ut ex hoc manifestum sit que sit materia vcl subiectum et quis Finis et
que utilitas et que forma sive modus (motus MS) agendi. Et accipiendo ex primo verbo
quod id de quo hic intendit sit sillogismussophisticus,occurrit questioduplex (dupli-
citer MS). Prima (primo MS) an de sillogismo sophistico possit essesciencia vel pars
sciencie.Secundaest cum sillogismussophisticushabetdiHerentimn(est enim sillogismus
unus qui videtur sillogismus et non est sillogismus, et alius qui 1videturet est, sed non
conveniunt rei), de quo istorum sit hec scientia aut in utroque.
Only the title and a few initia] lines of our commentary appear to be
lacking here. There seem to be changesof hand on f. 961'3,P..97"), and
P. 98"). The work breaks off in the discussion of the reduction of the
paralogismis into thefallacia secundumignorantiam elenchi..
The copy is anonymous, but & suggestion about the possible author of
this work may be put foru-vard. One of the fellox-v-teachersof Richard
Fishacre's was Edmund of Abingdon, who died as archbishop of Canter-
bury in 1240. Apparently he was regent in arts (in Oxford ?) for some
six years during the reign of & king who threatened him and who was,
no doubt, King John (1198-1216). See Martäne et Durant], Veterum
amplissima collectio, col. 1822 and ] C. Russe", op.cit., pp. 26-27. Now,
we are express!)Ir
told by Roger Bacon (Fratris RogeriBacanCompendium
Studii Theologiae,ed. Rashdall, p. 34) that Edmuncl was the First to read
the Liber Elenchorumin Oxford. The occurrence of our commentary on
the Soph.E1.along with a logical work by Richard Fishacre seemsdefinite-
ly to be in favour of its attribution to Edmund of Abingdon. [[ my surmise
be correct, the work may well be dated in the First or second decade of
the thirteenth century. For Edmond's life and works as known
—
hitherto, see C. H. Lawrence, St Edmundqubingdan, A Study in Hagio-
graphy and History, Oxford 1960.
Ff. 1031'3'") contains a fragment of & tract on grammar (1031'5'W)

—
and some notes on the relative pronoun, written in diH'erent hands.
FF.104-1'3-105V'Jcontain & set of grammatical questions about the

—
phrase In eo quod habent pudorem comedendicomedetse altero. This part of
our manuscript is written in a handwriting dating from the Fll'Sthalf of
the thirteenth century, if not from the last decades of the tx-velfth; it is
different from those of Ff. 93-102.
ANALVSIS os THE MANUSCRIPTS 75
The discussion of the First question gives some interesting views on

signijï'catio and suppositio.
Inc. ( ? ) in ea quod habentpudoremcomedendicomedetsc altero. Queritur

...... ......
primo de constructione huius nominativi. Nam si verbum significat ut quoddealtero, ergo
quod terminabit eiusrespectumex parteantc significabitut dequaalterum.Sedcumdico
'ut de quo', tango rationem ablativi; ergo verbum habet determinare ex parte ante per
ablativum et non per nonninativum. Item. Nominativus est de intellectu verbi; ergo
superfluit apponere. Sed dicet aliquis quod hoc haberet in prima persona et in secunda,
sed non in tertia, et hoc quia in verbo tertie personeest nominativusindil'Tmitus.Sed
contra duo. ln persona scilicet subpositum quod est res persone et preter hec ratio
persone. Sed verbum tertie persone si sit infinitum quoad personam, non est infinitum
quoad rem persone, quia hoc:verbum 'currit' eque Funitehabet rem tertie sicut hoc ver-
bum (verbo MS) 'curro' habet rationem prime persone. Item. Nomen generale sicut
'aliquid' vel 'res' quoad rem et subposituln personeest inEnitum. Ergo adnïinus tale namen
commune non poterit Fmitare inünitatem tertie persone ex parte ante.
Dicendum ad primum quod si proprie dicamus, dicemus verbum signilïcare actum ut
per ipsum agat aliqua substantia vel ut per ipsum patiatur aliqua substantia. Sic enim
dicendo dicemus quod hoc verbum 'lcga' signilïcat lectionem ut per ipsam agat aliqua
substantia, et hoc verbum ( ) ut per ipsum paciatur aliqua substancia. Sic patet
......
quod secundum hunc: modum illud qubd determinat respectum verbi ex parte ante
tangitur ratio(ne) nominativi. Dicendum quod cum dico verbumsignilïcareut quodde
ahera,non proprie tangomodumverbisedmagisproprie, ut dictum est.
Ad aliud dicendum quod aliquid essein intellectualterius dupliciter contingit: aut quia
sit pars signilïcati eius, sicut anima! est in intellectu haminis; aut quia intellectus unius
non est sine intellectu alterius, sicut duplumest in intellectu dimidii. Quod primo modo
est in intellectu non ei ap(p)onitur nisi superflue. Quod autem secundomodo est de
intellectu alicuius, bene ei potest ap(p)oni. Et sic est nominativus de intellectu verbi.
Verbum enim quia significat actum rellatum (!) ad substanciam,non sic potest intelligi
nisi intellecta illa substancia.Verum tamen intelligendum quod prima et secundapersona
verbi non indigent ap(p)osicionem nominativi, sed tercia indiget nisi verbum excepta
acmoms.
Ad aliud dicendumquod 'subposirum'
dicitur dupliciter, scilicet vel id proquosubpann
terminus,vel id quodsubponitterminus. Primo modo dicimus ap(p)ellatum termini com-
munis essesubpositum; secundomodo signiücatum. Et quod signiücatumtermini
dicatur subpositum,patet quia si dicitur quod aquuid currit, ex subpositoet ap(p)osito
fit ista locutio. Iterum ex significato eius ([est]'-')quod est aliquid, et significato l)redi-
ca(ti) Flteademlocucio. Manifestumest ergo quod significatumverbi est subpositum.
Dicendum ergo quod licet nomen generale fuerit inFlnitum quoad subpositum primo
modo, tamen est Finitumquoadsubpositum,secundomodo. Verbum autem utroque modo
est inFlnitum quoad subpositum dico in tercia persona. Sic ergo nomen generale 1verbum
poterit finitare ex parte ante.
These notes are found up to P. 104", line 4-1. Next we End some more
grammatica! notes (1041'5-105f'3),the last of which breaks off at the
bottom of f. 105"). The Fll'Stquestion which is raised here, has some
76 LOGICA MODERNORLIM ll
relevance to our subjecti. lt asks For the correct criterion of a debita

constructio
.
Questio est utrum construccio attendatur penes signilïcacionem diccionis vel con-
signiEcacionem aut racione utriusque. Ratione signiHcatorum patet, nam si dicatur
'cap(p)a categorica' vel 'homo ajrmatirus', hee simpliciter vitiose sunt et tamen est
conformitas accidencium, si sit vitium in his erit ratione signiFlcatorum. Et si inconformi-
tas racione significatorum et conformitas, videtur quod tantunn racione significatorum.
Cum 'lcgerc' et 'Icccio' et 'lcgcns' idem significant, ut dicit Priscianus, candmn habebunt
construccionem (1041'11).Quod falsum est. Cuius racio est quod penes utrumque
attenditur construcio, principaliter tamcn penes consignificacioncm. Unde. exigitur in
debita construccione concidencia formarum diccionum sub debita disposicione acci-
dencium.
16 Digby 174 (: B.N. 9) is a parchmentcodex mjbl 40 and 80 consisting

OF250 folios and dating from the twelfth to the fourteenth century. It
was Formerly found among the codices belonging to Thomas Allen
(Thonl.leen 147) and has the colophon: Liber johannisde Land(oniis) de
librario Sancti Augustini CantUmbrig-ensis)(dist. XI, 3. I), qui paucula ex
artt. 1-14 breviter, in tabula contentorumpremissarecenseri.These Fourteen
items (Ff. 1122lOT) contain the Consolatioof Boethius with an incomplete
commentary upon this work and quite & number oF tracts on the quadri-
vium. lt may appear From the table of contents mentioned in the above
colophon that the items 15 and sqq. did not originally belong to our
codex.
The Efteenth item is described by Macray as Tractatusfuse compositus,
superartemLogicus,There is [bunclfrom Ff. 2111'11-2411'13'
a tract on logic,
indeed, written in a small and nice handwriting, probably clating from
the third quarter of the tx-velfth century. One of its characteristics is the
use of & ligature for ct, written as Et. This caused & peculiar misreading
in the incipit as given b)r Macray (dictcriis for dictis):
Propositum quidem negocii est circa opinionis nostre posiciones singula diligenter
inquirere. Ordinem itaque (illam :lfacray) doctrine nostre per quatuor distin-
......
guemus capitula, primo agentes de terminis, deinde de signiEcatis eorum, tertio de
proposiciünibus, quarto de dictis (Macray read dicteriis) proposicionum, idest dc
enunciabilibus.
The x-vork is written in two columns by the same hand; only the' Fll'St
half OFF. 2311"IILseems to have been rewritten by a somewhat different
hand. The treatise is of an outstanding importance For our knowledge
! See below, Ch. II, p. 1123". and Ch. IV, p. 1835.

ANALïSlS OF THE n-mmuscmprs 77
of the logic about the middle of the tx-velfth «:;entur)rand will be exten-
sively studiefl in our Chs Vl—X. Unfortunately it breaks 011 at the
end of F. 241").
The Ff. 2413'3-2423'" contain & set of logical and grammatica] notes.
is blank, apart from the three Erst lines). The last note is on &
(1'.2421"&
grammatical question and gives as an example OF& binamium: "ut iste
vocatur Robertus et Robert" (2421'5), which might refer to Robert of
Melun, since the preceding tract certainly is from the School of Melun.
The Ff. 243-248 contain some theological sententiaex-w'itten in & ['cur-
tecnth centur )-' Imndx-vritilw. Next the Hebrew al 1)lmbeth is Found and the
b
Lord's prayer in Hebrew letters (Ff. 248-250).
17 MS Land.].at. 67 is & parchment codex dating partly From the Erst,

partly from the second half' of the twelfth century. lt consists of two
parts which did not originallyr belong together, viz. Ff. 1-19 and 20-88.
At the bottom of F. If we read: LIBER GUILIELMI LALID ARCHllz—'Pl
CANTuä et CANCELLARïUNIVERSITATIS OXON. 1633. At the top of the
same page the Figure 13 is found. "
A. Ff. lf-19V contain a number of incomplete works on grammar, in

the widest sense, and logic. This part is written in (liFFerent hands of
about 1 150, it seems.
— Ff. lm-Iï"): part of a work on the four elements of the world, in

the form of & commentary, presumably on Martianus Capella, Dc NuPtüs
Philologiac et Mercurii 1, 1.I The First lines are very difficult to read as the
result of Fading of the ink. The lmndwritting seems to date from about
the middle of the twelfth century. The work breaks oFFon F. 11"), line
14. The remainder of this page is left blank.
' — f. 21'3'") contains & divisio scientiarum. lt was probably written by the
same hand as f. 1. ] give the Full text:
Tria2 nobis naturaliter sunt data incommoda, videlicet lgnorancia, Vitium, Necessitas.
Ignorantes quoque naturaliter sumus. Anima enim secundum philosophos mole corporis
! Comparcthc commentaryon MartianusCapellawritten by Bcrnard Silvestris, extant

in MS Cambridge, Univ. Library, .:Hm1.18, Fl'. [!'-28'2 See E. ]cauneau, Non: sur l'Ecalc
dc Charrrci, in Stucli Medievali 1964, [pp. 1-45], pp. 37-39.
3 For the topic of the tria incommoda,
see L. M. dc Rijk, SameNare; on The T'll'cyïh
Centug/ 'I'opic qf Thc Thrize(Four) Human Erik and qufScicncc,Virtus, and 'I'cchniqucsas Thejr
Remediain VIVARIUM 5 (1967), pp. 8-15.
aggravata ea que prius, antequam incorporaretur, presciverat, iucorporata amittit.

Vicium est quelibet animi perturbacio. Necessitas est sine qua vivere non possumus,
melius tamen sine ea viveremus.
Istis vero tribus tria obiciuntur contrariis contraria. Que quibus a sede naturaliter ab
eisobsitaremotain privacionestransmutanturhabitus,hecscilicet: scienciaignorantiam
privans, virtus animi habitus modo nature racioni consentaneusassignatavitium execrans,
mecaniaexpellensnecessitatem.
Scientiaest quicquid scitur. Scienciaautemin duasdistribuitur partes: sapienciamet
eloquenciam. Quarum neutra potest esse sine alia. Sapiencia enim sine eloquentia
parum prodest, eloquencia sine sapiencia multum t:)beat.IEloquencia enim audacemct
protervum facit. Privacio vero sciencie stultum et temerarium facit. Eloquencia igitur
sine sapiencia stultum audacem facit quo nullum animal peius et scelestius. Sed ista
simul iuncta perfecte reddunt sapientem. Unde invenitur in philosophicis Mercurium
nubere Philologie. Quod nichil aliud est, cum Mercuriusinterpretetur sapiens,Philologie:
amorsapiencie;que, (quam MS) eloqucncia iuncta sapiencie, vcl econverso, reddunt
perfecte sapientem.
Eloquencia dividitur in tres partes: gramaticam, rethoricam, logicam. Gramatica
est sciencia loquendi, retorica vero est ornamentum loquendi, logica est argumentum
loquendi. Docet namque gramatica recte loqui, rethorica ornate loqui, logica vero
discernere verum a falso et falsum a vero.
Sapiencia dividitur in duas partes: theoricam et practicam. Theorosinterpretatur
video; inde theatrumidest specraculum.lnde eciam dicitur vita theorica, idest contemplativa
vel æpcculativa.
Practica dividitur in tres partes: ethicam, economicam, politicam. Ethica inter-
pretatur moralis sciencia. Ecanomicafamiliaris sciencia sive disPEnsam'a. Unde dicitur
economusfamiharis sive bonusdispensator.Pelium: civilis sciencia; polis enim interpretatur
civitas. Unde dicitur metropoliset Ncapohx.
Theorica dividitur in tres partes: phisicam, theologicam, mathematicam. Phijis
interpretatur natura; inde phisica, idest sciencia de naturis rerum. Phisica alia celestis,
alia terrestris. Celestiaest illa que est de naturis rerum que sunt supralunarecorpus,
ut in planetis et stellis Exis. Terrestris est que est de naturis humanorum corporum et
ceterorum que sunt infra lunare corpus.
Theologica cst racio de divinis; theosenim grece deusdicitur latine; logos: sermo; inde
theologica: racio sive sermo de divinis.
Mathematica interpretatur doctrinali: sciencia; matheo: enim grece latine decuma.
Unde Matheusinterpretatur doctus.Sed 'docrrinalis' duobus modis dicitur. Si ponatur
inter theologian ct phisicam et respiciat ad phisicam quia docet de eis que sunt circa
corpora, ad theologiam per hoc quod doceat de incorporeis, dicetur doctrinalis quasi
docensde utrisque. Dicitur autem doctrinalis, quia que docet (2113)occultata Fide, idest
figuris representat et demonstrat.
Mathematice sunt quatuor species: arithmetica, musica, geometria, astronomia.
latarum prima est arithmetica. Reliqua enim ea indigent nec sine ea consisterepossunt,
illa vero nec istis indiget et sine eis perfecte consistere potest. Due istarum, scilicet
arithmetica et musica, agunt cle multitudine. Sed multitudo alia constat per se et non
! For the developmentof this topic, see the interesting paper of G. Nuchelmans,
Philolagia et ion marriage avec Marcumjusqu'ä la 'En du Xll: siädc in LATOMUS, Revue
d'ätudeslatines, 16 (l957), pp. 84-107.
refertur ad aliud; de qua agit arithmetica. Alia non per se, sed refertur ad aliud; de qua
agit musica. Arithmetica nulle inveniuntur species sive partes.
Musica vero in tres partes dividitur: in mundanam musicam, humanam, instrumen-
talem. Mundana est que Et in concordia elementorum et temporum etc. Humana est
que Et in etate et complexionibus humanorum corporum in coniunctione anime et
corporis. lnstrumentalis est que Fit in timpanis, organis, et ceteris instrumentis. ln-
strumentalis dividitur in tres partes: melicam, metricam, rithmicam. Melica est que Et
in cantus armonia. Metrica que Et in observacione pedum et temporum. Rithmica est
que observatur in paritate sillabarun'l. Melica distribuitur in tres partes: diatonicam,
cronicam (!), armonicam. Hec de arithmetica et n-wsica,que de multitudine agunt in
presenti dicta suFFlciant.
Sciendum est cum due supradicte partes mathematice agant de multitudine, quod alie
due partes, scilicet geometria et astronomia, agunt de magnitudine (corr. ex multitudine
MS). Magnitudo alia mobilis, alia inmobilis. lnmobilis vero geometrice servit disciplineI
mobilis vero astronomico. Gemnetria prior est astronomia hac racione. Omne inmobile
prius est mobili. Omne enim mobile procedit ab inmobili, ut ab unitate alternacio.
Merito igitur geometria, que agit de inmobilibus, prior est astronomia, que agit de
mobilibus (corr. ex imuübilibus MS).
Sciendum est quod aliud est astronomia, aliud astrologia. Astronomiainterpretatur lex
sive norma astrormn; astra: grece latine astrum; namos: norma, idest regula. Astrologia
interpretatur sermodeastris: logosenim grece sermovel ratio dicitur latine. lnde astrologia,
idest sermode astris. Astrologia alia fabulosa, alia imaginariaT'Fabulosaest cum loquimur
de astris secundum fabulas, dicentes arietem sive taurum translatum in celum ct Heri
signum in celo. De qua tractat Aratus et lginus. lmaginaria est cum loquimur de astris
secundum hoc quod nobis videtur, dicentes quod sol declinet se ad occasum in Occeano.
De qua tractat Marcianus et [parens. Astronomia vero certitudinem et ratum astrorum
docet, idest qualiter sol perüciat cursum in hora sive in horis, in mense, in anno. De
qua tractat Tholemeus.
F. 2V is nearly blank and contains only & meaningless scribble.
Ff. 31'3-41'0- contain some notes on grammar. Inc.: (O)Mnia nomina

—
in a desinencia Feminina sunt, exceptis pmpriis nominibus virorum, ut
Catelina (!), vel fluviorum, ut Second,vel officiorum ad viros pertinen-
Icium, ut scriba.They were written by two diFFerenthands(lating From
about ] 150. The minor part of f. 4m as well as f. 4") contain 0111)r
some
ngres and meaninglessscribbles.
fF. 4V3-5V3 contains the initia] part of & commentary on Lucam,
—
Pharsalia. This fragment was written in two cliFFerenthands dating from
the second part of the twelfth century. Inc. Auctor iste Corclubensis fuit
et regnante Calvo Nerone Romam scripturus venit. Videns autem multa
detestabilia in Nerone vicia, cumulus viciorum coegit eum ad reprehen—
dendum. The half of F. SVB-as well as F. S'") are left blank.
Ff. 61'3-7'4-ragive the initia] part of an interesting commentary on
—
Porphyl'y's !sagoge.Inc..: Circa huius artis principium considerandum est

quid sit ipsa ars, quod genus eius, que materia, quod nomen, que causa
nominis, quod OFFICiUl'l'l,quis Finis, que partes, que species, quod' instru-
mentum, quis artifex. Hec ergo singula ordine proposito sunt exequenda.
As an example of an artifex agensex arte a certain Guarinus of Cambridge

is mentioned : anglie.":agensex arte est argumentorum güizcwrqui agit secundum
artem, ut Cantaber Guarinus. One Guarinus of Cambridge is mentioned as
abbot of St Albans in 1183and 1188. See Ulysse Chevalier, Räpcrtoiredes
sourceshistoriquesdu mcyen 536. Bio—bibliographie, Paris 2 vols 1903-07,
reprint New ïork 1960, s.v. Garin de Cambridge(vol [, col. 1653).
The copy was written in & hand dating From the second lmlfof the twelfth
century up to f. 7Vï'rline 10; then another contemporary hand took over
and copied some 32 lines. The remainder off.. 7'-' is left blank. It is worth
noting that the Erst hand endshis pensumin the middle of an argument
and adds the name CANTABER,whereafter the second immediately
continues the argument: ergohocgenusanima]est (etc.). I think
......
this Guarinus may well have been the author of this commentary on
Porphyry.
f.. STE'VH: the initial part of & commentary on Aristotle's Sophistici

—
Elenchi, written in :: hand oF the second lmlf of the twelfth century. Inc. :
(D)E saphisticis elenchis liber hic inscribitur. In eo igitur que sit materia,
que intencio, quis modus agendi-et quis ordo, que utilitas, cui parti
philosophie subiciatur intuendum. Sed ad istorum et ad tocius seriei
promciorem intelligenciam, quid ars, quid artis imitacio, quid imitacio-
nis similitudo intimandum. The work breaks off at the end of f. BN;
F. 83") is left blank.
Ff. 91'3-14-V'Jcontain part of another commentary 011 Porphyry's

-—
Isagoge.Inc. Intencio Porphirii est in hoc opere Facilem intellectum ad
PredicamentaAristotilis preparare tractando (le quinque rebus, genere
scilicet, specie, differencia, proprio, accidenti. Quarum cognicio valet
ad Predicamcmorumcognicionem. I Found :: complete copy of this com-
mentary in Assisi, Bib1.Conv.Franc. MS 573, Ff. 41'3-l5V'J. The present
cepy was written in a Fmehandwriting dating from the Erst half of the
twelfth century.
Ff. I5fï'L-l9HILcontain :: fragment of William of Conches' Summain

—
Priscianum. A more complete text of it is found in Florence, Bibl.
Laurenziana,Sanzlflarco310, and Paris,B.N.Lat. IS. 130 (two redactions).
ANALVSIS OP THE MANUSCRIPTS 81
See E. Jeauneau, Deux rädactions des gloses de Guillaume de Conchessur

Priscicnin Recherchesde Thäologie ancienne et mädiävalc 27 (1960),
pp. 212-24'7.
B. Ff. 20T-88V.This part of our manuscript seemsto have been indepen-

dent originally. I quote the description given by Mr. R. W. Hunt (in:
Mediaeval and RenaissanceStudies 2 (1950), p. 2). "The quircs are
numbered l-IX in & contempcn-ar)r hand. The ninth quire (after Fol. 80)
is lost, and there is & gap in the gloss.between Priscian, Inst.gramm. VII,
87 and VIII, 29, which involves the lossof the main part of the discussion
on the verb. Lezwcs
are alsolost after Fol. and 39 (l, 4—7-50)
38 (I, 41-4—4)
and parts of Ff. 53, 72, 80, 81 are tom out. The last quire is written in &
dichrent hand, and it is not certain that this part OFthe gloss is by the
same author as the rest. Some headingshave been added by a hand of the
Efteenth century".
This gloss, called after the opening words Pramisfmusis extensively
discussed by Mr. Hunt in his Studia: an Priscian in the Twclfth Centmy lI
(Mediaevaland RenaissanceStudies Il, pp. 1-56). Seealso Chapter V,
below, pp. 255-263.
P rl R I S, BIBLIOTHEQUE NATIONALE
Lit. : LäcwpoldDelisle, ln venraircdesmanuscritslatinsconservis&Ia Bibliothäque

Imperiale sous les Nos. 8.323-H.503 dufonds latin in: Bibliothöque de
l'Ecole des chartes 23 (1862), pp. 277-308; 4-69—512;24 (1863), pp.
185-236.
The same, !nventaire des manuscrits latin: dc Saint-Gernlain-des Präs in:
Bibliothäque dc l'Ecole des chartes, 26 (1865), pp. 185-214; 28 (1867),
' pp. 343-376 and 528-556; 29 (1868), pp. 220-260: MSS nos. 11.504--
14.231
.
The same, Inventairc des manuscrits latin: de Saim Victor conserväs& Ia Biblio-
thäqueImperiale souslesnumäros14.232-15.175 in: Biblioth'eque de. l'Ecole
de chartes, 30 (1869), pp. 1-79.
18 B. N. Lat. 1].412 is a parchment codex in [2010 consisting of two sections.

lt was described by B. Hauröau in an extensive way in his Notices et
extraits de quelquesmanuscritslatius de la Bibliothäque Nationale II Paris 1891,
pp. 30-48.
A. IT. [!'-2413: & number of acadcmic verses made by some students:

ff. [!'-233'. See Hauröau, ap. cit., pp. 30-4—3.An cxcomnmnication For-
mula is found on F. 24T'V.
B. [T. 25" — end of the MS originally was a separate codex, which

Formcrly bclonged to the priory of St Victor in Paris. lt contains a
number of works on logic, written all of them by the same hand dating
from the Erst half of the thirteenth century.
IT. 25T-4-01':an introduction to dialectic going under the title Summe.
——
(For this tel'm, seebelow, pp. 170f.). ] call it the SummeMetenses(see
below, pp. 450-452). It will be analysedbelow, pp. 452—490. Folio f-l-Ov
is left blank.
ff.. 4lP-811': the Syncategeremataof some Master Nicholas. lt Opens
—
as Follows:
INCIPIUNTSINCATHEGOREUMATA Ut dicit Philosophus, ea que sunt

MAGISTRINICHOLAI-u.
in arte et ratione sumuntur ad prcportionem et imitationem eorum que sunt in natura.
In naturalibus vero ita videmus quod sunt quedam que per naturam nata sunt in se
aliquid agere sine alieno suffragio, alia vero sunt que non sunt nata movere nisi mota,
sicut homo a se motus et non ab alio prota(h)it litteras, calamus vero non a se sed ab
homine motus. Similiter se habet in rebus rationis, maxime in vocibus, quod quedam
faciunt id ad quod sunt sine auxilio alterius, scilicet significant, quia omnis vox est ad
significandum. Quoniam, ut dicit Aristotiles, voces sunt note earum que sunt in anima
passionum, significant intellectus, qui sunt signa rerum; et ita voces significant res et
tales voces dicuntur categoreumata,idest significantes. Alis: sunt que per senon significant
sed in coniunctione ad alias, et tales dicuntur sinentegoreumata. De quibus, aliis omissis,
presens est intentio.
The syncategorematic by masterNicholasare: 'est' 'non'

terms discussed
( I
salus
( I I 'l l
desmlt
.l' ,
l . , .I I. - . I I . . I I- . ']
tantum , , preter , s: , ms: , map]: , , necessario,

'contingenter', 'an 'vel', 'sive', 'quia', 'et', 'bis', 'ter', 'jïere', 'quam', the
,
absolute ablative, 'adhuc', 'totus', 'ne', 'vult', 'tataliter', 'vix', and
'sin autem'.
The tract is incomplete and breaks oFFat the beginning of the discussion
of 'sin autem'.
The pages 81V, 821', 82? are left blank.
-— Ff. 83T-87T: the of

Appellationes John le Page (johannesFagus).This
work is also Found in another Parisian manuscript from St Victor, B.N.
Lat., 15.170, Ff. 63-70 and 46-48. See below, nr.. 22, p.. 88. The work
opens as Follows :
ANALïSIS 01: THE MANUSCRIPTS 83
Naama: JOHANNISmci. Secundum duas dispositiones ter-

INCIPIUNTAPPELLATIONES
minorum inest duplex actus sive duplex proprietas terminis. Sunt enim dispositiones
circa subiectum inquantum subiectum, et huiusmodi dispoaitionessigniEcantsigna
universalia. Sunt autem alie. dispositiones rerum subiectarum non inquantum subiciuntur,
et huiusmodi dispositiones significant nomina ac verba significantia aliquid ut rem et non
sicut modum, sicut illa nomina 'albus', 'nigcr', 'gromoticus', 'musicus'. Dicimus igitur
secundum primas dispositiones que tamquam dispositiones sunt sicut modi et non sicut
res: inest terminis quedam preprietas que appellatur coqfusioet & privacione huius
dispositionis inest terminis privatio eiusdem proprietatis. A secundis dispositionibus
inestterminis quedamproprietasque est coartatio; sedhocduPliciter: secundumeaque
attribuuntur subiecto; potest enim aliquid attribui subiecto quod secundum substantiam
inest indivisibile a subiecto cui attribuitur et sicut indivisum sic est in diversis quantum
ad substantiam simpliciter. ITEM. Potest aliquid esseindivisum (a) subiecto, ( )
.......
autem divisum. Et secundum primam indivisionem coartatur substantia, sed quod se-
cundo modo est indivisum a subiecto (substantiaMS), non coartat. Ut patet, cum dicitur:
'homoest.albus'; non enim 'homo' coartatur ad 'albus'. Sed cum dicitur: 'homoalbus', ibi
coartatur, quia indivisio secundum quod Et coartatio predicta, est secundum identitatem
signiEcationum que exigitur.
Somepagesare difficult to readas& result ofdamp stains(83V; 84f). The

tract cndson F.871': Et hocdeappellationibus
magisprijohonnisPagisujiciont.
A later hand added: ExpliciuntAppollotioncs MagistrijohannisPagi.
[T. 881'3-9lm: & tract on insolubih'a.For this work, see L. M. de Rijk,
——
SomoNotoson the ModioovalTroct Do insolubilibus, with the Edition ofa Trocr.
Daringfrom the End of the Twey'thCentmy [not ours], in: wmmum, a
and the Intellectual Life of the Middle
Journalfor MediaevalPhiiOSOPily
Ages4- (1966), pp. 93-98.
Ff.92r-101r: a tract on obligatiowith the title lNClPlLINTOBLIGATIO-
—
NESETPRIMOFALSA POSITIO.
lt opensasFollows:
Sicut significat Aristotiles in libro Topicorumaut Elcnchorum,ars disputativa ad tria viam
prestat; aut secundumphilosoPhiasdisciplinas, idest ad inquisitionem veritatis; et ad
obviationes et ad exercitationes. Quia ergo exercitatio aliis duobus facultatem augmentnt
idcirco ad presensde diäputa-
(agguätMS)— qui enim exercitati sunt magispossunt—-—-,
tione prout est ad exercitum videamus, prenotando quod duobus modis Et disputatio:
vel nil snpponendoa quo disputetur — et de hac nil ad presensintendimus—, vel
aliquid supponendo, que dicitur obligatoria disputatio. Circa quam presens versatur
intentio. Ad cuiusrei eividentiamscire oportet quid sit obligareet quid obligatio, quot
et quibus modis habeat fieri, vel quot sint species eius et primo etiam sub quo genere
disputationis accipiatur. ln libro enim Elonchorumdistinguuntur disputationum genera
quatuor. Sed nulla illarum est illa. Ergo non est disputatio, cum non sit in genere quod
non sit in aliquaspecierum,ut habeturin Topicis.Probatio.Doctrinalisdisputatioest ex
necessariis. Sed ista est ex falsis. Ergo non est doctritialis. Item. Doctrinalis est ad
scientiam.Hec tantumad exercitium. Ergoetc. ( ...... ).
84- LOGICA MODERNORun-l 11
Hoc:habito videndumest quid sit obligare et cetera que propositasunt. Sciendum

ergo quod obligatio est, secundum quod hic sumitur, alicuius ad aliquid ex petitione
opponentis et concessione respondentis astrictiü. El: obligare est aliquem ad aliquid
concedendum vel negandum quod non concederet vel negaret inpetendo opponentem et
respondentem consentiendo astringere, voluntarie autem et remota coactione.
lt consistsof Flve parts: (l) defalsa positione(92r-96V); (2) de deposi-

tione (96V-99f) ; (3) de dubitatione (99T-1001'); (4) de petitione (IOOFV);
and (5) de 'scir.verum' (100'f-1011').
The tract ends on f. 1011"with EXPLICIUNT.Two other hands added
Expliciunt !nsolubilfa Amen and Expliciunt;insolubilia, but this must have
been done by people who thought that this was the end of the tract on
insolubilia which began on [. 381'3'.
Folio 101** is near];r blank and f 1021'contains a number of diagrams
.
of philosophica] concepts. The remainder of our manuscript contains:
Ff. IOZV-IOST: other philosophica] (lefinitions and a number of verses

—
(for some of them, see Hauräau,op.cit, p. 47)
Ff. 106f-107V: Fabulae Ronmli taken from Vincant of Beauvais'
——
Speculum historiale '
Ff. 108f-125V: Some notes on the Ancient philosophers, with some

—
excerpts from Hugh of St Victor, St Bernard, and Hugh de Fouilloi
['F. 126P-133V: a number of medical prgscriptions and advices for

—
hygiene
Ff. ! 34T-l 54" : theological tracts on the sacramentsand other subjects.

——
lnc. : Cum queris cur iam non circumciditur christianus, si Christus non
venit legem solvere
......
Ff. 1551": The acts of the Council of Treves kept in 1238.
——
19 B.N.Lat. 14069 is & parchment codex, formerly of the library of St

Germain des Präs in Paris, written in different hands dating from the
twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. It consists of ten parts:
("F.lr-25v: compotus of Master Garland. For this author, see L. M.

—
de Rijk, GarlandusCompotista,Dialectica. First Edition qf the Manuscripts,
with an [ntroductian on The Lyïz'and The Worksqf TheAuthor and on TheContents
quhc PresentWerk, Assen, 1959, pp. [)(-XLII.
Ff. 261'3-331'3:a tract which goes under the title: Dc dialecticistrici:

—
added by & later hand. It is an incomplete copy 01"the Abstractionesof a
master Ricardussophista.For this work and this master, see above, nr.
15, pp. 62-72. This part was x-vritten by & thirteenth century hand.
Ff 35-4—8:prologues and canonafrom the Gospels.
— .
-— ff. 49-113: Petri Alphonsi tractatus adversus
j udaeos
Ff. 114-121: Excerpts from the Canones
—-
FraFa ? a a
122f-134V: astronomica! calendar a. 1407
135f-14-0'V:& fragment of the Historia Amici et Amelii.
!
14—1-177:Ex itinerario S. Clementis.

178-180: De variis reliquiis
181 sqq.: Formulae litterarum.
20 B.N.Lat., 15.130 is a parchment codex of 137 Tolios written in double

columns0147 or 48 lineseachby two different hands(one wrote lm-
18"); 271'3-137W; the other 18f'ï-26V'J), probably clating from the last
quarter of the twelFth century. It is a capy (with some lacunas)of
William of Conches' Glosulcin Priscianum(corrected redaction; the
original reduction is found in Florence, Sanzlffm'co
310). 011 f. 1r the
number 1217 was written. The codex formerly belonged to the library
of St Victor in Paris. An excellent analysisof the nmnuscript is given by
Mr Edouard ]eauneau, Deux re'dactionsdesgiese'sde GuiHaumede Concha:sur
Priscienin: Recherchesde Thäologie ancienneet mädiävale27 (1960),
pp. 212-24—7.
F. 1 m'W: the author's prologue. Inc.: (Q)uoniam in humanis invcn-
—
tionibus nichil ex omni parte posse esse perfectmn teste Prisc(iano)
cognoscimus, non est incongruum si quod iuvenes (]eauneau; invenies
MS) semiplenum scripsimus, senescorrigimus. For the complete text
of this prologue, see]eauneau,op.cft., pp. 243-246.
f. 1Vü-84Vb: text of the commentary on the Priscianus maior (Inst.
-—
gramm.,l-XVI), with a few lacunas(see]eauneau,op.cfr., pp. 213-214).
The larger part of f. 84V'J is left blank.
Ff. 85l'ï'-'WIL: the author's prologue to his commentary of the Priscianus

—-
minor (Inst. gramm.,XVIl-XVIII). lt opensas follows:
MATERIAartis gramatice (est) in his tribus: littera, sillaba, et dictione. Utilitas vero
eiusdem in ipsarum cognitione et earundem regulari constructione :. perfectis gramaticis
esseiudicatur. Unde Priscianus in primo volumine sui operis diffinitione et accidentibus
( ) cognitionem nobis tradit eiusdemque regularem coniunctionem subiungit.
......
In principio autem secundi quid sit sillaba diffinitione sua et suis accidentibus lmnil'estat
et earundem coniunctionem subiungit. ln Fine vero eiusdem et in onmibus que usque ad
Librum Constructianum sequuntur proprietatibus nominibus dianitionibus et accidentibus
dictiones distingu(i)t. Quo pacto in duobus voluminibus earundem regularem coniunctio-
nem, que.a gramaticis constructiodicitur, perfecte exequitur.
Ff. 85193-1373'3:text of the commentary proper on Priscian, Inst.

——
gramm. XVIl-XVIII, 57, p. 27813ed. Hertz. Folio 137? is left blank for
the most part.
21 B.N.Lat. 15.l4l is & parchment codex ofl -l- 177 folios (9 in. )( 6 in.)
which consists of two manuscripts. The Fll'St was written in double
columns (IT 1-104) by three handsprobabl)rdating from the last quarter-
.
of the twelfth century. The second (Ff. lOS-l77) is in one column by Et
hanc]ofthe Ersthalfof the twelfth century. This codexformerlybelonged
to the library of St Victor in Paris, as appears from several places. An
owner's name is found on f. 1413' (hic est liber quem Radulfus habuit ad
audiendumcursumsuum),and a tentamenphunaewith the name 'Radul us'.
Miss Marie-Thäräse d'Alverny was kind enough to give me her description
of the First part of our nmnuscript. She dates it in the beginning of the
thirteenth century. The handwriting and way- of illumination are prob-
ably those of Northern ltaly. Shedistinguishes three hands: 1-46; 47-80;
8 I -IO4. There are.many large and small initials in red and blue. Seealso
Lag. fl'had.I, p. 38, n. 2. The last part (105-177), too, has man)r decorated
initials.
Our codex contains four treatises:
f. "'a-4639: an anonymous SummaSophisticorumElencharum. For this

—
work, see Lag. Mad, [, pp. 88-l05. It has been edited in Full there, in
Appendix B (pp. 257-4—58).
— Ff. 471'3-104"): an extensivetreatise on logic in the form of introduc-

tiones.For this work (Introductionesrl'fontanemaiores),see L. M. de Rijk,
SameNew Evidenteron TuveU-th Centug' Logic. Alberic and the Schon!qf Mon:
SteGeneriäve in: vwmuum, a ]ournal for Mediaeval Philosophy and the
Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages, 4- (1966), pp. 12-22, and below,
our Chapter lll1I pp. 147-148.
ANAL'I'SIS 01: THE manuscmm 87
Ff. 105f-14-11': Cicero's De inventione, with margine:] glosses & in

-—
somewhat later hand.
Ff. 1421"
-177'-' : Cicero's Rhetoricaad Herennium, with marginal glosses
—
in :: contemporary hand. Miss Thäräse d'Alverny's description (given in
a letter) of Ff. 105-177 runs:
Xlle s. Grande initiale peinte et ornäe (105). Initiales bleues et rouges ornäes.
Petites initiales rchaussäesd'ocre. Rubriques, lemmes et initia en rougc ou en bleu; une
partie en rouge et en bleu. Corrections contemporaines et postärieures. Quelques
manchettescontemporaines. Gloses marginales et interlinäaircs d'une äcriture cursive
du Xllle siäcle (däbut). Piedsde mouche. F.. 141*V,en &criture cursive clu Xllle siäcle:
"Hic est liber qucm Raduy'us habuit ad audiendum cursum suum", et essai cle plume avec
"Radul us". F. 177? fragment cle compte, en äcriture cursivc, Fm Xllle siäcle. Dans les
marges, traces cle notes & la mine de plomb. Longues lignes.
22 B.N.Lat. 15.170 is & collective parchment codex of 162 folios written by

several diFFerenthands dating from the twelfth and thirteenth centurias.
The folios 1, 2, 14, 15, 23, 33, 54, 55, 63, 146, and 162 are seriously
damaged by damp stains. On the top 01 f. 3? the numbering S.!fict.500
occurs and at the foot of that page& contemporary hand (13th eent.)
wrote ISTELIBERESTSTI WCTORISPAR. The contents OFthis codex are
rather mixed: moral prescriptions in verse, sermons in Latin, a Formula-
rium of letters; & tract on mystica] theology, the beginnings of & gloss
on Alexander of Villedieu's Doctrinale, Cicero's SamniumScipionis,some
computistic tracts (among which the Gerlandususualisand the Compotus
Helprici), and a number of logical fragments. [ only mention the logical
works. They were all written in thirteenth centuryr hands.
Ff. (older
241'3-341-"3 folintion: 10-20): a tract on sophisms.lncom-
-—
plete and very diFFlcult to read. Inc. : Cum sophista, ut dicit Aristotiles
(Soph.E1.,175a 12-14), vult semper circa omnia exercitatus videri et in
nullo inscie se habere
......
Ff. 351'3-36W-( older foliation: 21-22): another tract on sophisms
——
written by & diFFerenthand. It opens as Follows:
S(i)cut dicit Aristotiles in libro Helencorum, sophistis magis pretium est videri esse
sapientes quam esseet non videri. Unde ut simus coaperiosi (!,far copiosi?) in 50-
phistica, que est apparens sapientia, circa sophisticam versetur nostra intentio, ut circa
communes distinctiones sophismatum contra eos ( ...... ). Et quia magis communis
est distinctio que solet Fieri de negatione, propter hoc de distinctione negationis primo
inquiramus. Et gratia Exempli eius sumatur hoc sophisma: 'nullus homolegit Parisiusm'si
ipis sit asinus'.
— Ff. 481'0-52
W'-: Abstractianes
Hervjei (!) Saphiste.
I t opensas follows:
'(O)mnis' dicitur signum universale quia signat terminum cui adiungitur supponere pro
universis, idest pro onmibus, suis appellatis. Hec Heri potest multipliciter. Ut solet dici,
adiungitur termino generalivel eiusequipollenti, multiplex est locutio.
quandocumque
Termino generali ut hic: omne coloratum est; sic tantum unum album, unum nigrum,
unum medio colore coloratum. Probatiü: album est, nigrum (est), medio colore
coloratum est; ergo omne coloratum est. Contra. Hec est falsa: 'omnealbum est,'. Ergo
eius contradictoria est vera, scilicet 'aliquod album non ext'. Et ita: album non est, nigrum
non est, medium non est; ergo omne coloratum non est.
The tract is untitled but the colophon explicitly attributes it to one

master Hervieus: P. 52 W: EXPLICIUNTABSTRACTIONES HERVIEISOPHISTE.
No doubt, this is the logician masterHerveuswho is mentionedby john
of Garland in his ll'forale Scolarium. See above, nr. 12, pp. 50—51.
ff. 52V3-53Vb : some stray sophisms, written in the samehandwriting.

—
Ff. 54-1*-'l--57"*"IJ
: an acephalousand incomplete tract on fallacias, ending
—
in the discussion of the fallacy secundumcompositionem et divisionem.The
folios 54- and 55 are seriously damaged by tears. The rest of f. 57v is
left blank.
l'T. 581'3-60'-'b : part of another tract on sophisms. lt opens as follows:

—
Quoniam dicit Aristotiles solutio est manifestatiofalsi sillogismi propter quod est falsus,
manifestatio falsitatis attenditur penescausasfalsitatis, pmpter hoc de causisfalsitatis
—
in generali dicendum est. Cum ergo oratio significatiönem suam trahat & partibus, si
aliqua pars sit multiplex, et ipsa totalis erit multiplex. Quando ergo in aliqua oratione
est dictio multiplex, et ipsa totalis est multiplex. Ut patet in talibus soFlsmatibus,ut
illud : '(n') quad nichil est legit, tu c.:asinus'.
Ff. 611'3-621'5:a short introduction into logic. For this work, seeour
—
Chapter XIII, below, pp. 4—40f;446 f.
Ff. 631'3-70'") -l- 461'3-4-8"): the Sincategoremata

of master John le
—
Page, which are also found in Paris, B.N.Lat., 11:412, Ff. 83f-871'; see
above, nr. 18, pp. 82-83.
In the latter manuscript they go under the title Appellationes,while the.)l

are called Sincategorematai n the colaphon on F. 48") of the present copy:
EXPLICIUNTSINCATEGOREMATA
M. I. PAGl.
V I E N N A, OESTERREICHISCHENATIONALBIBLIOTHEK
Lit.: Tabulae codicum manuscriptorum praeter graecos et orientales jn Bibliothe-
ca Palatina Vindabanensi vol.

asservatorum, 11(Vienna 1868), nos 2001-
3500 (reprint Graz 1965).
23 V. P.L. 2486 (Salisb. 388) is a parchment codex in 40 01'76 folios,

bearing the number 3772 on the First fly-leaf (containing & fragment of
written in a eleventhcentury hand). It was
Cicero's Cammaiordesenectute
written in handwritings dating from the beginning and the middle of
the twelfth century. The last Hy-leaf was taken from an eleventh century
manuscript of Cicero's Laelius de amicitia. lt was analysed by Msgr Grab-
mann in his study: Ein Tractatus de Universalibus und andere logische Inedita
aus dem 12. jahrhundert im CodJat. 2436 der Nationalbibhothek in Wien,
published in: MediaevalStudies 9 (1947), [pp. 56-70] pp. 59-65. For
some corrections, see L. M. de Rijk, Samenew Evidcnccon Twelfth Centwy
Logicin vwamum, ajournal for MediaevalPhilosoPhyandtheIntellectual
Life of the Middle Ages 4- (1966), pp. 1-4; 23-28.
This important manuscript consists of the following parts:
Ff. lf-4-T: part of the extensive commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge

—
which is found complete in this mmmscript on Ff. 45T—60'h'.
See L. M. de
Rijk, Joach.,p. 24. It waswritten in one column by a.handof aboutthe
middle of the twelfth century. Some glosseswere added by & contempo-
rary' hand. This part has been edited by Grabmalm, op.cit., pp. 65-70.
Ff. 4125") :& set of logica] notes, seemingly written by the same hand
—
that added the glossesto the foregoing tract. They were apparently taken,
for the main part, from the greater logical works found in this manu-
script.
f. 9434"): 21gloss on Horace's Liber sermonum,probably the initial

—
fragment of & commentary Upon this work. Inc.: Horatius venusinus
fuit libertinus cuiusdamfabri Elius. Qui puer ductus est Romam a patre
ut ibi litteras disceret. This part is by the samehand as the preceding one.
[. 6"'-"*rb : another set of logica] notes, written by the same hand. See
—
above, ad Ff. 4125"). In fact, f. 61'3'"J contains part of the commentary
on the Perihermeneiaswhich has been preserved nearly complete in Paris,
B.N.Lar.. 15.015, Ff. 1301'3-1991'3and seems to belong to the School of
Mont Ste Geneviäve. See LM. de Rijk, ap.cit., p. 51. P. 6V gives &
small part of some commentary on the Categories,which may have been
taken from the commentary Foundin Padua,Bibl.Um'v. 2084, Ff. IW-

48V'J, which turns out to come From the same school of logicians. See
L. M. cle Rijlc, op.cit., pp. 36-39.
Ff. 71'3'"): the initial fragment of & tract on arithmetics written by
—
the same hand. Inc.: Circa hanc artem sicut et circa alias quedam ex—
trinseca consideranda sunt, videlicet quid sit hec ars et quid sit nomen
huius artis, quod genus eius, que species, que partes, quod ofücium, que
materia, quis Finis, quod instrumentum, quis opifex, unde nomen sump-
serit, quare et a quibus inventa fuerit.
f. 7" (Erst part) contains another set of logica] notes written by the
—-
samehand.
—— [. 7v(second hait) —8'-': notes on Terence, ]uvenal, and Persius,

written in the samehand.
Ff. 9f-16V: theological Fragmentswritten in severalhands.
—
On P. 151"some notes on Horace (inc. Olim truncus eram) are inserted.
Ff". l7f-351'3: an extensive tract on grammar, being & cc-mmentar)r
—-
on Priscian's Institutione: grammaticae. It is followed by some loose notes
on grmnmar. For this part of the nmnuscript, see below our Chapter V,
pp. 234-255.
Ff. 38V'J-42W -l- 371'3-38") 4- 42W(second half)—43fb: an in-
——
complete copy' of an intrwaductoryrwork on'logic from the School of
Alberic of Paris. Another incomplete copy of it is found in Wolfen-
büttel, Herzog August Bibliothek, cod. 56.20 Aug. 80 (see below, nr.
25, p. 94). For this part of the manuscript andfor the work itself, see
L. M. de Rijk, ap. eft., pp. l-9. lt will be edited in our secondpart as
Tract [, under the title: IntroductionesMontane minorcs.
Ff. 43Vü-44V'J, initial fragment of Prosper of Aquitania's excerpts

—
from St. Augustine (Liber sententiarumex operibussancti Augustini delibata-
rum). Inc. Huius libri materia est dicta Augustini. Intentio Prosperi est in
hoc suo Opere quedam utiliora ex dictis Augustini decerpere et ad
nostram utilitatem metrice describere. It was written by the same hand
as the preceding treatises.
— Ff.45T3-60V'J:
an extensive commentary on Porphyry's Isagogcf rom
the Schoolof Alberic of Paris. It waswritten by a hand (or two similar
hands: 451'3-52V'J;52V1J-60Vb) dating from about the middle of the
ANALVSIS or- THE MANUSCRIP'I'S 91
twelfth century. For this part of the manuscript and for the Isagoge-
commentary, see L. M. cle Rijk, op.cit., pp. 23-28.
Ff. 6le-6Sï'13': & set of grammatical notes.
—
— FF.
6 SV'J-67T'J
: explanatorynotes on the Psalms.
f . (
671"IJ secondpart)
contains& short logica] note on quantitas.Inc.: Sciendumquod in pre-
dicamentoquantitatisnon secundum(carnex.sunt MS)generasedtantum
secundumspeciesspecialissimas Fieri assignationem.
-—- Ff. 67V3-68f'): &fragmenton f

quantitas, ollowed by a glosson l)riscian
and one on the three Magi (dat magusaurum, thus, mirrum). The main
part of this column as well as f. 681'3'Vbis Elled with verseswritten in
two diFFerenthands.
Ff. 69m-75vb: glosseson Persius and ]uvenal, written in different
—
hands. Inc. : Habuit quoque Persius amicos :: prima adolescentia, Cessium
Bassium poetam et Calpharnium, qui vivo eo iuvenis decessit.
— f. 761'0'1'": :! fragment of a dictionary; inc. Vadator: qui vadesdat;

vadatus dicitur qui eos recipit. "
f. 76V3'Vb: & continuation of the glosses found in IT. 69W-75Vb.

——
24 V. P. L. 2499 (Philol. 396) is & parchment codex in 16'1Imof 69 folios.

The First Hy-leaf has the number iH.m:-..I3O". The analysis given by M.
Grabmann (Bearbeitungen und Auslegungen der aristotelischen Lagi]: aus der
Zeit von PeterAbaelardbis PetrusHispanus,in: Abh. der Preuss. Akad. der
Wiss. Phil.-Hist. Klasse 1937, pp. 56-57) is to be corrected in some
points.
The first page(P. 11")bearsthe librm'ian's title: MS. Phil.: Institutiones
Grammaticaeet Dialecticos. At the top OFthis page the date is read: Anno
'dii M CCLXXII], with a lacunaof one letterafter the M. Accordingly it is
not certain whether we have to read 1273 of 1373. However this may
be, the date only concernsthe first part of our manuscript. (A). As a
matter OFfact our codex consists of three quite diFFerent parts.
A. Ff. lf-22V: written by :: line fourteenth (or thirteenth?) century

hand:
Ff. 1f-12f: a treatise on the preterita tenses. Inc.: Incipit tractatus
—
nominum. (A)S in preterito vi suscipit :. removendo. Non sic formantur
ter quinque sed excipiantur ...... etc. This is part of & commentary
on the Doctrinale(vss. 698-931 ed. Reichling 1893) of Alexander of

Villedieu, written in 1199. Our copy possibly dates From 1273, (or
1373?), this beingthe date written at the top of f. lr.
Ff. 12f-22v: & treatise on nouus, in the form of a commentary on
—
some metrica] work on grammar. Inc. : incipit tractatus nominum. Sub-
sequenti opusculo preponuntur isti sex versiculi quasi in prologum in
quibus continetur quibus quare scribatur, quia non provectis sed pueris
ut habeant doctrinam compendiosam ad discernendum genera nominum.
Scribitur etiam, ut dico, magistris et doctoribus intempestivis ne ullas vel
incerti puerorum quaestiunculas de generum discretione circa partes
orationis sub silentio transeant. Docetur enim quibusque nomina dis-
cernantur generibus ne si cecus duxerit ambo in foveam cadant ignoran-
tie.
I could not End out whether this commentary, too, is upon the Doc-
trinale.
B. Ff. 23P-691',written by a hand dating from the second quarter of the

twelfth century:
Ff.231'-291'; Introductioncsdialectice, called in the colophon (29?)

—
those of & certain master Wilgelmus: Hec predicta (et) consequenda sunt
introductionessecundumWilgchnum.The half of 1 291"is left blank
.
Ff. 29V-32V: second part OFthe excerpts from this master's Intro—
—-
ductiones.
I think this master William is to- be identiüed as William of Champeaux
(cl. 1121).Forsomearguments,seeI)elow, our Chapter 111,pp. 145-146.
Ff. 331'-35"-r
: a number of gramnmtical and logical questions on oratio,
——
vox, on the task of logic. Expl. Quam sententiam vocamus dyaleticam.
After the lastword the sign .; is Found. As & matter of fact, the following
part of our manuscript is an entirely diFFer-entexcerpt.
Ff. 35'4-421': :: number of practical school-disputations on logical
-—
matters. Half of F. 421"is left blank.
Ff. 42V-451' : some theologica] questions. Inc. Queritur si caro Christi

-—-
fuit animata diversis animabus. Quod sic videtur posse probari. Caro
que Christi est, ante fuit animata anima MARIE et postquam fuit caro
Christi, fuit animata anima Christi. Ergo diversis animabus fuit animata
caro Christi. Ergo eadem caro fuit animata diversis animabus.
Ff. 45f-4-6V: two excerpts from ]erome.

—
Ff. 4—7T-67V:& tract on propositions and expressions diFFlcult From
—
the view-point of logic. They will be edited as our Tract XV.
Ff.681'-691': Theological notes: Herom'mus super Liwangelia and De

-—
sinodo anni 1078
.
C. F.69Vcontains25 hexameterson the earthquakeof 25 january 1348.

This page was written by & Fourteenth century hand. Inc. : Auris percipiat
dictamen quod sibi dicat.
WO L F E N B U E T T E L, HERZOG AUGUST-BIBUOTHEK
Lit.: Otto von Heinemann, and others: Die Handschrytender Herzoglichen

Bibliothek zu Wolfenbüttel, 1[ vols. Wolfenbüttel 1884—19l3; Zweite
Abtheilung: Die AugusteischenHandschriften, part V (1903) nos 3401-
4083. "
25 Cod. 5620 Aug. 80 is a miscellaneous parchment codex of 209 Folios

(611in. )( 3ä in.) written by severalhandsof the twelfth andthirteenth
centuries. The folios 17 and 164 are mutilated. At the top of f. 8? are
the words: Ascelinus presbiter sancti zl'hchaclfs Hildeneshemensfs.(Sankt
Michael at Hildesheim). It contains the following tracts:
Ff. lf-4-V: Benno, bishop of Meissen(Saxony),CibeUusvel Epistolade
—
conscribendisepistolis, et quedam alia.
Ff. 4-V-17V: The same, Expositionesbrevessuper Evangelia dominicalia.

—-
-— Ff. 18T-4-1V
: Cicero, Laelius de amicitia, with interlinear and marginal
glosses.
Ff. 42T-56V: Prudence, Pg/chomachia.
—-
Ff. 57T-621':Theodulus, Ecloga.
—
Ff. 62T-65T: Ovid, De nuce.
--
Ff 66T-79V : Henry Francigena's Gemma(Libellus de conscribendisepisto-
— .
Iis).
Ff. Moduscomparationis(Pater ad lilium).
79V-801':
—-
Ff. SOT-Blï': El tract De fguris sillagismorum, written in & later hand
—-
than the other parts.
Ff. 82f-95V: Anselm of Canterbury, De IncarnationeVerbi.

—
Ff. 95V-l 121':The same,De conceptu
virginali et deoriginali peccato.
—
Ff. ll3f-l4-6f: Plato's Timaeus in Calcidius' translation. See Plato
—
Latinus. Edidit Raymundus KlibanskyVol.IV:T1MAEus & Calcidio transla-
tus commentarioque instructus, in societatem Operis coniuncto P. ].
]ensenedidit ] H. Waszink,Londinii et Leidae 1962.
Ff. l4—7V-l49V
: part of a tract on logic. A different hand from that of
—
the copyist wrote abovethe Firstfolio (f. 147?) De DialecticaseuLogica.
For this tract, see L. M. de Rijk, SameNew Evidenceon Tweffth Ccntury
Logic: Alberic and the Schoolcj- Ste Genevjävc(Montani) in VWARIUM,&
JournalForMediaevalPhilosoPhyand the lntellectual Life in The Middle
Ages 4- (1966), pp. 9-12.
Ff. I4-9V-
I SSV: ananonymous tract on the doctrine ofargumentation,
—
edited under the title Tractatusde dissimilitudineargumentorumin Log.
Med. I, Appendix C, pp. 459—4—89. For this work, see Log.Mod. I,
pp. 105-109.
Ff. 156'*-162" an incomplete introduction into logic. It is also found
—
in Vienna, l*'.P.L. 2486, Ff. 38v'J-42V3 4—371'3-38") 4—4-2V3-4-3T'J.
See
above, nr. 23, p. 90. For this work, see .L. M. de Rijk, SameNew
Evidcnce, pp. 1-9.
Ff. l64f-209ï': Ovid, Fasti (up to V, 705).

—
CHAPTER ll
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIAEVAL GRAMMAR
1 - Introduction
In the Erst volume of this study I havealready pointed to the remark-

able influence of the doctrine of fnllacy and that of grammar tlpon the
terminology as well as the theories of logic as found in the thirteenth
century tracts on the proprietates.ternn'm:urrum.l
In that book2 I have tried to show that the Former of these two influen-
ces seems to be the mo re obvious one : the tx-velfth and thirteenth century
authors not only illustrated the diFferent types of supposition by means
of Fallacies,but they also seem to have derived them from the deter-
minations of those fallacies.3 This took place to such & large extent4 that
we may consider the doctrine of fallacy as one of the roots of terminist
logic. lt wastheir masteringof Aristotle's SophisticiElenchi,indeed, that
inspired the twelfth c«eznllu')lr
logicians to work out & quite original
approach to the current problems of logic. Even the sense of authority
not to mention their rather exaggerated and somewhat mysterious
-—-
submissiveness could not prevent
to the sources (textusauthentici)5——
some of their Efteenth camur)r colleagues to have slight doubts as to the
correctnessof the Stagirite's proud suggestion(as the Mediaevalstudent
of logic used to understand it from the Hnal passageof the Sophistici
EIenchi, 184-b 3-8), that he had worked out the art of logic in a suFFlcient,
! LOGICA MODERNORUM, A Cantributionto the Histmy qf Earbr Terminis: Logic.

. Vol. [: On TheTuvcy'th
CcntmyTheoricsquaHagr (Assen 1962), pp. 20-23.
2 This volume will be referred to as Lag. Med. ].
3 Mrs Martha Kneale (Archivjïir Ge.:chichtc der PhilosoPhic,46 (1964) p. 126) rightly
points to the fact that someof the examplesappearingin the fallacyliteraturaalsooccur
in the treannent of suppositiones,e.g.. 'piper venditur hic et.Rome' (FaHaciaeParvipontanac,
of William of Shyreswoodasan illustration of suppositio
59913)occurs in the Introductioncs
vaga (7733). Compare also Fa". Parviponr...56119with Introd. 7719.
4 as will be pointed out below, Ch. XV.
5 For the outstanding röle of the concepts of auctoritasand authenticusin Mediaeval
thinking, see M.-D. Chenu, Toward Undcrstanding Saint Thomas. Translated with
Authorized Correctionä aml BibliographicalAdditions by A.-M. Landry O.P. and
D. Hughes O.P. Chicago 1964, pp. 129Ff.
if not a comprehensive, way. We have an interesting testinmn)r in an

anonymous Fifteenth century writer. After having enumerated the several
tracts on the properties of terms (the so-called parva Iagicalia), he
says:
Si isti tractatussuperiusenumeratipertinerent adlogicam,sequereturquod Arestoteles(!)
incomplete et insufficienternobis tradidisset logicam et quod absquemeritis in Fine
Secundi Elenchorum peteret sibi grates haberi de logice traditione' completa.
Sequclaprobaturquodipseillorum zractanrumnoriciamnobisnon tradidit etc.'.
......
We see, then, that, as & real Mediaeval scholastic, our anonymous

author was deeply cmwinced that he and his fellows were but the per-
petuators of a long—standingtradition which was virtually complete and
perfect in itself. All of them, indeed, made it their duty to keep alive
and to hand on this tradition to posterity. The mnl)r thing that they could
do themselves, in their opinion, was to develop and to explicate that
which Antiquity had invented in an implicit Form.
Therefore it is all the more remarkable to Find this Hfteenth (:.entur)r
author answering to the objection raised in this way: it must be said
that Aristotle sufficiently completed logic so far as the being of logic is
concerned(quantumad esse logice);neverthelesssomeother tracts can be
added, x-vhichmay serve for the 1.-'n.rtf:ll--being
of logic (ad bene£?.-iss).z
But
he had to admit that Aristotlc did not intrent this logic (viz. the logic of
the proprietatesterminorum)in itself and in the proper form of the usual
tracts.3 We must conclude that after all our. author was Fully aware of
the entirely" new departures in terminist logic.
The grammatica] root cannot be denied4 either, although it is evident

that the Mediaeval logicians were less ax-vareof the influence of grammar
upon the new development of logic than of that of Aristotle's Sophisticj
Elenchi.In the first volume of this study (Log.Mod.], pp. 20-22) [ have
already pointed to the occurrence of noticeable terms borrowed from
! One need not wonder, of course, that our author hasthe usual resort at hand of making
some subtle distinctions in order to savethe Philosopher's
credit. For the whole text,
see Log. zlfod. [, p. 15.
2 For the text, see Log. Mod. I, p. 15.
3 Seeibid. What follows ("tamen invenit istos tractatus in suis principiis") is nothing
but & rather unfortunate pis chr.
4 It is recognizedby JosephP. Mullally, TheSummulacLagjcalcsquetcr qupain, Notre
Dnme. Indiam 21960(Publicationsin Med. StudiesVIII), p. XXXVIIIH.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIAEX'AL GRAMMAR 97
Mediaeval grammar. The aim of this stud)r ï'h'ill be to make clear the
grammatical frame-work around which the logic of the properties of
terms was built up during the second half of the tx-velfth century. To
sketch this Frame-x—vork,
I start with & broad survey of the development
of Mediaeval gramn'narup to the thirteenth century.
Remarks on the Development

2 - Some Pra—zlilninar)Ir of
Grammar in the Middle Ages
As early as some hundred years ago Charles Thurot pointed to the

turn Mediaeval grammar took when grammar re-established' an eFfective
contact with its sister art: dialectic.z
Since the AlexandrianSJ, Ancient grammar had detached itself from
philosophy. From the fourth (tentur)r om-vards Latin grammar had lost
all originality. Neither Donatus (c. A.D. 400) nor Priscian (c. A.D. 500),
who became the famous masters of grammar FogltheEarly Middle Ages,
rose above the level of mere con'lpilers oF their Greek and Latin predeces-
1 The correctness of speaking of a re-establishment of the contact between logic and

gramnmr is well evidencedby the history of Ancient grammar. A Finesurvey of it has
been given by R. H. Robins, findent and :I'IediaevalGrammatica]Thcogr in Europe,with
particular rcjärenceto modernlinguistic daftrine, London 1951, pp. 6-68. The interference
of logic and grammarclearly appearsin Aristotle and it lastedfrom then on up to the
Alexandrianperiod. Seeibid., p. 37Ff.
2 Naticeset curam dc dircrs manuscritslatin: pour smir & l'histoire desdoctrinasgrammaticales
au moyenfige in: Notices et extl'aits des manuscrits de la Bibliothäque Impe'riale et autres
bibliothäques, publiäs par I'lnstitut lmpe'rial cle France. Tome XXII, 2, Paris 1368
[pp. 1-592], pp. 59, 176 et passim.ln fact, Thurot puts the turning-point about 1100,
which date is deEnitelytoo late, [ think (seebelow, p. 99Ff.). His divisionof Mediaeval
grammar into only two main periods (9th-llth cent. and 12th-15th cent.; ap. cin,
p. 59) seemsto be untenableas well: not only wasEfteenthcentury grammarstrongly
influenced in part by Humanistic ideals, such as that of the restauration of the Classic
elegantia linguae latinae (see Thurot, ap. fit., pp. 121 and 491-499, and L. Kukenheim,
Contributians&1'histaire dela grammaircgrecque,latine et häbraique& l'e'paquede la Renaixsance,
1951 pp. 77-78),but theperiodfrom the daysof Peter Abailardup to the Renaissance
also
, be far complicated than Thurot's division
turns out to more seems to suggest. ln
fact, Thurot's second period does decidedly not show & similar doctrinal uniformity as
is found in the daysof early Mediaevalgrammar. — However, all this need not diminish
our admiration ForThurot's pioneering achievement.
3 Aristarchus(c. 216-c. 144 B.C.) andhis pupil DionysiusThrax (c. 160B.C.). For the
latter, seeRobins,ap. cfr., pp. 36-42.
sors', and they did not aim at originality or doctrinal improvements

üither.3
Indeed, in the days 01'Priscian as well as in early Mediaeval gfmnnmr
we Find grammar and (lialectic treated as quite unrelated to each other. 1
give & Few illustrations.
(l) Thumt alreadyremarkeclfithat Prisciannot only Failsto contrast the
grammatical deFmitions of noun (Inst. gramm. 11,22, p. 562911".
ed. Hertz)
and verb (ibid., VIII, 1, p. 3692 11.)with those of logic (Aristotle, De
1nterpr., 16a 19-21; 16 b6-7), but also that he hasonly"& vagueidea of
their propositional functions and mutua] relations either. Alchvine's
procedure is even more obvious in this respect. He puts in his De arce
grammatica (ed. Migne, P.L. 101, 859 Bl-C4 and 874- A3-B10) the
cleFmitions of noun and verb as given by the philosophi beside those
secundumgrammaticos,without making a single attempt at harmonizing
them.
(2) The author of a tenth century anonymoustract on grammar, Found
in Paris, B.N. Lat. 7570, 11.2f-67V, makes the. Following statements
about the gencradlf'ï'nitianumof the noun, in spite of what he had learnt,
no doubt, from Isodore (Etymol. 11, 29, 1-16) or Alchvine (Dialectica,
14, 967 AS-968 A6 ed. Migne).
Genera diFHnitionum in nomine sex4sunt: prima substantialis secunda soni

...... ,
tercia numeri quartaspecialis sextaethimologiac
...... , . . . . . ,
principales, idest substantiae
. . . . . . , . . . . . .
Sed ex his duae sunt et. soni. Et ita differunt
inter se:
ubicunque inveneris sum vel cs vel est vel aliquid membrum ipsius, ibi diffinitio sub-
stantialis est; ubi vero inveneris dictusvel dicta vel dictum,ibi dil'Terentiasoni est.
' as was already pointed out by A. E. Egger, Apollonius Dyscalc. Ersai sur I'histoirc des
thäarics grammaticales dans !'zlntiquitä. Paris 1854. Cf. also A. Thierfelder, Beiträge zur
Kritik und Erklärung des Apollonius Dyskolos,Leipzig, 1935. For Donatus and Priscian, see
H. Roos S.J., Die ;'lfodi signifi'candi des;I'Iartfnus de Dacia, Farichungcnzur Geichichtedes
Sprachlogikim Mindalter (Beiträge zur Gesch. d. Phil. und Theol. des MA. Bnd XXXVII,
2, Münster 1952), pp. 88-90.
: However, Priscian'sfameduring the EarlyMiddle Ageswasnone thc smallerfor that.
Alclwine of 'fork calls him Priscianus latinae eloquentiae decus (Dc anc grammatica,
873C9-10 cd. Mignc). A ninth £f.-myt)r gloss on Eutych (Paris, B.N.Lat. 7499, 1. 73?)
has: Priscianus erat eruditissimus utriusque lingue, et quicquid defuit dc latina lingua
ille auxit, et quicquid superlluit reiecit, et quicquid vitiatum fuit emendavit (quoted
by Thut'ot, ap. cin, p. 63, n. 6). For the use of Donat and Priscian in the Middle Ages,
see also ]05. De Ghellinck, L'Essordela htte'rarurelatine au Xll:: siäclc, 21955, 11,p. 268 Ff.
3 ap. cfr., pp. 176-177.
4 the Efth one was omitted by our scriba.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIAEVAL GRAMMAR 99
Instead of the x-vell-known requirements For & dialectical cleEnition

(genusand dwärenziaspecijïca)our author mentiens,a few linesFurtheron,
a number of diH'erent constitutive parts as required For any cleHnition:
Tria requiruntur in unaquaque dimeitionc: communio, dichrcntia, proprietas; com-

munio, ut nomen est pars orationis, diHCI'entia: cum casu, proprietas: corpus aut rem proprie
communitcrresigxnl'fï'f:4:ms.l
All this is the more remarkable as the Earl)r Mediaeval grammarians

turn out to be well informed about those logica! treatises which were
current in their days (logicaverus)2.In another tenth century manuscript
(Paris, B.N.Lat. 756l)3 two referencesto Boethius,In Top.Cic.are founcl.4
The phrase secundumAristotilcm occurring in the former passageis un-
doubtedly not correct as & reference, but its very incorrectness seems
to imply that the author is conscious of dealing with logical matter.
During the eleventhS century, on the other hand, & noticeable change
appears to have occurrecl in gramnmtical teaching. ln that age of predo-
minating dialectic, that ars began to inHltrate the domain of grammar as
well as that of theology. From about the middle of the century the
grammarians took great pains to borrow from dialectic quite a number
of doctrina] (lata as well as methodological view-points in order to
' quoted by Thurot, ap. cfr., pp., pp. 69-70.

: For the course of the logica resus, see Log. Jl'lod. ï, pp. l4--l 5; the several stagcs of its
development in the Early Middle Ages are describet] by A. Van de Vyver, Lesirapu du
dä'velappement du haut mqyen536,in Revue belge de philo]. et d'hist. S(1929),
philosephique
pp. 4-25-4-52.
3 SeeThurot, pp. 12 and 74-75.
4 f. l*': quicquid enim apparet in rebus corporalibus necesseest ut intus in animo
habeat suam propriam conformationem; que conformatio secundum aristotilem (!)
substantiacorporalium rerum esseintelligitur. Cfr. Boethius,In Cic.Top.lll, ed. Migne,
P.,L.64, coll. 1092-1094.f. IOI': Plato ideas(ideo Ms)appellat, idest speciesincorporales
proprias individuas, quarum participatione discernuntur animalia, que etiam apparent
[animalia] in formis corporalibus. Cf. Boethius, ibid.
5 R. Hunt in his studies on Priscian hasclearly shown that 'the view that the inEltl—ation
of dialectic into grammar dates from the middle of the twelfth century under the
influence of Petrus Helias is due to ignorance of the work of his predecessors' (ap. cit.
[below, p. 100, n. 4] [, pp. 215-216. What has been said about this by Father Roos
(op. cin, p. 92 Ff,; see, however, p. 95, n. 7) and by R. H. Robins (op. cit... pp. 70;
76-77) must be corrected after Hunt's discoveries.— ln fact, & Erst l'cmarkable
Hourishing period of di'alectic is to be clated, in my opinion, as early ns about 1050 in the
schmls of Northern Italy.
IOO LOGICA MODERNORUM n
provide their own art with the scientific basisrequired by the intellectual
fashion of those days.
Such borrowings were not & complete novelty, as a matter of Fact. The
close theoretical interrelation OFthe artes of the trivium was bound to
invite their Early Mediaeval students to relate these artesone to another.
Thus, & Few modest attempts are made by & ninth centuryr author to
reduce all kinds OFnoun to the Aristotelian categories. His treatise is
entitled: Distributia omnium specierumnominis inter cathegoriasAristotelis. It
was edited by Paul Piperl, who wrongly ascribed it to Notker Labeo
(c. 950-1022).[ havefound another copy of this x-vork,dating from the
ninth century, so that undoubtedlyr we have to date it earlierF The late
Professor Van de Vyver -— one of the most brilliant Mediaevalists of the
Low Countries, whose contributions to Early Mediaeval thought, un-
fortunately, did not receive the attention they deserved speaksof
—
this x-vorkas "a Erst, if rather modest, attempt at Sprachlogikor gramma-
tica Speculativa".3
The inültration of dialectic — its doctrines, its method, and, to some
extent, its terminology —- operating from the middle of the eleventh
century on & wider Front, caused the Erst tum in the development of
Mediaeval grammar. It is well evidencecl by the clocuments extant that
the eleventh century saw a real l'evival of grammatica] teaching. These
important documents have been brought to light and investigated by
Richard Hunt in his excellent studies on Priscian in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries.4
To give some illustration of this new approach I conFmemyself to the
doctrine of the verbumsubstantivumS,which, as a matter of fact, is to be
considered as an interesting test-case for the new develoPment of
grammar.
' Die SchriftendesNatkersund seinerSchule1, Freiburg 1882, pp. LXXV-LXXXIX, snpplied
in Zeitschrifijïir deutschePhilologie 22, Hane 1890, pp. 278-286.
: See L. M. de Rijk, On the Curriculum qfthe Aris cjthc Triviam at. St.. GaHfr-Jm c. 850 -
f:. 1000, in: VIVARIUM 1 (1963), [pp. 35-86), p. 83.
3 A. Van cle Vyver, Vrocg-Middelecumchewijsgeerige rerhandchngcn, in: Tijdschrift voer
Philosophie4 (1942), [pp. 156-199], p. 189. — As a matter of Fact1haveto agreethat I
did not know this extremely rich essayuntil [ found it quoted in M. Grabmann, Themas
vor.-Elfurt und die Sprachlogikdes mittelaherlichcn Arisrotclijmus,in Sitz. Ber. der Bayer.
Akad.der Wiss., München1943,2, p. 70.
4 R. W. Hunt, Studia; Priscian in the elel'cnthand uvcyïh centurias, in: .
Mediaeval and
on
RenaissanceStudies, London 1 (1943), pp. 194-231, and [I (1950), pp. 1-56. They will
be referred to as Hunt'! and Hunt H.
5 For the analysisof the eleventhcentury documentsI am muchindebtedto Mr Hunt's
FII'Ststudy (Hunr.!, pl). 2205)
THE DEvELOPMENT 01: MEDmEvAL GRAMMAR 101
3 - The Doctrine of the Verb Substantive From the Late Eleventh Century
to about 1140
Priscian seems to have introclucedl the term verbumsubstantivumas &

rendering of ünmpmmövþülia, i.e. the verb to be as used to deuote
existence; e.g. *Socratesest' : 'Socratesexistit'. Un1brtunately Priscian's
translation of ün«pxnzäv was basedupon a confusion of the concept of
existenceand that 01"substancez,so that eleventh centur)r grammatical
speculation could not help getting entangled in some troublesome
complications.
Starting from the grammatical defmition of the veer, they asked what
action or passionis signiüed by the verb substantive. The great number of
competitive Opinions we Find in the documents extant shows how deeply
the grammarians and logicians were interested in the question.
The twelfth century manuscript Cham-es209, unfortunately lost now,
contained & page (f. 86V) mentioning Flvedichrent opinionesdc isum' verbo
substantiva.4This tract deals with the viex-vsof late eleventh century
masterss, some of which are so naive that Hunt seems to be right in
supposing (1, p. 221) that it evidences only what have been the First
beginnings of speculation on the matter.
A Further stage in that speculation is evidenced by the anonymous
Glosule super Priscianum maiorem. This work has came down to us in three
copies: Chartres209 (Ff. 1f-36v), Cologne(Ff. IT-74T), and Paris, B.N.
Nouv.'acq.lar. 1623 (11.lf-56r), formerly from Fleuryä Hunt hasworked
on the Chartres manuscript, which appears to have been more reliable
than the Fleury copy, since in the latter several clrastic abbreviations
are found. Hunt did not havean opportunit)r to use the Cologne manu-
script. Actually this copy seems to be of some importance, not only
1 Inst. gramm., VIII, 51, p. 414'4'15 Hcrtz: ...... 'sum' verbo, quod ü:rapx'rmöv
Graeci vocant, quod nos possumussubstantivum nominare. SeealsoThurot, ap. ciæ,,
p. 178, n. 1.
: Cf. Thurot, op. cfr., p. 178.
3 verbum est pars orationis cum temporibus et modis, sine casu, agendi vel patiendi
signifncativum (Priscian, Inst. gramm. VIII, 1, p. 3692'3 Hertz).
4 printed in Hunt[, pp. 224-225.The manuscriptwasdestroyedby Fn'eduringthe secand
World War (March 26, 1944).
5 For them (Lanfranc, Garmundus and others), see Hunt !, pp. 206-208.
6 See Hunt I, p. 195. The twelfth century manuscript Chartres 209 is actually lost (see
above note 4). The Fleury copy, dating also from the twelfth century, was formerly
part of OrleansMs 259. SeeHunt l,IIibid.
because it is the oldest Cop)rextant of the wcn'kI but also since.it gives
,
the Glesulein their (more) original Form.2
To have & clear notion of the logica! itwolvements of the view taken of
the verb substantive in the Glosule,it will be helpful, [ think, to place it
in its full context. Our authorapparentlyagreeswith the opinion of most
of the scholars (plerique)'0f his days that the substantivalforce of the
verb substantive, viz. to signify things as existing, is well studied by the
auctores, while its second meaning, viz. to deuote an action or passion, is
rather neglected by them. It is this very meaning, which the verb sub-
stantive has as a verb, that, in the opinion of our author and his Fellows,
deserves the greater part of our attention. They submit that the verb
denoting some action or passionis equivocal :
'est' 215
Diligenter tamen pleriquc singulorum inventionem ct proprietatem vocabulorum

attendentes, cum ab actoribus 'est' substantivum verbum vocari videant, nequaquam
huius vocabuli quod est 'substantivum', inventionem ociosam esse arbitrantur. Con-
stitucntcs igitur duplicem ipsius 'est' naturam, aliam ei ex hoc quod dicitur verbum
proprietatem, aliam ex hoc quod substantivum attributam essc (defendunt).3 Ex hoc
enim quod dicitur verbumactionem vel passionemin- (f. 3lva) -hcremcm ipsum quidem
signiücarc quis dubitet?" Ex hoc autem quod est substantivum omnes res. in essentia
quidcm, scilicet in hoc quod existunt, significaredicitur, secundumquamsignilïcationcm
maxime agitur ab auctoribus dc 'est',5 secundum aliam raro. Concedunt igitur 'est'
significareactionem non unam, sed omnescasquac a verbis onmibus actionem de-
signantibus notantur, ut lectionem, cursum, et similia, in quantum insunt subiectis. Ex
quo patet 'est' non unum posscdici verbum convenienter, sed multa (ColegneMs 201ll
PF.
slrb-snvu).
In the Cologne Ms. the exposition on the verb substantive encls here
and the glossatorpassesover to Priscian VIII, 38 (p. 409 Hertz). The
Chartres copy, however, devotes some more lines to the previous view,
in which the equivocal verb 'est' is put beside the equivocal noun 'ens' :
Substantivaautem verba secundum hoc quod sunt verba considerata actiones vel passiones
inessenotant. Si quis ergo querat quamactionem vcl passionem'sum'signiücat,respondc-
tur non unam actionem ut univoca vcrba, sed actiones omnes ab aliis verbis designatae.
'sum' significare ut actiones. Unde non unum verbum sed multa per se consideratum
iudicandumest, quemadmodumnec 'ens' unum nomensedmulta iudicatur. (Chartrcs
209, P. 37"); ed. Hunt, ], p. 22612'17).
! Secabove,p. 21.
2 Sec below, pp.. 102—104.
3 lacuna ( rasura ?) in the CalegneMS. Chartres read dejendunt.
4 Chartres209 read: ipsumestdesignarequisdubitet (Hunt !, p. 22615).
5 deestCologne.
THE DEVELOPMENT 01: MEDIAEVAL Gsmmmsn 103
What Follows, then, in the Chartres copy is apparently an interpolation,

in which the Opinionsof some other nmsters (oh'i)ll are mentioned.E
The adherents to this view have in common with their Forerunners
that they make a distinction between 'is' as used with verba] Farce and
'is' as used with substantiva] force. As a verb 'is' denotes an action or
passion, as something substantival it signifies things as existing. But their
special point seems to be that they consider as the specific Force of 'est'
115& verb that it links together the subject- and predicate- terms of a
proposition. The)r try to harmonize this function of the verb substantive
with its substantival Farce (viz. to deuote existence). When we say:
'homoestanimal', the verb 'est' does not signify by itself, i.e. apart frmn
its function in the preposition, that that which is homo is that which is
animo]. It has this signiEcation, i.e. this Function of identifying homoand
animal, From its substantiva], not Fr0111
its verba] force:
Alii tamcn videntur omnes res que ab' est' copulantur vocare actiones "est.Sciendum
autem quod, cum 'est'duplicem habeat1ri111,11nz1n1 cx l'IOCquod est ve1bum aliam ex hoc
quod est substantivum, secundum vim ve1b1habet copula1c.$ed quid? Actionem vel
passionem quas signiEcat, quod habet aliis verbis? Cum enim dico
commune cum
'Socratesest' si cun51dc1emus 'est' in vi vel tu, actiones quas significat, idest lectionem
,
et alias, sub disiunctione copulat cum Socrate; si autem in vi substantivi,Socratem
existentibus annumerare, idest quod Socratesest unum de existentibus dicere, intendo.
Cum igitur ex hoc quod est verbum copulare ei actionem concedanms, ex hoc quod est
substantivum nullum quidem ad verbi significationmn respectmn habemus, nec tamen
verbi proprietatem cum 00pulet. Nam illud positum in propo-
omnino ab eo separamus,
sitione diversas essentiasconvenienter ad se invicem iungere aFErmamus.Nam ex hoc
quod onmesres in essentiasignificat, aptum est ad hoc ut quaslibetrcs sibi coherentes
copulare possit, verbi gratia cum dico 'Socratesest animal', excluso respectuverbalia
signiEcationis, non prorsus tamcn verbi proprietate separata, copulat enim ipsum 'est',
quantum ad oFEcium quod exercet in oratione in vi substantivi consideramus. Unde
aperte rcm animalis cum re hominis capulat. Non tamen negamusidem 'est' considera-
tum in ipsaorationc vim verbi obtinere; sedaliud est agere de vocibus per se consideratis,
aliud de eisdemad vim et ofEciumquod habentin orationeposite relatis. Nam quantum
. ad vim huius orationis 'Homo animal', 'est'
est non per se tantunn sed cum aliis hoc solum
significat, quod illa res que est homo sit illa rcs que est animal. Hoc autem ex vi 'verbi
habere non potest, immo ex vi substantivi. (Chortres 209, f. 37"); Hunt [, pp. 2263-
227").
' Among them master Garmundus of Tournai seems to have.been. Sec Ms Chortres209,
F. 86? (printed in Hunt!, p. 22432'25)and Hunt I, p. 226, nete ad lines28 Ff. For this meister,
see Hunt !, p. 208 and the Introductiontö my edition of Abailard's Dialectice, p. XXI.
: Note that the author'of the Glosulehad apparentlyagreedwith the previousopinion
held by most of his contemporaries(plerique);seethe text quoteclabove,p. 102.
104- LOGICA MODERNORUM 11
A diFFicultyarises(aliquisvidctursubesse
scrupulus)in the caseof proposi-
tions denoting a contingent copulation, e.g. 'Socrates est albus'. The
author tries to solve the problem by distinguishingthe vis predicationis
From the vis substantiviverbi:
Plsnumveroest id quoddiximusde 'est'positoin orationibusin quibusalterumde altero

cnunciatur in essentia, ut in 'homo est animal' et similibus. Sed ubi accidens de suo
fundamento, ut 'Socratesest albus', vel e converso, seu equivocum de sui significatione,
vel e converso, predicantur, aliquis videtur subessescrupulus. Si enim quando dico
'Socratesest albus' ad albedinem quc ibi predicatur respiciam, nullo modo 'est'.. in vi
substantiviacceptumnec etiam in vi verbi, illam rem que aliene natura est a Socrate
capularc potest cum Socrate.Nam non potest dici 'Hecresestilla res' Sednota
.......
alium sensumessehuius prapositionis 'Socratesestalbus' ex vi predicationis, alium ex vi
substantivi verbi. Ex vi enim predicationis hoc solum intendit hec prapositio quod
albedo inhercat Socrati, ex si vero substantivi hoc dicit quod illa res que est Socrates
est album corpus, quia hoc dicit hoc propositio in sensu quantum ad vim substantivi
'Socratesest alba res'. (Chartres209, f. 3793; Hunt !, p. 227'4'39).
We see that, for our interpolator, the crucial problem lies in the
predication of contingentia:they cannot be linked up with any substance:
si enim, quando dico 'Socratesest albus', ac]albedinem clue ibi predicatur
respiciam, nullo modo 'est', in vi substantivi acceptum nec etiam in vi
verbi, illam rem (viz. whiteness,being an accident), que aliene nature
est a Socrate(viz. being a substance),capillare potest cum Socrate. Nam
non potest dici: hec res (viz. Socrates) est illa res (viz. whiteness); see
our previous quotation.
This interpretation of predication is undcmbtecll)lr connected with the.
puzzling problems about the significationisof verbs (e.g. albet) and
derivative nouns (sumpta;e.g. album)l. The interpolator's view betrays
a platonizing way of thinking.2 In his opinion propositions such as
'Socratesestalbus', by the force of predication (ex vi predicationis),only
intend to state that whitenessis in Socrates(albedoinhereatSocrati; see
our previous quotation); considered, however, in respect of the sub-
stantival force of 'est' (ex vi verosubstantivi)it signifies that that which is
Socratesis that which is albumor alba res.
' Sec Hunt !, pp. 218-220. From Abailard's words (DialecticaV, p. 5961". Dc. Rijk) it
becomcsclear that in his days much attention was still being paid to these problems.
2 Cf. Abailard, Dial. V, p. 5961'3Dc Rijk: At vero in his definitionibus quac sumptorum
sunt vocabulorum, magna, memini, quaestio solet esse ab his qui in rebus universalia
primo loco ponunt.
THE DEVELOPMENT 01: MEDMEVAL GRAMMAR 105
Thus it becomes clear that the late eleventh centur)lrl grammarians

introducet] non-grammatical consideratione. in order to clarify the pro-
positioml function of the verb substantive. In the texts quoted above from
the GlosulcsuperPriscianummaioremx-vritten by some late eleventh century
anonymous author, the development of the involved
viex-vs is clarifled.
Our author himself appears to adhere to the view of the equivocality of
the verb substantive. The later reduction of the Glosulcfound in Chartres
209 adds the view of another group of grammariaus who laid a Special
stress on the capulative function of the verb substantive. They made
use of the notion of 'inhcrence'(see the Enal sentenceof our last quota-
tion). As a matter of Factthis notion was far From new. lt is found in
eleventh century logic as what seems to be quite a usual termï, and it is
not lacking in the original form of our Glosule either.3 No doubt the
EarlyrMediaeval logicians had borrowed it from Boethius, In Periherm.I,
and11,14826.
136'0
In the days of Peter Abailard the contrewerS)rabout the meaning of the

copula in an aFFlrmativeproposition was still eagerly discussed. We End in
Abailard two theories. In his Logjca Ingredicmibushe turns out to be an
adherentto the inherencetheory. According to this thec-ryrthe copulaof
an aFFIrmativeproposition states the inherence of & IEuniversalnature',
signiFled by the predicate-term of that proposition, in the individuum
denoted by the subject-term; the cepula is taken as signuminherentieof
such a universal nature (e.g. albedo)in the individual (e.g. Socrates).
Abailard clearly has some diFFlculty in trying to reconcile the substanti-
val function which the verb 'est, has as a result of its substantival force,
with the implications of the inherence theory.4
However, in his Dialectica the author transferret! the pith ofthe matter
to the identity theory. This thær)r holds the copula OFan aFFlrmative
proposition to state that the subject-term and the predicate-term of'that
proposition refer to the same thing; it is supposed to serve as & sign of
' For the dates of the masters mentioned in the Chartres fragment cntitlcd opiniones
diversorum dc 'ium' vcrbasubstantivo(see Hunr.!, pp. 224-225) and rcferred to in our
Glosule(see ibid., p. 226), scr: Hunt !, pp. 206-208.
: Sec Garlandus Compotista, Dialectica[II, p. SINE; 3214, and W, 91:25. cd. De Rijk.
3 E.g. see the author's cxpositions on Priscian, II 18 (Colognc Ms, P. 13"! :Chnrtrcs
MSf. llï'b : Hun: !, pp. 2l8, n. ! and 219, n. l).
* For the texts, see the !ntroductionto m)- Abailard edition, p. XXXVIII.
iclentity of what both terms stand for. Thus Abailard says that in each
proposition there is primarily a copulatio essentiae, while the ottributio
adiacentiaeis only aweak connotation (quodammodo innuitur).' In the
chapter on the meaning of the proposition (Dial. Il, pp. 157'3-160'6:
utrum sint aliquae res ea quae a prapositionibus dicuntur) the author even more
stroneg rejects the inherencetheory".He concludesthe relevantpassage
as fbllows:
Dc Rijk: Non itaque per verbum interpositum inhaerentiacopulatur,

Dial. ll, 15931'37
cum etiam illa sit praprietas, sed sola hominis substantiaattribuitur, cum dicitur:
'Socratesest homo' illisque duobus casibus 'Socrates'et 'homo' verbum intramsitiwozcon-
iungitur, cum eorum ad se substantiascopulat interpositum. Nec aliud quidem intelli-
gendum 'hominem Socrati inhaerere' quam 'Se-cratemhominemesse', nec aliam per 'esse'
designari substantiamquam Socratem.
William of Conches' and Petrus Helias' (c. [ l4-2)3criticism of their

predecessors4 appears to be strongly influenced by Abailard. I conFme
myself to the question of the copulativa function of the verb 'est' in &
proposition. As & matter of [het, both William an'd Peter mention the
adherents of the inherence theory. William of Conches, In Prisc. maiorem
(editio prior, Florence (SanMarco3l0, f. 2743) gives it as the third of
the Opinions mentioned there. [ quote the whole passagein order to
show Peter's indebtedness for the whole passage (see Hunt [, pp. 2293-
2303, quotecl below, p. 107) to William:
Iterum opponetur de verbo substantivo 'est', 'esistit' Et huiusmodi.

Dicunt tamen quidam quod hec verbo in prima inventione signilïcaverunt actionem
quamdam talem: sum, idest inter res locumobtineo, sed deinde translatum est ad sub-
stantiam signiFlcandam;ergo naturaliter, idest ex prima inventione, significat actionem,
sed ex translatione substantiam. Unde dicit Priscianus: omne verbum naturaliter est in
actione vel in passione.
Alii dicunt quod 'sum' significat omnia; ergo et actionem.
Tertii dicunt quod 'sum' significat actionem et passionem, sed non per se, immo ex
adiuncto participio (participii MS), ut 'sum Iegens'hic significat actionem, 'sum Iectus' hic
signiEcat passionem.
Alii dicunt quod 'sum' signiEcat actionem, idest inherentiam predicati et subiecti,
ubi est tertium adiacens, ut 'Socratesesthomo'. Si iterum opponam de vocativis verbis, ut
! Dial. ], I3133-1327. See the lntroduction to the edition, p. XXXIX.

2 For the meaning of copulatiointransitiva, see the Introductfonto my Abailard edition,
p. XXXIXF. and the Index, s.v.
3 For hisflorut't, see Hunt !, p. 205.
**Summosopor Priscianum(ad H 18), printed in Hunt I, pp. 229-231 from MS Paris,
Arseno!7I I, [T. 18'7-191'.
'vocar', 'naminur', dicimus quod signiFlcant passionem duobus modis: absolute, ut

'nominur Sucrutes',transitiue, ut 'naminar ab ista'.
Dicamus igitur: omne verbum signiücat actionem vel passionem, aut aliquid eorum
que possunt responderi ad 'quid agi: vel patitur? ex prima inventione; et ( ...... )
aliquid significant, ex adiuncto hoc habent, ut 'est' substantia!" signiücat.
Peter has (Summain Priscianum;Paris Arsenul71 [, Ff. ]3vh-19ra : Hunt

[, pp. 22923-230'3):
Dicunt itaque quidam quod 'sum' ex sua inuentione prima significat quandam
absolutam actionem que est huiusmodi; 'sum-',idest 'inter respermunco'.Significat itaque
secundum istos actionem talem, idest inter res permanentiam; sed inde translatum est
ad substantiamsignificandam.Itaquc naturaliter, idest ex suaprima inuentione, signilïcat
actionem, sed ex translatione substantiam.
Alii dicunt quod 'sum' signiFlcatequiuoceomnemactionemvcl passionem,ut cum
dicitur ab aliquo 'sum', Fortassedicit se comedere uel bibere uel aliquid huiusmodi
facere quod uerbo (l91') potest signiücari. Et dicunt hii quod cum aliquis dicit: 'Deus
est.',fortasse mentitur, quia potest dicere 'Deusestasinus'uel aliquod aliud falsum huius-
modi. Inde quando eis proponitur 'homoes.'.'uel aliquod huiusmodi, statim querunt
'quid est?' istud Aristotilis postponentes, quod 'an' quandoque simpliciter predicatur,
quandoqueesttertium adiacens.Sedquiaplaneinsaniunt,niïhil contraeosdicendumest.
Sunt etiam alii qui dicunt quod 'sum' signiücat quamlibet actionem vel passionem, non
ex se sed ex adiuncto participio, ut cum dicitur 'sum legens', hic: significat actionem
eandem quam et 'Iego'; cum uero dicitur 'sum lectur', hic signiFlcat passionem eandem
quam 'lcgur', et sic ex diuersis adiunctis diuersas actiones significant uel passiones.
Alii dicunt iterutn quod 'sum' significat actionem talem, scilicet inherentiam predicati
ad subiectum, sed hoc tantum ['it quando est tertium adiacens. Cum vero opponitur eis
de uocatiuis uerbis, cuiusmodi sunt 'uacor' et 'naminar', dicunt quod signiFlcantpassiünem
duobus modis, absolute, ut 'numinorSocrates',et transitiue, ut 'numinurab ixto'.
When starting to give his own view on the matter Peter explains that
he will deal with the problem of the signiücation of the verb as& whole,
of which the question of the verb substantive is 21part:
Quoniam tamen de signiücatione uerbi aliter sentimus quam ceteri, necessarium

duximus nostramsuper hoc ponere sententiam,in qua [partem] questionisillius, scilicet
quareverbumsubstantivum'an' sit[ magiscopulativumquamceteraverba, solutio erit
implicita. (Paris, Arscnul?! l, F. 19:11: Hunt !, p. 23031'25).
He turns aut te adhere to the iclentityr theory:
Primo ergo dicendumest quod cum sint decemprima rerumgenera,scilicet substantia

et qualitas et alia huiusmodi, cetera vero omnia tamen idem actu sunt cum substantia.
Socratesenim et albedo Socratis idem actu sunt. Non dico quod sint idem sed dico quod
idem actu sunt, quoniam quantum ad esse actu non diFferunt. Quid enim est aliud
1 si:] Hunt hasthe manuscript reading: scilicct.

108 LOGICA MODERNORUM [[
Socratis albedinem esse actu quam Socratem esse album? Substantia itaque unitiva est
accidentium. Omnia namqueaccidentia in se recipit et sibi copulat ct unit. Quamvis
vero substantia et omnia que in ea sunt idem sunt actu, ratio tamcn distinguit ea et
disiungit, ut intelligat substantiam per se et accidentia pcr se. Repertum est itaque
nomen ad substantiam signilïcandam, eo scilicet modo quo a ratione perpenditur et ipsa
ab accidentibus ipsis discernitur. Hoc autem est istud nomen *substantia'(Paris, Arsena!
711, f. 1911;Hunl: !, p. 23016'35).
Sedquoniam substantiasic unit sibi accidentis et recipit ut idem actu sint, repertum est
etiam nomen quod signiEcct substantiamconfuse, hoccst non discernendo ab accidenti-
bus, sed ut substantiacum suis accidentibus idem est actu. Hoc autem nomen est 'ens'.
(Paris, Arscnai711, f. 19"); Hunt [, [). 2315'9).
Dicimus itaque quod 'ens' significat illud idem quod et 'substantia',sed aliter, quoniam
'substantia' signiFlcat discernendis, 'ens' vcro clilïfvusc"Isicut dictum est. Unde quamvis
'cns' nichil aliud significat quam 'substantia', tamen quia ei datum est secundum hoc quod
accidentia recipit in se, inde est quod hoc nomen 'cns' transumitur ad accidentia signiE-
care (!)II idest nd nominandumaccidentia, licct solamsubstantiamsigniEcct, veluti cum
dicitur 'albedoestens'. Si enim vere inspicias, sola substantia preprie est, accidens vero
inest. Dicimus ergo quod 'sum, cs' significat substantiam, scilicet ut de altero, scilicet
cum tempore, et in verbali terminatione. Et quoniam substantia est unitiva omnium
aliarum rerum, accidentia namque sibi unit ct copulat —, inde est quod 'sum, es'
—-
copulativum est, eo quod substantiamque sibi cetera unit et copulat significet. (Paris,
Arscnai71 I f. 19:11;Hunt I, p. 23121'23).
,
Thus we see Petrus Helias acting under the influence of the recent
development of twelfth century logic.
A similar procedure is Found in Petrus Helias' treatment of the related
question of the supposed equivocality of the verb substantive.2 After
Abailard'sseverecriticism of this interpretation (Dial. ], l33'5-23)Petrus
Helias does not speak with a single word of any equivocality of the verb
substantive. He energetically rejects his predecessors'view (seeHunt ],
p. 2307'3)and prevents all diFEcultiesagainsttheir view by explaining
the relation of substanceand accidents in a dil'Terent way.,closely related
to the identilr),r theory.
Thus our survey of the development of the doctrine of the verb

substantive againhasyielded a large number of illustrations of the remark-
able interference of grammar and logic from as early as the second half of
the eleventh century.
1 vel confuse eademmanus.
: E.g. Glosuie; see tests printed in Hunt !, pp. 225-228; the view is mentioned by
Petrus Helias in his Summa;seeHunt !, p. 2301'3.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIAE'VAL GRAMMAR 109
4- Tx-vclfth Century' Grammar as an Autonomous Art

-
Hunt (l, pp. 215-216) is certainly right in saying that the common
view that the inFlltration ofdialectic into grmnnmr (lates from the middle
of the twelfth century under the iniiuence of Petrus Helias, is clue to
ignorance of the work of his predecessors. What we have seen in the
previous section provcs that as early as From about the middle of the
eleventh tentur)r the glossators of Priscizm did their best to shape their
specihc ars after the requirements oftlialectic by introducing the dialectic
methods and doctrines. The documenta brought to light by Hunt clearly
shmwrthat the earlier glossators were addressingstudents who had already
made some progress in dialectic.' The inHltration of dialectic into gram-
mar took place to such an extent, it seems, as to involve some real risk
to the proper scepe and purpose of grammar.
The reaction against this predominance of dialectic over grammar was
boundto ensue,ofcourse. lt wasespeciallyPetrusHelias (c. 1150) who,
no doubt, under the iniluence OFWilliam of Conches, made consider-
able elïorts to disentangle both «;.-31:425.z
So Peter was rather successful in
distinguishing the grammatical from the logical uses of terms common
to both nrts (such as substantia,accidens,qualium, and the like). Hmvever,
this does by no means amount to saying that Petrus Helias intended to
do away with all influence of dialectic. The Dnl)r thing he tried to do was
to free grammar from questions that seemed to be quite unrelated to its
own purpose. At the other hand, he was fully aware that grammar as a
real ars could not dispense with the method of dialectic; the latter was
snpposed to furnish the necessary basis for what was considered, in
those days,asthe scientiFlcapproachto the subjectsinvolved. Peter tried
to arrive at this twofold goal by restricting the use of logica] distinctions
in grammatica] teaching to certain areas and undertaking a clear-cut
'systematization of the grammatical theories of his dast. The method
used byrhis predecessors of developing their views in the form OFglasule
to Priscian's text was necessaril)r unsystematic. The fact that Petrus
Helias has been the Fll'St to write a Summain Priscianumis signiücant in
itself.
! Cf. Hun: !, p. 214, who points to the glossators' method in tcaching grammar to the
more advanccd pupils; they are concerned to show what kind of argumentation Priscian
is using and to set out it formally. See the passagequoted from the Glasulcin Hunc[,
p. 214, n. 6.
1 For Petrus Helias' attempt, see Hunt I, pl). 2155.
3 Cf. Hunl H, I). 32.
Another master who, before Peter, had already made determined

eH'orts to build up grmnmatical doctrine out of its own inspiration was
William of Conches(c. 1080-c. 1154).llHe taught grammar in Chartresz
from about 1120 to his death. At the end of his De philosophia mundi
William gives a brief sketch of the aims he thinks & good grammarian
ought to set himself. He reproaches Priscian and the earlier glossators
(antiqui glasawres)of his work for contenting themselves with obscure
deEnitions and not explaining them, and esPecially for passing over the
causesof the invention of the parts of Speechand of their accidents:
Et quoniam in omni doctrina gramatica precedit, de ea dicere proposuimus; quoniam,

etsi Priscianus inde dicat, tamen obscuras dat diFHnitiones ncc exponit; causas vero
inventionisdiversarumpartium et diversorumaccidentium in unaquaquepretermittit.
Antiqui vero glosatores in expositioneaccidentiumerraverunt. Quod ergo ab
......
istis minus dictum est dicere proposuimus, quod obscure, exponere, ut ex nostro opere
causasinventionis predictorum aliquis querat et diFHnitionum Prisciani expositiones—ï
....
The question of the causeinventionis was of an extreme importance

For Mecliaeval grammar? Mediaeval grammarians thought the)Ir could
gras]: the most profouncl knowledge about language and speech by
looking For the causeinventionisof the parts 01'speech. These once found,
one had, in their Opinion, & reliable criterion for investigating ancldeter-
mining the prcper grammatica! function of & x-vord. The Glosule even
express this principle in rather exaggerating terms by saying that the
nature of the invention of a x-vorcl,that is the purpose for which it was
' For this master, see E. ]eauneau, Dcux rädactiansdesglans dc GuiHaumcdc Concha sur
Prüden, in: Rccherchescle thäologie ancienne et mädiävale 27 (1960), pp. 212-247. —
Hunt maybe right in supposing(ap. cfr., 11,p. 21) that PetrusHeliasis to be considered
as the papularizerof William's doctrines. [ should like to add the temptativesuggestion
that, after the full examination of the manuscriptsconcerned, William will be found
reacting againstPetrus Helias' rendering of the master's views in the second redaction
orhis Glasein Priscianum(preservedin Paris, B.N. Lat., 1S.] 30; for this Ms, seeJeauncau,
ap. cfr., pp. 213; 216; 230). To solve the problems a reliable edition of William's
grammatica]work is much needed.
: ]eauneauhas put forward (ap. m., pp. 230-232) some evidencethat might point to
William's carcer at Chartres.
3 De philosophiamundi edited by Migne P.]... 172 (among the works of Honorius of
Autun), coll. 100-102. [ follow the text, quoted by Jeauneau(op. cfr., p. 218) corrected
after Erfurt, Amplon. Oct. 87, f. 4311The grammatica] work William announces here is
his GlasesuperPriscianum.See]eauneau, ap. cit.
4 Seethe clear expositionof this topic in Hunt [, pp. 211-214.For that matter; Thurot
only just toucheson it (op. m., p. 122). -— For a severecriticism of this tcpic from the
view-pointofmoderngrammar,seeRobins,ap.m., p. SIT.
THE DEVELOPh-IENT OF IL-IEDIAEVAL Glmmn-mn 11 1
principally or properly (proprie) invented, is the criterion by which we

ought to juclgea word, not the way it is used in the construction of &
sentence.'
Petrus Helias appears to have well understood the importance of the
causeinventionisfor the establishment of grammatical theories out of the
praper insPiration of gramnmr, such as conceived by Mediaeval scholar-
ship.z Following the more advancecl programme outlined by William of
Conches, his Summagreatly extencls their use in assigning & cause of
invention to each of the accidents of each part of Speecl1.3
We will seelater on (below,p. 115; 191Ff.)how important a röle the
doctrine of the prcper invention of words (prima inventio,or prima im-
positiovocum)asestablishedby the grammarians,hasplayedfor the logical
theories about the signification of terms in the days of Peter Abailard.
For our present purpose — to give «[;-ni),r
a broad SLII-vej,r
of the (lev610p-
ment of grammatical teaching np to the thirteenth century ——[ confine
myself to some preliminary remarks on the development of the tcpic of
the causejnven.!inzmis.4
William of Conches and Petrus Helias had said that the general causeof
the invention 01'words was that men might have a means ofshowing their
will (voluntas)to one another.5The glossTria sunt,dating after the time
of Petrus Heliasf', has it in these terms: "that we might have a means of
expressingour concepts (intellectus)and of showing them to 0thers".7 A
1 See Glosule,ad Priscian VIII 1 and 9, printed in Hunr.!, p. 212, n. 3 and 4. The para-
phrasisis Mr Hunt's. Seealsobelow, p. 114.
2 For a general criticism on the Ancient and Mediaeval conceptionis as such, see Robins,
ap. cir.., pp. 4f.; 16121..;45;61; 67f.;691ï.;771ï.; 92 Ff. See also below, p. 120.
3 See.Hunr.], p. 214. Hunt's assertion that the importante of the doctrine of the cause
inventionisis diminished with Peter becausehe rarel)r uses them as a criterion for cle-
;ermining the proper nature of the words, does not seem to be conclusive. Peter, who,
as Mr Hunt himself remarks (I, p. 220 and 11,p. 32), intended to free himself l'rmn
questionsthat do not belongto grammar,would not haveelaboratedthis theory to such
an extent, if he did not believe in its importante. That he does not explicitly mention
his use of the criterion, or only rarely, seemsto be not relevant.
4 For the Following lines I am much indebted to the second part of Mr Hunt's studies
on eleventh and twelfth century gramnmr (seeabove, p. 100, n. 4).
5 Communis causa inventionis omnium dictionum est ut haberet homo qumnodo
propriam voluntatem alteri manifestaret (quoted in Hunt II, p. 32, n. 3).
& For the nmnuscripts, see Hunt II, p. 2; for its place in the grammatica] teaching after
Petrus Helias,seeibid., pp. 3-10.
? ut per illas intellectui uostros exPrimeremus et aliis manifestaremus. See Hunt II,
p. 32, n. 4.
[12 LOGICA MODERNORUM u
similar formula is Founclin the contemporaneous gloss F'ncmrlrru'sjmus.l

The
latter gloss puts the matter in the right perspective when the glossator
says2that "in all conversation, that is in the speechof one man to another,
three things are necessary,& thing supposed, a concept, and & word; &
thing so that there may be discourse concerning it, a concept so that by
it we may know the thing, and a word so that by it we may represent the
concept":
Sciendum quod in omni collocutione, idest unius ad alterum locutione, tria sunt ne-
cessaria: res supposita, intellectus, vox; res ut de ea sermo Eat, intellectus ut per ipsum
intellectum.3
vox ut per ipsamrepresentemus
rem cognoscamus,
Hunt is decideclly wrong in thinking that this text is an elaboration of a

very compressed phrase in Boethius' Perihermeneiascommentary.4 The
glossator's words are clearly based on another passagein Boethius' com-
mentary, where Boethius deals with this matter in & more explicit way:
ln Periherm.l, 375'10:Tria sunt ex quibus omnis conlocutio disputatioqueperEcitur:

res, intellectus, voces. Res sunt quas animi ratione percipimus intellectuque discerni-
mus, intellectus vero quibus res ipsasaddiscimus,vocesquibus id quod intellectu capimus
signiHcamus.S
From this parallel it becomes evident that the author of the gloss Promisi-
mus acted under the influence of logical doctrine. His passage clarifles
once more the useful interplay of grammar and dialectic.
Another Eeld, much more important for our purpose, where the
grammarians of the time after Petrus Helias found a profitable outlet for
their interest in logical analysis,was that of syntax (Deconstructionibus).
As is generally recognizedö, the principal achievement of Mediaeval
grammar was the organization of Latin syntax.
' For this gloss, see HuncH, pp. 1-2 and 3-10. Our passage
runs: hec enim fuit causa
ut haberethomo quo alii intellectum suum signiFlcar-et
et manifestaret.
2 ] give Mr Hunt's translation (Hunt ", pp. 32—33).
: SeeHuncn, p. 10.
4 In Periherm.ll, 715'16:...... vox per intellectuum medietatemsubiectasintellectui
res demonstrat (nat: manifestat,ashasbeen printed by Hunt).
5 Cf. In Periherm. ", 20'5'34.
5 See ]. Colling, Einleitung in die Geschichte
der Lar. Syntax in: HistorischcGrammarikder
Lat. Sprache(ed. G. Landgraf), Leipzig 1903, lll !, pp. 28 and 37, referret:] te in Hunr.II,
p. 35, n. 4.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIAEVAL GRAMMAR ] 13
As early as in the grammatica] treatises of the second half of the twelfth

century we End somesectionson 'constructio'.l—Iuntrefers (II, p. 36) to
the Summasuper Donatum of Abailard's pupil Ralph of l'3ti-.ïnn.raisI
as well
as to his Liber Titan and points to & large number of syntactical observa-
tions in the gloss Promisimus,the appearance of which is the more signifi-
cant becausethey are not alx-vaysrelevant to the matter involved there.2
We have, asa matter of fact, the task of the grammarian deEned by our
glossator in this way: Hec duo: certa regularum assignatio et subtilis
circa iudicium constructionum inquisitio et solutio perfectum Faciunt
gramaticmn.3
The large amount of attention paid to syntax by the grammarians of the
secondhalf of the twelfth century, — whether acting under the influence
of contemporaneous logic or not4, —- laid & Erm basis for a fruitful
interplay between grammar and logic. This interaction was fruitful
enough to bring to existence & logica] grammar (grammatica speculativa)
in the domain of grammar, and in that of logic a terminist logic, and
thus to be highly proEtable to both arts.
lt seems to be worth while therefore to pay some more attention to
what [ should like to call "the contextual approach" that is: the
——-
approach made from the viewpoint of the verbal context in which &
term is found —, which appears in the work of the grammarians after
Petrus Helias.
5 - On the Contextual Approach Taken by the Grammarians after Petrus

Helias
As we havealreadyseen (above,pp. ] 10-1] ]) Mediaevalgrammarians

were strongly interested in the origin of language, since they considered
the knowledge of the causeinventionisof the parts of speech as extremely
proEtable to the investigation and determination of the proper gramma-
tical force of a word.
The author of the eleventh century Glasulehad apparently thought so
much of this principle as to hold the proper invention (propriamnaturam
' On him and his followers, see Hunt H, pp. 11-16.

: Hunt givestwn signiücantpassages
(ll, pp. 36-37).
3 Hunt H, I).. 37.
4 I feel inclined to tak; the grammarians'vivid attention for syntacticalquestionsasa
result of their own preferenceto examinethe parts of speech(partesorationis)from the
view-point uf the sentence(oratio)asa whole.
inventionis:i.e. the original purpose) of a word to be the right criterion

for judging the meaningof a word and not the way it was used in some
actual construction:
Sepe enim activa ad inanimata diriguntur, ut 'omo Iibrum', sed tamen in hac tali con-
structione 'arma'non perdit potentiam naturaliter dirigendi ad homines. Non enimsunt
iudicando voces secundumactum constructionis, sed secundumpropriam naturam inventionis
(MS Cologne 201, [. 291'3).'
Compare another passage in the Glosule where some pe0ple are said to
snpport their view of the nature ofthe word 'homo' by the same principle :
Quidam tamen 'homo' semper appellativum aFErmant, arbitrantes iudicandumessede

nominibus secundumnaturam inventionis ipsorum nominum, non secundumquemlibet modum
significationis.Qui autem invenit prius hancvocem 'homo'non respexit ad illam speciem
informem, sed ad rem sensibussubiacentem,quam consideravit sensibilem rationalem
mortalem, sicque illi presenti cum onmibus aliis in hocnatura convenientibushoc nomen
'homo' imposuit.2
However, there is another passagein the later redaction ofour Glosule,

which is found in Chartres 209, where the author seems to make an
exception to this rule. in the case of the verb substantive. He Fmdsthe
proper forte of the verb substantive('est') to be that it denotesthings as
existing, not that it signiües some action or pnssionas other verbs do.
But, one might object, even when 'est' chmitel)r has substantiva] force,
yet it is still a verb grammatically speaking. Our glossator replies that it
is one thing to deal with words considered in themselves, another to deal
with them in relation to the force and Function the),rhave in & sentence.
Well, then, the verb substantivehasits special Force(of denoting things
asexisting) from its substantivalfunction, not ['s-0111 the verbal function it
has in common with all other verbs:
Nam illud (se.hoc verbum 'est.')positum in propositione diversasessentiasconvenienter

ad se invicem iungere aFFlrmamus.Nam ex hoc quod omnes res in essentiasignificat,
aptum est ad hoc ut quaslibet res sibi coherentes copulare possit. Verbi gratia cum dico
'Socratesest animal', excluso respectu verbalis significationis, non prorsus tamen verbi
proprietate separata (capulat enim ipsum 'ess')II quantum ad oji'cs'um quod exercet in
oratione in vi substantiviconsideramus Non tamen negamus idem 'est.'consideratum
.......
in ipsa oratione vim verbi obtinere, sed aliud est agerede vocibusper se consideratis,aliud
! Printed by Hunt (I, p. 212, n. 4) from Ms Chorsres

209. lt shouldbe.-noted, however,
that the Fleury manuscript, giving the most recent adaptation of our Glosuleomits the
last sentence.
: Printed by Hunt from the Chartres Ms, ibid. [ could not Fmd this passagein the
Colognemanuscript.lt must be considered,therefore, asanotherinterpolation.
de eisdemad vim et ofcium quodhabentin orationepositerelatis. Nam, quantum ad vim huius

orationis 'homo est animal', 'est' non per se tantum sed cum aliis hoc solum significat
quod illa resque est homosit illa resque est animal. Hoc autemex vi verbi haberenon
potest, immo ex vi substantivi. (Ms Chartres 209, f. 37"); Num !, p. 2272'14).
Thus our redactor betrays some (vague)notion of the importance of

the syntactical construction to determine the special force of a term.
[t will be worth noting that Peter Abailard (1079-114-2)certainly pays
some attention to the syntactical construction as relevant to the deter-
mination of the Properties of nouns. But it turus aut to be (ml)r one of
three points of view involved: signiücation, construction, and invention
(or: original imposition):
Dial. [, 12427-125'3, De Rijk: Sunt autem quaedam nmuinum proprietates iuxta signiE-
cationem pensandae, quaedamvero Secundum paiirioncm constructionisattendendae,quaedam
accipiendae.Quod enim alia propria, idest singu-
etiam secundumvocis impcæsitiüuneml
laria, ut 'Socrates',alia appellativa aut universalia dicuntur, ut 'homo', 'album', aut alia in
comparationem ducuntur, alia non — pleraque omnia ad significationem
......
pertinent. Quod vero alia recti casusdicuntur, alia obliqui, alia masculini generis, alia
alterius dicuntur, ad positionem constructionis refertur;- Quod autem alia
..... .
primitiva, idest primaeinventionis,alia derivativadicuntur ...... ad vocisinventio-
nem et impositionem attinet?
Abailard, however, shows & marked preference for the proper invention
of words to their place in & construction:
1bid., 12535'33: Prima autem nominum causa fuit signilïcationis impositio, secuta est
autem posteaconstructionis diiudicatio; et ad rei quoque demonstmtionem(discretio)
generum vel casuum necessarianon videtur, sed magis ad constructionis constitutionem.
In the daysof Ralph of Beauvais, who is supposed to have belonged to

the generation of grammarians after Petrus HeliasJ, there was an impor-
tant change in the evaluation of the three criteria mentioned above. As
we have seen already (above,
p. 113) there are not only a remarkable
number of syntactical observatione: in the gloss Promisimus,even when
! In my edition 1 failed to correct the. Ms reading compositionem.

1 CF. ibid., 13611'25,and 5724'6: non autem solum divisio vocis in significationes contingit
secundum aequivocationemnaminis, verum etiam secundum multiplicitatem orationis.
J See Hunc11,p. 12, who assumeson good grounds that Ralph came to France [:oricr-Lmbl)r
some years before 1140, and that he was at the height of his fame in the late sixtieæs anc]
seventles.
the)r are not relevant to the subject matter discusscd' but we also Find
,
the task of the perfect grammarian chned as, the subtilis circa iudicium
canstructionuminquisitio et solutio, apart from the positive assignation of
rules..
It seems to be certain that Ralph played an important rölc in this de-
veloPment of grammatical thinking. The gloss Promisimus explicitly
attributes to him the use of an argument drawn From the prominent place
of syntax in grammatica] theory. When discussing the reason wh)r case
and not declension is given as an accident of the noun, his argument is2
that grammarians did not call all the properties of the words their
accidents, but only those that they thought of some value For their
construction in & sentence, and that the distinction of cases is more
important for the construction OFsentences than that of declensions. The
gloss contains several other passagesin which the same principle is
invoked to snpport the views given there.3
These documents present enough evidence, I think, to show how the
contextualapproachto grammatica!matters— that is judging the Farce
and the function (H'setqu'ï'cium)of the. words (called, it should be noted,
parts qf speech: partes orationis) by their task in the construction of the
sentence (oratio) — was continued to enjoy the ever increasing attention

of the grammarians after Petrus Helias. This shifting of the interest of
the grammarians away from the primordial invention and imposition of
the individual words to their syntactical function seems to have found its
counterpart in — and, no doubt, to have stimulated —- the parallel de-
velopment on the side of the dialecticians, when the latter in their
theories of signification transferred their main interest from the original
imposition of the words to the actual meaning of this word in this
preposition as a result of its actual Function in that preposition.
The present study'will show, I hope, that it is this contextual approach
to logical matters that brought logic to a new stage of development,
in which the Mediaeval logicians achieved an original contribution
1 For two signiFlcantpassages,see Hunt H, pp. 36-37.

1 "Magister Ra(dulphus): ratiu hec est quod gramatici non omnes proprietates acci-
dentalesnominum vel aliarum partium orationis inter accidentia earum ponere voluerunt,
sed illas tantum (Hunt wrongly reads tamcn)quas iudicaverunt possevalere ad earum
constructionemet ad discernendumquomodoet qualiter ponendesunt in locutione."
Gloss Pramüimus,Oxford. [aud. Lat. 67, P.48"). This attribution to Ralph is supported
by a passage
in Ralph'sSumma
superDonatum(London, British Museum,Add. M: 16380,
f. 124'm), printed by Hunt II, p. 15.
3 See Hunl: ", p. 38.
THE DEVELOPMENT or- MEDIAEVAL GRAh-IMAR ] 17
to logic by develoPing a torminist logic, that is: a logic of the terms

consideredas Funetionalelements in & (verbal) (:::mtemzt.I
6-Some Additional Remarks on the [nterplay between Mediaeval

Grammar and Aristotelem Logic and Philosophy
As we havealready seenin the preceding sections, logic (logica vetus)

had penetrated the Eeld of grammar as early as the eleventh (::::ntury.z As
far as the thirteenth (if not the late twelfth already) and following
centurias are concerned, one might even Speak of a *philosc-phical' in-
vasion into grammar. This seems hardly an exaggeration, since all the
teachers of the ars grammatica were themselves masters of the Arts
course and well-read in Aristotle's Metaphysics,
Physics,and De anima
and did not hesitate, indeed, to quote from these works, even if they
did so mainly, as it would seem, to demonstrate their wide reading.3
However, although a real influence of 'philasophy' on grammatical
theory such as Found in the days after Petrus Helias cannot be denied,
one must bear in mind all the same that we have to look for such an
influence in the logical and criteriological theories that, in the Erst
decadesof the thirteenth century, originated as & result of the scholars'
Familiarity with Aristotle's De anima.4For that matter, a similar doctrinal
development is founds in the logical theories set forth in the commenta-
ries upon the course books of traditional logic?
' It is substantialfor a clear notion of Mediaevallogic to bear in mind that for Mediaeval
logicians terminusis the technical term used to deuote the term asjuncrionfng as part cf 0
proposition.Cp. its definition by Aristotle, Ana]. Priora [, 24b16 ("terminuscir. in quem
rexofvfturpropositio").This deEnition was explained by Mediaeval logicians in a much
narrower sensethan seemsto have been intended by its author. — For & word (term)
apart From the. contexi; of a praposition Mediaeval logicians prefiaar'alal)r used several
names, according to its different connotations: vox, vocabulum, ïcrmo, conceptus, intentio.
2 Van de Vyver considered the modestand rather isolated attempt of Notker Balbulusas
the real beginningsof this interference. Seeabove, p. 100, n. 3.
3 SeeThurot, ap. cfr., p. 118.
4 For the circulation of this work in the twelfth century, see M. Grabmann, Aristoteles
im IZJahrhundert, in: zlfh'ttelaherliches I", p. 79 H.
Geistcsleben
5 See e.g. the Perihermeneiascummentaries found in Munich, C.]..M. 14:160 (see
M. Grabmann, MittelalterlichesGeismlebcn! (1926), pp. 224-2 30).
5 The so-calledlogicaantiquacontaining Aristotle's Organonsupplied with Porphyry's
lsagoge,Boethius' mohographson logic, and the tract Dc IG! principiis going under the
name of Gilbert of La Porräe. lt consisted of logica vetusplus logica nova and is to be
Therefore we have no grounds, [ think, to establish any sharp distinc-

tion between logica! and 'philosophical' influences, nor to draw along
such & distinction another dividing line in the history of Me'diaeval
grammar. '
The il'ltel'PI-ïly of grammar and logic was extremely radical for both
domains. As to the noticeable changes it brought about in the Eeld of
grammar, they were of various kinds and For the main part such as to
draw forth some severe criticism From the side of modern grammar? It
seems to be quite justiflable, indeed, to pa)lrsome attention to the weak
spots in Mediaevnl grammatical teaching, not in the Erst place to do
justice to the claims of modern gmmlmu"J—- which, broadly Speaking,
has, indeed, achieved & clearer insight into the nature of language,
—
but rather to appreciate the, very qualities of this däfaut of Mediaeval
grammar.
The twelfth centuryrdevelopment in the Fleld of grammar, though
dilïerringto a high degree from that in the foregoing centuries, yet
appearsto be based npne the less upon the same principle: the Mediaeval
grammariansdid not examine obvious linguistic facts (not to mention
their failure to collect nex-vlinguistic materials), but contented them-
well distinguished from logica modernaor logicamodernorum. See Log. Mad. ], pp. 14-15.
Much confusion is still found of the terms logica novaand logica moderna(: terminist
logic), even with so excellent a connoisseur of termihist logic as Father Philotheus
Boehner was (see his ;Hcdievallogic, An Outh'neqf Its Derclopmenr,
from 1250 to :. 1400,
Manchester1952, p. 16). JosephP. Mullally, who wrote an excellent introduction to
Peter of Spain's Summulae logicalcs(Notre Dame, Indiam, 1945, reprint 1960), made &
peculiar-slip in making (p. XXXVIII) Porphyry's [sagogepart of the logicanova.
! Robins (op. cfr., p. 80 and passim)rightly usesthe words '!ogical' and 'philosaphical'as
equivalcnts. As regards the early bcginnings of grammar in Antiquity up to the days of
Plato, we clo havemore reason,incleed,to speakof a philosephicalapproachto gram-
maticalsubjects.Seeibid., pp. 6-19.
: Cf. above, p. lll, n. 2. Mcanwhile it must be remembered that, at the present time,
there is certainly no uniform modern grammatica] theory. ln fact, in this short survey of
Mediaevalgrammar,the author confineshimsclf to the basicprinciplcs of moderngrama
mar such as studied in the Flfties in Anglo-American circlcs, which are, asa whole, to be
preferred to any 'philosophic' interpretatiün of language,] think. For the comparative
congcniality of modern grammar and Mediaeval grammar, see below, pp. [23-125.
3 lt must be barne in mind, however, that in giving our criticism on Mediaeval grammar
from the modern point of view we are judging it in the light of many gencrationsof
subscquent research; this undoubtedly entails the risk of passing sentence by the
application of what Robins calls "retrospective legislation". Cf. Robins, ap. tit., p. 46.
selves with the exposition and contemplation of a limited number of

topics found in some obligatory texts which were supposed to have &
specialauthority (textusauthentici).l
Well, now, Fromthe begilmings of the twelfth caetrllzuryr
onwards, gram-
mar, especially asstudied in the Northern French tradition, seems to have
been marked by two Features. First, the number OFauthoritative basic
texts had been cut down. OF the Ancient grammarians :::-ni:,rDonat and
Priscian were used (exactlyras was the casein the Early Middle Ages),
but even these incompletely: Donat's abbreviation of grammar going
under the title Donatusminorand the third book of his Ars maior (viz. the
Barbarismus);of Priscian the volumenmaius (: Institutiones(grammaticae,
l-XVl) and the volumenminus (: Inst. gramm., XVIl-XVIH), sometimes
supplied by the Liber de accentibusascribed to him..z ln the second place,
the twelfth and thirteenth century scholars indeed surpassed the Earl);r
Mediaeval grammarians, whose expositions had l'ufn'dlyrever shown them
doing more than free-wheeling on their authoritative texts. But in doing
so the)r conEnedthemselvesto contrast these texts with dialectical (01-
'philosophical') doctrinas, not with linguistic fagts of their own experi-
ence. The result was philosoPhical speculation instead ofzm examination
of the actual language. Therefore what they produced was not linguistics
in the modern sense, but smnething like an attempt at :: philosophy of
language.
There is a remarkable piece of evidence extant For this view of the
röle of dialectics in respect of grammar. It is found in an Ars dictandi
written by the Bolognamaster Boncompagnusand named Boncompagnus
after its author.3 This work contains & Fictitious letter by the Master to
! FOI'this term, see Thurot, ap. cfr., p. I03, n. 2; M.-D. Chenu, TowardUndcrstanding
Sain: Thomas, Chicago 1964, pp. 129-132. See also Fr. Zucker, 'AX'GENTHE
und Ableitungcnin: Sitz. Ber. der Sächs. Akad. der Wiss. Leipzig, Phil. Hist. Klasse
1962, H. 4-.
: SeeThurm, op. ait., pp. 94-96. — As a nmtter of fact there was no real interplay
between the interest in grammatical theory and the study and imitation of classical
authorseither, in spite of HrabanusMaurus"deFmitionof grammarfrequently rcpcatcd
in the Middle Ages: "gramnmtica est scientia interpretandi poötas atque historicos et
recte scribendi loquendique". Dc inuit. der. III 18, p. 2231042 ed. Knocpfler; cfr.
Cassiodore, lnitft. II, p. 942'6 cd. Mynors. Thus with Düminicus Gundissalinus the
scienciaregularumad versifï'candum
is the scventh part of grammar. (De divisionephilosophiae,
pp. 4720-4-83,ed. Baur). For an evaluatiün of this charactcristic of Mediaevalgrammar,
see E. R. Curtius, EuropäischcLineratur und Lateinische;;l'fmclaher, Bern 31961, p. 473-476.
3 The work has been preserved in some Parisian manuscripts: 773] (5. XIII), IT. lf-
sav;7732(5.XIV),fi".lr-ssv,and8654(5.XIV),rf. 1r400r.SecThurot,OP.m.,
pp. 36-38.
some pupil who seems to have paid little attention to grammar before
devoting himself to dialectic. The master reproaches him For thisI :
Cum sit gramatica lac primarium quo addiscentium corda nutriuntur, miror quod sine
illius notitia te ad dialeticam transtulisti. Nam qui Partes: ignorat se ad artes transferre
non debet, quia non convalescit plantula que humore indiget primitivo.
The pupil answersthat he wants to servegrammar, indeed, but with the

help of dialectic3 (per auxiliumdialetica):
Ars gramatica potest moli asinarie assimilari que dum laborioso impulsu volvitur, grana
in farinamconvertit, de quaFitnutritivus panisper adiutoriasuccessiva.
Undecupio per
auxilium dialetica gramaticam adiuvare. Sane qui prülïcit in dialetica, gramaticam nan
obmittit.4
We need not wonder, indeed, that the help afforded by"dialectic should
makegrammarinto a kind of speculativaphilosophyof languagerather
than a linguistic discipline.
From the view-point of linguistics modern criticisms of Mediaeval
grammar seems to be quite justiEed, indeed. Such criticism, however,
runs the risk of precluding our insight into the positive röle which
Mediaeval grammar and logic as studied since about the middle of the
twelfth century playedfor the developmentof thought. The important
development of criteriology and of the theory of knowledge during the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries cannot be evaluated correctly unless
considered in connection with the twelfth century interference of
dialectic and grammar.
This interplay of logic and grammar went under & twofold form:
(l) the re-building of grammatical theories from the view-point of
dialectic, and (2) the diFFerentorientation OFthe theories of logic in
' quoted by Thurot after Paris, B.N. Lat., 8654, E. 6".

3 viz. the well-known tracta De partibux arationir.
3 One might consider this evidence to be the more noticeable because it derives from
the Northeï'n Italy tradition. However, it seems to be more obvious to suppose the
betweenthe two traditions (seeabove,p. 119) to havefadeclawaysince the
diH'erences
intensive contacta between Parisian and Italian masters, such as the stay of Alberic of
Paris in Bologna (see ]ohn of Salisbury, MerafagicanII 10, discussed in my Log. Med. [,
pp. 85-87). The approachto grammaticaldoctrine taken by Hugutio of Pigais also
evidence for the use of dialectica in the Northern ltaly tradition. For this master, see
my paper: SameNew Evidenceon Tlveyih Centmy Logic in: VIVARIUM 4 (1966), pp. 18-19.
4 quotecl by Thumt, ibid.
5 as set forth by R. H. Robins (see above, p. lll, n. 2); cfr. Thurot ap. cfr., pajsim,
and especially pp. 504-506.
relation to the new views concerning the essentialpurport of the sentence

(oratio).
Some outlines of the latter development of twelfth century logic,
which forms the main theme of this volume, will be sketched in the
next section of this chapter. For the present 1 conFlnemyself to & Few
additional remarks on the other fruit of the proEtable interplay of logic
andgramn'lar,which may be headedby the key-term *grammatica
specula-
tiva'. This new d«3wmhapmentIof grammar Found its culminating-point in
the subtle tracts De modissignyflcandi,which laid the basis for the Me-
diaevallogic of language('Spradllagik'). Its topic was& rational discus-
55an2of the various significative functions of the terms and their gram-
matical variations in the Latin language.3The speculativa grammarian
Felt himself no longer the pure grammarian(purusgramaticus),as he
occupied himself no less,and often more, with the (supposed)logical
and philosophica] implications of languageand grammar. The foundation
of speculative grammar, indeed, was laid by the doctrine OFthe modi
essendi,modiintelligendi, and modisignifcandü Well now, the imposition
of meanings was considered not to belong to the pure grammarian's task;
' For this development, see H. Roos, op. cfr., pp. 99-120. 1 feel some doubts as to the
röle of the Ars dictandi mentioned by Father Roos as the First factor. Meanwhile the
author's own remarksare cautiousenough (p. 101).
2 Cp. the Frequent use of formulas as queritur, abicitur, opponitur; sic solvitur, itafallacia,
innantia and the like, and the composition of saphismam
grammaticalia; seeTlmrot, op. cfr.,
p. 119 and passim;M. Grabmann,Die Saphismaralirerarur
des12 und 13 jahrhundertsmit
Texrausgabe einesSaphümades Boetiusvon Dacien. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ein-
wirkens der aristotelischen Logik auf die Ausgestaltung der mittelaltcrlichen Dispu-
tation. Beiträge36, 1 (1940).
3 This brauch of Mediaeval grammar has been of great importance For the development
of logicalandcriteriological theoriesduring the l'ourteenthcentury, n'endiplaisethe low
views the late Father Boehner took of it (see ap. Cn., p. 116, n. 10). Msgr. Grabmann
(Dic Entwicklung dcr mittelaherlichen Sprachlogik, in: zlfitrelakcrhches Geistcsleben[,
pp. 104-126)attachedgreat value to Mediaeval'Sprachlogik'.His intuition hasproved to
have been the correct one since the scholarly studies and text editions by Father Roos
andhis collaboratorsin the CorpusPhilosophorum MediiAuri SeealsoH. Roos,
Danicarum . (ed. Koch),
Die Stellungder Grammatikim Lehrbcrriebde; 13jahrhunderrsin: ArtesLiberum
pp. 94-106, and ]an Pinborg, Dic EntwicHunga'erSprachtheoric im Mittelahcr.
4 For this doctrine, see e.g. Martin of Dacia, Dc modissignifcandj, cap. 1, p. 5'2'13 ed.
Roos (Corpus Philosophorum Danicarum Medii Aevi 11, Copenhague 1961): sicut
tabernarius vinum signiFlcat per circulum, eodem modo intellectus rem intellectam
exprimit sive signilïcat per vocem, et post copulationemsive impositionem vocis ipsa
res dicitur res signifgcata, et omnes proprietates rei quae prius dicebantur modi essendi
rei extra et modiintelligendirei intellectae, iam dicuntur mach" Seealsocap. 2 :
xigny'ïcandi.
utrum modi enendi, modi intelligendi et modi signffïcandi sunt idem vel digerunt.
it was the task of the philosopher or of the so—called(gramaticusmixtus:

the philosopher-grammarian.'
The Mediaeval grammarian in his pursuit of the 'science' of language
(mostly the Latin language)was bound to invoke the help of logic
(philosophy) to Iay for him the reliable FoundationForhis theories. Thus
we see that the influence of logic is For the main part formal: logic ap-
pears to be of much help for the gramnmrian to systematize his own art.
Meam-vhile,this formal influence must causesome material changes,too,
in gramnmtical teaching. This material impnct from the influence of
logic seemsto have been twofold: (a) negatively: the tendency zilriï'ad)r
present to eliminate the auctoresis strengthened; (b) positively: the
introduction of new t0pics, such as the causeinventionis(see above, p.
110FF.).
It must be borne in mind, however, that the inhltration of grammar by
logic was not felt by the Mediaeval grammarian as merely an assault on
his indepenclence. The extension of the Flelclof grammar as well as the
formal renewal which grammar unclen—ventunder the influence of
logic, were conceived by the students of the Artes of that period as the
necessary and legitimate Fruit of the interplay of the two arts, grammar
and dialectic, both of them parts of the sciencc par cxcechce: philosophia.
The grammarians were by no means compelled to accept nolens valens
certain elements or approaches such as they x-vould think alien to the
proper nature of their art. On the contrary, the logical impact is con-
natural with the main purport of grammar as an ars as understood by
Mediaeval scholarship. '
In other words: the basic fact that underlies all forms of interplay
among the Mediaeval arts is the definite Failure on the part of the Mediae-
val scholars to realize the autonomous character of any branch of
philosophia. To bear in mind this Fundamentalcharacteristic of Mediaeval
scholarship seems to be an indispensable conditioni for the historian of
Mediaeval thought who wants to understand its failures as well as its
peculiar achievements.
' SeeMichael of Marbais (c. 1300) Damodisxignijïcandi: "Puri gramatici non est imponere
dictionem ad signihcandum. Nam ille qui invenit gramaticam et dictiones imposuit ad
signihcandum, debuit habere cognitionem rei signihcande et vocis que ei debuit imponi.
ln considerando autem ipsam rem fuit naturalis, et in considerando vocem secundum
quod huiusmodi; sed in tribuendo ei rationem significandi fuit gramaticus. Et sic im-
positor dictionum non fuit pure gramaticus." "Sic et iste qui imposuit partes ad signi-
Fncandum,
non Fuit purus gramaticussed mixtus." (quoted by Thurot, ap. m., p. 123).
7 - The Contextual Approach as the Key-Notion of Terminism
The most Fundamental weaknessof Greek and Mediaeval grammar un-

doubtedlyr was its basic view that language was to be considered as the
expression of thought complete in itself. So Far its principles seem to
have been quite diH'erent from those of modern linguistics, at least as
recognized in the Anglo-Saxon countries.' The)r are summarized by
Robins, op.cir.., pp. 91Ff. He mentiens as the cardinal principle of
linguistics, at least in Great Britain, "that language must always, and in
every analysis,be studied as& part of social process and socia] activity,
and every utterance must be considered and understood within its
context of situation. Any conception of language as 'conveying thought'
or *expressing ideas' is quite imdequate and misleading as the basis of
grammar or any other part of linguistic analysis. This is the case not least
becauseit implies that the meaning of a semente, phrase, or word can be
discovered by the inspection of it asan isolated self-Contained unit, apart
from the context ofsituation in x-vhichit was uttered; and it is contextual
function alone that constitutes and guarantees ligguistic meaning".
On the whole, this severecriticism seemsto be quite justiFled-ï.How-
ever, some maurgina]notes may be made, which seem to be of some
importance for the historian of" Mediaeval grammar and logic.
To my mind, the analysisOFthe Latin languageasgiven by the Mediae-
val Terministaepartly honoured the requirenwnts of modern grammar and
it is by doing so that terminism obtained its peculiar mark. The terminists
did certainly not confine themselves to an inspectation of words taken as
isolated self—containedunits apart from any context. It is true, they had
no eye for the largest context formed by the world around, and, to a
high extent, they Failed to recognize the uncleniabledependente of any
word (and any other lexicological unit) on the social context for its
functioning and actual meaning, But theydid Full)r understand the impor-
'tance of one kind of context. Unlike the Ancient (and Early Mediaeval)
grammarians they had & clear notion, indeed, of the fundamental impor-
tance of the propositionas the verbal context thatdecidinglydetermines the
actual meaning of a term. To deuote that actual meaning of a term tl1-eyr
introduced & new word : suppositio,to be distinguished from the meaning
of & word by itself (significatio).The very distinction of thesetwo kinds
of meaning of & word, one denoted by the word (significatio' (tnatural
' Seeabove, p. ll8, n. 2.

2 Robins, ap. m., pp. 91-92.
3 For & fair qualiHcation, see above, p. I 18, n. 3.
I 24 LOGICA MODERNORUM u
meaning'), the other by isuppositia'(*actual meaning in some deBnite

context') is illustrative of the fundamental x-veakness
of Mediaeval gram-
mar and logic as well as of their felicitous innovation. If we want to
understand and judge Mediaeval terminism fairly, we have to take into
account that, although they indulget] too frequently in such philosoPhic
speculations as "what is the natura! meaning of & wordP", nevertheless
they thought it of the utmost importance to distinguish clearly betx-veen
the general (Iexicological) meaningof a word and its actualstandingfor
(supponere)as completely dependent on the verbal context. The),rtried
& new approach to language, i ndeed, but in coining & new word ('sup-
positio') besidesthe usual'signijicatia' in order to denote the fruit of that
new approach, instead of re-interpreting radically their viex-vof signi-
Flcation, they failed to make the most of that new approach and reach &
sound linguistic method no longer marred by the hereditary taint of
obligatory philosophie quasi-implications and, generall)r speaking, non-
linguistic presuppositions. Hm-vever, though continuing to believe in the
radical (Ancient and Mediaeval)presuPposition(or rather: praesuPponen-
dum)of the importunaeof the signifcatioof & word asits fundamenta!and
natural meaning previous to, and independent of, any contextual
situation, they succeeded— and that is my point, now — in outlining
and develoPing to some extent, a logic of language based on the cardinal
importance of the verba] context for the actual functioning and meaning
of a word.
Even & notion of what is nm-vadayscalled 'the context of situation'
cannot be denied to Mediaeval scholars. ln fäct they discussed certain
casesin which the actual meaning (suppositio)
of & word is determined
by the situational context of the preposition itself. When discussing,
For instance, the so-called articular nouus, i.e. those nouns that deuote
public OFFICBI'Sor dignitaries, such as 'episcopus', 'rex', 'dux', special
regulas were established by the Mediaeval logicians. Thus the Tractatus
Anagnini preserved in Munich, C.L.M. 4652 (see above, pp. 42-43
and below, pp. 3915) give the following regula (f. 76V; my edition,
p. 27430-36):
quandohoc nomen 'episcapus'

per se sumaturcum verbo presentistemporis, suppositio
non Et pro quolibet appellato illius dictionis, sed pro appellata iHiu: terre in qua prqfertur
propositia. Unde si quis Anag(n)ie dicat: 'episcopusrenit', non est admittenda nisi pro
episcopoAnag(n)ino. Similiter si quis dicat in Francia: 'rex rcnii', non est admittenda
nisi pro rege Francie.
The same remarks can be made with regard to such terms as idomus'
and the words denoting weight and measures(seeibid., pp. 27527-2763).'
We can safely conclude from the above that twelfth century students
of grammarand logic paid much attention to the actual meaning(suppo-
sitio) of & word apart from its natura] meaning(signüï'catio)
and that they
held the former to be highl)r dependent upon the verbal context in which
the word occurs, and, in some special cases, even Luponthe situation in
which the proposition is uttered.
The results. of focussing the verba! context in which the words are
used, have been the proper achievement of twelfth century grammar and
logic. As & matter of fact, it is here that we have to look for the origin of
terminist logic.
! The same topic is found with other authors. See e.g. the Ars Meliduna, below p. 326.
Cf. also Roger Bacon,Linguam":cognitio(: Opusmaius,pars Illa), p.. 7734 ed. Bridges:
cum dicitur Parisius: "h' reis vcnt', iste articulus 'li' designat proprium et verum regem
(the particular and actual king) talis loci, quasiregernFranciae. Et non suFFlcerethoc ut
denotaret adventum regis Angliae. Nullus enim diceret de rege Angliae veniente.
Parisius: 'h' reis vcnt', äed adiungeret aliud dicens: '11'rei: de Engletercvent'. Et ideo
articulus solussuFEcitad veritatem et praprietatem rei de qua est sermo designandum.
CHAPTER IIl
THE INCREASING USE OF SPECIAL

TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC
IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWELFTH CENTLIRT
1 - On the lntrusion of Dialectic into the Whole Field of Knowledge
No doubt dialectic played its röle within the fmme-work of the

trivium as early as in the Carolingian period. Its rapid emergence, how-
ever, asa critical agent, and even as the pivot of an educational program,
did not take place before the eleventh century. As & matter of fact it was
in the Erst decades of that century that dialectic began to be & mighty
instrument for the search after knowledge anf] insight and to be appre-
ciated asa powerfu] weapon in all kinds of controversy.
This remarkable change was to be felt in many other domains of Mediae-
val thought, indeed. Theology, grammar and Law opened the gateways
to the pervasion of logic.
Thus dialectic had to wait till the eleventh century Renaissamnal
to become the decisive factor in theologica] method and to form, assuch,
an integral element of theologica] teaching.2 The further development
of dialectic occurring about the same time could onl)r increase the pre-
ponderance of that art in the Held of theology. Miss Beril Smalley rightly
says that at that time dialectic could also be used for building up a new
theologica] structure with some hi:)l)r text as & base.3 The outstanding
influence of dialectic upon theological teaching cannot be better shown,
perhaps, than in the one-sidedness of the new line OFtheologica] think-
! I think there are plenty of reasons,indeecl, to use the term 'renaissance'for the period
beginning as early as about 1030, rather than to speak of the renaissanceof the twelfth
century. See L. M. de Rijk, De indchng der :l-fiddcleeuwsc wijsbegccrtcin Philia, [pp. 229-
236], p. 234.
: See]. dc Ghellinck, Dialectiqueet dogmaau IOc-lZe siäcles,in: Studienzur Geschichte der
Philasaphie (FestgabeBäumkcr), Beiträgezur Geschichteder PhilosophiedesMittelalters.
Supplemcntband[ Münster 1913 (pp. 79-99), p. SINT.; H. H. Glunz, Die Literar-
ästhctik des europäischen.*Hmclaherx,Woyï'am-Rascnraman-Chauccr-Dantc,
Bochum-Langen-
dreer 1937, p. 132Ff. See also the Ene study by R. W. Southern, I,aqfrancchcc and
BercngarJ Taursin: Studies in Medieval history presented to F. M. Powickc, Oxford
1948, pp. 27-4-8, and B. Smalley, The Study qf [he Bible in the Middle !'985, Oxford
1952, pp. 46-4-9.
3 op. cit. (above, note 2), p. 72; see also, pp. 70-82.
THE INCREASING USE 01: SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC 127
ing: the theologica] questioning deviates ever more widely from biblica]
scholarschip, in spite of the promising beginnings of the biblical ap-
proach of theology as early as the eighth and ninth centuries. There are
good reasons,indeed, to ascribe the new theological development to the
new possibilities of scholastic reasoning and to the urgent interest in
discussion nourished by the still growing Spread of the well-known
text-books of Aristotelean-Boethian lagic.I
But theolc-g)lr has not been the (ml),r Held in which dialectic could
celebrate its triumphs. ln fact, I doubt whether the scientiade sacropagina
has been the First domain to be penetrated by logic. This much seems to
be certain: as early as about the middle of the eleventh century it is the
grammarianz Berengar ofTours who, as & grammarian "delighted in new
interpretation of words"3, attacked conventional theology w.rigcwou'sl)r
and, while doing so, prepared the fruitful use of dialectic in the Fleld of
theology that was made a few years later by his pupil L1nfranc.4
The same holds good, I think, for the study of Law. Here, too, the
new approach of the glossators and commentatops seems to have been
inspired by both grammar and dialectic. As to Roman law, it must be
remembered not only that the glosses dating np to about 1070 are
I Cfr. B. Smalley,ap. cfr., p. 77. Für the equivalenceof 'thealagy'and 'una-::pagina'

before the twelfth century, see ]. de Ghellinck, Le mauvement:häalogiquedu ...-Wie
siäcie,
Paris 21948, pp. 91-92.
3 For Berengaras pre-eminently a grammarian contrasted with the dialectician Lanfranc,
seeR. W. Southern,ap. cit. (abovep. 126, n. 2), pp. 28-32andthe testimoniescollected
by A. ]. Mat: Donald, Berengarand the Rgfarmquacramental Doctrina, London 1930,
pp. 27—29.
3 See Guitmund of Aversa, Dc Corporis ct Sanguinis Christi raritate in Eucharistia, where it
appears that already when studying the artesas a young man Berengar was "delighted in
new interpretationsof words", and that he afterwardstried to appl),rhis method to
theolügical problems. Dc Corporisct SanguinisChrim' veritatein Eucharistia,l, 1428 A-C:
l's ergo cum iuveniles adhuc in scholis ageret annos, ut aiunt qui eum tunc noverunt,
elatus ingenii levitate, ipsius magistri sensum non adeo curabat, condiscipulorum pro
nihilo reputabat, libros insuper artium contemnebat. Sed cum per se attingere philo-
sophiae altioris secreta non posset, — neque enim homo ita acutus erat sed et tunc
temporis liberales artes it-ïtra Gallias obsolevcrant — novis mitem vcrboruminterpretationibus,
quibus etiamnunc nimirum gaudet, singularis scientiae laudem sibi arrogare et cuiusdam
excellentiaegloriam venari qualitercunque poterat aFFectabat Sed postquama
......
D. Lanfranco in dialectica de re satis parva turpiter est confusus desertum se
. ..... ,
iste :: discipulisdolens,ad eructandaimpudenter divinarum ScripturarumSacramenta,
ubi ille adhuc adolescens et aliis eatenus detentus studiis nondum adeo intenderat,
sese convertit.
4 For the collaboration of grammar and logic as found from the last decadesof the
eleventh century onwards, see Ch. II, pp. 100-108; I l2f.; 117-122.
128 LOGICA ü-IODERNORLIM "
purely grammatical, but also that the more scientilïc glossesof the next
period were written in the School of the Bologneseglossators, x-vhichwas
Founded, as is known, by & former grammarian, [meritus, towards the
endOFthe eleventhcentury.l
lt cannot be the aim of the present chapter to deal with the influence
grammar and logic exerted mpon the stud)r of law about ] 100: suffice it
to refer to the remarkable testimonies found in the documents extant of
the lnvestiture Contest? The only feature to be singled out, now, is the
mixecl character of the scientific method found in nearly all these writ-
ings: it turns out to have been & mixture of grammatical and dialectica!
rules. [ will return to this question below.
Early Mediaeval logic seems to have focussed on two points mainly,

the evaluation of arguments and a modest set of metaphysica! implica-
tions, conFmedto some basic formulas of & rather simple nature. To
start with the latter, Mr Stauthern3seems to be quite right in pointing
out the bearing of the philosophie ideas contained in the logica vetuson
Earl)r Mediaeval thought. The philosophic content of the tracts of
Aristotelian-Boethian logic, becauseof its appearanceof objectivity, was
naturally bound to be used as a conceptual frmne-work by which Early
Mediaeval scholars tried to introduce order in many Eelds. They went
on to describe the world as well as human activities in terms of substance
and accident, genera and species, and in other headings borrowed from
the well-known Aristotelem treatise on the Categories. Thus it is in the
idea of substantiality, indeed, that dialectic imposed & profound mocliH-
cation on,the thought of the Early Mediaeval period. No doubt, the
metaphysical'ïIside OFthe famous problem of the universalia belongs to the
same line of thought.
However, this aspect of Em-lyMediaeval thought does not concern us
in the present study. Sul-Hceit to say that it could not appear to full
ndvantage until the metaphysical works of Aristotle had come to the
knowledge OFthe Mediaeval world.
' See Hermann Kantorowicz, Nate on the Dcrclapmcnt cjthc Gloss to the justinian and the
CanonLawin: B. Smalley,op. cit. (above,p. 126, n. 2), pp. 52-55.
: printed as Libelli de lite imperatorumct panrffcmn maculis X! et XII in the series Monumenta
GermaniaeHistorica. Hannover 1891-1397.
3 ap. cit. (above, p. 126 n. 2), p. 43.
4 Its logical counterpart can be best characterizcd, it seems, as the problem of the
proper task of logic as an art. See for Abailard, the Introduction to my edition of his
Dialectica(Assen1956), 55 3 and 16.
THE INCREASING USE OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC 129
More attention should be paid, nm-v, to the other feature of Early

Mediaeval logic: the search of a correct evaluation of arguments. As a
matter of fact it showecl two characteristic marks: the establishing of
a scala of the inference schemes according to the measure of their
stringency, and & kind of linguistic analysisof the wordings of the argu-
ments.
The division of argument into necessaw and probable argument and
its evaluation appear to have belonged to the obligatory exercises of
students of logic and rhetoric as early as the days of Cicero. The latter's
books De inventioneand Topicaand the comments upon, and paraphrases
of, the matter involved by Marius Victorinus and Boethius laid the Fn'm
basis and were & starting-point for all labour and ingenuity that was spent
on the art of argumentation as early as from the ninth century vcænwarcls,l
De Ghellinck rightly stressecl the peculiar function of the rationes
necessariae in the thought and arguments of Anselm of C..ï11'1tet-bl.lry.2
Besides,during the second part of the eleventh century the study of
human speech so modestly taken up by the earlier grnmmarians, devel-
oped into & real attempt to analyse language from certain basic points of
view. As to the theory and practice of argumentation the new trend of
arguing seems to have Found its clearest expression in the pamphlets of
the Investiture Contest. As & matter OFfact the welI-known interpreta-
tion rules clressed up by Abailard in the prologue of his Sic et Non3 are
nothing but a codiFlcatic-n of the concordance rules given by a whole
series of scholars before him, with the purpose to reconcile seemingly
contraclictory Canon Law texts.4
! See e.g. the well-considered composition of the ninth century Dialectica from the
Schnol of St. Ga", found in three copies and edited from one of them by P. Piper, Dic
Schriften Notizen und seiner Schule [, Freiburg 1832, pp. LVI-LXXV. For its early date,
see L. M. de Rijk, On the Curriculumqfdlc Aris, p. 83. —F0r some more examples, see
]. de Ghellinck, Dialectiqucet dogma,pp. 90, n. 1 and 91 n. 1.
,
?-Dialcctiquc ct dogma,pp. 91—92.
3 ed. Migne, P.L. 178, coll. 1339-1349.
4 See M. Grabmann, Dic Geschichteder scholasrischenA-fcthodc,1, pp. 234-239. The texts
were collected by Arnold Rcinke, Dic Schuldialcktik im lnvesriturstrcit. Eine geistes-
geschichtliche Studie in: Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte Xl, 4,
Stuttgart 1937, pp. 56-70. Reinkc's book can be of some help in 50 far as it refers to the
main evidence from the Libelli de lita. Für the rest, it is completely dependent on other
authors, mainly to Grabmann, lac. cit. Not even the national-socialistic trammels into
which he tried tn pressthe [actscompiled from other works, are of his own invention,
obligatorily prescribed as they were, at that time, to all "scientific" workers of the
Third Reich.
130 LOGlCA MODERNORLIM 11
It is self-explanatory that under the circumstances just mentioned an

increasing need for general text-books of (lialectic is frequently found
in twelfth century schools.' It is the aim of this chapter to give & survey
of the various text-books which intended to supply these wants.
2 - Two Tracts on Logic from the School of William of Champeaux
The twelfth century Vienna manuscript V.P.L. 24992 contains several

pieces on logic and grammar. Any distinction of treatises seems to be
diFFlcult, but two treatises at least may be distinguished with some
probability.
a !ntroductioncs dialetica secundum Wilgelmum

On Ff. 23r-32V we Find a treatise entitled Introductiones dialetica. It
opens as follows:
' Many testimoniesmay be adduccclfor the risc 01'logic about 1140. Seee.g. John of
Salisbury, A*!eralagicon,
116, p. 694sqq.: It is no more than just that this art should, as it
does, attract such tremendouscrowds frmn every quarter that morc men arc occupicd
in the study of lügic alone than in all other branchcs of that scicncc which regulatcs
human acts, words, and even thoughts, if they are to be as they should be. 1 refer to
philosephy (
...... ). All are shouting to one another: "Ict him who is last catch the
itch (Horacc, Ars Poetica,417), and let him who does not come to logic, bc plaguccl by
continuous, everlasting, Hlth" (translation by Daniel D. Mc Garry). — Sec also the
Victorinc tract on disPutatia, below, pp. 14111.— Parö, Brunct, and Trcmblay (in their
well-known study on the twelfth century rcnaissance(s'ce bibliography, below, p. 603)
give (pp. 204-206)an illustrative survcyon the intrusion 01logic into the other branchcs
of knowledge.Mr. Michaud-Quantinis quite right in referring (in the Introducu'an to his
edition of the FonsPhüosophiac,p. IIFF.) to GBOHI'cy01 St. Victor's FonsPhilosophiae,
where the author shows (vss 141-188) the prc-cminent function of logic for school-
exercisesapparently current in Geoffrcy's youth (c. 1150).
vss 149-152: Hic est enim gladius in se pretiosus
Quem si gerit sapiens,crit fructuosus
Quodsi forte strinxerit illum furiosus
tam sibi quam ceteris erit perniciosus.
vss 161-164: Instruit ingenium validi tironis
Et ad exercitium preparat agonis
Illis donatgladiosoppositionis
His econtra clipeum dat responsiünis.
vss 181-184: Solus hic ingreditur populus electus
Cuius gressusstabiles, cui robustum pectus
Omnis hinc excluditur, omnis est abiectus
Qui non Aristotilis venit armis tectus.
2 For this manuscript.,see above, Ch. I, nr. 24, pp, 91-93.
Ars ista dialetica, quom Pcripatctici ioycenappellabant,propter discretionemveri et

falsi inventa est. Quo. non potest fieri nisi per voces. Et ita, dum tractant de voce, ut
quidem (quidam MS) grammatici et rethorici tractant, seddiverso modo; gramatici ut
doceant casum cum casu construere, tempus et personam regere, rethorici docent
ornate et acute loqui, dialetici verum a falso per vocesdiscernunt —; ideo videndum est
nobis quid sit vox. Ut melius potest, ab altiori gradu exordinmur, scilicet a sono, qui est
genus vocis, ut viso genere pateat species eiusdem generis.
Sonusest quicquid auribus percipitur.
The common subjects are discussed: sonus, vox, nomen, verbum, oratio,
propositio; then the kincls of propositio: categorical and hypothetical
proposition; universal, particular, singular, and indelïnite proposition
and their interrelations and mutual inferences; next the conversiopraposi-
tionum and the inferences of converted propositions.
The passageour author devotes to the iiyïzrentio convenarumseems to
be of & personalstamp. ! quote this passage
in full (Ff. 26T-27ï'):
lnfercntis vero conversarum tam simpliciter quam per contrapositionem talis est
quod si vera est (vel falsacst) aliqua propositio, vera est (vel falsa est) suaconversaper
contrapositionem vel simpliciter.
Notandum est in conversionclm] per contrapositionenï hanc consequentiam (con-
sequendam MS) possc probari: 'si omnishomoestanimal, omnis[homocst] lapis est vci non
est'. Si conccdcrit hoc, 1' animal sinc determinatione, 'si omnishomoes: (26?) animal,
omne non-onimolest non-homo'; quam habemus cx regulis Libri hoc modo: 'si omnishomo
est animal, omne non animal est non-homoet si omne non-onimo! est non-homo, omnis lapis est.
non-homo';et si hoc est, tunc omnis lapis est vel non est.
Sed hoc consequentiafacta absurdavidetur ex coniunctione terminorum. Ad quod
vitandum ipsi determinant dicentes: hanc: propositionem 'omne non-onimol est non-homo',
potest duobus modis intelligi, ita scilicet (scd MS) quod sit aiïirmativo et ita quod sit
negativa. AFErmotiva enim est si sic intelligatur: 'omnenon-onimo!est,non homo', idest:
omnis illa res quo est non-onimol, est.illo ros quo est non-homo, ita quod per has voces 'non-
animol' et 'non homo' ponatur aliquid de. rebus existentibus. Ut autem plus dicam:
secundumhoc quod 'non-homo'ponit aliquam rem existentem, potest probari ex (et MS)
'omnishomoestanimal': 'omnislapis est' modo supradicto. Etiam idcirco sic determinatur:
si 'omnenon-onimo!est.non-homo'intelligatur aFEu-mativa,
conscqucntialm]non sequitur
et sic non licet extrema concludere. Ncgativa vero est, si sic in-
absque :::-:.)nstour'uljaI
telligatur 'omnenon-onimol', idest: quicquid est non animo! est non-homo,ita quod hec
voces 'non-animal' et 'non-homo' nichil ponant (ponatur MS). Secundum quod "e(c)
positio lapidis nec alicuius rei sequitur ex hac voce 'non-animal', nec esse(necesseMS)
cx 'non-homo'(hoc MS) nisi sub eodem sensu, scilicet quod nichil ponatur. Sed postea
non poterit concludi: 'ergo lapis est vel non est' simpliciter ex (et MS) 'omnishomoest
animal'.
lta determinatur & quibusdam. Sed si considerarem propriam ipsarum vocum in-
ventionem, nec 'lopidom' ex 'non-animal' nec 'esse'ex 'non-homo'(hoc .:HS)concluderetur.
Ad hoc enim iste voces 'non-(27i')-animal'et 'non-homo'fuerunt invente ut significarent
! For this terni, see Abailard, Dialectico, pp. 40l5-40615 Dc: Rijk.
132 LOGICA l't-IODERNORUM n
animal et hominem, sed alio modo quam hee voces'animal' et 'hama', quia hee voces
'animal' et 'homo' significant ipsas res animal et hominem ponendo, hee vero 'non-
animal' et 'nan-lrama'removendo; ex qua remotione non habentquod aliquid ex eis
vocibus concludant ponendo. Itaque, ut dictum est, nec 'lapidam' ex 'non-animal' nec
possuntconcludere.
'esse'ex 'nan-hama'
Item notandumest quod quidamdicunt simplicesconversionesparticularium propo-
sitionum tam bene esseregulares, sicut sunt ille quibus convertuntur. Veluti cum dico:
'quidamhamoestanimal', regularempropositionemfacio, et huius conversasecundum
eos regularis est. Que est: 'quaddamanimal est homo'(quidam homo est animal il'lS) et sic
(de) ceteris particularibus huiusmodi. Dicunt enim quod 'animal' eo modo quo ibi
subicitur, minus est 'lianiine'þu] predicato (predicatum MS), quia 'animal' acceptum
circa quoddam suum individuum minus est predicato (predicatum MS), scilicet
'liamine'þn].Et ita maiusest predicatum,scilicet 'homo' (hominemMS), illo quidem,
scilicet 'animal'. Et sic secundum (eos) est regularis propositia.
Sedquocumquemodo ipsi exponamillam propositionem:'quadclam
(quod quidam
MS) animal est homo', absurdum est eam dici regularem, quia absurdum est ut illud
(illis il-lS)quod prorsu-continetur ab aliquo in ordine predicamenti,cle continenti
regulariter predicetur. Veluti hamocontinetur sub animali ut speciessub suo genere;
quareliomincm absurdumest de illo regulariterpredicari.
Est etiam aliud, scilicet quod Auctoritati repugnatur. Dicit enim Boetiusin Topicis:
"ut vero minor de maiore predicet(ur) in nulla propositione contingit". Quod si iuste
ponatur diceret quod nulla propositio est ubi minus de maiori predicetur regulariter.
(27?) Sedsi inequalessunt termini, maior semperde minori predicetur. Quodsiequales
erunt termini, conversa vice de se predicantur, sed non ex utraque parte regulariter,
quia quandoproprium subicitur speciei,est irregularis propositio.
Item alia ratio que impedit errorem illorum, scilicet quod, cum (quodcumqueil'lS)
in hac consequentia: 'si nullum animal est hama, nullus homo est homo' detur locus a toto
et talis regula:
quicquid regulariter & toto universaliter, et & qualibet parte ipsius
universaliter,
sciendum est quod in designatione animalis datur ibi locus a toto, et ibi accipiatur uni-
versaliter. Ad quam propositionem, scilicet 'nullum animal es: homo', cum sit et contra-
dictoria: 'quaddamanimal es: homo', debet utraque Fieri de eisdem terminis. Et ita sub-
icietur in 'quod(dam) animal esthomo'animal continens hominemet ita est irregularis.
The same discussion of the conversio contains an interesting note on

prima and secunda
impositio(27V-281'):
Sciendumest quodhoc nomen'canvcrsia' nomenest vocumproprie et, si aliquo modo
detur rebus, non proprie Et et est secundaimpositioþe], quenmdmodumhee voces
' nainen' ' vcrbum' 'oratio'
, , .
Nunc vero quod (quoque MS) (28?) mentionem fecimus de impositione, dena ali-
quantulumincidentur agamus.lmpositio alia prima, alia secunda.Prima impositio fuit
quandoipsis rebusnominanon habentibusimposita sunt vocesad res ipsassignificandas.
Secundavero impositiofuit secundum(sedMS)hocquod posteaipsisvocibusalianomina
imposita fuerunt ad declarandumFiguramipsarum vocum. Et ille voces quidem que
flecti casibus possunt, nomina vocate sunt; que vero temporibus distribui, vcrba. Secun-
THE INCREASING use OF SPECIAL TEXT—BOOKS 01: LOGIC 133
dum quam impositionem habemusque sint ipse voces, scilicct an sint tales quod (que
MS) possint casibusinflecti — quod designatur per hanc vocem 'nomen' —, an tales quod
possint temporibus distribui, quod designatur per 'rerbunt'.
The discussion of categorica] proposition winds up with that ofsingular

and indefinite proposition (Ff. 28T'V):
His ostensisredeamusad propositiones.Quarum quedamsunt universalesaFErmntive
et negative,quedamparticulares amt'mative et negative. Et hee valent ad constitutionem
sillogismorum. ln(de)Fmite vero et singularesnon valent; cum ( ); illarum
......
tamen breviter naturam aperiamus.
'in(de)jinita' solet duobus modis accipi, aliquando equipollens universali[ter], ali-
quandoparticulari[ter]. Quandoautem equipollensuniversali[ter], omnia (que) de illa
dicta sunt, de ista (universaliMS) dici possunt;et eodem modo quando particularilter],
que de illa dicta sunt, de ista dici possunt.
Singularium vero et contmdicturiarum eadem est natura in hoc quia sicut contra-
dictorie dividunt verum et falsum, sic singulares. Dicuntur etiam converti simpliciter
(et) per contrapositionem singulares, ut 'Socratesest homo'— 'quidam homoest Socrates'
et 'Socrates non est homo' — 'nullus homo est Socrates'; per contrapositionem hoc modo:
'Socratesesthomo'— 'omnenon-homoestnon-Socrates'.Unde nullam auctoritatem habemus.
(28?) Sed quia nullum videmus inconveniens, inde simpliciter (sequi MS) converti
dicimus. "
Potest et sic probari per contrapositionemconversio: si Socratesest homo, omne
non-homo est non-Sucratcs, quia si quidam non-homo est non-Socrates, Socrates non
est homü, e[d] destructioneün] consequentis. Assumptio est vera; et pari per contra-
positionem, quia omnis particularis negativa per contrapositionem convertitur. Sed [si]
est particularis negativa (nec MS), ergo convertitur.
Est etiam talis inferentia inter singulares et particulares, (et indeFmitns,quod si vera
est singularis,vera est particularis) et[iam] indeEnita; sed non convertitur; sed si falsa
est particularis et[iam] indefinito, et (sed MS) falsaest singularis.
Hec autem que dicta sunt de cathegorica propositione sufficiant. Nunc vero diligenter
de hypothetica disseramus.
Then, our author gives & short discussion of hypothetica] proposition

(28V-29T):
Hypothetica est, ut diximus, que habetantecedenset consequens.Que sic dividitur:
alia aFFlrmativa,alia negativa. AFErmativa est que aFFlrmataliquid consequi ex aliquo
antecedenti, ut hic: 'si Socratesesthomo, Socratesest animal' : hec enin't dicit Socratem esse
animal, si homo fuerit. Negativa est que habet 'non' ante 'si' (scilicet MS) vel alia(m)
condicione(m). Ut hic: 'non: si Socrates esthomo,Socrates estlapis'. iterum Et alia divisio
hypotheticaüum) sic: alia constat ex duabus categoricis, ut hic: 'Si Socratesest homo,'
Socratesestanimal' ; alia ex duabus hypotheticis, ut hic: 'si (quia) Socrates esthomoSocrates
est animal, et quia SocratesesthomoSocratesest corpus'; alia ex cathegorica et hypothetica,
ut hic: 'si omnishomoest animal, tunc si Socratesest homoSocratesest animal' alia ex hypo-
thetica et cathegorica, ut hic: 'si quia Socratesest homoSocratesest animal, Socratesest
corpus'locus est ab antecedenti,scilicet hic (sedhancenim MS):
posito antecedenti (antecedens MS) ponitur (positio MS) consequens.
134- LOGICA MODERNORUM "
Et sic probatur consequentia: si quia Socnates (29?) est homo Socrates est animal, tunc
Socrates est animal, ut quicquid sequitur ex vero, verum est; et si Socrates est in animal,
Socrates est corpus.
Cum igitur omnium consequentiarum alia ex duabus cathegoricis, alia ex duabus
hyporhcticis,aliaex cathegoricact hypothetica,aliaex hypotheticaet cathegoricaconstet,
quando cathegorica probat cathegoricam, locus, idest vis argumenti, in probante
cathegoricaaliquando secundum subiectum, aliquando secundumpredicatum, aliquando
secundumutrumque. Quando probat secundumpredicatum, in probante et in probat:-
[et in probata] cathegoricaeademsubiectaet diversapredicataconsiderantur. Quando
secundumsubiectum, diversasubiectaet eadempredicata. Quandosecundurnutrumque
[utrumque] est locus, in prübante cathegorica et predicatum et subiectum utrumque
mutatur. Quando secundum se totam, tota est locus et tota mutatur.
The discussion ends with the words:
Hec predicta (et) consequentiasunt introductiones secundumWilgelmum.
Thc rest of f. 291"(13 lines) hasbeenleft blank. A frcsh start is madeon

P. 29? by the samehand:
Contraria sunt quarum quidem (quod MS) una universaliter aFErmat,altera universaliter
negatur.
As & matter of fact we End here (PF.29V-30V)& similar text as is found

in the precedingfolios (Ff. 24—V-28v), bc it with some abbreviations.'
This part of the abbreviated version ends on f. 3OV,lines2-3: Et hec dc
cathegoricapropositionedicta suFEciunt(! insteadof the usual: sujiciant).
Next our author starts the discussion of hypothetical proposition. lt
turns out to be more complete than in the precedingfolios (Ff. 28'4-291').
First the terms are cxPlaincd:
De hypothetica, que dicitur conditionalis, agamus. Sicut cathcgorica, que etiam
predicativadicitur, in sui constitutione habet predicatum et subiectum, ita hypothetica
antecedens et consequens. Hypothetica sic dividitur: alia aFErmativa,alia negativa; et:
alia ex duabus cathegoricis, que simplexdicitur, alia ex duabus hypotheticis, alia ex hypo-
thetica et cathegorica, alia ex cathegorica et hypothetica; que compositedicuntur.
Then, the statute of the simplexhypotheticais discussed:

De simplici primum agamus. In illa cathegorica probat cathegoricam aliquando ex vi
predicati, aliquando ex vi subiecti, aliquando ex vi utriusque, aliquando ex vi totius.
Quando (ex vi) subiecti, communis cognitio est quod predicata manent eadem, subiecta
variantur; quandoex vi predicati, subiectamanenteadem,predicatavariantur; quando
ex vi utriusque, utrumque variatur, quando ex vi totius, tota variatur.
' Most of my corrections in the previous texts are based on this abbreviated version.
In order to prepare for the discussion of the loci communesthe division of

voces is given:
Et (ut) locorum consideratioevidentiuselucescat,hec vocis divisio videndaest.
Voces alie habent se ut pars ot totum, ut 'homo' et 'animal', alie (ut) pares, ut 'homo'
et 'risibilc', alie (ut) opposite, ut 'homo' et '!apis', alie (ut) immediate, ut 'homo' et
'non-homo', alie (ut) excedentes (ct) excesse, ut 'homo' et 'ofbm'. Cum igitur tot modis
voces (dividantur), secundum omnes datur locus in argumentis, exceptis cxcedcntibus

et excessis.
cht the four possibilities found in the case of & simplex hypothetica are
discussed(3OV-31V):
[l] Quandoenim cathegoricaprobat cathegoricamex vi predicati, dant(ur) quinque
localesdiHerentie: a toto, a parte, a pari, ab oppositis,ab immediatis; et octo regule.
A toto due, una:
de quocumque (31?) predicatur totum universaliter, de illo predi-
cantur omnes partes illius sub disiunctione;
alia:
de quocumque removetur aliquod totum universaliter, de illo remo-
ventur omnes partes illius. ..
A parte duo:
de quocumque predicatur pars, et totum;
alia:
de quocumque removentur omnes partes, etiam totum illarum.
A pari (duo):
de quocumque predicatur unum par, et reliqua;
alia:
a quocumque removetur unum par, et reliqua.

Ab oppositisuna:
de quocumque affirmatur unum oppositum, ab eodem removetur
oppositum illius.
Al.) immediatis una:
:: quocumque removetur unum immediatum, de illo affirmatur illius

immediatum.
[2] Quandocathegoricaprobat cathegoricamex vi subiecti, dantur tres localesdiFFe-

rentie: a toto, & parte, a pari, et sex regule.
A toto due:
quicquid predicatur de toto universaliter, et de qualibet parte illius
vcl universaliter vel particulariter vel in(cle)l'inite vel singulariter;
alia:
quicquid removetur & toto universaliter, illud idem removetur a

136 LOGICAMODERNORLIM
11
qualibet parte illius universaliter, particulariter, in(de)finite, singu-
lariter.
A parte due:
quicquid predicatur de parte universaliter, et de toto particulariter;
alia:
quicquid removetur a parte universaliter vel particulariter, a toto
particulariter.
A pari due:
quicquid predicatur de uno pari, et de reliquo;
alia:
quicquid removetur ab uno pari, et a reliquo.
[3] Secundumutrumque.duplices diH'erentie: et a toto et pari, (et) a toto et parte;

et clueregule. Unaa toto et pari :
si aliquod par predicatur de aliquo toto, par illius predicatur de parte
illius;
alia a toto et parte:
si aliqua pars predicatur de aliquo toto, totum illius partis predicatur
de parte subiecti totius.
[4] Secundumse totan'u( 31") dantur heeregule:

a pari:
posito uno pari ponitur et reliquum;
:: causa; a subalternis, a causaper accidens:

si vera est universalis, vera est sua conversa per accidens;
a subalternis :
si vera universalis affirmativa, vera est particularis affirmativa;
similiter de negativis.
Quando tota (toto MS) est probans, tota (toto MS) mutatur.
Et hec suFFlciuntde simplici hypothetica.
A similar exPosition Followsof the hypothetica composita that consists of

two hypothetical propositions (3lv-321'):
Agamusigitur de composita que constat ex duabus hypotheticis. In illa hypothetica
probat hypotheticam aliquando secundumantecedenset tunc dantur due regula:,
una:
quicquid infert antecedens, infert
consequens.
Si queritur quid significetur ab 'anteccdcnri',consequens
probantisdebet responderi. lllud
debet probari
..
THE INCREASING 1155 01: SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS 01: LOGIC 137
alia:
si aliquid infertur, quicquid infert antecedens infert consequens;
signiFlcatur
ab 'antcccdcnti' probantis.Hic nichil estad probandum.
antecedens
Aliquando secundum consequens, et tunc dantur hee tres regule:
quicquid sequitur ad consequens, sequitur ad antecedens;
consequensest antecedensprobantis. Hec restat ad probandum.
alia:
si aliquid infert aliud, quicquid sequitur ad consequens sequitur
(ad) antecedens;
probantiset nil est ad probandum;
significatur consequens
a 'consequsnri'
alia:
si aliquid infert aliud, destructo consequenti destruitur antecedens;

in hac nil est ad probandum.
Aliquando secundumutrumque et tunc dantur duc regule, una:
si aliquid infert aliud, antecedens antecedentis infert consequens
consequentis;
alia: '-
si aliquid infert aliud, tunc si aliud infert antecedens et aliud sequitur

ad consequens, antecedens antecedentis infert consequens consequentis.
lsta non eget probatione. Datur et alia regula (32?) in ista hypothetica, talis:
si aliquid infert aliud quod illatum inferat tertium, primum inferens
infert ultimum.
The discussionof the hypotheticacomposita which consistsof two hypo-

thetical propositions and a categoricalone, runs as follows (321'):
Quando due hypothetice probant unam (cathegoricam), dantur plures regule, una:
si vere sunt alique clue hypothetice, tunc si consequens prime infert
antecedens secunde, et antecedens prime infert consequens secunde;
-alia:
si aliqua cathegorica infert aliquam hypotheticam, tunc si aliquid
infert antecedens illius hypothetice, illud ponitur in loco eius;
alia:
sequitur ad consequens illius hypothetice, illud ponitur in loco eius
in consequentia;
alia:
si aliqua catliegorica infert aliquam hypotheticam, tunc si aliquid

infert ipsam cathegoricam et aliud infert antecedens illius hypo-
thetice, illa duo ponuntur in loco illorum in consequentia;
alia:
si aliqua cathegorica infert aliquam hypotheticam, tunc si aliud infert

ipsam cathegoricam et aliud sequitur ad ultimam partem ipsius hy-
pothetice, illa duo ponuntur in ordine consequentie;
alia:
infert ipsnm cathegoricam et aliud infert antecedens hypothetice et
aliud sequitur ad consequens illius, ilia ponuntur in loco illorum in
consequentia.
Finally, that hypothetical proposition which consistsof & categorica] and

& hypothetical proposition, is discussed(32r'V); the text breaks oFf on
f. 32'", where about three lines are left blank:
Agendumest de illa que constat ex cathegoricaet hypothetica. In illa cathegorica
probat hypotheticam, Sed quia alia est universalis aFErmativa, alia est universalis
negativa,et alia particularisaFFlrmativa,
aliaparticularis negativa,de universaliaH'irmativa
(32?) prius agatur. Probatenim illam aliquandoex vi predicati et tunc danturheeregule:
si aliquid predicatur de alio universaliter, tunc si aliud predicatur de
predicato universaliter, illud idem predicatur de subiecto universa-
liter;
alia:
si aliquid predicatur de aliquo universaliter, tunc si predicatum
subicitur subiecto, et subiectum predicato;
hec probanda est, prior vero non;
alia:
si (sed MS) aliquid predicatur de aliquo universaliter, tunc: si predi-
catum removetur ab aliquo universaliter, et subiectum universaliter
vel particulariter;
alia:
si aliquid predicatur de aliquo universaliter, tunc si aliquid removetur
a predicato universaliter, et a subiecto universaliter removetur;
alia:
si aliquid predicatur de alio universaliter, tunc si predicatum re-
movetur a seipso universaliter, et subiectum.
Aliquändo ex vi subiecti; et tunc dantur hee regule:
si aliquid subicitur alicui universaliter, tunc si aliquid subicitur
subiecto universaliter vel particulariter, et predicato;
alia:
si aliquid subicitur alicui universaliter, tunc si aliquid predicatur de
subiecto universaliter 1.rel particulariter, et de predicato particulari-
ter;
heedue non probantur;

alia:
si aliquid subicitur alicui universaliter, tunc si subiectum predicatur
de se particulariter, et predicatum;
hec debet probari;
alia:
si aliquid subicitur alicui universaliter, tunc si subiectum removetur

ab aliquo, illud idem removetur.
This is apparently the end of our treatise. No doubt, we have to do

with & compilation From what is called the Intraductionesof one master
William. The treatise is marked by the special attention paid to the
theory of reasoning. For that matter, the discussionof the loci communes
asthe pivots (the media,to usethe term of the secondtreatise; seebelow,
p. 143 Ff) of every argument brings to mind the chapter De locis which is
quite current in the later Summule.Who was this master William, will
appear when we deal with the second part of our manuscript, which is
to be.considered here.
I). A reportatio of & school-dispute in the School of St. Victor
Our scribe made & fresh start 011P. 331"with a discussion on oratio. lt
presumably formed part of an exposition on grammar. The First question
concernsthesigniEcationoforatio. [quote the Firstquestionin full (331'*V).
Unfortunately the Fll'Stsentences seem to be corrupt:
Quid significet oratio. 1' Ab ipso quod oratio quantitassignificat quia ipse de oratione
ibi quantitastractat. T
Istudsic solvitur. Quia oratio per senon signiFlcat,sedgratiaaeriscui adiacetet ideo
quidam ne videantur Boetio contrarii, dicunt vocem tantum poni in predicamento
quantitatis, sub qua cuntinetur oratio. Et tunc dicunt eam proferri et audiri et significare.
Secundum quam sententiam nostre prolationes sunt quantitates, idest mensure ueribus
'adiacentes. Que secundumhanc sententiam nec proferuntur nec audiuntur, nec signiFl-
cant, sedquantitatestantum, idest mensurequasin alia sententianec proferri necaudiri
nec signiücaredicebamus.
Contra tenentes hanc sententiam quod vox in quantitate ponatur, Priscianus esse
videtur, ubi dicit: "vox est aer ictus etc". Quod dicens vocem aerem esse
......
conErmat; et ita est corpus. Quod sic solvitur. Licet Priscianus dicat vocem esseaerem
ictum, tamennon dicit vocemesseaerem, sed esseper aerem. Quia hec cliFEnitionon
constat ex talibus nominibus, quoniam de voce predicantur, sed Et per causam diFFmiti,
idest vocis.Sicut enim dicit Victorinus in libro D:;[j'ïnin'm-mufn,,l
quedamdescriptionesper
causam ipsius descripti Eunt, ut ista: 'di-:i estfo! lucenssaperterram' ; non tamen possumus
! Note that the work is ascribedhere correctly to Marius Victorinus.

dicere: diesest sol. Descriptionemper causamessedicimusquandoaliquaEt dESCI'iPtiO,

ut qua causaipsius diFEniti ponitur, quoniam predicari non potest extra descriptionem
descripta. Ut ostensumest in supradictis (superdictaMS). Eodem modo licet sit verum
dicere in diffinitione, non tamen est verum extra: vaa-est aer ictus, quia illa descriptio
data est per causam(33?) vocis, idest per aerem, qui vocis est causasicut fundamentum.
lgitur Priscianus alibi contra eos essevidetur ubi dicit vocem essemagis vere corpus;
et ita quod vox sit corpusconcederevidetur. Quod iterum sic solvitur. Non (nunc MS)
ideo dicit vocem esse magis vere corpus quod revera sit corpus, sed ideo quod est magis
adhercnscorpori, quoniamalia incorporeaeoquodsine corpore essenon possint,alia
sunt que sine corpore essepossunt,ut nous,[030t0n,lmensdivina.
Then, our author discussesthe question utrum (sc. vox) dicatur vm, I."
prolationevel postPl'Ofdtionem
(33v-34r):
Queritur dc vocc specie quantitatis, utrum dicatur vox in prolatione vel post pro-
lationem. Ut isra quantitas 'homo' dum ab aliquo profertur, voxdicitur, post prolationem
voxdicitur; et ita non omnis vra):profertur. Nec est inconveniens si non omnis profera-
tur, eoquod postquam (per quam MS) prolata est, vox dicitur, quia dum profertur vox
proprie dicitur; postquam(quasiMS)vcro prolata est inpropric voxdicitur.
,
dicunt quod numquamvoxdicitur nisi dum profertur,
Quidammeliusconsiderantes
sed post prolationem suam permanet in suo esse, idest in quantitate que est eius esse,
sed non remanet in hac proprietate que est vox.
Videndumest quod vox ipsaspeciesnon existit nisi dum profertur cius indicium
aliquod. Et si hoc quod nullum indicium eius proferretur, forte contingeret quod ipsa
species hoc nomen quod est vox amitteret, sed tamen in esse suo, idest in quantitate,
remaneret.
Iterum queritur de vocequando[con]signiF1cct,

in prolatione vel post prolationem vel
in utroque, ut hcc vox 'homo'. Unde dicitur a quibusdam quod dum profertur tantum
rem signiücet. Dicunt enim 'signi 'ista-rc:-ll
et 'intellectum in anima generare' esse paria.
Intellectum vero non generat nisi (non MS) dum est in prolatiüne. Quandü cnim tota
prolata est, a nullo videtur et ita non generat intellectum in aliquo. Quod autem ante
prolationemnon significat,satis(34?) patensest, quia iam haberemusquod illud quod
non est vox essetvox. Quod Fierinon potest.
The same question is put in respect of oratio (34F'V):

Eodem modo queritur de oratione verum et falsum significante, utrum signiFlcct vel
in prolatione vel post prolationem tantum vel in utroque [vel post prolationem]. Quod
diversis modis dicitur. Quidam enim dicunt quod in prolatione et post prolationem
generant verum vcl falsum intellectum. Quidam vero quod in prolatione tantum, et
quidam ante prolationem tantum.
Sed quod prolata intellectum .
MS),
Gratia pcrstquam est, non generat (güörum sic
ostenditur. Si oratio postquamprolata est, in animo alicuius intellectum generat ct
signiFlcat,tunc vel ut oratio vel non ut (etiam MS) oratio. Dicunt aliqui (quod) ut
1: To agathon.
THE [NCREASING USE OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC 141
oratio significet; si oratio significat postquam prolata est ut oratio, tum: illud quod non
est signilïcat ut oratio; et si hec est, tunc quedam oratio non est vox.
Opponunt quidam dicentes orationem numquam significare in prolatione. Si enim
oratio in prolatione signiFlcaret, vel quando aliqua pars eius profertur, vel quando tota
])rüfertur. Sed quando tota oratio profertur, non significat et numquam simul proferri
potest. Signiücat igitur quando aliqua pars eius profertur. Quod non verum esse sic
volunt Ostenderc. Si oratio significat quando aliqua pars eius profertur, vel quando prima
vel quandomediavel quandoultima. Sedquandoprima profertur, verum vel falsumin-
tellectum non significat. Eodemmodo quandomediaparsprofertur vel ultima, volunt
probarc supradicti oppositores orationem non significare, sic dicentes. Si oratio pcr
ultimam partem sui signiHcatquandoprofertur, tunc illud quod non est iunctum cum
illo quod est, significat. Quando enim ultima pars orationis profertur, iam cetere partes
prolate sunt. Sedut signiücct hoc quod non est cum illo iunctum quod est, absurdumest.
Potesttamenhoc modo solvi. Oratio dicitur duobusmodissignificare: perfecteet
(34?) inperfecta. Imperfectasignificat dum prima vel media pars eius profertur, quia
adhuc non generat perfectum sensum. Perfecte dicitur significare quando ultima pars
profertur, idest in ultimo puncto orationis, quia tunc primum perfectum sensum
generat.
Et de recta signiücationc FactaeSt superius obiectioþicm]. Posteasi aliquis inferat:
ergo illud quod est iunctum cum illo quod non est significat., si dicat: 'cum iHo quad
nullomodoest', non sequitur, quia quando alicuius orationis ultima pars profertur, licet
eanon exismntin prolatione, cetere partestamen,ut supcri'üsdictum est de voce, in suo
essemanent,idest in quantitate.Si vero dicat: "si oratio per ultimam partemsignificat
quando profertur, tunc illud quod profertur signiFlcatcum illo quod non profertur";
vera est quidemsententia.Nec est inconveniens,si illud quod profertur cum illo quod
iam prolatum est signilicat, sed tunc prolatum verum vel falsum sig(niFl)cat intellectum.
Eodem modo de qualibet vocc significative! dicendum est quod in ultimo puncto
prolationis ipsius significet. Nam, ut Boetius dicit in Commenta, ex quo aliquis voccm
incipit profcrre, auditor incipit intelligere et sempersignificationemperfectamexpectat,
donecproferensad ultimum punctumprolationisperveniat.
Next, out author goeson to speakabout voxas the subject of dialectic.

He explains the threefold aim of logic, taken here as a generic term
comprising grammar, rhetoric and dialectic (34L35f):
Nunc vero quoniam quedamde voce vel eius proprietate, idest proprium esse,dieta
sunt — quod, ut superius dictum est, duobus modis dinoscitur —, ad evidentem
veritatis et falsitatisdiscretionem de ea dicamus.
Que discretio solis dyaleticis convenit 1'aliquod dicendum ut competenter veniamus,
trinum Finem loyce breviter colligamus. Cuius tota intentio est agere de vocibus; sed
hoc diversis Finibus.Habet enim loyca alium Encm in grammatica, alium in rethorica,
alium in dyaletica.
(35?)[n grammaticahabet hunc Finemut reddat lectorem peritum loquendogram-
matice, ita scilicet ut casum cum casu, numerum cum numero et alia que pertinent ad
ipsamartem sciat competenteradaptare, In rethorica autem habet hunc ut qui peritus
fuerit rethor, sciat loqui persuasoric, ita scilicet quod attentos sibi possit reddere
audientes. ln dyaletica hunc Finem dicitur habere ut qui dyaleticus fuerit, veritatem a
falsitate sciat discernere (discretionem MS) et ut audita aliqua re sciat eam probare
cathegorice 1.felhypothetice.
Que discretio veritatem et falsitatem vocibus et sillogismorum ratione Ermissimam
manifesta[n]t.Et hoc totum dicitur ad dyaleticampertinere. Que (quamMS) quid sit
et quot (quod MS)modisaccipi possetostendimus.
superiuscliFFmivimus
The causainventionisof the art of dialetic and some related questions

about its origin seem to Form & transition to & set of disputationes(35f'V):
Nunc autem cum de ea sit agendum, videndum est qua de causareperta sit, hoc moclo.
Priores quidem philosophi sepe fallebantur in suis inquisitionibus male argumentando
quedam contraria colligentes. Ut si quis sic colligit nullum hominem esseasinum:
'nullus asinus esl: rationalis
omnis aurem homo est rationalis
nunu: igitur homo es.'.asinus'.
hoc recte concluditur, quia in secundangra ex universali negativaet universali affirma-
tiva universalis negativa recte colligitur. Rursum (si) hominememeasinumcolligat, hoc
modo:
'omnis asinus cs: animal
sed omnis homo est.animal
homo igitur asinus est'
,
hic non recte concluditur, cum in secundaFiguranichil possit regulariter concludi ex
omnibus amrmativis.
Quoniam igitur per imperitiam disputandi contraria colligebant quod Fleri im-
posuerant (?) placuit ipsis philosophis ipsarum argumentationum naturam preconsiderare
ut, ea re cognita, natura in suis inquisitionibus minimc (35?) [l'ullcrentun Et sic hac de
causareperta est dyaletica.
Que quomododividatur, in libris dyaletice sepeinvenimus.
Solet queri de ipsadyaletica utrum prius essetquam hominesde illa haberentnoticiam.

Cui questioni diversesententie(sententiequestioni diverse MS)respondentur,huc modo.
Sententiaphil4::rs--:.erhcummI
est SummumOpiEcema principio cunctassimul creasse
animas et eis omnem dedisse scientiam. Sed quando ad corpora descendunt in superis
celestibus per quas transeunt amittant paulatim scientiam suam, ita scilicet ut cum ad
ipsa corpora perveniant, illa nimia mole obfuscatede tanta scientia nil sciant. Solet
tamen aliquis ad mentem reducere per doctrinam aliquid de illis sententiis quas habuit
priusquama11i111a[m]ad corpus descenderet.
Secundumquam sententiam possumusdicere quod qui prior dyaleticam (dyaleticus
MS) invenit, et, ut melius dicam, ad mentem reduxi(t), in illius animalm] priusquam
incorpor(ar)etur, fundata fuit dyaletica. Et hoc modo prius fuit quam homo haberet de
ea scientiam.
Vel aliter. Prius fuit dyaletica quam homo eam sciret, scilicet prius fuerunt genera
et species etc., de quibus agit dyaletica, quam de illis homo haberet scientiam. Quam
scientiam (sententiam MS) vocamus dyaleticam.
1 Compare Macrobius, ln Cic. SamniumScipionis, [ 9.

THE INCREASING use OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC 14-3
The final word dyoloticomis Follm-vedby the sign ', apparently indicating a
.
in
caesura our copy. Then the readeris plungedabruptly into a reportotio
of school-exercises in logical disputes. All of them turn around the
central function of the mediumin every argument.. Our text starts with
a discussionon mediuma partibus (35V-361'):
MEmus-i a PARTIBUS:si aliqua species predicatur de suo genere universaliter affir-
mando, quodlibet appositum potest predicari de qualibet alia specie illius generis. Ut hic:
'si omneanimo! est.asinus, omnis homo est lapis'. Quod sic probatur. Si omne animal est
asinus, omnis homo est asinus. A genere. Si omnis homo est asinus, omne non-asinus est
non-homo. A pari per contrapositionem. Iterum. Si omne animal est asinus, omnis asinus
est asinus. Si (36?) omnis asinus est asinus, omnis asinus est non-homo. A parte. Et si
vere sunt iste due propositiones: 'omne non-osinns est non-homo' et 'omnis asinus csl: non-
homo', vera est 'omnenon-Iopisest non-homo'.A dividentibus: quicquid predicatur de
partibus dividentibus, et de diviso. Et si omne (non)-lapis et non-homo, omnis homo
est lapis. A pari. Modo collige extrema.
Eodem modo poteris habere 'omnishomoest.bos', .vel aliquid tale.
Then, other instances are given. On f. 36V our author discussesthe

natura de medioa subiectoand on f . 371"the natura de medioa predicato. The
determination of these kinds of arguments is discussedon f. 37'urFf.
I quote the beginningsof this section (37'i-38V):
Hec supradictamedia, scilicet medium a partibus et de predicato et de subiecto, hoc
modo determinantur. Vel magis quando ex aliquo antecedenti duo consequentiase-
quuntur, unumquodque per se, ex quibus postea simul acceptis sequitur aliud, non licet
iungi extrema, quia medius terminus dissimiliter enuntiatus est. Ut in argumentatione.
medii a partibus ex (et MS) 'omneanimalos:asinus'sequitur (sequitur MS): 'omnenon-
asinus est non-homo' et 'omnis asinus est non-homo' unumquodque per se; et ex illis postea
simul acceptis trahitur: 'omnis homo est bos', vel aliquid tale. Medius itaque terminus
dissimiliter enunciatus est, scilicet ille due prapositiones dissimiliter enuntiantur.
Quare non probatur consequentia, quia non ostenditur sequi ex aliquo vero.
Et hoc habet Auctoritas scilicet dicens (vel dicentis MS) quod quandomedius tcr-
minus dissimiliter enunciatur, non licet extrema concludere, si sit talis dissimilatio que
impediat conclusionem.
Sedcontra respondeturquod cum hec Boetiusdixit, agebatde modalibus(38?)pro-
positionibus.Sedpremissepropositionesnon sunt modales.Quarehec ratio non videtur
cogens. Sed concedatur (inconcedatur). ln nulla enim argumentatione universaliter
1'iterum dicitur extrema coherent, quia ibi semper medius terminus dissimiliter enun-
ciatur. Ratio enim predicta in medio a partibus non videtur valere, quod dicimus,
quandoaliquapropositio falsaconcedaturpro vera,quoddebeathabereillud quod vera,
scilicet quod predicatum sit maius vel par subiecto.
Medio.Nota hanc naturamin parvo medio, quotiensaliquid de aliquo universaliter
predicatum predicatur de se particulariter. Ut hic: 'si omnis homoest lapis, quidam lapis
est.lapis'. Quod sic probatur. Si omnis homo est lapis, tunc vera est ipsa, scilicet 'omnis
homoestlapis', et iterum ista: 'quidamlapis es:homo'..Et si vere sunt iste clue propo-
[44 LOGICA MODERNORLIM n
sitiones: 'omnis homo est lapis' et 'quidam homo est lapis', tunc 'quidam lapis est lapis'.
A subiecto. Regula :
si aliquid subicitur alicui universaliter et aliquid subicitur
subiecto particulariter, primum predicatum predicatur (parti-
culariter MS) de secundo subiecto particulariter.
Collige terminos positos.
Et iterum illud nota in parvo medio:
si aliquid removetur & sc universaliter,
illud removetur ab alio particulariter.
Ut hic : 'si nullus asinusestasinus,quidamhomonon estasinus'. Et istud aliud:
si aliquid singulare predicatur de aliquo universaliter,
ipsum predicabitur de se.
Ul: hic: 'si omnisasinusest Brundius, Bruncliuscst BruncHus'. Et istud aliud:
si aliquid singulare removetur a se,
illud removetur ab aliquo particulariter vel ab aliquo singulariter.
Ut 'si Socratesnon est Socrates,quidam asinus non est Socrates,vel BruncHusnon est Socratcs'.
Has naturas proba per parvum medium in unaquaque(38'-') faciendo locum ad

destructionemconsequentis.
The next lines are of some interest because the)Ir contain a mention of
the name of one Gyldx-vinus(38V):
Media. Nota hanc manerium terminorum in medio Gyldwini. Et secundum eos
poteris invenire ex qua natura procedant. 'Si omnis homo est lapis, tunc si quidam homo est
homo,si omnislapis est homo,quidamlapis est lapis'. Qui terminus sic probatur. Si omnis
homo est lapis, tunc si quidam homo est homo, quidmn homo est lapis. A subiecto.
Et si quiaquidamhomoesthomo,quidamhonw est lapiset quia quidamhomoest homo
sequitur: si omnislapisesthomo, quidamhomo est homo. Ab antecedenti.ProbatioEt
:! predicato. Iterum, si omnis homo est lapis, tunc si quidam homo est homo, quidam
lapisest lapis. A subiecto. Et si quia quidamhomo est homo quidam lapisest lapis, tunc
si quia omnis lapis est homo quidam homo est homo, et quia omnis lapis est homo,
quidam lapis est lapis. Ab antecedenti.
Modo habeshic uuam consequentiamet ante aliam. Ex his sic procede. Et si vere
sunt iste clue consequentie, ista[s si quidam homo est homo sequitur] 'si omnislapis est.
homo, quidam homoest homo', et ista: 'si quia omnislapis est homoquidam homoest homo, et
quia omnislapis est homoquidamlapis est lapis', vera est ista: 'si quidam homoest homo,si
omnislapisesl:homoquidamlapiscsl:lapis'. Ab antecedentiet a consequenti.Hinc ultimo
consequentiadiunge: 'omnishomoestlapis', quod (erat) primum antecedens,et,habebis
terminos positos.
This tract on practical di5pute is continued up te- P. 421', where it breaks

off in our cepy in the middle of a probatio(421'):
THE INCREASING USE OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC [45
Proba quod ista consequentia antecedat ad 'omnisasinuscst cignm' sic: si vera est et falsa
est illa consequentia, tunc falsa est, et si falsa est illa consequentia, tunc omnis asinus
est cignus et si quidam asinus non est cignus, vera est illa consequentia. Istud sic proba:
si quidam asinus non est cignus, quoddam animal non est cignus
......
The word cignus is followed by the sign and the rest of the page
. ..
(about [2 lines) is left blank. For the remainder of this manuscript, see
above Ch.. I, nr. 24, p. 92.
Thus, this tract serves to give us an impression of the practice of
school-exercises in logical disputes. Presumably the exposition of vox
as the subject of dialectic and the discussion of the origin and purport of
dialectic have been taken From some more systematic exposition of the
art of dialectic. The whole work as it has come down to us in this cap)r
(FT.33'*-42l'), makesthe impression of & compilation of some reportatio
of school-lectures on grammatical and logical questions. The remainder
of this section of our manuscript turns out to be of the same trlark.l
Finally. Some remarks on the date and provenance of these tracts.
No doubt, the Erst tract is a compilation, as appears from the Enal
sentence Of its Erst part: Hec predicta (ct) conscäucncia sum: introductiones
Wilgelmum(P.291").Its second part is an abbreviation of the
secundum
Fll'Stone.2 As the copy was written in the Erst decades of the twelfth
century (see above Ch. I, nr. 24), one cannot help thinking of Master
William of Champeaux as the author. I think we are quite right in doing
so. Certainly, the mention of Gilduin (in the second tract, see above,
p. 144) points in the samedirection. [n fact, & personof that namewas
Abbot of St. Victor's in Paris from I I 13-1 155.3
This surmiseis strongly supportedby & passagein john of Salisbury,
Meta! [II, 9 where the author says that in the common topics found in
.
the Topicathe subject-matter of invention (inventio)is involved. The
latter was deEned by William of Champeaux as the science of Ending &
middle term and of thence constructing an argument:
Matal. III, 9, 15294": Versatur in his inventionis materia, quam hilaris memorie
Willelmus de Campellis, postmodum Catalanensis episcopus, diffinivit, etsi non per-
fecte, essescientiam reperiendi medium terminum et inde eliciendi argumentum. Cum
enim de inherentia dubitatur, necessarium est aliquod inquiri medium cuius interventu
copulentur extrema. Qua speculatione an aliqua subtilior 1»'clad rem eFflcaciorfuerit,
non facile. dixerim. Medium vero necessarium est ubi vis inferentie in terminis vcrtitur.
Si enim inter totas propositionessit, ut potius sit obnoxiacomplexioni partium quam
partibus complexis, mcdii nexus cessat.
' See:above, p. 139. : Sec above, p. 134.

3 Sec E. Lesne, LesEcoles,p. 224.
Our tracts seem to date from the period before 1113, when William
still was at Paris' and Gilduin not yet Abbot of the. Priory of St. Victor
and probably still William's pupil. .
To which Parian school the tracts are to be ascribed is not quite
certain. The Augustinian canonry of St. Victor was founded by William
in 1108. Do the tracts date from the time, when William lectured on
logic at St. Victor's or from his mastership in the School of Notre Dame?
The question cannot be settled with gTeat certainty. Gilduin's abbotship
of St. Victor's might point to the School of St. Victor, but Gilduin ma)"
have already been & pupil of William's during the time when the latter
was archdeacon and master of Notre Dame (about 1100). This much
seems to be certain, that the tracts under discussion are valuable docu-
ments from the circle around Master William of Champeaux. The gram-
matical-logical stamp of these tracts as well as of the remaining part of
our manuscript can be adduced in support of this surmise.
3 - Pour Compendia of Logic from the School of Mont Ste Geneviäve
As is well known, the School of Mont Ste. Geneviäve in Paris was

one of the main centres of the study of logic during the second and third
quarters of the twelfth centm'y. [ have recentlyr published some new
evidence from the manuscripts on the teaching of logic as practised in
that schcuül.2
a Introductiones Montanc minores
The oldest treatise to be considered here is & compendium found in

two twelfth century manuscripts: Vienna, V.P.L. 2486 and Wolfen-
büttel 56.2O Aug. SO.! lt has the following incipit:
De duobus in logica agitur, scilicet de vocibus et de rebus. Sed quia doctrina vocum
prior est doctrina rerum, ideo primum de voce agamus.Sed quia vox super se habet sonum
quasi genus suum, ideo de sono quid ipse sit dicamus.
The Erst part of this treatise (edition pp. 11-46) deals with sonus,
vox, nomen, orario, propositio, (its defmition, division; the interrelation
' He becamebishop of Chälons in I 113.

: SameNew Eridcnce on Tu-eyïh Centug/ Logic: Alberic and the Schon! qf allon: Ste Generiäve
(.lIantani)in: VIVARILIM, & ]ournal for MediaevalPhilcauutzurpll).r
and the Intellectual Life
of the Middle Ages4 (1966), pp. l-57.
3 For these manuscripts, seeabove Ch. 1, nrs. 24-and 25, p. 91 Ff.
THE INCREASING [155 01: SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS 01: LOGIC 147
and conversionsof the categorica]proposition; hypothetica] proposition,

its kinds). Just like in someother compendia,probablymadein the same
school, the discussion of the vis queremieleads the author to speakabout
the loci communes(De locis qui solent assignariin lyipathctica simplici).'
This section (pp.. 47—67)can be considered as a precursor of the
chapter Delocisin the later Summule.Next the syllogismus which are based
On asimple implication (qui funt cx ypothetica simplici) are discussed (pp.
67-69). Then, the sillogisms based on & composed implication are
discussed (pp. 69-71). Our treatise abruptly ends in the middle of
this discussion.
Thus the First part of our tract dealswith those subjectsthat will be
discussed in the chapter called Introductioncsof the later Summule?A
Featureof the whole treatiseis that it is richly provided with oppositiones
and their solutiones.lt impressesone as a very sound piece of work.
On severalgrounds ] havedated it about 11303.It must be placed in
the surroundings of Alberic OFParis. [ have prcposed to call it Introduc-
cianesMontanemhrmrcs.4 It will be edited in the second part of this stud)lr
as Tract ] (pp. 7—71). ..
b Imroductione: ;Hontane maiores
The important Parisian manuscript B.N. Lat. 15. l4-l dating from the
twelfth «menturyscontains two pieces on logic; on FF.lf-4-6V the Summa
SophisticorumElencharumwhich [ have edited in the. Erst volume of my
Logica Modcmorum(pp. 257-458), and on H'.471'-104r an elaborate
treatise 011logic which opens as follows:
SECUNDUSB que in prima Introductionumeditione teneris introducendorum auribus sunt
accomodata simpliciter, et que quadam fallatia videntur in eis esse inplicita, unum-
quodque si(n)gillatim subtilius perquirenda, uberrime elimabit.
Sed quoniam !ntroductionumordo & voce sumpsit initium, hec quoque disputatio ab
eademducatexordium. (f. 4-7'1'").
! Cp. below, p. lS3f.

3 E.g. in the Summulefound in Paris, B.N.La:. ll4l2, and ascribed to some Nicholas.
See below, pp. 449-4-90.
3 ap. CH., p. 3.
'! op. Cic., p. 20.
5 For this manuscript, see above Ch. !, nr. 2], pp. 86-87.
0 sc. LIBER. lt should be noted that the term liber secundus
does not refer to the pre-
ceding SummaSaphistfcorumElcnchorum, but to some previous shorter tract on logic,
viz. the Introductiones
Mantancminores.See my paper in VIVARIUM 4- (1966), pp. 18-20.
148 LOGICA h'IODERNORUh-l 11
This tract frequently refers to itself by the title iHEI'OdUCE10n05.1

There are
striking resemblances, indeed, betx-veenthis treatise and the !ntroductiones
minoresmentioned sub (ci).2 Alberic of Paris is the favourite master,
again.3 lt appears to have been, For the main part, a sort of reportatio 01"
Alberic's lectures at Mont Ste Genevi'eve. It can be dated about 1140.4
For some more information about this treatise, see my paper in vnm-
[uuum
c A Fragment qf Anathcr Compendium qf Logic

The same Wolfenbüttel manuscript (56.20 Aug. 80)6 contains &
fragment of another compendium of logic from the School of Alberic.
It begins rather abruptly with the well-known exordial topics: intentio,
materia,fnis and ojcium? Onlyr & small part of this compendium seems
to have survived. It apparentl)Ir dated from before 1140 and is to be
located in the surroundings 01'Alberic 01'Paris.3
d An abbreviatian(J someIntroductionesMontane
A collective manuscript discovered by Grabmann in the librar)r of
the Germanisches Nationalnwseum at Nuremberg'ï' contains among
other important pieces on logic an abbreviation of some introductory
compendium on logia")
Its incipit (1'.551")reminds us of that OFthe compendium mentioned
5le (c) from the Wolfenbüttel manuscript:
Quot (Quod MS) sunt inquirenda circa principium artis dialetice? Quinque: nomen,
intentio, oFEcium,materia, linis. Quod est nomen huius artis? Dialetica. Sumpsit autem
hoc nomen & dialetica disputatione. Quomodo? 'Dia' namque dua, 'logas' sermo inter-
pretatur; inde dialetica quasi dualis sermo interpretatur, ide(st) sermo intcr Oppünentem
et respondentem.Quare?Huic arti a dialeticadisputationenomen antiquitasimposuit.
Per dialeticam namque disputationem totius artis veritas aperitur. Ad dinosccndam huius
' See my paper, pp. 19-20.

3 See ibid., pp. 20-25.
3 Sec ibid., pp. 27-35.
4 Seeibid., p. 36. Severalpassages
Fromit havebeenprinted ibid., pp. 18-36.
5 quoted above, l). 146, n. 2.
6 For this manuscript.seeaboveCh. 1, nr. 25, pp. 93-94.
? For its incipit, seemy paper, pp. 9-10.
3 See ibid., pp. 17-18.
9 For this manuscript. see above Ch. l., nr. 13, pp. 54-55.
"* For the so-calledExcerpta seebelow, pp. 155-160.
Introductionum,
THE INCREASING USE OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGlC 149
artis intentionem sciendum est quoniam duo sunt opiFlccshuius artis. Qui sunt illi?
Est unus qui agit ex arte, qui secundum regulas et precepta artis disputat et vocatur
diakticus, idest disputator.Qui agit de arte est ille qui docet artem et exponit regulas et
precepta artis et magister vel demonstra:(or) nuncupatur. ltaque secundum diversos
opificesdiversasassignamus. intentiones.
For the rest of the initial passage,see the edition in our second part
(Tract [l, below, p. 77).
Our tract deals with the usualsubjects: sonus,nomen,verbum,oratio,
propositia and the several kinds of proposition and their interrelations,
conversions, and interrelations (551'-S91'). On f. 591' the section on
hypothetical proposition is started. After the enumeration of its kinds
(59P'V) our author goes on to discussthe vis ;'.-gferenticof the simple
implication (ypotheticasimplexnaturalis).This causeshim to deal with the
loci in an extensive way. As & matter of fact &somewhat later hand added:
hic sequitur de locis:
Que est naturalis? Cui preponitur 'si', ut diximus. Que est antecedens in ypothetica
simplici naturali? Cui propünitur 'si'. In quo consideratur vis inferentie in ypothetica
simplici naturali? Quandoquein predicato antecedentis,'Eluandoquein subiecto ante-
cedentis, quandoque in utroque, quandoque in tota propositionc Considcratur
.......
etiam alio modc-localis habitudo in predicato antecedentia Quo modo? Quando sub-
iectum antecedentis et predicatum consequentis sunt idem et predicatum antecedentis
et. subiectum consequentis sunt diversa, localis habitudo consideranda est in predicato
antecedentisrespectu (601')subiecti consequentis; et secundumhoc quod predicatum
antecedentishabetse adsubiectumconsequentis,locus est assignandus
vel a toto, vel a
parte, vel alio modo (59'9-601';edition, pp. 8437-8519).
The discussionof the composedimplication (ypotheticacomposita

naturalis)
leadshim on to deal with categoricalsyllogism:
Nunc dicendum est de ypothetica composita. ïpothetica composita alia constat ex
categorica et ypothetica, alia ex ypothetica et cathegorica, alia ex duabus ypotheticis vel
pluribus. Et prius dicendum est de ea que constat ex cathcgorica et ypothetica
.......
Sed quia doctrina omnis est sillogismorum cathegoricorum et istarum propositionum
ypotheticarumet quia mgulisfereeisdemdemonstrantursillogismicathegoriciet huius-
müdi cathegorice propositiones, simul dicemus de cathegoricis sillogismis et huiusmodi
ypotheticispropositionibus(671';edition, p. 974'27).
The discussion of the three Egures forms the Fmal section of this com-
pendium (Ff. 67T-723').lt turns out to be basedon Boethius' work on
cathegorical syllogism, while Aristotlc's Prior Anabrticsis not mentioned:
Sillogismi cathegorici-alii sunt regulares, alii irregulares. chulares qui continentur in
regulis datis ab auctoribus, ut illi qui continentur in tribus terminis et in tribus propo-
sitionibus, quales sunt in Libro cathcgoricarumsillagismorum; edition, p. 981'4.
The abbreviation is written in a handwriting characteristic of the

middle of the twelfth century".l Unlike the scribe of the previous pages
(IT. 4-1f-54-V)
our copyist seemsto havebeen versedin the matters under
discussion.
The original compendium itself seems to have had some connection
with Alberic of Paris. This can be concluded from several passages.
First, there is & passageon the meaning of the terms 'nomen'and 'verbum' :
Et notandum est quod 'nomen'hic large accipitur. includit enim sua signiEcatione
quasdam interiectiones et quedam adverbia, ut 'bene', 'male' et his similia. Similiter et
'vcrbum' sua significatione quedam participia complectitur, ut 'disputans', 'amans', et
cetera in hunc modum. (1. 55'-'; edition, p. 78'3'22).
This was exactly the view ascribed to Alberic and his school.2 There is
another interesting passage in the section on the loci communes:
Est etiam locus a tuto in al'Flrmativa, ut quidam dicunt. Quümodo? 'S.-'Socratesesthomo,
estiste vci ista'. Unde locus? A toto. Regula: de quocumque predicatur aliquod
totum, et partes eius sub disiunctione. Assigna: sed homo est totum et pre-
dicatur de Socrate.Conclude: ergo parteseius de eodemsub disiunctione. Non sequitur.
Res enim que determinatealicui insunt, nomina sumptaab illis non predicantur sub
disiunctione. Quod testatur Boetius qui dicit: "corvus non est albus vel niger, quia
tantum niger, et nix non est albavel nigra, quia tantunn alba". A simili: ergo si Socrates
(62?) est homo, non est hic vel hic, quia tantum hic. (61 '-'-62l'; edition, p. 88349).
Now, we have & testimon)r in the gloss Pr-snviiisin-ms3

which ascribes this
refutation to the followers of Alberic of Paris:
1. 66"! (ad Priscianum Inst. gramm.V 2): Hec autem est diH'erentiainter numina dubia
generiset communisquod illis preponunturarticulariaduo I subdisiunctione,istis vero
per copulationem.Albricani inde sumuntinstantiasad hec argumenta:'esthomo,ergo
esthomovelasinus'; fallacia; 'dcdinatur: 'hic magisrcr", ergodeclinatur' 'hic velhecmagixter".
Nichil est: bis deberet ponere 'dcchnatur'4.
This testimony Hts in very well x-vitha passagein an anonymous commen-

tary on Boethius, De gylHyrp. from Alberic's School.5 Therefore [
propose to call this work Abbreviatio intraductianum Montanarum or Ab-
breviatiozilontanaäThe exclusiveuseof the logicavetus(seeabove, p. 149)
seems to point to & date preceding 1140.
! The name of Socrates is found as Socrates,Sacraï, Sand., and Soci.
: See my paper in VIVARIUM 4- (1966), pp. 10; 17.
3 For this grammatical gloss, see below, pp. 255-262.
4 quoted in Hunc ", p. 50.
5 See my paper in VIVARIUM (quoted above, p. 146. n. 2), p. 56.
5 The work contains an example in which the term introductionesis used. Our author
gives (567)asan exampleof the enuntiatioinparatum:'afrm.: introductiancs'.
THE INCREASING USE OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC 15]
4 - Two Compendia of Logic found in Berlin, Lac.oct. 76

ln 1955 I found in the Universitätsbibliothek in Tübingen an interesting
twelfth century manuscript belonging to the Berlin collectioni kept in
Tübingen since the end of the Second World War, under the signatum
BeroLMS.Lat.oct. 763 This manuscript contains on [T. Sv-l 11' & logica]
compendium entitled Intraductianes dialetica and the initial words of
another one.
a Introductioncs dialetica
The first compendium has the following incipit:

Ingredientibuslogicam incipiendum est a voce. Cuius genusest sonus. Huius diffinitio
talis est: sonusest quicquid aure percipitur.
This compendium is presumably complete. It is rather concise but clear

and well-composed. lt omits the discussion OFnoun and verb and deals
rather extensivelywith the doctrine of propositjpn, categorica!as well
as hypothetical. The author's main interest apparently lies in the thær]:r
of argumentation, as may appear From his discussion of the propositio
hypothetica(H".9'*'-101'
):
et consequensiunctum vel per 'si' vel
ïpothetica propositio est que habetantecedens
per 'cum' vel 'dum'. ( ...... ) Hec aliquando componitur ex duabus cathegoricis,
aliquandoex cathegoricaet ypothetica, aliquandoex duabusypotheticis. De duabus
ultimis diFferamus(disseramusMS) et de eaque constatex duabuscathegoricisagamus.
Cathegoricaprobat cathegoricamaliquandogratia (10?) predicati, aliquandogratia
subiecti, aliquando gratia utriusque.
The discussionof these three casesgives our author the opportunity

to deal with the rules of tcpical argument (argumentatiolocalis), which
'are discussedin the later Summule under the heading: Dc locis.
After & few words on argument and its kinds (gillogismus,enthimema,
inductio)our compendium ends without any clear explicit.
] give the complete text of theseIntroductiones.
Ber01.MSLa£.Oct. 76, ff. 3v-l Ir;
! Manyof the manuscriptsof the former Preuszische Staatsbibliothekin Berlin are now
preservedin the WestdeutscheBibliothek in Marburg&. Lahnand in the Universitäts-
bibliothek in Tübingen."
2 For this manuscript,seeaboveCh. l., nr. I, p. 20.
!NTRODUCTIONES DH LETICE BEROUNENSES

lngreclientibuslogicam incipiendum est a voce. Cuius genus est sonus. Huius diffinitio
talis est: sanus est quicquid aure precipitur. Sic diFFmitur. Et sic dividitur: sonus alius
vox, alius non vox: sonusnon vox ut fragorarborum,collisio lapidumet similia..Sonus
vox est percussio aeris que Formata plectro lingue per quasdam gutturis cavitates, que
arteria. vocantur, ab animali profertur. Vox alia nomen, alia verbum, alia oratio. De
nomine et verbo omittamus, de oratione agamus.
Oratio alia imperativo, alia Optativa, alia coniunctim, alia delirecativa, alia indicativo
vel enuntiativa, que propositio dicitur. lmperativa ut ffac hoc', optatius ut 'utinam bonus
essem',coniunctim ut 'cum—faciam vitulum, profrugibus ipse l'enito', deprecatiua, ul: 'adesto
Deus'. lndicativa vel enuntiatiua est eadem que et propositiodicitur.
Que propositio sic difEnitur: propositio est oratio verum falsumuesignificans.Sic
autem dividitur: propositio alia categorica,alia ypothetica. De ypotheticanunc differre
licet et de cathegoricadisserere.
Cathegoricapropositio dicitur predicaiiro a verbo 'cathegoro,-as, -at', quod est predico,
-os,-at. Cathegoricapropositio est que habetpredicatumet subiectumcum copula verbi,
ut 'Socratesesthomo': 'Socrates'est subiectum, 'homo' predicatum, 'est' copula. Cathe-
gorica alia vera, alia falsa; vera, ut 'Socratesesthomo', falsa, ut 'Socratesestlapis'. Item. Alia
affirmativa, alia negativa; affirmativa ut 'Socratesest homo', negativa ut 'Socratesnon est
(f. 91")homo': Item. Alia universalis, alia particularis, alia indefinita, alia singularis;
universalis que habet universale signum, ut 'omnishomoestanimal' ; particularis que habet
particulare signum, ut 'quidam homo est animal'; indefinita que nec universale signum
habet nec particulare, ut 'homoestanimal'; singularis propositio est que habet singulare
nomen in subiecto, ut 'Socratesest homo'.
Primo notandumquod cethegoricapropositio alia universalisaffirmativa, ut 'omnis
homoest animal', alia universalis negativa, ut 'nullus homoest animal', alia particularis
affirmativa, ut 'quidam homo est animal', alia particularis negativa, ut 'quidam homo non
est animal'. Deinde sciendum quod trina est materia circa quam versatur omnis propo-
sitio: naturalis, contingens, remota. Naturalis est illa materia, quando id quod predicatur
naturaliter inest subiecto, ut 'homoestanimal'; contingens est illa materia in qua forma
predicaturde formato, ut 'Socrates
estalbus'; remotaesthuandoid quod predicatur nullo
modoinestsubiecto,ut 'Socrates
estlapis'.
Postquam vidimus quod omnis propositio in tribus ['it materiebus, videndum est que
propositiones quibus propositionibus opponantur. Universalis aFürmativa et universalis
negativa opponuntur sibi tamquam contrarie, nam ipse contraria sunt; particularis
affirmativa et particularis negativa opponuntur sibi tamquam subcontrarie, quia ipse
quoque sunt contraria. Universalis aFHrmatis-aet particularis negativa opponuntur sibi
tamquam contradictorie, et particularis afErmativa et universalis negativa tamquam
contradictorie. Universalis affirmativa et particularis aFFlrmativaet universalis negativa
et particularis negativa sunt sibi subalterna: Ut in subiecto exemplo patebit:
'ems hemo—ggarumal' COHIRARIE 'r'-dq:- I-q-no esl anmor

SI—PHBI'W'EFI'S
NHJIWEF'S
'tu-udumrun: nm est arumal'

THE INCREASING uss or- SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS 01: LOGIC 153
(f. 9'-') Dehinc:de legibusearum dicendum est. Lex contrariarum talis est: Si vera
est una, falsa est alia. Ut si vera est hec: 'omnis homo est animal', falsa est hec:
'nullus homo est animal'. Inveniuntur autem simul false, numquam simul vere; et in
contingenti materia, ut 'omnis homoasi albus', 'nullus homo est albus', utrumque falsum est.
Lex subcontrariarum talis est: si falsa est una, vera est alia. Ut si falsa est
hec: 'quidam homonon est animal', vera est hec: 'quidam homoest animal'. Sed non con-
vertitur, ut si vera est 'quidam homoest animal' falsa sit 'quidam homonon est animal'.
Inveniuntur enim simul vere, numquam simul false; similiter in contingenti materia, ut
'quidam homoestalbus', 'quidam homonon es!:albus' utrumque 1Hsrumest.
Lex subalternarum talis est: Si vera est universalis, vera est et particu-
laris, ut si vera est 'omnishomoestanimal', vera est 'quidam homoasl:animal'. Sed non con-
vertitur ut si vera (est) 'quidam homoest animal', vera sit 'omnis homocst.animal'. item.
Si falsa est particularis 'quidam homo est animal', falsa est universalis: 'omnis homoest
animal'. Sed non convertitur, ut si falsa est 'omnis homo est animal' falsa sit 'quidam homo
es: animal'; possunt enim simul esse vere, numquam simul false, ut 'omnis homo cst.
animal', 'quidam homoestanimal' utrumque verum est.
Lex contradictoriarum talis est, ut si vera sit una, falsa sit alia. Ut si vera est
'omnishomoestanimal', falsaest 'quidam homononestanimal'.
Visacathegoricavidendumest de ypothetica.ïpotetica dicitur condicionalis

propositio.
ïpomcsisenim grece condiciodicitur latine: inde ypothetica'
dicitur, idest conditionalis.
ïpothetica propositio est que habetantecedenset consequens iunctum vel per 'si' vel
per 'cum' vel 'dum'. Per 'si', ut 'si Socratesest homo, Socratesest animal'; per 'cum', ut
'cum Socratessit homo,Socratesestanimal', et similia. Hec aliquando componitur ex duabus
cathegoricis, aliquando ex cathegorica et ypothetica, aliquando ex duabus ypotheticis.
De duabusultimis (:iifi'emmusI et de eaque constat ex duabuscathegoricis agamus.
Cathegoricaprobat cathegoricamaliquandogratia (P. 101")predicati, aliquandogratia
subiecti, aliquando gratia utriusque. Quando gratia predicati, predicata variantur, sub-
iecta manent eadem, ut 'si Socratesest homo,Socratesest animal'. Quando gratia subiecti,
subiecta variantur, predicata manent eadem, ut 'si omnishomoestanimal, Socrates
estanimal'.
Quando gratia predicati cathegorica probat cathegoricam, dantur quinque loca: &
toto, & parte, a pari, ab appositis, ab immediatis; et quinque regule.
Quando locus datur a toto, datur talis rcgula: de quocumque totum, et partes
eius sub divisione predicantur. Verbi gratia: 'si Socrates
estanimal,Socrates
est
rationalis vci irrationalis'. Sed anima) est totum, partes vero rationale vel irrationale.
Quaresi in hacpropositione: 'Socrates
est.animal'totum predicaturde Socrate, et partes
eius de eodem in hac alia: 'Socratesest.rationalis voi irrationalis'.
Quando locus datur a parte, datur talis regula: de quocumque pars, et totum.
Verbo gratia: 'si Socratesest homo,Socratesestanimal'. Sed homoest pars, animal est totum.
Quare si in hac prapositione: 'Socratesest homo'pars predicatur de Socrate, et totum
illius in hac alia de eodem: 'Socratesostanimal'.
Quando Iocus datur a pari, datur talis regula: de quocumque predicatur
unum par, et reliquum. Verbi gratia; 'si Socratesesl:honio, Socratesest.risibilis'. Sed
' disseramus MS
.
154- LOGICA MODERNORUM li
homo et risibile paria sunt. Quare si in hat.: propositionc: 'Socratesest homo' unum per
predicatur de Socrate, et reliquum de eodem in hac alia: 'Socratesestrisibilis'.
Quandolocusdatur ab oppositis,datur talis regula: de quocumque predicatur
unum oppositum, (oppositum) illius oppositi removetur ab eodem.
Verbi gratia: 'si Socratesest homo,Socratesnon est lapis'. Sed homoet lapis opposita sunt.
Quare si in hac propositionc: 'Socratesesthomo' unum appositum predicatur de.Socrate,
et oppositum illius oppositi removetur de eodem in hac alia: 'Socrates(non) estlapis'.
Quandolocusdatur ab immediatis, datur talis regula: de quocumque. predicatur
unum immediatum, immediatum illius immediati removetur ab eodem.
Verbi gratia: 'si Socrates nonesteger'.Sed sanuset egersunt immediata.
estsonus,Socrates
Quare si in hac propositionc: 'Socratesest sanus' unum immediatum predicatur de 50-
crate, immediatum illius immediati removetur de eodem in hac alia: 'Socratesnon est
eger'.
Quando cathcgoricaprobat cathegoricam(f. IO?) gratia subiecti, dantur tria loco:

a toto, a parte, a pari; et tres regule.
Quando locus datur a toto, datur talis regula: quicquid predicatur de toto,
et de parte. Ut 'si omnishomoest animal, Socratesest animal'. Sed animal est totum,
Socratesest pars. Quare si in hac propositione: 'omnis homoest animal', 'animal' predi-
catur de toto, et de parte eius in hac alia: 'Socratesestanimal'.
Quando locus datur a parte, datur talis regula: quicquid predicatur de parte
universaliter et de toto particulariter. Verbi gratia: 'si omnis homo (est)
corpus,quoddamanimo! est corpus'. Sed animal est totum, homo pars. Quare si in hac
propositione: 'omnis homoest corpus', 'corpas' predicatur de parte universaliter, et de
toto particulariter in hac alia: 'quoddamanimal estcorpus'.
Quando lacus datur a pari, datur talis regula: quicquid predicatur cle pari,
et de reliquo. Ut 'si omnishomoestanimal].omnerisibile estanimal'. Sed homoet risibile
sunt paria. Quare si in hac propositionc: 'omnis homoest animal', 'animal' predicatur de
homine, et de pari illius in hac alia: 'omnerisibile estanimal'.
Quando cathcgorica probat cathcgaricam (gratia utriusque), datur talis regula: si

aliquid predicatur de aliquo universaliter, tunc si aliquid predicatur
dc predicato universaliter, illud idem predicatur de subiecto universa-
liter. Verbi gratia: 'si omnishomoest animo], tunc si omneanimal est corpusomnishomoest
corpus'. Si aliquid predicatur de. aliquo universaliter, tunc si aliquid
predicatur de subiecto universaliter, illud idem predicatur dc pre-
dicato particulariter. Verbi gratia: 'si omnis homo est animal, tunc si omnis homo est
corpusquoddamanimal estcorpus'.
Argumentum est oratio rei dubie faciens Fidem. Argumentatio est argumenti per
orationem explicatio. Que dividitur in tria: in sillogismum et in entimcma et in in-
ductionem.
Sillagismusest oratio in qua positis quibusdamet concessisnecesseest aliud evenire
quomeeaquaeconcessasunt, ut
'Socratesesthomo
sedomnis homoest animal
igitur Socratesest animal'.
THE [NCREASING USE OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC 155
Entimema interpretatur fruma conclusio, quia posito uno et concesso, statim Et con-
clusio: Verbi gratia:
'Socratesest homo
igitur es.'.animal'.
lnductio est oratio in qua positis quibusdam et concessisFlt conclusio. Verbi gratia:
'qui canit cantor est, et qui pingit pictor est
igitur qui docet,doctorcjt'.
I) A Fragment q'Another Compendium
The same section of this manuscript contains the initial words of

another compendium. ] give all that has come down to us:
(f. 111')Logica est ratio, idest scientia, disserendi,idest disputandi, diligens (TULLIUS),
idest integra et perfecta. Sed quia disputatur argumentis, argumenta autem explicantur
sillogismis, sillogismi vero contexuntur propositionibus; propositiones vcro constant
ex terminis, termini autem sunt nomen et verbum, ideo de nomine et verbo dicamus.
Nomen est vox significativa ad placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars extra signifi-
cat finita rccta. 'Nam-enes: vox': hic removet sonos, 'signyï'calim': hic removet non
significativas; 'ad placitum' removet voces signiücantes naturaliter; 'sine tempore' removet
verbum, quod cum tempore signiücat; 'cuius nulla pars extra signi 'car' removet orationem,
cuiuspartesaliquid extra signiücant,idest propriamsignificationemhabentin ipso toto;

'jï'nita' removet infinitas, ut 'non-homo'; removet non rectas cum dicit 'rccta', ut 'domini',
'domino' et similia. Sed quia hec diFf-initio subiecti termini prülixa cst, breviter sic
dicamus: subiectusterminuscsl:nomcnjï'nitumrectum.
5 The Nuremberg Excerpta Introductianum: Various Excerpts from the

-
School of the Petit Pont and from Other Schools
Grabmannwasthe Firstto pay attention to the Iogical compendiathat

are found in & Nuremberg manuscript (Germanisches Nationalmuseum,
cod. 27.773) under the collective title: ExcerptaIntroductionum
(Ff. 41?-
54-3').This part oFthe nmnuscript seemsto date from the middle of the
"twelfth century.l
is used twice
The term introductio(nes)
p. 132": est etiam introductionis hoc exemplum
p. 140'0'" : de simplicibus diximus quantum ad introductiones pertinuit.
The work seemsto be (an excerpt of) & reportatioof somelectures:

p. 1401'3: sicut universalesaFFlrmativasdisporuistis,et illis contrarias negativus,sic parti-
(!) et in illis similes illis reperies
culareset indefinitasdisponas (!) equipollentias.
' For this manuscript,seeaboveCh. !, nr. 13, pp. 54-55.

Tx-vonmin parts may be distinguished. The First one is Found from Ff. 41?-
4-71'and opens as follows:
Cum uniuscuiusque artis eloquentia secundum intentionem facientis aliqua principali
causarepertasit, dialeticaartis eloquentiamaximeacprincipaliteradevidentiamveritatis
falsitatiSque discretionem inventa est. Sed quia veritatis falsitatisque discretio sillo-
gismorum ratione Ermissima nmnifestatur ( ...... ) introducendis noviterque in-
gredientibuslügicamde voce primum ostendendumest (edition, p. ] 134'9).
The work shows some influence of grammar, as appears From the de-
Hnition of noun and verb: nomen (sc. est) quod inflectitur per casus,ut
'dominus,domini' ; verbum quod distinguitur per tempora, ut 'lega, legi'.
The description of the predicate term of & proposition, too, is under
grammatical influence: partes eius (sc. of the preposition) sunt hee: res
subiecta et apposita; res subiecta est id de quo aliquid dicitur; apposita
est id quod (de) eo dicitur (p. 1193'9).
Just like the Former Berlin compendile (Introductiones dialetica,see
above, pp. 152-155)the main interest of our tract is to be looked for in
the theory of argument and the technique of the disputatio:
p. [ 135'7:dialeticaartis eloquentiamaximeac principaliter ad evidentiamveritatisfalsi-
tatisquediscretionem inventa est.
p. I ISIJ'H: Nunc autem videamus naturamet inferentiaset differentiaset conversiones
earum (sc. propositionum).
pp.. 12223-l232: propositio est quod aptum est in disputatione proponi ad hoc ut ipsum
probetur vel aliud ex eo.
pp. I233l-l24l: intentio dialetica artis versatur circa questionem.
p. 127"'"-': Maderni tamendialetici nichil dicunt aliud essedisserere
quam argumentari.
Besides, the discussion of argumentumis far more extensive and detailed

here than in the other treatises. Thus it contains an interesting exposition
on the quatuor alii modi explicandi argumentum. For the text, see our
edition, p. 1305H'.
The nature of the main subjects of our tract points to the same
direction. Just like the Berlin Introductiones,
our treatiseinvestigatasthe
severalkinds of topica] argument that are used to prove the vis irgjïeremie'
of & hypothetica] proposition.
Again, the several loci are dealt with in & rather extensive way, this time
after the division of simplexvox:
p. ] 1716-13:Ut melius videamus, simplicis divisio vocis videnda est. Voces alie dicuntur
par: et totum, alie pares,alie apposite,alie inmediate,alie excesse,
alie excedentes.
! For this term, see my Introduccianto Abaelard's Dialectica, p. XXIV.

THE INCREASING USE OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS 01: LOGIC 157
A separatechapter is devoted to the techniqueof the disputatio,of the

conclusive arguments as well as of sophictical ones. The discussion of the
sophisticeimportunitate:(the term has c'artainl)r been borrox-vedfrom
is quite similar to thoseFoundin the daysof
Aristotle's Dc interpretatione)
Peter Abailard. lt concerns the theory of fallacy in the framework of the
logica vetus.'
This excerpt contains at least one important lacuna. On F.441'just
in the middle of the discussion of the loci we Hnd this text:
p. 118:545: Ab immediatisdatur una (sc. regula): si aliquod inmediatum removetur ab

aliquo, inmediatum illius aFHrmaturhoc modo. Videndum est quid sit questio
. . . . ctc.
After hoc modo there is certï-Linlyr & lacuna.

On f. 451: a fresh start is made by our compiler with another tract
on disputatio :
Quinque sunt necessariain arte disputandi: propositio, questio, conclusio, argumentum,

argumentatio (p. 1222'5'17).
are enumerated (p. 12325'29)

The quatuargeneradi5putatiani5 after Aristo-
The technique of the logica] dispute receives some
tle's De soph.:zhæ:.r1r:his..2
special attention:
Ad cognitionem artis dialetica necessaria est argumenti et eius inventionis eiusdemque

lälsilïcationisscientia (p. I2520'27).
This concerns the röle of the opponens. That of the respondens, too, is
discussed(p. 126'45'.) This part of our excerptarather abruptly ends on
f. 471"(line 21). Without any transitional formula and on the sameline
our scribe goes on with another tract.
The second part of this section of our manuscript contains another

excerpt of & compendiumof logic: (Ff.4-7f-54V).lt has the following
incipit:
Videndum est quid sit ars primo; deinde quid in ea doceatur; deinde qualiter hec
doceatur (f. 471').
' See my Log. Med., lIl pp. 25-81

.
: See Lag. .rlfad. ], pp. 91-92.
158 LOGICA MODERNORUM !!
No doubt, this is the most interesting piece of our Excerpta.Again the

di5putatio is in the centre of the discussion:
Viso quid in istaarte doceatur,videndumest qualiter doceatur.Hoc modo.
p. 12713'17:
Sunt quedam rationes in ista arte quibus docemur diFFlnire,dividere, argumentari. Sed
quia maximears istaconsistitin disputatione,videndumest quid sit disputatio,et de quo
sit disputatioet ex quibussit disputatio.
are dealt with by our author. With the

Then, oppositioand responsio
chapter on arssaphistica(f. 491')& fresh start seemsto havebeenmade. As
& matter of fact some repetitions are found (e.g. in the dehnition and
clivision of disputatioon pp. 12718 IT.; 131"?FE).
Another Freshstart is made on P. 504. Here the well-known initia]
starting-point of some Introductianes and later Summuleis found:
Quia disputantur argumentis, argumenta argumentationibus explicantur que constant ex
propositionibus, a propositiuuibus incipiendum est. Sed quoniam simplicium proposi-
tionum partessunt subiectusterminus et terminus [et] predicatus,parsautem omnis ab
eo cuius pars est, prior natura est, a partibus propositionum incipiamus et primum a
subiecto. Sed quia omnis subiectus terminus enuntiationis (est) nomen et non omne
nomen subiectus terminus, nomen secundum artem diffmiamus et additis diH'crentiis ad
subiectumterminum restringamus(p. 1341'3).
Note the initia] sentence: quia di5putawr argumentis etc., which

. .....
stresses,again, that our Excerptaall of them take the ars dispucandito be
the central theme of discussion.
All these excerpts were written by & copyist who apparently could
not read his text very well but tried to make the best of it. For that
matter, one glanceat our apparatuscriticuswill sufhceto show that his
application greatly surpassedhis understanding of logica] subjects.' ln
many placesthe text which has come down to us is not emendable indeed.
As to the provenance OFthe Intraductiones from which our excerpts
were compiled, that of the tract De arte disserendi
seemsto be rather clear.
This title reminds us of the work of Adam of the Petit Pont bearing the
same title: Ars disserendi.
I t must be noticed, indeed, that one of the
most striking characteristics of the Adam's Ars was the choice OF ek-
amples: they were all taken From the technical terminology of logic
itselfz: enuntiatio, interrogatio, argumentum, conveniens, falsum etc. The
1 50 he writes conditio for conclusio,dispositio for disputatio, ajrmant for ajrmarive.

? See L. Minio-Paluello in his introduction to the edition of the Ars disserendi(Roma
1956) p. XX.
THE INCREASING us13 OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS 01: LOGIC 159
reader of our tract De arte disserendiwill be struck by the same feature;

seee.g. our edition, pp. 12930IT.; 13019Ff.
Secandly.Our tract De arte disserendicontains a remarkable exposition
of the various kinds of disputation, which [ have found in me other
compendium of this kind:
p. 1305'15:Sunt preterea quatuor alii modi explicandi argumentum, quorum unusquisque
omnes inferiores modos includit. Quia est unus modus explicandi argumenti cum in
principio argumentationis Et interrügatio, et illatio fit sine interrogatione. Et ille
convenit disputationibus. Est alter modus ubi non üt interrogatio in principio argu-
mentationis, sed illatio fit per interrogationem. Et illa convenit oratoribus. Est alter ubi
nec interrogatio fit in principio nec in Fine. Et illa convenit per se:disserentibus. Est alia
argumentatio 'ubi et in principio et in fine sit interrogatio. Et illa convenit discentibus,
quia illi nichil debent aFFlrmarepro constantibus.
Now, this unusual passageshows some affinity to chapter XXX of Adam's

Ars disserendi:
ed. Minio-Paluello: Quoniam igitur in diversis disputationum generibus
p.. 1923'29
diversis principiorum generibus utendum, que et quot 'disputationum genera pre-
monstrandum. Sunt autem tria: primum exercitativum, secundum contentiosum,
tertium inquisitivum. Est autem inquisitivum quod ad sciendum, contentiosum quod
ad vincendum, exercitativum quod ad utriusque dictorum usu nbundandum.
Thirdly, The reduction of the several kinds of sophism to the general

headings(generalissima): andinconiunctwn,
conjunctum andalsothe.fourteen
kinds of incaniunctumshow some similarit)Ir to Adam's expositions in the
Ars disserendU Unfortunately our tract breaks off in the middle of this
exposition.
The Saph.EI. of Aristotle are quoted once (p. 13120),but this quotation
is found in a passage that presents a repetition of the cleFmition of
disputatio. I think, it cannot be held for & reliable clue as to the date of
this tract.
The Erst tract: De arte dialetica, too, seems to have (at least in part)
some connection with the School of the Petit Pont. It consists OFseveral
main parts (1) Introductio; (2) De argumentatione,and (3) De arte d1'5pu-
tandi.There is one referencein the third part (p. 12312)to the secondone
(p. 11912Ff,), so that at leastthesetwo parts seemto belongtogether. It is
these parts that show some Parvipontaneaninfluences. Note the charac-
l Seethe Indexin Minio-Paluello'sedition, and my Lag.zl-fod.

l, pp. 65-81.
160 LOGICA MODEuNonun-l u
tcristic terms in the examples (argumentum, ratio ctc.)l . This pecularitzyr

is apt to stl'ike the reader even more stronglyr in the tract on sophisms,
where the Bocthian examples, quite usual in the early tracts on 'fallacyï,
are supplementcd by those characteristic of Adam's School.
There seems to bc another Fcature typical OFthe School of the Parvi—
pontani: the specialattention paid to the röles of the opponens
and the
respondens.See e.g. Adam's Ars dfxsercndi, 9319-957-7, where the classi-
Flcation of questions is based on the röle of the respondens;ibid. ad 2234
we Fmd thc tcrm isophisticum' dclïnecl as "that in which the cause of
ambiguityr is latent', the insuFHcient knowledge 01' which causes the
respondensto make contradictory statements. A similar stress on the
röles of the opponens and the respondensis found in the third part which
is cntitlcd: Dc arte disputandi(pp.. 12525-126'3).The cleFmitionof dia-
lectic as duahs sermo qui f?: intcr opponentcm ct respondentem,idest inter
afrmantem et negantem (e.g. p. 12330'3') might have been of & Parvi-
pontanean o-rigin.3
Finally, thc Erst part of the first tract (De arte dialetica) strongly
rcsc111blesthc Intraductionesdialetica found in Berlin, [.m.c-cr... 76. See
especially thc Fmal sections of them in which the vis ifyïzrentieof the
hypothetica! preposition is discussed. (Introd. dialetica Bero], above,
p. 151Ff. and ExcerptaNorimbergensia,edition. p. 11710Ff.4
As & matter of fact a similar exposition is found in the Abbreviaria Monta-
na, aswe havealreadyseen (above,p. 149). Possiblythis discussionwas&
Favouritc one in the School 01' Mont Stc Gcnevifzve. If this surmise is
correct, wo may assume that the Excerptum de arte dialetica and the
hm'oducrfoncs originated in that School.
Berohnenses
6 - The Compendium Foundin Berlin, Lat.oct. 262

Msgl'. Grabmann found in the Former Prcuszische Staatsbibliothek in
Berlin a small manuscript (lating from the twelfth century. Unfortunately
this manuscript, [.m.c-ct. 262 was lost during the Second World War,
so that we have to rel)lr entirely on Grabmann's accounts
' For this feature, seeabove,p. 158.

3 For the theory of fallacy in the framework of the logica Lag. Med. ,1II
vetus, see my
pp. 24-48. .
3 However, it is evident that the occurrence of this deFmition in a logical compendium

does not imply that the compendium as such should be of Parvipontanean origin, See
e.g. the tract found in the present Nuremberg nmnuscript Ff. 55"—72'-'
(Abbrcriario
Montano, p. 148).
4 See also, above, p. 147. 5 Bcarbcitungen und Auslcgungen, (nr. 6), pp. 40-4-1.
THE !NCREASING USE OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC 161
The manuscript consistcd of severi folios only, and formerly formcd

part of someother, as appearedfrom the earlier Foliation(Ff. 80f-861').
Grabmann dated the manuscript tox-vards 1200. lt containcd a short
compendium on logic on Ff. ll'-'7l' and the beginnings oFa short discussion
De proverbiis(IT. 7T-7ï'). The compendium of logic was complete and
ended with the clausula, written by the same hand: SummaDeusChriste,
per te liber explicit iste.
Grabmann edited the introductory scctianl :
Tria rerum generadistinguit nostra disciplina, scilicet signiFlcantia,significata, appellata.

Appellata sunt ipse res visibiles, ut homines,lapides. Signiücantia sunt que significant
dictiones et orationes. SigniHcatasunt que significantur dictionibus et orationibus. De
appellatis nichil ad presens, sed de significantibus et significatis est agendum. Circa
enim significantia et significata universum dialetica artis consistit negotium. Sed quia
significantia notiora sunt significatis, ergo prius de signiHcantibus quam de signiFlcatis
est agendum.
Significantium autem aliud est dictio, alius oratio. Sed quia dictio simplicior ast
oratione, prius ergo de dictione quam de oratione est dicendum.
Dictionum autem alia est nomen, alia verbum. Sed quia nomen dignius est verbo,
quia namen significat substantiam (subiectum Grabmann)et qualitatem, verbum autem
actionem vel passionem, ergo prius de nomine quam cle verbo est agendum. Sed quia
omne nomen est vox et omnis vox est sonus, a sono tamquam ab omnium principio est
inchoandum
.
Sonus ergo sic describitur: sonus est quidquid proprie auditu percipitur; 'praprie'
dico ad diFferentiam hominis et campana, que non proprie, sed gratia aliorum audiri
dica(n)tur. Homo enim gratia vocis, campana gratia soni audiri dicitur. Sonorum autem
alius est vox, alius non vox. Sonus non vox est (ut) strepitus pedum, fragor arborum.
Sonus qui est vox, sic describitur: vox (est) sonus naturalibus instrumentis formatus,
qui ab ore animalis profertur et per quasdam partes gutturis, que artherie vocantur,
emittitur, plectro lingue percussuset in vocem formatus. Naturalia instrumenta sunt hec:
lingua, dentes, palatus et huiusmodi. Arterie sunt quedam arte vene, per quas trahimus
et emittimus aerem ad formandam vocem.
Vocum autem alia est signiFlcativa,alia non signiFlcativa.Vox non significativa (est)
que nil significat, ut 'plicrix'. Vox signiFn-cativa(est) que aliquid significat, ut 'homo',
'animal'. De voce autem non significativaest obmittendum et de voce significativaest
agendum.
Vocum autem signiEcativarum alia est signiEcativa naturaliter, alia ad placitum. Vox
signiFlcativa naturaliter est ut mugitus boum, latratus canum, gemitus infirmorum. Vox
significatiua ad placitum est que ad placitum sui inventoris est instituta ad aliquid
significandum,ut 'homo', 'animal'. De voce signiFlcativanaturaliter est obmittendum et
de voce signiFlcativaad placitum est agendum.
Vocum autem significativarum ad placitum alia est nomen, alia verbum.
! ap. cfr.., pp. 40—41.

162 LOGICA MODERNORLIM u
The distinction of significantia, significata, and appellata is quite inter-

esting and shows the gramnmtical mark of the treatise. Nomenand verbum
were dealt with in more
ex extensiveway than in the of
Summule Peter of
Spain. It must be noted that the usual chapters on the predicamentaand
prcdicabilia as well as on the loci communes were missing in this compen-
dium. On the other hand, the discussion of theji'gurae and modi of the
syllogismi seems to have been rather cletailecl. Hox-vever,the well-knox-vn
mnemonic verses Barbara, Celarcnr.were not found in this compendium.
Gmbmann was struck by the rather frequent references by our author to
the differences between the approach to the matters involved made by
the grammarian and that of the logician.
The loss of this compendium seems to be most regrettable. It must
be numbered among those twelfth century compendia that made the
ars syllogistica the main subject of the logica] teaching.
7 - On the General Character of These Compendia

The frame-work of all the compendia discussed hitherto was that of
Aristotelean-boethian logic, namely the works of the logica vetus..They
are focussedall of them on disputation technique (ars disputandi).Thus
we see in these works that syllogistics and the discussion of sophisms have
Firstofall excited the interest of the authors. Even when from about ] 140
the logica novi::llwas drawn into the discussion, this applies only to those
partsof new logic that concern syllogistics(Prior Analytics)andsophistical
argumentations (De sophelenchis)in particular.
This view on the taskof logic certainly wasnot nex-v.It is foundalready
in the weIl-known definition of Cicero, Tcp. II, 6, which circulated in
the Middle Ages thanks to Boethius (In Cic.Top., 1045A and In Porph.
1503.II, 13931Ff.).This view was the current one, indeed, in the First
half of the twelfth century. I give some quotations from authors of
that time.
(1) Adam of the Petit Pont clearly puts the centre of dialectic (ars
in the practice of the art of disputation:
disserendi)
Arsdiis., p. 87'21ed. Minio-Paluello: Principium disserendi ab interrogatione vel
enuntiatione. Quoniam igitur ab ipso disserendi principio docendi disserere prapositum
inchoari conveniens, sit de eis docendi disserere principium a quibus est disserendi;
quare nunc proposito non sit parum qualiter ad principia prompti disserendosimus
expedire.Sunt autemdisserendiprincipia nonab his quedicta sunt sola ut ab his salis,
nec ab his omnibusut ab his omnia. Ab enuntiationeenim vel interrogatione non solum
1 For the terms logica vetus, logica nova, see Log. Mad. [, p. 15 and above, p. 117, n. 6.
THE INCREASING uss OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS 01: LOGIC 163
disserendi, sed et onmium pcne que ad disserendumprincipia; quare si qua in disserendo

enuntiationes et interrogationes FlCl'i convenit arte docuerimus, quod propositi nunc
suscepimusexecuti erimus, et proposito erit amplior propositi executio. Sic enim et ad
principia prompti erimus et ad singula in disserendo vie plurimum habebimus.
"mi., 60'33: Erit igitur contra hec (viz. the misunderstandingof logic found with
other logicians) a nobis susceptum artis institucnde negotium huiusmodi, ut artis ex eo
plena sit et facilis cognitio, secundum artem exercitii artiFnciosafacultas. 'Picna artis
cognitio', quoniam nos totam artis viam ordine monstrare cumbimus ne, more ceterorum
circa artem conquisita magnifice explicantes, ipsam artem nusquamdocuisse inveniamur;
'facihs' autem tum ex quo plena tum ex modo quodam docendi, quem in his admirantius
comperient in priorum libris exercitati et subtili quadam disputationis industria in
singulis quid nugatorie, quid improbabiliter-, quid falso, quid impedite, quid ociose, quid
turpiter, quid improprie, quid dure, quid his singillatim contrarie dici soleat com-
pericntius experti; 'anifidosa escrcitiifaculras', et ex quibus plena et facilis artis huius
cognitio et quoniam quibus et ex quibus et de quibus sunt disputationes secundum artem
ea in exemplis ponere studuimus, ut et in ipsis et in eiusmodi ex ipsis facile sit exer-
citiuml.
We need not wonder, indeed, that Adam's Ars gives so much attention
to the various kinds of sophistical argumenta:
(2) Abailard, Logica Nostrorumpetitioni, p. 5065?"23

ed. Geyer:
Est autem logica Tullii auctoritate diligens ratio disserendi, idest discretio argumentorum
per quae disseritur, idest disputatur. Non enim est logica scientia utendi argumentis sive
componendi ea, sed discernendi et diiudicandi veraciter de eis, quare scilicet haec
valeant, illa infirma sint.?-
(3) Alberic of Paris, too, appearsto lay the main stresson the discussion
ofthe conclusive force (vis inzr-enrie)of an argument. Seeabove, pp. 147-
and 209 [T.
(4) The same is Found in the Nuremberg excerpts from Parvipontanean

tracts on logic. See above, pp. 156-160.
'Miniu-l'nluello (1ntrod., p. XXI, 11. 17) is right in comparing John of Salisbury,
Matal. III, 3, p. 1343'l7ed. Webb: sed plane magis deducant quam erudiunt qui in hoc
libello (viz. Aristotle's Categories)legunt universa et eum brevitate sua contentum esse
non sinunt. Quicquid alicubi dici potest, hic congerunt quibus gravior essevidetur
confessio quam ignorantia veri. Deridebat eos noster ille Anglus Peripateticus Adam,
cuius vestigia sequuntur multi, sed pauci praepedienteinvidia proEtcntur; dicebatque se
aut nullum sut auditores paucissimoshabiturum, si ea simplicitate sermonum et facilitate
sententiarum dialeticam traderet, qua ipsamdoceri expediret.
3 See Log. Mod. [, pl). 63-81.
3 lt must be noted that the present passagecontrasts logic and rhetoric, which is es-
pecially conccrned with constructing nrguments. For other passagesand their inter-
pretation, see my edition of Abailard's Dialectica, !nrrad. pp. XXlll-XXV and below,
p. 1865.
164 LOGICA MODERNORLIM n
(5) The practica of disputationwhich is alluded to b)! suchauthorsas

GeoFfrcy of St. VictmI cannot be bcttcr clariFlcd than by the section On
the loci communesas found in the Abbreviatio zlflontana.Thcrc & straight
forward school instruction of the pupil in the matter of practical dispu-
tation is found:
Abbrcv. Montana, edition, p. 88'4'10: Consideratur ctiam vis inferentie in predicato
antecedentis respectu predicati consequentis in negativa. Quomodo? 'Si Socratesnon a::
homo, Socratesnon est omneanimal'. Unde Iocus? A parte. Regula: & quacumque
removetur pars, et totum universaliter acceptum. Assigna: sed homoest
pars et removetur :- Socrate. Conclude: ergo totum universaliter acceptum removetur
ab eodem, et dicam: 'si Socrates
nones:homo,Socrates omneanhnal'.
non051:
(6) john of Salisbur)fdistinguishcs dialecticafrom logica. The former

aims to dispute (disputare),that is: aliquid eorum que dubia sunt aut in
contradictione posita aut que sic vel sic proponuntur, ratione supposita
probarc vcl improbare (zl'letai.114, 6532-662).The art of dialectic, then,
is indisPensable for all studics, since its subjcct matter consists in
questions (Matal. 11, 12, 8326H.; cfr. 11, 14). Since the subject matter of
dialectic consists in questions and has reasoning or speech as its instru-
mcnt, the main task of the art of dialectica is to forge & strong, versatile,
ancleFFlcacious
instrument, and to provido instruction for its use. (Ibid.,
p. 8421-23).
(7) Finally, The fragmcnt of an anonymous Porphyry commentary
preserved in Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud Lat. 67, probably dating
from the second quarter of the twelfth centuryï, delïncs the ars dialetica
as the art 01 argumentation. Note the special function of the doctrine OF
the universalia with respect to the doctrine of the habitudinesargumentorum
(viz. in the tract De locis):
f. Gl'ü'fb: Ars vero ista (sc. dialetica) est scientia sola et tota in generibusargumentandi
constituta. Artium enim ea sola docet argumentari secundum quodlibet genus argumen-
tandi. Que sunt quatuor: sillogismus, inductio, entimema, exemplum.
Genus eius est ipsius qualitas secundum eius effectum, que est hec quod ipsa reddit
suum artiFlcem peritum artiFlcialis inventionis et iudicii argumentorum secundum
habitudines. Nec dicitur eius hec qualitas secundum suum effectum genus ipsius quod
predicetur de ipsa, sed quia ipsa est ars illius generis, idest maneriei sive qualitatis, quod
talem habet elïcctum. Vel aliter: genus istius artis est eloquentia et de ea predicationem
habet hoc moclo: dialetica est eloquentia.
Materia huius artis sunt generaleshabitudines unircrmhum ct argumentacx iUis habitudini-
1 Sec above, p. 130, n. l.

2 For this manuscript, seeabove, Ch. [, nr. 17, pp. 77—81.
THE INCREASING usa OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC 165
bussumpta.Nec discrepamus:: Boetio, qui dicit propositioneset sillogismoseius esse

materiam, idest habitudines subiectorum ct predicatorum ipsarum prapasitionum et
sillogistica argumenta quibus comprehenduntur argumenm non sillogistica, qua tamen
in vim sillogisticam possunt reduci.
Nomen huius est dialetica.
Causanominis hec est: 'dya' sive.'dys' grece duo latine; 'lagos'grece sermovel ratio
latine; inde cbralcncaquasi dualis sermovel dualis ratio, quia ipsius artiFlcium semper
versatur inter duos, idest intcr apponentem et respondentem. Vel aliter: 'dia' grece dc
interpretatur latine; 'Iccton' grece dictum vcl sermolatine; inde dialetica, quia agit de
predicta materia ad discretionem veritatis vel falsitatis dictorum sive sermonum.
OFEcium eius est docere argumenta invenire ad probandam questionem pi'opositam
et de eisdem iudicare.
Finis eius est ad probandam propositam questionem copiose argumenta invenire et
eadem rccte iudicare.
Partes eius sunt due: argumentormu artiFlcialis inventio, idest artiEciosa excogitatio,
et argumentorum artiFlcic-sc inventorum iudicium, idest eorum artiEciosa explicatio.
Iste autem partes integrales ipsius sunt. In ipsis enim integraliter consistit. ludicium vero
in duobus consistit: in veritatis discretione et in ipsius idonea expositione. Quarum
neutrum per se ponit iudicium. Inventio quoque in excogitatione consistit.
Dictum est autem quod inventio artiEcialis para cst dialetice ad diH'erentiam naturalis
ct casualiainventionis. Sunt enim tria genera inveniendi argumenta. Primum naturale,
ut cum dicitur: 'iste vigilat; ergo non dormit'; naturalitï—Sr
enim et sine arte scit quislibet
argumenta huiusmodi facere. Secundumcasuale,ut quandoaliquis usu et exercitatione,
ignorata omni locali habitudine, argumentum facit hoc modo: 'hec $PCCï€5 homopredicatur
de Socrate; ergo hocgenusanimal de codcm'. Tertium est artificiale, quando ex habitudine
locali et iuxta maximam propositionem argumentum elicitur.
Species dialetica nulle sunt.
Instrumentum est oratio dialetica, idest argumentatio (6113).Cuius quatuor sunt
species, ut predictum est,: sillogismus, inductio, entimema, et exemplum.
These testimonics can be augmented by many others from the same

authors as well as from quite a number of other treatisea.I
ln fact, this view on the task of dialectic was bound to change the
arrangement of the subjects to be discussed in those treatises. Alr'ead)r
in the Early School of St. Victor we Find the discussion of sonusand vox
as a stm'ting-point, since they are supposed to be the simplest units in
dialectic. ! give some quotations.
'Scc e.g. one of the tracts preserved in Munich, CL.;H. 4652, discussed below, l)-
399. ——Thus we Fundin Hugh of St. Victor, Didascahcon] 12 an exposition of the
origin of logic asan art which rcminds the St. Victor's reporiatio(see above p. 142).
E. A. Moody is quite right in taking the description of logic given by Hugh as represen-
ting the conceptio" of logic tacitl)racceptedby the tcachcrson the Arts Faculties
throughout the IatiærMediaevalperiod. (E. A. Moody, Truthand Consequcncc
in A*lcdiacra!
Logic,Amsterdam, I953ll pp. 13-14).
166 LOGICA MODERNORLIM "
(l) The Introductiones

dialeticafrom the Schoolof St. 3./i-z:t-::)1"l
:
f. 23" Ars ista dialetica pl'üpter discretionem veri et falsi inventa est.
......
Que non potest Fierinisi per voces ldeo videndum est nobisquid sit vox.
.....
Ut melius pateat, ab altiori gradu exordiamur, scilicet a sono, qui est genus
vocis, ut viso genere pateat species eiusdem generis.
(2) Abailard, Logica Nascrorum

petitioni, 5084"?ed. Geyer:
In scribenda itaque logica hic ordo est necessarius: cum logica sit discretio
argumentorum, argumentationes vero ex propositionibus coniungantur, propo-
sitiones ex dictionibus, eum qui perfecte logicam scribit primum naturas
simplicium sermonum, deinde compositorum necesseest investigare et tandem
in argumentationibus Finem logicae consummare.
(3) Nearly all later compendia of logic take the same starting-point
from terminus(c.q. noun and verb) as being the smallest element in
logic. [ give two referencesonly:
& Berlin, Lat.oct. 76 (fragment):3

Logica est ratio, idest scientia, disserendi, idest disputandi. ( ). Sed
......
quia disputanturargumentis, argumentaautem explicantur sillogismis, sillogismi
vero contexuntur propositionibus, propositiones vero constant ex terminis,
termini autem sunt nomen et verbum, -—-ideo de nomine et verbo dicamus.
b One of the Nuremberg Excerpts; for the text, see above, p. 158.
It was this new arrangementof the subject matter OFlogic that drew
more attention to the term as the smallest unit of & preposition 01-
argument. Thus the authors were induced to discuss the signiEcance of
a term (i.c. noun and verb) and its properties. As a matter of fact it is
this study of the term that can be considered, if not as the prelude to the
mid-century theories of supposition, yet as their modest counterpart.
Therefore it seems to be useful to discuss the theories of signilïcation
as held in the first half of the twelfth century by the most important
logicians(Ch. IV) as well asby someoutstanding grammarians(Ch. V).
It will appear, then, that logic: needed & fresh influx of grammar in order
to arrive at a new approach to one of the main problems of logic: that
of the meaning of meaning.
! Seeabove,p. 131.
2 See above, p. 155.
THE INCREASING USE Ol: SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGlC 167
8 - Some notes on the terms 'incx-oductio', 'summa', and 'ars'

Since some of the logical compendia as well as some later treatises
are called introductiones,t his final section will deal briefly with the several
uses of this term. A few notes are added on the of
use two other current
terms: isumma' and 'Iam».I
:: introductio(nes)
As early as in Boethius we Fmd the term ILintmduczjcnrl" used for such
things ascompendiaartium, especially for an introduction into the doctrine
of categorical syllogism? The parallel term insütutfaJ is found also in
the title of Cassiodore'sencyclopedical work (Institutione;divinarumer
saecularium Iiuerarum).4 The term 'intmductio' is used more than once
in the Earl)r Middle Ages, e.g. in the Fbrphy'ryr glosses of some lcpa,
probably the ninth century author Hucbald of Saint Amands, where
our term, used as a rendering ofysagoge, is paraphrased thusf':
p. 305 ed. Bäumker: ïsagoie graece latine introdumoncs dicuntur, eoquod per varias ac
diversasdiFEnitionessensumnostrum ad propriam differentiam cuiuslibet rei introducunt.
Abailard gives the following paraphrasis in his TheologiaScholarium(ed.

Migne P.L. 178, col. 979):
Scholarium nostrorum petitioni, prout possumus,satisfacicntesaliquam sacraeeruditiu-
nis Summam,quasi divinae Scripturae introductionäm conscripsimus.?
1 1 owe some of the passagesto be mentioned below to the Fichicr du latin philomphiquc
du moycnfige of the Centre National de la RechercheScientilïque(C.N.R.S.) in Paris.
1 am most grateful to Dr. Pierre Michaud-Quantin who was kind enough to send me the
items concemed.
2 For the term 'introductio' (: 'instiwtio'), see my paper On the Chronology
qf Boethius'
Workson Logic in VIVARIUM 2 (1964), pp. 41-43.
3 For this parallelism, see the preceding note.
4 FOI' his use of the term 'introductor', see G. Pari: ctc., op. m., (above, p. 130, n. 1)
p. 231, n. 1. For the distinction of authentici, disputatorcs,introductorcs,and expositores,
see also E. R. Curtius, EuropäischcLiteratur und Lateinische;;Ilitrdaltcr Bern 31961, p. 264.
5 For this identifncation, see M. Cappuyns, jcan Sto: Erigänc,sa via, sonoeuvre,sa pensa:
(reprint Brussels1964), pp. 71-73.
6 edited by CI. Bäumker and B. 5. von Waltershausen: FrühmirrelaherhchcClama das
jepa (!) zur lsagagcdesPorphyrius,in Beiträgezur Gesch.der Philos. des
angeblichen
MA. 24,1 (Münster 1924); jcpa is a misreading for !cpa.
? Cfr. Abailard, Logica Ingredicnnbus,p. 721'24ed. Geyer: Quonwdo introducmriummodum
servet supponit, abstinens scilicet :! quaestionibus arduis et obscuritate implicitis ct
simpliciores tractans mizdiocriter. Nec vacat quod ait 'madiacritcr': posset enim res esse
facilis in se nec tamen lucide tractari.
In his Dialectica the same author mentions. his minor glosscson the logica
vetus four times under the title IntroductionesParvularwn?
The anonymousPorphyry commentarypreservedin Oxford, Bodleian
Library, Laud.Lat. 67, Ff. 61'3-7933, gives the Following definition of
our term:
[. 6ï'ü: Tsagagc ideat introductiones. Introductio igitur est brevis comprehensio summe
aliquorum que in evidentiori tractatu explicanda sunt.
A compendium OF logic probably dating from the sixties or seventies

of the twelfth century, preserved in Paris, B.N. Lat. I5.l703 gives the
following defmition of introductio:
F. 6lm: Introductio est brevis et aperta demonstratio in aliquam artem. Et est intra-
ductio eoquod per faciliora debemus ingredi diFEciliora. Et dicitur introductio quasi
ductiointra, idest in aliud, videlicet in ipsam artem.
The same definition is Found in the logic Cumsit nostraprobably dating

From the last quarterof the twelfth century. Seebelow, pp. 4l6l-T. Roger
Bacon (? or Robert Bacon cl. 1248), too, gives this defmition in his
Summuledialecticas(ed. Steele, Operahaacnusinedita, XV, 1933'4).
Besides, there are many cases in which the term is used in the way
referred to above, without further e.v»:pl,.mwlati-on.4
lt must be noticed, however, that some! imes the term does not deuote
a simpler and easier discussion of all the subjectsof an ars, but a rather
detailed exposition of the inclispensable preliminary subjectsoFan art,
e.g. of the arsdisputandi.Thus it concerns the subject matter of Aristotle's
Dc interpretatione (nomen, vox, propositio etc.). As & matter of fact these
subjectsare discussedin the Fll'Stchapterof manylater Summule.
Now we
' See the lntroduction to my edition of the Diakcrica, p. XI, 11. ]. He uses formulas
such as: (introductiones) quas ad tenerorum dialecticorum eruditionem conscripsimus.
(Dial., 1742'3; cfr. ibid., 232'0'12; 2691, and 3294).
2 See above, pp. 164-165.
3 For this treatise, see below, p. 440 f.
4 E.g. in the manuscript titles of the treatise in Vienna 2499 (!ntraductionci), of the.
Nurcmbergexcerpts(Excerpta of the tract in Berlin, Lat. oct.76, andof
Introductiomnn);
the tract in Münich C.L..-l!. 4652 (Introducroria dialetica; see below, p. 397); moreover
the term is usedby man)rauthors, e.g. ps.-William of Conches,Philosophia
(Un bt'nno
inedita, cd. C. Ottaviano, p. 23": habito introducrionü modo); Introductioncs :I-Ianranc
majorcs(see VIVARIUM, 4 (1966), pp. 12-13).
THE INCREASING USE op SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC 169
are told by Grabmann' that the Erst chapter of the Summula of Peter of
Spain bears in some manuscripts the heading De introductionibus. ] found
the same heading in the Dialectica preserved in Paris, B.N.La:. [!.-112,
Ff. 251240r and ascribed to some master Nicholas of Paris by Hauräau
and Gr.:lbnmnn.2
This use of the word seems to have originated tox-vnrdsthe middle of
is John of Salisbury, who says
the twelfth century. Our main x—vitness
that Inu'oductioncs is the name for those doccrinaüa rudimenta:
Meta]. 111,4, p. 13514'19ed. Webb: Ceterum (ut paceonmium loquar) quicquid in isto
docetur libro (sc. De interpretatione), compendiosius et manifestius poterit quilibet
doctorum (quod et multi faciunt) excepta reverentia verborum in doctrinalibus parare
rudimentis, quas Introducrioncsvocant. Vix est enim aliquis qui hec ipsa non doceat,
adiectis aliis non minus necessariis. Hoc utique, quia sine his artis scientia comparari
non potest. Percurrunt itaque quid nomen, quid verbum, quid oratio, qua species eius,
que vires cnuntiationum, quid ex quantitate sortiuntur aut qualitate, que determinate
vera sunt aut false, que quibus equipolleant, quc consentiant sibi, que dissentiant, que
predicata divisim coniunctim prcdiccntur aut conversim, et que non; item que sit
natura modalium et que singularium contradictio. in his autem articulis operis huius
precipuc summa consistit habetque sicut sententiarum subtilitatem ita non mediocrem
diFEcultatemvcrborum.
Elsewhere (Matal. 111,5) John stressesthe indispensabiiity of the

introductory elements. In the art 01 warfare, he says, preparation of the
weapons precedes the practice of the art. 50 with those who take np the
sacred cult of logic, certain elementa are First provided as instruments,
whereby those entering upon this stud)r mal)lrmore misil)r and eFFectively
progress into the body of the art. He calls these introductory elements
extremely useful (utilissima). While they may not be exactly classiEed
215"of the art" (de arte), they may be correctl)r enough characterizedas
"For the art" (ad artem).
in the thirteenth irsentur)r both uses 01' our term are found. Thus it
sometin'uesstands For the introductory chapter dealing with the doctrinalia
! Dic Introducrioncsin logicamdesWilhelm von Siyfmswoad,München 1937, p. 16.

: Sec B. Hauräau, Noricuser extruit: dc quelquesmanuscritslatin: de la bibliarhäquc nationale ll
(Paris 1891), pp. 43-4—4;M. Gl'abmann, Die logischcnSchriften dc; Nikolaus von Paris und
ihre Stellung in dcr aristoteliïchcn Bewegungdes XII! jahrhundarts in: Mittelalteriiches
Gcistesleben 1, München 1926 [pp. 222-24-8], pp. 222-224. It is doubtful, whether they
and others are right in ascribing the work tcr the mastcr Nicholas of Paris who was still
alivc in 1263. If this work rea")r is by some master Nicholaus(in our mmmscript it is
anonymous), ! would rather think of Niclmlas of Metz, master in Paris about 1249.
Seebelow, Ch. XIV, pp. 450-451.
rudimenta of the Perihermeneias! and sometimes [br the whole compen-

dium of logici, as well as of other Ell'ts.3
b summa
(c), summu1a
(c)
In some of the foregoing quotations we have come across the term
introductio in connection with summa:
Abailard, Theol.Scholarium,col.. 979: aliquam sacraeeruditionis summam,quasi

.....
divinae Scripturae introductionemconscripsimus.
john of Salisbury, Meta). lll, 13537'23: in his autem articulis operis huius precipue
summa consistit.
In Porph. [sog. (Oxford, Laud Lar 67, f. GHI): introductio igitur est brevis comprehensio
summe aliquorum que in evidentiori tractatu explicanda sunt.
Thus we Fmdthe word already used by Cicero, Dc Imf. I, 20, 28 (ex hac
infnita licentiahaecsummacogitur)in order to designatethe main points 01'
the chief pm'ticulars. From the beginnings of the twelfth century our
term came into general use. Parä, Brunet, and Tremblay pointed to
Honorius of Autun (d. after 1130) for the oldest definition of the term.4
When composing & compendium oF ecclesiastical histor)?rhe gave it the
title summa(Summadc omnimodahistoria), which name is justiEed as
Follows:
Summa,cd. Migne P.L. 172, col. 189: De tota scriptura hac collegi compendium
.....
Et ideo Summam tocius placuit vocitari, cum in ea series totius Scripturae videatur
summatim notari
.
(ed. Miglie, Pi.. 176, col. 183) 1135:

Huguesof St. Victor, Dc sacramentis
hanc enim quasi brevem quandam summam onmium in unam seriem com-
pegi.5 Abailard uses the word speaking about the doctrine of the univer-
salia, which in the eyes 01 his contemporaries was, he says, tota summaof
dialectic:
Hist. caiam.2, P.L. 178, col. 119B-C: Et quoniam de universalibus in hoc ipso praecipua
semper est apud dialecticos quaestio, ac tanta ut eam Porphyrius quoque in Isagagis
' Sec the tracts mentioned above, p. 168, n. 4.

2 Thus in the compendium of William of Shyrcswood: Introductioncsin logicam (ed.
Grabmann, München 1937).
3 E.g. Arnauld of Villcneuve (cl. 1311 or 1312): zl-chicinaliumintroducton'um
speculum,inc.
lntroductiones appellantur
......
4 La Renamanccdu XII:: ïiäclc, Les6:010:et !'cnscigncmcnt.Paris ctc. 1933, p. 270, n. 2.
5 For other examples,seeibid.
THE INCREASING USE OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS 01: LOGIC 171
suis, cum de universalibus scriberet, difünirc non praesumeret, dicens: altissimum enim
est huiusmodi negatium. Cum hanc illc (sc. William of- Champcaux)correxissct, imo
coactus clinüaisset sententiam, in tantam lcctio eius devoluta est negligentiam, ut iam ad
dialecticae lectionem vix admitteretur, quasi in hac, scilicet de universalibus, sententia
tota huius artis (sc. dialecticae) consisteret summa.
An explicit definition is given by Robert of Melun:

Sententiaelll, praef., p. 3'0'" ed. Martini: Quid enim summa est nisi singulorum brevis
Ubi ergo singulainexplicatarelinquuntur, ibi eorum summa(mainpoints)
comprehensio?
nullomodo docetur. Singulis namque ignoratis summam sciri impossibile est, siquidem
summa est singulorum compendiosocollectio.
A similar definition is Foundin the lexica: Huguccioof Pisa(s.v. SuPer),

John de Gänesand the so-called Lucianus(s.v. Summa): compendium
(aliquod) totum quadambrevitate continens (comprehendensLuc.). I
found in the logic Cumsit nostra& definition which is of a similar conno-
tation:
p. 41810'": Summacst collectio plurium regularumsub compendio sumpturum, quia

compendiumest quoddambreve et utile, dispendiumlunguF-iet inutile.
The term summulcis defined by Master Eckhart (d. 1327):

Sermo XXIV, I, 226, p. 21111'12: In omni scientia sunt quaedam summulas, in quibus
summatim breviter tanguntur ea quae sparsim diFFusasunt in illa scientia.
The terms (summa' and isummula' are used from the twelfth centurf
onwards for works on various subjects: theology, philosophy, law,
gramnmr, logic, rhetoric and so (ïm..2
C GI'S
There existed quite & number of cleFmitions of ars in the Middle Ages.
,
Onl)r those with which we are concernetl here are discussed.3 Thuyr may
be divided into four main types:
a:The lexicon of Papias(s.v. Ars) has: ars dicta, quod artis (adjectiva-
noun : closeor concisa)praeceptis regulisque consistat. The same is found
amongthe deEnitionsHuguesof St. Victor gives:
' Ocurrcs dr: Robertdc d'le'lunHI, Louvain 1947.
2 See M. Grabmann, Dic Gcïch. dcr schol. .«I'Icthadc
", pp. 23-24.
3 Thus such like the platunizing ars in menteare omitted here as well as the well-known
deEnitions of the type: ars cs: rectaratio agibilimn (orfambilium).
Didascalicon11, 1, p. 23:445 ed. Buttimcr: Ars dici potest scientia quae artis
praeceptisregulisqueconsistit.
This definition goes back to lsodore, Egymol.I, 1, 21.
[3 The eleventh century Parisian manuscript B.N.Lat. 4422 gives the

definition: ars est preceptio quedam que dat certam viam rationemque
(loquendi)l. It seemsto be an adaptation of ps. — Cicero (Auctor ad
Herennium)1 1: ars est praeceptio quae dat certam viam rationemque
faciendi aliquid.
To this type belong the definitions which are found in some twelfth
century" tracts:
Dcartediss.(in the NurembergExcerpts)p. 1273-4:Sic autem generaliter diFFmi-

tur ars: ars est preceptio qua aliquid docemur facere.
ln Porph.[mg. (Oxford, Land. Lar. 67) 1613: Ars est artificialis preceptio qua
quis artatur ut artificiose agat.
In Ar. Dc Soph. El. (Oxford, Land. Lar. 67), f. 8111:Ars itaque est Facultas
artificiose quid agendi.
T There was & deFmition of ars in frequent use in the twelfth century"
which is ascribed to Cicero: ars est collectio multorum principiorum
sive preceptorum ad unum Finem tendentium. As & matter of fact this
definition is found nowhere in Cicero. The grammarian Diomedes(about
375? A.C.) ascribed the following definition to Cicero: Tullius hoc
modo eam (sc.arte111)deHnit:ars est praeceptionumexercitarum con-
structio ad unum exitum utilem vitae pertinentimn (11, p. 421.5K)4.z
Where the Mediaeval deEnition has come from, remains uncertain.
It was frequently used in the Middle Ages. So it is found in the logica
Ut dicit: Ut dicit Tullius, ars est collectio multorum principiorum, sive
preceptorum, ad unum Fmem tencLïntiLun,3 Also in the Parisian treatise
preserved in B.N.Lat. 15.1704:
Paris, B.N.Lat., 15.170 [. 611'0: Ars vcro dicitur esse collectio principiorum
ad eundem Finem tendentium 'Ars' vero dicitur de 'una, arras',
.......
sive de 'arror, artaris', quia artat sui inquisitores; de 'arrar, artarix', quia
artatur regulis sive maximis.
1 quoted by ]. Flach, Emdc:cririqtm iur l'histoirc du droir romain, Paris 1890, nr. 16, p. 137.
2 SeeM. Tullius Cicero, Scripta quaemanseruntomnia, ed. C. F. W. Müller 1V,3 (Teubner,
Leipzig 1904), p. 408, m'. 26 (Fragmentaincerta).
3 Sec below, p. 438 and Trac: IX, p. 3792'3.
and Tractvm, p. 357'243.
4 Secbelow, pp. 440, 446F1'.
THE INCREASING usus OF SPECIAL TEXT-BOOKS OF LOGIC 173
The Fll'St sentence also occurs in the compendium Cum sit nostra.' Roger
(or Robert) Bacon'sdelinition is in the sameline:
Summule dialectica, ed. Steele XV, p. 1934'3: Ars est colleccio multorum
principiorum ad unum Finem intendencium (!), ut multe sunt regule sive
precepta nd composicionem versuum quarum colleccio dicitur ars l'crsffïcandi.
Et ditur 'an' ab 'arccndo' vcl 'arsando', quin artat ct prohibet nos ab errore.
Lambert of Auxerre, too, gives this definition in his Summulc dialec-

ticas.[ quote from Paris, B.N.Lat. I6.617, P.64? (end):
Ad hoc dicendum est quod ars est collectio multorum preceptorum ad unum
Enem tendentium, idest collectio multorum documentorum et multarum
regularum que ordinantur ad finem unum, scilicet ad cognitionem illius de quo
in arte principaliter intenditur.
See also the theological Summajï'atris Alexandri Hafcnsis (Quarmchi 1924),

IV, p. 322 b.?-
8 The next type of definitions introduces the contrast with natura and
scientia. E.g. in Tractatus quidam de philosophia et- partibus eius Found in
Paris, B.N.Lat. 6570, Ff. 57P-591'(5. XII):
f. 581': Differt autem scientia ab arte quum ars est collectio preceptorum
quibus ad aliquid faciendum facilius quam per naturam informamur. Scientia
autem est rerum cognitio cum certa ratione quarc ita sit. Sic itaque scientie
ab artibus digerunt)
The same relation to natura and scientia is Found in Abailard's description

Of ars in his Intraductiones parvulorum:
Introd. parvul., p. 2067'13, ed. Dal Pra: arx, idest scriptum quod subiectis
praeceptis scientiam coartat, ipsam ampliücat quam natura suscitat, et cum
initium scientiae ratio naturalis conferat, scriptum eam quam naturaliter
habemus, adauget, ut videlicet is qui scripto quoque instructus est illud quod
aliquo modo per naturam faceret, commodius et facilius et abundantius per
scriptum faciat.
One of the deFmitionsgiven by John of Salisbur)ralso belongs to this

group:
' See belüw, p. 417 and Tracr IX, p. 3792'3.
2 A peculiar variant is found with Boncompagni (d. 1218) in his Rhemricanovissima
lll,l (Scriptaanccdaraglossatorum: Bibliotheca juridica Medii Aevi ll, Bologna 1393,
p. 2570): ars est clavigcra principiorum quae secundumspecy'ïcanrdijl-rcnriam erudiendis vias
aperit daftrinalcs.
3 quotcd by M. Grabmann, Die Gesch.der :chol. MethodeII 47, n. 1.
Metalag. 1 11, p. 289'17: est autem ars ratio que cmnpendio sui naturaliter
pombihum expedit läcultatem. Neque enim impossibilium ratio prestat aut
pollicetur effectum, sed eorum qur: Heri possunt quasi quodam disPendioso
nature circuitu compendiosumiter prebet, et parit (ut ita dixerim) difficilium
facultatem. Unde et Greci cam 'merhadon'dicunt quasi compendiariam rationem
quc nature viret dispendium ct amfractuosum cius circuitum dirigat, ut quod
Fieriexpedit, rectius et facilius Fiat.
s The last group is formed by the deEnitions of some authors all of

whom seem to have had some connection with the School of the Petit
Pont. This type of definition seems to elaborate the view found in the
deEnitions just mentioned, especiall)rthat of john of Salisbury: the
innumerable possibilities of nature easily leading to circuitous side-issues
should be reduced to their substantial content by ara. Indeed, the ars
avoids nature's wastefulness and straightens out her circuitous wander-
ings. Thus Johnof Salisburycontinues:
1bid...2932'33(Ratio) tandem artem statuit quasi quandam inFmitorum Enitam
csse scientiam.
The sameoxymomn (infnitorumjïniwm), by which ars is clescribedas a

circumscribed science 01unlimited things, was worded by an anonymous
(quidam)in & rather poetical way, as we read in Alexander Necham, De
naturis rerum:
11173]. p. 2926'" cd. Wright: artem namque quidam sic descripsit: ars
defmitum inFmitatis compendium, rationis insigne miraculum, imperiosum
naturae consilium, quod si per se consideres,minimum quantitate, si ad subiecta
appliccs,maximumreperiespotestate.
[ found the same deFmition 01 ars in the Notefratris Samsonismonachi

excerpta de diversis voluminibus contained in British Museum, Siccine MS
1580 (5. XIII), Ff. 131'-18'*'.lOur delinition is among a collection of
ethica] notes :
'These Narefall into two parts: FF.131'-16rand 16'-'-18V.The idcntiFlcatic-nwith

Samson, monk of Canterbury, is made in the full description of the manuscript kept in
the Studcnts Room (see Hunc !, p. 208, n. 1). Samson'sjorui: is said to be 1170. Scc
Th. Wright, Biogr. britann. 11,320-321. However, one could fccl inclined to identify
—
the compiler of these notes with Samsonof Norfolk (d. Dec. 13th, 1211) who was
abbot of Bur)r St Ednmnds about 1180. 500 Th. Wright ap. cit. 11,471. As a matter of
fact, this Samsonwas the adressecof the letter reproduced in the Chronica01"]ocelin
of Brakelond,in which the abbüt is reproachcdby the author for his adhercnccto some
sentcntia;l'Iehtdincnsium("£x-falsa nichil sequi"). See bBIOW, p. 232.
[. IST: Ars cst colleccio preceptorum quibus inlinita ducentur [inite (inFmitc
MS). Vel sic: Ars est prodige prolixitatis delinitum compendium, racionis
insigne miraculum, quod., si propius stes, minus invenies quantitate; si autem
longius stes, maximum invenies potestate.
The same1viewis found in Raoul Ardents' Speculum (end of the

universale
I2th tem.), where sciencia: ars is delined as follows:
MS Paris, B.N.Lar,., 3229, [. I'm: Scientia cst vcra preceptio mentis iqfinita
jinisc comprehendens.Dicitur quippc scientia collective. Unde et ars nuncupatur,
ca videlicct ratione quoniam infinitatis confusionem sub certorum locorum et
regularumarctat ct concludit brevitate (brevitatem MS).'
Finally, this definitioni is found in the opening section of the Logica Cum
sit nostra:
LogicaCumsi: nostrap. 4179'13(TracrX): Ars est collectio multorum principio-

rum ad eundem Finem tendentium. Vel: ars est quoddam [initum inlinitatis
compendium, insigne rationis miraculum, inpel'iosum nature consilium, quam
si in se consideresminimam quantitatumreperies,595]si ad subiectatc appliccs
maximam potestatem invenies.
One of the sources of Cum sit nostra has the same view as is exPressed in
the last lines of our definition:
Logica Ur.dicit, p. 379?*3 (500 Tract IX): (dicitur ars) maxima, quia maximam
continet (potestatem), licct parvum sit in quantitate.
It must be noted that this delinition is only found in what we may call
an "English" tradition: Alexander Necham, the monk Samson, and the
Oxford treatise Cumsil:mamma.2 From this the conclusion may be drawn,
I think, that this tradition must have been that of the School of the
Petit Pont.3 This surmise finds some support in & passage in the Ars
disserendi.The author of the revised edition of Adam's Ars concludes the
section on the practical character of the Ars with & statement about the
aim the author hac] in mind when writing his work:
' For this work, see M. Grabmann, Gesch.der schol. zlierhode!, pp. 246-257. Grabmann
wrongly ascribcs the work to the Raoul Ardens who in l 101 accompanicd William IV of
Aquitania to the Holy Land.
1 For this treatise, scc below, Ch. XIII, pp. 416-4-4—8.
3 For Alexander Necham's rclations to that school, see L. Minio-Paluello, Tuveyih
CcntmyLagic.Text and Studics. [ Adam BalsamicnsisPawipontani Ars Dissmndi (Dia-
lecücaAlexandri). Rama l956, Introductio", p. XX".
l76 LOGICA MODERNORUM "
Ars dm... pp. 9239-937 ed. Minio Paluello: Huiusmodi autem circa ea que
dicimus dubitabilibus nec omnino intactis (ne subito occurrentia imprcmunitum
ledant) ncc plene hic discussis(ne discipline seriesintcrsertis dissccctur), hoc
interim compertori plene suFBcientcquod nos artis' viam Funitam, non possi-
bilitatis excessuminFmitum,cognoscibilcmreddere! proposuimus,perspicien-
dum est num preter interrogabilium genera terdcna que distinximus alia
quedam inveniri possint.
' Comparc jolm of Salisbury, zl-Ieralag.

], II, p. 289'17,quotcd above, p, 174,
CHAPTER IV
THE THEORV OF SIGNIFICATION

IN TWELFTH CENTURT LOGIC UP TO ABOUT 1140
Generally speaking the theory of signiFncation as found in the logica!

works of the Erst decades of the twelfth :::cntur')Irhad its starting-point in
Boethius' commentaries on the Isagoge,the Categories,and Perihermeneias.
Therefore it may be useful to open this chapter with a few remarks on
Boethius' thær)Ir of signiFlcation.
] - Preliminm'y: Boethius
Boethius' commentaries on Porphyry's Isagogeintroduced the:problem

of meaning in the form of the Famous problem of the universalia. Even
apart from Boethius' own answer to the question, it is quite clear that
he considered Porphyry's [sagogeas a work with a declared ontological
inquam,,Ijust as he took Aristotle's Categoriesto be a work which aims
de primis rerum nominibus et de vocibus rcs signäfïcantibus .:rh'sput.::.-ria4.2
His view
on the subject appearsFrom many of
passages these commentaries.I
quote one of them:
!n [mg. II, p. 146'1'23 ed. Brandt: Cum igitur Al'istütclcs rerum genera collegisset, quae
nimirum diversas sub se species continerent, cumque de his ipsis
...... .......
quidem praedicamentis docuit —, quid vero essct genus, quid species, quid diFFcrcntia,
quid illud accidensde quo nunc dicendum est, vel quid proprium, velut nota praeteriit.
Ne igitur ad Praedicamento Aristotelis venientes quid signiFlcarct unumquodque eorum
quae superius dicta sunt ignorarent, hunc librum Porphyrius de earum quinque rerum
cognitione perscripsit.
As to the Perihermeneias,one would expect Boethius to follow

Aristotle, who says that the mental experiences which are directlyr
symbolized by words, belong to an investigation distinct from that of the
But all Greek Commentators disregarded Aristotle's
Periherrnf::ïfæich.3
! Sec ln 1503.Parph. pp. 1433-14625cd. Brandt.

: See In Catcg. Amt., coll. 159A-161A (esl). 159C) cd. Migne — For the Porphyrian
origin of this itcm of thi; trio: intentio, inscriptio, and utilitas, see my paper On the Chrono-
logy quaerhiux' l'l'arks an Lagi: " in VIVARIUM, 2 (1964), pp. 134-133.
3 Aristotle, Dc inrerpr. ], [63 3-9; [ haveused the Oxforcl translation.
178 LUGICA MODERNORUM 11
x-varningand when trying to answer the question why Aristotle inserted

here a few words on the menta! experiences, the)r took infinite pains to
explain the supposed importance of the Stagirite's incidental remarks on
this subject. For that matter, it was Porphyry in particular who thought
it relevant to interpret those remarks as referring to the famous problem
of the universalia. As is x-vell-knmvn, this commentator was Boethius'
favcn.11"ite.lW e need not wonder, indeed, that Boethius preferred
Porphyry's explanation of the meaning of Aristotle's remarks on the
subject:
ed. Meiser: SedPorphyriusipsampleniuscausamoriginem-
ll, p.p. 2617-2730
ïn Periherm.
que sermonis huius ante oculos conlocavit, qui omnem apud priscos philosophos de signi-
Flcationis vi contentionem litemque retexuit. Ait namque dubie apud antiquorum
philosophormu sententias constitisse, quid essetproprie quad vocibussignificaretur. Putabam
namque alii rea vocibus designari earumque vocabula esse ea quae sonarent in vocibus
arbitrabantur. Alii vero incorporeas quasdam naturas meditabantur, quarum essent
signiFlcatic-nes quaecumque vocibus designarentur, Platonis aliquo modo species in-
corporeas aemulati dicentis hoc ipsum homoet hoc ipsum aqua: non hanc cuiuslibet
subiectamsubstantiam,sed illum ipsum hominem specialemet illum ipsum equum,
universaliteret incorporaliter cogitantesincorporalesquasdamnaturasconstituebam,
quas ad significandum primas venire putabant et cum aliis item rebus in significationibus
posseconiungi, ut ex his aliqua enuntiatio vel oratio conficeretur. Alii vero sensus,alii
imaginationes signiFlcari vocibus arbitrabantur.
Cum igitur ista esset contentio apud superiores et haec usque ad Aristotelis per-
venisset aetatem, necessefuit qui nomen et verbum signiücativa esset deFmiturus prae-
dicaret quorum ista designativa sint.
According to Porphyry, then, Aristotle toök the nouus and verbs to

deuote neither the rcs subiectae,nor sensusor imaginationes,but passiones
animae.2Well, Porphyry says, Aristotle meant by Iinmatura) experiences'
(passiones animae) nothing but intellectus) Why Aristotle did not say:
' For Boethius as composing his commentaries on the Organan by translating Greek
marginal notes which he found added to his Greek text of Aristotle, and which came
for the greater part from Porphyry's commentaries, see ]. Shiel, Boethius'commentaria;
an Aristatlc, in: Mediaearal and Renaissance Studies 4- (1958), pp. 216-24—4,and L. M.
cle Rijk, On the Chronologyg'Boc-thius' WorL-s
on Logic 1, in VIVARIUM 2 (l964), pp. 31-37.
?-ibid., p. 2716'22.
3 "»d., p. 27:145: sed quoniam passionesanimaenomina et verba signilïcare proposuit,
non sensussed intellectus eum dicere putandum est; cfr., ibid., p. 29'3'16. See also the
introductory section of Boethius' commentary, ibid., pp. 731'87: quare erit libri huius
vocibusin tantum quantumconceptionesanimi intellectumque
intentio de signiFncativis
significent; de decempraedicamentisautemlibri intentio in eius commentariodicta est,
quoniam sit de signilïcativis rerum vocibus, quot partibus distribui possit earum signiFl-
catio in tantum quantum per sensuum atque intellectuum medietatem res subiectas
intellectibusvocesipsaevaleantdesignare.
THE THEOR? OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTURT LOGIC 179
"sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce intellectuum notae", but "animae passionum
notae", is explained by Boethius, after Porphyry, as follox-vs:
"»d., p. 3324'33:Restat igitur ut illud quoque adtlanms cur non ita dixerit: sunt ergo ea
quaesunt in voce intellectuum notae, sed ita: earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae.
Nam cum ea quae sunt in voce res intellectusque significent, principaliter quidem in-
tellectus, res vero quas ipsa intellegentia comprehendit secundaria signiücatione per in-
tellectuum medietatem, intellectus ipsi non sine quibusdampassionibussunt, quae in
animam ex subiectis veniunt rebus.
Accordingly, there are four elements to be considered here: litterae,

voces, a
intellectus, nd res, the former two are positione,t he other naturali-
mr..I They had already been dealt with by Boethius in his comments on
the Openinglines ofthe Perihermenems (16a l-3). Following the traditional
view of the Greek Commentzatm'sz on the subject Boethius, asa result of
an analysisof human speech, set up res, intellectus,and voces as their three
relevant elements: the most important of x-vhichare res and intellectus:
ln Periherm. ll, 209'35, 2123'30, 2227-235, 2312-2415:
209'15:Quare antequamad verba Aristotelis ipsaveniamus,paucacmnmuniter de
nominibus atque verbis et de his quae signiFlcantur a verbis ac nominibus disputamus.
Sive enim quaelibet interrogatio sit atque responsio, sive perpetua cuiuslibet orationis
continuatio atque alterius auditus et intellegentia, sive hic quidem doceat ille vero discat,
tribus his totus orandi Ol'düperficitur: rebus, intellectibus, vocibus. Res enim ab in-
tellectu concipitur, vox vero conceptiones animi intellectusque significat, ipsi vero in-
tellectus et cancipiunt subiectas res et significantur & vocibus. Cum igitur tria sint haec
per quaemunisoratio conlocutioqueperEcitur, resquaesubiectaesunt, intellectusqui
res concipiunt et rursus a vocibus signiFlcentur, vocesvero quae intellectus designent,
quartum quoque quiddam est, quo voces ipsae valeant designari, id autem sunt litterae.
2133'30: Praecedit autem res intellectum, intellectus vero vocem, vüx litteras, sed
hoc converti non potest.
2217'235:Quare quoniam apud quos eaedemres sunt, eosdemintellectus essenecesse

est, apud quas idem intellectus sunt, voceseaedemnon sunt et apud quos eaedemvoces
sunt, non necesseest eademelementa canstitui, dicendum est res et intellectus, quoniam
apud omnes idem sunt, esse naturaliter constitutos, voces vero atque litteras, quoniam
diversis hominum positionibus permutantur, non essenaturaliter, sed positione.
2322-24'5: Quocirca hoc cognito illud dicendum est quod is qui docet vel qui
continua oratione loquitur vel qui interrogat, contrarie se habet his qui vel discunt vel
audiunt vel respondentin his tribus, voce scilicet, intellectu et re (praetermittantur
cnim litterae propter eos qui earum sunt expertes). Nam qui docet et qui dicit et qui
' [bini, p. 4227IT.

2 Seefor instanceAmmonius,In Arisr. Deinterprcr.,pp. [730W., 1823
FR,20HlFf.
interrogat, & rebus ad intellectum profecti per nomina et verba vim propriae actionis
exercent atque ol'ïicium (rebus enim subiectis ab his capiunt intellectus et per nomina
verbaquepronuntiant), qui vero discitvel qui audit vel etiam qui rcspondet, a nominibus
ad intellectus progressi ad res usque perveniunt. Accipiens enim is qui discit vel qui
audit vel qui respondet docentis vel dicentis vel interrogantis sermonem, quid unus-
quisque illorum dicat intellegit et intellegens rerum quoque scientiam capit et in ea
consistit. Recte igitur dictum est in voce, intellectu atque re contrarie sese habere eos
qui docent, dicunt, interrogant atque. eos qui discunt, audiunt et respondent. Cum
igitur haec sint quattuor: litterae, voces, intellectus, res, proxime quidem et principa—
liter litterae verba nominaque signiEcant. Haec vero principaliter quidem intellectus,
secundo vcro loco res quoquc designant. Intellectus vero ipsi nihil aliud nisi rerum
signiücativi sunt.
Finally, a Fewremarks on Boethius' usagemust be inserted here. The

author distinguishesprimoand secundo (im)positio.The, primo impositiois
concemed with the things (intellectui subiectavel sensibus),the secundo
impositio with the words themselves. Note that Boethius refers to the
things denoted by the term used in Fll'Stimposition with the phrase
subiecto(intellectui), or subiectosubstantia:
ln Arisr. Coscg.col. 159B4-C8: Omnibus ergo nominibus ordinatis, ad ipsorum rursus
vocabulorum proprietates Figurasqucreversus est et huiusmodi vocabuli fornmm quae
innecti casibus possit, nomen vocavit; quae vero temporibus distribui, verbum. Prima
igitur illa fuit nominumpositio per quamvel intellectui subiectavcl sensibusdesignaret.
Secundaconsideratio, qua singulasproprietates nominum Egurasqueperspicerent, ita ut
primum nomen sit ipsum rei vocabulum. th, verbi gratia, cum quaelibet res homo
vocatur; quod autem ipsum vocabulum, idest 'homo', nomenvocatur, non ad signiFn-
cationem nominis ipsius refertur, sed ad Figuramidcirco quod possit casibus inflecti.
Ergo prima positio nominis secundum significationem vocabuli facta est, secunda
vero secundumFiguram; et est prima positio ut nomina rcbus imponerentur, secundavero
ut aliis nominibus ipsa nmnina designarentmu Nam cum 'homo' vocabulum sit subiectae
substantiaeid quoddicitur 'homo'nomenest hominisquod ipsiusnominisappellatioest.
Sometimes Boethius uses the grammatical term 'supponere' for

'subicere', the latter being the current logica] term. E.g. Introd. od syll.
categ., col. 768B ll :
inrrod. od syll. catcg., col. 768 B6-l2: 'homo' universalis est terminus: multos enim
propria predicatione concludit. Sed quia dicitur 'quidam' (sc. homo),ad unum homo
redigitur, qui universalepersisteretnisi particularitasfuissetadiuncta. In singularibusvero
propositionibus predicato termino semper individuum supponitur, ut 'Socrates
sapiensest'.
As far as I know there is only one passage in Boethius" works where

the term 'suppositum' seems to have a meaning closest to that found in
twelfth century supposition theories: suPpositum as the thing actually
THE THEOR'l' OF SIGNIFICATION IN T'W'ELF-TH CENTUR'I' LOGIC ]8'
referred to by the significant term. The question discussed is of what

nature the so-called loci intrinseci are. lt is raised in the opening section
of In Cic. Top.lll. Boethius wants to discussthe conclusiveforce (vis)
nnd division (ordo) OF the loci communes. He asks in which respect the
loci intrinseci, i.e. the loci qui in ipso haerentde quo quaeritur, dil'ïer from
things themselves(l083B). This question may be put also in this way:
what is the diH'erence between these loci and the termini qui in quaestione
versantur?(1083 C). Boethius things it useful to show this diFFerence.
He tries to clarify it in the three main types of loci intrinseci: totum,pars,
and nota. The text runs ad follows:
In Cic. Tap. HI, infr, ': ln tanta igitur similitudine rerum danda est dilTerentia. Neque
enim, ut dictum est, si locus haeret in eo ipso de quo quaeritur atque ab ipso de quo
quaeritur capi non potest argumentum, Fieri potest ut locus idem essepossit quad ipsum
est de quo quaeritur. Sed haec differentia est: ipsum est quod confuse ac singulariter
intelligitur, ut 'homo'. In eoï inest totum suum quod est deEnitio. lpsius igitur totum al)
00 quod ipsum est intelligentia separatur, quod illud quidem singulariter intelligitur,
hoc vero sub generis ac diFFerentim-umenumeratione nmnstrntur. Dividit cnim chlnitio
atque dispertit totumque patefacit quod in re ipsa singulariter intclligebatur.
De partibus quoque eadem ratio est. Si enim ad membrorum multitudinem vel
specierum omnium enumerationem singularem termini referas intellectum, statim ipsius
ac partium differentiam comprehendns.
Nota etiam ab eo cuius nota est facile distat, quia illud wx et signiFlcatio est, illud
res significationi supposita. Eorum vero que aFl'ectasunt, non sunt dubie differentie ab
his quorum affecta csse monstrantur. Quis enim idem dicat esseconiugatumquod est
id cui coniungatum Bit; quis idem esse iuste quod iustitia?
Two things should be noticed. Boethius seems to use here the term
'sigmjïcatio' for intellectus,so that the thing denoted is called "underlying
the concept of it" (signi 'cationi supposita).(2) Here, too, the problem
under discussion has some connection with that Of the nominasumptaand
nomina substantialia, as appears from the author's contrasting iuste and
iustitia. As is known the sumpta problem is one of the crucial points in
the question Of the um'vu-snrscz'lh'czï.J
We may conclude from the Foregoing that Boethius's theory ofsigniFl-

cation is determined by the ontological point of view to a decisive extent.
As a faithful adherent to the Greek Commentators, particularly Porphyry,
he strongly connects logic and logica] operation with the state OFalïairs
! [ quote from the Basel edition corrected after Leydcn, Voxsianus

Latinus Fol. 701 (5. X),
[. 23'11.The text printed in Migne is rather corrupt and badlypunctuated.
2 Sc. homine (gloss.in "the Vassianus).
J Cp. I)elow, p. 200 IT.
182 LOGICA monumentum 11
(rcs)denoted, or even only intended, by the terms used. Bearing this in

mind we need not wonder that, as a result of the lack of demarcation
between logic and psychology and ontology, he failed to arrive at a
purely logical theory of signiEcation, free From all non-logical elements.
2 - William of Champeaux
William's cleFmition of the ars dialetica : logica as Founcl in the

IntroductionessecundumWilgclmumï apparently finds its prcper scope in the
distinction of truth and falsehood.2 The phrase propter discretionemveri et
falsi appears to be of an ambivalent character. It can refer both to an
inquiry into the nature of things (ontological aspect)and to the distinc-
tion between true (: correct) and false (: incorrect) argument
(logical aspect). AS 21matter of fact both aspectsare found in the
Introductiones.In the Opening words of this compendium (see above,
p. 131) the author that
stresses the dialectician has to deal with as
voces
the vehicles For the distinction of truth and Falsity. Compare the ex-
positions given about the prapter nature of the vocesand their prcperties
so far as the distinction between truth and falsity is concemed:
1.351"In dyaleticahunc Enemdicitur habere(sc.onca) ut qui dyaleticusfuerit, veritatem
& falsitate sciat discernere et ut audita aliqua re sciat eam probare cathegorice vel
hypothetice. Que discretio veritatem et falsitatem vocibus et sillogismorum ratione
Firmissimammanifesta[n]t.
For the whole passage, see above, pp. 141F.In the next lines (f. t
351'11') he
origin of logic is linked np with the necessityof the earliest philosophers
to reason correctly. This passage(quoted above, p. 142) may be
compared with Boethius, In 1509.11, 1384Ff,, whose words were cepied
by William of Champeaux's pupil Hugh of St. Victor in his Didascahcon,
pp. 193-2024ed. Buttimer. However, this view is linked up in & peculiar
way with the supposedontological aspect of logic taken as the science
which the soul fallen into the body needs in order to recover its pre-
existent science of the true nature of things. ln fact, this pl.*1tc.*1»nizing3
! For this work, seeabove, pp. 130Ff. 2 For the text, seeabove, p. 131.
3 Cfr. Macrobius, ln Cic. SamniumScipionis[, 9 (pp. 401-11-22ed. Willis, Teubner 1963),
whose work was commented upon rather frequently from about 1100. See e.g. MS
Cologne 199 (5. XII); on our passage,Ff.301'5-31m.For the MediaevalPlatonic tra-
dition, see R. Klibansky, The Continua)! qf The Platoni: Tradition During the A*fiddle Agcs,
London 1939. For William of Canchcs' commentary on Macrobius, ln Cic. Somn.Scip...
see E. ]eauneau, Gfasesdc Cumanum dc Concha::sur Macrobe. Note sur le; mannicrits in:
Archivesd'histoire doctrinale et littäraire du Moyen fige, 35 (1960), pp. 17-28.
THE THEom OF SIGNIFICATION IN T'WELFI'H CENTLIRV LOGIC 183
story is found right after the author's report of the disputative origin of
logic (f.. 351").He continues ' :
Secundum quam sententiam possumusdicere quod qui prior dyaleticam invenit, et, ut
melius dicam, ad mentem reduxit, in illius anima priusquam incorporaretur, fundata
fuit dyaletica.
lt should be noted further that in this passagedialectic is deFmed as

dealing with the generaand s;:z-acias.2
In the fragment Qyjd oratio signifïcctfound in the samemanuscript our
author discussesamong other questions whether vas and oratio signify .in
prolatione01"postprolationem.[t appearsin this discussion(Ff. 33V-34-V;
for the text, see above, pp. 140-14-1)that 'signyficarc'standsfor 'in-
tellectum in anima gencrara', so that we Find here Boethius' psychological
view of signi "cauo.
ln Abailard's Intraductianesparvulorum an extensive discussion is found

of William of Champeaux's view of predication.3 ln order to save,
Abailard says,,4Boethius' division of predicative-questions (Dc tap. dy.
I, ] l77D7FF.), Master William and his willing followers (sequaces) used
to distinguish in (wer)r question or proposition the grammatica] from the
dialectica] sense. E.g. in such & praposition as 'Socratesest albus' the
grammarians only consider the copulatio essentiae,i.c. the copulatio
fundamenti albedinisad Socratem.Thus the grammarians take the predicate
albam as standing only for Socrateswho, in Fact, is the only thing actually
denoted by the term 'albus' in the proposition 'Socrates
estalbus' (album
secundum
solamnaminatfanamS
intransitivcücopulaturSocrati):
! Ibid., For the whole passage,see above, p. I42.
3 For the text, see above, p. 142.
3 Pietro Abelardo, Scrittiflosqfïci ed. Mario dal Pra, Roma-Milano 1954, pp. 27133-27335.
The discussion occurs in his Super Topica Glassac,a cmnmentary on Boethius' Dc tap. dii,
'found in Paris, B.N.Lar.. 7493, Ff. 16812184".
4 lac. tit., p. 273'0"'5.
5 For the term nominatio : appellatio, see below, pp. 192-193; 227-228.
(' For the term 'capulatia intransititfa', see Priscian, Inst. gramm. XI 8, 55226'37:
. .. . .
nam [seraüattwi dicuntur (sc. verba), idest transitiva, quae ab alia ad aliam transeunt
personam; and ibid., I l ],5551*-'-:...... ut '!cgans dacca' pro 'lega c: dacca' quae
intransitivaest, hocest ipsamse manereostendit personam.ln twelfth century
compositio
logic the copulatio essentiae was understood as a capulatia intransitiva, i.e. the copulation in
which there is no transition from one thing to another. For Abailard, see my edition of
the Dialectica, Intrad., pp. XXXIXF. and Index s.v. For William's see the passage
1'ufiew',,
discussedby Abailard, Ihtrad.parva]. p. 2721H'.); it should be noted that on p. 2724one
should read intransitivae instead of Dal Pra's transitivaa; cfr., ibid., p. 272".
!ntrod. parvttl. pp. 27133-27215ed. Dal Pral: Et profecto preceptor noster Willelmus
eiusque sequaces duos sensus tam in propositionibus quam in questionibus assignabant.
Quorum unum gramaticum, alt(er)um dialeticum appellabant. Dicebatur enim quod
cum dicitur 'Socratesest albus', alia est coniunctio rerum quam gramatici, alia quam
attendunt dialetici. Gramatici enim vim (in)transitive constructionis attendentes inter
hoc nomina 'a(l)bos' et 'Socrates',secundum id quod eiusdem rei nomina sunt, et inter
verbum substantivum. Quod quia intransi(ti)ve ea copulat, eisdem secundum termina-
lem significationem consignificat solam coniunctionem essentie que verbo substantivo
exprimitur, omnia in essentia signiHcarc considerat, etiam nominata praedicati nominis
et subiecti, secundum id scilicet quod Socratesdicitur esse ipsum album, idest ipsum
et hii tantum capulationem essentie fundamenti albedinis ad
quod albedineest a-Hïzctom;
Socratemattendunt. Quippe album, quod secundumsolam nominationem intransitive
capulator Socrati, solum fundamentum nominando significat, albedinemvero deter—
minando circa fundamentum, non nominando.
Therefore when analyzing suchs propositions as 'Socrates est albus' the

grammarian especially considers the nominata, i.e. those things that are
actually denoted by the terms used in the proposition:
!bid., p. 27215'2': Undi illi, qui vim intransitionis attendunt in Constructione, maxime
ad coniunctionem nominatorum respiciunt, secundum quam intransitio Fit, ut sit
gramaticus sensusquod subiectum albedinis essentialiter coherct Socrati, scilicet quod
ipse Socratesest ipsum quod albedine est affectum.
To the mind of the grmnmarians, such prepositions as 'Socratesest

albedo' and 'Socratesestalbus' have quite diFFeï-entsenses:
Ibid., p. 27211'31: Similiter autem si dicatur 'Socratesest albedo', coniunctionem essentie
intcr nominata considerat et hic accidens in essentia, ibi fundamentum in essentia
Socrati copulatur et ubique eundemcolmlationis modum, scilicet in essentia,retinentes,
secundum diversitatem copulatarum rerum diversos habent sensus; et in his duabus
l)ropositionibus 'Socrates est albedo' et 'Socrates est oibos', quippe ibi in essentia qualitatem
Socrati copulant, hic fundamentum qualitatis in essentiaSocrati coniungunt, quia (ibi)
in Socratedicitur esseipsaalbedo,hic [sunt]albedinissubiectum.
However, the dialecticians, William used to say,,,z

especially consider
the way of predication in a proposition. Theyrtake predication to be the
expression of inherency. When doing so, it does not matter whether it
(albedo) or odiacentiae(album), so that in their
is inherentiaessentiae
view 'Socratesestalbedo' has the samesenseas 'Socratesest albus' in both
being said to exist in Socrates(inherereSocrati):
of them lrhiteness
! The texts have been checked with the manuscript, Paris, B.N.Lot., 7493, E. l76l"*-'.
: sicut dicebat, ibid., p. 272".
THE THEOR? 01: SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTUM LOGIC 185
ibid., p. 27231'39:At vero dialetici, sicut dicebat, qui maxime predicationem attendunt,
eundem sensum accipiunt in his duabus propositionibus 'Socratesest album' et 'Socrates
estalbedo'.,quia albedoque tantum predicatur in utraque propositione, dicitur inherere
Socrati. Et hic quidem dialetici sensus quodammodo generalior et superior dicitur
quantum ad sensum gramaticum, quia hic large in essentia attenditur habens se ad
scilicet in gramatico sensu, copulatio
inherentiam essentie et adiacentie, ibi 1va'crcmfu
tantum essentie attenditur.
Thus, in the view of Willimn and his adherents, all propositions have &
double sense, a dialectica] and a grammatical one, the former being :!
larger one and containing the latter in a way:
Ibid., pp. 27239'1-2731: Habent utique, secundum hanc sententiam, singule propo-
sitiones sensus duos, unum dinlcticum, qui largior est et quodammodo superior
secundum simplicem inherentiam, alium gramaticum, qui determinatior est circa cn-
pulationem essentie.
William's followers hold that such propositions as llS«.':w:rc::rtf.-':s

est albedo'
can be said to be true or false onl)r when taken in their grammatical
sense:
lbid., p. 2733"": Propositiones tamen neque veras esseconcedunt neque falsassecundum
dialeticum sensum, sed secundum grammaticumsensum tantum, quia licet 'Socratesest
albcda' superiorem sensum hunc (habeat): albedo m inhcrcm Socrati, quad verum est;
secundum hunc tamen neque vera neque falsa iudicanda est, sed secundum gramaticum,
qui expressior est et determinatior tantum iudicatur.
We see that as & grammarian ' William of Champeaux had an eye for
the actual meaning of a predicate-term as denoting not some universal
but the concrete thing which underlies that universal
nature (essentia),
nature. Note the use of nominareand nominatioas equivalents of appellare
and appellatioï: quippe album, quod secundum solam nominationemin-
transitive copulatur Socrati, solum fundamentum nominandasignificat,
albedinemvero determinando circa fundamentum, non nominando.(ibid.,
p. 27213'16).
O n the other hand, as & dialectician he turns out to have
' According to Geyer (überweg-Geyer, p. 210) William had attended in Paris the
Iectures of the gramnmrian(?) Manegoldof Lautenbach.However, E. Lesne(LesEcolcs,
p. 200) thinks it uncertain who were William's masters.! think if William really had
some master Manegold, he should be identiEed with Manegoldof Chartres (or of Paris)
named ;l'lancgaldusphilosophusby the Anonymus Mellicensis. See below, Ch. V, p. 230,
n. 4. '
2 Cp. below, pp. 227-228.
beenan adherent to the inhel'encetheory, just as his pupil Abailard was

in the early stagesof his thought.I
To sum up this section it may be said that asa dialectician William of
Champeaux no less than the other early tx-velfth century masters Followed
Boethius in his thelür)lr of signiFlcation. Bearing this in mind one will be
struck the more by his grammatica] theory of meaning concerning the
predicate-term of some special kind of proposition (*Socrates esl:albus').
[ think, we need not hesitate to consider the appearance of such gram-
matical views in early twelfth v;:renturyr scholars as & remarkable prelude
to the grammatical approach to the logical problems of meaning which
we Find in the School of Melun about the sixtiesF-
3 - Peter Abailard
There are some passagesin Abailard's works on logic where the author
clearly dehnes the proper scoPe of logic. In Dial. I[l, he saysthat the nim
OFlogic is to inquire into the use of speech, while inquiring into the
nature of things (res)belongsto the domain ofphysics:
ed. Dc Rijk: Hoc autem logicacdisciplinaeproprium relinquitur ut
Dial. lll, 2863P35
scilicet vocum impositioncs pensando quantum unaquaque proponatur oratione sive dictione
discutiat. Physicae vcro proprium est inquirere utrum rei natura consentiat cnuntiationi,
utrum ita 51:50,ut dicitur, rerum proprietas habeatvel non.!
Another unmistakable passagc is Found in the Introductionesparvulorum,

where Abailard gives :: criterion For the recognition of what is & logica]
inquiry in contradistinction to & search for truth in itself: it is the
altercatioof somepeople who scekafter the probability (or provability)
OFcertain pmpositions, not after some real truth.4
Introd. parvul. p. 305'4'24 ed. Dal PraS: Quippe disputatio non est realis pugna vel
perscrutatio unius hominis in cognitione, sed altercatio et contentio ratiocinantium dc
proposita quaestione probanda vel improbanda. Unde bene quae ad disputationem con-
currunt, sive probantia sive probata, voces appellatiuus. Et nota quod cum dubiam pro-
positionemdicimus quaeargumentoostenditur, tantumdemvalereac diceremuseamnon
essecertam, hoccst nan recipi pro vera. Saepe enim FICICS
Et eis quae omnino prc- falsis
habentur, quae quidem quia de eorum falsitate constalnlt, dubia preprie non dicuntur,.
! See above pp. I05-l06 and below, pp. 203-206.

: See below, pp. 306 Ff.
3 Cfr. also Dial. ], 733'5 and lll, 38811'3".
4 Cp. Beonio, ap. cit. (below, p. 187, n. 3), ll'- I9.
5 Pietro Abeiardo, Scrmijilasqfici,Roma 1954. For the name Introductioncs parvulorum,
seemy edition of Abailard, lntrocL, p. Xl.
THE THEom' OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTunï LOGIC 187
When discussing the inadequacy OF Aristotle's enumeration of

qualitates I Abailm'd makes & very important statement about the proper
scope of logic. However, it will turn out to be a rather incidental one 2 :
Dial. l, 99'0'": Si quis autem de huiusmodi putentiis naturae quae.substantiales sunt,
cum in hac maneria I'IOI'Icontineantur, quaesierit in qua Aristoteles cas comprehendat,
agnoscat multos modos essc qualitatum extra hanc annumcrationem ...... Nemo
itaque qualitatesessedenegetquia non comprehendunturin annumcrationcqualitatum
apposita (viz. by Aristotlc). Beneautem hi qui logicac deserviuntad consuetudinem,non ad
naturam, respiciunt, quorum intentio vocibus debetur, quarum impositio naturalis non est, sed
consuetudinis.
However, For our author logic was also part OFphilosophy, as was
rightly stressedby Mrs Beonio in her Finestudy of Abailard's logic.3 As a
matter of fact Boethius' unfortunate attempt4 to settle the famous
Ancient controversy about the place of logic (*is it part, or instrument
of philosephy?) hasinfluencedAbailard, no lessthan the other Mediae-
val logicians, in his view on the place (and task) of logic. SecFor instance
the opening words of his Logica Ingredientibus:
..
Log. lngrcd... p. IH? ed. cher: lngredicntibus nobis logicam pauca de proprietate cius
praelibantes & genere ipsius quod est philosophia ducamus exordium. Huius
......
autem tres speciesBoethius distinguit, speculativamscilicet de speculandarerum natura,
moralem de honestate vitac consideranda, rationalem de ratione argumentorum com-
ponenda,quamlogiccnGraeci nominant. Quam tamena philosophiaquidamdividentes
non philosophiae partem, sed instrumentum teste Boethio dicebant ...... Contra
quos ipse Boethiusnihil impedire dicit idem eiusdemet instrumentumesseet partem,
sicut est manus humani corporis.
This traditional lack of a clear-cut distinction between logic and philo-

sephy must be considered, indeed, as a heavy mortgage on Abailard's
view of logic.5 Thus we see Abnilard continuing the passagequoted
above Frmn the Dialectica in this way:
! recognized by Aristotle himself, Catcg., l0a25-26.

2 See below, pp. 1835.
3 M. T. Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli, Lc.-logica di Abelarda, Firenze 1964, p. [S.
4 In Porph. (sog., ll, [4011Ff. cd. Brandt.
5 The fact that following tlie tradition, Abqilard mostly uses the words logica and
dialectica as equivalents (for the texts, see Beonio, op. til., p. 15, n. 6) and sometimes
contrasts them, hassomething to do with this lack of clearness,but cannot entirely be
explained by it. That Abailard followed & traditional view can be illustratcd by many
—
quotations from his predecessors. E.g. Adelard of Bath, De eodemet diversa, pp. 2133-
2334: haec cadum subdita sibi habet inventionem et iudicium, quibus universos
......
lites in negotiosuoortos dissolvit. Quaestioneenim proposita, quaeparseius tenendasit,
ISS LOGICA h-IODERNORUM 11
Dial. 111,28635-2874:Est autem alterius consideratio alteri necessaria. Ut enim logicae

discipulis appareat quid in singulis intelligendum sit vocabulis, prius rerumprapricrasm
Sed cum ab his rerum natura non pro se sed pro vocum impositione re-
investiganda.
quiritur, tota eorum intentio referenda est ad logicam. Cum autem rerum natura
percon(ta)ta fuerit, vocum signiEcatio secundum rerum proprietates distinguenda est,
prius quidem in singulis dictiünibus, deinde in orationibus, quae ex dictionibus iunguntur
et ex ipsis suos sensus sortiuntur.
For Abailard as well as for all other twelfth (nantur)rlogicians, logic was
not an autonomous ars. On the one hand they full): acknowledged some
diFferencesbetween logic and the other artes; on the other, their view
of the unity of all human knowledge (which was snpposed to centre in
philosc-phy) precluded them From seeing the importance of & clear-cut
distinction between the several autonomous branches of knowledge.
When studying Abailard's logica] theories one is frequently confronted
with a certain ambivalencc. As far as the theory of argumentation is
concerned, Abailard remains strictly faithful to his view of the proper
scope of logic as inquiring into the conclusivenessofargument, while the
state ofaFFairs denoted by-the tenus used is not taken in consideration.I
The samemay be said of his theory of preposition. This, too, shows our
author's clear insight into the Speciflc character of logic. Note capaciallyr
the author's view of the dictumpropositionis,! and his choice of the 1(1€I'lt1t)f
theory instead of the inherence theory?-
But as far as Abailard's theory of the terms is concerned, the picture
appears to be quite (liFl'c-zrent,
indced. When Geyer says4 that Abailard's
logic was essentially a Sprachlogfk,he is only right in a certain sense: true,
it was built upon a critical analysis of the meaning of words. But Sikes
certainly goes too far in saying?» that Abailard was the founder OF a
school of logicians, active throughout the Middle Ages, who basedtheir
logic llpon & careful imrestigation into the meaning of grammar and
quaereprobanda,prima contemplationediiudicat. Quo autem iudicium illud confirmet,

locos cum argumentis suis invenire non fatiscit ....... Haec ipsa universitatem
omnium quae videntur in decem naturassubtili indagationepartita est Haec
quippe universales mira luminis subtilitate ......
modo
rerum naturas perstringens eo quo in
artificis menteantetempusconceptaesum:,intueri nititur etc.
......
1 Cfr. Beonio, op. tit., pp. 71-79.
2 Sec the Introduction to my edition of the Dialectica, p. XCIIFL and Beonio, op. cfr.,
pp. 64 Ff.
J For this development, see Dialectica, lntrod. p. XXXVIIF. and Beonio, ap. cit.,
pp. 74-75 and also below, pp. 203—206.
* Dic patrfsn'schcund scholastischc
Phihmphie " 1923 (reimpression 1960), p. 216.
5 PeterAbaüard, Cambridgc 1932, p. 97.
THE THEORï' OF SIGNIFICATION [N TW'ELFFH CENTum' LOGIC 189
language. ln fact, unlike his theory of argument and proposition,

Abailarcl's theory OFterm was strongly influenced by non-logical view-
points, in spite 01 his regarding the scope OFgrammar as closest to that
of logic. ln Fact, it is somewhat surprising to see that it is too sharp a
contrast betx-veenlogic, on the one side, and grammar and rhetoric, on
the other, that made Abailard associate logic to some extent with
metaphysics and psycholügy.l
Thus we see that Abailard's whole logic of terms is overshadmved by
the problem of the um"vera::fh'r:ï.2
As a matter offact, the question of the
nature ofthe universalia(genus,species,etc.) wasa problem which at some
time or another had to be faced by every Mediaeval logician-philo-
sepher.3 Now, it strikes the attentive reader of Abailard's expositione.
on the point at issue that they consist, for the main part, of metaphy-
sical and psychological views 4 which have as such nothing to do with
the proper scope of logic as it is recognized by Abailard himself when
he speaksof it as the theory of arguments
Abailard's way of thinking is this respect may be clariFled by quite a
number of passagesFrom his Iogical works. I conFme myself to Four
subjects Abailard's treatment of which is rather illustrative.
1 Cfr. Beonio, ap. cfr., pp. 21-25.

3 That in his chapteron Abailard'slogica]theories(op. m., pp. 89-112) Sikesdoesnot
discussanything except the problem of the universaliamay be considered as.typical of the
overwhelming röle of this problem with Abailard, even when Sikes' treatment of the
matter may be argued to be onesided. It is remarkable that also in Beonio's excellent
study on Abailard's logic the chapter on il :i'gmfmra dei nomiuniversaliis by far the most
extensive one (ap. cfr., pp. 39-63). — lt should be noted that Abailard in his auto-
biography (Hist. colam.2, PJ... 178, col. 119 B-C) saysthat in the eyesof his contempo-
'raries the doctrine on the universalia was the focus.of logic: quasi in hac, scilicet de
universalibus,sententiatota huius artis (sc. dialecticae)consisteretsumma.
3 "The question at issue was whether gencra and species subSist, that is, whether they
signify some truly existent thing; or are they merely located in the intellect, as being
simply the empty creations of the understanding, Iacking all real existence? It is the old
problem which divided the philosephy of Aristotle from that ofhis master, Plato, and it
hadbeenbequeathed logiciansby Porphyry, who had refusedto decide
to the mecliaeval
between the rival interpretations of the Platonist and the Aristotelian. In the eleventh
andtwelfth centuriesespecially the problem bulked large in the ever-increasing
......
philosophicaland theologica]literatum." Sikes,op. cfr., p. 89.
4 See Sikes, ap. m., pp. 96FF., esl). 108 FR, and Beonio, op. fit., pp. 39F1'.and p. 30,
n. 14, where she rightl)r l)oints to the gnoseological impact of Abailard's vicws.
5 Seeabove,p.. 186f.
190 LOGICA MODERNORUM II
(a) signüicatfoand impositio(inventio,institutio)

ln Dia]. ], l ] 1-142 Abailard deals with signüicatio in an extensive way..
First he will ilwestigate the modi significandi:
Dial. [, lllï'": Evolutus superius textus ad discretionem signiücntionisnominum (et)

rerum naturas quae vocibus designantur, diligenter secundum distinctionem decem
praedicamentorum aperuit. Nunc autem ad voces significativas. recurrentes, quae solae
doctrinae deserviunt, quot sint modi signiFlcandistudiose perquiramus.
The signifcatio vocum(distinguished well from the signi "catio rerum;

ibid, ] l 113H'.) has various kinds: per impositionem,per determinationem,
per
generationem, per remotionem (ibid., ] l 127-11213). Besides there are some
other modisignffcandi(! 12'4*2').The author confineshimself to speaking
about the signifncation which is per impositionem.First, he discussesthe
controversy between Garmundusof Tournai and one master U or V.!
Garmundustakes a word to denote not all things (concreta)it names,
but cml)r this or that nature, since, according to Aristotle (De interpr.,
16b20) signifcare : intellectumgenerare:
Dial. l, 11223-1135: Nunc autem ad priorem modum revertentes, quem in impositione
posuimus, quasdam de ipso controversias dissolvamus. Alii enim omnia quibus vox
imposita est, ab ipsa voce signiEcari volunt, alii vero ea sola quae in ipsa voce denotantur-
atque in sententia ipsius tenentur. Illis quidem magister noster V. favet, his vero Gar-
mundus consensissevidetur; illi qui(dem) auctoritate, hi vero fulti sunt ratione.
Quibus enim Garmundusannuit rationabiliter easola quaein sententiavocis tenentur
(signiEcari, sustinentur) iusta definitione 'signilï'candi'r quae est intellectumgenerare; de
eo enim vox intellectum facerenon potest de quo in sententiaeius non agitur. Unde
nec a nomine generis speciem volunt signilïcari, ut hominem ab 'animah', nec subiectum
accidentis&sumptovocabulo,ut curpusipsum:! 'calarura'vel 'albo'; nequeenim homo
in nomine 'animahs'exprimitur nec subiecticorporis naturain 'coloraro'denotatur,sed
tantum illud quantum substantiaanimata sensibilisdicit, hoc vero tantum quantum in-
formarumcolorevel albedine.Habet tamen et illud impositionem ad hominem et hoc ad
corpus de quibus enuntiantur. Unde manifestum est eos velle vocabula non omnia illa
significare quae nominant, sed ea tantum quae deEnite designant, ut 'animal' substantiam
animatamsensibilem,aut 'album'albedinem,quaesemperin ipsisdenotantur.
1 I still think this master is Ulgerius of Angers (seethe Introductionto my edition of the
Dialectica, p. XXf.). Mrs. Beonio does not accept my surmise and, referring to Logica
Nostrorum,p. 54—4—21'20 proposes(La logicadi zlbclarda,p. 32, n. 23) tu consider Vasletus
as the master meant. However, the passagereferred to seemsto be irrelevant, since it
does not deal at all 1withthe relation of signi'carioand impositio.Moreover, how to
combine the view of Vasletus mentioned in Logica Nostrorum with what is said about
Vasletus'view can be comparedbetter with that of
magisternosterV. in our passage?
Garmundus, it would seem.
THE THEOR'l' OF SIGNIFICATION lN TWELFTH CENTLIR'I' LOGIC 191
On the other hand, Magister U. takes the impositioas decisive for the
significatioin the sensethat a word signifnesall it is actually intended to
signify :
Hi vero qui omnemvocumimpositionemin signiEcationem

Dial. [II ! 1315'24: deducunt,
auctoritatem praetendunt ut ea quoque signiFlcari dicant a voce quibuscumque ipsa est
imposita, ut ipsum quoque hominem ab l::minrncih'"vel Socratemab 'hominc', vel subiectum
corpus ab 'albo' vel 'coloraro'; nec solum ex arte, verum etiam ex auctoritate gramma-
ticae id conantur ostendere. Cum enim tradat grammatica (viz. Priscian, Inst. gramm.
[, 555) omne nomen Substantiam cum qualitate significare, 'album' quoque, quod sub-
iectam nominat substantiam et qualitatem determinat circa eam, utrumque dicitur
significare; sed qualitatem quidem principaliter, causa cuius impositum est, Subiectum
vero secundario.
How does Abailard solve this controversy? He appears to Follow his

master U. (Dial. I, ] 1311-1141), but in this case, too, he adds, just as in
the case OFequivocation, the term 'signi 'catio' is taken in & larger sense
asan equivalent for *impositia':
Dial. I, 1140'15: Si tamen ':igni/ïcarc' proprie ac secundunl rectam et prapriam eius
definitionem (as)signamus,non alias res signilïcare dicemus nisi quae per vocem con-
cipiuntur; propriae namque sunt illae rerum significationes quae determinate
......
in sententiavocis tenentur. Etsi enim vox aequivocapluribus impositasit, plura tamen
proprie significare non dicitur Laxe tamen nimium saepeAuctoritas ad omnem
......
impositionem 'signf/ïcatianis'nomen extendit.
Abailard himself prefers to stick to the distinction naturahter— ad

placitum as & better starting-point. It is only the voces signifying ad
placitumthat are the object of logic:
Dial. l, 11413'10:Quaecumqueenim habiles sunt ad significandum, 1welex natura vel ex
impositione significativae dicuntur. Naturales quidem voces, quas non humana inventio
imposuit sedsola natura contulit, naturaliter et non ex impositione significativasdicimus,
ut ea quam latrando canisemittit, ex qua ipsius iram concipimus ...... Sedhuiusmodi
vocesquaenec:locutionescomponunt...... ab omni logica sunt alienae.Easigitur
solas oportet exsequi quae ad placitum signiEcant, hocest secundum voluntatem impo-
nentis, quae videlicet prout libuit ab hominibus formatae ad humanas locutiones con-
stituendassunt repertae et ad res designandasimpositae.
Comparethe well-known passagein the LagicaNostrorum(5221!Ff ed.

.
Geyer), where Abailard contrasts voxand sermoand stresses,again, the
human activity of the impositio:
Logica Nasrrorum,52215'31':Universale est quod est natum praedicari de pluribus, idest &
nativitate sua hoc contrahit, ex institutione scilicet. Quid enim aliud est nativitas ser-
192 LOGICA MODERNORm-l n
manum sive nominum quam hominum institutio? Hoc enim quod est nomensive sermo,
ex hominum institutione contrahit. Vocis vcro sive rei nativitas quid aliud est quam
naturae creatio, cum proprium esserei sive vocis sola Operationc naturae consistat? ......
Sic ergo sermones universales esse dicimus, cum ex nativitate, idest ex hominum
institutione, praedicari de pluribus habeant; voces vero sive res nullatenus universales
esse, etsi munas sermones voces esse constat.
Hox-vcver, this does not amount to saying that the voluntas imponontis
is entirely free. In fact, the primusinventornominumacted "follm-vingthe
nature of things" :
Cum enim vocesduplicemhabeantsigniücationem,de rebus
Logicolngrod.,p. 11231'37:
scilicet et de intellectibus, res intellectibus naturaliter priores sunt; prius enim in rerum
naturaoportet constarequod possit intellectus concipere et qui vocabulum
invenit,prios
roi naturamconsideravit,ad quamdomonsuandam nomonimpoxuit.Intellectus itaque, qui roi
naturamsequidebent,naturaliter posteriores sunt, res vero priores.
Logico Nostrorum, 56736'2-7:lmpositor (compositor Goyor) namque nominum rerum

naturassecutus est.
Every impositio is founded on the ros. At the same time this relation of ros
and impositio is the l)osis of the secondary function of the term, viz.
denoting this or that individual thing. This function of the tcrm is called
its nominatio or appellatio:
Logico !ngrod., 2127-226: Nunc autem natura intellectuum generaliter inspecta univer-
ialium et singularium intellectus distinguamus. Qui quidem in eo dividuntur quod ille
qui universalis nominis est, connnunem et confusam imaginem multorum concipit, ille
vero quem vox singularisgenerat, pmpriam unius et quasi singularemformam tenet,
hoccst ad unam tantum personamse habentem. Unde cum audio 'homo' quoddam instar in
,
animo surgit quod ad singulos homines sic se habet ut omnium sit cmnmune et nullius
promium. Cum autem audio 'Socroros', forma quaedam in animo surgit quae ut certae
pemonaesimilitudinem exprimit. Unde per hoc 1v'cn'xnbulum
quod est 'Socrates',quod
propriam unius formam ingerit in animo, res quaedam certiFlcatur et daterminatur; per
'homo' vero, cuius intelligentia in conununi Forma omnium nititur, ipsa communitas
confusioni est ne quamex omnibus intelligamus. Unde nequeSocratemnequealium recte
signiFlcarc 'homo' dicitur, cum nullus ex vi nominis certiFlcetur, cum tamen singulos
nominat.'Socrotos'vero vel quodlibet singularenon solum habet nominare,verum etiam
rem sui:)iectamldotm'minm'e.2
Logico Nostrorum, 52723'29: genera et species quaedmn, non omnia, in sensibilius sunt
posita, hocest sensibilia habent nominare,et ponuntur extra sensibilia, idest rcs habent
significareet non cum aliqua forma quae sensui subiaceat, quia si res omnes formas quac
[ rcm subiectam:- rom suppositam,to use the later terminology.

: Cfr. ibid., 2837-297.
THE THEOM 01: SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTLIRV LOGIC 193
sensui subiacent, amitterent, non ideo minus a genere et specie nominari possent. Sunt
igitur genera et species in sensibilibus posita per appellationem, extra vero pcrsignificatiancm.
Well, now, while the Categoriesdeal with the voces secundumsignifi-

cationem rerum, the Perihermeneias discusses them secundum significationem
intellectuum.The latter signiEcation turns out to be the principal one:
Logica!ngrcd...30914'15: Ex quo aperte intentio huius operis (viz. Deintcrpr.) ab intentione
Praedicamentorum distare ostenditur, cum ibi quoque de partibus orationis, idest de
simplicibus sermonibus agatur secundum significationem rerum, hic secundum signiFn-
tationem intellectuum, quae principalior est illa secundum causaminventionis vocis,
quae ad nil aliud facta est nisi propter intellectum constituendum. Nil quippe voces in
substantia rerum faciunt, sed tantum de eis intellectum excitant. OFEcium itaque earum
ad quod institutae sunt, significare est, hocest intellectum constituere. Unde bene
secundumcausaminventionis et oflïcii vocum intellectus principalis est eorum signiFl-
cntio, res vero secundaria, quippe et haec quae de re est, non semper permanet, sicut
illa de intellectu, ut supra mel'l'uinimus.I
Mrs Bconio distinguisl'lesztwo phases(not in a chronological sense,

however) in Abailard's theory of signiEcation.l'would prefer to speak
of two diFferent aspects or points of view. The First found in severa]
passages of his works, is characterized by that the author derives From
the nature of impositio both the signi 'catio rerum and the signi "casia
intellectuumas the two significative functions of the nomina. In the section
on coniunction and preposition in the. Dialectica Abailard speaks ofsome
philosophers who contrast them with noun and verb by remarking that
the former 0111)rproduce an inteHectus, while the latter have some res
subiecta.But, Abailard here objects, this distinction cannot be made:
Dial. I, 1193'13: Sunt autem quibus videantur huiusmodi dictiones solos intellectus
generare nullamque rem subiectam habere, sicut et de propositionibus concedunt.
Tota enim propositio nullam rem subiectamhabet; tota tamende rebusper partessuas
designatisquemdamgeneratintellectum. Sic quoqueet praepositiones et coniunctiones
de rebus eorum quibus apponuntur, quosdam intellectus facere videntur, atque in hoc
imperfecta carum significatio dicitur quod cum omnis intellectus ex alio quod intelligitur,
procedat, ipsa quoque res de qua intellectus habetur, in huiusmodi dictionibus non
tenetur sicut in nominibus et verbis, quae simul et res demonstrant ac de ipsis quoque
intellectus generant. At vero cum intellectum omnem ex aliqua re necessesit haberi,
quomodointellectusexistet, ubi nulla erit rerum demonstratio, ut scilicet huiusmodi
dictionibus per se dictis intellectum aliquem capiamusnullis adhuc rebus designatis?
Unde certa apud grammaticos de praepositionibus sententia exstitit ut res quoque eas
quarum vocabulis apponuntur, ipsae designarent.
! Cfr. ibid., 3213FF.
2 La logica di Abelardo, pp. 34-IT.
!bid., 120340:Illa ergo mihi sententiapraelucerevidetur, ut grammaticisconsentientes

qui etiam logicae deserviunt, has quoque per se significativas esseconFlteamur, sed in eo
significationem carum esse dicamus, quod quasdam proprietates circa res eorum voca-
bulorum quibus appununtur praepositiones, quodammodo determinant
......
Quorum quidemsignificatioin eo imperfectaseuambiguavel suspensiva
dicitur quod eas
quas significat proprietates circa talia demonstrant quae in significatione eorum non
tenentur, sed potius in designatione oppositarum dictionum, tam scilicet nominum quam
vcrborum, quorum demonstratio perfecta est. Sive enim de intellectu sive de pra-
prietate alicuius formae nominis aut verbi significatio fuerit, rei alicuius significationi
semper adiuncta est.'
From the second aspect, however, the significatio rei is declared irrelevant
as to the proper scope of logic. The tcrm *significatio'is reserved, then,
for the significatio intellectuum only, while what was called significatio rci
according to the First point of view receives the name appellatio 01"
nominatio. Now Abailard (leclares that when speaking about terms, that
is noun and verb, one should deal with them not iuxta diversitatemrerum,
but iuxta diversitatemintellectuumï:
Log. !ngred., pp. 30819-30913: Cum autem nomina et verba tam res quam intellectum
significent, sicut diximus, recte hic de eis agitur non secundum significationem rerum,
sed intellectuum, ubi videlicet de eis intenditur propter constitutionem propositionis.
Quod tribus de causisfactum essevidetur. Nam quia partes orationis distinguere debebat,
quas tractabat propter constitutionem propositionis enuntiativae simplicis, nomen
scilicet et verbum, recte de signiFlcationeintellectus intendit. Quippe haec distinctio
partium orationis Fieri non potest secundumdiversitatemrerum, sedintellectuum. Res
enim eaedem a nomine et a verbo significantur, ut 'currit' et 'cursus' eandem rem
significant. Sed diversus modus concipiendi variat iutellectum, quia hic in essentia
cursus ostenditur, ibi in adiacentia, hic: cum discretione temporis, ibi sine. Unde
merito hoc:de nomine et verbo secundumsignificationem intellectus agitur, ubi scilicet
discretiu partium orationis Et, quae magis ad diversitatem intellectuum quam rerum
attinet.
Praeterea cum de nomine et verbo gratia constitutionis orationum intenderet,
maxime significationem intellectuum, non rerum attendere debuit, quia haec sola
significatio ad constitutionem pertinet. Quippe sicut propositio materialiter constat ex
nomine et verbo, ita intellectus illius materialiter iungitur ex intellectibus partium. Res
autem propositionis, cum nullam liabeat rem subiectam, ex rebus vocabulorum non
constat.
Denique haecsignificatio, quae est de intellectibus, eo quoque maxime ad constitutio-
and resis found Lag.[agni, p. 222'4(quoted above,

! The samecombination of intellectus
p. 192); Log. Nostrorum,p. 5252 and Dial. ll, 154-20'23:
sicut enim nominum et verborum
duplex ad rem et ad intellectum significatio, ita etiam propositiones quae ex ipsis
componuntur, duplicem ex ipsis significationem contrahunt, unam quidem de in-
tellectibus, aliam vero de rebus.
of Log. !ngred., p. 30934'35.
: To use the termimalczig)r
THE THEORV OF SIGNIFICATION [N TWELFTH CENTum' LOGIC 195
nem orationis attinere monstratur, quod ex ea semper ad constitutionem orationis

dictiones sumciunt, sed non ita ex rerum signiücatione.Rerum quippe signiücatio
transitoria est, intellectus vero permanens.Dcstructis enim rebussubiectis,si quis hoc
nomen proferat 'roso' vel 'Hhum', licet rerum quas nominabat, significationem iam non
teneant, signiFlcotio intellectuum non vacuotur, quia sive res sit, sive non, intellectus
semper constituuntur. Unde.semper propositionem reddere possunt et semper quantum
ad animi conceptionem, non quantum ad nominationcm rerum significativa dici possunt.
Unde bene Aristoteles, ubi de nomine et verbo agit prapter- constitutionem orationis,
eam maximc signiEcationem attendit in eis ex qua maxime orationem constituere valent.
In the continuation of this passageAbailard expressly says that the

significatiointellectuum principalior est illa (viz. the signfjï'catio
......
rerum) secundumcausaminventionis vocis, quae ad nil aliud jocta est nisi
propterintellectumconstituendum.'When discussingthe famous question of
Porphyry about the true nature of the universalia Abailard controsts,
again, signiücation and appellation (Log. Ingred, p. 2935-37).The
parallel passagein the LogicaNostrorumis quite clear. It was quotecl
above, p. 192f. In the Dialectica, too, both meanings of 'signffl'catio' are
contrastedand the signifi'catiointellectuum
is consigeredasthe proper one.
E.0'.:
b
Dial. V, 56230-563'5: est attendendum quare 'signjfïcarc' diversis modis

......
accipitur. Modo enim circa ea tantunn de quibus intellectuum generat, moclo vero circa
omnia quibus est impositum, solet accipi. Et secundumquidem primam et propriam
significationem ita Aristoteles in Libro Periern'uenias':ignyi'corc' descripsit cum ait:
"constituit enim qui dicit intellectum ", idest qui dictionem profert, idest voccm aliquam
significativam, constituit intellectuum in auditore, de propria scilicet et principali ipsius
significatione, veluti 'homo', cum et speciali naturae, ideat animali rationali mürtali,
primo loco sumptum (imponitur), et tantum ex ipsa individuis ipsius, ut Socrate et
ceteris, significationem [in se] ubique speciei in se tenet, non Socratis et ceterorum
quae speciem participant. Ex 'hominis' enim vocabulo tantum animal rationale mortale
concipimus, non etiam Socratemintelligimus.
Sedfortasseex adiunctione signi quod est 'omnis', cum scilicet dicitur 'omnishomo',
Socratem quoque in 'homine' intelligimus secundum vocabuli nominationem, non
secundumvocis intelligentiam. Nequeenim 'homo'in seproprietatemSocratistenet, sod
simplicemanimalisrationalismortalis naturamex ipso concipimus: nou itaque 'homo'
proprie Socratem demonstrat, sed nominat. Etenim de ipso quoque enuntiatur et ipsi
qui sensuioccurrit, primo loco fuit impositum, ipsi quidem ut Socrati ct discreto ab aliis.
Alioquin non recte diceretur: 'Socrates est homo', si non ex adiunctione ad alios, immo
ex communione universalis humanitatis, quae una est, eius signiHcatio proprie dicitur.
large,secundumscilicetquamlibetimpositionem,iuxta
Accipitur quoque':igngfl'cotio'
quod quidem in Praedicamentis dictum est vocabulo speciei manifestius rem ipsam
designari quam nomine generis, et rursus 'hobcro' significare calciatum esse, armatum
' For the cmupletetext, seeabove,p. 193.

esse.. Neque enim nomen generis intellectum facit, sed eam quoque ut nominatam
comprehendit, sicut speciesindividumm.l
In fact, Abailard did not push the useful distinction betweeh signü-
catio and nominatio Far enough. Such elaboration of the distinction is not
found until the problems are confronted from the viewpoint of gram-
mar.2
As a matter of fact Abailard's attempt to free logic from ontological
elements was far from succesful desPite the distinction he made between
signjicatio and appellatio, since he did not pursue it consistently. Even
when Abailard as a logician prefers the signyq'catioin the sense of signü—
tatio intellectuum,to that taken as signücatio rerum, he seemsto persist in
stressing the nexus of signifcatio and res.3! give some texts:
Lag.Ingrcd., p. 1365'10:Ubi enim ostendit (sc. Aristoteles) quamlibet dictionem cuius-
cumque rei designativam aut substantiam signiEcareetc., ostendit in his decem nominibus
rem cuiusquenominisesseinclusamideoqueseaperiendosigniEcntiones
horum nominum
decemnaturasrerum quibuslibetvocibussubiectarumaperire.
Lag. Nosrrarum, [). 5323'3: Et quoniam ita res inter se conveniunt et differunt ex necessi-
tate, adhancdoctrinamfaciendamoportuit invenirevncabulaquaeresdiscretasdetermi-
narent et rerum convenientiam significarent. In his enim duobus, convenientia rerum
videlicet et differentia assignanda,Platone teste perutilis et necessariaconsistit doctrina.
Ibid., p. 5377'10: Nota quod voces sunt aemulae rerum. Ut enim primo loco substituitur
substantia accidentibus, sit nomen significans substantiam primo loco in constitutione
ponitur et nomen adiectivum ci additur, ut 'homoalbum'; et sic in verbo: 'currit celeriter'.
The last passageis the more signiEcant as it connects a grammatica! rule

with the ontological point of view.
How is this inconsistencyto be exPlained?I think the answercan be
rather easil)rgiven: Abailard, just like all other logicians of his days,
took the !sagageand the Categoriesto belong to the purel)r logical
works.,4 It strikes the reader, indeed, that whenever signi 'catia is
' Compare Lag. lngred., p. "2540; quantum tamen ad causam impositionis nominis
prima et principalis signiücatio intellectus dicitur, quia scilicet ideo tantum vocabulum
rei datum est ut intellectum constituat. Seealso, ibid., p. [ 1533'4".
2 See below, p. 2245.
3 Cfr. Beonio, op. cfr., pp.. 36-38.
.
4 See e.g. Dominicus Gundissalinus, Dc divisionephilomphiae(written towards 1150),
p. 75'1'14 ed. Baur: set quia proposicio ex terminis numquam bene componitur, nisi
prius significatio cuiusque termini cognoscatur: ideo scriptus (inscriptus Baur) est
Liber Cadlcgoriarumad docendum quot sunt genera terminorum et que sit significatio
cumsque eorum.
THE THEORT OF SIGNIFICATION [N TWELFTH CENTUM LOGIC 197
discussed in the frame-work of these two works, the ontological point

of view prevaila.I For that matter this viewpoint was based on Boethius"
opinion about logic, as appears clearly from the opening words of
Abailard's glosses on the Categoriae:
Log. Ingrcd., p. 1I 13-l 121: Auctor iste.cum tractandae logicae curam praecipue suscepis-
set, nihil intactum reliquit, quod eius doctrinae necessarium iudicaverit. Unde cum
logica ratio sit disserendi, hoc est discretio argumentandi, argumentationes vero propo-
sitionibus iungantur, propositiones vero ex dictionibus et constitutionem suam et signi-
Flcationemcontrahant, ita singula diligenter tractavit, ut prius simplicium sermonum
signiEcationem utramque aperiret, cam quidem quae de rebus est, in hoc: opere, illam
vero quae de intellectu est, in Pcricrmcnias,in quibus etiam propositionum proprietates
diligentius prosequitur. Argumentationumvero doctrinam in Topiciscomplet et Ana-
lyricis.Et hoc quidem ordo naturalisexigebat, ut sicut partesnaturaliter praecedunt
suum compositum, ita eorum doctrina tam in tractando quam in legendo praecedat..
Unde.bene teste Boethio liber qui simplicium sern'uonumdoctrinam tradit, prior legendus
inter cetera Aristotelis opera ingredientibus logicam occurrit.
Cuius etiam teste Büethio in hoc opere intentio est de primis vocibus prima rerum
genera signiEcantibus in eo quod res significant, disputare, hoc est earum signilïcationem
secundum naturas subiectarum rerum aperire. Hoc autem hac consideratione facit, quod
cum videret tam rerum quam nominum infinitam multitiglinem nec propter infinitatem
suam singula posset prasequi, consideravit decem nomina, in quibus omnes res sint
inclusae quibuscumque vocabulis subiectae, quorum etiam decem nominum, dum
significationem aperiret, in ipsis decem naturas omnium rerum quibuscumque modis
subiectarum demonstraret et quodammodo omnium nominum significationes in his
decem nominibus zq'.nf:1-i1'*-e-.t;.z
See also the passagesquoted above, pp. 193-195.

However, when discussing the meaning of a proposition Abailard
appears to have a clear insight into the diH'e-rencebetween the logica] and
ontological points of viex-v.Seee.g. the texts, quoted above, pp.186-187.3
So we End impositio, in the sense of quaedamimponcncisintentio, and
signyficatiosometimes contrasted by Abailard:
Dial. [, l]. 12710'12:est autem suprapositacausavocabuli (viz. the term 'injinicum') non
tam ad :ignifï'carioncmreducenda, cum scilicet nec solis nec omnibus ianitis videatur
convenire, quam ad quamdam imponenti:intentionem.
! E.g. Dial. [, p. 12411'15: Subiectarum vero rerum diversitas secundum decem prae-
dicamentorum discretionem superius est Ostensa,quae principales ac quasi substantiales
nominum significationes dicuntur. Ceterae vero significationes, quae secundum modos
significandiaccipiuntur,tam posterioresatqueaccidentales
dicuntur..
: ln Arist. Carm., 161B. Compare Log. lngrcd., p. 7329:probat & causaper naturamrerum
proprietatem nominum.
J See also Dial. ll, pp. 157-l60: utrum sint aliqua: resea quae a propositionibusdicuntur;
cfr. the lntroduction to my edition of the Dialectica, pp. Lf
.
!bid., III, p. 28516-28633:est autem illud maxime notandum quam maxime in enuntiatione
consequentiarum magis vocum proprietas et recta impositio sit attendenda, ac magis
quidem quam rerum essentiaconsideranda
......
Si quis itaque vocum impositionem recte pensaverit, enuntiationum quarumlibet
veritatem facilius deliberaverit et rerum consecutionis necessitatem velocius ani-
madverterit. Hoc autem logicae disciplinae proprium relinquitur, ut scilicet vocum
impositiones pensandoquantum unaquaqueproponatur oratione sive dictione discutiat.
Comparcibid., p. 3041'4: In omni enim enuntiatione ad sensus

..... .
(meaning) cognitionem maxime necessaria est discretio impositionis et
significationis vocum, ex quibus pariter et suam impüsitiontzml sorti-
untur et suam significationem.
This important and fruitful distinction between general meaning
(signyï'catio) and actaual mening (quaedamimpanentisintentio) is frequently
found in ;'äbailard.2 ln this connection some passagesmay be pointed out
where Abailard discusses some praprictatcs nominum, even though it
should be noted that by this tcrm he meansgrammatica!properties:
Dial. I, p. 12427-12513:Sunt autem quaedam nominum proprietates iuxta signiücationem

pensandae,quaedamvero secundum positionem constructionis attendendae,quaedam
etiam secundum vocis impositionem accipiendae.
Quod enim alia propria, idest singularia, ut 'Socrates',alia appellativa (a)ut universalia
dicuntur, ut 'homo', 'album', aut alia in comparationem ducuntur, alia non; quod haec
quidem singularis numeri sunt, illa vero pluralis, ut 'homines'; insuper quod haec
essentiaesunt, quae substantivadicimus, alia vero adiacentia, quae sumpta nominamus,
ut 'album', 'vir', — pleraque omnia ad signiFlcatic-nempertinent.
Quod vero alia recti casusdicuntur, alia obliquiI alia masculini generis, alia alterius
dicuntur, ad positionem constructionis refertur. Cum enim et rectus et obliqui casus
eiusdem sint signilïcationis, cum alio tamen obliquus cum alio rectus construitur, aut
cum.eamdem habeant signiFlcationem 'albus', 'alba', 'album', diversis tamen generibus
iunguntur: non enim vel 'muh'cr albus' vel 'vir alba' dicimus. Patet autem hinc generis
diversitatem signiücationem non mutare quod in eadem signiFlcationediversa genera
saepe habemus, ut lapis pctra Saxum,fluvius aqua jhunen. Quod autem 'olim" et 'aliud'
diversae sunt significationis, (cum id personae sit discretivum, illud naturae), generis
diversitas non fecit, sed nova et consueta neutri acceptio quae in aequivocationem
! compositionem MS (and wrongly printed in the edition).

2 Sometimesthe opposition of signi"caua— impositiois found in the glosseson the
Imgageand the Categories;e.g. Log. Ingred.,p. 5427'3l: sed fortassesi ad vocum irn-
positionem magisquam ad naturam rerum hoc quod ait Boethius referamus, absolvemus
eum, dicentes scilicet nulla generalia vocabula quae aequalia fuerint inventione, adhuc
habuisse, non tamen hoc natura rerum recusante, sed magis impositione nominum
clanciente. It should be noted, however, that Abailard here speaksof impositioas prima
inventio nominum rather than of the actual imposition of a term in :: sentence. The same
can be saidof ibid., p. 10029'".

THE THEORV OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTUR? LOGlC 199
ducitur; casuum quoque diH'erentia signiFlcationem non variat, quod ex eo quoque:

manifestum est quod apud diversos diversus est numerus casuum, signiücatione tamen
eadem permanente. Sex enim casibus Latini utuntur, Graeci vero quinque., qui pro
ablativo quoque genitivo utuntur; barbari vero unius casusprolatione contenti sunt.
Quod autem alia primitiva, idest primae inventionis, alia derivativadicuntur, atque
alia simplicia, alia compositavocantur, ad vocis inventionem et impositionemattinet.
After speaking about such vitiosae compositiones as 'muh'cr albus' the

author concludes the passage as follows:
Ibid., p. 12535'33: Prima autem nominum causa fuit significationis impositio (: prima
inventio),secutaest autem posteaconstructionis diiudicatio; et ad rei quoque demon-
strationem (discretio) generum vel casuum necessaria non videtur, sed magis ad con-
structionis constitutionem.
Finally. There are some passages where Abailard seemsto use what I
havecalled (p. 113) the contextualapproach.One is found in his Dia-
!cctica' in the discussion of the metaphoric expression: "Hamcrusest
paeta' (Cfr. Arist. Dc interpr., 212125-26):
..
Dial. !, p. 136'4'2'5':Sed quaero in illa Ggurativa locutione: 'l-Iomcruscst poeta'. cuius
nomen 'Homerus'ut 'pocra'accipiatur. At vero si hominis, falsaest enuntiatio eo de-
functo; si vero poematis de quo agitur, cur esse et ipsum denegetur aut quid Egurativa
locutio dicitur?; non iam impropria est locutio, sed nova vocis aequivocatio.
Sed ad hoc, memini, ut Magistri nostri sententiam defenderem, responderesolebam
'Homeri' et 'poctac' nomen, si per se intelligantur, Homerum designare; unde et bene
denegatur simpliciter Homerum esse, qui iam defunctus est. At vero cum tutius con-
structionis sententiapensaturacsimul verba in sensualterius enuntiationisconfunduntur,
non iam singularum dictionum signiFlcatio attendenda est, sed tota magis orationis
sententia intelligenda; atque in eo impropria dicitur orationis constructio quod eius
sententia ex signiEcatione partium non venit.:
Besides,the numerous passagesmay be mentioned in which Abailard

points to the fact that, in the case of univocation, and, generally
speaking, of translatio, the various meanings of a word arise when,
having in itself (ex propria inventionisinstitutione)only one meaning, it
obtains a secondary meaning as the result of a special use in a propo-
sition. Someof them will be discussedin Chapter XV (below, pp. 492("f).
1 I, pp. 13523-13632.
2 Cfr. Dia]. V, p. 5724'".
(b) nominasumpta— nominasubstantiva(substantialia)

The distinction between nomina sumpta and nomina substantiva or sub-
stantialia is of much importance in twelfth century logic. Abailard
twice gives a definition of these terms:
Log. lagrcd. p. 12234-1234:Sunt autem omnia denominativa vocabulasumpta, non autem

omnia sumptasunt denominatiua.Sumptaautem vocabulaea dicimus quae simpliciter
propter adiacentemformam signiFlcandamreperta sunt, ut 'rarionalc', 'album'. Non enim
'rarionalc'dicit animal rationale vel 'album' corpus album, sed simpliciter 'rarionalc'
ponit affectum rationalitate, 'album' aH'ectumalbedine, non etiam substantiam rei, quid
sit, determinat.
Dial. V, 1). 59531'3'5:Sicut autem nomina quaedam substantiva dicuntur, quae rebus
ipsis secundum hoc quod sunt data sunt, quaedamvero sumpta, quae scilicet secundum
formae alicuius susceptionem imposita sunt, sic et chnitiones quaedam (secundum) rci
substantiam, quaedam vero secundum formae adhaerentiam assignantur.
The problem turns out to be relevant to the question under which

severalnounsare to be classiFled.
category(predicamentum)
Log. lngrccl., p. 11515'4": Cum autem in collectione hoc nomen 'pracclicamcntum'
sumitur, quaeri solet, utrum omnes simplices sermones ctiam praedicabilcs secundum
aliquam suam significationem in aliquo sint praedicamento. De quo quidem diversae
sunt opiniones. Alii namque in praedicamento substantialia tantum vocabula ponunt,
quae scilicct rem subiectam in essentia nominant, ut 'homo', 'albedo-', 'animal', 'color'.
Alii etiam sumpta in praedicamento 8550.1volunt;secundum principalem signiücationem
de forma adiacenteet tam 'albedo'quam 'album' in praedicamentoqualitatis ponunt,
quia utrumque albedinem signiFlcatlicct diversis modis, illud quidem in essentia, istud
in adiacentia
......
Sed fortasse dicetur, quia 'album' quoque substantiam per nominationem signiücat,
et 'homo' vel 'animal' qualitatem quoquc circa substantiamdeterminant. Unde et 'homo'
in praedicamento qualitatis ponetur et 'album' in praedicamento substantiae.Sed dicitur,
quod quandocontingit idem vocabulumrcs diversorumpraedicamentorumsigniEcare,
secundum principalem signiFlcationem in praedicamento ponendum est, ut 'album',
quod albedinem principaliter significat, prapter quam maxime repertum cst atquc
ubique eam tenet quam etiam praedicare dicitur. At vero si ad principalem signiücatio-
nem secundumcausamimpositionis respicimus,uni praedicamentopoterunt omnia
supponi secundumsignilïcationcm intellectus, quac principalis est.
The distinction plays a similar röle in the division dici de subiecto and
essein subiecto:
Log. lngrcd. p. I2727'36: Cum autem membra divisionis, scilicet dici de subiecto etc.,
non solum substantialibusnominibus, verum etiam sumptis conveniant, ipse tamen de
substantialibus tantum nominibushanc divisionem facit. Unde bene ait: 'eorum quae
THE 'n-lsorw OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTURV LOGIC 201
sunt', id est nominum quae in essentia rem significant, non scilicct cx adiacenti tantum
forma. In quo differentiam insinuat inter istam et superiorem divisionem. Nam quoniam
illa omnia nomina tam sumpta quam alia includcbat, non dicit 'sunt', 5ch 'dicuntur',
quod commune est omnium. Hic vero dixit 'sunt', ut sola substantialiaacciperet, cum
tamen membra dividentia non solum substantialibus conveniant.
In the Dialectica the distinction is used in the discussion about number

(De numero):
Dial I, p. 642l-652: Quomodo una res in natura dicentur aut quomodo ipsae spatio tanto
.
distantes unam simul specialem seu generalem naturam recipient? Unde potius numeri
nomen et 'binarü' ct ':cmarii' et ceterorum a collectionibus unitatem sumpta dice-
ba[n]t (sc. Magister noster). Sed si sumpta essent& quibusdam,ut ait, collectionibus,
male ipsis Aristoteles ostenderet quantitatem non comparari, cum ait: "neque enim est
illud alio magis bicubitum, nec in numero, ut ternarius quinario". ln sumptis enim non
ea quae ab ipsis nominantur, comparantur, sed tantum formae quae per ipsa circa
subiecta determinantur. Alioquin et substantias ipsas comparari contingeret, quae
saepe a sumptis nmninibus nominantur, ut ab eo quod est album et ceteris.. Unde
opportunius nobis videtur ut sicut supra tetigimus, numeri nomen substantivum sit ac
plurale unitatis atque idem in signiücationc quod unitates. 'Binarius' vero vel 'rernarius'
ceteraque numerorum nomina inferiora sunt ipsius 'plurahsf, sicut 'hamincs' vel 'qui' ad
ianimah'a', aut 'albi' homineset nigri' vel 'tres vel quinquehomines'ad *hominas'J
The full impact of the distinction becomes clear when Abailnrd deals
with the problem of the definition of nominasumptain Dial. V, pp. 596-
598. Here the question is raised whether these nouns refer to the subjecta
(: substmtes)or to the substantia]forms(-]brmaeessentiales). E.g. when
talbum' is deflned asjbrmatum albedine, is, then,]brmatum albedinethe
deEnition of "album' or of *albedo'? [t cannot be, Abailard says, the
deFmition of albedo,for it is impossible to say: 'albedoest.]brmataalbedine'.
However, if the defmition holds good for album, it may be askedwhether
it should be also applicable to all alba taken distributively or collectively.
In both casesthis turns out to be impossible.
Abailard solvesthe problem in this way (Dial. V, 59627ff.): (I) the
definition holds good also for thejbrma essentialis,that is to say, only for
the forma secundumadiacentjam accepta, e.g. "omne album estjörmatum
albedine'; (2) when the defmition fjbl'matumalbedine'is used for 'album',
then it happens secundumsigny'ïcationcm,i.e. it is taken to be commonly
applicable to more individuals becauseof the common status of those
individuals: resquaealba nominatur est-þrmataalbedine.
! For another discussiön in which thc distinction plays a röle, see Dial. 577'3; 8113Ff;
and 1243305quoted above, p. 198.
That Abailard's view on the problem is closely connected 'with his

solution of the universalia problem clearly appears From the second
pointJ This quasi-ontological approach was bound to preclude Almilard
from solving the question of the nominasumpta, as used.in a sentence,
i.c.
from the view-point of actual imposition.
(C) res - intellectus - vox
We have already2 seen that when dcaling with the subject matter
and proper intcntion of Aristotle's DeinterpretationeAlmilard appearsto
be fully aware of the distinctive object of logic to the extent that he
connects the vocesrather with the intellectus than with the res. All the
same, it is precisely this connection with the intellectus resicling in the
soul that seems to shift the merely logica] problem of the meaning of
terms to the domains of psychology and gnoseology?
This may be clariFlcd by Abailard's treatment of the Bocthian formula
of the tria generacal!ocutionurn.4Though in the foot-steps of Boethius he
discussed it quite rightl)Ir from our point of view and his own 5 by
— —
starting from sm analysis of the disputatio, he fails to free himself from
non-logical views:
Lag. lngred., pp. 32419-325": Notandumü vero quod ex his quatuor quc hic ponuntur,
1..":mzibusscilicct, litteris, intellectibus, rcbus, separatis litteris, quo tantum ad
——
scripturam pertinent --, in tribus reliquis teste Boethio omnis ordo collocutionis
perficitur. Sive enim eorum inter quos sermo est, alter interroget et alter respondeat
sive alter doceat et alter discat sive alter cantinua orationc loquatur et alter audiat, —
in his tribus semper corum collucutio versatur, sed tamen interrogans ct docens et
continua oratione loquens hec tria alio ordine sumunt quam respondens ct discens
(docens B) et audiens. Illi enim tres prius rem inspiciunt, deinde naturam eius vel
proprietatemattendentesintellectuum
concipiunt, tandemad manifestandum intellectum
vocemproferunt. Hi itaque de rebusad intellectuum,de intellectu ad vocesproEcisci
videntur. Alii vero tres econverso agunt. Prius enim audiunt voccm ex qua concipiunt
intellectum, quo, scilicet intellectu, ad rem attendendum perducuntur.
Est autem [Boethius, II, 4325]. Ostensa communi significatione vocum, que est in-
tellectuum, secundumquam videlicet de vocibus intendit (sc. Aristotiles), ac per hoc
assignata communi convenientia omnium interpretationum assignat etiam diFFerentiam
earundem vocum secundum diversitatem intellectuum, dicens scilicet quod quemad-
1 [Jo.-the concept of 'swrus' and its röle in the doctrine of the universalia, see Diqleccim,
ln:rod., p. XCIII.
: above, p. l93Fl'. 3 Sec also Bconio, ap. m., pp. 34-38.
4 See above, p. l79f. 5 See above, p. 186.
'-"I quate from the better Berlin text ns given by Minio-Palucllo in his Abaelardiana
inedita, SuperPeriermcniasXll-XIV, 1). 127.
THE THEORV 01: SIGNIFICHTION m TWELFTH CENTum LOGIC 203
modum intellectus qui in anima sunt, quidam sunt veri, quidam sunt fnlai, alii nequc
veri ncque falsi, ita etiam voces secundum signiFlcationcm intellectuum contingit quas-
dam esscveras, quasdamfalsas,quasdamnequc verasncque falsas,et que prius passiones
animevocaverat, hic apertiori nominc intellectus appellat.!
One need not wonder, indecd, that x-vhenspeaking about the proprietates
and dijerentiac vocum Abailard continuas this passnge with a discussion
about sane, vain, true, and Falsointellectus(ibid., p. 325" Ff,). Mrs Beonio
is right in taking this discussion to betray that Abailard did not carry
through his intcntion to liberate the noun from the domain of the res
to the end.:
d theory of predication
-
We have already seen (above, pp. 183ff.) that Abailard criticizcd
William of Champeaux's view oF prcdication. Master William and his
sequaces, Abailm'd says, used to clistinguish in every question or propo-
sition thc grmmnatical From the dialectical sense. Abailard energetically
denics that there are two diFFercnt scnses of a..proposition according
whether it is considered either by the grammarian or by the dialectician.
It is only thcir usage,he says, that is different. What is called transitiva
or intmnsitive construction by the gramnmrian, is named predicatio by
the dialectician. Such variety of names in the diWel'elït artesis quite usual.
Intrad. parma]. pp. 27337-27410Dal PraJ: Nolumus autcm unquam ut in constructionibus
alium sensum dialectici, alium attendant grammatici. Sed idem ex eadem constructione
et dialetici intelligant ct grammatici.. Quia cum dicitur 'Socratescurrit', quicumque
constructionem intelligit idem in ea attendit, Socratemvidelicet in modis (?) currendi
concipiens. At vero cum idem attenditur in constructione ab omnibus, diversis tamen
verbis ad agendum de constructionibus diversis utuntur. Grammaticus namque, cum de
iunctura constructionis;agit,transitivam et intransitivam eam appellat. Dialeticus vero
predicationem nmninat; unaqueque enim scientia prcpria verba habet. Nec mirum, cum
.frcquenter videamuseos qui in eademarte eamdemscientiam tractant, diversis verbis
sententiamprofcrre eamdem.
Then Abailard explains the meaning of such a proposition as "Sacrates

est albus': albedo is copulated with Socrates in adiacentia, and being
subiectumalbedinisis cepulated with him in essentia.However, the only
thing the speaker intends to do in pronouncing the proposition 'Socrates
' Cfr. Introd. panni., p. 73'65. cd. Dal Pl'a.

3 ap. cfr.... pp. 36-37.
3 Dal Pra's text containä some misrcadings. [ quate this and the following passagesfrom
the manuscript(Paris, B.N.Lat. 7493, f. 1769).
204 LOGICA MODERNOILUM 11
estalbus', is to state the inherence of whiteness (albedo)in Socrates.The

use of the verb substantive is only an imperfect exPedient to do so :
lbid. p. 274'"*34: At vero cum diversa sint verba quibus de constructione agitur, non est
diversus in constructione sensus,sed idem penitus ab omnibus intelligendus est in
singulis constructionibus et unaqueque propositio predicativa certum inherentie modum
continet et ponit. Veluti hec: 'Socrates cit homo' determinate monstrat hominem essen-
tialiter inesseSocrati, idest Socratemessehominem. Et ista quoquc propositio: 'Socrates
estalbum'determinataminherentiam proponit, scilicet quantum ad essentiamalbedinis;
quippe et albedinem in adiacentiacopulat tantum et subiectum in essentia.Quippe ubi
Socrates dicitur esse ipsum subiectum albedinis, simul ostenditur ipse albedine adia-
center aFHciet duo Socrati copulari videntur, albedoquidem in adiacentia,subiectum
albedinis'in essentia:solum tamen albedodicitur praedicari, licet non solum copuletur,
quia si rerum predicationem in universalibus quoque vücibUSsicut alii attendimus, non
oportet vocari rem predicatam esseillam que copulatur subiecto, sed illam tantum quam
propositio copulare intendit et ad quam capulandampredicatum vocabulumponitur,
sicut 'album' hoc nomen de Socrate enuntiatum maxime in significationem albedinis
coniungende subiecto ponitur, quia is qui propositionem profert tantum album inesse
Socrati ut formam ostendere intendit, et, si verbum haberet quod posset cupulare albe-
dinem tantum Socrati, numquam ad substantivumverbum veniret.
The verb substantive, however, cannot but cepulate things in essentia,

and the universal names (vocesuniversales),such as whiteness (albedo),
cannot be copulated in essentia(e.g. we cannot say: 'Socratesestalbedo'),
therefore we must recur to the underlying subject of the universal
quality (fundamentum ipsius).Accordingly, while two things are copulated
with the subject, viz. the fundamentin essentia and the universalquality
in adiacentia,yet only that quality (solaalbedo)is said to be predicated of
the subject of the proposition:
ibid., pp.. 27434-2757: Sed quoniam solum substantivum verbum, et nuncupativum
quando in substantivumresolvitur, aliquas res coniungereper predicationemconstat,
substantivum, quia omnia in essentia signiFlcat, sine coniunctione essentie proferri non
potest, oportet aliqua essentialiterper substantivumverbum copulari. At vero albedo
in essentiavere copulari non potest. Unde ad fundamentumipsiusvenimus,quod non in
essentia substantivi verbi copulamus: albedinis similiter adiacentiam quam intendimus
indicamus,dum 1..ridelicen
proponimusipsumSocratemesseipsum subiectumalbedinis,
et licet duo capulentur, fundamentum scilicet in essentiaet albedo in adiacentia, sola
albedo tamen predicari dicitur, quia sola capulari intenditur et propter copulationem
eius tantum propositio Fit et predicatum vocabulum maxime in signiHcationem eius
subiecto cupulatur, quia tantum ad subiectionem albedinis ostendendam subiecto
coniungitur.
The inherence theory, then, when speaking about predication con-

siders it de rerumsensu,not de vocibus:
THE THEOIW OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTLIR'i' LOGIC 205
[bini, p. 2757'29:Quod autem dicitur supra (SocratesMS) in predicativaquestionequeri

utrum predicatus inhereat subiecto, de rerum sensu hic, non de vocibus, accipimus.
Veluti in ista questione 'utrum Socratesest hamovel Socratesm albusP'; queritur scilicet
utrum predicatus eius inhereat subiecto suo, idest utrum res subiecti termini sit res ipsa
predicati, vel queritur utrum aFFlciaturea. Per rem quidem predicati dicimus in signi-
Ecationeþu] cuius ipsum subiecto copulari intelligitur: sicut albus Socrati in signi-
Ecationesolius albi coniungi attenditur. Quippe cum audimus Socrates
est albus vel
Socratesalbus, per albus solum albedinem non qüïzcmmalbedineSocrati in animo nüstro
copulamus.Omnis itaque predicativa questio querit utrum predicatusinhereatsubiecto,
id est utrum si: rex predicari, vel aFfecta; vel subiectam
res subiecti termini ea sit rem in-
tellige, ut dictum est, in vi signiFlcatic-nis,cuius predicata vox accipitur sive ut materie

idest in essentia, sive ut forme, videlicet in adiacentia. Nam ista 'utrum Socratesest homo?
et determinate querit utrum hoc sit illud: etiam "urrum Sacram est albus? determinate
interrogat utrum ipse sit affectus albedine; licet ubique determinate modus inherentie
proponatur, non tamen ideo in omnibus necesseest eumdem modum inherentie preponi,
sed in ista tantum [in] essentie,ibi adiacentia.
From the above evidence it becomes quite clear that unlike his master
William of Champeaux, Abailard did not take the predicate term as
denoting some concrete thing. lnfluenced as he was by certain ontological
presuppositions he failed to recognize the ad'vantages of William's
grammatica]approachof the problem ofpredication. (Seeabove,p. 185f.).
What William, as & grammarian, hesitatingly attempted and Abailard
as& dialectician energeticallyrejected, was to be achieved only :: few
decadeslater in the School of Melun: a theory of predication free From
non-logical elements.'
From the foregoing investigations the conclusion may be drawn that
Abailard's view of the signi "curiais nearly alx-vaysstrongly influenced by
certain ontological and psychological(gnoseological)points of view.
Nonetheless there really are the beginnings of a logical theory of snp-
position in Abailard's work. It is true we do not Find an elaborated
theory of supposition in the works OFAbailard nor even any use of the
.term *suppositio' in its technical sense.2 But there is & distinction made
! See below, p. 3 ] 9Ff. It should be noticed, however, that in the DialecticaAbailard sccms
to have transferred the pith of the matter to the identity theory. See my Introductionto
this work, IJ. XXXIX.
2 lt may be deEnedas follows: suppositiois the interpretation of & term, in a proposition,
for some thing or things speciFledby another term in that proposition. SeeE. Moody,
Truth and Canscquencc .in Medicam! Logic, 1953, p. 23. — lt should be noted also that
Abailard rarely uses the term suppositum.He nearly always speaks of rcs subiecta.E.g.
Log. lngred. p. 12337'33:ressubiectaenominibus; cfr. ibid., p. "520 (text quoted above,
p. 200); sometimes the verb supponere : subicere
is used (Dial. p. 29333)but never in the
technical sense; cfr. ibid., p. 590'5: 'album' 'homini' suppositum. See also below, our
Chapter XVI, pp. 519.
206 LOGICA MODERNORLm-l "
by Abailard betweenthe meaningsof the copula 'est', that is based,

indeed, on the meaningof the predicate term of the praposition in which
"est' is used..llThis may be seenas& Erst step to what hasbeencalled the
contextual approach?
Further, there is a distinction between signg'jï'catioand nominatio
(appellatio),evenif Abailard fails to useit tl'n'uughouut.3
There evenare
some passages in his works in which the author appears to be ax-vareof
the decisive function of actual imposition..4
However, the non-logical points of view seem to prevail. (1) The
term 'impositio' mostly stands for prima inventio, that is the activity of the
primus inventor nominum, who invented words with his eyes Exed on
natures; it is rarely found to deuote some actual imposition in this or
that sentencepronouncedby some actual speaker. (2) When even the
vocesare separated from the rcs, their connection with the intellectus
brings the author to the domain of psychology or confines him to that
of ontology, since the intellectusare said to refer, in their turn, to
reality? (3) His theory of predication, too, seemsto sufïer from the
prevalence of some non-logical points of view.
4- - Adam and the Sclwol of the Petit Pont

For Adam logica or dialectica should be. free of all complicated
accretions and superstructuresi So ontological problems about the
subjects of the logica] statements are expressly eliminated by Adam:
Ars diu., p. 12241ed. Minio-Paluello: Omnino autem qualiter et ad quid quid quorum
sit genuset que cuiussint speciescomperienclumalius erit docendilocus; ad id autem
1 See my Introductio" to the edition of the Dialectica, p. XLIX.

2 See above, Ch. 11,p. 1135.
4 E.g. See the texts quoted above, p. 199.
5 See the texts quoted above, p. 192 f. lt should be noticed that prima inventiois not the
sameasprimaimpositio.For the distinction primaand secunda
impositio,see[og, Ingrata!"
p. 11211'13. '
**See the texts quated above, p. 196. For & parallel view with Adelard of Bath: logic is
concerncd with argumentations and with things themselves, see the text quoted above,
p. 187, n. 5.
? Cfr. L. Minio-Paluello, The 'Ars disserendi'qf Adam q]- Balsham 'Parvipontanus' in:
Mediaevaland Renaissance
Studies111(1954). [pp. 116-169], p. 116.
THE THEOR'I' OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CEN'l'UR'i' LOGIC 207
artis quod nunc docemussatishic de quibus enuntiandum summatim distinguere, ut ad

enuntiationum principia intcmosccnda. Hoc tamen intcrscratur quod 'aliquid aliquorum
aliquod essegenus' quam 'aliquid aliquorum essegenus' et aliud est et ad usum loquendi
convenientiusdicere; illud tamen, ut brevius et ad artem docendammagisnecessarium,
disciplinaliter quandoque dici liceat.
The author's aim was appalwäntl)rto produce a handbook containing all

that is essentia] for the mastering of logic, so that the student who has
iearnt what is in arte should acquire thefacultas of discoursing ex arte.!
Adam's view of the task of logic is clearly focussed on the requirements
of practical dispute. Seethe opening chapters (I-X) of the Ars disserendi,
especially the passage:Ars dis., p. 66'23quoted above, p. 163.:
Adam concentrates on enuntiatio and interrogatio, in which is to be
found the principium disserendi.However, since questions and statements
are about the same kind of things, they are not distinguished from the
way in which they contain the subject (the de quo Adam says).There-
fore, this distinction is not relevant, now. It is especially the Erst
section and part of the second that are of some inlportance for us. These
parts of the Ars are concernedwith the de qua, i.e. the subject of the
question, and with the statements and the diFferent ways in which it can
be desigmted, or to use Adam's words: the problems to be discussed
here are de quo et qualiter de qua enuntietur ve! interrogetur.
The discussion of the de quo, with which the first section of the Ars is
concerned (pp. 111-18") is prepared by several preliminary remarks.
One of them is concemed with the two different points of view ac-
cording to which subject (de qua) and predicate (quid de eo) are to be
considered: the things themselves in question, and the words used to
designatathem (pp. 95'24).In fact, Adam'sdiscussionis concernedwith
both of theseviewpoints (pp. 934-105).Thus we see.that when dealing
with the diFfet-entprincipia enuntiandi the author recurs to the nature of
things themselves, in spite of his previous statement that ontological
problems are not involved in the Ars.3 Accordingly, he distinguishes
four principia enuntiandi, as the subject of the statement may be genus
generalissimum(in the technical terms used in the School: generaliter
appellatum non secundumspeciem), 01"genus proximum (generaliter appellatum
secundumspeciem),or speciesspecialissima(nan generaliter appellatum sed
! Cfr. above,pp. 162-166.

2 For the origin of the arsdialetica,seeArsdis., pp. 53-6'5;and Minio-Paluello, ap. til.,
p. 1245.
3 Ars. dis., p. 122'", quoted above, p. 206.
secundumspeciem), 01" individual thing (singulariter demonstratum). I quote

the original version oF the Ars and the explanation of the second
redaction' :
Ars dis., pl). 1222-134: Ex his igitur enuntiandi principiorum genera quatuor csse
intelligendum: omne enim huiusmodiprincipimn vel in designandoquid de aliquorum
generequod nullius Speciesquicquamdicatur, vel quid de alicuiusspecieque nullorum
genus, vel de eo quod utrumque, vel de aliquo singulorum.
Ibid., ad 1232-134 (secondreduction): Contingit autem preter hec et de quolibet singu-

lorum. Secundumhec ergo quadripertite de quibusenuntiari contingat, distinguendum
est, et iuxta eorum de quibus enuntiatur diHaærentiam,
quatuor essegenera principiorum
enuntiandi,intelligendum.Ad que planiusinternoscendahabeanturvulgariusnoscibilia
exempla hec: 'substantia-formamhabet', 'anima! sentit', 'homo laquitur' 'hic homo disierit';
primo de generaliterappellatonon secundmuspeciem,secundodegeneraliterappellato
(secundumsupra add.) speciem, tertio de non generaliter appellato sed secundum
speciem, quarto de Singulariter demonstrato enuntiatur. Artis ergo viam sine
deviis permearevolenti, exemplariterhinc innotescuntdicta quatuor enuntiandiprin-
cipiorum genera, et si nec descriptive nec nominatim.
The second redaction adds the secundumaccidensapchatum as the Efth

principium enuntiandi:
Ars diss. ad 14'2-151: Rursum, cum sic dicitur: 'certum dubium non est' dissimile distinctis
videbitur enuntiationisprincipium. Ratio ad hoc, quoniamsecundumaccidensest huius-
modi certorum appellatio, de quodam tamen genere eorum que dicuntur etiam sic
enuntiari dici poterit secundumillum loquendi usum quo genera aliquorum etiam
secundumaccidensdistincta dicuntur, ut cum dicitur reprehensoresquoddamgenus
hominum esse.Si quis autem hoc non susceperit, quintum genus principiorum enun-
tiandi constituat cum de secundumaccidensappellatoenuntiatur. Quo constituto, non
semper de genere aliquorum aut specie.enuntiari dicendum erit, cum in enuntiationis
principio nominati proprium plurium est; quoniam et reprehensorisproprium pluribus
convenit, et item similiter secundum accidensappellatorum.
In fact we Hnd here the same connections OFpropositions with the

ontological state of aH'airs(res),as is found in the section Dc locisof the
later Introductiones and Summuhz.
The second section of the Ars deals with the different ways in which
the subject (de quo) can be designated: qualiter de quo dicatur designandum
(p. 1813).Here the author teacheshmv things are expressedfor the
purpose of discourse in its diFferent kincls. This study is twofold: the
studyrof the various x-vaysin which the de quo is expressed resulting in a
classiHcationof the principia principiorumdisserendi(theoretical aspect),
! For both redactions,seeMinia-Paluello, op. m., pp. 121-124.

THE THEOR'n' OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTum' LOGIC 209
and the study of the usefulness of each way for the several kinds of
disPthation.' Then, our author goes on to deal with these kinds of
disputation (genus exercitativum, contentiosum, inquisitivum; p. 1925'27). ln
Fact,one-third of what remains of the Ars discussesthe casesin which the
word or phrase designating the de quo is ambiguous and as such produces
sophisma:
Generally Speaking Adam has much of the explorer and pioneer he

claims to be. Minio-Paluello is certainly right in pointing out3 that it
required more than skill and information about previous discoveries to
conceive of a system OFlogic which could be complete and well-Founded
through a studyrof the principia of discourseand to insert, without
apparent obtrusiveness, into the same plan a theory OFthe subject-
matter OFdiscourse, & theory of sophisms, and one of the possible types
OFquestions. ln coining & new technical usage, the author tried to direct
the student's mind immediately to the object under discussion and to
make. him dispense with the doctrines, true.- or False, traditionally
attached to the usual terminology and precluding a clirect approach to
logical problems.
How—vever, not only did Adam's exclusive vocabulary and artiFlcial
style give his work a rather short and limited life, but his approach to
logica] problems seems to have been Focussedalmost exclusively on the
diFFerentkinds of (sophistica!) propositions, not on an analysisof the
proposition as such. Therefore Adam's connection with contemporary
grmnmar seems to have been rather superHcial.
Summing up, [ feel inclined, with Minio-Paluello (ap. cfr., p. 116),
te recognise, Adam's great merit for the Mediaeval study of logica]
cli5putation,4 but to take his influence on the origin OFterminism to be
no more than indirect.
5 - Alberic OFParis and His School
Besides the shorter compendia from the School oFMont Ste Geneviäve
dealt with above, p. 146 Ff.there havebeen preserved some more elaborate
' Seethe clear exposition by Minio-Paluello, ap. cfr., pp. 127-I28.

2 SeeMinio-Paluello, ap. cit. 128-134 and my Log. Med. [, pp. 64-77.
3 Seethe interesting sqrvey he gives, op. cit. pl). 135-136.
4 Compare the ExcerptaNorimbergcmiadiscussed above pp. 155-160 and edited in our
second part as Tract lll.
works on logic which were composed about 1130-1 140 in that School.
The most favourite master of that milieu was Alberic of Paris.I So this
master"s views on signifncation may be looked for in these works.
(a) the Perihermeneias-Commentary in Paris, B.N.Lat. 15.015
This cmmnentary on Aristotle's De intcrprctatiancz shows many l'e-

semblanceswith Abaiiard's LogicaIngredientibus.As a matter of fact thc
theory of signifncationFoundin this commentary is rather suPel-Flcialand
doesnot rise abovethe ontological and psychologia] considerationson
the passiones animaeand the function of the human faculties (sensus,ima-
ginatio, intellectus)found in Boethius' commentary)
Paris, B.N.Lar.. 15.015, [. ISITE'W: Porphirius autem aliam pretendit causam) Ait enim
in tempore Aristotilis controversiam inter philosophos fuisse de principali vocum
signiFicationc.Alii namqueres praprie et principaliter a vocibussignificariasserebant;
alii proptcr quasdamincorporeas naturas quas Plato meditatus est; alii sensus,alii
imaginationes,alii vero intellectus. Ut ergo Aristotiles hanc controversiam dirimeret, de
vocibus interserit principalem esseeorum intellectuum significationem.
Sed ut per sensuset imaginationesproprietates intellectus distinguantur, quid sensus,
quid imaginatio, et in quo distant ab intellectu, breviter distinguamus.
Est namque sensus quedam vis anime que numquam ducitur in exercitium nisi per
instrumentum corporeum, ut tactus per manus, visus per oculos et ceteri per alias partes
corporis. Ad hoc enim ut sensusexerceri valeant corporeis instrumentis indigent et
corpora tantum percipiunt sane propria corporum accidentia. Unde Aristotiles in opere
de iustitiaS: "sensuscirca corpus et in corpore sunt"; circa corpus, quia corpora cum
permixtis accidentibus percipiunt; in corpore vero sunt quia cm'poreis exercentur
instrumentis atque remotis corporibus in quibus vis ipsa sensuumagit, sensusexercitium
tollitur. UndeabsenteRomaipsamvidere non possunt.In quo quidemad intellectum et
imaginationem eius notatur distantinf'. Intellectus enim, sive imaginatio, corpora non
exigit, ut sint nunc sensibilia tantum sed etiam insensibilia et incorporea, ut anima per
quasdamformas imaginarias quas sibi animus conüngit prout vult rerum naturali": con-
templari, imaginationem sive intellectum sepe retinet. Ut si quis a Roma recedens iam
eam propter remotionem videre non SUFFICit, instar tamen civitatis quoddam in animo
retinet, in quo absentem speculat civitatem. Unde imago sive intellectus per quandam
quamanimusconfingit, sublataetiam re vel penitusdestructa,retinetur.5ed
rei eFFlgiem
' See my paper: SameNew Evidenccon TweU-thCentugf Logic: Alberic and the Schau!q]-Mon:
Ste Generiäre(ilfontani) in: VIVARIUM 4- (1966), pp. l-57.
: For this work, seemy paperquoted in the precedingnote, pp. 4—6-52.
3 Sec above, pp. 177-182.
4 viz. for Aristotle's exposition on the principal signiHcationDFthe voces(deprincipali
vocum significatione); see above, p. 178 f.
5 Cfr. Boethius, ln Periherm.", p. 2734".
5 instantia MS.
THE THEOR'I' OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTURï LOGIC 21 ]
sensusperceptio que per ipsam rem habetur, non per rei similitudinem, sublata re
tollitur necessario.
lmaginatio vero est confusa animi conceptio et ex sensualitatenobis cum bestiis est
communiset cum ipsasine intellectu haberi possit, intellectus sine eahaberi non potest,
in quo eius ad intellectum consistit dilïerentia quod testatur Aristotiles in libro De
Anima, ubi diFFerentiamimaginationis ad intellectus aFFu'mationis et negationis assignat
diversaab affirmatione et negatione; complexio
dicens: "est autem imaginatio (1811'13)
illorum namque intellectuum est veritas vel falsitas; imaginationes vero non quamvis
intellectus (ex imaginationesMS) non sint, sine imaginationibusnon sunt". Quod etiam
Boeciusplane insinuat dicens: "sensus et imaginatio quasi quedam prime Figuresunt,
quibus velud fundamento superveniens intelligentia operatur. Nam sicut pictores
solent designare subter colores in quibus corporis liniamenta exprimunt, sic sensuset
imaginationaturaliter in anime perceptionesuFHciuntur.Nam cum res aliquasub sensu
cadit, prius necesse(est) ut quedam inmginatio eius nascatur, post vero plenior super-
veniat intellectus cunctas eius partes explicans quas confuse conceperat imaginatio.
Quocirca inperfectumquiddamest imaginatio",
Ex verbis ( ) patet intellectum non haberi sine imaginatione et eiusdemad
......
idem plane monstratur differentia. Cum enim ad aliquid intelligendum primum se
applicat animus, ipsaanimi applicatio et cogitandi inchoatio, antequamnaturam aliquam
rei distinguat, dicitur imaginatio. Ubi vero de confusione que imaginationis erat ad
aliquam rci proprietatem per rationem perventum est, intellectus dicitur. lmaginatio
namquerem linealiter concipit nullam cius proprietatei'nïattendens;intellectus vcro
superveniensaliquam rei naturam distinguet et quod imaginatio confuse et quasi infinite
capit, ipse per rationem format et quodammodoaliquam proprietatem depingit. Sicut
enim una manu lignum tenemus, et alia ipsum sculpimus, ita depingimus quod per imagina—
tionem capimus, per intellectum fürmamus. Unde Boecius lwminis dcpingens similitu-
dinem inducit pro imaginare et intelligere. Ut enim is qui depingit in corpore in quo
dcpingit, prius liniamentis quibusdam spatium dissinet adhuc et & coloribus nudum,
postea colores substernens formare et vestire incipit quod ante ambitu spatii con-
scripserat,sic quod imaginatio prius indiscrete perceperat nec in ullam formam vel
proprietatem formavemt, intellectus superveniens quodammodo depingit dum ipsum in.
aliquorum proprietatem attendit. Imaginari itaque est imaginationem rci tantum
attendere; intelligere vero est rem ipsam secundum aliquam naturam concipere et
distinguere.. Ex proprietatibus itaque sensus vel inmginationis voces esse inventas. Si
enim propter sensus invente essent, ut videlicet per eas non sensus haberemus, sed in
exercitium Teos profecto omnis vocum significatio ad aliquid sciendum nos pertrahere
deberet; quod omnino falsum est, cum si(n)t vocessignificationeö) insensibilium ut anime
veritatis et falsitatis et aliorum. Si vero propter imaginationem que. indiscrete con-
ceptionis et quiddam inperfectum, est voces essent reperte, tunc per voces nulla certa
fieret doctrina. Unde Boecius recte ait nominibus et verbis non certa, idest confusa, et
inperfectasigniücari, sedperfecta et secundumaliquid concepta. Quod autem ille in-
corporea nature meditate a Platone a vocibus primo loco nonlsigniücentur planum erit,
si prius quid ipse sint, inspexerimm.
Sunt itaque forme imaginarie quas sibi pro rebus ipsis animus conEgurat, ut illis res
ipsas speculetur et per eas rerum imaginationes sive memoriam retineat. Quas quidam
ideassive exemplaresformas nominavit, Plato vcro ens incorporeas naturas, idest in-
sensibiles similitudines, nuncupavit. Naturam quippe bene dicit similitudinem rerum
nascentium. Sunt autem si(mi)litudines quedam in quibus sensibilia intelliguntur, sicut

statua Achillis; quedam vero in quibus insensibilia percipiuntur; sicut ista rerum
simulacra, et cogitationi tantum, non sensui, subiacent. Unde cas effugies incorporeas,
idest non trnctabilcscorporeissensibus,Platonominat. Quasquidamvolebanta vocibus
primo loco significari, quod Aristotiles (! sm) improbavit. Non enim propter rerum vel
intellectuum similitudines voces reperte sunt, sed magis propter res ipsaset earum
intellectus, ut de rerum naturis doctrinam facerent, non de huiusmodi Hgiïientis, et in-
tellectus de rebus constituerent, non de figmentis. Sed tamen quandoque ipsa figmenta
pro rebus absentibus constituimus, quasi quedam rerum intcrsignia. Unde potius voces
per ea quibus intersigniis utimur, intellectus de rebus, non de ipsis constituunt, cum
scilicet voces animum audientis ad similitudinem rei applicant, ut ita non ipsum, sed
rem propositam attendat. Unde si quis cernens statuam Achillis ea non pro se sed pro
Achille utatur, in ea non ipsam,sed Achillem attendensutensqueea tanquamsimili-
tudine, non tanquam re, ut videlicet non se intellectu presentet, sed Achillem significet
et dum eam percipit ad Achillem derigat intellectum. Si autem eadem statua ut res
ponatur, in ea aliud non attendam. ln ficta euim imagine etiam contingere potest ut ea
aliquando pro imagine, aliquando pro re utatur. Cum ea pro imagine utor, aliud in ea
attendam cuius est intellectus; cum vero nil in ipsa attendo eius est intellectus qui
nomine ipsius imaginiscum nomine rei exprimendusest. Ut si dicatur: 'hocsimulachrum'
vel 'hoc imago'. Si autem nomen rei ponam, eius intellectus oportet essecuius est nomen
etiam quando per imaginatiünem rei habetur. Harum vero inmginationum quedam sunt
proprie et per unam certam substantiam constituteI quedam communes et ad plura
equaliter se habentes.Namperhoc nomen 'Socrotos'ad propriam aptamur, per 'homo'ad
communem et quam vagam.
Si quis autem querat utrum iste imaginarie forma per quas inmginatio vel intellectus
rei habetur, aliquid sunt, negamus. Non sunt enim l'orme substantiis inherentes ncc
substantie.Cum enim, visa turri, eius absentisvel penitus destructerecordor, illud
inmensumct confusumet quadratuminstar quod confingit animuset quasiante oculos
mentis constituit, ncc substantia est nec forma.
Sunt tamen qui dicunt ipsamanimamesseillud, que ita se transformarepotest ut
singulariter rerum similitudines in se transfm'met. Sed cum anima indivisibilis sit,
omnino et in longum inpossibile sit porrigere vel in formam totius ut sic ipsum cogitet
quomodo longitudinem 1irellatitudinem vcl quantitatem totius turris in se representare
poterit. Preterea.Cum sepeeodemtemporediversacogitet ut Fixumet mobile, com-
positum et simplex, si ad eorum similitudinem se haberet, oporteret eam fixam et
mobilem consistere, ut et motum habeat quo mobile presentet, ct contl'ariun1.Alioquin
non erit transformatio anima, si in uno statu semper consistit. Unde nec anima illud
instar concedimus essenec aliam substantiam nec etiam aliquam quantitatem aut formam.
De intellectu enim, de qua magis videtur iuxta illud Aristotilis et quorum he sunt
similitudines res etiam eede:11,1ninimeid recipimus. Intellectus enim qui in forma est
anime indivisibilis, subiectum suum excedere non potest ut se ad.quantitatem omnium
accommodare possit vel in formas turris Figuram, sicut nec anima. Unde nil penitus esse
concedimus huiusmodi rerum figmenta que sibi animus Fingit, ut easres absentcscon-
templemur. Nam dum res presens est que sensu attrahantur, non agemus imaginatione,
sed ipsa rei veritas et sensu et cogitatione simul percipitur nulla imaginatione inter-
cedente (. ) nonnisi preconceptaerat. Ubi vero res tenetur, non est Opus
.....
similitudine.l
' Cfr. Abailard, Log. Ingrod., pp. 3135.
THE THEORV 01: SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTurw LOGIC 213
(b) the Perihermeneias-Commentary

in Berlin, Lat. Fol. 624-
This incomplete commentary on the same x-vorkof Aristotle' does not
exceed the usual speculatiuus on sensus,imaginatio, and intellectuseither.
The passagesconcerned are Found Ff. 88ï'b-89ï'11. The end of them is
printed in my paper on the School of Mont Ste Geneviäve, pp. 4-3-44.
lt should be noted, indeed, that these Parihcrmcncias-commentaries
which without exception bear the conventional mark, confine them-
selves to the usual expositions on the psychology of knowledge and to
the current platonizing speculations about the universalia. They Fail to
push through to a purely logical analysisof the ciwnriatja, which is, as all
commentators rightly put it, the proper subject of Aristotle's Dc
interpretatione.
(c) The Introductioncsmaioresin Paris, B.N.Lat. 15. 141

The manuscript Paris, B.N.Lat. 15.14l?- contains, besides another
important logica] piece, an elaborate introduction into logic.3 It is
probably,Forthe main part, a reportarioof Alberi-c'slecturesat Mont Ste
Geneviäve and must be dated not later than about [ 140.4
lt seems to be of some importance for our purpose, since it contains
:: discussionofa question which, a few years later, became &more central
topic. lt is concerned with the later distinction between signgf'catioand
appellatio. Evcn the lack of any clear-cut distinction between these
fundamenta] concepts shows the diFFerenccswith the later theories of
snpposition :
Paris, B.N.Lar. lS.l4-l Ff. 473'11-4-81'3:

Non probari decet: quia huiusmodi propositiones,
,
scilicet: 'hcc voxrex 65!sanus', 'hoc nomenrex est l'ax', quc singulares videntur, indefinitas
essc posuimus, quemadmodum hec scilicet: 'hic homo est animal', pl'Optcr vim pro-
nominis singularis est et singulare subicitur, ita in illis videtur, non tamen est ita.
In illis enim non ad aliquam essentiam singularem Et demonstratio sed ad intel-
lectum vel ad ipsam ('l-BT")manericm nominis Fitdemonstratio, ut sic exponitur: hec
vox 'rex', idest vox talis mancriei, scilicet habenshuiusmodi formam ac compositionem,
est nomen sicuti dicimus: 'hccscientia,scilicet gramatica, est in illis', non demonstrando
aliquam singularemscientiam, scd ostendendaipsam mancriem, ut si dicatur: 'hcc
scicnria', scilicet gramatica, est in istis', idest scientia huius mancriei; sic quoque dicimus
'eadcmfdes ert in omnibus Christianis'.
Vel aliter possumus dicere quod (cum) demonstretur ibi illa essentia individua,
' For this work, seemy paper, pp. 39-46.

?'-For the manuscript, seeaboveCh. l, nr. 21, pp. 86-87.
3 For this work, see niy paper, pp. 12-22.
4 See my [):-per, p. 22.
tamen subicitur universale..Ut cum dicimus: 'hocvoxrcx cstnomcn',idest vox illius speciei
sub qua speciecontinetur hec essentiarcx quam modo protuli, est nomenet subicitur
ibi hoc universale'vox'. Sicuti cum dicimus: 'hic piscis'(demonstrandolucium!) mulcum
hobundot ir.-tcrro nostro', idest talis maneriei piscis cuius iste est quem video.:
(d) the Cotogorioc-Commentaryin Padua, BibI.Univ. 2084-

An extensive commentary on Aristotle's Categoriochas been preserved
in a twelfth century manuscript of the University Library at Padua.3 It is
& peculiar Fact that, unlike the Perihermeneias
commentarios, it is this
commentary on the Categoriesthat contains some precious dato on the
theory of signiücation as held in the School of Mont Ste Geneviäve.
I give some examples.
Speakingabout Aristotlc's phrases'essein subiecto'and'dici desubiecto'
the author raisesa diHïculty (f. 79"):
Hic oppositio alia: quicquid predicatur de subiecto est universale; sed quiddam quod
est in subiecto dicitur de subiecto teste Aristotile; ergo quoddam universale esr in
subiecto; ergo est res. Quod est contra eius sententiam. Sed ipse exponit Aristotiles:
scientia est in subiecto ut in anima; concedit; et dicitur de subiecto quia nomen eius.
Quam expositionem uiolatam et incongruam ostendo, quia talis est ista: 'mogisccr
cst appellativumquf cs: Porisius', idest hoc nomen 'mogistcr' est appellativum nomen, et
ipseest Parisius.Et sic aut hec erit bona,aut illa (sc.Aristotle's exposition) mala.
The author gives the sophism: 'Socratesest homo; sed homo est dignior
creatura ceteris; ergo Socrates est dignior creatura ceteris. The proposed
solutions are interesting (f. SV"):
Solutio. Duplex : non sequitur,quia 'istedigniorccccris'facit diversasrelationes.Quia cum
dico: 'homo ost dignior creatura cecoris', idest ceteris ab homine ; 'Socrates est.dignior creatura
ccccris',idest ceteriso Socrate.Et quia 'cctcris' diversa(s) facit relationes, ideo non sequitur.
Vel aliter: regula sic est intelligenda: quicquid predicatur de predicato,
prorsus et de subiecto. Sed aliquid non predicatur de predicato prorsus, cum
dicitur: 'homo est dignior creatura ceteris', sed indefinite: quid sit prorsus predicari
alibi dicetur.
The author gives a few more sophisms which make also us think of the
examples commonlyr used as illustrations of the later theorias OF sup-
position. Eg. 'hoc herba est in uno Ioco tontum'4 :
ï : lucc,or pikc.
: Cfr. the well-known example: 'hoc hcrbo crescithic c: in horto mco' (William of Shyres-
wood, Introductioncs,p. 79?*3ed. Grabmann).
3 For this work, see my paper, pp. 36-38.
4 Cfr. above, p. 2141.n. 2.
THE THEOR'I' OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTUR? LOGlC 2l5
f. SV": 'Hcc crba (faciendo demonstrationem nd absinthium) cst corpui; scdomnecorpus

est in uno loco tantum; ergo hec erba es: in uno loco tantum; sed e.:: in pluribus quia est hic et
Rome;ergonon es:in uno locorantum'.
Solutio. Conclusio multiplex est, scilicet 'hcc erba est in uno loco tantum', si facis
demonstrationem ad hanc singularem erbam, vera; si vero ad individua eius, falsa.
ln this connection we Find the well-known ambiguous proposition:

' Pascocstpulchrumtempus'(f. 281'3).
However, the concept of supposition seems to be completely un-
known to the author. This fact is shown in a peculiar way by a passage
and suppositioare contrasted (f. 32v'3):
where the terms superpositio
Item. Dividitur aliter ad aliquid: aliud est superpositio, aliud subpositio. Et est divisio
generis in species. Suppositio est tale aliquid per cuius assignationem demonstratur
aliquid supponi alii, utfliatio, servitus,et similia.
This use of the term suppositio,which can be compared with that made
of it in the doctrine of the predicabilia,' would have incluccd any later
author to add a few words about the logica] sense,,pfsuppositio.
To conclude this section on the School of Mont Ste. Genevi'evc, it

must be noticed that, no doubt, attention was paid to the signiFlcanceof
the terms in all kinds of propositions. However, when studying the
meaning of terms in several propositions the logicians of those days
Failedto conceivc one general point of view, which would haveenabled
them to dismiss all inciclental solutions of the problems raised and to
dcsign a general approach to the problem of signiFlcation. We shall sec
later that this was not realized until logic and grammar came to a
thorough cooperation in the School of Melun.z
6 - The flfletalagicon
of Johnof Salisbury
This remarkable treatise, completed in l159, is & defensaeof the arts
of the Triviam and especially constitutas an ardent plea for the thorough
study of grammar and logic as then practised in the famous Parisian
schools. As & matter of fact its title is apparently :: synthesis, original
with the author, of the Grcek words puoi and M-rmä.and seemsto
' 'specicssupponitur gencri' in the trec of Porphyry.

3 Sec below, Chs. VlFf.
signify: "a plea for the ars relative to words and reasoning".1 When
explaining (l, 10) what *logic' means,John saysthat in its broadestsense
it is "the science of verba] expression and reasoning" and emb'races all
rules and all instruction (magisterium)relative to wwm'ds.z Elsewhere he
says (l,12) that the arts of the Trivium (ratio Trivii) disclosethe signiE-
cance of all verbal expressions (amnium w'ssermonum), just as those of the
Quadrivium unveil the secrets of all natature.3
The most illustrative chapters of the zlffctalogicon in respect of John's
views on the signiücation 01' a word and, generally speaking, of any
verba] expression, are found in Book [. The chapters 15 and 16 discuss
the copulation of terms. Ch. 15 arguesthat adjective nouusof secondary
imposition should not be copulated with substantive nouns of primary
imposition, as in the example 'a patronymfchorse'. Those who, John
says,4 refer adjective nouns 01'secondary imposition to substantive nouus
of primary imposition, either fail to say anything at all, or talk sheer
If
nonsense. one speaks of 'a patronymic harse' or 'hypothetica! Shoes',one
puts together terms that are incompatible. Comprehension is here
precluded by the fundamental meaning of the words, rather than by &
mere lack of agreement in accidentale..
ln ]ohn's view there are manifestly two kinds of faults in speech:
lying, and violating the established usages01'language. Those who join
adjective nouns of secondary imposition with substantive nouns of
primary imposition are guilt)r 01 at least the second transgressi0n.5 He
would extendf' such futile diction to include every form of speech where
the copulation of terms is pointless, and in some way falls short of ful-
Fllling its own laws. But a verbal copulation is not futile simply because
what it states is false. ln fact, grammatica] rules do not censure lying,
1 SecMetalog.,prologue, p. 3'6'17.! have usedthe text by C. chb (Oxford 1909)

and the translation by Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeleyand Los Angelos 1955).
2 zl'lcralog.110, l). 2735.: est itaque logica (ut nominis significatio latissime pateat)
loquendi vel disserendi ratio. (cfr. Boethius, ln Cic. Top. ], 1045 C-D) ; sive
......
itaque ratiocinandi vias doceat, sive amnium Sermonumregulam prebeat, profecto desipiunt
qui eam dicunt esseinutilem. Duplicitatem vero huius significationis nomen &
......
greca quidem origine contrahit, quoniam ibi logos nunc sermonem, nunc rationem
signiücat. Sed ut quam latissime protendatur signiücatio, ei ad presens sermonum
omnium magisterium tribuatur.
3 lbid., l 12, p. 3019'3".
4 :!!etalog. 1 15, pp. 3519-361.
5 lbid., p. 3614": constat equidem duo esse peccata loquentium, alterum mentientis,
alterum transgredientis positam locutionem; quod adminus isti committunt.
6 Ibid., p. 3619'23.
THE THEORV 01: SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTURT LOGlC 217
and even things which mean nothing to one who unclerstands the langua-
ge, may be predicated of eachother. John adds' & remarkable example:
if one would say: 'tunic statessomething in a simple way, that is: ll'ithout a
conditionf or has a predicateterm', one's listener would straightwaþr argue
that this is false, but he would not so quickly complain of violation of
grmnmatical rules.
John tellsJ us that he has heard many persons arguing this point, and
advocating diFferent opinions on the question. As a matter of fact the
question was frequently discussedby logicians as well as by grammarians.
So we Find the example of the hypothetici sotularcs in Petrus Helyas'
commentary 011Priscian (ad XVII, 1). [ quote from Paris, Arsenal711,
f.]35:
Constructio itaque est congrua dictionum ordinatio; congrua intelligendum est tam
voce quamsensu.Tunc est ordinatio dictionmn congrua voce, quando (vocessecundum)
sua accidentia congrue sibi coniunguntur, ut 111asculi11un1 masculino et Femininum
feminino et neutrum neutro et singulare singulari ct plurale plurali iungatur, idest ut in
eisdem accidentibus sibi voces coniungantur. Ut 'homo albus currit': ibi 111asculinun1
111asculinoet singulare singulari coniungitur.Cong1ua vero sensu est ordinatio dictio-
num quando ex dictionibus predicto modo ordinatis Et ut auditor quid rationabiliter in-
telligat sive verum sit sive falsum. Ut cum dicitur' homo currn' vel 'Socratesest lapis' ;
.
quamvis enim hec propositio falsa sit, tamen ea auditor aliquid rationabiliter intelligit.
Et nota quod aliquando est congrua ordinatio dictionum sensu et non vocc: non enim
congrue coniunguntur sibi dictiones secundum accidentia. Ut cum dicitur: "turba ruunt'.
Nam incongrua est ordinatio voce quia 'turba' est singularis numeri, '1'1111111'
pluralis et
singulare non coniungitur plurali. Congrua tamen est sensu hec ordinatio, quia habet
auditor quid ex ea rationabiliter intelligat: '111rba'enim collectivum nmnen est et
pluralitatem signiEcat. Non enim nisi de pluralibus dici potest. ( ) Quandoque
......
congrua est voce et non sensu dictionum ordinatio quando congrue sibi iunguntur
dictiones secundum (et MS) suaaccidentia, nullum tamen intellectum (] 3SI'D)significant.
Veluti quando nomen adiectivum secunde positionis (ex impositionis .rl'lS)iungitur sub-
stantivo prime positionis (111:impositionis MS). Ut si dicam: 'Socrateshabctypatcticas
satularcs cum cathegoricis(cathethoricis MS) corrigiis', congrue iunguntur dictiones
quantum ad vocem. Sed ex hiis nichil habet auditor quod rationabiliter intelligere possit.
Quod per similitudinem ostendam. LOCUtiOsimilis est picture, quia sicut pictura
1 Ibid., p. 373'9: Dicatur ergo: tunica cs: cathcgorica; herebit intellectus ob adiectionis
incompetentiam, et forte citius de inepta dictionmn iunctura causabitur quam mendacii
reum arguat pr0p011e11te111. Sin autem dicat: 'tunica simpliciter, idest sine conditione,
aliquid enuntiat, aut rcrminum habet predicatum', statim falsum arguet auditor, nec tamen
cito prosiliet ad causandas iuncture ineptias. — For wnica as an instante, see Aristotlc,
Dc ln:crpr., 18a19ff. (Boethius, ln Periherm.", p. 17939IT.).
2r1'z. in contra-dictinction with a hypothetical proposition which states smncthing
under a certain condition: 'Jp, chenq'. Mc Garry's translation is senscless.
3 illatam? [ 15, p. 3723'24.
2l8 LOGICA MODERNORUM u
representatet depingit rem, ita quoque locutio depingit intellectum. Locutionesenim

non Eunt nisi prapter representandumintellectum. Si ergo velis facere picturam super
torrentem aqua, non poteris depingcrc rem nec eam pictura representarenisi habeas
materiam convenientem. Similiter vocabulum adiectivum quodammodo depingit sub-
stantivum. Ut cum dico: 'homo albus', 'album', depingit hominem et vocabulum ad—
iectivum secunde positionis aliquod substantivumdcpingit ita quod nullam per se
habentsignificationem nisi substantivoadiu(n)ctm11.Ut si dicam 'cathcgaricum'per se,
nichil intelligit auditor. Si vero dicam: 'cathcgaricapropositio', intelligitur propositio
habenspredicatum terminum et subiectum. Si autem iungatur cum substantivo prime
positionis, ut 'oculus cathcgoricus',evanescit significatio huius (hiis MS) adiectivi
( ...... ). Similiter si dicam 'corrigic me sunt ncgative', animus auditoris intelligit
nescio quid in quo hcret et refugit. Unde nullum intellectum rationabiliter dicitur
auditor habere. Ideo enim sunt distantestermini isti &se ut altera alteri iuncto alterius
signiFicatio evanescat.Et talis ordinatio numquam recipitur & Prisciano pro constructione
ipso dicente: "omnis constructio, quam Greci sintasimvocant, ad intellectum referenda".
Aliter enim non erit constructio nisi aliquem (aliquod MS) intellectum constituat in
auditore.
Alberic of Paris, too, cliscussesthe question of the copulation of

terms of primary imposition with those of secondary imposition. We
read his view in the Berlin commentary on the Perihermeneias
(Lat. Fol.
624, ff. 25V1J-26m):
Ut cum dico: "hec dictiü 'carmina' est dacti-(26fü)-lica", quia sicut per predicationem
huius universalis album demonstratur albedinem inesse rei alhe, sic per predicationem
huius universalisdactilicumdcnmnstratur illa species,scilicet dactilus, inesseisti voci. De
individuis predicatur etiam cum dico: "hec essentiavocis 'carmina' constat ex una longa
et duabusbrevibus, et illa alia similiter". Et sic dicimus quod hoc universale, scilicet
dactilicum, predicatur ibi per suam descriptionem et non per suum nomen. Dicit enim
Magister Albericus quod nullum nomen adiectivum secunde impositionis potest iungi
alicui nomini substantivoprime impositionisad reddendamconstructionem,ut dicam:
'vos cst cathcgorica','essentiacsrdaailica'.
To return to john, he refers to some anonymous Græcus

interpres who
statedthe rule that to join adjectivenounsOFsecondaryimposition with
substantive nouns of l'JrirnaaLr')r
imposition is inconsequential, even ac—
cording to grammatical rules.l And it is actually absurd to copulate such
terms, since the mind becomes, as it were, deaf on being confronted
with such cepulation.2
1 Ibid. [, IS, p. 37:25.

et quidemearationeabsurdaestquodad iuncturamliuiusmodianimus
2 lbid., p. 3811'13:
obsurdcscit.Cfr. PetrusHclyas' exposition, quotcd above,p. 217.
THE THEOR'I' OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTl-l CENTLIRT LOGIC 219
From the remainder of this chapter (1, 15) we learn that John'sview
is still rather superücial. ln fact, he seems to contract the rules of
congruit)! too much to those of common Speech,' just as, following the
Greek interprctcr, he considers the dialectica] rules too much as some-
thing like a set of detection rules for truth:
dicta). [ 15, 3822-3910:Grammar considera absurd any incongruous joining of terms,
but it does not presumeto constitute itself :: judge of truth It is dialectic
brands
......
which accepts only what is or seemstrue, and whatever is remote from the truth
as prcposterous ...... But let us return to the explanation given by our Greek in-
terpreter. That 'man is rational' is, in view of present reality, in :: way necessary.That
'manis ableto laugh' is probable. That 'man is whitc' is possible,but alsodoubtful, for its
chanccsof being false are about equivalent to its chauccsof being true. That 'man is able
to bray' is impossible, for this ['unaiti'wel)r
cannot be true. The grammarian, however, will
repudiato none of these statements. For in each of them he Fmdshis own rules observet].
The Iogician, however, challengesand (lisproves the last. For it is his function
......
to determine truth and falsity, in view of which he considers it absurd to payany attention
to the last propositiün.
But now let us supposethat to the foregoing statements we add :- Fnl'thto the eH'ect
that 'man is categorical'.Forthwith the grammarinn, who before admittcd the doubtful,
the false,and eventhe impossible,jumps up to condcmnthie asabsurd. Whatdoeshegive
as his reason?Simpbrthat his rules are vialatcd : for he has declared it to be ever anathema to
copulatesuchadjectivcnounsaspredicateterms with suchsubjectl:4ta'l'n'ns..z
Ch. 16 (liscussesthe possibility to reverse matters and join afljective

nouns of primary imposition with substantive nouns of secondary im-
position: & nomen(name or noun) is called swcctor bitter, even though
these qualities, strictly speaking, pertain to corpora] entities rather than
to WOI'CIS.3
Indeed, John says,it is smacceptedcustom to transfer what
we may call natural names(nominanaturalia) to supply what conceptual
names(nominarationalia)lack.4 Moreover, since manyconceptualterms
were originally derived from things, it is by no meansunfitting for them
"to be brought back home from their wandering, so to speak, and to be
joined with natura] names. So the terms "universa? and 'particular',
although especially used to refer to words, were originally borrowed
from things. Thus they may, without any absurdity, be referred to names
that have been assignedto things.5
However, as to the terms invented to designatethe quality 01'words,
they can decidedly not be diverted From this Special application and
' Cfr. ibid., 16, 4130FF. 2 Cfr. Mc Garry's translation, pp. 45-4-6.
3 Metalog.1 16, p.. 402'5. 4 lbid., p. 4010'13.
5 Cfr. Metalog.1 16, p. 4019Ff.
employment to refer to the quality of things.I Then, ]ohn makes an

interesting comparison in saying that these terms are something like
(: consignilïcative)in Greek. The meaning
those called syncategorematic
of such consigniEcative terms depends on, or is estimated From, their
context. When they are associated with terms of like origin, each of
these words aptly evokes its own proper concept. But if they are trans-
ferred to other words, thva)rfade and lose their force, as though they had
been drained of their natural vigor. On hearing someone say ia patronymic
horsc',the grammarianwill at once take the speakerto task, and constrain
him to correct his erroneous language.2
Thus Johngivesa vaguereferenceto the later basicrule of terminism:
the signiücance of any term depends on the context formet] by the
pr0p05ition.3 However, that this view is not yet carriecl through con-
sistently mayappearfrom an examplegiven in chapter 15. There John
gives4asan exampleof an incongruousstatement: 'equusdesinitin "s":
"similis quoque abusio, si quis dicat: *equusdesinit in 's" et similia". A
few decades later such constructions will be accepted and labelled
sappositia materialis and consideratio or transsumptio grammaticorum) in
which 'cquus'is consideredto standFortheword'equus'.
So we learn from ]ohn's report about the contemporaneousviews of

the task of "the arts of verbal exPressionand reasoning" (cfr. above,
p. 216) that towards the middle of the twelfth century the symbiosisor,
one might say, the osmosis of logic and gfammar had made Further
progress.
The next chapter will give a survey of the discussions on the problem
of signification as Found in some Priscian commentaries dating From
about the middle of the century.
' Ibid... p. 415'?.

211»de p. 417'15. Comparc, again, what Petrus Helyas says about this nmtter (see
above,pp. 217—218.
3 Cfr. above, p. 1133.
4 .:Heralog. [ 15, p. 37'5'15.
5 E.g. in the PalladeParvipanrane,
p. 562'443ed. De Rijk (Log. r'l'lod.], pp. 545-609).
CHAPTER V
ON THE THEORV OF SIGNIFICATION

IN TWELFTH CENTURV GRAMMAR
As we haveseenalready (aboveClmpter 11)there were certain major

grammatical questions mised by the classical grammarians that stirred
the vivid interest of the eleventh and twelfth century logicians. All of
these questions were concerned with the centra] problem of "the
meaning of meaning".
The present chapter will deal with this substantial topic as discussed
by some twelfth century grammarians. The discussions are found in their
commentaries on Priscian.
1 - William of Conches"
William of Conches (c. 1080 - c. 1154) called by John of Salisbury
gramaticus post Bernardum Carnotensemopulentissimus! left glosses on
Priscian in :: double reclaction. The older one is extant in the Lauren-
ziana in Florence, San Marco 310 (5. XIII) and the second is found in
Paris, B.N.Lat. 15.130.1 1 quote some passagesFrom the FlI'Stversion.
William discusses the topic of inventio in & rather abundant way. It
may be noted that he starts his expositions From the well-known passage
from Boethius, ln Periherm.1, 375'10.3
Florence, San Marco 310, f. 4-m'l'h4: Pertinet enim littera ad inventionem et propter
causamaliquam est inventa.
Dicit ergo Boetius in quodam loco quod omnis sermo debet essecollocutio (collatio
.MS), idest uniusad (et MS) alterumlocutioet non singularis. Ad quid enim loqueretur
suam, cum nullus propriam ignoraret volun-
homo sibi ipsi et manifestaret 1»für-luntaluem
tatem?
Collocutionis autem tria sunt genera. Est enim unum genus quod 1versaturinter
docentem et discentem, scilicet inter magistrum et discipulum. Et dicitur didascahcum;
' Metalog.1 5, pp. 16ï'-'-17led. Webb.

2 Seethe excellent paper by Abbö Edouard ]eauneau, Dan.»:
rcfdactions
desg1oses
deGuiHaume
dc Conchessur Priscicnin Rccherchesde Thäologie ancienne et mädiävale 27 (1960),
pp. 212-24-7.For the Parisianmanuscript, seealsoabove, Ch. 1, nr. 20, pp. 86-87.
3 See also above Ch. 11,'p. 112.
* For thc second (abbreviated) reduction, see Paris, B.N.Lar. 15130, 1. 5").
MS)est magister.Aliud est inter interrogantemet respondentem,

(didascalicus
didascalus
et ita quod neutrmn est magister et discipulus. Quod vocatur dramaricum& 'dragma' quod
est interrogatio. Et hor.:genere collocutionis utitur Virgilius in principio Bucaljcorumubi
unusrusticusquerit et alter respondet.Tertium est in continuaoratione inter loquentem
et audientem. Et appellatur enarracivumvel hcrmeneuticmn, idest interpretarivum.Hermes
enim est interpres.Et hoc modo loquimur narrando fabulam et historiam.
Cum aurem sint tria locutionis genera, in unoquoque, (ut) dicit Boetius, tria sunt
necessaria: rcs, intellectus et vox. Res de qua sermo constituatur. Intellectus: oportet
enim quod loquensde re illa aliquid intelligat quod alii manifestet.Vox, per quamalii
id quod de re intelligit manifestarepossit. Duo autem de istis natura (Operataest), rem
scilicet de qua est sermo, et intellectum in hominibus. Tertium vero, idest vocem qua
intellectus explicaretur, non est operata. Unde auctores invenerunt has voces per quas
homo homini convenienter suam voluntatem manifestaret. ln re autem qualibet sunt
quedam minima et quedam maxima et quedam media, ut inter voces quedam invente
(inventa MS) sunt minime, ut littere, quedam maxime, ut orationes, quedam medie, ut
sillabe et dictiones.
Et hec causa est inventionum omnium vocum signiEcantium et onmium que eas
constituunt: litterarum, sillabarum, dictionum et orationum.
Causavero inventionis figurarum est gemina, doctrina scilicet absentis et conservatio
memorie. Contingit enim aliquando quod non solum presentem sed etiam absentem
docere volumus. Hoc autem viva voce facere non possumus. Quare voluerunt invenire
auctores quasdam Figuras visibiles que voces representarent, voces vero intellectus et
voluntates animorum etiam absentibus indicarent. Conscrvatio et memorie fuit causa.
Oportet ( ) infmita scire, non omnia cor ( ) vel suo ordine (f. 41'b)
...... ......
retinere potest. lnde invente sunt nge ( ...... ).
Hec itaque fuit causa inventionis tam vocum quam figuraram; vocum: manifestatio
proprie voluntatis presentibus; figurarum manifestatioabsentibus,conservatiomemorie.
William pays much attention to the chapter De nomine in Priscian.

Having mentioned the causainventionisnominum he goes on to deal with
the signiFlcation of nouns. Starting from a seeming opposition! between
Priscian's defmition of the noun and Aristotle's he intends to give his
own view on the matter:
!bid., 26"): Causa ergo inventionis nominum hec est. In omni perfecta oratione dicitur
aliquid de aliquo. Fuit igitur necesse:ut inveniretur aliqua vox ad di(s)c(ern)endum de
quo est sermo.
Visa causainventionis est videndum de signiEcationenmninis. Dicunt (dictum MS)
(quidam) quoniamomne nomensignificatsubstantiamcum qualitate, putanteshoc habere
ex Prisciano,qui dicit: "proprimn est nominis significaresubstantiamcum qualitate".
Et contra hos est Aristotiles qui loquensde dictionibus et nominibus, ait: singulum aut
significat substantiam ut 'homo', aut qualitatem, ut 'album'.Si ergo voluisset quod omne
' As & matter of fact suchoppositionexistedonly in William's mind, sincehe failed to

see the different usagein Priscian and Aristotle. For this difference, see below Chapter
XVI, pp. 521-523.
THEORï' 01: SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTumf GRAMMAR 223
nomen et substantiam et qualitatem significaret, non disiunctionem ibi faceret. Post-

ponentes igitur istorum errorem et expositionem ct defensionem, quid nobis inde
videtur dicamus.
He makes a fourfold division of nouus:
!bid.,: Nomina igitur vel signiFlcantsubstantiasvel ea que insunt substantiis vel quedam
Egmcntaanimi vel modosloquendi; substantias,ut hoc nomina 'Socrates','homo'; vel ea
que insunt substantiis, ut 'albedo', 'nigredo'; figmenta animi, ut hec: "jfrcocervus',
'chimora'; modos loquendi de rebus, ut 'omnis'. Unde Aristotiles: "'omnis' enim non
signiEcat universale, sed quoniam universaliter". Similiter: 'quidom', 'oh'quis', 'nullus'et
huiusmodi, que dialetici vocant signapropositionum (prepositionum MS).
The members of the First group, consisting of the nomina que signi 'cont
substantiam,signify the substantiaand qualitas (cfr. Priscian, Inst. gramm.
II, 18). William raisessome objections and gives as his own view that
nouns of this kind only signify the universalthing (intelligibile) and not
this or that thing (actuale):
lbid... 26W-27m: Sed ea que significant substantiam signiFlca'fiteam sic quod qualitatem
circa ipsam determinant, ut 1106homen 'homo' sic significat substantiam quod et quali-
tatem substantie, scilicet hanc collectionem rationalis ol: mortalis; 'Socraros'(271'3) vero
(sic) significat substantiamquod propriam illius qualitatem, idest talem proprietatum
collectionem que tota alii inesse non potest. Quam Boetius in Secundo Commenta super
PorFirium vocat Socratitatem.
Seddicetur: si hec nomina signil'ïcantsubstantiamet qualitatem, ergo signiFlcantduo,
et sic sunt equivoca.
Quibus dicimus quod etiamsi substantianon sit qualitasnec qualitassubstantia,tamen
significare hec non est significare duo, veluti, quamvis homo non sit caput suum nec
caput homo, tamen videre hec non est videre duo. Sic ergo significare substantiam et
qualitatem non est duo signiFlcar-e,sicut loqui de homine et de prcprietate illius non est
loqui de duobus..Sedsi signiFlcarenttalesduassubstantiasvel duas qualitates, tunc signiH-
carent duo, et essent equivoca. Signiücant ergo huiusmodi nomina substantiam et
qualitatem; nec tamen sunt equivoca.
Iterum queratur cum hoc nomen 'homo' significat substantiam, an signiücet aliquam
substantiam et, si aliquam, utrum Socratem vel aliam. '
Dicunt quidam quod hoc nomen 'homo' omnes homines signiFlcat et communem
qualitatem omnium hominum. Nobis tamen non ita videtur, immo signiücat hominem
ita quod non aliquam et communem qualitatem. Unde dicimus quod significat sub-
stantiam ita quod non aliquam.
Seddicent: substantiaessenon potest nisi sit aliqua. Nec ergo substantiasigniEcari
potest, nisi significetur aliqua.
Contra quod dicimus quod aliter habet se essererum, aliter intellectus hominum et
sermo. Etsi enim substantia esse non possit nisi hec vel illa, ita tamen potest intelligi
quod non hec vel illa, quid vis est intellectus coniuncta disiungere et disiuncta coniungere..
Et ita ut potest intelligi potest significari.. Ut enim intelligimus, sermone manifestamus.
Quamvis igitur substantia non possit (posse MS) esse nisi sit hec vel illa, potest tamen ita
significari quod non hoc vel illa. Significat ergo hoc nomen 'homo' et similia appellativa
substantiam, et non aliquam. Quod igitur ab hac voce significatur, ita ut significatur
potest intelligi, non tamen esse. Unde dieimns quod solum intelligibile significat et non
actuale.
Iterum. Dicimus quod significat Speciemet non individuum, quia sic significat
hominem quod non aliquem; et homo sic intellectus speciesest et non individuum.
Concedimusergo hec omnia verba: 'homosignifico:sabstantiom','signihcat qualitatom',
nequeidcirco quid signiüce(n)tdiversa.
'signijïcotintclhgibilo', 'signy'ïcotspaciom',
Et notandumquod hic vocamusqualitatem quicquid inest substantiepreter agereet
pati. Quod igitur dixi de significatione huius appellativi HOITIiniS,
intellige de similibus.
William distinguishes between the significatio of & noun and its

being the denotation ofinclividual things:
nominatio,the latter alaparent]?lr
ibid., 27m: Modo de nominatione dicamus. Quamvis igitur 'homo' significet communem
qualitatem omnium hominum et non ipsos homines, tamen nominat ipsos homines et non
ipsam qualitatem. Unde dicimus quod aliud signiFlcat et aliud nominat.
Sed quamvisproprie nominat ipsa individua, aliquandotamen ex adiuncto nominat
speciem quam signiFlcat— ut hic: 'homoest species'—-; aliquando se ipsum tantum
[totum MS, deleted by & corrector], ut hic: 'homo est nomen'. Hoc idem intelligo de
nominationibus aliorum similium nominum.
The prcper nouus form a special case:

Modolad propria nomina veniamus et in uno quod de aliis volumus, manifestemus:
'Socratescurrit'. lgitur hoc proprium nomen signiücat substantiam ita quod aliquam
individuam, ct signiFlcnt propriam illius qualitatem quam superius diximus. Nominat
vero eandem substantiam quam signiFlcat, sed non illam qualitatem. Nominat aliquando
seipsum, ut hic: 'Socratesest namon'.
Next William deals with the second main group of nouns, viz. those
which signify ea que insunt substantiis. He discusses the signiEcations of
'albedo' and 'album' ; they only diHer in modosignificandi:
Ibid.: Visa igitur significatione talium nominum et nominatione, transeamusad alia de
unoquoquegenereunum ponendo. Hoc nomen igitur 'olbedo' signilïcat solamqualitatem,
hoc commune accidens. Nominat tamen sua individua, ut 'hoc albedoest albedo'. Similiter
hoc nomen 'nigrodo' et similia.
Sedde adiectivis nominibusqueramusquid signy'ï'conc. Dicimus igitur quod 'album'
idem accidenssignilïcatquod et 'albedo',sedaliter, quia determinat inherentiamillius
accidentis et subiecti, quod hoc nomen 'olbodo' non facit. Ergo hec duo nomina non in
re significata differunt, sed in modosignificandi.
Sed queritur an significet substantiam cum qualitate. Dicimus ita, sed secundario,
quia cum determinet inherentiam accidentis et subiecti, quia certum est quia sola sub-
stantia est subiectum accidentium; secundario, idest innuendo, signiFlcatsubstantiam.
THEmw OF SIGNIFICATION m TWELFTH CENTLuw GMMMAR 225
Modo de nominatione adiectivorum nominum dicamus. Adiectiva igitur nomina

nominant illas substantiasquibus insunt accidentia que significant, ut 'album' rem cui
inest albedo.
Then William continues his exposition on the meaning of the noun with
the discussion of the third main group of nouus, viz. those that signify
figmenta animi. ln this group significatio and nominatio turn out to coincide:
Ibid.: Modo ad illa que significant Egmenta animi, veniamus. lila igitur nec substantiam
nec qualitatem significant scd quoddam signiFlcatum animi signi 'canr.ct nominans.
The last group consists of those nouns that signifyr modi loquendi, e.g.
such words as 'omnis'. They signify neither substance nor quality anc]do
not denoteany individual thing either (necaliquid nominant):
ibid.: Illa vero que signiFlcant modos loquendi, nec substantiam (nec) qualitatem
significant nec aliquid nominant. Nicil enim hoc nomine 'omnis' nmninatur nec similibus.
He summarizes his view as Follows:
lbid.: Dicamus ergo quod non omne nomen signiücat substantiam cum qualitate, sed
illa sola que possunt poni (prius MS) in agendo de substantiis; vcl substantialiter, ut
'Socratesesthomo'; vel accidentaliter, 'Socratesest albus'. Reliqua signiücant qualitatem,
ut 'olbcdo', vel Hgmentumanimi, ut 'chinlcra'; vel modum loquendi, ut 'omnis'.
There follows si minor objection about such technical terms as 'varbum'

ancl ' pronomcn' :
!bid., 27I'E'l'b: Sed oppone(n)t de nominibus vocum quod nullum istorum videntur
significare, ut hoc nomen 'vcrbunr', 'pranaman'etc. Sed dicimus quod signiücant sub-
stantiam (f. 27l'b) cum qualitate, quia tenemus voces essesubstantias,quia sunt corpora
et habent suas qualitates que his nominibus significantur.
Significat igitur hoc vox 'nomen' quandam communem qualitatem omnium verborum
et nominat omnia verba. [tu de aliis nominibus vocum intellige.
Another objection is raisedabout the nounsdenoting the universalia.In

William's view they were invented ad nominandussubstantias et ad
significandas communesqualitates, but afterwards they were used ad
nominanda universalia et ad significandas communesillorum qualitates:
[bini, 27"): Iterum opponcnt de nominibus universalium, ut sunt hec: genus et species
etc. Sedde nominibus (onmibus MS)universaliumdicimus quod primitus fuerunt inventa
ad nominandus substantias et ad significandas cmumunes qualitates, sed postea propter
quandamsimilitudinem translata sunt ad nominanda universalia et ad signiücandas
communes illorum qualitates. Quod in uno ostendamus. Hoc igitur nomen 'genus"
primum fuit inventum ad nmninandas substantias et ad designandum talem qualitatem
circa ipsas, quod aiunt principium generationis.Unde Hercules dictus genusHi (: Hylli;
cf BoethiusIn lsag. II, 1747).Sedposteaconsideraveruntmoderni quaddamintelligibile
. habebat similitudinem quod
quod cum principio generationis, quemadmodum ab uno
principio diverse descenduntfamilie, ita sub uno universali diverse Species.Et ideo hoc
nomen principii generationis, scilicet 'genus', ei attribuerunt.
Significat ergo hoc nomen 'genus'substantiamet qualitatem ex prima inventione, sed
ex translatione nominat quodclam universale et signiEcat illius qualitatem, scilicet
predicabilem de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid est. Similiter de aliis
nominibus universalium. Sed quid ex prima inventione habent signiücare et nominare,
quid ex translatione aliorum inquirere linquimus.
William concludeshis expositione.with & possibleobjection against

his view, which may be miscd from Priscian's statement that it is the
pmpcnyof noun (and characteristicof all nouus, therefore) to signify
substancewith quality (Inst. gramm...
ILIS):
Ibid.: Est ergo nostra sententia quedam nomina, non omnia, substantiam cum qualitate
significare.Seddicent (diceret fl-IS)quod Priscianusdicit essepreprium nominis. Quibus
dicimus quod 'praprium'dicitur diversismodis. Vel quia convenit soli, etsi non omni,
ut homini medicum esse; vel quia omni, etsi non soli, ut homini movere, et quia omni et
soli, ut homini ridere. Cum igitur dicit Priscianus praprium esse nomini signilïcare
substantiam et qualitatem, dicit proprium quia convenit soli nomini, etsi non omni. Nicil
est enim preter nomen quod substantiam et qualitatem signiFlcat. Etsi enim pronomen
signiEcetsubstantiam,non tamen signiEcatqualitatem quantum in ipsa voce. Quodsi
adverbium signiücet qualitatem, ut 'bene', non tamen signiEcat substantiam.
Est igitur proprium nominis significare substantiam cum qualitate, nec tamen convenit
omni nonum.
Item. Dicent quod hoc non essepotest, quia talem debuit ostendereproprietatem que
separaret omne nomen ab aliis partibus orationis. Sed dicimus quod non debuit, imo
talem que ostenderet, nec illos bene divisisse qui diviserunt nomen in nomen et appel-
lativum (appellationemMS)et vocabulum,nec eosbeneconiunxissequi nomini coniu(n)-
xerunt pronomen et adverbium.
Ad quod suFFlcitista ut exponendo litteram ostendemus.Modo litteram legamus.
To conclude these quotations I quote William's view OF consigni 'catio:
[hii, 26"): Et notandum quod dialetici large accipiunt 'nomen'ita quod sub eo com-
prehenduntur nomina et adverbia. Similiter 'verbum' ut sub eo contineantur participia.
Item. Est notandum quod ea sola vocantur & dialeticis partes orationis que possunt subici
et predicari, idestessepartesprincipalesorationis, reliquasvero dictionesdicunt'earum
ligaturas. Qyia he sola.Ponit rationem dialeticorum qui dicunt essepartes orationis
solum nomen vcl verbum quia he sole per se, idest sine aliis partibus orationi(s) faciunt
plenam orationem. Alias-autem.Cum istas vocant solas partes, de aliis quid dicunt?!!!ia:
autcm, idest prapositiones (propositiones MS) et coniunctiones, vocantdialetici, sinca-
idest (camsigniücantia.
regaremata,
THEOR? OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFI'H CENTURT GRAMMAR 227
Et notandumquod 'consignffï'carc' est polisemis (!) secundummodernos). Consigni-

signff'carc,ut ibi: "verbum est quod consigniFlcz-ttempus". Sed
Flcareenim est secundario
hoc modo non (con)signiEcantpredicte dictiones. Item. consigniüdcaredicitur etiam
denominare,ut predicatum consigniEcat subiecto. Sed neque hoc modo consigniücant.
Tertio modo dicitur consignilïcnrequod per se dictum nicil significaþlt sed cum alio
dictum aliquid signiFlcat. Et hoc modo consigncha(n)t. Ut 'a' si per se.dicatur nicil
signiFlcat. Sin autem dicitur 'a damo' significat locum, si & 'Sacrum"personam; et sic de
aliis. Ergo que hoc modo significant, certam et stabilem non habent signiEcationem, sed
ex diversoadiuncta diversasignificant. De quo in loco suosatisdicemus.!
Foran evaluation of William's doctrine oF the significantiumof words,

or better of nouus, his Fourfold division of nouns must be taken into
consideration. That this division is of his own making clearl)lr appears
from the intrwaductoryrsentencc: postponentes igitur istorum errorem
et expositionem ct defensionem, quid nobisinde vidcturdicamus(2634);
quoteclabove, p. 223). Here is William's division of nominaï:
c—cz.
ea que significant substantias, e.g. 'Socrates-',*homo'

ea que signiEcant que insunt substantiis, e.g. 'flbcda', *nigrcdo'
ea que signilïcant Hgmcnta animi, e.g. 'hircoccrms', 'chimaera'
mn
ea que signiücant modos loquendi, e.g. 'omnis'.
(a) As to the Fll'Stgroup, Willimn says that such nouus as *homo'

signify the common essenccof all men, but not all men themselves, i.c.
taken in their indivicluality (connnuncm qualitatemomniumhominum,et non
ipsoshomines).Neverthelessthe term 'homo' "names"the individualis
themselves,but not their essencetaken asan individual essence(nominat
ipso: homineset non ipsamqualitatem).From this we learn that William
distinguishes between signg'fï'carc
and nominare.Unfortunately he does not
give any chmition of nominare.This much seemsto be certain, however,
that hc means by signffïcarc: signif.) the essence qf somethingtaken in its
abstract nature, apm't From the individual things participating in this
nature (or: subsunmblcunder the generic heading denotcd by such
terms as 'homo'); and by nominare:dcnotcall (possible)individual things
having samespecialesscncc (nature), or: subsunmbleunder the generic
heading. As Far ] can see, for William neither signi 'carc nor nominare
primarily refer to essential matures or individual things as actually
existing; actual existence is not considered here as such.
In Fact there are some special cases, William continues, in which a
' I could not Find such a discussion anywhere in the Glasc.

3-For the text, seeabove, p. 223.
term occurring in a Specialcontext (cx adiuncto)signiFlesanddenotesthe

abstract nature only (cx adiunctonominatspeciemquamsigny'ï'cat).Eg. in
suchsentencesas 'homoestspecies'. There are also propositions in x-vhich
a term signiüesand denotes just itself; e.g. in "'homo" estnomen'.
For the
text, see above, p. 224.
(b) The secondgroup distinguishedby our author contains the ad-
jective nouns. They, too, signify (signjþ'cant)some nature, admittedly in
a seconclary way. They deuote (nominant) the subjects of the acciclents
they signify; e.g. the term 'whitc' refers to the white thing. For the text,
see above, p. 224.
(c) The third group containsthe nounsdelïotingjgmenta animi, such
as 'hircoccrvus'( "goat-stag"). Terms of this kind do not signify any sub-
stantiaor qualitasbut they signify anddeuote a product of the imagination.
For the text, see above. p. 225.
((I) Those nouns classiFled in the last group and signifying nothing but
what is said modi loquendi de rebus do not signif)r substantia or qualitas nor
(lo they deuote anything. See our quotations, above, p. 225.
We learn from this that William takes only certain nouns to signify
an cssential nature. His distinction of signifcatio and nominatio (:
appellatio)was of the utmost importance and bound to be an important
contribution to the origin of the theory of supposition.l
' Sec below, p. 525 Ff. That William, too, is indcbtcd to his predecessors, appearsfrom
the parallcllous passagein the Glosulc(CologncMS 201, f 131'b):Notandum est tamen
.
quad nomen non significat substantiamet qualitatem insimul nuncupative, scilicct ita ut
utriusque coniuncti vel utriusque per se nomen sit, sed substantimn tantum nomina:, quia
ei fuit impositum, qualitatem vcro signffïcar non nuncupative, immo rcpresentando et
determinando circa substantiam prapter quam tamen notandam substantie fuit impositum.
Quare omne nomen habet duas signiücationcs, unam per impositionem in substantia,
alteram per representationem in qualitate ipsius substantie. Ut 'homo' per impositionem
significat rem Socratis et ceterorum hominum, idest nominando, determinans circa illa
rationalitatem et mortalitatem, et hec representando. Similiter 'album' per impositionem
signiücatcorpus, — idest nuncupativc,quia qui dixit: "dicatur hec res alba", non dixit:
"substantia et albedo dicantur alba"; in quo notatur impositio albedinem vcro
—,
significat per rcprescntationem ut principalem causam. Sed istud non omnibus eque
placct. Volunt enim quidam nomina utrumque coniunctum nominare substantiam et
qualitatem. Verbi gratia hoc nomen 'Socratcs' dicunt nomen esse substantie et acci-
dentium quibus forma[n]tur, scilicet albedinem, lineam (?), Sothronici Eliationem et
cetera accidentia que informant Socratem dicunt essepartes componentes illam primnm
substantiam que dicitur Socrate;.Quod non essemultis et necessariiscmnprobatur argu-
mentis. Si enim albedo essetpars constitutiva rei Socratis, cum ipse Socratessit prima
THEOIU' OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELl—Tl—l
CENTLIR? GRAMMAR 229
2 - Petrus Helyas
No doubt, the most Famousmaster of grmnmar in the twelfth century

was Petrus Helyas. He was tcaching in Paris c. 1 142 and is supposed to
have been still alive in 1166. However, nothing has been Found in his
SummasuperPriscianumwhich 1u-voulcl give any hint as to a more exact (late
of the x-vorkJ As the title indicates, the work is not meant as& continuous
commentary, but as an attempt to systematize the discussionsof those
days on Priscian.z The only masters mentioned by name in the Summa
are one Anselmus and one Manegaldus.3 These masters are not easy to
substantiaet ita fundamentum, albedo erit fundamentum; quod est inconveniens; num-
quam enim aliquod accidens vel per se vel cum aliis iunctum erit sustentamentum. Item.
Si Socratesest nomen utriusque substantie, substantiaet illud quod a[u]ctualiter suscipit
illas formas, idest ca accidentia, in constitutione Socratis, nihil esse probatur. Nam
neque est [est] res per se subsistensnec accidentalis. Si dicatur esseres per se sub-
sistens, (homo non potest esse), quia homo species essenon potest — homo enim ens
speciesnec albedinem nec aliud huiusmodi a[u]ctualitcr suscipit, immo potentialiter
tantum —; Socratcs item non potest esse, quia est pars substantie Socratis secundum
hanc sententiam. Rursus. Si Sacrates nominat utrumquc,"ct sic de ceteris nominibus,
pronominis (pronmuen MS) signiEcatio esse nulla convincitur. Debent cnim pronomina
puram substantiam signiFlcarc. Sed cum dicam in designatione Socratis: itu iegis' ct
Socratisdesignetsubstantiamet qualitatem, 'in' utrumque designabit(designabatMS);
quod est inconveniens. chuntiando igitur sententie huic dicimus 'Socratem'designare
substantiali":quandam qualitatibus affectam, quam ipsam signilïcat 'ego' et 'ru', sed non
representat ibi qualitates; (luud facit 'Socratcs'. Hoc autem in hac sententia attendendum
quod Socrates ipse, etsi plures habeat formas quam 'homo' et quidlibet aliud superius,
tamen n(on discrepat) ab i11(is) in quantitate. Accidentia enim, et si sint substantialia,
non faciunt maiorem substantiam quam inlbrmnnt. Nota etiam quod licet negemus al-
bedinem et cetera essepartes constitutivas Socratis, non tamen negamusessc formales.
Sic et de differentiis substantialibus licet ratiocinari quoniam constituunt formaliter
species suas. ——1t should be noticed that Anselm of Canterbury deals with similar
problems in his Degrammatico.Cfr. the Finestudies on this work by Father D. P. Henry:
Why 'grammaticus'?in: Archives d'histoirc doctrinale et litttäraire du Moyen Age 28
(1958), pp. 165-180; Saint Anselm'sDc grammaticain: Philos. Quarterly 10 (1960), pp.
115-126; The De grammaticoqf St. Anselm.Thethcmy quaronymi, Notre Damc Univ'ersity
publications in Mediacval Studies 18, Notre Dame 1964. lt should be further noticed
—
that, unlike William (seeabove, p. 222, n. 1), the anonymousauthor of the Glosulcdoes
distinguish Aristotle's and Priscian's usageas to the terms substantiaand qualitas. Seealso
below, ChapterXVI, pp. 521-523.
' Sec Ch. Thurot, Noricas,pp. 18-19; 508; and Hunt I, p. 205.
2 For a Erst characterization of the work, see Thurot, ap. cfr., PP' 19-21 and Manitius,
Gesch.der Lat. Litt. des.M./l., 111,pp. 184-186. For the exact title, see Hunt I, p. 198, n. 3.
For the term 'Summa', scr: above, pp. 170-171.
3 Ad Inst. gramm. VIII, 45 (Aricnai711, 1. "Num)and ad 1 13 (ibid., [. lOVb); seeThurot,
op. cfr., p. 96, n. 3 and p. 525.
identify. As to the former, I see no cogant reason to think of Anselm of

Laon. The latter is also referrecl to in the Note Dunehncnses
and the gloss
Promisimus.' 1 doubt whether Thm'oti's2 and l-Iunt"s3 vague sugge'stion to
idventif)r him ns Manegold of Lautenbach is correct. ] would like to
identify this master Manegaldus with the Manegold, friend of Wo of
Chartres, surnamed Menegaldusphilosophus.It should be noted in this
connection that one of our manuscripts of the eleventh century Glosule
was preserved in Chartres.4 Possibly this Manegold was a redactor-
Commentator of our Glasule,if not the author.
To return, now, to Petrus Helyas, in his Summahe gives & systematical

survey of the discussions carried on in his days rather than an original
exposition of his own. This feature of the work clearly appears from his
discussions on the signification of the noun. In fact he givies three
Opinionson the subject, the lastof which he saysto prefer. ] quote from
the Fine twelfth century manuscript Arscnal 71 1, ff. 173'3-181'3.
This manuscript has in the margin of f. 1734: Opinio quorundamde
signijicatione nominis.
(1) The Erst opinion is that all nouns signify substantiaand qualitas.
The adhel'ents try to support their view in referring to Priscism II 18:
praprium cst nominissubstantiamet qualitatemsignifcare. In fact, this view
is found in the Glasule(see MS Colognc201, f. 13Tü'v3). To iliustrate
Peter's dependence upon his predecessors, e5pecially William of
Conches, ] quote the passageconcerned in full :
17W'vb: Et ut de significatione dicamus: dicunt quidam omnenomensignümt substantiam
et. qualitatem volentes hoc ex Prisciani auctoritate habere, qui dicit quod nominis
praprium est substantiam et qualitatem significare.
Sed Opponitur contra illud. Aristotiles enim loquens de nominibus inquit: "singulum
eorum que sine complexione dicuntur aut significat substantiam, ut 'homo', aut qualita-
tem, ut 'albus' etc". Si ergo vellet quod omne nomen significaret substantiam et quali-
' For the Nate Dunalrucnm,see Hunc I, p. 209; for the gloss Promiiimux,see below, pp.
255-262. For the quotation, see Hunr.II, p. 40.
7-Op. cfr., p. 525.
3 Hunt !, p. 206.
4 For this Manegold (of Chartres?), see the Anonymus Mellicensis cap. 105, ed. Ett-
Iinger and the editor's note, pp. 91-92. For further possible data, see Ulysse Chevalier,
Re'pcrtaircdes sourceshistoriqucsdu Moyen Age. Biü-biliographie, s.v. Manägold de Paris
(coL 2983).
THEorw 01: SIGNIFICATION m TWELFTH CENTUR'K GRAMMAR 231
tatcm, non posuissetquasiopposita membra in eadem divisione significaresubstantiamet

signy'ïcarcqualitatem.
Quod tamen solvunt dicentes Aristotilcm ibi intellexisse substantiamillud primum
genus rerum quod per se.existit. Cum vero dicunt quod omne nomen signihcaret sub-
stantiam et qualitatem, sic intelligunt quod omne.nomen signiFlcatsubstantiam,idest rem
quamcumque ut substantive, idest ut suscipientem Formam, et preter hoc qualitatem,
idest formam que rem ipsamfacit esse..Ut 'homo'hoc nomensigniücatrem que est homo
pro substantiaet humanitatem pro forma. Et rursus hoc nomen 'albedo' signiFncatrem
pro substantia que est albedo, et facere album sive albedinem, ut Engamvocabulum pro
forma. Et hoc idem de ceteris nominibus dicunt.
Hoc autem est illud quod plerique dicunt, scilicet quod omne nomen signiücat
quod est et id quo BH, ut hoc nomen ('homo'-) signiFlcat id quod est, idest rem que est
homo, et illud quo est, scilicet hunmnitatcm qua est homo, quoniam homo ab humani-
tate est homo.
()pponitur illis de his nmninibusscilicet 'quis', 'omnis','nullus', 'nichil', quamscilicet

substantiam et quam qualitatem significent.
Dicunt ergo quidam illorum quod 'quis' et 'omnis' et 'nullus' ex diversis adiunctis
diversas substantiassignificant et qualitates diversas. Ut si dicatur: 'omnishomo', hic
'omnis' illam eandemsubstantiamsignificat et qualitatem quam et 'homo'. Et sic de ceteris.
Dixerunt tamen plerique eorum quod 'omnis' et 'nullus: significant omnem rem pro
substantia, ut dictum est, (et) collectionem et distributionäm pro qualitate. Hec enim
nomina quandoquecollective signilïcant, quandoquedistributive, 'Qyis' vero secundum
istos pro forma significat infinitatem eoquod inFmite signicht.
Quidam tamen nimis ridiculose dicentes quod 'omnis' signiFlcatformam que debet
dici onmitas, Engentes nomen ad similitudinem huius quod est 'humanitas' De hoc autem
.
nomine quod est 'nichiI' dixerunt (dixerunt nichil MS)quod signiücat remquononestpro
substantia et nichilitarcin pro forma.
(2) The second opinion mentioned by Peter is apparently that of

William of Conches. It should be noted that part of the objections
adduced b)! Peter are found already in William's work, where they are
objections foreseenby the author (note the phrasesused
given aspossible
by William: scd dicetur; sedopponam).In referring to William's view
'Peter turns out to have been quite a perspicuousteacher. Peter inserts
an interesting note on the meaning of materiale impositum(! 8").
l7ï'b-18l'b: Alii vero aliter sentiunt cle signilïcatione vocabulorum. Dicunt enim quod
nomina vel significant substantiam, ut 'homo' et alia huiusmodi, vel signiücant ea que
insunt substantiis, ut 'albedo' et similia, vel animi (alia :I-IS) quedam figmenta, ut
'hircocorvns'et 'chimero', vel significant loquendi modos de rebus, ut 'omnis' et similia,
que dialetica vocant signo.
Sed que significant substantiam, ita signiEcant quod qualitatem circa eam determinant
vel communem ut hoc nomen 'homo' rationalitateon) et mortalitatem circa sub-
—
stantiam determinat —; vel propriam, ut hoc nomen 'Socrntcs' vel 'Ploro' qualitatem,
cuius nomen(nominisMS)BoetiusEcto nominein Commentaploroniroiom
appellat.
Nec sequitur quod si nomina substantiarum signiFlcant substantiam et qualitatem

illius, quod idcirco (ISTE)significent duo vel quod sint equivoca.
Illa vero que signiFlcant ea que insunt substantiis, vel solam qualitatem significant, ut
'albedo', vcl solam quantitatem vel aliquid aliorum accidentium.
Vide ergo quod nomina que signiFlcant substantias, et aliquid significant et aliquid
nominant. Ut hoc nomen 'homo' singulos homines nominat et universale quoddam
significat. Que vcro nomino significant ea que insunt m.lIJstonlbiisll
aut signiücant eam sine
essentia,ut 'albedo' -— et hec nominant accidentia — aut significant ea in adiacentia, ut
'albus'; et hec nominant substantiasin quibus sunt accidentia.
Que vero nomina figmento animi significant, nec substantiam significant nec quali—
tatem, sed Egmentumanimi et significant et nominant.
Illa quoque nomina que modos loquendi signiFlcant, nec substantiam signiHcant ncc
qualitatem nec aliquid nmuinant.
Est ergo istorum sentcntiaquod non omne nomensubstantiamet qualitatem significat,

sed sola nomina substantiarum hoc habent, sicut demonstratum est.
Sed opponitur cis de nominibus vocum quid habeant signiFlcare, cuiusmodi sunt
'nomen' et 'rcrbum' et similia. Sed qui hanc tenent sententiam dicunt voces csse aera,
ideoque corpus et substantiam. Dicunt itaque quod ista vox 'nomen'signiFlcatsubstantiam,
scilicet nomen,et qualitatem,que est per casusinflexio.
Opponitur iterum illis de his nominibus universalium, quc genus sunt et species et
similia. Seddicunt quod hec nominaprimum repertafuerunt ad nominandus
substantias
et significandas communes earum qualitates. Ut hoc nomen 'genus' primo significavit
substantiam et hanc qualitatem cius: principium generationis, sed inde translatum est ad
nominandumuniversaleet ad significandumtalem cius qualitatem,scilicet predicabili-
tatem de pluribus differentibus specie (d.n. MS) in eo quod quid est.
Et quia de illis quc vocabula nominant facta est mentio, dicendum est quod vocabula
quandoque seipsonominant. Ut cum dicitur: 'hoc nomenhomo'; hic enim de homine non
loquimur, sed potius de hoc nomine 'homo'. Et hoc antiqui appellabant materiale im-
positum. Quod quid sit intelligas. Matcriale impositum est vox representansseipsam,
idest impositaad loquendumde seipso.Et dicitur materialeimpositum
quasinomen,si ita
contingit, representat materiam suam, idest vocem quc quasi materia preiacet ut inde
Fiatnomenex voce; namqueFlt per impositionem. Quod inde 1viczler'i
potest quia 'bh'ctrix'
vox est tantum et non nomen; sed si alicui imponatur, nomen est.
Dicunt ergo qui tenent lianc sen- (ISI'U)-tentiam quod non omne nomen significat
substantiam et qualitatem.
Sed rursus opponitur illis quod Priscianusdebuit talem proprietatem nominis

assignareque divideret nomen ab omnibus partibus orationis. Quod ipsi negant, sed
talem debuit assignareque ostenderet illos nec bene divisissequi diviserunt nomen in
tres partes, scilicet in praprium nomen et appellativum et vocabulum, nec eos bene
coniunxerunt qui nomini ccmiunxcrunt pronomen et adverbium, quasi pro una parte cum
nomine reputantes. Ad quod demonstrandum sufficit illud proprium, licet non con-
veniat omni nomini.
(3) The third Opinion about the meaning of & noun holds that all
nouns signif)r substantia and qualitas, admittedly in the restrictive sense
THEOR'I' OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTUR'I' GRAMMAR 233
that each noun signiFles either that what is substantia or something else
modo substantie. We do not know to what author this Opinion may be
ascribed.
le'J'W: Sunt qui aliam dc significatione vocabulorum tenent sententiam. Qui tamen
asserunt quod omne nomen substantiam"!cum qualitate signiücat, non quod tamen omne
nomen habeat id quod substantiam est significare. Dicunt ergo quod nmnina prapter
substantiasprimo reperta sunt. Qui enim nomina primo imposuit, ad loquendum de
substantiis ea invenit. llla itaque nomina substantiamsigniFlcantet qualitatem, hoccst id
quod est substantia, in natura connnuni vcl prepria. Hoc enim est nomina qualitatem
significare, iuxta illud Donati: qualitas nominum in quo est bipertita est. Aut enim
unius nomen est et propriumdicitur, aut multorum commune est, et appellatiuumdicitur.
Nichil ergo aliud est qualitas significationis nominum nisi quod communiter signiHcant
vel proprie, idest in communi naturavel propria. Et hoc quidemdictum est secundum
ea nomina que primo reperta sunt, et, ut dictum est, prapter substantias.
Sed postea dilatata est locutio, ita scilicet ut non solum de substantiis 1uerumetiam
de ceteris rebus vellent homines loqui. lmposuerunt itaque accidentibus nomina quibus
de illis agerent, sed positio eorum est secuta positionem nominum prius impositorum
propter substantias. Data sunt itaque nomina accidentibus sed ita ut quamvis signi-
Ecarent illa accidentia, tamen modo substantie signiFlcarent et in natura cmnmuni vel
propria (vel) ut in natura communi vcl propria. Scis quid esimodo substantiesignificare:
signiFlcarealiquid sine tempore et in casuali inflexione communiter vcl prcprie, vel
quasi communiter vel quasi proprie. 'Signlficarc' vero large accipimus, ita quod etiam
continet id quod dicimus consignlfi'care:
'onlnli' et 'nullus' et cetera huiusmodinomina
nichil signiFlcantsed tantum consigniücant, ut 'omnis' consignificat quoniam universaliter
et ita quod sine tempore in casuali inflexione et quasi cmnmuniter. Nichil cnim com-
mune pluribus designat, sed quasi commune aliquid significaret plura cmnplectitur.
Ideoque non communiter, (lSï'f-l) sed quasi communiter significare dicitur. Hec vcro
habentalia nominalmiusnmdi,ut 'quis', 'nlchil' et Flgmentorumnomina,ut 'hircoceruus'
et 'chimcra', ita scilicet quod nichil possit obici contra.
Verba quoque qua primo reperta sunt, propter actiones et passiones reperta sunt,
ut scilicet designarcntde substantiaquid ageret vel quid pateretur. Raperta sunt itaque
verba ad designandum(designiücandumMS) quid de altero dicitur et primo propter
actionem et passionem, ut dictum est, quemadmodum nomina primo reperta sunt
prapter substantias.Placuit vero postea hominibus locutionem extendere ut non solum
actionem vel passionemde substantia vellent dicere verum etiam (est MS) cetera acci-
dentia de ipsa predicare. chcrta sunt itaque quc vel qualitatesvel cetera accidentia
significarent.Sedhorum positio verborum prius repertorum positioncn'nsecutac'st, ut
quanwis verbum aliquod signiFlcct qualitatem ut 'albus', modo tamen actionis vel
significat,idestcum temporein verbaliterminationeet ut dealtero dicitur.
passionis
Omne igitur nomen significat substantiam et qualitatem, non quod omne nomen
signiFlcet id quod est substantia, sed quod omne nomen significat id quod est substantia
vel aliquid modo substantie in natura communi vel propria vel ut in natura communi vcl
prolaria. Similiter omne verbum signilïcat actionem vel passionen'u,
non (quod) omne
verbum significatid quod est actio vcl passio,sedquod omne verbumvel id quod est
actio vel passiosigniücet vel aliquid aliud modo actionis vel passionis,idest cum tempore
in verbali tenninatione et ut de altero dicitur.
Peter thinks the last view to be preferable: '

Hanc vero de significatione nmninum seu verborum sententiam ad presens pre-
ferendam Utpüte artis gramatice proprietati accommodatam iudicavimus, quoniam et
appellativum et proprium nomen et vocabulum hunc habent modum significandi,
videlicet ut substantiam vel qualitatem significent, ut multipliciter est expositum. Inde
est quod illa tria & Prisciano una esse pars orationis coniciuntur.
3 - The Commentary on Priscian in Vienna, V.P.L. 2486
The important collective manuscript V.P.L. 2486 in Vienna also

contains a Priscian commentary.2 This work seems to date from about
the middle of the twelfth century. It was written by some grammarian
who was quite well versed in logical subjecta, witness the numerous
quotations from Aristotle and Boethius as well as the frequent use of
Sephisms and their solutions. As & matter of Factthe whole cc;mn'lel'ntar)r
makes the impression ofa thorough and solid piece of scholasticism.
The works is apparently an abridgment, since, though discussing all
the subjects dealt with by Priscian, it still shows some lacunas.3 In this
connection an interesting passagemay be quoted (f. 2lVb): Nunc de
ordine litterarum dicendumest(exdicamusMS), scilicet quomodo vocales
debeant preponi consonantibus et consonantes vocalibus. Sed quia parva
utilitas est ibi, ideo pretermittamus. No doubt, we should read here:
dicendumesset(instead of dicendumest) as a correction of the original
dicamus.
One master P. possibly master Petrus Helyas is referred to
— —
several times and he appears to be the favourite master.
The work opens with an extensive prologue. ] quote it in full :
Vienna, l*'.P.L. 2486, ff. l7l'"-": Tocius eloquentie principium dicitur gramatica in qua
tocius litteratorie professionis consistunt cunabula. T res enim facultates sunt eloquentie,
quarum prima est gramatica, secunda dialetica, tercia rethorica. Quia inter septem
liberales artes tripartita facultas nobis primum occurrit, uncle.quid sit cuique proprium
videamus.
! For the incorrectness ol' Peter's interpretation ol' Priscian's words II 556: proprium est
nominis substantiamet quamatcm significare, see below, Chapter XVI, pp. 522-523.-
2 For this manuscript.,seeaboveCh. l., nr. 23, pp. 89-91. For the other treatisesfound
in this manuscript, see ibid.
3 E.g. f. 25"): sed quamvis in loco sua multa simus dicturi (sc. de verbo substantivo),
sententias tamen hic aliquantulum tangemus. However, our author did not keep his
promise.
THEORV OF SIGNIFICATION IN T'WELFTl-l CENTURV GRAMMAR 235
Primq facultatis proprium est docere dictiones apte coniungere ad intelligentiam

preparandum. Secunde facultatis proprium est docere I)er inimicicias verborum disserere
adversarium cogendo prebere assensumad aliquod propositum sive velit sive nolit et
contra onmes deceptiones verborum cautelam adhibendo. Tercic facultatis proprium
est docere tam verbn quam sentencias exornare el: apposite ad persuadendum dicere ut
animo persuadeatut velit vel nolit aliquid.. Et quia de prima facultate,1iriclelic-et
arte
gramatica, tractaturi sumus, videndum est quod tam in huius quam in aliarum artium
principio duplex est habenda consideratio, scilicet extrinseca et intrinseca. Extrinseca
consideratio est compendiosa introductio ad artem intrinsecum; intrinseca consideratio
est collectio preceptorum ad aliquid docendum vel faciendum; et hec est ars extrinseca,
illa vero intrinseca.
Sed in hac prima facultate videndum est quid sit ipsa ars, que eius materia, quid
officium, quis Finis, quid eius genus, que partes, que species, quis opifex, quid in-
strumentum, et unde dicatur ars gramatica.
Ars gramatica est sciencia recte loquendi recteque scribendi et eorum que ad sic:
loquendum sunt necessaria. Recte scribendi, idest que docet recte scribere, videlicet
que littere debeant aspirari et que non et que littera cui sit preponenda vel subponenda.
Recte loquendi, idest que docet dictiones apte coniungere ad intelligen tiam preparandum,
hocest casum casui, numerum numero, tempus tempori, modum modo convenienter
associare.
Vel: ars gramatica est sciencia recte scribendi recteque loquendi, ratio ergo et funda—
mentum omnium liberalium artium. "
Queritur quare in hac diffinitione prius ponatur scribendi quam loquendi, cum vero
prius soleamus dicere verba quam scribere. ldeo scribendi prius ponitur quoniam &
Prisciano prius de recta scriptura quam de recta locutione tractatur.
Omnium liberalium hec ars doctrina vel origo dicitur, quia prior ipsa reliquis
ponitur. Earum fundamentum dicitur, quia nisi prius aliquis fuerit instructus hac
scientia, accessus ei ad reliquas denegatur.
Que materia. Uniuscuiusqueartis materia id appellatur circa quod omnia precepta
eiusdem artis versantur. Gramatice igitur artis materia quadripertita est, scilicet littere,
sillabe, dictiones, et sintasis, idest perfecta constructio.
Alii autem dicunt quod sola sintasiseius materia sit. Quicquid enim :: Prisciano in hoc
libro tractatur, adsolamsintasinspectareprobatur. Namgratiasintaseos
de dictionibus,
gratia dictionum clesillabis, gratia sillabarum de litteris tractavit.
Qyodejicium
Officium uniuscuiusque artis est quod convenit opifici secundum ipsam artem. Huius
vero artis opilïci secundum ipsam competit docere recte scribere et recte loqui, idest
ut aliquis recte scribat et recte loquatur.
Est autem recte scribere et aspirare et accentare atque omnia elementa ratione
congrua ordinare. Recte loqui est genus generi, numerum numero, personam persone,
casum casui, tempus tempori, modum modo convenienter associare vitando soloecismum
et barbarismum. Et l'IOCest artis OFFicium.
Vel: est considerareproprietatem litterarum in sillabis, pro-
huius artis OFFicium
prietatem sillabarum in dictionibus, proprietatem dictionum et uniuscuiusque accidentis
earum in sintasi.
Qyisjïnis
Finis huius artis est docuisse recte scribere et recte loqui. Vel: Hnis est recte
scripsisse et recte locutum esse. Vel : Finis est perfecta noticia recte scribendi et recte
loquendi.
and genus
Quod genushuius artis sit videndum est. Ergo breviter talis faciendaest divisio.
Scientiarum alia eloquentia, alia sapientia vel philosophia. Sapientie vel philosophie
duc sunt partes: theorica et practica. Theoricc tres sunt partes: mathematica,physica,
theologya. Practicc tres sunt partes: ethica, politica, equonomica( !).
Eloquentie tres he sunt partes: gramatica, dialetica, rethorica, sine quibus nullus
perfecta utitur eloquentia. A gramatica enim principium est eloquentie, scilicet scientia
recte scribendiet recte pronuntiandiscripta. A dialeticavero est scientiarecte pronun-
tiata probarevel inprobare. A rethoricaquidem perfectio, scilicet scientiasuadendivel
dissuadendi aliquid cum ornatu verborumet ponderesententiarum.,
ln discernendis igitur artibus hic ordo servandus est ut gramatice artis noticia primo
comparetur, deinde pro scientia dialetice subtilitatis laboretur, et consequenter ornatus
rethoricc discipline studio et exercitio conErmctur. His itaque cognitis et diligenti
labore memorie traditis, recto ordine ad philosophie tandem studium est ascendendmn.
ch partes
Partes eius secundum quosdam sunt triginta et duo, scilicet ratio accentnndi, ratio
gravandi, acuendi, circumflectendi etc.
Sed nobis quatuor huius artis partes esse videntur, scilicet ratio tradita de litteris
et ratio tradita cle sillabis et ratio tradita de dictionibus et ratio tradita de sintasi. Vel duc
sunt partes tantum: ratio scribendi et ratio pronuntiandi.
ch species
Dicunt quidam quod genera linguarum sunt eius species, quia dicunt genus est in
suis speciebus,ita ars grammatica
in singulis linguarum generibus exercetur.
Sed nos dicimus nullasessespecieseius.
Qyis::pr
OpiHces(171?)duo sunt, scilicet qui agit de arte et ex arte. Agere de arte est tradere
precepta artis; agereex arte est loqui secundumartem. Vel : opifex est qui scit Optime
declinare et derivare.
Qyod insrrumentum
Instrumentum cuiusque artis est quo ipsa ars exercetur, ut instrumentum dialetice
est dialetica disputacio. Ergo instrumentum huius artis est gramatica disputatio.
Unde dicatur ars gramatica
A 'gramma' idest littera; inde diciturgramatica, idest litteralis scientia, que non solum
tractat de litteris, sed etiam de his que constant ex litteris.
THEom' OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFI'H CENTUIW GRAMMAR 237
In hoc loco queritur quare gramatica vocetur, cum hoc nomen possit esse commune
omnium.
Sed ita respondeturquia elegit sibi prerogativamquandamet hoc quod commune
erat aliarum sibi quasi proprium usurpavit.
Item queritur quarc sumpserit nomen a principali parte, idest :: littera.
Ad quod respondetur: non est mirum cum etiam Liber Genesis :: principali parte
nomen sumpsit, cum in principio tantum tractet de generatione.
Solet etiam queri quisprimus invenerit litteras apud Grecosel".Latinos.Et Gathmus
dicitur quatuor invenisse litteras, scilicet al a, bera, deiici, ganimai; deinde alie sunt
reperte. Apud Latinos vcro Carmentisnimpha mater Euandri quatuor invenit litteras:
a, b, c, d; deinde alie sunt reperte.
Illis premissis que circa artem requiruntur, que circa (Librum) sint consideranda
videamus. Circa Librum hec sunt consideranda: auctoris intencio, utilitas Operis,
modus tractandi, causa operis, quos imitetur, et titulus.
Intencio auctoris est artis gramaticc precepta mirifice tradere. Vel: est eius in-
tentio Antiquorum gramaticorum vicia corrigere.
Utilitas est perfecta cognitio litterarum vel sillabarum, dictionum ct sintasis. Vel :
utilitas est omnium scripturarum facilis expositio.
Modustractanditalis est: intendit tractare per compositionemet divisionem. Per
compositiünem tractat in sedecim libris quomodo littere compellantur in sillabas, et
sillabe in dictiones, et de accentibus earum. In duobus aufäm libris sintaseos tractat
scilicct quomodo constructio alia transitiva, alia intransitiva, alia reciproca, alia
retransitiva. Vel: modustractandi talis est: primo loco premittit prologum, in quo
reddit auditoresbenevolus,dociles et attentos et presertim Iulianum. Deinde quare
dictiones constant ex sillabis et sillabc ex litteris et quare littere sunt voces. DiFFmit
quid sit vox, quid littera, quid sillaba, quid dictio et unumquodque accidens dictionis.
Preterea tractat de sintasi. Hoc autem facit Antiquorum bene dicta comprobando, male
dicta reprobando,minusdicta snpplendo,superfluarecidenda.
Causaoperis fuit IulianusApostata,discipulusTlieotisti, qui dubitansde accusativo
et ablatiuosingulari et genitivo et accusativoplurali tercie,-declinationis, et de preteritis
perfectis et plusquamperfectis tertie et. quarte coniugationis, rogavit Priscianum ut
hoc opussibi componeret..V el : causaoperis fuit cmmuunisutilitas.
Qyos imitetur
Imitatus est Appollonium et Herodianum, quia (sicut) illi Antiquorum gramaticorum

in arte gramatica vicia corruerunt, sic: iste Antiquorum latinorum vicia emendavit.
Titulus est: Prisciani Ccsaricnsis Constantinopolitani ars gramatica incipit.
Dicunt quidam quod Cesaris fecit hunc librum, alii Constantinopolitani. Sed
nos nescnnusnec scn'e curamus.
Auctor iste de gramaticatractaturus premittit prologum, in quo reddit lectores
benevolos,dociles, attentos et precipue iuliani Apostatecaptat benevolentiam.Bene-
volos reddit ubi dicit: meo labore hoc faciente; attentos ubi dicit: conatus sum rem
arduam; dociles ubi dicit: supranominntorum 1siluarumprecepta in latinum sermonem
transferre.Et in aliis locisqui in prologofacile notantur. Iuliani captatbenevolentiamab
illo loco: te tamen, 0 Iuliane, consul ac patricie.
Et notandum est quid sit hoc quod dicit: animam eius constare tam ex animo
238 LOGICA MODERNOIIUM "
Homeri quam ex animo Virgilii, quorum uterque possede(r)at arcem musice. Unde diverse
sunt sententie. Una est quod apud Antiquus post omnes artes musica legeretur; unde
non poterat eam quis scire nisi reliquarum arcium perfectionem obtineret.. Ergo sic
legitur littera: quia isti tres possede(r)ant arcem, idest principatum et periciam onmium
artium. Secundaest sentenciaquod quedammusicadicitur metrica que docet metrum;
et hanc sciebant. Tercia est: in musica sunt onmes consonantis et ille. sunt quinque:
diatesseron,diapente, diapason, cardiapente, cardiapason; quas illi optime sciebant.
Nos vero dicimus musice tres essepartes.. Alia enim est mundam, alia humana, alia
instrumentalis, Mundane tres sunt partes: planetalis, temporalis, elementalis. Planctalis
est que docet motus et effectus et septem habet partes: alia Iunalis, alia saturnalis etc.
Temporalis est que docet temporum variationes, et quatuor habet partes: alia est
autumnalis, alia hyemalis, alia vernalis, alia estivalis. Elementalis est que docet in quo
elementa conveniant et in quantum et in quo differant, et quatuor habet partes: alia est
terre, alia aque etc. Humani; tres sunt partes: humoraiis, virtualis, coniunctim; humo-
ralis est que in quatuor humoribus consistit, idest sanguine,Hegmate,celera, melancholia.
Virtualis est que quatuor virtultultibus consistit: prudentia, temperantia,fortitudo,
iusticia. Coniunctiva est que docet quomodo anima corpori coniungatur et qumuodo ab
eodem separetur. lnstrumentalis tres habet partes: metricam, rithmicam, melicam.
Metrica est que docet facere metrum; ritmica multas habet species et ducet facere
rit(h)mos; melica est que docet canere et tres habet species: diatonicam, gramaticam et
armonicnm. Et hasomnes isti sciebant.
The following gloss is found in the margin:
Musica pro liberali scientia ponitur, quia sicut in Musica sunt septem vocum discri-
mina, que, licet sint diversa, tamen sunt convenientia, ita in liberali scientia septem
artes comprehenduntur que inter se et conveniunt et differunt.
Then our author goes on to the descensioad litteram. On the lemma

philosophi dijïniunt vocem several views are given:
181': Sed de voce diverse sunt sententie. Prima hec est. Vox est aer tenuissimus ictus et
aer est corpus; ergo vox est corpus. Vel aliter: oratio est vox et oratio est quantitas et
si species alicuius est in aliquo predicamento et genus in eodem; ergo vox est quantitas.
Alii dicunt quod vox est actio vel passio, quia percussio aeris est actio 1vel passio et
percussio aeris est vox; ergo vox est actio. Moderui sic dicunt: vox est aer tenuissimus
ictus, idest vox habetesseper aerem tenuissimumictum, idest ner tenuissimusictus
est causa quare sit vox. ictus naturalibus instrumentis ut per hoc ceteri soni excludantur
qui non sunt voces. Est autem hec diffinitio data per causamut illa: 'dies est sol lucens
super terram', idest sol lucens super terram est causa quare dies existat. Vere vox est
suum sensibileaurium, idestad quod percipiendumauressunt accommodate.Et prior
diFFinitio sumpta est a substantia, idest & substantiali causavocis, idest ab acrequi est
causasubstantievocis.Alia sumptaest :: non'ninibus
vel a notionibus,idestabaccidentibus.
Accidit enim voci ut audiatur quantum in ipsa est. Si autem queratur utrum sit sub-
stantia vel accidens, respondeo quia neque est substantia vel accidens. Si opponatur quod
dicit Boetius quicquid est, vel est substantiavel accidens,respondeoquia dictum est hoc
de rebuspredicamentalibus,idest que in aliquo predicamentorumponuntur. Sedpreter
THEORV OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTUR'I' GRAMMAR 239
illas res sunt multa que neque substantia sunt nec accidentia, ut argumentum et ratio
et similia.
Speaking about the causa inventionis litterae the author discusses the
collocutianis(which remind us of William of Conchcs)and the
tria (genera
four elements which had been considered to be the necessary con-
stituents since the Greek Commentators ' :
18W 1: Brevi et compendioso tractatu de voce premisso ingreditur tractare de materia
sua et primum de littera hac ratione, scilicet quia constitutiva est aliorum et omne con-
stituens prius est suo constituto. Unde in ea resolvi possunt. Eius igitur inventionis
causam videamus.
Tria sunt genera collocutionis: unum intcr interrogantem et respondentem et dicitur
drammagicon(!) quod latine dicitur interrogatio.;aliud (est) inter docentem et discentem et
,
dicitur didascalican,idest doctrinale; tercium est inter continue narrantem et continuo
audientem et dicitur enarratirum vel ermcneticon (euermetico MS).
Ad hec tria genera collocutionis quatuor sunt necessaria,scilicet res, intellectus, vox,
littera. Res, ut de ipsa aliquid dicatur; intellectus, ut per ipsum rei cognitio habeatur;
vox, ut per ipsam presentibus intellectus manifestetur; littera, ut absentibus idem in-
tellectus per ipsam nuntiatur. Hac itaque necessitate inventa est littera, ut quemadmo-
dum viva voce presentibus, similiter per litteram loqueremur absentibus. Est quoque
secundaria causa inventionis littere commoditas, scilicet quia cum multa sint virtutis
gesta memoria digna commodius per litteras presentium mentibus intimantur et facilius
pasteris cognoscenda transmittuntur.
The discussion of littera is continued up to f. Z?":

18"): Litera dicitur a 'h'na', 'h'm's'breve 1vala 'lac, les' vel a 'iego, legis', quia prebet iter
legendi congrue posita; vel a 'lino', quod Antiqui solebant scribere in ceratis tabulis et
delere illud.
Littera enim vocantur elementa ad similitudinem elementorum mundi. Elementa
enim dicuntur quasi alimenta vel quasi ilememavel quasi elevamenm.Ahmenradicuntur,
dicuntur quia Deusfecit ilen primammateriamex
quiaomniaalunt et nutriunt. Hemanm
qua postea elementa discussit. Elevamemadicuntur quia constituunt omnia corpora.
Unde et littere per similitudinem dicuntur elementa. Sicut enim elementa coeuntia
faciunt omne corpus, sic litere coeuntes faciunt literalem vocem que est quasi corpus,
immo etiam magis est vere corpus secundum illos qui volunt quod vox sit corpus
( ...... ).
193: Hic queritur de inventione eolice digamma.
ZIW: Tribus de causis invente sunt diptongi.
Next the syllabe is discussed:

22'-'E'1-'b:Dictum est de litera. Nunc de sillaba est dicendum. Prima autem 1hfitzia-ncium
est causainventionis sillabe. Que talis est. Cum in humana locutione plures dictiones
! See above, p. 1775.

: From f. 18? on the pagesare of two columns; seeaboveCh. l., nr. 23, p.. 90.
24—0 LOGICA MODERNORUM u
essent necessariead significanda ea de quibus sermo habetur, patens fuit quod singule.
sub uno accentu et uno spiritu (ZZW) et indistanter pmfcrri non poterant quia nec
omnes monosillabas essc ratio pateretur. Sunt ergo invente diverse sillabe ut per carum
compositionem dictiones sub diverso spiritu et distantcr proferri possent.
The discussion of dictio is rather extensive:
Et de sillabn hec dixisse sumcialnk. Racio de literis expedita est. Racio

233'3-24-1'3:
syllabarum quoque manifesta. Racio sintaseos in posterum reservanda est. Sed nunc
terciam aggrediamur, videlicet de dictione.
Sed primo videndum est quid sit dictio et unde dicatur dictio et que sit diH'erentin
inter dictionem et sillabam et quot sint genera et varietates dictionum et quot accidentia
earum. Et de his tractandum est communiter et postea de unoquoque singulariter. Et
primum de nomine et eius accidentibus, et post de verbo et eius accidentibus. Et sic
recurrendo per singula primo videndum est quid sit dictio.
Alii dicunt quod nulla sillnba1..fcl

(231'13) litera est parsorationis,quia dicunt quod esse
partem orationis non portat plus nisi essesignificatiuum (signiFlcativam MS) vel essepartem
orationis non portat plus nisi essecamprchcnshwm
(comprehensionem MS) sillabarum et esse
camprchcnsirum(comprehensionem MS) sillabamm non portat plus nisi essein constitutione
dictionis. Sic autem exponunt auctoritatem Boetii: "quicquid est pars partis, est pars
tocius", dictum hoc essepueris; et ita exponunt idest: quicquid continetur a parte
integrali, continetur et a toto. Quia si destruerentur alique litere de oratione, destruere-
tur oratio tota.
Nos vero dicimus hoc dictum essede rebus universalibus, non de vocibus.
Modo queritur si hec diffinicio conveniat omnibus, idest nomini et verbo et participio
ctc. Dicimus quod convenit nomini et verbo et participio et pronomini et quibusdam
adverbiis, sed aliis non. Sed antiquissimi magistri, ut Servitis, Donatus, Caper, docebant
hancomnibusconvenire,quiadicebantquodprepositioneset interiectioneset coniuncti-
oneserantdictionessignificative:Et dicqba(n)tquodsigniücabantþr]eaquesignificabant
nominaquibusadiunguntur,ut 'in civitarc'illud idem[quod]significabatin quod 'cirims'.
Alii dicunt quod non signiFlcabantea que significant nomina quibus adiunguntur, sed
significant qu'asdamproprietates, ut quandoquesignilïcant motionem, quandoquequie-
tcm. Et ita exponunt litteram Prisciani Constructionis: 'consignificant', idest iuncte cum
aliis significant istas praprietates.
cis, idest secundumdiversoscasus
ltaquevariatur earumsignificatioad vimconiunctarum
quibus adiunguntur diversassignificant proprietates. Quia 'in' aliud significat cum
iungitur ablativo, et aliud cum iungitur accusativo; et coniunctio aliud cum est copulativa
et aliud cum est disiunctiua.
M.P. aliter dicit, scilicet quod non significant. Et sic ista diffinito non convenit istis.
Et ita exponit litteram Prisciani Constructionis,scilicet defendit sibi vim dictionis.
Defendere vim dictionis est poni ita (241'11) per se quod non ponatur in constructione
dictionis. Consignifcatidest: signi 'cui con,idest inter ligaminaet conligamenta:iliarum.
ConsigniFlcm-e est quodammodo sensum orationis iuvare mutando vel minuendo vel
augendovel quodammodü variando. Itaquevariatur carumsignificatioad vim coniunctarum
eis, idest: variantur earum officia secundum proprietates casuum quibus adiunguntur,
quia alio modo adiuvant cum coniunguntur ablativo et aliter quando iunguntur accusativus.
THEOR? OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTURV GRAMMAR 241
Alii autem volunt accipere diFFmicionem istam largam, ut istis conveniat secundum
predictam sententiamdicentes: dictio est pars orationis minima quantum ad totum
sensum, idest vel habenssensum vel unitatis sensum. Et ita accipiunt 'ad [atumscnsum'.
The main part OFthe discussion of nomenis devoted to Priscian's well-

known sentence: "the property of the noun (nomen)is to signify sub-
stance with quality" (proprium est nominis significare substantiam et quali-
tatem, Inst. (gramm.[I 18, p. 556, ed. Hertz).
First our author give a number of viex-vson the meaningof the phrase
then he gives his own and he refutesan objection
'to signijj/substance';
made to it:
241'h'ï'b: Sed quia de hoc apud Antiquus multe sententie erant, ideo eas in medium
proferamuset que melior videbitur teneamus.
Proprium cst nominis significare Illbltdnlfdm et qualitatem, idest: praprium est nominis
significare aliquam essentiamet qualitatem, idest eius aliquam proprietatem. Priscianus
non ita accipit 'substantiam' sicut Boetius, quia dicit Boetius quod substantia est que,
cum sit una et eadem numero, est susceptibilis contrariorum. Sed Priscianus appellat
substantiam quamlibet essentiam.
Modo opponitureis scilicet quod hec cliFHnitionon con'ir'eniat
'yic' et 'deus'et 'quis'.
Sed dicebant quod 'yle' est nomen dialeticorum, non gramaticorum; vel dicebant quod
illud signiFlcalJatquandam proprietatem, idest informitatem. De hoc nomine 'deus' ita
respondebantquod bene fuit inpositum ad (24Vü)significandamessentiamcum quadam
proprietate. De 'quis' ita respondebant quod signiþ'careiaþ'nitchabet pro qualitate.
Iterum. De 'cania' Opponitur eis. Sed nulla est appositio, quia bene denotat tres
essentiaset tres proprietates.
Alia sententia est: praprium (cst) nominis signiþ'care substantiam, idest omne nomen
substantivum, et qualitatem, idest adiectivum. Substantivum est quod est inventum
causasubstantie, adiectivum quod est inventum causaaccidentium.
Alii dicebantquod 'propriam'quatuor modis dicitur.. Et ita dicebant propriumest
nomini hoc convenit soli nomini et non omni, quia nun convenit huic scilicet 'albedo' et
aliis multis. Et dicebant quod Priscianus noluit ut conveniret omnibus. Sed dicebant
quod ideo dixit Priscianusut ostenderetconvenireappellativiset ut ostenderetea esse
sub eademparte orationiscum aliis nominibus,ut inprobaretsententiamStoicorumqui
dividebant.
Alii dicunt: omnenomensignificatsubstantiam,idest signiEcataliquid eu intellectu ex
quo perpenditur adiacere, idest inesse, subiecta. Ut 'homo' signiEcat essentiamque est
homoet istam prüprietatem scilicet humanitatem; et 'albedo' signiFlcat rem albam et
aliquam prüprietatcm, scilicet albcrevelfacerc album. Et sic omnia alia.
El: dicunt quod unumquodque nomen duo significat, idest duo intellectus sunt in
unoquoque nomine, idest quod significat substantiam et aliquam proprietatem, scilicet
vel aibere vel clarerc vel aliquid tale.
Modo opponitur eis de hoc quod dicit Boetius: "album nichil significat nisi quali-
tatem". lta exponunt quod intellexit: quando ponitur ex parte predicati, tunc significat
qualitatem. Sed bene potest poni in subiecto; et tunc signiEcat aliquam essentiam ut
'album estcorpus': tunc 'album' quoddam corporeum significat.
Modo queritur si hec diFanitio conveniat onmibus negativis. Et dicimus ita quod
omnia nomina signiEcant substantiam et qualitatem vel ponendo, ut 'homo', vel per-
imendo, ut 'nichil' vel 'ncnia'.
Alia sententia: proprium est nmninis significare substantiam et qualitatem, idest: omni
nomini vel fere omni nomini convenit signiFlcareid de quo loquimur vel de quo agitur
vel de.quo sermo habetur, et significat qualitatem, idest communiter vei pmprie.
Et ita exPonebant, ut excluderent pronomina, idest: vel estcommune,rci proprium.
Alia sententia. in tota humana locutione duo genera locutionis maxime sunt neces-
saria, videlicet id de quo possumusloqui et id quod significat id quod alteri inherere
ostenditur, scilicet nomen et verbum, et secundo loco pronomen, quod auxiliatur
nomini, et participium quod auxiliatur verbo.
Et hecsententianon discordata supradictanisi in signiEcatione'quahtatis'.
Prapriumes: nominissignificare. . . . . . etc. idest: omni nomini convenit, vel fere
omni, signiFlcaresubstantiam, idest signiFlcal-ealiquid eo modo quod de eo possumus
loqui. Ut 'cursus" et 'currit', 'cursus' signiFlcat cursum eo moda quod de eo possumus
loqui; verbum significatactionem et passionemeo modo quo sempersignificatisnomi-
num inesse ostenditur, ut dicit Aristo(ti)les: "verbum est semper nota eorum que de
altero predicatur", idest actionem signiFlcatvel passionemque semper aliis inesse
ostenditur, de se nichil, idest verbum numquampotest poni in subiectoitaquod de eo
aliquid possimusloqui, idest de eius significatoper prepositionem. Quia non possumus
dicere: 'icgit estactia', seddicimus 'Is-gitestverbum';ibi '!cgit' est nomenverbi et ita de
nominealiquid dicimus, non de significatoverbi. Et idemsignificatverbumhoc scilicet
'currit' et nomenquod est 'cursus'.
Si opponatur (24-ï'b): ergo verbum significat substantiam, dicemus non esse verum,
refertur ad modumsignificandi.Significarcsubstantiam
quia 'significaresubstantiam' nichil
estaliud quamtaliter signiEcare,idestut deeo possimusloqui, sednon sicut hocverbum,
immo signiEcat taliter quod semper inherere significatum eis ostenditur. Unde verba
dicuntur signiFlcareagere vel pati, quia plus est significareagerevel pati quam significare
actionem et passionem,quia 'actio' et 'passie'signiFlcantactionem et passionem.Sed
aliter significare agere et pati est (quam) significare actionem et passionem et taliter
significare,scilicet alteri convenire. Sicut pronümenillud idem significatquod nomen
et totum illud; et nomen signilïcat substantiam et qualitatem, pronomen vero sul)-
stantiam solam; sed dili'erunt in modo signiEcandi, quia nomen denotat de quo genere
rerum aliquid sit, pronomen vero non.
Then he exPlains the phrase iltu:.-

signyj' quality' :
24Vb-25f3:Dictum est quid sit significare substantiam. Modo dicendum est quid sit
significarequalitatem. SigniFlcare
qualitatemest denotarede quo generererum aliquid
sit vel de.qua manerie. Decemsunt predicamentaet omnia nominauniuscuiusquepredi-
camentidenotatde quo generererum sit aliquid et ita omniaillius predicamentilscilicet
subalterna et specialissimaet individua. Subalterna evidentius quam generalissima
denotant de quo genere rerum sit aliquid, ut animai; specialissimaevidentius quam sub-
alterna, Ut homo; individuum evidentius quam specialissima,nisi equiuocatio inpediat,
ut 'Socratcs'.
Unde dicit Priscianus:proprium nomen est quod denotat prapriam substantiamet
THEom' 01: SIGNIFICA'I'ION IN TWELFI'H CENTLuw GRAMMAR 243
qualitatem. Sed equivocatio inpedit, quia plures Socratesvel lohannes. Sed quot erunt
equivocationes in aliquo nomine, totidem eiusdem nominis erunt nomina. Unde dicit
Aristotiles: "vox quidem una, significationes vert) plures". Sed si habmidaremus nomini-
bus, deberemus inponere unicuique rei suum nomen diversum. Sed quia deFlcimus
nominibus, ideo Et equivocatio. Sed unum nomen signiflcat plura, idest pluribus modis
inpositum fuit diversis rebus. Et sic in alio predicamento qualitatis est prius qualitas et
posteacolor et coloratum,deinde albedo et nigredo. Per 'qualitarem'de quo genere
rerum aliquid sit denotatur et per 'colorem' convenientius; per 'colararum' evidentius
quamper colorem et per 'albedincm'vel 'nigredinem'evidentiusassignaturde quo genere
rerum aliquid sit quam per 'colaratum', et per 'hanc albedincm'convenientius quam per
'albudinem'.Et eodem modo de nigredine.
Iterum. 'Album' bene denotat de quo genere rerum aliquid sit, scilicet quod 'album'
dicitur nomen corporum et quod semper intelligitur albumcorpus.Et 'album' bene
denotat de quo genere rerum aliquid sit. Nisi per equivocationem, sicut 'bonus'; 'bonus'
est equivocum, quia 'bonus', idest 'utilfs' et 'bonus' signiEcat quandam bonitatem.
iterum. Sunt alia nomina que non continentur in aliquo predicamentorum. Sed
faciamusmoclo quoddam predicamentum et ponamusea ibi sicuti conveniens sit; primum
postea ratio, deinde dünicia, postea argumentum, deinde argumentatio et postea
rox,
siliusismtrs;deinde hocet hoc et hacargumentum.Et convenientius assignatur per 'rutianem'
et convenientiusper 'dijï'niciancm'
quid de quo generererum sit quamper 'coni'cnicns';
quam per 'raciancm'; et (sic) de unoquoque. Unde dicit Boetius: "convenientius assigna-
bat proferens speciemquam genus".
Et ita diximus quid sit signilïcare qualitatem.
Iterum. Opponitur quod sunt quedam nomina que. non denotant de quo genere
rerum sit aliquid. Quia sunt ita universalia(251'3)quod currunt per omnia predicamenta
et possuntconiungi cum nominibus omnium predicamentorum,scilicet 'cum','rex',
'unum', 'aliquid', 'discrctum', 'quis', 'totus', 'solus', 'qualis', 'talis'.
Seddicimus quod illa, scilicet 'ens'et alia quatuor, benedenotant de quo genere rerum
sit aliquid propter equivocationem. Quia sunt equivocn et quandoque reguntur circa
singularia.Et ideo dicebantilli reprehendendo(corr. ex respondendoMS) Priscianum
'uHus' etc. esse pronomina.
Sedde 'quis' et 'uHus'et 'uterque'dicimusquodsignificantinFmite.Et hoc habentpro
qualitate, idest sicut signilïcarequalitatem illa inpediret essepronomina, sic ianite
significare inpedit ea essepronomina.
Next the pmprietas verbi is discussed after Priscian: "the property of

the verb is to signify an action performed, or undergone, or both, by
means of moods, of forms, and of tenses without cases" (Inst. gramm.
ed.Hem):
1118,p. 558-9,
25'11'1'0:Dictum est de preprietate nominis. Nunc dicendum est de proprietate verbi.
Proprium cs: verbi significare actionem et passionem sive utrumque cum modis cr. temporibus el.
formis siue casu.
Alii hic assignantduas proprietates, alii unam. Sicut in dimeicione alii assignantunam
dimeicionem, alii duas.
llli qui assignant unuim proprietatem, sic dicunt: proprium est verbi, idest omni verbo
convenit vel fere omni, significareactionem, idest significare aliquid istius predicamenti,
idest aliquid illius predicamentiquod ea passio;vcl significatactionem,idest

et passionem,
signiücat aliquam praprictatem que significatur per aliquid incomplexorum illius predi-
idest significataliquamproprietatemquc significaturper aliquid
camenti, et passionem,
incomplexorumistius predicamenti.In hoc excluduntur quedamnomina, scilicet illa
que signiFlcant actionem, ur 'iectio' et 'actio', et quedam que significant passionem, ut
'passio' et alia; cum temporibus,idest cum discretione temporum; in hoc excluduntur
nomina illa; et modis,idest quod sit indicativi vcl inperativi vcl optativi; et in hoc
excluduntur participia. Et ita legant qui (quod MS) dicunt quod omni verbo convenit.
Et dicunt quod 'albco, albus' et 'nigrcsco'et 'albcsco'significant quandam pmprietatem
quc potest significari ab aliquo incomplexorum predicamentorum. Et secundumhanc
diFEnicionemexcluduntursubstantivact vocativaex eo quod sunt substantivaet vocativa.
Alii dividunt et faciunt duasproprietates: unam que"convenit omnibus, aliam que
non convenit omnibus, dicentes: proprium est verbi significare actionem et passionemsoli
verbo convenit, sed non omni; signiFlcnre prcprietatem que denotatur per aliquod in-
complexorum predicamentiactionis qualitatis et illius predicamentiquod est passionis,
cum temporibus et modis. Per temporibusexcluduntur nomen; per modisexcluduntur
participia. Quia hic ita accipitur 'modis'idest: cum discretione modorum.
Et hoc nobis placet, quia qucdmnverbasunt que non signiFlcantactionem, ut 'albus'
et 'candco' et alia multa. ( ...... )
Modo queritur si in una constructione signilïcent (sc. verba) utrumque. Quidam

dicunt quod non, sed in una signiFlcant actionem, (2519) in alia passionem. Et quidam
dicunt quod sempersignificantactionem ct passionemubicunque sint, sed non ponuntur
in aliqua constructione nisi causa(circa MS) unius (( ...... )
Alia diFEnicio. Verbum est id quod est signiücativum agendi vel paciendi. Et hec:.
diFEnicio convenit soli verbo, sed non omni.
Modo queritur que sit differencia intcr signiþcarc agere et pati et inter signyq'care
actionem Hec est diFferencia,quod quedamnominasigniEcantactionemet
ct passionem.
quedampassionemet taliter quod de eis possimusloqui; verba vcro significantagereet
pati; idest signiEcantactionem ct passionemtaliter quod alii convenire ostendatur.
Unde Boecius: verbum est nota eorum que dc altero predicantur. Quod in nomine
expositum est.
Sed1iridisnclum
est quod Priscianusaccipit unum pro altero, scilicet significareager::
et pati et significareactionemccpassionem.
Modo queritur si hec diFFlnicio conveniat 'sum', 'es', 'est'.. Sed quamvis in loco suo
multa simusdicturi, sententiastamenhic aliquantulumtangamus,
Substantivum verbum meram denotat substantiam sicut pronmnen. Nec habet
nisi discretionemtemporumet modorumet verborumcon-
aliquid undedicatur verbum
structionem. Nichil habet substantialeverbi sed accidentia. Et ideo si volumus conside-
rare secundum substancialemsigniEcacionem,dicemus esse proprie nomen; si con-
sideremus accidentia, dicemus esseverbum.
Then, the prcperties of the participia and the article are discussed
(25v3-26Pü); next that of the pronoun:
26m: Postquam dictum est de proprietate nominis et verbi et participii et articuli, nunc
dicendum est de proprietate pronominis. Primum ergo videnda est causainventionis
THEORV OF SIGNIFICATION m TWELFTH CENTum' GRAh-m-IAR 245
eius. Causainventionispronominis est triplex. Nomina enim erant terciarum personarum

nec erant demonstrativavel relativa; ideo inventasunt pronominaquedamdemonstrativa
vci relativaut faciantdemonstracionemct relationem. Hec fuit prima causa.Secundaest
quia tercie pcrscnc verborum sunt inlinitc, ut quando dico 'scribit' incertum est de quo
dicam et quia potest iungi cum omnibus nominativis nominum. Sed quia si poneremus
nomen proprium eodem modo essentianita proptcr equivocationem,ideo fuerunt
inventaquedampronominatcrcic personeut iungerenturcum eis et facerentca Finita.
( ...... ) Tercia causaerat quia verba erant discretiva prime et secundeet tercia
persone, nomina vcro erant tantum tcrciarum personarum et ita non poterant coniungi
cum prima et secunda persona verborum exceptis substantivis ct vocativis — ideo
inventasunt pronominaprima et secundepersone,ut istis mediantibusnomina redu-
cerenturad primam et secundampersonam.
The author continues with a discussionof the properties of the pre-

positi-on, the adverb, the coniunction and the interjection (261'9'3'0).
Next the deFmitic-ns of the single parts of speech are given. Noun
(namen)is deait with on ff. 263'3-29fb : 1.
(abbreviated): Dc prolwietatc singularum (singularium MS) partium orationis

261'0-291'11
dictum est. Restat ergo ut videamusquid sit unaquequepars et que sint accidentia earum.
Sed prius de nomine incipiamus et quid sint nomina et que eius accidentia sint
dicamus.
M.P. sic dicit: nomenest dictio per quamEt nominatio. Hec dil'iïnicio non convenit
omnibus nominibus et ideo recurrendum est ad diffinicionem Prisciani. Qui ita dicit:
nomen est pars orationis que unicuique subiectorum corporum seu rerum communem
vcl propriam qualitatemdistribuit. Quod Priscianussuperiusdixit expedite[expedite],
hic dicit inpedite. Dixit enim superius quod nomen est dictio et nominis est proprium
significare substanciam et qualitatem. Hic vero dicit: nomen est pars m-acionis quc
unicuique subiectorum corporum etc., idest nomen est pars orationis quc proprie vei
appellative vci dcnotando de qua mancrie rerum aliquid sit distinctim signiFlcatunam-
quamque rem corpoream et incorpoream. Sed considerandasunt verba distinctionis:
nomen est pars orationis. Si nomen est pars oracionis, argu est pars existens in oratione.
Ergo si non est pars existens in oracionc, non est nomen. Ergo nisi sit oratio non est
nomen.
Ad hoc vitandum sophismasic exponitur. Nomen est pars oracionis, idest nomen est
dictio que distribuit propriam vel communem qualitatem unicuique subiectorum cor-
rumpo seu rcrmn, idestdistincte significatpmprie vei appellativevei denotandode qua
manerie rerum sit aliquid, unamquamque rem corpoream vel incorpoream
......
26"). Accidunt nomini quinque: species, genus, numerus, forma, casus ( ...... )
Dictum est quod nomini accidunt quinque: species, genus, numerus, forma, casus.
Primum ergo videamusquid sit species.
Speciesest eiementariscomposicioper quam Flt primitivi vel derivativi discretio.
Vel species que compatit nomini, verbo, pronomini, adverbio, est discretio primitivi
vei derivativi ( ).
......
Quid est nomen esse primitivum? lllud esseprime posicionis. Quid est aliquam
dictionem esse prime positionis?: idest: eam ita esse inventam ut non respiciat aliam
dictionem prius inventam. Quid est aliqumn dictionem essesecundeinpositioni52, idest
eum ita esseinventamut respiciataliamdictionem prius inventamcum qua conveniat
voce et signilïcacione. Si vero non transit in aliam dictionem sed manct sub ea a qua
derivatur, debet in voce convenirecum ea in principio et voce diFferreab ea in Fine.
Hic abicitur derivacio que Et solo sensu et illa que Fit sola voce et tenetur ea que Flt
sensu et voce. ( ).
......
271'3.Dictum est quod nominum alia propria, alia appellativa.Et dictum est quod
quatuor sunt speciespropriorum nominum. Nunc videndum est de appellativis.
Sedqueritur hic que sit diH'erenciainter propria et appellativa.Proprium est quod
signiFlcatpropriam substantiam et qualitatem ita quod convenit uni soli. Appellativum
est quod signiücat communem substantiamet qualitatem, ita quod convenit pluribus.
Item. Alia dilïerencia inter propria et appellativa (est) quod appellativa intelliguntur
in propriis, non propria in appellativis, idest significatioappellativorum intelligitur in
propriis, ut cum dico Petrum,intelligo hominem,sed [sed] significatio propriorum non
intelligitur in appellativis. Non enim cum dico hominem,intelligo Socratem.
Intelligitur tamensignificatio prapriorum in quibusdamappellativispcr exellentiam.
Ut cum dico Apostolum absolute, intelligo Paulum,et cum dico urbemabsolute, intelligo
Romam.
Aliter. Appellativa intelliguntur in propriis et non propria in appellativis, idest
appellativasecuntur ad propria, non pl'Opriaad appellatiua.Cum enim dico: 'Socrates
est', possumconcludere: 'ergo homoest'. Sed non econverso.
Quatuor sunt species appellativorum nmninum communes cum propriis et appel-
lativis et dcrivativis, scilicet corporale,incorporale,amonimum,jinanimum. Corporale est
quod corporeamrem signiFlcat;hoc est in propriis ut Socrates,
Plato; est in appellativis
ut homo, animal. Incorporale est quod incorpoream (rem) signiFl-cat. Hoc est in propriis
ut hec iusticia, ct hccfortitudo; est in appellativis ut iustiamfortitudo.
Omonimum est unum nomen diversis intellectibus vel diFFmitionibusmulta signiü-
cans. Hoc est in appellativis ut 'canis', quod signiEcat latrabile animal, marinam beluam,
celestesydus; et in prcpriis ut Cato Censorinuset Cato Uticensis.Sinonimumgrece
'sin' ( ) latine namendicitur; sinonimum est coniunct[ion]um nomen cum aliis
nominibus in eademsignificatione. Hoc est in appellativis ut 'cnsis', 'gladius', 'mucra',
'spata'; et in propriis ut 'Marcus', 'Tulh'us', 'Cicero'. In his quedam sunt binonima,
quedam trinonima, quedam tetranima. Binonima ut 'Lucius' 'SuHa'; trinonima ut
'A'larcus' 'Tullius', 'Cicero'; tetronima, ut 'Pubh'us', 'Carnehus', 'Scipl'a', 'Ajï'icanus'.
( ...... ).
Hic queritur quare aliquod nomen dicatur adiectivum aut aliquod substantivum.
Adiectivum dicitur quod positum ex parte predicati significat praprietatem, positum ex
parte subiecti signiFlcatrem habentemproprietatem. Substantivumdicitur quod sive
ponatur ex parte predicati sive ex parte subiecti, semper idem signilïcat. Vel sub-
stantivumdicitur quod cqualesignilïcatvel qualesit aliquid. Vel substantivumquod per
se in constructione ponitur. Adicctivum dicitur quod per se in construc(f. 27l'b)tione
non ponitur et semper eget auxilio substantivi. Adiectivum est quod adicitur propriis
vel appellativis nominibus. Et significat laudem et ea que pertinent ad vituPcracionem,
ut 'indoctus','in-iustus';et signilïcatmedium, idest illud quod cum tali nomine iungitur
THEOR? OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTUR? GRAMMAR 247
quod signilïcat laudationem et cum tali nomine iungitur quod significat vituperacionein,
ut 'magno: doctor', 'mognus latro'. Et signiEcat proprie suum uniuscuiusque, ut 'nigrum'
proprietatem corvorum et 'album' proprietatem cignorum. ( ).
......
28"): Dictum est de primo accidente. Nunc dicendum est de secundo, idest de genere.
Antiqui dicebant ita: genusest exploratio sexusque Flt per vocem carentem genere.
Nam ipsavox non est genussedid quod per vocemmonstratur. Hoc est dici quod illa
dictio est masculinigeneris que significatremgenerarepotentem masculinomodo. Illa
est feminini generis que signiücat rem generare potentem feminino modo. Et sic de
ceteris. Sed hi nihil dicebant. Nam multa sunt quo res inpotentes generare signiEcant,
alicuius tamcn generis essedicuntur.
Alii dicebant ita: quod aliqua dictio est masculini generis que signilïcat rem generare
potentemmasculinomodovel que habetsimilitudinemcum illa. Et sic de ceterisgeneri-
bus. Sedmaledicebant. Narn 'lopis' eandemsimilitudinem habetcum 'Poris' quamcum
'PhiHis' ; dicitur tarnen masculini generis esseet non feminini. Et sic in multis contingit.
Videndum ergo quid rnodo dicatur et quid verum sit. Si(c) dicitur: aliqua dictio est
masculini generis que sic est instituta quod ei preponitur articulus 'hic', aliqua feminini
cui preponitur 'hoc', aliqua neutri-cui 'hoc'; aliqua communis cui 'hic' et 'hoc', aliqua
omnis, cui 'hic' et 'hoc' et 'hoc'.
Sed opponitur clepronominibus 'idcm' et de mobilibus nominibus et de participiis
futuri et preteriti temporis quo nullos recipiunt articulos. ldeo ita dicendumest: aliqua
dictio est masculini vel feminini generis, et sic de ceteris, que recipit articulum vel quo
hoc habet quod intransitive potest construi cum aliqua dictione articulum habente in
eadem parte orationis, ut pronomina et mobilis nomina et participia. De quibus dictum
est quod (quo MS)licet non recipiant articulos, in eademtamenparte orationis construi
possunt intransitive cum dictione articulos habente.
Et secundum IIOCsic diffinitur genus: genus in nomine, pronomine, participio est
aptitudo recipiendi articulos vel construendi intransitive cum aliquadictione articulos
habente in eadem parte orationis. ( ).
. .. . ..
ZBVG:Dictum est de genere et specie. Restat de numero, scilicet quid Antiqui dixerint
de numero et quid Moderni dicant.
Numerus est forma dictionis que discretionem quantitatis facere potest. Idem in
verbo et pronomineet participio de numero dici potest.
Quidam Antiqui dicebant quod sola forma, idest terminatio, dictionis esset numerus,
ut -os, -o, -c et cetere terminationes. Sed nichil hi dicebant. Num multe voces eiusdem
terminationis sunt sunt singularis et pluralis numeri, ut 'mogiscri'.
Alii dicebant quod signilïcatio unius esset numeri singularis et significatio multorum
numeri pluralis. Sedhi quoque nihil dicebant. Nam si hoc esset,omnia appellativa nomina
pluralis numeri essent, quia multa signiFlcant.
Et ideo sic dicendum est: aliqua dictio est singularis numeri que sic (est) inventa
quod non potest poni in constructione nisi significatione unius rei tantum, ut 'homo legit'.
Aliquadictio est pluralisnumeri quesic est inventaquodnonpotestponi in constructione
nisi signiEcationc multorum, ut 'homincslogonc'.
Et numerus sic dilï'inicndus est: numerus est Forma dictionis in voce et discretio
quantitatis in significatione, idest per terminationem dictionis et per discretionem
signiEcationis cognoscitur que dictio sit singularis numeri et que pluralis. ( ).
......
248 LOGICAMODERNORUM"
[ZSW] Sequitur de Figura.
[28vb] Explicit clelignra. Sequiturde casu.
[291'0] De accidentibusnominum hec dixisse suchiaþïlt. Tractam de accidentibus
...
nominum, queritur quare comparatio non connumeratur inter ea. Sed hec questio
superiussoluta est. [viz. f. 26"? ad init.] ( ...... ).
291'13 Et hec de nomine dicta suFHciant.
.....
An extensivediscussionis devoted to the verb (291'0-3ll'h). I give some

extracts:
29fb-31fb: Dictum est de nomine. Consequenterdicendum est de verbo. ( )
..... .
Et primo videndum est quid sit verbum, et unde dicatur 'rerbum', et quot accidunt verbo.
Verbum est pars orationis cum modis et temporibus sine casu signiücativum agendi
vel patiendi. Hoc sic potest legi quod sunt due cliFHnitioneset sic quod una tantum.
Unatantumest si sic legitur: verbumest parsorationis, quodverbumest signiFlcativum
agendi vel patiendi; et ut excludatur 'acria', 'passia', 'Iccrio', et huiusmodi, subditur
'cum temparibus'; ut excludatur participium, subditur 'cum modis'; et quia participia
dicuntur habere modos per omnescasussubditur 'sinecasu'.
Due difEnitiones sunt si sic legitur: verbum est pars orationes cum temporibus et
modis sine casu; hec est una diFBnitio, secundum quam 'sum', 'cs', 'est' bene dicunt (?)
esse:verbum; altera diffinitio est hec: verbum est significativum agendi vel patiendi,
idest omne verbum ad hoc est inventum ut significet aliquem agi et pati.
Dicitur autem 'verbum' a verberata aeris eo quod frequentius verberemus aerem in
proferendo verbum quam in proferendo alias partes orationis.
Nunc videndum est quot (quod MS) accidunt verbum. Antiqui dicebant verbo
accidere septem(!): modus, species, Egura, coniugatio,
genus, Inf.:mpus,II persona cum
numero ( ).
......
293'5-( ) Sicut dictum est, octo accidunt verbo: genus, tempus, modus,
......
species, Figura, coniugatio, persona cum numero.
Nunc de generevidendumest, quid Antiqui dixerint et quid indedici debeat.
Quidam dicebant quod genus in verbo est terminatio in '-0' et in '-or'. Sed si hoc
esset, duo tantum essentgenera verborum.
Alii dicebant genusidem essequod signifcatio. Et asserebantquod genus in verbo est
signiFicatio actionis vcl passionis. Sed si signiFlcatio actionis vel passionis esset genus in
verbo, significatio substantie et qualitatis deberent connumerari inter accidentia no-
minis; item id quod est substantiale verbo, eFFicercturei accidentale, sed hoc minime
competeret.
Cum ergo neutra diFFmitioAntiquorum valeat,quiddam statuendumest per quod
quid genus in verbo sit possit animadverti.
Genera verborum sunt quinque: activum, passivum, commune, deponens, ct
neutrum. ( ).
......
( ...... ) Et secundum has omnes diFlïniciones quid sit genus in verbo sic diHïniri
potcst: genusin verbo est naturalisterminatio in '-a' vel in '-ar' cum tali significatione.
SigniFlcatio autem pcr [ disiunctiones potest videri, sicut dictum est ( ...... ).
Nunc de constructione activorum et passivorumvcrborum. ( ).
......
IN TWELFTHCENTUR?GRAMMAR 249
THEORVOFSIGNIFICATION
[f. 29W] Dictum est de genere. Dicendum est de tcmpore. ( ).
......
[f. 301'3] Dictum est quid sit tempus in verbo et quod vcrborum alia sunt discretim
presentis temporis, alia preteriti, alia futuri. Nunc videndum est quod modus indicativus
liabct omniatemporadisiuncta.
[f. SOFD]De ordine modorum ( ).
......
Dictum est de modis personalium verborum. Nunc de inpersonali verbo
dicendum est. ( ).
......
[F. 3093] Dictum est de genere, de tempore, de modo. Nunc dicendumest de specie
( ...... ).
". 30Vb] Dictum est de specie. Nunc dicendum est de Figura( ).
......
[f. 3113] Dictum estdefigura.Dicendumestde coniugatione( ).
De
......
persona. ( ...... (.
De numero. ( ).
......
[f. 3l1'h] Et de accidentibusverbi hec dixissesuFBciat.
......
Then the participle is dealt with (Slfb-V'J), followed by the pronoun

Here are the main points of the latter discussion:
(31'4'1-331'3).
31ï'b-33ï'3: Dictum est de participio. Dicendum est de pronmuine. Pronomen quarto
(secundoMS) Ioco ponitur, quia post nomen ponitur verbum. Nam nomen et verbum
sunt due principales partes orationes, tercio loco ponitur participium, et quare, superius
dictum est. Necesseest ergo pronmuen quarto loco constitui.
De pronomine videndum est quare sit inventum et quid sit pronomen et quomodo
dividantur pronomina.
Tribus ex causis inventum est pronomen: causa nominis et causa verbi et causa
utriusque, scilicet nominis et verbi. Causa utriusque inventa sunt pronomina duo:
'ego' et 'm'. Verba enim erant sic instituta ut essent discretim prime et secunde et
tcrcie persone. Nomina autem sic instituta erant ut essent discretiva terciarum perso-
narum tantum. Nomina ergo terciarum personarum non poterant intransitive construi
cum verbis prime et secundepersonenisi cum substantiviset vocativis verbis. Ideo
itaque inventa sunt 'ego' et 'tu', ut adsciscerent nomina terciarum personarum ad verba
prime et secundepersone. Ut 'ego Pauluslcga', 'tu Petrusscribis'. ( ...... ).
Causanominis sunt inventa pronomina relativa et demonstrativa: 'ille', 'ipxc', 'isrc',
lhif:",, 'is'.
Causaverbi sunt inventa pronomina terciarum personarum. Nam cum tercie persone
verborum sint inEnite, per terciaspersonaspronominumappositasEunt Enite (32l'ü), ut
'im legit'. 'iste scribit'.
Videndum est quid sit pronomen. Pronomen est pars orationis que pro proprio nomine
ponitur frequentissime et raro pro appellativo. Vel: pronomen ponitur (pro) proprio
nomine, idest pronomen positum in constructione significat puram substantiam, quem-
admodumet proprium nomen et magisquia significateamdemonstrativevel relative,
vel quia proprium nomen potest esse equivocum. Sed pronomen in constructione
positum numquam tunc potest signiFlcaresubstanciam diversam ab ea quam significat
signiHcat,idest mere signilicatsubstanciam.Nam significandoid
et meramsubstanciam
de quo aliquid dicitur, non denotat de qua manerie vel de quo genere rerum sit ipsum.
Dictum est quid sit pronomen. Nunc videndum est si illa diFFmicioalii parti oracionis
(conveniat) quam pronomini. Est alia dictio 'qui', que est parsm'acionis,que ponitur
(pro) proprio nomine et certam significat personam.Et ideo quidamdixerunt quod 'qui'
essetpronomen. Sedalii dicunt ita quod illa dictio que accipitur (pro) proprio nomine
et ubique (verbi qus:MS) significat certam personam,est pronomen. Sed 'qui' aliquando
infinite ponitur, ut 'qui interficiet tyrannum, premium accipict'. Sed nullum pronomen est
inFlnitum.Ergo 'qui' non est pronomen.
Pronomini accidunt sex: species, genus, numerus, Figura, persona, casus.

Species idem est in pronomine quod in nomine et in verbo. Quid autem sit species et
quid sit esseprimitivum et derivativum et quid sit esseprime et secundepüsicionis, in
nominesufficienterdictum est sc. supra,[f. 26'-'b].Ideohic repeti non oportet.
Pronominum alia sunt primitiva, alia derivativa. Primitivn pronomina sunt octo:
'cgo', 'tu', 'sui', 'iHc', 'ipsc', 'istc', 'hic', 'is'. Derivativa pronomina sunt septem. Tria
derivantur :: pronomine prime persone: 'mcus', 'nostcr' et 'nostras'. Tria derivantur &
pronominesecundepersone: 'mus', 's'csrcr'et 'rcscras'.Unum derivatur & pronomine
tercie persone: 'suus,sua, suum'. Sic pronomina sunt quindecem.
Sed queritur, si 'idcm' sit pronomen. 'ldcm' pronomen est nec est aliquod supra-
dictorum pronominum, quia nec est 'is', de quo magisvidetur. Nam 'is' est simplex
et 'idcm' est cmnpæitum. Sednullum compositumest silnplex. Ergo 'idcm' non est 'is'.
Item 'idcm' signiEcat 'oliras'J Sed 'is' non significat 'olitos'. lgitur 'idcm' non est 'is'.
Sic plura sunt pronomina quam quindecem.
Sed predictam divisionem fecit Priscianus de simplicibus pronominibus et non de
compositis. Queritur si 'mecum', 'rccum', 'sccum', 'nobiscum', 'vabiscum'sint pronomina.
Donatus dixit quod sint personaliaadverbia. Alii dixerunt quod sunt composita prono-
mina.(......).
Pronominum alia sunt demonstrativa, alia sunt relativa, alia demonstrativa et relativa.
Demonstrativa sunt 'ego-', 'in', 'isrc' et 'hic'. Relativa sunt 'is' et 'sui' et 'idcm'.
Demonstrativasunt et relativa'ille' et 'ipsc'.
Demonstrativorum quedam sunt demonstrativa oculorum tantunn, quedam oculorum
[tantunn]et intellectus.Oculorum tantum: 'cga' et 'm'; oculorum et intellectus: 'iste'
et 'hic'. Est autem hec diH'erencis inter 'isrc' et 'hic' quod 'hic' est demonstrativum
corporea et incorporee rei presentis et absentis; 'isrc' secundum suam inventionem
est demonstrativum corporee rei tantum presentis. Sed secundum auctorum
(321'13)
abusionemcst demonstrativumcorporearei presentisVEIabsentis.( ).
......
Dictum est de specie. Nunc dicendum est de genere. (
. . . . . . ).
l'. 321": Dictum est de genere. Nunc dicendum est de numero. (
.. . . . . . ).
Sequitur de ngra ( ).
......
P. 32")
De persona( ).
......
De casu ( ).
..... .
! olitos : & aüïöq.

THEORV OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTLIRT GMMMAR 251
f. 331'5 Dictum est de casu pronominis. Dicendum est de declinatione ( ).

......
Primus modus est ( ).
..... .
I' 331'11Dictum est de primo modo declinandipronominum.
. de secundo videndum.
Nunc ( ).
......
De 'alius' videndum est. ( ).
..... .
De tercio moclo declinandi pronominum et de quarto modo paulo ante dictum
est. Et quia de accidentibus et de modis declinandi pronominum satis est dictum, ideo
hec de pronomine dicta suFFlciant.
De 'quis' autem utrum sit nomen vel prünomen argumenta que aFferuntur ex
quod 'quis' vel sit nomenvel pronomen,suFHcienter
utraquepartead pro (33'-'ü)-bandum
superius tractata sunt, quando de proprietate partium oracionis tractabanius. Qua-
propter hic ea repeti non oportet.
Our commentary concludes with the discussion of the four indeclina-

bilia: preposition, adverb, interjection, and conjunction (33Vü-35m).
[ give some main points from these discussions:
33V3-34V3: Dictum est de nomine, de verbo, de participia, de pronomine. Nunc de

quatuor indeclinabilibus dicendum est. Et prius de preposicione quam de aliis. Ideo
autem prius de preposiciüne tractatur quia preponitur per regimen casus nomini pro-
nomini, participio. Est autem de preposicione sic tractandum. Videndum est quid sit
preposicio et que differencia sit inter preposicionem et coniunctionem.
Est autem preposicio pars oracionis preposita aliis partibus orationis vel per compo-
sicionem vel per apposicionem (vel) per apposicionem et per composicionem. ( ).
......
verbo adicitur.
[f 33W] De adverbio. Adverbium est pars orationis cuius signiFncacio
Vel: adverbium est pars oracionis que ad hoc est inventa ut mudificet verbo. ( ).
.... ..
[f. 34rbl
Dictum est de adverbio. Dicendum est de interiectione. ( ).
......
[3493] Queritur quare Latini ordinaverunt interiectionem aliam partem oracionis ab
adverbio, cum Greci onmesinteriectiones connumerent inter adverbia. Tribus ex causis
iactum est semper abscondita voce proferri.
est hoc. lnteriectionum proprium Item.
Interiectiones in constructione posite signiFlcant affectum verbi, ut 'pape' significat
admirationem (animi rationem MS) et (ut MS) 'heu' dolorem. Adverbia vero non
significantaFfectumverbi,-sedsignificantmodumagendivel paciendi.Item. Adverbiain
nulla constructione possunt poni sine verbo vel sine participio. Interiectiones autem in
constructione possunt poni et sine verbo et sine participio.
His tribus rationibus interiectio apud Latinos est alia pars orationis ab adverbio.
Greci autem qui interiectiones adverbiis connumerant, sive bene sive male faciant
ignoramus.
Nunc videndum est quid sit interiectio. Interiectio est pars oracionis indeclinabilis
cuius proprium est aliis partibus oracionis interiacerc et varios animi affectus ostendere.
( ).
......
[ give the discussion of the coniunction in full as it was a substantia]

contribution to the later theorias of modal propositions.
34W-35m: Dictum est de.interiectione. Sequitur de coniunctione.
Queritur quare prius tractetur de interiectione quam de coniunctione, cum inter-
iectio sit inferior coniunctione. ldeo prius tractaturdeintcriectione post adverbium
quam de coniunctione, quia interiectio est confinior adverbio. Sicut enim adverbia non
possent poni in constructione sine verbo vel sine participio, sic interiectiones non possent
poni in constructione nisi verba ponantur vel subaudiantur.
Nunc videndum est quid sit coniunctio. Coniunctio est pars oracionis indeclinabilis
coniunctiva aliarum partium oraciünis vim vel ordinem significans; vim, ut copulativa
et adversative; ordinem, ut continuative et subcontinuative.
Coniunctianiaccidunttria: ligurit, leecies,ordo. De lignranichil aliud dicendumest
in coniunctione quam quod dictum est in ceteris partibus oracionis, Coniunctionum
ergo alie sunt simplicisI Egure, ut 'enim', alie composite, ut 'ctanim'.
De specie. Non primitiva nec derivativa species coniunctioni accidere dicitur.
Omnes enim coniunctiones primitive speciei sunt. Sed speciesin coniunctione idem est
quod et parcitasvel significandi varietas.
Coniunctionum Speciessunt quindecem: copulativa, continuativa, subcontinuativa,
adiunctiva, effectiva, causalis,approbativa, disiunctiva, subdisiunctiva, discretim, col-
lectiva vel rationalis, dubitativa, abnegativa,adversativa,et expletiua.
Dictum est quod quindecem sunt speciesconiunctionum. Nunc de unaquaqueillarum
tractandum est.
Copulative coniunctiones sunt ille que capulum tam sensumquam verba, ut 'Socrates
legit et disputat'. Tunc copulative coniunctiones copulant sensum cum una persona
diversis actibus copulatur. Copulativarum coniunctionum alie sunt augmentative, alie
non. Non augmentative, ut 'et', '—quc'; augmentative, ut 'num', 'vera', 'quaque'.
Continuative coniunctiones sunt illa que continuationem et necessariam conse-
quentiam rerum ostendunt, idest que sic sunt inventaut necessarium) ypotheticaml)
coniunga(n)t, idest antecedens cum consequenti, ita quod neutra significatur esse, ut
'(si) Dionisiusambulat, Dionisius movetur'. Continuative coniunctiones sunt he: 'si',
'sin', 'scu', 'ni', 'nixi' et alie quedam.
Subcontinuative coniunctiones sunt ille que necessariamconsequentiam aliquorum
ostendunt, ita quod utrumque significatur esse. Ut 'quia Dionisius ambulat, Dionisius
movetur', et 'quoniamsol estsuperterramlucens,cst dics'. Hoc enim (non MS) interest inter
continuativas et subcontinuativas quod [sub] continuative necessariam consequentiam
aliquorum ostendunt ita quod neutrum significant esse; subcontinuative necessariam
aliquorum consequentiam ostendunt ita quod invenitur esseneutrum.
Adiunctive sunt illa que cum subiunctivis verbis capulantur cum dubitacione ut
[(lacunaof someEfteen[(autem)]et illud: 'cum-faciam
vitulamprafrugibusipsevenita'.
Causales coniunctiones sunt ille que causam aliquorum effectuum ostendit, ut
'prqfaci, quia domu sum" et 'studea,quia hanarandussum'.
Approbative vel effective coniunctiones sunt illa que aliquid approbant et indicativis
verbis semper coniunguntur, ut 'ideo paciar [quia] multa mala quia merui'..
Sciendum est quod Donatus has quinque species coniunctionwn sub una conclusit et
causalesnominavit. Et bene fecit. At Priscianus sequens Apollonium, sicut ille distinxit
' simplicesMS.
THEOR? OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELF'I'H CENTURV GRAMMAR 253
easin diversasspeciesapud Grecos, sic iste apud Latinos. Item. Sciendmnest quod
coniunctiones nichil signiFncant,sed ideo signiFlcare videntur quia orncio in qua ponitur
aliqua coniunctio id signiHcat[ur] quod ipsasignificaredicitur.
Disiunctive coniunctionessunt illa que coniungunt verba et disiungunt sensumita
quod alterum significatur esse.,ut 'rcl estsanusvel estcgcr' ; ' rel estdiesvel estnox'
.
Subdisiunctive sunt illa coniunctiones que vocem disiunctivarum habent et copulant
sensumita quod utrumque signiFlcaturessemodo coniuncte modo disiuncte; coniuncte,
ut 'rllcxandcr vcl Paris duxit Hclenam'; disiuncta, ut 'Petrus tota die vcl legit re! scribit',
Discretiva vel electiva coniunctio est quando de diversis positis nos aliquid ex eis
eligere ostendimus, ut 'volo essedivesquampauper' et 'magis voloservireDeoquamhominibus'.
Et est sciendumquod 'quam' potest esseelectivn coniunctio et comparativumacl-
verbium et accusativuscuiusdam nominis, scilicet 'quo, cuius'.
Adversativa coniunctio est que significat adversum convenienti, ut 'ego multumserviri
tibi, sed tu male tractasti me'. Adversative coniunctiones sunt hec: 'aut(em)', 'vero',
'quidam',' 'ramcn', 'sed' et alie multe. Adversativarum alie sunt diminutive, alie non;
diminutive, ut 'sahcm','atquc'et 'ne'; non dimi(35fa)nutive,ut 'sed', 'vera'.
Abnegativa coniunctio est que colmlata cum verbis substantivis ostendit aliquam rem
potuisse Fieri nisi aliquod inpedimentum intervenisset, ut 'jïzcisscmillud, si patuissem'.In
hoc loco 'si' est abnegativa coniunctio. Alias coniunctiones Latini non habent.
Dubitativa coniunctio est que aliquid cum dubitacione signiücat ut 'nos-ciaan eloquar
an sileam'.
Collectiva vel rationalis vel illativa coniunctio est que äliqua cum racione collecta
memorat, ut 'iginir', 'ergo'.
Completivnvel expletiva coniunctio est que ponitur in oracionecausaornatus vel
causa metri.
De. ordine. Ordo accidit coniunctionibus, idest coniunctionibus accidit ut sic ordi-
nentur ut quedam preponantur, quedam communes sint, quedam subiungantur. Con-
iunctiones prepositive sunt quatuordecim: 'at', 'asi', 'aut', 'ac', 'ref', 'nec', 'neque',
'si', 'quin', 'quatenus','sin', 'seu', 'sivc', 'ni'. Subiunctive sex: 'qua', '-re', 'ne', 'quidem',
'quoquc', 'aurem'. Cetere sunt communes.
Queritur de 'namque'si sit prepositiva. 'Namque'communisest.
Queritur de 'equidcm', 'siquidem', si sint figure simplicis vel composite. Quidam
dixerunt 'cquidcm'componiex 'ego'et 'quidam'.Sedmaledixerunt: nonpossemus enim,
si hoc esset,dicere: 'equidemtu legis', 'cquidcmille legit'. 'Siquidem'Figur: simplicis est..
Si enim componeretur ex 'si' et 'quidem','si' longum esset.Et sic quidam mentiti sunt:
"si' enim brevis est, ut illudz:
magnam deum matrem siquidem Cybelyus Atijs.
This is the end of the commentary itself. Then follow & number of
diagrams written by the same hamd3:
' quod MS.

: Cp. Ovid., Metamorph.X, 104.
3 See:also above Ch. l., m'. 23, p. 90.
254 LOGICA Es-IODERNORUMIl
CopuIativa -
I ...— I
aFIïrmativa negativa
I I
I . — I I , I
alia simplex alia cum distributione alia simplex alia cum
ut: 'Socrates legit. ut: 'Cjcero quidem est bonus diminutione
cr scribit' Catilina vcro malus'
continuatim cum
dubitacione: 'si est homo, est animal'
cum necessitate
subcontinuativa sine.
dubitncione: 'quoniam ambulat morcrur'.
CausaIis
eHectiva
,
sine necessitate I
(
adiunctiva
simpliciter causalis
Some special points from this commentary deserve notice. The tria
generacollacutionismake the reader think of William of Conches' expo-
sition of this matter; see above, pp. 221-222. Just as in William's
commentary, this discussion is followed by the enumeration of the
necessary elements of each kind of locutio; However, there is some
differencebetweenour commentaryand William's in that the latter,
following Boethius,,I takes their number to be three (res, intellectus, vox)
and our commentator addsto them littera. Seeabove, p. 239.
It must be noted, further, that, Iike William of ('Ita-nolles.»2
our author
pays much attention to the causae inventionis of the parts of speech and
their elements (littera and yllaba).
The exposition of the consignilïcative function of such prepositions
as "in', s
IcI-zI hows many resemblances with that given by William of
Conches. Compare the text quoted above p. 24-0 with that from
William's commentary, quoted p. 226f. The important röle of the con-
struction of the proposition taken as & whole should be noted in both
explanations.3
' In Periherm.II, 20'5'31; see above, p. 179.

: Seeabove, p. 222.
3 For the signiücanceof this fact, seeabove,p. 113Ff.
"meon? 01: SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTUIW GRAMMAR 255
The most important part of this commentar); for our present purpose,
is the author's discussion of the signification of noun and verb. It is
focussed on the differences in the modussignyï'candibetween related
nouns (album,albedo,etc.) and between noun and verb. However, no-
where does our author arrive at such fruitful distinctions as between
signjfï'catioand nominatio, as are found in William of Conches' com-
mentary.'
4- - The Gloss. Promisimus
In the second part of his important Studieson Priscian in the Tuveyïh

Centuryz Dr Hunt has successfully tried to diminish the gap in our
knowledge of the development of grammatica] theory between the time
of Petrus Helyas and the Doctrinale of Alexander of Villedieu. He brought
to light much material from that period. One of the documents is the
gloss Promisimus,found in Oxford, Bodleian Library, Land.].at. 67, which
dates from the second half of the twelfth century)
Its place of origin is probably Paris, as appearg.from many examples
used in the glosses.4 Hunt dates it the last quarter of the century. How-
ever, there is some risk in relying on external chronological data, since
more than other tracts glosses are apt to contain later additions, es-
pecially in their examples. Internal evidence, namely the unmistakable
dependenceLlpon the works of William of Conche55and Petrus Helyas,6
seems to point to a date in the third quarter of the twelfth century. The
quotations Fromproseauthorscollected by Hunt II, p. 31 seem to conErm
this date: all the text. books of logic belong to the logica vetus,except the
Sophisticf Elcnchi This decidedly points to the third quarter of the
.
century rather than to the fourth.
The gloss is & reportatio of the lectures of some master. Hunt has
already pointed to the name IER4:-£:r.-m:us'*'
as used twice in examples and
hasconcludedfrom the fact that it is the only nameso used (except, of
course, thoseof Socratesand Plato), that Robertmay be the nameof the
glossatoror of the raa-pcu'trar.3
I think, it is the nameof the glossator(the
' See above, p. 224.
2 quotecl throughout as Hunl:II ; seeabove, p. 100, n. 4.
3 For this manuscript, see above, Ch. l.ll m'. 17, pp. 77—81.
* See Hunc H, pp. 17-18.
5 See below, pp. 258 Ff. and Hunt H, pp. 4-2-4-3.
5 See HuncII, pp. 21-22 and p. 22, n. 1, and pp. 32-35.
? See Hunc ", p. 3.
3 See Hunc ", p. 11.
lecturing master) rather than the reporter's. 1150,we are probany not
FarFrom the truth if we idfmtif)r this master as Robert Blundus, whose
Summa in arte gramatica (being as & matter of fact & summa on the Priscian
minor : De constructionibus[Inst. gramm. XVll-XVIIII) is preserved in

London, British Museum, qual MS 2 D XXX.!
The identity of Robert Blundus is somewhat dimcult to state as& result
of various confusions. Thonms T::mma-r2gives the Follmving infornmtion:
Blund [Robertus] qui interdum Rogerus
Blund vocatur, Parisius, Bononiae,et
Oxoniae bonis litteris olim incubuit, uti patet ex Petri Blesenis Epist. 62, ubi
etiam ex familia Gaufridi episcopi Lincolnensisfuisse.dicitur. Fuit unus cleri-
corum sive cnpellanorum Roberti Grostest episcopi Lincolnensis, rector
ecclesiaede (."-amb)rcomit. Leycest. anno 2 pontificatus Roberti Grost.
(: 1236). Occurrit canonicusLincoln. anno 4-pont. ejusdem: et anno 5 rector
ecclesiaede Scampton:et anno 1I rector ecclesiaede Sottebycom. Linc.
Extat SummaA*!agmriRadbertiBlundi in arte grammatica, lib. 1, cap. IX. Pr.pr.
"]ustas parit petentium precium necessitas"; MS Bibl. reg. Westmon. 2
D XXX,3; et in bibliotheca Petroburg. R. Vll.
Mag. Rab. Bluncl dedit bibliothecae eccl. cathedr. Lincoln. Psalterium
glasxarum, ct Epistolas D. Pauli glosæatas.Nota in principio Bibliorum antiquor.
lbid. Claruit A. MCCLXIV. Ita in Rotulis eccl. Lincoln.
1 think Tanner confuseclat least two persons3: (a) one Roger Blund,
chaplan of bishop Robert Grosseteste. He may be the person who died
1264; (13)Robert Blund, the author of the Summa:I'IagfstriRodberri
Blundi in arte gramatica, found in British Museum, Regia]M: 2 D XXX,
Ff. '791'-93Wand 104T-106V.4
This Robert Blund is the one mentioned in Epist. 62 of the collection
ofthe Letters of Peter of Blois, dating between 1180-87. Magister Robert
Bluncl (or Blandus)appearsto have been reproved by Geolïrey Plantage-
net, bishop elect of Lincoln, between 1173 and 1182, because, as &
clerk in his service whom he had appointed to a beneflce, Robert failed
to come when required and busied himself instead in debating casesat
Paris, Bologna, and Oxford. He was canon and prebendary of Lincoln
in 1185-86.5
! For this mnnuscript,seeaboveCh. 1, m'. 5, pp. 22-25.

3 Bibliotheca Brittanico-Hibcrnica sive de scriptoribus qui in Anglia, Scatia, er. Hibernia ad
saeculi XVII initiumjïaruerunt commentarius,Londini 1743, p. 103.
......
3 For three personanamedjohn Blund, see JosiahCox Russe", Dictionagy(y' Writersqf
'I'hirlccnth Ccnmgf England London etc. 1936, pp. 56-58.
4 See A. B. Emden, A Biographical Register qfthe University qfOJyBrd [a A.D. 1500, 1
Oxford 1957, pp. 206-207.
5 SeeEmden, loc.cft. andStaphanKuttncr and E. Rathlonein Traditio7 (1949-51), p.323.
THEORV OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTURV GRAMMAR 257
Tanner's reference to the Peterborough manuscript of the Summa

affords another reliable clue for Robert's dates. In the list of former
Peterborough manuscripts edited by M. R. James! this manuscript is
in Fact Found under R. VH. lt occurs as an item of what is named Matri-
cularium Librarii Monasterii Burgi S Petri paucis libris non examinatis. James
.
rcmarks (op. cfr., p. 14) that the Matriculariumis a thoroughly abnormal
catalogue.,2and that the process of identifying extant books by its means
is not easy and is beset by uncertainties. However, & cepy of Robert's
Summais found under nr. 153:
nr 153 R. Vll:
Liber Petri Elie super maiusvolumen Preciani (!)
Item Liber de Construccione
Summa Mag. Roberti Blund de gramatica
Liber cle Barbarismoet Silogismo(!) 3
Regule Mag. Serlonis de primis sillabis
Liber qui sic inc.: Inter Summa 4 Philosophie
This item Of the fliatricularium occurs in the Lis: (J Books bequeathed by

Abbots qf Pcterboroughf- under those bequeathed by Abbot Benedict
(1177-94) as nr 39:
nr 39: Summa Petri Helye de gramatica cum multis aliis rebus in uno Vol.
From this the conclusion may be ch'awn that Robert's Summadates

from before 1194, the year of Abbot Benedict's death.
Finally, the manuscript of the British Museum, written in the Erst
decades of the thirteenth century, frequently has the abbreviation So.
for Socrates, sometimes even the name of Socrateswritten in Full. This
seems to be an additional reason to put the original treatise not later than
the last quarter of the twelfth century.
Bearing this in mind, we have some reasonsto identify the glossator
of the gloss Pramisimusas Robert Blund.
1 Montague R. James, Lis: qf Manuscript: Farmcrly in PercrboroughAbba)! Library, with

Prgfaceand Idcntyïcatians, Oxford 1926.
3 For a discussionof its characterandof the principle on which it is armnged,seeJames,
ap. cin, pp. 9-14.
3 for soloecismo.
'
4 for SummashCfr. nr. 266, P. Xll: Tractatus sic incns: Inter Summus.
5 James, ap. cfr... pp. 20-26.
To return., now, to the gloss Promisimusour glossator appears to

continue the work of William of Conches and Petrus Helyas by-further
refinements. ! conFmemyself to the doctrine about the meaning of the
noun.
When discussing the significatio nominis our glossator says that there
are many opinions about it. In fact he gives (Dicunt enimquidam)the
fourfold division made by William of Conches but, compared with
William's discussionsof the subject, there are some corrections,
additional expositions and reEnements, indeed, some of which were
apparently current already in William's School.
4713: Notandum autem quod de signiücationo nominis diverse sunt sententie. Dicunt
enim quidam quod nominum quedam signiücant substantiamsimpliciter, ut hoc nomen
'scrbnontio', vel quod significat substantiam non ita simpliciter, ut 'homo', 'lopis'; alia
significant qualitatem, idest eaque insunt substantiis;alia Flgmentaanimi, ut 'hircocorvus',
'chimoro'; alia modum loquendi, ut 'omnii', 'nullux'.
Et eorum que signilïcant substantiam quedam determinant qualitatem circa sub-
stantiam, sive communem, ut 'homo', sive propriam, ut 'Socrotos',que Socraticos(So-
cracitas MS) & Boetio appellatur. Concedunt ergo quod utrumque istorum nominum
'homo', 'Socrotos' significat substantiam et qualitatem; neutrum tamen eorum plura,
licet alterum sit substantia et alterum qualitas, que sunt plura, tamen signiHcaresub-
stantiam et qualitatem non est significare plura. Essetenim sensus:'nomonsignyicotploro',
idest: plures intellectus constituit, sicut hoc nomen 'Iopis' signiHcatintellectum, idest
constituit, et licet intellectus sit res incorporea, non tamen signiücat rem incorpoream.
Et hoc nomen 'homo' (duo MS) significat duo; nec tamen plura. Est enim sensus
'significocduo' idest: de duobus constituit intellectum.
[tem. Ergo concedunt quod licet nomen significet- substantiam et qualitatem, nec
tamen plura, sicut homo et eius proprietas sunt plura, tamen loqui de homine et eius
proprietate non est loqui de pluribus.
Item. Nomen prcprium nominat, idestappellat, eamsubstantiamquamsignificat,sed
nullamqualitatem..De nulla enim qualitateagitur per proprium, ut hoc nomen'Socrom'
el: signiFlcatet appellat hunc hominem..Appellativum vero signiFlcatsubstantiamet
omnem appellat, sed non omnem cui convenit proprietas designataper ipsum, scilicet
humanitas, nominat, (sed) quamlibet substantiam cui ipsum convenit appellat, quia pro
unoquoque eorum liabet poni. Ut hoc nomen 'homo' signilïcat hominem et omnem
appellat et quemlibet hominem, sed nullum determinate. De hoc vero nomine 'albedo'
dicunt quod solam qualitatem significat, scilicet albedinem,sed nullam appellat, tamen
omnem significat.
De nominibus vcro adiectivis dicunt quod principaliter significant qualitatem solam,
sed aliter quam nomina Fixa, scilicet determinando eam inesse, secundario vero sub-
stantiam, cum constet ipsam qualitatem nulli inessenisi substantie.
Et dicunt qualitatemin nomine: quicquid in dictione intelligitur preter agere et pati.
Ideo autem nolunt Gramatici inter accidentia nominum recipere agere et pati, quia
oporteret concedi verbum signiFlcaresubstantiam cum qualitate, cum in verbo persona
vel patiens intelligatur. Ut ait Priscianus: inest igitur nominativus in ipsis verbis in
prima et secunda persona deFlnitus, in tercia inFmitus. Si autem in verbo intelligeretur
THEORV OF SIGNIFICATION IN TWELFTH CENTURV GRAMMAR 259
sic substantia et qualitas et verbum significaret substantiam cum qualitate, non esset
praprium nominis signiücnre substantiam cum qualitate. ( ).
......
Nominant autem, idest appellant, adiectiva substantias illos quibus insunt accidentia
illa que eis signiücantur, ut 'albus' principaliter significat substantiam determinando eam
inesse,secundariosubiectum albedinis et illud nominat.
Si queratur qunm qualitatem significet hoc nomen 'quis', respondemus quod non est
certa qualitas aliqua quam significat; et tamen signiücat substantiam et qualitatem,
signiEcando scilicet inünitam substantiarumet generalem, vel signiEcando substantiam
infinite et generaliter. Ipsa enim inEnitas est ei pro qualitate et hoc ostendit ipse Pris-
cianus, ubi ait in tractatu pronominis his verbis: "quomodo numeros et quantitates inter
species qualitatis nominum accipimus, sic etiam qualitatem inEnitam et generalem sub-
stantialis que est in hoc nomine 'quis' vel 'qui', et que.ex eo componuntur".
As to the questionjust mentionedabout 'quis' the Masteragreeswith

William's adherents:
471"ll"J: ln hoc consentit Magisteret dicit 'quis' haberepro qualitate inFlnitamsub-
stantiam et quandoqueritur de propria qualitate, ut 'quis es:intus? adiective ponitur
per subintellectumhuius nominis 'homo' et inFmitesignilïcateandemqualitatem quam
nomen quod subintelligitur, scilicet 'homo'. Adiunctum vero pronomini, ut 'quis es:
iste?', signiEcatpropriam qualitatem inEnite, quia ad multitudinem proprim'um qualita-
tum pertinet et de una earum querit. Adiunctum vero proprio nomini, ut 'quis est
Socrates?',inEnite signiEcat substantiam. Pertinet enim ad multitudinem substantiarum
et de (f. 4711!)unaearumquerit et sic pro qualitatesigniücatinfinitum substantiam.
There are some points, however, in which the Muster disagreeswith

them. The former holds that Priscian's famous phrase: "omne nomen
signiücat substantiam cum qualitate" should be interpreted as: each
noun signiFles that which "stonds under the vorbal cxprcssion" (sapposita
words, suchas 'omnis'and, 'nullus',
locutioni).As to the consigniFlcative
however, they signify the same substantiaas the substantive nouns which
they are joined to, while their qualitasis the truth of the proposition:
47"): ln quibusdam(ex predictis MS) vero non bene consentit, seddicit quod omne
nomen significat substantiamcumqualitate, idest: suppositolocutioni, sive signiFlcet rem per
se existentem, sive non. lsta autem nomina 'omnis', 'nullus' veritatem (corr. ex v. :
quinque?MS) habent pro qualitate et eandemsubstantiamsigniFlcantquam nomina eis
adiuncta.
Nota quod cum dicitur "omne nomen signiFlcat substantiam", variatur 'nomen'.
Quod multipliciter accipitur pro actu subsistendi, pro re per se existente, pro supposito
locutioni. Et hoc modo accipitur cum dicitur: "nomen signilïcat substantiam".
Here we have, for the First time, a clear reference to x—xrhat

is called the
suppositumlocutioni This view contains the Fll'Stbeginnings of the later
.
theorias of supposition, all of which seem to be no more than subtle

reEnements of the general idea as worcled here.'
Our glossator continues his exposition with the third and' fourth
l(inds of William's division of the nouus. He adds the well-known ob-
jections and answers:
47T'J: De nominibus Egmentorum animi, ut 'chimcra', 'hircocerrus' dicunt quod nec sub-
stantiam nec qualitatem significant et Egmenta animi signiücant et appellant. Similiter
de nominibus que modos loquendi significant, ut 'omni:' et "nullus'.
Cum opponitur de nominibus vocum, qualia sunt hoc nomen 'nomen', 'verbum',
respondemusquod signilïcant substantias, quia voces quas dicunt essecorpora et dicunt
ea signiFlcare qualitatem circa substantias, ut hoc nomen iverbum' communem qualitatem
onmium verborum designat et nominat omnia verba.
De his vero 'genus','spccics'dicunt quod prius fuerunt inventaad res signiFlcandas
1irel
qualitates, sed postea sunt translata ad universalia significanda et nmninanda.
Dicunt itaque non omne nomen signiücare substantiam et qualitatem, sed solum
nomen. Et ideo dicit Priscianus hoc esseproprium nmninis non quod conveniat omni et
soli, sedquia soli; necper hoc ostendit omnenomenab aliis partibusorationis dilTerre,
sed ostendit eos peccare qui separant ab invicem nomen et appellationem et vocabulum.
Finally, hc repeats the view that all noun signiFles substantiaand

qualitas.
Gloss Promisimus,f. 47"): Sed melius est ut dicatur omne nomen signiEcare substantiam
cum qualitate, quamvis dilïïcile sit in quibusdam assignare.Sed hoc in principio Summe
dc aromatica: diligentius pertractata invenies.
This discussion ends with a personal note of the reporter:
Pmprium est nominis signiFlcare substantiam et qualitatem idest: quod convenit

omni et soli, quia licet conveniat pronomini, non tamen simpliciter, sed ex demonstra-
tione et usu. Dicit enim Magister quod quoddam pronomen, ut possessivum,significat
substantiam cum qualitate, sed hoc ideo quia duas personassigniFlcat. Etiam alia prono-
mina quandoque dicebat significare substantiam cum qualitate, quando(que) non. Ego
vero dico quod ex usu signiFlcat, sed non ex institutione ut nomina.
There are two interesting notes on materiale impositum:

48W: Nota quod quando(que) nomen ponitur materialiter, et oratio, et tamen idem
facit intelligere quod non materialiter posita. Ut in Evangeliocum dicitur: "in illb
tempore dixit Jesusdiscipulis suis", totum quod sequitur materialiter ponitur et eque
valeret pruprium nomen illius orationis ibi positum, si illa oratio nomen haberet; et
' Seealsobelow, ChapterXVI, pp. 5245.

3 [ doubt whether this reference is to Petrus Helyas, Summain Priscianum, as has been
suggestedby Hum ", p. ll, n. 1 and p. 22, n. l.
THEOR'i' OF SIGNIFICATION m TWELFTH CENTUR? GRAMMAR 261
licet tota illa oratio materialiter ponatur, tamendatur per ipsamintelligi quicquid ea
signiücatur eque ac si non materialiter pcmorotur.I
Nota quod nomen appellativumsignificat propriam qualitatem sui ipsius
483'5-4-91'0:
quandoponitur ad seipsumsigniücandum,ut 'homoestnomenappellotmmi'; et in tali loco
dicitur materialeimpositum,quia scilicet idem est impositum et materia impositi, idest
cui imponitur; idem enim est ibi signiFlcans(4911)et signiFicatum.
Same lines further the glossator gives an interesting note on the

nomina communio.They are divided into communionaturaliter, communio
casu, and consilio.
communio The division is of some importance for the
later theories of significatio and appellatio:
4-9ï'ü'ï'b: Sciendum quod nominum cmmnunium aliud commune naturaliter aliud casu
aliud consilio. Naturaliter commune est illud quod ex una institutione habet idoneitatem
conveniendi pluribus et omne tale in una signilicatione habet pluribus convenire, quia
nullum nomen ex una institutione habet in diversis signiücationibus pluribus convenire,
cum nomen non possit institui ad signiFlcandum nisi proferendo. Sunt autem paria
significare ex una inuitatione plura et convenirein una significatione pluribus; et paria sunt
significare ex diversis institutionibus et convenire aliquibus in diversis significationibus. Sunt
ergo istaparia, si eis supponaturiste terminus 'nomen'sic: omnenomenquodsignificat
plura ex una institutione, convenit pluribus in una signiEEätione;et econverso.Sedin
aliis tamen mutato subiecto potest variari sic: omne pronomen quod ex diversis in-
stitutionibus signiFicat, convenit signiFlcatis in diversis signiücationibus, et econverso:,
non quia pronomen in diversis signiücationibus convenit diversis et tamen ex una
institutione, sed hoc Facit demonstratio. Hoc etiam alibi ( ). Similiter in
......
albus', 'propositiosimplexet cothogorico'.
'monochus
Illa autem nomina que sic ex una institutionel vel naturaliter quia naturas signiFlcant
[dicuntur communiamultorum naturaliter, idest ex una institutionelü ut 'homo'homi-
nem, 'onimoi' rem talem naturalem.
Commune casu est quod aliquibus impositum est nullo habito respectu unius ad
alterum, ut in PirrusFilio Achillis el: Pirrus rege Epirotarum.
Communeconsilio quod ab uno (493'5)aliquo translatumest ad aliud, ut olomcntum
a partibus yles primordialis materie ad litteras quadam proportione; sine proportione
quando nomen patrium i mponitur filiola. Nulla autem translatio facit nomen equivocum
nisi quo Flt ex necessitate et nullum nomen commune appellatorum oppellativum est nisi
sit commune naturaliter, idest conveniens pluribus ex una institutione et una signiE-
catione. Et omne quod naturaliter est commune, est appellativum, licet uni soli conve-
niat, ut 'phonix'.
The same holds good for the author's next note 011 Priscian's lemma
Multorum quos eadem substantia:
49"): Nota quod Antiqui volentes loqui de rebus generaliter, quandoque minus gene-
raliter, quandoque etiam specialius, invenerunt nomina per que de eis agerent. Con-
! For the same view, see the ancstioncs l'icrorinoo(edited asour Tract XV), p. 743'43.
siderantes autem omnes res in quadam proprietate convenire, scilicet in existentia, eis
quoddam nomen indiderunt, scilicet hoc nomen 'substantia', per quod generaliter
loquerentur de rebus. Item. Cum tali proprietate, idest cum existentia, videntes etiam
quamdam aliam proprietatem inesse rebus, non omnibus sed quibusdam; ex hac in-
diderunt hoc nomen 'corpas', per quod minus generaliter agerent de rebus. Sic ergo
consideroin 'animal' et 'homo'descendensad individua que imposita sunt ad agendum
de rebusdiscrete. Et nota quod substantiadicitur rosper seexistens
et substantiaactus
subsistendiprout per substantiam (pro non per sine MS), significatur, ut substantia status
substantialis,idest illud essesecundum quod aliquid assignaturquid ipsum Sit. Unde et
Boetius dicit: questio est de substantia,idest: propter substantiam, cum queritur "quid
estalbedo?", idest quid est substantialisstatus albedinis.
Substantiam ibi appellat Priscianus substantialem statum convenientem rebus diver-
sarum specierum xfel nomen generale, idest nomen designatiwm substantialis status.
Specialomdicit substantialem statum convenientem uni Speciei; vel 'spocialom'vocabulum
generalem qualitatem convenientem rebus diversarum specierum, idest formam secun-
dum quam assignentur de eis quales sint ( ).
......
Item. Nota cum substantiadicitur proprietas subsistendi, non dicitur ut forma in
formato, sed ut quod suscipit formam, ut et substantia: qaadjormis substat; quod a
dicitur. Unde nomen quod signiücat et appellat rem talem,
plerisque resper seexistens
dicitur substantivum (substantiaMS), ut apud Aristatilem in Predicamontisprima sub-
stantia, secundasubstantia.
Alii exponunt litteram sic: generalemqualitatem: generale nomen quod qualitatem
appellat, ut 'virtas', vel statum per ipsum designatum. Similiter de quantitate.
Our gloss contains another interesting note on the signification of

adjectiva nouus. There is the distinction of sigmfcaro and copulare:
4-9'-'b-50"'-: Sunt autemadiectiva etc. Causam nominis ostendit. Est autem adiectivum quod
significatqualitatem,vel proprietatemaliam, ut adiacentem.Et idoneumnon est verba
supponere proprie; ur adiacentemdicimus propter 'albedo', quod significat qualitatem
existentem; 'homo'autem significat qualitatem ut adiacentem,scilicet humanitatemet
eam supposito apponit quando est in opposito, ut 'Socrateses:homo'. Similiter 'animal' et
cetera nominaex 'animo' sumpta.Tamennon sunt adiectiva,quia sunt idoneasupponere
verbo proprie. Dicuntur autcm adiectiva tam nomina signilïcantia et copulantia sub-
stantialesproprietatesquamaccidentalescopulantia,ut 'ratioaalo', 'album'. Adiciuntur
autem substantivis suis, tum significatione — quia significant formas que insunt rebus
substantivorum — tum vocc, quia (501'3) proprietates suas in constructione variant
circa substantivasecundum eorum proprietates.
Another gloss, however, mentioned here as (Now,,I gives a diFferent

delinition of the adjectiva noun :
501'3: Gloscautem aliter habent, et sic adiectivum est quod significat proprie ut adia-
centemet nominibussigniFlcantibus
res quibus inest proprietasper ipsum signiFlcata,
'The eleventh century glossesfound in MS. Cologne 201 (Glosaloln Priscianum;see

above, p. 21) are certainly not meant.
THEORV OF SIGNIFICATION IN T'WELFTH CENTUR'I' GRAMMAR 263
est adiungibilcper se. Addunt autempersepropter hoc nomen'parer', quodcum habeat

omnia predicta, non tamen est per se adiungibile. Cum enim dicitur: 'Priamuspater
Hectoris',subauditur ens,vel hec oratio: 'qui estveljuir'.
To conclude this chapter, it may be stated, again, that grmnmatical

theory as developed about the middle of the tx-velfth century is quite an
indispensable source for understanding the contemporaneous develoP-
ment of logic. As & matter of fact, not only was the influence ofgrammar
upon the other Helds of knowledge in the twelfth century as pervasive
as that of logic, but it is noticeable to & high extent in the very domain
of logic. We are so fortunate as to possessa remarkable piece of evidence
for the intrusion of grammar into logic in a logical treatise dating From
about 1160. This work, to be entitled the ams MELIDUNAwill be the
subjectof the next chapters(Chs. VI-X).
CHAPTER VI
THE TRACT ON LOGIC

FOUND IN MS. OXFORD, DIGBT' I74.
ANALVSIS OF ITS CONTENT.
[TS ORIGIN AND DATE
The Oxford Manuscript Digby 174- contains Ff. 211-24—1& very inter-
esting piece on logic. For the manuscript, see above, Ch. ], nr. 16. In
this chapter :: general survey of the content of this treatise will be given
(A) and some remarks will be made on its date and the school where it
originated (B). The next chapters will give a more detailed analysis
(Chs Vll-X).
A - General Survey of [ts Content
The anonymous author starts with a clear exposition of his aims:
Propositum quidem negotii est circa opinionis nostre positiones singula diligenter
inquirere, ut sic et nobis ipsis iocundum comparemus exercitium et sociis progressum.
Facile namque Fieri poterit ut in quo scriptor sumet exercitationem, lectoris etiam
diligencia suam instruat ruditatem.
Ordinem itaquedoctrine nostreper quatuordistinguamuscapitula,primo agentesde
terminis, deinde de signiFlcatiseorum, tertio de prapositionibus, quarto de dictis propu-
sicionum, idest enunciabilibus.
Quoniam autem omnis terminus est vox (et non convertitur), ideo a voce quasi
altiori speculationem exordientes primo querimus quando voces inceperint esse.
We learn from the exordiumthat the work consists of four capitula,

called partesafterwards:
PARS PRIMA: DE TERMINIS
PARS SECUNDA: DE SIGNIFICATIS TERMINORUM
PARS TERTIA: DE PROPOSITIONIBUS
PARS QUARTA: DE DICTIS PROPOSITIONUM SIVE DE ENUNTIABILIBUS.
[ give the subdivision' of the four PARTES
' It must be noted that this division is not intended as following exactly our author's
design. As & matter of fact the subdivisions in our manuscript are Far from clear.
THE TRACT ON LOGIC FOUND IN ms. OXFORD, DIGBï 174 265
1- PARS PRIMA: DE TERMINIS
Primo querimus quandovocesinceperint esse(21IN)

Sicut quesitum est utrum voces inceperint esse et quando, ita queri
solet utrum desinent esseet quando (21III))
Post hec queritur an dictio dicendasit vox hominis (211T'J)
Determinatis illis que generaliter circa vocem inquirenda videban-
tur, deinceps de vocibus signiHcativis ad placitum facienda est con-
sideratio. Occurrit autem primo questio non inutilis, utrum
scilicet obliqui nominum dicendi sunt nomina (21 l*'")
Consequenter ergo queritur utrum obliqua cum suo recto dicenda
sunt idem nomen vel non (21 I'm)
Post hec que ad vocis essentiam pertinent, ad earum instititionem
transeamus(2131'0)
Quid vero voces habeant signiHcare, tam apud veteres quam apud
modernosdubitatum est (2131'11)
02!
Inter modernos autem due sunt principales opiniones (2131'3)

Aristotiles tamen causas impositionis ipsarum vocum recipiens
dixit. (213va) "
.....
10 Nota quod positionum causemultiplices sunt (ibid.)
11 Demum queritur quid sit voccmsigncharc communemstatum vel
proprium (213V'J)
12 Quoniam vocum significationem pene sufficienter exposuimus,con-
sequens erit expedire utrum aliqua vox plures habet signi 'cationes.
Huius autem problematis negationemnobis eligimus (ibid.)
13 Post hec autem que de vocum signilïcatione dicta sunt, pauca de
appellationeadiungendum(215Vü)
14- Sequensautem erit his inquirere utrum similiter in disiunctione
sumendum sit iudicium appellationis subiecti termini & precedente
verbo an a toto termino disiuncto (2161'3)
15 Sunt alia verba presentis temporis cum quibus extenditur appellatio
nominis ad res alterius temporis (2 ] 6'4'1')
16 Deinde considerandum est utrum nomina accidentalia sequantur
naturam aliorum nominum, variando scilicet appellationem suam
secundumdiversitatemtemporum (217V1J)
17 His ita determinatis hoc solum circa terminorum appellationem
restat inquirendum utrum terminus nulli conveniens per appellationem
possit congruesumi ad supponendum verbo presenti affirmato vel
negato (213Va),
Et hec de terminis suH'iciant(2183'11').
2
- PARS SECUNDA: DE TERMINORUM SIGNIFICATIS
Prologuc: Explcta prima parte propositi consequens est ut ad secundam, idest terminorum
signilicata, de cetero stilum inclinemus. Horum quidem hec sunt universalia", illa vero
singularia. Sed quoniam universalia longc digniora sunt utpote priora in natura, similiter
etiam quia ex eorum cognitione tota pendent singularium cognitio, ideo de eis primo
nobis disserendum videtur. Et ne res sine ordine Fiat circa illa hec quatuor disquirenda
proponimus: quid sit universale, quibus terminis significentur universalia, et qualiter
assignandasit eorum constitutio, et que cui predica(men)to aptentur (ZIBW).
So this PARScontains four heads concerning the universalia:
A Quid sit universale

B Quibus terminis signiFlcentur universalia
C Qualiter assignandasit eorum constitutio
D Que cui predicamento aptentur.
The following chapters may be distinguished:
A Quid sit universale

1 Quid sit universale, utrum scilicet sit res an terminus, contingit
dubitare (218W)
2 Ponentibus solos terminos esse universalia vel singularia manifeste
obviat Aristotiles (218WJ)
3 Astruentium resesseuniversalia multiplex est Opinio (2191)
4- Nos dicimus quoniam omne universale est res quedam intelligibilis
et a pluribus participabilis, idest quiddam quod solo intellectu habet
percipi (2191'13)
Solent etiam universaliaessererumappellari (ibid.)
GNU"!
Alii dicunt quod nullum universalevel singulare est esserei (219T'J)

7 'Rursus. Potest queri utrum hoc individuum SocratesdiFferat ab hoc
asino specie vel genere vel alio modo, et utrum homines et asini
dilï'erant specie vel hoc tantum conveniat individuis specierum
(ibid.)
8 Nunc ad supradictam universalis descriptionem redeamus inqui-
rentes utrum ipsaomni universali conveniat et soli (219W)
9 Postea queritur utrum tale nomen [sc. 'phiiasophus'] recipiät
adiunctionem signi universalis aFEI-mativel negati. Ex hac questione
quatuor descenduntpositiones (219V'J)
10 Ostenso quid sit universale videndum est qualiter habeat dividi
(zzoru)
Solent
]] etiam quadripertita sic predicabilis distingui (220i'b).
THE TRACT ON LOGIC FOUND IN ms. OXFORD, DIGBV 174- 267
Dehinc ad ostendendum quibus terminis signi "camur universalia
transeamus.Et id quidem primo circanominaet secundocircavcrba,

tertio circa orationesper ordinem regulariter colligendum (221V3)
Nominum alia conveniunt cuilibet rei per appellationem, alia non
(ibid.)
Rursus. Nominum que non omnibus conveniunt sed quibusdam,
alia conveniunt generibus singularum et non singulis generum
. . . . ..,
alia non (ibid.)
Amplius. Pinitorum cuilibet rei convenientium alia sunt nomina
vocum, que dicuntur nomina secunde impositionis, alia rerum
(ibid.)
.p.
Amplius. Nomina ipsarum rerum hec quidem sunt nomina rerum

artilïcialium illa vero naturalium (ibid.)
...... ,
Rursus. Nullum nomen numerale significat universale (ibid.)
Item. Nullo possessivosignificatur universale (ibid.)
KDOORJGXU'I
Item. Nullo nomine Egmenti [sc. significatur universale] (ibid.)

Item. Nullo signo [sc. significatur universalel (2213'13)
Amplius. Etiam, ut volunt quidam, nullo termino OFHciidesignativo
[sc. significatur universale](ibid.)
Comparativaquodqueet superlativasolent excipi (ibid.)
11 De obliquis nominum dicimus quod idem universale signilïcant
quod recti (ibid.)
12 Alii ponunt non significari universale nisi per rectum singularis
numeri (ibid.)
13 De verbis dicimus quod fere omnia universalium sunt signilïcativa
preter substantivum, quod omnia sequitur generalissima et ideo
non potest subaliquo contineri (ibid.)
14 Restat dicere de orationibus (ibid.)
15 Item. Nulla oratio que sit appellatio alicuius enuntiabilis universale
signilïcat vel singulare (222m)
16 Amplius. Nulla constansex substantiali et non substantiali (ibid.)
17 Sunt alie orationes de quibus maior solet essedubitatio utrum sint
universalia (ibid.)
18 His adiunctum est dicere in qua propositione aliquid predicetur
vel removeatur (2221'13').
Post hec ad tertium procedamus capitulum, idest ad assignandum

universalium constitutionem..
Omne igitur predicabile in quid contentum sub hoc genere substantia

constituitur ex genere et substantiali differentia vel substantialibus

differentiis (2221'b)
2 Nunc de aliorum predicabiiium in quid, quorum scilicet res non
sunt substantie, constitutioneþn] videamus (222V'l).
D Reliquum est expedire qualiter universalia in predicamentis dispo-

nantur (223m'v'3).
The remainder of the PARSSECUNDAdeals with the singularia, the
discussionof which is not announcedin its prologue (seeabove,p. 266).
This discussion is introduced by the following words:
Nunc ad singularia tractatum convertamus. Circa singularia hec considerabimus: quid
sit singulare et qualiter dividatur, quibus terminis singularia significentur et quibus idem
singulare, que eorum consecutio, et adultimum que constitutio (223Vb).
So the discussion of the singularia, too, contains four heads:
E Quid sit singulareet qualiter dividatur

F Quibus terminis singularia significentur et quibus idem singulare
G Que eorum consecutio
H Que eorum constitutio.
The following chapters may be distinguished:
E Quid sit singulare

1 Singulare est subicibile quod nullo modo est predicabile (2233'13)
2 Sunt autem singularium alia status substantiales alia na-
...... ,
turales alia accidentales(ibid.)
...... ,
3 Nunc quare dictum sit singulare non esse predicabile, videamus
(ibid.)
F Quibus terminis singularia significentur et quibus idem singulare
] Nunc quibus terminis singularia significentur convenit intueri (22473)

2 Amplius. Omnis terminus constans ex pronomine demonstrativo
et dictione vel oratione significante universale, significat singulare
(ibid.)
3 Quibus terminis idem significetur singulare consequenter pastl hec
considerandum(224fb).
' per MS.

THE TRAC'I' ON LOGIC FOLIND [N MS. OXFORD, DIGBV 174 269
G Que eorum consecutio

! De habitudine singularium ad invicem secundum consecutionem hec
solet dari regula (224'43)
2 Ad superioravero hanchabentsingulariahabitudinem (ibid.)
3 Cum his quoque illud notabis non essealiquod singulare eFFectivum
alicuius (2251'3).
H Que eorum constitutio
] Nunc expedire ordinis est singularium constitutionem (2251?)

2 Solet tamen a plerisque nostrorum recipi unum singulare alii esse
substantiale(2251'0). '
Ac nunc de terminorum signiHcatistanta dicemus (ibid.).
3
- PARS TERTIA: DE PROPOSITIONIBUS
The PARSTERTIA opens as follows:
IN superioribus distinctionibus de terminis suFHcienter egimus et de eorum signiücatis.

Nam res ammonet ut propositum exequentes ad propositiones veniamus. Hoc enim fuit
tertium nostre voluntatis (2251'13).
This PARSconsists of two sections, the First of which deals with cate-
gorical proposition, the.second with hypothetical proposition.
A DE PROPOSITIONE CATHEGORICA
] Principio itaque de propositione disserenti ex ipsa quid' sit dicen-

dum videtur (2251'b)
2 De hac voce (Parisiuslegitur' et consimilibus (225Wr)
3 De hac voce 'omnisphenixestanimal' (ibid.)
. 4 Videtur2 tamen quibusdamquod locutionis congruitatem non ium-
pedit rerum defectus,sed veritatem tantum vel falsitatem (ibid.)
Soli propositioni non videtur dicta descriptio convenire (225v3-Vb)
(Tum
De hac voce 'egovellemhaberecentummarcas'(225Vb)

7 Prima divisio prepositionis est in cathegoricam et ypotheticam
(226ra-rb)
8 Cathegorice propositionis ad plus quinque sunt partes (2261'b-W)
9 Divisio cathegoricarumduplex est (226v3)
' quod MS 2 aut MS

10 Sunt alie de quarum quantitate magis dubitatur. Cuiusmodi sunt ille

in quibus subiecti termini sunt nomina fluminum aut oppidorum
(226va-vh)
11 Nobis videtur ad presens (226V'J-227m)

......
12 Rursus dubitatur dequantitate earum in quibus nomen appellativum
antonomasice (2271'3)
13 Amplius in quibus duo termini per coniunctionem copulantur
(ibid.)
14- Non est autem coniunctorum et disiunctorum natura eadem
(227ra-rb)
15 Dc(h)inc queritur de quantitate earum quarum subiecti ex
obliquo constantet recto (2271'b)
16 Postremo dubitatur de illis in quibus subiecti termini sunt in-
Flnitivi verborum (227T'J'Vü)
17 Nunc eam propositionis divisionem que secundum qualitatem
attenditur, inspiciamus (227'9'0)
18 De his autem que signum negativum negant, potest dubitari (ibid.)
19 Ultimo queritur de illis que negationem habent interpositam
(227'43-2281'3)
20 Cathegoricarumalia est de inesse,alia est modalis (2281'41)
21 Harum (sc. propositionum de inesse)alie sunt contrarie
...... ,
alie subcontrarie alie subalterne alie contra-
...... , ...... ,
dictorie (ibid.)
22 Sed utrum similiter sumptis terminis pluraliter contradictorie sint:
'ista animalia sunt rationalia' 'ista abimalia non sunt rationalia',
——
dubitatur (2281'3'1'13)
23 Solet autem de inFmitis esse controversia utrum positionem faciant
existentie (2281'13'1'3)
24- Solet etiam pro regula assignari quod propositiones eiusdem
subiecti et quantitatis et diverse qualitatis variato predicato per
finitum et inlïnitum sibi equipollent (228Vü)
25 Habetur aliorum opinio quod substantiva positionem faciunt
essendi, sed verba, participia et adiectiva adiective retenta nullam
(ibid.)
26 Sed de hiis verbis 'ncscft', 'nequit' que in se negationem habent
implicitam, potest dubitari utrum positionem Eaciant(ibid.)
27 Illud quoquescienduminfinita parium esseparia (ibid.)
28 Iamnuncad modalestranseundumest (ibid.)
29 Amplius. Sunt quedam modales in quibus non videtur' posse agi de
dicto vel modus predicari (228Vb)
THE TRACTON LOGICFOLINDIN ms. OXFORD,DlGBï 174 271
30 Pretereaqueritur de illis que habenthunc modum "nccesse'

(228VD-
2291'3)
31 Tandem de illis queritur in quibus modus preponitur (2291'11)
His quasi communibus cathegoricarum gratia compendiose pre-
32
missis iamnunc ad proprias opinionis nostre ypotheses que circa
cathegoricasattenduntur, descendendum(2291'4-1'15)
Instabit iterum quis incongrue dictum secundum hoc: 'tantum
33 esse
Socrateset Platocurrunt' (2291'b)
34 Postea queri potest utrum eadem in obliquis habenda sit con-
sideratio (ibid.)
35 In adiectivis (sc. numeralibus) sic arguitur: 'duo et tria suntaliqua;
aliquasuntquinque;ergoaliqua suntduoet tria' (229V3)
36 Consueverunt quoque nostrorum plerique negare duo et tria esse
quinque, vel suscipientes tamen ea esse tot quot quinque (ibid.)
37 Eis vero qui recipiunt aliqua essehomineset asinoshec poterunt obici
(229vn-vb)
38 Cum superius dictum sit copulationem adiectivorum falsam esse

ubi neutrum inesse contingit, potest queri utrum similiter et ubi
b-2301'ï'4)
utrumque inest (229*'-r
39 Postremo de illis substantivis que adiectivam habent constructio-
nem queritur utrum in eis similiter vera sit copulatio (2301'4'1'13)
40 Sicut illas negavimuscathegoricasin quibus [it cepulatio diversorum
terminorum quorum neutrum inesse contingit, similiter eas repu-
diamus in quibus plurale copulatur singulari, vel econverso (2301'13)
41 Rursus. 'Omne totum continuum est unum solumi (ibid )
42 Amplius. Posito huic eri ex una parte impressam esse formam
hominis et ex altera equi, queritur utrum hoc sit plures statue (ibid.)
43 Sunt alia iterum in quibussingulari plurale copulari solet 030")
44 In discretis quoque conabitur quis similiter ostendere quod sint
due partes (ibid.)
45 Sunt etiam alia circa numerum consideratione digna (230W-W'b)
46 Amplius.. Et hoc queritur utrum unitas sit in re composita vel
tantum in re simplici (230Vb)
47 Oratio quoque videtur esse plura; cui similiter et dictio quelibet
(230Vb-231T4)
48 Deincepsad tota disgregatatranseamus(2311'3'1'5)
49 Postea queritur cum populus sit unum et aliquid quod est unum,
utrum in eo sit unitas (231Pb)
50 [tem. Queritur utrum populi possit esseprcprium nomen aliquod
significansidem huic orationi ;hicpopulus'(ibid.)
51 Amplius. Queri potest utrum hoc nomen 'populus'evocarepossit

adiunctione pronominis :: tertia persona ad primam (ibid.)
52 Rursus. Dubitatur utrum populus crescere possit vel minui
(23lrb-vu)
53 Amplius quoque. Et hoc nomen (sc. 'populus') signum collectivum
videtur (231V0)
54 Similem etiam predictis, aut maiorem Forte, dubitationem habent
ilgem"?'vulgus' et ïamflia', 'honus', lsohdus' et 'libra' (ibid.)
55 Ponentibus omne compositum esse plura obviat prima Fronte
descriptio generis et speciei (ibid.)
56 Nunc addiscreta (sc. 'hic populus')transeamus(231 Vb)
57 Ars quoque dicetur eadem inspectione esse plura, scilicet multa
precepta (ibid.).
B DE PROPOSITIONE 1h'POTHETlCM.
ïpothetica prapositio est que habet propositionem partem sui

(2321'3)
Vpotheticarumsex sunt species(ibid.)
Cepulativa dicitur illa ypothetica in qua due propositiones in unam
connectuntur per hanc copulativam coniunctionem 'et' aut ei
similem (232m*f'ï)
Fuerunt autem qui dicerent copulatiuam non esse unam speciem
ypotheticarum (232HJ)
.
Sed quod difficilius est et ad omnes ypotheticarum species com-
mune, queri potest utrum in cepulativa partes aliquid significent
(232rb-va)
Sed de illis copulativis in quibus antecedensidem signiFlcat, potest
dubitari utrum signilïcent cum utralibet suarum partium (232V3)
Suntquidamqui dicunt copulativamplurasignificare(ibid.)
00
Amplius. Queritur utrum cepulativa Fiat sermo de aliquo vel de

aliquibus (ibid.)
Deinde querendum utrum in cepulativis contradictio possit
assignari (ibid.)
10 Postremo inspicienda sunt habitudines cepulativarum ad suas
partes (232V3'Vb)
11 Hactenus de copulativis. Nunc de disiunctis videamus (232V'ï-
233ru)
12 Sunt vero alie disiuncte in quibus non eadem poterit clari solutio
(233rb)
THE TRACTON LOGICFOLINDIN ms. OXFORD,DlGBï 174 273
13 Transcursis breviter reliquis ypotheticarum speciebus deinceps

continuativis insistendum (233fï'r'rh)
14- Ac de his quidem qui sunt] dissimili qualitate; nonnulli nullam
recipiunt (2331'ü'fb)
15 Ad eos autem qui huiusmodi esse consequentiam negant in qua ad
affirmationem ostenditur sequi negatio, ex primo dices
......
(2331-11)
16 Sicut in questionem ducitur utrum ad aFHrmativam sequitur
negativa, ita quoque ambigitur utrum ad aFf-irmativam antecedat
negativa (233T'J'Vü)
17 Consequens reor duas reliquas species (sc. continuative) demon-
strare (233V3'W3)
18 Sicut diximus omnem consequentiam falsam esse cuius antecedens
et consequens non possunt sumi circa idem, ita et illas repudiamus
in quibus de alio Flt sermo in antecedenti quam in consequenti
(233vb)
19 Sed utrum in transpositionc idem maneat enuntiabile, potest

dubitari (233'4'1-2341'3)
..
20 Post hec queritur utrum cum verbis transitivis recipiendum sit:
scit aliquid essehomo,scit aliquid esseanimal' (2341?)
'si Socrates
21 Nunc eas prosequamur habitudines quas necessitatem conferre
precliximus consecutioni. Et primo parium habitudinem par est
ostendere.. Cuius rei gratia naturam et diversitatem parium
distinguamus(2341'3-1'11)
Cetera paria non aliter quantum ad consequentimn sese habebunt
quam pars et totum (234T'J)
23 Habitudo partis ad totum quandoque attenditur inter subiecta,
quandoque inter predicata, utrobique. tam construendo quam
destruendo (234rh'vü)
24- Habitudo totius ad partem inter predicata inutilis est sumpta
constructive (234Vü)
25 Restat de his dicere continuativis quc vere sunt ex habitudine pro-
positionum (234—V3'WJ)
26 Equipollentia propositionum secundum quatuor attenditur (234V'J)
27 Deinde querendum utrum aliqua propositio ad aliam sequatur ex
habitudine conversionis (ibid.)
28 Rursus. Queri potest utrum hec argumentatio conveniens sit:
'aliquid est asinus; et si aliquid esl:asinus, ipäumest animal; ergo aliquis
asinusesl:animal' (2341'11-2351'3)
' in 1115 2 quantitate MS
29 Amplius. Queritur utrum sicut conversio ita et transpositio con—

secutionem impediat (2351'3'1'11)
30 De orationibus illis cluenecessitatemtenent complexionis (2351'b)
31 Deincepsad compositasypotheticastransemnus(ibid.)
32 Primum itaque genus (sc. ypotheticam coniunctam) primo
expediendum (ibid.)
33 Eademreperitur diversitasin disiunctis (2 35f'J-V3)
34 Implicita dicitur propositio que preter principalem significatio-
nem ..... implicat et continet vim alterius propositionis
.
(23Sva-vb)
35 Postremo inspiciende sunt ille que in altera sui parte sumunt
continuativam per partes prolatam vel magis cathegoricam (235V'J-
236ra).
4-PARS QUAR'I'A: DE ENUNTIABILIBUS
The PARSQLIARTAopens as follows:

Ordinis hoc fuisse intelligo ut post ceterasquadrupertite materie partes novissime
enuntiabilia tractari conveniret. Quatuor siquidem initio capitula suscepimusexcolenda,
que ubique et laborem aHel'ent excolenti ea et fructum facient culta. Ut igitur Finem
habeat propositum et doctrina ordinem minime interruptum, post enuntiationes de
enuntiabilibus aliqua enuntiamus.
In his primum queritur de eorum (sc. enuntiabilium) essentia

(236ra-rb)
Nostro vero preceptori nulla predictarum placuit opinionum

(2361'b)
Non tamen ex predictis satis innotuit quid sint enuntia-
. . . . . .
bilia, sed magisquid non sint (2361'b)
Illud tamen rationabiliter queri potest utrum possit aliquod nomen
proprium esse signiücans hoc enuntiabile Socratemessealbum vel
aliquod aliud (ibid.)
Sumitur autem et aliter appellatio enuntiabilis, ut plerique volunt,
prepositaconiunctione 'quod' ipsi propositioni (ibid.)
Enuntiabilium aliud verum aliud falsum (2361'b-W)
&]
Cum certum sit ex prioribus omne enuntiabile verum esse vel

falsum, inquirendum erit consequenter utrum similiter econverso
sit
verum omne verum vel falsum esseenuntiabile (236vu'VD)
Deinde queritur utrum aliquod verum vel falsum possit incipere
yel desinere esseenuntiabile (236v13-237f")
THE TRACT ON LOGIC FOUND IN ms. OXFORD, DIGB'r 174 275
Illud quoque dubie queri poterit utrum idem sit verumquod veritas
etfalsum quodfalsitas (2371'3)
10 Post hec considerandum utrum aliquod verun'n (vel falsum) sit
verum (vel falsum) de quo, sive dicatur de quo; aut si non, quid
aliud (2371'3'1'13)
11 His itaque nil impedientibus dicimus enuntiabilia esse vera de
aliquibus (237l'b)
12 Primum itaque de universali querendum utrum ea de aliquo Fiat
sermo (ibid.)
13 lndeünita vero vel particulari (sc.prepositio) Et sermo de aliquo et
de.aliquibus (237T'J'V3)
14- Progrediendumitaque deincepsad singulares(2371111-1113)
15 Determinatis illis que circa vera et falsa communiter poterant
dubitari, specialem in utrisque considerationem ponendum. Ac
primum de veris videamus(2371'13)
16 Et primo de illis (sc. veris de presenti) (237vD-2331'3)
17 Transeamus deincepsad vera de.preterito (238V5'Vb)
18 Enuntiabilia ex preterito mixta et futuro-quasi media versantur
inter cetera enuntiabiiia de preterito et illa de.futuro (238Vb)
19 De eventibus tamen futuris non minima inter veteres habita est
dissentio (238Vb-239fü)
Dehinc illud considera omne verum et solum esseargumentmn ad
aliquid probandum. Opinio tamen de argumento quadri-
......
fariam Spargitur (239fü'fb)
21 Argumentatio a Boetio sic describitur (2391'11)
22 Deinde querendum utrum omnis qui argmnentatur, faciat argu-
mentationem (2 391'b' """-)
23 Amplius. Et illud querendum utrum ex propositionibus de presenti
vera possit Heri argumentatio (239?3)
24 Argumentationis quatuor sunt species (239V3'Vb)
25 Sillogismuscst argumentatio etc. (239Vb)
...... (ib1'c1
26 Demonstrativus sillogismus est argu111e11t1tio etc )
......
27 Temptativus sillogismus est etc. (ibid.)
......
28 Dialeticus (sc.sillogismus)est etc. (ibid.)
......
29 Sephisticus(sc. sillogismus) est etc. (ibid.)
......
30 Rursus. Sillogismorum alius ostensivus, alius ex hypothesi (2 393")-
24-01'11)
31 Amplius. Alius divisionis, alius non (2401'3)
32 Amplius. Alius est expositionis, alius circulationis, alius con-
versionis (ibid.)
276 LOGICA h-IODERNORUM [[
33 Item. Sillogismorum alius est praptcr quid, aliud quoniam(ibid.)

34 Post illa que veri cle veris vere diximus, Speculntionem ad falsa
transferendum. Circa hec primo queritur utrum ipsa sint
(240ra-rb)
35 Hiis rationibus persuasi dicimus quod, sicut bonum est aliquid, ita
et malum, sicut verum, ita et Falsum.(240f'3)
36 Hoc ipsum tamen questionem habet utrum Falsasciantur (240r'1' W)
37 Secunda positio cle Falsisest quod ex nullo Falso aliquid sequitur
(240va)
38 Itaque quia nos prime aclhesimus Opinioni, quid pro ea et contra
videamus(ibid.)
39 Data vero consequentia ex habitudine conversionis facilis erit
deductio ad eorum Opinionem qui recipiunt ex impossibili quidlibet
sequi (ibid.)
40 Itaque nulla naturalis ypothetica est vera nisi cuius utraque pars est
vera (24OVE-vb)
41 Deinceps quid contra dictam positionem obiectis responderi
conveniat, inspiciendum est (240W-24IV'J).
Here our text breaks OFF,the two last lines of the extant text being
written under the last column (24l1'h).
B - Some Remarks on This Treatise. Its Origin and Date
No doubt, our treatise is to be considered as the work ofa master of

high competence. It is ordcrly and systematic and its division is carefully
marked by the author. See above, p. 264. It was composecl with &
peculiar vividness, as may appear from such phrases as: ex his variis
diversorumsolutionibuselige cui dicas: "tu michi solaplaces". (f. 227"); see
below, p. 327). The author likes to quibble, sometimes in a rather
aFFectedway, to the modern taste. E.g. :
2251'11':Nam res ammonet ut prepositum exequentes ad propositionesveniamus. (See

above, p. 269).
2341'3:Nunc eas prosequamurhabitudines quas necessitatemconferre prediximus

consecutioni.Et primo pariumhabitudinempar estostendere.(Seeabove,p. 273).
2361'5: Ut igitur finem habeat propositum et doctrina ordinem minime interruptum,
de cnuntiabihbusaliqua enuntiamus.(See above, p. 274).
post enuntiationes
Post illa que veri de reris rere diximus, speculationem ad falsa transferendum.
24-01'11:
(Seeabove, p. 276).
THE TRACT ON LOGIC FOLIND IN ms. OXFORD; manv 174 277
Our author (or reclactor) seems to have made some additions after-
wards, as may appear From the passagediscussing the nature of verumand
falsum (our Ch. X, cap. 10; seebelow, pp. 363-367). There he enumer-
ates Eve diFferent Opinions. He says that he assentsto the fourth, which
he calls the ultima opinio (see below, p. 365). From this we may con-
clude that the Flfth Opinion was added later on.
Our treatise certainly was intended for publication, as may be con-
cluded From the introduction, where the author Speaksof the EXEI'CItüHO
scriptorisput besidcd the Iecrorisdiligentia. (See above, p. 264). Some-
times the reader is addressed:eligecm'dicas(seebelow, p. 327); notabis
2241'13;2171'11,see below, p. 302; 229"); see below, p. 333; 233W;
see below, p. 346; pertransibis 214"), see below, p. 298; and many
other passages.
As to its primary sources, they are Priscian's !nstitutiones grammaticae
which are referred to many times,,I and the current text-books of logic,
OFcourse. The latter; apart From the works OFthe logica vetus;are those
of the logica nova. For that matter; in our extmct From the text seven
referencesto the SophisrfciElenchiare Found,si:; to the Topica,sevento
the Prior Analytics, and only one to the PosteriorAnalytics. Actually it is
hardly surprising that only one reference is made to the PosteriorAnalytics.
We have in the prologue to an anonymous translation of the Posterior
flmzz-I/ytics2
a precious piece OF evidence that this Aristotelian book was
not in great Favourwith the Parisian masters(magistriFrancie)about the
middle of the twelfth century. For the text, see above, p. 15. [must
be noted, further; that the PosteriorAnalyticsare not Found, either, in the
Heptateuchonof Thiery OFChartres; who does give the texts of all the
other works of the logica ausum.3
From the contemporary schools only the School of the Petit Pont is
once referred to by name:
2361'11:Contra id vero quod prediximus ad cathegoricam non sequi continuativam, sic
obiciet Parvipontanussustinensnecessariumex quolibet enuntiabili sequi. (Seebelow,
p. 356).
Adam of Petit Pont is not referred to personally, as might be suggested

by the singular form Parvipontanus.] think the word should be taken asa
collective noun for Parvipontani. This surmise Ends some suPport in the
future tense abiciet.
' See the Index locorum.
1 ed. L. Minio-Paluello, ArisratcicsLatinus IV 2, Bruges-Paris 1953.
3 Seealso Chapter [, p. IS.
278 LOGICA MODERNORLm-i n
The treatise makes quite an original impression, as compared with the

common tracts on logic known to us From the twelfth century. It is
neither a comment on Aristotle or Boethius, nor a Free discussion of the
Subject matter of the Aristotelian-Boethian logic of the type of Peter
Abailard's Dialectica.'
Our treatise has two distinguishing Features,indeed. First, it shows
all the usual marks of a mid—twelfth centur)r discussion of the matters
concernedtogether with quite a lot of objections and questionscurrent
in the schools in those days. However, it seems to distinguish itself by a
close relation to Aristotle's Topica. An important number of terms are
reminiscenses of this Aristotelem work, e.g. problema, positio. Especially
the author's exordium deserves some attention:
Propositumquidemnegotii est circa opinionis nostre pomianessingula diligenter inquirere.

(21lm; seeabove,p. 264).
Compare the initia] phrase of the Latin translation of Aristotle's Topica:

Propositum quidcm negotii cst mctodum invenire uente.2
......
The other peculiarity much more important of our treatise lies

— —
in the original arrangement of the subject matter. Like Adam of the
Petit Pont, our author attempts to arrange the logical matters in an
original way) He chooses the term and the proposition as the focus of
reference :
2111'5: Ordinem itaque doctrine nostra per quatuor distingucmus capitula, primo
agentes de terminis, deinde de significatis eorum, tertio de propositionibus, quarta cle
dictis prapositionum, idest enuntiabilibus. (Seeabove, p. 264).
Thus we Fmdall the current subjects discussedwithin this frame-

work. The problem of the universaliais discussedin the SECUNDA PARS
(our Ch. VIII). In this connection the categories or predicamentaare
dealt with (our Ch.. VIII, pp. 306-315). The theory of propositions is
discussedin the TERTIAPARS(our Ch. IX), the categorical proposition
as well as the hypothetica] one. The discussionof the latteralso contains
! See my edition, and the Introduction, pp. XXXHT.

: quoted from Paris, B.N. Lar. 6294, 1. 371"; see Aristoteles Latinus, Codices, Pars prior,
p.. 119.
3 For Adam's design and aims, see L. Minio-Paluello, The 'Ars disserendiq]- (Idam qf
Balsham'Parriponranus' in: Mediaeval and RenaissanceStudies 111(1954, 116-169); the
same's Intraducrionto the edition Of the xlrs disserendi;and my Log. Med. ], pp. 62-81
.
THE TRACTON LOGIC FOUND IN MS. OXFORD,DIGBV 174 279
& discussion of mutua] inferenccs between propositions which are based

upon the interrelations of the terms used in those propositions. These
chapters(B 21—24)
deal with what is found elsewhereunder the heading
De locis. Another topic is the infel'ence between the atomic propositions
of the hypothetical proposition. It is discussed in B 25-30. We Find
discussed here the conversion and the equivalence of propositions.
Finally, the QUARTA PARS, dealing with the enuntiabile, contains the
discussionof argumentatio(chs 20-33), among x-vhichthe syllogism is
dealt with (chs 25-33). For that matter, the author does not speakof the
fgm'ac and modi of the syllogism but gives some distinctions from the
Prior Anabftfcs.
However, our treatise is much more than an original discussion of the
current subject matter of logic. The frame-work in which this material
is found is not only quite substantia] to the author's way of discussing it,
but it also seems to have a value of its own. It is (;.-speciall)rthis Frame-
work that shows the original approach our author takes to logic and
grammar. ln fact, it is the fruit of a systematic re-thinlcing of the
subjects discussed by grammarians and logicims, separately to some
extent and each from his own inspiration, until that time. Our chapter
XVI will give & more thorough discussion of some points relevant to the
present study, such as set forth in this remarkable treatise. [t should be
noted, again, that this treatise deserves the closest attention much
—
more attention than can be given in the present study, indeed of
—
students of twelfth century logic. Unlike the attempt made by Adam of
the Petit Pont to renew logic our author's enterprise (or better: that of
the School he belonged to) apparentl)rwas successful.lt seemsto have
been, indeed, a cardinal link in the development of Mediaeval logic. It
certainly stimulated, and gave order to, the Mediaeval study or that part
of logic which was to become the original contribution of Mediaeval
logicians, the most fertile, no doubt, for philosopher and theologian
alike in the thirteenth ancl Following centuries.
Undoubtedly the treatise was the work of & French master. Here are
some pieces of evidence:
214"): Hoc idem etiam videtur ex materna lingua. Que numquam dictione cmnmuuis
generis solet uti ad supponendumres diversorum sexuumuna prolatione, sed cam-
prehendendo rcm masculini sexus preponit articulum masculinum genus discernentem,
rem vero feminini sexüs femininum, dicendo: 'H citcrcens rcnt', 'la citcrccnnc vcnt'. (See
below, p. 299).
That our work came into existence in some Parisian school is out of
doubt. I give one significant piece OFevidence. It is Founclin the (lis-
cussion of the proper senseof the names of rivers and towns. Our author
askswhether suchnamesasSecana
are proper nounsor appellativenouns,
and the answer to this question, in its turn, depends upon our view of the
real nature ofa river and a town. The discussion1 clearly refers to Paris
as its place oforigin :
226"): Quidam dicunt Fluvium esse aquam illam que in terre superHcie apparet, ut
Sccanam(the river Seine)astrunntesseaquamque in alveoest a fonte usquead mare. Sed
eadem ratione et illa que huc (: here in Paris), postquam in mare fluxerit (viz. the
water streamingnow in Paris),succedet,dicetur Secana.(Seebelow, p. 324).
ibid.: Si vero aquaubi a fonte oritur, duasfaciat reflexiones, neutra earum erit Secana,
sed pars illius, immo illn totalis que bifurcatur. Unde si una Parisius transeat, reliqua
Aurelianis (at Orleans), recipiemus quod idem fluvius currit hic (: here in Paris) et
ibi (at-Orleans). Sed aliud nomen scrrtitur hic forte quam ibi: etenim Aurelianis For-
tassis appellabitur Ligeris (Loire), Parisius Sccana; et erit Ligeris-Secana. (See below,
p. 325).
The parallel problem is concernedwith *Parfsius'as the nameufa town;

here, again, our author speaksof Paris as of the present town:
226Vb: Dicitur tamen interdum 'Parisius' vel 'Roma' proprium nomen loci, quia
nomina huiusmodi quandam faciunt rei adiacentis, idest loci, discretionem. Nam quid
aliud est Parisius quam collectio domorum in hoclocosita? (See below, p. 325).
There is also an interesting hint as to the. date of our treatise. The

author says that the proposition: 'Rex est Parisius' is only true for Loda-
wicus:
2271'3:Nec dubium quod hac tantum propositione: 'Rexcs: Parium" agatur de Lodewico,
ne accidat ea significari Lodowicum csse Parisius; sed tantum pro eo vera intelligitur.
below,
(See p. 326).
Louis VI reigned From 1108-37 and Louis Vll from 1137-80. The latter
was succeededby Philip Auguste (1180-1223). It is evident that (ml)Ir
Louis VII should be considered here. So we have 1[80 as terminus ante
quemfor the composition of our treatise. There is another possible clue
for the date:
232ï'ü: ConsueVimus enim commendare Regem Francie et vitnperare Regem Anglie
dicendo quod Rex Francie est iustus, quod pacis conservator, ct Rex Anglie est tirannus.
(Seebelow, p. 342).
' Seebelow, pp. 323-325.

THE TRACT ON LOGIC FOLIND IN ms. OXFORD, DlGBï 174 281
Would we be Far From the truth in supposing that these words allude
to King Louis Vll and his adversary Henry [1 of England? Indeed, Louis
is known in history as & gentle, serious and devout prince, whose chief
interest lay in protecting the Church, although this protection served
his private political ends at the same time. In 1152 his unfortunate
marriage with Eleanore of Aquitania was (leclarecl null by an assembly of
French Bishops on the ground of consanguinity. A few months later
Eleanore became the bride of Henry, duke of Normandy and count of
Anjou, who ascendedthe Englishthrone as Henry 11in 1154. Henryrwas
not troubled by many scruPles, indeed, neither in his light against the
English barons nor in respect of the French king.
If our surmise be correct, we may take 1154-as the terminuspost quem
for the composition of our treatise.
The school in which our treatise came into existence must have been
the famous school of Melun. This can be shown by quite a wealth of
evidence.
..
First, one of our author's favourite theses is that of the non-equi-
vocality of nouus. See below, pp. 297-298. Well, then, this thesis
is (:)-(plicitl)r ascribed to the zlflclidunensesby the author of the Gloss
Pramisimus' :
MS Oxford Laudlat. 67, f. 711"): Sepecadamproprio nominc (: Priscian V 52, p. 1754fl

cd. Hertz). Hoc contra Meludinenses,qui nullum nomen dicunt 'equimmz'um.2
Another favourite thesis of our author's is what is announced as the

secunda positio de jälsis. It states that nothing follows from anyfafsum.
There were, in our author's days, four diH'erent interpretations of this
thesis, the most rigid one of which held m'] cxfalso accidere.Our author
'conFessesto be an adherent to this viea—v. For the texts, see belox-v,
pp. 387—390.lt should be noted, then, that it is especially this viex-vthat
was attributed by many contemporary x-vriters to the School of Melun.
John OFSalisbur)rmentiens this thesis in his MetalogiconIV 5, where he
says about the second book OFthe Prior Analytics that it comments on
how true conclusions may be concluded from false premisses in the
second and third figures. He adds somewhat malignantly: this expo-
sition of Aristotle is possibly overlooked by those who contend that
! For this gloss on Priscian, see above, p. 2511.

2 quoted in Hunt 11,p. 50.
nothing follows from what is false (quodeosjbrtepreteritqui e.»:falso

nichil
sequi contendunt, ed. Webb, p. 16933'33). Webb rightly refers to the
Chronicle of ]ocelin of Brakelond, from whose words it appearsthat
this thær)r about thejälsum had some adherents in the famousabbeyof
Bury St. Edmond. ]ocelin saysto abbot Samson:
cap. 25, p. 35, ed. Butler': Duo sunt que multum miror cle Vobis ...... Unum est
quod adhuc in tali statu fovetis sententiam Melidunensium dicentium a.u'þlsonichil sequi,
et cetera fl"i1.'n::vla.,z
Another witness is Geoffrey of St. Victor, who in his Fons Philosophiae

as follows (m. 269-276 ed. Michaud
describes the turbae Robertinae3
Quantim) :
Hcrent saxi verticc turbe robertinc,
Saxeeduritie vel adamantinc,
Quos ncc rigat pluvia neque ros doctrine;
Vetant amnis aditum scapularum mine.
!stifalsum liugan: nihil sequi vere,

Quamvistamen ipsimet post hoc abiere;
Qui de solo nomine Finguntmille fere:
lgitur pro nihilo licet hos censere.
We have & precious piece of evidence on ï'ï'hïlt is called the secta

zlfeludina in a collective manuscript preserved in the British Museum,
Royal Ms 2 D XXX. This peculiar tract on dialectic is found Ff. 951'3-
102'*"7..5lt opens with a rather diFchlt prologue in six elegiac couplets.
The text seems to be rather corrupt:
(S)ecta Meludinc velut erroris medicina.
Hac Hl: doctrina nota, nota gemma
(Q)ue Fit monstrato, post apposito reprobato
(H)ac infirmata, sic minus ente rato.
(H )ac demonstrata logica ratione probata
(H)ac conFlrmata, sic magis ente rata.
ï TheChroniclequocelin qufBrakclondconcerning the acts of Samson,Abbot of the Mo-

nastcry of St Edmund in: Mcdiacval Classics, London ctc. 1949.
3 To satisfy the reader's curiosity: the other thing about the abbot at which ]ocelin
marvelled much was that at home he clicl not show as kind a face as elsewhere, not even
among the brethren "who lovc you still and loved you of 0ch and chose you to be their
lord, but yüu are rami)" among them, nor do you rejoice them, as the).'say" (ibid., p. 36).
3 Robert of Mclun is meant. Seealsobelow, p. 288.
4 in the series: AnalectaMediaevalinNamurccnsia8 (1956).
5 For this manuscript, see above Ch. [, m'. 5, pp. 22-25.
THE TRACT ON LOGIC FOLIND IN MS. OXFORD, mam* 174- 283
(H)ac sinc disserere nescitur, qua duce vere

(e)t respondere scitur et arguere.
Hoc: hic: asseritur quod pcne probabile scitur
(Q)uod sic nescitur vilet ct abicitur
(H)anc igitur lügicus veneretur ut artis amicus

ut sit non logicus ct rudis et laicus.
Then, the proper introduction begins:

(M)eludinc professionis quam ea pars philosophie quc ratio disserendi dicta est, sibi
ducem elegit, perfecta et integra in huius'operis volumine consum(m)atur cognitio.
Hanc igitur sibi si quis vendicare voluerit, aput cum philosephic nominc manente
sacroct venerabili,huiusvoluminisseriemstudeatdiligenter inspicere.
(D)ialeticamartem esseprimo et principaliter qualiter disserenduminstituentemet
ad id cxpedicnduminstitutam non ignorantibusperhipateticediscipline et Mcludine
professionisquedamelementa propono. Quorum probabilitate multiplici ct confirmata
ratione contrarium his ut probabilius accidet rationabilisinpugnabitobviatio, multis
quidem que ad horum improbationem inducuntur rationibus congrua similium in-
ductione repulsis.
Cum enim dialetica disquisitio probabilitatis sit gratia ratiocinando sermocinatio
circa positionem aggredientis terminare propositum, ad eius probabilitatem prima sit
rationis institutio, ut non solum quid sedqualiter id et cuiusgratia dicatur sit manifestum.
Demumverosi quid positionidicaturcontrarium,sustinentispositionemestid dissuadere
insistendo quidem resistenti positionis contrarium contrarii persuadere conantis.
Proposita vcro elementa, ratione quidem non omnino inconsulta subtili disquisitione
elaborata, sunt hec (95'11).
Next, our author gives an enumeration of all the important thesesof the
School (95T'J'Vb):
(l) (N)ullum singularepredicatur de aliquo.
(2) (N)on signiFlcaturidem liis terminis: 'hoc animal', 'hoc album'.
(3) (N)on ex solis substantialibushabet esseprima substantia.
(4) (9511!)(H)oc universale tempus est universale cuius plura sunt inferiora; et
tamen unum solum tempus est.
(5) (Omn)e universale cst predicabile de pluribus; aliquod tamen predicatur de uno
solo, ut hoc universalephenix.
(6) (N)icl1il est genuset species.
(7) (N)ullum genussubicitur.
(8) (N)ulla speciespredicatur.
(9) (N)ulla forma est accidens.
(10) (N)ulla consequentia naturalis aflïrmativa vera est, nisi et antecedenset con-
sequens ipsius verum sit.
(1 !) (N)ichil sequitur ex falso.
(12) (N)ullum falsum est.
(13) (N)ullum nomen est equivocum.
284- LOGICA MODERNORUM ll
(14) (N)ulla propositio est multiplex.

(15) (N)ulla propositione dicitur eius dictum de aliquo.
(16) (N)ulla diffinitio predicaturde aliquo.
(17) (l)clem significatur dimeitione et nomine dianiti.
(13) (N)ichil predicatur de aliquo quod non sit maiuseo vel par ci.
(19) (N)ullius hominis pars est anima.
(20) (N)ulla pars rei integralis diFfert a suo toto.
(21) (N)ullum universalepredicatur de aliquo universali nisi ad predicationem subiecti
sequatur predicatio predicati.
(22) (V)erum premissumin argumentationeeI'Flcaxillate conclusionis est argumentum..
(23) (O)mne argumentum est necessarium.
(24) (O)mnis elenchus sophisticus est necessarius.
(25) (O)mnis sillogismus est perfectus.
.
(25) (O)mnis argumentatio est vox non signiFlcativa.
(27) (O)mnia animalia sunt rationalia vcl irrationalia.
(23) (N)ulla quinque sunt duo et tria, nec duo et tria sunt quinque.
(29) (N)ulla sunt duo et tria.
(30) (S)ocrates et Plato non sunt Socrateset Plato.
(31) (N)ullus populus est plura.
(32) (N)ulla sunt inFmita.
(33) (N)ulla oratio est inperfecta.
(34) (N)ulla huiusmodi consequentia est recipienda: 'si aliquid est homo,illud est
animal'.
(35) (O)mnia genera et omnes species sunt in primo predicamento.
(36) (P)redicamentumest moduspredicandi,et primum predicamentumest primus
modus predicandi
.
(37) (Q)uoddam verum probabile est et ab omnibus scitur ipsum; tamen nec propo-
sitio ipsum significansantecedit vel sequitur ad aliquid.
(N)on si aliquid est, aliquid est verum.
(38) .
(N)ullum nomen pluralis numeri significat universale vcl singulare.
(39) (N)ulla propositione predicatur aliquid de aliquo, vcl removetur aliquid ab
(40) aliquo
cuiusparsestobliquuscasusvel alia parsorationisquamnomenet verbum.
(41) (95'-'"-)Omne universalepreter accidensest univoce predicabile.
(42) Nulluml accidens est equivocc predicabile.
(43) (L)ocus argumenti cst consecutio generalium habitudinum maxima propositione
explicita.
(44) (N)ulla scientia est qualitas.
(45) (N)onnisi unum tempus est et illud est simplex; nonnisi unum tempus est et
illud est compositum; simplex tamen nec est compositum ncc econverso.
(E)adem vox est hoc nmncn 'albus' que hoc nomen "album'.
(46) (N)ullum nomen secunde impositionis significat universale vcl singulare.
(47) (N)ullum genus est accidens, nulla species, nullum praprium.
(48) (O)mnis modalis est singularis.
(49) (N)on quicquid Fuit necesseest fuisse.
(50) (A)"Jum nigrum est possibile.
(54) (N)ullum esse
significansrcm:zartiücialemsigniFlcatuniversalevcl singulare.
(52) (N)ulla falsa
nomen
aliquid predicaturde aliquo vcl removeturab aliquo.
(53) propositionc
1 olum (!) .«IIS. 2 (rcm rem) MSC.
THE TRACT ON LOGIC FOLIND IN MS. OXFORD,DlGBï 174 285
Our author continues (95V3):

Cum igitur aput logicos id solum constet esse' dubium quod ex utraque parte contra-
dictionis rationis habetdiductionem,quid propositorumquodlibet probabilitatishabeat
utrimque moderatasul) brevitate est pcrtranseundum,ut et nostre opinioni Iabes
inimica omnino adnichilata convincatur et pereat ct nostre partis veritas ratione con-
Hrmata multiplici COI'I'ObOl'CtUI'z
et floreat.
He turns to the FlI'Stthesis, now (ibid.):

Propositorum vcro primum est nullum singulare predicari de aliquo. De quo & contro-
versantibus maxima solet Fieri dissensio, ad utramque partem contradictionis multis
inductis rationibus. Quid igitur de singulari sentiat nostre professionisOpinio, primo
est pertranseundum.
The Erst thesis is discussedFf. 95V3-96Vb.

The secondthesis is subdividcd into six sub-thcscs(96V'J-97m):
Secundum propositorum est quod his terminis 'hoc animal', 'hoc album' non signiücatur
(9711)idem singulare. Circa quod hec sunt consideranda: ..
(a) utrum aliqua singularia sunt paria;

( b) utrum omne singularesub specie specialissimacontinentur;
(0) Utrum omne singulare sit individuum, et cconverso;
(d) utrum id quod singulareest, sit sensibile;
(e) utrum hoc nomen 'Socrates'significet Socratem;
(f) utrum hoc nomen "Socratcs'sit unius tantum, cum huius individui, cum huius
nominis.
Thc second thesis is discussedin an extensive way (Ff. 971'0-981'b).The

third, too, is subdivided into a number of preliminary questions(98fb):
Tertium propositorumest quod nonex solissubstantialibus
habetesseprima substantia.
Ad cuius evidentiam multorum occurrit consideratio. C irca quod hec sunt consideranda:
(a) utrum aliqua singulariaalicui individuo sint substantialia.

(b) utrum aliquid adalicuius esscexigatur quod non sit ei substantiale.
(c) utrum hec singulariaïv'hoc animal', 'hoc album' demonstratisdiversis differant
substantialiter.
(cl) utrum aliqua singulariacontineantur sub'pluribus que in quid non predicantur.
(e) utrum substantialisdifferentia sit substantialisalicui cui non genus cuius ipsa
est diiïercntia.
(f) utrum quodlibet superiussuo inferiori sit substantiale.
(g) utrum hoc corpus animatum crit insnimatum.
(h) utrum animatio huic corpori sit substantiale.
[ (essc) MSF. 2 ex corroboratur MSC. 3 hoc sin. MS..

(i) ex quibus habeantessesingulariasub aliis universalibusquam sub in quid predi-

cabilibus contenta.
(j) utrum descriptio individui conveniatomni individuo et soli.
(k) utrum omnis res singularisaliqua res sit et que cuius res sit.
(1) utrum omne singularesit essesue rei.
(m) utrum singulare a re sua differat.
(n) utrum plura singulariasint que significantur his terminis 'hic homo','hoc animal'.
After & general introduction (98fb'ï'h) the fourteen questions are

discussedin an extensive way (98Vb-1021'b).
The fourth thesis is discussedfrom 102") on:
De significato vero huius termini 'tempus'questio est an ipsum sit universale et an
(l'OZï'ü)ei conveniat universalisdescriptio. Quorum utrumque concedimus, nec tamen
est nisi unum tempus et hoc universale tempus genus est, cuius sunt species opposite
hec signiücata dies, annus, mensis,momentum.Nec istarum specierum plures sunt res,
nec una sola, sed cuiuslibet earum est aliqua res que nota (?) alterius, cum pars non
differat a suo toto.
Unlike the Foregoingthesesthis one is not subdivided. It is immediately

followed by a number of objections and their solutions. Our copy
abruptl)rendsin the middle of them (102V'ï):
Sicut in uno solo loco Socrates est et ille est mundus, in uno solo loco est Socrates, et
ille est Gallia; et nullus locus est Gallia qui sit mundus, vel econverso; in uno solo loco
tamen est Socrates. Sicut etiam 'tu ridas solumSocratemcurrere'; vides solum Socratem
nec Socratemcurrereest Socrates, ncc econverso; et tamen solum .....
Many of the discussions reported in this manuscript remind the reader

of those found in the Oxford treatise (Digby 174). It is beyondany doubt
that the London manuscript conFlrms in a deEnitive way our surmise that
the Oxford treatise must be & prodcut of the group of logicians named
by contemporary authors Melidunenses.Therefore ] propose to call this
treatise the ARSMELIDUNA.'
From the external evidence2 the conclusion may be drawn that the
Ars must have been written in Paris between 1154-80. The high favour
of Aristotle's TopicaJas well as the neglect of his PosteriorAnab/tics4may
conErm this date.
But what about the milieu in which our Ars came into existence? lt
should be noted that this treatise of the Melidunenses
was certainly Wl'itten
' Our manuscripts have büth ;i-feliduna, Meliduncnscs and Mehrdina, Meludinenscs; the
former spellings seem to be preferable. (Melun : Melidunumor Melodunum).
1 Seeabove,pp. 280-281. 3 Seeabove,p. 278. 4 Seeabove,p. 277.
THE TRACT ON LOGIC FOUND IN ms. oxmnn, DIGBV 174 287
in Paris, not in Melun. As a matter of Fact, as a residence of a school

Melun seems to have been of a peculiar stamp during the twelfth
century. We know that as early as about ] 103 Peter Abailard, as :: young
man hardly twant)r four years OFage stopped attending the lectures of
William of Champeaux and set up For himselfat Melun. lt was& bislmpric
of its own and, accordingly, independent of the bishop of Paris, who
was the patron of the Parisian schools. Moreover, Melun was the main
residence of the King's Court. For that reason, the prospects of a young
and audaciousscholar who was in trouble in Paris, certainly became &
gooddealbrighter, oncehe wasreceivedinto the King's (01'the Queen's)
favour.
As a matter of fact Abailard probabl)r was at Melun, again, about 1132,
the approximate date 01 his dcparture from the abbcy of St Gildas de
Ruys (in the Breton dioceseof Vannes),causedby the hostility of the
monks against him. Sikes seems to be right in supposing' the Historia
calamitatum, which, as is known, ends at his departure From St Gildas,
to have been written by Abailard as a pamphlet to prepare for his
cventual return to Paris; hc thinks it therefore natura] to conclude that
Abailard was waiting For its circulation to provide him with a suitable
opportunity to go back there. In fact, we do not hcar of Abailard again
until 1136, when ]ohn of Salisbury,who went to study at Paris in the
year after thc deathof Henry [ (December Ist, 1135), becamehis pupil
at Mont Ste Gencvi"'.-sinc.z Sikes assumes that Abailard spent the interim
either with his relationis in Brittanny or, more likely, somewhere within
easy reach of the sisters at the Paraclcte. However, ] would myself be
inclined to locate Abailard's intermedim-y stay at Mclun. No doubt,
Melun gave him the best opportunitics to prepare his return to Paris.
There, in the immediate surroundings of Paris and probably supported
by the King's favour Abailard had the best chance to obtain once again a
chair in one of the Parisian schools. If my surmise is right, Abailard is
likely to have found there & school of logicians, which aftcrwards came
under the presidence of Robert of Mehm. Lesne's surmise should not be
rejected, indeed, that there were also lectures given by Alberic, who
later on was & teacher of John of Salisbury'sat the Mont Stc Geneviövc
after Abailard'sdcparturefrom there (c. 1137).3
I think that only starting from such surmiscs one can understand the
passagewhich John of Salisbury spends a few decadeslater on the
! ]. Sikes, PeterAbailard, Cambridge 1932, p. 25.
2 Seefl-Ietalog.II 10, pp. 7731-786ed. Webb, and Sikes, op. cir. pp. 25-26.
3 For Robert's and Alberic's stay at Melun, see E. Lesne, Les£f.-alcs,p. 212.
Mchdunensesin his Entheticus.' He speaks there (rss 55 ff.) Of certain

verbosa person(s) who pretended to be more learnecl than master
Alberic and of one who undertook to correct the erroresAbelardi
(m 55-57):
Iste loquax dicaxqueparum redolct Melidunum.
Creditur Albrico doctior iste suo.
Corrigit errores verbosushic Abelardi.
Thus, these audacious logicians, breaking with the whole tradition of

logic, called by them scornfully trita moneta(vs 58), had lost the ap-
proved mark Of the School of Melun (parum redolct zlffehdunum),which
apparently was at the same time, in John's eyes, that of Abailm'd and
Alberic. Lesneseemsto be right in -::oncluding2
that in this passage
John
is inveighing against :: grouP of unfaithful pupils of what was considered
to be the School of Melun.
Our surmise Fmdssome more snpport in the. fact that these innovators
are not likely to have taught themselves at Melun about l155 (the (late
of the composition of the Entlreticus).We have a remarkable piece of
evidence in GeoFFrey of St Victor's Fons Philasaphiae. This poem,
published in 1178;- gives a vivid description of the controversias in the
Parisian Schools from the daysthe author studied there, about the middle
of the CBlïtLll')'.4Well, then, the turbae rabertinac turn out to have taught
on the Mont Ste. Geneviäve (heren: saxi vertice turbe robertinc),5 not
at Melun. That the flflehdunenses are meant. by the Robertini seems to
be quite certain, as the thesis denounced by GeoFfrey is typical of that
school.6
We must conclude From the above evidence that the Melidunenses
were logicians who studied logic after the tradition OFthe School of
Melun, whether they were faithful to it or not. From about the Efties
they were Found teaching in Paris, on the Mont Ste Geneviäve.
AS 21matter of fact, about the middle of the centur)r there seem to
have been only two important schools of logic in Paris: that of the Petit
Pont (Parvipontani)and that of the Mont Ste Geneviäve,the latter being
' written in "55. The work (Enthaticm, sive de dogmataphilosepharum)was edited by

C. Petersen, Hamburg I84-3, and is found in Migne, P.L. 199, coll. 965-1004.
2 op. fit., p. 212.
3 Seethe Introducrianto the edition by P. Michaud Quantin, p. 22.
4 Seeibid., p. 9.
5 For the whole passage,see above, p. 282.
6 !srifalsum liugan! nihil .cequivere. See above, p. 282.
THE TRACT ON LOGIC FOUND IN MS. OXFORD, mam* 174 289
the heiress(faithful or not) of Abailard, Alberic and Robert 0fMelu11.'

Both of these schools apparently took pains to renew the study of logic
by the use of an original approach to the current subject mattner.2This
is borne out by the beginningsof the Entheticus,where John of Salisbury
mentiens two groups of such innovators who were averse to the dogmata
veterum(vss 4-1-62):
Si sapisauctores, veterum si scripta recenses,
ut statuas si quid forte probare velis,
undique clamabunt: "Vetus hic quo tendit asellus?;
cum veterum nobis dicta vel acta refert?;
45 a nobis sapimus, docuit se nostra iuventus;
non recipit veterum dogmata nostra cohors,
non onus accipimus ut eorum verba sequamur
quos habet auctores Grecia, Roma colit.
Incola sum3Medici Fontis, novus auctor in arte,
50 dum prius inventum glorior essemeum.
Quod docuere senesnec novit amica iuventus,
pectoris iuventum iuro fuissemei.
Sedula me iuvenum circumdat turba putatque
grandia iactantem nonnisi vera laquif"
55 Iste loquax dicaxque parum redolet Melidunum.
Creditur Albrico dcrctior iste suo.
Corrigit errores verbosus hic Abelardi:
"Pellitur a nostro trita moneta foro;
temporibusplacueresuisveterumbenedicta,
60 temporibusnostrisiam novasola placent.
Cum sit ab ingenio totum, non sit tibi cure
quid prius addiscaspusteriusve legas"?
! For some new evidence on this school, see my paper in VWARIUM, quoted above,
p. I4-6, n. 2.
: Seeabove, p. 273 f.
3 Minio-Paluello certainly is right in arguing that by this incola Medici Fontis, mentioned
by ]olm as the Erst in this series of the new, degenerate, generation of logicians, Adam
of the Petit Pünt cannot be meant himself. See L. Minio-Paluello; The Ars disserendiqf
Adam qf Balsham'Parvipontanus' in Mediaeval and RenaissanceStudies 3 (l954), pp.
163-164.
4 We need not w.».faznnder,l indeed, that these,people were little interested in anything but
logic, and some of them were satislïed with the mere appearanceof being a logician;
see Entheticus,vss. l ! l-l 16:
Laudat Aristotilem solum, spernit Ciceronem
et quidquid Latiis Grecia capta dedit;
conspuit in leges, vilescit phisica, quevis
Iitþera sordescit, logica sola placet.
Non tamen ista placet ut eam quis scire laboret;
Si quis credatur logicus, hoc satis est.
290 LOGICA i'leDERNORUM "
It has been observed already! that the zl-Ichduncnscs

were more successfull
than the Parvipomani.
To conclude this chapter I quote an interesting passageFrom Aldxander

Neckham's Dc naturis rerum. The words of this former PLllJilof the School
of the Petit Pont may show how this school was outstrippecl by the
incleecl, all of the theses discussedby Alexander in that
zl-Ieliduncnses;
passageare Founfl in the ARS MELIDUNA.
De naturis rerum, cap. 173; pp. 288-290, ed. Wright: Miror ctiam quosdam damnare
opinionem (licentium es impossibili per sequodcumquesequienuntiabiic. Quod cum plurimis
astrui queat rationibus, vel paucae prodeant in lucem. Nonne igitur si Sortes est homo
et Sortes non est homo, Sortes est homo? Sed si Sortes est homo, Sortes est homo vel
lapis; ergo, si Sortes est homo et Sortes non est homo, Sortes est homo vel lapis; sed si
et Sortes non est homo, Sortes non est homo; ergo si Sortes est homo
Sortes est l'IOITIO
et Sortesnon est l'lOan, Sortesest lapis. Consimilideductioneprobabitur quod si Sortes
est homo et Sortes non est homo, Sortes est capra, et ita de singulis rebus, puta rosa,
lilio, et caeterisrcbus. Videsneigitur quonammodoex hoc impossibiliquod est Sortem
essehominem et Sortem non essehominem, sequitur quidlibet?
Item. Si Sortes dicit se mentiri, et nihil aliud dicit, dicit aliquod enuntiabile; ergo
verum vel falsum; ergo si Sortes dicit tantum se mentiri, dicit verum vel falsum; sed si
Sortes dicit tantum id quod est Sortem mentiri et dicit verum, verum est Sortem mentiri,
et si verum est Sortem mentiri, Sortes dicit falsum;,ergo si Sortes dicit tantum id quod
est Sortem mentiri et dicit verum, dicit falsum; sed si Sortes dicit tantunn id quod est
Sortem mentiri et dicit falsum, falsum est Sortem dicere falsum; et si falsum est Sortem
dicere falsum, Sortes non dicit falsum; sed si Sortes dicit tantum se mentiri, dicit verum
vcl falsum; ergo si Sortes dicit se mentiri, dicit verum; ergo si Sortes dicit tantum se
mentiri et dicit falsum, dicit verum; sed si Sortes dicit tantum se mentiri, dicit verum
vel falsum; ergo si Sortes dicit tantum se mentiri, dicit serum et dicit falsum.
Praeterea. Si solum hoc enuntiabile estfalsum esse,illud est verum vel falsum; sed si
est verum, verum est falsum esse; quodsi est, aliquod falsum est; ergo si solum hoc
enuntiabilc estfalsum esseet illud est verum, aliquod falsum est; sed si solum hoc
cnuntiabile est et aliquod falsum est, hoc enuntiabilc est falsum; ergo si solum hoc
cnuntiabile est et ipsum est verum, ipsum est falsum.
Similiter facile est probarequod si solum hoc enuntiabileest et ipsum est falsum,
ipsum est 'iterum;, sed si solum hoc enuntiabile est, ipsum est verum 1ws]falsum; ergo si
solum hoc:enuntiabile est, ipsum est verum et ipsum est falsum; sed si ipsum est verum,
ipsum non est falsum, et si est falsum, non est verum; ergo si solum hoc enuntiabile est,
ipsum nec est verum ncc falsum.
Item. Si verum est nihil esse, nihil est. Sed si hoc est verum, aliquod verum est, et,
si aliquod verum est, aliquid est; ergo si verum est nihil esse, et nihil est et aliquid est;
sed si nihil est, nullum ennntiabile est; ergo si verum est nihil esse, nec hoc enuntiabile
est; ergo si hoc est verum, ipsum non est; sed si hoc est verum, hoc est; ergo si serum
est nihil esse,et hoc enuntiabile est et hoc enuntiabilc non est.
Rursum. Si tantum duo sunt, verum est tantuni duo esse; sed si verum est tantum duo
esse, a est verum; sit :: nomen enuntiabilis huius tantum duo esse; ergo si tantum duo
' above, p. 279.

THE TRACT ON LOGIC FOUND IN ms. OXFORD, manv 174- 291
sunt, a est verum; sed si tantunn duo sunt, duo sunt; et si duo sunt, verum est duo esse;
ergo si duo sunt.. b est verum; sit b duo esse; ergo si tantum duo sunt, et a est verum
et b est verum; ergo si tantum duo sunt, utrumque istorum est verum; ergo si tantum
duo sunt, 1irerumest utrumque istorum esseverum ; ergo si tantum duo sunt, c est verum;
sit : utrumque istorum esse verum; ergo si tantum duo sunt, tam 0 quam b qunm : est
verum; ergo, si tantum duo sunt, tria sunt. Ex hoc patet verum essemille esse,si unum
solum est. — Caeterum utrum enuntiabile sit aliquid quod sitII non tantunn logica sed
et theologica est questio.
Item. Si Sortes scit se nihil scire, verum est quod nihil scit; et si hoc, nihil scit; ergo
si Sortes scit se nihil scire, Sortes nihil scit; sed si Sortes scit se nihil scire, scit hoc;
ergo aliquid; ergo si Sortes scit se nihil scire, et aliquid scit et nihil scit. Nec solvit
argunwmteiticn'uernI qui dicit instrumentum dicendi non subessesuae dictioni. Seddices:
"O vanitas!" Vide tamen ne veritatem censeas vanitatem.
! my guess;Wright readsad orationem.

CHAPTER Vll
THE ARS MELIDUNA.

ON THE THEORV OF TERMS
The PRIMAPARSof the Ars MelidunaoFfersan extensive discussionof

the smallest meaningful unit of language:the terminusor term. For the
prologue of the whole work, see above, p. 264.
The author starts with the discussionof some generalquestions(illa
que generaliter circa voceminquirendavidebantur): (a) when vocescame into
existence (quando vocesinceperint csse); (b) whether they, and ifso, when
tim)r will ceaseto be (utrumdesinantesseet quando);(c) whether & man's
voice is to be considereda dim'o (an dictiodicendasit voxhominis).
[cap. 1] 1 ad (a): The author's opinion appears after some discussion (2111'11-
?.l ]rb);
Nos medium tenentes dicimus nec omnem vocem tunc tantum essequando profertur
nec nullam esse; nec omnem vocem esse sive proferatur sive non, nec nullam. Sed
vocumque Euntquedamsunt quedamnon. Et quedamvocum tunc tantum fuerunt cum
prolate sunt et post prolationem statim desierunt esse, quedam vero post prolationem
adhuc manent, licet non proferantur.
[cap. 2] ad (b): The author refers to Horatius, Arspoeticavs60-6I : quod voces

desinant esse quidam negant, non animadvertentes illud Horatii dicentis
in Pactria:
ut silve foliis pronos mutantur in annos

prima cadunt, ita verborum vetus interit etas,
quod dicit: vetera verba et diu usitata intereunt. There follow some
objections and their solutions.
[cap. 3] ad (c): As to this questionour author answersin the negativeandamply

clariües his point of view (21 IN):
Negamusitaque vocem hominis essedictionem. Dicimus tamen dictionem essevocem
prolatam ab homine. Est enim equivocatio circa hoc nomen 'vox'. Quandoque enim
! These indications refer to my division of the work; see above, p. 2645.

ans MELIDUNA. ON THE THEORV 01: TERMS 293
dicitur vox modus proferendi vocem; et secundum hanc signiEcacionem hoc nomen
'vax' recipit hec adiectiva 'vos tua', 'vos clara' Dicitur etiam vox
...... .......
sonus ab animali prolatus et per arterias emissus. Et secundum hanc signiEcacic-nem
omnis diccio est vox ....... Sic itaque dicimus nullam vocem hominis essediccionem,
nullam vocem hominis esse vocem prolatam ab homine. Sed contra: 'vos hominis
auditur; erga vox hominis prqfcrt vel prc-ijïzrrur', et non: 'venms sive tumultus auditur; ergo
prc-tjïsrtvel prqjïrrmr'; vel: 'Socratemessehominemauditur; erga Socrates. etc.'; non, sad
..
enunciatur.
Then, our author goes on to discuss the vocessigny'icativead placitum. [cap. 4]
The Fll'Stquestion is whether the casusobliqm are to be called nouus.

Aristotle seems to deny this (De intcrpr., l6a32-bl), but our author
criticizes the Stagirite's opinion and gives quite a number of instantia:
(21lva-vb):
Item: 'a Patre,vcni'; iste vocatillum suo proprio nomineproferendoillud; ergo profert
prüprium nomen illius, et sic 'Petre' est proprium nomen. Item: hec vox 'Catonis'
constituit aliquem intellectum de re nominativi; et est vox signiEcativa; ergo est vox
signiEcativa naturaliter vel ad placitum; sed non naturaliter; ergo ad placitum; et est
simplex; ergo est simplex significatum; ergo est pars iurationis. (ZHW) Nam se-
cundum dialeticos simplex consigniHcativum sive sincathegoreumanon est pars orationis;
si autem est pars orationis, ergo est nomen vel verbum. Eadem ratione est de casibus
verbi etc.
......
The author makes & plea for & more comprehensive use of the terms
'noun' and *vcrb' than Aristotle made (ibid.):
Propter dictas et alias rationes, immo propter rei veritatem concedimusobliquos
nominum essenmnina, ut 'Catonis' et 'Catoni', ut communius accipiantur hec vocabula
'nomen', 'verbum' quam Aristotiles accepit. Nam Aristotiles strictius accepit quam
communis usus vel ars recte. loquendi, aut etiam Boecius, accipiat.
The next question is whether the declined forms (oblica) of & noun [cap. 5]
are to be considered as the same noun as the nominative case. Three
opinions of contemporaneousmasters(or schools)are mentioned:
Triplex superhoc modernoruminvenitur opinio.. Dicunt enim quidamoblicum esse
aliud nomen quam suum rectum eoquod alia sit eius terminatio; alii dicunt quod sit
idem nomen eoquod eadem sit signilïcacio et institucio obliqui et nominativi; alii quod
nec idem nec aliud; non idem, quia non eademest vocis terminacio recti cum obliquo;
non aliud, quia non alia est eius signiEcaciovel institucio quam recti.
A special case is-formed by the word 'biltrix'; it is mentioned as an

instantia to be adduced againstthe adherentsof the second opinion:
Amplius queritur utrum hec vox 'bilrrix' modo sit hec vox 'biltricis'. Quod necessario
dicendum videtur. Nam hec vox (2131?)'thrix' instituetur cras ad signiFlcandumet
tunc declinabitur: "bilrrix, biltricü', nec alia vox erit 'bilrricis' quam 'bihrix', sed eadem.
Finally, the author rejectseachof the three opinionsset forth.

[cap. 6] Then, our author broaches the important question of the impositio 01"
institutiovocum.] give the passagein full (2131'3'f'1):
Post hec que ad vocum essenciam pertinent, ad earum institucionem transeamus. Causa
institucionis vocum fuit manifestacio intellectus, idest ut haberet quis quod alii in-
tellectum suum manifestaret.Ideoquesicut intellectu duo principaliter comprehendimus,
suppositumet quod de eo dicitur, ita quoque inventa sunt duo genem dictionum, nmnina
scilicet et verba,hec nd supponendum,illa (2131'11')
ad apponendum.Natandumtamen
quod institucio vocum non fuit facta ad signilïcandum, sed tantum ad appellandum,
quippe cum appellncio vocum magis sit necessariaad loquendum de rebus subiectis
quam signiücacio. Quod autem ad appellandumfuerint voces institute, satis probabiliter
coniectari potest ex illa inposicione mcis que Et cum puero nomen inponitur: ibi enim
non queritur quid significabitillud nomenvel quo nominepuer signifïcabitursedpocius
quid appellabitur. Amplius autem ex hoc quod ubicunque proprie ponuntur nmnina in
supposito semper ponuntur ad agendum de appellatis tantum, ut dicto quoniam homo
currit. Appellant ergo nomina res illas propter quassupponendasfuerunt instituta. Verba
quoquesimiliter, saltemcasualia,idest participia. Licet autemad appellandumtantum
fuerint instituta voces, tamenpreter appellacionemhabentetiam signiFlcacionem,sed
hancex appellacionecontraxeruntsiveex institucionefactaadappellandum.
We learn from this passnge the important distinction between the

signy'ï'catiaof a word and its appellatio (or nominatio).' The latter's
relation to suppositioappears from the phrase: appellant ergo namma res
illas propter quas supponendas fuerunt instituta; its relation to signffïcatio
from his Enal words: hcet autem ad appellandumtantumfuerint instituta
voces, tamcn preter appellationem habent ctiam signyï'cationem, sed hanc cx
appellationecontraxerant,sive ex fnstitutionefacta ad appellandum.
[cap. 7] Next, the important question of the prcper signilication of the words
comes up for discussion. The problem appears to have been eagerly
debatcdby his predecessors(apudveteres)
and turns out to be so still in
the author's days. Among the veteres(which term seems to denote the
eleventh century scholars, c.q. those of the Fll'Stdecadesof the twelfth
century) our author found three views, to each of which he has an
objection (2131'b):
Quid vero voceshabeantsigniücare,tam apud veteresquam apud modernosdubi-
tatum est. Plerique enim veterum arbitrati sunt voces signiEcare imaginationem eoquod
! For this distinction, seeabovepp. 224; 26l and below pp. 300; SZSIT.
ARS MELIDUNA. ON THE THEORV 01: TERMS 295
vocc prolata aliquid imaginemur, ut prolato hoc nomine 'Roma' imaginamur civitatmn
talem, et hoc homine 'homo'animal tale. Alii ideasformas, scilicet quasdamque in mente
divina constiterunt al) eterno intelligibiliter antequam in corpore prodirent, hoc inde
sibi [in corpore prodirentlü persuadentes quo, desinente re appellata, manet vocis
signiFlcntio.Sednil potestmancrenisi forma per ipsamsignificata.Alii vero intellectuum.
A quibus queri potuit utrum hoc vox 'homo' unum solum significet intellectum, et utrum
intellectum huius vel illius, et qualiter ibi accipiatur 'intellectus', utrum scilicet pro illa
vi anime an pro actu intelligendi vel pro passionerei intellecte an etiam pro modo in-
telligendi. Nam si pro ipsa vi, continget omnia nomina eundem intellectum significare,
cui similiter et diversos'; quorum utrumqueinprobabile.
Of the modern views he mcntions only two. Some hold the view that [cap. 8]
the nomenpropriumsignificas(significat) and "calls" (appellat) the same
thing, and that the nomenoppeUativum"calls" (appellat) whatever thing
it may "call", but only significas(significat) it in an indeterminate way.
Thus the word 'homo' only signifies the species 'man', not this or that
man, and, consequently, may stand both for a man who exists and for
one who does not exist:
Inter modernos autem due sunt principales Opiniones, ut 'geteras omittamus. Ponunt
enim quidam nomen proprium idem signihcareet appellare,appellativavero non
similiter, sed appellare quamlibet rem cui per appellationem conveniunt, signiHcare
autem communiter, idest nil determinate. Verbi gracia hoc nomen 'homo' talem mane-
riem rerum, scilicet hominem,sed non hunc vel alium. Unde etiam nullam recipiunt
relacionem pertinentem ad essentiam ( : cxisroncc),ut hoc nomen 'homo' significat
aliquid quod est vel aliquid quod non est.
The second view is that of the adherentsof the so-called status-doctrine.

The author snpposesit to be confirmed by Priscian (Inst. gramm.H, 25,
p. 58'4*'5). ] quote the passage
in full (2 [ 3TD-W):
Secunda opinio quam nos in potionem tibi duximus, fatetur dictiones significare com-
munesstatus vel privatos, idest participabiles ab uno solo vel a pluribus. Ut hoc nomen
'homo'significatspecialemstatum, idest participatum (2133?) tantum a rebus unius
'speciei, 'animal' vero generalem, idest participatum a rebus [a rebus] oppositarum
specierum, 'Socratex'vero privatum statum, idest ab uno solo participabilem. Verba
quoque communes status significant, ut hoc verbo 'Iagir' quoddam accidens participatum
ab omni re legente. Neque enim dicimus verba significare actionem vei passionem, sed
copulare; significant autem accidentia quarum predicatione ostenditur actio vel passio
inesse: ut dicto quoniam legenslegit.
Hanc autem opinionem conlirmat Pt'is-inonuæï.,,2 ubi loquens de nominibus dicit "quod
appellativum naturaliter commune est multorum quos eadem substantia sive qualitas
sive quantitasgeneralis vel specialisiungit", idest quos iungit idem substantialisstatusper
appellativum significatus aut idem status significatus clunlitativo vel quantitativo vocabulo,
I ii.". significare continget. 2 Inst. gramm. II 25, p. 58'4'1'5Hertz.

hocest qualitatem vel quantitatem copulautc. Proprium vero naturaliter uniuscuiusque

privatam substantiam et qualitatem significat, idest privatum statum alicuius, quicquid
sit illud, determinandocirca illud aliquamcertamqualitatem.ln Libroenim Construccia-
numfrequenter dicitI nomina signiEcare substantiamgeneralem vel specialem, generalem
substantiamvoccmsubstantialemstatumsigniFlcatum
nominegeneris,specialemspeciei.
[cap. 9] The author then discusses the causes of the imposition of the words.
He starts with giving Aristotle's and Boethius."views (2133'3):
Aristotiles tamcn causam inpositionis ipsarum vocum recipiens dixit: eas esse notas
earum passionum que sunt in anima, idest intellectuum. Voces enim inposite sunt rebus
non propter ipsas res —- ipse enim non egent impositione ad sui manifestacionem, cum
sedpropter intellectushabitosde rebusinterpretandos.Magis
sensibussint subiecte-——,
proprie tamen dicerentur interpretari vel constituere intellectus quam signiHcarc.
Boecius quoque ipsam causam impositionis considerans ait3 eas principaliter signiEcare
intellectus,secundariovero res: principaliter, inquit, signiücantintellectus,idest cum
signiFlcent intellectus propter ipsos signiFlcand-Dssive exprimendos sunt inposite;
secundariovero significantres sive appellant,quia cum significantres propter aliud eas
significant, scilicet prapter intellectus. Ad hoc quippe scilicet ut interpretemur, idest
intellectum exponamus, signiFlcamus, non autem ecanverso.
[cap. 10] Then, in a short digression, the author sums up the severalcausesofa
man's choice OFposition as to a problem given: sola auctoritas, auctori-
tatum contrarietas, sola exercitatio, salus usus, ratio cogens absque auctoritate,
ratio cogensauctoritati consentanea.He announces that the last mentioned
causaagreeswith his thesis of the non-equivocality of the terms (ibid.):
Huius autem presidium causesibi defendit que circa 'vocum significationemsuperius
pronuntiata est positio, scilicet nullum .r.-omenplura sigmfmrc. Nam et autorum hoc
perhibet assertioet ilisolubilium rationum persuadetmultitudo.
[cap. II] After this digression our author returns to the status-doctrine against
which several objections are raised. He concludes this section by
discussing the preper sense of signifcarc communem
statum, vel proprium
(213vh):
Demum queritur quid sit voccmsignificarecommunem statumvcl proprium. Ad quod dicunt
quidam quoniam est ipsum menti representare: audita quippe hac voce 'homo' statiua
mensconcipit talem statum in quo conveniunt omneshomines ex eo quod sunt homines;
deinde etiam intelligit rem illius. Sed quia hoc forte diFHcile videbitur intelligere in
propriis, dicunt alii quoniam vox dicitur ideo significare statum, quia apposicionc sua
' Cfr. lnsr. gramm. XVII 37, 1313'" cd. Hertz.

: Dc Interpr. l, I633-4.
3 Cfr. ln Periherm.], 4015"22ed. Meiser; ll, 3337'3'.
ARS MELIDUNA. ON THE THEORV OF TERMS 297
facit illum predicari. Ut predicacionem hic large intelligas: voces quippe instrumenta
sunt predicandi. Et videtur hor.:satisprobabiliter dictum ....... Dicit1 enim Aristotiles
in Prcdicamcnlisloquens de incomplexa signiHcatis, quod quedam eorum significant sub-
stanciam, quedam qualitatem, quedam quantitatem ctc., idest: quedam predicant
qualitatem ctc., hoccst quedam predicacione sua ostendunt quid aliquid sit, quedam
qualealiquid sit etc. Dicit etiam quoniam omnis substanciavidetur hocaliquid significare,
idest predicacione sua circa rem determinare csse singulare. ldeo autem superius
diximus 'prcdicaciancm'large accipiendam Iuro quacumque scilicct assignatione, quia non
omnes dicciones signilïcant tales status qui sint predicabilia. Quod melius tractatus
significatorum expedit.
The last question concerns the: signiücation of the words and is a very [cap.12]-
important one for our author: utrum aliqua vox plures habeat signifcatianes.
His answer is in the negative. In his view neither any noun nor any
proposition is equivocal (ibid.):
Quoniam vocum signiücacionempene suFEcienterexposuimus, consequenserit
expedire utrumaliqua voxplure: habeatsignificationes.Huius autem problematis negacionem
nobis eligimus. Forme enim diversitas ex institutione diversa exigit fürme subiecta.
Ideoque numerum signiücancium iuxta numerum signiücatorum metimur. E quo accidit
nullum nomen esse equiuocum, nullam proposicionem ease multiplicem, nisi forte.
dicatur multiplexquia est in multiplici forma vocis. Est ergo aliud hoc nomen 'canis' quod
est unum huius speciei latrabilc animal, et aliud nomen huius speciei marina belua, sed
tamen ei consimile, velud in eademforma vocis cum illo, sicut similes imaginesdiversa
imitantes inter se sunt diverse. Formam autem vocis appellamusdisposicionem litterarum
et sillabarum in dictione, dictionum in oratione.
The author quotes Aristotle (Soph. E)., 169a25FF.)and Priscian

(Instit. gramm.XVII, 33 ff.) in snpport of his view (2133'13-214-1'3).
What
is equivocal, are the signfcata or nominata; nouns are equivacantiarather
than equivoca.The author also quotes Aristotle, Categ., 1a 1-2 in support
OFhis view (2141'3):
Queri autem potest, cum nomina non sint equivoca, quibus assignanda sit equivocatio.
Ad quod dicimus quod solis significatis vel nominatis. Illa enim debent dici equivoca
equivocata, idest que equivocata, scilicet equis sive equalibus, hocest similibus,
1'.":le
vocibus nominata vel significata (sunt). Nomina vero magis dicenda sunt cquivocantia
quam cquivoca. Unde Aristotiles f:.ïltetur2 in Predicamcntis illa esse equivoca quorum nomen
est commune; hec autem sunt signilïcata et nominata, non nomina. Verbi gracia
'latrabiic animal', 'marina baiua' et res earum equivocantur in hac forma vocis 'canis';
non est ergo equivocacio signiFlcancium sed pocius significatorum vel nominatorum.
The author gives a general solution for all kind of objections clrawn
from the usageof the auctores
(214—Tb):
' Cares. 4, lb25-27. : Categ. l, lal-2.
Que omnia uno modo pertransibisdicto quoniamauctoresdiversanominaeiusdemforme

interdum idem nomen reputant propter expressam similitudinem, sicut et omnia
nomina eandem partem essepropter eundem modum signiEcandi. Ideoque disciplinaliter
loquentes quicquid nominibus eiusdem forme convenit, uni nomini dicunt convenire.
There Follow several rational objections. [ quote some of them

(2141'b'ï'3):
Amplius circa institucionem sic obicitur: hec vox 'bilrrix' modo est non signiücativa et
ipsa potest inponi ad significandum; natura huius vocis non est talis quod ipsa sit magis
idonea ad significandum unum quam aliud; ergo ipsa potest institui ad utrumque
......
lnstituatur ergo hic ad significandumhoc universalehomo,alibi ad hoc universaleasinus;
nunc ergo si usus approbaverit utrmnque inposicionem, signiücabit hec vox plura,
Dicimus quoniam liec vox potest institui ad significandum hac et similiter ad signifi-
candum illud, non tamen ad utrumque illorum vel ad illa ( ). (2144?) Queritur
. .....
iterum utrum aliquod verbum sit communis sensus; nam ex hoc accidet aliquod verbum
plura signilicare. Ad quod solita utemur solutione Rursus queritur utrum
.......
idem nomen sit predicatus terminus utriusque istarum proposicionum: 'animal est
sanum', 'apium cst mnum'. Quo sumpto continget aliquod nomen diversa signiEcm-e in
diversislocucionibuset ita videbitur simpliciter plura significareet sic esseequivocum.
Then the author formulstes his answer to the objections raised in

establishing the main law of the meaning of terms: No term is equi-
vocal in itself ; it may, however, be used in different waysand, conse-
quently, have diHïerent meanings. It is by the context in which it
is used that & word's meaning is determined. (214V'J):
Nos dicimus eundem terminum utrobique sumi et nil prohibere eundem terminum
plura signiücare in diversis locucionibus ex diversis adiunctis. Nec tamen simpliciter
plura significabit, quia illud quod significat tantunn ex adiuncto, non significat. Unde et
ibi inproprie dicitur tunc poni. Itaque non erit propter hoc aliquod nomen cquivocum,
sed cquiroccacceptum.Distat autem inter me equivocumet equivoccaccipi, quia equivoca
esset aliqua dictio si ex diversis institutionibus diversa signiücaret; equivoce vero dicitur
accipi dictio, quia alia 1110thdicitur de uno quam de alio. Ut 'ianum' dicitur de animali
aliter quamde apio vel de urina. Et sic cquivoceaccipi convenit etiam indeclinabilibus.
Et, ut generalius dicatur, omnis ista dictio dicitur accipi equivoce que in oratione posita
[heit ambiguitatem secundumdiversassigniEcationesvel consignificationes.Quod fere
in omni parte orationis invenies. Nomen facit multiplicitatem ut 'canis'; verbum, ut
'iegit', quod aliquando consignificat presens, quandoque preteritum; similiter partici-
pium; adverbium, idest alio tetnpore vel loco vel modo; coniunctio, ut 'si', que
quandoqueconsigniücat continuationem, ut 'si est homo,est animal', quandoque for-
tuitum notat eventum, ut 'si veneris, rapulabis'; prepositio, ut 'de' que quandoque
consignificat materiam, ut 'pannu: est da Iana', quandoque locum, ut 'pannus es.'.de
Flandria', quandoquealiascircumstantiasrerum.
mas MELIDUNA. ON THE THEORV OF TERMS 299
Not every kind of multiplicity causasequivocality, as had been shown

by other logicians (alii) (ibid.):
Non ergo omnis multiplicitas facit equivocacionem. Nec etiam secundum alios. Unde et
ab ipsis solent quinque assignari cause multiplicitatis, scilicet diverso insrimcio, usus,
demonsuocio, relacio, :ronssumpciosive diversa adiuncta. Ex diversa institucione contingit
multiplicitatem Heri, ut in hoc nomine 'canis'. Ex usu, ut in hoc nomine 'piscis', quod
ex institucione convenit animali, ex usu vero tali corpori. Ex diversa demonstracione,
ut in hoc pronomine 'ego'. Ex diversa relatione, ut in 'ipse'. Ex diversis adiunctis, ut in
hoc nomine 'sonum' et in hoc verbo 'ridor'. Cum autem tot sint cause multiplicitatis,
tantum prima secundum eos est causa equivocacionis; vel secundum alios due priores.
The author apparently refers to the School of the Porvipontoni.'

Next the problem of the diverso consignif'cociosexusis discussed in &
rather extensive way. Our author denies that any dictio communis(generis
could be used in another way than denoting one of both sexes deter-
minately (ibid.) :
Poterit iterum hic queri utrum diversaconsignificaciosexusfaciatmultiplicitatem. Quod
constabit. Sit prius quod nulla dictio una probatione plures consigniücet sexus. Hoc
autem redditur probabileex inspectionealiorum accidentium. Verbum enim ut 'iogit'
numquam uno prelacione potest et presens et preteritum consigniücare; dictio etiam
casualis non semel prolata utrumque numerum potest consignificare vel essediversorum
casuum. Unde si dicas: 'isrnd est res', oportet quod determinat ibi hoc nomen 'res'
circa suppositum vel tantum singularem numerum vel tantum pluralem. Similiter si
dicas: 'iste logi: librum pooto', oportet ibi nomen teneri 1ireltantum in vi genitivi casusvel
in vi dativi. Hoc idem etiam videtur ex materna lingua. Que numquam dictione com-
munis generis solet uti ad snpponendun'nres diversorum sexuum una prelacione, sed
comprehendenda rem masculini sexus preponit articulum nmsculinum genus discer-
nentem, rem vcro feminini sexus femininum, dicendo: "li ciroroens ront', 'Ia cireroonne
ront". Dicimus itaque quoniam dictio communis generis, vel 'omnis', semper sumitur
secundumalterius sexus consigniHcationem.Ideoque in hac forma vocis: 'omniscivis
currit' sunt due propositiones, quarum una potest esse vero pro solis maribus, altera pro
solis mulieribus. Quud palamerit si easGallico exponas.Est ergo vera utraque istarum:
'omniscivisost.moscnlinus','omniscivisostjoniinino',nec potest fieri conceptio generumsub
nomine communi semel pusitü sed vel eo repetito, ut 'iste civis et illo civis sunt albi', vel
sumptis sub illo nominibus diversorum sexuum, ut 'vir otjomino snnt olbi', aut Priamus
ot Ecubo.
Some scholars, hox-vever,are of a different Opinion. The)-rthink that,

under certain conditions, the dictio communisgeneris can refer to both
sexesat the same time and together (2141;'J-2l 5"):
Quidam tamen de huiusmodi nominibus communibusaliter iudicant dicentes quoniam
una prelacione possunt supponere res utriusque sexus; sed non cum quolibet predicato,
! See Log. Mod. !, pp. 66-67; 136.

300 Locrcn MODERNORUM 11
quia nonnisi cum illo quod potest communiter copulari nomini communi sumpto cum
signis utriusque generis. Ut cum dicitur: 'omnis civis est album', supponuntur res utriusque
sexus,quia communiter dicitur 'at quilibetcivisar quolibetcivises.'.
album'. Sedcum dicitur:
'omnis civis est albus', non supponuntur nisi res masculini sexus, quia non communiter
dicitur: 'et quilibet civis et quolibet civis estalbus'. Et preterea ista propositio 'ciris estalbus'
non potest essevera nisi pro mare. Si igitur ex hac: 'omniscivis estalbus' inferatur ista:
'omnis civis est album', idem erit ac si ad partem subici universaliter inferas totum subici
universaliter (2151'0) Alii rursus aliter senciuntponentestale nomen
...... .......
res utriusque sexus supponere quociens ei signum communis generis preponitur ......
The author concludes this section by giving a general answer to the

objections raised (2 l SH) :
Postremo autem generaliter onmes qui plurale recipiunt dici de singulari, facile erit
persuaderenullum nomen plura significare, velud qui ponunt nomen esseplures voces,
( ...... )'. es fuisseplures statuas,aut fluvium plures aquas.Similiter enim debent
accipere hanc vocem 'canis' esse plura nomina, quia ad esse nominis duo exiguntur: vox
et institucio quemadmodum ad esse statue materia et forma. Unde et diversitas in-
stitucionum ad diversa signiFncancla
secundum eos debet facere diversitatem nominum
circa eandem voccm, quia nullum nomen erit equivocum, sed vox. Et hoc quidem
veterum pleriquc arbitrati sunt ponentes hanc vocem 'canis' csse tria nomina. Sed quia
contrarium est nostre discipline, que nunquam recipit appositiones
hoc dicere 1eralczla
pluralisadsingulareet econverso,dicimusquodsemperdiversitatemnominumcomitatur
diversitas vocum.
[cap. 13] THE PARSPRIMA ends with an extensive discussion of the appellatio
vocum.The author starts from the distinction between the nomenproprium,
which is always taken in the same way, whatäver predicate it is followed
which variesits appellationaccordingto
by, and the nomenoppoHotivum,
the diFFerent tenses of the verb in the proposition. Then he gives the
three regulas corresponding with the three main tenses of the verb
(2I5W'V'J):
Post hec autem que de vocum signiEcatione dicta sunt, paucade appellatione adiungen-
dum. Notabis igitur nominum (215'ib) alium (!) esse nomen proprium, alium appel-
lativum; et proprium quidem eandemhabere acceptionem quolibet predicato sequente,
appellativa vero variare appelacionemsuamsecundumdiversitatem temporum. (1) Nam
sequenteverbo presentistemporis habetappellationemad ea tantum que sunt, ut 'omnis
homoestanima!' verum est, licet eorum qui desierunt vel incipient essenullus sit animal,
exceptis tamen verbis admodum paucis, de quibus deinceps! (2) Cum verbo vero-
preteriti temporis habet appellationem ad ea que sunt et que fuerunt, ut 'omnishamofuil
animai' vera est, scilicctl et omnils] qui est et omnils] qui fuit, licet nulli eorum qui
incipient esse.Unde et incongrue dicitur 'aliquis homoos: (vel nones:)id quodipsedesii:
esse'.(3) Cum verba autem futuri temporis ad eaque sunt et que erunt, ut 'omnishomo
lia
' tafl csse plura [) MS. 2 Vide infra, f. 2l6ï'b (below, pp. 30l-302. 3 si MS.
ARS MELIDLINA. ON THE THEOIW OF TERMS 301
crit isniimsl',l licet nullis qui obierunt.. Et idem signiflcat 'omnis homo erit onimoi' quod
'omnis qui es.':vol crit oris animal'.
Next the specialcaseof the disjunction is discussed(2161'3): [CEP-

14]
Sequensautem erit his inquirere utrum similiter in disiunctione sumendum sit iudicium
appellationis subiecti termini :. precedente verbo an a toto termino disiuncto, ut utrum
hec sit vera: 'aliquis homoes.'.volfuis Cosor'. Volunt quidam quod semper a verbo prcce-
dente, nec recipiunt terminum disiunctum cum verbis diversorum temporum habere
vim extendendi appellationem. At vero secundum hos erunt omnes iste vere: 'nullus
homoest veifuit Ccsor'; 'unus solusphilosophusest voi jiiit'; 'unum solum momentum cst vol
fuii' ; 'quicquid cssveijuit est'. Et hoc incongrue dicetur: 'omnisphilosophusestvoijisir', sed
incongrue: 'omnisphiiosophusjuiirei est'. ( ...... ) Nos dicimus quod terminussic
disiunctus appellationem ad
extendit ea que fuerunt vel erunt, quemadmodum si precedat
in disiunctione verbi preteriti temporis aut futuri. Non ergo quemadmodum in coniunc-
tione, ita etiam in disiunctione sumendum erit iudicium :: procedente verbo, sed pocius
& toto termino disiuncto.l Huius autem causa manifesta est quin in aliquibus terminis
disiunctio convenit non existenti in quibus non copulatio, ut 'Cosor csl: rci jiiis', non
tamen 'est Et 'fuit'. Natura quippe disiunctarum est ut cuicumque convenit altera pars
disiuncti conveniatetiampredicatusdisiunctus.Undelicet non commodedicatur: 'omnis
roso est', tamen dicetur: 'omnis roso est rei jiiii' propter alteram partem disiuncti qua
dicitur de subiectoomni. Similiter omnis philosophusest vg! fuit, etiam si tantum duo
fuerunt et nunc primo sit tertius. Pertinet enim hec appellatio tam ad eum qui non est
quam ad eos qui prius ......
The ampliation and restriction OF the appellation is discussed in the

following lines (2161'3):
Secundum predictum iudicium non omne animal est vel fuit rationale, licct omne sit
rationale, et incongrue dicitur 'omneanimal' dicis.(rei lcgis) id quod ipsumdicis', propter
irrationalia que fuerunt, ad que extenditur nominis appellatio. Quidam tamensumunt
veritatem huiusmodi propositionum non secundum ampliationem aut restrictionem
appellationis. DiFEcile enim inquiunt iudicare quantum amplictur Fel restringatur
nominissic positi appellatio,sedpotiusex equipollentiapropositionum......
When giving the main regulas for the appellation oF terms (2l53'b; ICEP- IS]
seeabove, p. 300) our author pointed to an exception to the Erst regula
formed by a few verbs (exceptistomen verbisadmodumpaucis, de quibus
deinceps).Now, he dealswith theseverbs: 'potest', ')oquitur', 'promittitur'
(216vb-217V'J). [give some texts (216Vb-217f'1):
Sunt alia verba presentis temporis cum quibus extenditur appellatio nominis ad res
alterius temporis, ut 'aliquis homopotestesseAntichrissus',non qui sit, sed qui erit. Et
ideo cum tali quoque, sicut cum verbo futuri temporis, comprehendit nomen in uni-
' Compnre Fa". PorI-'ip.,1").56420'26ed. Dc Rijk.

versali tam ea que sunt quam ea que fuerunt Quibusdam tamen videtur in
......
onmibushuiusmodisolaexistentiacomprehendi.Sedvidetur essesillogismus:
'omne animal potest essehomo
sed omnis asinus potes: esseanimal
ergo omnis asinus potest essehomo.'

( ...... 217m ) Notabis igitur in his veram esse consequentiam in singulari
. .....
vel particulari, sed non similiter in universali. Nam si hoc animal est homo, hoc animal
potestessehomo, et si aliquodest, aliquodpotestesse,sednon si omneest, omnepotest
esse.Similiter si aliquid est, aliquid potest esse,sed non si quidlibet est, quidlibet potest
esse ( ...... 2171'73 ) Similiter etiam 'laquitur' extendit appellationem
. ......
dictionis natantis niodum locutionis. Nam qui loquitur de Cesare1..rtsl
Antichristo, lo-
quitur de aliquo homine, non qui modo sit aliquishomo, sed qui fuit vel erit. Et ideo
hec universalis: 'de omni homineloquitur isne"comprehenditomne id pro quo aliquis
dicitur loqui de aliquo hmnine, scilicet onmium temporum homines, et forte omnes
illos qui possunt essesed non erunt. De quovis enim istorum loquendo dicitur quis
loqui de aliquo homine. Sed: 'omnishomoloquiturde aliquo' non comprehendit nisi
homines qui nunc sunt, quia illis solis convenit loqui.
Item. Non omnis homo supponitur locutioni aliquo istorum nominum 'Socrates','Plam',
'Cicero', quia snpponitur aliquis hoc: nomine Cesar, et sic non de omni homine agitur
aliquo istorum nominumnec omnis equusprmnittitur pro illis qui sunt, quia 'promirci'
verbum est rerum onmium temporum. Sed 'omnis equuscs: aliquod promissum'solis
convenitexistentibus.
[cap. 16] Next our author discusses the nomina accidentalia. Some were of the
opinion that these nouns do not vary their appellation according to the
diversity of tenses.Our author is of the contrary opinion (217vb):
Deinde considerandumest utrum nomina accidentaliasequanturnaturam aliorum
nominum, variandoscilicet appellationemsuamsecundumdiversitatemtemporum. Et
suntquibushoc non videtur, sedpotiusquodsemperin subiectopositafaciantpositionem
circa presens.Quod intelligendum. Ut 'aibusfui: rc! erit,', idest id quodmodoestalbus.
Unde et aliquod sanumfuisse Cesaremvel aliquod album fare Antichristum. ( )
......
Eodemetiam modo opinantur cle participio presentistemporis et nomen relativum, ut
'currensfuit id quodcurrit'. Similiter autem et orationem constantemex nominativo ct
genitivo arbitrantur in subiectofacerepositionemexistentia. At his obviat Aristotiles in
Elenchislubi ponenshuncparalogisn'uum equivocationis:
"quicumque sanabatur sanus est
sed laborans sanabatur
erga laborans sanus est.'
dicit in eo falli ex hoc quod 'laborans'quandoquesigniücatquod nunc laborat quanclo(que)
qui laborabat prius. Priscianus etiam manifeste dicitz tale participium presens tempus et
preteritum inperfectum consigniücare. Idem etiam hanc orationem 'jï'hus Pdci' in
' Cfr. Soph. El. [6631-6.

2 Inst. gramm. XVII, 180, p. 19923'26ed. Hel'tz.
ARS MELIDLINA. ON THE THEORT OF TERMS 303
secundo Constructionumsic reseivit, idest qui es.':veifuitjilius Poloi, dicens:! "est quando
per eclipsum(!) verbi vel participii verbi substantivi constructio nominativi cum
obliquis solent proferri, ut 'jïlius PoloiAchillesmultosinterfecit Troianos'; subauditur cnim
participium verbi substantivi 'ens', quod nunc in usu nobis non est, pro quo possumus
dicere: 'qui est veifuitjilius Palai'."
Accidentalia quoque frequenter posita inveniuntur absque positione existentia. Ut
'occcvirgo concipio: etc.'
......
Rationibus etiam videtur hec opinio posse interimi. ( ) Nos recipimus in
......
his omnibus extensionem Fieri appellationis, sicut etiam in nominibus illis que instantiales
vel naturalescupulant proprietates. Licet ergo iste modo non sit albus, tamen aliquod
album fuit iste, idest aliquid quod est vel fuit album. Et 'aliquod sanumfuit Cesar' et
'aliquod vivenseris rlnsichristus'. Similiter 'aliquis seneserat puor' et 1"aliquod necessario
falsun'ualiquod inpossibile verum preterita etiam forte sunt futura et asini mortui vivent,
idest qui sunt vel erunt mortui. At ex hoc videntur multa accidereinprobabilia, ut
'aliquod albumfuit iste homoquandoaliquod nigrum', et econversn; et 'aliquis sonoserit
Sednechocfateri verendum,sicut et alii
quandoaliquispuercrit Antichristus'.
Antichristus,
recipiunt: 'aliquod fuaurum vel aliquod nasciturum erit Antichristus, quandocumquealiquod
.'
.
animal
.
The last subject our author expressly moots in the section on the [cap. 17]
appellation of the terms is the problem concerïiing the terminus nulli
such as 'rosa' in 'rosaest', or 'rosanonest' (218vü):
conveniens,
His ita determinatis hoc: solum circa terminorum appellationem restat inquirendum
utrum terminus nulli conveniens per appellationem possit congrue sumi ad supponen-
dum verbo presenti aHirmato vcl negato, ut dicatur bene 'rosaestvel nonost'. Quod non
patitur ratio. Nam terminus in subiecto vult poni pro aliquo suorum appellatorum.
Unde cum nil subest eius copulationi, non habet ibi locum velud non habens quid com-
prehendat. Cum verbo enim presenti non pertinet ad preterita vel futura, ut ex supra-
dictis palam.Ad hoc autemsi commodeet vere dicitur 'aliqua rosanonest', oportebit
necessario hoc intelligi aut pro preterita aut pro futura. Et sic habebit nomen appellatio-
nemcum presentiad resaliorum temporum; quodsuperiusnegavimus.Nec crit assignare
quare similiter posito multas incipere esse non sit verum aliquam rosam non esse; nam
illa adhuc non est pro qua dicebatur aliquam non esse. Et eadem ratione dicetur quod
aliquis homo modo non est et sic non quilibet est.
item. Aliqua rosanon est si aliqua rosaest 1-ipsaexistit vel sic assume:si aliqua fuit ipsa
extitit; ergo aliqua non est et ipsa non existit; ergo aliqua rosa non est et ipsa extitit vel
non extitit; quelibet rosa extitit; ergo aliqua non est et ipsa extitit. Sed quecumque
extitit, nec est nec erit; ergo aliqua nec est nec erit et ipsa extitit et sic aliqua nec est
nec erit; ergo aliqua nec: est nec erit; ergo non omnis est vel erit. ( ...... )
[dem ex adiectivis vcl participiis incongrue dictum esse ostenditur. Nam constans est
' lust. gramm. XVIII, 6, p. 2125'10 ed. Hertz.: est autem quando per ellipsin verbi vel
participii substantivihuiuscemodi casuum(id est nominativi cum obliquis) constructio
soleat preferri, ut 'filius Poloi Achilles multosintodocit Troianos'; subauditur enim parti-
cipium verbi substantivi'ens', quod in usu nunc nobis non est; pro quo possumle'qui
vel quifuit. Peleij'lius' dicere vel subaudire.
es.'.
non posseconvenienter dici alba essevel non essesi nil sit album. Ex hoc enim accideret
albentia esse vel non esse et alba non esse candida. Similiter animalia essevel non esse
inferret viventia essevel non esse. ( ...... ) Sunt quidem qui indeFmitam recipiunt:
'rasa non est' et 'rosc non sunt', et etiam universalem negativam: 'nulla rosaest', sed alia
signanegantposseapponi. Sedsi universalisnegativaest vera, videtur quod necessario
eius subalterna sit vera: 'aliqua rosa non est', et contradictoria falsa: 'aliqua rosa est.'. Erit
etiam secundum hoc invenire universalem veram absquesingulari.
The situation is complicated when such verbs as 'potest' are used:

Item. 'aliqua rosa non potest esselilium; rosa non est lilium; ergo aliqua rosa
non est lilium'.
The author gives his own opinion in the following lines (218vb):
Nobis videtur quod quia semper tam in subiecto quam in predicato aut etiam per se
prolata aliquid determinate faciunt intelligi, possunt cum quolibet verbo sumi ad illud
supponendum. Ex hoc tamen 1vidcturaccidere inprobabile, ut hanc consequentiamesse
falsam: 'si Socratesasl, aliquis homo est' vel 'si Burncllus est, aliquis asinusest', eoquod
antecedens possit esseverum vel falsum sine consequenti. Sed non ob hoc fateri neces-
snrium. Nam ad hoc ut aliqua consequentia sit vera, non exigitur quod antecedens non
possit esse verum vel falsum sinc consequenti, sed exigitur tantum quod sine eo verum
essenon possit. Neque enim habet regula quod si verum vel Falsumest antecedens,et
consequens,sedsi verum est hoc, et illud.
Licet autem in subiecto predicti termini vitium faciant, tamen non equum est ut
quoniam ibi habent poni dietiones inFlnite et confuse. Sit itaque
similiter in prfuzli-fJatall
congrue dictum: 'nil cst roso', sed non contingit ad predicatum resolutionem Fieri
respecto eodem verbo ut dicatur: 'nil cst rosaqueestvel nonest', sed cum subiunctivo, ut
'nil ost rosaquesit vel quanon sit'. Et poterit quidem addi signum particulare, ut 'nil est
aliquo rosa'. At universale additum vitium faciet, quia nulla sunt appellata huius nominis
'rosa' quorum vellet Faceredistributionem. ( ).;
......
The PRIMA PARSis concluded with a determinatioby our author of the

related question whether such expressions as 'homo albus', may be used
as predicate terms ofa proposition (21B")):
Rursus. Posito nullum hominemessealbum, queritur utrum hoc substantivum et illud
adiectivumpossintsibi inmediatcconiungiin predicato.Quod quidamnon recipiunt,
velud nec in subiecto. Nam idem est, inquiunt, 'homoalbus'cum verbo presentiquod
'homoqui estalbus', tam in subiecto quam in predicato. Adiectivum tamen per se sumetur
convenienter: 'nullus homo est albus'. Sed si posueris nil esse album, non poterit album
sumi subsistere, quoniam idem est 'album' quam 'res alba'.
Nobis videtur recipiendumquod nil est homo albus vel res alba, sed non aadem
ratione nil est homo cornutus et homo irrationalis. Nam ex homineet albo bene Et unum
et signiFlcatiste terminus 'homoalbus' aliquid quod non est sed fuit homo existente albo.
Undeet potestsupponereverbo preteriti aut futuri. Sedhomo et cornutusvcl irrationalis
adeosibi sunt oppositaquod numquamex eis potcst Fieri unum, sed erit appositio in
adiecto. Non itaque dicimus: 'nil est homoalbus' sub hoc sensu idest nil est homoqui sit
ans MELIDLINA. ON THE THEOR'J' OF TERMS 305
albus. Nam secundumhoc essentet predicte vere. Sed: nulli convenit, sive a nullo
participatur, significatio huius termini 'homo albus'. Neque instet quis eadem ratione
incongrue dictum esse: 'nil m cornu hominü'; nam hic est transitio personarum inter
'haminix' et 'cornu'. Sed illa intransitive volunt intelligi.
Item: 'nil es.'.homoalbus'; ergo nil est Socrates vel Platü vel alius homo albus; ergo
nil est Socratesalbus; ergo nil est iste homo albus; quare nil est hoc animal album; et sic
nil est hoc album, demonstrato nigro.
In quo Et solutio dicto adiectivum inconvenienter adiungi nomini proprio immediate.
Sit ergo huius prime orationis instantia: 'quihbc: homo currit; ergo quilibet Socrates ve!
Plato vel alius homo currit'.
Et hec de terminis sufficiant.
CHAPTER VIII
THE ARS MELIDUNA.

ON THE DENOTATION OF THE TERMS
The SECUNDA PARSdiscussestwo main themes: the problems con-

cerning the universaliaand those concerning the singularia. See above,
pp. 264 and 266. After a short prologue(for the text, seeabove,p. 266)
the author defmes (218V'J) the term 'umversale'with Aristotle (Dc
Interpr., 172139-4-0):universaleestquodesl:natumpredicaridepluribus.
[cap. 1] I There are two contrary opinions about the nature of the universale;
some scholars consider it as:: pure term, others as:- thing. Both Opil'liOl'lS
are rather weak, our author says(218V'J):
Sedillud predicabile[sc. universale]quid sit, utrum scilicct sit resan terminus,contingit
dubitare. Quidam enim ponunt solos terminos cssepredicabilia, alii rcs, idest termino-
rum signiEcata.Sed ad neutram partem problematis cst argumentis habundarc. Nam, ut
ait Aristütilcs in Tapicis, circa artium principia difficile argumentabilcm accidit essc
propositionem (f 218Vb).
.
[cap. 2] Those who hold the universaliamerely for terms End Aristotle, Porphyry
andBoethiusagainstthem. The author adds(2 1911):
Ex hoc etiam coguntur huius sententieprofessoresrecipere plures terminos esseidem
predicabile; aut si non fateantur, oportet duasspeciesspecialescssepares, ut homoet
antmpos;quod tamen videtur essecontra artem.
[cap. 3] Those who hold the contrary Opinion in considering the universalia
asthingsare alsorefutedby our author (f. 2191'3'1'13).

[cap. 4] He explains liis own opinion at great length (219fb):
Nos dicimus quoniam omne universale est res quedam intelligibilis et a pluribus parti-
cipabilis, idest quiddam quod solo intellectu habet percipi. Unde Boetius retractans
Opinionesphilosophorumde generibuset speciebus:Plato inquitz ideasquasdamsive
formasgeneraet speciescsseputabat; at Aristotiles intellectam similitudinmn rerum
differentium specie vel numero genus putat essevel speciem; intellectamvcro dixit, quia
' These indications refer to m)- division of the work; seeabove, p. 266 Ff.
2 Cfr. In 1503.II, p. 167lïsqq.
aas MELIDUNA. ON THE DENOTATION OF THE TERMS 307
non imaginationevel sensucorporeopercipiuntur genuset species,ut nec visunec auditu,

sed sola ratione et intellectu sive rationabili intellectu. Sicut testatur idem Boetius in
libro De consolatione,ubi de ratione loquens ait': "que quidem cum universale percipit
non sensuvel imaginationeutenssensibiliaapprehendit",hoccst: ratio qua sue con-
ceptionis universale sibi diFFlnit: 'homo est animal' etc.; et paulo inferiusï: "illa suum
universale non sensu vel imaginatione sed sola ratione considerat"; quod autem dicit:
similiter diH'crentium specie referendum est ad genus, similitudo autcm differentium
numero ad speciem..Est enim genus intellecta similitudo plurium diH'crcntium numero.
Genus idcirco dicitur similitudo plurium quia ipsum est quasi quadam similitudü sive
convenientia eorum a quibus ipsum participatur. Attendat enim aliquis in quo ostenditur
convenire homoet asinusquando dicitur esseanimalia, et ubi ipse fuerit, animal inveniet
illud esse, hoc generale; res enim que est homoet res que est asinusin illo genere con-
veniunt, cum sint rcs illius generis. Quod tamensimilitudo frequentiussolet essenomen
relationis, nc vidcamurponerc genuset speciesesscrelationes,sub aliis verbis cadam que
prius teneatur sententia ut dicatur: genus est intellecta communio rerum specie differen-
tium, species vero intellecta communio rerum numero diH'crcntium. Sed quoniam
etiam universalia videntur essehuiusmodi communiones, addendum erit aliquid predictis
descriptionibus, hoc modo: genus est intellecta communio rerum differentium specie
cuilibet carum conferensut ipsaaliquid sit. Ex eo enim quod res aliqua est homo vel
animal, est aliquid. Non autemsimiliter ex eo quod est albumvel rationale,sedpotius
alicuiusmodi. '
The universaliaare also called essererum (the being of the things), and, [cap. 5]
consequently, other definitions of the several universaliaare given. The
author mentiens the indijäremia-theoryl (ibid.):
Solent ctiam universalia essererum appellari, ut hoc universale animal indifferens esse
hominum [hominum], hoc individuum 'Socrarcs'proprium esseSocratis.Unde et alie
solent dari descriptiones, hoc. modo: genus est indiFFcrcnssubstantia rerum dichrcntium
numero, substantia, idest substantiale esse:et predicabile in substantiam, idest in quid,
indifferens,idest conrenirefacicns,
utpotc eaa quibusparticipatur.Si queraturutrum sit
idem esseSocratiset Platonis,quia idem essespeciale,vel Socratisct Burnelli, quia idem
essegenerale, dicendum quia non, eoquod non sit idem essesingularehuius quod illius,
sicut nec idem est nomen istorum, licet idem sit nomen commune eorum, nec isti sunt
in eodem loco licet in hoc mundo. Et preterea non est concedendumidem em participari
a Socrate et Platone, quamvis idem esse generale. Hoc tamen sumpto non accideret
idem esse illorum esse;sicut: 'isti: convenitidem nomen', non tamen idem nomen est
nomen istorum et 'eadem vas prqjimur ab istis', non tamen eadem est vox istorum.
Others say that not a single universale or singulare is esserei. Therefore [cap. 6]
they explain the deFmitions given in & different way. Our author seems
to agreewith their view (ibid.):
' De cansa]. phil. V 4, p.. [34:00-102 cd. Pcipcr.

: Cfr. ibid. p.. 134105-1W.
3 For this theory, sco.überwcg-Geycr, pp. 2l ] and 218.
Alii dicunt quod nullum universale vcl singulare est esserei, sed esseSocratisest constitutio
eius ex partibusillis suis, nc necessesit confiteri plurimum quodlibet mc Socratisesse.
Unde et predictas descriptiones sic intelligunt: genusest indigemussubstantiaetc., idest
indilTercns substantia vel status. Non sunt ergo universalia substantie nec proprietates,
sed habent suum esseper se, sicut enuntiabilia, tempora, et voces, et fama. Quare sunt
extra sensibilia et extra intelliguntur, ut hec species homovel hoc individuum Socrates
extra Socratem, sed tamen circa ipsum intelligitur. Si enim esset in eo, oporteret ut in
eo essettamquampars vel tamquam proprietas nec esset intelligibile qualiter aliquid
quod partes non haberet essetin pluribus. Ad hec autem, quid inprobabilius quam
universalia essein digito vel in naso aut in posteriore asine! Dicuntur tamen participari
a sensibilibus.quia circa ea intelliguntur et illa sunt res eorum ut quilibet homo (est) res
huius universalis homo, idest quilibet homo est homo. Sicut dicitur aliquid esse res
alicuius maneriei vcl alicuius natura, non quia mancries sit in aliquo. Et cum dicitur
est albus' vel 'Socratescurrit', aliquid ostenditur Socrati inesse, sed illud nullo
'Se-crater
termino ibi posito signilïcatur. Nam hoc universale 'album' predicatione sua ostendit
inesse albedinem quam tamen non signiücat; et 'currit' similiter cursum. Dicto vero
Socratemesseanima] vel subnanriam nil Socrati adesse vel abesse ostenditur, sed circa
ipsum intelligi. Nam illa non sumuntur.
chce a noticeable corrolary about the difference between iste homo

and isteasinusfollows (ibid.) :
Item. Sicut recipimus universalia non esse in sensibilibus, sed in individuis, idust in
singularibus sub eis contentis, similiter etiam concedimus sensibilibus nil esse sub-
stantiale sed solis universalibus et singularibus, ut hoc genus animai huic speciei hama,
quia exigitur ad esse illius et constituit eam cum differentiis tamquam pars integralis.
DiFFerunttamen iste homoet iste asinussubstantialiter sed non substantiali diFFerentiavel
substantialibus, quia neutri aliquid est substantiale, sed substantialiter, idest tota sub-
stantiasive essentia; similiter isteasinuset hoc individuum hama,quorum huic aliquid est
substantiale, illi vero nil; vel, quod verius est: diFferur-t hic homoet hic asinus istis
differentiis rationale, irrationale non quia sint eis substantiales, sed quia eorum speciebus.
[cap. 7] Some other questions concerning the same subject are raisecl and
answered. Finally, the author mentions. those peoPIe who distinguish the
diffinitio vocalis from the dij'initio realis; this distinction, however, is
rejecteclby him (2193'3):
Quidam tamen duo constituunt diFEnitionumgenera: diFFmitionemvocalemet diFFmitio-
nem realem sive diFHnientem ct cliFFmitam,difïinitionem realem appellantes significatum
vocalis, idest illius que est vox. Sed hec in nullo autore recipiuntur.
[cap. 8] Next our author deals with the well-knox-vnquestion whether the
cleFmitiongiven can be applied to each universaleand to it only (utrum
ipsaamni universaliconveniatet soli (2193'3).
ARS MELIDUNA. ON THE DENOTATION 01: THE TERMS 309
The question OFwhether the word 'philosophus'may, or not, receive [cap. 9]

the addition of a universal sign ('omnis', 'nullus') is amply discussed.
Pour cliFferenttheses(positiones)
are mentioned (2l9ï")-2201*11).
The author clealswith the wcll-known division of universaleinto genus, [cap. 10]
species,deE-rentia, proprium, and accidens. He concludes the discussion
with another division of the universale(220343):
Ex predictis itaque palamuniversalesic dividi quod aliud est substantiale,aliud naturale,
et aliud accidentale. Dicitur autemaliquod universaleessesubstantialequod semper ad-
estet estcausasubsistendi,ut generaet specieset substantiales diFfercntie.Hec enim sunt
causa rei, alia vero minime, ut risibile vcl coloratum. Quod tamen ins-Leparabilialsi(n)t
causa rei plus ex veterum auctoritate quam ratione scitur. Quod enim perceptibile
disciplinevel mortalesuntsubstantiale,et risibileet navigabilcminimesedtantumnaturale,
credo pro Aristotile. Nec huius quidcm rationem dialeticorum sed potius phisicormn,
qui causasrerum et naturas considerant, iter est assignare.
The last chapter of this section (A) is devotecl to the division and [cap.11]
interrclations OFthe predicabilia (220WJ):
Solent etiam quadripertita sic predicabilia distingui quod alia sunt paria, alia opposita,
alia pars et totum, alia excedentia et excessu. Quorum onmium habitudines et proprie-
tates hic breviter attingendum, prenotata tamen illam distirictitzunemznon essesuFHcien-
tem. Neque enim complectitur hec universalia( ..... )3 sanum, posito sola animalia
essesana. Sed est per opposita, quia nulla quo uno tempore sub uno dividentium cadunt,
possunt in eodem tempore vel in alio sub alio contineri. Non enim erunt hec universalia
hamo,albu: pars et totum, licet posueris omnem hominem essealbum, et non econverso;
nec paria, si contingat omnem hominem esse album, et econverso; quare tunc esset
locus a pari: 'homo; ergoalbum'.
The second section (B) discussesthe terms signifying the universalia

(221V3; seeabove, p. 267).
First the terms 'res', 'aliqufd', iens', and 'unum' are discussed. Thtz)r [cap. 1]
do not signify & universale(2213'5).
The nomina irfnita such as inon-hamo', 'non-asinus' do not signify & [cap. 2]
universaleeither (221W):
' insaparabiliumMS. 2 distingcionem (!) MS.

3 homo (?) MS.
Rursus. Nominum que non omnibus conveniunt, sed quibusdam, alia conveniunt
generibus singulorum et non singulis generum, — ut nomine inlïnita: 'non-homo',
'non-asinus'—, alia non. Nullum inEnitum significat universale, quia nullum statum ponit
in re subiecta sed potius perimit Enitum. Cum enim dico: 'iapis est non—homo', nichil
certum circa lapideri: determino, nec aliquid attribuo, sed potius quid non sit ostendi:).
[cap. 3] The author deals withthe important distinction between the nomina
rerum and the nomina vocum or those that are called nomina secunde in-
positionis.'The latter never signify :: universale (ibid.):
Amplius. Finitorum cuilibet convenientium alia sunt nomina vocum, que dicuntur
nomina secundeinpositionis, alia rerum. De nominibus vocum dicimus quod non
signiEcant universalia, ut 'nomen', 'verbum', 'potronomicum', 'possessivuni','orotio', 'propo-
sirio'. He autem voces non sunt res alicuius generis generalissimi, ut nec substantie nec
quantitates uec qualitates. Et eadem ratione nec nomina enuntiabilium, ut 'verum',
ïoisum', 'necessarium', 'possibile'ncc nomina habitudinum:sive appellationesuniversalium,
ut 'genus', 'species','dig'erentio', 'propriam' et 'accidens', nequc nomina collective, ut
'populus', 'grex', 'chorus' et generaliter nullum nomen nisi res ei subiecta sit, (est) res
alicuius predicamenti; ne contingat aliquid esse universale quod nec sit generalissi-
mum nec sub generalissimo contentum.
[cap. 4] Of the nomina rerum those which denote an ortefactum do not signifyr &
universale(ibid.):
Amplius. Nomina ipsarum rerum hec quidem-suntnomina rerum artificialium, ut 'domus',
'stomo', 'pollium'; illa vero naturalium, ut 'homo', 'osinus'. Nullum nomen rei artiFlcialis,
idest conveniens rei ex eo quod contraxit ab artiFnce,significat universale, quia potius sig-
niFlcaretgenusvcl speciemquamaliud universale,quod tamen significarenon potest.
Nam genera et species sunt nature rerum, idest naturales earum status. Sed status illi qui
per huiusmodi nomina signiFlcantur potius sunt artiFlciales quam naturales, idest non
conveniunt rei naturaliter sed per artilïcium. Et preterea hec nomina non simpliciter
indicant quid, sed quale.
[cap. 5] No nomennumeralesignilïes & universale(ibid )

Rursus. Nullum nomen numerale significat universale, ut 'duo', 'trio', 'quinque', quia
non quelibet eorum sunt res alicuius generis generalissimi, ut voces et enuntiabilia.
Quodlibet etiam eorum abest generalissimoquoniam nulla substantiavel quantitas est
duo. Accideret ctiam aliquod singulare predicari de pluribus, si huiusmodi nomina
significarent universalia. Ut hoc singulare hec duo de his individuis: Socrates Plato in
hac propositione: 'Socrateset Plato suntduo' et eadem inspectione hoc singulare heemille
de mille. Similiter dicendumde hoc signiFlcato'oquuot'. Si enim significaretuniversale,
possct ei addi pronomen dcnwnstrativum ad signiEcandum singulare sub eo contentum.
! Cfr. ]ohn of Salisbury, rI-lerolog.!, 15-16, discussedabove, pp. 217-218.

ARS MELIDLINA. ON THE DENOTATION 01: THE TERMS 311
The samecan be saidof the nomen possessivum(ibid .): [cap. 6]
The univelsale cannot be denoted by a nanumj'i'g.'1r143.'1l:i.,,l

such as ichimera [cap. 7]
or Ihircoccrvus'(22 1M' V'J):

Item. Nullo nomine Flgmenti, ut 'chimera', 'hircocervus',quia nullo generalissimopossunt
subici, sed sunt cuilibet opposita nec ponunt aliquem statum in re subiecta. At vero de
his qua modo nulli per appellationem conveniunt, sed convenerunt, (221ï'b) recipimus
quod significent universalia. Si ea quandoque signiücaverint, ut 'Iilium' et 'rosa', signiFl-
cant duo universalia que non sunt nec tmnen ideo aliqua non sunt, sicut 'Ccsar' et 'zlnti-
christus" duos homines supponunt locutioni qui non sunt et tamen omnes sunt. Et iste
qui mentitur dicit aliquid quod non est, tamen.quidlibet est; et falsa propositio aliquid
significat quod non est.
Not by & quantifying sign (signum) or any other syncategorematicï[cap. 8]

term (such as 'solum', 'tantum', 'pretcr', 'ah'ud', IE«:iivwzrstmi",,
(idem') or
any relative or interrogativa term either (221ï'h).
Some pe0ple say the same of the terms that denote some official [cap. 9]
function, such as '!ector', iscriptar' (ibid.). "
The nominacamparativaand superlativa are also excluded (ibid.): [cap. 10]
Comparativa quoque et superlativa solent excipi, eoquod difFlcillimum sit assignare

predicationem. Neque enim ponitur signiücatum comparativi, cum dicitur: 'Socrates
est albior Platone'; ne contingat aliquod universale predicari de aliquo singulari et ab
eodem removeri. Nam 'Socartcscst aibior Platoneet non est albiar Ciceronc'. Ad hec autem
si aliquid in illa propositionc predicaretur, potius ibi predicaretur signiEcatumhac
oratione 'albjor Platonc' quam aliud, quippe illa oratio est predicatus terminus illius.
Ad hec, si 'albior' significat universale, potius predicabile vel ad aliquid quam alio modo,
cum ipsum dicatur in respectu; sicut et 'pater'. Quare predicatione sua ostendit inesse
relationem, uon qualitatem. Et ita 'albior' non eandem copulabit qualitatem cum
au(g)mento quam suum positivum sine au(g)mento, scilicet albcdincm. Non sint ergo
'universaliasedeis similia huiusmodi nominum significata.
ConnumcranturtameninterdumabAristotile inter vererelativasecundumopinionem
Platonis vel propter similitudinem quam habent cum eis, in hoc scilicet quod dicuntur
in respectu.
The casusobliqui signif)lr the same universaleas the casusrecti clo (ibid ) [cap. II]
Some people think that the universaleis only signiFledby the casusrectus [cap. 12]
singularis numeri, and that, accordingly, the oblique and common casesof
' Cfr. the discussionof noun given by William of Conches;seeabove,pp. 223-228.

: consigniEcative; see above, pp. 226-227.
312 LOGICA MODERNomm-i 11
a word do not deuote the same thing. Their view is rcjected by our
author (ibid.).
[cap. 13] Almost all vcrbs aignifyr a universale,the verb substantivi: (.'-ess')
cxceptcd, together x-viththe impersonal vcrbs and some other categories
of verbs (ibid.) :
De verbis dicimus quod fere omnia universaliumsunt signiFicativa,prcter substantivum,
quod omnia sequitur generalissimaet ideo non potest sub aliquo contineri. Impersonalia
quoque excipiuntur ut 'pcnircr', 'tedct'. Et que solis vocibus conveniunt, ut 'dcclinari',
'dcrivari', 'prqjizrri'; aut solis signiücatis, ut 'prcdicari', 'dici', 'subici', aut que actiones vel
artiHcialcs,ut ita dicam, copulant, ut 'cdijicari', 'fiari' et similia. Signiücnt
passiones
autem omne verbum idem accidenscum sua participio, ut 'lego', ct 'icgcns' idem
predicabile in quid agit. Sed utrum participium preteriti temporis ve] futuri universale
significet potest essedubium, quia nil ponit in re subiecta, nisi ponatur substantive.
Unde tam de ente quam de non ente dicitur. Nam sicut iste homo est lecturus, ita et
Antichristus,sednon lecturum. Potesttamendici quodidem universalesignificentquod
verba a quibus nascuntur. Sed non potest eorum FIC'l'ipredicatio nisi per verba aut
participia prcsentistemporis, sicut prius de obliquis discimus, quia in propositione de
preterito aut de futuro nil ponitur utpote cui nil attribuitur.
[cap. 14] Of thi: orationesonly one kind significas:: universale (2211-"3-2221'3):

Restat dicere de orationibus. Omnis oratio cliFFmitivavel descriptiva alicuius universalis
universale significat quod diffinit, ut 'animal rationale mortale etc.' lianc speciem hamo;
'apmm riderc' hoc proprium risibile. Et forte sola oratio talis universale signiEcat. Nulla
enim ex diversorum casuumdictionibus constanssignificat universale, ut 'asinushominis',
':imiie alicui', 'scicnsgrammaticam','qH-Ectumalbedine'; vel 'pcrccptibiledisciplinc'. —
licet penuria nominis sumatur in desig (2221?)nationedilTerentie—, quia nullum talium
respondetur ad aliquam doctrinalium questionum, ncc simpliciter indicant quid aut
quale etc. sed quid cuiusaut quale quo. Nec possent in aliquo predicamento contineri.
( ...... )
Generaliter enim sciendum quod nulli termini idem significant, si aliqua pars unius
significet oppositum signiEcato reliqui; sed album et albedo opposita sunt; similiter
et grammatica.Quare 'ajirctumalbedine'et 'album' erunt specialissimaparia
grammaticus
in predicamento qualitatis, si utrumque sit predicabile. Et ita sumetur a duabusspeciebus
specialissimis paribus, quod Fieri non potest. Nulle enim species possunt esse pares.
ltaque quia sumpto talibus orationibus universalia signiFicariaccidit inpossibile,,contrarie
opinandmn.
[cap. 15] No oratio that is the appellatio Of some enuntiabile significasa universale
&
01" such
singulare, as 'Socratem hominem'
esse or 'hominem album'
6553 (ibid.).
[cap. 16] The same can be said of such orationes as 'honmalbus', 'animal album'
(ibid.):
ARS MELIDUNA. ON THE DENOTATION 01: THE TERMS 313
Amplius. Nulla constans ex substantiali et non substantiali, ut 'homo albus', 'animal

album',quiapotiussignificarenttalesorationespredicabilein quoh:quamalia predicabilia.
Et ita convenienter redderetur ad quale, maxime cum eorum sumpta congrue reddantur,
ut 'album'. Interroganti enim 'qualaestistud' convenienterrespondeturquoniamalbum,
sed inconvenienter: animal album.
Item. Si essentpredicabilia in quale, necessarioessentsumpta, quia omnia universalia
preter genera et species, ut 'sanus', sumuntur. Quare predicatione sua ostendunt
aliquam maneriem qualitatis inesse vel saltem qualitatem simpliciter, ut quale. Atvel'o
non alia videntur ostendere inessequam albedinem. Quare si sumantur, sumantur ab
hac specie albedo; et sic omnia hec 'albus', 'homo albus', 'animal album', 'corpusalbum',
'substantiaalba' sumentur ab eadem specie; quod non minus impossibile quam falsum.
There is some question about such orationesas 'anima! mansuetum',[cap.17]

'animal sensibile' (ibid.).
The last chapter of this section (B) is devoted to the important [cap-13]
question: in which prepositions sama thing is predicated or denied of
another (222f'1):
His adiunctum est dicere in qua propositionc aliquid predicetur vel removeatur.Quod
cx predictis aliquantum innotuit, sed tamen evidentia gratia duabus regulis enucleatius
expediendum.
Omnis et sola propositio affirmativa et vera et de presenti cuius
predicato termino significatur universale et subiecto universale vel
singulare, quo posito ponitur predicatum, est propositio in qua
aliquid predicatur, ita dico, si termini sumpti fuerint per rectum.
Ut 'Socratesest homo', 'animal est tornutum', vel etiam 'hoc album estalbum'. Ex quo palam
est in his propositionibus 'homo-[tmanimal', 'nomanest vos', 'homoestalbus' nil predicari.
Unde et in hac orationel: 'hoc propositio est cathegort'coat rara et da presenti et habet et
predicatumet subiectum;ergo in eo aliquid predicaturde aliquo' fallacia est secundum consc-
quens. Nam omnis in qua aliquid predicatur est talis, sed non econverso. Sit ergo instantia
hec: 'dum Socrateslegit, Satana currit Porisius' ( )..
......
Deinde in qua pmpositionc aliquid removeatur ab aliquo, hec regula innotescat:
.omnis et sola propositio negativa et vera de presenti cuius predicato
termino signiHcatur universale vel singulare ei oppositum habens
terminos sumptos per rectum est propositio in qua aliquid removetur.
Ut 'homo non est lapis', 'Socratesnon est asinus'. Sicut enim signiFlcata que non sunt uni-
versalia de nullo predicantur, ita vero ab aliquo removentur eoquod hec universalium
sint propria.
! : argumentatione.
The third section deals with the constitutiouniversalium.Some preli-

minary remarks on the special senseof tconstitui'are made (2221'h):
Prenotandum tamen quod cum res simplices universalia sint, non prcprie dicuntur ex
aliquibus constare vel constitui; sed sicut statua ex materia et forma.
Quemadmodum enim ad essestatue hec duo exiguntur, ita et ad essespeciei exiguntur
sibi substantialia.Unde et snperiora magis pmprie dicuntur exigi ad esse inferiorum
quam ea constituere, quia cum iste modus loquendi (non) in autoribus reperiatur, non
omnino reprobandus est, maxime inter sapientes.
[cap. [] Each predicabile in quid subordinate to the genus substantia consists of

and
a genus one or more dijkremic substantiales
(222rb'ï'3).
[cap. 2] The other predicabilia consist of the genusproximumand its digerenda

substantialis(222V3-223")
.
The fourth section dealswith the arrangement of the universalia into

the categories (predicamenta). But Erst some distinctions concerning the
term 'predicamentum'
must be made (2231'3):
Reliquum est expedire qualiter universalia in predicamentis dislionantur, idest que in
quo predicamentocontineantur. Quod quidem aptius Flet predistincta multiplicitate
latente in hac forma vocis 'prcdicamcntum'. Notandum ergo quoniam 'prcdicamcntum'
quandoque est tractatus predicamentorum) idest Liber Carcgoriarum, quandoque predi-
— "quoniam hec quidem predicantur
camentumcompositum,ut in Libro PCFHIEHIIEHI'GSZ
composita, ut unum sit omne predicamentum etc." —; interdum predicativa prapositio,
secundum quod dicit Aristotiles in Andi(cticis)3 quod universale predicamentum non
convertitur, idest universalis aHirmativa. Sed harum significationum nulla aptabitur
ad propositum. Quarto modo dicitur predicamentum:moduspredicandi. Unde Aristo-
tiles in Tapicis4: "Post hec autem oportet determinare genera predicamentorum in
quibus sunt quatuor5 diFFerentie; sunt autem hec numero decem; quid, quale, quan-
tum ...... etc.", intelligens primum predicamentum idest primum modum pre—
dicandi scilicet modum predicandi in quid, per quantumsecundum, pcrqualetertium
etc., sicut et prima declinatio dicitur primus modusdeclinandi. Quare omnia genera et
onmes species in primo continentur predicamento, idest omnia predicantur in quid.
There is an improbable opinion about the nature of & predicamenta:]:

(ibid.):
1 predicabilium :I'IS. : Dc Intarpr. ll, 20b31 Ff.

3 Cfr. Anal. Pr. [ 28, 44:134-35. ** Tapica [, 103 bZOFF.
5 decem MS
.
ARS MELIDLINA. ON THE DENOTATION OF THE TERMS 315
Aliorum opinio est predicamentum predicabiliun'i essecollectionem, ut substantia cum

suis inferioribus primurn, quantitas cum suis et eorum sumptis secundum. Quibus
accidit improbabileveludcentum vel mille essepredicamenta.
Finally the question is raiseclof the anima hominis,whether or not it is

a part of man. After some discussion our author gives his own opinion
(223rb-vh):
Nostra Opinio est animam non essepartem hominis, quia pars semper auget quantitatem
totius. Sedest omneanimalcorpus,sicut nequecarbonisigniti parsest ignisvel candela
lumen. Dicit tamen Aristotiles in libro de prulïu'iüI quod proprium est animalis constare
ex corpore et arnima.zSed illud 'cansrarc' potius ad exigentiam refertur quam ad con-
stitutionem, sicut statua dicitur constare ex materia et forma, non quia illa sint partes
eius, sed quoniam ad esse illius exiguntur. ( (223Vü) ) Cum autem
...... ......
dictum sit animam non esse partem hominis, potest dubitari an eadem rationalitas vel
scientia sit in homine et in anima. Et sunt qui anime rationalitatem vel scientiam negant
inesse.(
......
(223130)
....... ) Nobis videtur quod scientia animalisechctus est
scientia ipsius anime et etiam quod 'scientia' de illis dicitur equivoce.
The remainder of the PARSSECUNDA(our sections E-H) discusses the

singularia (seeabove, p.. 263).
This section deals with the nature of singulare..Thc chnition of the [cap. 1]
tcrm 'singulare' is app.?u'entl)r given from the view-point of the prcpo-
sition: singulare est subicibile quod nullo modo est predicabile, e.g.
that which is denoted by the noun 'Socratcs'(223V'3):
Singulare est subicibile quod nullo modo est predicabile, velud significatum hoc nomine
'Socratcs',quod est res quedam intelligibilis ad quam sensusnon conatur: status enim
quidam singularis et privatus unde Socrates habet em- Socrates.Similiter hoc singulare
[hoc singulare]hocanimalest istud unde aliquid est hoc animal, sicut hoc:specieshomo
est id unde aliquid habet essehomo,quedam scilicet unitiva communio in qua Socrateset
Plato ostenduntur uniri et convenire, dicto eos esse homines. Participatione enim
specieiplures heminasunus.
The singularia can be divided into statussubstantiales,e.g. hoc animal, [cap. 2]

status naturales, e.g. hoc risibile, and status accidentales, e.g. hoc album. But
thoseterms are rather confusing,it seems(ibid.).
Sedtamen nullum est aliquod substantialevel naturale quia hec nomina solis universalibus
concesserunt, sicut propusitio non est universale, sed universalis.
' Topica V, l28bl4-l39a20. : Cfr. ibid., 128bl8.

3I6 LOGICA MODERNORUM "
Another definition of singulare is given: vel potest etiam singulare

proprium esserei appellari (ibid )
[cap. 3] Next the question is discussed why the singulare is not & predicabile
(ibid.):
Nuncquaredictum sit singularenon essepredicabile,videamus.Estautemratio hecquia
nec equivocepredicari nec univoce, ut posteapatebit. Et preterea,ut verboalludamus,
predicari dicitur quasi quad pre aliis dicitur, idest que alia sub se continet vel continere
potest. Sedsingulare nullum habet inferius. Aristotiles etiam singulare de nullo predicari
fatetur in Prioribus Analeticiiï in distinctione electionis medii, astruens eorum que sunt
quedampredicari nec subici, quedampredicari et subici, quedamnec subici nec predi-
cari ut sensibilia, idest singularia, ut Cleon et Callias. Et in Prcdicamcntisz:a prima
substantia nulla est predicatio.
[cap. I ] This section discussesthe question by which terms the singularia are
dcnotcd. The answer is: each proper noun that is, was, or will be the
noun of & thing bclonging to any speciess signifies
pecialissima, & singulare,
e.g. iSocratcs', iBruneHus', *Cesar', 'Antichristus'. When & thing denoted by
:: noun has ceased to exist, that noun still exists; what it has lost is not
its significatio" (significatio)but its appellation (appellatio).The author
availshimself of this opportunity to explain the distinction: suppositio.
significatio, appellatio (2241'3):
SigniEcat enim hoc nomen 'Cesar' adhuc illud individuum quod olim significavit. Neque
enim nomen re (ce)dente significationem amisit quam prius habuerit, sedappellationem,
que est per verbumprcsentistemporis rcm attribuunt mrc copulatio. Unde et semper exigit
—
rern existendi ( jir: rei existentiam ?). Distat ergo inter suppositionem, significationem,
appellationem,quia duo prima precedunt tertium, ut in hoc nomine 'Anrichristus'; semper
etiam post ipsum nmnent, ut in hoc nomine 'Cesar'; ipsa vero simul. SigniFlcat itaque
'Cesar'individuum, non quod modo sit individuum sed quod est vel fuit vel erit. Et ita
signiücat individuum quod non est nec tamen (erit) aliquod individuum. Sicut supponit
vel, secundum alios, significat homoqui non est.et tamenquüibet homoest, quia signiFlcatio
dictionis appellationem ampliat.
[cap. 2] Moreover, each term consisting of a demonstrative pronoun and some

dictio or oratio dcnoting a universalesigniFlcs & singulare, e.g.. hic homo, hoc
rationale (224fb).
[cap.31 The same singulare is dcnoted by & prepcr noun and by an oratio which
consists of Eome terminus rectus designans proximum superius predicti singularis
! Cfr. Anal. Pr. 1 27, 433255. 2 CGWS-5. 3336'37-

ARS MELIDLINA. ON THE DENOTATION OF THE TERMS 317
and a demonstrative pronoun. E.g. 'Socrates", 'hic homo', 'hoc animal

rationale mortale gressibilebipesperceptibilediscipline monsuotwn'(224fh).
The author gives another regula (ibid.):
Item. Quotienscumque duobus terminis idem significatur universale, orationibus
constantibus ex illis terminis et pronomine demonstrativo, idem singulare signihcatur.
Ut his terminis hoc album hoc candidum; similiter et his: 'hoc animal', 'hoc substantia
animata sensibilis' sive 'hoc corpus animatum sensibile'. Si autem horum neutrum afïuerit
nec idem communiter nec idem his terminis significatur: 'Socratcs','hoc rationale', 'hoc
album'; 1veludnec idem universale istis: 'rocionolc', 'animal', 'album'.
This section deals with the consecutio singularium. For the mutua] G
of the singulariathe following regulo is given (224Vü):
consecutio
De habitudine singularium ad invicem secundum consecutionem hec solet dari regula:
qualiscumque erit universalium consecutio, talis erit singularium que sub eis continentur.
Verbi gratia sequitur: 'si est risibile, est nocurolo', et econverso; et eodem modo: 'si est
hoc risibiio, est hoc noturolc', et econverso. Item: 'si cst homo, non est asinus', et econverso;
similiter: 'si cst hic homo, non ost hic asinus', et econverso. Rursus: 'si esthomo, estanimal',
et non econverso; quare 'si esthic homo,esthocanimal', et non econverso.
For their inferential rclations with re5pcct to the superiora(species,

and genero)the author gives the following rules (ibid.):
Ad superiora vero hanc habent singularia habitudinem quod ad ipsa antecedunt neces-
sario. Et in his quidem quo sub naturalibus 1velsubstantialibus continentur, nulla est
dubitatio eoquod illa rem non deserunt sed semper adsunt. llle etiam ypothetice in
quibus ad inseparabile accidens eius singulare antecedit, probabilitatem habent ut
possint recipi, ut 'si est hoccoloratumvel hocalbum, estcoloratum'. Sed utrum hee similiter
in quibusad inseparabile,non omnino certum, eoquodutrinque sit rationesapparere.
He points out the Factthat no singulareis cjcctivum alicuius(2251'3):

Cum his quoque illud notabis non essealiquod singulare eFFectivumalicuius, ne accidat
idem singularein diversistemporibusplurium primarum substantiarumesseeffectivum,
ut 'hocalbum', aut etiam in eodem, ut 'hoc scicns'.
Thc last section of the SECUNDAPARSdiscusscs the constitutio singu- [cap- 1]

larium (2251'3):
Nunc expedire ordinis cst singularium constitutionem, idest que exiguntur ad hoc ut
singulariasint. Omne enim singulare habet aliquid esseet ad suum esseexigit suum
superius. Ut hoc individuum Socrates

ad suum esse,idest ad hoc ut sit, exigit hanc speciem
huma.
[cap. 2] The author mentions. an opinion common to the adherents of the

School (nostri), but he does not agree with them (2251'13):
Solet tamen a plerisque nostrorum recipi unum singulare alii essesubstantiale. Sed non
hec individua Socrates,Plato ideo dilTerent substantialiter eoquod nullum substantialeuni
est substantialequod non alteri. Singulareenim non simpliciter est substantiale,licet
alicui. Sicut aliquid est nomen et aliqua est ratio substantie huius universalis hamoque
non est huius universalisanima]. Non tamen diFFeruntilla nomine et ratione substantie,
ne sint appellativa.
CHAPTER IX
THE ARS MELIDUNA.

THE THEORV OF PROPOSITION
The TERTIAPARSof the Ars Meliduna contains an extensive exposition

of the theory of proposition. lt may be divided into two main sections;
the Fll'Stof which (A) dealswith categorica]proposition, the second(B)
with hypothetical proposition.
DE PROPOSITIONE CATHEGORICA
First, Bocthius' well-known dcünition of propositio is given: oratio [cap. 1] I

verum-falsumve significans(De top. «iw: l, 1174BlO-11). Somedoubts arc
raised as to its convertibility, since it does not seem to hold good for all
pmpositions nor for the prcposition only (coqiiod nec omni convenire
videatur,necsoh). The author starts with objections to the thesis that
evegyproposition should signify truth or Falschood.He points to pro-
positionesquc constantex verboet nominativodgficientcin obliquis (2251'13):
ut ifors regit initabilcs'. Neque cnimforlcm regere instabiles püterit dici significatum
......
huius propositionis. Sed multo minus aliter assignabitur.
Other examples(instantis)contradicting this chnition arc to be found

in such propositions as *Parisiuslego', 'parcitur Hesperie', 'Iegendumest
Virgilium'.
The author giveshis own view of the matter (225V3): [cap. 2]
De hac voce: 'Parisiuslegitur' et consimilibusdicimus quod non est prepositio, sed

potius quasi unum appositum, nec signiHcat verum vel falsum, sed tamen facit quo-
cumque moclo intelligi dictum huius: 'ab aliquo legitur Parisius', aut, si velit auditor,
etiam huius: 'ab aliquibus legitur Parisius'. Similiter 'ipse Iego' non est propositio sed vox
prolata per subintellectionem pronominis prime persone. Unde facit verum intelligi hoc:
scilicet meipsumlegere.'Ipselegis' non significat Sacram"!legere,sed non potest per se sumi
ad illud significandum nisi scilicet precedet in alia locutione hoc nomen 'Socrams'vel
hec oratio 'iste homo'.
1 Theseindications refer to my division of the work; seeabove, p. 269 H-

.
Therefore the definition cannot be criticized in this respect.
[cap. 3] The expression'omnisphenixestanimal' is rejected by our author as a

proposition (ibid.) :
De hac voce 'omni; phenix est animal' dico quod non est propositio neque conveniens
locutio, quia nullum ommino constituit intellectum. Omnis autem constructio, quam
Greci sintasinl vocant, ad intellectum referenda cst, qumnvis tamen quelibet (lue partes
illius sibi convenienter iungantur; sicut quelibet due istarum 'cen', 'rum' sillabarum
possunt sesesequi in metro, non tamen ex illis omnibus potest Fieri conveniens versus.
[cap. 4] The opinion OFsome people (quidam)about the congruitoslocutionisis

rejected (ibid.):
VideturI tamen quibusdamquod locutionis congruitatem non impedit rerum defectus,
sed veritatem tantum vel falsitatem. Quibus dicte obviam descriptiones. Et etiam se-
cundum hunc modum 'omnix phcnix est lapis', 'quidam phonix non es: Iopis' sunt contra-
dictorie; aut 'omnisest lapis' et 'nulla: vel nonaliquis a;: lopis' contrarie; et una est vera,
ergo reliqua est falsa. Similiter 'omni; estlapis' 'quidam estlapis' sunt subalterna; particu—
laris est falsa; ergo et universalis. ( ) Ad hiat:2autem quid improbabilius quam
.......
propositionem omnem que non est concedenda, sit neque neganda?
[cap. 5] The deFlnition of propositio also seems to be defective in that it does

not apply to prepositions only. ln Fact we may speak of the truth and
Falsityof such expressions(orationesimpcijocte,the Mediaevalscholars
said) as 'hoc verum',? 'hoc falsum', 'Socratem currere'. The author instances
many other casesin which we may Speakof truth or falsity (225W):
Et propter quatuorgeneraetiam dictionum, ut propter verbaprime et secundepersone,
queex demonstrationeintellectum habentsnppositi; et verbaexceptoactionisin quibus
(leEnitus intelligitur nominativus; et impersonalia passivevocis; et dictiones responsive,
idest in responsione,positas, que per se sumuntur ad constitutionem pleni intellectus.
Ad hec autempropter huiusmodique non sumunturpcr iudicativum: 'egovollemhabere
animal' ; etiam 'sifuisscshic,,fratcr meus
centummarcas'; 'si ista lapis essethomo,iste lapis «'.-sm:
fuisset
non m ortuus'.4
N onneenim verumdicit qui talempropositionemprofert?
All theseobjections,however,must be rejected (ZZSPB'V'F):

Sedhec omnia facillimum (facillimorum MS.) solvere. Iste cnim orationes: 'hoc verum',
'hocfalsum' verum quidem vel falsun'ndemonstrant, sed non signiFlcant.Velud ncc iste
terminus 'rerum' vel hec oratio 'Socrotcm!ogcrc' non signiFlcatverum, sed appellat, sicut
! aut iHS. : ad hec bcsidcs. 3 said instead of 'hoc est rerum'.

4 ]ohn, Xl,2l. For this praposition, see also the introductiones Montono minores and
maioresquoted in my paper: SomeNew Evidenco,p. 14.
ARS MELIDLINA. THE THEORV OP PROPOSITION 321
(2251'1')hoc nomen 'miHc' non significat mille sedappellat ( ...... ) Dictiones quoque
que per se proferuntur nequc vcrum neque falsum signiHcantsed prapriam retinentes
significationem simplicem constituunt intellectum; signa tamen et nota sunt compositi..
Verbi gratia 'lcga' per se prolatum facit intelligi me legere,'tonat' ex discretione nostra
lorem tonare, sed tamen illud non significat ( ...... ) Neque isre due Figurag, a una
representant hanc dictionem 'crgo', vcl p ducta ex transverso linea ab
alii suruacæzaital
inferiori partiezhanc sillabam 'per', sed ex usu et discretione nostra facit quoquomodo
intelligi et ad memoriam reducunt. Circulus quoque non significat 1vinum nec nutus
oculi voluntatem hominis.
Others give another solution (ibid.):

Alii solvunt hoc aliter dicentes quod ille qui huiusmodi profert dictiones verum quidem
vel falsum, non dictione autem sed prapositione quam prüfert quamvis non
Sigl'liFICi'lbit3
totam. Ut ille qui hoc verbum 'Iego' prüfert, perfectum constituit intellectum, et verum
dicit non hnc dictione sed hac prapositione: 'ego!cgo', quam profert sed non totam
( ....... ). Sicut aliquis videt domum, quamvis non videat nisi partem eius; profert
ergo tantum dictionem, sed tamen pt'üpositionem. Velud 'ista tantumcapudSocratis
videt', et tamen Socratem et 'tantum in Gama est', tamen in mundo. Sedquod pro simili
inducunt, valde dissimile. Etenim aliter in totis integris evenit quam in his que sunt
voces, quia in vocibus comitacio recipitur inter partem e.t totum, et in aliis minime.
Unde dictio exclusiva cum nomine partis que est vox iuncta totum excludit.
The expression 'ego vellem habere centum marcas' cannot be taken as a [cap. 6]
proposition either, since it does not signify truth or Falsity; it is not
oratio enuntiativa but oratio optativa. Some p80ple4 wrongly think that
this expression "ego vellem etc.' has the same meaning as (ego
......
volo etc.', but arguing in this manner one could take the
......
* l l
and
i !
ego volo habere ...... utinam haberem

.
expressmns etc.
......
to have the same meaning. However, the author seems to be inclined
to considersthe rejected expressionsas& specialkind of hypothetica]
praposition (ibid.):
Poterit tamcn forte probabiliusdici quod sint propositiones)fpothcticc, non naturales
sed accidentales, sicut et ista: 'si veneris ad me, dabo tibi cquum' ; habent autem partes non
propositiones, sed aliqua loco prapasitionum sumpta. Velut et ista: 'Socratesheri legebat
quando Plato dormiebat'
.
But the difficulty lies in the fact that we cannot formulate (appellare)the
dictumor enuntiabüeOFsuch expressions, unless we have recourse to the
formulation used by some peoPIe (quidam)(ibid.):
D
' g : D 3 signilïcabat MS.
Cfr. my paperSameNewEvidencc,
p. 14. 5 with Albcric of Paris. See ibid.
Sed non habemus appellationes enuntiabilium quc istis significantur, nisi preposita
coniunctione 'quod' toti propositioni dicas: 'quod si jiiisses hic frater meo: non fuioscr.
mortuusest verum! Nam ut quidam volunt, cnuntiabilis appellationem dupliciter est
sumere: aut per inFlnitivum, ut Socratemlegare, aut 'quod' coniunctionem toti prapo-
sitioni preponendo, ut 'quod Socrateslegit'. idem enim est, ut aiunt, Socratemlegere et
quodSocrates legit. ltaque nulla talium erit cat!1egarica,lsed ypotheticn qua ostenditur
accidentalisrerum eventusabsqueulla necessitate.
[cap. 7] Then Follows the main division of propositions into categorical and
hypothetical propositions. Our author amply discusses the question
whether this division is pcr apposita (225'4'5-2261'3).
[cap. 8] The categorica] praposition never has more than ch parts: subject
term, predicate term, negation, copula, and quantifying sign. The
author showsthat the quantifying signs (such as 'omnis', 'quidam') are
part of the proposition.
Such propositions as 'Socrateset Plato currunt', 'aliqua sunt Socrateset
Plata' are called piuresby Aristotle. (Dc Interpr., 17:116).Somepeolale,
however, say that such prepositions have only one subject, or only one-
predicate, since one can take the nominative casesas forming one single
cxpression (oratio), signifying only one thing, though they actually
stand for (supponere) more things. But their view is to be rejected
(226V3):
Quidam tamen dicunt omneshuiusmodi unum solum haberesubiectum vel unum solum
predicatum, quia ex nominativis copulatis Flt uno oratio'que unum tantum significat sed
plura supponit, quemadmodum et hoc nomen 'duo'.
Contra quos Aristotiles. Qui ex oppositis negat: posseHeri unum. Ad hec autem, si hec
oratio 'Socratescl: Plato' aliquod participabile ab istis signiEcat, poterit eis veraciter
attribui, maxime cum id proprietas non impediat constructionis; et sic ista sunt Socrates
et Plato. Item. Socrates et Plato sunt propria nomina istorum; ergo per ipsa potest agi
de illis; quari illi supponuntur locutioni per sua nomina, dicta Socratem et Platonem
currere. Amplius. Si 'homoet asinus'terminus est pluralis 1velplurali equipollens, poterit
reciperesignum pluralis numeri: 'oh'quihomoet osinu;currunt'vel 'oinrnoiJl homoet minus
currunt'; similiter: 'isti homo et asiam: currunt;' ct partitivum namen distributionem
faciens appellatarum: 'alter hominis al: osini' vel 'ohor Socratis ct Piatonis'; similiter:
'quilibet Socratis et Platonis ct Cicoranis'.
[cap. 9] The categoricnl proposition can be distinguishedin a twofold way:

according to its quantit)r and according to its quality (ibid.):
! consequentia MS. : Cfr. De Interpr. 1 l, 2 I a2l-23.

J amnis MS
.
ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORT OF pnoposmow 323
Divisio cathcgoricarum duplex est: una secundum quantitatem altern secundum quali-
tatem. Et eius quidem que secundumquantitatem Fit naturaliter precedit consideratio,
eoquod quantitas, ut ait Boetius, qualitatem precedit naturaliter.
Est autem hec: cnthegoricarum alia est universalis, alia particularis, alia indefinita,
alia singularis. Que divisio penitus semotaest ab ypotheticis.
Our author holdsthis divisim":for an adcquatcone (peropposita):neque

enim his consentimus qui omnia confundentes eandem recipiunt singu-
larem esse et indefinitam, ut 'Ieo currit'. Next, he sums up several
instantis disProving the sufEciency of this division. [ give one of them
(ibid.):
Sed de his melius queritur: ïjl-re omnishomoestiustus', yere nullus homoestbonus', quia in
neutra predicatur aliquid de specie universaliter, vel removetur, quoniam appositione
adverbii quodammodo extinguetur universalitassigni. Nec tamen penitus Fit particularis.
Non enim positiva Fit suppositio, ut in hac: 'quidam homoes: albus', sed datur intelligi
predicatumomni homini convenireexceptispaucis.Itaque, cum in his intellectus quo—
dammodo sit1 angustior universali et capacior particulari, neutris proprie supponantur
sed utrisque accidentes intcr utrasque versantur.
The next is & most rcmarkable chapter on the nominafuminum and [cap. 10]
nomina oppidorum. Of what quantity, our author asks, are propositions
such as 'Se-canacurrit Parisius', II:Romüest Optima civitas'? The difficult)! is
to be reduced to the question whether such namesare propria nominaor
appellata, and the answer to this question, in its turn, depends upon the
real nature of & river and a town (ibid.):
Hec dubitatio inde pendet quod incertum est utrum hec nonüna prcpria sint an appel-
lativa. Que rursus dubitatio inde surgit quod fluvius ipse aut civitas quid ait,' nondum
satis innotuit.
Our author mentions. those who consider the bed of the river as the
river itself, and the location of the town as the town itself. Thcir view
is quite untenable (226W'Vb):
Ponunt enim quidam fluvium essealveum ipsum et civitatem locum in quo fundata sunt
ediEcia. Unde quotiens dicitur fluvius currere, attribuitur, inquiunt, continenti, quod
est (226ï'b) contenti. Secundumhoc numquam crescit Secana.Nec est aliquid quod
possit fluere; quare non est aliquod fluens; ergo nec aliquod flumen. Et si mutetur
alveus, non manebit idem fluvius. Sed erit alius fluvius Secana,si aque illi que currit
Parisius artificio hominum detur alius alveus. Ad hec autem, quid improbabilius quam
civitatem esselocum ubi ipsa est, nec posse crescere vel dcscresecre? Oportet etiam
recipere quod Troia adhuc est sed non est civitas, et adhuc est ubi fuit, quamvis auctm'z
1 Et Mg, 2 Ovidius, Hcroidcsl,53: "iam segesest ubi Troia fuit".

324- LOGICA s-IODERNORus-l 11
dicat: "nunc segesest ubi Troia fuit". Nec poterit aliqua civitas destrui vel comburi.
Barbam quoque eadem ratione non pilorum multitudinem, sed mentum cui adherent
fateantur necesseest, ac silvam non arbores sed terram cui adherent radicitus.
The two variantsof another opinion are also rejected by our author.
I give the text in Fuli, since it seems to be ver)! interesting because of its
couleur locale (226V'J):
ldeo dicunt alii Fluviumesseaquamillam que in terre superEcieapparet, ut Secanam
astruant esse aquam. Sed istorum etiam bipertita est Opinio. Etenim quidam dicunt
fluvium esse aquam illam que in terre superficie nlJparet, ut Secanam astruant esse aquam
que in alveo est a fonte usque ad mare. Sedeadem ratione et illa que huc,,1postquam in
mare fluxerit, succedet, dicetur Secana.Cui similiter et alie infinite. Et item hoc nomen
'Secana'plurium aquarumcuilibet conveniet et in eademsigniFlcatione.Quid enim aliud
est Sccananisi aquaimplenshuncalveum; ergo ipsumest appellativum.
Contra quod videtur esse Priscianus. Qui aitï: "pmpria nomina fluviorum in 'a'
desinentiamasculinigenerissunt, ut Turia".3Item.Siappellativasunt huiusmodinomina,
videtur quod possint recipere signum universale vel particulare et numerum pluralem
habere.Ad hec autem Heri poterit ut ïsara sit Sccanaet RodanusPadus;marequoque
Ligeris ut alveis commutatis.
Carnotum etiam secundum hoc Flet Parisius, si edificia transferantur, vel papulus
huius civitatis4 ad illam incolendam transferat se. Nam si fluvius est aqua implens alveum,
ut perhibent ad quos nobis est sermo, erit et civitas eadem ratione aut populus ipsc
pariter sub eodem iure manensaut ediüciorum multitudo.
Alii dicunt Secanamesseaquam, twn illam que est ab urigine fontis usquead mare,
sed eamque incepit defluere ab initio et defluet continue; cuius pars latet in cavernis
terre, pars est in alveo.
Cui opinioni obviat quod nullus sciet utrum Secanamodo sit annon. Si enim medietas
vel plus medietate in mare defluxit, iam nil est Secana,edquod cuiuslibet totius medietate
desinente esseipsum totum desinit esse. Nemo autem novit quanta pars Secanedefluxerit
in mare; quare nemo novit utrum Secana currit Parisius vcl utrum idem fluvius sit
Parisius ct Rotomagi.
There is also a third Opinion, but this is not tenable either (ibid.):
Est et alia opinio. Que asserit Fluvium essealveum cum aqua et civitatem locum cum
edificiis. Qua secuunturhec improbabilisquod nulla civitas potest destrui vel comburi
nisis tota terra desiit esse.Modiusquaqueeademinspectioneerit non vinum simpliciter
sed vinum cum vase,et pratum locum cum herba, et barba faciescum pilis.
The namesof books are open to the samedifficult),r (ibid.):

Sub eadem cadunt etiam librorum nomina dubitatione. Potest enim dubitari quid sit
Lucanus,utrum scilicet volumen ipsuman historia metrice descriptaaut illa duo simul.
' viz. here in Paris. ï Inst. gramm. V 6, p. 14315'17. 3 curia 1115.

4 viz. of Paris. 5 nec MS.
ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORT OF PROPOSITION 325
The author gives his own view in & somewhat hesitative way (ibid.): [cap. 1I]
Nobis videtur ad presens: hanc omnium solutionem eligimus ut fluvius dicatur illa
totalis aquaque ab initio Fluereincepit ct fluet continue. Nec ego scio utrum Secana
adhuc sit, velud nec aliquis novit utrum nunc dies sit. ltaque si nunc posueris fontem
Secaneobstrui ut non Fluat dcinceps, non desinit ob hoc Secanamesse, velud nec sol
etsi numquamdeincepsappareat.Si vero aquaubi a fonte oritur, duasfaciatreflexiones,
neutra earum erit Secana,sed pars illius, immo illa totalis quc bifurcatur. Linde si una
Parisius transeat, reliqua Aurelianis, recipiemus quod idem fluvius currit i'liC' et ibi.
Sed aliud nomen sortitur hic forte quam ibi: etenim Aurelianis fortassis appellabitur
Ligeris, Parisius Sccana; ct crit Ligeris-Secana.
Civitatem quoque dicemus ediFlciorum multitudinem et nemus arborum pluralitatem,
pratum herbam multmn radicitus terre adhaerentem,barbam quoque pilorum collectio-
nem. Consuevimua enim civitatem fateri ubimmiquez ecliF-ciaalta sunt et pretiosa, ct
sitamessein turpi vel pulchro loco, arduovelhumili. Sednil situm est in locohuiusmodi
nisi ediFlcia.Quare oportet ut civitas sit ediEciorum multitudo.
Sometimes, however, such names as ILParisius"

or 'Roma' are said to be
nomina propria, but, if so, they are a special kind of proper names
(ibid.):
Dicitur tamen interdum 'Parisius' vcl 'Roma' proprium nomen loci, quia nomina huius-
modi quandam faciunt rei adiacentis, idest loci, discretionem. Nam quid aliud est
Parisius quam collectio dmnorum in hoc loco sita? Si enim transferantur iste domus ad
alium locum, deSinetstatim collectio illarum domorum esscParisius. Quippe accidentale
est alicui esse Parisius.
Non erit tamen in conflictu recipiendum tale nomen esse proprium nomen loci vel
alterius, sed magis commune multorum naturaliter, sicut et 'phenix', 'soi', 'mundus', et
'papa'. Et forte discretio illa loci quamfacit huiusmodinomen,causaest quare ipsum
careatplurali. Itaquesi corruantnuncmuniahecedificiaet reedificenturnova,erit altera
civitas. Et iste (sc. locus) habuit multas civitates, qui(a) in uno solo loco aliam multotiens
innovatam. Parisius etiam poterit per supradictam positionem esse Carnotum. Nisi forte
dicere velimusnominahuiusmodipropria esseet in multiplici forma vocis, ut sint multa
nomina in hac forma vocis Parisius,quorum unum supponat presentem civitatem, reliqua
illas que corruerant. Sed fortassis minus verum.
As to the namesof Forestsandbooksour author states(ibid.):

Dc nemoreautemsi succidanturarboreset alie succrescant,non recipiassimiliter quod
istud nemus sit aliud ab illo, quoniam maxima pars sub terra remansit. Sed neque quod
idem illi. Neque iste qui olim barbam rasit, habet nunc eandem barbam quam prius.
Aut pratum idem. De nominibusvero librorum dicimusquod sempersumendasunt in
designatione 1if-tzlluniinis..
The question may be mised of what quantity are such propositions as [cap. 12]
'Urbs (: Rome) videtura me', 'Apostoius(: St Paul) dixit hec'; 'poeta
! viz. in Paris. 2 plerumque ;I-IS.
(: Virgil) scripsit Eneida' or 'Rex venit Parisius', in all Of which a nomen

appellativum is used antonamasicc.'
There are some objections, indeed, against this use, but the' author
prefers common usage. His words contain a precious hint for dating the
work2 (2271'3):
Nec duibium3quod hac tantum propositione: 'Rexcst Parisius'agatur de Lodowico, ne
accidat ea signiFlcari Ladou'icum-l
esscParisius;sed tantum5 pro eo vera intelligitur.
[cap. 13] There are some other propositions the quantity of which is difficult
to state, viz. those in which two terms are capulated. They can be
devided into two main groups:
quedam l'CCtOS copulant COPLIlatiVEll'l'l coniunctionem
a per
.. . . . . .
b quedam per disiunctivam.
The first group (a) can besubdividedinto four headings:

a' those of the type: 'omnis homo et omnisf' asinus currunt'
&2 those of the type: 'omnis homo et quidam asinus currunt'

aii those of the type: 'quidam homo et omnis asinus currunt'
a4 those of the type: (quidam homo et quidam asinus currit'.
do not presentany diFchlty. As to the other types

The types (al) en (4:14)
some people want to call them after both signsand, accordingly
(az, 4:13)
they call those of (az) universal and particular prapositions, those of
(all) particular and universal propositions. Others call them after the
first sign occurring in those propositions. Our author excludes all these
prepositions from the determination of quantity (ibid.):
ldeo nobis verius videtur ut nulla talium alicuius dicatur quantitatis. Illa enim quadri-
partita divisio circa eastantum intelligendaest que simpliceset cum uno signo habent
subiectos. Iste autem mixtc sunt, partim scilicet universales, partim inchnitc vel
particularesaut singulares.Velut ncc constructioista 'egodiligo mea: te' iudicandaest
transitiva vcl intransitiva, sed magis ex his mixta; ncc 'rcspublica'7 prime declinationis
vcl quinte, scd extrinsecus huius, intrinsecus illius; vel 'lcapardus' leo vcl pardus, aut
secundumalios pica alba vcl nigra sedBmedio-colore colorata.
' as an anmnamasia,a rhetorica! Figura in which, instead of the name, an epithet of &
personor thing is used. Cfr. Quintilian, Vlll 6,29 and 43.
: Seeabove, p. 280f. 3 dabit MS.
4 lodo hoc verum ( !) MS. 5 tamen MS.
(' corrected from quidam,by the samehand, it seems.
? respuplica(!) MS. 3 vel MS.
mas MELIDLINA. THE THEORV OF PROPOSITION 327
Next, our author discussesthe diH'erences between the conjunctive [cap. 14]
and disjunctive subject-terms, which appear clearly when the propo-
sitions in which they occur are to be denied (2271'0'f'3').
Then, the quantity of those propositions is discussed the subject- [cap. 15]
terms of which consist cx obliquo cr. recto. ! give the beginning of this
chapter (2271'5):
De(h)inc queritur de quantitate earum quarum subiecti ex obliquo constant et recto.
Inter quas sunt similiter quedam que eiusdem sunt quantitatis secundum duo subiecta.
Ut 'olicuius hominis aliquis filius es.',albus'; aut 'cuiusiibct quilibot'. Et harum quidem
manifestaest quantitas, quia illa procul dubio particularis est, ista universalis. Sedde his
que in varia sumuntur quantitate ambigitur. Ut 'aiicuius quiiibct' vel 'quilibet olicuius'.
As to the quantity of such propositions as 'Iegereestagere','currere'est [CHP-

16]
moveri', 'verbcrori est pati', our author offers several possibilities (227
TD'VG). He leaves it to the reader to make hic choice of them: ex his
variis diversorum solutionibus elige cui dicas: 'tu michi sola placesl'
(227va). ..
The distinction according to the quoligy of the proposition divides [cap. 17]
them into afErmative and negative propositions. The application of this
distinction to the hypothetical propositions seems to offer some diFFl-
cuities (ibid.) :
Sed dubitatur utrum illa divisio circa cathegoricasrestringatur vel etiam usque ad ypo-
theticas extendatur. Si dicatur quod aliqua ypothetica sit negativa, potius illa cui pre-
ponitur negatioquamalia. Ex quo fiet deductioad recipiendumduascontradictoriasesse
falsas, ut 'omnishomoestanimo! cr,Socratesestminus" 'non omnishomo animo!
csl: et Socrates
—
est asinus'. Nam utriusque altera pars vel utraque est falsa. Quare cum sint copulativa,
sint false. ldeo dicunt pleriquc quod ypotheticis quibusdam assignari potest contra-
dictio negatione preposita, sed non copulativis nisi que coniunctionem habent propositam
,ct interpositam, ut 'et omnis homoest animo! et Socratesest asinus' — 'non et omnishomoest
animo! et Socratesest asinus'. Alii satis probabiliter (dicunt) quod ad solas cathegoricas
pertinet ilia divisio.
Propositions of the type 'nemo est asinus' and 'Socrates nescit Iegerc' cause
some troubles for the division (ibid.).
Sodo thoseof the type: 'nonnullushomoestanimal' (ibid.). [cap.18]

There Follows an important chapter on the correct place of the adverb [cap. 19]
of negation. What is to be said of such propositions as 'quidam homo non
estanimal' ? Sume people (sunt qui) call them aFErmatix-fe

prapositions. As
the quantity of :! proposition is judged by the quantity of the subject-
tcrm, they want to determine & preposition's quality in the samemanner.
Our author seemsto agree with them (227v3'v')):
Unde et a simili de qualitate videbitur iudicandum secundum negationem subiecto
prepositum. Ut non dicatur negativa que negationem interponit sed ea sola cui toti
preponitur, ut 'non quidamhumacurrit', 'non Socratesestanimal'. Item. Quod prapositiones
huiusmodi affirmative sint;, vidctur posseostendi ex eo quod dicit Aristotiles (Categ.,
3:17—8): "commune est omni substantie non esse in subiecto". Nam non essein subiecta
est illud proprium substantiequod ibi assignatAristotiles (2273'0). lllud etiam prüprium
substantie aliqua propositione potest attribui.. At vero nulla melius quam ista: 'sub-
stantia non est in subiecto'.Ergo hec propositio est aFIïrmatix-a.
Sola enim affirmativa
aliquid attribuitur, negativa vero non Flt attributio alicuius pmprietatis sed potius
remotio.
Then, our author quotes other instances From F'ccrprphyr)r and Aristotle
(Prior and PasmriorAnalytics).Therefore some people consider prcpo-
sitions such as 'Socratesnon est animal' as aFErn'nativepropositions, while
taking the expression 'non estanimal' as a whole. The author, however,
rejects the arguments and takes the propositions in which the adverb of
negationis interpascdto be negativejust as those in which it is at the head
of the proposition (227V'J).
A proposition such as 'Socratesnon currit' can be taken as& negative one,
but also as an affirmative proposition OFthe Form: 'Socratesnan-cum't'.
As to the particulae exclusivae ('unus', 'solus', etc.), sometimes they
prevent contradiction, e.g. in: 'solus' est albux' — 'solus' non est albus'
(227vb-223ra).
The last question of this chapter concerns the precise meaning of such
negations as 'quidam homonon estalbus' (2281'3):
Potestqueri quid ea negetur. Nec potest dici quodaliud quamdictum alicuius istarum
trium: 'omnishumaestalbus', 'quidamhomoestalbus', 'non quidamhomoestalbus'. Sednon
videtur dictum universalis ca negari, quia si dictum illius negat, ergo posito tantum duo
homines.esse,nil negabit. At vero nec huius: 'quidamhomoestalbus', cum utrumque
dictum verum sit. At multo minus tertie, immo potius illa dictum huius negat. ldeo
dicimus quod nil negatur tali particulari negativa, sed aliquid ea negative enuntiatur.
Velut ut nec ista aliquid predicatur et est predicativa. '
[cap. 20] The categorica! propositions are divided into modal propositions and
those de inesse,the latter denoting only the läct OFthe inherencc of the
' The MS has30. : Socrates

(!).
Alls MELIDUNA. THE THEOR? OF PROPOSITION 329
predicate in the subject, the former clenotingalso the way of the in-
herenceor the incoherence(discaherentia)(2281'3).
The interrelations of the pmpositions de inesseare given: some are [cap. 21]
contrary, some subcontrary, others subaltern, others contradictory. But
the relations are disturbed by such words (determinations)
as "tantum',
*preter', 'nisi', *adhuc'. Though Aristotle says: una unius negatio (De
intcrpr., 17b38), the proposition "quidamhomonon estanimal' seemsto
have more than one contradictoria: 'omnis Imma est animal', iquidam homo
est' animal', "unus hamonon est animal', 'aliquis homonon est animal', 'non
omnishomoestanimal'. But Aristotle points to the unity of meaning, not
to that of expression (2281'3). Moreover: si quis tamensuptiiius inspiciat,
non erunt contradictorie que signa variant. After some discussion our author
concludes(2281'3):
Palam itaque est ex his in assignatione contradictionis ponendam esse negationem in
universalibus ct particularibus vel (ad) subiectum in indefinitis. Sed in singularibus non
refert ad utrum libet ponere, ad subiectum vel ad verbum.
A special case is formed by such singular prepositions as: 'ista animalia [cap. 22]
sunt rationalia, (2231'13):
Sed utrum similiter sumptis terminis pluraliter contradictorie sint: 'ista animalia sunt
ratianaha' — 'ista animalia nonsuntrationalia', dubitatur. Quidam enim homine: et asino
demonstratis utrumque negant, quia ab utroque videtur negari predicatum. ( ).
......
Ad quos ita: 'tantum altarum istarum [alterum] est rationale et tantum alterum istorumest
irrationale; ergo nec ista sunt rationalia ncc istaiIl sunl rationalia; ergo ista nec sunt rationalia
necirrationalia; ergonon sunt rationalia'. ( ...... ) Amplius: 'tria non suntdua'. Non
videtur secundum hoc esse recipiendum quia videtur esse sensus: nec tria nec aliqua
trium sunt duo, sicut 'ista non sunt rationalia' ponit quod nec ista sint rationalia nec aliquod
eorum sit rationale, nisi quia, ut iam diximus, aliud iudicium est in numeralibus quam
in aliis, quia illa carent numero singulari: ideoque nullam patiuntur distributionem. Sed
"rationalia' vel 'aliqua' habent singulare, per quod Heri potest distributio ad singulos.
Unde non recipitur: 'ista non sunt rationalia' vel 'iste qui vivit et Antichristus non sunt
aliqua'.
Also are rejected: 'quilibet-fidelis est de numero eorum qui non credunt in
Deum]. et (Rex est unus eorum qui non habent quod camedant'. Likewise:
*Socrateset Plato non sciunt gramaticam' posito quod tantum unus sciat, or
'ipsi nesciunt
gramaticam'(under the samecondition). The author gives&
generalregula (ibid.):
1 The MS. has non est. 2 homo MS. 3 iste MS.

Et ut generalius dicatur: quotiens duo opposita predicantur de aliquibus, neutrius

plurale patest de illis copulatis vere enuntiari. Et ideo cum Socratessit hamo et Plato
non-homo, ipsi nec sunt homines nec sunt non-homines; tantnm enim unus eorum est
homo, alter non-homo.
[cap. 23] This chapter discussesthe inEnite terms such as 'non-currit', 'non-
homo', 'non-sapiens'.The decisive question is whether they deuote
existence (utrum positionemjäciant existentis). I give this important passage
in full (228f'J'W):
Solet autemde infinitis cssecontroversia utrum positionem faciant existentie. Suscipicnti
namque vidctur obviare Aristotiles in libro Perihermenias
asserens!infinitum verbum ideo
dici quoniam similiter est in quolibet quod est vel nun est. Quod sic videtur intelligen-
dum, idest sicut nec assignatur-enti, ita et non enti Et ita: 'chimcranoncurrit', verbum
.
inFlnitum; ergo est non currens.
Sed non sic Aristotilcm exponimus, idest non determinat circa rem aliquam statum
qui sit vel non sit generalem vel specialem.
Vel potestaliter solvi dicendovcrba personalianullam facerepositionemexistentia;
sed casualia,idest participia. idem in eodem ait: si verum est interrogativum negare et
verum est aFFlmmrc,idest si ad aliquam interrogationem vere respondetur negativa de
predicatoEnito, vere potcst inferri aHïrmativade predicato ianito, ut 'putasneSocrates
sapiensest ——Non -- ergo Socratesest non sapiens'. Que illatiü Aristotilis (si) recipiatur
conveniens esse et necessaria, impossibile est verum esse quod dicitur negatione quin
sit verum significatumconclusionisde predicatoinEnito. Sednegatioilla nunc est vera,
quia Socratesnon est sapienscum non sit. Ergo est non sapiens.Sedillatio illa Enctaest
per subintellectum cuiusdam propositionis extrinsecus sumpte. Subintelligitur enim
ista: 'Socratesest'. Sicut Boetius dicit locum essea contrariis immediatis in hac argu-
mentatione: 'aliquod animal non est sanum; ergo ipsum est egrum', subintelligens istam:
'aliquod animal estanimal'. Nam aliter falsa esset illatio.
estentis,quia [in]opinabile tam de ente quamde non
[dem Aristotiles: [in]apinabiicgcnus
ente predicatur.zMulta enim non entia öpinabilia sunt. lllud sic intelligendumidest:
opinabile vere copulatur tam nominibus existentium quam illis que non sunt nomina
existentium. Nec fecit inde in eo quod ait nonente.
Item. Si aFFeratio cum aHïrmationc convertitur (228W) et negatio cum negatione,
idest si Fmitum cum Enito ct inFmitum cum inFmito. Sed si Cesar currit, est currens, et
econverso. Ergo si non currit, est non currens, et econverso.
At et hoc intelligendum dc Enitis et infinitis eiusdem maneriei, que scilicet utraque
sint casualiavel utraque vcrba.
Et argumento sic instandum: si Cesar currit, est aliquid quod est currens, ct econ-
verso; ergo si non currit, est aliquid quod est non currens, nisi negare volueris 'Ccsar
nan-currir' verbmu infinitum.
[cap. 24] Next our author dcals with the related question of the supposed
mutual equipochtia of such propositions. It is to be rejected (228Vü):
'De lnmrpr. 3, 16b14-15.
1 Cfr. Dc lntcrpr. ll, 21332-33; Tapica IV 1, 121a22; Saph. El. 5, 167al-2.
Aus MELIDLINA. THE THEOM OF PROPOSITION 331
Solet etiam pro regula assignari quod propositiones eiusdem subiecti et quantitatis et
diversa qualitatis variato predicato per Fmitum ct inlïnitum sibi equipollent. Ut 'nullus
homoest asinus' -- 'omnis homoes: non asinus'. Sed 'nullunrjinunmr estpresens;ergaomneest
non prcscns'. Similiter: 'nullus homoqui desiit esseest animal; ergo omnises.'.non animal'.
At hec regula in au(c)toritate non rcpcritur. Vera tamen est ubique, si non impediat
rerum defectus. Rationes quoque possunt ad id induci: si aliquid est verum, ipsum non
est falsum, et econverso; aliquid verum est non falsum; ergo aliquod falsum est non
verum.
Instantia: si aliquid est unum presens, ipsum non est unum futurum, et cconvcrso;
aliquod presens est unum non futurum; ergo aliquod futurum est unum non presens.
Somepeople have& diFFerentopinion about the positioexistentia(now [cap. 25]

called positioessendi)(ibid.):
Habetur iterum aliorum opinio quod substantiva positionem faciunt essendi; sed vcrba,
participia ct adiectiva adiective retenta nullam. Unde recipiunt: 'Ccsarnan laborat', vel
'est nonalbum', sed non similiter quod sit non-album vel non-homo. At et huic Aristotilis
obviat au(c)toritas.
Such verbs as 'ncscit', 'nequit', which contain an implicit negation, do [cap. 26]
not deuote existenceeither in the view ofour author (ibid.):
Sedde hiis verbis'ncscit','nequn',que in senegationemhabentimplicitum, potcstdubi-
tari utrum positionem faciant. Quod non recipimus, sicut nec 'ncmo', vel 'ad'; immo
Cesar nequit et nescit currere, quemadmodum et iste qui nunc est. Sed non quacumque
modo facienda huiusmodi verborum in participia resolutio. Nam 'Ccsar es.'.nescienscurrere'
incnngrue dicitur. Sed debet participium verbo preponi: *Ccsarnesciens'est currere';
quod contingit ex eo quod in his negatio est implicita. Velud et incongrue dicitur:
'Caesar
estnemovcl nichii' nomine postposito verbo.
The last chapter of the section on the propositions deinesse

is dcvotcd [cap. 27]
to the mutual intcrfcrence of the paria, such as 'homo', 'risibiic'. The
regula is: irfm'ta parium csseparia (ibid.):
Illud quoquescienduminFmitaparium esscparia: omnis enim non-homo

nan-risibilcest,
et econverso. lnFmitum vero contenti superius est infinito continentis, quippe destructo
consequenti destruitur quod antecedit. Et ideo si omnis homo est animal, omne non-
animal est non-lwmo.
Then, moda] proposition comesup Fordiscussion(ibid.): [cap. 28]
lamnunc ad modalestranseundumest. Circn qunsconsiderandumest que et quare dican-

tur modales,et de quo in eis agitur sive, quod idem est, de earum terminis. Quibus
cognitis manifesta ctiam erit tam quantitas earum quam qualitas, de quibus similiter
! nequiens MS.
dubitatur. Modalisest illa propositio qua modiFlcaturcoherentiapredicati ad subiectum,

ut 'Deumesseostnecessarium', vel modus consequendi.Et sunt modi qui propositionem
faciunt modalem sex ab Aristotile assignati: 'verum', 'folsunr', 'possibile', 'inpossibile',
'contingens'.Quibus etiam addi possunt 'dubiurn' et 'tantum'. Boetius tamen
'necessarium',
modales appellat etiam istas: 'Socrateslogi: bona'.,'Ploto currit coleriror'. Sed adverbia ibi
posita magis determinant qualitatem agendi, idest qualiter legat vel currat, quam modum
cohercndi. Ergo modalescasfortassedixit Boetiusa qualitatesui predicati, quia scilicet
in predicato verbum habent adverbio modiFlcatum. Unde etiam in eis pars in modo
predicatur. SedFrequensususnon recipit modalesessenisi que predictos contineant
modos.
Some people prcpose & double exposition of modal propositions, one

de re, the other do dicto (ibid.):
Potest autem omnis modalis, ut volunt quidam, dupliciter exponi, tum de re, tum de
dicto. Et de re exposita eosdem habet terminos cum illa de inesse & qua descendit. Ut
'Socrotomessehominemest possibile',si de re exponatur subiectum habet hoc nomen
'Socrarcs',predicatum 'homo', modus vero nec subiectus nec predicatus neque pars
alterutrius eorum seddeterminatio predicati. Expositaautem de dicto subiectumhabet
orationem dicti nominatam, predicatum vero modum.
Secundumquod accidetunum oppositorumde altero in vero propositioneuniversaliter
predicari, ut 'omnealbumosse
nigrumestPüisfbik', que vera est de re intellecta.
After the discussion of some more instantis the author concludes: ideo
dicimus quolibet modali tantum de dicta agi et ita de aliquo discreto. Then he
gives two quotations from Aristotle's Prior Anolyiics. Finall)Ir he speaks
about the conversionof modal propositions (2283'3-V'J).
[cap. 29] Propositions, however, of the type: 'aliquid essehominemquin ipsesit

animo] estinpossibile'present diFFiculties(2281'13):
Etenim hec oratio 'aliquid essehominem quin ipse sit animal' non est appellatio alicuius
enuntiabilis, quia tunc illud essetverum 1vclfalsum. Et ita verum vcl falsum essetaliquid
essehominem quin ipsesit animal, quod inconvenienter dicitur. Eadem obiectio est de ista:
'possibileest Socratemlegerecros'. Et erit solutio quod non est latine dictum, aut quod
verbum inpersonaliter ibi ponitur. Nec sunt propositiones modales immo per accusati-
vum Fit suppositio locutioni.
The author addsa few more instantis(ibid.):

[notabit iterum quis huiusmodi propositiones 'te scire plus quam sciosos: inpossibilc',
'nullumproterSocratemessealbumestpossibile'verasesseet concedendas,si modali tantum
de dicto agitur. Quasultro recipimus.
[cap. 30] More diFEculties arise from modal propositions containing the modus
nus MELIDUNA. THE THEORT OF PROPOSITION 333
'necesse'. The discusison is quite interesting for our understanding of the

developmentof the doctrine of snpposition (2283'13-2291'3):
Pretereaqueritur de illis que habenthunc modum 'neccssc',utrum ipsesint nwdales, ut
'Deum esseext ncccssc'.Quodsi est, ergo ea, ut diximus, de dicto agitur. Et ita de dicto
dicitur quod sit necesse. lta hoc dictum est necesse, quod incongrue dicitur. Ad hec
duplex secundumdiversoscst solutio. Recipiunt enim quidam huiusnmdi propositiones
essemodaleset in eisagi de dicto. Sednon potestloco appellationisdictio vel oratio alia
sumi, quia modus iste 'nccussc'talis nature est quod semper exigit suppositionem fieri
per appellationemenuntiabilis, velud adiectivasecundeinpositionissuppositionemsihi
volunt Heri pcr consimilia substantiva. ( ). Alii dicunt eas non esse modales
......
(F. 229m), immo potius de inesseet verbum habere inpersonaliter positum. Unde in eis
non agitur de dicto.
Those propositions in which the modusprecedes the ditium present some [cap. 31]
diFFlculties. E.g. 'aliquid possibileest Socratemlegere'. Some pecvplereject
those prepositions as incongrue, but our author accepts them as locutiones
congrue rendered legitime byfrequens usus; although they are not modal
propositions, quibus semper in modalibus oportet, ut supra diximus, ap-
pellationemcnuntiabilis supponere(2291'3).
..
Then follow the views of the author (aq. the School he is following) [cap. 32]
about the problems of several kinds of categorical prapositions. The
author rejects propositionsthe predicate-termof which consistsof a
copulation of more terms coniunctione tantumsemelposita., e.g. 'cquuset
asinuscurrunttardeet velociter"(2291'3'1'0).
The so-called dictionesexclusivepresent specialdiFchlties (229Tb): [cap. 33]

Instahit iterum quis incongrue esse dictum secundum hoc: 'tantum Socrateset Plato
currunt', quia dictio exclusiva aut referetur tantum ad terminum precedentem aut ad
terminum complexum. Et si ad precedentem, inconveniens erit copulatio quoniam
solitudini nichil copulandum. Unde non bene dicitur: 'rolus Socrate;et Plato', Sin vero ad
totum complexum, multo magis incongruitatcm faciet exclusionis additio, cum nulla
et Plato.Ideo enim non recipiuntur huiusmodiIocutiunes:'tantumquidlibet
sint Socrates
est', 'tantum uterqueistorumestvel currit', quia nil est quidlibet vcl uterque istorum quod
innuunt illc locutiones. ( ) Itaque in hoc dicemus aut exclusionem essein-
......
congruumaut referendamtantum ad terminum precedentem,ut sit sensusidest: preter
Platonemnullus nisi Socrates.
Notabis interea iterum 'isti homo et asini currunt' aut 'omneshomo et axini' incongrue
dictum esse, si pronomen intelligatur luarmirieslet asinos demonstrare. Vel signum ad
terminos coniunctim relatum, quia exigeret necessario ista esse homines et asinos, sed
demonstrat necessario tautum rcs nominis precedentis. Similiter signum nmncn prcce-
dcns distribuit.
' wrongly changed inter omnes in our MS.

34] This chapter discussesthe propositions which contain oblique casesin

lCüP-
their construction. The author rejects such propositions as *fsta sunt
eademSocrateset Plato'; 'isti suntfhï Socratiset Platonis', Ili:;tca'
duo nomina
conveniunt:Socrati et Platoni', 'parvum et magnum sunt equalia magna et
parvo', ilisti duo videnthominemet asinum', '(istf) ferunt lapidem et h'gnum';
'binarius est in Socrate et! Platone'; 'Socrateset Plato sunt. in hoc loca et in
aha" (ne sint hic et alibi). One must not say: 'in Socrateet Platoneesttalis
numerus', but 'in Socrate et (in) Platone etc.', quia prepositis: bis
......
posita vidctur equipollcreconiunctionibis sumpta.Those prcpositions, too,
are rejected: (nulla sunt Parisius et Rome', *cignus ct corvus sunt ajïzctj
albedineet nigredine', 'anulus aureusct anulus argenteusconstantex auro et
argenta' (2291'1').
[cap.35] The occurrence of numeralsprescntssome dichulties (229PU'V3):

'duo et tria sunt aliqua
aliqua sunt quinque
ergo aliqua sunt duo et tria', (
..... . )
Amplius: 'aliqua sunt plura sedecimet pauciora viginti; illa non runt decemet :oprcm nec sunt
decemet acra; (f. 229vu) ergosuntdecemet navcm'.
Another problematic argumentation is: 'aliquis homo est quintus decimus

in hoc ordine; aliquis est quintus in hoc ordine et tantum aliquis est deamus;
erga aliquis homo est quintus et decimusin hoc ordine"
.
In the author's view a related problem is presented by such arguments
as: 'aliquod animal est leopardus; aliud2 est leo et Lah'ud
estpardus; ergo aliquod
est leo et pardus'. Or: *ah'quis homo estjbrtissfmus; aliquis homo estfartis et
tantum(?) alius estsimus;ergoest-jbrtiset simus'(229'43).
[cap. 36] Someof the author's fellows reject such propositionsas idua et tria sunt
quinque',or understandthem as 'dumet tria sunttot quotquinque'(229V3):
Consucverunt quoque nostrorum pleriquc negare duo et tria esse quinque, suscipientes
tamen ea esse tot quot quinque. Sicut isti duo homines non sunt duo asini nec plures
asini, sed tot quot duo asini. Quod non minus intelligibile quam falsum. Eademctiam
inspectione dicendum esset quod in duobus et tribus non est quinarius, sed totus
numerus. Et ita aliquis numerus erit qui non erit quinarius nec maior numerus nec
minor. Et poterit queri cx quot unitatibus constet.
Alii vero divisioni innitentesdixerunt duo et tria essepaucioraquamquinque,ut duo
vel tria. Secundum quod recipi oportebit duos et tres nummos haberi ab eo qui tantum
tres habet. Et ita ille habet duas et tres nummos.
' et (in) 1115. 2 aliquod MS.

ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORV OF PROPOSITION 335
The author, however, rejects this view (ibid.):

Nos itaque recipiemus duo et tria esse quinque, sicut Socrates et Plato duo. Aliam
enim vim habet coniunctio copulativa in predicato et aliam in subiecto semel posita
quemadmodum et repetita ( )
......
Licet autem dictum sit duo et tria essequinque, tamen non erit recipiendum quod ipsa
sint quinque in eodem tempore, propter duplicem vim quam habet pronomen relativum:
nam cum distributione notat collectionem. Unde et sensusillius locutionis talis est:
idest duo et tria in aliquo temporesunt quinque, et earum quilibet.
Next there follow a number of objections which can be mised against [cap.37]
those qui recipiunt aliqua essehomineset asinos.They are confronted with
several inprobabiiia. Such as: quilibet homo est de numero hmninum et
asinorum; et ita Socratesest unus hominum et asinorum. Likewise: Achilles
juit fortissimus Grecorumet Troianorum; ergo fuit vel non jiiir. fortissimus
Troianorum.
Same people also reject such prapositions as iaiiquis homoestgramaticus[cap.38]

et musicus',which theyrthink to be a slipshod wayhofsayingfor: 'aliquis
homoestet gramaticuset musicus'(229v'3):
Cum superius dictum sit copulationem adiectivorum falsum esse ubi neutrum inesse
contingit, potest queri utrum similiter et ubi utrumque inest. Quod quibusdamvidetur.
Unde dicunt quod nullus homo est gramaticus et musicus nisi coniunctio gen'uinctur,
quia, ut aiunt, copulantur diversitates substantiarum sicut et formarum. Secundumquod
Oportet recipi quod Deus non est iustus et fortis et patiens et misericors et quod nulla
sillnba cst brevis et longa et ita nulla est indifferens. Nec Socratesest sciensgnmmticam
et sciens musicam, non ergo scit gramaticam et musicam. Ad hec autem: aliquis equus
est noster, posito quod nos habeamusequum communem; ergo aliquis est meus et
tuus ...... Similiter 'aliquis equusfuit Priami et Tullii; ergo aliquis fuit priameia: ct
tuiiianus'
.
Then, our author gives his own opinion and states some important
r'egulas for the substantiva! and adjectival use of adiective nouns (ibid.):
Nos dicimus huiusmüdi veras essein quibus adiectiva cupulantur adiective sumpta, quia
non copulantur diverse substantie, sed magis proprietates. At ubi substantive: acci-
piuntur, non eadem erit ratio. Neque enim recipiendum erit quod Socrates sit gramati-
cum et musicum et ne sit res gramatica et res musica. Nam adiectivum substantive
positum in suum femininum resolvi habet et nomen generale.
Finally, our author discusses those substantive nouns that have an [CHP- 39]
adjectival construction, such as 'senex',*pucr', 'oratar', *rhetor' (2301'3):
Postremode illis substantivisquc adiectivumhabentCODStrUCtiODeH],
queritur utrum in
cis similiter vera sit copulatio. Sunt enim nominum gencra quatuor. Etenim quedam
sunt substantivasignificatione et constructione, ut 'homo', 'lapis'. Quedam signiEcationc
et non constructione, ut 'unus', 'aliquis'. Nam hec nomina adiectiva sunt constructione
sed non signiEcationc, quia non copulant aliquam adiectivam qualitatem, sed magissub-
stantiam notant. Qucdam constructione et non significatione, ut 'sencs', 'pucr', 'rethar',
ct 'oraror', 'pater' et 'jilius'. Hec enim adiectiva sunt signiEcationc, quemadmodum et
ista: 'grammaricus'et "musicus'. Alia nec constructione nec significatione, sed utroque
adiectiva, ut 'albus' et llniger".
De his vero que tertii sunt generis ambigitur utrum dicendum sit quod aliquis homo
sit rethor et orator.Quod primo videtur, quia si rethoricus et oratorius in eadem diceren-
tur signiFlcatic-ne, reciperetur in eis copulatio. At vero dictionum constructiü non variat
signilïcationem constructionis vel locutionis; quarc nec veritatem aut falsitatem. Dicetur
quoque inspectione eadem quod nullus homo est magister et comes, vel episcopus et
comes, aut decanuset archidiaconus, scriptor et pictor; nec aliquis fuit magister et
discipulus, vel diaconus et subdiaconus; quamvis videatur in omnibus his oFFlciorum
tantum et dignitatum notari diversitas, non etiam substantiarum.
[cap. 40] Those propositionsin which the predicate-term is formed by a copu-

lation of a plural and a singular word, are rejected by our author. This
rejection hoids good for the tria totarumgencra: continuum,discretum,and
disgregatum and is supported by some instances: (l) posito aliquam
muscamcareamnunc primo ex duabusessccompactam,(2) posito quod aliquis
hauseritaquam in Secana,alius in Tsaraet illas sibi commiscuerit;(3) posito
aliquemduasnummatas(!) vini a diversisemptassibi commiscuisse; (4) posita
aliquemhaberetot nummosargenteosquo: ad marcamsujïciunt. (2301'").
[cap. 41] Other problems arise from the nature offa totum «a::vmiirimimI
(ibid.):
Non videtur quod ex lapidibuset lignis gt cementounum possitFieri,cum sint resadeo

diversarum manerierum. Secundumhoc etiam Oportebit recipi quod quidlibet sit pars
alicuius. Nam mundus eadem consideratione dicetur unum solum esse, quia et in eius
constitutione sibi continuantur partes ut elementa, in quibus alia. At vero quodlibet
corpus est pars mundi; ergo alicuius et sunt homo et asinuseiusdem.
Then, the general problem of physical conjunction and coherence is

stated, e.g. ex quibuslibet duobus corporeis unumfieri, and quodlibet corpus
maiusposseessequamsit. The problems are specified: ut si pedesduorum
hominumclavorumcaiyqsionevel sola artifcio compaginentur(is, then, the
whole animatumor inanimatum?); utrum e.xpedeequi etjärro sibi agisa unum
fiat; pretereaea abscisorecipietur ex illis unum constitui, quemadmodum
patini
jierrati parsjizrrum ??-
! For these problems, cfr. my paper: SameNewEvidcnce,pp. 15-16.

2 For such problems, cfr. also the Introducüancs
ilfomanc maioresand minorcs.Seemy paper
SameNew Evidence,pp. 15-16.
ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORV ()F PROPOSITION 337
The same question is Further developed posito huic eri ex una parte im- [CHP-
42]
jbrmam
pressamesse hominis et ex altera equi. Is there, then, more than One
picture (pluresstatue)to be distinguished?The samequestion can be put
asto the wax and the pictures of the king andthe bishc-p.
(ibid.).
This chapter discussesthe nominapluraha tantum,suchas 'arma', 'menia', [CüP-

43]
£brmnnaï"?
inundinc', ilin::irlf-rnch?",
'Thcbe'. (230Vü).
As to the totum discretum some cliFEculties are mentioned, e.g. if it is [caP-44]

Formedby such pairs as Adamet Noach (Noe), East (Oriens)and West
(Occidens).If the continuation is lacking, one cannot speakof any totum:
sicut enim puncta ut ad hoc ut lineam efEciant exigunt continuationem,
ita et unitates ut binarium efficiant, subiectorum coexistentiam.
This chapter cliscussesthe linguistic problems concerning arithmetica] [CüP-

45]
addition and some related problems (ibid.):
Sunt etiam alia circa numerum consideratione digna, ut utmm recipienda sit in numeris
cmnitatiol inter partem et totum, quemadmodum in vocibus. Quod si est, erit una
unitas et unus binarius in duobus liominibus, sicut et in tribus et tres binarii in tribus,
erga senarius. Econtrario si unitas non dichi-t a binario, ergo nec eadem inspectione
binarius a binario habente secum unitatem communem; et quelibet unitas pars est
alicuius binarii; ergo unius solius. Sed iste qui laquitur de Socrate et de sua manu,
loquitur de aliquo; et non de uno et de alio; ergo de uno solo. 'Unum solum' tamen
multipliciter est accipere, aut scilicet pm eo quod est unum et non aliud, aut unum et non
plura, aut unum er.: m'] quod non si: illud.
The problematic arguments instanced are such as: 'quodlibet anima]

habet aliquod caput et quodlibet caput habetur ab aliqua animali; quelibet
animalia habentaliqua capita et quelibet capita habentur ab aliquibus animali—
bus; et unum et.aliud habetur ab aliquo animali; ergo aliquod caput habetur et
ab uno et ab alio animali', and 'quilibet homojkrr, aliquod lignum
1' ......
etc.
A related problem is utrum unitas sit in re composita vcl tantum in re simplici. [CüP-45]
The author choosesfor the former of these alternatives (230Vb).
Similar questions may be put concerning the orationesand dictionesas [CHP-

47]
considered 215tam (ibid.):
' cannumcracio MS. 2 aut (corr. ex et ?) MS.

Oratio quoque videtur esse plura; cui similiter et dictio quelibet. Nulla enim videtur
vocum possc esse coniunctio, cum non sint rcs corporea. Et fortassis non facile erit
assignarequid aliud sit earum coniunctio quam continua ipsarum sit prolatio.- Quod si
est, poterit etiam ex istis nominibus 'homo', 'osinus' unavox Heri, si continue proferantur.
Poterit etiam queri utrum eademvox sit 'homoalbus' et 'albushomo'.Quo sumpto erit et
eadem inspectione eadem propositio 'homo albus est' et 'olim: homo est'; et similiter
'Socratesaliquemhominemvidot' et 'vide: aliquemhominem'.Et eademratione in negativis:
'aliqua-mhominemnonvidct' et 'non vido:aliquemhominem'.Quod dici nequit, quia hec forte
vera, illa falsa. Ad hec autem, si propositio una sola vox est, ergo et argumentatio simili-
ter; et ita sillogismus est una vox, et oratio dmninica'; ergo signilïcativa vel non signi-
Ecativa; sed non significativa, quia non est assignarequid ea signiücetur; sed nec non-
signiücativa, cum Fiat ex signiücativis convenienter ordinatis. Contradictio quoque
eadem ratione diceretur vox una, quamvis dicat: Aristotiles quoniam est aFHrmatio et
negatio opposite. Ex non-significativis etiam apparebit unam posse fieri vocem non-
significativam,ut si continue proferantur 'biltrix' et 'bubo'. Namsi imponatur ut sit una
verbum, altera nennen, erit ex eis vox una, que et nunc videtur essevox non-signiücativa.
The author answers(ibid.):

Nos etiam in his recipimus quod sit unum solum. Dicit enim Boetius quoniam nomen
est vox. Aristotiles etiam ratione assignat quare diFFlnitio unum solum sit. Non vidctur
tamen vox una fieri ex non-signilïcativis, sed vel ex solis significativis vel ex his cum aliis
permixtim. Nec est idem terminus 'homo albus' et 'albus' homo', sicut nec eadem dictio
'ad' et 'da', vel 'dum' et 'modo'.
[cap. 48] Similar problems are mentioned concerning toto disgregoto, such as
'populus', 'oxorcitus'. Propositions such as 'populushabetcaput vel capita'
are rejected. One of the questionsis: cum vero, ut diximus, homo pars
sit populi, potest queri utrum parvus homo sit minor pars illius quam
maximus. The answer: quod dici nequit cum (2311'0) uterque sit pars
eius minima. Nec enim manum vel pedem partem populi dices vel caudam
gregis (231rav-l'b).
[cap. 49] This chapter discusses the question whether there is an unity in such
things as populus(23lf'3):
Posteaqueritur, cum populussit unum, et aliquid quod est unum, utrum in eo sit
unitas. Et videtur potius quod maior numerus3 ex constructione quam habet super-
lativum ad genitivum singularisnominis collectivi. Ut 'aliquis dicitur essojortissimus
populi
vel Troianogomis'; ergo est de numero populi; quia superlativumincludit quod cum-
paratur inter ea ad quc comparatur, et ita aliquis numerus est in populo.
The author concedesthat some problems are unsoluble Forhim (ibid.):
! the Lord's prayer Paternoster. : De intorpr.6, l7a33-34. 3 sc.quam unitas.

ans MELIDUNA. THE THEORV 01: PROPOSITION 339
Fatcndum itaque populum vcl exercitum desinere vivere vel esse, quotiens homines
separantur, et incipere illis in unum coeuntibus. Nec ego novi utrum populus iste fuerit
mortuus.
The author discusses the question whether there can exist a nomen [cap. 50]
propriumpopuli. The answer is in the negative (ibid.).
This chapter discussesthe use of the First person in expressionscon- [Cap. 51]
cerning suchterms as 'populus'.This cannotbe done except perfguram,
(by personilïcation)(ibid.).
e.g. perprosopopeiam
Another question is about the growth and declina of & pe0ple. If both [cap. 52]
are possible, then poterit populus centumhominumessepapulas sexaginta
hominum, and the reverse; likewise minimus acervusfrumenti poterit esse
maximuset sic valereplus quamipse valeat (ibid )
This chapter discusses the somewhat strange comparison of such terms [cap. 53]
as l:]:wqulusl'
with the names of constellations, such as Gemini (Castor and
Pollux), and Pisces(231V3). "
The same questions, even more difücult ones, present themselves [cap. 54]
concerning some related terms like 'gens', (vulgus', ifamilia', 'honus'
(burden), isolidus'(the weigh of &gold coin) and "Iibra' (pound) (ibid.):
Similem etiam predictis, aut maiorem forte, dubitationem habent 'gens', 'vulgus' et
yamma', 'honus', 'solidus' et 'Iibra' Similiter familia alicuius est, quamvis forte
.. .. ..
unus sit de familia nunc Parisius, alius Rotomagi, et tertius Aurelianis, duo milia quoque
hominum, licet nullus ubi alius. Item. Inter 'milia' et 'nulla" hec solet assignaridiH'erentia
quod 'miHe' singularia unius millenarii appellat, 'milia' vero plurium.
The author concludes these discussions by giving one general solution

(ibid.):
Est et alia in his quedam facilior et forte probabilior solutio, dicendo omnia collectiva
nomina.essepraprietatum. Ut sit populusquedampt'üprietas accidentalis, que hominibus
inest ex eo quod sunt ita cangregati, ctfamilia ex eo quod eidem serviunt. Et habet pro-
prietas illa partesquemadmodumnumerus. Sahdusquoque, et libra, numeruserit.
The definition of genus and speciesis against those who say omne compositum [cap. 55]
esseplura (231 "'Vb).
Similar questions concerning such discreta as 'hic populus' are raised and [cap. 56]
solved (2311'13).
[cap. 57] A specialcaseis Formedby the term 'ars' (ibid.):

Ars quoque dicetur eadem inspectione esseplura, scilicet multa precepta, quia omnis
ars est collectio preceptorum.Et sic arsdialeticaest plura. Ac mille sunt artes liberales
et plura quam tria artes trivii. Sed nulla earum est quam non tradiderit Priscianus,
Tullius, vel Aristotiles. Ergo ipsi non tradiderunt tantum tres.
Finally, such collections as barba (: pilorum collectio)and civitas

(: edificiorumet habitatorummultitudo) are discussed (ibid.).
DE PROPOSITIONE VPOTHETICA
A cathegoriciscongruusest transitusadypotheticas,utpote a prioribus ad posteriora,

a simplicibusad magiscomposita, a partibus ad earum tota (232m).
[cap. 1] The hypotheticalpreposition is deHned(ibid.):

ïpothetica propositio est que habet propositionem partem sui. Etenim ypothetica duas
habet propositiones in sui constitutione, antecedentem scilicet prepositionem et con-
sequentem. Aliqua tamen ypothetica videtur esse cuius nulla propositio est pars, ut 'si
legitur, disputatur', 'si sedetur,statur'. Similiter etiam potest obici: 'si quis currit., ipsc
I
HIDPUEUI'
.
[cap. 2] It has six kinds, three of which are discussedonly briefly:

Vpotheticarum sex sunt species: continuativa, copulativa, c.lisil.lm:t:a,,,l
temporalis, localis,
causalis. Sed quoniam inter has tres prime maiori egent consideratione, relique prius
expediantur. ïpothetica temporalis est illa in qua clue propositionesconnectuntur in
unam per adverbium temporaleprepositum; localis in qua per locale; causalisquoque
in qua per coniunctionem subcontinuativam, que species est causalis coniunctionis,
autem ideo dixi quia si interponatur, non
scilicet per 'quia-'vel per 'cum'; 'prcpasirum'
erit forte ypothetica propositio, sed magiscathegorica,ut 'Socrates
loquiturquandocumque
Plato diætputat'vel 'Socratesfuit ubicumquePlato fuit'. ( ). Nunc ad ceteras
......
ypotheticarum species stilum convertamus.
[Cf-P-3] The copulativa proposition is that hypothetical proposition in which

two propositions are connected with the copulative conjunction 'et', or
its like. lt has the following types:
! disiunctim MS.
ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORï OF PROPOSITION 34l
(a) consisting of two categorical propositions: 'Socrateslegit et Plato

disputat'.
(IJ) consisting of two hypothetical propositions: 'si Socrates
est homo
Socratesestanimal, et si estanimal estsubstantia'.
(c) consisting of one categorical and one hypothetica] preposition
(having this order): 'Socratesest homo, et si Socratesest homoSocrates
estanimal'.
(d) consistingof one hypothecaland one categorica]proposition: 'si
Socratesest homoSocratesest animal., et Socratesest albus'.
Next the diHerences and resemblances of the hypotheticacopulativa and

the categoricade coniunctopredicatoare enumerated (2321'3'1'13):
Dilïert ergo ypothetica (232l'b)copulativaa categoricadc coniuncto predicato, quia hic
clue propositionesintegre proferuntur, ibi per compendium, hic propositiones, illi
termini copulantur. ln veritate tamen vel falsitateseseFrequentercomitantur. Unde et
ex hac categorica:'Socrates legit et disputat'potest inferri probabiliter: 'Socrates
legit et
Socratesdisputat'. Similiter 'Socratesestgraniaticus et irritisiirnis'l
infert: 'Socratesestgramaticus
et Socratesest musicus'; et permutatim. Interdum tamen equipollentia inpeditur ex
adiunctione dictionis exclusive, ut 'solus Socratesest gramä'ticuset musicus' non infert:
'solusSocratesestgramaticuset solusestmusicus'.Aut ex variatione appellationis, ut 'aliquid
et aliquid nonest'.
desiitesse
Somepeople,bclonging to the gencration before our author (fuerunt qui [cap. 4]
dicerent)did not take the copulativa proposition to be a hypothetical

ad omnemhuiusmodi interrogationemplures proponi ut unam.
one, respondentes
They Find Priscianagainstthem (Inst. gramm..XVII, 9 p. ll3"*'4) and
quite a number of inconvenientia(2321'13).
This chapter discusscs the question whether the parts (i.e. the propo-
[cap. 5]
sitions) of a copulativa (and generally speaking of each hypothetical

'proposition) signify something. The author answersin the affirmative
(232fb'V3):
Sed, quod dilï-ïciliusest et ad omnes ypotheticarum Speciescommune,queri potest
utrum in copulativa partes aliquid significent. Quod plerique negant, quemadmodum
nec in compositis dictionibus partiales dictiones aliquid significant, ut 'res' vel 'publica'
in hoc nomine: 'respublica'.
At hoc falsum ostenditur. Primo per simile. Nam in cathegorica aliquid significat predi-
catus vel subiectus. Unde et a simili coniectandum antecedens et consequens signilicare
in ypothetica.Item. Si nil ibi significant,ergo ponuntur materialiter: aut ergo inpropric
et extra propriam significationem.Item. 'Socrates esthomo'in ypothetica est propositio;
ergo oratio verum fal'sunwe significans. ( ..... .) Rursus. ln antecedenti huius:
currit et Plato disputat', hoc nomen 'Socrates'supponit huic verbo 'currit'; ex
'Socrates
illis solispcrEcitur illa oratio perfecta; ergo verbumest nota eiusquod de altero dicitur,
idest de re nominativi; ergo vere vel falso dicitur de ea; ergo illa oratio verum signiücat
vel falsum. Item. Cum omnis veritas vel falsitas in consideratione duorum consistat,
supponi scilicet et apponi, quorum utrumque illic reperitur, oportet quod cathegorica
verum vel falsum illic significet; sed non enuntiat verum vel falsum qui eam in con-
stitutione ypothetica profert; non enuntiat verum vel falsum, quia nil ea dicit, sicut in
hac oratione: 'Socratesas: albus rci nigar' ponitur hoc nomen 'albus' in propria signiFl-
catione, quia eandem prcprictatem ibi signiücat quam habet signiFicare; non tamen
illam copulat supposito, et hoc nomen 'Socrasos'illud idem significat in hac locutione:
vcl Platocurrit' quod habet per se significare,sed non supponit illud. Et est
'Socrates
satis expressa similitudo. Nam quemadmodum nomen quando per se sumitur signiFl-
cationemsuamcopulat vel supponit, cum alio vero iunctum com retinet, sed nec eam
copulat nec supponit, similiter est in ypothetica: cathegoricaqueper sesumptasignificat
et enuntiat, in constitutione vcro alterius prolata, tantum signiücat.
Obviously, this answer is very interesting from the viewpoint of the

doctrine of signification and supposition. See also below, Ch. XVI,
pp. 536-541.
[cap. 6] A special case of this problem is found in such propositions as: 'Socrates
est albus et Socratescsl:candidus'. They are considered, however, as cases
of incongruacopulatioby our author (232Vü).
[cap. 7] Some people assert that the copulative prcposition signiFles more than
one thing, e.g. that 'Socrates est homo, et Socratesest animal' signifles Ihe
truth of both Socratemessehominem and Socratemesseanimal. Therefore
tiua)r reject such expressions as: 'impossibileestSocratemessehominem ol: ipsum
non esseanimal', since it connects two possibilia. Our author, however,
proves their view to be untenable by ad hominem(sed
an argumentum
eadem ratione dicet (quis)) (ibid.).
[cap.8] This chapter deals with the important question of the real purport of the
copulative proposition (utrum copulativajiot sermode aliquo vel de oli-
quibus). The argument is important for our knowledge of the supposition
theory of our author (ibid.):
Quod contendetaliquis probare ex eo quod nominativusin antecedentipropositione
supponit verbo et ita significat suppositum". locutioni; ergo rem de qua Et sermo.
Similiter etiam ex loquendi consuetudine. Consuevimus enim commendare Regem
Francie ct vituperare RegemAnglie dicendo quod RosFranciacst iustas,quod pacis
conservator, et Res Anglia asi tirannus.
The sameseemsto hold good for the disjunctive proposition, e.g.

ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORV OF PROPOSITION 343
'Socratesest anima], vel Plato est homo'. Therefore the author decidedly
rejects the view (ibid.).
ldECI' dicendum quod nulla ypotlietica Et sermo de aliquo nec supponit nomen in
alterutra partium locutioni, sed verbo.
The next question is whether in copulative propositions two contra- [cap. 9]

(lictor)r propositions can be found. It is denied by our author ne sit duas
simulverasinvenire.He concludes (ibid.):
contradictorias
Itaque.non est in copulativis contradicere vel disiunct[iv]is, inpediente ']'conclusione
duarum prapasitionum in unannï Debet enim hoc inter cetera contradictionis inpedi-
menta annumerari.
This chapter deals with the evaluation of copulative propositions. Note [cap. [0]
the comparison with the madicumjizrmenti (232V'ï): -
Postremoinspiciendasunt habitudinescopulativarumad suaspartes.Omnis copulativa
est vera cuius utraque pars est vera et omnis vere utraque pars est vera et etiam ex
qualibetpotest inferri utraqueeius parsnecessario.Item. anis est falsacuius utraque
pars est falsa. Sed non Et in hoc: conversio, quia non cuiuslibet false utraque pars est
falsa, immo sufficit ut tantum altera sit falsa, quippe modicum fermenti totam massam
corrumpit. Item. Cuiuslibet necessarieutraque pars est necessaria.Sedutrum econverso
verum est postea queramus. Item. Omnis impossibilis est cuius utraque pars est im-
possibilis. Sed non convertitur, quoniam omnis que Et ex duabus contradictoriis, im-
possibilis est, ut 'Antichristusestalbus (et) Antichristusnon estalbus'. Econtrario: cuiuslibet
possibilis utraque pars est possibilis; et non econverso. Ultima tamen regula videtur
habereinstantiamin istis copulativis: 'tria suntaliqua et duosuntplura' ; 'hocgenusanima]
predicaturde aliquibus et hec specieshamopredicatur de pluribus'; 'Socrateset Plato videbunt
aliqua et Ciceroer.Virgilius videbunteadem',posito quod isti videant alia quam illi. Similiter:
'isti dua montessun: multum magni cl: isti nani sun: equemagni'. Nam in his utraque pars
sumpta per se vera invenitur. ln eisdem etiam terminis habet eiusdem regule conversa
instantiam.ldeo hoc regule addendumerit: "nisi hocimpediatdiversaacceptiotermini".
Sed 'plura' in ypothetica comparative, in catliegorica non comparative sumitur. Similiter
'altcr' nunc distributive, nunc relative.
Si quis tamenpenitusinspiciat, nullam in his inveniret instantiam,quia consequens
est verum prout ibi sumitur. ( ...... ) Quod vero omnis sit necessaria cuius utraque
pars est necessaria,instantiam videtur habere in his: 'aliquid es.'."
et ipsumfui: Sacram';
'aliquod momentumestet ipsumnon est b', posito quod sequens momentum modo dicatur b.
The author tries to solve these and other difficulties, but his answer is
somewhat hesitative. It seemsto be important for our knowledge of his
theory of supposition, indeed (ibid.):
! therefore, i.e. becauseof suchdeceptiveargumentsasthosementioned.

A tque in hoc si quis diligenter inspiciatmaximamvidebit inessedifficultatem, ut difficile

sit, aut inpossibile sit, bene solvere. Solvet tamen forte aliquis dicto primam partem
huiusmodi ypotheticarum non signiFicare necessarium. Restringitur enim appellatio
huiusnominis 'aliquid' vel huius nominis 'momcntum'
ex suppositionepronominisrelativi.
Quod ex huc palam quia locutio talis non recipitur nisi pro eodem vera sit locutio
precedenspro quo vera est et subsequens.Sed hec solutio ex hoc potest inprobari quod
eadem ratione in cuntinuativa significationem suam variabit. Et itaa liquid essehominemnon
anteceditad aliud in hacypothetica: 'si aliquid esthama,ipsumaslanimal'. Nec videtur
inconveniensillatio facta per positionem antecedentishoc: modo: ( ) 'sed
......
aliquid esthomo; ergo ipsumestanimal' ( ). Tota autem huius rei difficultas ex eo
......
surgit quod incertum est quid pronomen relativum significet relatum ad nomen appel-
lativum, utrum scilicet idem cum sua-antecedenti vel aliud, et utrum consequens
propositio in talibus (sit) singularisvel indefinita. Nam si non est singularissedindeFmita,
non erit hec vera: 'aliquid estat ipsumesseestillud esse'et 'aliquis humaes.'.et illum esseest
Sacrarum esse'( ) Atque ad hec, si quis idoneampoterit excogitaresolutionem,
......
nec sibi futilis nec nobis habetur gravis.
[cap. ll] This chapter discussesthe disjunctive proposition (disiuncta)and its

evaluation (ibid.):
Hactenus de cupulatisris. Nunc de disiunctis videamus. Disiuncta quoque appellatur
cuiusantecedenset consequens per disiunctiuamconiunctionemcopulantur.
Est autemomnis disiuncta, ut solet dici, vera cuius altera parsest vera, et econverso.
Item. Omnis falsaaltera pars est falsa,sed non convertitur. Et econtrario: omnis est
cuius altera parsest necessaria,
necessaria nisi (præpositio implicita impediat, ut 'Deus
est vel Socrates
ast id quad est asinus'; vel ut generalius dicatur: si tam antecedensquam
consequenssit necessariaenuntiabile. Sed non cuiuslibet necessariealtera pars est
necessaria.Ut eius qua Et ex duabus contradictoriishut 'Socrates estalbus,vel Socrates
noncsl:albus'.
Priori tamen regule videtur posseinstantia ferri in omnibus fere disiunctis, eoquod
czlicatlBoetius omnem disiunctam veram verti in coniunctam, destructo antecedenti et
manente.eodemconsequenti.Sed illud intelligendumest de illis que circa immediata
proponuntur, ut 'aliquod animal estsanumral ipsumestegrum', 'aut diesestaut nax'.
The author's exposition of & supposed instantia aHbrds us another

glimpseinto his view of the suppositionof terms (ibid.):
ln hac enim disiuncta 'aliquis hamo esi Cesarvel ipsejai: Ccsar' non habebit regula
instantiam, quia neutra pars est vera. Non enim extenditur appellatia, licet sequatur
verbum preteriti temporis, quia in alia clausula quam nomen positum non habet vim
ampliandi, sed tantum ex priori verbo nomen suam contrahit appellationem, ut non
possit pertinere nisi ad ea que sunt. Sequens vero relativum idem non refert in eadem
significatione et eadem appellatione, sed terminorum disiunctio vera est.
1 Cfr. Da syll. liyp. [, 839B12-Cl and ll, 873Dsqq.

ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORï OF PROPOSITION 34-5
Somc other disjunctive propositions ask for specialsolutions of the [cap. 12]
problems involved in their construction. E.g. 'aliquid promittitur ::
Socratevel illud est Cesar'. ("Hic enim prior pars est vera., posito quod
Socratesindeterminate promittat, et tamen tota disiuncta est falsa").
The author amply discussestheseproblemsand concludesthis section
with the words: sum:autemin copulationect disiunctionedubitabilia multa.
ch ideoad presens omittamusquodmagnampartem ( ?, the word is iHcgiblc in
my photostat)astructioniscontrapropositumbrevitatisesqmrunt (2331'3).
This chapter gives the definition and division of the propositio continuatim [cap. [3]
(implication,in modern terminology) (2331'3):
Tran(s)cursis breviter reliquis ypotheticarum speciebusdeincelascontinuativisinsisten-
dum. Dicuntur autem continuative que per 'si' continuativam coniunctionem proponunt.
Unde et ab ea continuative denominantur. Vel forte continuatim dicuntur non &
'continuanda', sed & 'contincndo', quia in eis consequens continetur, sive conclauditurl
in antecedenti.
Harum alie sunt simplices,alie composite.Simplicium quoquespeciessunt quatuor:
nam alia constat ex aHirmativa et negativa, alia ex negativa et aFFlrmativa,alia ex. duabus
affirmativis, alia ex duabus negativis. "
Some people referring to Boethiusand Aristotle reject those impli- [cap. 14]
cations which consist of an aFHrmative proposition and negative one:
Ac de his quidem que in dissimili qualitate nonnulli nullam recipiunt, ponentes ad propo-
sitionem unius qualitatis non sequipropositionemalterius. Dicit enim Boetiusloquendo
de necessitate conditionalium nullam earum esse necessariamnisi consequensclaudatur
in antecedenti. At huius: 'si Socratesest homo,Socratesnon est asinus', consequensnon
intelligitur in antecedenti, velud nec in uno oppositorum reliquum. Ad hec autem
Aristotiles in Topicis: si sit dubium de consequentiaproposita utrum sit necessaria,
considerandum si dissonantia Flt in tempore. Nam si hoc est, reprehensibilis est con-
secutio. At vero in hac: 'si aliquid estalbum, ipsumnon estnigrum', tempus dissonat, quia
si erit vel fuit album, non erit vel non fuit nigrum. Non ergo ipsa est vera.
Our author, however, does not share their Opinion nor does he accept
the many problematic propositions that are set forth (2331'3-1'").His
counter-argument is based on the theory of contradiction. The text runs
as follows (the Firstsentenceseemsto be corrupt (2331'13):
Horum omnium solutionem nobis pre(s)ta(t) positio contradictionis! (: the thesis of
contradictory propositions) nil cxfalsa accidere,et aliorum pariter incmwenientium que
aliis accidunt ex huiusmodi consequentia recepta in qua ad aFHrmationemsequi ostenditur
negatio. Eis enim probabitur facile quod ad aliquam propositionem sua sequitur contra-
! readingof our MS. 3 consignificationis;IIS.

dictoria et ad eandemsue contradictorie et ad unamprapositionemalia que non potest

esseveracum illa, ut in sequentibusostendemus.Illud tamen non negamusquia maiorem
habeat [irmitatem et necessitatemconsecutio apposita dictione ex(c)lusiva, ut 'si est
tantum unum, non estaiiud'.
[cap. IS] Boethius is adducedagainstthose who reject such implications as: si

esta, non estb' (ibid.):
Dicesquod Boetiusinter ceteroslocosdialeticosponit eum qui est ab oppositis; a quo
numquam poterit secundum illos necessarium sumi argumentum. ln ypotheticis etiam
ponit quatuor species ypotheticalmn, docens ex eis sillogizare per positionem ante-
cedentis et destructionem consequentis.Inter quas ponit illam qua ex nFErmatione
constat et negatione.
[cap. 16] This chapter discussesthe propositions of the type: 'si non est a, est b'
(233rb-va):
Sicut in questionem ducitur utrum ad aFErmativam sequatur negativa, ita quoque

antecedatnegativa.Quod non recipimus, si utraque
ambigitur utrum ad aFErmativam
sumatur recta et pura negativa tam voce quam significatione, et similiter pura aFHrmativa.
Negatio quippe, ut ait' Aristotiles, precedit aFFlrmationem. th non esseasinum antecedit
Socratem, quia illud quod est Socratesprius non fuit asinusquam ipsum essetSocrates.
Quare non si non est asinus,est Socratesnec si aliquid animal non est rationale, est
irrationale. 'Pura' autem ideo adiecimus quia sequitur: 'si Socratesnon es.':albus, est
candidusvel non esl:candidus'. Vel 'si Marcus(233Vü) non currit, Tullius currit vel non currit';
aut 'si nullus homo non currit, aliquis homocurrit'. Sed consequens prime vel secunde non
est proprie aFFlrmativa,sed magis mixta. Antecedens quoque secunde aHïrmativa est
signil'ïcatione,licet non voce. Similiter ista: 'aliquid es.'.anima!er.nonestracionaie'nec
affirmativaest proprie necnegativa,cum utrumquehabeatimplicitam. Undeex eapotest
aFErmativam sequi: ipsum est irrationale. Nec erit illatio necessaria si quis sic dicat:
'si quid est animal et non est rationale, ipsum est irrationale'. Nam in5tantia est in temporibus
extrinsecis.
[cap. I7] Of the two remaining kinds of implications: 'si esta, est b', and 'si non
b',
esta, nonest only the former will be dealt with by our author (233W):
Consequens reor duasreliquasspeciesdemonstrare.SuFHcittameneampersequique ex
solis constat affirmativis. Habita quippe discretione veritatis vel falsitatis illius, facile
reliqua innotescet.
Notabis igitur quod in constantibus ex aFFlrmativisquandoque) sequitur simplex
aFErmatioad simplicem, quandoquenon simplex ad non simplicemvel etiam ad sim-
plicem. Non simplicemautem hic voco non solum cum que prcprie dicitur composita
prapositio, idest ypotheticam, sed etiam illam que terminum habet disiunctum vel
coniunctum, aut que habet aliquod implicitum per relativam particulam, ut 'Socrates
estaliquid, quod esthomo'.
! errat auctor noster; cf. Arist. Anal. Post. !, 86b33-35; 87:11.
ans MELIDUNA. THE THEOR? 01: PROPOSITION 347
Ac primum de his in quibus ad simplicem sequitur simplex, utpote de simplicioribus,

disseremus.Quod in hoc propositionem ad propositionemsequidicimus, gratia signifi-
cat-orum intellige. Harum alie sunt vere ex habitudine terminorum sive eorum que
terminis significantur, ut 'si es: homo, es.'.animal'. Alie ex habitudine propositionum, ut
'si omnis homo currit, quidam homo currit'; locus a subalternis. Alie cx dispositione
sillogistica, ut 'si omnishomoest anima! et omnerisibile est homo, omnerisibile est.animal'.
Ac terminorum quidem habitudo ordinem sequitur locorum. Locus quippe nil aliud
est quam habitudo terminorum sive eorum que terminis significantur. Nam etiam inter
termiuos gratia significatorum habitudo attenditur. Non negamus tamen quin in Silio-
gismu locus sit assignandus.Est enim illic necessitas duplex, una ex dispositione, altera
ex loco. Non tamen secundum quemlibet lucorum vera sumitur consequentia, sed
tantumlocus&pari, locusa parte, locusa toto et locusaboppositisde quo prius diximus,
necessitatem tenent, quia in his solis circa idem est sumere antecedens et consequens.
Alii in solaprobabilitateconsistuntet inproprie ioci appellantur,ut locusa toto integro,
:: relativis, a casibus, a coniugatis. Ut possit recipi consecutio secundum lios sumpta,
cum non ad hoc sed per hoc est disputatio, deEcit tamen a necessitate. Nam nec si domus
est pariesest, nec si pater est Filiusest, aut si album est, et albedo.
The, author rejects those implications that proceed from res to dictum or [Cip- 13]
from dictumto res (233'4'3):
Sicut diximus omnem consequentiam falsam esse cuius antecedens et consequens non
possuntsumi circa idem, ita et illas repudiemusin quibus de alio Et sermo in antecedenti
quam in consequenti.Quales sunt ille in quibus de re Et progressusad dictum, vel
econverso. Nec enim si Socrates est homo, Socratem esse hominem est verum, nec si
Socratem esse hominem est verum, Sucratem esse animal est verum. Velud nec si vere
dicitur hoc, et illud, nec si Socratesest homo, vera est hec propositio 'Socrates
estanimal',
nec si utrumque contradictorie oppositorum erit verum, verum erit utrumque esse
verum; nec si verum erit unum solum momentum esse,unum solum momentum erit.
Tamen si aliquid esse est verum, aliquid est, quia hic duplex Operatur habitudo. Est
enim locus a parte tam inter subiecta quam inter predicata. Et similiter si unum vel aliud
esseest verum, unum vel aliud est. Sed non ideo: 'si Socratem esseest verum,Socrates est'.
Nec 'si et unum et aliud esseest. verum, si: unum et. aliud est', quia hic subiecta dissonant.
Quemadmodumsi aliquid essedicitur 1ws!auditur ab isto, aliquid dicitur vel auditur ab
isto, et si aliquid essescitur ab aliquu, aliquid scitur abaliquo. Non tamensi grammati-
tam esse,est et grammatica. Et si unum vel aliud essedicitur, unum vel aliud dicitur;
non tamenet unum et aliud, si et unum et aliud esse(sc.dicitur).
The Hnalexampleis quite interesting (ibid.):

Rursum. Si utrumque istorum 'Sacratcmessehominem','Socratem animal' est verum,
esse
Socratem esse animal est verum, si et Sucratem esse hominem et Socratem esse animal
est verum; Socratem esse animal est verum; ergo si et Socratem esse hominem et
Socratem esseanimal est 1mierum,,
Socratem esseanimal est 1'is'-imm.
Quod verum est, ut
supradiximus, si in antecedentidicto dicta cathegoricarumsupponantur;falsumautem,
si dictum copulativa supponatur,quia illud aliud est ab eo quod est 'Socratemcsse
ani-
mal'.
[cap. 19] The question ma)r be raised whether, when the propositions of some
ypothetico are tronsponed, its cnuntiobilc remains the same. E.g. is
'Socratemessehominemvel (Platonem)esseasinum' the sameas 'Platonemesse
asinumvclSocratem hominem'?
esse Our author answers(2341'11):
Dicimus quod nec idem est enuntiabilc nec eadem est disiuncta in transpositione, vel
copulativa,sicut nec eodemest capulativaconstansex aFErmativaet negativaet constans
ex negativa et aFFlrmativa nec idem signiEcationis; nec traclatusl idem iambis).z Con-
secutionem tamen adinvicem habent.
[cap. 20] This chapter discussessuch implications as 'si Socratesscit aliquid esse
homo, scit aliquid esseanimal'. There are diFferent opinions about its
validity, which dependson the question of what is referred to by such
propositions. Some peoPIethink that such locutionesmust be understood
not de re, but do dicto, others are of the contrary opinion. Both views,
however, are untenable, our author proves. He prcposes to make certain
distinctionis (ibid.):
Huius itaque solutionem opus credimus essehoc tripartita distinctione. Quandoquein
tali locutione ul)i infinitivus cum accusativo adiungitur, de re accusativi agitur, ut 'ego
rideo Socratemcurrere', idest Socratemcurrentem; vel 'audio angeloscanorc', idest angelos
Quandoquede re infinitivi, ut 'scntioignemcolerc',idest coloremignis. Quandoque
canentes.
de enuntiabili; sed nonnisi cum verbis quorum significatio proprie spectat ad enuntia-
bilia. Cuiusmodi sunt: 'scirc', 'diccrc', 'significaro'.
[cap. 21] This chapter discusses the mutual inferences between prepositions,
which are basedon the interrelations of the terms used in those prcpo-
sitions (ibid.):
Nunc easprosequamur habitudines quasnecessitatemconferre prediximus consecutioni.
Et primo parium habitudinem par est ostendere..Cuius rei gratia naturam et diversitatem
parium disringuamus. Sunt autem eorum gencra quinque. Quidem enim termini ex
accidentesibi invicem parificantur, idest ex accidentali rerum eventu, ut 'homo' et
'currcm' posito omne currens et solum essehominem. Alii ex additione. Sedhorum duo
sunt genera: nam quandoque utraque pars unius antecedit ad utramque partem alterius,
ut 'vivum (unum MS) rationale' et 'anima! rationalc' vel 'substantiaalba' et 'carpmalbum';
quandoque neutra, ut 'hoc animal' et 'hoc risibile' vel 'hoc animal' et 'fac homo'. Alii
dicuntur pares quia idem significant, ut 'album' et 'condidum' vel diFHnitio et nomen
diFFmiti, ut 'homo' et 'animal rationalemortale' etc. Alii, quia signiEcant paria simpliciter,
idest absque termini additione, ut 'homo' et 'risibilc', 'animal' et 'sensibilc'.
Ac de his quidem paribusqui in primo sunt genereuno modo sentiunt omnesquod
nec necessariamhabeantconsecutionemnec probabilem. Nec etiam simpliciter paria
debent dici, sed paria ut nunc. Econtrario que in quarto et quinto sunt genere, mutuam
Alls MELIDUNA. THE THEOR'i' OF PROPOSITION 349
habent consecutionem et necessariam fere secundum omnes, nisi quod speciem sequi
ad pruprium non conversim plerique autumant, propter illud quod ait Porphiriusl:
prcprium naturaliterest posteriusspecie.
Sedde his qui paritatem contrahunt ex additione ambigitur. Quarum duo distinxi-
mus. Et sunt qui in utrisque conversionem recipiunt consequentia, alii in neutris. Nos
autem cum beatis medium tenentes inter illa tantum paria qui prioris sunt generis
consequentiam recipimus, in quibus scilicet altera pars unius ad utramque reliqui
antecedit. Additio quippe superioris etsi non coadiuvet necessitatemconsecutionis,
saltem non impedit, maxime cum ad ipsum antecedat illud cui Fit additio.
The mutua] inferences of all paria are the sameas those between pars [cap.22]
and totum (234T'J):
Ceteraparia non aliter quantumad consequentiam
sesehabebuntquamparset totum.
Sequitur enim: 'si aliquid est hic homavel hocrisibile, ipsumest hocanimal', et non econ-
verso. Cum his etiam que paritatem habent ex additione pronominis, illa ponemusque
ex appositioneablativi vel adverbialis determinationis pm'il'icantur, ut 'colorammalbedine'
'a—Hscmmalbedine', 'necessarioïfalsam'et 'necessariaimpossibile'et 'necessaria(non) rerum'.
There are somespecialcases(ibid.): ..

Inter descriptionem quoque et descriptum non ['it consecutio necessaria quoniam de-
scriptio sola accidentalia sumit. Et ideo non est verum: si aliquid est genus, ipsum est
predicabile de. pluribus differentibus specie in quid; nec: 'si est Socrates,est albus crispus
Sophroniciflius'. Item. (Que est inter) accidenset subiectum plerique negant:
musicus
'si estcoloratumestcorpus', vel econverso:, aut 'si estsanum,estanimal', quia numquam, in-
quiunt, ad accidentale sequitur substantiale.
The relation of pars and tatum is sometimes found between the subject [cap. 23]
terms, sometimes between the predicate terms of the propositions
contained in the ypothetica. This chapter deals with the habitudines partis
ad totum (ibid.) :
Habitudo partis ad totum quandoqueattenditur inter subiecta,quandoqueinter predicata,
utrobique tam construendo quam destruendo. Inter subiecta autem utilis est ad constru-
endum particulariter: 'si quidam homocurrit, quoddamanimal currit'. Inter predicata vero
tam particulariter quamuniversaliter.Namsi quidamhomo est albus,quidamhomoest
coloratus; et similiter, si omnis homo. Nisi contingat predicatum ampliare subiectum,
ut 'omneanimal est homo', 'omnepares:essehomo'. Sed nec in subiecto neque in predicato
utilis est sumpta destructive, quia non si quoddam album non est homo, quodclam
album non est animal, nec si quidem homo non est albus, quoddamanimal non est album.
Non enimsi parsabaliquo, et totum abeodem,necsi aliquida parte, et a toto.
! Vide Boethium, ln Isagr.[, 12619.

1 necessarium MS.
[cap. 24] This chapter discusscsthe habitudines

totiusad partem(23435):
Habituclo totius ad partem inter predicata inutilis est sumpta constructivc, quia non si
aliquid est animal, illud est homo. Sed ad destruendum utilis. Inter subiecta vero
quandoquenecessariam habentconsecutionem,quandoquenon. Si enim Fiatconsecutio
vel illatio & toto in quantitate, in tempore, vel in loco ad partem in quantitatevel in loco
vel in tempore, sumpta indeterminate, necessariaest. Ut 'si omnishomo, quidam homo';
'si in omni temporaest Deus, in oliquo': 'si ubique, olicubi'. Si vero pars chmitc et deter-
minate sumpta fuerit, nil Et necessarium,quia non 'si omnishomoest, Socratesest'; nec
'si omneanimalest,omnishomo'; nec 'si Deussemper
est,modoest'; nec 'si ubique,et liic"II nisi
tam pars quam totum demonstrative sumatur.
[cap. 25] The other kind of inferential relation is that between the propositions
themselvesof the hypothetica]proposition (i.c. the implication). These
inferencesare the subjectof the next chapters(25-30). They are divided
into the inference relation of propositiones subalternae,that based on
equivalenceand that basedon conversion. The First kind is dcalt with
now (2343'3'3'0):
Restatde his dicere continuativisque verosunt ex habitudinepmpositionum. Notandum
itaque quoniam tribus modis videtur prupositio sequi ad propositionem, scilicet ex
habitudine subalternarum, equipollcntie, et conversionis. Sed queritur de prima habitu-
dine utrum generaliter omnis consequentia vera sit secundum eam sumpta, idest utrum
quelibet particularis ad suam sequatur universalem. Et videtur instantia ferri posse tam
in aFFxrmativis quam in negativis. In uFHrnmtis-is, ut 'omnis homo preter Socratem currit -——
aliquis homo prater Socratemcurrit'. Et in his similiter in quibus per nomen cmnmunis
generis locutioni Et snppositio, quia non si omnis civis currit, aliquis civis currit vel
aliqua civis; nec si omnis bos, aliquis bos.
Sed huiusmodi instantis non obsunt. Nam huius universalis: 'omnis homo prater
currit' non est hec subalterna: 'aliquis etc.', sicut nec ista eius contradictoria:
Socratem
'aliquis homo precor Socratemcurrit', inpediente natura dictionis exclusive que aliam
habet vim in universaliquam in particulari, quippe ibi excludit, hic includit. Dc ista
vero: 'omniscivis currit' dicimus quod necessarioantecedit ad suam particularem. Neque
enim 'aliquis civis currit' et 'aliqua civiscurrit' subalternasunt eiusdem,sed sunt in hac
forma vocis: 'omniscivis currit' due propositiones quarum una est vera pro solis maribus,
altera pro solis mulieribus et ad utramque sequitur propria particularis. Est igitur in
aFErmativa verum generaliter sequi particularem ad universalem.
Sed in negativis videtur (234ïh) similiter dici posse, ne accidat acl negativam sequi
aHirmativamet aliquampropositionemsequiad suamcontradictoriam (234W'Vb).
[cap. 26] There are four kinds of equivalence of propositions: secundum signa,
secundumdeterminationem,secundummodos,and secundum jinitos terminoset
iufinitos (2 34W13):
Equipollentia propositionum secundum quatuor attenditur. Secundum signa, ut
'aliquis homocurrit' — 'quidam homocurrit'. Secundum determinationem, ut 'unum
nRs MELIDUNA. THE THEOR? 01: PROPOSITION 351
solumcurrit' — 'tantum unum curris'. Secundum modos, ut (in) propositionibus modalibus,

quorum quedam sunt de possibili, quedam de contingenti, alia de necessario,alie dc im-
possibili; propositionesvero de possibiliet de contingentiin eademqualitateet in eodem
subiecto sibi equipollent, ut 'possibile est esse' 'contingens est esse'; de possibili et
—
necessario in diversa qualitate ct diverso subiecto, ut 'possibileest esse'— 'non necesse
estnon esse'.llle de.possibili et ille de impossibili in diversa qualitate et eodem subiecto,
ut 'possibileesi.esse'— 'non impossibileest esse'.llle de necessarioet impossibili in eadem
qualitate ct diverso subiecto, ut 'necesse est esse'— 'impossibileest.non esse'.[tem. Secun-
dum Fmitosterminos et ianitos, ut universalis aFFirmativade utroque Enito et universalis
negativa de predicato infinito sibi equipolient, ut 'omnis homoest animal' -— 'nullus homo
es: non-animal'. Similiter universalis affirmativa et universalis negativa que negationem
habet interpositam, ut 'omnishomoest animal' 'nullus non est.animal'.
—
Habitudo tamen quo ex modis est, magis in necessitate consistit comitantie quam in
veritate consequentia'. Neque enim si impossibile est esse, necesse est non esse, eoquod
diversa supponant dicta.. Volusi nec si impossibile est esse hominem et esseasinum,
et nonessehominemet non esseasinum.Universalisquoquenegativanon videtur
necesse
antecedere sed sequi ad affirmativam de utroque Finito, sicut ad hanc: 'nullus homo
es: lignum non album' non sequitur 'omnis est lignum album'.
This chapter denis with the inference relation between two convierted [cap.27]
propositions. The question is whether thc valid iiifcrencc is due to the
termini paresor to the conversion ns such. The author takes this kind of
inference, too, more as & necessariocomitantio than as & consequentia
(ibid.).
This chapter discussesthis argumentation: 'aliquid estasinus;et si aliquid [cap.28]
est asinus, ipsum est animal ; ergo aliquis asinus est animal'. It is rejected by
our author as a case of the fallacy secundumcompositionem

et divisionem
(234vb-235ra);
Rursus queri potest utrum hoc argumentatio conveniens sit: (2351?) 'aliquid esl:
asinus; ei. si aliquid est asinus,ipsumest,animal; ergo aliquis asinusest animal'. Quod non
videtur nisi apud eos qui conversas admittunt, quoniam hoc nomen 'asinus', cum prius
sit predicatus terminus, Et in conclusione subiectus. Et preterea inde videbitur
......
consecutio ex habitudine conversionis hoc modo haberi hec argumentatio conveniens:
'( ) sedsi aliquod animal est.asinus, aliquid est asinus; et si aliquid est asinus, ipsum
......
est animal; ergo si aliquod animal es.'.asinus, aliquis asinus est animal'. Hic:] tamen de-
ceptio Et secundumcompositionemet divisionem, quin cum dicitur: 'si aliquodanimal
est asinus, aliquid est asinus; er.si aliquid estasinus, ipsumestanimal' , nan est unum conse-
quenshoc totum 'aliquid est.asinuset si aliquid . . . etc. '. Tale enim consequensnon sequitur
ad hoc antecedens:'aliquod animal estasinus',sed profertur per se hoc continuatim:
'si aliquod animal est asinus, aliquid est.animal'; cum non copulatur huic cathegorice:
'aliquod animal est asinus', sed magis huic ypothetice: 'si aliquod animal estasinus,aliquid
estasinus'.
] hec MS.
[cap. 29] This chapter discusses the question x-vhether transposition prevents the
consecution of the propositions involved (2351'3):
Amplius. Queritur utrum sicut conversio, ita et transpositio consecutionem impediat,
Et si non, erunt vere omnes huiusmodi: 'si rerum est Socratemesselranrincm, Socratemesse
hominem est verum'; 'si Socratem esseasinum est falsum, ( ctc.)', 'si necessarium
......
( ...... etc.)', 'si contingens( etc.' ) At his receptis prohiberi non
...... ......
poterit consecutio secundum conversionem. ( ) Sed forte quis reprehendet
......
locutionem tamquam nugatoriam propter superfluam repetitionem eiusdem, sicut et
istam: 'si Socratesest homo,Socrateses.'.homo' ldeo varietur terminus: 'si rerum est Marcum
.
essehominem,TuHium essehominemest.rerum'. Solutio in his est facilis dicto quod non in
illis est transpositio,sedetiamconversio.Et etiam predicti modi si post appellationem
enuntiabilisponantur, predicati termini sunt, et Flt prepositis;modalis; si preponantur,
subiecti sunt et tenentur substantive, sicut et cetere in his: 'album est animal' et 'nigrum
estjärrum' ( ...... ) Est tamen (sc. consecutio)ubi transpositio Fit solaabsquecon-

versione, ut 'necesse estDeumesse','Deumnecesse esse',quia 'nec-esse'
es.'. non potest supponere
verbo. Similiter: 'Socrates aliquemhominemvidet' et 'Socratesvidc: aliquemhominem',aut
'a Socratecurritur' ct 'currimr :: Socratc'. Quia quocumque ordine proferatur, sive
'curritur :: Socrace'sive 'a Socratecurrimr', eadem est propositio, et est 'a Sacrasc'subiectus,
'curritur' predicatus.
[cap. 30] The author speaks but shortly about orationes quc necessitatem tenent
complexionis(2 3ST") :
De orationibus iliis clue necessitatem tenent complexionis nil aliud nunc dicimus nisi
quod omnis sillogismus consequentiam faciat, sed in plerisque necesseest necessitatem
coadunari habitudine terminorum. Ut in concludentibus indirecte, aut aliter non Flet
sillogismus,ut ex supradictispalam.
[cap. 3l] This chapter(lesiswith the lyrpotheticae (ibid )

compositae
Deinceps ad compositas ypotheticas transeamus. Compositarum' prout hic accipitur
'composna', quatuor sunt genera. Nam quedam habent in altera sui parte propositionem
vel terminum coniunctum, alie disiunctum, alie habent aliquid implicitum per relativam
particulam, alie habent continuativam partem sui.
[cap. 32] The Erst kind of compound hypothetical proposition is dealt with, viz.
those which contain & copulative proposition or copulative terms (ibid.):
Primum itaquegenusprimo cxpcdicndum.Sedillud etiamtripertito subdistinguitu'r.

Etenim in non-simplicibus habentibus terminum coniunctum quandoquesimplex
sequiturad coniunctamsive copulativam,quandoqueconiunctaad simplicem, quando-
que coniunctaad coniunctam.Quandosimplexsequitur, considerandum utrum sequatur
ad alteram partem antecedentis.Nam si sequaturad alteram, et ad copulativam, sive
' compositorum MS.

ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEOR'i' 01: PROPOSITION 353
sequatur ad alteram tantum sive ad utramque. Ut 'si Socrates esthomoet Socrates estanimal,
Socratesest substantia'; 'si Socratesest homo cr, Plato currit, Socratesest animal'. Similiter
quando sequitur copulativa, inspiciendum utrum utraque pars ipsius sequatur ad eandem.
Nam si utraque pars, et copulativa; et econverso. Ut 'si Socrates est homo, Socrates est
anima! et Socrateses.'.substantia'. Item. Quando copulativa ad copulativam, consideran-

dum an utraque pars consequentis ad utramque partem antecedentis sequatur, vel una ad
unam et reliqua ad reliquam. Ut 'si Socratesest homo et Socratesest risibile, Socratesest
animal et Socratesest substantia'; 'si Socratesest homo et Socratesest albus, Socratesest anima!
et Socratesestcandidum'.Aliter non erit vera. Plerisque tamen videtur quod numquam e.x
copulativa constante ex aihrmatiunc et negatione sequatur illa pars que negativa est,
sed tantum aFErmath-a.
This chapter (Iiscussesthe second kind, viz. those that contain a dis- [cap. 33]
junctive proposition or disjunct terms (2351'b'm):
Eadem reperitur diversitas in disiunctis. Nam quandoque simplex sequitur ad non
simplicem, ut 'si aliquid est rationale vel irrationale, ipsum est animal'. Quandoque non
simplex ad simplicem, ut 'si Socratesest homo, est anima! vel lapis'. Quandoque etiam
non simplex ad non simplicem, ut 'si Socrateses.':homovel lapis, est rationale vcl rudibiic';
'si estalbum vcl nigrum, est candidumvci :etrmn'.
In his autem in quibus simplex sequitur, considerandum utrum si eadem simplex
sequatur ad utramque partem disiuncta; quod si accidet, crit consequentia vero, et
econverso.Si fuerit vcra, oportet ut utraque pars antecedat, nisi forte in aliquibus
impediat positio consigniFicansnil ex falso accidere. th quia sequitur si est rationale est
animal et similiter si est irrationale, una est composita, et quia est composita,,utraquc
pars per se sumpta ad idem consequensantecedit.
Hanchabentreguleinstantiam:nisi fallaciaincidat ex disiunctionenon rectesumpta.
falsum, similiter; non tamen
Ut 'si est necessariaverum, non est contingens; et si est necessario
rerum i-eifalsum'.
si es:.necessario
Secunda etiam regula instantiam habere videtur in his: 'si aliquid est contingenter
verumrelfaisum, contingenterest enuntiabifc'; 'si nunc Plato est.sanumw:! egrum, num: Plato
est animal'.
In his quoque in quibus ad disiunctam simplex antecedit, considerandum vidctur
utrum altera pars sequatur. Nam si altera pars sequitur, et disiuncta. Ut 'si est homo, est
anima! vel lapis et si est album, est candidum vei nigrum', nisi (pl'0)positionem habeat
implicitam preter antecedens,quia non si est homo est animalvcl id quod
consequens
est lapis.
Utrum autem econverso: verum sit quod altera pars sequatur ubicumque disiuncta,
dubitatur ( 1235vul ) Tertium disiunctarum sive habentium terminos
...... . . . . ..
disiunctos est quando disiunctum antecedit ad disiunctum. Atque in his quandoque
disiunctum ex linito ct infinito antecedit ad aliud disiunctum ex Enito similiter et
inFmito. Ut 'si es: anima! vel non animal, est homo vel non homo' Quandoque
..... .
disiunctumex solisEnitis adaliud disiunctumex solisEnitis. Quod dupliciter variatur.
Nam quandoque aliqua (lividcntia alicuius antecedunt ad alia dividentia eiusdem, et tunc
neutra pars disiunctarum ad alteram partem reliqui antecedit. Ut 'si est rationale vel
estsanumvci "egrum'; 'si estpossibilevel impossibile,estverumreifalsum'.Qunndo-
ii'.l'.::l.'.ii:nm::lh:II
que ad utramque partem antecedentis sequitur altera pars consequentis. At et hoc
354 LOGICA MODERNORLIM n
tripliciter Hericontingit. Etenim interdum eademparsconsequentisad utramquepartem

sequitur antecedentis, ut 'si estSocratesrc! Plato, esthomovel asinus'; 'si esthomorc! asinus,
est anima! vel !opis'. Interdum una ad unam et reliqua ad reliquam, non conversim; ut
rc] Burnelius,esthomovci asinus'; 'si esthomovelmargarita,estanimo!re! lapis' ;
'si estSocrates
quandoque conversim, ut 'si csl: homo rc! asinus, est.risibile rc! rzidibilo'; 'si est album rci
nigrum, est candidum w:! rctrum'. Nam si est album est candidum, et econverso; et similiter
si est nigrum, est tetrum, et cconverso.
Quotiens aliquo istorum modorum se habuerit consecutio, dicimus esserecipiendum;
aliter vero minime.
[cap. 34] The third kind is that of the propositiones

implicitos. They are deFmed
(235V3):
Impliüta dicitur propositio que preter principalem signiHcationem, idest preter
—
significationem que ex principalibus attenditur —, tamen implicat et continet vim
alterius propositionis. Ut 'Socratesest aliquid quod currit' implicat istam: 'aliquid currit';
et 'homoqui est albus, est animo! quod currit' has duas: 'homoest albus', 'animal currit'.
Unde magis proprie diceretur ista implicans, ille implicite.
Then, our author gives some regulas concerning the mutual infercnce of
implicit prepositions (235V0'Vb):
Circa implicitas dicimus quod numquam ex simplici sequitur implicita, quia non si
Socratesest animal, est id quod est animal ; nec si currens disputat, quod currit disputat.
Quod enim participium presentis temporis dicitur a grammaticis resolvi in verbum
consimilis temporis et hoc relativum 'qui', non expositio est, sed puerile rudimentum.
Ad implicitam vero nil prohibet sequi simplicem. Habenda tamen est determinatio,
quia non quelibet simplex sequitur, sed que remanetsublatarelativa particula et verbo
quod ei redditur. Ut 'si Socrates
est.aliquid quodcurrit.,Socrates aliquid' et 'si estsub-
es.'.
sronsioque est animo], csl:substantia' et 'si homo (qui) disputo: currit, homodisputat'. Sed
non: 'si homo qui currit disputat, homo currit' nec 'si aliquid est aliquid quod est animo],
ipsumestanimal'. Et generaliter: numquam ad implicitam sequitur illa quam implicat,
nisi hoc operetur habitudo terminorum. Ut 'si csl: homo qui est albus est candidus, homo
est.albusqui est.condidus',et 'si aliquid esthomoqui estSocrates,
aliquid esthomo'et 'si aliquid
quodestscienses.'. aliquid estscicns'. Sed non: 'si aliquid quodestSocrates
grammaticum, est
homo, aliquid est Socrates'; nec: 'si quod cssgrammaticum csssciens,aliquid estgrommoricum',
quia non coaduniatur hic consecutio habitudine terminorum.
lmplicitarum vero adimplicitaseademerit in aflïrmativishabitudoque et simplicium
ad invicem. Nam ubicumquesimplex ad simplicem,et implicita ad implicitam. Ut 'si
est homoest animo], cr. ideo si est id quod est homo, est id quod est.animal'. Similiter: 'si est
homoes: risibile, cr,oconvcrso',eodem modo: 'si ost.id quod est homo, est id quod ost risibileI
ct econverso'.Sed non: 'si estid quodesthomo,non estid quodest.asinus', quamvis sequatur
'si ost homo, non cst asinus; scdcssid quod non est asinus' ( 235") ). Rationes
..... .....
que ad simplicemprohibent implicitam sequisunt hec: 'si Antichristus
esthomo,csl:aliquid
quod es.'.homo', et econverso; 'si potestesseissehomo,poses:csseistud quod es.:homo; ergosi
aliquis homo,aliquid quodes:homo'.
ans MELIDUNA. THE THEom' os PROPOSITION 355
The Fourth kind consists of those propositions que in altera sui Parte [cap. 35]
sumunt continuativam per partes prolatam rci magis cathegoricam. Pl'Opo-
sitions of this type are not discussedby Boethius, who (ml)r dealswitha
similar type of the temporalis: 'si cum est a est b, est c'. There are three
variations of this kind, apart from the temporalis:(1) categorical
antecedensand hypothetical consequens, (2) the reverse, and (3) both
antecedensand consequensare hypothetical. Both (1) and (2) are rejectecl
by our author and the validity of (3) dependsttpon the correct intcr-
rclation of the terms used in the proposition (si congruetermini sumantur)
(235Vh):
Postremo inspiciende sunt ilie que in altera sui parte sumunt continuativam per partes
prolatam vel magis cathegoricam. Ut 'si Socratesest homo, Socratesest animal si asi risibile'.
Boetius tamen nullam facit mentionem de his in ïpmhcticis, sed totam consideratio-
nem punitl in his que implicant temporales,ut 'si cumesta estb, estc'; et in disiunctis.
Que tamen parvam vel nullam habent dubitationem. Constat quippe quod numquam in
his ad simplicem sequitur que implicatur, vel econverso, quia non si est homo cum est
animal est risibile nec si iste quando currit movetur, iste movetur, quoniam temporalis
positiva est. Sedtemporalem ad temporalem nil prohibet sequi. Ut 'si cumest homoest
albus, cumestrisibile cstcandidum'. "
Cetera vcro similiter triplicem recipiunt variationem. Quia quandoque ad cathe-
goricam ostenditur sequi continuativa, ut 'si Socratesest homo, Socratesest anima! si es:
homo'. Quandoque econtrario, ut 'si Socrateses.':anima! si es: homo, Socratesest sensibile'.
Et ex his nullam omnino recipimus, quia non si Sacrates est homo, ad ipsum esse
hominem sequitur ipsum esse animal nec si' ad ipsum essehominem sequitur ipsum esse
animal, ideo est risibile. Quandoque continuativa ad continuativam. Et hec admitti
poterit, si congrue termini sumantur, ut 'si estanima! si esthomo,estsensibilesi esthomo'.
Neque enim sensusest, ut opinabitur forte aliquis, si ad hanc propositionem sequitur
ista, ad eandemsequitur illa, aut: si hec consequentiaest vera, illa est vera. Velud nec
dicto: 'si Socratesest homo, Socratesest animal' sensusest: si hec species homo predicatur
de hoc individuo, hoc generale de eodem, aut: si dictum antecedentis propositionis est
verum, dictum consequentis est verum, vel: si hec prapositio, et illa, quia aliam vim
habent voces quando materialiter sumuntur, et aliam quando per easagitur de rebus.
The consecution of the valid forms can be stated in three regulas

(235Vb-236T3):
Que vero ad quam sequatur, tribus regulis potest comprehendi, iuxta numerum
quidem terminorum qui sumuntur in antecedenti, ut in hac: 'Socratesest.animal', termini
sunt 'Socrates", 'animal', primus quidem est subiectus, secundus qui ponitur ante
coniunctam,tertius qui post verbum. Secundumquemlibet horum contingit sumere
consequentias.
[l] Regula. Si secundumprimum, idest ex habitudine eius ad alium, sumatur,
oportebit quod subiectus consequentis maior sit eo vel ei equalis. Ut 'si album moretur
! De syll. hyp. ], 853 Asqq.

si ipsum currit, candidum movetur si ipsum currit' ( ). Si sumatur in consequenti

......
terminus minor, falsaEet consecutio, quin non si aliquid est animal si ipsum est homo,
Socrates est animal si ipsum est homo. (. ) Unde maxime reprehensibilis
.....
ostenditur modus ille argumentandi quo utuntur alii contra nos, hoc modo: 'si aliquid
est asinusipsumestanimal; ergo si Socratesestasinus, Socratesest animal', facientes descensum
a superiori ad inferius.
[2] Si sumatur consequentiaex habitudinesecundi ad secundum,terminus antece-
dentis mutabitur simpliciter in par vel maius, ut 'si Socratesest animal si est.homo, Socrates
esl:sensibilesi esthomovel est corpus' ( ...... 2361'3
...... ).
[3] Si ex habitudine postremi ad postremum, pares sumi necesseest. Ut 'si est
animal si est homo, est animal si est risibile'.
The validity of both (1) and (2), however, is defendedby the Parvi-
pontani (: the adherentsof the School of Adam of the Petit Pont)
(2361'3):
Contra id vero quod prediximus ad cathegoricam non sequi continuativam, sic abiciet
Parvipamanuslsustinens necessariumex quolibet enuntiabili sequi 'si Socratesest homo,
Socratesest animal' ; ergo 'si est homoest animal, si est homo'.
Instantia generalis: 'ergo si es.'.anima) si est homo, est homo'; ut ubicumque cx cathcgo-
rica fecerit sequi continuativam, et tu ex cantinuativa cathegoricam. Nam quemadmo-
dum hec non sequitur ad illam. ita nec econverso. Quod ad continuativam
......
sequaturcathegorica,similiter contendetprobare.
Instantia: si omne id quod est animal est omne id quod est rationale vel irrationale
est, ergo si omne id quod est animal est omne id quod est rationale est vel non est
Huiusmodivero ypothetice ideo aliis dif&ciliores forte apparebuntquod ipse
......
rarenter in usum collocutionis ducuntur.
Here ends the TERTIA PARS.
' This is not found in what is extant of Adam's flrs disserendi(ed. Minio-Paluello).
CHAPTER )(
ARS MELIDUNA.
THE THEORT OF THE ENUNTIABILE
Thc QUARTAPARSof the Ars zlieliduna presents an claborate and

thorough discussion of the enuntiabilc or dictum. As the SECUNDAPARS
dealt with what is dcnotcd by the terms, so this PARSis devoted to what
is denoted by the proposition as such.
First the enuntiabilia are deiïncd as propositionumsignificata, i.c.
that which is denotedby the propositions (2361'3):
Enuntiabiiin sunt propositionum significata; dicta sunt ab enuntiando sive ab aptitudine
enuntiandi, quia apta sunt enuntiari, idest enuntiatione dici.
This chapter dcals with the nature (essentia)of what are called [cap-ll'
enuntiabilia. Some people took them for intellectus per vocesconcepti, as is
Socratem legereof the proposition iSocrateslegit'. But in the author's view,
this opinion is not tenable (ibid.):
In his primum queritur de eorum essentia, scilicet quid ipsa sint.
Et fuerunt qui enuntiabiliadixerunt esseintellectus per vocesconceptas,ut hoc dictum
Socratemlegereintellectum constituit hacpropositione'Socrateslegit' ; et ita proprietatem,
cum omnis intellectus sit proprietas.
At vero secundumhanc opinionem erit omne falsum aliquid, quia intellectus; omnis
autem intellectus pmprietns est anime; quare aliquid. Multorum etiam quodlibet erit
hoc enuntiabile Socratemessehominem, ut intellectus huius, idest quem iäte in mente
concipit ex prolatione propositionis, et similiter intellectus illius, sed iste alius diFi'ert
ab ista, quia utraque pmprietas est que est in anima. Nulla autem praprietas in pluribus
esse potest, ita quod in quolibet eorum. Erit ergo inFmitorum intellectuum quilibet
illud enuntiabile. Ex quo accidet hanc propositionem indefinitam csse: 'Se-cratem esse
hominemest verum', quia appellatio enuntiabilis nullum illorum intellectuum supponit
determinate, sed potest pro qualibet poni. Et has non essecontradictorias: 'Socratem
essehairtinemest verum', 'Socratemessehominemnonest rerum', velud nec (in) incleFmitis:
'homoest iustus', 'homonon ex: iustus'. Rursum. Omni homine dormiente nil erit verum.
Tunc enim anima nil intelligit, et ita nullus intellectus erit in ea. Sednec in alio. Quare
nullus intellectus tunc erit, cum proprietas sine subiecto essenon possit. Ergo nullus
intellectus tunc erit verus. Et ita tunc nil erit verum. Ergo tunc non erit verum omnem
hominem dormire [ ] aut Deum esse.Et eademinspectionemultociens incipiet
..... .
et desinet esseverum Deum esse. Amplius. Intellectus constitutus hac voce 'Socratesest
' Theseindicationsrefer to my division of the work, seeabove,p. 274IT

.
358 LOGICA MODERNORUM li
homo'compositusest utpote ex tribus partialibusintellectibus constanset ipse est

verum; ergo totus vel non totus. Nec potest dici totus, quia intellectus dictionis non
est verum: ergo non totum illud verum est verum. Ergo nec totum recipiendum.
There was another opinion related to the view of verumas the compo—
sition of the subject-term and the predicate-term. This, too, is rejected
by our author (ibid.):
Alii posuerunt verum esse compositionem predicati ad subiectum, falsum vero
divisionem eorum ab invicem, dicentes hoc verum Socratemessealbum nichil aliud esse
quam cmupositionem sive coherentiam huius predicati album cum Socrate. Ideo enim
dicitur illum1 esse album verum, quia albedo coheret Socrati et Socratemesseasinum
falsumesseideoquoniamhecspeciesasinusnon participatura Socrate.
Secundumhancopinionem, sicut et secundumprimam, oportebit falsumessealiquid,
quia omnis divisio proprietas. Poterit etiam queri in quo subiecto vel in quibus sit
compositiovel divisio talis, utrum scilicet in ipsisterminis an in eorum significatis1:«":I
in
dicente enuntiabile. Horum quodcumque dicatur, idem accidet imprübabile et etiam
impossibile. Etenim si veritas in homine essedicatur, recipiet ab ea, quamadmodumet a
ceteris proprietatibus,denominationem.Et ita erit aliquod verum. Similiter autem et
de terminis et de eorum signilïcatis, si in ipsis essedicatur.
The third opinion is not acceptable either. It took verum andfalsum to be

nothing but ways of expression (2361'11'1'5):
Tertia opinio fuit quod nil est verum, nil est falsum, sed sunt huiusmodi nomina
determinationes quedam quorundam modorum legendi, ut sit quidam tropus loquendi
dicto Socratem legere esseverum vel Socratem (2 3611?)( )2 essefalsum
...... ......
[cap. 2] Then the author gives his master's Opinion, according to which the
enuntiabileis an enssui generis(2 361"
b):
.
Nostro vero preceptori nulla predictarum placuit opinionum, scd suam proferens dixit
aliqua essevera et aliqua essefalsaet tam hec quam illa esseenuntiabilia. Que nec
substantie sunt nec proprietates, sed habent suum esseper se. Similiter ( ? )
.. . . ...
voci. Et comprehenduntur sola ratione et intellectu. Nec enim contingit ad ea sensum
donari, ut nec visum nec auditum. Dicitur tamen interdum figunt(iv)e audiri rerum,per
eam Figuram qua signiücatio attribuitur, quod est signiFlcantis, idest vox auditur qua
dicitur verum. Quod autem istuc 'audiri' improprie et gratia propositionis dicatur de
enuntiabili, ex hoc palam quod non secundum pluralitatem vel singularitatem enuntif
abilium attenditur singularitas auditorum vel pluralitas. Siquidem illi quorum unus audit
hanc propositionem: 'Marcus est albus', reliquus istam: 'TuHius es.'.candidus', non
unumdicuntur audissesedtantumdiversa,quia diversaspropositiones.Econtrario'dici'
enuntiabilibus proprie, vocibus improprie convenit, quod per dictum considerationem
manifestum cst.
! illud MS. 2 illegible in our MS because of the [ading of the ink.

ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORV 01: THE ENUNTIABILE 359
All the same, we seem to know, in a way, what the enuntiabilc is not, [cap- 3]
but not what it rea")r is. Our author's remarks seem to be rather
hesitating, which is due, he thinks, to the abstract nature of the
cnuntiabilia. Therefore he confines himself to describe them after their
propriae appellationes(ibid.):
Non tamen ex predictis satis innatuit quid sint enuntiabilia, sed magis quid non sint.
Quippe cum de his solis que sensuisubiacentsciri possit plene quid ipsasint, sensus
siquide111vias preparat cognitiuni. Ergo ubi sensus dancit, cognitio non ascendit. Et
preterea cum diversi diversas assignaverint enuntiabilibus essentias, non est facile
dinoscere qui verum attigerint. Potuerunt autem bene dicere tam hi quam illiII cum 11'i1'i
essent 111agneau(c)toritatis. Itaque non novi utrum Deum esse sit 1'e1'u111
aut utrum
Socratemessehominemsit ipsumesseasinum.Et generaliter de nullo enuntiabili aliquid scio.
Si enim — quod hupossibile est — contingerea) enuntiabilia Heri visibilia et demon-
stratis omnibus quereret quispiam quodl istorum esset Deum esse, non esset qui interro-
gationemsciret certilïcare. Qua inspectionenec novi aliquid de aliquaanima.
Habentautem enuntiabiliaproprias appellationesque sumuntur n0111inativo propo-
sitionis flexo i11accusativmnet verbo in infinitivum. Ut hominem legere(est) appellatio
huius enuntiabilisquad significat hec propositio: 'Socrates
legit'. Cui similiter in aliis.
Videtur etiam huiusnwdi imperfecta 01ano enuntiabile sig11iEca1',e non solu111
appella1e.
Nil enim facit intelligi p1opos1t1oquin2 detur intelligi per orationem i111perfectan1
quia
utraque tantum enuntiabiie facit intelligi. Unde idem videntur signiEcare, — quod
plerique recipiunt —, seddifiïe1'(un)tin modo, quia hec appellando, illa enuntiando.
But this opinion conflicts with Boethius" definition of preposition.

Therefore 0111'author prefers to say that the oratio imped'ecta(e.g.
'SocratemIegcre') does not signify an enuntiabile, but "calls" (appellat)
somethinglike a singulare(ibid.):
ldeo non dabimus quod signilicet enuntiabile cuius est appellatio, sed potius quiddam
simile singulari cuius res est illud enuntiabile. Maxime tamen enuntiabile facit intelligi,
quippe quelibet vox magis facit intelligi appellatmn quam significatum. Velud nec iste
speciemsigniücatquam demonstrat,quia potius individuum signi-
Iterminus 'hecspecies'
ficaret quam speciem. Si alterutrum, nec hoc nomen 'miHc' significat mille que appellat,
'hic homo'huncl10111i1'1e111
aut iste te1'111ir1us aut 'quchbctres'qua111libet
rem. Eodemniodo
de his orationibus sentiendum: 'hoc enuntiabile', 'hoc verum' et de hoc nomine 'verum'.
Non enim signilicant enuntiabile, sedappellant.
This chapter dealswith two questions (l) utrum possit aliquod nomen [cap. 4]
prcprium esse significans hoc enuntiabile: 'Socratemessealbum', and
(2) utrum infinitivus in appellatione sumptus consigniücationem variet
' sc. enuntiabile. 2 qui non MS.

ex adiunctione diversorum temporum, an ubique retineat presentis

consigniHcationem.
ad a. The Erst question is answered in the negative (ibid.):

["Ut] tamen rationabiliter queri potest utrum possit aliquod nomen proprium esse
significans hüc enuntiabilc Socratemessealbumvel aliquod aliud. Quod inde videtur quia
voces ad placitum sunt. Sed in contrarium validior est ratio. Habcrct enim nomen illud
intellectum istarum trium dictionum 'Socratei', 'est', 'albus' et ita signiücarct qualitatem
adiectivum, quod essetcontra naturam et proprietatem prapriorum nominum, que omnia
in propria sunt qualitate. Non potest ergo nomen proprium ad significandum enuntiabile
institui, sed tantum ad appellandumnc peccaricontraartem recte loquendi accidat.
ad b. The second question seemsto demand an affirmative answer, but

again this cannot bc given (ibid.):
Amplius. Queritur utrum infinitivus in appellatione sumptus cnnsigniücationcm
variat ex adiunctione diversorum temporum an ubique retineat prcsentis consigniE-
cationem. Quod variet, primo ostenditur quasia simili. Participium siquidemhis tribus
locutionibus diversa tempora consignificat: 'lcgenses.'.iste homo', ']cgensfuit Cesar', 'legens
erit Anlichrütus': hic presens,ibi preteritum, illic futurum. Ergo et a simili infinitivus
in istis: 'Socrarcmlegere est verum', 'Cesarcmlegerefuit rerum', 'Antichrisrum legere erit
verum'. Constat [enimF etiam quod per se, idest non in appellatione enuntiabilis,
sumptus consignilïcationem suam variat, si dicam: incipio, incepi, incipiam legere.
Quare ergo non similiter et in appellatione? item. ';ludiam Angeloscaneremnncs'ibi
consigniücat inFlnitivus futurum, quia additur futuro. Et recipit ad sui determinationem
adiunctioncmadverbiisignificantiatempusfuturum. Sedlocutio illa in hancvideturdebere
resolvi: 'Angeios canere cras audietur :: me', commutato activo in passivum, ubi ncquitl
inFmitivus presens consigniücarc, cum recipiat determinationem huius adverbii 'cras'.
Amplius. Posito quod omnes homines habebunt Filios,sed modo non omneshabent,
omnes homines diligant Filios suos; et siniul non erit vcrum aliquos homines non diligere
Elias suos; ergo verum crit vel non erit omneshominesdiligere filios suos. Que con-
clusio soloecismum habet, si non futurum sed presensconsignificat inEnitivus.
Propter huiusmodi rationes arbitrabitur forte aliquis infinitivum consignilïcationem
suam variare ex diversis adiunctis.
Verum id ita facillime improbabitur: omnes homines diligere Filios suos crit verum;
ergo est possibile; ergo verum uel falsum. Et pretereade quo dicitur quod erit verum?
Nam de enuntiabili aut de alio. Sed non de alio; ergo de enuntiabili. Sed non erit
assignare de quo. Si enim dixeris: de hoc cnuntiabili 'omneshomines etc.',
......
incongrua est demonstratio.
Dicimus itaque quod semper in appellatione enuntiabilis consignificat inFmitivus
presenstempus, sed quandoquepresensde presenti, quandoquedc preterito aut de
futuro. Unde nulla appellatiocuni extrinsecisten'uporibus
commodesumetur nisi et cum
presenti congrue fuerit sumpta; velud nequc demonstratio. Et ideo soloecismum facis si
dicas: 'omnemhominemdiligerejih'um suumerit vel non erit verum', aut 'Sacralcmdiligere
fihum :uum', posito quod nondumhabeatFilium, aut Antichristum id
esse quodipseest; vel
' nequid ;'"S.

ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORV 01: THE ENUNTIABILE 361
'Socratomassaalbumquodipsaest', si nondum sit albus; aut 'flngoloscanorocrasaudieturab

aliquo', quia nil subest appellationi talis vocis, et ideo non habet quod supponat.
This chapterdiscussesanother way of wording the enuntiabile(appellatio[cap. 5]

enuntiabihs)with the help of the conjunction 'quod' (that). it is rejected
by our author (ibid.):
Sumiturautemet aliter appellatioenuntiabilis,ut pleriquevolunt, prepositaconiiunc-
logi: estverum'nec aliud quamSocratem
tione 'quod' ipsi propositioni. Ut 'quodSocrates
legero.Verius tamen videtur esseut talis vox non sit appellatio enuntiabilis, sed ponitur
impersonaliter verbum. Nec Flt oratio ex illis dictionibus. Similiter si dicas: 'ab aliquo
dicitur quodSocrateslcgit', vel 'aliqua propositioncsignificatur'. In hac etiam oratione: 'ista
dicit quod Socrateslegit'. non faciunt orationem dictiones posite post verbum. Velud et
in his omnibus accidit: 'dosidoroquod Socratescurrat', 'sorvopracipitur ut faciat ignom';
'video hominemcurrere'. Etenim si dicas: 'aliquod quod est verumest quod Socrateslogit', aut
'quod Socratescurrit non est lapis', vel 'quod Socratescurrit et Plato disputat sunt diversa', minus
congruaapparebitlocutio.
This chapter deals with the division of the enuntiabih'o into verum and lcaP-6]
falsumand with some diFEcultiesconcerning this-division (236Tb-W):
Enuntiabiliumaliud verum,aliudfalsum.Verum dicitur significatum
vcropropositionis,
ut hominemesseanimal ; falsumfalsc, ut hominamessaasinum.
Sed potest circa predictam divisionem queri primo utrum sit sulïiciens, deinde utrum
dividentia universaliter subiciantur divisio.
Apparebit autem ideo insufficiens, quod aliquis dicit quid sit Sucrates et ita dici
patest quid sit Sucrates; quare dicibile; ergo cnuntiabile. Dicto tamen verum esse vel
falsum essequid sit Socrates, latebit soloecismus. Item. lnterrogari potest quid currat;
ergo intcrrogabile est quid currat; et cnuntiabile est quid currat.;ergo vel non unum
solum est quid currat, vel idem (236"") est enuntiabilc ct interrogabilc. Sednullum in-
terrogabilc est verum vel falsum; ergo nec omne enuntiabilc.
Some people answer to this and other objections with & distinction
between cnuntiabilia and intcrrogabilia, but our author rejects their
solution (236V3):
Ad harum vcro solutionem distinguunt plerique inter enuntiabilia et interrogabilia,
enuntiabilia appellantes significata propositionum, interrugabilia vcro significata intcr-
rogativarum orationum. ( ).
......
Sed nos in i'lDCsolvemus ut in priori, quia non Et. oratio ex his dictionibus quid, sit,
Socrates,dicto aliquem scire vcl dicere quid sit Socrates. Sed ponitur verbum absolute.
Quod manifestumfit per hoc verbum absolutum'dubito', quod ibi poni potest. Non
enim dicetur 'dubito hoc', sed 'de hoc'. Neque recipimus predictam distinctionem; immo
omne enuntiabilc est iuterrogabile. Ut astra ossaparia interrogat qui sic queritur: 'sunt
astra paria necne?, et unum solum interrogat. Tamen astra esse paria non est, ut licite
dicatur utrum astra sint paria. Nec omnem animam esse imnwrtalem, utrum omnis
etc., quia aliter dicitur hoc: 'intcrragarcde quo' et aliter 'illud', ut quod interrogativa
proponit istud est questio querens, illud quesita.
Another diFFlculty arises, in discussing which the author uses a Few

Greek words to prevent misunderstanding(ibid.):
Rursum. llli quorum neuter alterum novit cognoscunt se, non &)..Pt-älour;
sed
äau-röu'; ergo sciunt que ipsi sint; similiter quot ipsi sint; sed ipsi non sunt nisi duo
homines; ergo sciunt se esseduos homines; ergo aliqua csseduos homines et ita duos
homines esse, cum forte uterque unum tantum esse opinetur. Ideo aliter iudicandum
erit quam prius. Nam nec sciunt quid nec que ipsi sint. Tamen vident que ipsi sint et
1sitientsc currere, idest se currentes. Sed nesciunt sc currere, quia hoc ad dictum
refertur.
[cap. 7] This chapter discussesthe question whether each verumorfalsum is an

enuntiabile. Some difficulties are met with in such verbs as "tonat',
yulminat', iicgitur', 1'disputü'tlsi'i
(2363'3'3'5):
Cum certum sit ex prioribus omne enuntiabile verum esse vel falsum, inquirendum
crit consequenter, utrum similiter econverso verum sit omne verum vel falsum esse
enuntiabilc. Feret autem quis instantiam. Primo in verbis excepta actionis. Nam tonat;
quarc tonare est verum; non tamen est enuntiabile, ne sint tonare et fulminum duo
enuntiabilia.
Secundoin (im)pcrsonalibus, ut legitur et ita legi est verum; similiter disputari. Sed
cuiusmodicnuntiabilia esscpoterunt legi et disputari?
In his quidem dnplex poterit esse solutio. Primo quidem 'dicto incongruum esse
locutionem 'tu-nareaut legi estverum',quamvisbenedictum sit 'Iagitur' aut 'tonat', quia
non ita licct suppositumin inEnit(iv)o ut in verbopersonaliintelligere. Aut quodmelius
est: suscipiatur quod tonare est verum et est enuntiabile, non dico harum dictionum
sed que per easintelliguntur.
signiFncata,
Tertio apparebit instantiain hoc vero majori, quia jor' non invenitur, scdfaris vel
fare. At hec obiectio non obest, cum possit aliud verbum pro eo sumi, ut '!oquor'.
lllud tamen sciendum (2363'13)quod etsi omnes voces ab usu dccadercnt, non esset
aliquod verum minusab hoc enuntiabilc,dum tantum possit vox aliquaad illud signifi-
candum convenienter inponi. Nam cnuntiabilc dici non ab actu, sed ab aptitudinc
snperiora docuerunt.
A few more instantisare raisedand discussed(236Vb).
[cap. 8] A special difficulty is presentedby the propositiones

implicitus (236V'J):
Deindequeritur utrum aliquod verum vel falsumpossitincipere vel desinereesscemm-
tiabile. Quod vidctur propter dicta inplicitarum, ut 'id quodcurrit moveri','Socratcm
em:
album quod ipse est'. Similiter 'Socratem diligere fiium suum', aut 'esse albiarem Platone'.
1 non alleon sed caytoy MS.

ans MELIDUNA. THE THEORT OF THE ENUNTIABILE 363
Nam quemadmodum locutio que congrua est, Et ex rei mutatione incongrua, ita et ipsa
enuntiabiliavidentur Eeri nugatoria, ut 'Sacratcmessealbumquodipseest', vel 'diligerc
flium suum', quando desinet esse albus aut habere Filium. Ponendum itaque
......
talia cnuntiabilia nugatoria Fieri posse. Ex quo accidit aliquod cnuntiabile pluries
incipere ct desinere esseverum vcl falsum iuxta rei variationem et aliquorum contra-
dictoric oppositorumnon essenecesseunum esseverum et alterum falsum, licet hoc
contrarium Aristotili inveniatur, nisi quia dictum est illud (de) eo genere loquendi quo
et hominem esse et animal esse necessarium aut contradictoriamm unam esse veram et
alteram essefalsam.
This chapter discussesthe identity OFverum(c.q. jälsum) and veritas [cap. 9]

(c.q falsitas) (2 371'3'):
.
Illud quoque dubie queri poterit utrum idem sit verumquod veritas,etfalsum quodfalsitas.
Quod videtur possc inprobari. Primo quasi argumento a simili, quia non idem est album
quod albedo, nigrum et nigredo, sanum ct Ianitas; ergo nec idem erit rerum et veritas.
( . ..... ).
Rursum. Nomina ista 'verum', [falsum' dicta de cnuntiabilibus adiective tenentur;
ergo aliquamcis adiectivumcopulant proprietatem. 5ch quamnisi veritatem vel falsi-
tatem ?, 'vel forte aptitudinem vere enuntiandi vel aliquam talem, sicut et prapositio vera
dicitur, idest veri signiEcativa. Pl'üpter has forsitan rationes ponet quis veritatem csse
proprietatem qua dicitur aliquid vcrum.Sedab eo illud queremus utrum veritatem aliqua
vocc dici contingat vel significari. Quo sumpto erit vox illa propositio, vel alia vox.Et
si, propositio accidet qualibet propositionc significari duo. Similiter utrum mendacium
sit idem falsa, aut idem falsitati, 1irelaliud ab utroque.
The question remains without an exPlicit answer.
In this chapter our author discusses an important question: utrum [cap. 10]
aliquod verum vel falsumsit verumvelfalsumdequo (ibid.):
Post hec considerandumutrum aliquod verum vcl falsumsit verum vel falsumde quo,
sive.dicatur de quo; aut si non, quid aliud.
Ex hacquestionevarieinveniuntur descendisse
opiniones.[1] Quidamenim posuerunt
solas proprietates dici de quo, ut albedinemvel cursumde Socrate, dicto Socratem esse
album 1mlcurrere. [2] Alii non proprietatem quc copulatur, scd signiEcatumipsum
predicati termini, scilicet accidens vel aliud universale; aut ei simile, quia illud ostenditur
a re suppositalocutioni participari. [3] Alii attributa sive perceptarationis, appellantes
attributa sumptaal) enuntiabilibuspreter principium, ut essehominem est verum de
Socrate,idest vere attribuitur illi. [4] Alii cnuntiabilia dicunt essevera de aliquibus, ut
Socratemessehominemde Socrate. [5] Alii locutionem soliti sunt redargueretamquam
soloecisticam, quia cum hec propositio de multis habeat consigniücationes, ut loci,
temporis et persone, non erit facile assignare quam earum ibi retineat. Similiter autem
neque! uncle hec nomina 'verum', ïaisum' talem qualem alia non noverunt nomina
! .cc.erit facile assignare.

364 LOGICA s-lODEnNonum u
sortiantur constructionem. Recipiebant tamen aliquid vere vel falso dici de aliquo ut
genus de specie, sed nil de re locutioni supposita, sumentes cum Aristotile hoc verbum
'dici' pro eo quod est 'prodicori
'.
Our author criticizes most of them severely. He rightly points out that
the prcliminar)r question is that of the precise meaning of 'aliquid dici
de aliquo' (ibid.):
inter has omnes minus probabilis est opinio cle attributis. Quid tamen contra quam-
libet dici possit, breviter videamus,prenotatotamenomnemhancopinionumdiversita-
tem ex hoc habuisseoriginem quod nondum satisinnotuit quid sit aliquid dici dealiquo,
utrum scilicet si oriribui vel ostendiab eo participari aut de eo predicari vel enuntiari
.
Hc raiscs & number of objections againstall these views except the

fourth. The first mentioned (solosproprietatesdici de quo) is confronted
with theseobjections (ibid.):
Secundumprimam accidit propositionibus de preterito vel de futuro nil dici de aliquo,
nulla negativa, nulla etiam in qua sit predicatus terminus pronomen demonstrativum
quod meram signiFlcet substantiam vel tantum idem de se, ut aliquod animal vel aliquod
enuntiabile de se in istis: 'Socratesest animal isrud', 'Socratomesseest istud'.
The second view (non proprietatemquc copulatur, sed signtiatum ipsum

predicaritermini, sc. dici de quo) raiseseven morc difficultics (ibid.):
Eadem etiam secnnde obviam, cum quibus et alia multa. Poterit siquidem queri quid
de quo his propositionibusdicatur: 'chimoroest.opinabilis','Socrates
estquidlibet','homo
et asinussunt idem', 'monachusest albus', 'Socrotis est asinus', 'Piotonis est ( ...... )2 ve!
caput', 'a Socratealiquod caput hobotur', 'a Cesarenil videtur'.
The third view (attributo siveperceptorationis, sc. dici de quo) called by

our author (sco above) opinio minusprobabilismects with the gravest
objections on his part, indccd (ibid.):
Ab his quoquequi attributade aliquo dici astruunt,queremusquid dictis propositionibus
dici de aliquo contingat. Similiter quid de Socrate ista: 'de Socrateloquitur Ploto' vel de
Cesare dicto cum CesarepugnassePompeium. Ad hec autem quid de Helena vel Socrate,
dicto eamessepulchram vel illum esselegentem? Dicto quippe quem essepulchrum vel
esselegentemlatebit soloecismus,quia adiectivumponitur sine substantivo.item. Pro-
positione non attribuitur nisi signilicato predicati. Sed huius propositionis 'Socratesest
homo'predicatusterminusest 'homo'et non hoc vox 'est.homo'. Non ergo essehominem
ea
attribuitur Socrati, sed quod hoc nomine 'homo' intelligitur. Aut si essehominem,queramus
quid illud sit, utrum scilicct res per se existensan proprietas; et si proprietas, erit in
! propositiones MS (on: (per) propositiones?)

: illegible on the photostatat my disposal.
Alls MELIDLINA. THE THEORV OF THE ENLINTIABILE 365
anima. Et ita attribuetur Socrati aliud quam Platoni, dicto ipsum essehominem, cum
nulla proprietas in utroque duum essepossit. Quare me hominemde solo Socrate erit
verum, et essealiquid de uno solo. Non tamende uno solo me aliquid vel de solo Socrate
essehominem.Velud et homo unum tantum est, non tamen unum tantum est homo.
The adhercnts of the Efth view, who reject thc expression (of the
dictum)as& solecism, arc attackedwith both common usageand rational
argumcnts (ibid.):
Opinioni que locutionem reprehendit ususobviat et loquendi consuetudo aliquid esse
rerum velfalsum de aliquo, certum autl dubium. Unde et Aristotiles verum essegenus de
specie astruit. Ratio quoque in hunc nmdum: Plato scit aliquid de Socrate; ergo de
Socrate scitur aliquid a Platone; ergo de Socrate aliquid est scibile; ergo verum vel
falsum. Item. 'Socratesest homo' est simplex aFErmatio; ergo enuntiatio alicuius de
aliquo; sed ipsa non est enuntuatio nisi veri; ergo est enuntiatio veri de aliquo; ergo
aliquod verum de aliquo enuntiatur; quare aliquid est verum de aliquo. Rursus: aliquis
loquitur de Socrate; et dicit aliquid; ergo dicit aliquid de Socrate. Ad hec autem
secundumlioc nulla negativa, nulla etiam de preterito aut.de futuro. Et generaliter nulla
in quaest verapredicatio,dicitur aliquidde aliquo. Et erit locutio incongrua:
aFHrmativa
'a Socratedicitur aliquid de aliquo', quia dupliciter, inquiunt, 'dicirur' est accipere: pro
"prcdicari' iunctum ablativo precedente prepositione 'id-r', el'pro 'cnumiari' ablativo pre-
cedente 'a' vel 'ab'. Scd utramque signiücationem nequit una probatione verbum
retinere.
Somc of them tcmpcrcd this extreme view; because of the grave

criticism lcvclled againstthem (ibid.):
Ob hoc plerique positionem temperantes suscipere consueverunt propositione aliquid
dici de re locutione supposita,sed non est quid. Ut hac propositione: 'Socrates
esthomo'
de Socrate dicitur quod ipse est homo, non dico ipsum essehominem, sed confuse et
vulgariter accipiendaest locutio. Velud et imperativaoratione imperatur ut legasvel
quod ignem facias, et optativa ostenditur aliquis optare quod aliquid habeat, non tamen
discretealiquid, propositioncquoquedicitur aliquodbonumde aliquo, non dico aliquid
quod sit bonum. Sed que de aliis inducitur orationibus fallax est similitudo, cum sola
,enuntiativa aliquid discrete significet.
Our author apparently adhcrcs to the fourth opinion (named here, not
quite correctly, ultima opinio). Hc adds, however, an important remark:
one had better speakof dici pro than of dici de, thus giving :: clear hint to
the later usagesupponere pro (ibid.):
Ultima opinio est que astruit enuntiabilia essevera vel falsade aliquo, ut Socratem
es:: hominemde Socrate. Et huic quidem vestigia pr(o)ni sequentes et usum pariter
emulantesassentimus.Si quis tamen altius inspiciat, intelligit convenientiuset magis
' autcm MS.

exquisitedictum pro aliquo aliquid esseverum quamdealiquo, ut pro homine hominem

esseanimal; et in 'dici' sin'niliter. Adeo etiam ut alii locutioni potius congruitatem usus
attribuat quam propria partium iunctura.
This view, however, appears not to be indisputable either. The Erst

diFFlculty is an inconveniens iqfïniratis (ibid.):
Quod primum huic opinioni obviat est infinitatis inconveniens. Quod sic accidit:
Socratemessehominemest verum de Socrate; et de hoc vero aliud verum est verum; de
quo tertium ; et sic in inEnitum. Probabiturctiam tot esseveraquot enuntiabilia. Namde
quolibet enuntiabili aliquod verum est verum quod de nullo alio est verum. Et similiter
de quibuslibet ( )1 aliquot sunt enuntiabilia et aliquot vera. Ergo quot sunt
......
enuntiabilia, tot sunt vera.
Another seemingdiFFlculty(ibid.):
Simili quoque ratione ostenditur tot essevera quot existentia. Quod ultra recipimus.
Our author, then, discussesthe diFficulties set forth (2371'ü'r'1):

Que igitur in his sint concedendaper hec paucaconsiderandum.Quotcumquesunt
vera vel enuntiabilia, tot de eis sunt vera et omnibus veris plura sunt vera et ab omnibus
veris alia. Omnia etiam vera et alia sunt vera et quelibet vera sunt de numero aliorum.
Sed de nullorum (237fb) numero sunt omnia vera, sicut a quolibet homine aliud est
risibile et quilibet homo et alius sunt homines. Vel in numeralbillibus: a quibuslibet
duobus veris alia sunt vera; quelibet duo et alia duo sunt. Etenim in his que propter
infinitatem unum aliquem terminum non recipiunt, pluralia distributiva eandem aut
similem vim habent singularibus distributivis, idest distribuunt sine collectione; non
dico: sine omni collectione, sed absque ea quam cüm aliis facere solent, idest non
comprehenduntunamaliquamsummumquaside quasint omnia que subtali appellatione,
non tamen similiter dandum: alia ab onmibus veris sunt vera. Aut etiam aliud ab omni
vero vel plura onmibus veris. ( ...... ) Itaque in his per distributionem elaborabit
instans aut certis de multis sumendo numerum, aut in similibus. Ut in differentiis vel
proprietatum proprietatibus vel terminis qui sunt in hac forma vocis: 'hic existens'.
Eternitas quoque simillima his invenitur, quia ipsa nullam habuit partem quam non
precesserit alia.
The author puts forward quite & number of instantis. I give some of them
(237Tb):
Aut: nonnisi eternaliter fuit Deus; ergo aliquo spatio solo fuit. Amplius. Deus omnia
creavit in numero et pondere et mensura. Ipse est enim qui dinumerat multitudinem
stellarum, harenas maris, et squamaspiscium. Scit ergo quot sunt vera et quotcumque
vera sunt. Quod satis cuncedimus, idest si duo aut centum aut mille sint vera, illa scit
ipsc. Sednescit aliqua vera preter que non sint alia vera, quippe nulla sunt talia.
' illegible on the plwtüstat nt my disposui.

ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORV OF THE ENUNTIABILE 367
He gives a conclusive argument in support of his own view: enuntiabilia
esseveradealiquibus (ibid.):
Atque in hanc quidemfacile deducetur opinionemquicumqueenuntiabiliadixerit
esse vera de aliquibus. Etenim hoc termino 'hoc existcns' potcst quudlibct existens
demonstrari ut dicatur de quolibet 'hoc existens051". Et ita tot vera significantur hac
propositione quot sunt existentia, immo cum nulla propositio plura signiEcet; ac
crescetnumeruspropositionum et terminorum ad paritatem rerum. Idem per rationem
superius dictam contingit ostendere. Nam de quolibet enuntiabili aliquod verum est
verum quod de nullo alio est verum. Et similiter de quibuslibet. Ergo tot sunt vera quot
enuntiabilia. Ad hi:: autem per ad impossibile deductionem: plura sunt enuntiabilia
quam vera; ergo enuntiabilia sunt plura omnibus veris; ergo veris preter que nulla sunt
vera; ergo aliqua sunt vera que sola sunt vera. Sint illa centum, vel decem, ut ad Finem
facilius perducatur ratio. lsta sunt vera demonstratis illis que sola sunt vera; ergo ista
essevera est verum. Et est unum illorum, quia non aliter illa sola essentvera. Separetur
hoc ab illis intellectu. Remanentnovem. Quibus similiter demonstratisvere dici potest
ista essevera est verum nec erit hoc idem separato, quoniam non eadem que prius per
pronomen demonstrantur. Separetur autem et hoc ab illis novem et relinquuntur octo.
De quibus etiam dici potest: 'ista sunt.vcra'. Quo sublato residuaerunt septem, ut tam
diu hecFiatsubtractioquousquetandemadduo perveniatur.Que demonstrandodicere
poteris: 'ista essevera est verum'. Et erit hoc alterum ilIOI'LLljï. Et ita cuiuslibet enun-
tiabilis preter unum appellatio erit ista essevero, quia novem separata sic dicebantur. Et
erit ultimum de se et de alio verum..
Therefore our author sticks to his view that one must say that the [cap. 1I]
cnuntiabiha or dicta are true of something. It must be borne in mind,
he adds, that only by the singular proposition something is said of &
particular subject (dequo). He proposesto test this view for all kinds of
propositionsasdistinguishedafter the quantity of the proposition (ibid.):
His itaque nil impedientibusdicimus enuntiabilia essevera de aliquibus. Sednotandum
quod sicut non qualibet propositione agitur determinate de aliquo, sed sola singulari,
ita et huiussoliusdictum de aliquo quod est vel non est verum, utpote de illo, vel de
illis, de quo, vel de quibus, per eam agitur. Aliarum vem etsi de aliqua, tamen non est
clequo..Quod ut planius Eratin singulis prapasitionum generibusadhibendaerit consi-
deratio.
The next chapters (12-14) are of the utmost importance for our
knowledge of the earlyr theory of supposition, since our author tries to
clarify his thesis from the viewpoint of supposition (rationesumptaex
suppositione):
First, the universal proposition (ibid.): [cap. 12]
Primum itaque de universali querendum utrum ea de aliquo Fiat sermo. Quod

ratione sumpta ex snppositione videtur posse ostendi. Nam nominativus cum verbo
construitur ex parte suppositi; ergo ei supponit. Et ita significat suppositum. Ergo rem
de qua Fit sermo. Ad hoc autem 'omnishomoestanimal', 'quidamhomoes:animal',,sub-
alterno sunt; ergo illis agitur de eodem. ldeo dixerunt quidem quoniam dequolibet
appellatosubiecti termini Fit sermo; alii quod non de pluribus sed de aliquo, ut de
homine ista: 'omnishomoestanimal', sed nec de aliquo nec de omni Non est tamen in-
.
telligibile qualiter omnem aut nullum hominem esseanimal verum sit de uno. Fatendun'u
itaque universali de nullo agi ; sed non supponit locutioni nominativus sed verbo. Velut
et in copulativis accidit.
[cap. 13] The some question is discussed with reference to the indefinite and
particular proposition (2371'5'"):
lndefinita vero vel particulari Et sermo de aliquo et de aliquibus. Ut 'homoest
animal' vel 'animalium quodlibet est homo'. Sed de nullo Et ea sermo, quia in subiecto
ponitur nomen pro aliquo suorum appellatorum, predicatum autem aptius est confusioni.
Et hominem esse animal est verum de homine, sed non de homine est verum hominem
esseanimal. Quod sic arguitur. Quidlibet est aliquid de quo non Et sermo hac propo-
sitione: 'homoestanimal' ; de aliquo non Et ea sermo; ergo de quolibet non Flt ea sermo;
ergo de nullo. [tem. Accidente Socratem et Platonem proferre has propositiones:
'homoest animal', 'Socratesestanimal' aut duosindefinitas: 'de homineloquitur Socrates','de
homineloquitur solusSocrates',vel 'de homineloquitur Socrateset alius'; si solus, ergo de
homine loquitur Socrateset nullus asinus;quod pro aliquo oportebit intelligi. Sin vero
de homine loquitur et Socrates et alius, ergo de eodem et Socrates et alius. Similiter
circa promissionem indeterminatam. 'Aliquid (237'm) promittitur Platoni'; ergo aliquid
et promittitur et reddetur Platoni, vul promittitur et non reddetur. Ad hec autem de
Socratenon Et sermo hac indefinita; ergo de aliquo homine; ergo de homine; quod si
verum est, tenebitur illic nomen pro aliquo suorum appellatorum. Quare ergo non
etiam in allirmatione similiter? At contra: non de homine Fll'.sermo hac propositionc;
ea non Et sermo de aliquo homine; ergo ea non Et sermo de homine. ( . . . . . . )
Notandumiterum quod non sempercleFmiendum de quo hat sermo indehnita propo-
sitione vel particulari per id totum quod ponitur in subiecto. Nequeenim hoc: 'aliquis
homoest'Et sermode aliquo homine, sedsimpliciter de homine; neque'unussolushomo
est' de uno solo homine; nec forte ista: 'alter istorum currit' ne eadem inspectione et de
aliquo hominum, dicto aliquemhominumcurrere. Hac etiam: 'homoalbus currit', ut quibus-
dum placat, non agitur de homine albo vel 'animal rationale es.'."ll
de animali rationali, sed
de homine vel de animali, velud nec ista: 'omnishomoest' de omni homine, aut 'homoqui
est albus est candidus' de homine qui est albus, aut 'homo vel aliud ab illo currit' de homine
vel alio ab illo.
At vero secundumhoc non Eet ista sermo de albo: 'albumestaliquid', quia non de re
alba. Hoc etiam nonnisi ab his dicendum1uideturqui dicere consueveruntsubstantivum
terminum supponere verbo adiectivo circa eius rem detenninante proprietatem. Nos
dabimusquod Eatsermode homine albo, quoniamet hec suppositioin(cle)Enitaest et
'euandriusensisestocuuis' de euandrio ense et etiam de ense Euandri et 'nosusSocratisest
oquilus' de naso Socrate et 'des-teroculusPlatonisesl:lippus' de dextro oculo Platonis.
Sed de his: 'homo albus est Sacrares', 'homo niger est Ploto' potest dubitari utrum eis Fiat
sermo de aliquo vel de aliquibus.Sedpotius videtur de aliquo. Ergo et istis similiter:
' grammaticumest', 'musicumest' contingente nullum grammaticum essemusicum quod ex
mas MELIDUNA. THE THl-tom' OF THE ENUNTIABILE 369
hoc improbatur quod accidente amne grammaticum esse musicum et cconverso aut
unum solum hominem esse et illum esse grammaticum et musicum, non poterit dici
quod eis de aliquibusFiatsermo.Istis ctiam diceretur eademinspectionesermonemHeri
de aliquo: 'album es: coloratum', 'cancliclumest coloratum', et ita de uno. Fatendum itaque
nullis indeHnitis agi de aliquibus. Quare subiecti termini eidem rei possunt convenire.
Licet ergo utraque istarum: 'album est', 'nigrum est' Fiatsermo de aliqua, non tamen eis
de aliquo vel de aliquibus. Et in p(articul)aribus similiter.
Finally, the singular proposition is considered (237V3): [cap. 14]
Pragrediendum itaque deincepsad singu lares. in his autem agitur discrete quandoque
de uno, ut 'Socratescurrit', quandoquede pluribus Tet de nulloT ut 'Socrateset Plato
currunt', aut 'isti hominescurrunt', de Socrate et Platone, non tamen de Socrate et de
Platone, quia 'de' materiale est. Sed 'solusSocrates
currit' de nulla Flt sermo, velud nec
ista 'nannisi Socratescurrit' aut 'nullus nisi Sacrases', quia Vim habet universalis proptcr
generalem exclusionems Similiter necistis: 'omnesisti currunt' vel 'amba isn' disputant':
Huctuantsiquidemhe inter universaleset singulares,neutris proprie annumerande.Aut si
de aliquibus Et sermo, erit verum de istis omnes istos currere; ergo et istos ct quoslibet
eorum; ac de illis ambos; ergo eos et utrumque.
A special problem is presented by the propositioiis which have & subject-

term containingan oblique case(ibid.):
Sunt et alie de quibus magis ambigi potest utrum eis Fiatsermo de aliquo discrete an
in(dc)finite, ut 'Sacratisasinusest albus', 'Platanis calor est albedo'. 'istarum altcrï currit'.
Etenim secundum proponeiïdi naturam indefinite videntur iudicande, singulares autem
secundum propositarum rationem. Si tamen singulares dicantur, erit universalem in-
venire absquesingulari, ut 'cuiuslibcshominisasinusestalbus'. Sedcontra, his inter singu-
lares numeratis Flet sermo de Socrate, non de Socratis asino, et ita de Socrate diceretur
eius asinum essealbum; ergo sui asinum, ergo suum. Qua insPectione et de Euandro
Euandrium Filium pugnare, dicto Euandri Elium pugnare. Quod dici nequit, quia illud:
dictum est indefinite. Pretereaidemdictum videtur 'Socratisflius' et 'filius Sacraris'.
ldeo litem de mediotollentesdicimusquodsuppositiopotcst Heri tum per obliquum,
ut sit propositio singularis, tum per orationem cx obliqua constantemet recta, ut
indeEnita. Singulari autem agitur de aliquo discrete, ut de Socrate de quo dicitur sui
asinum essealbum, non tamen suum; licet namque primitivum ubi de re agitur inferat
possessivum,non licebit hoc observarecum de dictis est sermo. Velut et necessariaest:
'illud esthomo,ergoestrisibile' ; falsa tamen 'dicitur esse
hama,ergodicitur esserisibile'. Aut
hac propasitionesignilïcaturSocratem esseanimal, ergo essesensibile,vel Socratem
haberealiquod caput,ergo aliquod caput haberi& Socrate.lsta quaque: 'israrumuterque
currit' in predictarum iudicium cadit. Nam (cum) signiFlcatussit subiectus terminus
quod sequatur 1iricum predicati erit singularis T et dicetur ea de istis istarum utrumque
currere, non tamen et hunc et illum currere.
' corrected frmn uterquein our MS.

: viz. Euandriumfilium :: a son of Euander,insteadoffilius Euandri: the sanof Euander
(Pallas; sce Vergilius, AeneisVill, l215qq.).
370 LOGICA ü-[ODERNORUM "
Another special case is presented by those singular prcpositions which

speak Of :! non-exl'stens
(2373'3'13'3):
Solet etiam de dictis singulariumquibusagitur de non existenti, dubitari utrum ipsa
sint vera de aliquo, ut Cesarem
non esse.Dicunt quidam quod, sicut Cesar non est neque
tamen aliquid non est, ita et dictum illius propositionis qua fit sermo de Cesare est
verum de Cesaresednon ideo de aliquo nec tali propositioneagitur de aliquo quamvis
de Cesare.Contra quos superiusmulta inter (237Vb)appellationesque etiam ad hunc
locum transferri poterunt, induximus.
Nos dicimus quod quicquid est verum de non existenti, idest de eo quod desiit vcl incipiet
esse,est verum de aliquo. Nam 'est verum'appellationemablativi extendit quod per
superiora consideravimus; sed de Cesare est verum ipsum non esse; ergo de aliquo est
verum Ipsumnonesse.
The author's view is refutcd by several other scholars, on different

grounds (237Vb):
Huic argumentationidiversis modis respondetur a diversis. Quidam enim con-
clusionem recipiunt; non tamen aliquid non est cui simile est quod de uno solo est
verum ipsum esse, non tamen unum solum est et de paucis vere dicitur ipsa existere aut
de paucishominibusverum erit ipsosesse,posito quod pauci erunt simul; et de altero
contradictorie oppositorum est contingens ipsum esseverum, non tamen contingens est
alterum esseverum.
Alii dicunt prcdictmn illationem esse falsmn, quia non est, inquiunt, in his sumenda
dicti appellatio per relationem ad nomen existentium factam nisi aliquid precedat quod
ampliet appellationem, scilicet altera oratio aut relatio, ut de aliquo de quo iste loquitur
esr verum ipsum non esse,aut aliquid fuit et verum est de eo ipsum non esse,quemad-
modum et per rectos: aliquid fuit et ipsum non est, non tamen aliquid non est. Etenim
relatio ad nomen existentis facta «EsalentialnI
infert et idet) appellationem antecedentis ad
existentia restringit. Quare non potestdici vere quod de aliquo est verum ipsum non esse.
An extensiverefutation of thei r argumentsis given by our author (ibid.):

Contra quos sic negotiantium est: de aliquo aliquid est verum et de eo est verum ipsum
non esse; nam 'de aliquo aliquid est verum' omnia complectit tempora; ergo de aliquo
est verum ipsumnon essevel aliud et de eo est verum ipsumnon esse;sedde nullo est
verum ipsum non esse; ergo de aliquo est verum tantum aliud quam ipsum non esseet
de eo est verum ipsum non esse. ( ) Illud etiam notandum quod quicquid est
......
verum de aliquo discrete, est verum de omni eodem illi, idest de 130quocumque modo
sumpto, ut Socratem esse est verum de hoc animali, de hoc corpore, de hoc albo, nam
de aliquo determinate; ergo de aliquo quod est vel non est; ergo quod est hoc corpus
vel aliud. Verum non sempereademdicti appellationeuteris assignando
de quo sit verum.
Nam de hoc mthe est verum ipsum essebonum et idem est verum de hoc:homine, non
tamen de hoc homine est verum ipsum sed hunc militem esse bonum. Et de hoc:
homine qui moritur est verum ipsum desinere esse,quod est verum de hac substantia,
! : actual existence.
ARS rs-IELIDLINA. THE THEORï OF THE ENUNTIABILE 371
non tamende hac substantiavel de hoc corpore verum est ipsum desinereessesed hunc
hominem desinere esse,quia variato antecedente mutatur signiFlcatiorelativi. Quare et
tunc sumitur alterius cnuntiabilis appellatio, sicut 'quicquidvidc: Sacram,ridet Plato',
et Socrates videt fratrem suum, non tamen Plato fratrem suum, sed illum. Item. Hac
est' dicitur de hoc animali non ipsum essesed Socratemesse.Qua
propositione 'Socrates
inspectione de nullo dicitur ea ipsum esse,quia simplicius sumitur vocabulum aliquod
quamsit illud quod significatsuppositumet 'hic homoalbusest'! dicitur de hoc homine
ipsum essealbum vel hunc hominem album esse,non autem ipsum esse.
The next chapters(15-33) are devotcd to the discussionof verum.The [cap. 15]
vcra are divided into and

necessaria contingentia. The necessariaare sub-
divided (ibid.) :
Determinatis illis que circa vera et falsa communiter poterant dubitari, specialem in
utrisque considerationemponendum.Ac primum de veris videamus.Horum alia sunt
necessaria, alia contingentia. Necessarium sic a plerisque describitur: necessariumest
enuntiabih: necessarioverum; ab aliis vero: verumquod non putas:esse
falsum. Impossibile
quoque dupliciter. Similiter verum cuntingens: verumquodpotestesse
falsum aut verum
quod non necessaria est verum.Secundum quas diversasdescriptiones diversis modis dici
dicatur a diversis quod enuntiabile sit nccesærium vel contingens.
Item. Necessariorumaliud necessariumper se, aliud ])cr-accidens.Necessariumper se
quod nullo casu sit necessarium, sed semper fuit et est et erit necessarium, ut Deum esse.
Necessariumper accidensquod accidentaliter, idest aliquo rerum eventu, incepit esse
necessarium, ut Cesaremfuisse.
Amplius autem necessariorumaliud est de presenti, aliud de preterito, aliud de futuro.
De quibus omnibus hic aliqua dicendum.
This chapterdiscusscsthe veradepresenti(2373'13-2381'11): [cap. 16]
Et primo de illis de presenti. Sunt autem quedam vera de presenti de quibus ambigitur
utrum ipsa sint necessaria an contingentia, ut amnem hominem esse vel non esse, aut non
omnem esse Socratem, eoquod utrimque sint rationes apparere. Quod necessaria sint
ex his arguitur: omnishomo necessarionon est lapis; necessarium
hunc hominemnon
esselapidem ; et illum ; et sic de singulis; ergo necessariumest omnem non esselapidem;
ergo omnem essevel non esselapidem et ita essevel non esse. ( . . . . . . ).
Nos vero dicimus contingens esse, idest contingenter vcrum, omnem hominem esse
vel non esse. Similiter omnem hominem non esselapidem, aut aliquem non esseSocra-
tem. Quarehominemesselapidemnon est impossible,nisi impossibile
dixeris idcstfalsum
quodnonpares:. rerum;desinuntquippe veraessevel falsahec rebustranscendentibus.
esse
Neque enim poterit aliquo intellectu apprehendi omne animal esse vel non esse nullo
existente. Aut tantum incongrua propter positionem scilicet quam facit nomen appel-
Iativum in subiecto. ( (2381?) ). Sicut diximus non esse necessarium
. . . . . . . . . . . .
aliquem hominem non esse Socratem, ita etiam concedimus quod non est necessarium
aliquod animal non esse hominem. Quod predictis rationibus ad impossibilitatem
deducentibuscontingit ostendere ( ).
..... .... ..
l : by the proposition: 'hic homo albus est'.
372 LOGICA MODERNORus-i 11
In implicitis quaque eademspeculatio, quia possibile est omne id quod est animal esse
hominem et hominem qui mecum loquitur csseAntichristum. Et contingensid quod est
Socmtes esse vel non esse. Necessarium quoque omne id quod est existerenec est
possibile hominem qui sedet stare ( (238l'b) ).
.. .... ......
Sunt iterum alia vera de quibUSdubitari poterit utrum necessaria sint, ut Socratem
non stare in hoc momento in quo sedet ( . . . . . . . ).
Deniqueattingendaquorundamopinio arbitrantiumquodlibet verumde presentiesse
necessariumet omne falsum impossibile, nisi eius eventusspectet ad futurum. Ut si
quid habeat illa rationis, in medium prul'eratur. Fatetur Aristotiles in libro Peri-
hermenias! quod quicquid est, necesse est esse quando est. Et ita necessarium est Socratem
essemodo. DiHerentimuetiam propositionum de presenti et de preterito ad illas de

futuro assignansdicit quod non in illis ita ut in his necessariumest unam esseveram et
alteram falsam. (. ) lnductis vero rationibus ad eam construendam facile erit
.. ...
respondere.Dicit enim Aristotiles quod quicquid est, necesseest essequandoest, quia
nil potest simul esse et non esse; cui simile est et quod in Rcsaiurariiszdicitur neces-
sarium est hominemesseani:11al.ltem.ln contradictoriis de presenti aut preterito dicit
aliter sehaberequamin his de futuro, quianecessariumest in illis unamdeterminateesse
veram et alteram falsam, idest cum necessarium sit unam esse veram et alteram falsam
certum est et determinatum utra sit vera et utra falsa, quippe presentia et preterita
certa sunt et in notitiam nostram veniunt latentibus futuris. lllationi vero sic instandum:
semper hoc apium erit aH'cctum sanitate et ipsum erit sanum: impossibile est aliquid
(non)0 esseaffectum sanitateet essesanum,ergo semper hoc apium erit alïectum sanitate
et erit sanum. Nam sicut hic mutatur signiFlcatio termini, ita et illic non pro eodem
ponitur hoc nomen 'aliquid' : ponitur in assumptionepro quo prius hoc nomen 'Socratcs'.
[cap. 17] This chapter discussesthe verade preterita (2 3833):

Transeamus deincepsad verade preterito. In his primum notabisomne dictum singularis
et affirmative dc preterito cuius veritas non pendet ex eventu presenti vel futuro,
necessarium essesi fuerit verum, non tamen impossibilesi falsum. 'Singularis'dicitur
quia secusest in dictis universalium. Neque enim necessariumomnem animam fuisse de
numero istarumaut omne animalfuissehominem; 'ajirmativc' vero, quia non est neces-
sarium Antichristum non fuisse; 'cuius veritas etc.' hic additur nc contingat instantiam
in his ferri Antichristum fuisse nasciturum, hoc fuisse verum demonstrato predicto
enuntiabili.
[cap. 13] The enuntiabilia etfuturo the subject Of this chapter

cx preterita mixta are
(233Vb):
Enuntiabilia ex preterito mixta et futuro quasi media versantur inter cetera enuntuaf
bilia de preterito et illa de futuro. Nam possuntessevem et falsa. Similiter his de
presenti,sed nec incipere nec desinere,in quo ad illa de preterito accedunt,ut Anti-
christum fuissenasciturum.
' Dc Interpr. lO, l9b23sqq.

3 Anal. Priora [. 25320-25 and 30a 30-31.
ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEom' OF THE ENUNTIABILE 373
This chapter refers extensively to the veterum aboutfuture events [CHP-

dissensio 19]
(cfr. Boethius, In Periherm. ", 24416sqq.). Our author's discussions
prelude the later controversiasabout thejütura contingentia(ibid.):
Dc eventibus tamen futuris non minima inter veteres habita est dissensio. Nam Epicurus
omnia mundana dixit regi fortuna, mundum etiam ex fortuito elementorum concursu
coniungi; deum quoque qui incorruptibilis cst istorum incorruptibilium causamnon
gerere..Cui contrarie Stcuicil opinantesnulla fortune cmnmittunt, sed omnia necessi-
tate astringunt, argumentum sumentesa divina providentia que infallibilis est.
Contra quos disPUtans Aristotiles ostendit perire casum ac libertatem arbitrii quc
casui favet. Boetius quoque hoc inconveniens ex hac Opinione producit quod secundum
eam inmerito puniuntur mali et remunerantur boni. Nam et illi per necessarium
eveniendorumprogressumagenturadpeccandumet isti compellenturadbeneagendum;
sicque cessabitaliquid essevitium vcl virtus, quia confusum et adnichilatum est meritum
et virtus. Narn omnis virtus et omne vitium ex voluntateï progreditur et ideo, cum nil
sit voluntas vel arbitrii libertas, nil erit aliquid horum. Et, quod maius est, sequitur inde
Deum amnium malorum esse principium. Nam cum secundum providentiam omnia
contingant et ipsa necessarium':faciat eventum singulorum tam bonorum quam malorum,
consequitur ipsum esseautorem malorum. Quod etiam cogitare nefarium est.
Perhipatetici medium tenentes nec omnia fortune. legibus subtrahunt ncc singula
necessitati addicunt.
The opinio Stoicorumis supported by sophista,phisici, and theologi(ibid.):

Opinionem autem Stoicorum, scilicet necessario evenire quc eventura sunt, licet
ipsa ad periculum trahat, diverso diversis modis probasse inveniuntur. Aliter namque
Sophiste,aliter phisici et aliter teologi illud probare conati sunt.
Sophiste quidem ratione sumpta cx proprietate contradictoriarum male intellecta,
hac scilicet: omnium contradictoriamm necesseest unam esse.veram et alteram falsam.
attribui utrique parti determinateut vera necessariosit
chutantes enim necessitatem
vera et falsa necessario falsa, procedebant nd inferendum omne quod eventurum est
necessario esse eventurum. Similiter hanc: 'amnium dividendum utramque necessariumes:
veramvelfalsam'putabantsensumhabereypotheticedisiunctcattribuiquenecessitatem
esse
utrique parti, ut scilicet unam determinate necessesit essevemm et alteram falsam. Sed
huic illorum rationi solutionem adhibet Aristotiles docens predicta propositione
attribui dicto cathegoricedisiunctaet neutri parti determinate.
necessitatem
Phisici vero per qualitates celestium idem probabant dicentes in rebus inferioribus
omnia evenire secundum naturas superiorum in hec inferiora agentium, scilicet secun-
dumconstellationes,secundumcursumplanetarumet motumsuperiorumelementorum.
Inferiora siquidem beneficio reguntur superiorum. Sed si superiora cause sunt humano-
rum proventuum, opürtet ut postquam precessit causa, sequatur ct eH'ectus; et ita
necessarium est ut qui sul) Marte nascitur, iracundus sit et bellicosus; qui sub Saturno,
tardus, tenax et prediis habundans. Hanc rationen'l solvit Macrobius dicens3 quia
' The MS has chici (!). 2 Cfr. Peter Abailard, Ethica, passim.
3 I could not Hndsucha passnge
in Macrobius.It is probablyto be found in sometwelfth
century commentary On Macrobius, In Cic. SamniumScipionis, ad [ 12, 4, p. 48:15.
ed. ]. Willis, Teubncr 1963.
374 Locum MODERNORUM 11
superioranon sunt causefuturorum proventuum sed signa. Velut nec volatusavium a

dextris consideratus vel sinistris, nec horum etiam omnium, quia non casualiuml
determinationum est istum sedere in sequenti momento aut legere, sed. tantum
naturalium scilicct complexionum ct qualitatum ipsorum temporum.
The m'guments of the theologi are discussed in a rather extensive wayr

(ibid.) :
Theologi ad idem ratiocinantur. argumentum sumentes a divina providentia. Utrum
enim providentia Dei necessitatem inferat rebus futuris dicit Boetius veterem csse
querelam. Quam a Marco Tullio in libro de Divinationctractatam ipse in libro de Con-
solutionem adhibens retractat ostendenda qualiter providentia et casussimul
s.:r-Iizlru'us-ns1
subsisterequeant. Obiectio vero talis erat. Si possibileest aliquamrem aliter evenire
quam eveniat, possibile est aliquam rem aliter evenire quam provisum sit a Deo ipsam
esse eventurum. Sed si aliqua res evenit aliter quam provisum sit esse eventurum, ergo
possibile est providentiam Dei falli, quia si possibile est antecedens, et consequens.
Sednon est possibilefalli providentiamDei. Ergo nec aliquamrem aliter evenirequam
eveniat. Ergo necessarioeveniet ita ut eveniet. Fallacia incidit compositionis et divisionis.
Cum enim dicitur possibile est aliquam rem aliter evenire quam eveniet, agitur de dicto
liuius cathegoricc: aliqua res eveniet aliter quam sit eventura. (Si) dicatur quod sit
possibile, falsum est. Si autem secundumdivisionem formatur, verum, idest si possibili-
tas attribuatur alteri parti catlicgoricc, ut Fiatsermo non de dicto sed de re hoc modo:
aliqua res eveniet aliquo modo et possibile est ipsam alio modo evenire. Similiter secun-
dum compositionem accepte false sunt iste: possibile est aliquam rem aliter evenire
quam provisum sit cventuram, possibile est istum aliquid essealiter facturum quam ego
sciam aut veraciter dicam essefacturum, possibileest predestinatumesseet dampnari
aut prescitum salvari. Neque enim possibile aliquem simul predestinatum esse et
dampnari,sedqui predestinatusestpotestdampnati,quia potestlabi in criminalia.Item.
Deus providit hunc dampnandum ct providentia eius nequit falli; ergo necessarium est
ipsum essedampnandum.Non provenit, sed inferendum fuit: 'ergo dampnabitur',quc-
maclmodum'ista esthomoet nonpotestessehomoquin sit animal' ; non tamen necessariumest
esse animal. Providentia enim Dei non infert eventibus futuris necessitatem eveniendi,
sed potius rerum ipsarum nexus inevitabilis propter causasvarias. Etenim quedam sic
providit eventumut nullis causisintervenientibuspossitimpediri quin eveniant;alia sic
ut possit. Que vero impedire valent non previdit necessarioevenire, sed si eveniunt
previdit3 eventura. Si non eveniunt, non cassaturob hoc eius providentis, quia prcvidit
non esseeventura. Exempli gratia: si velim hunc proficisci Cartaginem sicque voluntati
mec modum statuamut velim ipsum proücisci, si nulle causedestantesiter eius im-
pediant; impedientibus autem aliquibus velim non proficisci. Si proficiscatur, voluntas
mea adimpletur; si tamen non prOFlciscatur,non cassatur voluntas, quia non absolute
volui ipsum prolïcisci.
[cap. 20] As verum,and only verum, is to be used as argumentumad aliquid proban-

dum, our author proceeds to the discussion of argumentum(2391'3).
! consualiumMS. 2 V, pr. ! FI". 3 previdet MS.

ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORï OF THE ENUNTIABILE 375
There are four opinions about the nature of argumentum

(2391'3):
Opinio tamen de argumento quadrifariam spargitur.
[1] Etenim quidam solam prapositioncm conclusioni promissam argumentum putant,
eoquodin Topicisdicat Boetius: enuntiatio sive sui causadicatur sive ad probandum
afferatur, propositio est. Secundum hos evenit antc vocum inventionem nil fuisse ar-
gumentum ad aliquid probandum. Ergo tunc nulla fuit ratio quare verum essetmundum
esse vel posset verum esse ostendi. Apparebit etiam ex hoc propositionem non esse
argumentumnecessariumad aliquid probandum,quia vocasad placitum sunt, ut possit
'Socratesest.homo' idem signiEcar—c
cum ista: 'Socratesest lapis'. Item. 'Socratescurrit' est
argumentum ad hanc probandum 'iste homocurrit'; que. ad istam: 'Plato currit'; ergo
prima ad tertiam. ( ).
......
[2] Aliarum est opinio generalis ypothetice dictum esse argumentum. Ut in hac
argumentatione: 'Socratesest homo; ergo est animal' argumentum est dictum huius: 'si
aliquid est homo, ipsumest animal'. Sed illud est necessarium; ergo istud, nam si neces-
sarium est antecedens, necessariumest consequens, et si probans, et probatum. Illud
preterea ad hoc probanduminducitur: poterit quoque eodem argumento probari
Socratem esseanimal et Platonem esseanimal.
[3] Tertia fatetur opinio dictum specialisypothetice, scilicct constantiscx propo-
sitionc ct canclusione, csse argumentum. Cui eadem et priori obviant.
[4] Alii etiam a longe speculanteshabitudinemmedii ad extremaargumentoinesse
predicant, cum eadem sit inter argumentum et argumenti habitudinem dilïerentia, quam
et argumenti dicimus locum, quippe habitudo illa nil aliud quam argumenti locus. In
entimematis preterea orationibus non facile 1ridetur assignare quid sit argumentum.
The author's own view is (ibid.):

Verius itaque opinandum argumentum esse verum premissum in argumentatione essc
efficax illata conclusionis. Velut si quis arguit et cogit respondentem concedere con-
clusionem rei dubie faciendo Fidem.
A number of objections against this view are raised and refuted

The author sticks to the opinion that only verumcan be said
(2391'3'1'13).
to be argumentum, as neither the signifcotum dictionis simplicis nor & false
.argumentcan ever be used to prove anything (2391'b):
Ideo autem solum verum argumentum esse diximus quia nec significatum dictionis
simplicis nec falsum argumentum est ad aliquid probandum, quippe et falsum non habet
Fidem quare non potest eam alii prestare. Et ita non potest esse ratio rei dubie faciens
Fidem; quare nec argumentum.
Sed nec significatum dictionis, licct aliquo sic arguente: 'curritur; ergo movetur',
appareat instantia. Similiter cum aliquo interrogante 'currime Socrates?'-,
et alio respon-
dente 'na', infert primus: 'ergoaliquishomocurrit'. Hic enim videtur inferre aut ex
signilïcato advcrbii aut interrogativa. orationis, et ita non ex vero.
Sed dicimus neutram illarum vocum esse argumentationem. ( ). Ex predictis
......
itaque palam omne argumentum esse verum. Unde omne, ut solet dici, est necessarium,
idest omne habet necessariam adiunctionem cum alio.
The word 'argumentum',however, is equivocal, since it can stand for

explicansand argumentum
argumentum explicatum(ibid )
Equivocatur autem nomen 'argumcnti' ad explican:et explicatum;qt:l.1il.151m::u:iil
equi-
vocatio ex adiunctis discernitur. Nam cum verbis transitivis,pro explicante, idest pro
argumentatione, accipitur' ut 'istefacit', vel falsrffïcat,argumcnrum'.Similiter cum verbo
substantivo si non sequatur vox notans respectum. Ut cum dicitur: 'argumcmum istim
estnecessarium, vel estbonum'.Sed sequentealiquo quod notet respectmn,pro explicato
sumitur, ut docet aliquid esseargumentumad aliud. Similiter cum hoc verbo 'cxplicarur'
vel 'eliciwr'. Sepetamen etiam non appositavox quc notet respectum,subintelligitur.
Ut ponente aliquo omne argumentum esse necessarium, velud dicto sillabam csse cor-
reptamvel productam,subintelligitur quoniamalicui correpta vel alicui producta est.
(239rb).
[cap. 21] Argumentatiois deEned (ibid.):
Argumentatio a Boetio sic describiturï: argumentatio est argumenti per orationem

explicatio, idest oratio explicans argumentum.
There is some discussion about the meaning of oratio in this defmition

(ibid.) :
Sed potest queri qualiter hic accipiatur hoc nomen 'oratia', utrum scilicet proprie an
improprie. Si proprie, ergo oratio perfecta vel imperfecta; sed non imperfecta cum
nominacontineatet verba; ergo perfecta; ergo enuntiativavel imperativavel optativa
aut aliqua aliarum, ergo cnuntiativa cum aliarum nulla; ergo pl'olmsitio; quare cathe-
gorica vel ypothetica; sed non cathegoria,cum habeatpropositionespartessui; sed nec
ypothetica esse videtur, cum non possit sub aliqua illarum specierum ypothetice que
assignarisole(n)t, collocari.
Dicunt quidam quod quemadmodum cetere ypothetice a coniunctione quam in se
continent vel adverbio denominantur, ita et argumentatio denominari potest a coniunc-
tione illativa, ut dicaturypmheticaracionalis.Sed potest ab illis queri utrum illa ypothetica
habeatcontradictoriam et utrum unum verum signilïcet an plura. Videbitur etiam quod
ipsa possit probari, et ita quad possit inferri in aliqua argumentatione aut premitti. Erit
quoque oratio d::z-minica3 eadem inspectione vel totum Psalteriun'uuna propositio una.
Therefore our author states that, in this delinition, oratio stands for
orationumcongregatio(ibid.):
ldeo dicemus orationem in superiori descriptione pro orationum accipi congregatione.
Cui similiter et in descriptionesillogismi. Quare non crit sillogismusoratio perfecta
vel imperfecta, quemadmodum nec numerus qui nmnini accidit, par est vel impar, nec
locusargumentivacuusvel plenus.
' cuiusmoda MS. 2 De top dfg. [, I 174C 14-15.

3 the Lord's Prayer(Paternoster).
ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEOR? OF THE ENUNTIABILE 377
The conjunction (we would say: the adverb) *crgo' is not part of the
oratio (ibid.):
Sed obicitur quod hoc coniunctio 'ergo-'ibi ponitur in vi coniunctionis; ergo copulat
dictiones vel orationes. Sed constat quoniam dictiones non copulat. Sed nec alias
orationes quam propositionem et conclusionem. Ergo eas copulat in unam orationem..
Et ita ex illis eFFlcituruna oratio.
ldeo dicimus quod coniunctio illativa non potest essepars alicuius orationis, velud nec
hoc adverbium 'ito' secundumhoc quod est (signum) confirmandi, vel vocativus.
The author takes*orgumentori'to standfor iqferendoarguere(239vb'va): [cap. 22]
Deinde querendum utrum omnis qui argumentatur, faciat argumentationem. Quod

ideo non videtur quia aliquis sic interrogans: 'astnoomnisanima humanamortalis? et data
responsione inferens: 'ergo omnisanima humonoest incorruptibilis' argumentatur, utpote
alii concludens et forte redarguens. ( (239W) ). Nos dicimus ex eis
...... ......
constare argumentationem que non ab uno fit, sed a pluribus, velut et domus. Et argu-
mentatur inferensl ut 'orgumcntori' sumatur non pro argumentationem facere, sed pro
ioferendoarguere.
A complicated question is that of the inference force of the propositiones[cap-23]

de presenti(2 3943) :
Amplius et illud querendumutrum ex propositionibusde presenti vera possit Fieri
argumentatio. Quod ex hoc falsum esse coniectatur quia verbum presens tempus con-
significat, idest ad hoc ut propositio vera (vere MS) dicatur, exigat eamesseveram in illo
presenti in quo profertur. ( ). Similiter etiam de cathegorica que verum
......
significans in prolatione subiecti falsa esse incipit cum ad predicatum pervenitur. Et ita
semel prolata verum videtur enuntiare et falsum.
The cardinal point is the consignifcatio verbi, about which there are
severalopinions. Our author seemsto agree with the third one (ibid.):
Tertia opinio est que verius astruit verbum consigniFlcarepresensconfuse ad similitu-
.dinem preteriti
aut futuri. Quod ex inspectioneceterorum accidentiumredditur pro-
babile,quianulliusaliorumconsigniEcatioaddiscretionemaccedit.Non ergohec propo-
sitio: 'Socratescurrit' significat Socratem currere in hoc presenti, licet nonnisi gratia
illius constet veritas propositionis, velut nec '"homocurrit' signiFlcat hominem qui est
currere, quamvis nonnisi ad illum habeat nomen appellationem. Nec ista: 'phenix volat'
significathunc phenicemvolare; non tamen ideo evasisseaccidit si quid proferensin
prolatione propositionis ad aliquod tempus determinate respicit, sive illud consignifi-
cetur verbo, sivenon. Ergovel adid in quo propositio tota proferendaest 1wol
adillud in
quo verbumvel adaliudaliquid, et deincepsut prius.
Dicimus itaque quod nonnisi in prolatione ultime sillabe propositionis nuntiat
aliquis ut sit actus enuhtiandi simplex, non compositus, ut cursus. Neque enim illud
nunc dicere volumus quod in prolatione cuiuslibet sillabe enuntiat aliquis, ne una
378 LOGICA MODERN ORUM "
prolationedicatur verum et falsum..ltaque hac voce: 'Socrates

estalbumquodm nigrum',
staz' verum dici non contingit, et si forte album factum sit nigrum, aut sedens
aut 'sed-ens
stans, cum perventum est ad predicatum ( ...... ).
Deinde nota non idem habendumde illatione iudicium, ut possit una propositio ex
alia ex qua sequaturconvenienterinferri. Sed impedit diversumtempus,quia prope-
sitiones tunc ad enuntiandum sumuntur et in diversis temporibus. Ideoque potest una
enuntiari verum et altera falsum, ut 'manusmeaes.'.clausa'; ergo 'manusmeanon es:aperta'.
Similiter unum alii contradicere non «:«:z-nting'it.l
Interdum tamen, ne interimatur dispu-
tatio, inferimus unam prapositionem ex alia, referentes quasi quadamgenerali et tacita
pactione omnium prapasitionum prolationes ad prolationem prime. Unde multa utentes
collocutione dicimus hoc momentumdemonstrando momentum preteritum, et dispu-
tantes de hac die semper dicemus hec dies, etiam in nocte, si duret tantum disceptatio.
[cap. 24] There are four kinds of argumentation: sillogismus,inductio, entimcma,

and exemplum. Some preliminary remarks are made on these four types
(239va-vb).
[cap. 25] The syllogism is deEned as argumentatioin qua quibusdampositisaliud quid
accidit ex necessitate,where 'necessicas',stands for necessitas
complexionis,
not for necessitas rerum. It is divided into demonsrmtivus, temptativus,
They are dealt with in the next chapters(26-29).
dialeticus,andsophisticus.
[cap. 26] The demonstrativesyllogism is deüned (239'413):

Dcmonstrativus sillogismus cst argumentatio sillogistica premimus aliquod arti: principium
aut aliquodeorumqueprimaiacafdem capiuntcx principiix vcl comamad iryïzrcndum
causatum
In quo et Finisdemonstrativi exponitur: tendit enim
semperer.solatendensad necessitatem.
semperad necessitatem.Non dico ad hoc:tantum ut necessaria
sit conclusio— quia hec
etiam omnibus est commune —, sed ad hoc ut probantia et probatum talia sint ad quorum
oppositerationesinduci nequeantvere vel verisimiles.Et etiam materiaipsiusdeclaratur.
Que triplex. Unde Aristotiles in Posteriuribiisï:"necesseest demonstrativumscientiamex
veris esseet primis et immediatiset notioribus et prioribus causisconclusionis.
[cap. 27] The temptativesyllogismiis deFlned(ibid.):

Temptativus [ab Aristotile nuncupatur]3 sillogismus est qui ex artium principiis aut ex
his que communia sunt ad exPerientiam sillogizat. Cum enim temptativus ex primo
ipsius usu nonnisi circa principia Fieri habeat, ampliata est tamen eius materia, quippe
circa communia etiam temptari accidit. Unde Aristotiles-i: "quare manifestum quoniam
temptativa nullius determinare, eoquod de onmibus est"; et alibiS: "temptativa est
dialeticaquedamquapropterde onmibusinspicit".
! corrected from oportet in our MS. 2 Ana). Post. [, ?! b20—22.

3 deleted in the MS. 4 Soph. E]. I ], l72a27-29.
5 Saph.El. ll, l7lb4-5.
ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEORT OF THE ENUNTIABILE 379
The dialectica] syllogism is delined (ibid.): [cap. 28]
Dialeticus est qui Et ex communibus tendendo ad probabilitatem. Nam dialetica

omissis principiis sola sequitur communia, sed maxime probabilia. Quid autem sit
probabile, dissimiliter dialeticus et orator considerant. Etenim orator probabile illud
appellat quod sive sit verum sive falsum, verum esse videtur; dialeticus vero id solum
quod cum sit verum, propter eminentemsui veritatem omnibusverum essevidetur vel
sapientibus vel maxime notis vel ei cum quo sermo conseritur, Unde consuetum est dici
falsa videri probabilia et non esse, quia apparentia vera et non sunt vera. Usus tamen
interdum appellationem ampliat. Sed potest dubitari utrum aliquod probabile Fiat
improbabile, vel econverso. Quod videtur. Nam nonne Deum esse mortuum fuit im-
probabile? Nunc autem quia omnes credunt, videtur esseprobabile. Ad hoc dicimus
quod non est probabile etsi omnibus videatur, nec eo minus improbabile.
Est autem dialetica collectiva contradictionis, quia dialetici est conari etiam ad falsam
partem ut ad veram et ad eam inducere argumentum probabile, verum secundum Formam.
Licet ergo ei falsumcolligere, si detur verum, accidat — cui similiter et temptative —,
nec tamen ideo ipsa minus est ars. Nam et hoc simile in singulis artium evenit. Ut in
arte gramatica peccante ex accidentium dissimilitudine plcrumque accidit. Ubi enim ex
falsiscolligitur, non orationis sed dicentis est peccatum. Itaque cum dialetica utmnque
partem contradictionis argumento probarc habeat, hanc vero probat (sibi), illam vero
ad alterum.
The centml task of the ars dialeticais mentioned (ibid.):

Illud quoque notandumquoniam dialetica communis dicitur essead omnesaliasartes
propter speculationemforme sive propter ipsiuslocos,&quibuselici possuntargumenta
in qualibet facultate.Quilibet cnim artifex moduminferendi accipit :: dialetica,materiam
vero a propria disciplina. Nam per artem propositamscit quis eligere propositionesad
proprium finem idoneas, ut per demonstrativam ad demonstrandum, per temptativum
ad experiendum, pcr sophisticam ad gloriam habendumvel victoriam. Singularum etiam
disciplinarum circa quas agitur est considerare utrum vera an falsa sumpta ( ),!
......
dialetica prestantescientiam consecutionisillati ad sumpta, idest utrum ex premissis
accidat. Quare generalisest eius consideratio. Ipsaest enim que circa singulasartes viam
apperit; et nemo claudit.
'The sephisticalsyllogism is deFmed(ibid.): [cap. 29]
Sophisticus est qui ex communibus infert ad gloriam tendens vcl victüriam. Sequitur
enim sola cmumunia, similiter dialetica. Talia tamen communia maxime sibi elegit qua
aliquid habeantmultiplicitatis, quia sempersubnubemultiplicitatisvult lateresolihisma.
Unde et sophisticus sillogismus sive elencus sic aliter solet describi: elencus est argu-
mentatio sillogistica ex communibus facta deceptoriis, non tamen fallax sed propinqua
fallacie ad gloriam. tendens vel victoriam. 'Elcncus' vcro contraria locutio sonat, quoniam
liabct Fieri ad contradictoriam preconcesse.
' illegible in my photostat of the MS.

The four species of the syllogism differ secundumfnes, not always in

materia (ibid.):
Sunt tamen excedentia et excessaclenchizanset elenchizatum,quia nec omnis elencus
ad contradictoriam preconcesse Fit, eoquod ab elenco interdum disputatio incoetur.
Nec omnis qui sic Et, est elencm, sed forte sillogismus dialeticus aut aliorum aliquis.
DiFferunt itaque species sillogismorum secundum Enes omnes, sed in materia non
semper, eoquod principiorum quedamsunt probabilia ex quibus et demonstrativusesse
potest et dialeticus. Quemadmodumgeneracausarumin FIDibUS differunt, cum in materia
plerumque conveniant.
As there are four genera disputandi, there are four genera imitativa earum;
likewise there are not only four artif'ces,but also four imitatores(ibid.):
Sciendum quoque quod cum quatuor sint disputandi genera, quatuor sunt eorum
imitativa; et sicut quatuor artiFlces, ita et quatuor eorum imitatores. Velud et virtutes
collateralia habent vitia sibi adiuncta, ut prodigalitas largitatem imitatur, ypocrisis
religioni assimilatur.
[cap. 30] Another division of syllogism is that into gillogismus ostensivus and
gillogismus ex hypothesi. lt goes back to Aristotle's expositions in the
Prior Anabrtics(I, 4-0b25) just like most of the other divisions (ibid.):
Rursus.Sillogismorumalius ostensivus,alius ex ypothesi. Ostensivusest ille qui
statim et sine ulla circuitione ostendit, idest directe sillogizat propositum. Sillogismus
vero secundumypotllesindupliciter dicitur secundumduplicem ypothcsisacceptionem.
Nam ypothesis quandoque dicitur condicio: unde propositio ypothetica; secundum quod
syllogismusex ypothesidicitur sillogismusypotheticus. Ut
'si Socratesest homo,Socratesestanimal
sedest homo
animal'.
ergoes.'.
ïpothesis etiam quandoque dicitur snppositiavel consensus;ut sit sillogismus ex ypothesi
qui gratia principalis propositi aliud a proposito concludit, idest qui ex contradictorie
op(posito pro)positi concessoet alio producit aliquod impossibile, quo interempto
habeaturposteapropositum. Ut sillogismusad impossibilequi ex consensufit.
[cap. 31] A third division is that into g/Hogismus divisionis and gynagismus non
divisionis(24—0"):
Amplius. Alius divisionis, alius non. Et possumussic partire: argumentationumalia
divisionis, alia a divisione. Sillogismus divisionis dicitur qui aliquam premittit propo-
sitionem habentem vim divisionis, idest habentem in se terminum disiunctum con-
stantem cx dividentibus. Ut
'omne animal est rationale vel irrationale
omnis homo est animal
ergo omnis homo est rationale rel irrationale'.
ms MELIDUNA. THE THEOR'I' OF THE ENUNTIABILE 381
Nam prima propositio huic divisioni quasi equipollet: 'animohumaliud rationaic,aliud

irrationale'. Et est sillogismus divisionis, ut ait Aristotiles.I 1volat:]inFlrmus, sed non
simpliciter infirmus, quia Ernms est ad suam conclusionem, sed inErmus ad illud ad
quod eo utebanturVeteres.Qui per sillogismumdivisionisputabantseprobasse
alterum
disiunctarum determinate. ( )2 Horum siquidem consideratio huiusmodi fuit.
. . . . . .
Sit propositum hominis diffinitionem per partesconstruerede ipso; diFHnitionemdico,
idest orationem ( ),2 substantialia hominis complectentcm. Ut sit hec diFFmitio:
. .. . . .
animal rationalemortalehabenspedes(idest: aptum haberepederis).Existente igitur certo
animal esse( )2 arguebant sic:
..... .
'omne animal est rationale vcl irrationale
omnis homo eo: animo!
ergo omnis homo.m rationale vel irrationale';
et ita habentes
quasicertum quodnullushomo est irrationaleputabantse probasse
per
sillogismum divisionis quod omnis homo est rationale. Similiter quod omnis homo est
habenspcdes,sic arguendo:
'omne animal cs: habenspedesvel non haben: pedes
omnis homoest animal
ergo . . . . . . etc'.
subaudientes
quod nullus non est habenspedes.
Cum tamen per sillogismum divisionis neutrum illorum sumitur, argumentatio a
divisione dicitur in qua sumitur argumentum :: loco a divisione, idest in qua pmponitur
aliqua disiuncta et interempta una parte infertur reliqua. S'umitur autem divisio teste
BoetioJ dupliciter: tum per partitionem tum per negationem. Per partitionem dicitur
FICI'iilla cuius utraque pars sumitur negative. Ex quo sic arguitur:
'aut omnishomocn rationale, aut omnishomoest irrationale
$ednullus est irrationale
ergo omnisest rationale'.
Per negationem vero cuius altera pars sumitur aFFlrmative, altera negative, hoc modo:
'aut omneanimal habetpedes,aut nullum
sed non nullum
ergo omne'.
A fourth division is that into syllogismus expositionis, gillogismus circu- [cap. 32]
lationis, and yllogismusconversionis
(24-01'3):
Amplius. Alius est expositionis, alius circulationis, alius conversionis. Per sillogismum
expositionisfateturl Aristotiles probari possesillogismostertie Figure,ubi duo dicuntur
de tertio ( ). Exempli gratia:
.. . . . .
'omne animal est ros
omne animal CII subitantio
ergo quedam :ubstansia est res'.
Quod conclusio vera sit potcst ostendi ostensoutramque extremitatum de hoc inferiori
medii Socrate probari per tertium modum prime, hoc modo:
! Cfr. Anal. Priora], 46ä3l-32. 2 illegible in my photostatof the manuscript.

3 Cfr. De top dif. ll, 1192D8-9. 4 Anal. Pr. I, 28a23sqq.
'omne animo! est.res
Socrate: est animo]
ergo Socratescir,rex';
similiter:
'omne animo] est Substantia
Socrate;es.'.animal
ergo Socratesest substantia'.
Similiter autem et de homine sub medio sumpto. Et dicitur merito talis sillogismm
expositionix,quia quodammodoexponitur medium per suum inferius. Qui et ipse quidem
cxypothosi,idest suppositione, potcst appellari.
Circulariter ostendere est facto aliquo sillogismo sumere conclusionem conversam
utriuslibet promissorumad sillogizandum reliquam. Velud si sillogizatum fuerit sic:
'omnis homoest risibile
omnenovigobilo (est) homo
ergoomnonovigobik oi: risibile'.
Sumi poterit conclusio cum conversa maioris ut sillogizetur minor hoc modo:
'omne risibile esl:homo
omnenorigobile es: risibile
ergoomnenot'igobilc (est) homo'.
Item. Sumpta eademconclusione cum conversa minoris sillogizabitur maior:
'omne norigobilo est risibile
omnis homo est novigobHo
ergo omnis homocsl:rioibilo' .
Sed nota quod conversionem nunc appellamusillam terminorum transpositionem que
Et in universali alïirmativa ad modum simplicis conversionis, ut 'omnis homo ext risibile'
'omne risibile em homo'; quc nonnisi in paribus torminis locum habet. Sillogismus
—
vero qui Et in terminis qui talem possunt admittere conversionem, circularis meta-
phorico nuncupatur, quia sicut in circulo quodlibet punctum primum est et [quodlibet]
ultimum, sic: in circulari sillogismo omnis terminus potest esse primus et ultimus. Et
potest tantum in primo modo prime Egurc plena circularitas inveniri , ceteris modis et
ceteris Eguris non plenam circulationem ( ) habentibus. Circulatio siquidem in
......
secundo modo sic:
nullum b est o
omne: ost b
ergonullum c esto;
poterit maior probari per conversamassumptionisct conclusionem:
nuUum : est o
omne b est :
ergo nuUum!) es: o;
sed non similiter minor pcr conclusionem et maioris conversam, no inferatur sillogistico
ex solis negativis.
Sillogismusconversionisest qui ex oppositaconclusionis,idest contraria vel contra-
dictoria, cum altera premissorum infert oppositum reliquum, cum prima scilicet oppo-
sita minoris et cum minore maioriset ita quod sempersillogismusprime Figurasumpta
contmria vel contradictoria conclusionis et maiore facit secundamFiguram,cum minore
tertiam; sillogismus autem secundo cum minore tertiam, cum maiore vero primam.
Sed tcrtia Figurasumpta contraria vel contmdictoria conclusioniscum minore Facit
primam, cum maiore secundam.Nec differt sillogismusconversionis& sillogismoper
ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEorw OF THE ENUNTIABILE 383
impossibilenisi tantumin modo, quia scilicetsillogismusconversionisEt habitorespectu

ad aliquem sillogismum precedentem ex cuius conclusionis contradictoria cum altera
dicitur nullo habitu
premissaruminterimat reliquam. Sillogismusautem ad impossibile
respectu ad alium, sed quia sumendo contrariam vcl contradictoriam propositionis vere
sillogizat ( )! ad formam contrariam vel contradictoriam alterius vere, ut quelibet
.....
argumentatio indirecta oppositam formam preconccsse inferens argumentatio ad im-
possibile dicitur.
A Hfth division is that into gfllogfsmus propter quid and gzllogismusquoniam [cap. 33]
(ibid.):
Item. Sillogismorum alius est praprer quid, alius quoniam. Sillogismus propter quid
dicitur ille sillogismus demonstrativus in quo causasillogizat ad causatum,quia causaest
illud propter quid aliquid Fut..Sillogismus quaniamdicitur qui ex falsissillogizat.
Other divisions are that into medictus and inmcdiatus, into propositivus and
instantivus, into universalis and particularis, and into ajïrmativus and
negativus(ibid ) :
Rursum. Alius mediatus, alius inmediatus. lnmcdiatus dicitur cuius maior propositio
est inmcdiata, idest terminos habensinmecliatos, scilicct tales quorum alter non potest
de altero prübnri per medium demonstrativum, idest per tale medium quod sit causain-
ferioris et inferius superioris. Mcdiatus est ille cuius maiorem de medio probari accidit
demonstrativo, ut
'omnis homoes: substantia
omneanimal est homo
ctc.'
Ad hec autcm alius prapositivus, alius instantivus. Propositivus potest dici quo utitur
opponenscontra respondcntmnad improbandumpropositionem concessam,aut ad
probandum negativam. Instantivus vero qui facit opponenti respondensad improbandum
propositionem ab eo illatam.
Amplius. Alius universalis, alius particularis. Alius quoque aFFlrmativus,alius negati-
vus. Que duo secundumconclusionesdiiudicanda.
The last chapters of the QUARTAPARS,and of the whole tr'eatise, are [cap. 34]
devotedto the nature offalsum. This chapter dealswith the questionof
the existenceof falsehoodor better of falsa(utrumipsa,sc. falsa,sint). Its
existenceis proved with a number ofargun'lents (2401'3'1'13):
Post illa que veri de veris vere diximus, speculationem ad falsa transferendum.
Circa hec primo queritur utrum ipsa sint. Quad sic indirecte monstratur:
falsum nil est; ergo nulla est differentia veri ad falsum; ergo nulla discretio; ergo nulla
artificiosa discretio; ergo nullus scit assignareartiEciosam discretionem veri ad falsum;
ergo nemo scit artiEciosc discernereverum a falso; erga nemo est dialeticus. Item:
! illcgiblc in the photostatat my disposal.

aut scis discernere verum a falso, aut nescis; si scis, cum teste Boetio omnis discretio
fit ex forma, ( )1 forma Heri; quare aliqua proprietas; sed nulla proprietas est
......
in re non existente; quare omne falsum est aliquid. Item: hoc nomen 'cnunriabiic'
aptitudinem notat enuntiandi; ergo illam potcst copulare aut non potest; et si potest,
ergo in aliqua locutione; sed in nulla melius quam in ista: 'rerum es.'.cnuniiabiic'; qua
inspectione et in hac: ïaisum csl:cnuntiabilc'; aut si non sub una prülationc recipiemus,
non erit et verum et falsum est cnuntiabile; sin autem minime, vana illius inventio.
Amplius: onmium oppositorum est eadem disciplina; sed verum et falsum sunt
contraria; erga eorum eadem est disciplina; ergo per quamcumque disciplinam scitur
de uno quid ipsum sit, et de reliquo; atvero per dialeticam scitur de vero quid ipsum sit;
ergo et de falsa. Ratione quoquc similitudinis videtur hac posscastentli lälsum
esse aliquid. Nam quemadmodum cnuntiabilium aliud verum aliud falsum, et intellec-
tuum; sed constat quoniam omnis intellectus, sive 1marus sive falsus, aliquid est.
Amplius: istud enuntiabile est hoc falsum et hoc falsum est istud enuntiabilc; ergo
istud (24OI'D)enuntiabile est idem huic falso; ergo idem sibi; et quodlibet est id quod
ipsumest; ergo istud enuntiabileest vel non est id quod ipsumest. Secundumhoc etiam
non videbitur hec propositio esse vera: 'aliquid csifalsum', cum Et de presenti non
habensverbum quod appellationemsubiecti ampliet, imo si alterutra istarum: 'falsum
est aliquid', 'aliquid csifalsum' potius hec quam illa; etenim predicatum confusius est
subiecto. Ut in his apparet: 'iste promitti: aliquid', 'Is-quitur dc aiiqua', 'omnishomohabet
capud'. Rursum. Non verum1 vel aliud ab eo est falsum: 'quadlibct existensnon est.
jäisum'; 'falsum quidlibet non est'; ergo quidlibet non est falsum et falsum nil est; ergo nil
est falsum. Ad hac autem hec propositio: 'nil estfaisum'aut erit vera, ut sit eius
dividens Falsa,aut erit falsa, ut comprehendantur tam existentia quam non existentia,
idest falsa. Qua inspectione et contingente tantum duas res esse.et aliquod enuntiabile
essefalsum, dicetur convenienter: 'quidiibci est, vel nonest.,falsum; nec tamen quidiibcr.
essevel non (me, aliquid.
The author gives eight additional a'rguments.(240fb).
[cap. 35] On the ground of all these argumenta: our author concludes thatfalsum
and malumare as real as rerumand bonum(2401'13):
Hiis rationibus persuasidicimus quod sicut büllllll'l est aliquid, ita et malum, sicut
verum, ita et falsum.
This statement, however, is clearly contrasted with his view of the

signi "catanominumrerumnonexistentium(ibid )
Non tamen circa signiücata nominum rerum non existentium similiter opinandum.
Neque enim signilïcatum hoc nomine 'Cesar' vel 'Antichristus' est aliquid, ne sit indivi-
duum et ita specieisuscipienspredicationem.
! illegible in the photostat at my disposnl.

2 unum MS.
ams MELIDUNA. THE THEORV OF THE ENUNTIABILE 385
The author raises some objections borrowed from the authorities (ibid.) :
At huic obviat quod ubique Aristotiles per essevera, per nonesse
consignificatfalsa.
Unde in Analcucisl: "quod non est, non contingit scire: scientia enim inpermixta est
falsitati", idest quod est falsum.Idemin Tapicisï:"illud est, illud non est", de vero et falso
loquens. Idem in secundo ElcncorumJ: "conclusio duplex plura significat: quandoque
quidem illud est, quandoque non est: duplex enim signiFlcatillud ens, illud non ens".
Idem in libro Cathcgariarum-l:"cum sit Socratem essesanum non esseSocratem languere".
He reduces all cliH-iculties to confusion resulting from colloquia] speech

(ibid.):
Sed dicimus quod usualis est iste modus loquendi, quia communiter inter se collo-
quentes dicunt: 'nil est quod dicis', ini! dicis', idest non est rerum quod dicis. Usum ergo
communiter colloquentium sequens Aristotiles ait5 quod cum sit Socrates sanum esse,
non erit Socratem languere, idest cum istud sit verum, illud non est verum. Similiter
"duplex signiEcatquandoqueillud ensquandoqueillud non ens"? idest illud ensverum,
' illud non ens verum. Aut "quod non est, non contingit scire?", idest quod non est verum.
Neque mireris si hoc modo exponamus Aristotilem cum sic aut longe remotius eum
omnes exponunt in libro Perihermenias dicentema: "verbum dictum purum nil cst",
idest non signiücat verum vel falsum; quia nisi sic exponas:-diFFlcileerit pertransire.?
The.author givesquite :- number of objections. ] give the last OFthem

(ibid.):
Amplius. Sic melius et dubitabilius dici potest: Et«?
asinumpotestesse'; ergo quod tu
sis asinus potest esse; ergo potest esse quod tu sis asinus: ergo tu potest esse asinus.
Dicunt quidam quod hic Fit deceptio ex variatione appellationis enuntiabilis. Alii quod
nulla Fit ibi variatio, sed agitur semper de uno eodemque enuntiabili, imo deceptio est
ex equivocatione, scilicet ex diversa.significatione huius verbi 'esse';quod potest poni
pro hoc verbo 'cxistcrc',secundumquod est locutio vera; et potestaccipi pro contingere,
ut sit falsa; et ad hanc significationem magisaccedit.
Rursum: 'iste qui est niger, scivit se essealbum et modo non scit iHud'. Non est factus
transcasusrei scientis aut rei scite; ergo oblitus est illud. Et videtur ab octavo Topicorum
sumpta illatio.
Sed dicimus quod transcasum intelligit Aristotiles non solum in essentia, sed in pro—
prietate. Aut lbrte per 'quicquid' non comprehendit nisi scientias sive artes, dicendo
quoniam quicquid scivit aliquis et non scit re non transcadente oblitus est. Instantia:
contingente te nescire Regem esse Parisius sed scivisse heri.
This chapter discusses the question whether the falsa can be known. [cap. 36]
First :: number OF arguments are given, which look like rhetorical
evidence (ibid.) :
lubi? 2 ubi? 3 Soph.El. l9, l77al4-I5.

4 Catcg. I I, 141114. 5 lbid. 6 Soph. EI. 19, I77a l4-I 5.
? See nütc I. 3 D.: intcrpr. l6b23-24. 9 pertranssire (i) MS.
Hoc ipsum tamen questionem habet utrum falsa sciantur, siquidem scire aliquod
enuntiabile non aliud esse videtur quam habere de eo intellectum aut nosse eius pro-
prietatem, utrum scilicet verum sit an falsum. Item: iste novit mentiri; ergo scit dicere
falsum; ergo scit falsum; aut numquid dicit que nescit?; aut numquid scis quod tibi in
proximo dictum est? Item: tu scis quid significet hec propositio: 'Socratesest asinus';
ergo scis quod significet.. Instantia: tu scis quid addiscat Plato; ergo scis quod addiscit
Plato. [tem. Tu scis quid enuntiabile signiücet hec prapositio; ergo enuntiabilc quod
significat. Instantia. Scis quam scientiam addiscit iste; ergo scientiam quam addiscit.
Amplius. Ovidius multas novit fabulas; ergo scivit multa fabulose dicta; ergo multa
falso dicta, quia fabula est res nec vera nec veri similis.
Someobjections are made (240fb'vü):

Suscipienti autem sciri falsa obviat supradicta auctoritasl: "quod non est, non
contingit scire: scientia enim inpermixta est falsitati". Ad hec autem quid inprobabi-
lius quam fateri te scire hominem esseasinum et quodlibet impossibile est necessarium,
aut aliquod nomen esseequivocum? Vel si hoc proposito scis cur illud negasnisi quem:!:
contra conscientiam loqueris? Item. (240W) Rege existente Parisius scis ipsum esse
Aurelianis; ergo quod est Aurelianis; non ergo dubitas utrum sit Aurelianis. Item.
Opinaris Regem non esse Parisius ; ergo nescis contrarium.
Our author seems to look for the solution of the difSculties in certain
psychological clistinctions. His attempts to clarify the matter are not
succesful, indeed, and he declines to discussall related questions, e.g.
utrum 'scire' eodemmododecnuntiabili et scientiadicatur (240V3):
Sit itaque in his solutio dicto quoniam scire enuntiabilc (non) est scire ipsum esse
verum, ——sicut aliquid essecertum non est de eo aliquam haberi certitudinem, utrum
scilicet ipsumsit veruman falsum,nc hominemessecapramsit certum —, sedquoniam
est verum. Scire autem fabulasnon est scire aliqua falsa,sed est scire narrare fabulas,ut
scire narrare qualiter lo mutata fuerit in vaccam, non est scire eam esse conversam in
vaccam,quemadmodumscire hospicium alicuius non est ubi sit. Quidam tamen recipiunt
se scire hoc enuntiabile hominemesseasinum, non tamen hominem esse asinum, quia hoc
magis ad rem refertur. Velud et precedente l'lOCverbo 'apinar'. Illud quoque dubie
queri possct utrum 'scire' eodem modo de enuntiabili et scientia dicatur; cum quo et
alia plurima. Sedde his alias.
[cap. 37] The second thesis about jälsum is: ex nqu jblsa aliquid sequitur. The
author points to the origin of the thesis (ibid.):
Secundapositio de falsisest quod ex nullo falso aliquid sequitur. Que utique ex huius
orationis solutione ortum habuit:
'si Socratesestet homoet asinus,Socratesest homo
si es.'.homo, non est asinus
ergo si esthomoet asinus,non es: asinus'.
! Seeabove,p. 385, n. l. 1 quid MS.

ARS MELIDUNA. THE 'anom' OF THE ENUNTIABILE 387
The various solutions of this sophism lead to different views on the

matter involved (ibid .):
Ex qua 1variea diversis soluta quadripartita invenitur evasissepositio. [1] Quidam
enim primam interimentes posuerunt nil ex falso accidere. [2] Alii prima concessaet
negata media generaliter pronuntiaverunt ex nulla affirmativa sequi negativam. Quare
falsa est hec ypothetica: 'si Socratesest homo, non est.asinus', sicut et cum aliis verbis: 'si
vido: hominem, non videt asinum; vel 'si loquitur de homine, non loquitur de osino'.
[3] Alii tum prima concessatum media, conclusionemnegandamputant et argumenta-
tioni instandum. Nam quemadmodum, inquiunt, circa cathcgoricas ne recte Fiat a primo
ad ultimum processus,medium impedit saphisticcsumptum— ut cum dicitur:
'omnis homoest milcs
omnis homo est bonus
ergo omnis milcs est bonus'
vel
'omnis propositio cothcgorico est simplex
omne simplex es.':carensportibus
etc.'
ita et circa ypotheticas; sed si tale smnatur medium quod nullam ingerat deceptio-
—
nem, erit illatio utrobique' necessaria,ut
'omnis homoest animo!
,,
omneanimal substantia
ergo omnis homo substantia'
'si est homo, ost.animal

si est animal, est substantia
etc.'
[4] Alii et illationem iudicantz necessariam et consequentiam veram, ponentes ex
quolibet per se impossibilequidlibet sequitur.
We learn from this passage that in the author's days there were these
about the matter involved:
four theses(positiones)
0 ni) oxfolso accidere
b ex nullo ojrmotivo sequi negativam
the third group of scholars denying the validity of the argument do
not arrive at & Specialthesis about the inference force oUolsum
d ex quolibet per se impossibili quidlibet sequitur.
Our author appearsto adhereto the Firstthesis. In this chapter he deals [cap.38]
with the argumentspro and contra(ibid.):
ltaque, quia nos prime aclhesimusOpinioni, quid pro ea et contra videamus.
! viz. both in a categorical syllogismi and in & hypothetica! one.

2 indicant MS.
Fateturl Aristotiles in primo Analeticorum quod ostensivussillogismushabet alias

propositionesex quibusest siilogismus.Sedsillogismusper impossibilealterum tantum,
quia scilicet in eo altera tantum est vera. In quo aperte consigniücatquod tantum ex
veris propositionibus est sillogismus. Idem in eodem:: "transumptis his que sunt secun-
dum habitudinesnon erit sillogismus,ut si pro sanitatequidem ponatur sanum,pro
egritudine egrotum. Non enim verum est dicere quoniam [1011contingit egrotanti sanum
esse". Idem in Secundoï: "falsa autem Fit oratio propter primum falsum". Idem in
Elcnchis dicit4 orationum quasdam solvendas esse per divisionem, idest per fallacie
determinationem,ut que peccantin forma, alias per interemptioncm, ut peccantesin
materia. Quodsi solvenda oratio huiusmodi generis solutione eget, quare non est
necessaria,sed potest inconveniens esseostendi per interemptioncm Falsi.Item. Boetius
in Topiciss: "omnis sillügismus [est] ex certis et convenienter positis propositionibus
contexitur". Amplius:
'omnishomoestlapis
omnelignum esthomo
ergo omnelignum est lapis',;
si hec oratio sillogismus est, erit sillogismus demonstrativus vel temptativus vel dialeticus
vcl sophisticus. Verum, quod magis videretur, dialeticus essenon potest, cum inferat
ex omnino improbabilihus.
Hc addsan argumentesimpossibili(ibid.) :
Huius itaque Fides est positionis tum ex dictis auctoritatibus tum ex dicendis rationi-
bus. Suscipienti contrarium probari potest ad aliquam propositionem sequi suam contra-
dictoriam, duas contradictorias sequi ad eandem, et ad aliquam [impositionem sequi
aliamque non potest esseveracum ista. Quorum quodlibet contraartem essevidetur.
Nam quenmdmodum nil potest simul esseet non esse, ita nec ad eandem due.
Then, some counter-argumcnts(inconvenientia)

are given (ibid.):
PrimUm inconveniens sic sumitur: si Socrates est homo, Socrates non est lapis; si
non est lapis, non est et homo et lapis; ergo-si Socratesest homo, Socratesnon est et
homo et lapis; sed si est homo et lapis, est homo; ergo si est et homo et lapis, non est et
homo et lapis. ( ) Secundum hoc modo: si hoc enuntiabile necessarioest
......
verum contingens, necessario est verum; et si necessario est verum, est necessarium;
ergo si est necessarium, non est contingens; ergo si necessario est verum contingens, non
est cantingens. (. . . . . .) Tertium sic provenit: si quidlibet est, nil non est; si
quidlibet non est, nil est; quidlibet est vel non est; ergo si quidlibet est vel non est, nil
est vel non est. Recipiatur etiam: necesseest si Socrates est homo, si est animal, est
homo si est asinus; et si est asinus si est animal, est sensibile si est capra; si est homo si
est rationale, non est homo si non est rationale; si est homo si est animal, non est homa-
si non est animal. Et item conversasin ypotheticis; si aliquid est homo si estanimal, est
animal si est homo; si aliquid est homo, ipsum et est animal et est homo; ergo si aliquis
homo est animal, aliquid animal est homo.
'zlnal. Pr. ", l4, 62b29-33. 21bid.i34, 48:19-12.

3 Ibid., H 18, 66a16. 4 Saph.E1.18, l76b35sqq.
5 Not in Dc top. dig." but in Dc sy". iyfp. ], 331 D4-832A10.
ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEOR'i' OF THE ENLINTIABILE 389
The last-mentioned inference from conversion induces our author to [cap. 39]
discussthe untcnabilit)Irof the fourth thesis (ibid.):
Data vero consequentia ex habitudine conversionis facilis erit deductio ad eorum opinio-
nemqui recipiunt cx impossibiliquidlibet sequi. Hoc modo: si homoest animal,animal
est homo; sed si homo est asinus, homo est animal; ergo si homo est asinus, animal est
homo; quare aliquid est homo; si aliquid est homo, aliquid non est asinus; ergo si homo
est asinus, nec quidlibet est homo nec quidlibet est asinus. Item. Si Burnellus est Marcus
et Tullius est Burncllus, Tullius est Marcus; sed si Burnellus est Marcus, Tullius est
Burnellus; ergo si Burnellus est Marcus, Tullius est Marcus; ergo si Burnellus est
Marcus, homo est Marcus. Item. Si Socrates est aliquid, aliquid est Socrates; si aliquid
est Socrates,aliquid est Socrateset idem est homo; ergo si Socratesest aliquid, aliquid
est Socrates et idem est homo; ergo si Socrates est aliquid, idem Socrates est homo;
quare Socratesest homo; sed si est asinus, est aliquid; ergo si est asinus, est homo. Ad
hec autem: si argumentatio necessariaest ex falsis, erit lianc artis regulam confirmare:
'Socrates csl: margarita; ergo Socratesest lapis'. Atvero nulla comnwdius quam ista: de
quacumque pars, et totum, aut: iijizrius, et superius. Sed neque hec poterit adaptari eoquod
margarita nullo modo de Socrate, sed est ei oppositum.

Denique sicut ad cuiuslibet fabrica constitutionem duo exiguntur: materia idonea et
apta partium iunctura et ad sintasin congru(it)as vocis et intellectus, ita et ad hoc ut
dialetici instrumentum conveniens sit, necessaria est tum materie sanitas tum forme.
Quare ex falsis non est sillogismus, T licet adalterum T, ned'ex falso aliquid.
Cuius dicti poterit et hec essc ratio. Argumentum est ratio rei dubie faciens Fidem;
sed nullum carens Fidepoterit alii prestare Edem; ergo nullum falsum quomodo dabit
alii quod non potest sibi ipsi? —; ergo non potest esseargumentum ad aliud; quare ex
falso nil.
The above discussions present an opportunity to give :: general [cap. 40]

corrolariumabout the nature of the naturalisypothetica
(240V1ï-Vb):
[mque nulla naturalis ypothetica est vera nisi cuius utraque parsest vcra. Ceterc autem
false simpliciter, aut, quod verius est, incongrue, quia hec coniunctio 'si' quociens
indicativo proprie iungitur conFlrmativcponitur et certitudinem notat. Unde Priscia-
nus in secundo Canstructionum': "'si' indicativo (240Vh) coniunctum ostendit magis
conErmari et credi rcm sic esse vel Fieri possequam dubitari. Virgilius:: Di, si qua est
celo pictas". Idem in primo3: "antecedentia si fuerint consequentibus coniuncta vera
esseostenduntur,dum anteponunturconsequentibus
per primumorationisconiunctio-
nem, ut 'si ambula: Dionisius, et movetur Dionisius'." Quare dicto Socratem esse animal si
ipseestasinus,aut esselapidemsi est margarita,latebit Fieripositio.
De hac quoque dubitari potest utrum vera sit vel congrua: 'si aliquid csl:asinus, ipse
estanimal'. Volunt enim quidamquod sit generalis,ut ponatur 'aliquid' pro 'quolibct' et
suorum appellatorum equipollens signo universali, idest si aliquid quicquid illud sit.
Ideoque potest inde inferri: ergo si Socrates,ergo si equus,ergo si lapis. Habetur
namque in Legibus-l:"si quis in furto deprehensusfuerit, suspendatur"; et est lex genc-
' Inst. gramm. XVIII, 83, p. 2431245,ed. Hertz. 1 .rlcncis". 536.

3 Inst. gramm. XVII, 8, p. Il2l'12, ed. Hertz. 4 Legesduodecimtabularum.
raliter data, idest si iste aut aliquis alius. Unde iste qui modo deprehenditur in furto, ex
illa habet dampnari; quod minime Geret, nisi generalis esset. Appuleius quoque sit1
quod huiusmodiypothetice aut pro omni sunt vere aut pro nullo. Boetius etiam in
ïpmhcticisdicit2 quodhic est locusa positioneantecedentis:
'si aliquid est homo, ipsumest animal
sedillud est homo
ergo illud es: animal';
quod non esset, nisi hoc nomen 'aliquid' supponeret pro omni suo appellato quod est,
vel fuit, vel erit. Secundumhoc:dicessuperioremincongruum velud aliquam singularem
habentemincongrumn.
Alii secus iudicant astruentes nomen in antecedenti confuse accipi, non, dico, pro
quolibet suorum appellatorum, sed ita: pro aliquo quod non est determinate sumere pro
quo. Velud et in his accidit: 'quandocumquealiquid erit anima],aliquid crit homo','quando-
cumqucaliquid erit verum, aliquid erit necessarium''necessariaalterum contradictorie opposi-
torum est verum 'scmpcr aliquod momentum crit'. quue in hoc, sicut nec in hiis, consequi
non potest.
[cap. 41] This chapter, the last of our copy, announces the refutation of the
objections against the author's thesis (m'! exfalso accidere)(240V'ï'):
DeincePsquid contra dictam positionemobiectisrespondericonveniatinspiciendumest.
The author opposes quite a number of instantis to the prepositions

allegued by the adversary of his positio. I give some of them. The ad-
versary had stated this argument: 'si Socratesest homo, Socratesest animal;
si
ergo nonestanima], nonesthomo' Our author continues (ibid.) :
.
lnstantie generales per 'quia', 'dum' et 'cum', "verum antecedens",aut premittendo
cnthegoricam.Specialesquidem induci possunthoc modi:):si Socratesest gramaticuset
est musicus, Socrates est musicus; ergo si non est musicus, non est gralmticus et non est
musicus.
This is followed by quite an amount of counter-arguments (240vb,

24lf'1'). [ give the last one occurring in our copy, the text of which is
incomplete (24ll'b):
Amplius. Si necessariumest quidlibet essevel necessariumest quidlibet non esse,
necessarium est quidlibet existere vel necessarium est quidlibet non existere; si neces-
sario quidlibet est vel non est, necessario quidlibet existit vel non existit; ergo si neces-
sario quidlibet est vel necessarioquidlibet non est, necessarioquidlibet existit vel
necessario quidlibet non existit. Instantia: si necessarium est alterum istorum esse verum
vel necessarium est alterum istorum non esseverum, alterum istorum esseverum est
necessarium vel alterum non esseverum est necessarium; si necessario alterum est vel
non est verum, alterum necessario; ergo si necessario alterum est verum vel necessario
alterum non est verum, alterum necessariovel alterum necessarionon. Vel si ( ).
......
: ubi? 2 Cfr. Dc syll. hyp. I, 8455 ! lsqq.
CHAPTER Xl
SOME TREATISES ON LOGlC DATING

FROM ABOUT 1200
1 Tractatus Anagnini
-
The miscellaneous manuscript Munich C.L.M. 4652 contains among
other works a collection of treatises on logic. (Varia ad logicamperti-
This part may be divided into two main parts: ff. 651'-92vand
ncnati-si).l
Ff. 104-T-1161'.The former part consists of six tractatus which seem to
belong together, but are only loosely connected.
(a) Tractatus primus: Dc predicabilibus. This treatise is found on

ff. 65T-68Vandbearsthe headingSoþ'tain artibus.It opensasfollows:
Quia significantiasignificatis notiora sunt, omississigniHcantibusagamusdc signiücatis.
SigniEcatorum autem aliud est dicibile, aliud predicabile. Dicibile est quod significatur
oratione; predicabile est quod signiücatur dictione. Omissa autem dicibili de predicabili
agamus(218-1*'5').z
The incomplete tract dealswith the predicabilia, to be sure. But what to

do with the heading 505th in artibus? Grabmann read: sophismatain
artibus but had to admit that this title does not Fit the tract very well.
AS21matter of fact, Grabmann'ssolution of the abbreviationsoþtaseems
to be incorrect. First, the usual twelfth and thirteenth century ab—
breviation for sophismata,is soph'ca. One should solve soþta into sopreta,
which would be quite unintelligible, indeed. My guessis that soþtais &
scribe's error for söpta, the latter being the abbreviation for sumptaor
sumpta. In fact, the problems concerning the meaning of the nomina
sumptaformed the centra] part of the universaliadiscussion.3The spelling
sumptalooks like that of an Italian scribe and may be supported by such
spellings, frequent in our treatise, as stantia for substantia,stantivumfor
substantivum etc.
An interesting distinction of the meanings of subici and predicari is
! For this manuscript., see above Ch. l, nr. IO, pp. 4-2-43.
2 All referencesare to the edition in our secondpart (Tract VI).
3 Seee.g. Abailard, Dialectica,V, pp. 596-598ed. De Rijk.
Founcl in a preliminary discussion.! The whole tract bcars throughout &

grammatical mark. Sec e.g. the cleFmition of universaleas quod signi 'cum:-
nomineappellatjvo(p. 21817'13).The authors' deFmitionsof genusand species
sound quite original: genus est essentia vel existentia qua ostenditur de
unoquoque specie (lifïcrentium quid sit (p. 2213'FF). Note especially the
use of the word existentia for essenciaor substantia. The same tcrm is
found in the author's division of things. Hc divides them into (l) resquc
aliquorumsun: existentia,such as the generaand speciesand such indiviclunls
like phoenix; (2) quarumalique, such as the primary substanccsand the
appellata;(3) quenullorumet quorumnulle, such as the universalaccident
album (to be distinguished well from hocalbum) (p. 2234'10).
The author mentiens as a special thcsis of the school: nuUa dilïzremia
aliqua dwf'srunt. What is meant by this appears, from the author's
argument:
Premonstratis adiciendum est illud nostre opinionis quod nulla differentia aliqua
differunt. Quod probatur hoc modo: homo et asinus diHel'unt rationalitate,; ergo ratio-
nalitaset diFFerentia
asiniad hominem; ergo est communisvel propria vel magispropria.
Et sic probatur quod substantialis vel accidentalis hec diFferentia est asino (p. 2321'5).
Our treatise ends abruptly in the middle of the discussion of some ob-
jections against contrahuiusapinianisveritatem.For that matter, the whole
tract 35richly provided with objections and solutions.
Priscian is frequently quoted throughout the treatiam1 There are only
a ch references to the logica nova (while many from the logica vetus
are found): two referencesto Aristotle's Topicaand an implicit one to
the Posterior Analyrics. There is also an interesting reference to one
magister Adam:
Notandum etiam quad mpcriusdicitur totum in predicatione; iqjl'riuædicitur pars in
subiectione.Contra hoc quidamdicunt illud quod est superiuscognitione, etiam Et pars
in constitutionesui inferioris, perhibentesspeciemconstareexgenereet substantialibus
diHere11tiis.Hoc verbo quidam simplices abducti dicebant genusessequasi materiam,
clichrentias vero quasi formas, ex quibus iunctis constitueretur species. Sed dicit
Magister Adam: "onme signilïcatumdictione est simplex et incompositum". Et dicit
'componimr' idest dib'i'nitur; 'consritutio' pro dignius; cannitutio speciei pro dignius
Speciei.Et sic exponit auctoritatem illam: "Speciesconstituitur ex genere et ex sub-
stantialibus dilTerentiis", idest: ex nomine generis et ex nomine substantialium cliH'eren-
tiarum constituitur species (p. 22517'23).
In fact this sentence does not occur in the extant part of the Ars disserendi
' [). 2l83-33. Compare below Ch. XVI, pp. 516-528.

2 For all references, see the Index locorum.
SOME TREATISES ON LOGIC DATING FROM ABOUT 1200 393
written by Adam of the Petit Pont in 1132, but it may x-vell have be-
longed to it..l It should be noticed, however, that the same sentcnce is
ascribcd to Aristotle & few pagesfurther in our manuscript (f. 67V):
species etiam non habet partem componentem, sicut IEf.:.uru'nnthlï',,
quia dicit
Aristotiles: omne significatum dictione est simplex et incompositum
(p. 2291).
(I)) Tfactam: secundusdcals with the (gencra argmnentationum (H'. 691"-
72v). At the end of the treatise our author gives a short recapitulation
(summa):
Erit autem hec summa prioris summe quam dedimus. Quicquid probatur, dupliciter
probatur: cathcgoricc ct ypotheticc; cathcgorice duobus modis: localiter ct complexio-
nalitcr; localiter duobus modis: vi propositionum et vi terminorum; vi propositionum
sex modis; & subalternis, & contradictoriis, a simplici conversione, a conversione per
accidens, & conversione per contrapositionem, et ab equipollcntibus; vi terminorum
dupliciter: predicati et subiecti; complexionaliter tribus modis: secundumprimam,
secundumsecundam,et secundumtertiam Figuram;ypothetice duobus modis: tum
secundum antecedens; tum secundum consequens (pp. 25631-2579).
We can establish the following schema:

£ sec. primam Figuram
complexionalitel' sec. secundam Figuram
sec. tertiam Figuram
1
s vi subiecti
cathegorlce
. w, terminorum
,
? vl, predicati
, ,
localiter - a subalternis
& contradictoriis
vi prcpositionum & simplici conversione
a couwemione per accidens
& conversione per contrapositionem
ab equipollentibus
( secundum antecedens
!
l. ypothetice
secundum consequens
ï
The prior summaour author refers to is that given in the introductory

words of this tractatus(seeedition, p. 2351'14).Combining this with the
author's remarks on pp. 235'7 FF.and 236245. we can cstablish this
schema of categorica] argumentation:
lSee L. Minio-Paluello, The 'Ars disserendi' etc., p. I63. For :: different
......
identiFlcation Of d'lagiircr Adam, see bel-OW, p. 396.
394- LOGICA MODERNORUM ll
directe
...————....I—...—
I I
complexionaliter localiter
I I
secundum termi l'IOI'U 111 secundum terminorum
discoherentiam cohercntiam
——
I
I
a pari d [DEO
a partevel a partibus a causavel ab gjäctu
I I
secundum terminorum secundum propositionum
coherentiam habitudinem
I
I
pcr con versam per contrapositionem ab cquipallentibus
iimpliciter
I .'
I
I———I nominate innominatc
innaminale nominate I
I —, I
I
. de rebus de propos.. cledlCtlS permutatim
I
explicite inplicite
'—
quuendo de rebus loquendo de loquendo de dictis loquendo

I propositionibus permutatim
(I) (25 («ID I I
!— I I'——""'I""—'"'"I I :""""—'I
(D (9 cä) (D (2 (3 G 6) (9
Hypothetical argumentationis divided (p. 25115ff.)as follows:

]. de copulativa
2. de temporali
3. de disiuncta
4. de conditionali.
Then, an interesting section bearing the heading Dc varietateiqjizrcntiarum

is devoted to inferentes in which the terms ILsza-It.'.'ï'.-",,,
"'tantum', 'scmpcr'
and "'ipse'are found. Next our apthor discusscs the commutatiopropo-
sitionum (pp. 25421-25614).Finally, a few short notes on indirect
argumentation conclude the treatise.
(c) Tractatus tertius discusses snpposition (Ff. 73T-78v). From the

opening words it appears that it is intended to serve the purposcs of the
opponensand the respondensin the dialectical disputation:
50th TREATISESON LOGIC DATING FROM ABOUT 1200 395
Cum totius dialectice (!) fructus in questionum solutione tamquamsuo Finereperiatur,

ut ad ipsumtamquamad metamperveniri possitdiligenter estelaborandum.Sedquoniam
ad quodlibet diFFlcilequedam minus difficilia viam prestant, idcirco quo ad metam
artiHciosusHat progressus,illud quidem iudicium preconsiderandumest. Sed etiam
iudicium, sicut inventio, multiplex est. Est enim iudicium veritatis vel falsitatis circa
propositiones discretivum, cuius doctrina a Boecio et aliis .nle-zwrlmtcl
tradita est. Est et
aliud iudicium veritatis vel falsitatiscirca propositiones,quod fugiendasimul et conce—
dendasecundumdiversaoiEcia opponenti et respondentiaccommodatavarie instruit et
informat. Huius consideratiünem presentis tractatus prmnittit executio (p. 2603'12).
Our treatise has three parts, called ciimifunticrm-rs2

[ De vocis consignificatione
ll De vocis principali significatione
lll De communi usu loquentium.
It contains a theory of supposition which bears an unmistakable

grammatical stamp. For this doctrine, see below, Ch. XVI, pp. 5415.
We have one possible clue for the place of origin. We End Francia
and Anglia (?) instanced as well as a few Italialf'local names (Bononia
and Anagnia):
p. 27424'25:si quis Anagniedicat: 'episcapus
rcnit', non est admittendanisi pro epistolae
Anagnino. Similiter si quis dicat in Francia: 'rex renir', non est admittenda nisi pro rege
Francie.
pp. 27523-2763:si quis stans in Franciahabensmedietatem sue marce, que est marca apud
et diceret 'hec est marca', falsum diceret. Sed si quis Bononiahaberet eamdem
Bononienses,
medietatem marce (et) diceret: 'habeomarcam', verum diceret, quia de easemper iudica-
mus secundum statum proferentis.3
p. 28027'11
: Notandumest etiamquodhic non Et denegationeadaffirmationem,
processus
quia bene admittimus hanc: 'in aliquo loco non es:Socrates hecregia', denmnstrata
et ipsees.'.
Anglia. Similiter: 'similiter: 'in aliquo loco nunc ultimo est Socrateset ille est hec rcgia',
similiter demonstrataAnglia, posito quod statim intravit.
The occurrence of Anglia in the last reference is questionable, indeed.

The conjunction of regio with the name Anglia is rather puzzling and the
phrase statim intravit seems to Et in better with the name of a town than
with & c-Duntr)r name such as Anglia. For this reason [ think we should
read Anagnia instead of Anglia. If this surmise be correct, our treatise
' : completely.
* For the term, see our Index verborumet rerum.
J Another reference to Bologna is found in Tractatusquintus (p. 3I55): 'Ramanus
est
fortissimusBononiensium'.
396 LOGICA MODERNORLIM [I
would come from Anagnia (Anagni near Rome, well-known as a papa]

residence).This provenancechls some support in the instanceof the
Bolognese mark, found in our second quotation, and is strongly sup-
ported by the Erst quotation.
As to the identity of this master Adam 1 feel myself inclined to think
of the master of that name who is found mentioned several times in
connection with John le Page(JoannesFagusor Pagius).I As is known,
the latter is the author of a number of logical works (Ratione:saper
Predicamcnmand Appellationcs). He is mentioned as a master of arts in a
letter by Pope Gregory IX dating from 1231,2 so that this master Adam,
too, may have been an active master of arts in the Erst quarter of the
century. The date of this part of our manuscript fits in very well with
this surmiseit
(d) Tractatus quartus deals (Ff. 79r-81r) with the several kinds Of
preposition. This, too, seemsto be closely related to the ars disputandi,
asmayappearfrom the initial sentences:
Distinguenda sunt propositionum genera, ut adversarium multipliciter cogendo, singula
demonstrandoad eiusdem impedimentum singulis probationibus varias subiungamus
instantias (p. 285l'3).
For that matter, our treatise discussesthe probationesof each kind of

proposition :
1 De universali aFFlrmativaeiusque probatione

11 De universali negativa eiusque probatione
111 De particulari aFErmativa eiusque probatione
[V De singulari aFHrmativa eiusque probatione
V De indefinita eiusque probatione
V] De particulari negativa eiusque probatione;
Finally, & concluding (?) section is devoted to general instantiae; un-
R::n-tunatel)rit is incomplete in our manuscript:
VI] De generalibus instantiis.
'See M.-D. Chenu, Allaïtrcs et bachclim de ['Univcrsitä dc Paris vers 1240 in: Etudcs
d'histoirc littöraire et doctrinalc du Xlllc siäclc, lre sörie, Paris-Ottawa 1932II [pp.
11-39], pp. 14-15; 19-20; 31-32; 36.
3 See DeniHc-Chäte1ain, Chartularia Universitatis Parisiensis1, pp. 145-146.
3 See above, Ch. I, nr. 10, pp. 42-4-3.
ON LOGlC DATINGFROMABOUT 1200
SOMETREATISES 397
(e) Tractatusquintusdiscusses(811f-90V)the Fwekinds of dictiones:

[ De dictionibus distributivis
II De vocibus inFmitatis
lll De dictionibus adiectivis
IV De dictionibus exclusivis
V De dictionibus relativis.
(f) Tractatus the arssophistica

sextusdiscussing has not been completely
preserved in our manuscript (Ff. 911*-92V).lt ends abruPtly .in the
discussion Of the Fallacy secundumcompositionem et divisionem.
As to the place and date of our treatise, it seems to be the work of
some master well-versed in logic as it was practised from the second
half of the twelfth (zwentur)ronwards. The version given b)! our capy
presumably came into existence in the Erst decades of the thirteenth
century in some Italian school.l As Anagnia is 111entioned several times,
we may think of this papal residence as the place of origin. ] propose to
call these tracts the TRACTATUS ANAGNINI.
2 The Ars düputandi Burana Preserved in Munich C.]..M. 4652

-
The same Munich manuscript C.L.M. 46522 contains from Ff. 104?-
I 161"a piece on logic bearing the title INTRODLICTORIA DIALETICE. This
work Opens as follows:
Rationis disserendi dialetica tres sunt partes: propositio, interrogatio, et conclusio.

Sedquia quelibet istarumpartium suashabetpartes,scilicet dictiones,et dictianessunt
voces et vox est sonus, :: sono tamquam ab altiori incipiendum est.
The tract, apparentl)lrserving for disputation purposes, has the three

main parts mentioned in the prologue:
] (edition, pp. 183-191)

DEPROPOSITIONE
II DEINTERROGATIONE(p. 192)
III (pp. I93-2l3).
DE CONCLUSIONE
The First part (Dc propositionc)is preceded by the usual discussionof

sonus,dictio, nomen,verbum,and oratio (pp. 179-182).
! For somecaulemlocale,scc above,p. 395.

2 For this manuscript, see above Ch. l, :11'. 10, pp. 42-4-3.
As is quite natum] for this kind oF treatise, the third part (De con-
clusione),dealingwith all Formsof argumentation,is the mostextensive.
The treatment of the syllogism is apparently based on Aristothä's Prior
Anabfticsas well as on Boethius' De syll. categ., though neither of these
works is referrcd to explicitly. The discussion of the modal syllogisms is
preparedby that of the moda]propositions,just asAristotle doesin his
Prior Analytics. This section is quite interesting, since the author comes
to speak about the enuntiabjle or dictum propositionis or signjf'ï'catumpropo-
sitionis(p. 208'6Ff,). Comparcthe parallel expositionsin the ArsMehduna,
pars IV.,l Unfortunately this section ends ad:)rulatlyr
p. 21331.
The tract bears :: grammatica] stamp throughout. See for instance the
division ofdictiones(pp. 18325-18420):
Dictionum alia nomen alia pronomen (alia verbum). Nomina alia substantiva, alia
adiectiva. Substantiva tam in nominativo singulari quam in nominativo plurali subi-
ciuntur et predicantur ( ), in obliquis vero tantum subiciuntur. ( ).
...... ......
Adiectiva vero tam in nominativo singulari quam in nominativo plurali tantum predi-
cantur. ln obliquis vero nec subiciuntur nec. predicantur. Si vero substantivantur in
neutro genere, regulam servant substantivorum. (. ). Pronomen prima et
.....
secunda persone subiciuntur et non predicantur. ( ). Pronomina tercie persone
......
regulamservantsubstantivorum.Reliquavero pronomina,scilicct possessiva,
regulam
servant adiectivorum. Si vero substantiventur in neutro genere, regulam servant sub-
stantivorum.
Such an exPosition is looked for in vain in such works as those OF

Abailard, indeecl. The concluding section pf our tract contains an
extensive discussionof the regulasconcerning the (grammatical) suPpo-
sition Of appellationesdicti.2
As to the sources of the work, there are some references to the works
of the logica vetusand some vague allusions to Aristotle's Prior Analycics,
Topica,and Soph. EI. Other reliable clues For its date are missing.
] think, it may have come into existence in the third quarter of the twelfth
century. Not a single allusion to the place of origin can be found. There-
fore ] call it, after the manuscript in which it has come down to us: Ars
(disputandi) Burana.3
1 Secabove, Ch. X.
: Sec also p. 1861'?'1Elwhere the tcrm ':uppositmn' is found instead of 'subiectum' which is
usual in Iogical treatises.
3 Munich C.L.M. 4652 crriginall)r belonged to the library of Benediktbcucrn. Seeabove,
Ch. ], nr. 10, p. 42.
SOME TREATISESON LOGIC DATING FROM ABOUT 1200 399
3 - The Ars disputandi Emmcrana preserved in Munich, C.]..M. 14.458
The manuscript Munich, C.L.M. l4.4—581 contains from Ff. 45"!-

4r91'a:: treatise on logic x-vhichbears a close resemblance to the treatise
discussedin the preceding section. This tract, too, clearly intends to
introduce the reader to the ars disputandi, as we may conclude From thc
introductory section (p. 1479'27):
( ). Dialeticn est scientia disserendiprobabiliter ad alterum. Disserere idem est
......
quod disputare. ( .). Item sic (sc. describitur): dialetica est ars dubitandi.
.....
( . ..... ). Et quoniam dialetica negotium circa disputationem versatur, videndum est
quid sit disputatio,
que et quot sint partes eius, quo et quot disputationis
species.
Disputation is chlncd (p. 1431) as ratiocinativa in locutionedisceptacio

and the term is derived from de diversisand putatio. It has three parts:
positio, (deflned after Aristotle, Topica, IO4bl9-20), oppositio, and
responsio.The second one has the well-known parts: propositio, intcr—
rogatio (or questio),and afma'lusicr.2 Finally, responsio
is subdivided into
concessio,contradictio,and prohibitio. We may set np Ehefollowing scheme:
positio
propositio
OPPOSIUO? Interrogatio
disputatio ' conclusio
a
& concessio(in veris)
responsio - contradictio (in falsis)
(
prohibitio (in obscuriset nugatoriis et in multiplicibus).
Like the Ars Burana, our treatise takes its main division from the trio:
propositio, interrogatio, and conclusio.
: DE PROPOSITIONE (pp. 149-l60)

This section discussesthe usual subjects (sonus,vox,nomen,etc.) in &
way similar to that of the Ars Burana. Compare especially the discussion
Quehabeantpredicari vcl subici (p. 1532'29)with our quotation from the
Ars Burana, above, p. 398. It should be noticed, however, that the
present treatise is more detailed. The end of the section De propositione
contains some interesting personal notes of the author on the implicit
propositions (pp. 15929 -1 603):
! For this manuscript. see above Ch. ], nr. Il, pp.43-49.
3 Compare the Ars Burana,above, p. 397.
Dicunt quidam huiusmodi propositiones ipotheticns, quidam cathegoricas. Ego nec

approbo nec inprobo. Tutius tamen est ut dicantur ipothetice quam cathegorice. Sed
queretur sub qua specie ipotheticarum contineantur. Ad hoc dici potest quod predicta
divisio ipotheticarumnon est suFFlciens.
Suntenim quedamipotheticequeficto vocabulo
quantitatirc prapositionesdici possunt, ut 'tantus cst Sacram quantus Plato',; quedam assi-
milarirc ut 'tam homocit Marcusqualis T::Hius'; quedam substantiva,ut 'id quod est illarcus,
cst Tullius" ——si tamen propositiones huiusmodi ipothetice dici debeant.
The Ars Meliduna, too, deals with implicit propositions in connection

with the hypothetical proposition. As is known, the prapasitioimplicita,
apparently & novelty in logic clue to the influence of grammar, is not
found in the logical treatises of the daysOFAbailard.
" DE INTERROGATIONE sive QUESTIONE (pp. 161-162)

This section may be compared with the parallelous one in the Ars
Burana. See above, p. 397.
lll DE CONCLUSIONE (pp. 163-173)

Like the corresponding section in the Ars Burana, this section deals with
all kinds of argumentation. It has an interesting discussion on the nature
of every argument. Our author takes every argument as reducible to an
implication (p. 164'9'39):
De argumento apud diversosdiverse sunt sententie. Quidam enim dicunt propositionem
premissam in argumentatione, quidam dictum propositionis premisse, quidam dictum
generalis ipothetice. ( ). Nos vero dicimus argumentum esse dictum con-
......
ditionalis ipothetice transformata ab argumentatione. A qualibet enim argumentatione
transformari potest conditionalis propositio, sicut a qualibet conditionali sumi potest
argumentatio.
The section is throughout similar to that of the Ars Burana. Our tract
adds to the discussion of the syllogismussome short notes on the locutio
nugatoriaunder the manuscript headingDENUGATORHS (p. 174). Here an
allusion to the place OForigin may be seen in the example (p. 17425):
'Francia et Parisius', 'Pax-risiuset Francia'. On the analogy of the Ars
Burana! pr0poseto call this tract Ars (disputandi)Emmerana.
As to the date of our tract, it seemsto have come into existence about
the sametime as the Ars Burana(third quarter of the twelfth century).
To state in a more exact way their interrelation as well as their place in
the development of twelfth centur)r logic, an examination of the use OF
some mnemonic versesseemsto be of some interest.
SOME TREATISESON LOGIC DATING FROM ABOUT [200 401
4- - On the Development of the Mnemonic Verses

Used in Mediaeval Logic
Every student of scholastic logic knows the Famousmnemonic verses

Barbara, Calorem etc., which seem to have made their FlI'St
.....
appearance in the Erst half of the thirteenth century. For instance they
are found in the Introductiones in logicam written by William OFShyres-
wood, probably towards the middle OFthe century.I There they occur
in this formï:
BARBARA CELARENT DARII FERIO BARALIPTON
CELANTES DABITIS FAPESMO FRISESOMORUM
CESARE CAMPESTRES FESTINO BAROCO. DARAPTI
FELAPTON DISAMIS DATISI BOCARDO FERISON.
Each word is to be taken as the formula ofa valid modus.It is interpretecl

according to the Following rules: the Erst three vowels indicate the
quantity and quality of the three prcpositions (viz. the two premissesand
the conclusion) of :: syllogism, a standing for the universal afErmative,
e for the universal ne ative, :" For the particular aFFlrmative,
a nd 0 Forthe
particular negative. The remainder of the significant elements of these
formulas is concerned with the reduction of the imperfect modi (From
the fifth one on: BARAUPTONetc.) to one,of the Fll'StPour, which are
perfect (BARBARA, CELARENT, DARN, FERIO). So the initia] consonant
of each Formula of the imperfect modi indicates that, for the proof of
validity of the corresponding modus,the mood is to be reduced to that
modusamong the Fourperfect ones which hasthe sameinitial. ; s occurring
immediately after a vowel indicates that, For that reduction, the propo-
sition concerned is to be converted simply, while p in the same position
indicates that the praposition is to be converted per accidens,and m
between the Erst two vowels of & formula indicates that the premises
lareto be transposed;Finally,c appearingafter one of the Erst two vowels
indicates that the corresponding premise is to be replaced by the negative
of the conclusion For the purpose of a reduction per impossibile.The rest
of the letters of these formulas are non-signiflcant.
] have not been able to Fmdthese verses in twelFth century treatises.
lt should be noted, however, that the famous verses BARBARA,CELA-
RENT had a few Forerunnres in two twelfth century tracts on syllogism.
! edited by M. Grabmaqn from the only manuscript Paris, B.N. Lat., 1661? in Sitz. Her.
dcr Baycr Akad. dcr "ïss., Phil. Hist. Abt. 1937, Heft 10.
2 p. 5531'34ed. Grabmann. Cfr. P. Hispanus, Summulacfagicola, m'. 4.l7 ed. Bocheüski.
I found such mnemonic verses both in the Ars Burana and in the Ars
Emmcrana.To start with the latter, after the apparent conclusion of the
treatment of the three syllogistic Figuras (Et hac de tribusfiguris silla-
gismorum) we have an additional notandum. [t turns out to present & set
of mnemonic versessimilar to Barbara,Celarent(p.. 17315'25):
Notandum quod universales aFErmative designantur his quatuor literis .E. .l. .0.
U. ; universales negative his: .L. .N. .N. .R.; particulares aFHrmative (his) tribus:
.
...-I. .S. .T. ; particulares negative (his) tribus: .B. .C. .D.
.
Secundumhoc he novemvocesdesignentnovem modosprime ngre:
via. non. est. Iac. m'a. mel. vas. erb. arc.;
he quatuor voces designant quatuor modos secunde figure:
ren. erm. rac. ('.-bd.;

sex modi tercie figure his sex designantur:
sua. nec. aut. asa. duc. mac.
As is easily seen, these formulae only indicate the quantity and

qualit)r of the three propositions which go to make a syllogism.
Some folios earlier, our author gives the x-veII-lcnownscheme il-
lustrating the interrclations of prepositions (p. l56):
unww-äl ul ln mqm-g CONTRAHIE &
ENUBDU'EHS
BNH 3111!qu
mrluurur nilumnlwt SUBCWTHARIE p-urlrcular negative
A later hand added to the formulas AL, ME, NI and RO, standing for
respectively the universal affirmative, the universal negative, the
particular affirmative and the particular negative. The same hand wrote
at the foot of the page theseformulas; numbered !, II, lll:
[
ALA MAE LIN ENO LAN MAE LIN LER [MO
ll
MAM AME MIR ARO
lll
LAN MAR lLl LIN RAR ENO.
No doubt, they refer to the three conclusive syllogistic Figuras. lt should

be noted that these formulas, too, only indicate the quantity and quality
SOME TREATISES ON LOGIC DATING FROM ABOLIT 1200 403
of the propositions of the syllogism, and, further, that here already we

chl- the letters A, E, ! and O used in the same way as in BARBARA
CELARENTexcept that they are seconded by, re5pcctivcly, L. M. N. and R.
To turn, now, to the Ars Burana, there the tract on syllogism contains
the sameformulas (called naculehere) as are found in the notandum of
the Ars Emmcrana:
pp. 19931'39: Restatmodorum subditio. Sed preconsiderandum est quod sunt quedam
notule quibus singuli modi denotantur. He autem nutule litteris denotantur. ( ).
......
He littere .E. .I. .O. .U. signiFlcant universales aFFn'mativaset he littere: ..L. .M.
.N. .R. significant universales negativus; et he .A. .S. .T.. significant particulares
affirmativus, et he . B. . C . . D. significant particulares negativus.
Then follow the same formulas as in the Ars Emmerana,which are here
called vcrsus(2003'3; 203'3'13; 2053'3).
Il: should be noticed that, unlike the Ars Emmerana,in the Ars Burana
the passagesabout the noruie seem to belong to the original text..
Moreover, the latter has some breviloquia indicating the dispositioof each
syllogistic Figura(pp. 19632-1981):
..
1973: quod primo subicit apponit prima jigura
197'3: apponi bis querit idem natura secunde
19715: bisque sibi subici tercia querit idem.
These or other similar breviloquia are not found in the Ars Emmcrana'.
From the above evidence the conclusion may be drawn that the Ars
Emmerana,in which the verses apparmïtlyr form an interpalationmz is
older than the Ars Burana. In fact, the latter seems to be an abridgcment
ofthe ArsEmmerana.Probably both of them are products originntcd in one
of the Parisian schools.3
5 Two Tracts Dc predicabihbus and De locis

-
Pound in Munich, C.L.M. l4.4-58
The Munich manuscript C.]..M. l4.4—58 contains on ff. 491'11-53") two
other tracts on logic. They are written in the same handwriting as the
but separatedfrom it by a strayrquestion (491'3'1'0)
ArsEmmcrana :
! The corresponding verse in Willimn of Shyreswood: subpre prima bi: pre fecundatertia
bis sub is apparently a refinement (p. 5529,ed. Grabmann).
seethe edition, pp. 17410'"and 17423'31.
2 For two other im:utfn'pculatitzzvnsll
seeabove,p. 400.
3 For :: local hint in the ArsEmmcrana,
404 LOGICA h-IODERNORUM 11
Queritur an dialetica magistri futura sit dialetica discipuli et an discipulus s(c)it eandem
dialeticam quam magister suus. Quod sic probari potest.
'zllagijtcr docet dialecticamquam dixcipulus addiscit
$ed magister nuUam docet m'si quam 5ch
ergo dijcipuhls nullam addiscit nisi quam scil: magister
scd magister nullam sci: nixi suam
ergo disripulus eandemaddücit'.
Sed contra: videtur impossibile quod dialetica unius Fiatdialetica alterius, cum singulare
accidens non possit permutare subiectum suum.,
Ad hoc dicimus quod nomen (non MS) cuiuslibet artis equivoce dicitur. Una enim
acceptione ar; dicitur singularis (49ï'b): qualitas informativa subiecti iuxta applicationem
animi ad perceptionem regularum; et in hac acceptione ars eadem non potest esse in
pluribus. Alia acceptione ars dicitur collectio prcceptormn; et in hac acceptione potest
essein pluribus.
Then the same hand inunecliatel)r continues with the intmductor)Ir

words Of & tract De predicabilibus(49fb):
Cuiuslibet nominis duplex est officium. Habet (enim) nomen signiFlcare, habet
apellare( !). Significatumergo est predicabile (possibileMS), appellatum (exappellativum
MS) vero est ipsa res cui convenit nomenper appellationem.Sedde appellatonichil ad
nos.
Omne autem predicabile aut est substantiale, aut est accidentale. Substantiale predi-
cabile illud est quod inest rei substantialiter, ut genus vcl Species vel individuum vel
substantialisdilïercntia. Accidentalcpredicabileest illud quod inest rci accidentaliter,
ut praprium et accidens.
Item. Omne predicabile aut predicatur in quid aut in quale; predicariidem est quod
in(her)crc; vel predicari: predicato termino de subiecto assignari. lllud predicabile predicatur
in quid quod (quia MS) inheret rei substantialiter et raspondetur ad interrogationem

factamper quid?'. lllud predicabilepredicatur in quale quod respondeturad interro-
gationemfactamper 'quaIeP'.
Omne predicabile quod predicatur in quid, aut est genusaut est speciesaut indivi-
duum. Omne predicabilequod predicaturin quale,aut est proprium aut accidensaut
diH'erentia.
This tract is found from Ff.491"J-501'b. After the usual discussion of

genus, species, individuum, djferentia, and accidens the author gives an
alia divisiopredicabilium(49fb). According to this division he discusses
the several relations of terms: tatum - pars; paria; excedens the
- excessum;
diFFerent kinds of opposition (as relativa; as contraria, as aFFlrmation and
negation, as privatio and habitus), and disPcn-ata.These distinctions
apparently serve for a better insight into the doctrine of the loci communes.
As a matter of Fact the later Summulcall have such tracts on the predi-
cabilia as a preparation OFthe tract De Locis.
Our tract winds up as follows:
some TREATISES ON LOGIC DATING FROM ABOUT 1200 405
sicut etiam quedam opponuntur ut privatio et habitus que non sunt privatio et
. .....
habitus, ita quedam opponuntur ut contraria nec tamen sunt contraria.
Et hec cle predicabilibus.
After that the tract on the laci communes

follox-vsimmediately (SOPb).lt
appears from the introductory words that it is rather independent of the
preceding Ars Emmerana,since the terms 'pmpositio', ILquesr.ic,-"
etc. are
deEned, again (SOTD)
:
Nunc videndumest quid sit propositio, quid questio, quid conclusio,quid argumen-
tatio, quid argumentum, quid locus.
Propositio est oratio signiücnns verum vel falsum. Questio est in dubietate!" ambi-
guitate-mque adducta propositio. Conclusio est argumento vel argumentis approbata
propositio. Argumentatio est argumenti per orationem explicatio. Argumentmn (est)
ratio rei dubie faciens Eclem. Locus est sedes argumenti; sive id a quo elicitur argu-
mentum.
This tract is found Ff. 501'5-531'13.It contains the usual discussions of the
loci inherentesand extrinseci. Its sources are De top. d'ij'. OFBoethius and his
comment on Cicero's Topica. As to the logica nova ]
found one quotation
(F. SOW) from Aristotle's Topica (101 1338 01" 153a15-16) and one
allusion (SZW) to the Saph.EI. (1641323-24).The latter appearsin &
passage which bears quite a personalstamp. Our author inveighsagainst
certain pedants (scioli) who questioned the supposedinsumciency of
Boethius' enumeration of loci. The passage has an unmistakably Italian
couleurlocale (SZVB):
Sequitur de loco a disparatis, de loco :! pari, de loco & subcontrariis, de loco a
contrariis, de loca a subalternis, de loco a conversione simplici, de loco a conversione
per accidens, de loco a conversione per contrapositionem, de loco ab equipollentibus.
De quibus nil 1videturdixisse Boetius. Unde quidam scioli supradictorum locorum
divisionem arguere conantur insuFFlcientie,cum ipsi potius redarguendi sunt inperitie.
Nam cu(nc)ta Italia minima irretiti questiuncula suc inperitie solatium querentes, in
superficie deaurant(cleauratum MS)scoriam! Quibus videntur litargirea argentea,felle
tincta aurea'! Ceci enim sunt duces eorum et. nox nocti indicat scienciam!
-
Nos autem ne tanto auctori inpudenter videamur derogare, immo vero ne animo
nostro nostra ratio discrepet,dicimus locos quos in proximo enumeravimuspredicte
includi locorum aivisioni.
Our tract winds up as follows (531'b):

Connumerantur (convertuntur MS) autem isti loci inter locos ab appositis contrarie,
sicut et locus ab oppositis contradictorie, de quo suPcrius (521'3)dictum est.
Et de his hactenus.
' Cfr. Arista Soph. EL," 164b23-24 and the Gion in flrist. El. edited in m)- Log. :llaa'. [
(pp. 187-255)II p. 05:547.
406 LOGICA h-iODERNORLlh-l n
Next there follow three logical problems (531'13'W):

(l) Due sunt partesdialetica principales: ars inveniendi et ars iudicandi.
Ponatur ergo quod duo sunt quorum unus sciat artem inveniendi el: altas artem
iudicandi. Queritur an isti sciant dialeticam, an sint dialetici. Quod sic probatur: isti
sciunt aliquam scientiam; ergo dialeticam vel aliam; sed nan aliam; ergo dialeticam; et
si sciunt dialeticam, ergo sunt scientes dialeticam, et si sunt scientes dialeticam, ergo
sunt dialetici.
Opponitur: 'isti sunt habentesdivitias; ergo sunt dirircs'. Non sequitur.
(2) Dispositio est collectio rationum ad astruendamvel destruendamutramque

partium (5331)contradictionis. Ponatur ergo quod sint duo qui disputent dialetice et sic
dicatur: 'uterque istorum disputat cum aliqua et neuter istorum est qui non disputat (disparem
MS) cum aliquo; ergo isti disputant cum aliqua vel cum aliquibus; sednon cum aliqua; ergo cum
aliquibus; et si cum aliquibus, ergasecumvel cum aliis; scd non cum aliis; ergo secum;ergo
disputantesdialeticanan disputantdialeticc'.
Ad hoc:dicimus quod isti disputantad alterum, sednon cum aliquo vel cum aliquibus
et quod uterque istorum disputat cum aliquo, si isti non disputant cum aliquo vel cum
aliquibus. Et erit instantia contra hoc: 'uterque istorum habctfratrcm; cr. ncutcr istorum est
qui non habcatfratrcm; ergo isti habcncfratrcm'. Non sequitur.
Item. Pono quod alter disputat, alter taceat. Si[c] ergo isti disputant dialetica, ergo
(unus) opponit et alter respondet; ergo uterque istorum loquitur; vel aliquis potest
opponere et respondere non loquendo; et si uterque istorum loquitur, ergo in momento
quo unus respondet alter interrogat; ergo unus non respondet ad ea que alter interrogat;
ergo, ut supra, dialetice disputantesnon disputant dialetica.
(3) Nullius voxestnomen.Sedad hoc opponunt quidam: 'hoc nomen'magistcr'est vos:
prolata a te; ergosuaest vos'. Falsum est.
Instantia: 'illud pallium cst indutum a rc; ergo estpallium tuum'. Non sequitur.
Item aiio modo opponunt: 'si aliquodnamcnestvox,aliqua vas:csl:nomen,et convertitur;
scdalicuiusnomenestvos,ergoalicuius voxestnomen'.Falsuni est.
instantia: 'si aliquis homoestanimal, aliquodanimal esthomo;sedaliquis homoes:animai;
ergoaliquodanimalesthomo'.Non sequitur.
Next, our scribe goes on to give some regulas for argumentation:

Lex iubet ex veris ut nonnisi vera sequantur.
Falsa modo veris modo falsis ante ferantur.
Ex inpossibili quidlibet adde sequi.
6 A Tract De univocationc Found in Munich C.L.M. l4.458

-
The same Munich manuscript contains a remarkable piece on uni-
vocatian(53V5-56T13).lt defmes univocation as manenteeademsigni 'cationc
variatanominisappellatio.There are three modiof univocation: (1) by the
adjunction of verbs of diFFerent tenses (present, preterite, or future.);
(2) by the adjunction of modi (irerum,falsum, necessarium,possibile,
50:915TREATISES
ON LOGICDATINGme ABOUT1200 407
contingens,impossibile);(3) by the adjunction of vcrbaenuntiabilia (tango,

video, amo, dicitur, enuntiatur, aptatur, desideratur).
The three groups are dealt with in & somewhat different order anc]
some other subjects are intermingled (e.g. accidental predication,
relation and comparison).
The tract bears throughout :- grammatica] stamp and its main purpose
seems to be to give & set of grmnmatical regulas for supposition, ampli-
ation and restriction. For that matter, the author once refers (p.
35032'33)to an (his?) exposition of ampliatio and restrictio, which is,
howevgr, not found in our manuscriptI
.
Our tract is complete (P. 56") : Hecde univacacionc sufï'ciant).
Once Aristotle's Tapica(] I9b35-36) are referred to (p. 33921'23).
Any clue for its place of origin is missing. ] suppose it to have been
written in the third quarter of the twelfth centuryr in & Pm'isianschool.
The tract will be edited in our second part ns Tract FH.
! Cp. p. 349'0.
CHAPTER XII
THE DIALECTICA MONACENSIS

FOLIND [N MUNICH C.L.M. l4-.763
Msgr Grabmann found in & miscellaneous manuscript in Munich

(C.L.M. l4.763)' among other pieces on logic & copy of an apparently
complete Dialectica. It is written on Ff. 901'-l2ll'.2 He suggestsl & date
posterior to Peter of Spain's Summule(about 1240). However, acloser
insPection of the contents shows that Grabmann's surmise should be
rejected emphatically.4
The work Opensas follows:
Cum dialetica sit quasi via in amnes alias scientias, in principio huius tractatus divisionem
scienciarum ponamus.
The work ma)r be divided into two main sections.
A ("f. 901'3-115W: the discussionof Aristotelean-Boethian logic, the

focus of which is the syllogism or, generally speaking, argumentation;
90": Quia ergo tota intentio dyaleticc versatur circa cognitionem sillogismi —- quod
patere potest ex hoc quod in omnibUSlibris loyce agitur de ipso sillogismo et de partibus
eius subiectivisaut integralibus—, idcirco potissimum'docenda et discendaest natura
sillogismi sive argumentationis.Sedquia nullum tutum cognosciturnisi per eaex quibus
est, idcirco ad partes sillogismi descendamus,viso tamen prius quid sit dyaletica, et
unde dicatur.
This section is divided as fbllows:
I De sillogistica sive cmnplexionali argumentatione (95rb-93V3)

[[ De locali argumentatione (98v3-108m)
lil De sophistica argumentatione (1081'3-1ISW).
These three parts (I-lli) are precededby an introductory part dealing

with the usual preliminary subjects (sonus,vox, nomen, verbum,oratio,
propositio) (901'3-95fb).
' For this manuscript., see above Ch. !, nr. 12, pp. 49-54.
: See his Bearbeitungenund Auslegungcn, pp. 48-51.
3 loc. cir.., p. 48. 4 Sec below, pp. 410-4l4.
THE DIALECTICA MONACENSIS 409
B The second main section deals with suppositio, appellatio, and

rcstrictio under the heading De dictione signjjï'cativa. ln fact, this section
gives an elaboratediscussionof some Fundamentalsubjectsof terminist
logic, afterwards called parva logicalia. It is found in our capy ff. ] IS'")-
lerb. That both sections must belong together appears from their
connection in our cepy' as well as from the doctrina] congruity of the
doctrine of supposition as found in the first section (edition, pp. 582"-
5844) with that in the second (edition, pp. 60622lif,).2
This important Dialectica will be edited in full in our second part as
Tracr.Xl (below, pp. 453-638).
As to the place where our Dialectjca was composed, there seem to be

some rather vague clues in the examples used by our author. E.g. :
9411":lmpossibleper accidensest quod nec potestnec putarit, potuit tamenesse1«neruum,
ut menanfuisseParisius.Et hoc solet appellari diuum depreteritofalsumct negatum(edition,
p. 482").
Compare the parallel passage:

ibid.: Necessariumper accidensest quod nec in presenti nec in futuro poterit esse
falsum, potuit tamen in preterito esse falsum, ut hominem studuisse Parisius. Et tale ne-
cessarium solet appellari ditium dc praemi verum al: a—Hïrmatum
(editiün, p. 48137'3').
The former example, which would hardl)r make sense if used by a

master teaching in Paris, seems to point to a non-Parisian author. As &
matter of fact we do not End anywhere in this Dialectica the well-known
propositionsin which the river Seine ($.-arcana)
is instancednor any other
references to Paris, one irrelevant passageexcepted, where Rome and
' Sec above, Ch. [, nr. 12, pp. 49; Sfo.

: There is an unspeciüed reference to a tract De insolubilibus: qualiter autem Eat hec
fallacia in dictione illius insolubilis: 'ego dicofalsum', hoc habetur in tractatu de in-
solubilibus (f. 11473; edition, p. 59430'31).As & matter of fact, such a tract is lacking in
our manuscript, and does not belong to the subjectsof the proper Summufe either.
Moreover the verb habetur(not: habebitur!)does not look like a referenceto somesub-
sequent tract. --—Fora tract Dc inminbihbusdating probably from as early as the end of the
twelfth century, seemy paper: SameNotason TheMediaevalTractDc insolubilibus, With The
Edition of A Tract Dating from The End of The Twclfth Century in: VWARIUM, &
Journal for MediaevalPhilosophyand The Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages4-(1966),
pp. 83-1 IS.
Paris are instanced in a sophism.' I think even the phrase mc nonjüissc

Parisius as an example of an impossibile per accidens may refer to a non-
French master. So we have to think, First of all, of an English author.
Actually we FundAnglia instanced three times (1093'3; ] 123"); l 163'3).
As to the primary sources used, we Fund,apart From the 1Nell-l-wutzzvs-vn
references to the works cf the logica verus,a number of explicit references
to the logica nova: Prior Analytics (24- times); PosteriorAnalytics (twice);
Topics(9 times) and Saph.Elcnchi(17 times).2 It strikes the reader that
when nemlmemting3the curriculum of logica] works, our author does
not mention the Dc sexprincipiis, nor (it should be noted) Porphyry's
Isagoge.However, there are some quotations, From the Liber dc sex
principiis attributed sometimes to Gilbert de la Porräe, but this work is
not referred to by name.4 From the rest of Aristotle's works we Fmd
only what may be two quotations from the Physics,but this work is not
named either.5
From this we can safely assume that our Dialectica was composed as
early as the second half of the twelfth century. It is well-known that the
masters OFthe third quarter of the century had some acquaintance with
so that
the Libri n.«:lrtlu'cz'hzsm,6 any quotations from Aristotle's do
Plym'cs not
presentany diFh'culty.As to the useOFthe Desexprincipiis, somesimilar
quotations from it are found already in a commentary on the Categories
From the School of Alberic of Paris, which is to be dated about ] 14-017
Finally, in the tract on the fallaciae there is one reference to Com-
no doubt Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose commentm'y was
irm-:.r11:atc;-r,,3
alreadyused (and translatedpartly) by ]ames'of Venice as early as the
second quarter of the twelfth century)? At the same time, the use of the
word Commentatormay refer to a date befo re the twenties ofthe thirteenth
' 'ubicumque existens cir aliquid 51'ipsum cit Roma, ibidem exigens nm aliquid si ipsum est
Parfïius ([ lOra-rb; edition, p. 5671'2).
3 For all these references, see our Indexlocorum.
3 f. 90m; edition, p. 46115'13.
4 Seethe edition, pp. 522-527.
5 edition, pp. 5181047und 54115'10.
* See L. Minio-Paluello, Nate SUH' firmata]: latino medievale V in: Rivista di FilösoFm
Neoscolasticn 44 (1952), pp. 389-397, and M. Grabmann, Aristatclcs im 12 ]ahrhundarr
in: Mittelalterliches Geisteslebcnlll, pp. 79f.
7 See my paper: SameNeu- Eridenccon TchEh Ccntmy Logic in: VIVARIUM 4- (l966),
pp. 35-36.
3 edition, p. 5843.
9 See L. Minio-Paluello, Nota:uH' Aristotelelatina medievale[X, in: Rivista cli FilosoFla
Neoscolasticn46 (1954), pp. 229-231.
century, since afterx-vardsthis name was generally used per antonomasiam

For Averroes. It should be noted that Peter of Spain says: sicui vult
AlexanderCommentator supra Librum Elenchorum (ed. Bocheflski, nr. 708).
lt should be noted, further, that our author shows a peculiar prefer-
ence for the formula Post hec, which is, no doubt, & rendering of the
phrase (1316:SE:Täüïff. used by Aristotle in his Topics(not in his other
logica] works). I think that this wasa FashionableFeaturein those days
and that it points to & date when Aristotle's Tapics were not only
assiduously used but enjoyed :! somewhat naive Favour with the masters
of longis.IThis fact, too, seemsto point to the sixties or seventiesof the
twelfth century.
Another reliable clue For the date of our Dialectica is to be found in
the extensive divisio scientiarumat the head of it.. lt opens as Follows:
90m: Sed ad evidentiam subsequencium sciendum est primo quod tria sunt in quibus
homo, sive humana natura, molestatur, sive deprimitur, secundum tria que sunt in sub-
stancia humana, scilicet anima, et corpus, (et (:): his coniunctum. lgnorancia exprimitur
ex parte anime; indigentia ex parte corporis, vicium ex parte coniuncti. Contra que
tria datum est homini :: suo Creatore triplex rcmediunn..scilicet potencia in anima
acquirendi sciencias, vel artes liberales, que liberant animam al) ignoranda; sed contra
indigentiam potencia acquirendi artes mechanicas: per has enim removetur indigentia;
contra vicium autem potencia acquirendi virtutuis.2
The same topic of the three human needs to be fulFllled by the three
remedies OF science, techniques, and virtue, is Frequently found in the
twelfth century and may be taken For typical OFthe time after the
forties.3 lt certainly belongs to the Mediaeval Platonic-Augustinian
tradition as reflected in the works of Hugh of St Victor and those of the
School of Chartres.4 The £ria-t0pic does not occur in the thirteenth
century, as Faras I know.5
As & matter of fact, there are a few more Features which make us
'think of the School of Chartres. Grabmann already pointedf' to the
' Comparc the initial phrase Propositumes.'.in the Ar: ;Hchduna, above, p. 278. For the
Tapicaasa favourite work, see]Ohn of Salisbury,;I'lctalogicon
III, chs. 5-10.
1 Compare the parallel passagein the division given on f. 893"ILof the same Munich
manuscript; seeedition, pp. 459-460.
3 See my paper: SameNotason the Tu'c-ljïhCcntmyTopic qf the Thrcc (Four) HumanEvils
and rJScicncc, l*'frtuc, and chhniqucs as Their Rcmcdics,in VIVARIUM 5 (1967), pp. 8-15.
4 See ibid., pp. 9-l I.
5 See ibid., p. 14.
(' Bearbcirungcnund Auslegungcn,p. 43.
412 LOGICAMODERNORUMIl
in the former division of sciences:
opposition OFmegacosmos-microcosmos
8993: Musica dividitur in tres partes: quedam est mundana, quedam humana, -quedam
instrumentalis. Mundam est que consistit in ordinacione parcium mundi in ipso mega-
cosmo, idest maiori mundo.. Humana est que consistit in compositione parcium micro-
cosmi, idest hominis.
ln this connection a remarkable passage discussing the Forma] cause of

the dialetica may be quoted:
ars
90"): Ex parte causeformalis sic describitur: dialetica est ars arcium, sciencia scientiarum
que sola facit scire et scientem apparere.l Sicut enim lux est quasi forma 1«risibilisrei
eoquod non contingit rem videre nisi mediante luce, eo modo oracio sillogistica, sine
qua nichil contingit recte sciri est quasi formale lumen omnis cognitionis (edition,
p. 46211'16).
No doubt, this reference to the basic function of light must be reckoned

among the speculations about nature so p0pular with the School of
Chartres. Notice also the enumeration of causes in the tract on the loci
communes:
IOSVB:Notandumergo quod quatuor sunt generacausarum:eFFlciens,

formalis, materia-
lis, Funalia.Et concurrunt ad generacionem cuiuslibet rei naturalis et eciam ad causa-
cionem mundi. Unde versus:
Wriens causaDeuscir, jbrmah'sydca,
facilis bonitas, matcrialisyle
(edition, p. 5417'12).
1061'5:Alia est causaformalis, illa scilicet que est in mente artificis operantis, secundum
quam regulat suasoperaciones. Et hec appellaturydca siveforma exemplarisvel paradigma
(edition, p. 54-3l'3).
Elsewhere the mundusarchetipus is mentioned by our author as mundus

sicut intelligitur (1091'b; edition, p. 56130'3').
The classiHcation of sciences, too, is typical of the second part of the
twelfth century. lt appears to be closely related to those discussed by
Grabmann in his Geschichteder SchalastischenMcthode.2 lt clearly diH'ers
From those current From the Erst part of the thirteenth century, such as
found in the Munich manuscript C.L.M. 14:460 on Ff. 11'-4-1';28T-321';
32f-33V; 150f-151'ï'; and 167r-168v.3 The latter, indeed, are based,
1 Cfr. St Augustine, De ordine ", 13.

1 11,2, pp. 28-54: UngcdruckrcWissenschqftseinreiiungen
und Wissenschqftslehren.
3 All these classiücations form the initial parts of commentarius on logic (mostly on
Porphyry's 1:03090).SeeM. Grabmann, Die logischcnSchrfjirendesNikolausvon Paris, in:
Mittelalterliches Geistesleben [, pp. 225-228; 236-237; 241-242; and 243-246.
all of them, on the Aristotelem works from which their criterion of

arrangement was taken. In the classilïcation Found in the intr-zz-czluctor),r
part oFour Dialectica,such an arrangement is not found at all.
There seemsto be, however, an argument against dating our Dialectica

before the First decades of the thirteenth century. Our author seems
to know the weIl-known mnemonic verses on syllogistics Barbara,
Celarent, which were probablyr not in common use before the Fll'St
(lecades of the thirteenth century.l In fact, they occur in our copy in
the tract on syllogism. However, sonwthing peculiar must be noticed
here. The versebelongingto the Erst ngre of the syllogism(BARBARA,
CELARENT etc.) is found after the discussionof the modiof the
......
introduced by the Formula: facilius
First Figure, hec omnia possunthaberi
per hos versus: (BAR.BA.RA. CE. LA. RENT etc.) 96V3;
.......
edition, p. 494'4H'). On the other hand,the verseserving to clarif)r the
modiof the secondFigure(CE.SA.RE,CAM.EST.RES etc.) is missingafter
the discussion of that Egure, but is found, together: with that concerning
the third Egure (DA.RAP.TI., FE.LAP.TONetc.) at the end of the
discussion of the third figure: Et sciendumquod omnia que dicta sunt de
secundaet terciafgura, faciliter possunthaberi per hos versus:(CE.SA.RE
.
CAzlf!.EST.RES etc.( edition,
97ra-rb; pp..497sr-4933).
This peculiar......
arrangement OFthe mnemonic verses strongly suggests
that they were interpolated in the original treatise.z No doubt the latter
did not contain these verses, but some glossator wrote the verses
BARBARA,CELARENTetc. in the margin of the discussion of the Erst
Figura. ] snppose, the spacein the margin of the discussionof the second
Egure was too small and, accordingly, our glossator added the versesof
the second Egure together with those of the. third in the margin of the
discussionof the third figure?
This surmise seems to find some support in another addition in our
' On these verses, see above, pp. 401-403.

2 That nur manuscriptis only &copy of the original treatiseappearsfrom [. 99"b (edition,
p. 50931'33)where an illustrative schemais announced (quid autem sit speciesspecialis-
sima et quid speciessubalternaet quid genusgeneralissimumet quid genussubalternum,
patet in hacji'gura). But it is not found in our manuscript.
3 It should be noted that apparently the occurrente of Barbara, Caloremwas the only
reason for Grabmann to date our work in the thirteenth century, unlesshe took the.date
of this part of our manuscript asgiven by the Munich catalogue (5. XIII) asa reliable clue
for the date of the original treatise itself.
manuscript.. In the discussion of the kinds of proposition the following

passage is found in our text:
921'3: Post hec notandum quod secundum tria dubitabilin tripliciter contingit queri de
proposicione. Dubitatur enim quandoque de essencia, et tunc qucrimus per hoc nomen
'qua' ut 'qua est hec proposicio?', et tunc debet l'cslmnderi: 'ccthegorica' 1w:]'ypodrerfca'.
Item. Dubitatur de qualitate, et tunc querimus: 'quam est hecproposicia?',et debet
responderi: 'ajrmativa' vcl 'ncgatira'. Item. Dubitando de quantitate proposicionis
qucrimus: 'quanta es.'.ista proposicioï; ei debet responderi aliquod membrum huius
divisionis: universalis, particularis, indqfi'nita, singularis. (edition, p. 47021'23).
An apparently later hand added in the margin the wellknown' mnemo-

technical verses:
Que? cam vel yell. QUALIS? Nir:W vel AFFIRW
QLIANTA? Uliä. PI'IE. le. SINNH.
Well, now, these verses are found in tracts on logic dating from as
early as about 12001 so that their addition in our manuscript is a reliable
clue for its terminusante quem, indeed.
] think, we must conclude From these additions that the original
treatise should be dated not later than the last decades of the twelfth
century. I doubt whether the spelling of Sor and Sortesfor Socratesshould
not be ascribed to the thirteenth centuryr copyist.3
As to its author, he [')robablyrmust be looked for in that English circle
(Oxford ?) the members of which maintained close relations with
Chartres and Paris.4 He is likely to have been active about the time when
John ofSalisbury was bishopof Chartres (] 176-80).
I propose to call our treatise, after the codex in which it has been
preserved (Munich, C.]..zH. 14.763) the Dialectica flïanaccnsis.It will be
edited in full in our second part as Tract XI, pp. 453-638.
Our Dialectica divides suppositio into suppositio discreta and suppositio

communis(6073743).The latter is subdivided in four ways (6087'10),so
that we may establish the following scheme:
' E.g. in the logica Cum sit nostra dating from about the last quarter of the twelfth
century; see below, edition, p. 4214.
: Sec, e.g. the logica Cum sit nostra, p. 4214; Peter of Spain, Summulc,nr. l.ll cd.
Bocheüskh
3 For thc spellings,cp. above,pp. 257; 446.
4 For instancc, one might think of somebodylike Samson,abbot of Bury St Edmonds.
Secabove, pp. 174, n. l ; 282.
discreta 9 simplex
!
—( personalis
.
& confusa
( determinata
supposntlo. . . I mobilis
—9
' inmobilis
communis
—-
& confusa
determinata
-
g restricta
( ampliata
As to the fll'St and second subdivisions, mobihs and personalisare

nearly identical, and so are inmobilisand simplex(610'0'13). The third
division (into coqfusaand determinata)is alsoapplicable to personalsup-
position (61333'35).As to the fourth division, into restrictaand ampliata,
though leading to & separate chapter De restrictions, it clearly forms part
of the general discussion of suppositio, in contrast to the parallel ex-
positions in the SummeMetenses'and in Peter of Spdin's Summulc.2
' See below, our Ch. XIV, p. 490.

: Seealsobelow, our Ch. XVI, pp. 585FF.
CHAPTER XIII
SOME EARLV OXFORD TRACTS ON LOGIC
The manuscript Digby 2 in the Bodleian Library in Oxforcl contains on

Ff. 26r-67V an interesting piece of logic.' It has the Foilowing incipit:
Cum sit nostra presens intencio ad artem dyaleticam, primo oportet scire quid sit
materia artis dyaletice. Materia artis dyaletice est vox significativa, quia de voce non
significativa nullus ageneratur in animo auditoris intellectus.
A similar incipit is Foundin another Digby manuscript (Digby 24)z of

the samelibrary on 1. 171":
Cum sit nostra presens intencio ad artem dialecticam, primo oportet scire quid sit
materiaartis dialetica. Materia artis dialetice est vox significatiua. Quare?Quia de voce
non singinFltiva(!) nullus ngeneraturintellectus in animo auditoris.
Besides, there are two manuscripts in the British Museum that contain
logical treatises with similar opening words: Rayal 1145
12 F. XIX, 90? FF.
and 1061'Ff. (two copies)and AdditionalM 8167, 1891"
Ff.
A closer inspection of the parallel passages-ofthese tracts reveals that
the Fwe manuscripts under discussion contain FwediFFerent redactions OF
some introduction on the art 01 logic, which has not been preserved in
its original form as Far as 1 know. The aim of this chapter is to give &
detailed analysisof the tracts found in the manuscripts under discussion,
to establish their approximate (lates and provenances, and to deal with
two other compendia of logic: which apparently belonged to the sources
OFthe treatise Cum sil: nostra.
1 - MS Digby 2, Ff. 26r-67v
After the incipit quoted above, our treatise gives deHnitio'ns of

introductio, instrumentum, ars, principium, preceptum, regula, and maxima:
! For an analysisof the manuscript, see above, Ch. 1, nr. 14, pp. 55-59.
: For an analysisof this manuscript, see above, Ch. [, nr.. 15, pp. 59-76.
some EARL'L' ()XFORD TRACTS ()N LOGIC 417
Introductio est brevis et aperta demonstratio in aliquam artem, quia per leviora et
faciliora debemus ingredi dil'Flciliora. Vel: introductio est facilis et compendiosus
tractatus eorum que in dimcilioribus tractatibus continentur.
Instrumentumartis clyaleticeest sillogismus,quia de sillogismoet de partibussillogismi
Flt tota dyaletica sive logica.
Ars est collectio multorum principiorum ad unumEnenitendentium,idestad scientiam.
Vel: ars est quoddam Fmitum inFmitatis compendium insigne rationis miraculum im-
perioslole nature consilium; quam si per se consideras minimam quantitatem reperies,
et si ad subiectate applicesmaximam potestateminvenies.
Et dicitur 'an' ab 'arw', -as', quia artat nos ( ); 1«.'-el:
artat animum sui inquisitoris
. . . . .
a confusione ignorancie ad naturalem rci cognicionem.
Principium dicitur quia primum est in arte; preceptumquia precepit sic facere; regula
quia regit artiFlcem; maximaquia maximam habet potestatem; dignitas quia dignius est
in arte.
Then follows a divisioni of ars and the deFmitions of each of the seven
libera! arts (26T-271').
Quot modis dividitur ars? Duobus modis, scilicet in artes mecanicaset in liberales.
Et sunt artes mecanice quc manibus eFHciuntur (26v). Artes liberales sunt septem,
scilicet gramatica, dyalctica, rethorica, arsmctica, musicar'geometria, astronomia.
Gramatica docet recte scribere et recte loqui. Unde versus:
me pueri: primam tradidit natura .«l'fincrvam.
Et dicitur a 'grama', quad est litera et 'icas' scientia, quasi litoralis scientia.
Dyaletica docet discernere verum a falso. Llndc versus:
me sine docwrasfrtmra coluere sorores.
Et dicitur a 'dya', quod est duo, et 'logos' sermo,quasi dualir sermo.
Rethorica docet ornate loqui. Unde versus:
est meadi[s]cendiratio cumfiore loquendi.
Et dicitur a 'rethos', quod est ornatum, et 'iam" scientia, quasi scientia de ornata loquela.
Arsmetricadocetde numeroper se. Undeversus:
rerum mensuraset earum signojgurai.
Et dicitur ab 'arc', quod est numeruset 'mea-:"mensuraet 'icas' scientia, quasi numerali:
scientia mensurandi.
Musica docet de numero relato. Unde versus:
invenire locum per me moderaminavocum.
Et dicitur a 'mays', quod est aqua, et 'icos' scientia,quasi scientiaiuxta aquaminventa.
Geometria docet de magnitudine mobili, scilicet de mensura terre. Unde versus:
explico per numerumque sit proportio remm.
Et dicitur a 'gc', quod est terra, et 'nmos'(!) mensura,quasi de terra mensura.
Astronomia docet de magnitudine mobili, scilicet de motu Firmamenti et planetarum.
Unde versus:
astra viasquepoli varias mihi vendito! soh.
Et dicitur ab 'anra' (!), quod (27?) est stella et "mqys'(!) mcnmra,quasi destellis mensura.
' corr. ex vindico Ms.

This section ends with another division of the artes:
Item. Dividuntur artes in triviale et quatriviale (!). Et dicitur triviaic a 'm's', quod est
tre;, et 'via, vic', quasi tres vie tendentes in unum, scilicet in eloquentiam. Item.
Dividitur ars in trivium, scilicet in grammatica, dyaletica et rethorica. Quatriviale
dicitur de 'quamor'et 'via' quasiquatuor vie tendentesin unum, scilicet (in sapienciam.
Item. Dividitur ars in quatrivium, scilicet) in artemetria (!) et in musica, in geometria
et in astronomia.
Trivium est eloquentia. Et est eloquentia ydoneorum verborum sive scientiarum
venustarum recta consideracio. Quatriviale tendit ad sapienciam. Et est sapientia saporis
contenta(?) condicio.
The deHnition given of sapientia sounds rather enigmatically indeed:

saporis contenta condicio.
I think that a passageFrom an anonymous commentarr on Martiam
Capella probably dating from the twelfth century?l may be compared
with this deFmition. It gives the Following definition of philosophia,
ascribed to one Master Adam who presumably was Adam of the Petit
Pont: apud magistrum Adam philosophia est sapore virtutum condita
("wisdon'nspiced by the Havor of virtue"). ] snppose, the
.f.-f:):u'ïentia2
delinition of sapienciaFound in Digby 2 should be read: est sapientia
saporis condimento conditio: "wisdom is the spicing with the spice of
subtlety". A similar metaphor is used by Adam's pupil Alexander
Neckamin his poem De laudibusdivinaesapientiae.3
The parallel may be
considered as additional evidence For the identity of the master Adam.
Then, the definition of dialetica, well-known from the later Summulae
is given and an objection is added together with its refutation:
Quid est dyaletica? Dyaletica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, quia sola facit scire
et nescientem posse manifestare.
Contra. Theologia est ars artium, scientia scientiarum; non ergo dyaletica. Dicendum
quod dyaletica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, quia sine illa nulla ars perfecte
potest sciri (27r).
' found by Manitius (see next note) in Dresden, öffentliche Bibliothek, Ms Dc. 17! zl,
the manuscript is lost since the last World War. See alse,-the next note.
H".4-2'1'-4-3'-';
2 p. 431940 ed. Manitius (Max Manitius: Analektcn zur Schulgeichichtedes Mittelalters in:
Mitteilungen der GesellschaftFür deutscheErziehungs-und Schulgeschichte16 (I906).
For :- description of the manuscript, ap. cfr., pl). 40-41. As to the identiHcation of
Magister Adam, see Manitius, op. cfr., p. 41.
3 Alexandri Neckam, Dc laudibus divinae .ïapicnnacdistinctione: darem, cd. Wright,
London 1863, vss9-10 (p. 357):
novit amor verus condire sapore timorem
canditusqucjïrrc nari: amare timor.
SOME EARLV OXFORD TRACTS ON LOGIC 419
Next, our author gives the etymology of the word idi--.".-leutif:c.-"

and the
contradistinction of dialeticaand logica (271').
After all theseintr'Dductcu'yrnotes the tract itself starts (27?) with the
deBnition and clivision of sonus.Then the author goeson to speak about
vox, namen, verbum, oratio, and propositia (27r-281'). A rather extensive
discussionis found on the kinds of propositio,conversio,
the equipollentia
prapasitionum,and the various kinds OFmodal propositions and their
interrelations (28r-351').This part of our treatise breaksoFFon P. 351",
where the x-vell-knownfgura modorumhas been drawn. The remainder of
this page contains the beginnings of & section which opens as follows:
Ut dicit Aristotiles in Libro Predicamcnrorum,singulum incomplexorum aut significat
substantiam, ut animal, lignum, aut qualitatem, ut album, nigrum, aut quantitatem, ut
bicubitum,tricubitum, aut relationem, ut dominus,servus etc.
.....
This chapter continues on Ff. 35V and 361'and turns out to be a tract on
the predicabilia (after Porphyry's [sagoge).It enclsabruptly on f. 36r
where some space hasbeen reserved For a Figure.
On f 36V our author starts the chapter comn'ronly called dengc-gismis
.
afterwards.Any headingis lackinghere. The incipit runsasfollows:
Ut dicit Boetius, argumentum est ratio rei dubie faciensFidem,idest certitudinem de re
dubia. Quot sunt species argumenti? Quatuor. Que sunt emptimema (!), exemplum,
inductio, sillagismus.
This chapter ends at the end of F. 381".On the next side (f. 38?) our
author goeson to speakabout the loci communes.. The title (De lacis) is
missing:
Ut dicit Boetius, locus est sedesargumenti. Et dichrt argumentum al:-argumentatione,
quia argumentum est in mente, argumentatio extra mentem. Vel: argumentum est ipsa
ratio aliquid probans sive dicatur sive non; argumentatio est dum conaistit in probatione.
Unde argumentatio est (argumenti) per orationem explicatio.
F.. 42r (line 21) our author starts & new chapter with the following
words:
Ut dicit Aristotiles, omnis sillogismus constat ex prapositionibus et propositio ex
terminis. Ideo ad cognicionem sillogismi primo oportet (42?) precognoscereterminos.
Sed termini possunt cognosci dnpliciter: aut per materiam, secundum quod dictio
constat ex litteris et sillabis — et sic cognoscit eos gramaticus —; aut secundum formam
et propriam significationem; et sic cognoscit eos logicus.
Dicendum quod quidam sunt termini categorematici et quidam cincategorematice(!).
intendimushic (42f'V).
Sedsolumde cntegorematicis
These words are the introductory lines of an important tract on snp-

position, which ends on F. 443', line 18. It is Follox—vecl
by a tract on
appellatioand another on copulatio(F. 4513,line 14). This section 'x-vinds
up as follows:
Et sciendum quod quando terminus communis copulat tempus futurum et lJreteritmn,
confuse significat qualequid, determinate hocaliquid.
Then our author makes& Freshstart (P.461') with the Following 1wmrds:
Ut dicit Aristotiles in principio Elencorum, quatuor sunt genera disputacionum, scilicet
disputncio doctrinalis, dyaletica, temptativa, sophistica.
Disputaciodoctrinalis est quae procedit ex primis et veris principiis et inmediatis,
qualiter disputat geometer.
Dyalectica est illa que procedit ex probabilibus tantum. Et sunt probabilia quc vera
videnturonmibusvel pluribusvcl sapientibus.Ad quid pertinet probabile?Ad opinionem.
Disputatio temptativa est illa que procedit ex illis que videntur respondenti. Et pertinet
ad experimentum ignorancie.
Disputatio saphisticaest illa que procedit ex apparentcrprobabilibus.Ad quid pertinet?
Ad apparentemgloriam quoadopponentem,et addeceptionemquoadrespondentem.
This part (Ff.46P-67V) contains & rather extensive paraphraseof

Aristotle's De sophistici:elenchis,commonly entitled Dc Palladis; this
title is mentioned in the explicit (F. 67ï', line 17):
Sed videtur quod ista fallacia (viz. the fallacia secundum
plures interrogationesut unam
faaas) cliFfert ab equivocntione, quia in omni paralogismo equivocationis interregantur
plura ut unum sub eadem voce, hic autem sub diversis vocibus. EXPLICIUNT
FALLACIE.
Hereafter the same hand continues (P. 681") with a tract on the
predicabiha. See the analysisgiven above, Ch. ], nr. 14; see also p. 432.
As we shall seein the next section (below, p. 423ET.)the logica] treatise
under discussion consists of two main parts: (l) what is elsewehere
namedSummulc(l'ï. 26r-45V), and (2) a tract on Fallacies(Ff. 46r-67V).
24,Ff.17ra-45va
2 - MsDigby
I give the introductory sections of the logical treatise Cum sit nostra
as found in Ms Digby 24, Ff. I7W-45W:
Cum sit nostra presens intentio ad artem dialeticam, primo oportet scire quid sit
materiaartis dialetice. Materia artis dialetica est vox signiücativa. Quare?Quia de voce
non singinEtiva(!) nullus agencraturintellectus in animo auditoris.
SOME EARLV OXFORD TRACTS ON LOGlC 42l
Contra. Nullum accidens potest esse materia; vox est accidens; ergo non potest esse
materia artis dialetice.
Solucio. Dicendumquod vox dupliciter potest considerari:aut inquantumproferturab
ore alicuius, et sic est accidens; aut inquantum est pars et diccio nominis, et sic non est
accidens.
Qyid es: instrumentumarti; dialeticc?Sillogismm. anre? Qyia de sillagismoet de partibus

siHagismijir. tam dialetica sive logica. (296suntparteseius?Enuntiacia, propajicia et terminus.
Et est introduccio brevis et aperta demonstratio.
Contra. Digitus vel stramen est introducciü. Ergo. Dicendum quod licet digitus vel
stramen sit brevis et aperta demonstrando, non tamen quoad introduccio.
Ars est collectio multorumprincipiorum ad unumfinem tendendum.(17r5) Contra. Arbor cst

colleccio multorum principiorum ad unum Hnem tendendum; ergo arbor e5t ars. Ergo.
Dicendumquod licet arbor sit colleccio multorum principiorum ad unum Fll'lel'l'ltcn-
clencium ut ad stipitem, tamen non est calleccio multarum regularum, quia non pertinet
ad Enem 0(p)ponendi neque respondendi.
Then the same remarkable definition of ars as occurs in Digby 2 is Found:
Ars est quoddam Enitum (quod Fmitum .'Hs)infinitatis cnmpendium insigne rationis
miraculum imperiose nature consilium; quam si (qui :Hs)per se consideresminimam
quantitatem invenies, et si ad subiecta te applices, maximam potestatem reperies.
Ars dividitur (in duas p).:trtes, scilicet in artes liber::(les et in) artes mecanicas. Et
sciendum quod artes mecanice sunt infinite quoad n(os), (173'5) Fmite tamen quoad
naturam.
Artes liberalessunt septem ctc. Seethe text of Digby2, quoted above,p. 4175.
......
A striking dil'ïerence with the text in Digby 2 is that this manuscript

does not contain the etymologias of the names of the several arts
((gramatica', 'dyaletica' etc.). Moreover the order of musicaand arith-
metica has been reversed. Finally, the second division Found in Digby 2
(into artestrivialesand artesquadrivialcs)is missingin this copy.
A damp stain hasmade the text on Ff. 171'IJand [7193almost illegible,
but we can see that From now on our text runs practically parallel to that
of Digby2. On F. 17?" the sameobjection asin Digby 2 (f. 27T)is Founcl:
Contra. Teologia est ars arcium. Non ergo dialetica. Sed dicendum
. . . . . etc.
Sometimes Digby 24 offers a more complete. text than Digby 2; e.g.

after the words (Digby 2, P. 271' : Digby 24, f. l7ï'b) logica vero ex
probabili ec apparenti probabili (Digby 2 reads: apparenti vero), Digby 2
immediately starts the treatment of sonus("Quid est sonus?" etc.).
... .
Dilqby24, however,aFFords
a better transition:
Constat autem dialetica ex argumentacionibus, argumentacio ex propositionibus et

proposiciones ex terminis; et terminus est vox et vox est sonus, ideo a sono primo
inchoandum est.
The continuation in both copies of this passus is interesting:
Ms Digby 24, [. 17"), lines l5-21: Sonus est quicquid ab aure percipitur. Contra.
Frigus percipitur ab aure; ergo frigus est sonus. Solutio. Dicendum quod aliquid per-
cipitur ab aure [est] dulwliciter,scilicet proprie et improprie; unde frigus percipitur ab
aure inproprie et ideo non est sonus.
This objection does not occur in Digby2, but the refutation (dicendum
quod) has been worked into the definition which Digby 2 gives of it:
Ms Digby 2, P. 271', lines l9-20: Quid est sonus? Sonus est quidquid ab aure auditu
proprie percipitur.
The conclusion, too, of this paragraph shows remarkable differences

between our copies:
Ms Digby 2, f. 27'", lines 1-8: Ms Digby 24, f. ISTE, lines 6-19:

Vocum alia signiEcativa, alia non signilï- Vocum alia significativa, alia non signiE-
cativa.V0x signiEcativaut 'homo', 'animal' ; cativa. Vox significative: est qua imponitur
vox non signiücativa, ut 'buba', 'bultrix'. ad signjf'candum aliquid ut 'homo' est (!)
Item. Vocum significativarum alia signifi- 'animal'. Vox non significative; est que
cativa naturaliter, alia ad placitum. Vox nichil signifcat, ut 'bau', 'bav', 'blccrix'.
significativa ad placitum est quo secundum Vocum signiEcativarum alia ad placi-
placitum instituentis aliquid signffï'cac, ut dum (!), alia naturaliter. Vox significativa
'homo', 'animal'; vox signiücativa natura- ad placidum est que (in)panir.ur ad aliquid
liter, ut gemitus inürmorum, latratus ca- signyï'candum,ut 'homo' est (!) 'animal'.
num, ira, risus :: (? luctus). Vox significative;naturaliter es.'.queprovenit
Qyid cs: Summa?Summa est colleccio ex.natura, ut latratus canum, gemitus in-
multarum regularum sub compendio Hrmorum.
sumpta, quia compendiumest quoddambreve Summa est colleccio plurimarum re-
et utile, dispendiumlongumet inutile. gularum sub compendio sumpta.
This comparison not only clearly shows the mutua! independence of

both copies, but also puts it beyond doubt that they represent two
dilï'erent adaptations of some original treatise. For the sake of clarity'
I call this original treatise: T.
After the prologue the diFferencesseem to be lesssubstantial : Digby 24
makes the impression of having been written by a rather careless scribe,
the man'sself-esteem(seeabove,Ch. I, nr. 15, p. 60).
n'ende'plaise
As to the character of T, I think we have to look for its author among
SOME EARLï' 0:4me 'I'RACTS ON LOGIC 423
those logicians who were strongly inHuenced by grammatica] theorias.

This surmise seems to Fmd some support in the following passuson the
doctrine of snpposition. I quote from Oxford Digby 2, as this copy
seems to give & more reliable text here:
Ms Digby 2, [. 43", line 16 - f. 4-4-r',line 6:
Item. Suppositionum alia gemina, alia antonomatica. Gemina est quando proposicio est
copulativa, ut l.Sïare: Plato currunt'. Antonomatica est quando terminus supponit pro eo
cui maxime convenit nomine. Ut 'Apostolusdicit hoc', intelligitur: Paulus;similiter
'Philoxaphusdicit hoc'; intelligitur: Aristoteles.
Item. Supposicionum alia sinodochica, alia metonomatica. Sinodochica est quando pars
supponit pro toto, vcl econverso, ut 'prora est in mari'; prora est anterior pars navis, et
ita ponitur pars pro toto. (P.441"). Supposicio metonomatica est quando continens
punitur pro contento, ut 'bibc ciphum', idest quod continetur in cipho.
Item. Supposicionum alia prcpria, alia inpmpria. Supposicio propria est illa quando
terminus supponit pro sua signiücatione propria, ut 'homo currit'. Inpmpria est illa
quando terminus supponit inpmprie, ut 'Angh'apugnat', idest gens Anglie. — Et iste
due suPposicionespertinent ad gramaticam.
We may return, now, to our analysisof Ms Digby 24. The treatise

Cumsit nostrapresensintendo as presented by our codex, ends f 4—5Mafter
.
the tract De Palladis. This proves that in Digby 2 we must put & caesum
after [. 671", where the scribe only wrote EXPLICIUNTFALLACIE(see
above,p. 420). The conclusionin ngb)124 doesnot leaveany doubt:
EXPLICIUNT
SUMMULE
CUMOMNIBUS FALLACIIS
QUISCRIPSIT
CARMEN:
AMEN (r. 45va,lines20-23).
SITBENEDICTUS
Moreover the next column (F 4-5V'J)openswith somecommentson our

.
'treatise: Quare magisdicis (!) 'cum' quam 'si'? etc. (For these
......
comments, see below, p. 425f.
The division of our Summule
asfound in Digby 2 and 24 is as Follows:
Prologue: Digby 2, Ff. 26r-27V; ngb] 24, Ff. 171'3-l8m
[ Nomen, verbum, oratio, propositio: Digby 2, Ff. 27V-351': Digby24,

['P.181'3-23'f'rb
! the four versesof this explicitare meant.

lnc. Nomen est vox signiFlcativa ad placitum sine tempore cuius nulla pars per
se signiFlcat Finita recta. Contra. 'res publica' est nomen et li 'res' significat per
se et li 'pubhca' per se; ergo aliqua pars nominis per se signiücat.
This tract ends with the treatment of moda! proposition.
ll Tract on the prcchcabiha: Digby 2, IT. 35T-36f Digby 24, H.

23vl)-24vl)
Inc. Ut dicit )f'n'isltq'.:)tileslin Libra Predicamamarumsingulum incomplexorum

aut signilïcat substantiam, ut 'animal', "Luïqgirwaw'".z
aut quantitatem, ut 'bicubiwm',
'lricubitum', aut qualitatem, ut 'album' 'nfgrum', aut relacionem, ut 'daminus',
'sanfus', aut accionem, ut 'ïecara', 'urara', aut paasionem, ut 'xacari', 1turrim,,
aut
ubi, ut 'Hh'c', vel 'hic',3 aut quando, ut 'hadia', 'hari', aut positionem, ut 'arma''!
'scdarc',aul:habitum, ut 'armatumam', 'calcl'arum«me'!
......
Predicabile est quod de altero est subicibile. Predicamentum est ordinacio
predicabilium.5 Universale est quod'5predicaturü de pluribus.
III Tract on syllogism: Digby 2, Ff. 36V-381' : Digby 24, Ff. 251'3-26")
!nc. Ut dicit Boecius, argumentum est racio rei dubie faciens Eclem, idest
certitudinem de re dubia.? Et3 sunt quatuor species argumentiB: emptimema,
exemplum, induccio, silllagismus.
The welI-known mnemonic verses BARBARA, CELARENT etc.

......
are added (ngby 2, f. 3715;Digby 24, f. 25V3).
IV The tract on the laci communes:Digby 2, Ff. 38V-4-21'; Digby 24,

Ff. 26'-'3v-291'ïl
lac. Ut dicit Boecius, locus est sedes argumenti. Et differt argumentum ab
argumentacione, quia argumentum est in mente, argumentum est extra
mentem. Vel: argumentum est ipsa racio aliquid probans sive dicatur sive non;
argumentacio est dum? consistit in probatione.!" Unde argumentatio est argu-
menti" per oracionem explicncia.
' Cf. Aristotle, Caragarjaa,c. 4, lb25 Ff.

3 Digby 24 reads'homo', 'animal'.
3 Digby 24: hic ibi.
4 Digby 2 omits calciatum am.
5 predicamentum pradicabihumomitted by DiLy 2.
......
6 ngby 24 reads: quad art aptum natum predicari.
? idest dubia omitted by Digby 24.
.......
3 Digby 2 reads: qua: sunt spacia argumenti? anttuar. de aunt etc.
......
9 praur, Digby 24.
"' prabaciana, Digby 2.
11omitted by Digby2.
SOME EARLX OXFORD TRACTS ON LOGIC 425
V The tract on supposition, appellation, and cepulation: Digby 2,

Ff. 42r-45'4'; Digby 24, Ff. 29r'J-3IW
lnc. Ut dicit Aristotiles, omnis sillogismus constat ex propositionibus et propo-
sicio ex terminis
........ etc.; seeabove, p. 419).
VI The tract on fallacy: Digby 2, FF.46f-67V; Digby 24, Ff. 319'11-45W

Inc. Ut dicit Aristotiles in [:n'incipictwlElencorum ccc.; see above, p. 420.
......
For the explixit of this tract and of the whole Sumule,see above, p. 420.
As we havealready seen, Digby 2, after our Sumule,contains from [. 681-
in a somewhat diFFerenthandwriting the SummaPorjïriana by William of
Montoriel (seeabove,Ch. I, nr. H, 13.57). This Summaand the other
works on the Ars vetusare Iacking in Digby 24.
Digby 24 continuaswith the initia] columnsof :: commentaryon our

Summ'de (Ff- 45V'L46f"). I quote them in full: "
Quare magis dicis 'cum' quam 'si'? Quia 'cum' signiFlcatcertitudinem et 'si' significat
incertitudinem; et dignior est certitudo incertitudine; ergo melius dicitur 'Cum' quam
'Sy' (!).
Quare magis'presensintencio'quam 'prcterita' vel 'furura' ? Quia presensse habetad modum
habitus, preteritum et futurum ad modum privacionis; sed dignior est habitus quam
privacio; ergo etc.
Quare magis dicis 'inrencio' quam 'prapositum'?Quia 'intencio' se habet ad presens,
'pr0posizum'
tamen ad preteritum vel futurum. Quia presenscicior est preterito vel
futuro, ergo etc.
Quid est instrumentum artis dialectice? Sillogismus. Contra. Omne instrumentum aut
(Ms: ad) est tangibile aut visibile; sed sillogismus nec est tangibilis nec visibilis; ergo
etc. Dicendum quod duplex est instrumentum, scilicet artiFnciale et sermocinale; si
sermocinale, sic est instrumentum, si artificiale, sic non.
'Qyo:sun:artesliberala? Septem.Quare non sunt plures nec pauciores?Quia imponuntur
:: septemdonis Spiritus Sancti. Quare sunt liberales?Quia in antiquo tempore nulli
solebant audire istas nisi Filiorum (? to be read: fh'i liberorum). Vel: quia
......
reddunt suosauditores liberos a servitute.
Next we fmd (f. 46T3-Tb)the etymologiesof the words 'gramatica',

'dialetica', 'rethorica', 'musica', 'geometria','astranomia'and 'arsmetria' (!)1II
which are given by Digby 2 in the text of the Sumulebut are missing in
the text of Digby 24. This is not only an additional argument for my
' Diglgy 24 reads: Libro.
hypothesis (see above, p. 422), that Digby 2 and 24 represent two

diFferent adaptations of some original treatise T, but it also makes it
clear that Digby 2, too, gives an interpolated version of T.
After this annotation our comments contain two other questions
together with their answers(F. 461"!up to the end):
Quare magis dicit 'sit' quam 'an'? Quia 'si:' signilïcat tempus completum et 'est'
nondumcompletum.Et tempuscompletumdignior (!) est temporenondumcmnpleto;
ideo etc.
Quare magisdicit 'nostra-'quam 'rcscra'?Quia 'nostra'pertinet lectori et auditoribus et
'u'cstra'tantum auditoribus. Sed quia tam bene indiget lectori adibcre curam Sume
quam auditores (!), ergo etc.
Here the notes break OFF.
3 - British Museum, RoyalM: 12 P. XIX, Ff. 90T-105V

This manuscript contains another adaptation of the logical treatise
Cumsit nostra. To show the diFferencesFrom the preceding tracta, I give
the text of the introductory section in full (f. 901'3'1'3):
[I] Cum sit nostrapresensintencio ad artem dialeticnm,primo Oportetscire quid sit
materia artis dialeticc.
[2] Quare magisdicit prcscmintendoquam prateritavelfutura? Quia presenstempus se
habet ad modum csse, preteritum vel futurum ad modum non esse, ideo magis dicit
presensquam prctcritus veljiuurus.
[3] Materia artis dialetice est vox signiücativa,quia de voce twn significantiam
nullus
agencratur intellectus in animo auditoris.
[4] Contra. Nullum accidens potest esse materia. Vox est accidens. Ergo vox non potest
essemateria. Dicendumad minorem; quandodicitur: "vox est accidens",quod vox

potest considerari vel inquantum est communis ad omnem vocem — et sic est accidens
et nullomodo materia —, vel inquantum est vox et dictio signiücativa; et sic potest esse
materia.
[5] Quid est instrumentumartis dialetice?Sillogismus,quia de sillogismoet de partibus
sillogismi Fit tota dialetica sive logica.
[6] Quod sillogismusnon sit instrumentum,probo. Aristotiles in libro Prcdicamemorum
determinat de decem nominibus et in libro Pcricrmcnias
de proposicione tamquamde suis
instrumentis,et non desillogismo.Ergovidetur quodsillogismusnon sit instrumentum.
Dicendum quod in illis libris determinat de suis instrumentis specialibus et non de suo
instrumento generali. Et hoc non est inconveniens.
[7] Quid est introductio? Breviset apertademonstratio.
[8] Quare dicit breviset aperta?Quia per breviora et faciliora debemusingredi difFlCi-
liam.
[9] Contra. Digitus est brevis et aperta demonstratio. Ergo est introductio. Dicendum
quod duplex est 'brevis et aperta demonstrario',scilicet sensualis et intellectualis. Unde
digitus est sensualisintroductio. Non tamen est demonstratio sive introductio in aliquam
artem.
[IO] Quid est ars?Ars est collectio multorum principiorum ad unum Finemtendentium.
SOME EARL? oxmnn TRACTS ON LOGIC 427
[11] Contra. Arbor est collectio multorum ad (unum) Hnem tendentium. Ergo arbor
est ars. Dicendumquod arsest collectio multarum regularumad unum Finemtendentium,
ut ad Finemopponendi et respondendi. Arbor est collectio multorum ramunculorum ad
stipitem tendentium.
[12] Ars est quoddam Fmitum inEn(i)tatis compendium insigne rationis miraculum
imperiosum nature consilium, quam si in se consideres minimam quantitatem reperies,
sed si ad subiecta (90fb) te applices maximam potestatem invenies.
[13] Principium, preceptum, maxima, regula, dignitas. Principium, quia primum est
in arte. Preceptum, quia precipit facere sic vel sic. Maxima, quia habet maximam po-
testatem. Regula, quia regit artilïcem. Dignitas, quia dignius est in arte.
[14] Vel quia dignior est omnibus in arte contentis. Similiter dicitur primumquia trahit
ad artiscognitionem.Et dicitur locuseoquodin ipsafundaturtota scientia.
addiscentem
[15] Arsdicitur ab 'arc' grece, quod est virtuslatinel quia reddit hominesvirtuosos.
[16] Ars dividitur in artes mecanicas et in artes liberales. Artes mccanice sunt sicut ars
sutoria et ars pelliparia et huiusmodi. Et dicuntur a 'mccanos'grece, quod est manuali:
latine, quia manibus cunFiciuntur. Artes liberales dividuntur in trivium et in qua-
drivium. Triviam dicitur a 'm's', quod est trcs, et 'via, rie', quasi trcs vic concurrentes ad
unam viam, quia tres, scilicct gramatica, dialetica, rethorica, sunt ex parte vocis sive
sermonis. andririum dicitur quatuor vie concurrentes in unum, ut scilicet arsmetrica,
musica, geometria, astronomia.
[17] Gramatica docet rccte scribere et recte loqui, ut non ponatur unus casus pro alio
"
nec una litera pro alia. Unde vcrsus:
mc pueris primam tradidit natura :l-Iincrram.
Et dicitur a 'gmma', quod est litera, et 'icos': scientia, quasi literali; fcientia.
[18] Contra. Omnis scienciaest literata. Ergo omnis scienciaest gramatica. Dicendum
quod gramatica denominatur a litera inmcdiate, idest cum nullo medio; omnis autem alia
scientia mediate, mediante gramatica. Et idea gramatica pocius denominatur a litera
quam alia sciencia.
[19] Contra. Quod gramaticanon sit scienciaprobo. lllud quod habemusa natura, non
est sciencia. Sed gramaticam habemus a natura. Ergo non est scientia. Probatio minoris:
gramatica docet recte scibere et recte lnqui; scd recte loqui habemusa natura; ergo et
gramaticam. Dicendum (quod) gramatica potest dupliciter considerari, aut inquantum
docet naturalemquuutionem quam habemusa natura — et sic non est scientia—; aut
inquantum docet regulasgramatice; et sic est scientia.
[20] Dialctica docet discernereverum a falso.Unde versus:
mc £ine dactarcsj'ustra coluere IOI'OI'CS.
.
Et dicitur dialetica :! 'dia', quod est duo, vel (et 3145)
'logas', quod est sermo,vel (et MS)
'Iexis': ratio, quasi duorum :ermo vel ratio. -
[21] Contra.In omniscientiadiscernitur veruma falso.Ergoomnisscientiaest dialetica.

Dicendumquod 'disccrncrcrerumafalso' est dupliciter, scilicet mediatevcl inmediate.
Sed dialetica docet discernere inmediatc et modo excellenti; omnes vero alie scientie
mediate. '
[22] Rethorica docet ornate loqui. Unde vcrsus (901'0):
est mea dicendi ratio cumflore loquendi.
Et dicitur a 'rem', quod est ornatus, et 'icos' : scientia, quasi ornata scientia.
[23] Arsmetica docet de numero per se, idest de numero computandiet algorizancli.
Unde versus: '
cxplico per numerum:quid sit.proportio rerum.
428 LOGICA MODERNORLIM [:
Et dicitur ab 'are', quod est virtus, et 'mctros' : manium, quasi virtuosamenmrans.

[24] Astronomia docet de magnitudine mobili, idest clefirmamenti motu et planetarum.
Unde vcrsus:
astra viasquepoli varias michi vendicosoh".
Et dicitur de hoc: 'astrum' et 'mctrox': menmra,quasi (scientia)dc mensuraastrorum.
[25] Geometria docet de magnitudine inmobili, idest de mensura terre. Unde vcrsus:
signojïgurai.
rerum DIGDSHFGS El earum
Et dicitur & 'gc', quod est terra, et 'metras': mensura,quasi scientiade mensuraterre.
[26] Quod terra sit nmbilis probo: quiasi unaglebaproiciatur versussursumnaturaliter
movetur versusdeorsum..Ad illud dico quod terra non est mobilis per se sed per accidens.
Undealiquid dicitur mobile aut per seaut per accidensaut naturaliteraut violente.
[27] Musicadocetde numerorelatoadsonum(a sono;l-Is).Undeversus:
invenire locum per me moderamina vocum.
Et dicitur & 'mois', quod est aqua, et 'icas' : scientiaquasi scientiainventa iuxta aquam.
[28] Dialetica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Vel: dialetica est ars artium, scientia
scientiarum, qua sola facit scire et nescientem posse manifestare, sine qua nulla ars
perfecte potest sciri.
[29] Contra. Theologia est ars artium; non ergo dialetica. Dicendum quod dialetica
est ars artium quia omnibusaliis viam prebet et sine illa nulla scientia perfecte potest
sciri. Alio modo est theologia ars artium quia determinat de prima causa,idest de Deo.
[30] Et dialetica differt :: logica sicut pars a suo toto, quia dialetica est ars sillogizandi
ex probabilibus tantum, logica vem ex omni vero et apparenti vero et ex probabili el:
apparentiprobabili.
After this introductory section our copy continues with: sanus est
quicquid ab aura percipitur. Then two oppositiones and their solutiones are
given. Generallyspeaking,our copy seemsto give the original tract (T)
with quite :: number of objectionesand solutiones,which are distinguished
fairly well from the original text. Towards the end of the tract their
number diminishes.
On F. 9181"!L
our tract winds up with the section on copulatio. Here the
explicit runs as ['olim-vs(cfr. above, p. 420):
Et sciendumquod quando terminus copulat presenstempus vel preteritum vel futurum
confuse significat quale quid ; cum autem determinate, hocaliquid.
The remainderof the column is blank. On the next one (F. 981'b)a fresh
start is madewith a tract on Fallacy:
Ut dicit Aristotiles in libro Elencorum quatuor sunt genera disputationum, scilicet
disputatiü doctrinalis, ten'lptativa, dialetica, sophistica.
lt turns out to be the sametract as is found in Digby 2, FF.46f-67? (see

above,p. 420). In our copy it is found FromFf.981'b-104-l'3. The rest of
some EARL? OXFORD TRACTS ON LOGIC 429
column 104-m is left blank. On the other column the same scribe makes
a Fresh start with & shorter tract on Fallacy:
Secundum philosephum primo Elencorum quatuor sunt genera disputationum, scilicet
disputatio doctrinalis, dialetica, temptativa et sophistica.
The tract is complete and endsas follows (f. 105V'J):

Tertius modus(viz. of piuresinterrogationes)
est quandoplura interrogantur de pluribus.
Ut si demonstratobono et non bono queratur: 'sunmcista bonavel (et Ms) nonbona?' Si
dicatur quod sunt bona, inferatur: 'ergo bonumest non bonum'. Nam per primam propo-
sitionem, que plures est, respondenti aFFirmativeaccidit verus clericus, et respondenti
negativecontingit apparenselenchus.Sequitur quod ad propositionemque plures est,
plures dande sunt responsiones.EXPLICIUNT FALLACIE BREVES.
After this tract the rest of the column is left blank andthe samehand
continuas on the next folio (1061'3)with another commentary on the
tract Cumsit nostra.It is dealt with in our next section (& 4).
4- - British Museum, quu] Ms, 12 F. XIX'; Ff. 1094 101"

The same manuscript of the British Museum contains another tract
on logic with the well-knox-vn incipit: Cum sit nostrapresensintentio. This
time we have to do with an incomplete commentary on our treatise,
sinceof the original tract (T) only lemmataare given:
Cumsi: nostrapresensintentio. Queritur quare magis dicit 'cum' quam 'si' ex quo est
coniunctio ita bene sicut 'cum'. Solutio. Dicendum est quod hac coniunctio 'cum'
significat certitudinem, 'si' signiücat incertitudinem, sicut patet de modo signiHcandi.
Sed dignior cst certitudo quam incertitudo. Ideo magis dicit 'cum' quam 'si'.
Queritur quare magis dicit 'sic' quam 'est'. Quod deberet dici 'est.'probo, quia dicit
Aristotiles in libro Periermenias in primo: sola iudicativa oratio est de consideratione
logici; sed dialeticus est logicus; ergo deberet dici 'est'. Dicendum est quod ista
caniunctio 'cum' exigit sibi adiungi verbum coniunctivi modi. Unde versus:
' 'cum' 'si' coniungant,'utinam' 'ne' 'qualinur' aptant.
Pro illo alio argumento dicendum quod sola iudicativa oratio est de consideratione
logici, verum est ubi non fit aliquid inpedicns. Sed in preposito hec coniunctio 'cum'
inpedit. Velaliter potestdici adformamquodsolaindicativaccc.: verumestprincipaliter.
Quare magis dicit 'nostra' quam 'vestru'? Dicendum est quod dicit 'nostra' ut com-
prehendat se cum aliis. Et hoc ad demonstrandum quod non fuit inventor dialetice, sed
auditor.
Quare magis dicit 'prcscns'quam 'prctcricum'vel 'futurum'? Huic dicitur uno modo sic::
quia presenssigniFlcatper modum entis, preteritum et futurum per modumnon entis;
seddigniusest ensquamnon ens,ita magisdicitur 'prcscns 'quam'prctcritum'vel 'fururum'.
Aliter dicitur: presensse habet per modumhabitus, preteritum et futurum per modum
privationis. Seddignior est habitusquam privatio. Ergo ccc.
Quare magis dicitur ad artem dialeticam quam ad scientiam?Quia ars est dum est in opere,
scientia (dum) manet in quiete, ideo magis dicitur (ad) artem dialeticam quam ad
scientiam.
Quaredicitur ad artemdialeticam,et non ad artemlogicam?Dicendumquoddialeticaest
pars, logica totum. Ut ergo signiEcat quod non tota simul adm(0)veri putest, sed per
partes, propter hoc dicit dialeticamet non logicam.
Quare magisdicit dialeticamquam demonstrativam,ex quo demonstravaest pars logice
sicut dialetica?Dicendumest quod demonstrativase tenet a parte Finis,quia demon-
strativa pars est de 51—g no (?) demonstratio, quia facit scire et scire Fmisartis est.
Dialctica se tenet a parte principii et ars estprout consistit in Opere.Ergo etc.
Quare magisdialeticamquam sophisticam,ex quo sophistica est pars logice sicut dialetica?
Dicendumest quod dialeticase habet per modumhabitus,saphisticapcr modum pri—
vationis reapectudialetice. Et hoc vult Aristotiles dicensquod sophisticaest obliquitas
dialetica. Et a digniori semper incoandum est. Ideo magis dicitur dialericaquam
sophistica.
After these verbose comments the author continues with the second
lemma: primo Oportetscire quid sit materia etc.
The work ends abruptly on f. 110") in the discussion on proposition,
so that our cornnwntar)r is only concerned with & small part of the
treatise Cum sit nostra.
Fortunately our scribe has underlined all the lemmata, so as to make it
possible to reconstruct the Erst sections of the original treatise (T).
There are 18 lemmata:
[ Cumsit nostrapresensintentio (1061'3)

" Primo oportetscire quid sit materia etc. ('1061'9')
III Materia artis dialetica est vox signchativa (l061'b)
IV Instrumentumetc. est sillogismus (106V3)
V Introductio etc. 006")
Vl Ars est collectio multorum principiorum (IOGV'J)
Vll Ars estquoddamjïnitumiqjïmtatis etc. (1071?)
VIII Ars sic dividitur: alia liberalis, ah'a mccanica(1071'3)
IX Item. Dialetica csl:ars artium etc., que solafacit scire etc. 007")
X Voxest quicquid ab ore animalis prqfertur etc. (107WJ)
Xl Summacst collectio etc. (1081'3')
Xll Nomenestvoxsignäfcativaetc. (1081'3)
Xlll Verbumest vox etc. 009")
XIV Oratio est vox etc. (IOSW)
XV Propositio est oratio etc. 009")
XVI Propositiosic dividitur: alia categorica,aliayporhetica (l09l'b)
XVII Propositionum alia ajrmativa, alia negativa(1091'b)
SOME EARL'I' OXFORD TRACTS ON LOGIC 43]
XVIII Propositio ajrmatim est illa in qua principale verbum a-ü'ï'rmatur

(109Vü).
These lemmata will be of some help in reconstructing the original

treatiseT. Seebelow, ä 8.
5 - British Museum, Add. MSS. 8167, PF.189r—196V

Finally the treatise Cum sit nostra is found in the same librar Add.
,
Mss 8l67, Ff. 1891'3-1961b'b.lI give the text of the introductory section
(f. 139m-rb):
Cum sit nostra presens intentio ad artem dialeticam, primo Oportet scire quid sit
materia artis dialetica.
Materia artis dialetica est vox significativa, quia de voce non significativa nullus in-
tellectus ageneratur in animo alicuius.
Quid est instrumentum artis dialetica? Silogismus,quia de silogismo et de partibus
silogismi Flt tota dialetica.
Quid est (introductio ?). Introductio est brevis et aperta demgpstratio in aliquamartem.
Ars est collectio multorum principiorum ad eundem Finem tendentium. Principium
dicitur quia primum [est]: in arte; preceptum quia precipit sic facere; maxima, quia
maximamhabet potestatem; regula, quia regit artificem; dignitas, quia dignius est in arte.
Septem sunt artes, scilicct gramatica, dialetica, retorica, musica, arsmetica, gemnctria,
astronomia.
Gramaticadocet recte scribere et recte loqui. Dialetica docet discer(ner)e verum a falso.
Retoricadocet ornate loqui. Arsmcticade numero per se. Musicade numero relato.
Geometria de magnitudine inmobili, scilicet de mensura terre. Astronomia de magni-
tudine mobili, scilicet de motu Ermamentiet planetarum.
Dialetica est ars artium., scientia scientiarum quc sola s(c)it scire et nescientem mani-
fcstare.
Contra. Tcologia est scientia scientiarum (1891'0); non ergo dialetica. Dialetica est,
quia nulla scientia perfecte scitur sine illa.
Et dicitur & 'dia', quod est duo, et 'lagos', quod est sermovel ratio; inde dialetica quasi
duorum sermo vel ratio intcr opponentcm et respondentem.
Et diFi'ertdialetica a logica sicut parsa toto.
Vel: dialetica est ars discernendiverum a falso. Vel: dialetica est ars silogisandi(!) ex
probabilibus, logica ex omni vero vel omni (apparenti? vero.
After this introduction our copy immediately starts with the tract
itself: xonasest quicquid ab aure percipitur.
The work ends on f. 1961") with a short tract on copulatio: Its explicit
runs as follows:
' For the manuscript. see above Ch. [, nr. 9, p.. 41.
Et sciendumquod (quando) terminus communiscopulat tempuspresenset futurum et

preteritum, confuse signilïcat qualequid, determinate hacahquid.
Any discussion of thefaHaciac is missing in this copy.
6 The Relationship of These Cepies

-
A few remarks may be made on the possible interrelations of the five
redactions of the treatise Cum si: nostra as is found in the manuscripts
discussedabove (gg 2-5). Sincethe most important diFferencesappearto
occur in the introductory section of this treatise, this section may serve
asa basis for our comparison.
The following table will show the similarities and diFFerencesbetween
the five redactions as to the occurrence of several chapters of the
introductory section. For the sake of clarity ] use the division into
headings(1-30) Etted to the text quoted from British Museum, RoyalMS
12 P XIX, Ff. 901'3-3'3;see above, pp. 426-4-28.
Abbrew' ations :
D 2 Oxford, Digby 2, Ff. 26F-271'

D24 : Oxford, Digby24, [ . 17m-vb
R I : British Museum, qua! Ms 12 P XIX, 1. 901'3-W
R2 : (only its lemmata)
ibid., Ff. 1061'11-109W
R3 : (the cmnmentary itself)
ibid., Ff. 1061'3-1093'3-
Add. : British Museum, Add. Mg 8167, 1. 891'3-1'0
X : is found in this redaction
0 : is missing in this redaction
(X) : is found but in a different form
R ] and R 3 R2 D2 D 24 Add. TOTAL

1 X X X X X 5 )(
2 X 0 0 0 O ] x
3 X X X X X 5 )(
4- X 0 0 X 0 2 )(
5 X X X X X 5 )(
6 X 0 0 0 0 1 )(
7 X X X X X 5 )(
8 X 0 X X 0 3 )(
9 X 0 0 X 0 2 )(
R 1 and R 3 R2 D 2 D 24 Add. TOTAL

10 X X X X X 5 :(
11 X 0 0 X 0 2x
12 X X X X 0 4):
13 X 0 X X X 3x
14 X 0 O 0 0 1 )(
15 X 0 (X) 0 0 2 )(
16 X (X) (X) (X) (X) 5 )(
17 X 0 X X (X) 4):
18 X 0 O 0 0 1x
19 X 0 0 0 O 1 )(
20 X 0 X X (X) 4x
21 X 0 0 0 0 1 )(
22 X 0 X X (X) 4x
23 X 0 X X (X) 434
24 X 0 X X (X) 4):
25 X 0 X X (X) 4):
26 X 0 0 O " 0 lx
27 X 0 X X X 4):
28 X X X X X S )(
29 X 0 (X) (X) X 4):
30 X 0 X X X 434
The following conclusions may be drawn. The most concise text is

offered by R 2. I propose to consider this text as the version relatively
closest to the original treatise (T). As to the introductory section, it
seems to have consisted of chs 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 16, 28 only.
The most extensive texts are presented by R 1 and R 3. However, it
should be noted that R ! gives the impression of being an adaptation of
.the original tract (T) in contrastto R 3 which is apparentlya commentary
on (T). ln fact R 3 is evenmore prolix than R I.
There seems to be no relation of dependence between D 2 and D 24;
the chapters4, 9 and 11 missingin D 2 are found in D 24, which might
point to the priority of D 2. But ch. 15 is missing in D 24, while it is
found in D 2. This is the more remarkable as this chapter is not found
in R 2 and Add. either. We must infer from this that D 2 and D 24 are
mutually independent. See also the arguments put forward above,
pp. 421-422; 425-426, and below, pp.. 434; 437.
Add. apparently s'eemsto keep a middle position between .R 2 and the
other COpieS.The only remarkable exception concernschapter 12 (the
seconddeHnition of ars; see also below, p. 442), which is missing in

Add., while it is found in R 2 and all other redactions of our treatise.
One might feel inclinecl to consider it as & lapsusin fidci, but I think it
should be explained in a different x-vay.Seebelow, pp. 434-437.
AS etmatter of fact no interrelation can be shown with any certainty
between all these redactions, apart from the postulated dependence of
all of them 011(T). A comparisonof the parallel passages
will yield the
same result. See above, pp. 416 FF.
a nd pp. 432-433. [ give some of them.
(l) The division of arsis rather diFFerentin our copies:

R 2: only the lemma is extant: Arssicdividitur: aha liberalis, aha mecanica
(1071'3). The next lemma is: et dialetica est ars artium etc. (107V3), so
that we may conclude that the text artesmecanice sunt iqjïnite, not being
a lemma, clic]not belong to the original treatise (T). But we Findthese
words in the comments (: R 3) LlponR 2 in the following sentence:
artes mecanice sunt inünite, sicut magister dleE in littera. From this we
may infer that the text commented upon (littera) containedthe phrase:
artesmecanice sum:iänite.
[t seemsto be useful to contrast the texts dealing with this subject as
found in the different redactions:
R !: for the text, see abüvc, p. 427, m'. 16.
D 2: Quot modis dividitur ars? Duobus modis, scilicet in artes mecanicas et in
liberales. Et sunt artes mecanice que manibus eFEciuntur. Artes liberales sunt
saptem, scilicet gramatica, dynletica, rethorica,arsmetica, musica, geometria,
astronomia (261'4').
D 24: Ars dividitu(r in duas par)tes, scilicet in artes liberales (et in) artes mecanicas.
Et sciendum quod (artes) mecanice sunt inFmite quoad nos, (mite tamen quoad
naturam. Artes liberales sunt septem, scilicet gramatica, dialetica, rethorica,
arsmetica, musica, geometria, astronomia.
Add. reads only :

Scptem sunt artes, scilicet gramatica, dialetica, retorica, musica, arsmetica,
geometria, astronomia.
We may conclude from this: that Add. gives the most concisa and
original version, and that the text commented upon by R 3 which [
——
propose to call the littera magistralis is posterior to Add. Again, there
—
seems to be no interdependence between D 2 and D 24, nor between
these copies and R I. However, since the phrase artes mccaniccsunt
ify'ïnitcis Foundonl)lrin D 24 and R2 (R 3) there may have been some
connection between these copies as coming from & common source (x).
The distinction of artestriviales and arcesquadrivialesis only found in D 2
and R ] Therefore we may again assumethat these copies derive from
.
& common source ( y)..
From what hasbeensaid it follows that (x) and ( )) are mutually inde-
pendent. However, there are so many similarities between R ], R 2,
D 2 and D 24, in contra-clistinction to fidci, that they cannot be ex-
plained unlesswe assumea common source of (x) and (y) which cannot
havebeen (T) itself. Therefore [ postulatebetween (T) and (x), ( y) &
codex (0) as the common source of (x) and (y).
The rather isolated position of Add is supported by some other facts.
.
Only Add. gives the bmnches of the quadrivium in this order: musica,
arithmetica,geometrica,astronomia,while the other copies all of them have
arithmetica, munea, etc. Secondly, all the copies except Add. have the
peculiar defmition of ars as quiddamjïnitum iqjï'nitatis compendiumetc.I
lt should be noticed further that there are some diFfer-ences in the re-
dactions of our copies in chapters [28] and [29] of the introductor)!"
section.
R ) reads :
[28] Dialetica est ars discernendiverum a falso. Vel: dialetica est ars artium,
scientia scientiarum, que sola facit scire et nescientem posse manifestare, sine
qua nulla ars perfectepotestsciri.
[29] Contra. Theologia est ars artium; non ergo dialetica. Dicendum quod
dialetica est ars artium quia onmibusaliis viam prebet et sine illa nulla scientia
perfecte potest sciri. Alio modo est theologiaars artium quia determinat de
prima causa,idest de Deo (903).
D 2 reads :
[28] Quid est dyaletica? Dyaletica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, quia
sola facit scire et nescientem posse manifestare.
[29] Contra. Theologia est ars artium, scientia scientiarum ; non ergo dyaletica.
Dicendumquod dyaleticaest ars artium scientiascientiarumquiasine illa nulla
ars perfecte potest sciri (271').
D 24 reads :
[28] Dialetica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, que sola facit scire et
nescientemmanifestareposse.
1 For this definition, see above, p. 175 and below, p. 442.

436 LOGICAh-IODERNORUM
n
[29] Contra. Tcologiaest arsartium; non ergo dialetica. Seddicendum quod
teologia est ars artium, scientia scientiarum quoad dignitatem, non tamen
quoad perfectionem (17W'U).
Add. reads :
[28] Dialetica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, que sola scit scire et
nescientem manifestare.
[29] Contra. Teologia est scientia scientiarum; non ergo dialetica. Dialetica
est quia nulla scientiaperfectescitur sine illa. ...... Vel: dialetica est ars
discernendi verum a falso. Vel: dialetica est ars sillogizandi ex probabilibus,
logica ex omni vero vel omni (apparenti?vero (1891'5'11).
From this comparison it may be concluded that Add. occupies & rather
isolated position, indeed, and that there is some similarity between
R I, D 2 and D 24, especially between D 2 and D 24.
Another remarkablefact is that in the division of prepositions, too,

some diFFerentredactionsare found.
Add. reads :
Oratio iudicativa est illa in qua ponitur modusindicativus. Et sic de aliis. Set
sola indicativo oratio est de consideratione logici, ut dicit Aristotiles in prin-
cipio peryermenias, propositio est oratio verum aud (!) falsum significans
(1394).
D 2 reads :
Indicativaoratio est illa in qua ponitur modusindicativus, ut 'homoestanimal'.
Et sic de aliis. Sola indicative oratio est de consideratione logici, ut dicit
Aristotiles in libro peryarmenias.Inperativa est illa in qua ponitur modus in-
perativus,ut 'Henrice,facmihi ignom'.Optativus,ut 'utinomessem
bonuscloricus';
coniunctivus, ut 'cum venerisad me, dabo tibi coprom'. lanitiva, ut '!ogero'.
Propositioest oratio verum vel falsumsignificans(281').
D 24 reads :
Oratio iudicativa est illa in qua ponitur modus indicativus, ut 'homoestanimal'.
lnperativa est illa in qua ponitur nmdus inperativus, ut 'WiHoImo,
fac ignonr'..
Et sic de aliis. Set ut dicit Aristotiles, sola iudicativa oratio est de con-
sideratione logici, cetere autem relinquende sunt.
R ] reads :
lndicativa oratio est illa in (l ua l )onitur modus indicativus ut 'homo est'. In-
:
peratho, in qua ponitur modus inperativus, ut 'WiHolme,focfgnom'. Deprecativa,
SOME EARLT OXFORD TRACTS ON LOGIC 437
ut 'adestamihi Domine'. Optativa in qua ponitur verbum optativi modi. Coniunc-

tiva, ut 'cum venerishuc, dabo tibi cqmml'. InFlnitiva in qua ponitur modus in-
Enitivus. [] Ut dicit Aristotiles in libro Periermenias, propositio est oratio
verum vel falsum significans(911'5'13).
As & matter of fact the text of Perihermeneias

runs as follows (in Boethius'
translation) :
Et ceterae quidem relinquantur; rhetoricae enim vel poeticae convenientior
consideratio est; enuntiativa vem presentis est speculationis (: In Periherm.
17114'17ed. Meiser : Aristotle, De Interpr. 4, 1734-7).
It must be noted that the deFmition of preposition is that given by

Boethius, not Aristotle's.' Therefore we may conclude that Add. gives
quite & good text, provided we put & full stop after peryermenias
and ve
start a new sentence with prapositio est oratio. D 24, too, seems to give
quite & reliable text. This cannot really be said of R I. D 2, too, seems
to present a suspiciens reading. The four First lines are quite acceptable,
indeed, but the lines 5-10 ([npcrativa (legere')should be taken
...... thehpreceding
as an interpolation, as appears clearly from phrase et sic
dealiis (line 2).
The following conclusions may be drawn. Add. seems to have & pretty
good text; it is concisa, but seems to be complete, all the same. D 24
surely gives quite an intelligible reading, but I think it has added a few
lines to the original text, as given by Add. For that matter, the fact that
D 24 has the correct pamphrasis from Aristotle (ut dicit Aristotiles, sola
indicativa oratio est de consideratione logici, cetere autem relinquenda sunt)
would make it seem very reliable, indeed, but the text in D 2 t::lm-u-l)r
- shows that the addition must be an interpolation into the original text.
Therefore, so far as this passageis concerned, I think we should take Add
.
to give the older redaction, and consider D 24 as quite an intelligent
adaptation of the original tract, while D 2 should present & contaminated
and R ] a rather confusing redaction of the passageconcerned.
! For that matter, Aristotle did not deHnethe term rcpömau;(propositio).

The interrelations of our codices can be illustrated, now, by the

Following stemma:
T
Add
.
7 - On two related compendia of logic: in London and Paris
As we have Ieamed from the foregoing sections the tract Cumsit nostra
was widely used in the schools. Further investigations will show that the
work itself was strongly influenced by two other compendia of logic.
They will be discussed in this section.
0 A Compendium'of Logic Found in London, British Museum, Rcyza!

flflss,8 A VI
.
The collective manuscript British Museum, RoyalMss,8 A VII contains
on ff.. 57r-62ï' and F651' a compendium of logic with the Following
incipit:
Ut dicit Tullius, ars est collectio multorum principiorum, sive preceptorum, ad unum
Finemtendentium. Et sunt idem in subiectoprincipium, preceptum, dignitas,regula,
maxima, differunt tamen latione. Dicitur enim principium quia primum est in arte;
quia precipit ageresic et sic, dignitasquia dignitas est in arte, regulaquia regit
preceptum
artiHcem, maximam quia maximam continet (potestatem), licet parvum sit in quantitate.
I prapose to call this treatise Ut dicit, after its initial wordsï. The
similarity OFthis incipit with the exposition on ars found in the intro-
ductory section OFCum sit nostra is obvious. The phrase maximam continet
' Fur the manuscript, see above, Ch. [, nr. 6, pp. 25-33.
2 This title is the more suitable as nearly all the chapters of this work open with amne
similar phrase, such as ut dicit Ariston'lcs,ut dicit Baetim; see our edition, pp. 375-41 I
.
some EARW OXFORD TRACTS ON LOGIC 4-39
potestatem,licet parvumsit in quantitateshould probably be connected with

the second deFmition of ars found in all our copies of Cum sit nostra
except Add.
Next, in the treatise Ut dicit the division of ars into trivium and
quadrivium is found, which can be compared with & passagein Digby 2
(f. 271')and R] (F.901'9');seeabove,pp. 417; 4-27.
The famous phrase dialetica estars artium, scientiascientiarumetc. found
in Cum sit nostra as well as in many later Summulcl is ascribed to St.
Augustine here:
Et, ut Augustino placet, dialetica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, que sola novit
scire, sola scit scientes reddere, ex qua omnis, sine qua nulla scientia perfecte scitur.
The reference must be to De ordine Il 13:
DeordineII, 13 : Illa igitur ratio, perfectadispositaquegrammatica, admonita est quaerere

atque attendere hanc ipsam vim qua peperit artem: nam cum deEniendo, distribuendo,
culligendo non solum digesserat atque ordinaverat, verum ab omni etiam falsitatis
irreptione defenderat.Quando ergo transiret ad alia fabricanda,nisi ipsasuaprius quasi
quaedam machinamenta et instrumenta distingueret notaret digereret proderetque
ipsam disciplinam disciplinarum, quam dialecticam vocant? Haec doce: docere, haec doce:
discere; in hac se ipsa ratio demonstrat atque aperit quae sit, quid velit, quid valeat. Scit
scire; sola scientesfacerenon solumvult, scd etiam potest..
No doubt we cannot speak OFany direct borrowing From St. Augustine.

There must have been an intermediary source, presumably some
gl»:r-s.sary..2
Finally, the same dilïerence between logic and dialectic is given here
as in Cum sit nostra.
As to the treatises themselves, there are many resemblancesbetween

Cum sit nostra and Ut dicit. To illustrate them [ give the initial sentences
of the main sections of both treatises3 :
' e.g. in the opening sentenceof Peter of Spain's Summule

logicalcs,m'. ] .Ol ed. Bocheflski.
2 A similar deEnition of didicerim is found in Abailarcl, Epist..XIII, where the author
explicitly refers to St. Augustine, De ordine II, 13. For some searl)rtwelfth century
collections of Canon Law in which the sameformulas are found, see ]. cle Ghellinck,
Dialectiquee: dogmaaux Xe-Xlle sie'cles(Festschrift Bäumker [91 3), pp. 94-95.
3 The mnemonic verses,too, are the samein both works.
MODERNORUM
440 LOGICA II
a Logica Cumsit nostraII, p. 43127'29:Ut dicit Aristotiles in libro Pradicamentarum,

singulum incomplexorum aut significat substantiam, ut 'animal', 'lignum', aut
qualitatem, ut 'album', 'nigrum', aut quantitatem, ut *bicubirum', 'tricubitum'
etc.
......
Logica Ut dicit II, p. 386'7'W: th dicit Aristotiles, singulum incomplexorum
hac est dictum: omnis dictio aut
—— signiFlcat
s ubstantiam,aut qualitatem,
-—-
aut quantitatem ...... etc.
!) Logica Cum si: nostra III, p. 4349'11: Ut dicit Boetius, argumentum est ratio rei
dubie faciens Fidem, idest certitudinem de re dubia. Et sunt quatuor species
argumentandi: entimema, exemplum, inductio, sillogismus.
Logica Uf.dicit, V, p. 3947'10:Ut dicit Boetius, argumentum est ratio rei dubie
faciens Edem, hocest potest facere certitudinem de re si ipsa sit vel non.
Argumenti vero quatuor sunt species, scilicet sillogismus, inductio, entimema,
et exemplum .
c LogicaCumsi: nostraIV, p. 4382'6: Ut dicit Boetius, locus est sedesargumenti.

Et diFFert argumentum ab argumentatione quia argumentum est in mente,
argumentatio extra meutern. Similiter argumentum est ipsa ratio aliquid
probans, sive dicatur, sive non; argumentatio est ipsa ratio prout consistit in
prolatione. Unde argumentatio est per orationem explicatio.
LogicaU: dicit Vl, p. 4-012'6:Ut dicit Boetius,locus est sedesargumenti. Quid
sit argumentum, dictum est prius. Differt autem argumentum ab argumentatione
eoquodargumentumest oratio probansaliquid, sive ipsasit in prolatione sive
non; argumentatio prout consistit in prolatione. Unde argumentatio est
argumenti per orationem explicatio.
However, there certainly are some differences between the treatises,

e.g. in the chapter on suppositivon.l
b A compendium of logic found in Paris, B.N. Lat., 15.170

The collective manuscript Paris, B.N.Lat. 15.I7Oz contains on
Ff. 6lm-62vb & nearly complete compendium of logic. lt Opens as
follows:
Intrad. dia]. paris.,J p. 3572'5: Introductio est brevis et aperta demonstratio in aliquam
artem. Et est introductio eoquod per faciliora debemus ingredi cliFFlciliorn. Et dicitur
introductio quasi ducria intra, idest in aliud, videlicet in ipsam artem.
We have here not only the x-vell-known deHnition of imrraductia4found

Iikcwise in Cumsit nostra,but also an exPlanation ofit: et est introductio,
' Seebelow, Ch. XVI, pp. 549-551.

2 For this manuscript, see above, Ch. I, m'. 22, pl). 87-88.
3 For this title, see below, p. 4—4-7.
4 Par this deFmition, see also above, Ch. III, p. 168.
SOME EARL'x' OXFORD TRACTS ON LOGIC 441
eoquod per faciliora debemusingredi difficiliora. As & matter of fact the

same explanation is found in some copies of Cumsit nostra, viz. Digby 2
and British Museum Royal Ms 12 FXIX (our R I, see above, p. 426).
Since it does not occur in Digb)r24 and Add. 8167 (seeabove, p. 431),
we may conclude that the archetype of the Introd. dia]. paris. was one
of the sources of Cumsit nostra (T), and that our copy, being & later
adaptation, has influenced the copies D 2 and R ] of Cum sit nostra,
possibly by way of an intermediary source.
The whole introductory section OFthe Introd. dia]. paris. shows man)Ir
resemblances with Cum sit nostra, so that & certain relation must have
existed between these treatises or their sources. However, in the
sections on snpposition there are some important diFFerences,especially
in their dilïerent composition.
8 - On The Reconstructionof The Original Treatise Cumsit nostra(T)

I have proposed above (p. 433) to consider the lemmata of Cumsit
nostra as found in British Museum, Rcy-falMs 12 E. XIX, Ff. 1061'3-109W-
(: our R 2) as & reliable cola)!of the original treatise Cumsit nostra(T).
The copy R ], contained in the same nmumscriptl on Ff. 90T-105Vseems
to be an adaptation of T, and the same can be said of D 2, D 24, and
Add? From severalcmnparisons[ haveconcluded (above,p. 4325.) that
of the complete clopies3 the redaction of Add. seems to be the most
concise and to come the closest to T. Unfortunately Add. has a lacuna
between f. 1901?and f. 1911' and its scribe was rather negligent and
inclined to ablarcviate his text. Besides, the redactions as found in the
other cepies are sometimes of some use For the reconstruction of the
text Of Cum sit nostra.
All facts considered, it seems to be quite impossible to make ::
reliable reconstruction of the text of T especially as far as the intro-
ductory section is concemed. After that the differences between the
copies are less frequent and seem almost to disappear towards the end
of the treatise.
I think the most useful procedure is to reproduce the text of Add.
snpplied with those OFthe other copies wherever it would seem ne-
cessaryto adduce them. It is self—evidentthat the printed text (see
! See above, p. 4265.

3 For these sigla, see above, p. 432.
3 lt should be remembered that R 2 is far from being complete. Seeabove, p. 429f.
Tract X) can deFmitelynot be consideredas a critical edition. There-

fore I refmined from nmking up an apparatuscriticus.The text presented
is only meant to give a general impression of the logical treatise T, which
turns out to have been so highly favourite in the schoolsabout 1200.
9 - On The Dates and Provennnces of The Treatises Discussed
The dates and provenanccs of all these compendia of logic are rather
obscure incleed. We can only make a few statements with all duc
reserves.
:: Thc Logica Cum sit nostra
One of the most rcmarkable featurcs of this treatise is the occurrcnce

of the peculiar definition of ars as quoddam
finitum quïnitatis compendium,
insignerationis miraculum, inperiosunlnature consihum, quam si in seconsideres
minimam quantitatem reperies,sed si ad subiecta te applica; maximam po-
testateminvenies.! As we have seen already".z this delïnition is found only
in an English tradition. lt seems to be of a Parvipontancan mark.3 Since
our oldest copies of Cum sit nostradate from the Erst half of the thirtcenth
century,4 we may look for its author among those masters of logic who
enjoyed& certain celebrity as early as the end of the twelfth century. [
think this will take us to the surroundings of Alexander Neckam, who
was, in fact, of
one our informants about the above-mentioned delïnition
of ars. As we have seen,5 he ascribed this deEnition to quidam. One
might think of his master William (Wdhelmuszlfontanus),who is de-
scribed as follows in Alexander's De laudibusdivinae sapientiae:
V, 835-84-8, ed. Wright:
Lindisiae columen Lincolnia sine columna,
Muniüca, felix gente, repleta bonis,
Par tibi nulla foret, si te tuus ille magister
Informarct adhuc moribus atque Ede.
Montanus, sed mons stabilis Edeiquecolumna,
Cui se coelestispaginatota dedit.
Montanus, meritis, pius, et servator honesti,
Veraqucsimplicitasdignafavorefuit.
' For this defunition, see above, Ch. III, p. 1741.

: above,p. 175.
3 Seeabove, p. 175. Compare the definition of sapientia,discussedabove, p. 418.
* Digby 2 and Add. 8167; for these manuscripts, see above Ch. IIl nrs. 14-and 9.
5 above, p. 174.
SOME EARL? oxsonn TRACTS ON LOGIC 443
Contulit huic primam cathedram Genovefn, secundam

Mater virgo, sacrae 1uirginitatis honos.
Transiit ad montem Montanus, monte relicto;
En montana Syon et luca celsa tenet.
Haec digressio sit signum seu testis amoris;
Condigna fateor laus crit ista minor.
Willimn de Monte was of great repute asa theologian. He had become,

probably about 1180, & well-known professor of the artes at the Mont
Stc Gencviövc in Paris, where he numbered Gcmld of Walcs and
Alexander Neckam among his students. thther his name "de Monte"
is due to this circumstancc, is rather uncertain, since his alternative
name de Montibus cannot be thus cxplained. Before 1189 he becamc a
canon and about 1191 chancellor at Lincoln. He dicd shortly after
Eastcr (April 14th) 1213. He was a very famous authority and gave
immensa prestigc to the cathedral school of Lincoln in his days.'
Alcxander's poem De laudibus was probably written early in the thir-
tecnth century, during the reign of King John (1198-1216).2 His De
naturis rerum in which the dchnition of ars is Föund, must have been
well known at the end of the twelfth century.3 Thcrefore these dates Fit
in very well with our other information about William.
lt would seem quite possible, indeed, that some meister like William
de Monte might have been the author of the original treatise Cum sit
nostra(T). This surmisemight draw somesnpport from the fact that in
two of our copies(D 24 and R ]) the nameof one William is usedasan
example,4 in & passagein which D 2 has chrice and which is omitted
by the other copiess.
The date [ havesuggestedfor the original treatise (T) (late twelfth
century) is supported by the peculiar fact that in the Rcy/aiMs copy the
name of Socratesis sometimes is abbreviated as So. instead of the ab-
breviations Sor and Sortesusual from about 1200. I think this must be
explainecl by snpposing that our scribe had & much older cepy at his
elbow, which had the current twelfth century abbreviation Sa.
' SeeJosiahCox Russe",Dicrianalyqf Writerscy"ThirrccnthCentug:England,Lonclonetc.

1936ll pp. 196-197.
2 Sce Th. Wright in the Introduction to his edition, p. LXXV.
3 See:ibid., I). XIV.
4 See above. p. 436.
5 Set:nur edition, p. 419, n. 1.
444 LOGICAMODERNORUM11
So much for the original treatise (T). To return to its various re-
dactions, we must remember that the)r are all of them adaptationsol" (T)
probably made by several authors.
The cepy in Digby 2 certainly represents an adaptation of the original
treatise (T).l lt seemsto date from the late thirteenth century.2 Some
more pieces on logic are contained in this manuscript; three of them
appear to form a commentary on the Erst part of the logica vetusby one
Willelmus FFr.(frater) de Montoriel.3 As & matter of fact sixteen leaves
missing here are bound LIPas Ff. 1-16 in Ms Digby 24. They contain the
greater part of William of Montoriel's SummaPredicamentorum,the last
five leaves of which are found in our manuscript. ngby 2, Ff. 80-84.
Thus Digby2 (snpplied with the leaves in ngby 24 that originally
formed part of it) makes up our compendium Cumsit nostratogether
with a c0py of William of Montoriel's Summain artem frua-tenzf'n.4 Would
we be far from the truth in snpposing William of Montoriel to be the
author OFthe Digby 2 adaptation of Cum si: nostra? [ think this suggestion
can certainly be maintained.
As to the identity of this William, certain clues are missing. Does the
name Mantoriel (for: Mount Oriel?) refer to Oxford? As far as I know,
there is no Mount Oriel in Oxford. For that matter, the name is not
found in Chevalier's Räpcrtojrei either. Did there ever exist & convent of
Blackfriars or Greyfriars of that name?
[ think we have some reason to date this adaptation not before the
middle of the thirteenth century".6
As to the adaptation of our compendium Cum sit nostraas found in
Digby 24 the present copy seems to date from the First half of the
fourteenthcentury? The text of the compendium(Summule)
is followed
by that of the tract on fallacy which should apparently be connected
with it, as appears from the explicit (f. 451'13):EXPLICIUNTSUMMULE
CUM OMNIBUSFALLACIIS.After some other pieces of ltz-gic8& commentary
written in & thirteenth century hand on a treatise Nulla est a-þ'i'rmatio
begins on f. 601'0', while the treatise itself is found from Ff. 6lm to
90"). This treatise is called in our manuscript Abstractjonesand ascribed
' Seeabove, pp. 432-438. 2 Seeabove, Ch. [. p. 55. 3 Seeabove, Ch. ], pp. 57-58.
4 For the other piece of logic in our manuscript. & tract on sophismscalled Abstractiancx,
see below, p. 445.
5 Ulysse Chevalier, Räpertaire des sourceshistorique: du moyen age. Topo-bibhographie,
Montbe'liard 1903 (reprint New *(cu'k 1959).
& See below, p. 445. ? See above, Ch. I, nr. IS, p. 60.
5 For these,seeaboveCh. [, nr. 15, pp. 60-6l.
SOME man' OXFORD TRACTS ON LOGIC 445
to some Ricardus Sophista. ln fact it is a collection ofsolahisms and their

solutions. This Ricardus Sophista is presumably to be identified with
Richard Fisl'mcrül The latter is associated by the older historians with
Robert Bacon O.P. As & matter of fact the first student to incept under
Robert as & Dominicam was Richard Fishacre. Well then, it is Robert
Bacon's Summulc dialecticas, printed by Steele under Roger Bacon's
nannte,2that Opens with the cleFlnition of introductio known from Cum
sit nostraand the latter's source found in Paris, B.N. Lat., 15.170.3
1 Feel inclined to attribute the Digby 24 adaptation of Cum sit nostra
to Richard Fishacre. Since he.died in 1248 it must have been written
before that date. ln fact it seems to be obvious that this treatise should
date from the days in which Richard taught the profane artes,so that we
may put it before about 1230, the approximata date of Richard's entry
into the Dominicam order.
lt must be borne in mind that the tract on sophisms called Abstractiones
is also contained in Digby 2, but undoubtedly in a later adaptation, as
appears from the opening words:
Digby 24, f. 6111!(Richard Fishacre): Nulla est ajïrmario 111qua universaleuniversaliter
sumptumpredicatur,ut dicit Aristotiles. Et hoc potest essedupliciter (next follow the two
cases)
Digby 2, f. [2212 Nulla est ajrmatia in qua universale unirermhrcr sumptumpredicatur, ut

dicit Aristotiles. Et hoc potest essetripliciter (next follow the three cases).
If we are allowed to consider this adaptation of Richard Fishacre's

Abm-actioncsas a work of William of Mentoriel's, too, this may be an
additional argument to date William's lifetime not before about the
middle of the thirteenth century. It should be remembered that the
adaptation of Cum si: nostra as found in Digby 24 also seems to be of an
earlier date than that found in Digby 2.4
As to the earliest adaptation extant of Cumsit nostra, & copy of which
is found in British Museum Add. M: 3167, I am unable to make any
suggestionin regardof its author. The copy itself seemsto datefrom
about the same time as Digby 2.
The Roya!M: cepy (our R 2) is found in & manuscript that contains
among other works quite & number of tracts on logic written by Walther
of BurleyS(1275 c. 1345). It must be remarkedthat in the manuscript
-
: See above, Ch. [, nl'. 15Il pp. 71-72. : Opera hactenusincdira XV, p. 1933'4.
3 For this treatise, seeabbve, p. 4401. and below, p. 4-46f.
4 Seeabove, p. 422. 5 Thus he is namedin our manuscript.
4—46 LOGICA MODERNORUM 11
our compendium, followed by the usual tract on fallacy and & shorter
version of it,,l immediately prccedeseight works by Walther of Burley,
in the middle of which an extensive commentary on the tract Nulla est
is Found.2
a—H'ïrmatio
I think that the secondconmwntary (our H 3) Foundin this manuscript
presenta:an adaptation by Walther of Burley of our treatise Cumsi: nostra.
To whom the (adaptation OFthe) tract Nulla est a—Hï'rmatio
must be
attributed, remains uncertain.
The treatise Cum si: nostra will be edited as our Tract X It must be
.
remembered that it was connected, at the time, with a tract on Fallacy,
either the extensivetract (Pallademaiores)or the shorter one (Pallade
minores),?-
!) the logica Ut dicit
This compendium OFlogic is Founclin a thirteenth century manuscript4

and was written in 50 careless a hand as to make any more exact dating
of this copy quite impossible. However, there seems to be :: reliable clue
to date the treatise itself. Just assometimesin the qua! Ms copy of Cum
sit nostra, we Hnd the name of Socratesabbreviated as So. instead of Sor
or Sortes; the latter abbreviations are quite gxceptional in our treatise
indeed. We may explain this, again.,5as a hint to a date before about
I200 for the tract itself.
Who the author of this compendium was cannot be said until more
data will be at our disposal.
The tract will be edited as our Tract IX.
c the Introductionesdialetica parisiense: found in B.N. Lat. 15. 170
This compendium of logic is found in & miscellaneous manuscript

which containsamongother works on variousSubjectsa few more pieces
! Seeabove, p. 428f. nnd Ch. l, nr. 8, p. 38.
: See above, Ch. !, nr. 8, pp. 38-39.
3 Both are füund in London, British Museum,Reyn!M: 12 F. XIX. The longer tract
follows the compendium Cumsi: nostrain both Digbeiani (2 and 24), while any tract
on fallacy is missing in British Museum, Add. M. 8167.
* For this manuscript, see above Ch. [, m'. 6, p. 3l .
5 Cfr. above, pp. 257; 414.
SOME EARLV OXFORD 'rmxcrs ON LOGIC 4—4—7
on legio,! which are by John Le Pageand HerveusSthhist-a.2

However,
the (late of the hand that wrote our compendium precludes us from
thinking of one of these logicians as the author. Moreover, the name of
Socratesis always abbreviated as So., so as to exclude for the original tract
any date after about 1200.3
The treatise was apparently written in :: Parisian school, since Mont-
martre(Monsflifarg/rum)is usedin an exampleOFa fallacy by equivocation
(the second kind of it, being ex diversasignyï'catione):
Similiter: 'plus ex: dc :l-IontcMargrrumad Parisiusquameconl'crsa';potest enim hec dictio
'de' teneri materialiter, vel notare localem distantiam, scilicet de uno loco ad alium
(r. ezrb).
Therefore, and because it opens with the definition of 'introductio', l

prcpose to call this compendium: Introduman-csdialetica parisienses. I feel
inclined to date it about ] 170.
Our cepy also contains a tract on fallacy. However, the last leaf of our
copy being badly stained and very diFFlcult to read, ] have thought it
better not to edit l.lïejällaciae. The preceding par? of these Inu-oductiones
will be edited as our Tract VIII.
1 Par this manuscript, seeabove Ch. l, m'. 22, pp. 87-88.

2 For these logicians, see ähove, pp. 82f. and 50f.
3 For this argument, seeabove, pp. 257; 414-and 446.
To conclude this chapter ] sketch the possible aFEliation of our tracta

in the following stemma.
Abbrcl'iatcd siglis:
L : Logica U: dicit
P : Introductioncs as presentedin B.N. Lar. 15.[70
dialeticaparisiense:
(p) : supposedsource (aq. original) of P (not extant)
T : the Original treatise Cumsit nonra
Add. : adaptationof T found in London Add. Mss8l67
D2 : adaptationof T found in Oxford Ms Digby2
D 24 : adaptationof T Foundin Oxford Ms Digby 24
RI : adaptation of T found in London, Reyn!;HSSI2 F. XIX, f. 901'3'981'3-
R .? : adaptation of T found in the lemnmta of the same ms, Ff. 106m-109ï3
(0), (ac),(y) : supposed missing links.
Stcmma:
L —-- : -— —) T 4————: (P)
'; "
.)
Add. P
(0)
'
(r) r (y)
CHAPTER XIV
THE SUMME METENSES

FOUND IN PARIS B.N.LAT. 11.4-12
The small Latin manuscript ll.412 of the Biblioth'eque Nationale in

Paris contains among other interesting pieces on liggic:l an anonymous
Summa. It is Found on FF.251'-40f, anc] consists of twelve chapters
clearly distinguished in our copy :
De introductionibus; a concise discussion of sonus, vox,
(1)
verbum,oratio, propositioand its division [2SHVI
(2) De suppositionibus [2519-261']
(3) De appellationibus[26v-271']
(4) Dc restrictionibus[271']
(5) De equipoHcmüs[27T'V]
(6) Dc modalibus[27V-28V]
(7) De prcdmabihbus[28V-29V]
(8) Dc lacis [29V-311']
(9) DcfaHacüs [3lf-331']
(10) De sillogismis[33T'V]
(l l) De relationibus[33V-36T]
(12) De distributionibus[36T-401'].
011 P. 271, our author appears to have some main division of the tract
in mind.3 As to the First two sections, they may be reconstructed as
follows:
] DE TERMINO ET DE EIS QUE ACCIDUNT TERMINO
a de suppositione
b de appellatione
r: cle restrictione
II DE PROPOSITIONE ET DE EIUS ACCIDENTIBUS
a de equipollentia
!) de. modificatione.
' For this manuscript, Seeabove Ch. [, m'. 18, pp. 8I-84.
2 For the text, see below, p. 465.
On P. 28? & fresh start is made with the discussionof argumentation,

to which the tract on the prcdicabiha is l:)ruteliminary'.I So we mayr
continue the main division as follows:
[II DE ARG LIMENTATION [BUS
predicabilibus
'Is-:::.
De
De locis
De fallaciis
n.". De sillogismis.
The remainder of our Summaseems to be relatively independent of

the forcgoing tracts. lt contains the tracts on the relativa and on the
distributiones,which are mutually independent, it seems. Here are the
initia] words:
333: De relativis tractatum facientibus primo considerandum est quid relatio,
quid relativum et de diversitate relativorum et de difFlcuItate eorum circa
gramaticamet de sophisnmtibuscirca hec incidentibus (incidentia MS)
361": Quoniam dictionum quedam significant res, quedam significant modos
rerum, ad plenam sermonis notitiam cognoscendum est non solum naturam
earumque signiFlcantres, sed etiam earumque significantmodos rerum. Que
signiFlcant res sunt que significant substantiam aut accidentia substantie
......
De quibus nihil ad presens. Que significant modos rerum dicuntur que im-
portant loquendidispositiones.
Thus we may Fmish the division as follows:

.
IV DE RELATIVIS
V DE DISTRIBUTIONIBUS.
On f. 401"the series of tracts is concludecl with the explicit: EXPLICIUNT

SUMME,where the plural Summeis to be noticed.
As we have already saeua,zour Summeare Followed in this copy by the
Syncathegoreumata magistri Nicholai, cclmmonlyr ascribcd to one master
Nicholas of Paris..3Are our Summeby the same author? I do not know.
This much is certain, that the only refcrcenüe4made in our Summato a-
' For the text, see below, p. 470.

2 Seeabove, Ch. !, nr. 18, p. 82.
3 See B. Hauräau, NoricusII, p. 44- and M. Grabmnnn, Dic IagischcnSchrjjï'cndesNikolaus
van Paris, p. 2225.
4 For the text, see below, p. 486.
THE SLlh-IME METENSES 451
tract on the yincathcgoreumata does not refer to the Syncathcgareumata Of

Muster Nicholas found in our manuscript on f. 411'11".As a matter of fact
there are some remarkable difïerelïces between the discussion of 'totum'
as found in our Summe' and that in the Synm1:hrfagi.)rrzuuwmta::2
of Muster
Nicholas.
lt should Further be noted that instead of the usual example 'Secana
currit' our Summe has ill'foscHa raunt».3 Should this be considered as a clue
For the place of our tract? If so, we are probably referrecl to Metz. ln
that town must have been :: Hourishing school since the arrival of some
Gerardus(or Warinus) from Chartrcs in the First half of the eleventh
century:l As a matter of fact, we know of a mastcr named Nicholausof
Metz, who is found as a witness in a document of the bishopric of Paris.5
It is dated Sept l3,1249. 1 must admit, this surmise hangs by quite &
slendcr thread, but it might explain the occurrence of our Summealong
with the Syncathcgorcumata of Muster Nicholas (of Paris?). As & matter of
fact, the identity of the latter is not certain either. Provided he is one
Magister Nicholaus Parisiensis,we. have to choose between at least two
thirteenth century masters of that name. [ found in the Notre Dame
Cartulary one magisterNicholausparisiensiscanonicusin a document dating
from Sept., 12095and one magisterNicholausin a document from ]une,
1202. No doubt, this master must be distinguishcd from the magister
Nicholausoccurring in the Parisian documents mentioned by Grabmann,7
which date from 1254 and 1263. At First appearance, the Syncathego-
reumatafound in Paris, B.N. Lat., 11.412 make the impression of having
been written in the First decadesof the century rather than about 1250.
To return, now, to our Summe,these tracts are clearly marked by the
grammatica] approach. See e.g. below, p. 452, and the quite extensive
tracts on relativa and distributiones.There are three explicit references to
Aristotle's Physic.:and Metaplyrsics.3As they may have been quotcd From
the older translations? no reliable clue for the date can be inferred from
them. Their small number, however, seems to preclude any date after
' 1. 39; see belüw, p. 448. 3 f. 80".

3 Seebelow, p. 476.
4 See E. Lesne, LesEcolcs,p. 342 ff. For master Garland of Matz, see my edition of the
Dialecticaof Garlandus Cmupotista, Introd., p. XI.
5 Paris, B.N.Lat. 5526, 1. 111"; in the edition by M. Guärard (Cartulairc de l'Eglics
Notrc Damadc Parii, Paris 1850) p. 159.
6 Paris, B.N. Lat. 5526, f. 74" (Guärard, p. 114).
? loc. cfr., p. 223.
') SeeM. Grabmann,Aristoteles
im 12jahrhundcrt, pp. 84—85;89-90.
about l220. Our Summecertainly date before 1240, the presumable date
of Peter OFSpain's Summulc.'
] would (late our tract not later than about 1220. It might have come
into existence in Metz or have been written in Paris by some master
from Metz (Nicholas of Metz?). In order to distinguish it from other
tracta of the same period, ] propose to call it the Summerifletenses.
[ will now quote the most important passagcsof the SummeMetenses.
CAPITULUM ]: DE INTRODUCTIONIBUS
The works Opensas follows (251"):

Dialcticam ingredientibusprimo videndumest quid sit dialetica et undedicatur et
quid intendat.
Dialetica est ars discernendi verum a falsa et falsum & vcro, idest ars per quam
dignoscitur quid verum, quid falsum et quo differt hoc ab hoc.
Et dicitur & 'dia', quod est duo, et 'logox', quad est sermo,idest opponentis et respon-
dentis.
Que et logica nuncupatur. Et dicitur a 'iaxiï', quod est ratio, eoquod de rebus rationis
est et de sermone secundum quod subest veritati et falsitati. Et dicitur 'rationis' a(d)
diH'erentiam scientiarum que sunt de rebus moris et nature. Et intendit in nos facere
habitum scientie de argumentatione et sillogismo.
Sed quia argumentatio ex propositionibus est et propositio ex terminis et omnis
terminus est vox et omnis vox sonus, a sono tamquam a priori inchoamus.
Then follows the discussion of sonus,nomen,verbum,and oratio. The latter

is divided as Follows(ibid.):
Orationum alia perfecta, alia imperfecta. imperfecta est illa que imperfectum sensum
generat in animo auditoris, ut 'homo albus'. Et loquor de perfectione que est ad expri-
mendamsententiamgramaticamet perfecmm.Perfectaest illa que perfectum sensum
generat ut qui audit quiescat, ut 'homo currit'. Que dividitur in iudicativum, ut 'Sar
currit'; in imperativam, ut 'audi lcctionem', in optativam, ut 'unum: 'quam', in subiuncti-
wam, ut 'cum [egero prafciam', in quesitativa, ut [legitne magister?'.
Et sciendum quod nulla istarum est propositio nisi sola indicativa quia circa solum
verbum est veritas falsitasque, et nuncupatur a suis modis propositio. Ergo est oratio
verum vel falsum significans. Et dicitur quasi pro alio positio, idest pro conclusione
hallmeclü.z
' Cmnparee.g. Peter's discussionof cquivocario

(esp. nr. 7. 18 ed. Bochefiski) with that
of our author (see below, p. 475 Ff ). Moreover, in our Summe,restrictio is more closely
.
related to mppositiaand appellatioand the discussion of ampliario has not yet become an
independent tract, like the one in Peter's Simlmule,Seebelow, p. 462.
2 Cfr. William uf Shyreswood,Introductionc:in logicam,p. 3024'25ed. Grabmann.
THE SUMMEMETENSES 453
There is an interesting note on categorical praposition (ibid.):
Et notandumquod predicatumquandoqueincludit in se virtutem compositionis,scilicet
verbum personale, quandoque est cmnpositio libera, scilicet ut cum dicitur: 'homoest
homo', 'Nihil' est lectus'.
The propositio hypotheticais deFinedand divided (ibid.):

lpotctica est quo constat ex duabus categoricis, ut 'si homoest, animo! est'. Et dicitur ab
'ipos', quod est sub, et 'tosis', quod est positio, quia unum alteri supponitur. Et sunt eius
503:species,scilicet condicionalis, copulativa, disiuncto, causalis,temporalis, localis.
Condicionalis est que constat ex duabus categoricis sesesequenter coniunctis (coniunc—
tus 35) per hanc dictionem 'si', ut 'si homo est, animo! est'; quarum prima dicitur
Ad cuius veritatem exigitur quod
quodad 'si' sequitur; altera vero consequens.
antecedens,
antecedensnon possit essevero sine consequenti; aclfälsitatcm, quod possit.
Copulativo est illa in qua capulantur clue categorice per hanc dictionem 'et', ut
'Sor currit or Plato disputat'. Ad cuius veritatem exigitur quod utraque sit vero; ad fal-
sitatem quod una sit fälsavel altera.
Disiuncto est in qua coniunguntur due catogoricc per hanc dictionem 'vol' quo
simul essenon patitur, ut 'Sor currit vol Plato disputat'. Ad cuius veritatem exigitur quod
una sit vero; ad falsitatem quod utraque sit vera vel falsa. Et'ljoc de vera disiuncta,,
Causalis est in qua coniunguntur clue categories: per hanc dictionem 'quia', ut 'quia
Sorcurrit, movetur',De veritate et Folsitatedicendum est sicut de condicionali. Temporalis
est in qua coniunguntur due categorica per hanc dictionem 'dum', ut 'Sor currit, dum
Platodisputat'. Ad cuius veritatem exigitur quod antecedenset consequenssint in eodem
tempore(!); ad Falsitatcmquod non. Localis est in qua clue categorice coniunguntur
per hanc dictionem 'ubi', ut 'ubi ost Sor, ibi os:et Ploro'. Dc veritate et falsitate exigitur
quod antecedenset consequenssint in eodem loco( !).
The aFFirnmtiveand negative propositions are deHneclas Follows (294):

Item. Propositionum alia affirmativa, alio negativa. Affirmativa est in qua negatio non
ponitur ad verbum principale ut 'Sor qui noncurrit, disputat'; licet enim negatioponatur
ad verbum inplicatonis, propositio tamen est affirmativa. (25?) Negativa est in qua
ponitur negatio ad verbum principale, ut 'homonon currit'.
Et hec cle categoricis propositionibus. Ad hoc vero quod ipotetice sint negative,
oportet negationem toti preponi, ut 'non si homoest, animo! est'. Et est sensus:.non
sequitur: 'si animal est, homoest'. Similiter: 'non Sor currit or Plato disputat', idest non est
verum quod per hanc copulativam dicitur: 'Sor currit et Platodisputat'. Et ita de aliis.
The quontity of & proposition and the signo quantitatis are describcd in
these words (25 V) :
Item. Propositionum categoricarum alia universalis, alio particularis, alia indefinito, alia
singularis. Universalis est in qua ponitur signum universale ad subiectum, ut 'omnis
homocurrit'. Particularisest in qua ponitur signumparticularead subiectum,ut 'aliquis
homo currit'. Et voco signum universale dictionem determinantem quid supponat tcr-
454- LOGICA MODERNORUM n
minus cum quo coniungitur. Hoc est: signorum aliud universale, aliud particulare, aliud
aFFlrmativum,aliud negativum. Universalia afürmntiva sunt 'omnis', 'quilibet', 'unusquis-
quo' etc.; universalia negativa sunt 'nullus', 'neuter',-,particulare nFHrmativum, ut 'qui-
dom', 'ob'-quis','alter' et 'rohquus" sed nullum est particulare negativum.
lndeEnita est in qua ponitur terminus communis non determinatus aliquo signo ad
subiectum, ut 'homocurrit'.
Singularis est in qua ponitur terminus discretus ad subiectum, ut 'Sor currit'. Et
dicitur terminus communis id(em) quod nomen appellativum, ut 'homo', 'osinus' ctc.
Terminus discretus est nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum, ut 'Sor',
'Ploro', 'istc' etc. Et dicitur singularis quia uni soli convenit determinate. Inchlnita
dicitur quia non determinat utrum pro uno vel pro pluribus. Particularis dicitur quia
terminus communistrahitur in partem pro aliquo signo particulari, non tamen deter-
minate. Universalisappellaturquia pro (pre MS)cunctissupponit.
Et notandumquod iste trcs propositionis divisionessumuntur secundumtria que in
prapositionc sunt; prima secundum substantiam, secunda secundum qualitatmn, tertia
secundum quantitatem. Atque circa quedam invente sunt tres dictiones, que sunt
scilicet 'quo?', 'quolis?', 'quanro?'; 'quo? querit de substantia et respondendum est
'cotegorica' vcl 'ipotctica' secundum quod sint; ad 'quam ?' respondendum est 'nogativo'
vel 'o-girmom-o'secundum quod sint; ad 'quonta?' respondendumest 'univcrsolis',
'particularis', 'indg'ïnitaf, 'iingulariï'. Unde versus:
Que ca vcl fp., ne vel ofqualis, por. quanta sin un in.
Then, the interrelations of categorical propositions (contradictory),

their laws are dealt x-vith; and
contrary, subcontrary and subalter11)ancl
soare the k
several indsof conversio.2The chapter ends asfollows (ZSV):
Et hec dc introductionibus sufficiant.
VISO DE INTRODUCTIONIBUS
VIDENDUM EST DE SUPPOSITIONIBUS.
CAPITULLIM II: DE SUPPOSITIONIBLIS3
25": Quoniam terminus est illud quod primo cadit in intentione logici in via
generationis,ideo de termino et de eis que accidunt termino, ad presensvideamus.Quc
accidentia sunt scilicet: suppositio, capulatio, appellatio, ampliatio, restrictio, distri-
butio. Iclcode eis videbitur per ordinem.
' relicua MS.

2 Our MS adds an interesting gloss on the impedimento
conrorsionis:Septem (!Vltem MS)
sunt que inpediunt conversionespropositionum: identitas terminorum, ut 'homoest
homo'; Obliquus casus, ut 'lapis est in muro', defectus termini, ut 'ncmo est asinus'; tcr-
minorum equivocaacceptio, ut 'qucdompropositioestximplox'; verbum confuseacceptum,
ut 'nox est obscurumtompus'; terminus qui potest predicari et non subici, ut 'Sor currit'
vcl 'Sor est album'; ordo rerum, ut 'ista puer crit scnox'; varia determinatio, ut 'ab omni'
hominehabeturcapur'.
J The completetext of this chapteri:; given.
THE summe METENSES 455
Do termino
Terminus est in quem resolvitur propositio, ut dicit Aristotiles, scilicet subiectum

et predicatum in categorica ct duc categorica in ipotctica. Et dicuntur eius termini
abusive,ut dicit Boetius. Quia ergo inter accidentiatermini prius est suppositio, ideo de
ea prius est determinandum.
Then, supposition is (lefined as substantivoroi designatio; capulation as

odioccivodesignatio(ZSV):
Est autem suppositiosubstantivarei designatio,idest per nomen substantivum.Et
supponere cst substantive rem designare..Unde 'homo', 'osinus', 'olbcdo' dicuntur termini
suppositiones.
Copulatio est adiectiva designatio, idest per nomen adiectivum. Et copulare cst
adiective rem designare, ut 'album, —bo, --bum' et 'hic et hoc et hocfolix'. Dicitur
tamen adiectivum tripliciter: vocc solum, ut pronomen trine tcrminationis 'ille, illo,
illud'; solum significatione, ut nonüna oFFlcii et dignitatum, quc significant formas
accidentales per modum substantie, ut 'fobor' ct 'cpiscopux';et est adiectivum voce et
signiEcationc, ut :]Elix' et 'albus, alba, album'.
Next, suppositionis divided andsubdivided(253'1'261'):

Dividitur ergo suppositio in connuunem ct discretam. Comnmnis suppositio est quam
habent nomina appellativa a forma communi a qua imponuntur, ut 'homo', 'animal'
ctc. Suppositio discreta est quam habent termini discreti, ut nomina propria et
pronomina demonstrativa, ut 'Sor', 'Ploto' et 'iste'. Et discreta dicitur quia ad unum
determinata est nec ampliori potest nec coartari.
ltcm. Communis suppositio dividitur in simplicem et personalmn. Personalis sup-
positio est quam habet terminus communis quando inest ei predicatio ratione parti-
cularium, ut cum dico: 'homocurrit', 'homoest(26?) animal'. Suppositio simplex est quam
habet terminus communis cum tenetur non ratione suorum particularium sed ratione
sue communis intentionis & qua imponitur, vel quando non potest demonstrare aliquod
certum particulare pro quo supponat.
Notetur quod dicunt alii quod quando ponitur cum verbo significante actum mentis
vel cum est ibi predicatum rationis, tenetur simpliciter. Ut cum dicitur: 'homo est
' species'
,
'homointelligitur'
.
Et dicitur simplex quasi sinc plica particularium. Similiter: 'pipor venditur hic et
Romo'; similiter: 'homo est dignissimo crooturorum'. ln hiis amnibus termini supponunt
simpliciter nec licet addere signa universalia, quia sic non possunt multiplicari. Cum
autem coniunguntur cum verbo significante actum corporis, tunc supponunt personaliter,
ut 'homocurrit', quia pertinet ad personam, idest ad particulare.
The most important subdivision is that of personal supposition into

suppositiocadumand suppositiodeterminata(261'):
ltcm. Suppositio pcrsohalis dividitur in confusam et determinatam. Determinata sup-
positio est quam habet terminus communis sumptus inchnite vcl particulariter, ut
456 LOGICA MODERNORUM li
'homocurrit', 'aliquis homocurrit' ; confusa quam habet terminus communis cui adiungitur
dictio vim inportans confundendi, ut 'omnis homo'. Et dicuntur inportare vim con-
fundendi signa universalia et negatio. Dicitur autem confluit)quasi simulfusio, idest fusio
partium. El: dividitur in confusam mobilem distributivum et in confusam tantum.
Confusntantumest illa quamhabetterminuscommuniscum supponitpro pluribus, nec
tamen licet sub ipso sumere partes suas. Suppositio distributiva est quam habet terminus
communis quando supponit pro qualibet sui parte per universalitatem signi adiuncti.
Thus our author gives the Follox-ving division of suppositio:
simplex
" communis ' determinata
-
suppositio - personalis & confusa mobilis
." -
discreta confusa
—. k confusa tantum
t
(siveinmobilis).
Next, a rule is given for the last kind of supposition (ibid.):

Unde regula est quod terminus communis adiunctus signo universali nFErmativo
inmediateconfunditur mobiliter et distributive, idest pro qualibetsui parte: adiunctus
autem"mediate confunditur tantum inmobiliter. Quod patet cum dicitur: 'omnishomo
est.animal'; iste terminus 'animal' confunditur pro quolibet particulari hominis et potest
Heri in eo descensus(dessusMS): 'ergo Sor estanimal', 'Pioro ', et sic de aliis.
......
Iste terminus 'animoi' confunditur, quia oportet tamen reddi pro quolibet particulari
hominis sed inmobiiiter, quia non potest dici: 'ergo hocanima] vel aliud'.
Then follm-vs an extensive discussion of the signo quantitatis, this time

from the view-point of snpposition(ibid.):
Et notandum quod diversa sunt signa. Quedmn enim distribuunt partes substantie,
quoddistribuit partesquantitatis,et 'quolisiibct'et
quedamaccidentia,ut 'quantusiibot',
'quolisvii' partes qualitatis, 'quodris' 'quodiibor' partes materie, 'quotuslibot' partes ordinis.
Et sciendumquod non valet processusa signis substantiein partes harum distributivas,
nec econverso, neque mixtim (mistim MS). Unde non tenet': 'quontuslibot homocurrit;
ergo homoalbus'.
Signorum".substantie quedmn sunt aFErmati-ia,quedam negativa. Quodam enim
distribuunt inter duo tantum, quedaminter plura. Inter duo tantum, ut 'uterque' (iter-
que (!) MS), 'neuter', Unde: 'uterquemorumcurrit; ergo iste vci illo'; similiter: 'neurer
istorumcurrit; ergo nec ista nec iHc': 'Omnis' autem (et) 'quilibet' et 'nullus' distribuunt,
inter plura, adminusinter tria. Propter quod dicunt quidam hosesseinconvenientes:
'omnis sol est', 'omnisfcnix m', nisi accipiatur multitudo in aptitudine vel in successione.
Item. Sciendum quod differentia est inter signa universalia aFErmativa et negativa,
quia cum aanrmativa solumnmdo, ut dictum est, inmediate sibi additus tenninos
mobiliter confundat ct distributive, mediatos confundat tantum, negativa mediatos et
immediatus mobiliter et distributivo confundit. Unde cum dicitur: 'nuHus homo os:
asinus' potest descendi tum in subiecto tum in predicato.
THE SUMME METENSES 457
Then, another regulois given (ibid.):

Item. Regulaest quod negatioprepositatermino communi confundit in predicato
mobiliter et distributive, Ut cum dicitur: 'non-homoos: oiinus', tum iste terminus 'homo'
tum iste terminus 'osinus' confunditur mobiliter et distributive.
Next, some impedimento distributionis are enumerated:
Sed quia pluribus modis potest impediri distributio, nunc de impedimentiseius

videamus. Quando enim termino distributo virtute signi universalis preponitur negatio,
ligatur distributio nec potest Fieri in ea descensus(dessusMS); quare non sequitur:
'non-omni; homo currit; argo Sor non currit'. Similiter quando signum universale ponitur ad
predicatum, quia ad predicatum non est addere 'omne', ut dicit Aristoteles. Non enim
sequitur: 'omnishomoestomnishomo; ergoSor'. Et si probetur quod sic: 'Sor cit Sor, Plato
os: Plato', et sic de simili; ergoomnishomoBS!omnishomo', dicendum quod non sequitur,
quia licet a parte subiecti possunt sequi, tamen a parte predicati non, cum predicatum
se habeatper modum forme et forma indivisibilis est, subiectumquidem pro forma
materieet materiadivisibilis est; quaread subiectumpertinet divisio.
Our author continues with giving some impediments of inference (ibid.):

..
Item. Dictiones quedam sincategoreumatice dispositiones
immobilitate sunt. Que
inportant virtutem negationis. Prc-pter quod non sequitur: 'omnis homode nocosoirozo
o::
animal' ; ergo Sor de necessitatees.'.animal'.
Item. Non valet processus a confusa suppositione ad determinatam, ut 'omnis homo
estanimal; ergoanimo!estomnishomo',quia terminus 'animal' in secundahabebatconfusam
suppositionem, in altera vero determinatam, cum non sit ibi a quo confunditur, quia nec
signum universale nec negatio aliquid agit ante se sed solum post. Similiter non tenetur
processusa pluribus determinatis suppositionibus alicuius termini ad unam determinatam
eiusdem. Ut cum dicitur: 'non Sor vidensest aliquid videns, non Pharovidenson aliquid viden:
et sic de. simili; ergonullus vidonsest aliquid ridons'. Cum enim iste terminus 'vidons'
secundo positus in primis et in ultima determinate teneatur, quia 1virtus.signi 'nullus'
confundit in alia clausula, non sequitur processus.
Item. Non tenet processus a simplici suppositione termini ad personalem; non de
personali (ad simplicem). Non tenet: 'homo est species';ergo aliquis homo', cum li 'homo'
' teneatur in prima simpliciter, in secunda determinate per virtutem signi particularis.
Two specialcasesof suppositionare given (ibid.):

Item. Dicitur quod in appellationedicti terminus supponit simpliciter. Ut cum
dicitur: 'scio hominem (cosa) in Angiia', non potest sumi sub ea; 'ergo scio Sortem vol
Plotonom'. Est autem appellatio dicti quod sumitur ex propositione mutando nominati-
vum in accusativun'uet verbum personale in infinitivum vel proponendo toti propositioni
hanc dictionem 'quod'. Ut 'homo currit' est propositio; 'hominemcurrere' vel 'quod homo
currit' est suum dictum. Et quod dictum potest supponere in oratione ut 'hominem
currere est verum'.
item. Cum dicitur: 'omni:homoesttotumin quontiroto',iste terminus 'homo'distribu-
tive supponit, quia, licet sit terminus communis et ponatur cum eo signum universale,
tamen predicatum, quod est vere totum in quantitate, non permittit ipsum supponere
nec ratione sue cmnmunitntis nec ratione suorum particularium.
This chapter winds up with another division of the suppositions of terms

(ibid.):
Item. Terminorum suppositionum duo sunt genera: quedam dicuntur antecedentia,

quedamrelativa. Antecedentiadicuntur quod orationeminitiant et a nullo dependent,
ut 'homocurrit'. Relativasunt que precedentemsubstantimnreferunt. Unde & Prisciano-
tzlicitlurl relativum rei antclate representativum, ut 'homo currit et ipso disputat'.
De suppositioneigitur horum talis datur regula:
qualem suppositionem habet antecedens,
talem relativum,
ut si antecedens supponit distributive, et relativum, ut 'Sor currit or.ipse disputat'; et si

antecedensinclcEnite, et relativum; et si antecedensparticulariter, et relativum; et si
antecedensuniversaliter, et relativum.
De hoc tamen dubitatur quidcm utrum relativum pronomencum dicatur signiFlcal-e
meram substantiam, possit referre substantiam cum suis dispositionibus. A(d) quo(d)
dicendum quod sicll quia aliud est referre, aliud est significare.
VISO DE SUPPOSITIONIBUS
VIDENDUM EST DE APPELLATIONIBUS.
CAPI'I'ULUM III: DE. Jf'iF'PEI..L."L'I"IüNIBLISz
First, the diFferencesbetween suppositio

and appellatioare stated (261'):
Quoniam appellatio est nota eorum que accidunt termino inquantum est in propo-
sitione, idea viso dc suppositione!termini videndumest de appellationeeiusdemet de
diH'crcntiaque est inter appellationemet snppositionem.
Sciendumtamenquod appellatio termini est suppositioeius pro iis qui sunt. Unde
appellata dicuntur presentia supposita; suppositio est tum pro existente tum pro non-
existente. Et ex hoc patet dichrentia inter appellationemet suppositionem,quia
terminuscommunisper se positussupponitpro omnibusillis qui sunt vel qui erunt vel
qui fuerunt participantesformam communem a qua imponitur. Unde bene dicitur:
'homoest', 'homofuit', 'homoerit,'. Non autem terminus appellat nisi pro eo qui vere est.
Et propterea liïanifestum est quod multos appellavit quos modo non appellat, et multos
posteaappellabit; item multosappellatquosmodononappellatnec posteaappellabit.
Considering the different functions of supposition and appellation it is
' Cfr. Inst. gramm. XV", 1). l4-l30*21.

2 The complete text of this chapter is given.
J suppositione correcmdfrom appellatione MS.
quite natural that another couple of terms is introduced: rostrictio and

ompiiotio(ibid.) :
Cum igitur terminus communis :: suppositione sua habeat coartari, videndum est de
restrictione termini quantum ad appellationem.
Next a number of regulasare given andexpounded(261'H'):

Quaredicendumpro regulaquod
[l] terminus communis non ampliatus adiunctus cum verbo cle presenti
non habenti vim ampliandi et sumpto simpliciter restringitur ad
presentes, idest ad hoc solum quod supponat pro presenti. Ut cum dicitur: 'homo
currit', iste terminus'homo'supponittantumpro eis qui sunt. VeriFicatioreguletalis est:
'torminuscommunis'dicitur quia nec ampliori potest nec restringi ; 'non ompIiows'opponitur
quia si iam ampliatus esset, terminus discretus esse non posset; 'cum verbo do prosonti'
dicitur quia illud a quo restringitur est presentialitas& verbo consigniücata— aliter enim
restringunt verba cle presenti, quia ad presentia, et aliter verba de preterito et futuro,
ut patebitpost; —-'nonhabentivim ampliandi'dicitur ad removendumverbaampliantia
(ampliandoMS) que sunt: 'potost','loudotur', 'intcHigitur', et similia. Cum enim dicitur
'homopam: esse',iste terminus 'homo' supponit non solum (26?) pro eis qui sunt vel qui
erunt vel qui fuerunt, sed pro eis qui essepossunt. Multi vero possunt essequi nec sunt
nec erunt nec fuerunt. Et ita patet quod iste terminus 'homo' pro pluribus supponit per
virtutem huius verbi 'porost' ipsum ampliontis quasi pro se poneretur. Et si obicitur quod
ibi est terminus communis coniunctus cum verbo de presenti, ergo restringitur ad
presentes, dicendum quod illa prcsentialitas distinguitur a ratione presentialitatis per
virtutem potentie. Que diFFerentia,
scilitetlI temporis, non consideratur.
Similiter cum dico: 'Cosor loudomr', si id verbum 'loudotur' ratione presentialitatis
teneatur, locutio est falsa, cum Cesarsil; non-ens. Quare liec verba et similia ampliare
dicuntur, ut 'inrciligitur'.
lTEM. Per hoc quod dicitur 'sumptosimplicitor', removentur verba cum determinationi-
bus; amplius sumpta quc distrahunt ipsa a presentialitate, ut sunt 'opinobile', 'possibile'
et similia, 'possibilitor', 'secundum hobimm' et similia. Cum enim dicitur homine dor-
miente 'homovidot', secundum habitum patet; quod si hoc verbum 'rides' teneretur pro
presenti, locutio esset falsa, cum homo non videat in presenti; unde non sequitur ex
illa: 'homo vidot'. Similiter cum dicitur: 'chimoro os: opinabilo', non sequitur 'ergo
'chimaeraest', quod est primo positum per determinationem sequentem ad hoc quod sua
suppositio sit tam pro existenti quam pro non-existenti.
[2] ITEM. Notandumquod terminus communis coniunctus cum verbo de

preterito a parte ante potest supponere tam pro presentibus et pro
preteritis. Ut cum dicitur: 'homo cucurrit', sensus (est): 'homo qui est cucurrit' vel
'homo quifuir. cucurrit'. Similiter:
[3] Coniunctus [sc. terminus communis] cum verbo de futuro potest

supponere tum pro presentibus tum pro futuris. Ut cum dicitur: 'homo
currot', potest esse sensus quod homo qui est curret, vel homo qui ori: curret. Hoc autem
' sunt MS.

habentverbapreteriti et futuri a presenti,quia copulanturad ipsum,sicut 'i"( )1'

......
per quem stant. Sicut dicit Aristotiles quod de copulativa tempore non est nisi presens
nunc. Et hoc est 'a porta ante', quia si a parte post, secundum temporis exigentiam
teneretur. Unde cum dicitur: 'Cosarfuic homo', iste terminus 'homo' non potest reddere
locutionem veram nisi pro homine qui fuit. Similiter cum dicitur: 'flntlcllrlsws erit
homo',hecest vera,sedpro nullo existentepctest supponereli 'homo',sedsolumpro eo
qui erit. Et ita patet quod terminus communis & parte post supponit tantum secundum
verbi tempus.Similiter intelligendumest de terminis adiectivis.
Then follow some instances of the special case OFpresenscorgfusum,

such
as in 'Pusca est pulchrum tempus' (26V):
Quia tamen contra predictam regulam videntur iste orationes reperiri: 'Pascaon pul-
chrum tempus', 'rosa est pulclrorfos', ideo dicendum est de illis. Et quod sint false mnni-
Festum,quia quando aliquid alicui attribuitur quod ei non inest,. Falsoattribuitur. Ergo
non existente Pascavel rosa Falsoeis attribuitur. Ergo iste orationes sunt false. Preterea
ibi est terminus communis non ampliatus etc.; ergo restringitur ad presentia. Ergo iste
terminus 'rosa' cum dicitur 'rosa est' retringitur ad presentes; sed nulla rosa est; ergo
ista estfalsa: 'rosaest'; ergo est ista: 'namestpulchorjios'.
Dicendum quod duplex est 'prosamis'sensus:presensin ratione temporis discreti vel
in ratione presentis. Et tale presens restringit ad supponendum pro presentibus. Et de
tali datur regula predicta. Et est aliud presensquod se habet per indiH'erentiamad omnia
presentia et de tali vere sunt iste secundum usum. Unde sensusest 'Poscaostpulchrum
tempus', scilicet quando est. Et de tali dicitur presens confusum. Llnde versus:
presenscorylum" prcsentisnon reno: usum,

cum non restringit ad presentia.
The fourth regula runs as follows (ibid.):

[4] ITEM. Notandumquod terminus c0pulans adiunctus cum verbo & parte
ante potest construi cum eo ratione materie vel ratione forme. Et
voco materiam et subiocwmforme et accidens idem. Ut cum dicitur: 'album currit', si iste
terminus 'album' snpponit verbo ratione materie vel subiecti (. ) id quod est vel
... . .
fuit vel erit; si ratione forme vel accidentis, sensusest: album manansalbum currit.
Next, our author desis with such prepositions as the Scriptura] 'coci
vident, surdi audiunt' (ibid.):
Ad cuius evidentiam queritur de istis onmibus: 'ceci rident, surdi audiunt' et similibus.
Qui sermones licet sumantur al) Evangelio, videntur tamen esse falsi prius, quod in-
congrui. Quare datur pro regulaquod adiectivum in solo neutro supponit. Unde hec
est incongrua: 'albumnigrat' (ergo! MS). A simili ista: 'cocirident'. Quod falsumvidetur,
quia terminus communiscum inest appellativo, non tenetur secundumrationem sui sed
secundumrationem oppositionis.Ut cum dico 'homoalbuscurrit', li 'albus' non supponit
nisi pro illis quibus inest albedo. Ergo multo fortius terminus ille qui signiücat sul)-
stantiam et formam innatam substantie non tenetur nisi ratione forme. Ergo cum
dicitur: 'cecusridot', cum 'cccus'sit idem quod 'non-ridens', erit sensus: non—ridens
videt.
Quod est inpossibile, cum idem sit quod 'qui nonridet, vidct'.
Dicendum quod ista est congrua: 'cocusridot', quia licet hoc nomen 'cocus'sit adiecti-
vum, tamen sua determinatur adiectivatio per formam quam subiecto inponit; et hoc
est ratione forme privative quod suum subiectmn determinat.
Item. Oliicitur quod adiectivum non potest substantivorinisi in neutro. Dicendum
quod verum est, nisi Fiat:: forma denotatio determinante verbo aliquo. Ut cum dicitur:
'cum venit.'. Similiter tenentur dicti termini in locutionibus sanctis (or: sacratis ?): 'ceci
ridenr' etc. Quod obicitur de falsitate, dicendum quod illi termini possuntsigniFlcore
ratione materie vel ratione forme. Si ratione materie, ista sunt vere; et est sensus: qui
sunt rolfuerun: ceci, rident. Si ratione forme, iste sunt false; et est sensus: cocimonentes
cecivident.Et quod obicitur quod oportet tenere terminum ratione forme, dicendum
quod non, quia subiectum non coartatur ad hoc quod non possit supponere tum pro eo
qui est tum pro eo qui fuit.
Then our author inquires whether appellation of a term should be in-

Flucncedby the use OFa negation,just as suppositionis aFfectedby it
(ibid.):
Item. Videndumestde negationetermini utrum mutet appellationem,sicut et suppo-
sitionem. Et de suppositione habetur pro regula quod"negatio postposito termini
communi (re)lata ad cmnpositinnem principalem, mutat qualitatem propositionis et
non quantitatem. Ut cum dicitur: 'homocurrit', 'homonon currit', utraque est indefinita,
sed alterooFFirmativa,
altera negativo. Sed prepositanegotiotermino communi mutat
qualitatem propositionis et quantitatem. th 'homo currit', 'non: homocurrit'; prima est
indefinita oFFlrmativa,secunda (secundum il'lS) universalis negativa..Similiter: 'omnis
'non: omnishomocurrit': prima est universalisaFFil'lïintiva,
homocurrite"ll secundaparticu-
laris negativa. Propter quod similiter queritur dc negationeista: 'homononcurrit' utrum
mutet appellationemhuius termini 'homo'. Et affirmativa restringebaturad presentes,ut
v(i)sum est. Quod non restringebatur videtur, restricta causa 'i*. effectus(?)
....
T, sed causa restrictionis subiecti est compositio unita cum subiecto. Ergo
. . . . ..
restricta compositione restringitur restricta. Sed restringitur compositio per negatio-
nem, ergo restrictio. Ergo iste terminus 'homo' non restringitur, cum dicitur: 'homo
noncum:. . .
Contra. Eodem modo tenetur terminus communis in duabus subcontrariis. Sed in
'hoc: 'homocurrit' tenetur iste terminus 'homo'solummodo pro presentibus; ergo in hoc
'homonon currit' tenebitur pro presentibus ubi (nisi MS) restringatur; ergo restringitur.
Item. Regula est quod inpossibile est duascontradictorias simul esseveras. Sed iste
contradictorie sunt simul vere, si iste terminus 'homo' non restringitur pro hoc. Ponatur
quod non sint nisi tres homines et currant, hec est vera: 'omnishomocurrit', quia vera est
universalis propositio quando quelibet suarum singularium est vera. Sed hec est vera:
'iste homocurrit', et ille, et tercius. Sed si in hac: 'aliquis homonon currit' iste terminus
'homo' non restringitur, poterit supponere pro non existenti; poterit ergo supponere
pro Cesare; ergo hec est vero pro Cesare: 'homo non currit'. Unde est contradictoria
istius: 'omnishomocurrit'. Ergo iste contradictorie sunt simul vere. Quod est inpossibile.
Ergo inpossibile cst terminum non restringi. Ergo necessequod restringitur in negativa
sicut in oFHrmativa.
462 LOGICA MODERNORUM [1
Quod concedimus.Ad hoc quod obicitur, dicimus quod non restringitur compositio
ratione temporis presentis quod est causarestrictionis.
The chapter on appellation winds up with a discussion of the praposition

'Verumdicetura Sorte' (26'V-2'71'):
Item. Notandum quod mutatur appellatio termini per constructionem eius cum ï'el'bü.
Ut cuni dicitur: 'verumdicetur a Sorte', iste terminus 'vcrum' potest supponere pro eo
quod modo est vel quod erit verum. Sed cum dicitur 'Sar dice: verum', non supponit iste
terminus 'vcrum' nisi pro eo quod erit verum, quia est a parte predicati. Ad cuius
evidentiam ponatur quod te scribere sit verum in A et falsum in B et Sor dicat in B:
'in scribis'. Probo quod (27?) hec est vera: 'Verumdicatur:! Sorte'; sednil dicetur & Surte
nisi in B; ergo Sur dicet verum in B. Et. quod sequatur videtur, quia quelibet passiva
infert suam activam, et econverso. Sed (licet te scribere in B. Ergo verum erit te scribere
in B. Ergo tu'scribes in B. Quod est falsum et contra positionem.
Dicendum quod ista est vem: 'verum dicetur a Sorte', et ista est falsa: 'Sor dice.:verum'.
Nec valet argumentatio, quia iste terminus 'verum' sumptum cum hoc verbo 'diccre' a
parte ante potest supponere tum pro presentibus tum pro futuris. Unde id est sensus:
id quod est verum vel erit verum dicetur & Sorte. Que est vera pro hac: id quod est
verum dicetur a Sorte. Positus autem cum hoc verbo 'dicet' & parte post non potest sup-
ponere nisi pro futuro veru. Et ita Fit abampliata
processus ad
suppositione restrictum.
Et hoc de appellationibus suFFiciat.
DICTO DE APPELLATIONIBUS
DICENDUM EST DE RESTRICTIONIBUS.
CAPITULUM nr: DE RESTRICTIONIBUSI
A separate chapter is clevoted by our author to restrictio, already

mentioned abovez (27"):
Quoniam supra habita est.mentio de restrictione minusquesufficienter de illa dictum
est, nunc de ea convenit latius expedire. Videndum igitur quid restrictio et quid habeat
restringere et quid restringi et de causis restrictionis et quot modis Eat restrictio.
First restrictio is deFmed (ibid.);
Restrictio est coarctatio termini ad supponendumpro paucioribusquam sua natura

exigat. autem habent termini communes quorum natura potest esse in plus aut
Restringi
in minus. Termini vero discreti nequaquam. Restringcre autem possunt multa tam-verba
tam nomina. Sed de restrictiune facta per verbum, causata& presente, consigniücata in
verbo iu precedentibus tactum est. Ideo de ea nil ad presens preterquam dicendum est.
' [ give our author's text in full. 2 pp. 4595.

Next it is divided into restrictio usualis and restricrio simplex Or naturalis.

The former is used in four ways: (1) per antonomosiom,1(2) per precisio-
nom, (3) in comparationead oppositum, and (4) in torminis odiectivis in
comparationead oppositum. I give our author's exposition in fuil (ibid.):
Restrictio (dicitur dupliciter), scilicet usuaiis et simplex. Usualis est que provenit
ex usu loquendi. Et potest Fieri quatuor modis. Per antonomasiam,ut cum dicitur: 'res
vcnit'. Licet enim iste terminus 'rex' supponatcommuniter pro quolibet rege, tamen
ex usuloquendirestringitur adsupponendumpro regepatrie in quaest.loquens.Simile
est de istis nominibus 'dominus' in sua domo, 'opiscopus'in episcopatu suo, et sic de
similibus.
Secundomodo Et usualis restrictio per precisionem. Ut cum dicitur: 'iste panis volet
ex usu loquendicreditur non plus valerepropter naturamprecisionis.Et
trcsclenorios',
in hoc casu dicunt quidam duascontradictorias simul esseveras, quia cum dicitur: 'iste
ponis volet.tros dcnorios' et ponitur quod valet sex, hec est vera, quia quod valet plus valet
minus; preterea ista est vero per precisionem: 'iste panis non valet tres', quia valet plus.
Et iste sunt contradictorie. Ergo due contradictorie sunt simul vere. Dicendum quod
non sunt contradictorie, quia non sunt respectu eiusdem aFlirmatio vei negatio.
Tertio modo Et usualis restrictio in comparatione ad oppositum. Ut cum dicitur:
'nil est.in orcho'. Si enim hec dictio 'm'l' negaretpro quolubet, locutio essetfalsa,cum
non sit vacuum; unde est piena aere. Sed li 'nil' negat solum pro rebus solidis.
item. Quarto modo Et usualis restrictio in terminis atliectivis in comparatione ad
opposita. Ut cum dicitur: 'in-: mons est parvus': Cum enim omnis mons sit magnus,
non dicitur parvus nisi in comparatione ad maiorem. Similiter si decem homines erant
in vico, dicerentur multi, quia consultum est essepaucos, et si in tota civitate non essent
nisi decem homines, dicerentur pauci. Patet igitur quod in hiis 'paucum' et 'mulrum',
'mognum'(et) 'parl'um'dicuntur in compatationead opposita.Et sic Fit.in eis restrictio-
per comparationem ex usu.
The other kind of restrictio (restrictiosimplexor naturalis)is deiined and

its useis divided into four modi : (1) per adiectivotionem,(2) pergenitivum,
(3) per implicationem,and (4) perpronomen possossivum.
I give the complete text (ibid.):
Viso (le restrictione usuaii videndum est de naturali. Est autem naturalis restrictio
que fit a signiücationetermini. Et habet Heri quatuor modis: per adiectivationem,per
genitivum, per implicationem, per pronomen possessivum.
Primo ergo dicendum est de illa que Fit per adiectivationem.Cum enim dicitur:
'homoalbus currit', iste terminus 'homo' ab hoc termino 'albus' restringitur ad supponen-
dum solummodo pro illis quibus inest albedo, quia cum iste terminus 'albus' de se non
habeat signiEcaresubstantiam nisi in generali, [et] ponit substantiamsuam in sub-
stantiam quam signilïcat iste terminus 'homo' in speciali, et ita restringitur fluxus sue
substantie. Similiter potentia que est in substantia significata per hunc terminum 'homo'
ad quamlibet formam accidentalem, ad specialem qualitatem quam significat iste terminus
'albus', restringitur. Et ita alter per alterum restringitur, ita quod li 'homo'non supponat
! Fur this terun, see above, p. 326, n. l.
464- LOGICAMODERNORLIM11
nisi pro homine in quo est albedo' et li 'albus' non copulat nisi pro albedineque est in
homine.
Et sciendum quod non omnia adiectiva restringunt. quia illa adiectiva que sumuntur
de eo quod est de intellectu alterius vel proprium vel accidensinseparabileei appro-
priatum, non restringunt. Ut cum dicitur: 'homoestrationalis', id adiectivum 'rorionolis'
non restringit hunc terminum 'homo', quia 'rorionolo' est de intellectu 'hominis' et cadit
in diffinitiüne eius que est: animal rationale mortale gressibile bipes. Item, cum dicitur:
'homoestrisibilis', iste terminus 'risibilis' non restringit huncl substantivum'homo'; quia
risibileest proprium hominis et de eo conversimpredicatur, ut si homo est, risibile est;
si risibile est, homo est. Similiter si dicatur 'cors'us
niger', hoc adiectivum 'niger' non
restringit liunc terminum 'corrus'quia signiücat accidensinseparabileei appropriatum.
Sic ergo patet que adiectiva restringunt. et que.non.
Modo videndum est de restrictione facta per genitivum. Cum enim dicitur: 'asinus
Sortiscurrit', iste terminus 'osinus'per hunc genitivum 'Sortis' restringitur ad supponen-
dum solummodo pro asino possessoa Sorte, quia iste genitivus cum illo nomine ex vi
possessionisconstruitur. Unde sensus est 'asinus Sortis' idest: asinusPOSSBISUS a Sorte. Et
o Sorte' restringit hunc terminum 'osinus'; ergo et iste genitivus
ita determinatio 'possossus
'Sortis' restringit, cum idem valeat.
Posteavidendum est de restrictione facta per implicationem. Cum ergo dicitur:
'homo qui currit, disputat', iste terminus 'homo' per hanc implicationem 'qui currit'
restringitur ad currentes. Quod patet, quia dicit Priscianusquod hoc nomen 'qui' cum
cum verbo equivalet suo participio. Sed cum dicitur 'homocurrons',hoc adiectivum
'currens' restringit hoc substantivum 'homo', sic hoc quod dico: 'qui currit', cum ei
equivaleat, restringit eundem terminum.
Item. Notandum quod pronomen possessivum restringit terminum communem. Ut
cum dicitur: 'homoagger:o suoalbedine',per hoc quod dico 'suo' restringitur iste ter-
minus 'homo' ad supponendumpro albis, quia est sensus'homodigeri a suo albedine',
ldcst: homo dijl-rr ab albedine que inest ei ; sed si albedü inest homini, Immo est albus. Patet
ergo, quod cum dicitur: 'homo digeri o suo olhodino', sensus est: homodigïm ab albedine
quamhabet.lit hoc per virtutem huius pronominis 'suo', quod dicitur ab hoc relativo
'sui'II qui signihcat eandemsubstantiamnon agere (nisi) in se et pati a se.
Sic ergo visum est quid sit restrictis) et quomodofiat et quid habeatrestringere et
quid restringi et quibusde causis.
Thus, we can establishthe Following table of the kinds of ressrictio:

] per antonomosiam
2 per precisionom
usuolis ' 3 in comparatione ad oppositum
4 in terminis odioctivis in com-
P aratione ad aPF asitum
restricrio -
] por adiectis-otionom
simplex 2 per genitivum
or naturalis 3 per implicationem
4- per pronomen possessirum.
-
' sc. terminum.

THE summus METENSES 465
Finally, our author mentiens three kinds of impedimentorestrictionis

(ibid.):
Nunc considerandum est de impedimentis restrictionum. Notandum ergo quod terminus
communis restringi non potest, si ante est ampliatus vel restrictus. Ut cum dicitur:
'omnis homoalbus currit', iste terminus 'homo' ab hoc signo 'omnis' distribuitur ita quod
(cum MS) supponit actu pro universis suis particularibus. Et sic hoc adiectivum 'album'
non habet virtutem restringendi in predicto.
Dicunt tamenquidamquod iste est duplex: 'omnishomoalbuscurrit', idesthabetduos
sensus,quia potest essequod hoc signum 'omnis' distribuat hunc terminum 'homo' et
faciet ipsum snpponere pro quolibet suo particulari actu et tunc superveniens hoc
adiectivum 'oibus' informat cum sic distributum sua forma. Unde est sensus 'omnis homo
albus currit' idest: omnis homo, qui omnis homoest albus, currit; vel est sensus omnis homoest
albus et omnis homocurrit. Vel potest esse quod hoc adiectivum 'albus' determinet hunc
terminum 'homo'et rcstingatipsumad supponendumpro solisalbis et tunc supercodat
hoc signum 'omnis'. Et ita non distribuet ipsum nisi sit restrictum. Unde sensus est
'omnishomoalbus currit', idest: omniscui inostalbedocurrit.
Item. Alio modo inpeditur restrictio quotiens cum termino restricto construitur
verbum vim in'iportans restringendi, ut 'homoalbuspotestesseAntichrisnls'. Licet iste ter-
minus 'albus' debeat istum terminum 'homo' restringere, ipse tamen ampliatur per hoc
verbum 'porest',iam non restringit ipsum ut deberet. Sed tamen potest dici, licct ista
oratio non sit veranisi pro hominenon enti, non potestsuþþonerenisi pro hominealbo.
Unde sensus est: homoqui es: roi ori: albus, polos: ossaAntichristus.
Item. Alio modo inpeditur restrictio quando et restringitur et causa restrictionis
ponitur in locis diversis. Unde cum dicitur: 'homo currit qui est albus', licet ista inplicatis)
'qui est albus' restringat hunc terminum 'homo' si iungeretur sibi inmediate, tamen non
restringit, quia est extra suam clausulam.
Et hec de restrictionibus suFficiant.
VISO DE RESTRICTIONIBUS
VIDENDLIM EST DE IEQLIIPOLLENTIIS.
CAPITLILUM V: DE EQUIPOLLENTHS
After the four preceding chapters, deaiing with the term and its
accidents, our author goes on to speakabout the accidents of the propo-
sition, viz. equipollentia and modificatio. The Flfth chapter discusses
equipollentia. it opens as follows (27V):
Quoniam de termino et de eis que accidunt termino, secundum quod necessarium
est in introductionibus (in mobus MS : in modalibus?)cognoscere,in presentibus
determinatum est, nunc sequitur ut de propositione, que ex terminis est, videamus.
Sed quia visum est quid propositio que est oratio vcrum vei falsum signiEcans
—, —,
ideo de accidentibuseius videamus.Que sunt equipollcntia et modilïcatio. Et primo de
equipollentin.Videndümigitur quid equipollentiaet que propositionesequipolleantet
que non et penesquid prosumaturequipollentia.
is definedand explained (ibid.):

Next, oquipoHontio
Est igitur equipollentia, secundum quod hic sumitur, equalis valor duarum proPo-
sitionum secundumsuamveritatem de eodemsubiectoet predicatoet diversiseorum
signis, ut 'omnishomonon currit', 'nullus homocurrit' equivalent, ut patebit post.
Et sciendum quod de equipollentia solum categoricarum detorminamus, quia, etsi
ipothetice equipolleant, nil tamen de earum equipollentia determinamus.sicut nec de
sillogismis.
Ex dictis apparet quod penes hanc proprietatem propositionis que est veritas vel
falsitas, sumitur equipollentia propositionis. Que quia mutatur & negatione, ideo notanda
est ista propositionis divisio: prapositionum alia aHïrmativa, alia negativa. AFFlrmativa
est ad cuius principalem compositionemnon ponitur negatio, ut 'homocurrit'. Negativa
est cuius principalis compositio negatur. Item. Affirmativarumalia ex terminisfinitis,
alia ex terminis inEnitis; sic et negativarum. Et item, negativarum alia separativa, alia
extinctiva. Separativaest illa in qua separaturpredicatum a subiecto per negationem,
ut 'homo non currit'; et est sensus: cursusdividitur ab homine. Extinctiva est illa in qua
ponitur negatio extingens totum quod sequitur, ut 'non: homo est asinus; et est sensus:
non ost verumquod homoestasinus.
Notandumigitur quod dupliciter sumitur equipollentia: uno modo ratione termino-
rum, alio modo ratione signiFncatorum.Primo videndum est de illa quo fit ratione ter-
minorum. Ad cuius evidentiam videndum est ista propositionis divisio quod quedam
sunt de utroque termino Finito aFIïrmativaet negativa, ut 'homocsl:iustus', 'homononest
l'lmus'; quedam de utroque inEnito aFFnrmativa et negativa, ut 'non-homoos: non-iustos',
'non-homonon es:non-iuscus'; quedam de subiecto Hnito et predicato inünito aFFlrmativaet
negativa, ut 'homoes:non-iosms','homononestnon-ioscus';quedam de subiecto infinito et
predicato Finito aFErmativaet negativa, ut 'non-homoestiuxtus', 'non-homonon estiustus'.
Notandumigitur quod prapositio que est de Utroquefinito aFFlrmativa
equivaletei
que est de predicato inEnito negativacum constantia subiecti.'Unde iote clueequivalent:
'homo m iustus', 'homo non es: non-iosms'; si vero non sit subiectum, equivalent, sed ad
aFFlrmativamsequitur negativa et non econverso. ( .' ).
... ..
Viso qualiterEt equivalentiacirca terminosinFmitoset infinitos sinesignis,videndum
est de eadem cum signis. ( ..... ).
The chapter winds up as follows (ibid.):

Et notandumquod secundumdocumentumprius datum (signumnegationepreposita
equipollet sue contradictorie, postposita sue contrarie, proposito et postposita sue
subalterno). Secundum id poterimus considerare propositiones de terminis Finitis et
inFlnitiscum signis.Pretereasolum categoricarumequipollentiasdeterminamus.quia
sicut nequead nos spectatde ipotheticis sillogismis,ita nequede ipotheticarumequi-
pollentia prapasitionum.
Et hoc de equipollentia causa brevitatis expliciat.
DICTODE EQUIPOLLENTHS
DICENDUM
ESTDEMODALIBUS.
CAPITULUM VI: DE MODALIBUS
This chapteropensasfollows (27V):

Quoniamvisum est de equipollentia, restat videre de earum nwdiHcationePropter
quod notandum est ista propositionis divisio: propositio alia de inesse, alia modalis.
De inesseest illa in qua est compositio a nullo determinata, ut 'homoestalbus'. Modalis
est illa in qua determinatur compositio aliquo modo, ut 'homonecessario
estanimal'.
Next our author explains what kinds of dispositio are to be found in a

proposition and after which of them the propositio modalis is named
(27v-23r):
Quod ut melius videatur, videndumquod sicut tria sunt in propositione,scilicet sub-
iectum et predicatum et compositio, ita quidlibet istorum habet sibi proprias deter-
minationes,que dicuntur dispositioneseorum. Dispositionesvero subiectisunt nomina
adiectiva que signiEcant formas accidentales ponentes aliquam dispositionem ex sub-
iecto. Et harumduo sunt genera,quia quedamdeterminantsubiectumratione rei sub-
iecte, ut 'albus', 'm'ger' et similia ——-
et a talibus non recipit prepositis: denominationem.
Alia sunt que disponunt subiectum inquantum subiectum;. idest in comparatione ad
predicatum. Que significant modos distribuendi, ut sunt nomina distributiva que signa
dicuntur, quia significantmodossupponendiquos habentsubiectaquibus iniciuntur.
Et a talibusdenominaturpropositio. Ut cum dicitur: 'omnishomocurrit', ista propositio
dicitur universalis, quia subiectum eius universaliter sumitur, quod significat signum
appositum (281). Item. Quedam sunt que determinant predicata. Ut sunt adiectiva.
Sed quia predicatum forma est, ideo non est in eo ponere per indiHerentiam quod est et
quo est, sicut in subiecto. Et ab illis determinationibus non denominatur propositio.
Ut cum dicitur: 'Sor currit. bcnc', non propter hoc dicitur compositio bona.
Sunt alie dispositionesque disponunt ipsamcompositionem,idest dicunt modum
inlierendi predicatum cum subiecto.
Sciendumquod omnis inherentia predicati cum subiecto vel estet nonpotestnonesse,
et sic est necessaria, ut Deum esse, vel non est. nec potest esse, et sic est inpossibilia, ut
hominem esseasinum, vel non est et potest esse, et sic est possibilis, ut hominem qui sode: currere,
vel est er.potest esseet sic: est contingens, ut hominem qui currit currere.
ldeo dictio determinans compositionem est solummodo qua dicitur propositio
necessaria, impossibilis, possibilis, contingens.
,
Ex hoc patet illos peccare qui probant sex modos essecompositionis, rerum et falsum
addentescum quatuor predictis, tum quia non habentalium moduminherendi predi-
catumcum subiecto,tum quia non habentalium modumsupponendiin propositionibus
de inesse. Quod patet per Aristotilem in libro Priorum.
Notandum tamen quod isti modi quandoqueadverbialiter significantur, et sic dicuntur
modi adverbiales, ut 'possibiliter', 'inpossibiliter', 'necessario','contingontor'—quand0que
nominaliter, et sic dicuntur modi nominales, ut 'possibile', 'inpossibile', 'necesso','con-
tingens'; et licet idem significetur eis, tamen diversimode utimur prapter diversos modos
signiEcandi, quia secundumquod sunt adverbia, semper sunt determinationes verborum
nec subici possunt nec predicari, secundum vero quod nomina sunt, subici possunt et
predicari..
Then follow some objections, together with the author's ansx—vers,

concerning the function of the,modusin the prcposition (28f):
Dicitur tamen quod modi solum in predicato possuntponi, quia dicit Aristotiles in
libro Periermenies:"esseet non essesunl:subiecta,modi vero sunt appositiones".Et est
sensus: dicta propositionum subiciuntur., modi vero predicantur, ut 'Sortemcurrereest
contingens'vcl 'hominemnonesseasinumestneeesse'.
Sedsi hoc esse(t), non videtur possetenere.quod dicit Aristotiles in libro Priorum,
scilicet quod licet syllogizare ex modalibus in omni Figura; quia si minus, ( )
......
tunc non possetFieri syllogismusin prima figura, in qua est subiectumprime propo-
sitionis et predicatum secunde, ut
'omnishomoestanimal
omnerisibile est homo
ergo omnerisibile est animal'.
Preterea. Modi sunt dispositiones, predicatum vero res. Ergo videtur quod modi non
possintpredicari. Pretereanon essevidetur quod solet dici et quod innuit Aristotiles,
quod propositio potestesseduplex,de re vel de dicto, quiasemperessetde dicto, quod
est quando predicatur modus et subicitur dictum, ut 'album esse nigrum est possibile'.
Dicendumad hoc quod non oportet sempermodumpredicari ad hoc quod prapo-
sitio sit modalis sed potest et subici ct interponi. Et sic verbum Aristotilis cst intelligen-
dum quod modi sunt appositiones, idest: semper apponuntur compositioni, sive sit
affirmativa, quod intelligitur per esse, sive sit negativa, quod intelligitur per non esse.
Quod compositio est subiectum modi nec propter hoc oportet quod sit subiectum com-
positionis.. Vel potest dici quod dicit Aristotiles in libro Periermeninsquod ibi intendit
cle enuntiatione, et non de propositione.
Another objection is made concerning the quantity of the appellatio
dicti(ibid.):
Item. Dicitur quod cum quelibet appellatio dicti sit singularis, huiusmodi propo-
sitiones singulares sunt et similes: 'omnemhominemcurrereestpossibile'. Sed contra: dicit
Aristotiles quod non licet syllogizare sine universali; sed hic est bonus syllogismus:
'omnem hominem currere est possibile
sea'Sor est homo
ergo Sortemcurrereestpossibile';
et non est universalis nisi in prima; ergo prima est universalis; non ergo singularis.
Dicitur quod duplex est subiectum, scilicet subiectum enuntiabilis quod subicitur
verbo, et sic est singularis quia subiectum eius est singulare, scilicet appellatio dicti —;
et est subiectumprapositionisinquantumde ea lit syllogismus;et sic est universalis.
After some remarks on the terms 'possibile', 'impossibile', 'necesse-',

and
'contingens' and their interrelations, our author sets uP four regulas
(ibid.) :
Dc eis dantur quatuor regule. Quarumprima est talis:
de quocumque dicto affirmativo predicatur 'possibile',
de eodem predicatur 'contingens', ab eodem removetur 'inpossibile', et a suo op-

posito contradictorie removetur 'necesse';
et iste sunt de prima linea. !
Secundaregula est:
de quocumque dicto negativo predicatur 'possibile',
de eodem negativo predicatur 'contingens', ab eodem negativo removetur 'in-
possibile' et a suo opposito contradictorie removetur 'necesse';
et iste sunt de secundalinea.I
Tertia regula est:
a quocumque dicto aFErmativo removetur 'possibile',
ab eodem removetur 'contingens',de eodem predicatur 'inpossibile', de suo Op-
posito contradictorie predicatur 'necesse';
et iste sunt de tertia linea.l
Quarta regulaest quod
a quocumquedicto negativoremovetur 'possibile',
ab eodem removetur 'contingens',de eodem predicatur 'inpossibile', (de suo
apposito) contradictorie predicatur 'necesse';
et iste sunt de quarta linea.l Quod patet in Iigura subiacenti:
(l) possibile est esse contingens est esse
(2) possibile est non esse contingens est non esse
(3) non possibile est esse non contingens est 3558
(4) non possibile.est non esse non contingens est non esse
(1) non inpossibile est esse non necesseest non esse

(2) non inpossibile est non esse non necesse est esse
(3) inpossibile est esse necesseest non esse
(4) inpossibile est non esse necesse.est esse.
Then, the intcrrelations of the modal propositions are discussed(ibid.):

ltcm. Notandum quod propositiones de dictis modis con'lparantur n(d) seinvicem per
quatuor habitudinesconsideratusin propositionibusde inesse,scilicet contrarietatem,
subcontrarietatem, subalternitatem, contradictionem, ut visum fuit in lntroductionibus,
—-quodlicet considerare
penesvirtutem earum. Sedquia de
propositiones prima linea
et ille de secundasic se habent quod possuntsimul essevero de aliquo et numquamsimul
' false (quod est regulasubcontrariarum), ideo dicuntur subcontrarie. Unde versus:
sit tibi lineo subcontraria primo secunde.
Item. Quia ille de primo ordine sunt vero, si vere sint ille de quarto, et non econverso,
sedsi Falsasunt ille de primo, falseerunt ille de quarto, et non econverso;a simili si
vere sint ille de tertio, vero erunt ille de secundo, et non econverso,sed si iste sunt.vero
de secundo, erunt vero de tertio et non econvemo (quod est lex subalternarum)
—
ideo prima et quarta subalternantur; similiter secundaet tertia. Unde versus:
prima subest quarte vice particularis habens se.
' Thesewords refer to a table ol' modal propositions nddedi n our .:lfS.
Item. Quia ille de tertio ordine et ille de quarto sic se habent quod si una vera,
reliqua est falsaet sic:numquamsunt vere simul, falseautempossuntesse(quod est lex
contrariarum), -—-ideo dicuntur contrarie. Unde versus:
tertius est quarta semper contrarius ordo.
Item. Quia prima linea et tertia sic se habent quod si una est vera, reliqua est falsa,
et econverso, similiter secunda et quarta (quod est lex contradictoriarum), —-
ideo
dicuntur contradictorie. Unde versus.
tcrtia; ES!primo cantradictorius ordo
pugna: cum quarta contradicendo secunda.
Finally, the interrelations discussedare clariFled by the usual figure.

The chapter winds np with the traditional formula (281'"-'):
Et hec cle modalibus sumciant.
VISO DE MODALIBUS
VIDENDUM EST DE PREDICABILIBUS.
CAPITULUM VII: DE PREDICABILIBUS
Preliminary to the discussion of argumentation, our author wants to

speak about the predicabilia. The opening words of this chapter contain
an explanation (28V):
Ut dicit Aristotiles, innata (ignata MS) est nobis via a-communibus ad propria, idest
per naturam & cognitione communium devenimus in cognitionem propriorum, idest sin-
gulorum. Quoniam igitur universale, in racionequa est predicabile, maxime commune
est in intentione logica, ideo ad presenscle predicabilibus videamus,antequamde argu-
mentatione et sillogisnw perscrutemur.
There follows an exposition of the terms 'universale', *predicabile'and

'dfcjbjle' (ibid.):
Sciendum ergo quid sit universale et quid predicabile et quot modis utrumque
sumitur.
Predicabile autem et universale idem sunt in substantia. Sed universale dicitur
secundum quod est collectivum multorum in naturam unam, sicut anima] colligit
hominem, bestiam et cetera animalia; similiter hamoSortem et Platonem et ceiteros
homines particulares. Predicabiicdicitur inquantum ordinatur in propositione secundum
quod est dicibile de alt(er)o. Et sic utrumque diFFmit Aristotiles in libro Pericrmenias
dicens: "universaleest quod aptum natum dici de pluribus". Sed cum dicibile de
pluribus sit idem quod predicabile de pluribus, manifestumest quod predicabile et
universaleidem sunt.
THE summa METENSES 471
The term 'predicori' is explained as de precedentedici. The several kinds

of predicabileconnect with the possiblemodipredicationis(ibid )
dici. Sed duplex est
Notandum igitur quod predicari idem est quod de procedente
predicatio, scilicet predicatio per se et predicatio per accidens. Prcdicatio per accidens
est quando predicatur individuum, ut 'hoc album est Socrotos'.Et de tali prcdicatioüue)
non laquitur Aristotiles in libro Predicomentorum, cum dicit: "a prima substantia nulla
est predicatio", scilicet per se. Que predicatio per se est quando predicatur hoc quod est
in plus vel quod est in equum. Si in equum sit, predicatur proprium, ut 'homoestrisibilis';
si in plus, sic predicatur: aut in quid, aut in quale. Et voco predicari in quid predicari per
modum substantie, sicut predicantur nomina substantiva, ut 'homo es.'.onimol'. Voco
predicari in quale predicari per modum accidentis, sicut predicantur adiectiva et verba,
preter verbum substantivum, ut 'homoest albus', 'homocurrit'. Si ergo sit predicatio in
quid, aut erit de pluribus «:iiFForentibusl in specie — et sic erit genus —, aut erit de
in numero tantum — et sic erit species.Si sit predicatio in quale,
pluribusdiFFerentibu-sï
aut erit quod est de essentiarei — quod est diFferentia —, aut non erit de essentiarei —
et sic erit accidens.
There are, consequently, Hve universaliaor predicabilia only, (ibid.):

Cum ergo sumatur numerus universalium vel predicabilium secundum divisionem
predicandi, manifestum est quod, cum predicatio ncm2 inveniatur nisi quinque modis,
non erunt nisi quinque universalia, scilicet genus, species, differentia, praprium et
accidens.
De quibus videndum est per ordinem.
The remainderof this chapter (29f-29V) dealswith the universaliain the

usualway. The chapter winds ul) with the well-known clausula (29V):
Et hec cle predicabilibus suFEciant.
VISO DE PREDICABILIBUS
VIDENDUM EST DE LOCIS.
CAPITULUM Vlll: DE LOCIS
The opening words of this chapter are important for our under-
standingof the frame-work of the whole treatiseJ (29V):
Viso de terminis et de eorum latione et de enuntiatione, quantum ad introductoriam
expeditionem videre necesse.est, et de nullo istorum propter se sed propter argumen-
tationem est determinatum, propterea de cetero de argumentatione est videndum.
' differentis (!) MS. 2 in MS.

472 LOGICA MODERNORUü-l "
Then follows & clear exposition on the exact meanings of the terms
'enuntiatio', 'propositio', 'conduno' and 'qucstio' (ibid.):
Quia tamen argumentatio ex propositionibus est et propositio, enuntiatio, conclusio
et questio idem sint et diFferant, primo videndum est de earum identitate et diFferentia.
Sciendmn ergo quod idem sunt secundum substantiam, diFferunt tamen in rationibus
suis. Cum enim dico: 'homo currit', enuntiatio est, quia solum intendo enuntiare pre-
dicatum de subiecto. Et sic agit Aristotiles dc enuntiatione in libro Poricrmonios.Propo-
sitio vero est cum ad aliud probandum sumitur in argumentatione ut:
'quicquid currit. moretur
homo currit
ergo homo movetur';
hec enim 'homocurrit' sumitur ad hanc probandam 'homomoretur' in hac argumentatione.
Conclusio est quandoprobatur per promissaspost hancdictionem 'orgo' prolata, ut
'omne animal currit
homoest animal
ergo homocurrit'.
Questio est in ambiguitatem vel dubietatem adducta prapositio apposito signo
dubitationis vel nomapposito sed tamen sub intellectione prolata. Ut 'currit homoiste?',
'currimo homoiste?'. Sunt autem iste tres dictiones 'an', 'ne', 'utrum' note dubitationis.
Est autem ambiguitasorationis quando utraque pars orationis est dubia, sed tamen se
inclinat magis ratio ad alteram quam ad alteram, ut 'utrum colum sit rotundum vel non?".
Dubietas est quando utraque pars contradictionis est dubia equaliter, ut 'utrum porfo-
sr'nr.anro vel non?'
Then, the terms 'argumcntum'and 'urgumoutatio'are definecl(ibid.):

Hoc:habito videndumest quid argumentumet quid argumentatio.
Argumentum est, ut dicit Boetius, ratio rei dubie faciensFidem,idest ratio [signifi-
catio] facienscertitudinem de re dubia. Argumentatiovero est argumentiper orationem
explicatio, idest tota complexio per quam sequitur conclusio ex premissis.Secundum
hoc ergo manifestum est quod virtus inferentie per quam infertur conclusio ex premissis
est argumentatio.Et proptereadixerunt quidam medium, cuius ordinatio ad extrema
facit necessitatem conferendi conclusionem ex premissis, esse.argumentum, prout
dicit Boetius quod argumentum est vis argumentationis et argumentatio est ipsa argu-
mentatio inferens conclusionem ab extremis ordinatis ad medium, sicut causatum ex
causatio.
Next, our author comesto speakabout the Iocus(ibid.):

Sed quia argumentatio per locum confirmatur, ideo de loco 1videndumest.
Locus igitur, ut dicit Temistius, sedes est argumenti, vel illud unde conveniens
trahiturl argumentum. Et sic transumptive sumitur :- naturalibus, quia sicut in l'EbLIS
nature (locus) locatum in loco continet et ei Firmumconfert positionem et ab eo
extrolïitl.lr,,z similiter Iocus iste virtutem argumentationis continet et stabilem confert ei
positionem et ab eo convenienter elicitur.
! traitur :HS. : uxtraitur MS.

Locus isre dividitur in maximamet in diHErentimnmaxime, quia tam a maxima, tam

a dilierentia maxime trahiturl argumentatio.
The usual expositions are given on the x-veIl-knox-vn loci (H'. 29V-3lr).
Then, the customary conclusion (311'):
Et hec de locis sufficiant.
VISO DE LOCIS
VIDENDUM EST DE FALLACHS.
CAPITULUM [X: DE FALLACIIS
This chapter opensas follows (3 lr):

Ut dicit Aristotiles, Enis est quod primo cadit in intentionem agentis. Quia igitur
hic de fallaciis intendimus et non sunt fallacie nisi propter Finem,ideo de finibus falla-
ciarum primo videmus. Que Finesume dicuntur.
Est autem meta quoddam inconveniens ad quod intendit opponens ducere (dicere
MS) respondentemargumentatione sophistica. Et sunt quinque mete; prima redar-
gutionisz, secundafalsum, tertia inopinabile, quarta nugatio, quinta soloecismus.
Then, the five meteare deHnecl(ibid.):

Redargutio est negatio preconcessi vel concessio prenegati in eadem disputatione
vi argumentationis. Et sic ducitur aliquis ad metam redargutionis cum cogitur negare
et concederequod negaveratin eademdisputatione,quia nil prohibet
quod concesserat
idem concedere et negare in diversis disputationibus. Et dicitur 'w' argunmntacionis',quia
si spontefaceret, non essetredargutio. Hec metaprecipueest in sophismatibus.
Meta falsi (secundaMS) est quando aliquis cogitur vi argumentationisut contendat
falsum, non quo(d)libet falsum, sed quod manifeste falsum, ut te non sederedum
sedes.
[nopinabile est quod est extra Opinionem plurium, ut celumoctiesessemaius terra.
Ad quam metam ducitur aliquis cum cogitur concedere quod est extra 0pinionem suam.
Nugatioest eiusdemintegraVitiosarepetitio. Vitiosadicitur quia quandoquerepetitur
aliquid inmediate causamaioris attentionis vel conFn'mationisvel laudis vei vituperatio-
ni(5), sicut in Ewangelio: 'amcn,amendico vobis', et in similibus. Ad hanc metam ducitur
aliquis cum cogitur concedere idem bis vel pluries repetitum. Quod precipue contingit
in ad aliquid, sic:
yiij": patris estfh'us
sed in 'filio' intelligitur paternitas
ergo patris patris enji'lius; et sic in fq/initum'.
' trnitur MS. 2 Sc. meta.

Soloecismus est quecumque falsa latinitas. Ad hanc metam ducitur aliquis cum
cogitur concedere incongruam latinitatem, sic:
'quod dicis hoc esse,hac est
sed hominem dicis hoc 2:50
ergo hominem 251'.
Next, the four generadisputationumare enumerated (ibid.):

Sed quia ad metas istas nonnisi per disputationem venitur, propterea disputationum
genera exemplo Aristotilis dignum ducimus explananda.
Disputatio est diversorum putatio, eoquod diversi diversa putant inter di(s)putati0nes.
Disputationum quatuor sunt genera, quia est disputatio doctrinalis vel demonstrativa,
que procedit ex primis notis necessariisinmediatis causisconclusionum. Secundaest
disputatiodialetica. Que Fitex probabilibus.Probabilevem dicitur quodvidetur omnibus
1velpluribus vel sapientibuset his maxime notis. Tertia speciesdisputationum dictitur
temptativa, quia per eam proceditur ad experiendum. Temptator autem procedit ex eis
que videntur vera respondenti, sed non sunt, quia cum aliquis temptare vult, aliqua falsa
sumit principia iuxta (iusta MS) principia illius scientie. Et dicit se scire quicumque
temptatur.
Quartaspeciesdicitur sophistica.Que procedit ex inprobabilibuset non existentibus.
A qua dicitur sophista, qui sophistica utitur disputatione. De qua Aristotiles: "sophista
est cnpiosus ab apparente sapientia". Et sophistica est apparenssapientia, que alio nomine
litigiosanuncuPatur,eoquodlitigium Et inter opponentemet respondentem.Et utitur
sillogismosophistica vel elenco. Qui paralogismiparelenchivelfauacie vel loci saphistici
nuncupantur; paralogismi quia videntur essesillogismi et non sunt; fallacie quia fallunt
respondentemet etiam quandoqueopponentem; laci saphisticiquia ad hos sicut ad
propriasdomosonmesmodi solvendireducuntur.
orfaHacia is divided andsubdivided (ibid.):

The locussaphisticus
Notandum igitur quod locus sophisticus vel fallacia, quod idem est, dividitur primo
in duas species, in locum sophisticum qui est in dictione et in eum qui est extra dictio-
nem. Et dicatur hic 'dictio' large quicquid dici potest sive sit dictio sive oratio sive pars
dictionis sive proprietasdictionis. Potestautem locussophisticusvel fallacia,quod idem
est, sic notiücari: fallaciaest quedamaptitudo decipiendiper latentiama parte vocum
vel rerum per quam deceptusconcedit aliquis quod non concedendumest vel negat
quod non negandum. Est ergo locus sophisticus in dictione qui provenit ex proprietati-
bus dictiünis. Que sunt significatio, consignificatio, officium, transumptio, constructio,
ordinatio, prolatio, terminatio etc. Locus sophisticus extra dictionem est qui provenit
ex proprietatibusrerum, sicut posteahabebitur.
Fallaciaergo, vel locus sophisticusqui est in dictione dividitur in sex (species),
scilicet in fallaciamaequivocationis,
amphibologie,compositioniset divisionis, accentus,
et Figuredictiünis. De quibus exequendum est per ordinem, quia prius est signum quam
signatum in cogitando, et dictiones sunt signa, res autem signata. Que quia provenit ex
multiplicitate vocis, proptereanotandumquod triplex est multiplicitas, scilicet actualis,
potentialis et fantastica. Actualis multiplicitas est quando vox actu multa significat et
hec in equivocationeet amphibologiainvenitur. Potentialis est quandoaliqua dictio,
ex eo quod potest coniungi cum diversis, diversum generat sententiam et hec in campo-
sitione et divisione cadit. Fantastica est que provenit ex ap(p)arenti vocum similitudine.
Quam invenimus in accentuet ngra dictionis.
The discussion of equivacation deserves our attention. The author starts

with the main division into proprieand communiter
(ibid.):
De equivocationeprius videndum est. EQUIVOCATIO.
Et notandum quod equivocatio duobus modis accipitur, proprie et communiter;
proprie quando ipsa dictio multiplex est actu; cmmnuniter quando dictio se habet ad
plura, ad unum prius et ad alia ex consequenti. Et sic dicuntur analoga equivoca, sicut
ens, unum et aliquid, que dicuntur primo de substantia, per posterius autem de quantitate
et qualitate et ceteris; similiter 'sanum' primo dicitur de animali, de urina vero et pocione
et cibo ex consequenti.
Equivocation properly understood is of Four kinds: (1) in vocissignif-

catianc, (2) in consignj/ätionc,(3) in a-Hïcio,and (4) H":transumptionc.All
subdivisionsare clariHedby instances(31"'*'):
Secundum igitur quod 'equivacatio'proprie accipitur, ;'ic de ea intendimus. Quod
habet Heri quatuor modis: in vocis significatione, in consigniücatione, in olïicio, et in
transumptione.
Equivocatio ex signiEcatione est quandoaliqua dictio ex sua institutione plura signiE-
cat, sicut hoc nomen "canis', quod ex sua inpositione significat celeste sidus, marinam
beluam et latrabile animal. Secundumquod sic paralogizatur:
'quicquid est !atrabile anima! es: canis
marina belua est canis
erga marina belua est latrabilc'.
Solutio. Dicendum quod hoc nomen 'canis' est equivocum quia significat animal latrabile
sic prima est vera vel marinum piscem —sic secunda est vera; et sic terminus
— —
equivocatur in prima et in secunda. Sunt enim diversarum rationum, quia equivoca sunt
quorum nomen cmnmune et ratio substantie est diversa; et ad hoc quod sequeretur
oporteret sequi univoce, idest secundum eandem rationem, quia univoca sunt quorum
nomen commune et ratio substantie est eadem.
Secundo moclo Flt equivocatio penes consigniücata vocum. Vocamus autem consignifi-
cata vocum accidentia quibus mediantibus ordinantur voces ad constructionem. Et divi-
ditur iste modus in quinque. Primus sumitur secundumcasum. (31?) quta quem sic
paralogizatur :
'quicumque sunt episcopi, sunt homines
sedquidam equi sunt epixapi
ergaquidam equi sunt homines'.
( ) Secundus modus provenit ex diversitate generis. Sic:
......
'qua-cumque
sunt.alba, sunt plura
$ed her:mulier est alba
erga hec mulier en plura'.
( . . . . . . ) Tertius modus est in numero. Sic:

'quecumquesunt res, suntplures
sed ista liber est res
ergo ista liber est plurcs'.
( . . . . . . ) Quartus provenit ex tempore. Sic:
'quicumquelegit, est homo
sedCesarlegit
ergo Cesar est homo'.
( ) Quintus provenit ex persona. Sic: 'Sor currit et videtur; ergo Sor currit et ipse
. .....
vidctur'.( )
...... ........ . .....
Tertius modus principalis equivocationis qui provenit ex ofFlcio, Et circa dictiones
oFFlcialcs.Et vocamusdictiones oFHcialesquarum constructio est deservire partibus
aliis, ut prepositioncs, coniunctiones et quedam adverbia et, secundum quosdam,
pronominademonstrativact relativa non inquantumsunt pronomina, sed inquantum
sunt demonstrativa ct relativa, quia secundum hoc dcscrviunt rcbus demonstratis et
relatis. Secundum quem sic paralogizatur:
'isre es: Sor
isrc est Plato
ergo Sar cir. Plata' ;
similiter:
'hic homo ext.Cicero
ipsees: Virgilius
erga Ciccro cn Virgilius'.
(. .) Quartus modus principalis ['it ex trnnsumptione, quando scilicet dictio
....
aliqua transumitur ad aliud signiücandum. luxta quem sic paralogizatur:
'quicquid currit habet pedes
MaieHa currit
ergo Mocha habet pcdcj'-
Dicendum quod verbum 'currit' sumitur equivocc, quia in prima sumitur secundum
propriam rationem, in secunda transumitur ad labi. Similiter de aliis, ut 'ridere' ad
'vircrc', sicut dicto 'pratum ridet'.
The following scheme can be established:
e.g. in the so-callcdanaloga('ens', 'unum-','ah'quid')

communis,
! cx si3 m''l]-'catione c.3 'caniï'

. , ' .
...-l'-
equwocatlo l secundum casum

2 ex diverxitatc generis
[1 ex comignffi'catianc 3 in numera
.!
propria 4- ex tempore
5 ex persona
lll ex oji'cio i.e. circa dictiones OFHciales
(pre positiones,coniunmoncsctc.)
IV ex rransumptione.
lt must be noted that the author does not deflne equiuracatio.[ think the
passagc in which he does so is missing in our MS. This surmise is snp-
ported by the opening forlmllas used in the other sections, on amphi-
bology, composition-f'livision, accent etc. The section on amphibology
opensas Follows(31V):
SecundoIoco dicendum est de amphibolia. Videndum ergo quid sit amphibolia, et unde
dicatur, et quomodo decipiat, et quot modis.
Amphibolia cst deceptio proveniens:: multiplicitate causataex diversismodis con-
struendi. Et dicitur ab 'amphi', quod est dubium,ct 'balc', quod est sententia,quasi
dubia sentcntiacx dubietate sermonum proveniens. Decipit autem ista fallacia ex unitate
que videtur esse in constructione et diversitate coniunctorum. Unde sicut in fallacia
equivocationis deceptionis causa est vocis unitas, que est causa apparentia, et diversitas
signiEcandi,que est causanon-existcntic et Eïlsitatis, ita in amphibolia causaapparentic
est unitas orationis, causa falsitatis ct non-cxistentie diversitas construendi. Et ex hoc
patet quod sequitur amphibolia ad equivocationcm quia cquivocatio in dictione sola,
amphibolia in oratione peccat.
Our author knows four principal modi of amphibology. These are sub-
divided as Follows: ..
1 ex diversitate constructionis in rectis:

'crastina diesdiescstfutum'
1 I ex constructione 2 ex constructioneobliquorum: 'homopredicaturdepluribus
I
I casualium , de-ïzrcntibuj quid ' speciein
3 ex variataconstructioneobliquorum ad rectos:
lmrv'us est coloratus albedine exisrentc'
ll ex variata constructione
Amphi- non-casualium: *iste vuh pectore'
bolia
! ex variata constructione rectorum ad verba:
lll ex variata constructione 'Me mortuus homoest'
casualium ad non-casualia
2 ex variata constructione verborum ad obliquos:
'verum est panemcanemcomedere"
': W ex transumptionc
facta in tota orationc: "h'ws aratur'.
Then Followsthe discussionof the othcrjällaciae (32P-331'):

(3) COMPOSITIO
ET (4) DIVISIO
(5) ACCENTUS
(6) FIGURADICTIONIS
DE FALLACIIS EXTRA DICTIONEM:
(7) ACCIDENS
(8) SECUNDUM QUID ETSIMPLICITER
(9) IGNORANTIAELENCHI
(10) PETITIOPRINCIPII
(] !) CONSEQUENS
(12) NON CAUSAUT causa.
(13) PLURESINTERROGATIO(NES)UT UNAM.
The well-known closing formula is found again (351'):

Et hec de fallaciis sufficiant. lNClPlUNT SILLOGISMI.
CAPITLILUM X: DE SILLOGISMIS
The opening words of this chapter again give an insight into the frame
work of the whole Summe'(331'):
Quoniam, ut dicit: Philosophus,Finespropter quem omnia alia, [quam] imponit ne-
cessitatem et esseeis que sunt ad Enem; quo adepto quiescitur —; cum ita se habent in
intentione lügices, ideo habito de terminis et conditionibus eorum ex quibus Eunt
propositines, et de propositionibus et circumstantiis suis, ex quibus Fiunt argumentatio-
nes, et de locis dialeticis, ex quibus argumenta sumuntur, et de locis sophisticis qui
prorsus argumentationem impediunt, quantum intruductionis ratio postulabat —, nunc
videndun'uest de argumentatione et speciebuseius, maxime de illa que sillogismusdicitur.
Next the four speciesargumentationun: are discussed:
Notandum ergo quod argumentationum quantum;sunt species, scilicet sillogismus,

inductio, entimemaet exemplum.Sillogismusest oratio in qua quibusdampositis de
necessitatealiud accidit eoquod hec sunt, ut dicit Aristotiles.
lnductio est collectio particularium in universali, ut 'Sor currit, Plato currit; ergo
omnishomocurrit'.
Entimema est sillogismus abbreviatus. Et dicitur ab 'en-', quod est 'in', et 'dum',
quod est 'mcns', quia qui talem argumentationemfacit, retinet semper unam propo-
sitionem in mente sua. Ut:
'amnis homo currit
erga Sar currit'; subintelligetur: 'Sor en homo'.
Exemplum est eratio probans aliquid per simile. Ut lin nave regenda es.',eligenda;
rector arte et non sorte; ergo in scalis regandis'.
! Seeabove, pp. 452; 471.

2 Cfr. Physica,B 2, l94-a27; 200334. Metaph.ut2, 994b9-10.
Istarum enim due sunt principales, scilicet sillogisnms el: inductio, due vero minus,
scilicet entimema et exemplum, quia reducuntur ad alias: entimema ad sillogismum, et
exemplum ad inductionem. lnductio tamen ad sillogismum reducitur ut dicit Aristotiles
in libro Priorum' (68b30Ff.).
The well-known mnemonic versesare found in this form (F. 33-4):

[ ll lll llll V
BARBARA CELARENT DARH FERIO BARALIPPO
VI VII VIII IX
CELANTES DABlTlS FAPESMO FRISSESONORUM
[ ll [ll [lll [
CESARE CAMPESTRIS FESTINO BAROCO DARAPTI
[I [II [III V VI
FELARTO DISAMIS DATlSl BOCARDO FELISO.
The chapter winds up with the well-known clausula(f. 33):

Et hec de sillogismis suFFlciant.
VlSO DE SILLOGISMIS
VIDENDUM DE RELATIVIS.
CAPITULUM Xl: DE RELATIVIS
Our author devotes a special chapter to the discussion of the relativa.

A clear-cut distinction is made between relation as a logical and as a
grammatica]category (339):
De relativis tractatum facientibus primo considerandum est quid relatio, quid
felativum et de diversitate relativorum et de dil'ïicultateï eorum circa grmnaticam et de
sophismatibus circa hec incidentibus.3
Notandumergo quod 'rclatia' diversimodeaccipitur apudlogicum et apudgramati-
cum, secundumquod a logico accipitur sic: est aliquod decem predicamentorum. Quod
sic potest notiFlcari: relatio est mutuus respectus duorum extremorum sese equaliter
respicientium; que extrema dicuntur ad aliquid; que describit Aristotiles in libro
Predicamcmorum:"ad aliquid talia dicuntur quecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum
dicuntur qumnodolibet aliter ad aliud".
! Phisicorum(!) MS. 2 diFlcultateMS.

3 incidentia MS.
Our author confines himself to a discussion of grammatical relation

(34P):
Sed de his tantunndictum sit. Licet autem multo plura de relatione logica dici
possent,quia tamen ad presensnon spectat negotium sed plus de gramatica, ideo illa
pretermissade hac est agendum.
Next the terms 'i-elatio', 'rgferre', and 'relatum', all of them in their
grammaticalsenses,are deEned(ibid.):
Notandum ergo quod relatio sic accepta est rei antelate representatio; et rgjïrrre est
rem antelatam iterum presentare; relatum: rei antelatc recordativum, ut dicit' Priscia-
nus. Cuius inventionis necessitatem idem assignansdicit quod qui dicit 'Iuppiter ronat',
'Iuppiterfulminar' ( ) alterius dictionis, quia 'Iuppiter' licet sit nomenpreprium,
......
diversistamensecundumeandemvoccm potest convenire,prout patet de hoc nomine
'Aias', qui subeademvoce significat Tclanmnii et Oilei Filios.
The relative pronouns are divided into four grouPs, so that we can
establish the follmving scheme of relativa:
apud logicum: aliquod decem predicamentorum ("ad aliquid")
relativa
6 ! relativa tantum, ut 'is', 'id
apud grammaticum 2 relativa et discretiva, ut 'ipse'
' 3 relativa ct demonstrativa, ut 'ille'
4 relativa ct reciproca, ut 'sui', 'suum'.
Eachof them is discussed.I give the most significantpassages

(34V-361'):
Rclativorum igitur pronominum quedam sunt relativa tantum, ut 'is id', quedam
,
sunt relativa et discretim vel appositiva, ut 'ipse', quod vocat Apollonius epitagmati-
con:, alia sunt relativa ct demonstrativa, ut 'ille', alia sunt relativa ct reciproca, ut 'sui'
et 'suum'. Dc ultimo primo dicendum.
(DE RELATIONE HUIUS PRONOMINIS SUI)
Sciendumergo quod reciprocatio est sui ipsius agentispassio.( ).
......
(DE HOC PRONOMINE ILLE)
Viso dc relatione huius pronominis 'sui' videndum est de hoc pronomine 'iHe'.
Notandum ergo quod non solum relativum est, sed et demonstrativum, quia prono-
minum due sunt pmprictates: demonstratio ct relatio. (f 351')
.
Sequiturdc relationehuiuspronominis'is' vel 'id', quc idem sunt preter hoc quod 'is'
simplex est, 'idcm' vcro compositum ex hoc adverbio 'demum'; unde plus discretionem
importat. De quo dicit Priscianus quod 'idem' latine est alirhosapud Grecos, quod est
compositum ex hoc articulo prepositive 'o' et hoc pronomine relativo '!itos'. ( )
......
Notandum igitur quod 'idem' dupliciter accipitur, scilicct prunominaliter — et sic
' Cfr. Inst. gramm. XVII, p. 14120'21and XII, p. 579225. : Cfr. ibid. X", p. 580".
est semper rclativum -- ct nominaliter secundum quod accipitur pro hoc nomine
'in(dff)järens' et privat diversitatem; tunc proprie est ad aliquid sumiturque ab eo ista
forma idcnliraj.Secundumquod procedit istud suphi5maIsuiusSorestidem'. Sic probo:
'Sar est idem Sorti; et tantum alius a Sorte est idem Sorti; ergo solusSor csr idem Sorti; erga
salusSorestidemsibi'. Dicendumquod prima est duplex, quia hoc relativum 'ubi' potest
referri ad hunc terminum 'Sar' tantum —— et sic est vera et sic probat — vel ad hunc
terminum 'solusSor', et sic falsa et sic improbat. ( ..... ) Posteavidendum est de
relatione huius pronominis 'ipse'. Notandumergo quod hoc pronomen 'ipse' quandoque
relativum est, quandoqueappositivum ( 1139" ) Viso de relativis
...... ......
identitatis videndumest de relativis diversitatissubstantie,scilicet de hoc nomine 'alius,
alia, aliud'. ( ) Hoc viso de relativis substantie videndum est de relativis
......
accidentis. Notandum ergo quod quedam eorum nomina sunt, quedam vcro adverbia,
veluti 'quam' est relativum qualitatis, 'quantus"quantitatis, 'quams'numeri vcl ordinis,
'cuius, cuia, cuium' possessionis,'cuias' gentis. Similiter adverbia ab eis descendentia
secundum eandem signiFlcationcm, sicut 'qualirer' rclativum est qualitatis relate ad
agere vel pati, 'quantum' quantitatis, 'quoriens' numeri. Sciendum ergo de his quod et
quesitiva sunt et relativa et indefinita, ut dicit Priscianus( [. 361' )
..... ......
Hoc viso de relativis accidentis que identitatis dicuntur, videndum est de relativis
accidentis que diversitatisdicuntur. Que sunt 'alter' et 'rch'quus',et 'alrcriusnmdi'secun-
dum quosdam. ( )
......
Et hec de relationibus suFEciant.
..
DICTO DE RELATIVIS
DICENDUM EST DE DISTRIBUTIONIBUS.
CAPITULUM Xll: DE DISTRIBUTIONIBUS
Our author starts the discussionas follows (361):

Quoniam dictionum quedam significant res, quedam signiFlcantmodos rerum, ad
plenam sermonis notitiam cognoscendum est non solum naturam earum quc signiFncant
res, sed etiam earum que significant modus rerum.
The dictiones that signify the modosrerum are said to be those que important
loquendidispositiones
(ibid ) '
Que signiFn-cant' res sunt que significant substantiamaut accidentia substantie, ut
'homo', 'albus'. 'currit'. De quibus nihil ad presens.Que signiHcantmodos rerum dicuntur
que important loquendi dispositiones. Et quia locutio completa tamquam ex principiali-
bus ex subiecto constatet predicatoet compositione, ideo principales intcr tales voces
sunt que disponunt aut subiectum in ratione subiecti aut predicatum in ratione predicati
aut compositionem ratione compositionis.
1 4- [suba] MS.
482 LOGICA h-IODERNORUM u
The dictionesdisponente:subiectum,viz. the signa quantitatis or quantifying

preflxes, are discussedFirst (ibid.):
Inter que quin primo occurrit subiectum, ideo primo de dictionibua disponentibus sub-
iectum inquantumsubiectumvideamus.Quc signanuncupantur,quia significantmodum
signiFlcandivcl supponendi quem habet terminus cui adduntur, cum signum sit, ut dicit
Augustinus,quodpretcrspeciemsensibilemquamsensibusingerit, aliud in mente venire
facit. Ut patet de circulo per quem vinum venaleapprehenditur. Licet igitur omnis vox
signum dicatur, sicut innuit Aristotiles quod voces sunt signa intellectuum, intellectus
autem rerum et ita voces rerum, iste tamcn dictiones signa dicuntur antonomaticc quia
sunt signasignorum, idest signiFlcant' modos supponendi in signis rerum, ut dictum est.
We can establish the following schcme:

( clue signiEcant substantiam
quc significant res
que significant accidentia substantie
ut
dictiones que disponuntsubiectum(: signaquantitatis)

quc significant
quc disponunt predicatum
modos rerum
que disponunt compositionem.
The signa quantitatis are divided into signa substantie and signa accidentis
(ibid.):
Quoniam igitur duo sunt rerum genera scilicct substantia et accidens, ut dicit
Alpharabius in libro de ortu scientiarum,,z ideo duo suntlgcncra signorum, quia quedam
significant substantiam, ut 'homo', quedam accidentia, ut 'albus' et 'currit'. Et similiter
inventa sunt quedam signa que significant mndum supponendi in termino ratione sub-
substanticut 'omnis', quedamratione accidentis, ut 'quantuslibet'et cetera. Prima dicuntur
signa substantie. De quibns primo.
Next the signa substantieare divided into signa universahaand signa

particularia. The former are defluet] and their function (ofcium)
and distribuereis explained (361'4'):
consistingin coqfundere
Notandum igitur quod signorum substantie quedam universalia, quedam particularia.
Universalia sunt que universalitatem, idest multitudinem suppositorum, determinant,
ut 'omnis' ; particularia que designant terminum pro uno particulari sumi, ut 'quidam' et
'aliquis'. Notandum ergo quod signorum universalium hoc est oFFlcium,scilicet con-
fundere ct distribuere. Coqfundercidem est quod simul in uno termino onmium vel plurium
illius termini formamparticipantium-ïmultitudinem fundere,idestiungere.
signil'ïcattmmm3
' servantMS. 3 ed. Räumkcr (Münster l916), p. 193.

3 singularium MS. 4 pretium MS.
THE SLIMME METENSES 483
Unde patet quod potentia que est in termino communi per se sumpto, (36?) scilicet sup-
positio partium, pcr signum in actum reducitur. Ex hoc patet quod termino singulari
non potest addi signum univctsnlc, quia non est ibi multitudo ncque actu nequc potentia.
Signorum officium est distribuere, idest quod erat unum in universali aggregatione
partium, in diversa tribuere.
are subdivided (36?):

Finally the signouniversalio-
Horum igitur universalium quedam distribuunt inter duo tantum affirmative, ut
'uter', quedam negative, ul: 'neuter', quedam inter plura, ad minus intcr tria. Et hec
dicuntur importare summam multitudinem, aH'irmative, ut 'omnis', 'quilibet', negative,
ut 'nullus'.
The discussionof the several signo substantiestarts with an extensive

discussion of 'omnis'. Our author deals with its meaning, its function
(officium), the regulasconcerningthe useof it and the sophismsrelated.
I quote the most relevant passages
(ibid.) :
(Qyid siqnijï'cet et utrum in generepredicamentoli contineatur)
l. l.
ln(tcr) que primo videndum est de hoc signo 'omnis'. Dc qüb queritur quid significet et
utrum in genere predicamentali continentur et quid sit eius officium":et de regulis et
sophismatibus circa ipsum contingentibus. De signiEcationc suo dicit Aristotiles in libro
Perihermeneias quod 'omnis' non significat universale sed quoniam universaliter, idest
modum universalitatis. Aliud enim est signiE-careuniversale; quod signiücant termini
communesinpositi a forma communi que est speciesvel genus1et:]aliquid similium, ut
'homo', 'animal' etc, aliud est significare universaliter, idest modum universalitatis; quem
significant signa universalia. Unde illa significant rcm, ista vero modum rci. ( ).
......
(De oj'ict'o eius)

Viso cle significatione huius signi 'omnis' videndum est de oFlicio cius. Quod quia
dicitur distribuere vcl confundere, querendum est a qua virtutc habeat hoc OFFtcium,
utrum & se vel ab alio, et si a se, utrum a modo signiHcandivel a rebus significatis; si ab
alio, quid sit illud. Propterea, cum exerceat (exerciat! MS) suum officium in allis;»,I
querendum est quid sit illud in quo exercet et utrum ad subiectum vel ad predicatum
possit poni indiH'ercnter.
Sciendum ergo quod suum officium est, ut dictum est, communem (communiter .MS)
terminum, idest multitudinem suppositorum quc potentia continebatur in ipso, in
actum reducere vcl distribuere tantum, idest ipsum in actu multa dividere quod idem
est quod dici de omni. De' quo in Libro Priorum: "dici de omni est quando nihil est sumere
sub subiectode quo non dicatur predicatus", idest de quolibet contentosub subiecto
dicatur predicatus (
.............................................
).
........................................................
Quod queritur a quo habeat,dicendum quod a se et a termino cui adiungitur; scd
cliH'erenter, quia a se tamquam a principio motivo vel efficienti, a termino tamquam a
principio materiali vel ab eo in quo efficitur. Sicut patet in sole et mollicnte terram et
durante lutum.
484- Locicn MODERNORUM"
The author's remarks on modus sigmjïcandi seem to be important for our
understanding of such later points of view as found in the x-vell-known
tracts De modissignijï'candi(ibid.): '
Quod queritur utrum hoc sit a re significatavel a modo signiEcandidicendum quod
a modo signiEcandi. Sed multiplex est 'modussignificandi'. Quidam per quem distinguun-
tur partes orationis in specie: secundum quod nomen dicitur significare substantiam cum
qualitate, verbum vero significare agere vel pati sub modo et tempore. Unde cum
'currus' et 'currere' eandem rem significent, ea(n)d(em) tamen pro partibur. diversis
propter diversos modos signiücandi quos habent.
De quo dicit Priscianusquodnihil tantum facit ad participationempartium quantum
earum significatio, idest modus signiücandi.
Item. Dicitur modussignificandidiscretiovocumquoajï'nc arrcndirur.Per quem dignos-
citur accidentium diversitas, ut genitivi a nominativo, ut 'magisror', 'magistri', masculi-
num & feminino, (ut) 'albus' 'albo', prima persona a secunda, ut 'Icgo', ')cgis'. Qua
discretione utitur Latinitas loco articuli, ut dicit Priscianus.
Item. Tertio dicuntur modi significandi ipso accidentiapartiumper que construuntur.
Secundumquod dicitur quod principia constructionis sunt non signiEcata,sed modi
significandi secundum consequentiam, ut singulare cum singulari, prima persona cum
prima. Et sic de aliis que dicuntur consigniücata.
Item. Dicitur modussignificandiquiddamcontingens
principalesigni "catum.Quoadhunc
dividitur modus se habendi signiEcatum in significante, sicut in hoc nomine 'populus'
significatur multitudo hominum, cuius ratione plurali se potest adiungeresub similitu-
dine universalitatis singulari adiuncto. Similiter hoc nomen 'omnis' ; preter rem signifi-
catam est in ipso modus signiFlcandi (secundum) quem apprehendimus in ipse cui
adiungitur multa ut multa. Quia tamen hoc est per rationem universalisquod se habetad
modum totius continui quod est in unum potentia, ideo non potest plurali coniungi,
sicut hoc nomen 'popuhis',quod signiFicatmulta ut multa per aggregationem.Unde se
habet ad modum totius continui, in quo sunt multa per discretionem alterius ab altero.
There remain two Enal questions ns to the o-Hï'cium

of 'omnis': quid sit
illud in quo exercet and utrum ad subiectum vel ad predicatum possit poni
indiüärenter(ibid .) :
Quod querebatur tertio circa (quid) exerceat hoc signum 'omnis' suum ofFlcium,
dicendumquod solum circa terminum cmumunem,quia omne quod signiEcataliquid
per modumproprie, solummodopotest! coniungicum eo quodsigniFlcatidem ut rem.
Sed hoc signum 'omnis'significatuniversalitatemper modum. Quare solum cum eis
poterit addi que significantuniversalitatemut rem. Sedhoc solum termini communes.
Quare cum solis communibuspoterit addi hoc signum 'omnis'.
Then follow quite a number of objections (and sophisms)and their

solutions(37T-381').After that the last questionconcerningthe :::-[ficium
is discussed(38r):
! pre MS
.
Hiis habitis potest queri utrum universale signum sit addibile predicato sicut et subiecto.
Et videtur quod sic. Omni enim divisibili potest addi illud per quod dividatur actu;
sed omne predicatum est divisibile, quia solum terminus communis potest predicari
per se loquendo;sed per hoc signum 'omnis'Et divisio termini actu; ergo putest addi
predicato ; aio quod licet sit divisibile secundum potentiam, non tamen potest dividi actu.
Sed contra dicit Aristotiles quod frustra est potentia que ad actum non potest reduci;
ergo si actu non potest dividi, frustra (fustra! MS) dicitur divisibile. ( ....... )
Item. Benedicitur: 'omnishomoes!.omnishomo';quod patet quia Sur est Sor, Plato est
Plato, Cicero est Cicero, et sic de similibus. Item. Dicit Boetiusquod nulla propositio
verior est illa in qua idem predicatur de se; hec est talis; erga. Sed ibi est 'omne' ad
predicatum. Ergo signum universale potest addi predicato.
Contra hoc dicatur sic. Dicit Aristotiles quod ad predicatum non est addendum
quod fallaciaest ubi dicitur 'omne'aslpredicatum,
'omne'. Pretereain libro Perihermeneias
ut 'omnishomoestomneanimal'. Pretereadicitur quod in propositionesubiectumse habet
ad modum materie, predicatum ad modum forme. Sed forma indivisibilis est. Quare et
predicatum ( ).
. . . . . .
Item. Si dicatur: 'nullus homocst.lapis', hec est vera, quia removetur lupis ab homine
pro qualibet sui parte. Unde sequitur: 'nullus homo est lapis'. Ergo sequitur: 'omnis
homonon es:margarito', et ita de aliis lapidibus. Cum vero dicitur: 'omnishomoestlapis',
hec est contraria precedentis, et est falsa, sed pro tot et eisdem est contraria falsa pro
quot et quibus est sua contraria vera. Sed sua contraria est vera pro onmibus illis qui sunt
sublapide; ergo et ipsa.Sedhoc non potestesseverum nisi confundaturad quamlibet
partem sui. Ergo confunditur nonnisi per hanc dictionem 'omnis'. Ergo confundit mobili-
ter turn subiectum tum predicatum. ( . . . . . . )
Dicendum quod signum universale (non) potest addi ad predicatum quia predicatum
est in ratione forme et dicitur de substantia secundum se, non secundum suas partes.
( . . . . . . ) Quod obicit de hac dictione 'non' et de signo universali, dicendum quod
non sunt eiusdempotentie. Quodpatet,quia negatiopotestaddi termino singulari, non
tamen signum universale. Cum dicitur: 'nullus homoestlapis', verum estquod removetur
lupis a Ii homine pro qualibet sui parte et non propter negationem ( ), sed
......
propter rei veritatem. Quod patet cum dicitur: 'nullus homo est animal'; ista enim non
est falsa pro qualibet parte predicati, sed pro pluribus. Unde dico quod non plus dividit
ista negatio quam dividit virtus signi universalis, quia non dividit nisi per suam rationem.
Unde non confunditur quantum ad partes materiales.
Quodobicit de ista: 'omnishomoestomnishomo',dicendum quod ipsa est falsa,quia
quelibet singularis eius est falsa; hec enim est falsa: 'Sor est omnishomo', et sic de aliis.
' Nec concludit ut deberet, sed debet dicere: 'ergo omnishomoesthomo'. ( ).
......
Next, our author adds two more remarks on the use of the words 'non',
'si' and 'aliud':
Item. Ex dictis [intet quod solum terminis communibus potest addi hoc signum
'omnis' et non terminis singularibus, eoquod termini singulares non significant quid
multiplicabile ad plura.
[tem. Sciendum quod non solum signum universale non confundit terminum com-
munem, sedetiam hec dictio 'non'. Ut cum dicitur: 'homoostnon—irisinus'.l
Quia hec dictio
' homo non est asinus corr. ex. non homo est asinus MS.
'non' iuncta numl hoc termino 'osinns' a quolibet suo particulari?- (removet) ct reducit
illum-?-in de ( ) tem dictionis quam importat. Similiter hec dictio 'si'. Unde
. .....
datur pro regula quod termini communes positi post hanc dictionem 'si' consecutiva
positam tenentur simpliciter et pro se totis. Ut cum dicitur: 'si homo est, animo! oss,,4
sensusest quod quandocumqueest verum hominem esseest verum animal esse,et: de

quocumquehomineest verum quod ipsumest, est verumquodanimalest. Similiter per
hanc dictionem 'oliud (a) vel 'quam'. Unde sequitur: 'hircocorrusest aliud ab hominevel
quamhomo;ergohircoccrvus estaliud a Sortevcl quomSor'.
Then, our author enumeratos quite a number of impedimentadistri-

butionis (38r'V):
Sed quia quandoque inpeditur distributio, ideo cle impedimentis eius videamus.
Quorum aliud est a parte sui, aliud a parte termini cui debetaddi. Hoc autemquoddebet
addi potest impedire distributionem vel per discretionem. Que dupliciter potest esse:
substantialis et accidentalis; substantialis dupliciter, scilicet in nomine praprio et in
pronomine demonstrativo, quia neutri istorum potest addi signum universale, nisi
ratione alterius, ut possit dici 'omnis iHithlS musicus'et 'omnis istafomilio' ( ...... )
Que causantur a restrictione vel
que Fit per genitivum, ut 'gromotico zlristorchi', vel per
implicationem vel per aliquid simile, quia terminus restrictus non ampliari potest nec
confundi nisi ad ea (38'-")que permittit suarestrictio, ut 'homoqui estSor'. Nullis enim
talium est addibile signum universale. Similiter suppositio termini simplex impedit
distributionem. Unde non est hec congrua: 'omnishomoestspecies'.Item. Cum terminus
iam est distributus non potest iterum distribui. Item appellatio dicti impedit ne distributio
que est pars sui, confundat aliquid extra, ut cum dicitur 'omnem hominem currere sit
aliquis homo'. Item a parte sui impeditur sua distributio, cum simplex cadit negatio vel
virtus dictionis sincategorematiceper quam ligatur, ne fiat in ea divisio. Sed hoc
specialiusapparebit in Sincoccgorcumosibus.
Next the regulas for the use of 'omnis' connected with a complex term
are discussed(38V):
His habitis dicendum est de regulis datis de hoc signo 'omnis'. Quarum iam quedam
vise sunt secundumquod adiungunturtermino simplici. Hoc autemsunt secundumquod
addunturcum termino complexa.Quarumprima est talis:
quociens signum universale ponitur super terminum disiunctum,
locutio est duplex ex eo quod potest confundere utramque partem
disiuncti vel disiunctio potest disiungere distributionem.
Et potest Fieri tum a parte subiecti tum a parte predicati. quta quod solvitur hoc
suphisma: 'omnis propositio vel eius contradictoria est vero'; propositio "Sor est homo" vel
eius contradictoria est vera; et ista "Sor est asinus" vel eius contradictoria est vera; et
similiter de qualibet; ergo prima contradictoria omnis. etc. Sed non omnis
......
propositio est vera, quia hec non est vera: 'tu es asinus'; ergo eius contradictoria est
: in MS. 3 suum particulare iHS.

: illam .*HS. * si animal est, homo est MS.
vera; sed hec: 'tu nones homo' est contradictoria huius: 'tu eshomo'; ergo ipsaest vera.
Quod est falsum. ( ).
......
Item. Regula est :
quando signum universale ponitur in aliqua locutione (capulativa),
ipsa est duplex, ex eo quod signum universale potest distribuere
utramque partem copulati vel aliam tantum; vel ex eo quod potest ibi
esse distributio copulationis 1vielcopulatio distributionis—quod idem
est—; vel potest esse categorica vel ipothctica; quodidem est.
Secundumquod solvitur hoc sophisma: 'omnishomoest,et quilibet aigum; ab illo est
non-homo'. ( ) Item.
.. . . . .
Quando hoc signum 'omnis' coniungitur cum termino complexu ex
adiectivo et substantivo, locutio est duplex, quia potest distribui
substantivum cum adiectivo, vel sine.
Ut cum dicitur: 'omnis homoalbus currit', hec est duplex, quia si distribuatur sub-
stantivum cum adiectivo, sensus est: omnis homo qui omnis humo est albus, currit,
et tunc sequitur quod omnis homo sit albus et currat; vel si distribuatur sine adiectivo
id est sensus: omnis homo cui inest albedo, currit. Et tunc non sequitur quod omnis
homo sit albus et quod omnis humo currat, quia restringitur iste terminus 'homo' per
implicationem importatam per hoc nomen 'qui'. Ut habitum est in Restrictionibus.
Secundum quod solvitur hoc süphisma: 'omnenon-onimoiquod et Ser sunt duo, ditior: a
Sorte'.
Then thoseof 'omnis'usedasa collective sign (39r):

Viso de hac 'omnis' secundum quod est distributiva, videndum est de eadem secun-
dum quod est collectiva. Sciendum igitur quod dicunt quod hoc nomen 'omnis' in
singulariest tantummododistributivum, in plurali tantumcollectivum. Ut cum dicitur:
'omneshominescurrunt', sequitur: 'ergo isti' ; tenetur ergo distributiva. Cum vero dicitur:
'omnesApostoli sunt duodecim', tenetur collective neque sequitur: 'ergo isti sunt duodecim',
vel 'duo sunt duodecim'. Et hoc cum habet vocativum, ut cum dicitur: 'a vos onmesqui
transitis per viom'. Sed quod hoc nil sit videtur quia et in singulari invenitur vocativus,
cum dicitur: 'omnishomo,omni hora ( . . . . . . )Inboro'. Preterea eadem est signiücatio in
singulariet in plurali; ergosi in plurali signiücetcollectionem,et in singularisigniHcabit.
'Preterea eadem est multitudo signiücata per hunc terminum 'omnis' et per hunc 'omnes',
quia pro tot et eisdem supponit cum dicitur 'omnis homo', scilicet pro quolibet homine
nullo relicto, acsi dideretur: 'omnes
homines'.
Ergoquarationeestcollectivumin plurali,
et in singulari. Item. Quod non habeatplurale videtur. Dicit Priscianusquod omne
plurale generat suum singulare; sed tot snpponit per 'omnishomo' quot per 'omnes
homines';ergo non est eius plurale. Preterea. Dicit Philosophus quod omne operans
faciens per duo quod potest facere per unum, f(r)ustra operatur; sed per singulare
possumussupponere omnia supposita; ergo f(r)ustra esset plurale.
Dicendum ad hoc quod hoc signum 'omnis' tum in singulari tum in plurali potest
supponi collective, scilicet quando redditur predicatum non ratione partium sed totius,
ut 'omnis homo est totum in quontitote'. Unde ista est singularis, quia predicatum inest
subiecto tamquam uni singulari. Frequenciustamen est in plurali, quia ibi est multitudo
actualis secundum res et secundum modos significandi.
Quod queritur utrum habeatplurale, dicendumquod sic, non quantumad supposita,

sed quantum ad signiEcatasub suo modo.
Quod in plurali non possetessedistributivum videtur. Nullum signum universale
potest addi termino discreto; sed pronomina demonstrativa sunt termini discreti; ergo;
sed bene dicitur: 'omnesisti currunt'; ergo. Dicendum quod iste terminus 'isti' licet
secundum modum signiFtcaudisub specie partis sit discretus, propter tamen pluralitatem
a qua habet multitudinem actu, Et communis; et ita potest distribui.
After the discussion(39?) of 'nuHus'as the counterpart of 'omnis', the

author discusses'totus' (39f):
Notandumquod sicut est duplex 'totum', scilicet totum universaleet totum integrale,
ita sunt duo generasignorumque per illa dividuntur in partessuas.Sicut enim per hoc
signum 'omne' 'fdividitur totum universale in partes suas nulla relicta secundum exigen-
tiam suppositionis,similiter per hoc signum 'totus' dividitur totum integralein partes
integrales nulla relicta. Ex qua colligitur ista regula:
omnis terminus cum quo additur hoc signum 'totus', dividitur in
quamlibet partem integralem ex qua constituitur totum significatum
per illum terminum.
Unde dicitur quod hoc adiectivum 'totus' cum suo substantivo equipollet ei quod est
quelibet pars cum genitivo illius totius. Unde idem est 'totus homo' quod 'quoh'botpars
hominis'. Ex hoc iterum apparet quod IIDCsignum 'totus' potest addi alicui termino cui
non potest addi hoc signum 'omnis', quia aliquid potest dividi (dividisseMS) in partes
integrales quod non potest dividi in partes subiectivas. Unde licet non possit dici:
'omnis Sor', potest tamen dici 'totus Sor ost albus'; et est sensus: caput Sortis est ofbum,
manus,et sic de aliis partibus.
Sed tunc queritur utrum possit addi hoc signum 'totus' termino signilïcanti aliquid
indivisibile in partes integrales, scilicet utrum possit dici totus Deus, tota anima, totus
punctus,tota unitas. Et 1uideturquod non, quia sicut se 113th hoc signum 'omnis' ad
partessubiectivas,ita se habet hoc signum 'totus' ad partes integrales.Sed isti termini
'Deus', 'onimo', 'puntrtus','unitos' et si qua sunt similia non habent partes integrales, cum
significentsimplicissima;ergo non poterit dici tota anima.
Dicendum quod hoc nomen 'totus' duobus modis potest considerari, secundum quod
est signum distributivum et secundum quod idem est quod 'pcdïtctum', ut dicit' Aristo-
tiles. Et sic potest addi cum predictis terminis, quod idem est 'totus Deus' quam 'per-
jl-ctus Deus', secundum quod distributive, tenetur sic non potest addi cum istis ratione
parcium integrarum. Boecius tamen inter cetera tota assignat totum virtuale, scilicet
aliquid unum habensin se multas virtutes, sicut anima. Unde cum dicitur 'toto onimo',
Fit distributio pro virtutibus anime, que sunt sensus,intellectus, ratio, memoria, et non
pro partibus integralibus. Ex quo patet solvendum ad predicta..
Posset tamen queri utrum hoc nomen 'totus' posset addi cum terminis successivis.
Et videtur quod sic, quia hoc nomen 'totus' non exigit nisi multitudinem partium ex
quibus consistit illud cui additur. Sedomne successivummultas habet partes; ergo cuilibet
successive potest addi 'totus'.
Then follows the discussion of the siglis composed with the word 'quis-',
' Cfr.. Anal. Pr. [ 33, 47b22Ff.

such as 'quilibet', 'quisvis', 'quicumque', 'quisquis', 'quisque' (39V). The.

next discussion is concernecl with the signs 'uterque', 'neuter', 'olter' and
'reliquus' (39V-4-01'):
Quia supra habitum est quod signorum substantiequedamdistribuunt inter duo
tantum, quedaminter plura et determinatumest de distributionibus inter plura, sequitur
determinarede his que distribuunt inter duo, que sunt 'uterque'aFFn-mativum et 'neuter'
negativum. Sciendum igitur quod hoc nomen 'uterque' compositum est ex hoc nomine
'uter' —, quod est quesitivum de duobus, ut cum dicitur: 'uterqueittorum' (40?) sensus
istis duobuscurrit' ; et ita habet in se potentiam ad duo cum dependentia —-
est: quislibete.»:
et ex hac copulativa coniunctioüwe) 'que' per quam Hnitur illa dependentia; et ita
reducitur potentia in actum. Unde hoc namen 'uterque'supponit pro duobus actu.
Unde cum dicitur: 'uterque illorum currit', sensus est: 'iste currit et ille currit'. Cuius
( ...... )? causaetiam singularecum plurali potest adiungi secundumillud aetoris:
'utroquejormose' dependentia
etc. Et pro causa huius
quam importat, est partitivum
signi universalis. Signaparticularia 1irelipsum dividentia sunt ista duo: 'alter' et 'relicus'.
Quare si quis dicit quod 'quilibet illorum', ad utrumque suppositum per indifferentiam
respicit, non tamen intelligit ambo simul. Unde cum dicitur: 'olter istorum currit',
sensus(est): 'iste vel ille currit'. Sciendumtamen quod sicut hoc nomen 'uterque'duo
ponit simul, ita similiter hoc nomen 'neuter' pro duobus negat simul, ita quod pro
quolibet illorum. Ut cum dicitur: 'neuteristorumcurrit', senatus
est: 'necistenecille currit'
vel 'nequealter nequerelicus' Et componitur ab hac dictione 'ne' et hoc nomine 'uter'.
.
Sed tunc queritur utrum ista signa sunt unversalia. Etsi hoc videtur esse falsum, quia
cuiuslibet signi universalis est facere propositionem". universalem et in omni pt'olmsitione
universali est dici de omni vel dici de nullo. Sed ubi est dici de omni Oportet quod sint ad
minustria appellata.Sedin distributione horum signorumnon sunt nisi duo appellata.
Ergo non sunt signa universalia.
The tract is concluded with the discussion of the signs distributive of

accidente;(401).I give the text in full:
Viso del signisuniversalibusdistribuentibussubstantiamconsequentervidendumest
de distribuentibus accidentia. Que Fiunt, ut dicit Priscianusper generationem nominum
quesitivorum, ut 'quolis', 'quontus' per assumptionem horum trium 'libet', 'vis' et
'eumque', ut 'quolisvis', 'quontuslibet', 'quotuseumque'.
Et Et in eis eadem ratione distributio qua in hoc termino 'quis', de quo dictum est
supra. Quia cum sint quesitivain(cle)Fmiteet in potentia habent in se multitudinem
omniumpartium suesigniücationiset per restrictionemsui suprase'velper apponentiam
dictarmu dietionum Finitur illa dependentia et reducitur potentia in actum. Unde cum
dicitur: 'quolirlibet homocurrit', 'homocurrit', sensusest: 'homoalbus currit, niger, medius,
eger, sanus',et ita de singulisqualitatibus. Similiter 'quontuslibet'de omnibus quanti-
tatibus, 'quotuslibet' de omnibus numeris.
Sed videtur quod non sint signa universalia, quia signum universale non potest addi
supra signum universale 'omne quilibet' vel econverso:. Sed congrue dicitur: 'omne
quolelibetcurrit', etc. Videtur quod 'qualelibet' non sit signum universale.
l513 (!) MS.

Item. Posito quod aliquis habeat quemlibet colorem et currat, congrue dicitur eo
demonstrato: 'id quaiclibct currit' vel 'aliquod qualclibct currit' sed non posse dici ll«:iiiquid
omnc'. Ergo videtur quod non sunt signa universalia.
Quare queritur utrum signauniversaliasubstantiedistribuunt signaaccidentis, et non
econverso. Dicendum quod omne accidens habet fieri in substantia. Unde impossibile
est esseaccidens sine substantia. Quare universalitas accidentium repugnat particularitati
(cx quantitati MS) substantie; in una enim substantia notari possunt multa esseaccidentia,
sed unum accidens numquam potest esse in multis substantiis. Ex quo patet solutio
quesitorum.
Et hec de diatributionibus ad presens sufficiant.
EXPLICIUNT SUMME.
Finally, some remarks can be made on the several kinds of supposition

Our treatise gives the follox-ving
distinguished in the Summe!liflïEGHSES.
division of suppositio:
g discreta
suppositio ( simplex
(
communis determinata
-(
personalis & confusa tantum
z'
confuaa
confusa mobilis
distributiva
This integration of the several kinds of supposition clearl)Ir shows that

our Summe must be posterior to the Dialectica zl-ionacensis,
in which a
juxtaposition of all these membcrä of the clivision is found.' On the
other hand, just as in the latter treatise, the chapter on restrictio in the
Summefifetensesis still closely connected with those on suppositioancl
appellatio; nor does the discussion of ampliatio form the independent
tract it is in Peter of Spain's Summulelogicalcs.
' See above, p. 415.

CHAPTER XV
THE DOCTRINF. OF FALLACV AND

THE ORIGIN OF THF. THEORIES OF SUPPOSITION
The First volume of this study on the origin of terminist logic mainly
dealt with the influence which Aristotle's Sophisticï elenchi cxerted on
the development of the so-called logica modemorum.' The doctrine of
Fallacy was called there2 one of the two roots of the new development
of Mediaeval logic as it appeared about the middle of the twelfth century.
As a matter of fact the frequent occurrence ol" fallacias in the examples
illustrating the leaming of the wcll-known Summulacon logic is not just
a concomitant. Rather, the doctrine of fallacy seems to have been,
together with the twelfth centuryr grammatical theories, at the very
basis of terminist logic. No doubt, the prcsentmolume makes it fairly
clear that, in this respect, the development of grammar was Em-more
important than the growth and development of the twelfth century
Fallacy-theorics considered in themselves. It is evidcnt that the influence
of the latter arc to be taken and evaluatcd in their connection with the
frame-x-vork of the grammatical theorias which pervaded into the whole
domain of logic about the Efties,3 and with l'egard to their function
within this frame-x-vork. Not 0111),in the Geld of logical Fallacybut in
many other subjects of logical doctrine as well, the propositioassuch was
subjectecl to a strictly linguistic analysis, to a much greater extent,
indced, than it hac]been by Abailard nnd his fellow-teachers of logic.
The present chapter will deal with the development of the doctrine
of signilïcation as it is found in, and apparently stimulated to some
extent by, the twelfth camur)r theories of fallacy.
Two kinds of fallite): deserve our special attention, thejaHacia secun-
dum univocationemand thejäHacia secundum fguram dictionis.
A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic. [ On the

1 Lagica;l-lodcrnarum.
Twelfth Centum)fTheorics of FalIaC)r(Assen 1962).
: ap. ciæ,,Preface.
3 Sec above, Chs Vl-XW. — l now seethat in the Erst volume of this stad)r (pp. 20-23)
the extreme importancc of twelfth century grammar was insumciently stressed.
l Univocation
-
It must be bome in mind that in the doctrine of fallacy the term

'univocorio' is used in & special sense: a term is said to be used univocally
in two propositions, such as 'homoambulot' — 'homonon ambulot', when
in one case it refers to & universal nature (essentia,say a genus or Species)
and in the other to some individual. This was stated by Boethius in a
fairly clear way in his commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione:
In zlrisr. Periherm.II, 1332'3 ed. Meiser: Positis ergo secundum univocationem terminis
utrasque simul et adlïrmationem et negationem veras esse contingit. Ut si quis dicat:
'homoambulot', 'homo non ombulot', adfurmatio de quodam homine vera est, negatio cle
specialivcra. SedSpecialishomo et particularis univocasunt. Quocirca sumptisunivocis
contradictio non fit.!
ln Abailard's mind these words of Boethius' raised many questions.?-

Unlbrtunately the text in Log. !ngred.39916Ff. seems to be somewhat
corrupt and the passageconcerned in the Dialecticais rather concise.3
However, this much is certain: (1) when :- term is usedin severalcases
to (lenote the sameindividual each time, it is said to be usedidentically,
not uniwocally],4 e.g. 'Socratesis the son of Sophroniscus'— 'Socratesis not
thesonofSophroniscus' ; (2) when a term is used in several cases to deuote
diFFerentthings (diverso),but hasits original imposition each time, it is
said to be used uniw.rocaullyä,5 e.g. 'Socratesest homo (particu!ari5)' ——
'Socratesnon est homo (universalisï; (3) when a tcrm is used in several
casesto denote clilïerent things (diversa)and hasdifferent impositions as
well, it is said to be usedequivocallyä e.g. 'conis (viz. dog) est]atrabile
animal' 'conis (viz. the constellation Dog) non est !atrobile animal'.
—
! For the context, see Log. Mod. 1. pp. 25 H., especially p. 27.
3 Lolq.Ingrcd., 399'5; see Log. Med. [, pp. 51 Ff.
3 Dial. ll, 18135'37;see Log. Mod. l, ibid.
4 Dial. Il, 18134'37: Univocotioncmnon dicunt cum circa eamdem rem vox accipitur, sed
identitatem.Sicut enim aequivocum ad multa (viz. ad diversa) dicitur, ita univocum; unde
'Socroris'nomen si commune non sit, neque aequivocum nequc univocum dicitur. Cfr.
Log. lngrcd., 12021'23.
5 Log. Ingrod., 39923'3": Ideoque univoce dicitur accipi hoc nomen 'homo' cum in
designatione vocis et rei ponitur, quia licet diversa significet, non diversas habuit
impositioncs. '
f' Log. !ngrcd., 39934'3'f: Nam licet 'ourigo' per translationem rectorem navis signiücct,
non tamen aequivoce, quia non habet ad eum diversam impositionem, sed univoce secun-
dum Bocthium, quoniam diversam inventionem (: impositionem) in eo non habuit.
In the Dio). (V, 592-595) the contra-distinction of cquivocal and univoca] nouus is dealt
with from the vicw-point of delïnition.
THE DOCTRINE OF FALLACV 493
Abailard's views about equivocation and univocation are clariEed to

some extent by his use of the term l::rci.-m!i:il:.üo".,
He Speaksof translatioin
four (liFferent cases,! which may be rendered by the following technical
terms (they are not found as such in Abailard):
(a) translatio equivacationis. This type is that Of the equivacatio qua fit
conxiiia, e.g. Icanis' for dog (latrabilis animai), seal (marina belua), and
the constellation Dog (celestesidus).ln such caseswe have to do with
different meanings resulting from different impositions of the word
(di verseimpositiones)
.
in the three remaining cases of translatio (I), c, and (I) the same,
original imposition OFthe word is alwaysconcerned:
(b) translatiopoetica01'metaphor, e.g. 'auriga' when used for steersman
ufa ship
(c) translatiogrammatica,e.g. the word 'homo' usedin *homoestvox'2
(d) translatiodialectica, e.g. the word 'Immo"used in 'homoest s;:æeciuesï'si
The last three types (b, c, d) have two things in common: (I) the
secondarymeaning the word takes on is not the result of a new impositio
(inventio, or institutio) of that word, since its original imposition still
holds good For the new usage; (2) the word takes on the sccondary
meaning not in itself (ex prapria accommodatione), but by virtue of the
context in which it is used (pcr adiunctionempredicatorum,ex aliquo sibi
adiuncto).] quote three important texts from the LogicaIngredientibus.
Log. lngrcd., 39924'36: Sed 'homo' (viz. as used) modo in designatione specialis vocis
(i.e. the species homo), modo in designatione rei (i.e. the individual man) vidctur
aequivocatio,sednon est, quiapotiustranslatiodicendaest, quaenulliusest proprietatis,
idest non est signiFlcativa per impositionem, idest per inventionem, neque per naturam.
Ideoqueunivocedicitur accipi hoc nomen ilhmnmra"
cum in designationevocis (sc. specialis)
et rei ponitur, quia licet diversa significet, non diversas habuit impositiones. Est ergo
vocem univoce sumi quotiens nomen in diversis signiEcationibus accipitur ad quas
diversas impositioncs non habet, quia hoc habet signiEcare ex propria inventionis
institutione, aliud ex accidentali usurpatione. Veluti si dicatur: 'auriga nan navigat'.
Nam licet 'auriga' per translationem rectorem navis signiFlcet, non tamen aequivoce,
quia non habet ad eum divcmam impositionem.
Ibid., 1213'35: Si quis ornatus gratia gubernatorem dicat aurigam, non erit 'auriga'
nomen aequivocum, licet id diversa significet, scilicet moderatoremcurrus et navis. De
quo haec ratio est, quod quando sermonem cxornamus, vulgaria verba et omnibus nota
propter curialitatem vitantes, non novam impositionem vocis facimus, sed ad tempus
ad novam signiücationcm cam accommodamus, quam quidem signiücationem per se non
' For a dctailcd discussion, see Log. :l-Iod.!, pp. 51-56.

: In the FaiiacieParripantanait is called tramumptiagramaticorum(Log. aliod.[, Appendix
E, p. 562"). '
3 The FaliacicParl'ipanranchave: lransumptiodialeticarum(ibid., 56219).
habet, sed magis ex aliquo sibi adiuncw. Si enim dicamus: 'ourigommum novi; omisit',
per adiunctionem 'noris' in 'ourigo' rectorem intelligimus. Si vero dicamus: 'an-riga
romt', nonnisi moderator currus intelligitur. Similiter cum dicimus: 'proro ridont' pro
'protojioront', in 'ridorc' florere intelligimus non ex vi vocis, cum per se hoc non habeat,
sed ex adiunctione 'prororum', quorum scilicet florere esse scimus, non ridere. Si vero
diceremus substantiam ridere, nullomodo nisi risum intelligeremus. Quod itaque in
'ourigo' vel in 'ridoro' quandoquealiud intelligimus ex adiunctis sibi quam habenteorum
propria impositio, non est hoc aequivocationis multiplicitati deputandum, cum vox
etiam per se dicta diversos non habeat sensus. dicimus 'ourigom' ad
...... .....
tempus per adiunctionemalicuius ad hancsignificationemper translationemquandam
esseaccommodatum nec tunc praprie in vi dictionis esseconliguratam orationem (quia)
reddit aliud intra quam extra significans.
"»d., 33615'17:illud etiam fortasse rationabilius dicemus, cum aliquam vocem in
designatione sui accipimus, per translationem, non per aliquam institutionem id Fieri,
et in quibusdam orationibus tantum, non omnibus, quando videlicet nominibus vocum
ipsa coniungitur, 1welutisi dicam: 'homoest vox' vel 'homoest nomon'. Sicut enim 'rident'
per odiunctionem'proto' mittit ad florere cum dicitur: 'proto ridont', sed non ita cum
dicitur: 'homoridct', ita cum dicitur: 'homo est vox vel nomen', per adiunctionem predica-
torum signiücantium voces tantum mittit 'homo' hoc vox ad seipsam. Sed quia translatio
huiusmodi nullius est proprietatis, nec per inventionem aliquam vel per institutionem
vocis id contingit, non est inde hoc signilicativum iudicandum, quia hoc per accidens
habet, non ex propria accommodatione.
From this, three important points emerge. First. The translatio

grammatico(or transumptiogrammaticorum) is exactly the sameas what is
afterwards named suppositiomotoriolis (e.g. William of Shyreswood,
Introductioncs,p. 75'0'13 ed. Grabmann). Second. The translatio dialectica
(or tronsumptiodialecticorum)is quite of the same type as what is after—
wards called suppositiosimplex (e.g. William of Shyreswood, op. fit.,
13. 75'4'lf'; Peter Of Spain, Summule Logicalcs, nr. 6.05 ed. Bocheflski).
The terminology used by Abailard is of some interest: the Specieshomo
(or homospecialis)is designatedby him as homosimplex(Dial. II, 18132
ed. De Rijk). Third. The use of a term in o propositionconstitutes the
particular meaningthe term hasin that proposition. As we havealready
seen (above, Chapter Ii), it is this "contextual approach" developed
especially by the grammarians after Peter Helyas in their theories of
signiFlcation, that Furnisheclthe basisfor the doctrine of supposition.
A further stage of development is shown by the Foliocic Poruipontone.'

Univocation is reckoned among uquivocation in its wider sense. The
latter is deFmed as the equivocation that m'ises from some variato appellatio
' For this interesting work, see [og, :l-Iod. [, pp. 127; 134-152. It has been edited in full
there, Appendix E, pp. 545-609.
THE DOCTRINE OF FALLACT 495
The former is deHnedas manente

or somevariatasuppositio. eademsigni]?-
cationovonoto nominissuppositio(56211'13ed. De Rijk).' The anonymous
author distinguishesthree kinds of univocation (ibid., 56214'3'):
(a) the First type occurs when & term is used to refer to itself, either
when it is taken as & technical term of grammar (grammaticalcategory;
this is the case of grammatical transsumption, e.g. 'mogister' in 'magister
estnomen'),or when it is used to refer to its signfcotum; by the latter
term the universal nature taken as a technical term of logic (mental
concept) appearsto be meant. The latter caseis that of the dialectical
transsumption, e.g. 'homo' in: 'homo est species':
Fall. Porrip., 562'4'19 ed. De Rijk: Sunt autem tres species univocationis. Prima est
quando aliqua dictio sumitur ad agendum de se vel de suo significato.. De se ipsa ut cum
dicitur: "magister" estnomen'; hic enim transsumitur hoc nomen 'mogisrer'ad agendum
de se. Et hec est proprie transsumptio gramaticorum. Tramsumitur ad agendum de suo
significato ut cum dicitur: "'homo" estfpecies'; et hec est transsumptio dialeticorum.
(b) the secondtype is found when a term now refers to & certain in-
dividual of some sort of things (monorics), now to ghat sort itself quo tohs,
e.g. 'homo' in : 'homo est dignissimo crooturorum'; or to some unde-
termined part of it, e.g. 'pipor' in: 'pf'per vendltur hic et Rome':
Ibid., 56230'35:Secunda.species est quando aliqua dictio transsumitur modo ad agendum
de aliqua rerum alicuius maneriei, modo de tali manerio rerum, ut cum dicitur: 'homo
est dignissimocreamrorum'. Potest enim sic intelligi ut Fiat sermo de aliquo appellatorum
huius nominis 'homo'; potest etiam intelligi ut Fiatsermo de tali maneria rerum. Eodem
modo intelligendum est cum dicitur: 'ourum .m preciosissimammetallum', 'piper venditur
hic et Rome'
..
(c) the third type Occurswhen an appellativenoun hasan ampliatedor

restricted meaningdependingon the use of a verb of a certain tense
(present, preterite, or future) in the proposition in which the term is
found, e.g. 'homo'in: 'omnishomoest(or ero:, or erit) albus':
Ibid... 56217'31: Tertia species est que consistit in ampliatione et restrictione alicüius
dictionis, quemadmodum accidere solet in nominibus appellativis. Nomen enim appel-
lativum si supponat verbo presentis temporis, habet se per appellationem ad presentia
tantum; si verbo Futuri, habet se ad presentiaet ad futura.
Univocit)r (univocotio),deFmedas monenteeodemsignifcotionovariato

nommis suppositio (Follocic Porvjpontone,56211'12) or manenteeodem
! Cfr. Adam's dehnition: eademratione (: dtfnmon) diversorumeademappellatio

(Ars Dm., 3113'14ed. Minio-Paluello).
signyïcotionc variato nominis appellatio (Tractatus de Univocatione Mona-

comis,!3374'5)is a property belonging to terms on the ground of their
signiEcative Punction. Two terms are said to be univoca] when One has
the same signjfïcotio as the other. lt must be noticed that signifï'cotiois to
be taken here as the presentation of a certain universal nature to the
mind, to use the definition of William of Shyreswood.2 The signi/ï'catio
ofa term dependson its impositioï: when there is but one impositio,there
is also one sfgnjjïcatio only. So univocal terms are defined in contra-
distinction to equivocal terms, one of which has not the same signifï'catfo
as the other, asa result of diFferent impositions.
However, though having the same siganatio, univocal terms used in
different propositions may stand for different things. E.g. the term
'homo'in the following pmpositions (cp. above, p. 493):
(I) 'homo est nomen': 'homo' stands for & grammatical category
(2) 'homoestspecies':'homo'standsfor & logical category
(3) 'homo est dignissima creaturarum': 'homo' stands for man taken as
some particular sort of things
(4) 'omnis (or quidam, or hic) homoest (or erat, or erit) albus': 'homo'
standsfor a!] (or some,or this) thing(s) of this name whether they
exist in the present or preterita or future time.
In the last case, now, the term ('homo') is used as an appellative noun
the actual meaningof which dependsLuponthe tenseof the verb of which
it is the subject. ln other words: the appellatiyefunction (: appellatio)
of the appellative noun dependsupon the verb with which it is connectecl
in & proposition. Appellatioassuchalwaysrefers to the existence of some
particular thing(s) whether they (it) exist(s) in the present or in the
preterite or in the future time.
However, it must be borne in mind that taken in its primary sense
the notion of appellatiois alwaysconnectedwith the presenttenseof the
verb substantive'est' (or some other verb containing it). So the author
of the Introductionesparisiense:deFlnesit as follows: appellatio, ut solet
dici, est presentialis convenientia alicuius cum aliquo; vel: quedam
prcprietas que inest termino ex eo quod pro presenti significat, ut solet
' For this tract, see below, p. 533ff. It is edited in Full in our second part as Tract VII..
2 presentatio alicuius forme ad intellectum (Introductioncs in logicam, p. 7416"? ed.
Grabmann).
J See above, p. 492. Cp. Adam of the Petit Pont, Ars disserendi, oa' 27'7'13 ed. Minio-
Paluello, where cx impositioneintelligenda significatio is mentioned as one of the three
causes of equivocation.
dicii.l But a certain appellation occurring in :: particular proposition may

be ampliated 01' restricted for some reason, e.g. becauseof the preterite
or future tense of the verb used in that proposition?
Accordingly, we see that the main interest of the univocation-tract
found in the Fallacie Parvipontanelies in an elaboration of the third kind
of univocation distinguished there, which is concerned with the use of
appellative nouns in a proposition. ln fact, the four rules our author
gives for the recognition of univocation all concern the use of appellative
I'IO'LIHS:
(1) si nomen appellativum supponit verbo presentis tempül'isII habet se

per appellationem ad presentia tantum. E.g. *omnishomoest albus'
omneid quod est homo, est.album
(2) quando nomen appellatiuum snpponit verbo preteriti temporis,
habet se per appellationem et ad presentia et ad preterita. E.g. *omnis
homoerat albus' : anmeid quodest vel erat homo,estvel erat album
(3) quandonomen appellativum supponit verbo futuri ten'nporis,habet
se per appellationem tam ad presentia quam ad iutura. E.g. 'omnis homo
erit albus' : omneid quod est re! erit homo,est vel crit album
(4) quandonomen appellatiuumsnpponit verbis diversorum temporum
interposita capulativa coniunctione, contrahit appellationem & proximo.
homoestetjiu't albus' : quicquid est homo, esterfuit album.?-
E.g. IL«.':mr.-1r'.-1's
The same observations can be made with reference to the Munich

tract on univocation (C.]..M. l4-.4-58).4This treatise shows remarkable
resemblances,indeed, with that found in the Fallacie Parviponmne.Uni-
vocation is said to be a frequent causeof deception (by this its connection
with the tract of fallacies is shown), and is defined as manenteeadem
signifcatione variata nominis appellatio in contra-clistinction to aequivocation
which is said to consist in & different sigmf'catioofa noun:
' Introd. paris., p. 37123'25 (our Tract VIII). Cmnpare William of Shyreswood, Intrad.
in logicam,p.. 74:643ed. Grabmann:appellatioautem est presemconvenientiatermini,
i.e. proprietassecundumquamsigniHcatumtermini potest dici de aliquo, mediantehoc
verbo 'est'; Peter of Spain, Summulacfagicola, m'. l0.01 ed. Büchel'lski: appellatio est
acceptio termini pro re existente.
3 For :: more detailed discussion ol" appellatio, see below Ch. XVI, pp. 528lT.
3 FaHacieParvipantane,563" IT.: see also Log. :l'fad. I, p. 140.
4 For this manuscript, see above, Ch. ], nr. 11, p. 43.
Tract. dc univocationc Manum, p. 3372*7: Quoniam univocatio in multis occasionem

fallendi prestat, ideo quid sit univocatio et quot modis fmt breviter dicemus.
Est igitur univocatio manente eadem signiEcatione variata nominis appellatio, quando
scilicet aliqua dictio variat appellationem. (Nota) quod equivocatio consistit in variata
nominis significatione, univocatio vero in variata nominis appellatione.
Unlike the univocation tract of the Fallacie Parvipontane our tract

does not even mention the Erst and second kind of univocation dis-
tinguished there, and the treatise only deals with what was called the
third kind of univocation in the FaHacieParvipantane.Just as in the latter
work, the Munich tract is wholly concerned with investigations of the
different meanings ofappellative nouns as used in a preposition to deuote
individual things:
lbid., 3373'": Fit autem univocatio tribus modis: vel adiunctione verborum diver-
sorum temporum, vel adiunctione terminorum qui modi appellantur, vel adiunctione
verborum ad enuntiabilia pertinentium et positionem cxistentie facientium.
Our tract seems to be of a slightly later date than the Pallade Parvi-
pontane. AS 21matter of fact the order of the subjects discussed is rather
confused, as will appear from the headings of the capitula..l The separate
discussion of relatio given in our tract shows & cleHnitely later stage of
develoPme-nt than is Founcl in the FaHacie Parvipontane. Relatio is dealt
with as :: cause of ampliation or restriction of the supposition of a noun
used in & relative preposition or in the proposition containing a relative
proposition :
!bid., p. 3494'5: Quoniam igitur mentio habita est de relatione et relativo, (quod) sepe
variat suppositionem nominis restringenda vel ampliando, de relatione pauca intcr-
ponenda sunt.
It may be useful to compare the doctrine on univocation and equi-

vocation as it is Found in the FaHacie Parvipontaneand the Tractatus de
univocatione;Honacensiswith the much earlier strageof its develoPment
represented by the Summa sophisticorum elenchorum probably written
shortl)r after the middle of the century.z In the discussion of the Fallacy
secundumaccidensthe following passageoccurs:
xaph.cl., p. 365"'20 ed. De Rijk: Fiunt adhucparalogismisecundumaccidens.
Summa sic:
'ille homoqui pugnavit heri, modonon est
ergo quidam homo non est
crgafalsa cs: hecpropositio: 'omnis homoest'.
1 Seeour second part, p. 335. 2 SeeLog. Med..], p. 89.

THE DOCTRINE OF- FALLACï' 499
Sophisn'ua est secundum accidens. Non enim quicquid assignatm' parti, et toti, quia
quamvisessedemonstraturFuisseremotum ab eo quod videtur essepars quantumad
hominem, cum dicitur: 'ille homoqui pugnavit heri, modonon ext' -———,
non tamen sequitur
quod illud idem removeatur ab eo quod videtur essetotum, scilicet ab homine, ut possit
dici: 'ergo quidam homo non est'.
Next the anonymous author mentiens some people who reckon the
sephism involved among the fallacies secundum cquivocationom:
lbid... p. 36521-24:Sunt tamen alii qui dicunt quod hoc nomen 'homo' habet plura
signihcare, quia accipitur 'homo' qui fuit homovel qui es: homovel qui erit homo. Unde
secundum hoc erit in predicto paralogismo sophismasecundum aequivocationem.
This view is rejected by pointing 0th that the noun 'homo' used in this
paralogism has one sigmjï'cotfo only. However, the reason adduced is
remarkable indeed: if there would exist three signyï'couonesof 'homo'
in this case, the noun 'homo' would be a verb. The author apparently
doesnot think of what is afterwardscalled (e.g. in the above-mentioned
tracts) the third kind of univocotio(viz. that concerning the diFferent
of
uses an appellative nouum)land he does not"introduce the concept
'oppcllotio' either:
lbid... p. 3651541: Sed nos dicimus quod hoc nomen 'homo' non habet illas significationes,
quia si hoc esset quod 'homo' ita significaret, idest quijïu'r homovel qui est homovel qui
crit homo, iam hoc nomen signiücaret cum tempore; ergo esset verbum. Et propter hoc
inconveniens dicimus quod 'homo' non habet illas signincatior-es. Nichil enim aliud
signiücat nisi animal rationale. Unde non est in predicto paralogismo sophisma secundum
equivocationem, sed secundum accidens.
Thus the discussion of univocation occurring in the frame-work of the

theory of Fallacy(arssophistica)proves to haveacted as& certain stimulus
for the development of the theory of meaning from about the middle of
the twelfth century.
2 - Figure of speech
The fallacy secundum fguram dictionis is found in many forms in the

Mediaeval tracts on fallacies, some of them are related to the subject
under discussion in this chapter.
The Glosein Arist. Soph.EI. probably written shortly after ! 150,,2when
' lndeed he only knows the Firstkind of univocation ('homoestspecies

——homonon est
species').See ibid., p. 2'877'3.
: SeeLog.Mod. !, p. 88.
commenting upon Soph.EI. 166b10 ("quc autemsunt secundum

jiguram
dictionis")dividesthe figure of spccch(jï'guradictionis)into three kinds:
secundummateriam vocis, secundumappellationem, and secundumsignificatio-
nem.' The First kind does not concern us here.
The same expositions are Found, in a morc extensive way, in the
SummaSophisticarumElencharum], 1, 6, pp. 327-352 cd. Dc Rijk (in
Log. Med. ], Appendix B).
Thefigura dictionis secundumappellationemis found, according to the
Glosc(p. 212'3'14)quandoaliqua voxeadem jiguracioneappellatplura et ex
hoc videtur signyï'carc hoc aliquid. The text of the Summais somcwhat morc
precise:
SummaSoph.EL, p. 327'6'26:Figuradictionis que Et secundumappellationem, est quando

id quod communiter convenit pluribus, per appellationemvidetur hocaliquid significare,
ut 'quod rm Bononia, non est Roma
homo autem est Bononia
ergo homo non e;: Rome'.
De hacetiam Figuradictionis que Et secundumappellationem,dicit Aristotiles in Predi-

camentis: "in primis substantiis indubitabile quidem verum est quoniam hocaliquid
signiE-cat; in secundisvero 1'..ridn'a-tur
hocaliquid significaresecundumFiguram
......
appellationis".
The reference to Aristotlc makes it clear that the distinction of concreto

substancc (prima substantia) and universal nature (secundasubstantia) is
involved here. The case under discussion reminds us of the second type
OFunivocation discussedabove (p. 495): "homo'estdignissimacreaturarum'
or 'piper venditur hic et Roma,.
The jigura dictionis secundumsigni rationem is described by the author
of the Summa(p. 32737'29)asfollows: Figuraautem dictionis que Et
secundum signiFlcationis similitudinem est quando aliqua dictio videtur
signiFlcarealiud quam significet.2 It is instanced and explaincd:
HM., 3281'5: 'quia',-uidhabebasheri, hodiehabes
sedheri liabebajffiam virginem
ergohabesvirginemjïliam'.
Quod non sequitur, sed videtur' sequi ex Figuradictionis secundumsigniEcationem.
Videtur enim illud 'quicquid'significarealiud quam significet, scilicet qualitatem; quod
non facit.
! Cp. Glose,p.. 2124'7ed. De Rijk (in Log.:l'lod.l, Appendix A).

2 Cp. Giese, p. 212174": Egura dictionis secundum significationem est cum una vox
exponitur per signiFlcationemalterius vocis, ut hec vox 'quid' exponitur per qualevel
quantum,quia iste vocesnon videntur differre in signiEcatione,tamendifferunt.
THE DOCTRINE OF FALLACT 501
Both works mention an additional use of 0111'tcrm, viz. when it stands

For lacutiofgurativa vel tipica ve! tropica e.g. in 'prata rident'.' This type
is reckoned among equivocation:
Summa,p. 3287'": Potest quoque dici alia esseFlguradicrionis vul locutionis. Ut cum
dicitur: 'prararident'; hac enim dicrio vel locutio dicitur Egurativavel tipica vel tropica.
Sed illi paralogismi qui Eunt ex hac Egurativa dictione vel locutione, non Fiunt in Egura
dictionis sicut hic accipitur, sed F1u11t
in secundomodo equivocationis.
111the next lines thc Giese as well as the Summa seem to ncglcct this
threcfold division by distinguishing thc paralogisnm containing the
figure OFspeech fallacy according to & different point of view. As a
matter of fact they are divided into Fweheadings:
Summa,p. 32812'24:Fiunt autem paralogisnüsecundumfiguram dictionis, ut ait Aristoti-
les in Elencis, quandanon-idem111idem 1'n1erpretan111r.
Que siquidem interpretatio multis
habet Fleri 1110di5.Fit enim secundum diversitatem generum, scilicet quando inter-
pretamur masculinum genus femininum, vel econverso. Fit etiam secundum diversitatem
casuun1,secu11du111 diversitatem 11u111e1'o1'un1,
secundmn diversitatmn predicabilium,
idest quando111te1p1 ea que sunt communiapluribus ut signiEcenthocaliquid.
eta111u1
Fit quoque p1ed1ctainter'pletatio secundum diversitatem predicamentorum vcl genera-
lissimorum, idest quenadmodum sunt distincta predicamenta, sic. possunt fieri inter-
pretationes in eis. lnterpretamur enim multociens quid quale, quid quantum, quid ubi,
vel qualequid, qualequantum,vel quantumquale, et sic de ceteris.
The interpretatio secundum diversitatem predicabilium is connected with

what was called in the Foregoing division OF the figure of speech the
figura dictionis secundumappellationem.However, it must be noticed that
in the discussion of the ch kinds OF paralogisms the type secundum
diversitatempredicabilium is taken together with that secundumdiversitatem
predicamentorum,as appears From the Fmal scntences of the introductory
words of the chapter SECUNDUMDIVERSITATEM PREDICAMENTORLIM:
lbid., p. 334'l'l4: Vel dicatur quod 'q111'd'accipiatur pro re discreta ct individuali que
ab Aristotilc hoc aliquid appellatur. Nomina namque generalia et specialia non quid
tantum, sed qualequid notant.
Thus the term 'quid' refers to the concreta thing (hocaliquid; Aristotle's
1685'11), while 'quale quid' refers to the nouns dcnoting genera et
'11).The chapter
species(nominageneraliaet specialia; Aristotle's 11:01611
under discussion contains an interesting passage,in which the author
raiscsan objection against the infcrcnce of all syllogismsof the Erst,
! Glose,p. 21221'22;Summa,p. 32875.
second, and third ngres and baseshis conclusion on the inference from
quid to quale, or reverse:
Ibid., p. 33727-3381:Oppositio. Videtur autem oriri ad predicta inconveniens ex
predictis determinationibus,quia in supradictisoppositionibussempersic determinavi-
mus: "ideo non sequitur ('ergo'), quia prius posui quid et postea conclusi quale, vel
assumpsi".Eademratione dicamquod 'ergo'non sequaturhic cum dico:
'quicquid homoest, animal es.':
sedsacerdoses: homo
estanimal'.
ergo sacerdos
Et si iste sillogismus fallit, a simili omnis sillogismus prime et secundeet tertie in quo
proponitur quid, et postea assumitur quale, vel econverso, fallit. Vel igitur predicte
solutiones erunt false, vel omnes huiusmodi sillogismi fallunt.
The author replies that such an inference is quite correct since quid
and quale are paria in existentia:
[hii, p. 3383'14: Ad quod dicimus quod huiusmodi sillogismi non fallunt, sed bene
sequitur in his. Sed hoc contingit gratia rerum et gratia paritatis. ln existentia enim
propositum bene sequitur. Nam si aliquid est, aliquod qualecumque est, et quantum-
cumque est et ubicumque est ipsum, est illud. Unde quid et qualein existentia paria
sunt. Sed in aliis non. Non enim verum est, si datur aliquid quod habetur, quod quale-
cumque et quantumcumque datur, tale habetur. Unde quamvis 'quicquid est homo, es:
animal' praponatur ut quid, assumaturautem quale,cum dicitur: 'sedsacerdos
es:homo',
hecdiversainterpretatio non inpedit sillogismum.Presensenim existentiacum quali ac
quantitate etc. pariücatur. Non enim aliquid potest existere cum qualitate quam non
habet, sicut aliquid potest dari cum alia qualitate et cum (alia) haberi.
This explanation is rather puzzling, indeed. As & matter of fact, the

author himself raises an objection on account of the theological problem
of the Trinity :
Ibii, p. 33825'35: Videtur tamen fallere in Trinitate quod dicimus — scilicet quod
gratia presentisexistentia sequanturpredicti sillogismi -— hoc modo:
'quicquid 65: Pater, est.Filius
sed Pater est ingenitus
ergo Filius es.':ingenitux';
vel:
'quicquid eit Pater, est Filius
sed Filius est genitus
ergo Pater est genitus'.
ln his enim non sequitur.
The Tractatus de dissimilitudine argumentorum,probably dating from

about 11501, contains the passagein its second part, which is wellnigh
' See Log. Mad. III p. 109

a double ofa part of the Summa (l, pp. The

32lzl'-*-3fl-32')..I version OFthe
Tractatusadds another syllogism (borrowed from Aristotle's Anal.
Priora, 4—7b30 Ff.) in which the inference Fromqualeto quid seemsto be
illegitimate. He has no better replyr than the sigh: "solvat igitur qui
solverepotest! ".2
However, the objection is quite interesting, since & similar problem
is involved in it as in such inferences as those from homospecialisto homo
particularis, with the dilTerence, to be sure, that here two nominaSpecialis
are concerned one of which (sacerdos)
is subaltem to the other (homo).
It must be agreed, however, that problems ofthis kind are not considered
in the early theories of supposition, but, as is known, they are amplyr
discussedin later theorias of terms.3
The FaHacie Vindobonenscs give & clear description oF-the second type
of the Figura of speech, called ex similitudine appenatianjsw4 but do not
discuss our problem of signjfïcatia. It is only touched, and solved in &
rather superlïcial way in the chapter secundumdiversitatemtemporum:
ed. De Rijk: Nunc videndumest de interpretatione temporum.
Fall. Vindob.,1).51720'33
lnterpretamur autem unum tempus per aliud, quando interpretamur presens per
preteritum, et econverso;et sic de aliis, sicut permisceripossunt.(Presensper pre-
teritum) hoc modo:
'omnis homoestanimal
sed fldarnjhit homo
ergo Adam est animal'.
Non sequitur, quia interpretamur presens tempus per preteritum.
The anonymousauthor of the FaHacieParvipantane defines thefaHacia

secundumj'ïguram dictionis as que provenit ex similitudine unius vocisad aliam
quam habent vel in terminatione vel in accidentium paritate ([)158624'2'5
'ed. De Rijk). He distinguishessix types of paralogisms,5the sixth of
' See Log. Med. ], p. 106.

: Tractatus,13.48614'20ed. De Rijk (in Log. Med. [, Appendix C).
3 E.g. by William of Ockhamin his Summa
totiuslogicael1IlIO (pp. 33-36ed. Boehner).
Seealso Ernest A. Moody, TheLagi: qufWilliam qfOckham,New ïorl-c [965 (reprint of the
Firstedition, l935), pp. 55-57 and 276-278.
4 Fall. Vindob.,p. 5159"12ed. De Rijk (in Lag. ;I-IDd.[, Appendix D): ex similitudine
appellationis, ut hoc nomen 'homo' videtur significare hoc aliquid, non quia appellat hoc
aliquid, idest individuum, sed non signiEcat hoc aliquid, immo significat aliquid (for:
qualequid?),idest univei'sale.
5 Fall. Parvip., pp.. 5874—59035,
see Lag. fliod. [, p. 145.
which is of some importance to our present purpose. lt concerns the

mutual inferencemadebetween hocaliquid and qualequid, that is: the
confusion of generic and specific nouns with prcper names and pronouns.
At the end of the passagethe interesting remark has been added that this
kind of fallacy may be reckoned among univocation as well:
Fa". Parvip...pp. 590'1-5914ed. De. Rijk: Sextusmodusest qui Fit ex fallaci commu-
tatione eius quod est hocaliquid in qua]: quid. Ut autem hoc facilius intelligatur, sciendum
quod dictiones determinatesignificantesdicuntur hocaliquid signilïcare, ut propria
nomina et pronomina. Dictiones autem indeterminate signiFlcantesdicuntur qualequid
signiücare, ut nomina generum, nomina specierum. Provenit itaque deceptio secundum
hanc fallaciamex eo quod a dictione determinate significationisfallaciter transit quis ad
dictionem indeterminate significationis.
luxta quod fiunt talesparalogismi:
'n' aliquid est simile alicui, ipsmn non est illud
$ed Socrates cn similis homini
erga Socrate.;non est homo'.
Non provenit. Transitur enim a dictione determinate significationis, scilicet ab hoc
pronomine 'illud', Fallaciterad dictionem indeterminate significationis, scilicet ad hanc
dictionem 'homo'.
Item sub eadem fallacia:
'si aliquid digeri ab aliquo, ipium non ex: illud
sedSocratesdij?!" ab homine
ergo non est homo'.
Non provenit. lnIJeditenim predictaratio.
Possumuset huic fallaciehunc paralogismumassignare:
1'qm'fqurid ego rideo, tu non vidc:
sed ego video montem
ergo tu non vide; montem'.
Et est fallaciaex eo quod, cum propositumsit in particularibuset minimis, concluditur
in generali.
Quidam tamen hunc paralogismum et consimiles univocationi deputant, sed nichil
prohibet diversas fallacias in eandem orationem incidere. Omnes autem paralogismi
qui Eunt secundum commutationem predicamentorum, Fiunt secundum commu-
tationem signiFlcationum.
3 - The FaUacie Londinenses
We have an interesting tract on Fallacies preserved in a manuscript of

the British Musenn1.' This 0:pr2 was written in the beginning of the
! British Museum, 110an Am, 2DlX, Ff. 1271'3-134-1'5.For this manuscript, see above
Ch. I, nr. 4, pp. 21-22.
2 That it is not an autographouswnrk can appearfrom the numerouserrors of the scribe.
Seethe critical apparatus.
thirteenth century.' The work seems to have originated in England2and

shows a peculiar influence of grammar. A few points deserve attention.
The author's distinction of the active and passive meaning of the term
'cquivocatio', and his reference to & passage from Priscian is quite
unusual (p. 64815'20).He usesinstitutioinsteadof impositio(p. 6-4-822
Ff,).
He shows quite a striking interest in grammatical distinctions: the cases
of the noun and their mutual constructions, the different tenses of the
verb, the constructions of oblique caseswith a verb etc. Besides, the
merely grammatical use of such terms as suppositioand appositio, sub-
positive and appositive teneri deserves our attention,3 as well as the
discussion of the copulative function of the verb.4 Our anonymous
treatise gives an extensive discussion of the thirteen fallacies. lts date is
not easyto establish, but we will probably be not far from the truth in
putting it between ] 160/70 and I 190, I think.
The complete text will be edited in our second part as Tract XIII.
This tract does not deal with univocation, but pays much attention
. Equivocatiöh delined
to the diFFerent types of equivocation. is as follows:
ed. De Rijks: equivocatioprout hic accipitur, sic describitur:
Fall. Laudem,p. 64821'30
equivocatio est rerum diversarum ex diversis institutionibus vel ex una institutione
qualiscumque designatio; 'ex diversis institutionibus" dico propter hoc nomen 'canis',
quod ex diversis institutionibus diversa significat; 'ex una institutione' dico propter
huiusmodi nomina 'Iccrfa', 'acu'o', que ex una institutione signiFlcant actionem et pas-
sionem; 'quaüscumquedesignatio' dico quia sive vox signiFlcet vel consigniücet plura
proprie, vel unum proprie et aliud transumptive, vel per se vel cum alio, ex hoc proveniet
equivocatio.
The fallacy of equivocation is deFlned as deceptio proveniens ex signif'catione

vel consigniücatione
dictionis (ibid., p. 649ï'2). It is divided into four
principal types, two of which are subdivided into six sub-types (pp.
649-652).
1 Ex principali significatione dictionis:
] ex diversa signifcationc dictionis ex diversis institutionibus, e.g. 'canis',

which may signify: dog, the constellation Dog, and seal '
' Seeabove,p. 21.

: As may appear from the. example: 'iste esl:dc Anglia', edition, p. 652".
3 Seepp. 6601?Ff.and654—23
Ff.of our edition.
4 !bid., pp. 6621Ff.and 66230Ff.
5 In our second part, pp. 639-678.
506 LOGICA MODERNORLIM 1!
ex diversasignycicatfone dictionis exuna inuitatione, e.g. *excccatio'which

has both an active and a passivemeaning
ex eo quod aliqua dictio in prima propositione tenetur proprie, m alja
transumptive, e.g. llricïhzrf'
ex diversa demonstratione,e.g. hec vox (a! a', standing both For 0973
and a
ex diversa relatione, e.g. the different use of the relative pronoun
tquod" as referring to cliFferent antecedente.
ex diversorcxpcctu,e.g. when & proposition is used once with, once
without & determination.
11 Ex diversa consignificatione dictionis:
ex diversa comigniH-ratfone casus, e.g. ILlnavu'asrn.»::.'Iis!'

taken once as a
nominative and once as & genitive case
e.xdiversa conngnäf'cationc numeri, e.g. talba' taken once as & singular
and once as a plural word
ex diversa consignffcationegeneris, e.g. 'alba' taken once as a feminine
and once as & neuter word
ex diversa consignääcationctemporis, e.g. *Icgit' taken once as & present
and once as a preterita tense
exdiversaconsignyï'catione
modi, e.g. '!egam' taken once asan indicative,
onceasa subjunctive
ex diversaconsigniücationc
persone, when & verb is taken once for the
Erst person, once for the third person.
III Ex consigniücationibus dictionis, que diversas consignifi-

cationes contrahit ex diversis adiunctis:
e.g. 'de, once denoting the origin ("coming from"), once the
material ("made from").
IV Ex eo quod si qua dictio tenetur nominaliter, per se signifi-

cat; si est alia pars orationis, nichil per se signiflcat:
e.g. 'nisi' taken once as the genitiva case of 'nisus' (: *sparrow-

hawk'), once asa conjunction.
The author's discussionof the fallacy of the figure of Speech,too,

requires our attention.I Six meanings of the word fgura' are distin-
1 Fa". Land., pp. 66431-66824.

THE DOCTRINE 01: FALLACT 507
guished, three of which are used in grammar and three in logic. The
second and third use of fgura' found in logic are relevant here:
Fa". Laudum, pp. 66519'25: In secunda (xc. acceptione) dicitur dispasitiofuahum partium
dictionis, quia penesFinemdictionis discernitur dictio a dictione, idest differentia habetur,
numerus a numero ...... , casus & casu ..... . , genus & gener; ...... , una
pars orationis ab alia ...... In tertia acceptione dicitur appellatio dictionis, scilicet
quedamproprietas que inest dictioni ex eo quod supponit unum vel plura.
Accordingly, figure of Speech(jï'gumdictionis)is taken by our author as

dispositiofnahum partium dictionis or as appellatio dictionis, and the fallacy
arising from it as deceptiopro veniensex tali dispositione vel ex tali appellatione.
Pour principal types are distinguished:
1 Ex eo quod alique dictiones videntur habere eandem

suppositionem vel eandem significationem propter similem
terminationem 1
11 Ex eo quod üt variatio antecedentiumþin pluribus

dictionibus :
[ variatio generis in pluribus dictionibus
2 variatio numeri in pluribus dictionibus
3 variatio temporis in pluribus dictionibus.
III Ex commutatione predicamenti:
] ali (!nando 't Precessus a dictione unius Predicamcnti ad dictionem alterius

predicamenti
2 aliquando fï't processusa dictione unius predicamenti ad dictionem eiusdem
predicamenti
?) aliquando fï't processus termini unius predicamenti ad terminum non perti-
nentem ad aliquod predicamentum.
IV Ex variata suppositione in pluribus dictionibus:
1 ex eo quod ft processusa termino subponente coqjüsc ad terminum suppo-

nentcm determinate
2 ex eo quodft processus:: determinata subpositiane ad calyüsam.
' This type will be discussedbelow, Ch. XVI, p. 540H'.

are of outstanding importance, since they

The Pallade Londinenses
illustrate the intermingling of logic and grammar in the discussion of the
well-known fallacies.
4- - The tract on Fallacies in the Dialectica Monacensis

The extensive Dialectica MonacensisFound in Munich, C.L.M. 14.763,
which will be edited in full in our second part, elaborately discusses
the thirteen Fallaciesunder the heading De saphisticaargumentatione.Two
fallacies are of special relevance, again, thefallacia secundumequivacatio-
nem and thefallacia secundumfguram dictionis.
The anonymous author deHnes equivocatio as multiplicitas dictionis
diversaequeprincipaliter signfcantis ve] consignchantis,aut unumprincipa-
liter reliquum per posterius, aut unum praprie reliquum transumptive (p.
55921'23)and the fallacy involved asdeceptioquecontingit ex tali multiplicitate
dictionis nan apparentesedlatente (p. 55931'32).
This fallacy has three speciesaccording to the threefolcl matter in which
equivocation is found. The Erst species is found when there is equi-
vocation in & dictio siganatim per se. This case is divided into two
groups: (a) when there is equivocation ratione signjfi'catianis, and
(b) when there is equivocation ratione cansignäfïcatianis (p. 5609'15).
Each group is subdivided. Thus our author distinguishes many types
of paralogismsand sophismsin the prima Species(pp. 560-563):
(3) when there is equivocation ratione signff'qatianfs
(l) dictio plura sfgnäfï'catequeprincipaliter, e.g.. 'canis' as dog, seal, and

the ConstellatianDog
(2) dictio signifïcat unum principaliter, reliquum per posterius,e.g. lsanus'
said of an anima] and of urina. The equivocation concerning the
nomina transcendentia ('l-es', 'ens', ILunularia"?'universale', (possibile',
'contingens','idem', ldiversum'etc.) is of this type. The sameis said
of the equivocation occurring in terms which may be taken either
materialiter or sigmfcative. They arise all of them from the con-
nection of something (res)with the word (vox).The examplegiven
by our author is rather peculiar since it is & proper noun (Petrus):
Dial. Monat, p. 5614"): Et ille equivocationes(sc. ad hunc modum reducuntur) que
sunt circa aliquem terminum ex eo quod potest sumi materialiter vel significative.
Materialiter duobusmodis: aut enim pro pura voce aut pro ipso nomine. SigniHcative
duobus modis: aut enim pro toto signiEcato, aut pro parte signiEcati. Sicut patet in hiis
exemplis: ( l) 'Petrusest vox dixsillaba'; (2) 'Petruscst prapriumnomcn'; (3) *Petrusest
homo'; (4) 'Petrus iacet in tumulo', 'Petrus est in telo'.
THE DOCTRINE 01: FALLAcy 509
The theory of supposition is not brought into discussion here by

our author, and it would certainly be deFlcientin such casesas (4),
indeed.
(3) dictio signifcat unumex institutioneproprie, reliquumex transumptione.
This is the grammatical type of equivocation involved in several
kinds of metaphorical usage.
(b) when there is equivocation rationeconsigngfcatfanis

(l) iuxta nomen: rationegeneris,e.g. 'alba' once taken as & fe-
minine, once as a neuter
ratione numeri, e.g. (episcopi' once taken as a
singular, once as& plural
ratione casus, e.g. 'episcapi' once taken as &
genitive, once as a nominative case
e.g. tiste' once referring to
(2) iuxta pronomen: rationedemonstrationis,
Socrates, once to Plato
ratione relationis, e.g. 'ille' once referring to &
donkey, once to Socrates--
(3) iuxta verbum: ratione temporis,e.g. ilbita?"once taken asa present
tense, once as a preterite
ratione generis sive signifïcationfs, e.g. 'criminatur'
once taken as an active verb, once as & passive
(4) juxta participium: one type only, viz. rationetemporis,e.g. ((aber-anf,
once standing for the present tense, once for the
preterita.
The second species of the fallacy of equivocation is found when there

is equivocation in a dictio cansignäfïcarivasolum. This case is subdivided as
follows (pp. 563-565):
(1) in dictionibus exclusivisque habent multiplicitatem ex eo quod possunt
jacere generalemexclusionem vel specialem,e.g. (tantum'.
(2) in dictionibusexceptivis,exeoquod(possunt)sumiexceptiveve!diminutive,
e.g. tpreter'
(3) in huiusmodidictionibus 1in'"et 'de'

(4) in quibusdam quefaciuntsermonem
coniunctionibus ambiguum,e.g. ivel' "!
i .'I' l 'l i . '!
.
nm , quad , qum .
The second species is interesting in that it involves the syncategoreu-

matic terms which receive special attention in the tracts De gyncategore-
510 LOGICA MODERNORUh-l 11
maribus as early as towards 1200. See below, our Chapter XVII, p. 594.
The third speciesof the fallacy of equivocation is Foundwhen there is
equivocation in a dictio qua uno modo est cathegoreumatica, alio modo
sincathcgorcumatica. Here such words are concerned which can be taken
as:: noun or as :: conjunction. E.g. 'quod' (relative noun or conjunction),
and *m'sj'(conjunction or the genitive caseof 'nisus' : 'sparmw-hawk').
Summingup the:results it may be said that though the subject matter

involved in the theory of snpposition is dealt with in the discussion of
the fallacy by equivocation, the several kinds of supposition are not
taken into consideration, and that the usual distinctions of the doctrine
of supposition would not have satisFled all requirements made For &
solution of each kind of «$.-quivc-cation.l
The second Fallacy to be discussed in this chapter is the-fäüacia

sccundumjï'guramdictionis. The discussion of this fallacy in the Dialectica
Monacensis(pp. 578-584) has Far more points of contact with the theory
of suPposition than that of equivocation.
The fallacy by figure of speech is focussed in the concept of resem-
blance (similitudo): some words are similar from a certain point of
view, but cannot be considered as similar in other respects.
Figure of speechUigura dictionis)is deEnedby our author asproprietas
sive dispositio dictionis secundumquam proprietatem una dictio similis est alteri
(57834'35).The Fallacyby Egure of speech is deFmedas deceptio
proveniens ex similitudine dictionis ad dictionem, vel etiam ex diversitate
sigmfcatorumve] consignyïcatorum(p. 5799'"). In Factsuch resemblance
(similitudo) between two terms (dictiones)may arise from the word
(vox), or from the meaningof that term, or from both. The distinction
of the three species of this fallacy proceeds from the diFferent origins
of the resemblance.
Dial. Manna, p. 5794'3: Potest autem similitudo causari aut penes ea que sunt in
dictione ex parte vocis, ut in 'Musa' vel 'Cathelina', aut penes ea que sunt ex parte
significationis, ut in 'album' et 'quicquid', vel penes coniunctum, ut in univocatione. Et
secundum hoc tres species paralogismorum distinguuntur in hac fallacia.
' E.g. seeabove, p. 508 the examples: 'Petrusiacetin tumula'and 'Petrusc;: in celo'.
THE DOCTRINE OF FALLAC? 511
The, Erst species of the fallacy by Figure of speech is that arising from
the grammatica]similarity of two terms taken as words (cx parte vocis),
viz. ex simili terminatione diversarum dictionum, e.g. in the paralogism
(p. 57920'22):
'qualiscumqucest Helena, talis eit Katelina
Helena est alba
ergo Karelina estalba'.
It is certainly to be seenasa joke in school-disputation.

The second species had some serious implications for the Mediaeval
logicians. It is that arising from the meaning of the terms (ex parte
sigmfcationis). It is found whenever the Aristotelian categories are
confused (ex commutatione predicamentorum; pp. 57935-53232).The most
important type is that concerning the confusion of such concepts as
'album' and 'albedo', in which it is not clear whether a general term as
'quicquid' refers to the qualit)r whitencss
or to the whitething. E.g. :
Dial. (linnac., p. 58223'32:Sed non tenet (Ic. argumentatio) hic:
'quicquid vidisti heri, (hodievides)
scd heri vidisti albedinem..
erga hodie vides albedinem'.
Similiter non tenet si cum predicto verbo sumatur hoc accidens 'album' loco huius
dictionis 'albcdincm'. Et ut generaliter scias ul)i teneat talis processuset ubi non, con-
sidera gratia cuius reddatur predicatum huic dictioni 'quicquid' in maiori, scilicet
utrum gratia substantie vel gratia qualitatis, et sic de aliis. Et si pro eodem sumitur
minor extremitas in minori propositione, tunc tenet argumentatio; si pro alio, non tenet.
In Fact, the same problems are touched upon here as in Anselm of

Canterbury's Degrammatico.!However, asto the prcper linguistic problem
clearly conceived by St Anselm, our author remains non-committal.
The third species of this fallacy is that which arises from both the
material side of the term and its signiFlcation. It is said to exist in all
bases of univocation. Accordingly it concerns all paralogismis in which
the dilïerent kinds of supposition are confused.
Dial. Manum,pp. 58234-5834:Tertia specieshuius fallacie est ex univocationetermini
unam significationem habentis tamquam ex causa apparentie, diversitatem vero snp-
positorum vel copulatorum, vel modorum supponendivel copulandi, pro causafalsitatis.
Ad hanc speciem reducuntur onmesparalogismi qui Fiunt ex eo quod proceditur a corn-
munisuppositioneacldiscretam,sivequod interpretamurqualequidin hocaliquid.
' Seethe excellent studieson this subject by DesmondPaul Henry: TheDcgrammatica

qut Ansehn;Saint Anselm'sDc grammatica,and Why 'grammaticuæ'?
For the complete titles,
see BOOKS AND ARTICLES REFERREDTO, below, p. 602.
Thus we cncountcr the several pairs usually occurring in the tracts

on supposition (pp. 583-584):
] communis — discreta
2 simplex personalis
—-—
3 personalis sumpta pro individuo vago — personalis sumpta pro individua
signata
4- coqfüsa— determinata
5 cmjüsa restricta — cargfusaampliata
6 inmobilis mobilis.
—
Unfortunately our author does not deal with the adjectiva! terms (Et sic
pateat de terminis copulamibuset adiectivis; p. 5844).
Two remarks can be macie.(l) There turns out to be an unmistakablc

connection betx-veenthc theory of snpposition and the theory of fallacy.
(2) However, in the stage appearing in the Dialecüca flfonaccnsis,we can
certain!)r no longer speak of a theory of supposition stimulatcd by the
theory of fallacy. Thc former rather seems to be introduced in its own
right into the discussion of certain fallacies.
CHAPTER XVI
THE GRAMMATICAL ORIGIN

AND EARLV DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORT
OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION
] - Preliminary Remarks
It is generally agreed that the theory of supposition, and generally

speakingthat of the.properties OFterms (praprictales
terminorum),which
x-vereso prominent and influentia] in later Mediaeval Iogicand philosophy,
took shape in the second half OFthe twelfth century.l Hm-vever, the
precise ways these theories developed From the discussions of the
twelfth century scholars about the structure of proposition, both of
simple (atomic) and compound (molecular) proposition, have remained
rather obscure so far.
As the implies, the theory of the propeäies of terms is intended
name
to provide an account of the diFferent rölcs that words can have when
they appear as terms in propositions. AS 3 matter of fact these terms arc
commonly distinguishecl in Mediaeval logic into such terms as have
meaning in their own right (termini signy'ïcatjvi)and such as are only
significantwhen joined to terms of the Erst sort (terminicansignffcarivi).
Thc former are also named categorematicterms (terminicategorematici),
the latter syncategorematic However,
terms (terlrm'.r1u':fyncaregamur?).f.!riri).2
there seems to be some confusion in 50 far as syncategorematic terms
may be discussed as determining to some extent the actual signiFlcatic-n
or dcnotation (: supposition) of the categorematicterms to which they
are joined, rather than taken in their own right. lt must be home in
mind, then, that when those terms were only taken in their Function of
determining categorcnmtic terms, Mediacval logicians used to deal with
them in the tracts on the properties of terms (namely, in the tract
Dc distributionibus). Whenevcr the)r were taken as having some kind of
' See für instance William and Martha Kneale, The Derclopmcntqf Logic, Oxford zl964-,,
p. 246, and Norman Kretzmann, in his annotated translation of, and introduction to,
William of Shyreswood's Inrroducrianzo Lagic, Minnenpolis 1966, p. 16. The author is
not right, however, in nssuming (op. cit. p. 20) that it would be very surprising if an
earlier synthesisthan William's of all the ingredients ofterminist logic were to be found.
The treatises discussed in our Clmpter Xlll £um-tain!)r
are of an earlier date than William's
Introductian. : Cp. above, p. 82.
meaning (con-signijcatia) of their own, or when they were determinants

(Functors)of phrasesor of simple propositions, they were dealt with in
special tracts, such as those entitled De .y/ncategorematibus,and De
consequentiis.Besides, there is another feature peculiar to the Mediaeval
view of the properties of terms: Mediaeval logic apparently assumed that
onl),r those categorematic terms truly have signäjï'caciox-vhich signify
forms (or: universal natures), either with the underlying substancesof
such forms or without. This assmnption appears to have been widespread
in Mediaeval logic to such an extent, indeed, that the Mediaeval theory
of the properties of terms was, in fact, reducecl to a doctrine of sigmf-
casia in its proper sense. This doctrine was concernecl with signyq'catio
and its three functions: suppositio,appellatio, and copulatio.
It is the aim of this chapter to trace the details of the origin of the
theory of sapposition including appellation and copulation. The next
chapter will discuss the theoryr oF the properties of terms as found about
1200 and give some historical evidence for the origin of the tracts
dealing with the properties of syncategorematic terms, and those
discussing the other speciFlcelements of the Logica Aflademorum.
Mr. Kneale, discussing William of Shyreswoocl'sIntraductionto Lagic,

gives an intelligent account of em])r Mediaeval snpposition. He suggests'
that the. ke); to the whole of William's terminology on supposition is to
be found in the passage where he (Ielïnes the most common kind of
suppositio, namcly personal snpposition. I quqte the text printed by
Grabmann and the translation published by Norman Kretzmannz:
Personalis autem (sc. est suppüsitiü) It is personal, however, when :: word

quando supponit significatum, sed pro re snpposits what it signiFIes,but for & thing
que subest, ut thomo currit'. Cursus enim that is subordinata (to what it signifles),
inest homini gratia alicuius singularis (cd. as in 'a manis running'; for running is in
Grabmann,17.751543). man becauseof some individual.
Kneale assumes that in this context it is clear that William ascribes

supposition to & common noun 01' similar substantive occurring as
subject in & preposition, because, in Kneale's opinion, William thinks
that it subordinatesits meaning(i.e. the form it significas)to that of the
predicate.On the other handKretzmannsupplies: (is subordinata).(to
what it signilïes). If the latter interpretation is the right one, this point
in Kneale's criticism upon the Mediaeval theory of supposition would
' op. cit. (5842p. 5I3 note 1), p. 249.
2 560 above, p. 513, note !.
THE THEORT OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 515
no longer bc snpported by the text. However, Kneale's interpretation

of our pnssagecertainly FltSin well with the Mediaeval views about the
relation and interferenceof the subjectand predicatetermsinapropo-
sitionI and this might be adduced against Kretzmann's understanding of
our passage. But there seems to be a further complication. Kneale is
full)r murarethat against his interpretation oF the term 'suppanere'the fact
can be set that the successors of William of Shyresx-vood,and we may
add: man)r of his predecessors, deFlned supposition quite simply as the
acceptiotermini substantivi pro aliquo, as though supponerewere in their
view an intransitive verb like stare in the equivalent phrase stare pro?
He thinks it conceivable that their usage could have grown out of that
we End in the work of William of Shyreswood. ln this connection
Kneale adds the interesting remark that the absolute use of supponerepro
might perhaps have originated as & vulgarism, like the use of 'substitutc
for' in English where it would be more correct to write 'genusin place43)".
He supposesthat, since in classical Latin the phrase supponere aliquid pro
aliquo had the sense of subnitute somethingfor something,& transition from
this to the technical usage as found in the pasaagein William's work
quoted above would be no more surprising than man)r developments
occurred in the histor)r of language.If, however,
that have un(.lrc:-Lll::-tedl)Ir
this is what happened, the above-mentioned explanation by William
as interpreted by Kneale, can be no more than :: private fancy of
William's suggested by a false etymology. We need not be surprised
that Kneale concludes in saying that the truth of the matter seems to be
even more complicated than either of the hypotheses considered
before.3 Indeed, the history of the term 'suppositum'itself shows & high
degree of complication.4
How can such problems about the true development of both the
term and the concept of (suppositia' be solved in & satisfactory way? No
doubt, all the extant evidence from the time before William of Shyres-
wood must be taken into consideration. Besides, grammar and gram-
matica] tracts of that period are to be taken as starting-points of our
' Compare the famousadagium: talia suntsubiecta,qualia permiserintpredicata:subjects

are of such sorts as the predicantesmay have allowed. See William of Shyreswood,
lunai, l). 7810'21.William rightly remarks there (p. 7821'23)that the authoritative
sentence of Boethius is the inverse of the above adagium: talia sunt predicataqualia
permiserintsubiecta. Grabmann's reference to Boethius, Introd. ad yr". categ. col. 768 B
is not correct. William apparentlyrefers to Boethius, DeTrinitate,p. 1564'5ed. Peiper
: col. 1252 A-B, cd. Migne)].
: op. cit... p. 250.
3 See Kneale, ap. cfr., p. 250. 4 See Kneale, op. m., pp. 250-251.
investigations, since it is quite clear that the occurrcnce of such terms
as 'suppositum',
'supponcrc', and 'suppositio'
is of & cleünitelygrammatica]
mark, just like mem),rother terms in the technical vocabulary of the
terminist logicians.'
2 - The Terms 'supponore','suppositum',and 'suppositio'

as Grmumntical Terms in Twelfth Century Grammar
The word suppositumis found as uarl)r as in Priscian's work. For

instancc, in & passagcwhere it is connectefl with the word subiectio,the
latter term apparently stnncling for putting os grammatico] subject. No
doubt, suppositum here hasthe scnscof subject,aut] substantiasuppositiis
in this passagefully i(lcntical with persona
agens(the acting individual):
inst. gramm. XVII, 23, p. 1221'9 ed. Hertz: Nam substantioiualicuius suppositi quaerentes
dicimus 'quis movo:ur?',*'quisambulat?', 'quis loquitur?", cum manifestussit actus, idest
motus vel ambulatiovel loquella, persona vero agensincerta; ideo subiectionos
nominative
(nominativaeHersz)Fiuntappellatimrum vel prapriorum, propriis manifestantibusetiam
generalemsubstantiam. Respondemusenim vel 'homoombuiot', vcl 'cquus'vel 'Tiypho',
in quo etiam homo intelligitur, vel etiam pruris2subicitur que pro nomine accipitur,
scilicet (sedHcrrz)nominc proprio, idest pronomen, quandodicimus 'ogo'.
lt was introduccd first as a translation of the Greek önuzsïuavov,which

was used to clcnote the logical and gmmnmtical subjcct to which
attributcs are ascribed (or: which prcdicatesare said 003. In Priscian
our tcrm is certainly to be translated by subjcctand does not refer to any
ontological substratum of accidentst
Other passagcsare XVII 27, 33, and 41, where the term suppositum
always stands for subject of the proposition. 1 quote the last passage in
full, since our tcrm might seem, at Fll'Stsight, to have some 'ontoiogicai'
connotation :
Inst. gramm. XVII, 41, p. 1331?"22ed. Hertz: Supradictis vero nominibus vel adverbiis
quia generaliter omnes in se species comprehendunt, omnibus sibi subiectis speciebus
' See Log. aliod. 1, pp. 20-22.

2 viz. parsorationis: 'part of speech'.
3 Eg. see Aristütlc, Categories11310and 21. Besides,the word is used in philossthical
texts to signify an entity of the kind that underlics all other entities and is, as might be
said in modern English,presupposedby talk of qualities, positions, relations,and the
rest. See Kncale, op. fit., p. 251 .
4 For the interrclntion and interdepcndenceof the logicnl and the ontologicaldomains
especiallyin Aristotelian philosoluhy,seeL. M. de Rijk, ThePlocccJtho Categories
quoing
in xlristotle'sPhilosophy,Asse" 1952, pp. 3-7, and possim.
THE THEOR'l' OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 517
bene respondetur. Ut si dicam 'quis es: ille?, potest ad hoc omnis substantia::
SPGCiCS
responderi quae est supposita interrogatiüni, ut 'homo', 'cquus', 'corrus', 'piïcis'. Similiter
si dicam 'quahsP', omnes species qualitatis huiuscemodi interrogationi bene redduntur,
ut 'bonus', 'malus', 'albus', 'nigcr', et similia. Similiter 'quantus? interrogantibus mnnes
species quantitatis aptissime subiciuntur. ut 'langus', 'breris', 'magnus', 'parrm', et similia.
The parallel word subiciuntur, certainly having the sense of "are made
subjecrqfthc answer-propositian",afïords a safe guarantee that the phrase
substantiaequaeestsuppositainterrogationi must signify: the substancewhich
is the subjcct-tcr'm qf the interrogativa proposition. Besicies, any Ontological
sense of supponiand subici must be denied cmphatically For this pnssage,
since any talk about the speciesquantitatis (being an accident) which
would "underly", would be nonsensical.
Peter Helyas sometimes uses the passive voices supponi and apponi in the
sense of being subjcct and being attributa in a preposition. A relevant
passagc is found in his comments on Priscian, Inst.. gramm.. VIII, ]. lt
discusscs the nature of noun and vcrb:
1.
Sicut enim nomen repertum est ad signilïcandum de qua dicatur, ita et verbum ad
significandum quid de aliquo dicitur. Unde nomen numqumu apponitur nisi auxilio verbi
substantivi, nec verbum supponitur nisi auxilio nominis substantivi. Sed quodlibet
nomen per ac supponitur, et verbum per se supponitur.
There is another passagc where the phrases supponendorem and rcs

(significataper nomen)supponiturrei significataper verbumare used. Our
passage is quite interesting apart from the tcrminology used. Pctcr
discusscsthe clichrcnt definitions of regereand after rcjecting some
other chmitions, he says (ad Prisc. Inst. gramm. VIII, ]; I quote the
text printed by Ch. ThurotI after the Parisian manuscripts Saint Victor
798 (: B.N.Lat.15.121)and Arsena!711):
Sed ut breviter dicam et verius, dictionem regere aliam dictionem nil aliud est quam
trahere secum eam in constructione ad constructionis perfectionem, non autem dico:
ad signiFlcationis determinationem. Unde verbum exigit nominativum, quia ad per-
fectionem constructionis trahit secum nominativum in constructione. Ut cum dico
'Icga', actum legendi designo alicui inesse. ltaque significo sermonem Fieri de aliquo.
Nominativus autem significat id de quajit sermo. Quare illud verbum trahit secum no-
minativum in constructione ad perfectionem constructionis, quia aliter non erit perfecta
constructio. 'cha' etiam ex vi denwnstrationis designat rem ut de 312
loquitur, scilicet ut
signiFlcatur pcr nominativum perscme prime, et ideo illud verbum trahit secum hunc
nominativum'ego-'.Eodemmodo et de secundaperssone.
verbi eat dicendum
..... .
' Noticcser.c.»:traits,pp. 241-242.
Similiter et de tertia persona est manifestum Nun autem econvcrso est verum
......
quod nomen trahat secum verbum in constructione, quia nomen non signiücat rem suam
ut aliquid de ea dicitur. Non enim significatrem suamsupponendo
eamalicui, et ita non
signiEcatrem ut snppüniturrci signiFlcatcper verbum, quanwissigniFlcetrem de qua
dicitur rcs verbi, sed non ad hoc significat rem. Cum enim dicitur: 'Plaro', non intelligo
statim rem ut de ea dicitur res verbi. Sed cum «::lim-l'!egit', dcsigno rem ut dicitur de
re nominis.
It clearly appearsfrom the context that Peter here contmsts noun and
verb in that the Former does not as such include any talk about the thing
denoted by the noun, and that the latter always includes something the
actusverbi is said of. The noun may well signify its reswithout introducing
it asa subjectof a verb in & proposition. This must be the precisesense
of the sentence: non enim signiFlcat rem suam snpponenclo eam alicui
:: putting it as the subject(J'some warb), et ita non significat rem ut
supponitur rei significataeper verbum (: and 50& noun doesnot signify
its resas actually being madethe subject of some action denoted by the
andthe passivevoice supponi
verb of a proposition). No doubt, supponere
here mean: make:: subjectand be made:: subjectof some verb in & propo-
sition, respectively.
As to the word suppositio,Charles Thurot pointed2 to a passagein
Peter Helyas where he comments upon Priscian, Inst. gramm. XVII, 20.
I quote the text printed by Thurot from the Saint Victor manuscript
: Paris B.N.Lat.,15.121),f. 128V:
Virgilius scripsit Bucolica. Is scripsit Gcargica. Idem scripsit Encida. Per hoc nomen 'Vir-—
gfhus' Et ibi prima rei suppositio.Per hoc nomen'is' facio secundamrei suppositionem
et primam relationem. Per hoc nomen 'idcm' facio tertiam rci suppositionem et secun-
dam relationem.
Just as relatio must here denote &grammatica]act of referring to a previous

word (antecedent),so the phraseprimasuppositio reijït should be rendered
with: thejï'rst act qufputting a thing as subjccthappens.In just the same
manner secundasuppositioand tertia suppositiostand for: the secondand
third ac: etc. Certainly this hassomething to do with referring
......
to a thing in reality (i.c. Virgil), which is not surprising at all, since
nounsare invented to signify id de quadicitur (seethe first from
passage
Peter Helyas, quoted above, p. 517) and the nominative case denotes
id de quaft sermo(see the second passagefrom Peter Helyas, quoted
! reading Uf Arsena! 711 ; Thurm follows the Saint Victor manuscript in reading dicitur.
2 Revue archäologique, 1864, p. 273 and Nariccset Extraits, p. 358, note.
THE THEOIH' OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 519
above, p. 517). However, any ontological or quasi-ontologicalsenseis

absent here from the notion of suppositioand the word should be trans-
lated : ac: quutting somethingasa subjectgf discoursc.
A similar use is found in Abailard's Lagica Ingredientibus.When dealing
with Categ., 2b7ff. Abailard explains that the speciesare more similar
to substance than the gencra since the former are more snpposited
(: subjected)than the latter:
LogicaIngredicnribus,p.. 1495'27: lllud amplius quod ostendit, scilicet quod species est
magissubstantiaquamgenus,alio modo confirmat, per hancscilicct maioremsimilitu-
dinem quam habent cum primis substantiisquam genera, quod cum primae substantiae
maxime sunt suppositae atque ex eo dicantur maximc substantiae et similiter species
magis sint suppositae quam gencra, magis sunt in suppositione similes primis substantiis
quam gencra. Et ex hac quoque maiori similitudine magis substantiae.debent dici. Et
hoc est quodait: Amplius,idest adhucidemostendoalia via, quodscilicet speciesmagis
est substantia quam genus. Principales æubsrantiaeeo quod aliis omnibusxubiecmcsunt, sive
per praedicationem sive per fundationem etc. Sicut autem. Hic adaptat similitudinem
specierum ad primas substantias, in eo scilicet quod sicuti primae substantiaemaxime.
sunt suppositae, ita Speciesmagis quam genera sunt suppositae, quia cum ipsae quoque
Speciesgeneribus per praedicationem supponantur, gencra ei non submittuntur eodem
modo. Subiacc:enim. Vere species eodem modo se liabet'ad genus, quia haec eodem
modo [quod] subiacet,id est supponitur, generi. Et vere supponitur, quia per praedica-
tionem. A parte. Quod a relativis ostendit dicens: Generanamque,Species autem, ut
scilicet de genere pmcdicentur ut de contentis. Quareet ex his. Quandoquidemspecies
magis conveniunt in suppositione cum primis substantiis quam gencra, ergo apparet ex
his quae novissime diximus ctc. A causa. Quod enim ita est, causa est quam illud
iudicetur.
It should be noticed, however, that Abailard's use of the terms supponere

and suppositiois rather confused in that they seem to refer at the same
time to grammatical-logicalsupposition (subjection)and to ontological
"underlying".
That it is an easytransition from the above usageto the later technical
'senseof suppositiowill be shown presently (below, p. 521).
Finally a few words on the use of the word supponerein Boethius.

Kretzmann' refers to what he thinks to be an interesting use of our tam
in Boethius, Introductio ad gfllogismos categoricas, col. 7635, where,
accordingto Kretzmann, the author indicatesthat a singularsubject has
' op. tit., p. 113, note 36.

a certain eFfect on its predicate. To judge Kretzmann's view it seems to

be useful to quote the entire passage:
lntrod. ad syll. categ.,col. 768A8 - 816 ed. Migneï: singulares(sc. propositiones) vero
sunt que de singulari aliquid et de individuo affirmando negandoveproponunt, ut
'Socratessapiensest', 'Socratessapiensnon est'. DiFFertautem particularis propositio &
singulariquod particularisquidem unum aliquem subicitnec quis sit iste designat,ut
'quidamhomosapiens est': quisistehomosit propositionondeclarat.Singularisvero unum
aliquem sumit et quis iste sit significat, ut 'Socrates
sapiensest': unum enim, et hunc
Socratem,sapientemesseproposuit. Amplius. Particularisomnis universalemquidem
terminum ponit, sedei detrahit universalitatem,dum qualitatemparticularitatisadiungit,
ut in propositione: 'quidamhomosapiens est'homouniversalisest terminus; multosenim
propria predicationeconcludit. Sedquia dicitur 'quidam',ad unum 'homo'redigitur,
qui universalepersisteretnisi particularitasfuissetadiuncta.ln singularibusvero propo-
sitionibus predicato termino semper individuum supponitur,ut 'Socratessapiensest'.
Socratesenim singularisest atque individuus. Idcirco igitur illa est particularispropo-
sitio que partem ex universalitate detrahit, hec singularis que in singularis atque in-
dividui praedicationeconsistit.
From the context it is clear that Boethius here does nothing but de-
scribe the several kinds of proposition. The particular proposition, he
says, is that which subicit a universal term in & confused way, while in &
singular prcposition always an individual supponitur. We have to do here
with the stylistic figure of variatio, which is so characteristic of this work,
as I have shown elsewhereF The two terms are equivalent and quite
harmless, indeed.
However, there is another passage in Boethius which deserves our
attention in this respect. It is Found in his commentary on Cicero's
Topica. There the preterite participle suppositusis used in & remarkable
way:
ln Cic Top. Comm. 111,col. 1034C1-3 ed. Migneï: Nota etiam ab eo cuius nota est facile
distat, quia illud (et.. nota) vox et significatio est, illud (sc. id cuius nota est) res
signy'icationisappost'to.
It may be added that Cicero, Topica8 (35) says,that words are tokens
(notae)of things and that Boethiusexplainsthis by saying(] 111B9-13):
nota vero est quae rem quamque designat; quofit ut omne nomen nota sit idcirco
! corrected after Paris, B.N. Noue. acq. lat. 1611, 1. 151".

2 L. M. de Rijk, On the ChronoloayofBoethius' Workson Logic iri VTVARIUM, & Jüurnal
for Mediaeval Philosophy and The lntellectual Life of the Middle Ages, 2 (1964),
pp. 11-12 and Log. Mod. I, p. 41, n. 3.
3 I havecheckedthe text after Leyden, Vassianus
Lar. Fol. 701, f. 23f3.
THE THEOIW OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 52!
quod natamfacit rem de qua praedicatur. He does not return himself to the
phrase he used 1084C3: re:; significationi supposita. Unfortunately this
work of Boethius' has never been commented upon by the Mediaeval
logicians as far as I know. Therefore this interesting clue in Boethius'
text did not lead to any speculation by the Metliaeval scholars. If so, it
could have contributed to the theory of supposition.
From the above evidence it is quite clear that the verb 'supponcre'and
the substantive noun isuppositio' are used by Peter Helyas and by Abailard
as well in & purely grammatical sense. The same can be said of Boethius'
use of suppanerel and Priscianis use of These
suppositum. terms somehow
refer all OFthem to the grammaticalsubject ofa verb in & proposition.
The term suppositumdecidedly does not refer to an entity of the kind that
underlies all other (accidental) entities as& substance.Any metaphysica]
reference is missing.
However, the question must be raised, what, to the Mediaeval mind,
is the nature of a 'purely grammatical subject'? The answer should be:
it is id de quo scrmojït, i.e. that which ta": is about. Well, then, this is, in
most cases,an individual thing (or individual things). Thus we havequite
an easy transition in the human mind from the term denoting something
to the thing denoted by that term or, to put it in other words: from the
of & proposition (talk, or discussion)to its subject-matter.
subject-term
lt must be borne in mind that the essentia]conformity (or, if you
want: parallelism) of speechand state OFaFfairswas one of the basic
views in Mediaeval as well as in Ancient thc-ught.2 Thus it is found in
the speculations of Mediaeval grammarians as early as From the eleventh
century. The prfapert)r of the noun is generally delïned, with Priscian
l(lnst. gramm.ll IS, p. 556ed. Hertz) as to signify substancewith quality.
Well, substantia is nothing else but the individual thing, the qualitas
being the universal nature in which the thing participates. Abailard is
Fully aware of the diHerent usage in Priscian and Aristotle of the terms
! For a peculiar and unique exception, see above, p. 520.

: As is known, in Greek thought such a transition was always taken for granted, which
may be illustrated by Greek usage: )..c'rmr;: both word, account, statement of a theory,
law, ground, l'e-RSOI'I, law exhibited in the world-process and the (rational) state of
aFfairsitself. For the interrelations of the logicnl and ontolügical domains in Aristotle's
doctrine of the categorie's,seemy ThePlaccqfrhe Categories qf Bcingin Aristotlc'xPhilosoph],
Assen, 1952, pp. 3-7, and passim.
substantia and qualitas. He touches twice upon the question in his

Dialectica.
Dial. !, p. 933'9cd. De Rijk: *anlitatii' quoquc vocabulumplures habet significationes,

scd quas magis in consuetudinem ducimus, duae sunt, cum videlicet vel omniumjbrmarum
nomenaccipitur, secundum quod Priscianus omne nomen significare substantiam cum
qualitate voluit, vel earum tantum quae in praedicamento (sc. qualitatis) cuntinentur;
quarum quidem descriptionem Aristoteles praemisit cum ait: "qualitatem vero dico
secundum quam qualem dicimus".
lbid. I, p. 11310'24ed. Dc Rijk: Cum enim tradat grammatica omne nomen sub-
stantiam cum qualitate significare, 'album' quoque, quod subiectum nominat substantiam
et qualitatem determinat circa eam, utrumque dicitur signiEcarc, sed qualitatem quidem
principaliter, causacuius impositum est, subiectum vcro secundario.
It must be remarked that William of Conches and sometimes Peter

Helyasapparently failed to see (aq. did not recognize) the different
usagein Priscian and Aristotle and seem to have rejectecl the under-
standing of substantiafor individual thing and that of qualitas for universal
nature.l On the other hand the former view is already found in the
eleventh century Glosulc in Priscianumfound in MS. Cologne201 :
f. 13m'fb: ProPriumcn nominissignificare mbsranriam, idest quamcumque CSSCDtianïfcum
qualitate, idest cum proprietate pmprial vel communi! Significat illam substantiam ad
quam designandam est inventum, vcl discretam ab alia per aliquam prcprietatem vel
similem communionem alicuius proprietatis.5 Propria enim nomina sic sunt inventa et
imposita ut sempersignificent aliquam certam personamdiscretamab aliis per aliquas
certas proprietates. Non enim sunt inventa proptcr diHel'entialïi substantiarum,,f'sed
tantum ad discernendasproprietates in substantiisexistentes. Ut potest videri in
'Socrate'.'Socrates'enim signilïcat certam (f. 1311!)personamet discretam ab aliis non in
substantiali esse, sed per has proprietates quod Saphronicifhus, quod poetaet alia huius-
modi.. Cum enim eademsubstantiasit in omnibus hominis individuis, quia omnis homo
est animal rationale mortale et non diH'e-raturnisi in qualitatibus, inventa sunt propria
nomina ad signiHcanclassubstantias, in hoc quod sunt discrete in suis proprietatibus.
Similiter appellativa sunt inventa ad signiEcandassubstantias similes aliis in aliqua
! For the texts, seeabove,our ChapterV, pp. 222-227and 230-234.For William of

Conches, see also below, p. 525.
: essentia : substantia : existentia existing individual. Compare the Gloss Pra-
misimus,f. 49'-"'J:considerantes(sc. Antiqui) autem omnes res in quadam proprietate
convenire, scilicet in existentia, cis quoddam nomen indiderunt, scilicet hoc nomen
'substantia', per quod generaliter loquerentur de rebus. For the whole passage,see
above, p. 262.
3 viz. denoted by the praper nouus.
4 riz. denoted by the appellative nouus.
5 riz. bath of thempartakingof the sameuniversalnature.
5: individual things.
THE THEORV OF APPELLATION AND SLIPPOSITION 523
qualitate. Ut 'homo' significat plures cum una communi proprietate, scilicet cum
rationalium et mortalitate, quia cum 'homo' tam bene illum quam istum signiEcet,
significat quandam communem proprietatem esse in omnibus, in qua conveniunt. Sunt
igitur qualitates, idest prcprictatcs, precipua causa inventionis nominum. Nam si
propter solas substantias designandaminvenirentur nomina, superflue inventa essent tot
diversa, cum solum hoc nomen 'subxtontia' ad hoc suFEceret.Sed quia 'substantio' res
tantum significat (que) in quantitate sunt vel per se existunt, si proprie accipitur nec
determinatin ipsis rebuscorpor(e)itatem, animationem,sensibilitatem,rationalitatem,
albedinem vel nigredinem vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi -— necesse fuit inveniri nomina
diversa que has diversasqualitates et alias huiusmodi in ipsis rebus dcterminarent.
Notandum est tamcn quod nomen non signiücat substantiam et qualitatem insimul
nuncupative sed substantiamtantum nominat, quia ei fuit imlmsitum, qualitatem
......
vero significat non nuncupative, immo representando et determinando circa substantiam
propter quam tantum notandam substantie fuit impositum.
For the sequel of this passage,see above, p. 228, n.. ].

The commentor)" on Priscian Found in Vienna V.P.L. 2486, which
possibly belonged to the School of Mont Ste Geneviäve,l is very clear
on this issue. The anonymous author mentiens several views on the
property OFnoun (see above, pp. 241-24—5),ant] appears to adhere to
the view of those who held that substantia : individual and qualitas ::
universal nature:
f. 24W (see above, p. 242): Alia sentencia: praprium cs: nominis signyq'carc subotantiom et
qualitatem, idest: omni nomini, vel fere omni nomini, convenit significare id de quo
laquinmr vel de quo agitur, vel do quo sermohabetur, et signiücot qualitatem, idest com-
muniter vcl proprie.
Thus he expressly identiFles substantia as used by the grammarian with

the subjea matter OF& discussion (id de quo sermohabetur). It is not sur-
prising at all that he adds an alia sententia, hardly dichring From thc
foregoing, as we are rightly told by our author, which exPressly starts
'Fromthe nature ofall humantalk (locutio):
lbid., In tota humana locutione duo genera locutionis maxime sunt necessaria,videlicet
id de quo possumusloqui et id quod significat id quodalteri inhcrcroostenditur, scilicet nomen
et verbum.
A ch lines further our author says: signyï'care substantiam nichil est aliud
quam taliter significare, idest ut. de eo possimusloquiz.
' See above our Chaptei' [, nr. 23, p. 90.

2 For the contcxt, seeabove,p. 242.
His account on qualitas is equally clear. Signyï'carcqualitatem is deFmecl

as: denotare de quo generererum aliquid sit, vel de qua muneris.!
The anestiones Victoriam found in Vienna, lf'.P.L. 2499, which un-
cloubtedly are & product of the School of Willimn of Champeauxf
contain an interesting notc on the signjfcatio nominis. The author
paraphrases Priscian's chmition of the noun: nomen significat sub-
stantiamcum qualitate, idest supponitcumstaturei. ln this case,hc adds,
the reference is to the qualitas praprictatis que inest dictioni ex eo quod
aliqua dictio est proprium nomenvel appellativum.3 Thus as early as the First
halfof the twelfth century wc Fmdsupponereas an equivalent for signi "care
substantiam. i.c. dcnatc the concretaindividua! thing.
lt should bc noted that the anestiones Victorinus not in)lr use supponere
verbo but also supponereahquid (aliquem). E.g. : si substantive (sc. ponatur
hoc pronomen 'ubi'), ergo supponitaliquid vel aliqua. Aliqua non potest
quia
supponere, est singularis numeri, nec est dictio complexiva nec
collectiva. Ergo supponit :::ih'fmid.4
The Gloss Prmnfsimus(lating From the second half of the twelfth

centuryf- gives the same view with more precision, it seems. The
mastcr quoted in this Priscian gloss holcls that Priscian's phrase: "omne
nomen . ..... etc. " is to be rcndcrcd with: each noun signilïcs that
which "stand: under" the verba] expressio":
f. 4711](seealsoabove, p. 259): dicit quod omnenomensignificatsubstantiamcum

...... significet
qualitate, idest supposita locutioni, sive rem per se existentem (: substance or:
the subsistingindividual thing) sive non.
Thus our author divides the Suppasita locutioni into (l) res per se
existens individual thing, being denotecl by Priscian's substantia,and
(2) resnonper seexistens,by which, no doubt, Priscian's qualitasis meant
or included. Comparc an interesting note added by our author to the
discussion of the status-thcory. After mentioning the three mcanings of
'substantia'(et nota quod substantiadicitur resper seexistens
et substantia
actus subsistendiprout per substantiam signiEcatur, et substantia status
substantialis, F. 49V'J), he remarks: nota cum substantia dicitur proprietas
! Ibid., f. 243"); see above, p. 242.

1 For this work, see above our Chaptcr [, nr. 24, p. 93, and below our edition, pp.
73l-769.
3 For the contcxt, see our Tract XV, p. 7393'IT.
4 For the complete text, see our Tracr,XV, p. 74010'31. Other examples will be given in
our Chapter XVII.
5 For this work, seeabove,our Chapter V, pp. 255-262.
THE THEORT' OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 525
subsistendi, non dicitur ut forma in formato, sed ut quodsuscipirjbrmam,

ut et substantia: quodjbrmis substat; quod a plerisque res per se existens
dicitur.I
To understand the full scnsc of the author's account of this matter,
it is useful to consider the contcxt in which it is Found. When reporting
(P.47"; seeabove, p. 258) the discussionsin the Schoolof William of
Conches, our author rcmarks that these grammarians pointed out that
sigiljfcare substantiam et qualitatem cannot be considered as signi 'cum
plura. Spcaking about homoas an individual and the universal nature of
homo (humanitas) is not loqui de phnribus.z Thc account OFhis own view
of signjfj' substanccwith quality : signify the suppositalocutioni is followed
by this note:
f. 4711)(seeabove, p. 259): Nota quod cum dicitur "mnne nomen signiücatsubstantiam",
variatur "nomcn'.Quod multipliciter accipitur pro actusubsistendi,
pro reperxeexistente,
Iuro suppositolocutioni.
The author continuas with & discussion of the nomina communia.3 Theyr
may be common either naturaliter, or casu, or cönsfho.The Fll'Stgr0up4
are those which signif)r many things OFthe same nature ex una institutione:
(see above, l). 26l): Naturaliter cmnmune est illud quod ex una institutione
f. 491'11
habet idoneitatem pluribuset omne tale in una signffi'carianc
canvcnicndi habet pluribus
convenire, quia nullum nomen ex una institutione habet in diversis signiücationibus
pluribus convenire. Omne nomen quod significat plura ex una institutione
......
convenit pluribus in una signiücatione; ct econverso.
One impositio or institutio implics onc single significatio.?-Whenever two

terms are used (or: one term is used twicc) with the samesignificatio
(i.e. dcnoting the same signijcatum, or: universal nature), this use is
called univocationþ But, aswe haveseenabove (p. 496), an appellativc
.noun used univocally in dichrent propositions, may stand for clichrcnt
things, i.e. the)r may have diFFercntnominationes(or appellationes).The
distinction between signifcatio and nominatio is already found in William
' ibid. For the context, see above, p. 262.

: For the text, sccabove,pp. 258-259. For the author's indcbtnessto Willimn of Conches,
seeabove,pp. 223Ff.
3 F. 49vü'vb; see above, p. 261.
4 As to the other groups, compare Abailard's division of the equivocal nouus into quc
fiunt casuand qucjï'unt consilio. Lalq.lusui, pp. 12139sqq.ed. Geyer.
5 Sec also above, Ch. XV, pp. 496 Ff.
(' See above, Ch. XV, pp. 492 ff.
OFConches, who appearently understood bywthe latter term the. de-

notation of individual things, not, presumably, as & denotation of things
as actually existing, but of all possible individual things as such.I ln fact,
when appellative nouus are used in a proposition, theo)!rmay sometimes
deuote (nominare)the universalnature, e.g. in 'homoestspecies',or them-
selvesas voices, e.g. in 'homoestnomen'? Thus we see.that For William of
Conches there are two kinds of nominatio (appellatio); one might call
them respectively: appellatio manerioh's or simplex and appellatio materialis.
But, the grammarians definitely did not use such terminology. However,
they did know the notion Of manericsand of materiale impositum. I give
some texts from the Gloss Promisimus.
When discussing the lemma of Priscian nomenest pars orationis quae
unicuique subiectorum corporum seu rerum communem vel propriam qualitatem
distribuit (: II 22, pp. 5619-571), where Priscian apparently speaks
about the appellatio of appellative nouus, our anonymous author gives
the view of the Master:
[. 48"): Magister sic legit nomen os: pars orationis qur: unicuique etc., ut que3 :implicem
Faciatrelationemnec ponitur propter aliquod nominatum, sed propter maneriem nomina,-
torum. Sicut dicitur: hoc nomen 'Socrates' est pars orationis sine qua non est perfecta
oratio. Non dico: sine hacparte:orationis 'Socrates',
sedsine illa parteorationisquo ipsum
est, scilicet sine nomine. Similiter licet omne nomen sit pars orationis que distribuit
communem vel propriam qualitatem etc., tamen nullum nomen distribuit unicuique
corporum seu rerum talem vel talem. Et sic tenebitur quod licet tota diFEnitio conveniat
(conveniet MS.) omni nomini, non tamen quodlibet positum est diffinitione conveniet
omni. Et hoc contingit in omni diFFmitione vel descriptione que comprehendit pro-
prietates rei diFFmitesecundummanicromrei et non secundum aliquid eorum que sunt de
illa maneria, ut, si dicam: 'homoest animal, cuiuspropriumest risibile', sit proprium
hominis tamen nullius. Item in diFHnitionibus etiam contingit quod aliquid positum in
ea, nisi sit pro uno aliquo, non convenit cuilibet appellato diFEniti. Ut cum dicitur:
'propositio est oratio rerum vel falsum significons', vorum significaui non convenit cuilibet
propositioni, quia non pro una dilTerentia ponitur, sed hoc totum: verumvclfolsum. Sed
aliter est in hac: 'pars orationis que unicuiqueetc..lhpropter relativum quod non pro aliquo
appellatorumponitur, sed pro manerie,sic cliFFlnitionis(f. 481'0)parsconvenit maneriei
et non singulis maneriei; cuilibet vero nomini convenit tota diFEnitio, scilicet 'esse
partem orationis que unicuique etc'. Et hoc est: nomen est pars orationis que unicuique sub-
iectorum corporum, suppositorum visui, :ou rerum
.....
A few lines further the author speaks of a materiale impositum:
48vD-4-9m: Nota quod nomen appellativum significat propriam qualitatem sui ipsius
quando ponitur ad seipsum significandum, ut 'homo est nomenoppeHorivum'. Et in tali
' See above, pp. 227IT. 3 Seeabove, pl). 223-226.

3 sc. pars orationis.
Tl—IETHEOlw or: APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 527
loco dicitur materiale impositum, quia scilicet idem est impositum et materia impositi,
idest cui imponitur. Idem enim est ibi signiFlcans(4911)et significatum.
As & matter of fact, the term materiale impon'tum was used long before
the daysof the author OFthe Gloss Promisimus.As is generally known, it
is Founclas a current item of terminologyl as early as Adelarcl of Bath's
Deeodem et diversa(written between ] 105-16).
Summing up the results of this section, the Following statements may

be made:
has & grammaticalsenseand stands

ln Priscian the term suppositum
for grammatica]subject(j a vcrb: substantiasuppositais equivalent to
persona andstandsFor
agens che(acting)individualthing. Boethiusonce
uses the past participle suppositusin & remarkable way, but his usage
clid not stand uP and remained quite unnoticed in Mediaevallogic
and grammar.
lx.)
sfänds For: to put as the

In Peter Helyas (about llFl-O-SO)supponere
grammatica] subject qf a verb.; suppositio :
the ac: tj- putting as gram-
matica! subject.
To the Mediaeval mind, the subiectumor suppositumis both subject-
term of & preposition (talk, discussion) and its subject-matter (id
de quo sermojït : that which talk is about).
That which talk is about is designatedby isubstantia'in the sensein
which Priscianusedthe word in his famousdefinition of the property
of the noun: proprium est nominissignificaresubstantiamet qualitatem
(Inst.. Gramm. 1118, p.. 556 ed. Hertz). For most twelfth century
grammarians substantia(or: existentia): individua] thing; qualitas :
the universalnature(forma) participated in by such individual things.
The anestioncs Victorinus(Erst half of the twelfth century) use
supponere as an equivalent of signifïcaresubstantiam (: signify the
individual thing). — The Vienna commentary on Priscian (V.P.L.,
2486) saysthat the property of (nearly) all nouns is to signify that
whichtalk ISabouttogether with thecommon or properuniversa!nature.-—
The Gloss Promisimusputs signyjzsubstancewith quality as equivalent
with signjfythat whichunderliesthe vcrba]expressian(suppositalocutioni).
It appearsto understand by the latter phrase both the individual
thing (substantia).
and universalnature (qualitas).
! Seebelow, p. 589.
528 LOGICA A-lODERNORLlä-l 11
6 A signy'ï'cotio is the result ofan impositio or institutio, to the effect that
one impositio conveys one sigmficotio only. The signy'i'corio is the

conceptual presentation of a universal nature.
7 An appellative noun may be used univocoHy, i.e. have the same
signiHco-tio,and, at the same time, deuote diFFerent things. The
actual denotation of certain individual things is called by the gram-
marians appellatio or nominatio.
8 Generally speaking, in cases such as 'homo est.nomen' the twelFth
century grammarians spoke of materiale impositum; in cases such as
'homo est species'OFsimplex relatio.
9 In William of Conches' Glose in Priscianum the term nominatio
(appellatio) sometimes concerns the reference to :: universal nature
(og. 'homoest species'),or to the word itself (e.g. 'homoest nomen
oppellativum'. Hox-vever, generally speaking the twelfth century
grammarianson!)r spoke of nominatio(appellatio) when appellative
nouus were used to deuote individual things.l
3 - Appellation and Supposition in Some Logical Tracts

Dating From the.Third Quarter of The Twelfth Centur)r
In the FoHocieParvipomonc, 'suppositito' is discussed in the chapter on
univocation, the latter tcrm being deFmedas monense eademsigngf'conone
variato nominissuppositio.As we have already"seien....2
there are three kinds
of univocation 3:
(1) when a dictio is used improperly (transsumitur)(a) to denote itself,

or (b) to denote what it signifies (its signy'ï'cotum)
(2) when a dictio is usedimproperly, now to deuote some thing of a
certain sort (mancrfcs),now this sort itself
(3) when an appellativenoun is ampliatedor restricted in accordance
with its connection with a verb in the present, preterite, or future tense.
The anonymous author gives four important rules For the detection of
univocation of the third type. It must be noticed that in the First and
second kind of univocation the terms 'supponere'and 'suppositjo' are not
1 No doubt, William of Conches' point of view should be considered in connection

with his Platonic view of the univerroha.
1 above, Ch. XV, pp. 495 Ff.
3 Fa". Parvip... p. 562'14-563', ed. De Rijk.
THE THEOIW Ol: APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 529
used at all. In the third kind of univocation, the term 'supponere' is

always connectcd with the term 'appellatio', x-vhich is not surprising,
indeed, since (Julyrappellative nouns are involved here. The four rules
are:
(21) si nomen appellativum supponit verbo prcsentis tem-
poris, habet se per appellationem ad presentia tantum,
ut 'omnishomoestalbus', idest: omneid quodest homo, estalbum (Fall.
Parvip., p. 563'3'l5). '
What is the precise purport of this rule? Apparently this: in & propo-
sition having an appellative noun as its subject-termand & verb in the
present tensa the appellativc noun refers (habe:sc) b)! way of appellation
(pcr appellationem)to the existing things only denotedby that appellative
noun. The reference to the things which the proposition is about, is
cxpressed in this rule by the words habet sc ad. The word
......
supponit apparentlyr does not have the later technical sense and, ac-
cordingly, cannot be translated l))lrsapposits.As a matter of fact it gocs
with the indirect object verbo.Thcrefore we must translate the initial
words of the rule: llan appellatum noun acti as d;: (grammatica!) subject qf
a Fcrb cy-the present[ense etc. Thus here
supponere only has the
.....
merely grammatical senseof beingsubjec:::ch verb.
(l)) quando nomen appellativum supponit verbo preteriti

temporis, habet se per appellationem et ad presentia et
ad preterita (Ibid., p. 56333'35).
(c) quando nomen appellativum supponit verbo futuri
temporis, habet se per appellationem tam ad presentia
quam ad Futura (Ibid., p. 5646'3).
(d) quando nomen appellativu m supponit verbis diver-
sorum temporum interposita copulativa coniunctione
contrahit appellationem & proximo, ut cum dicitur: 'omnis
homoest etfm't albus', sensusest idest: itql.u'.':quic;l
es.':homo, est etfuit album'
(Ibid., p. 564'5-19).
The rules (b) and (c) do not ask for further explanation. In the fourth
one (ch the phrasecontrahitappellationem
a proximoappearsto signify:
borrows its appellation jiam, or: accommodatasits appellation to, the vcrb
nearest to it..
The notion of appellatio is certainly derived from the phrase namen
appellativum, which was used by the grammarians to deuote a term which
applies to all the different things it covers. Thus we read in the FaHacic
Parvipantane,p. 56327-33:omnia appellativa inventa sunt ad uniendum,

idest ut plura appellata sub eodem nomine uniantur. Accordingly the
appellative noun, having a certain sigmfcatio, serves for comprehending
all individuals denotedby that term (appellata).Which appellataactually
are signifled in a proposition depends upon the verb useclin that propo-
sntion.
The central notion is that of appellatio.The appellation varies in
accordance with the several verlasused in the proposition. That appellatio,
not suppositio, is the logica] notion on which in the Fall. Parvip. the
whole discussion of univocation is focussecl also appears from the
author's discussion of the impediments of the foregoing rules (pp.
56432-57133).There are three cause predictarum regularum inpeditive:
(oc)such words as 'apinabile', 'laudabile', ([3) a group of verba, such as
'dicitur', 'pramittitur', and (T) some of the so-calledmodi, viz. 'possibile',
'inpassibile' and 'contingens'
, .
As to the FlI'Stgroup (ac),the occurrenceof such a word as 'apinabile'
in a proposition causasthe appellative noun to refer not only to the
present things (appellata), but also to all things which were, will be,
and even may possibly be. The author saysthat, in this case, the appel-
lative noun circuit omnia tempora:
Fall. Parvip., p. 5654'1": Sciendum itaque namen remativa(m) aptitudinem natans
positum cum verba presentis temporis in predicata confundit eius signiHcationem.Unde
contingit quod nomenappellativumsupponensverbo presentistemporis non tantum se
habet ad presentia, sed circuit omnia tempore, neque solummodo supponit pro eis que
sunt, sedetiam pro his que fuerunt vel erunt vel etiam que essepossunt. Ut cum dicitur:
laudabile', 'aliquid es:apinabile'.
'aliquid 651?
[n such cases the appellation of the appellative noun is said to be ampliated:

ibid., p. 56515'29:Nomina vera aptitudinem remativam natantia rerum existentiam nan
exigunt et horum quodcumque positum fuerit cum verba substantivo in predicata,
quamvis verbum sit presentis temporis, facit tamen ipsum confuse teneri. Unde et
nominis appellativi supponentis illi verba ad omnia tempora ampliatur appellatio.
It should be noticed that our author takes the veriücation of a propo-

sition to be the proper foundation of the ampliation of the appellation
of the appellative noun. I give some illustrating passages:
Fall. Parvip., p. 563'3'24: Si enim contingat unicam rem vel duas tantum subesseappel-
lationi nominis appellativirebus tmnscedentibus,etsi nppellat(iv)umnomen supponat
verba presentis temporis, evagatur tamen eius appellatio ad omnia tempora. Unde hanc
concedimus: 'aliquis phanixnon est'. Cum enim unicum sit appellatumhuius nominis
THE THEOR? OF APPELLA'I'ION AND SUPPOSITION 531
'phenix', vera est propositio vel pro phenice qui desiit essevel pro phenicequi erit.
lbid., pp. 56735-5684:Si ergo Fmtsuppositio per nominativum, si nominativus ille sit
nomen appellativum, versatur eius appellatio circa presentia tantum, cum verbum
enuntiationissit prcsentistemporis. Ut hic: 'aliquid dicitur esse'
: supponit ibi hoc:nomen
aliquid tantum pro ente et tantum pro ente vera dicitur propositio.
As to the gromup of verbs (B) which impede the foregoing rules, they,
too, are said to extend (: ampliata) the appellation of the subject
(appellatio suppositi):
lbid., p. 56634'33:Quodlibet enim istorum etsi sit presentis temporis, tamen quod-
cumque eorum positum fuerit in predicato alicuius prepositionis, non exigit rem esse
dcsignatam per snppositum, eoquod huiusmodi verba in propositione posita appellatio-
nem suppositi extendunt et confuse teneri faciunt.
Discussing the function of the prepositions 'a' and 'de' in phrases such as
'ab aliquo dicitur aliquid de se', our author speaksabout the restriction
andampliationof the appellationes:
ibid., p. 57031'33: Appellationem variant huiusmodi prgpositiones 'o' et 'ob', que
personalesdicuntur, eoquod restringontappellationes
nominumcum quibus ponuntur in
subiecto. Unde hoc argumentum est falsum: 'ab omni hominedicitur aliquid de se; ergo de
omni homine dicitur aliquid a se', eoquod hoc nomen 'homo' in prapositione habeat se
tantum ad existentia ex adiunctione huius propositionis 'ob'; in conclusione vero non
solum habet se ad eos qui sunt homines, verum etiam ad eos qui desierunt essevel erunt;
cuius ompliationiscausaest hec propositio 'de'.
As to the third group (ï) formed by the modi 'possibile','inpossibile',

and 'contingens', they sometimes ampliate the appellation, sometimes
not:
lbid., p. 5717'15: Cum ergo aliquis predictorum modorum ponitur in propositione, aut
sumitur ad agendum de re aut de dicto. Si de dicto, non adtenditur ibi aliqua ampliatio.
Si autem de re, extendit appellationem nominis appellativi cui adiungitur
. Falsum tale 'aliquid
.....
est ergo argumentum: possibilees: esseet illud nichil est; ergo aliquid
verumvelfolsumes.':
esseet.illud nichilest.Istaenimterminus'possibile'vim habetampliaudi,
scd neuter horum terminorum 'verum', 'falsum' eam habet vim. Unde hoc nomen
'aliquid' in conclusionesupponittantumpro ente, et ideo non provenit illatio.
Thus we see that throughout the whole discussion the author's attention
is Focussedon appellatio, not on suppositio.lt may be asked, now, what
the precise meaning of suppositio is in this discussion. I give some of the
relevant texts.
Fall. Parvip.,p. 56733-56810: sciendumquod in locutionein quaponitur verbum

.....
ad enuntiationem spectans, dupliciter contingit FlCl'isuppositionem:vel per nominativum

vel per ablativum adiuncta ei hac propositione 'de'. Si ergo fiat suppositio pcr nominati-
vum, si nominativus ille sit nomen appellativum, versatur eius appellatio circa presentia
tantum cum verbum enuntiationis sit presentis temporis, ut hic: 'aliquid dicitur esse';
supponit ibi hoc nomen 'aliquid' tantum pro ente, et tantum pro ente vera dicitur pro-
positio. Si autem Fiatsnppositioper ablativum cum hac prcpositione 'de' variatur iudicium.
generalis regula: ['it verba ad
,
Est ergo quotienscumque suppositio enuntiationem spec-
tanti per ablativumadiunctaei hac prepositione'de' et sequitur dicti appellatio, extendi-
tur appellatio ablativi ad omni tempora vel etiam (ad ea) que essepossunt.
lbid... p. 569'7'32: Contingit plcrumque extensionesappellationmn Fieri in huiusmodi
locutionibus in quibussupponit verbo oratio constansex nominativo ct obliqua, ut cum
dicitur: 'anima Patri est' In huiusmodi enim locutionibus nomen appellativum
.....
extensionem appellationis contrahit, ut sic intelligatur: 'anima Petri est': non que es:,
sedquajür. animaPatri. In aliis eodemmodo provenit ampliatioappellationis,et hoc ex
subintellectu articuli. Articulus enim facit appropriari huiusmodi orationesrebuspra
quibusjir. suppositio,ut sint quasi appellationesipsarum. Nichil enim aliud dictum est
'animaPatriest'quamsi pro oratione nomenponatur: 'animaest'. Non tamenubicumque
Et sappasitiaper talem orationem, contingit predicto modo fieri ampliationcm. Posito
enim quod Socrates habuit multos Filios: etsi unus illorum desierit esse, non tamen
concedendum quod filius Socratis non est, eoquod non subintelligatur ibi articulus.
Hec enim oratio 'filius Socratisnan est' appropriata (est) ita ut natet Flcri sappositianem
pro aliquo FiliorumSocratisdeterminate.
Two things are fairly clear in thesepassages. is here an

(l) Suppositia
equivalent for subiectioand means nothing else but putting as grammatica!
Subject.(2) Such phrases as suppanit har:namentantum pro enteapparently
mean something like: this nounftmctians as Subjectin the proposition only
jar the things that actually exist. As & matter of FaCtthe phrase supponit pro
is Found throughout the whole discussion of univocation in the Fall.
Parvip. as a variant and equivalent of liabet se ad. E.g. pp. 56435—565'4,
where an invalid argument has been instanced and the author says: in
propositione enim habet se hoc nomen 'homo' ad presentia tantum, in
conclusione vero habet se ad presentia et ad preterita. After the invalid
argument illustrating the purport of the third rule, he adds: in propo-
sitione enim hoc nomen 'homo' suppanittantunnpro eis que sunt, in
conclusione vero suppanitet pro eis que sunt et pro eis que erunt. More
evidence is found in the passagcquoted above, p. 530: nomen
.....
appellativum supponensverba presentis temporis non tantum se habet ad
presentia, sed circuit omnia tempora, neque solummodo suppanitpra
eis que sunt, ...... etc. Compare also the passagequoted above,
p. 532 where we Findthe phrase:jï't pra (p. 5692445; 56931'31).
suppositio
Suppanarcpra is explicit!)r called as an officium of the verba supponenda
verbo:
THE THEORV OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 533
Fall. Parrjp., p. 56910'16:Et notandum quoniam nomina supponentiaverbo duplex

habent omcium. Supponit enim quandoquenomen pro aliquo suorum appellatorum,
quandoque pro nullo. Unde si in predicta argumentatione hoc nomen 'cquus' supponit
pro aliquo suorum appellatorum, concedendum est sequi posse relationem, ut si
dicatur: 'cquuspromittitur et.ille est vel non est'. Si vero non supponit pro aliquo suorum
appellatorum, omnimodo prohibenda est relatio.
As to the term 'suppositum', it certainly does not refer to the sup-

posited thing as such, but primarily means grammatica] subject qf the
proposition.See the Fmalpart of the passagequoted above, p. 531, where
our author speaks of res designataper suppositum,where the rendering of
suppositumby suppositedthing would make nonsense. lt might appear
smnewhat surprising at First sight, indeed, that the passiveparticiple
is used to deuote the subject term (literally: that whichhas
suppositum
beenmadesubject)and, accordingly, servesas the past participle for the
activevoice of the verb supponere(: beingsubject).But, as we have seen
already(above, p. 517) the grammariansin general tended to use the
active verb supponerein the sense of ac: as grammatica!subject,and the
pastparticiple suppositum
is to be consideredto havethe sameintransitive
meaning.
As we have said before (Chapter XV, 1). 497), the Tractatusde um"-
vocationeMonaccnsisshows remarkable resemblances with the Fallacfe
Parvipantane.However, unlike the FaHacieParvipontanethe Tractatusde
univocationeMonacensisonly deals with the different meanings of appel-
lative nouns when they are used in & prcposition to deuote individual
things. What in the Fallacie Parvipontane was distinguished as the First
and second kind of univocation is not even mentioned here. For this
reason it is not surprising, indeed, that in the Tractatus univocation is
cleFmed,with Adam of the Petit Pont, as variata nominisappellatio, not as
suppositio:
Tract. dc univ. .»Honac.p. 3374'7: Est igitur univocatio manente eadem significatione
variata nominis appellatio, quando scilicet aliqua dictio variat appcüacionem.(Nota)
quod aequivocatio consistit in variata nominis significatione, univocatio vero in variata
nominis appellatione.
Univocation as conceived by the anonymous author of the Tractatus has

three modi :
534- LOGICA MODERNonun-i "
Ibid., p. 3373'": Fit autem univocatio tribus modis: vcl adiunctione verborum diverso-
rum temporum, vel adiunctione terminorum qui modi appellantur, vel adiunctione
verborumad enuntibiliapertinentiumet positionemexistentiefacientium.
The phrasepositionemexistenticjäcicntia(sc. verba) is interesting in 30 far

as it clearly refers to the existence of individual things denoted by
appellative nouus.
The discussionsin our Tractatusand those in the FaHacieParvfpontane
run parallel in & striking way. There are, however, some diFferenæs.
For instance, as to the ampliation of appellative nouus when used in
propositions having verbs of different tensas, the Tractatus takes the
opposite view of that held in the FaHacieParvipontanal
Just as in the Fall. Parvip. appellation is the central notion in the
Tractatusup to the chapter Dc relatione.Ul) to this chapter (our edition,
pp. 337—34—9) mention is alwaysmadeOf ampliation and restriction of
appellationes, not of suppositiones,just as we found it in the Fall. Parvip.
But From this chapter onwards (pp. 349-351) our author does no longer
speak of ampliation or restriction of appellationes(nor of suppositiones,
for that matter), but of what he calls the congruumrelationis(p. 35022).
He says here that ampliatio and restrictis will be discussed eISCWhül'e.3
However, in the introductor)r phrase to the chapter De relatione, the
author Speaksof the variation of the suppositioof a noun, not of that of
its appellatio:
Ibid., p.. 3494'6: Quoniam igitur mentio habita est de relatione et relativo, (quod) sepe
variat suppositionem nominis restringenda velampliando, de relatione pauca interponenda
sunt..
Becauseof the rather loose composition of the Tr.:awt.-:.-ms3any conclusion

about the precise stage of development of the theory of appellation
(supposition) as found in this tract is diFEcult to be dmwn, especially in
comparison with the stage appearing in the FaHacieParvipantane.How-
ever, both tracts seem to correspond in that in both of them the dis-
cussions are focussed on the appellation, not the snpposition, of the
appellative nouus.
The Pallade magistri Willelmi4 turn out to show the same stage of
develc-pment as the foregoing tracts. When discussing the fallacies
' Compare Tracmtusdc univ. ;l'fonac., p. 3463'FF.with Fall. Parvip., p. 564105.

: This discussion is missing in our copy of the work.
3 See above, p. 498. 4 See Ch. I, nr. 7, pl). 34-35.
THE THEom' OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 535
arising from the figure of speech, William deals with univocation. It is

defmed as eiusdemdictionis in eadem significatione ct terminatione varia
appellandi His explanation is, as always, rather concise:
Fall. .rliag.I'Viliehni,p. 69124'35:Et notandum quia variatur univocatio usu et accidente
consignificatione. Accidit enim ex hiis appellationem restringi vel ampliori
.
Thus we [ind that William, too, speaksof the restriction and ampliation
of appellatio, rather than of suppositio.
The samestageof development is found in the Ars Burana.In the

chapter De dPPäHdtiODUHIz the anonymousauthor discusses
suppositionibus
the subjection (: act of putting somethingas the subject of a propo-
He saysthat such&subjection
sition) of an oratio,suchasquidsit Socrates.
(suppositio)should be consideredas that of a singularsubject, because
such orationesare singularisnumeri:
Ars Burana, p. 21129'34: Hec autem est falsa: 'isti dicunt quid sit Socrates'vel 'quid sit
Socrate:dicitur ab utraqueistorum', ideo scilicet quia licet [FC oratio: 'quid sit Socrates'
fungatur vice nominis appellativi, tamen non habet vim pluralis numeri, sed singularis
numeri tantum. Unde suppositio eius consideranda est secundum suppositionem singu-
laris numeri in singulari numero tantum.
The phrase appellatio (dicti) supponitpro jälso enuntiabili is frequently

used. It signifies: an appellatiodicti, being an oratio, is subject of a verb,
acting for a falseenuntiabile(: stateof aFfairsasconceived).Thus suppa-
sitia clearly has the senseof subiectio,again:
ArsBurana,p. 2125'15:Queritur an talis appellatio'quid sit.Socrates'
possitsupponerepro
falso enuntiabili. Dicendumergo est quod appellatioque sumitur ab interro-
......
gatione implicita, non potest supponerenisi pro his enuntiabilibusque vere possunt
responderiad talem interrogationem.
ibid., p. 21326'29: Secure tamen potest concedi quod talis appellatio unicuique verbo
possit supponere.Unde congrue dicitur: 'quid sit. Socrates
eu asinusvel non 85!asinus',
licet falsa, quia quod aliqua vox substantive posita uni verbo possit supponere et non
alii, raro invenitur.
! See our edition, p. 69111'12.

2 Appeliaiia here means appellatio dicti, which is an cxpression consisting of more than
one word (oratio). Appellationes of this kind were sometimesconsideredas being similar
to appellativenouus.SeeArsBurana,p. 2! 131: "licet hec oratio quid si: Socrates
fungatur
vice nominisappellativi. . . . ." and, ibid., p. 21221'23:"Dici potestquodsicut aliquod
nomen appellatiuum est quod non habet nisi unicum appellatum, ut hoc nomen 'ad',
ita talis appellatio (sc. dicti). — The subject is also discussedin the Tractatusde uni-
pp. 348-349.
vocationc.rlfanaccnsis,
Summing up our results the follox-ving conclusions may be drawn:

The entire discussion in the tracts discussed in this section is Focussed
on the appellative nouus and, accordingly, on the notion ofappcllacio,
rather than 011suppositio.This feature [its in very well with Adam of
the Petit Pont's (leFlnition of univocation as eademratione diversorum
lx..)
eademappellatio (flrs dis., p. 31'3'H ed. Minio-Paluello).
The term suppositiohas the same meaning as subiectioand is used to
deuote the act of putting as, or being, subject of & verb in :: propo-
sition.
The verb supponeremeans being the subject cgfa vcrb m a proposition
andalwayshasthe inclirectobject verbo.
The phrase supponereverbopro aliquo is used to signifyr being a subjcct
qf a warbin a proposition, or: actingfor somethingelsewhich is the proper
thing thespeechis about (id de quoscrnïojït). Here the direct connection
with the later theory of supposition is to be looked for. See below,
pp. 553-554.
In the distinction of the three kinds of univocation as found in the
Pallade Parvipontane the later doctrine of supposition is, as it were,
prefabricated. However, since only the appellative nouus are
discussed by the author, appellation, not supposition, remains the
centrali point and the First and second kinds of univocation are not
further taken into consideration. In the Tractatus de univocationc
Monacensis the Erst and second type of univocation (distinguished in
the Fall. Parvip.)are not even mentioned.
.
VeriFncationis at the basis of the doctrine of appellation as discussed
by the author of the FaHacicPar'vipontanc.
4- - Signyrïcatia and Appellatio in the Ars Meliduna
The impositio(or: institutio) vocumis discussedby the author of the

Ars Mehduna in an extensive way.! His starting-point is its cause, which
is the rnanJescmiaintellectus..In this two things playr major röles, the
subjectand the predicateOF& statement.Note that the term supponere
chauïu'l)lr
has the grammatical sense:
(scc above, p. 294): Sicut intellectu duo principaliter com-
Ar: Mehduna, F. 21311'2IL
preh endimus, suppositum et quod de eo dicitur, ita quoque inventa sunt duo genera
dicti anum, nomina scilicet et verba,hec adsupponendum,illa ad apponendum.
1 f. 2l3m'l'b; seeaboveour Chapter VII, pp. 2945.

THE THEORT OF APPELLA'I'ION AND SLIPPOSI'l'lON 537
Appellatio is the primary notion, not signyï'catio, since when speaking

about things we need the former more than the lattorx.I One of the
author's arguments is interesting: whenever nouus are put preperly
(proprie)in a suppositum (: grammatical subject), they are always used
in order to refer to (ml)r the appellatoof those nouns. Appellation, then,
is the proper task of nouus:
Ibid., p. 294: Amplius autem (sc. coniectari potest) ex hoc quod ubicunque proprie
ponuntur nomina in supposito, semper ponuntur ad agendum de appellatis tantum, ut
dicto quoniam homo currit. Appellant ergo nomina res illas propter quas supponenda:
fuerunt instituta. '
The word proprie is apparently added in order to except propositions

such as 'homo es: nomen' or 'homo est species',in which the appellative
nouus are used improperly. It should be noticed that in the last sentence
Of our passagesupponerestands for to put somethingas the subjectcf 0 talk
which is equivalentwith: put the noun denotingsuch thing
(discussion),
as the subject term of a proposition? Besicle, our author continuos, the
voceshave signücatio, but the)! take it from appellatio:
!bid., p. 294: Licet autem ad appellandum tantum fuerint instituto voces, tamen preter
nppellacionem habent ctiam signiücncionem, sed hanc ex appellacione contraxerunt sive
ex institucione facta ad appellandum.
This primacy of appellatio over signyï'catioprobably hassomething to do

with the author's view of the nature of the universalia.?-
As to the proper signyïcatio of the voceshe mentiens only two of the
modern views. The Erst holds that the appellativenoun "calls" (appellat)
whatever thing it may deuote, but only signiFles(signyïcat) it in an
indeterminate way. Thus, the word 'homo' only signifies the species
man, not this or that man, and it ma)r stand both for & man who actually
exists and for one 1th does not exist.4 The author himself seems to
prefer the status—doctrine:'all nouns signify either a common or & private
status,the former being divided into special and generic status.5
As to equivocntion, the author energetically rejects the view that a
word may have more than one signffcatio. What is equivocal, are the
sfgnif'cata or nominata; nouns are rather equivocantfathan equivoco. No
! For the text, see above, p. 294.

3 For this equivalence, see above, p. 517.
3 For the texts, seeabove, Chapter VIII, pp. 295-3l5.
4 For the text, see aboüe, 1). 295.
5 Secabove, pp. 295f. and 307 Ff.
term is equivocal in itself, but x-vhenused in different statements it ma)r

have dil'ïerent meanings' :
ArsMelid... I). 298: equivoca esset aliqua dictio si ex diversisinstitutionibugdiversa signifi-
caret; equivocevero dicitur accipi dictio, quia alio mododicitur de unoquamdealio.
Ut *sanmn'dicitur de animali aliter quam de apio vel de urina Ut generalius
.....
dicatur: omnis ista dictio dicitur accipi equivoceque in oratione posita facit ambi-
guitatemsecundumdiversassigniEcationes vel consigniücationes.
This applies to nearly all the parts of Speech: noun, verb, participia,
adverb, conjunction, and preposition.
The appellatio vocum is discussed in the Ars Mchduna in an extensive
x-vay. The characteristic feature of the appellative noun, in contra-
distinction with the proper noun (nomenproprium), is that the latter
always has the same meaning by whatever predicate it is followed in a
proposition, while the appellative noun varies its appellative function in
accordance with the different tenses of the verb of the proposition.
Next the same four rules are given as are found in the Pallade Parvi-
PODtdn€.2As to the fourth rule, unlike the author of the Tractatus de
univocationcMonacensis,our author holds the same view as is found in the
The discussion of the special cases ('potest',
Pallade Pf.'u'w';:wnr1mane:.1i
(loquitur', 'promittitur'), too, runs parallel with that in the FaHacie
Parvipontanc.4lt should be noticed that our author, too, speaksof the
extension (or ampliation) of the appellationes,
not of the suppositiones,
of
the terms. However, his discussion of the matter involved is more
exhaustive, since he also deals with the nomina accidentalia and the
termini nuUi convenientes.5
Our author's terminology is quite the same as that of the. Pallade
Parvipantane: he uses supponereverbo, supponerepro, se habere ad, and
supponereahquid (aq. in the passivevoice: aliquid supponitur)
i n just the
same loose manner as the author of the Fall. Parvip.6
When dealing with the question by which terms the singularia are
denotedf our author Hnds an opportunity to explain the distinction
between suppositio,signy'ï'catio,and appellatio. The last term is deFmed
! For the author's discussion of this view, see above, pp. 297-299.
: For the text, seeabove, pp. 300-301.
3 Comparethe text aboveon p. 30! with Fa". Parvip., p. 56410'25;see also above,
p. 534, n. l.
4 Compnre the texts quoted above, pp. 301-302 with Fall. Parvip. pp. 56433sqq.
5 See above, PP' 302-304.
6 For some places, see our Indexverborumin the second part of this volume.
? Seeabove,pp. 3I6-3I7.
THE THEORT OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 539
as per verbum presentis temporis vcra attributio sive capulatjo. When an

individual thing denoted by & noun has ceased to exist, that noun still
has its sign.:"fï'catio, but its appellatio has gene. Signyrïcatia and snppositio
precede appellatio. lt should be noticed, however, that the author does
not give & clcar-cut distinction between the signi "carieand suppositioof
& noun used in a proposition. Later logicians would certainly have said
that the suppositio of & dictio rather than its signäfcatio ampliates its
appellation.
Ars Meliduna,f. 224m: Distat ergo inter suppositionem,signiEcationem,appellatio-

nem, quia duo prima precedunt tertium, ut in hoc nomine 'zlntichristus'; semper
etiam post ipsum manent, ut in hoc nomine 'Cesar'; ipsa vero simul. SigniFlcatitaque
'Cesar' individuum, non quod modo sit individuum, sed quod est vel fuit vel erit. Et
ita signilïcnt individuum quod non est nec tamen (erit) aliquod individuum. Sicut
supponit vel, secundumalios, significat homoqui nonestet tamenquilibethomoest.,quia
significatio dictionis appellationemampliat (above, p. 316).
Thus we End in the Ars flieliduna the samestageof development of the

appellation (supposition) theory as is found in .the foregoing tracts. lt
should be remarked that in the PARSSECUNDA,dcaling with the signif-
cata terminorum,the term suppositiois also found, be it in as yet rather
confused opposition to signi 'catio.
However, the outstanding importance of the Ars Meliduna is shown
by the fact that for the First time in this treatise quite a new approach to
the ars dialecticahas been made. The m'rangcmcntof the.subjects is no
longer determined by that of the works of Boethius and the other
authorities, but by the main distinction of term and proposition, which
gives a far more rational division, indeed:
PARS PRIMA: DE TERMINIS
PARS SECUNDA: DE SIGNIFICATIS TERMINORUM
PARS TERTIA: DE PROPOSITIONIBUS
PARS QUARTA: DE DICTIS PROPOSITIONUM SIVE DE ENUNTIABILIBLIS.
It was such an arrangment that laid the very basis of terminism.'

A second point to be noted is that more than any other tract the Ars
Meliduna stresses what we have called the contextual aPPl'OaChzas the
1 The same Starting-point is found in the Tractatuszlnagnini ; see the edition in our second
part, p. 2184FF.
2 See above, Chapter III p. 113.
key notion for the actual meaning of & term. It must be remcmbered
that the most peculiar thesis of the Mehdunenses (nullum nomenesse
equilfacum)was precisely presented as a corrolary from this principle...l
Thus the Ars Meliduna made an important contribution to the main
thesis, and the very foundation, of the later theories of supposition,
that the term which hassupposition, has it only qua subject-or predicate-
tcrm of & proposition.
5 - Signifcatio, suppositio,and appellatio in the FaHacieLondinenses

The grammaticalsenseof suppositio (: the act of putting somenoun
as the subject of :: proposition) is frequentl)rfound in the Pallade Londi-
ncnses. When dealing with augurio the author says that sometimes :!
repetition of the sameword (being in general a nugatio) is quite legal
and allowed. One of these casesis when the repetition is made causa
determinandasuppositionis,i.e. in order to clarify which term preciael)r is
subjectedin &pr0position:
Fall. Landen.p. 64630'33:
...... tum causadeterminnnde subpositionis, ut hic: 'homo
es::et ille currit'; hoc relativum 'ille' idem significat quod suum antecedens et tamen
apponitur ibi ad determinandum eius suPpositionem.
In the chapter on zmnphibolog)rthe author mentions the case that aliqua

dictio potest teneri appositive vel suppositive. E.g. in the paralogism:
ilquicqm'd videt Socrates, illud videt; sed Socratesvidet lapidem; ergo lapis
w'det'. The phrase suppositiveteneri stands for being taken03 subject-term,as
appearsfrom what Follows:
"»d., pp. 65433-6553:Hic provenit deceptio ex eo quod hec dictio 'illud' potest
teneri suppositive huic verbo 'ridet' secundo posito; et sic est nmninativi casus
. . . . . .
Vel potest teneri appositive, et sic erit accusativi casus.
The same can be said OFthe phrase supponeremateriamcirca quam versatur

res verbi in such casesas 'instruercgrammaticam'(Opposedto: 'instrucre
aliquem'). However, it should be noticed that here the verb supponere
refers, at the same time, to the subject-matter of the proposition. But,
of course, this supponeremateriam has nothing to do with anything like
the later material supposition (suppositiomaterialis). '
Another instance of the grammatica] use of supponere and suppositiois
found in the chapter De suppositione orationisverbo,dealing with the
' Secabove, p. 298.
THE THEORT OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 54l
suPposition (: putting as:! subject in the. preposition) ofan oratia' (or:

appellatiodictiï).
The notion of appellatiois discussedunderthe heading:Deappellatione
dictionis.3 It is defined as quedamproprietas quc inesr dictioni ex eo quod
supponitunumvelplura. Just as in the Ars Melidunathe distinction between
suppositioand signyïcatiais not :: clear-cut one:
Fa". London.,pp. 66530-6662:Hec (sc. fallatia secundumFiguramdictionis) quatuor
principalibus modis variatur. Quorum primus provenit ex eo quod alique dictiones
videntur habereeandemsuppositionem vel eandem signiFlcationempropter similem
terminationem.
On the other hand, the term suppositiohasthe later technical sense in

the discussion OFthe fallacies which arise from the Figuraof speech. Our
author here speaksof suppositiocorgfusaand suppositiodeterminata.The First
case is that which arises from a processus a termino subpanentecmjuse ad
terminumsupponentem determinate;the second that which comes from the
inverse processusä A sharp distinction between signjfï'careand supponere
is found in the bcginnings of our Pallade, wherehthe author clariEes the
notion of phantasticamultiplicitas. The multiple supposition (occurring
in a certain kind of Figure-oF speech) is here well contrasted with the
unique signifcatja:
Fa". Landon.,p. 6481'5: Phantasticamultiplicitas est quandoaliqua vox videtur plura
signiFlcareque tamcn plura non signiEcat. Verbi gratia: Socratesest homo', 'Nam est
homo'; hec vox *homo' videtur aliud signilïcare in prima, aliud in secunda. Talem
multiplicitatem operatur Figuradictionis.
6 Signi 'catio and suppositio in the Tractatus Anagnini

-
The third tract of the Tractatus Anagnini is entirely devoted to the
notion of suppositio.The several kinds of supposition are reduced to the
warious mocles of signyïcatjo of the terms. The latter are said to arise
either from the principal signyï'catiaof & term, or from its consignchatio,
or From common usage(communis ususloquentium):
Tract. flnagn. lll, 26013'": Sed quia suppositionm'nvarietassuam variationem a termi-
norum varietate contrahit, videndum quot modis termini varietur significatio. Provenit
autem omnis terminorum varietasvel ex alicuius vocis consignificatione,vel ex principali
significatiuum, vel ex communi usu loquentium.
' For the text, seeour edition, p. 660'7ff.

2 For this term, see.above, p. 535, n. 2.
3 To be distinguished ffom appellatio dicti; see the preceding notes.
4 For the text, seeour edition, p. 668444.
When making this starting-point our author has in mind quite & different
division of the discussion of suppositionesFrom that which is found in the
FaHacieParvipomane.The main part of the discussion in the latter work
was devoted to the various kinds of appellatio (and secondarily of suppo-
sitio) as arising from the diFferent use OFsubject-terms with verbs of
diFFerent tenses. This discussion is found in the Tracwtus Anagnini in the
Erst main division: De vocisconsignfjïcatione,where the word iconsignäjï-
cauo" stands for the secondary meaning :: term has when connected with
:: verb Of some tense. AS 21matter of fact our author roughly identiües
secondary meaning with the tense of a verb: appellatur autem hic
consigniücatio: secundaria vocis significatio, ut tempus circa verbum et
participium (Ibid. p. 26020'"). It should be noticed, then, that the author
,
always Speaks of the variatio suppositionum, not Of variatio appellationum,
the latter being the heading found in the FaHacieParvipamanc.
In the Erst part (De vocisconsignücarjone) similar rules for Fmdingout
the correct supposition are found as in the tracts discussed in the
preceding sections, together with a set of rules related to the use of
participles. Seveml expressions are found to describe the notion OF
suppositio: suppositiopertinet ad presentia tamtum; suppositio intelligitur pro;
suppositiose habetad; suppositior'gjizrendaest ad ; suppositio]?! pro, suppositio
fr: verba et pertinetad (cfr. p. 26035Ff.).An interesting expression
...... subiectus terminus non habet pro quajäciat
is found p. 2617:
......
suppositionem. Besides, the phrase contrahit suppositionem a verbo sibi
proximo, also found in the precious tracts, occurs several times. We also
End the use of supponere with the accusative casia:
!bid., p. 2712'4: tunc precedensterminus restringitur ad supponendumilla
......
que caduntsub appellationesequentistermini.
Another example is found on p. 2818 sqq., where the author discusses

the term ivice':
Ibid., p. 2813"): Dubitatur tamcn utrum supponat hoc nomen 'vice', an aliquid supponat.
Videtur quod nichil aliud quam spatium temporis supponat.
For the equivalence of supponerepro and suppositio pertinet ad the reference

made by the author on p. 274" Ff. is interesting:
Ibid., p. 2741145:Supra diximus quod terminus communis cum verbo prcsentis temporis
supponi:tantum pro presentibus; cum verbo preteriti sappanir.
pro presentibus et preteritis ;
cum verbo futuri temporis pro presentibuset futuris; ut veram reddat locutionem pro
quolibet appellatosubiecti termini.
THE THEORV OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 543
The reference is to p. 26024-26126,where such phrases are found as:

quandojï't suppositio
per terminum communemverbopresenti
the ......
Of ,
suppositio pertinet ad presentia tantum (260343...) For sense supponere
the author's dis-
and os the subject-morter)
(as: to put as the subject-term
cussion of the phrase 'supponitur locutioni' is interesting. It is found in the
second main division ofhis tract Desuppositionibus.Compare the following
phrases: 'aliquid supponitur locutioni et ipsum jim Cesar' anc] 'aliquid est
soppositum'(note the past participia) locutioni, ol: ipsumjuit Cesar,where
the author adds, ita tamenut participium teneaturadiective(p. 267").
Another example of the meaning of the verb supponereis Found in this
passage:
Ibid... pp. 27811'2792: Sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'tempus' quandoque snpponit in
nominativo, quandoquein ablatiuo. Quando hoc nomen 'tempus'supponit in nominativo,
communis est suppositio ut 'aliquod tempus«m', 'aliquod templi:fuit'. 'aliquod
..... ,
tempusorit'. Quando Fit suppositio per hanc vocem 'in aliquo tempore' verbo preteriti vcl
futuri temporis, suppositio Et pro tempore contcrn'linabili rci subiecti et pro quolibet
alio temporecuius aliud tempusnon est pars. Unde non est concedendum:'in aliquo
tomporojuitzldomet in iHojTuil:Socrotox'.
As to the author's second main division (De vocisprincipali signifi-

catione),it deals with the special verbs or phrases('potest', 'ioquitur',
'supponitur iocutioni', 'verum est' etc.) which impede the application of
the normal rules.
DiFi'erent kinds of supposition are mentioned, but they do not occur
under the technical names used afterwards.
The third main division (Do communiusu loquentium)deals with
suppositioimpropria, found when special nouns are subject-terms of
propositions. These. too, are impediments for normal supposition. The
author states that he will not give definite rules since they cannot be
supported by authority. However. the "improper supposition" may be
'ofsome useForour knowledgeofproper supposition,he adds(p. 279940).
For this reason the author gives some Special rules all the same. ] quote
that concerning the word 'opiscopus'given by the author as an example
of a nomenarticulum! Noticc the use of the phrase: suppositiojï't pro
appellato etc., and the occurrence of the local name Anognioï:
......
1 They are defined asnominoojicioho vol nominodignitatum(p. 27415'19).ln fact the.)rare

nouns which, preceded by the definite article in the vulgnr languages,denote one deFmitc
oH'icial person in & certain territory.
1 Seealsoabove,p. 395f.
544 LOGICA h—lODERNORUM n
Tract. Anagn. iil, p. 27410'35:Quando hoc nomen 'cpiscapus'per se sumatur cum verbo
presentis temporis, suppositio non Flt pro quolibet appellato illius dictionis, sed pro
appellato illius terre in qua profertur propositio. Unde si quis Anagnie dicat: 'cpiscopus
rcnir', non est admittenda nisi pro episcopo Anagnino.
We Findthe phraseampliare(restringere)appellationem(e.g. p. 27433)and

(e.g. p. 275'3) as wcil.
ampliare (restringcrc)suppositionem
As we have said before (above, p. 543) the cliFFerentkinds of sup-
position are not found under the later technical names. However, we
meet with the Erst bcginnings of that terminology. For instancc, the
generalsignffcatio ofa noun is named its prapria cafy'usio:
[hii, p. 27415'13:Si autem adiungatur ei (xc. nomini articulari) signum particulare ...... ,
redit ad propriam confusionem, ut *ahquisepiscopus
rcnir' pro quolibet episcopoad-
mittenda est.
Eisex-vhcre the author speaks of coding significare and minus coq/ilse

(p. 2804) and coqjiiscteneri(p. 280'5).
The name suppositio communisis found For 'commonsupposition'. See
e.g. p. 27823-24: quando hoc nomen "tempus' summum in nominativo,
communis est suppositio, ut *aliquod tempusest'. The term does not
exactly have the later meaning of "common supposition", which is the
opposite of "discrete snpposition", the former being cleFmedas the snp-
position which is accompiishcd by means of & terminuscommunis,while
discrete supposition is that which is accomplished by means oia discrete
term, as in 'Socratescurrit', or by means oia common term in conjunction
with a demonstrative pronoun, as in 'iste homocurrit', or a demonstrative
pronoun used without a substantive, as in "iscecurrit'. However, although
in our tract the tcrm 'suppositiocommunis'is used in contra-distinction to
suppositio improPrfa, and, accordingly, seems to be identical with sup-
positio propria, its meaning practically comes down to that which it has
afterwards, since & term used in common supposition (in the sense in
which our author usesthe term) is said to have its prapria coqfusio,i.e.
its general meaning. No doubt we have here the origin of the technical
term suppositio communis.
The rather loose and unsettled way in which the term suppositio
communisis still used in our tract, may be illustrateci by & passage,where
our term is qualilïcd by the preposition ad:
ibid., p. 27915'17:Quando iit suppositio per hoc nomen 'locus' sumptum in recto,
suppositio communisest ad mundum et ad partes mundi.
THE THEOIW OF APPELLATION AND SLIPPOSITION 545
Another clear example of the loose way in which thc term communisis
used, is found where the author discusscsthe supposition of a discrete
term. Again we meet with the phrase communis ad cr. It
. . .. . . .....
should be Further noticed the author here speaks of sappositiocommunis
Of a terminus discretus:
lbid... p. 2801'5: Quando autem supponit terminus discretus, communis est suppositio
ad locum circumscribentem et ampliorem.
Finally, & renmrkable terminology is found where, clealing with &

special")r kind of restriction, our a'uthor speaks of separatio suppositionis
(p. 27733).
The Flfth tract of the Tractatus Anagnini discusscs the (lifï'erent (gencra
dictionum: (l) dictiones dinrjbutive; (2) dictiones infundis, (3) dictiones
adiective, (4) dictionesexclusive,and (5) dictionesrelative.
It should be noticed that the dictionesdistributus, discussed in the later
Summule as a separate tract Of the tractatus dc proprietatibus terminorum
under the heading De distributionibus) are dealt with by our author to-
gether with the other kincls of dictiones.As a matter OFfact this ordering
of the subject-mattcr seemsto be morc plausiblethan that in PeteroF
Spain's Summulc, where the n(ldition Of only the tract Dc distributionibus
without the tracts discussing the dictionesirycï'nftatc,adiective, and exclusive
is somewhat arbitrary. As to the tract on the dictionesrelative, which are
discussed by Peter as Special cases of snppanercand, accordingly, were
added by him as the second tract on the pmpertics of terms after that on
suppositions, this is dealt with by our author not in the Frame-work of
supposition, but as a tract on sigmjï'catio.See e.g. the following passage:
Tracl. Anagn.V, pp. 32235-3233: ponitur hoc pronomen 'ipse' et refertur ad
.....
huc nomen 'aliquid' et in utraque (sc.propositione) dixcrctcsignificat. Ergo in utraque
invariatamhabetsigni "canonem Sedin utraque nichil significatquod non contrahat
.....
ab hoc nomine 'aliquid'. In utraque invariatamhabe:significationem relativum. Ergo in
utraque antecedens inrariatam habet signi tationem ..... etc.
For that matter, the samecan be said of the tract on the dictionesdistribu-
tive, as appears From the author's terminology. In the Fll'Strules, For
instance, he speaksofsjgng'jïcarioand appellatio, not ofsupposjrio:
1 For instante in the Summe
;l'lctcnieï(seeabove our Chapter XIV, pl). 481-490) and in
Peter Of Spain's Summulac logicalcs.
Ibid., p. 29815'25:Quando hec dictio 'omnis' determinat aliquam dictionem, colligit

omnia appellato illius dictiones et distribuit rem predicati termini circa omnia appellato
subiecti termini Item. Hec dictio 'omnis'quando determinat aliquam dictionem,
.....
oportet ut illa dictio partibilcm habeat signifcotionomad numerum dictionis illius.
Once our author speaks of suppositioin the technical sense, although

here, again, the main notion is that of significatio, no doubt as a result of
the general theme of this tract, which deals with the signyqrotio of
several dictiones:
lbid., p. 32525'32: rclativum relatumaddictionem confusesigniEcnntemcontra-
......
hit significationemsuam partim a significatione sui antecedentis, partim & suppositione.Ut
cum dicitur: 'aliquid est homoet ipsumest asinus', hoc relativum 'ipsum' partim contrahit
significationemsuamab hoc nomine 'oliqmd' et partim ab hoc suppositohomo.Unde
quemadmodum variatur siguiücatio relativi, si variatur siguiücatio antecedentis, ita
etiam variabitur, si variata fuerit suppositio antecedentis.
Note that here suppositumdoes not stand For grammatica] or logical

subject, but for individual thing, the term 'homo' being in fact the
predicate-term of the preposition. In the continuatiou of our passagethe
phrase supponitverbopro is fbund (p. 32612and 326'5FF.).On the other
hand, the use OF'suppositum'For gronmroticolsubjectis also Found; see
p. 3227'9, where ïm oratio is said to be perfect since it has :! subject-
term (suppositum)and & pl'edicate-term: imperfecta non (sc. est hec
oratio), quia habet suppositum et appositum, in quibus duobus termi-
natur perfectio orationis.
Both in the tract on suppositionos-and in that on the different kinds of

dictionesthe congruitosof the proposition is the. very foundation ofcorrect
supposition (c.q. signification). lt should be Further noticed that Falsity
and incongruity of the proposition are fully identical. [ give some
evidence.
Troct. zlnagn. III, p. 26112'14:
...... utraque istarum est congrua: 'omnisjiznixfuit',
'rosafuit'. Et hec estfalso: 'omne animalfuis homo'.
lbid... p. 26133'25: Hec etiam est falsa: 'omnis homodigärot ab Antichristo'. Etiam hec est
incongrua: 'omnis homoet Antichristusdigorcns'.
!bicL, p. 274'3'15:
...... curn verbo futuri temporis (sc.terminus communissupponit)
pro presentibus et futuris, ur rorum reddat locutionempro quolibet appellato subiecti termini.
Further, the correct supposition of a term is taken from the verb, 01'
For that matter, the doctrine of snpposition, as part of
Pl'BdiCEltE-tEl'H'lJ
! lt must be borne in mind that predicatum,in the Mediaeval senseof the term, is any
term in a propositionthat is not the grammatica]or logica]subjectof that proposition.
THE 'muonw OF APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 547
:. theory of terms, is built upon a general theory of significantium

of terms,
to the e[ïect, incleecl, that it broke away From the Aristotelian-Boethian
logic of classesin the direction of & logic of predicantes) [ give some
evidence from the TractatusAnognini
.
Troct. Anogn. lll, p. 2701'7: Notandum quod iudicium traditum de hoc relativo 'qui'
non servatur in aliis nominibus relativis, in his scilicet 'quah's', 'quontos', et similibus,
quia antecedentia illorum non contrahunt suppositionema verbis relativorum, scd a propriis
verbi; Unde iste sunt false: 'quo-Iishomofuit,soh":homononest'etc.
......
lbid... V, 1").298'5'13: Quando hec dictio 'omnis' determinat aliquam dictionem, colligit
omnia appellataillius dictionis et distribuit rcm predicatitermini circa omnia appellata
subiecti termini.
lbid., V, 17. 3040'13: Sequitur de dictione 'singtrli'. De: qua notandum quod ipsa
solam notat distributionem circa terminum cui adiungitur, et semper distribuit rcm
predicati circo rom subiecu termini secundum unitatem Ad veritatem autem illius
. . . . .
locutionis in qua ponitur hoc dictio 'singuh' exigitur quod predicatumpossitattribui
subiecta dempta etiam illa dictione, et quod res predicati ponit distribui circa rcm subiecti
secundum unitatem.
Ibid... V, p. 30639'33:Ad veritatem autem illius locutionis in qua ponitur hec dictio
'quothbet', exigitur quod predicatum possit attribui subiecto dempta etiam illa dictione
secundum omnem speciem numeri sub quem cadunt appellata subiecti termini.
The following statements can be made:
] In the Tractatus Anognini, which all are of & clearly grammatical

stamp, appellation is no longer the central point, but 'signffï'catio'
and 'suppositio'are the focal terms.
IM.)
The changehas been causedby the Factthat, from now on, the First
kind of univocation as distinguished in the Fallocie Parvipomanezis
taken into consideration, so that the central position of the signifi-
cative use of the appellative noun was infringed UPOI'I.To catch the
non-signiücative uses of nouns, such as in 'homo est nomen'and 'homo
est species',the appellation theory must be widened into et more
general theory of the use of & noun, whether significative or non-
signiEcative, as subject in & proposition: thus it grew into a theory
of supposition.
3 The First stage of development was that in which the timor),r (of
appellation) covered the diFFerentsignificative usesof the appellative
' Cfr. Ph. Boelmer, Mediam! Lagic. An Outiinc cjhs Dcvclopmcntfrom 1250 ro c. 1400,
Manchcster 1952, p. 28.
3 Seeabove, p. 495. The socondkind of univocation ('homoestdignissimacrcaturorum')
:implcx(seeWilliam of Shyreswood,p. 77'9sqq.) in the
Fmdsits own placeas s'uppoxitio
third stageof develolunent. See below, p. 549 Ff.
nouns, while the non-signiücative uses x—vel'eput aside as transsumptio

(gramnmticorum ('homoestnomen')and transsumptiodialeticarum('homo
est species').' The second stagc, appearing in the TractatusAnagnini,
brings all the uses of a noun in a proposition under the general vicx-v-
point of subiectio (suppositio), which is, from now on, comprehensivc
of the.three kinds of univocation?
4- Although the diH'crentkinds of supposit'iondo not yet appearunder
the later technical names, the Erst beginnings ofthc later tcrminology
are found.
5 As in the foregoing tracts, the cangruitas or veritas of the preposition
is at the very basisof correct supposition or signiFncation.
6 The theory OFsupposition (signilïcation) tends to develc-p into a
(partial) them)rof terms, to the eFfectthat it gocsin the direction ofa
logic of predicantes,instead of & logic of classes.
7 - Supposition and Appollation in Four Later Tracts

This section intends to discuss some later tracts on logic x—vhich
contain theorics of snpposition. In them the theory is clearly focussed on
snppositioitself, x-vhile the other notions involved (appellatio, copulatio,
ampliatio, restrictio) are subordinate to suppositio.
The Fll'Sttract to be discussed here is the short tract on supposition
found in the IntroductionesParisienses.The anonymous author dcals with
supposition and related notions in :: sketchy survey occurring bctx-veen
the extensive tracts on the loci communesand thejäHaciaej Supposition is
defincch as quedam proprietas que inest dictioni ex eo quod substantive sive
existenter signifcat. Note that supponere means substantiam signi 'care, i.e.
denotc thc existence of an individual.5 The author chnes,6 with
Aristotle, the term (terminus) as pars orationis subicibilis vel predicabili:
and, accordingly, admits supposition of both the subject-term and the
prcdicate-term of :: proposition. The well-known rules concerning the
diFFerent tenscs of the verb appear with some rcHnements intended to
exclude the usual exceptions ('potcst', 'Iaudatur' etc.), and they are
given as six rules applying to supposition and appellation as well.
' See Fa". Parvip., l). 562'4'W; above, p. 495 H.
2 For the third stagc, see below, pp. 548-552.
1 For this order, compare William of Shyreswood's Introductioncs in logicam and Peter
of Spain's Stumlmiacfagicola. See also M. Grabmann, !'landschrfjilichc Forschungenund
Funde, pp. 127-130.
4 Secour edition, p. 371'5'10.
5 Cfr. abüve, p. 5235. & Ibid... p. 37130'3'.
THE THEORT OF APPELLATIONAND SLIPPOSITION 549
Inrrad. Paris., pp. 37129-3723:Cum igitur omne verbum de presenti vel de preterito vel
defuturo sit et, ut dicit Aristcitiles,terminus est parsorationissulJicibilisvel predicabilis,
de suppositionibus et appellationibus sex dantur regule, duc de presenti et duo de
preterito et duode futuro, propter subiectumet predicatum.
Next several divisions OF terms are given, one of which is that in

terminussingularis, e.g. 'Socratos', and terminus discretus,e.g. 'isto', and
terminus communissive universalis sive appellativus, e.g. 'homo'. The di-
visions of suppositioare said to be basedupon the former clivision:
lbid., I). 3735'10: Et ita subpositionum quedam singularis, quedam communis. Item.
Suppositionum quedam mobilis, quedam immobilis, ut 'animal' cum dicitur: 'omnis
homo est animal'. Item.. Subpositionum quedam simplex, ut 'homo' cum dicitur: 'homo
ootapocios';quedam particularis, ut cum dicitur: 'homocurrit'. Item. Quodamdeterminata
per aliquod signum, ut 'aliquis homo',quedam indeterminata aliquo signo, ut 'homo'.
Thc logica Ut dicit discusses supposition in a short tract without

reference to appellation or other related notions. Supposition is chmecl'
as substantiva roi designatio, quodam
bocos: proprietas termini substantivi. The
Following clivision is Foundz:
simplex
deternnnata
suppositio s
confusa tantum
: communis -
s confusa
personalis. .' ?
discreta confusa et distributiva.
-
ln respect of the last distinction (coajiisatantum ——

cogam et distributiva)
three rules are givcn.3
The logica Cumsit nostra chnes4 snpposition as substantivaroi designatio,

idest significatio termini substantivi, and a few lines below5 as sermonis
subicibili: significatio. The main division of supposition in this tract can
be illustratecl by the following diagramö:
' Sec our edition, p. 40817'33. 3 See ibid., p. 4090".

3 Seeibid., p. 40921Fff 4 Seeour edition, p. 44615'19.
5 Seeibid., p. 44623. 6 For the text, seepp. 44635-4-4-731.
equivoca
suppositio & simplex
univoca ( discreta
personalis determinata
?
communis confusa tantum
indeterminata
:: confusa
confusa et
distributiva
Besides,other divisions are found, which are of & clearly grammatica!

stamp' :
geminata
antonomatica
suppositio
metonomatica
sinodochica
S prepria
suppositio
(
impropria
[t should be noticed that our author states that there is only sup-
position ex parte subiecti:
Logica Cumsit. nostra,p. 44615'16:Sed quia suppositio est ex parte subiecti, ideo primo
dicendum est de suppositione.
Ibid., p.4—4623'19:Suppositio est sermonis subicibilis significatio; 'sermonissubicibilis'
ponitur ad diH'erentiampredicabilis.
is deHnedas remsuamsubapposito(: predicate)

Accordingly, supponere
ponere(p. 44630'31).Appellation is defunedas the counterpart of sup-
position:
lbid., p. 44925'23: Et est appellatio sermonis predicabilis significatio sine tempore;
'sigm' 'catia' ponitur in loco generis; 'scrmonr'sprca'icabilis' punitur ad differentiam
sermonis subicibilis; 'sine tcmporc' ponitur ad differentiam verbi signincantis cum
tempore.
' For the text, seepp. 44733-4483.

THE THEOR't' OF APPELLATION AND SLIPPOSITION SSI
The last qualiFlcation('sine tempore')is apparentlyadded in respect of

copulation, which is deFlned (ibid. p. 451'3'l9) as sermonispredicabilis
signifcatfo cumtempore.
There is another deFlnition of appellation: appellatioest proprietas
termini communisquam habet secundumquam comparatur ad sua singularia,
quc comparatioinest ei secundumquodappellat (ibid., p. 44929'3').
T he Dialectica Monacensisdevotes & good deal of attention to the theory

of the proPerties of terms under the heading Dc dictione signiji'fazuräw:.-.I
T he basic division is here between supponereand copulare, which
terms are cleFlnedas follows:
Dial. Manna, pp. 60633-6072: Supponere siquidem est substantive (rem) significare et per
se et sine dependentia tali que est in principali significatione. Copulare est adiective
rem signiEcare et in tali dependentia que est de principali significatione ...... Licet
obliquus termini supponentis aliquam habeat dependentiam, tamen supponit, quia illa
dependentia non est ex principali signilïcatione, sed consigniücatione, scilicet ex casu.
The following division ofsupposition is foundz:

& simplex
g discreta - ( personalis
suppositio *( mobilis
communis —
? immobilis
& confusa
determinata
(
restricta
9
ampliata.
(
T he third division of suppositio communis into coqjüsa and determinata is
said to apply both to snppositiocommunisand suppositiopersonalis,änd,
accordingly, the same division is found as that of suppositio personalis:
suppositionum personaliumalia coqfusa,alia determinata(p. 61334'35).
lt should be remarked that in the Dialectica Monacensisthe exigenda
veritatis in locutioneis the basic notion upon which the correct way of
supposition depends.3[ give some evidence:
' See our edition, pp. 605-638.
: Seethe text in our edition, pp. 60717-6081".
3 Campareabove,p. 546f.
552 r.oclcfx MODERNORUM "
p. 60811'19:Suppositionumalia simplex, alia personalis.Et nota quod hec

Dial. ;I-Ionac.
divisio fit secundum exigentiam veritatis in locutione. Dicitur enim suppositio per-
sonalis esse in termino communi quanda secundum exigentiam veritatis in locutione
terminus ille sumitur pro aliquo inferiorum sub ipso. Simplex autem suppositio est in
tcrnüno communi quando secundum exigentiam veritatis in locutione non sumitur pro
aliquo inferiori scd I)l'0 cmmnuni.
The same is said of the division OFsupposition into mobilis and immobilis
(ibid., p. 6093"'IT.). Compare also ibid., p. 6l2'5 and 61433'30,x-vhere
the function of the correct supposition of a term is Snid to be reddere
locutionem veram.
Appellation is dealt with in its relation to snpposition (ibid., p.
61630Ff,), and the notion of restriction is discussedin connection 1with
supposition and appellatiuum:
!bid., p. 6161ï-617": Dicitur autemterminusappellareid de quo vereet presentialiterct
nFFlrmativepütcst predicari Et notandum quad terminus communis hoc quod
. .....
appellat, supponit. Sed non convertitur, quia multa supponit que non appellat
......
Unde cum in appellatione ct suppositione terminus communis varietur, videndum est
qualiter hoc flat. Ad hoc sciendum quod terminus communis per se sumptus supponit
pro omni quod potest participari formam eius sive id sit presens sive preteritum sive
futurum Contingit autem quod terminus communis in locutione positus
......
quandoque sumitur pro presentibus quandoque pro presentibus
..... , ...... ,
quandoque pro futuris Et terminus dicitur restringi Dicitur autem
..... .....
rcstrictio variatio suppositionis magis communis ad minus cummuncm.
In & similar way the notion of ampliation (vis ampliandi) is discussed

(p. 62239FE). '
Our tract is also remarkablc in that many soPhisms and their solutions
illustrate the author's cxpositions of the diFferdnt kinds of supposition.
Considering the results. of this section the following points may be

made:
1 In the tracts discussed in this section the them)r of the properties of

terms is clearly focussed on the notion of supposition itself, while
the other notions involved (apchatio, copulatio,amphatio,restrictia)
are subordinate to supposition.
2 The propositioml approach' appenring in most of the foregoing
tracts has been carried through in the Introductiones Parisiensesto
such an extent that it is no longer the appellative noun, but the
' 01' contextunl approach. For this term, see above, our Chapter Ii, pp. 113, and the
Inde,»:
verborumet rerum,s.vv. contextum],
propositionc!
.
THE THEORV or: APPELLATION AND SUPPOSITION 553
terminus (deflued as pars orationis subicibihs 01" predicabilis) that has

become the focus of the theory. Accordingly, the division of sup—
positio was based upon the division of terminusand so the author
speaksof the supposition of the terminuscommunisetc.
3 Someattributa supposition to both the subject- and predicate-term
(50 in the Intrad. Paris.), others to the subject-term only (so the
Logica Cum sit nostra). The latter speak of the appellatio of the
predicate-termg which is deHned, then, as sermonispredicabilis
signüï'catio sine tempore. See the Logica Cum sit nostra, p. 44925
(abovep. 550), which immediatelyr adds the usual definition:
appellatio est proprietas termini communis quam habet secundum quam
comparaturad sua singularia (ibid., p. 44929'30).
4- From now on copulatio(: 'binding' of one notion with another) is
discussed together with supposition and appellation. Sometimes the
notion of cepulation is reserved to the verb (and participle); e.g.
in the Logica Cum sit nostra; sometimes it is called a pl'Opti-rt)lrof
adjective nouns (50 in the Dialectica zlffonacensis).
5 All the later distinctions of supposition are found in these tracts, as
well as ampliation and restriction.
6 The tracts discussed in this section present the thüoryr of the pro-
pcrties of terms in its third stagc. From now om-vm'ds,all the usesof
& noun (term) in a proposition are covered by the theory of sup-
position, sot that, unlike the carlier stages, the second kind of uni-
vocation distinghuished in the FaHacieParvipomane((homoestdignis—
simacrcaturarum'),too, hasreceived its place in the theory. Another
dilïcrence with the earlicr stagcs is that the different kinds of sup-
position havereceived their own technical namesby now.
7 No doubt, the impulsa to this development of the theory came From
the technique of dialectical disputation. It is not surprising that
many tractsz start their ex])ositions with stressing the basic function
of the theory of meaning For Iogical dispute, in which, indeed, the
centra] question is: ILwhatareyou talking about?. Thc grammatical-
logical subject-tcrm ofa proposition ('id dequo') is, at the sametime,
the subject—matterof & talk ([id de quo sermo ff), and, from the
viewpoint of truth and Falsity(aq. 'rfghr or wrong'), it is "jd pro quo
' Comparc William of Shyrcswood, !ntroductioncsin Lagicam, p. 8211'19; Kncale, The

Dardapmcnr qf Logic, [up. 248-24-9. Walther Burley, Dc puritate artis logicac, p. 47, ed.
Büehner; Nürman Krctzmann, I'ViHiamef Shcru-aod'sIntroduction ra Logic, l). 122ll n. 74.
: E.g. see the Ars Burana, pmloguc, p. 179 and the Tractatuszlnagnini, p. 2602Ff.
vera est !acutio'.' From now 011 supponerepro is no longer equivalent

to habere se ad appellata, but has the broader sense of standfor (stare
pro)
.
Thus we have seen the later theory of snpposition growing out of the
grammaticaI-logical analysis of the proposition, as it is found in the
Priscian commentaries, the tracts on fallacy and the logica! compendia
of the second half oFthe twelfth century.
! Seeabove, pp. 5463.; 551 f.

CHAPTER XVII
THE LOGICAL THEORT

OF THE PROPERTIES OF TERMS UP TO ABOUT 1200
I - The Problcn'n of Meaning in the Middle Ages
Already in the Fll'St chapter of the Sophistical chütations Aristotle rc-

marked that things qua things, literally speaking, cannot cnter into a
statement but by virtue of the substitutivc value ofnouns:
Soph. EI. !, 16536-13: änsï *roïp oüv. It is impossible in a discussion to bring in
Estw aü'roï tti npäïpwra: Stacläïsa-B-m the actual things discussed: we use their
qaäpovtag,&)J..&Toïc, övöpmcw &Wï 'tiiw names as symbols instead of them; and
Epaïpäcfmv xpcögeöaz614;GupB-Slom,16 therefore we suppose that what follows in
oupBo-zïvov&:cl 'n'-"w övoliäz'rmu xai". ärcl the names, follows in the things as well,
'räiu npmïuärmv 'hïoüpeöa: auuBuivEL-u, just as peüple..who calculate suppose in
xa&änsp && 1:631;Lþ'hcpmvtoic; low- regard to their counters. But the two
Copäumg.16 8' 0153:Es'rw öpowv' tri päv cases(namesand things) are not alike. For
ïäcp övöuaru narcäpnw-cm.xai. 'rö täv namesare Enite und so is the sum-total of
löïmv nl'ï'jäoq, 16»:Si: rrpäzïpæm rbv formulae, while things are infinite in
&ptäuöv «izapa? &crw. &vmïxaïov oüv number. lnevitably, then, the same for-
nleim töv aü'töv ).61'0'9xai. roüvoga Tö mulae, and a single name, have a number
äv a'quctivst of meanings. (Oxford translation).
Thc symbolic or signiEcativc function OFthe noun is denotari in the

Aristotelian-Boethian delïnition usual in Mediaeval logic: nomenest vox
signi 'cativa etc.2 From the first (lccadcs of the thirtccnth
......
century onwards & good deal of attention was paid precisely to the sign-
'charactcr of the noun. Scc e.g. the Tractatusdc proprietatibussermonum,
p. 7103?Ff. (our Tracl: XIV):
Unde non aliud videtur dicere vocem signifïcarerem nisi vocennfacere signum de re, non
quodfaceredicat agere,sed signumfacereidest: natamesse.?-
Compare Peter OFSpain, Summulaclogicales,nr. 6.03, where he explains

the dichrencc between siganatio and suppositio:
! The initial part of our passageis quoted in the prologue of the Tracrarusdeproprietatibus
sermonum, see our edition, p. 70920'11.
2 AriStOtle, Dc lmcrpr... l-6a19ff.; Boetllus, Dc sy". categ., 794DH'.
3 For the term nota (aüpBolo-u or cmxsïw), see Boethius, In Periherm.II, 257'".
SigniFlcatio est signi ad signatum, suppositio autem non est signi ad signatum sed suppo—
siti ad suppositum. Ergo significatio ct suppositio diFferunt.
A noun (nomen)denotes id de quo possumusloqui, or, to use Peter

Helyas' words: nomenrcpcrrumjüit ad discernendumdc quo]?"cretsermo.! Its
proper functionis nominatio 01' appellatio. See e.g. the Ars Meliduna:
appellant nomina res illa; propter quas supponendasjfer'unt I'Jrïstimm.2Nominarc
or appellare rem is to "call" or "make present" an individual thing in a
talk or atdiscussion by meansofa symbol or signJ (e.g. the symbolic or
signiücative Fllnction of the name). So our authors Frequcntly stress the
notion of presence in their definitions ofappeHatia; e.g. the Ars flJeIiduna:
appellatio est per verbum presentis temporis vera attributia sive copulatio.4
However, the appellative noun secondarily conveys a signyï'catioin the
strict sense of the tcrm, that is the connotation of a universal nature.
E.g. see the follox—vingpassageFrom the Ars ;l'lehduna:
Licet autem ad appellandum tantum fuerint instituti: voces, tamcn preter appellationem
habentetiam signiücationem.Sedhancex appellationecontraxerunt aive ex institutione
factaad appellandum.5
ln accordance with this twofold function of the noun, the Roman

grammarianscalled it the property (praprium)of the noun to signify sub-
stance and quality!) This phrase is conunonly intcrprcted by twelfth
century grammar as dcnoting an individua] thing and the universal nature
(jbrma) in which it partidpatesi
Thus, From the logical point of view there is' a certain internal tension
in the semantic Fleld of an appellative noun: on the one hand it denotes
zmindividual thing this
(substantia), being the proper appellativefunction
of the noun, and on the other it contains the connotation of some
universal natureUb-rmaor qualitas).
As we havealreadyseenabove(Chapter XV), the fallam)rof the Egure
of speech mised some problems concerning thc meaning of appellativc
' Paris, Ariana] ?] 1, [. l7ï'ü; after William of Couches; see above, p. 222.
2 Seeabove Chapter VII, p. 294 and also our Chaptcr XVI, p. 537.
3 Aristotle speaksül- 'symbols': foïc; övöwraw &vrï T(TJ'U npaïpäïmv xpdapeüa.(bc;
Gulxüölou;(Saph.E)., [65:17-3).
* See Chapter VH, p. 3I6 and some of the deEnitiona of appellatio quotcd below,
pl). 561-565.
5 SeeaboveChaptcr VII, p. 294.
6 Sec Priscian, Inn. grannn. " 18, p. 556 ed. Hcrtz: proprium est nominis signiEcarc
substantiamet qualitatem. Cfr. Donatus,Arsgrammarica
ll I, p. 3732"3cd. Keil.
? SeeChapter XVI, pp. 522IT.
THE LOGICAL Ti-uzom' OF THE PROPERTIES OF lemas 557
nouus. ln fact, an unmistakable point of contact with the problem of

meaning mentioned above is Founcl in the usual clei'inition of the jigura
diCtionis secundum appellationem. E.g. in Glase in flrist. Soph. EI.l :
6109:in zlrist. Saph.EL, p. 212l2'10cd. De llijk: Figuradictionis secundumappellationem

est quando aliqua vox eadem Figurationc appellat plura et ex. hoc videtur signiFlcarehoc
aliquid. De qua Figuradictionis dicit Aristotiles [Carcg., 3!) 10-14]: "'omnis substantia
videtur hocaliquid signiFlcare;et in primis quidem substantiisindubitabile verum est;
in secundis videtur subjigura appellationi$".ï
Ibid., p. 2225"' (ad Soph. Ei. l68a23): Enim, idest quia, conuictum, idest consuetudo
est, omnia nomina appellatiua significarerclur hoc aliquid, idest aliquam rem discretam,
sub figura appellationis. Et hoc demonstrat in Predicamcntiscum dicit (3IJIO-l4)
...... ctc. Ut hoc nomen 'homo' appellat Socratem et Platonem eadem Figuraet ex
hoc videtur quod significet Socratem et Platonem; non tamen est verum.
This was the cruxof every theory of meaningin the Middle Ages, whether
of the Platonic or Aristotelian-Boethian type. It is not surprising, then,
that we chl Abailarcl occupiecl with just this problem in his com-
mentar)r on Aristotle's Categories.When commenting upon Categ.,
3b IOH., he touches the heart of the problem- of meaning as it was
considered in Ancient anc] Mediaeval thought:
Log. lngrcd., p. I575'1hlcd. Geyer: Sed nulla substantia universalis nisi particularis, quia
scilicet nullam videtur rem subiectam signiücarc nisi ut hoc aliquid, idest personaliter
discretam ab omnibus aliis rebus, pro eo scilicet quod nulla res est nisi ut discreta. Et
hoc est quod ait: omnis substantia videtur signilicare hoc aliquid, idest rcm subiectam
nominare ut hoc aliquid, idest peraonalitcr discretam. Nisi et inde faceremus in modo
significandi, non esset falsum, quod videretur., quippe nun aliae rcs numinantur ab
universalibus quam a particularibus. Et in primis quidem, idest in particularibus nominibus
substantiarum, indubitabile est. (Quia) posset esse tamen et falsum, addit: et verum est.
Individuumcnim. Probat a pari, quod signiFlcant rem ut hoc aliquid, quia significant eam
ut individuum, et quia individuum accipi posaetvel propter duritiam vel propter parvi-
tatem, determinat se individuum accipere iucundumpersonalemdiïcrctioncm, cum supponit:
'unum numero', idest personaliter discretum. ln secundisrero. In primis videtur et est,
'sed in secundis vidctur similiter, ut scilicet significent rem subiectam ut personaliter
discretam, sed non est verum. Et unde videretur similiter, supponit: cx figura appel-
lationiï, idest ex ;imiiitudinc nominationis.Similes namque sunt secundaesubstantiae cum
primis in eo quod easdem res quae discretae sunt, nominant, sed in modo quidem
nominandi differunt, quia primae, inquantum hoc aliquid sunt, nominant eas, idest ut
personaliter discretas et ab omnibus differentes, secundae vero easdem appellant ut
convenientes. Sed magk. Secundae non signiFlcant res suas ut hoc aliquid, sed potius ut
quale aliquid, quia cum primae substantiae maxime propter discretionem substantiae
sint impositae, secundae impositae sunt propter qualitatem substantiae. Licet enim 'Sa-
Saph.EL, þ. 327'0'13ed. Dc Rijk.

' Cfr. Summa
: Tt?)armum. fik rrpoa'ch-piïg.
cratea'qualitates easdemdeterminet quas continent superiora nomina, non tamen propter

eas impositum fuit, SH] propter personalem substantiae discretionem, quam communia
nomina non denotabunt.
[bini, p. l585'13: Nequeenim. Vere secundaesubstantiaenon signiFlcantrem suam ut hoc
aliquid, quia res non significatur ab ea ut hoc aliquid. A pari vel quasi a relativis. Et hoc
est: nequeenimeo quodsubiectum est, idest nominatum a secundasubstantia, subiectum ei
ut unum, et ne 'unum' acciperemus pro convenienti iuxta illud: 'plures homines unus',
unum dico quemadmodumprima subsrantia, idest unum personaliter, sicut est primae
substantiae, inquantum ab ea signiFicatur. Sedde pluribus homodicitur et anima), quod
Scilicet non esset,si rem ut personaliterdifferentem signiücarent. Nonautemsimpliciter.
Quare dixit 'quale aliquid' et non simpliciter 'quale', determinat, quia scilicet non
tantum qualitatis significationem tenent secundae substantiae, 1warumetiam certum
statum secundaecontinent.
The occurrence "ofthe term status in the final sentence of our quotation
shows clearly enough that the famous problem of the universalia is in-
volved here. For that matter, a Platonic view on this problem is found
in William of Conches' Giese in Priscianum.1 A clear-cut distinction
betweennominare(appellare)and signi "careappearsin Abailard's Porphyry
glosses in the Logica Nostrorumpetitioni:
Lagica Nostrorumpetitioni, p. 52713-5283 ed. Geyer: genera et species quaedam, non
omnia, in sensibilibus sunt posita, hocest sensibilia habent nominare,et ponuntur extra
sensibilia, idest res habent significareet non cum aliqua forma quae sensui subiaceat.,
quia si res omnes formas quae sensui subiacent, amitterent, non ideo minus a genere et
specie nominari possent. Sunt igitur genera et species in sensibilibus posita per appel-
lationem, extra vero per signilïcationem.
In hac vero ultima quaestione Büethius Aristotelem et Platonem diversas esse in verbis
commemorat hoc modo: Aristoteles omnia universalia in sensibilibus esseponit, extra
vero intelligi; Plato vero non modo intelligi, verum etiam ( . . . .
. . . . . )
sic intellexisse arbitror, quod genera et speciesin sensibilibussubsistantper appel-
lationem, idest in se appellant, extra vero intelliguntur, quia intellectus eorum absque
omni sensibilitate habentur, quia non faciunt concipere res ut informatas formis, secun-
dum quas res sensui subiacent. Plato vero dicit genera et species non solum extra in-
telligi, verum etiam extra subsistere,quia Si res substantiaeonmibus illis formis carerent,
secundum quas res sensui subiacent, non minus tamen secundum intellectus generum et
specierumveraciter deliberari possent. Apparet igitur in sensunon essediversos,
quamvis in verbis 'ificleatmr.2
It is not surprising at all that, though distinguishing well between

nominareand significare, William of Conches holds that sometimes the
' Seeabove Chapter V, pp. 223 IT.
3 CompareJohn of Salisbury, ;I-Iamlag.
ll 20, p. 1046'3: fere in omnium ore celebre
est, aliud scilicct essequod appellativa signiEcant et aliud essequod nominant. Nomi-
nantur singularia, sed universaliasigniEcantur.
THE LOGICAL THEORT 01: THE PROPERTIES 01: TERMS 559
appellative noun denotes (nominat)the species which it signiHes.No

doubt his view arisesfrom the ChartresPlatonismhe adheresto:
Giesein Priscianum,f. 271'11
[see above, p. 224]: Sed qumnvis proprie nominat ipsa in-
dividua, aliquandotamen ex adiuncto nominatspeciemquamsigniFlcat.th hic: 'homo
estspecies'.
Thus we Find in the twelfth century theory of meaning tx-vo foci:

nominatioand signmcatio.Apart from the fact that the Platonists, such as
William of Conches, used the term ilnf.:mru'.n.-«m'a"
also when generic or
specilïc terms are concerned, the distinction between both notions is
rather vague, since Abailard and the other anti-Platonists, too, made use
of the term signyï'catioloosely. As & matter of fact they &" frequently
speakof signi/ï'catiowhen individual things are concerned. For Abailard,
see our last quotation.' ln fact, the term 'signiücatio'(e.g. 'signüï'care')
is used in Mediaeval logic in a broader and in & stricter sense?2which
may be shown in this table:
S appellatio or nominatio (: denotationEFan individual thing)
signiücatios.l. ?
(: "meaning") signiücatios.s. (: connotationofa universalnature).
However, many Mediaeval scholars do distinguish sharply between

signfjï'catiain the strict senseand nominatio. It is not surprising, indeed,
that the evidence for this is found in the tracts on fallacy, which, of
course, had & special need for clear-cut distinctions in order to solve
sophisms. They deflne univocity as manente eadem signi 'catione variata
nominissuppositio) ngnäfï'catiais to be taken in this deFmition as the
presentationqf the universal nature (þrma) to the understanding,4 and,
accordingly, the term is here usedin the strict sense("connotation of a
universal nature"). Besides,this deBnition introduces the notion of sup-
'position.5 The same can be seen in the passagewhere the author of the
Ars Mehdunacontrasts the notions of signücatio, snppositio,and appellatio.
The passageis of some importance as it shows the absence, again, of a
' For other examples, see the Gloss.Promisimus, [. 491'11,

quoted above, p. 261 ; Tracracus
Anagnini, p. 32535Ff. and above Chapter XVI, p. 539.
1 As is known, Ockham has & Fourfold distinction. See E. A. Moody, The Lagi: qf William
(!)-Ockham, pp. 113-115.
1 Seeabove, Chapter XV, pp. 4-95IT.
4 Seeabove, pp. 5220".;' 556; 566 Ff.
5 For the correct sense,seeabove,ChapterXVI, pp. S28Ff.
560 LOGICA MODERNORLm-t "
clear distinction between signjfïcatia and suppositio, in contrast with the

sharp one between siganatia-suppositio and appellatio:
Ars Melidunum,[. 2241'0: Neque enim nomen rc cedente significationem amisit quam
prius habuerit, sed appellationem..... Unde et semperexigit rei existentiam. Distat
ergo inter suppositionem, significationem, appellationem, quia duo prima precedunt
tertium
..... ; ipsa vero simul. Signiücat itaque 'Cesar' individuum ..... ; et ita
signiEcat individuum quod non est nec tamen (erit) aliquod individuum. Sicut supponit,
vel, secundum alios, signiücnt homoqui nonestet tamen quilibet homo est, quia signiFlcatio
dictionis appellationemampliat.'
Together with the introduction of the notion suppositio,which originally

the basicfunction of
denotedmakingor actingasa subjectin a prcæpzm'tmnw,z
the proposition was acknowledged. Accorclingly, the gloss Promisimus
paraphrases Priscian's well-known formula: 'omne nomensignifcat sub-
stantiam et qualitatem' with: each noun signiFles that which "underlies"
the verbal expression (suppositalocutioni). ln Priscian's formula, the
author adds, the term inaun' is ambiguous:
GlossPramisimus,P.47"): unme nomen signiFlcatsubstantiam cum qualitate, idest sup-
posita locutioni, sive signiEcet rem per se existentem, sive non. Nota quod
......
cum dicitur "omne nomen signiFlcntsubstantiam", 1w.*.mr'iatur'nomen'; quod multipliciter
accipitur pro actu subsistendi, pro re per se existente, pro supposito locutioni. Et hoc
modo accipitur cum dicitur: 'nomcnsignyï'ca:subscantiam'.(see above, p. 259).
Thus, the term 'supposita!acutioni' (: "the subject-matter of & talk")

turus out to be a comprehensiveterm for both the individualthing (sub-
stantia 01' resper se exissem)and the universal nature( forma or qualitas)
participated by it. Accordingly, the internal tension present in the noun
as signifying "substance" and "quality" returns in the notion of suppo-
sition. At the same time, however, the clear-out opposition of signif-
catio-suppositio to appellatio (nominatio) occasioned the first main
distinction within the somewhat confuse notion ofsuppasitio - signy'i'catio.
2 - Appellation
Two basic connotations are found in the notion of appellatio termini,

w'z.(l) the useof that term in a proposition, and (2) the occurrenceof a
verb of the present tense in that proposition.
! For the completetext, seeabove,ClmpterVI, p. 316.

: Seeabove, ChapterXVI, pp. 5185.
THE LOGICAL THEOR'ï' 01: THE PROPERTIES OF TERMS 561
The former connotation is to be considered as the fundamenta] one

both of the theory of appellation and of that of supposition in general.
No doubt, this important ingredient notion arose From the large amount
of attention paid by the twelfth century grammariansto syntax (con-
structio), which led to quite & new approach of analyzingthe proposition
as a basic element both of logic and grammar.l The Mediaeval gram-
spoke in this connection of congruitas,while the logicians
nmrians macustlyr
denoted the same thing with veritas propositianst It should be noticed
that when discussing such problems our tracts sometimes use the
formula.: "subjects are of such sorts as the predicates may have allowed"
qualiapredicatapermiserunt).E.g.
(talia suntsubiecca
Ars Burana, p. 21322'25: Unde congrue dicitur: 'quid sit Socratesscitur, dicitur
......
vcl enuntiaturab ista'; aliis vero verbis, ut dicunt, non congruepossuntsupponere:talia
enim sunt subiecta qualia predicata permiserunt.
William of Shyreswood rightly pointed out, however, that the reference

to Boethius (found in some tracta, indeedi) is incorrect, since the
authoritative Opinion of Boethius is as followsf'predicates are of such
sortsasthe subjectamayhaveallowed", and not vice versa.4
No doubt, the (incorrect) referenceto Boethius'formula may be
taken as& clue for the unawarenessof the scholars concerned of the true
origin of the prepositional approach out of the grammatical discussions
of syntax (constructio),and the logical discussionsabout the correct view
of the proposition. As to the latter, it was focussed on what Ernest
Moody hascalled5the opposition of the inherence theory and the identity
theory. The latter was held by the grammarians as early as the days of
William of Clïalnpeatlx.5 In propositions such as 'Socratesestalbus', they
interpreted the predicate album as standing only for Socrates who, in
fact, is the only thing actually denoted by the term 'albus' in this propo-
sition. Doing so the grammarians centred their analysis of the propo-
! For this "propositional" or "contextual"approach,seeChapterIl, above,pp. 113-117,

and our Index verborumand rerum, s.v. prapoxitional.
: Seethe Index, s. W.
3 See the Index locorum.
in logicam,p. 7821'25:Sciendumautem quod hec est auctoritas Boetii:
4 Introductianes
"talia sunt predicata qualia permiserint subiecta", et non huius conversa. Ut est exem-
plum eius ibidem istud: 'homoes.'.funus', 'Deusest iustus'. The reference is to Boethius,
De Trinitate, p. 1564'5 ed. Peiper.
5 Truth and Conscquencc, in ;l'fcdiaeval [agit, pp. 36 Ff. See also my [ntl'oduction to the
edition of Abailard's Dialectica,5 6.
6 See (.'hapter IV, above, pp. 183-186.
562 LOGICA MODERNORUh-l u
sition and of the proper task of the copula ('est') primarily around the
general theory of signilïcation rather than around an ontological inter-
pretation of the predicate term as standing For some universal nature.
The latter view was held, indeed, by the dialecticians in William's days!
and by the young Abailarcl as well.2 They all followed Aristotle's foot-
steps, who, 515is known, showed little interest in the signiFlcation
problems as logica! problems (semantics)and, accordingly, centred his
logic primarily around the analysis of the logic of CIaSSGS.3This theory,
still occurring in the fourteenth century, has been named by Moody the
inherencetheory. It holds that the 00pula (*est') in an aFFlrmative
propo-
sition statesthe inherence of & universal nature (forma)signiüedby the
predicate-term in an individual thing denoted by the subject-term. ln
other words: the inherence theory takes it to be the function of the
copula to copulate the intension of the predicate-term with the. extension
of the subject-term (logically: it statesthe subsumptionof the classto
which the subject-term belongsto that of the predicate-term). On the
other hand the identity theory takes it to be the function of the copula
to identify subject and predicate (logically: to identify the actual ex-
tension Ofthe subject-term with that of the predicate-term).4
Accordingly, when analyzing such propositions as 'Socratesest albus'
the grammarians and, generally speaking, the adherents to the identity
them")r esPecially considered the nominata or appeHataof the appellative
nouns used in the pmposition, that is: those individual things actually
denoted in the prcposition.5 This analysisof the function of the copula
in an affirmative proposition, and of the proposition in general, laid the
basis of the earliest stage of the supposition theory, viz. the theory of
appellation as found in the older tracts on the properties of terms.6
The other substantial connotation of the theory of appellation, viz.
that the verb of the proposition in which the appellative noun occurs,
is of the present tenseff' should be considered in close relation to the
first connotation discussed above. This appears most clearly from the
defmition of appellation given by the author of the Ars Meliduna,where
the notions of vera attributia and copulatio are qualiFled by the addition
' See above, pp.. 183-186.

3 Seeabove, ibid., and my lntroduction to Abailard's Dialecrica, p. XXXVHIH'.
3 Seealso Phil. Boehner, ;l-iedievalLogic, p.. 28.
4 Sec Moody, op. cfr., p. 36.
5 Seeabove, p. 183Ff.
5 For this stageof develoPment, see our Chaptcr XVI, above, p. 528Ff.
? Seeabm'e, p. 560.
THE LOGICAL THEOR'l' OF THE PROPERTIES 01: TERMS 563
that this attribution or copulation is made through a vcrb gfthc present tensa:
ArsMaliduna,f. 2411; (seeabove, p. 316): appellatio est per verbum presentistempo-

ris vera attributio sive copulatio.
Both ingredients, viz. true copulation (or: congruity) and copulation

through a presentverb, are found in most of the defmitions of appellation:
:! Introd. Paris., p. 37123'35:Appellatio, ut solet dici, est presentialis conve-

niential alicuius cum aliquo; vel: quedam proprietas que inest termino ex
eo quod pro presenti signiücat, ut solet dici.
b Dial. dianam,p. 61631'22:dicitur terminus appellareid de quo vere
.....
et presentialiteret aflïrmativepotest predicari.
c Tracr.dcprap. sermonum,: p. 72222'25:Appellare est assignarealiquem. Unde
terminum appellare nil aliud est quam terminum convenire alicui, hocest em:
assignarealicui medianteverbo prcsentistemporis. Appellatio est proprie-
tas quc inest voci ex eo quod assignet aliquem mediante verbo presentis
temporis.
d William of Shyreswood, Introd. in logicam, p. 74:543: Appellatio autem est
presens convenientia termini, idest proprietas secundum quam signiEcatum
termini3 potest dici de aliquo, mediante hoc xfeïqu 'est'.
4: Pater of Spain, Summulac logicales, m'. l0.01: Appellatio est acceptio
termini pro re existente.
As is easily seen, William centres his delïnition around the signtiatum

of a term, that is the universal nature(farma) signified by & term. He
Speaksof "the prcperty of & term with re5pect to which what the term
signiFlescan be (truly) said of something through the use of the verb
*is'". Accordingly, he says that apptllation is in & term insofar as it is
of the thingssubordinateto the term takenasa universal
(truly) predicable
term, through the use of the verb iis'f' Therefore, William adds;- some
peoplesaythat & term serving as& subject supposits(supponit)and that it
appellates(appellat)when it servesas & predicate. This is explained by
William in this way: because & term serves as a predicate-term, it is
related to the subject-term through some of the things signiFledby it, and
I pmentiahs convenientia : "present correct application"; see Normau Krctzmann,

William cy'Sherwaod'sIntraduction ta Logic, translation, p. 106.
: For this tract, seebelow, pp. 575-578. it will be edited in full asour TraccXIV.
3 signy'ïcatumtermini, i.e. "the universal nature the term signifies".
4 Introd. in logicam,p. 827"): Appellatio autem inest termino secundumquod est predi-
cabilis de suis rebus mediante hoc verbo 'an'.
5 lbid... p. 8211": Dicünt igitur quidam quod terminus ex parte subiecti supponit et ex
parte predicati appellat.
564 LOGICA MODERNORUM H
in that capacity it appellates.' It appears from the last quotation that the
quidammentioned by Willimn are aclhercnts of the identity theory of the
copula: both subject-term and preclicate-term are taken in- their
extensional values, the force of the capula being that of just stating the
iclentity of the extensionsof the subject- and predicatfæterm..2It should
be noticed, hox-vever, that William himself appears to adoPt the in-
herence theory, according to which the copula determines that the
subject-term is to be taken in extension, but that the predicate-term is
to be interpreted in intension, as standing for the universal nature which
it connotes (i.e. its signyï'catum).Accordingly, William calls appellation
the predicabiligr of & general term, not its actual use as a predicate in &
proposition.
The same view is Found in the Logica Cum sit nostra, p. 44934'25: cst
appellatio sermonispredicabilis signyf'ïcatiasine tempore,where the addition
of isine tempore', which is made in contra-distinction to copulation,3 is
noticeable in this connection.
As will be clear From the next section, appellation, roughly spealcing,
concerns the snpposition of & term as regards existing things only.
Accordingly, it is to be considered as oni)r & sub-classof supposition. It
is known that William OFOckham (leclined to make use of the dis-
tinction between supposition and appellationi For that matter, the
theory of appellation as found in the later Summulcis but a remnant of
the Erst stageof the theory of the properties of terms, when appellation,
not supposition, was in the focusof the thaïwary'.5
BeFore passing over to the notion of snpposition it seems to be of some

importance to pay attention to two renmrks by Mr Kneale in his Develop-
! !bid., p. 82l7'19: Secundum autem quod predicatur, comparatur ad subiectum suum

per aliquam suarum rerum, et secundum hoc appellat.
2 Cfr. E. Moody, Truth and Consequcncc
in Mediana] Lagic, p. 36.
4 Summatalius logicac, ] 631'", pp. 175-176 ed. Boelmer: Est autem primo sciendum
accipitur dupliciter, scilicet large et stricte. Large acceptanon distin-
quod suppositio
guitur contra appellationem, sed appellatio est unum contentum sub snppositi-one.
Aliter accipitur stricte., secundum quod distinguitur contra appellationem. Sed sic non
intendo loqui de suppositione,sed primo modo tantum. Et sic tam subiectmn quam
praedicatum supponit; et universaliter: quidquid potest esse subiectum propositionis
1velpraedicatum, supponit.
5 Seeabove,pp. 528ff.
THE LOGICAL THEORT OF THE PROPERTIES 01: TERMS 565
ment gif Logic.' He seems to be right in pointing outz that it is a little

surprising in Shyreswood's chnition of the notion of appellatio that all
terms should be assumedto signify universal maturesUbrnæac).He sul)-
posesthat we may perhaps take this assumption as an indication that the
theory was Erst conceived as a doctrine about general terms such as
*homo' anc] only later extended to singular terms such as 'Socrates'and
*iHc'. ] think, the state ofaFfairs as pointed out by Kneale in Shyreswoocl's
exposition, hasbeen observed correctly, but our surprise may disappear
as soon as we realize that the theory was FlI'Stconceived and presented,
indeed, as a theory of the meaning of the appellative noun and, ac-
cordingly, was& theory of appellation rather than & theory of supposition.
Kneale's second remark concerns the convenientia
prcsentialis(Shyres-
wood has: presens as& basicnotion of appellatio. He thinks3
convenientia)
it rather curious that no term is said to have appellation unless it is
applicable to something existing at the time of speaking. He rightly adds
that for understanding this feature of the theory we must consider the
rest of the supposition theory in more detail, and that we may suppose
that Mediaeval logicians thought of appellatiua as involved primarily in
such statements as 'this is a man', when we call & present individual by a
general term. However, our surprise may disappear, again, when we
know that, in the earliest stage of the theory, the appellation was
supposed to be ampliated or restricted to something past, present, or
Future, and that after the appellation theory was replaced by the snp-
position theory and the ampliations and restrictions of appellation were
considered as ampliations and restrictions OFsnpposition, the notion of
appellatio was limitated to the basic type of presentialisconvenientia.
3 - Supposi tion
As we have seen in the Erst section,,4 in the Erst stage of the develop-
ment of the theory of supposition there existed an internal tension
within the rather vague Fleld of signiflcation of a noun such as considered
by the Mecliaeval grammarians and logicians: this clearly appears in
Priscian's formula: proprium est nominis signifï'care substantiam et quali-
tatem.5This interna] tension is still found to exist in an ambivalent term
quogic, pp. 247-248.

! TheDcrclopment 2 lbid... p. 247.
: Ibid.,
pp.2 47443.
Seeabove, 556. Seealso Chapter XVI, above, pp. 5239.
* p.
5 For the interpretatioh of the formula, see above, pp. 222I'T.; 230 Hl; 24I IT.; 258IT.;
29454 522ff.
such as suppositalocutioni (: "the subject-matter(s) of talk"). However,

the notion of appellatio termini as concerning only things existing really
(in the present, past, or future) seems to have led to a FlI'Stcontra-
distinction, a little vague, it is true, of suppositio and signyïcario. The
situation is rather dif&cult, at Fll'Stsight, when we start From Shyres-
wood's definitions of the terms involved:
Introductianes.in logicam, p. 7415'13: Est igitur signilïcatio presentatio alicuius forme ad
intellectum. Suppositio autem est ordinatio alicuius intellectus sub alio. Et est copulatio
ordinatio alicuius intellectus supra alium.
Norman Kretzmann translates as Follows' :

SigniHcation, then, is :: presentation of the Form of something to the understanding.
Supposition, however, is an ordering of the understanding of something under something
else; and copulation is an ordering of the understanding of sumething oversomcthingelse.
I am afraid, his interpretation is far From convincing. (l) William has

alicuius þrmc and alicuius intcllccrus, not: jbrmc alicuius and intellectus
alicuius; accordingly we have to translate: 'some form', not *the—form qf
something',etc. (2) ordinatio alicuius intellectussub alia is to be rendered
OFsome thought under some other thought', not, as
with: Il(J-rdta-ring
Kretzmann has, ' under something else'. That we should
......
supply sub alio (intellectu), clearly appears from the phrase supra alium
(not: supraaliud) in line 18. (3) Kretzmann failed to notice the ambi-
valent meaning of such & word as 'intellectus'. [n fact, to the Mediaeval
mind (and to the Ancient as well) the word 'mteüectus'can deuote both
thought in the senseof thinking or :mderstanding,and thought in the sense
of concept?[ think the former meaning is found in line 16, and the latter
in line 17. (4) The word supraused in line 18 should be rendered with
over and above,as indicating an addition or cumulation of concepts, such
as in 'homo albus', which is homo 4- albus. For my interpretation,
compare p. 7424-25: et dicitur copulatio significatio alicuius ut adiacentis,
et quod tale est, natum est ordinari supra aliud.3 I prcpose this trans-
lation of our passage:
SigniEcation, then, is the presentation of some form to thought. Supposition, however,
is the ordering of some thought (concept) under some other thought. And capulation is
the ordering (cumulation)ofsome thought (concept)over andabovesomeother thought.
1 0P- tit., p. 105.

2 mostly referring as& mental sign to smnething existing.
3 Of course we here Fundaliud, not alium, since William speaks, now, of the order of
things,not of that of thought..
THE LOGICAL THEOIW OF THE PROPERTIES OF TERMS 567
Kretznmnn says! that these definitions seem unnecessarily vague and

platy no important part in the remainder of the chapter. [ think he is
right as far as his second statement is concemed. As to the Erst, one
thing is clear enough: for William significatio is nothing more than just
the conceptual presentation of & universal nature, x-vhilesuppositiois more
in that suppositioapparently is the ordering of one
than signyQ'catio0111)Ir
concept to another. Signyicatia is concerned with simple or incomplex
terms, suppositiowith the composition of two terms. Peter of Spain
describes the difference between signi 'catio and suppositioas follows:
Summulaelogicalcs, m'. 6.03: DiHEI'unt autem suppositio et signiFlcatio quia signiEcatio
est per impositionem vocis ad rem significandam, suppositio vero est acceptio ipsius
termini iam signiücantis rem pro aliquo. Ut cum dicitur: 'homo currit', iste terminus
'homo' supponit pro Sorte vel Platone; et sic de aliis. Quare significatio prior est suppo-
sitione et non sunt idem, quia signiücare est vocis, supponere vero termini iam com-
positi ex voce et significatione. Ergo suppositio non est significatio. Item. SigniEcatio
est signi ad signatum, suppositio autem non est signi ad signatum, sed supponentisï ad
suppositum. Ergo signiücatio et suppositio differunt.
However, what is the precise meaning of Wiiiiam's term 'ordinotia'?

One might think, at Fll'Stsight, 01:111ordering of one concelat under
are ordered under their generain the Tree of Porphyry.
another, asspecies
As a matter of Fact, supposition seemsto be conceived in that wa): in the
Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum:
p. 7119'11: Videtur autem quod mpponcrcsecundum ctimologiam vocum non sit nisi
subponere,idest designarealiquid sub aliqua forma. Subpositioenim dicitur quasi Püïitiü
sub, ut videtur.
p. 71216'23: Suppositio igitur est significatio rei sub Forma substantiali perliciente eam
prout sub ipsa cogitata est res ut perfectum et per se ens, non ad aliud dicta per modum
accidentis, sed ad quod dicatur aliud. Unde supponere est signiEcare rem sub aliqua
forma ut per quam cogitatur res ut per se ens et stans in anima et de quo possit fieri
sermoet respectucuius dicatur aliud, cum ipsum non cogitatur ut dependensab alia,
hoc respectu habito ad ea que sunt secundum modum secundum quem est id quod est
substantia.
However, if this interpretation is correct, the opposition of supposition

to copulation would be somex-vhat surprising. When defined as the
ordering of some concept over another concept (as & translation of
lop. tit., p. 105, n. 3.

ïThe manuscript Vat. Reg. Lat. 1205 used by Bocheüski wrongly has suppoxitii The
correct reading suppooentisis found in liat. Reg. Lat. 1731. The manuscript Milon,
H. 113].64-does not contain the sentcnce beginning with Item.
William's ordinatio alicuius intellectussupra alium) copulatio" would

therefore be quite the same thing as supposition, so that viewed from
the irgfmusthe ordcring would be called supposition, while viewed from
the superius it x-vould bc copulation. However, all authors, including
William of Shyrcsx-vood,conncct the notion of adiacentiawith copulation
and, accordingly, take copulation as a property of the adjective noun
and the verb, not of the substantive nüunwI while snpposition is a property
of the substantivenoun, or of the substantivatccl
adjectivc moum..2
Before solving this difficult)! it seems of some use to take the dc-
Enitions of supposition given by the other tracts into consideration:
Introd. Paris., p. 371'5'10: suppositio est quedam proprietas que inest dictioni ex eo
quodsubstantivesiveexistentersigniFncnt.
Logim 'Ut dicit', p. 40817'33:cst suppositiosubstantivarci designatio,hocestquedam
praprietastermini substantivi.
Logica'Cumsit nostra', p. 44613'19:cst suppositio substantivarci designatio, idest signifi-
catio termini substantivi.
lbid., p. 44633'33: suppositio est sermonis suhicibilis significatio; 'scrmonis subicibihs'
ponitur ad difTerentiamsermonispredicabilis.Hec est differentia inter suppositionemct
signiHcationem:supponereest rem suamsub appositoponere; signilïcareest rem suam
sub principali ratione ipsius instituentis designare.
Dial Monac...p. 60623—24:
supponere siquidem est substantive rcm signilïcarc et per se et
.
sine dependentia tali que est in principali signiücntione.
Two key-notions may be obscrved in all these (IeFmitions: (l) sup-

position is assumedto be a property of & substantiveterm, and (2) sup-
position is assumed to be a prcperty of & term in 50 far as it is used in &
pl'Oposition. As to the second notion, it should be barne in mind that
this notion is (lecideclly involved in & phrase such as ex eo quodsubstantive
sive existentersignyï'cat. For that matter, such signiücatio is only found
when & term occurs in a proposition, nmnelj,r 1««a-Inenit is connected with
a verb of the present, past, or future tense.3
The clearest exPression of this notion is found in the deEnition which
is given in the Logica Cumsit nostra, p. 4—4630'3'
: to supposit is to posit its
rcs under the predicate (supponere
est remsuamsub appositoponere). At the
' For the notion of copulation,scc below, p. 578Ff.

: Sec the Logica 'Cum si: nostra', 1). 44615'21and the Tractatusdc proprieraribussermonum,
pp. 7l l-712.
3 For the view that actual existencein the present (or past, 01'future) time is the kcy
notior! Of substantiam :igngficarc and substantive :il'c cxistcntcr significare, see above,
Chapter XVI, pp. 548 ff.
THE LOGICAL THEORV OF THE PROPERTIES OF TERMS 569
same time another ctyn'nological delïnition of supponereis involved: sub

apposito ponere. When putting it besiclcs that found in the Tracmtus de
praprictatibus sermonum: designare sub aliqua jbrmal one might observc
some discrepant:)Ir between them, because of the sccmingly ontological
import of the latter.2 Hm-vevcr,aswe havesaidalready(above,p. 567),
the latter view of suppositio cannot bc taken as concerning some on-
tological ordering of conccpts such as is found in the Porphyrium Trcc
for the substantive nouus. Therefore, it seems to be obvious that in the
latter interpretation of supponere
and suppositio,too, the occurrcncc of the
term in a proposition is involved as & basic one. Indeed, the phrase
designaresub aliquajbrma is to be taken as designaresubjbrma predicati, and
the usage of our author should be ascribcd to his adeption of the in-
hcrencc theory of the celelaJ.
With this, we touch upon the very heart of the supposition theory.4
This theory sulastantiallyris to be taken as an ansx-vcrto problems appear-
ing in the ilwcstigation of the logical import of the cepula 'est' (or
some vcrb containing it) in categorical aFFlrmativc propositions. And
since supposition is principally, though not (:::-u:lqgfjwzclym,5
concemed with
the quantit)r of terms as used in a preposition, it discusses,for the main
part, the extension or range of prcdicates, in the large sense of the word?
in reference to individuals (subjccts). Accordingly, the distinctions of
kincls of supposition are mainly determined by the use of quantifying
preExcs(signaquantitatis),or of demonstrativepronouns.7As this range
of predicates and subjects (individuals) was taken by the Mediaeval
grammarians and logicians as basic to what they called the congruum or
veritas of the preposition, the theory of snpposition may also be con-
sidered as an attempt to specify the congruity-conditions or truth-
conditions for the categorical proposition.
The logica] import of the copula *est' and of any verb, which as
! For the text, see above, p. 567.

: Seeabove, p. 567.
3 Seeabm'e,p. 561IT..
* See the excellunt remarks on the doctrine of supposition found in Erncst A. Moody,
Truth and Consequencc
in zlfediacval Lagic, pp. 4-38; 4-3-63.
5 QuantiHcationwas thought not to apply to terms takenin material or simple suppo-
sition. Cmnparethe FII'Ststageof the theory, in which :::-ul).r
the third kind of univocation
was considered. Sec above, pp. 528FF.
'5In the Mediaeval sensea predicate is any term in a proposition that is not the (gram-
matical ur lcgial) subject of that proposition. See Ph. Bochner, .«IJchicv-al
Lagic, pp.
10-1! '
.
? Secbelow our sectionsix, pp. 581-589.
Aristotle had already said,1 contains it in its meaning, is that it has the
function of positing & certain cmnposition of the predicate with respect
to the subject. As we have seen abwe.2 the meaning of this composition
was sometimes considered as the function of the copuladetermining that
the subject-term is to be taken in extension, i.e. for the individuals for
which it actually stands, and that the predicate-term is to be interpreted
in intension as standing for the universal nature (jbrma) which it was
assumcd to signify. In this theory the copula was taken as a sign of
inherence (inherentia)of the universal nature signiüed by the predicate-
term in the individuals for which the subjcct-term stantis (inherencc
theory of the copula). ln fact, this is the view of the. author of the
Tractatus dc proprietatibus sermonum.On the other hand, the composition
was also intcrpreted, especiallyin the later logical theories (fourteenth
century), in accordancewith the grammatica]view of predication found
as early as about 1100.3 This theory, the identity theory of the copula,
was an attempt to express the meaning of afürmative predication in a
forma] and extensional manner, in the sense, namely, that both the
subject- and the predicate-term are taken in extension, while the force
of the copula is assumedto be that of positing the ideantit)rof the exten-
sional valuesof the terms as used in the preposition.4
Accordingly, while the inherence theory construed the function of
the copula as that of associatingan intension (viz. the universal nature or
forma of the predicate-term)with an extension(viz..of the subject-term)
and the identity theory helt it to be the function of the copula to identify
the extensions of the subject- and predicateäterm, both theories are
focussedon the notion of snpposition as their key idea. For the identity
theory this is seIf—evident,since the extensional values of the terms
depend upon their actual "standing for" ("suppositing for") certain
individuals. For the inherence theory the same holds good. For that
matter, what determines the truth of a preposition in which certain
terms occur as subject and predicate, is not the fact that they have
meaningor intension of their own; it is rather the fact that thereis (or:
can be, in & certain kind of ampliation) something individual for which
the subject-term is usedand with which the universalnature (þrma)
signiHeclby the predicate-term is assumedto be connected.5
' De Interpr. l2, 2lb9-10.

2 pp. 183-l86; 56l-562.
3 Seeabove, pp. 1833.
4 Seeabove, p. 561 f. and E. A. Moody, Trurhand Conscqucncc,
p. 36.
5 Campare Moody, Trurh and Conscqucncc,p. 38.
THE LOGICAL THEORV OF THE PROPERTIES OF TERMS 57]
So it is fairly clear that the notion of interpretability, i.e. the ability

of "standingfor" ("suppositingfor"), is & key ideaof the theor)r of sup-
position. From this point of view one might be inclined to say, with
Moocly,l that supposition, being one OFthe properties of tenus,,2 is the
property of "being interpretable for something". It must be conceded,
indeed,that the Mediaevallogiciansbasedsuppositionupon the capacity
ofa term, when used in a proposition, to be interpreted for one or more
individuals. It should be noticed, however, that this capacity as such is
the signyïcatio (being the First proprietas termini) rather than its suppositio.
ln fact, there seems to be 110sharp distinction between signyfï'catfo
and
suppositioin authors such as William of Shyreswood and Peter of Spain.
As a matter of Fact we do find with them something like "virtual sup-
habitumin the terminülog)rof William3;
secundum
position" (suppositio
suppositionaturalis in that of Peter of Spain.4 (It is the supposition of &
terminusper sesumptus.5lt should be stressed, however, that anything like
virtual supposition is dcfinitely absent in our oldest tracts. Compare the
dcünitions given by them (above,p. 568). Thea)rall mention suPposition
as the property which & term haswhen used in a.proposition (exeoquod
substantivesive cxistcntersignäfï'cat)?
Mullally takes Peter ofSpain's conception ofsuPposition to be diFferent
from that of William of Ockham on the account that Peter did not
stipulate that a term has Stlpposition only when it occurs in & proposition.
He saysï': "For Peter of Spain, supposition was the preperty of any
substitutive term in virtue of which the term could substitute For a thing
or things, regardlessof whether it was :: component part of a statement
or not. Latet, William ofOckham attributed the proPerty ofsupposition
to a term but only when the term functioned as part of & statement".
Moody energetically rejects this view, but his arguments are not con-
vincing. That Peter of Spain explicitly states that supposition is a
prcperty ofthe tcrm, which is deFmeclby Peter, in his tract Dc syllogismis?
with Aristotlej as "that into which a preposition is resolved, as into its
' Truth and Consequencc, p. 20.

2 Compare William of Shyreswood, Introducciancsin logicam, p. 7412'15: Quatuor sunt
pmprietates termini Et sunt hec proprietates: significatio, suppositio, copulatio,
......
et appellatio.
IT.
3 Introductionesjn logicam, p. 74—21 4 SummulacLogicales,nr. 6.04.
5 Ibid.; see also p. 575. 5 For this phrase, see above, p. 568, n. 3.
? TheSummufae Lagicalc;qufPeterqupain, p. XLVII.
3 The occurrence of the deFmition in this tract is of some importance. Seebelow, p. 572.
9 final. Priora [ [, 24—b16-l7.
subject and predicate", does not alter the Fact that Peter, no less
exPlicitl); contrasts suppositio naturalis and suppositio occidentalis:
Summuloologicolos,nr. 6.04: Suppositio naturalis est acceptio termini comnmnis pro
omnibus de quibus aptus natus est predicari, ut 'homo' per se sumptusde natura sua haba
suppositionem pro onmibus hominibus qui sunt et qui fuerunt et qui erunt. Accidentalis
suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro onmibus pro quibus exigit adiunctum,
ut 'homom'; iste terminus 'homo' supponit hic pro praesentibus. Cum autem dicitur:
'honuofuit'supponit pro praeteritis. Cum vero dicitur: 'homocrit', supponit pro futuris.
Et ita habet diversassuppositiones secundum diversitatem eorum quae ei adiunguntur.
William of Shyreswoodis even clearer in this respect. After giving the

definitions of supposition and copulation he addsl that the words 'sup-
position'and 'copulocion'are also usedwith reslaectto the capacityof the
term to occur in a proposition. With respect to what supposition is in
capacity, then, supposition is deHned by William as a signiücation of
something as subsisting (siganïcorioalicuiusut subsistentis),
while virtual
copulation is called :: signiHcationof somethingas adjoining (signyä'catfo
alicuius ut adiacentis).It is clear then, that William's suppositiosecundum
habitum is not ïm Ol'dering (as is, indeed, the suppositio secundumactum),
but a certain kind of signiücation, viz. ofsomething as subsisting. There-
fore any clear-cut distinction betm-veen
sigmf'cotioand suppositiodrawn
From the view-point of the term's use in a prcposition, is Iacking with
these authors, indeed.
When Moody arguas2that construing supposition as the direct relation
of a significant term to what it signifies, is completely trivial and allows
no basisfor the sharp distinction drawn by Peter of Spain between sup-
position and signiHcation, he not only overlooks the above distinction
between natural and accidental supposition drawn by the same author,
but he is also too Optimistic as to the consistency of Peter's usage. Peter
uses the word terminusin our tract not in the sensuin which he defmed it
and, fairly speaking,Peter warnshis readers
in the tract Desyllogismis?-
that he doesnot; in our tract he explicitly saysthat he takesthe word
here asa word which signifiesthe universalor the singular (individual).4
From the above evidence it is clear enough that Mullally is right in
claiming that Peter's conception of supposition was somewhat difïerent
from the later theory, in that he did not distinguish signj/ïcotio and sup-
! Introductionosin logicam, p. 7419'25.

: op. fil., p. 22.
3 Summuloo,nr. 4.0l See above, p. 571 .
.
4 Ibid., nr. 6.01 : terminus, ut hic sumitur est vox signiFncnns
universale vel singulare, ut
'homo' vel 'Socrates'.
THE LOGICAL THEOR? OF THE PROPERTIES OF TERMS 573
positio from the view-point of the occurrence of the term in & propo-
sition. However, it may be asked, then, what is to Peter the precise
distinction between signi 'catio and suppositio. From Pcter's words it
appears' that SLIPIJOSitiOI'Iand signiEcation diFFer in that signifncation is
accomplished through the imposition DF:: word to signi]? :- thing, while.
supposition is the acceptanceof & term, already significant, as signify'ing
its ros For something, i.e.. clenoting some individual participating in the.
rcs signilïed by the term. For Peter natural snpposition (suppositio
naturalis)is the acceptanceOFa generalsubstantiva!term For all those
things of which, by its original imposition, it can luepredicated, such as
the term 'homo' when it is taken by itself, denotes &" men, including
those who exist, those who will exist, and those who have existecl.2
Accidentalsupposition (suppositio
occidentalis),however, is the acceptance
of the samegeneral termfor aH thosethings its odjunctdetermines,as in the
preposition: 'homoest', the term *homo'denotes all men who exist at the
present time (at the time of Speaking),while in *lïomojoft' it denotesall
men who existed in the past, and in 'homoerit' all men who will exist.
Thus it is clear that only in the caseof Peter's accidental supposition the
congruitos !ocutionis (veritas propositionis) is considered, and, therefore, the
actual occurrence oFa Lerm in a pl'Oposition is required.
It can be said, then, that, For Peter, signffï'catiois the mere represen-
tation of & res accomplishecl through & word hy convention,3 the res
being either & universal nature or an individual.4 [n other words, for
Peter the notion of significatio covers both the connotation of the uni-
versal nature,(forma 01' qualitas) and the denotation of the individual
(subsmntio).5Natuml snpposition, however, is the acceptanceof a
general substantival termf' for all things in present, past, or Future for
which it may"be used, and, accordingly, it l:)ril-nz-lr'il)r
concems possible
rlenotation, not connotation. Finally, accidental snpposition, being the
acceptance of & general term For all those things its adjunct determines,
' For the text, see above, p. 567.

: Summuloe logicolox, nr. 6.04: suppositio naturalis est acceptio termini communis pro
omnibus de quibus aptus natus est praedicari, ut 'homo' per se sumptus de natura sua
habetsuppositionempro omnibushominibusqui sunt et qui fuerunt et qui erunt.
3 Summuloelogicam, nr. 6.0I : significatio termini, prout hic sumitur, est rei per vocem
repraesentatio secundum placitum.
4 Seeibid.: sed quia omnis res sit universalis aut singularis
.....
5 For the terms substantiaand quolitox, see above, p. 565, n. 5.
'5'lt should be noticed that the distinction between natural and accidental supposition is
one of suppositiocommunis,i.e. the supposition of general appellative nouns.
574- LOGICA 11-10013111101111111
11
concerns actual denotation only, as accomplished by the actual oc-

cunence oia ter m in a pl opos1t1011
Accordingly, there seems to be, in Peter's view, a siiding scale
between the notions of signification, natura] supposition, and accidental
supposition, only the last being the same as the later conception of sup-
position.
A similar fading effect appears in William of Shyreswood's conception
of supposition. As we have seen b1'3f01'1'11nI for William significatio is
nothing more than just the conceptual presentation of a universal nature.
It is concernecl with simple or i11co111plex terms. Actual supposition
(Pcte1"s accidental supposition), however, is the ordering of one
concept to another and is concerned with the composition OFtwo terms
in & proposition. William, too, knows & middle way between signifi-
cation and actual 511ppositi0n,which he calls suppositiosecundumhabitum.
it is (iei'int'xl2 as & signiEcation of smnething as subsisting (signi 'cau'o
Well, ii' signification is & presentation
alicuiusut subsistentis). qf someform
m though:,3 we have by substitution this deF111iti011
of "habitual snppo-
sition": & presentationq]- samething(forn1?)as subsming to thought. Ac-
cordingly, habitual snpposition is nothing l)ut a special kind of signifi-
cation, viz. that of subsistant naturas, which may be underlying
ünoxsiuzva(subiecta01' supposita),viz. entities of the sort that underiy
as substrataall other entities, and are meant by substantival terms.
From the above evidence the conclusion may be drawn that, though
giving a clear-cut distinction between signil'ication and supposition,
William of Shyreswood and Peter OFSpain yet Fadedthe distinction by
introducing what they called 11atural,1'espectivelylmbitual, supposition.
ln doing so, these authors seem to have left the Formal basis 011which
logic conceived as sm ars sermocinahshad been taught np to 1200. For
that matter, the logicians of the early thirteenth century seem to have
been infiuenced by philosophical literature, e5pecially the psychological
comments on Aristotle's Perihermeneias and De anima and, thus, engaged
in epistemological and metaphysical debatesand speculatiuus which gave
rise to a kind of' philosophicai logic". 4 Moody seems to be quite light
in considering5 the very rejection of the confusion of logic with meta—
1 above, pp. 566-567.

1 Introd. in logicam, p. 74:243.
* See E. Moody, Truth and Comcqucnce,pp. 5-6. However, Moody dates this development
too late (later thirteenth century). 5611
alsothe next section.
!- Ibid., pp. 5-6.
THE LOGICAL THEORV OF THE PROPER'I'IES OF TERMS 575
physics as William of Ockham's primm'y concern and the proper signifi-

cance of what is called his "nominalism". It should be stressed, then,
that when doing so Ockham returned to the older conception of logic as
& sermocinal art the Function of which is to analyzethe Formal structure
of language rather than to hypostatize this structure into & science of
Reality or Mind. However, this Forma] conception of logic is not that of
Abailard nor of Aristotle and Boethius, who all in one way or another
failed to be consistent in maintaining the distinction between logic and
metaphysich The sharp distinction is really Found in the works of the
later twelfth century logicians, who all clung to the key-notion of snp-
position as the property of terms when used in & pr-carposition.2
It must be noticed, however, that the thirteenth centur)r logicians,
too, practicam held the formal view of logic and that, in fact, the
"philosophie" conception of natura] (habitual) suppositionplayedno part
in their expositions ofsupposition.3 This is not surprising at all, since the
different kinds of supposition discussedby these authors, are all con-
cerned with the different uses of the suppositing terms in a proposition.
Besides, there may have been more consistency-in their expositions in
the tract De suppositionibusthan one might observa at First sight; in that
their conception of the terminusper se sumptusis possibly due to their
intention to consider the terms used in a proposition For a while apart
from their actual extensionsin the proposition Forthings in present, past,
or future time, and to take them only in their confused extension as
denoting some individuals actually existing whether in the present, and
(or) past, and (or) future.
A remarkable example of & "philosophie" or "psychological" approach

of supposition is found in the Tractatus dc proprietatibus sermonum. This
peculiar treatise will be discussed in the next section.
4 - Supposition and the Related Notions in the

Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum
The collective Munich manuscript C.L.M. 14.458 contains after two

tmcts 011 logic a treatise on the properties of sermones.4It uncloubtedly
dates from as late as the First decadesof the thirteenth century, as may
' For Abailard, seeabove our Chapter IV, pp. 187l'f.

3 See Chaptcr XVI.
3 Cfr. Norman Kretzmann, op. cfr., p. 105, n. 3.
4 For this manuscript. see above Chapter !, nr. [ ], pp. 43-4-9; esp. p. 46.
appear from the great deal of attention paicl to the psychological and
criteriological approach to the pmperties of terms. Indeed, the anony-
mous author's expositions of cogitatio and related notions (intellectus,
qg'ccms,apprehendere,imaginaria) remind us of similar discussions in the
logica! commentaries of Nicholausof Paris,' especially in those on Peri-
hcrmeneias.The author's intention clearly appears from the prologueï:
Tract. dc proprietatibus Iermonum, p. 7075'3: utile videtur instituere tractatum
......
de sermonibuset diversitate proprietatum et oflïciorum que consideranturiuxta ser-
monem. Que sunt copulatio, appellatio, suppositio, et multa alia de quibus dicemus
inferius.
33:11"'cum is (leHned asfacere signum de re or natam esserei. lt predicates &

It is divided in supponereand
relatio sive convenientiasigni ad signa:.wralnrn.JL
copulare. The former term is defmed as designareahquid sub aliquajbrma
and the author refers to the etyl'nology of the term ((subponere).4The
definition of suppositionand supponerei:, put in the psychologicalframe-
work as found in the initia] sections of our tract:
lbid., p. 712'6'13: Suppositio igitur est significatio rci sub forma substantiali pchlciente
eam prout sub ipsa cogitata est res ut perfectum et per se ens, non ad aliud dicta per
modum accidentis, sed ad quod dicatur aliud.
Unde supponere cst signiücarc rcm sub aliqua forma ut per quam cogitatur res ut per se
ens et stans in anima et de quo possit Fieri sermo et respectu cuius dicatur aliud, cum
ipsum non cogitatur ut dependensab alio, hoc respectuhabito ad ea que sunt secundum
modum secundum quem est id quod est substantia.
The author gives four different divisions of suppositions:
(a) simplex — personalis (p. 71355qq.)

(b) mobilis —-inmobilis (p. 71455qq.)
(c) distributiva —-determinata
(d) confusasolum — confusaet distributiva ;-(p.715r-sqq.)
There is some interrelation between them, the third one being the
central one, according to our author:
' For these works, see M. Grabmann, Dic logischcnSchryïen des Nikolaus ran Pari: und
ihre Stellung in der flrfstotclixchcn Bewegungdes XII! jahrhundcrtx, in Mittelalterhches
Geistesleben ] (München 1926), pp. 222-248, e5pecially his and other commentaries
on the Perihermeneias.
: The tract will be edited in full in our second part, pp. 703-730.
3 Cfr. Peter of Spain, Summulaclogicales,nr. 6.03 ed. Bocheüski.
4 Tract. de prapriet. sermonum,p. 7I l9'".
THE LOGICAL THEOR'I' OF THE PROPERTIES Ol: TERMS 577
Ibid., pl). 7I 535-7164:Cum igitur tot sint divisiones suppositionum, scilicet alia mobilis,
alia inmobilis; item: alia distributiva, alia determinata; item: alia confusa solum, alia
non, — si voluerimus reducere has divisiones ad invicem, dicemus hanc primam esse
divisionem et propriam: suppositionum alia distributiva, alia determinata. Et quia
distributiva est, mobilis est et quia determinata est, ilnnobilis est. Non enim debet Heri
actualis distributio cum dicitur: 'homocurrit'. Non enim sequitur: 'ergo isto homocurrit
et ille'., licct tamen veritas sit pro hoc vel illo, quia cum Fit distributio fit confusio.
Coqftmdienim hic sumptum non est aliud qunmjïmdi pro mukissuppoxiris,
hoccst multi-
plicari.
In this tract, again, supposition has a substantia] relation to true

predication in & proPOSition (ottributio verbi; predicatum suscipere; veritas
prapositionis):
Ibid... p. 7I37'lf': Simplicemhabetsuppositionemterminus in locutione quando suscipit
attributionem verbi pro suo significato in cmnmuni et non pro particulari aliquo con-
tento. Talem habet suppositionem iste terminus 'homo' cum dicitur: 'homo est species'.
Non enim est veritas pro aliquo homine, sed pro homine in communi Personalis
.....
autem dicitur suppositio termini communis quando non suscipit predicatum pro
cmnmuni sed pro persona, idest aliquo particulari. Ut cum dicitur: 'homocurrit', hic
est veritas pro particularibus et non pro homine in cmnnqgi.
Therefore the additional division into suppositioabsolutoand respectiva

given by our author (ibid., p. 71655qq.) is somewhat akward, indeecl,
as suppositioabsolutois the supposition of & term taken in itself (terminus
per se sumptus):
":i-i., p. 7I65'": Item. Solet poni talis divisio: suppositionum alia absoluta, alia
respectiva. Absoluta dicitur quam habet terminus per se sumptus, ut 'homo'. Supponit
enim absolutecx institutione pro quolibet equaliter. Respectivaautem dicitur eadem
suppositio respectu alicuius attributionis verbi. Ut cum dicitur: 'homocurrit', non hic
simpliciter supponit pro homine, sed pro currente. Et hoc dicitur respective supponere.
'Homo'autemper sedictum nec snpponit pro currente necpro albo.
As we have seen beforel a similar distinction is found in William of

Shyreswood's clivision of supposition and copulation into secundumactum
anc]secundumhobimmz and in Peter of Spain's division of supposition into
naturalis and occidentalis.3
It must be noticed, however, that, as in William of Shyreswood and
Peter of Spain,4 the introduction of the distinction of absolute and
' Secabove,pp. 572-575.

2 Introduccionc;in logicam, p. 74'945 ed. Gl'abmann.
3 Summuloelogicam, nr. 6.04- ed. Bocheflski. For the phrase: principalis ve! naturalis
suppositioas occurring in our tract, see p. 72834'35.
4 Seeabove, p. 575.
resPective supposition is only due to the authors' engagement in psycho-

logical ("philosophie") debatesandspeculationsanddid not influenceat
all the prcper expositions of supposition and its various kinds 'in the
remainder of the tract..
Copulation is dealt with in the section De terminis universalibuscopu-
Iantibus (pp. 720-721) as part of the chapter De suppositionibus.The same
can be said of the section De relativis(pp. 721-722).
Appellation is contrasted with supposition as a speciFlc term with its
generic termI and deHned as proprietas quc inest voci ex eo quod assignet
aliquem mediante verbo presentis to:n;:»or1"s.2
Or as suppositio coortoto per
verbum presentis vol preteriti vel jüturi. As this val'iation Of supposition
arising from the verb of the preposition is called restriction (rostrictio
facta per verbum), our author discussesrestriction in the frame-work of
snppositionandappellation (pp. 723Ff,). The Fmalsection of the chapter
on appellation (pp. 728-730) discussesthe dictionesvim ompliandi
habentes,such as the verb *pomst'. Amphorais delined as terminumrelinquere
in suo principali vel naturali suppositione.
5 - Copulation
Capulation or 'binding' refers in the doctrine of snpposition to the

fact that nouns are united with a substantive noun or & substantivated
term. E.g. in *homoalbus', *homoest albus', 'homo currit' (: 'homo est
currens'). Cepulation concerns the signiFlcativefunction not only of
predicates(i.e. all terms that are not subject-te'rmin a preposition), but
alsoof adjectivo.nouus when joined adjectively with substantiveterms.
Accordingly, copulation is accomplished whänever nouns are united
with a substantive term.
The Gloss Promisimusconsiders as the key-notion of copulation that
the copulating (capulatedJ) term is not able to supposit properly
propiis). The author confinesCOPulation
(idoneumnonest verbosupponere
to adjective nouns, but seemsto take the term rather widely, including
also nomino significantia et copulantia substantialesproprhenum.4By this,
capulationis &kind of signiFlcation,viz. of adjectivalsigniFlcation.
This vague conception of cepulation, being the counterpart of sup-
! lbid., p. 72219'24.
: Ibid., p. 72225-26.
3 Like the verb supponere,
the 1rerbcopulareis usedintransitively. Seeabove,our Chapter
XVI, p. 515.
4 For the text, see above, Chapter V, p. 262.
position conceived as substantival designation (substantiva rci designatio)

is found in most of the tracts:
Introd. Paris., p. 37117'13: Copulatio est quedam proprietas que inest dictioni ex eo
quod adiective, sive adiacenter, signiFicat.
Dial. Manum,p. 60624'33:Copulareest adiectiverem signiücareet in tali dependentia
que est de principali significatione ..... Dicitur autem ille terminus copulare qui
dependentiamhabet in principali sua signiEcatione.Ut patet in hac dictione 'albus',
que significat quailitateml Enite, smllzistarlltiamz
vero inFmite; unde dependens est ad
subiectum per quod suam finiat substantiam.
Summe p. 455 (seeour Chapter XI-V): Capulatio est adiectivadesignatio, idest
ilfetenses,
per nomen adiectivum. Et copulare est adiective rem designare, ut 'albus', 'alba,
album', et 'hic et hacet hocjïslix'. Dicitur tamen adiectivum tripliciter: voce solum, ut
pronomen trine terminationis 'ille, illa, illud'; solum signiücatione, ut nomina officii et
dignitatum, que significant formas accidentales per modum substantie, ut 'faber' et
'episcapus';et est adiectivum voce et significatione, ut 'yälix', et 'albus, alba, album'.
However, the logica Cum sit nostra clearly conFmesthe notion of

00pulation to the use of & term (adjective, participle, or verb) in a
prapasiiion : '-
Logica Cumsi: nostra,p. 45113'20:Et est copulatio sermonis predicabilis signiücatio cum
tempore. Pmprie loquendocopulatioest in verbo. Communiterloquendoest in verbo
et in omnibus participiis et concretis.
Peter of Spain gives a vague deFmition of copulation: binding is the

acceptanceof an adjectival term for something (cepulatio est acceptio
termini adiectivi pro aliquo. Summulaelogicales,nr. 6.03). Copulation
doesnot play any röle in his tracts on the preperties of terms.
William of ShyreswooddeFmescopulation as the ordering of some
thought over and above some other thought (ordinatioalicuiusintellectus
sapra alium).3He addsthe note that and
'supposition' 'copulation'like
many names of this sort, are used in two ways: either with respect to
an actual occurrence (secundum a ctum) or with respectto the capacityfor
such an occurrence (secundum habitum).Thus he distinguishes,besides
actual and habitual supposition,4 actual and habitual copulation. By the
latter term he meansthe signiFlcationof smnethingasadjoining(signi)?-
catio alicuius ut adiacentis).5We here Find a similar fading away of the
1 viz. albedo.
: viz. hoc album.

3 For this interpretation, see above, pp. 566-568.
4 Seeabove, pp. 572-575.
5 lntrad. in logicam,p. 7414'25.
580 LOGICA MODERNORUü-l "
distinction between copulation and signification as was observet] before

in the distinction of supposition and sit-.':'r»nilic..ïttion.l
Again, the most verbosa "philosephic" interpretation of the gram-
maticaI-logical conception is found in the Tractatus de praprietatibus
sermonum. The anonymous author reduces the distinction between sup-
position and capulation to the modes of being of substances and ac-
cidents:
Tract. dcpropr. sermonum,pp. 71 123-71214: cum res omnis substantia sit vel accidens
. . . . .
et id quodaccidensest salvaturet subsistitper substantiamsalvantemid in csse,— unde
etiam dicitur accidensquasi cadensad subiectumsive substantiam —, tunc qui primo res
nominavit que sunt, nominavit cas secundum quod sunt, hocest secundum modum sub-
stantie et accidentis. Nomen ergo adiectivum dicitur id quod est notans id quod est
accidens et secundum modum accidentis. Modus autem accidentis est esse in subiecto.
Unde adiectivum est quod notat accidens ut in subiecto. Unde dicitur adiectivum eoquod
est notans rem suam ut adiectam alii, ei scilicet quod est constitutum in pleno esse.
Unde hoc nomen 'album' est nomen rei habentis albedinem qu habet esseperfectum ante
adventum albedinis. Nomen ergü substantivum sive subpositimm dicitur istud proprie
et secundum primam inventionem quod est nomen suppositi sive substantie secundum
formam perfectam illius substantie. IUnde nomen substantivum significat unum et ut
unum. Significatenim rem que est sub suaforma, non quc dicatur ad illam rem, sedque
est de re et pars essentialis rei. Unde dicitur nomen substantivum quia est nomen sub-
stantie, idest prout est per se:existenset ad cuius signiücationempotest Heriadiectio per
alium terminum ratione sui signiFlcati. Adiecti-vum ergo dicitur eoquod adicit rem suam
substantivo, nec Et subiectum sermonis adiectivum nisi mediante substantivo. SigniFlcat
enim ut ad aliud nec:significat ut stans per se. Unde dicitur copulare, idest signiücare
copulativa: sive coniunctim ad aliud. Exigit enim alii coniungi, nisi Fiatsubstantivatum.
Tunc autem Flt substantivatum cum includit in se certum suppositum sive generale sive
speciale, ratione cuius potest suscipere attributionem. Unde posset proprie dici quod
nomen adiectivum est nomen proprie accidentis, sed accidentis prout ad subiectum.
Unde per immutationem est nomen subiecti.
Afterwards, capulation was deEned as the union ar compositio:]d a

From then on the theory of cepulation only
predicate with a subjnfzmnt.2
concerned the significative Punction of all predicate-terms of a propo-
sition and covered adjectives,participles and verbswhen united with :]
substantive term in a preposition. Since the distinction OFsubject-term
and predicate-tenn is of little relevance in this respect, many logicians
abandoned the distinction between supposition and c0pulation. As &
wrong in assuming that Shyrcswood's notior. of copulation as

' Kretzmann is (;'.-bvi-cæusl)r
:: property of terms is different from the notions of copulation discussed by other
Mediaeval logicians (ap. cit... p. 120, n. 63).
2 Walther Burley, Dc puritate artis logicac tractatus longior, p. 54-ed. Boehner.
matter of fact William of Ockham does not even mention the concept
of copulation in his lougic.l
6 - The various kinds of supposition
As we have seen befczn-e?2 the distinction of actual and virtual snp-

position found in William of Shyresx—vood and Peter of Spain seems to
refer to their intention to consider the suppositing terms of the propo-
sition apart from the actual extensions the)r havewhen used in the pmpo-
sition for things in present, past, .01'future time and, accordingly, to
take them only in their confused extension as denoting some individuals
actually existing whether in present, past, or future. In fact, this view
OFsupposition closely corresponclswith the earlier stage of the theory,
viz. that of the appellation theory; in which certain rules are given to
state the actual extension OF appellative nouns having a confused ex-
tension of their own.
Thus we Fmdhere the starting-point of the main distinctions communis-
discreta, coryfusa-dctcrminata,
mobilis-immobilis.
..
(a) communis — discreta

Whenever & term is used to denote more than one single individual
only, it is said to have common snpposition (suppositio communis). When
it is used to denote one single individual, it is said to have discrete sup-
position (suppositiodiscreta):
Logica Cum si: nostra, p. 4-4-73'": Suppositio communis est quando subicitur terminus
communis secundum quod habet respectum ad ea que sunt communia. Suppositio
discreta est quando subicitur terminus discretus, ut 'Se-tracescurrit', vel pronomen
demonstrativum, ut ",-'Nevel iste currit'..
Dial. xlfonac.,pp.60730-6082:Suppositiocommunisestque fit in termino communi, ut
'homoestanimal'. Suppositio discreta est que Et in termino discreto, ut 'Sor currit'. Et hec
divisio fit penes divisionem rerum signiücatarum per tales terminos. Que talis est:
rerum alie universales,alie singulares.In qua divisione non est medium. Quare nec in
hac: suppositionum alia communis, alia discreta, quia omnis terminus aut signilïcat rem
universalem aut singularem.
The discrete supposition needs no further discussion, since it is not

variable:
' Cfr. E. R. Moody, The Logic QfWiHiam qfOckham, p. [SB, n. l.

: above,p. 575.
p. 6084'6: Relicto de suppositionediscreta, quia non variabilis est,

Dio]. ..-Honoc.,
dicendum est de divisione suPpositionis communis, quia illa multis modis variatur.
As is easil)rseen, it is the very variability of meaning of the common

tel'm which is considered and evaluated in the theory of supposition.
To put it in other words: the discrete term has one well-determined
appellation (or denotation) of its own. On the other hand, the actual
appellation of :: common term may vary in accordance with its use in a
proposition.
(b) determinata— coqfusa

Determinate snpposition (suppositio determinata) is accomplished
whenever :: common term is taken indefmitelyl in a proposition, so that
in that proposition the term may deuote any individual (pro aliquo
pro omnibus),but the preposition is true even if
ioj'eriors'Et de necessitate
only one individual exists of which the predicate can be said:
Logica Ut dici:, p. 409'1'14: Determinata est ista quando terminus communis supponit
pro aliquoinferiori et de necessitate
pro onmibus.Et istasuppositioestsinedistributione,
ut 'homocurrit'.
Logica Cumsi: nostra,p. 4471?" : Suppositio determinata est quando terminus communis
supponit pro aliquo determinate, ut 'homo currit'.
Dial. Monocqp. 614-2'4: Determinata est illa que est in termino communi sino exigentia
plurium suppositorum, ut in hac: 'homocurrit'.
William of Shyreswood,Introd.in logicam,p. 7519'32:Et est determinataquandopotest
exponi loquutio per aliquod unum. Et hoc est quandodictio supponit pro aliquo uno.
Ut cum dico: 'homocurrit', ita potest essevera quolibet currente.
Confusedsupposition (suppositiocoqfusove]indeterminata),on the other

hand, occurs when & common term supposits (stands) For man)' in-
dividuals:
Logica Cumsi: nostra,p. 447'4'16: Suppositio indeterminata est quando terminus com-
munissupponit pro pluribus indeterminate,ut 'omnishomocurrit'. Indeterminatasup-
positio et confusaidem sunt.
Dial. Monoc...pp. 61336-614-2:SuPpositio confusa est que est in termino qui stat de
necessitate pro pluribus, ut in hoc termino 'homo' in hac locutione: 'omnis homo currit'
et in hac: 'nullushomocurrit' et in similibus.
.
William of Shyreswood, !ntrod. in logicam, p. 7532'33: Confusa autem quando dictio
supponit pro multis.
! or taken with a sign of particularity, as Peter of Spain says (Summuloologicolos, m'. 6.09).
THE LOGICAL THEORV or- THE PROPER'I'IES 01: TERMS 583
(C) cory'usotantum— coqfusaer:distributivo

Confusesuppositionis divided into pure.confused(coqfusatantum)and
distributive confused(coqfusaet determinato).A term is said to havepure
confused supposition when it is not allowable to infer from the common
term to any individual of that term. It should be noticed, then, that this
kind of supposition is characterizedin terms of inferential operations,
as appears also from the references to the fallacy of the Figuraof speech
in caseof invalid inferences:
Logica U: dicit, 13.40916-2": Confusa tantum est illa quando terminus communis supponit
pro suis inferioribus et tunc locutio non redditur vero pro aliquo inferiori. Verbi
gratia: 'omnishomovidet omnemhominem;li 'hominem'supponit confuse tantum, quia
non sequitur: 'omnis homo videt omnemhominem;ergo hunc hominemvel iUum'.
Logica Cum si: nostra, p. 44713'22:SuPpositio confusa tantum est quando terminus
communis supponitur pro suis inferioribus et non potest Fieri descensus sub ipso. Ut
'omnis homoest animal'; li 'animal' stat confuse tantum, quia mediate adiungitur huic
signo 'omnis'. Unde non valet argumentum: 'omnis homoest animal; ergo omnishomoest
hocanimal', sed est fallacia Egure dictionis.
The inferential applications are labelled with the technical term

'descem'(descensus),which means that an inference (or & descent) is
madeFrom the common term (designatedwith the word superius)to its
individuals (designatedwith the word iqfcrioray.
Distributive confused supposition, on the other hand, is accomplished
when a common term snpposits for many individuals in such a way as to
stand for anyrof them and, accordingly, to allow an inference from the
common term to any of its individuals:
: Confusaet distributiva est quandode necessitateEt descensus
Logica U: dicit., p. 40920-11
ad omnia inferiora.
Suppositioconfusaet distributiva est quandoterminus
LogicaCumsi: nostra,p. 4—4-726'32:
communissupponitpro suis inferioribus et sic potest Heri descensussub eo ad unum-
quodque appellatum contentum sub termino distributivo. Ut cum dicitur: 'omnishomo
es!:animal', li 'homo' stat confuse et distributive, quia inmediate adiungitur huic signo
'omnis'. Unde hoc argumentum est bonum, per locum a toto in quantitate: 'ergo im:
homoestanimal et ille homo', et sic de singulis.
Ibid., p. 4-4-9l'1:Supponereconfuseet distributivo et quandocontingit descenderead
omnia appellatasub eo contenta.
William of Shyreswood, Introd. in logicam, p. 7533'35: Distl'ibutiva autem, quando
supponit pro multis ita quod pro qualibet. Ut hec dictio 'homo'cum dico: 'omnishomo
estanimal'.
' For the origin of the'term, see Abailard, Logico Nostr. petit., p. 55316'24;see below,
p. 593.
(d) mobilis— inmobilis

Finally, the applicability of a common term is dcsignated by the word
'mobihty'. Mobile supposition occurs when a term ma),rstand for its
individunls; inmobile supposition is accomplished whenever & term
cannot be taken For its individuals. In the caseOFmobile snpposition, no
exception for the znpplhi:.abilit)Ir(or: "immobilimtion") is made, while
in the caseOFthe immobile supposition, certain exceptions are made by
which the supposition of the term is immobilized for certain of its in-
dividuals. In other 1umrds:when a descent can be made, there is mobile
supposition, while it is immobile when & descent cannot be made. E.g.
in prcpositions such as 'tantum omnis homo currit' ("only cvæy man is
running')one cannot infer: 'thcrgfbreonly Socrates is running':
Dial. .«Honac.,p. 61029'33: Dicitur enim snppositio mobilis in termino communi quc
Et pro inferiori; inmobilis vero que non Flt pro inferiori. Et notandumquod si aliquis
terminus respicitur pro inferioribus et non possitmoveri et exponi ad illa, inmobilem
habebit suppositionem.
William of Shyrcawood, Introd. in logicam, pp. 7535-761: Mobilis autem quando potest
Heri descensus: lnmobilis est quando non potest fieri descensus, ut hic:
......
'tantum omnishanmcurrit'. Non potest inferri: 'ergo tantum Sortescurrit'.
(e) restricta——ampliata
As we have seen, & common term when used in a preposition may
deuote individualsof the present (aq. preterite, future) time only or
individuals of all times, and even all possible individuals. ln those cases
the common term is said to restrict or ampliate its appellation (or:
supposition).'
Ampliated supposition (or: appellation, aswas said in the earlier stage
of our theory), or ampliation is the prcperty of & common term which
consistsin the fact that its supposition is extended (or: ampliated) to
deuote not only individualis OFthe present, but alsoof the past or future,
or of the "donmin of possibility". Ampliation, then, has to be expressed
by an appropriate term, viz. usually by the warb, sometimes by another
word, such as 'possibiliter'.
Restricted supposition (or: appellation) or restriction being the
counterpart of ampliation is the property of a common term which
consists in the Factthat its supposition is limited to a restricted number
of individualis. Such Iimitations may be effected and expressed by the
' Seeabove, pp. 528 IT. and pp. 560IT.

THE LOGICAL THEOIW OF THE PROPERTIES OF TERMS 585
use of various words and additionis to & noun, viz. verbs of the past or
future tcnseandadjectivesaddedto & substantiveterm.
The earliest introduction of the notions of ampliation and restriction
seems to be Found in the Fallacio Parvipontanc.When discussing the third
kind OFunivocation the author says that it consists in the ampliation and
rcstriction of appellative nouns' :
Fa". Parvip., p. 56237'31:Tertia species (sc. univocationis) est que consistit in amplia-
tione et restrictione alicuius dictionis, quemadmodum accidere solet in nominibus
appellativis. Nomen cnim appellativum si supponat verbo prcsentis temporis, habet se
per appellationem ad presentia tantunn; si verbo futuri, habet se ad presentia et futura.
The older tracts do not have & separate chapter 011 ampliation and
restriction. In the First tracts which deal with these notions separately,
the main attention seems to be paid to l'estriction:
P. 261'(see above, p. 459): Cum igitur terminus communis & suppositione

SummoA*!otcnses,
est de restrictionetermini quantumad appellationem.
suahabeatcoartari, 1.'i-.':lcru:lum
Ibid., [. 27r (see above, p. 4-62): Rcstrictio cst coarctatio termini ad supponendum pro
paucioribus quam sua natura exigat. Rcstringi autcm habenl: termini communes quorum
natura potest esse in plus aut in minus. Termini vero discreti nequaquam. Restringere
autcm possunt multa tam vcrba tam momina.z
Dial. :I-Ionac.,'pp. 61631-6175: Cum in appellatione ct suppositione terminus communis
varietur, videndum est qualiter hoc liat. Ad hoc sciendum quod terminus communis per
se sumptus snpponit pro omni quod potest participari formam eius sive id sit presens
sive preteritum sive futurum. Unde ille terminus 'homo' per se sumptus supponit pro
omni eo quod potest esse homo. Hoc autem sunt tam existentes quam non existentes.
Et idem pateat de quolibet termino communi.
Contingit autem quod terminus conununis in locutione positus quandoque sumitur
pro presentibus, ut in hac locutione 'homo est', quandoque pro preteritis, ut in hac
locutione 'homofuit', quandoque pro futuris, ut in hac locutione: 'homocrit'. Et terminus
dicitur restringi. Propter quod videndum est quid sit restrictio et quot sint cause
restrictionis.
lbid., p. 61710'15:Dicitur autem restrictio variatio suppositionis magis communis ad

minus cmnmunem. Unde cum ille terminus 'homo' signiFlcct hominem simpliciter
secundum quod communis est ad presentes, preteritas et futuros, si intellectus accipiat
ipsum solum pro presentibus, dicetur quod in ea facta est restrictio, idest coartatio
suppositionis magis communis ad minus comnmnom.3
' Fa". Porrip., pp. 562-571. See above, pp. 495 Ff.
2 The nütion of restriction has been elabornted by the author of the Summe.rlflewnsesin
an extensive way. See above, pl). 462-4-65.
3 For an elaboration of the doctrine of restriction by our author, see ibid., pp. 6171?-
638'9. A separate tract on :: special kind of rcstriction is found in Munich, CL..»U.
l4.4-58, f. 4-0f'1'l'bunddr the title Do inplicationibus.it hasbeenedited in L. M. de Rijk,
SamoNotoson the .Jl'lediaomlTract Do insolubilibus ctc., pp. 100-103.
.....
586 LOGlCA MODERNORUM n
The Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonumdefines restriction (: suppositio

coartata) as appellatio:
Tract. de propr. scrnwnum,pp. 72230-7235: Et cum suppositio quedam sit discreta quedam
communis, et discreta cum certa sit, non possit variari per aliquod adiunctum, notandum
est quod cum suppositio termini communis vaga sit et incerta, quandoque habet variari
per aliquod adiunctum, quandoque non habet variari per adiunctionem signi. Et de tali
variationenil ad presens.Quoniamautem variatur per verbum presentistemporis vel
preteriti vel futuri, et cum talis variatio sit suppositio conrtata et talis suppositio coartata
per verbum presentis vel preteriti vel futuri dicatur appellatio —, de tali variatione
tractandum est ad presens.Et cum talis variatio sit restrictio facta per verbum, videndum
est quid sit restringere. Restringere est terminum coartare, ad supponendum pro pre-
sentibus tantum.
Its counterpart, ampliation, is delïned by the author as leaving a

common term in its principle and natura] supposition:
lbid., p. 72823'25: Notandum ergo quod ampliare est terminum relinquere in sua
principali vel naturali suppositione.
William of Shyreswood, too, discussesampliation and restriction

under the heading Dc .:z'ppeU-cititma..I He defines restriction as follows: to
restrict something is, strictl)r speaking, to force it to exist in a smaller
space than it is naturally suited far.z
Peter of Spain deals with ampliation and restriction in two separate
chapters of his Summulae. He deFmes restriction as the limitation of &
common term from & greater supposition to & lesser suPposition and
ampliation as the extension of & common term from a lesser snpposition
to & greater.3
lt should be borne in mind that ampliation and restriction are nothing
else but two varieties of supposition (C.q. appellation) and their occur-
rence in separate chapters in Peter of Spain's Summulaelogicales might
be somewhat misleading in this re5pect.
' Introd. in logicam, p. 82:05.

21bid... p. 8219'30:Sed intellige quod restringere est proprie cogere aliquid essein
breviori loco quam sue nature competit.
3 Summulacfagicola, nr. 9.2: Restrictio est coarctatio termini communis a maiore
snppositione ad minorem Ampliatio est extensio termini communis & minore
.....
suppositione ad maiorem.
THE LOGICAL THEOR? 01: THE PROPERTIES OF TERMS 587
80 far we have dealt with kinds of snpposition that are all concerned
with the actual appellative force of nouns. They chscl)r corre5p0nd with
the appellation theory, being the Erst stage of the snpposition tinam)?»l
which arose From the Iogicians' speculations about the third kind of
l.lnivomtion.z As we have seen adactae,,3 the appellation theory was
extended to those usesof the appellative nouns that were involved in the
Fll'Stof the two kinds of univocation distinguished in the Fallacic Parvi-
pontane: grammatica] and logical transsumption of terms.
Fall. Parrip., p. 562'4'19: Sunt autem tres Speciesunivocationis. Prima est quando aliqua
dictio sumitur ad agendum de se vel de suo significato. De se ipsa ut cum dicitur:
'magincr cst namen'; hic enim transsumitur hoc nomen 'magister' ad agendum de se. Et
hec est proprie transsumptio grammaticm'um. Transsumitur ad agendum de suo signilï-
; et hec est transsumptio dialeticorum.
cato ut qum dicitur: 'homoest.species'
The authors distinguished as two kinds of snpposition the uses of & term
standing for, resPectively, the word itself and the universal nature
(forma) signiFledby it. The former was called material sapposition, the
latter simple snpposition. All other kinds of supposition, viz. those dis—
cussedabove, pp. 581-586, were classified under the general heading:
personal supposition.4
([ ) suppositio materialis
Whenever a word was used autonomously, as& name for itself or for
the kind of language-signof which it is an instance, it was said to be
used in materia] supposition. William of Shyreswood Speaksof material
snpposition when & word itself snpposits either for the very utterance
itself or for the word itself, composed of the utterance and the signiE-
cation, e.g. when we say: Ilucum:-
estdissillabum' or 'homoestnomen'.5
Peter of Spain does not know this kind ofsupposition in his Summulac.
For that matter, it does not appear in the earlier tracta either.
! See above, Chapter XVI, pp. 528-54I.

: Seeibid., pp. 528-535.
3 Chapter XVI, pp. 541-547.
4 William of Shyreswood contrasts material supposition with simple and personal
supposition taken together as material against formal supposition. See Introd. in logicam,
p. 759ff.
5 lt shouldbe noticed that for the secondpropositionar: insight into the meaningof the
word is neededin order to determinethat it is a noun (not a pronounor verb etc.).
588 LOGICAMODERNORUM
"
(g) suppositiosimplex(or: monoriolis)— suppositiopersonalis
Whenever a word was used significatively, that is to stand for. things
such as it was instituted to be & sign of, it supposits either for individuals
or For the universal nature (forma) itself which the individuals were
assumed to share in. In the Former case the authors spoke of personal
snpposition, in the latter of simple SLlpposition.
LogicnUr,dicit., p. 4091'5:Suppositionumaliasimplex, alia personalis.Simplexquando
terminus communis subponit pro forma propria a qua imponitur nomen et non pro
aliquo inferiori eius. Ut 'homo ost dignissimocreaturarumcrcoturo'; li 'homo' non subpünit
pro isto hominenecpro illo, ...... sedponitur pro istaformaaquaimponitur nomen.
Logica Cumsit nostra,p. 4473'5: Suppositio simplex est quando terminus communis
supponit pro forma communi in qua nomen ponitur, ut 'homo on dignissimo crcoturo
crooturorum'. Suppositio personalis est quando terminus communis supponit pro aliquo
inferiori, ut 'homocurrit'; hic li 'homo'supponit pro illo et pro isto.
DioI. ;l-Ionocq p. 60812-19: Suppositionum alia simplex, alia personalis. Et nota quod
hec divisio Fit secundum exigentiam veritatis in locutione. Dicitur enim suppositio
personalis esse in termino communi, quando secundum exigentiam veritatis in locutione
terminus ille sumitur pro aliquo inferiorum sub ipso. Simplex autem suppositio est in
termino communi quando secundum exigentiam veritatis in locutione non sumitur pro
aliquo inferiori, sed pro conununi.
Troct. dopropr. sermonum,p. 713746: Suppositionum alio simplex, alia personalis. Simpli-
ccm habet suppositionem terminus in locutione quando suscipit attributionem verbi
pro suo signiFlcatoin communi et non pro particulari aliquo contento. Talem habet
suppositionemiste terminus 'homo'cum dicitur: 'homoestspecies'.Non enim est veritas
pro aliquo hmnine, sed pro homine in communi ..... Personalis autem dicitur sub—
positio termini communis quando non suscipit predicatum pro conuuuni sed pro per-
sona, idest aliquo particulari. Ut cum dicitur: 'homocurrit', hic est veritas pro particu-
laribus et non pro homine in communi.
It should be noticed that in a later note William remarks that in the

example 'homo estspecies'the term 'homo' is often said to have & maneria]
snpposition (suppositio moneriolis) because it here snpposits for the
universal nature in itself (quia supponit pro ipso manerio spor:im')..lManerial
supposition, then, is clistinguished from the kind of supposition found in
prepositions such as 'homo est dignissimo creaturarum.?-
As we have said before, personal supposition was the general heading
under which all the sub-groups of common supposition discussed above
were classed. The variety of personal snpposition is the very heart of the
theory of supposition conceived as & logical (: forn'ml) theory of
' Introd. in logicam, p. 771743. Grabmann's materialis is & result of his misreading the
manuscript.
: !bid., p. 7719'25.
THE LOGICAL THEORT 01: THE PROPER'I'IES OF TERMS 589
meaning. As to material supposition, taken in contm-distinction to all

kinds of significative use of a term (including both simple and personal
supposition), it was concernecl x-viththe generic distinction between the
significative and autonomous use OFwords and, properly speaking, is of
quite a diFferent sort from the signiFlcative uses of a term. However, it
is permissible to bring this usage under the general heading of suPpo-
sition, since, in fact, the meaning of *homo' taken as the subject—term in
'homo est nomen', and, accorclingly its 'supposition', clepends upon the
predicate-term used in that proposition. T hat in such cases we are not
using the word thomo"in the ordinary way at all and, accordingly, not
signiFlcatively, was opparontl)r considered by the Mediaeval scholars as
irreliewuïunt..l
As to simple supposition: this has little bearing on formai logic. On
the other hand it cannot be considered apart from the. different meta-
Thus we seethat while rejecting the
physica!and criteriological issues.?-
subsistent universal nature, William of Ockham and most of the other
fourteenth century Iogicians, only retained the distinction between
simple and material snpposition by saying that, when & conventional
language-signis used to stand for itself as a sound, it has material suppo-
sition, but when it is used to supposit for the concept or mental sign
which is only its psychological correlate, then it is used in simple
supposition.3
7 - Some Notes on The Origin of The Terminology
Most of the names used to distinguish the various kinds of snpposition

had been used in a similar wa)!" in twelfth century logic and grammar.
I give some evidence.
(a) materialis. As early as the eleventh centuryr the grammarians

spoke of materiale impositumin cases such as 'homoestnomen' For examples
- .
see above our Chapter V, pp. 232; 260 and our Index verborumet rerum.
(b) simplex. Boethius, In Periherm.II., 1333'3speaksof Specialishomo
(i.e. the universal nature of man) in contra-distinction to particularis
homo.Peter Abailarclusesthe term homosimplex:
' Compore William of Shyreswood,Introd. in logicam,p. 7610'24.] think, Kneale's

criticism (op. cfr., p. 254), though justiüed from the nwdern view-point seems to be
not to the point. Cp. above, p. 587, n. 5.
2 See F.. A. Moody, Truth ond Conscquonccin A-lodiacvalLogic, pp. 24-25.
3 See Moody, ibid., p. 25, and the same, TheLogicof ['l/imamty-Ockhom,pp. 39-4-0.
ed. De Rijk: Nam et Socratesaliquod est de individuis

Dial. II, p. 18130'33
hominiset illa species quae homoest, vere denegatur esse; de utroque autem
homine, tam de simplici quam de individuo univoce nomen 'hominis' dicitur.
John of Salisbury, too, uses this terminology when he says: our under-
of things, simply, as
standing at times looks directly at the simpleessence
when it conceives of man as such, or noneas such, in which Operation it
is simple,.I The Tractatusde proprietatibussermonumgives an etymological
explanationof the word simplex:
Tracr. dc prapr. sermonum,p. 71313'13: Et ideo dicitur simpliciter: sine plica, idest
respectu, ad significare aliquid.!
(c) manerialis. We are told by john of Salisbury that the term

*maneries'wasstampedby someone(aliquis)to designatethe unilferSaIl'a,3
It is used by the author of the FaHacieParvipontane
in discussingthe
secondkind of l.ll'liVOCi'ltiOlï.4
(d) personalis. Abailard paraphrasesindividual (hoc aliquid) as res

personaliter discreta ab omnibus aliis rebus.5 Accordingly, Aristotle takes
the term (individuum' secundumpersonalemdiscretionem,Abailard addaf'
The Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum paraphrases persona as aliquod
particulare?and adds an etymological explanation of the term isuppasitio
personalis':
Tracr. de propr. sermonum, Et ideo dicitur huiusmüdi subpositio ::
p. 71313—21:
'pars-anu'personalis.Persona enim est rationalis creature individua essentia.
Largiusautem sumitur hic 'persona'ut dicatur personaomnis singularissub-
stantia, sive rationalis creature sive irrationalis.
See also s.v. discretus.
(e) discretus.This term is commonly usedto designatean individual

thing as distinguishedfrom all other individuals. lt frequently occurs
II 20, p. 989'":
! .«l-Ietalog. Intellectus enim quandoque rem simpliciter intuetur, velut
si hominemper se intueatur aut lapidemet ob hoc:simplex est.
2 : hoc aliquid : Aristotle's 1685 11.
3 ;I'Ietal.ll l7, p. 95123'.
4 FaH. Parvip., p. 56220'26; see above, Chapter XV, 1). 495.
5 Log. lngrcd...1). 15775.
51bid., p. 15715.The same usage is found in the Sententiasecundum
MagistrumPetrum,
pp. IlSïï-l 1925, ed. Minio-Paluello.
p. 713'4"5.
? Tracr. de prapr. sermonum,
THE LOGICAL THEORV 01: THE PROPERTIES OF TERMS 591
together with the word 'persona-'. Whatever is designated by :: singular

noun is called res discreta. E.g. in Abailard:
Lag. Nostr. petit., pp. 52432-5252: Quaestiones huiusn'nodi de universalibus et
non de singularibusnon immerito Fiebant,cum singularia (sc. nomina) res ut
discretas et ab omnibus aliis diversassignilïcent et quasi ad oculum proprio
sensueascapiamus.Universalia vero nullam personamdistinguunt; unde sanum
intellectum facere non videntur, quia omnis sanusintellectus ex aliqua persona
surgere videtur, cum ea quae sensu capimus, per intellectum recordamur.
Quippe quemadmodum sensus, qui duces sunt intellectus, res ut discretas cum
exterioribusformis percipiunt, ita intellectus, aemulatoressensuum,easdem
alio modo concipiunt. Sedintellectusuniversaliumres ut discretasnullo modo
attendunt, cum omnis res sit haec 1welilla, sed neque hanc vel illam significant.
Abailard seems to identify discretum with corporale (corporeum),since

discretiochiefiy consists in corporeality.I John of Salislmryrspeaksof
The same author has (Metalog.II, 20,
singularium discreta e:.1:.w.'nl:ic:f..z
p.. 1043'4): existentium a natura certus est linis, et singula suis
.....
ab invicem prcprietatibus discreta sunt.
Seealso s.v.. personalis. "-
(F) communis.A common noun (nomencommune) does not designata

the individual, but the universal nature, as we are told by Aristotle,
Soph.E]. 22, 178b37-39. This passageis quoted by John of Salisburyin
his Metalogicon(1120, p. 10326'23).The Gloss Promisimus deEnesthe
nomencommunenaturaliter as Follows:
Gloss Promisimus,[. 49W: Naturalitercommune est illud quod ex una institutione
habet idoneitatem conveniendi pluribus et omne tale in una signiFlcatic-nehabet
pluribus convenire,quia nullum nomenex una institutione habet in diversis
signilïcationibuspluribus convenire,cum nomennon possitinstitui ad signilï-
candum nisi proferenda,?-
As we have seen before (Chapter XVI, pp. 544-54-5), the earlier tracts
"usedthe term 'suppositiocommunis'
in a rather loose way. William of
Shyreswood in his tract on the Predicabiiia defines the word commune as
"uniting many things together, i.e. into a single nature".4 Actually, in
! Lag. Nostr. petit., p. 5271'3; cfr. Log. fugaci., p. 2823'24.

2 d'fetalog.ll 20, 1").10026.
3 For the context, seeaboveChaptcr V, p. 26l.
4 Introd. ir.- iogicam, p. 465'7: Commune autem et universale idem sunt. Dicitur enim
commune quod unit multa simul, idest in unam naturam. Kretzmann right!)r remarks that
William of Shyreswoodis here offering what he takes to be the etymological basisof the
distinction, viz. 'cammuhc'from 'con' and 'um'rc' (actually 'con' and the mot 'sum-' :
ro hind). See Kretzmann, op. m., p. 51, n. 4.
the term suppositiocommunisthere seems to be & metonymical usage in

that the common term having common supposition does not designate
the universal nature as such, but the class of all individuals which are
assumedto participate in that universal nature.
Finally. It should be noticed that as & technical term 'conlmunis'
originally formed part of the terminology of grammar. See the Logica
"Ut dicit", p. 383'0'" : terminorum quidam universales, quidam singu-
lares. Universales in logica dicuntur tamquam communes in gramatica.
(g) coqfusus. Abailard uses the word corgfususin connection with

communis in order to designata the indeterminate meaning of the
common noun.
Log. Ingred., pp. 2129-221: ille (sc. intellectus) qui universalis nominis cst,
communem et confusam imaginem multorum concipit; ille vero quem vox
singularis generat, propriam unius et quasi singularem formam tenet, hocest
ad unam tantum personam se habentem Unde per hoc vocabulum
......
quod est 'Socrarcs',quod proprium unius formam ingerit in animo, res quaedam
certiEcatur et determinatur; per 'homo' vero, cuius intelligentia in communi
forma omnium nititur, ipsacommunitasconfusioniest ne quam ex omnibus
intelligamus.
!bid., p. 2327'23: ipsa universalia, quae licet confusaesigniFlcationis
ad
......
sint quantum nominatas essentias
......
The earlier tracts alreacl)r Speak of the propria coqfusjo of common nouns:
TractatusAnagnini lll, p. 2742'WB: Si quis Anagnie dicat: 'episcopusvenit', non

est admittendanisi pro episcopoAnagnino...... Si autem adiungaturei
signum particularevel nomen numerale, redit ad propriam confusionem,ut
vcnit' pro quolibet episcopoadmittenda est.'
'aliquis episcopus
The Tractatus dc proprietatibus sermonum takes confusion together with

distribution :
p. 7162'4:Cum fit distributio, Fltconfusio.Coqftmdi

Tracr.dc propr. sermonum,
enim hic sumptum non est aliud quam fundi pra mu!tis suppositis,hocest multi-
plicari.
(h) distributivus. The same tract oFFerswhat it takes to be the ety-

mological basia.of the term "distributia':
thick, p. 7159'13: Distributio autem dicitur quasi diversis :ribmia, eoquod
attribuitur predicatussubiecto comuwni et non pro communi solum, sed
! See also above, Chapter XVI, pp. 541 ; 54—4.

secundumdistributionem particularium contentorum sub ipso communi.

Unde etiam potest dici distributio quasi diversisdiversaartributia predicati.
(i) mobilis. The same tract explains the term 'mobilis' as follows:
Ibid., pp. 71431-7I55: Cum una via saphistica sit secundum multiplicitatem,
omnis autem communitas sive universalitas refcratur ad multitudinem
..... ,
ideo cum iuxta subpositionesviam habetsaphistadeceptioni,consideratipse
mobilitatem et inmobilitatem circa multitudinem et communes terminos. ln
multitudine enim est causaerrandi. Propter hoc dicendum quod subpositio
mobilis sive inmobilis debet attendi circa terminos communes. Et motus sub-
positionis sive expositio debet attendi circa eaque sunt sub aliqua communitate.
Unde cum non possit moveri terminus communis ad particularia contenta,
tenetur inmobilitcr hoc respectu.
For the possible origin of the terminology suppositiomobilis, see

Abailard's Logica Nostr. petit., p. 553'6'24, quoted below.
(j) descensus.The technical term 'desccndere'is Found as early as in

Boethius' translation of Porphyry's Isagoge.(II, 2283). Compare Abai-
larcl"s comments ad loc.: "
Lag.Ingrata,p. 57'6'23:...... in descensuscilicct unum per multa dispergi-

mus, in ascensuvero multa sub uno colligimus ...... ln ascensuitaque multa
sub uno unimus, quin dissimilia convenire monstramus. ln descensu vero qui
fit per divisionem, convenientium rerum diH'crentinm econtrario monstramus.
His Logica Nostrorum petitioni has an interesting note on the use of the
where it is related to the terms 'mobilis' and lfaanfu-suar":
term descensus,
Legica Nasrr. petit., p. 553'6'24: Hic ascensus per similitudinem
et descensus terrae
dictus est. Terra enim est stabilitaset lirmitas, a qua quantoaliquid recedit
sursumaltius, tanto magisest mobile, instabile. Quando vero magisad terram
accedit, tanto magisad stabilitatemappropinquat.Similiter autem vocabulum
aliquod quanto plura continet in appellatione quam aliud, tanto magis est altius
illo, idest minus stabile et minus certum in signiücationequam aliud. Quanto
minus continet quam aliud, tanto minus est confusum et magis stabile, idest
magis certum in significatione, quam aliud.
8 - An Additional Note on The Origin of Other Tracts

Charactcristic of The Logica Modemorum
As was rightly remarked by Fathcr B-£)c:l'1nel',,l

the Logica Modernarum,
if this title refers to a grouP of tracts and not to & general method used
' Mediam![agit, p. 117, n. I5.

594- LOGICA MODERNORUM n
by the moderniof the Middle Ages, contains all the tracts which, in the
Middle Ages, were considered to be new elements in the study of logic.
The group contains, apart From the tracts De suppasitionibüs,De
appellationibus, De capulatione, De ampliatione, and De rcm'ictione,' also &
tract discussing the suppositions of relatives.
(21) De relativis. ln these tracts the term 'rclativum' was taken in the
sense of our relative pronoun and all other terms used in language to
refer to another term. They discuss the significative function of such
( .! (. 'l' ( 1 (. .'I' II. I I I I '!
.
terms as qm , Iste , ahus quam , idem qu: , mcus , tuus , suus . The
main purpose of this tract was to le the snppositions of such 'relative'
tenus.?-
Such discussionsare found already in the earlier tracts, such as the
Tractatus Anagnini, [II, pp. 26823-2735 and V, pp. 32132-3263'.
(b) De Syncategorematibus. For the meaning of the term, see above

Chapter XVI, p. 513 f. Some of the syncategoren'naticterms, such as the
quantifyingprelees (signaquantitatis,suchas 'omnis'etc.) were discussed
as early as in the old Perihermeneiascommentaries.3 The tracts De
distributionibus such as Found in the older tracts, e.g. in the Tractatus
Anagnjni V, pp. 2989-3097are closely related to it.
The oldest tract De yincatcgorematibusalso discussing other con-
signiücative terms is, as far as we know, that found in Munich, C.]..M.
14:763, Ff. l26f'ï'.4
(c) De imphcitis. The oldest discussionof implicit propositions I

know of is that found in the Ars zlflehdunaj Afterwards the tract De
implicarionibus formed part of the discussion of restriction. See, for
instance, the seemingly oldest tract Dc imphcationibusfound in Munich,
C.]..M. 14.458.5
((I) De modissignffïcandi. The topic of the tracts on the moclesof

meaning is & discussion of the various signiFlcative Funetions of terms and
' For all these tracts, see above, pp. 565-589.

: Scc Boehncr, zlkdiera! Lagic, p. Il.
3 For instancc, Abailard, Log. Ingred. pp. 455115. Compare Abailard, Dialectica ll,
pp. I73-I90.
4 Seeabove, Chaptcr [, m'. l2, p. 53.
5 Sec above, Clmpter VIII, pp. 354; 362.
6 Editcd in: L. M. dc Rijk, SameNotasan Ihr:.«Hcdiacva!
TracrDe insolubilibus,pp. 100-103.
theirgrammatical variations in the Latin language.' ln William ofConches'

Fourfolddivision of nounsthe modiloquendiplatya certain röle (seeabove
our Chapter V, p. 223-225). Besides,as to the diFFerent meaningof
'album' and ialbedo', he says that they do not differ in re signyï'cata,but
in modo signücandi. The tapic receives increasing attention during the
thirteenth century.
In the domain of scholastic dispute in the narrower sense there are

found tracts on ambiguous prapositions (Saphismara),on difficult propo—
sitions (De insolubilibus) and De obligationibus:
logicalia and grammaticalia.As early as the eleventh

(e) Sophismata
century ambiguous propositions or logical puzzles are intersPersed in
the compendia on logic in order to clarify the given expositions or to
oFfer the reader practical exercises. For instance this is Found in the
Diakctica ofthe eleventh century Garland the Computist.'—'-Many soPhisms
are found in the tracts discussed in the preceding chapters, e5pecially in
the Dialectica Monaccnsis. Hence it was an easy ;.ransition to special tracts
dealing with such logical puzzles and giving general principles and
methods for solving them and others of the same type.
(f) Dc insolubilibus.For the early histc-r').r

of this tract, seemy paper:
Same Notas on the A'Iediacval Tract Dc insolubilibus, With the Editian qf a
Tract dating ji'om the End cy-the Twc—Ifth
Centmy, in vWARIUM 4- (1966),
pp. 83-115.
(g) De obligationibus. Boehner seems to be right in suppüsing3 that

the origin of this tract is probably to be found in scholastic exercises in
Iogical cli5pute, since there seemsto be a definite link between it and the
sophismataaccompanying the teaching of logic as early as the beginnings
of the twelfth century at least. The oldest tract on obligationes is found
! Set: Boehner, A-Iedieml Lagic, p. ll6, n. 10, who apparently does not r*ightl)r evaluate
the importante of these tracta. For a right evaluation, see the tracts De modissignificandi
edited in the series CorpusPhilosapharum
DanicarumMedii flevi (Copenhaguc 1955ff.) and
especially Father Rüos' excellent introductiün to the matter in his: Dic A*fodisignffï'candj
desMartium de Dacia, pp. 99-120, and ]. Pinborg, ap. m., pp. l9-l 35.
: See my edition of this work, passim, and especially, p. 2113: His quidem inscruimus
saphisticas cavillationes, tam gratia examinandi regulares preceptioncs ct repellendi
pravorum expositorum errores quam gratia exercendi lectores. [ found a similar use of
suchsophismsin anotherlogical tract datingfrom the clevcnth or the bcginningsof the
twelfth century preserved in Munich, C.L.M. I4-.735.
3 .rlfedicvalLagic, p. 14.
in Munich, C.L.M. 14:458, Ff. 42V-4-31'.'Boehner rightly considers these

tracts as more than & collection of rules for school exercises, since they
contain & nucleus of rules for an axiomatic method, though in a rather
crude fcu'm.2
This work represents,no doubt, the most im-

(11) De consequentiis.
portant new element of Mediaeval logic, since it undertakes a kind of
axiomatic derivation of the laws of valid deduction, whereby the laws
of propositional logic are taken as the basic part of the theory of de-
duction. All of the traditional forms of argumentatio:] (syllogism,
enthymemaetc.) are classiüedunder the generalheadingof consequentia.
Moody rightly remarks that the organization found in the tract Dc conse-
quentiisconstitutes something ofa reversal of the procedure of Aristotle,
who sought to exhibit all non-syllogistic forms of inference as incomplete
syllogismus,and that it reflects :: conscious recognition of the privarit),rof
the general theory of consequenceover the special tl'ne-zzar),rof syllogistic
argument.3Indeed,logicalsubject-matterstudied long before in various
tracts was re-organized and investigated in the tracts De consequentiis
from their inferential validity as their common point of view anc]
integrated into & general theor)lr of inference-conditions. lt should be
noticed, however, that a similar arrangement of argumentation is found
as early as in the Ars Mchduna.4
9 Conclusion
—
lt may appear from the present-study that the theory of supposition
gradually grew out of twelfth century grammatica.] doctrine and the
theory of univocation forming the most relevant part of the twelfth
century doctrine of fallacy. How this proceeded has been discussed in
the last three chapters.
The elaborata development of the theory of supposition led to what
is certainly a remarkable terminological congruence with all the authors
of the tracts on the properties of terms. However, this decidedly did
not mean that there did not exist, at the sametime, & number of contro-
! namely a tract onfalsa positio. Seeabove our Chapter [, nr. ] 1, p. 46. Positio,as the
laying—dawn ofa forms the
proposition, OF
starting-point dispute.
any
2 ,I-fcdievalLagic, p. I4.
3 E. A. Moody, Truth and Canscqucncc,
pp. lO-l I.
4 See above, p. 375 Ff. The same organizaticm is found in the Abbreviata Montano,
p. 9723'27(our Tract ll).
THE LOGICAL THEORT OF THE PROPERTIES OF TERMS 597
versial points in the theory of supposition. It may be useful here to

mention them shortly.
First. No doubt, what I have called the "propositional or contextual
aPPFOaChuJwas, from the beginnings of the theory of supposition
(appellation),at the very basisof the theory. Both the thecrl')rof appel-
lation and the theory of supposition were focussed on the congruum
locutionisand the veritaspropositionis
as the basic requirements (exigenda)
for stating the actual meaning of the terms used in the proposition. So
up to the decadesof
Fll'St the thirteenth century there existet] a Flrm and
well-conceived bond between the meaning of & term and the truth-
conditions of the preposition in which it occurs, to such an extent,
indeed, that the supposition (appellation) theory may be consideredas
anattempt to Specifytruth-conditions for (mostly aHïrmative)categorica!
proposition in & formal manner. However, in spite of the formai manner
seriously intended by all authors as logicians, a great number of the
thirteenth century scholars were inevitably influenced by a set of
psychologic items coming chiefly from Aristotle's Perihermeneias
and De
Anima and, afterwards, from new philosophicnl literatum translated
from the Greek and Arabio. As :: result of this, they were engagedin
criteriological and metaphysical (lehntes and speculations which as such
were alien to forma] logic and Enally gave rise, to a sort of *philosophic
lo-gic".2 The Erst evidence of this development is Found in the intro-
ductory sections of the Tractatus dc proprietatibus serirnurJnum.3
The intro-
duction of the notion of 'virrual supposition' as found in this Tractatus as
well as in the works of William of Shyreswood and Peter of Spain is
symptomatic of this development. lt was the majority of fourteenth
century logicians, in particular William of Ockham, who emphatically
stipulated that & term has supposition only when it occursin a propaginem
and in doing so they restored the original inspiration of twelfth century
supposition theory. lt should be noticed, however, that even in Ockham
the psychological elements continued to platy their röle to some extent
in the discussionof simple supposition (suppositio
simplex),since Ockham
retained the older distinction between material and simple supposition
and called the use of & term for the menta] sign its simple supposition.
Secondly. From the beginnings of the theory of meaning the word
1 Seeabove, Chapter ll, pp. I ! 3-1 [7 and also the Indexverborumet rerums.v. propositione].
p. 5. Indeed, this product ma)rbc con-
3 Seealso E. A. Moody, Truthand Consequence,
sideredasmetaphysicallogic or logicizedmetaphysica
as well.
4 See above, p. 575 and also Ph. Boelmer, CollccredArticle: on Ockham,pp. 232-267.
signifcatio (c.q. signyïcarc)was usedin an ambiguousmanner, both for

the connotation of a universal nature (signchario 53.) and For the
denotation of an individual thing. This ambiguit),r was certainly due to
the confused views held by the Mediaeval authors about the nature of the
universals. An attempt to clarif)Ir the usual complications was made by
OckhamI but it was unsuccessful.
Thirclly. The occurrence of appellatio as clistinguished from suppositio
is, in my opinion, only & result of the historical development OFthe
snpposition theory,rout of the older theory of .ïlppella'lti-mnz
No doubt,
William of Ockham was only consistent in declining to make use of the
distinction between snpposition and appell:ation.3
The theory of the properties of terms was very prominent in later
Mediaeval logic. It (leserves our attention as a remarkable and original
attempt in the direction of & logic of predicates, Besides, since the
diFFerent views concerning signi 'caria and suppositio simplex reflect
important metaphysica] and criteriological issues, the development of
the doctrine of supposition, at the same time, aFFordsinteresting test-
cases For clarifying the authors' viex-v-points in philosophical questions.
This cannot be better illustrated themby the weIl-known Factthat it was
Formal logic which provided fourteenth century philosophers with &
powerful instrument in their severe criticism of the quasi-logic opinions
as well as the diverse metaphysica] views held in those days.
' See E. A. Müody, The Logic qf Wilham qfOckham, pp. 66-1 17, especially pp. 113-115.
2 For this stage of the development, see above, Chnpter XVI, pp. 528-541.
3 Summatatim logicac[ 631'", pp. 175-176 ed. Bochner. For the text, see above, p. 564,
n. 4.
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assum,mnuoncn COh-IUNALE Amplon.Oct. 76 41 (bi:)

. .
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Amplon. Occ. 87 110, n. 3
Com'. Franc. 573 .
. . . . . . . .
BERLIN, DEUTSCHE STAATSBIDLIOTHEK FLOILENCE,

mnuonc». MEDICEA
LAUIIENZIRNA
Lat. Fol. 624 213; 218
. . . . . . . Cod. Plut. Xll, sin. 2 39
Lat. Oct. 76 20; 151-155; 166; 168.n.4 . . . . .
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Lat. Oct. 262 .
. . . . . . .
221-228;559
BRUGES, BIBLIOTHEQUE DE Lh. 'VILLE
LEïDEN UNIVERSITEITSBIBLIOTHEEK
MS. 497 59; 71; 72 ,
. . . .
MS. 500 39 (ter); 40 (bis) Voss.Lat. Fol. 701: 181, n. 1; 520, n. 3
MS. 503 41
. . . . . . . .....
MS. 534 24
..... . . . . . . . LONDON, llRlTISH MUSEUM
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. . . . . . . .
CAMIHUDGE, UNIVEIISIT'I' LIBIlAIïï qua! MSS. 2 D IX 21-22; 504-508
. .
Reyn! MSS. 2 D XXX 22-25; 37;
Mm. l. 18 77, n. 1 . .
. . 256; 282-286
Royal 11455.8 A VI 25-33; 438-440;
CHARTRES, BIBLIOTHEQUE DE LA VILLE . .
446; 448
MS. 209. 21; 101; 102; 103; qual MSS. 9 E Xll 33-36
. . . . . .
104; 105; 114; 115 Reyn! MSS. 12 P XIX 25; 36-41;
. . .
426-438; 441-446; 448
COLOGNE, DOMBIBLIOTHEK Sloane 1580 174
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MS. 199 182,n.3 Add. MSS. 8167 41; 431-438;
. . . . . . . . .
MS. 201 21; 101; 105, n.2; 441-446; 448
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114; 228, n.1; 262,n.1; 522 Add. MSS. 16.380 116, n.2
DRESDEN OEFFENTLI CH E BIBLIOTHEK MILAN, BIBLIOTECH AMBROSIANA

,
MS. Dc. 171 A 417, n.l H.!rJ.64 567,

n .2
. . .
ERFURT, WISSENSCHAFTLICHE BIBLIOTHEK MUNICH, [I:ïï'ERISCHE STAATSDIBLIOTHEK
DER STRDT
C.L.M.4603.......... 55
Amplon. F01.313 41 C.]..M.4652 4243; 165, n.];
. . . . . . . . .
Amplon.Q:. 273 38 168,n.4; 391-393
..... . . .
LIST OF THE MANUSCRIPTS USED 607
C.L..r1!.6905 55 marus, BIBLIOTHEQUENATIONALE
. . . . . . . . . .
C.L.M. 8002 50; 51 B.N.Lat. 3229 175
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C.]..M. 14.458 43-49; 399-400; B.N.1.ar.. 5505 25
. . . . . . . . . . .
403-407; 575-578;-585, n.3; 594; 596 B.N.Lat. 5526 51; 451 nn.5 and 6.
C.]..M. 14.460 117, n.5; 412 ,
. . B.N.Lal:. 6294 278, n.2
. . . . . .
C.L.M.14:135. . . . . 595,n.2 B.N.La£. 6570 . . . ...... 173
m.,". l4.763. . 4953; 403-415; B.N.Lat. 7593 184, n.] ; 203,n.3
503-512;594B.N.Lat. 7499 98,n.2
c.L..u.14.779. . . . .. . . . . 43 B.N.Lat. 7561 ........ 99
C.L.M.21:94 . . . . . . . . . ss B.N.Lal:. 7570 ....... .
98
B.N.Lat. 7731 119,n 3
NUREMBERG, GEIKMANISCHES NATIONAL- B.N.Lat. 7732 119,n.3
MUSEUM B.N.Lat. 8654 119,n.3
. . . . .
B.N.Lat. 11.412 33; 81-84; 88;
MS.27.77354-ss;155-160;160,n.?- . . .
147, n.2; 169; 449-490
B.N.Lat. 13.368. 49
MUNICIPALE . . . . . . . .
ORLEANS,BIBLIOTHEQUE B.N.Lar.. 14.069. 38; 71; 85-86
.
MS. 259 101, n.6 B.N.Lat.15.015. 89; 210-212
. . . . . . . .
MS. 266 48 B.N.Lac.15.l21. 517; 518
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B.N.Lat. 15.l30 80;85-86;110,n.1;221
OXFORD, BODLEIAN LIBRAIKV
B.N.Lat. 15..141 86-87; 147-148;
213-214
Can. Misc. 219 41 B.N.Lac.15.170 33; 51; 82;
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Digby 2 38; 55-59; 60; 71; 416—426; 87-88; 168; 172; 440-441 ; 446-448.
428; 432-438; 441-446; 448 B.N.La£. 16.130. 40
Digby 24 38; 39; 58; 59; 59-76; 416- . . . . . . . .
B.N.Lac. 16.134. 41
426; 432-438; 441-446; 448 . . . . . . . .
B.N.Lat. 16.519. 37
Digby174 76-77; 264-390; . . . . . . . .
. . . B.N.Lat. 16.617. 173; 401, n.1
536-540; 560; 563 . .
B.N.Lat. 16.621 40
Land. Lat. 67 77-81; 116, n.2; . . . . . . . . .
. . . . Now. acq. lat. 308 55
164-165; 168; 170; 172; 255-263; 281; . . . . . . .
Now. acq. lat. 910 25
524-527; 559,n.1; 560; 591 . . . . . . .
Nauv. acq. lat. 1374 50
. . . . . . .
Nouv. acq. 102. 1611 520, n.]
OXFOIlD, MERTON COLLEGE
. .
Nouv. acq. lat. 1623 21; 101
. .
MS. 296 50 (bis);
51 (bis).
. . . .
MS. 301 24 TOURS,BIBLIOTHEQUE
MUNICIPALE
. . . . . . . . . . .
1115.309 24 MS.843 25
. . . . . . . . . . .
PADUA, BIBLIOTECH UN [VERSITARIA crrrfs. DEI. vATICANO
MS. 2084 90; 214-215 Pa1.Lat. 1007 50 (bis); 51

Reg.].at. 230 49
. . . . . . . . . .
Regini. 1205. 18, n.5; 567, n.2
DE L'AnsENAL
PARIS, BlBLIOTl—IEQUE .
567, n.2
Regius. 1731
MS. 530 50 (bis); 51 (bis). . .
.
MS.711 106, n.4; 107; 108;
. . . . VENICE, BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE MARCIANA
217; 229, n.3; 230-234; 517; 518,n.1;
556, n.1 CLXIcad.
12 . 40; 41
608 LlST OF THE MANUSCRIPTS USED
V-P-L-2499 -9l'93i130'146i
VIENNA, GESTERREICHISCHE
NATIONAL- - - - -
BIBLIOTHEK 163. n.4; 524
V.P.L.4698 38
. . . . . . . . . .
V.P.L. 244 51
. . . . . . . . . .
V,P,L, 2436 3931; 14644-7; WOLFENBUETTEL, HERZOG ALIGIIST
, , , ,
234455; 523 mnuomsx
V.P.L.24-98. . . . . . . . . . 24 Cod.56.20/Iug.8" 90;93-94; 146-150.
LlST OF [NCIPITS
Absoluta cuiuslibet discipline perfectio dnplici cmnparatur exercicio 24

Actualis multiplicitas est quando dictio vel oratio sub eadem forma plura significat 61
.
Ad evidentimn fallacie accidentis notandum quod cum 111aterialite1' dicatur accidens 73
Ad n1a1o1e111 fallaciarum evidentiam 22
suppone1'e.ltem..'3iliud
Aliud est significarhs aliud esl: supponerh: aliud locutio-
nem redduc veram vel falsam . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Ars est collectio plurium preceptormnad unum finem tendentimu
Ars ista dialetica, quam Peripatetici loycen appellabant, prapter discretionem veri
et falsi inventa est . l3l
Auctor iste Cordubensisfuit et regnante Calvo Nerone Romam scripturus venit 79
Augustinus in libro de doctrina christiana breviter theologie materiam assignans 34
Circa dictiones exclusivam est sciendum quod dictio exclusiva addita subiecto
renwvet predicatumab oppositissubiecti . . . . . . . . . . 39
Circa triplex ['it
equivocationen'u questio 73
.
Circa exceptivasest sciendumquod hec dictio preteraliquandotenetur exceptive
aliquando diminutive 39
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Circa hanc artem sicut et circa aliasquedam extrinseca consideranda sunt 90
considerandum est quid sit ipsa ars, quod genus eius,
Circa huius artis p1'i11cipiu111
que mate1la 80
Circa insolubilia queruntur duo primo circa insolubile simplex secundo circa
insolubile cmnpositum
.
Circa librum Porphirii quedam in generali querxuntm Primo ut1 1.1111 sit possibile
aliquidscire 51
. . . . . . . . . . ciies quancioque
Compotistaautempartestemporisquandoque 111ai01'
es die5111i1101'es
determinat 59
. . . .
Consequensest quedmuI1abitudovel sequelain qua consequensse habet ad
antecedens. 38
Consequenterdicendmnestde istis dictionibus necessaria
contingenter 46
.
estquedamhabitudointer antecedens
Consequentia et consequens. 38
Cum argun'nentatio multis modis dividatur, hanc divisionem summuus ut ex illa
eligamus illam partem de qua intendimus 46
Cum attendatur duplex sermo ' est enim quidam sermo qui est coniunctio rei cum
voce mediante intellectu . . . . 28
Cum cognitio quinque universalium scilicet generis speciei, dili'erentie proprii
et accidentis, sit necessari11ad doctrinmn '11'
edicamentor u111 57
Cum cognicio sillogismi sit Fmis logices et cognitio partis precedit cognicionem
totius........... 36
610 115101: lNClPlTS
Cum dialeticasit quasivia in onmesaliasscientias,in principio huius tractatus

divisionem scientiarmn ponamus 408
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cum queris cur iam non ci1'cu111cidit111'
christianus, si Christus non venit legem
solvere...... ...84
. . .
Cum respondensmultis modishabetobligari in disputatione de illa obligatione
quc falsa positio nuncupatur hic tractandum est . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Cum sit nostrapresensintcncio ad artem dialeticmn, primo oportet scire quid
sit materia artis dialetica 38; 41; 56; 416; 420; 426; 43I
. . . . . . . . .
Cum sit nostra presens intentio. Quare magis dicis cuni quam si 60; 425
. . . . . .
Cum sit nostra presens intentio. Queritur quare magis dicit cum quam si ex quo
est coniunctio ita bene sicut cum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38; 429
Cum sophista,ut dicit Aristotiles, vult sempercircaomniaexercitatusvideri et in
nullo inscie se habere 87
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cum totius dialetica fructus in questionum solutione tamquam suo Flne reperiatur 395
Cum uniuscuiusque artis eloquentia secundum intentionem facientis aliqua
principali causa reperta sit I56
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
De argumento apud diversos diverse sunt sententie 400

. . . . . . . . . . . .
De duobus in logica agitur, scilicet de vocibus et de rebus 146
. . . . . . . . .
De hiis adverbiis necessariocontingenter. 54-
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
De philosophiainquirendaquedamcontinet necessariaet quedamutilia . . . . 59
De relativis tractatum facientibusprimo considerandmnest quid relatio quid
relativum 479
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
De sophisticis elcnchis liber I1ic inscribitur. In eo igitur que sit materia que
intentio. 80
. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . ......
Dialctica est ars arcium ad omnium methodorum pr incipis viam habens 32
. . . . .
Dialeticam 1ng1ed1ent1busprimo videndum est quid sit dialetica et unde dicatur
et quid intendat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
452
Distinguendasunt propositionumgeneraut adversarium111ultiplicite1'cogendo
singula denmnstrando 396
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Entium aliud substantia aliud accidens, idest entium aliud est ens in subiecto,
aliud non ensin subiecto 53
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
queacciduntlittere et sillabequedamsuntcommunia,quedampropria . .
Eor11111 4-l
Eorum que dicuntur quedamdicuntur cum complexioneet quedamdicuntur sine
complexione 39
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equivocadicuntur. Liber iste continuari potestad illa que dicta sunt de universa-
libus........ 4-9
Equivoca1' sunt res est signiEcateT per nomen equivocum in sermonesunt
quarumsolum nomencmnmuneest seddifFlnitiodiversa . . . . . . . . 60
Evocatio est inmediataassociatiodiversarmn personaiwn eidem verbo personali
supponentium 73
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
de 111a111111011e
Facite vobis a111icos iniquitatis, ut cum delïceritis, recipiant vos in
eterna tabernacula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . 35
Fallaciaapudlogicosdicitur deceptio 34
. . . . . . . . libro . . . . . . . .
Aristotiles' 111
Formaest cmnpositioni conti11gens.Quamvis P1ed1car11ento1
um
suFEcicnter.................... 37
LIST OF IN CIPlTS 611
Gramaticn est naturale principium discipline 3]
Habuit quoquc Persiusamicos a prima adolescentia 91

Horatius venusinusfuit libertinus cuiusdam fabri filius 89
.
Huius libri materia est dicta Augustini: intentio Prosperi est in hoc suo opere
quedam utiliora ex dictis Augustini decerpere 90
111disputatione dialectica sunt duc partes, scilicet opponens et respondens 40

.
In eo quodhabentpudoremcomedendicomedetscaltero 75
In libris philosophicis auctore Boetio sex inquiri atque expediri convenit 48
In omni doctrina convenit ordinem observare. igitur in doctrina dialetica ut
ordinatus sit p1ocessus ordinem nostre doctrine premittamus 44
.
In principio docuine libri Peryhermenias oportet n1ate1'ialite1'difEni1'e quid sit
nomen et quid verbu111 iila . . . .
58
Incipit liber Boetii de topicis differentiis idest precepta que traduntur nobis
auctore Boetio cle tapicis diFFe1entiis 1'e111ove1iclo
49
Incipit tractatus nominu111.Asin pr'ete1ito 1-1'suscipit : 9l
incipit tractatus nominum. Subsequenti OPUSCUIO preponuntur isti sex versiculi
quasi in prologum 92
.
lngredientibus logicam incipiendum est a voce lSl ; l52
. . . . . . . . . . .
inplicite propositiones & dialeticis appellantur in quarum qualibet inplicantur
vel involvuntur due 34
vci
inquisitio cuiuslibet disputationis est ut trahitur aliqua questio vel in fidem in
scientiam vel in apparentem [idem vel scientiam. 44
Intentio Aristotilis est in hoc opere de decem primis vocibus prima decem rerum
genera signilïcantibus in eo quod res signiFlcant disputare . 49
Intentio Boetii estin hoc operetractaredesillogismisypotheticisregularibus 48
intentio mea in hoc ser111011e est giosare librum Aristotilis qui dicitur Auditus
naturali: 37
. aci . .
Intentio Porphirii est in hoc opere facile111intellectum P1ed1camentaAristotilis
p1epaiare 80
utiliora
Intentio Prosperiest in hoc opere quedam ex dictis Augustinidecerpere 90
inter signadistr ibutiva pr11110
dicendum est de hoc signo omnis 54-
lntroducendis in artem dialeticam primo videmus quid sit ars 33
Introductio est brevis et aperta demonstratio in aliquam artem 4—40
.
lustas parit pete11tiu111 preces necessitas quotiens eius qui petitur debitum et
facultas occurrunt 23
.
Liber iste vocatur ars granmtiea, ex quo nomine materia eius demonstratur 21
Locus est sedesargumenti, idest id unde argumentum F11'matur et elicitur 35
Locus in communi sermone cst superficies aeris rem includens neque maior neque
minor [corpore] quam id quod includit 52
Logica est ratio, idest scientiaI disserendi, idest disputandi ] 55
Meludine professionis quam ea pars philosophie quc ratio disserendi dicta est sibi
duce111elegit.......... 24;283
liabet
Modio vini ad denarium meilli qui non 25
612 LlST 01: lNClPlTS
Nomen constt uct1on1st11pl1C1te1 accipitur 23

. . . . .oF-Fendit
. . . . . . . . . .
Nota quia verum est quod qui oH'endit unam personam,, omnes . . . 36
.
dolus sit in ista-de quo dicitur: populushic me labiis
Nota quod queritur :111
I1ono1'at...............35
preciicatur
Nulla est affirmatio in qua universale universaliter sumptum 39; 59; 62
.
Olim edebatur actio per scripturam et sine scriptura 22

. . . . . . . . . . . .
Olim t1uncus eram 90
. . . . . . . .suiJiecti
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Omne sincategoreuma aut est dispositio vel predicati aut co111positi011is 61
Omnia. nomina in a desinentia feminina sunt 79
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Omnis acceptio anime est duplex, scilicet rei et actus 31
. . . . . . . . . . .
Omnis dicitur signum universale quia signat ter111ir1u111
cui adiungitur snpponere pro
universis, idest pro onmibus,suisappellatis 88
disputzitio, . . . . . . . .Ecien1,vel
. .
Omnis ut dictum est alibi, vel tendit ad scientiam, vel ad ad
apparentem fidem vel scientiam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45
Omnishomoestl1c11110.Quocl
hecsit ver11probo t1'ibusrationibus 61
. . . . . . .
Opor tet enim p1ecognoscerede quo sit hic intentio et ad quid et in genere qualiter
sive in universali. 74
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Per veter11111 cmnpositusfueratKalendar1us

sagacitatem 56
. . . . . . . . .
Post chilindri cmnpositioncmnunc cuiusdaminstrumenti horologici, videlicet
quadrantis, c0111positi011em investigemus 59
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Postquam vidinms de [11ed1ca111e11t1s
secundum ordinem Aristotilis videamus de
0ppositis............................53
Primo querendum est itaque causainvencionis litterarum 37
. . . . . . . . . .
Primum oportet co11stitue1'c.Cum cognicio sillogisnü sit Finislogiccs et cognicio
pa1tls precedit cognicionmn totius 36
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Primum oportet dete1111111a1equot coniectant qui in disputationibus decertant et
corrixantur 52
.. .
Primum quidem oportet constituere quid nomen. Quid debeatdici subiectum in
hac scientia, patet ex. divisione logicss. .' 50; 51
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Propositumquidem negotii est circa opinionis nostre positionessinguladiligenter
inquirere.........................76;264
QuamvisAristotiles in libro Predicmnentorumsufficienter 37

. . . . . . . . . .
Quasimoclogeniti infanteslac concuPiscientierationabile 41
. . . . . . . . . .
isti fuit animatadiversis animabus
Queritur si caro Cl11' 92
. . . . . . . . . .
Questio est utrum const1uct1oattendatur penes signiFlcationmndictionis vel
consignificationem vel ratione utriusque 76
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quia disputatur argumentis, argumenta argu111entatior1ibusexplicantur que constant
ex pr opositionibus, 11pr opositionibus incipiendum est. . . . . . . . .
158
Quia in sophismatibusprobandoet improbandoconsequentiisuti1'11111',ideo
circa
naturam consequentiarmu multa 01:101
tet scire . . . . . . . . .
39; 61
Quia significantia significatis notiora sunt, omissis significantibus agamus cle
significatis.............................391
Quia, ut habet sanctusAugustinus 72
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quid estlittera. Littera est111ini111z1'1111's
vocis 59
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LIST OF IN CI PITS 613
Quinque sunt necessariain arte disputandi: propositio, questio, conclusio,
argumentum, argumentatiü [57
Quodimpossibilispositivahabeatsustineri,sic probatur 46
Quot sunt inquirendacirca principium artis dialetica. Quinque 148
Quoniam appellatio est nota eorum que accidunt termino inquantmn est in
propositione, ideo viso de suppositione 458
videamus ,
ad presensintendimus,
Quoniam de equipollentia p10pos1t10nu1'11 quid
sit equipollentia 53
Quoniam cleexigenda partium orationis multi multa locuti sunt nec tamenaliquid
ex eadistinxerunt, pro modulo nostrecapacitatisde eaagg1edlamu1disse1we1e
48
Quoniam de termino et de eis que accidunt termino, secundum quod necessarium
est in introductionibus cognoscere, in presentibus determinatum est 465
Quoniam dicit Aristotiles solutio est manifestatiofalsi sillogismi prapter quod est
falsus 88
Quoniam dictionum quedamsignificant res, quedamsignificant modos 1"e1u11'1,11d
plenamsermonisnotitiam 481
Quoniam disputationis membrum 51
Quoniam ex signiEcationeverbi cognita maxime procedit dete1m1nat1c1
regiminis
partium orationis 32
. .
Quoniam igitur mentio habita est de relatione et relativa, quod sepe variat sup-
positionem nominis restringendavel ampliando 498 ' 534
.
Quoniamin humanisinventionibusnichil ex omni parte päs'se
esseperfectumteste
Prisciano cognoscimus 35
.
Quoniam infer'mris cognitio a suo dependet superiori,tractatu1'i cleenm1tiationeet
de eius partibus 52
Quoniam ignari Virtutis nmninum sepe paralogizantur, teste Ariatotile in primo
Elencorum, virtutes quarundamdictionum que mentibusrudium dubitationem
ingerunt declaremus 53
.
Quoniam supra habita est mentio de r'estlictione minusque suFFlcienterde illa
dictum est, nunc de ea convenit latius expedire 462
Quoniam terminus est illud quod primo cadit in intentione logici in via generati-
onis, ideo de termino et de eis que accidunt termino ad presens videamus 454
.
Qu011iam,utdicit Philosopl1us,finis
propter quemomniaaliaimponit necessitatem
et esseeis que sunt ad Finem . . .
478
Quoniam, ut testatur ab actoribus naturalibus, proportionantm rationalia, de
naturalibusintendentesa naturalibus sunmmusexordium 29
Quoniamvisumestde equipollentia, restatviderede earummodificatione 467
. .
Rationis disserendidialetice tres sunt partes: propositio, interrogatio, et conclusio 397
Sciendmn quad hoc argumentum est Falsum: duo bona sunt; utrumque est
vite eterne; alterum potest Heri sine altero; ergo maioris meriti
111e1'ito1'iu111
sunt duo quam unum 36
quod in predicamento quantitatis non secundum genera sed tantum
Scie11du111
secundum species specialissimas fieri assignatiünem 91
Sciendum quod principium sine principio et principium de principio et principium
de utroque principio appellationes sunt et nichil aliud significant quam Pater
et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus . . . . . . . . . . 35
614 LIST OF INCIPITS
Sciendum quod si quis loquatur hic ' os meum aperui et attraxi spiritum 35
. . . . .
Secta Meludina velut e1'1o1ismedicina 24 ; 282
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
inest duplex actus sive duplex pr'op1ietas
Secundumduas dispositiones ter111in01'u111
terminis ......33; 83
Elencimr
Secundmn Philosophmn I)" imo quatuor sunt aenera disputationum 38; 429
11111
Secundus que in prima Introductionum editione teneris introducendorum auribus
sunt accomodatn si111plicite1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[47
Sicut dicit Aristotiles in libro Elel1c01';u111
sophistis magis pretium est videri esse
sapientes quam esseet non videri. 87
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sicut dicit Philosophus secundo Metaphisicorum, inconveniens est simul querere 50
.
Sicut significat Aristotiles in libro Topico1'u111
aut Elc11cl101'um; ars disputativa ad
tl 1a viam prestat . . . . . . . . . . 83
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Solvere non est ignorantis vinculum; ter tio Metaphisice capitulo pr imo 40
. . . . .
Strenuum negociatorem mecum non iudico qui rem non auget. Negociacio autem
nostra saltibus glorie ceteris preeminencius fremitat . . . . . . . . . . 37
Substantia autem est que proprie ctc. Hec est secunda pars huius libri et continet
quatuar capitula. . . . . . . . . . . . . ciue. . . . . . . . . .
36
Summus Aristotiles trutinando cacumina 1';er1.1n1 in divisit quicquid in 01be
fu1t43
alius est predicabile, alius non. Ut ergo melius pateat quis terminus
Te1'1'11in01'u111
sit predicabile, quis non, videndum est quid sit predicari 48
. . . . . . . . .
Terminus autem aut signilïcat universale aut particulare 26
. . . . . . . . . . .
"restante Porphirio cognitio quinque universalium utilis est ad scientiam predica-
111ento1'u111 53
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . ciicitur .
Totius eloquentie principium gla111at1ca in qua totius l1tterat011e profes-
sionis consistunt cunabula 234
. . . . . . . . . .
. . .diviciitur;
. . . .
T 1115sunt partes in quibus philosophia est enim rationalis philosophia
moralis et naturalis 27
. . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . .
Tria nobis naturaliter sunt data incomnwda; videlicet ignorantia, vitium,
necessitas 77
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
T11a1cqu11untm in unaquaque dimnitionc: communio differentia, pmprietas 99
. .
genera distinguit nostra disciplina, scilicet significantia, signilïcata;
T11a 1"e1u111
appellata 20; 16]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ut con1pla11atasc1'iptu1'c
superücie facilius cxcerpatur 22
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Ut dicit Aristotiles, finis estquod primo cadit in intentionemagentis 473
. . . . . .
Ut dicit Aristotiles in Libro Predicaincntorum; singulum incomplexarmu aut
signiücat substantiam 419; 424; 440
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ut dicit Aristotiles in principio Elencorum; quatuar sunt genera disputationum 38; 56;
420; 425; 423
th dicit Aristotiles; innata est nobis via a connuunibusad propria; idest per
naturam a cognitione communium dcveninms in cognitionem propriormn 470
th dicit Aristotiles, omnis sillogismusconstatex propositionibuset propositio ex
terminis.... .......56;;4l9425
..
th dicit J41istotiles;singulum inc0111plex01',um
hoc est dictum: 011111isclictioaut
signiEcatsubstantimu —. 440
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LIST OF INCIPITS 615
Ut dicit Boetius argumentum est ratio rci dubie faciens Edem, hocest potest
facerecertitudinemde re si ipsasit vel non 440
Ut dicit Baetius 111'gu111ent11111 est ratio rci dubie faciens Edem idest cer titudinem
dereclubia.... ......56;;;4-l9424 440
th dicit Boetius locus est sedes argumenti. Et diflert algunwntmn ab mgumenta-
tione ......................56;4l9;424; 440
Ut dicit Boetius, locus est sedes argmnenti. Quid sit argunwntum dictum est
prms 440
Ut dicit Philosophus ea que sunt in arte et ratione su111untu1'
ad proportionem et
inütationem eorum que sunt in natura. 82
Ut dicit Tullius ars est collectio 111ult01'u111 um ad
sive p1cccpt01
p11n01p101u111
unum finem tendentium 438
Ut melius pateat de relativis quod presentis cst negotii, primo notandum quod
relativorum aliud est supponens aliud copulans 54
.
th testantur philosophi anima 131 cata est imperfecta . 28
th vult Aristotiles libro de Anima quod lingua congruit in duo opera nature,
scilicet in gustum ct laquelam 25
.
Vadator:qui vadesdat; vadatusdicitur qui eosrecipit. 91

Vallatum multis occupationibus me dilectio vestra cmnpulit IS
Videndum est quid sit ars primo; deinde quid in ea doceatur; deinde qualiter hec
doceatur 157
VisocleprOpositionibus videndumestde propositionibus1110clalibus
de 111cssc 52
Viso de terminis et de eoru111ratione et de enuntiatione, quantmn ad introduc-
toriam expeditionem videre necesseest 471

Logica Modernorum: Professorof Mediaevalphilosophyin The Universitiesof Nijmegenand Utrecht

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Logica Modernorum: Professorof Mediaevalphilosophyin The Universitiesof Nijmegenand Utrecht

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LOGICA

OF EARLT TERMINIST LOGIC

VOL. II - PART ONE

THE ORIGIN AND EARL? DEVELOPMENT OF THE

VAN GORCUM & COMP. N.V. -DR. H. ]. PRAKKE & H. M. G. PRAKKE

O 1967 by Koninltlijkc Von Garcum&, Comp.N.V., Asscn,TheNetherlands

No parts qf this bookmaybe repraduccdin anyjorm, b): print, photoprint,

Printed in The Nechcrlandsby Royal VanGarcumLtd., Assen

In this work it will be attempted to show how the LOGICAMODERNORUM

Nijmegen, November 1967 L. M. DE RIJK

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION. ANALï'SIS OF THE

CHAPTER ll ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIAEVAL

1 - lntroduction 2 - Same Preliminary Remarks on the Develop-

CHAPTER 111 THE INCREASING USE OF SPECIAL TEXT-

CHAPTER IV THE THEORV OF SlGNlFlCATlON IN

CHAPTER V ON THE THEORï OF SlGNlFlCATlON IN

1 - William of Conches 2 - PetrusHelyas 3 - The Commentary

CHAPTER VI THE TRACT ON LOGIC CONTAINED [N

CHAPTER VII ARS MELIDUNA. ON THE THEORV OF

CHIAPTER VIII ARS MELIDUNA. ON THE DENOTATION

CHAPTER IX ARS MELIDUNA. THE THEOR'I' OF PRO-

CHAPTER Xl SOME TREATISES ON LOGIC DATING

I - TractatusAnagnini 2 - The Ars disputandi Burana preserved in

CHAPTERxn THE DIALECTICAMONACENSIS

CHAPTER Xlll SOME EARLï OXFORD TRACTS ON

CHAPTER XIV THE SUMME METENSES FOUND IN PARIS,

CHAPTER XV THE DOCTRINE OF FALLACV AND THE

I - Univocation 2 - Figure of Speech 3 - The Fallacie Londinenm

CHAPTERxw THE GRAMMATICAL ORlGlN AND

1 - Preliminary Remarks 2 - The Terms 'supponere',

CHAPTER XVII THE LOGICAL THEORï OF THE PRO-

BOOKS AND ARTICLES REFERRED TO

EDITION OF A NLIMBER OF TRACTS DATING

] Introductiones Montane niinores

VII Tracratusde univocatianeManacensis 333-35 [

XIII FaHacfe Magistri Willelmi 679-702

C INDEX VERBORUM ET RERUM

D INDEX SOPHISMATUM ET EXEMPLORUM

INTRODUCTION. SHOR'I" ANALTSIS

1 See e.g. Joseph P. Mullally, TheSummulaclogicalcs.'JPeterqupain, Notre Dame 1945,

devoted to Aristotelian syllogistics, especiall)r Aristotle's theory of the

Amolds' interpretation of ünöäemg(suppositio): the "substitution of a

! op. cfr., pp. 845.

Aristotle's ünöB-emqdefinitcly hasnothing to do with any theory of the

(2) Not & single commcntary on the PosteriorAnabrticsclatingfrom the

1 CharlesThurot, De Ia logiqucde Pierred'Espagnc,in: Revuearchäologique, Nouvelle

' op. m., pp. 7411". 2 Seebelow, pp. 518Ff.

'ap. cfr., p. 211.

evidence of persisting acquaintmïce, and hencc of the possibility of

As regards the interesting studies 01"Giulio Preti on the development

author investigates the important connection between logic and grammar

2 Analysis of the manuscripts

! ap. cfr., pp. 2305.

1 Bcrol.MS Lat.oct. 76 (kept in Tübingen now) is & parchment codex in

3 MS 201. A parchment codex in 80 0174 folios, x-vritten in double columna

the deanof Rouen, dated 24-]uly 1093, an analysisof the contents of

& tract on fallacies: Inc. : Incipit prologusjäUaciamm.

RoyalMSS2 D XXX is & parchmentcollective codexof 14-4- folios (915in.

ff. 11'3-78") the Biblical books Ecclesiasticusand Wisdom in the Latin

Ff. 791'3-94'") and 103Tü-106vb: Summa Magistri Rodberti Blundi in

Unfortunualnsl)rthe work is incomplete here and breaks 03 in the

Ff. 1061'3-1131") and 124Tü-132V'): a grammatical tract which opens

lt apparently is a grammatica] work on constructioand discusses the